NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0051n.06 

 No. 16-6202 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

PATTY JELSMA; SHANE JELSMA, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

KNOX COUNTY, TENN.; J.J. JONES, 

Individually and in his official capacity as 

Sheriff of Knox County, Tenn., 

 Defendants, 

and 

BRADLEY COX, Individually and in his 

official capacity as officer of the Knox County 

Sheriff’s Department, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE 

 BEFORE: MERRITT, MOORE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges. 

 PER CURIAM. Officer Bradley Cox brings this interlocutory appeal from the district 

court’s order denying him qualified immunity on Patty Jelsma’s excessive force claim filed 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 On July 28, 2013, Officer Cox and another officer responded to a report of a domestic 

disturbance at the home of Jelsma’s mother. When the officers arrived, Jelsma came out of the 

house and stood next to her vehicle. Officer Cox interviewed Jelsma, who began to record their 

interaction with her cell phone. Jelsma asserted that, without provocation, Officer Cox grabbed 

her and forced her to the ground, causing severe pain in her arms and wrists and injuries to her 
No. 16-6202, Jelsma v. Knox Cty., Tenn.

- 2 - 

hip and ankle. Officer Cox charged Jelsma with domestic assault, disorderly conduct, and 

resisting arrest. Those charges were later dismissed. 

 Jelsma subsequently filed this action asserting § 1983 claims for excessive force and false 

arrest and state-law tort claims for reckless infliction of emotional distress and assault and 

battery against Officer Cox, as well as § 1983 and state-law tort claims against Sheriff J.J. Jones 

and Knox County. Jelsma’s husband brought a loss of consortium claim. After the district court 

dismissed Jelsma’s claims against Sheriff Jones, Officer Cox and Knox County filed a motion 

for summary judgment. Granting the motion in part, the district court concluded that Officer 

Cox was entitled to qualified immunity on Jelsma’s false arrest claim. The district court 

otherwise denied the motion, determining in relevant part that a triable issue of fact existed as to 

whether Officer Cox used excessive force in arresting and handcuffing Jelsma and that he was 

not entitled to qualified immunity on her excessive force claim. This interlocutory appeal 

followed. 

 “A denial of a claim of qualified immunity is immediately appealable only if the appeal is 

premised not on a factual dispute, but rather on ‘neat abstract issues of law.’” Phillips v. Roane 

Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317 (1995)). 

“Accordingly, a defendant must essentially ‘concede the most favorable view of the facts to the 

plaintiff for purposes of the appeal,’ and limit his argument to questions of law premised on facts 

taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 

561, 563 (6th Cir. 1998)). To the extent that a defendant’s arguments regarding qualified 

immunity “rely exclusively on a disputed version of the facts, this court does not have 

jurisdiction to consider [the] appeal.” McKenna v. City of Royal Oak, 469 F.3d 559, 561 (6th 

Cir. 2006). 
No. 16-6202, Jelsma v. Knox Cty., Tenn.

- 3 - 

 On appeal, Officer Cox argues that Jelsma’s cell phone video contradicts her assertion 

that he used force without provocation. Officer Cox contends that the video establishes that 

Jelsma was not complying with his lawful orders to produce identification and that she turned 

away from him after placing her cell phone near his chest. According to Officer Cox, Jelsma’s 

conduct in turning away from him and toward her vehicle could be interpreted by a reasonable 

police officer as an effort to leave the scene, to prevent or obstruct his investigation, or to 

retrieve a weapon. However, the video does not conclusively show that Jelsma turned away 

from Officer Cox and toward her vehicle. The video, after focusing on Officer Cox’s name tag 

on his chest, shows Officer Cox stepping toward the camera. The video moves, shakily 

recording the ground and a vehicle, and eventually goes dark. The video shows that the camera

turned toward the vehicle; it does not necessarily establish that Jelsma turned away from Officer 

Cox and toward her car.1 To the extent that Officer Cox’s first argument hinges on our 

acceptance of his version of the facts, we lack jurisdiction over his appeal. See id. at 561–62. 

 Even under Jelsma’s version of the facts, Officer Cox argues that he is entitled to 

qualified immunity because he did not violate any “clearly established” right. See Ashcroft v. alKidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Jelsma claims that Officer Cox violated her right to be free 

from excessive force during her arrest when he forced her to the ground “without any 

provocation.” The district court correctly held that a reasonable officer would have been “on 

notice” that such an act amounted to a constitutional violation. This court has repeatedly 

acknowledged that “people who pose no safety risk to the police [have a right] to be free from 

 

1 In a footnote addressing Jelsma’s false arrest claim, the district court found that Officer Cox 

had probable cause to arrest Jelsma for resisting arrest, stating: “When viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to plaintiff, Officer Cox still had reasonable grounds to believe that 

plaintiff, in turning toward her vehicle when Officer Cox moved toward her, was attempting to 

prevent him from arresting her.” Again, the video does not conclusively show that Jelsma turned 

toward her vehicle. 
No. 16-6202, Jelsma v. Knox Cty., Tenn.

- 4 - 

gratuitous violence during arrest” absent extenuating circumstances. Shreve v. Jessamine Cty. 

Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 

356, 367 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Under this circuit's existing case law, there undoubtedly is a clearly 

established legal norm precluding the use of violent physical force against a criminal suspect 

who already has been subdued and does not present a danger to himself or others.”); Solomon v. 

Auburn Hills Police Dep’t, 389 F.3d 167, 174 (6th Cir. 2004); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 

946 (6th Cir. 2002) (“We have long recognized, for instance, that the Fourth Amendment permits 

detention using only ‘the least intrusive means reasonably available.’” (quoting United States v. 

Sanders, 719 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1983)). Since we are reviewing denial of a motion for 

summary judgment, we assume the truth of Jelsma’s allegation that Officer Cox acted without 

provocation. See Phillips, 534 F.3d at 538. Accordingly, we reject Officer Cox’s argument and 

hold that his actions—as alleged by Jelsma—were contrary to clearly established law at the time 

of the arrest. 

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Officer Cox’s motion 

for summary judgment on Jelsma’s § 1983 claim for excessive force.