www.usip.org

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 198 January 2008

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions .

Contents 

Introduction 1

Radio Delivering Information to the Afghan People 2

Enhancing Government Capacity to Communicate 4

International Actors Step In as Needed 5

Cause for Concern 7

Conclusions 8

About the Report

This information and conclusions drawn in this report 

are based on presentations by a panel of media experts 

that gathered for a session of the United States 

Institute of Peace’s Working Group on Media and 

Conflict, organized in June 2007. John Langlois, of the 

U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of 

Transition Initiatives, chairs the group. Panel speakers 

included Thomas Dine, former director of Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty; Adam Kaplan, U.S. Agency for 

International Development; Linda Flour of the Rendon 

Group; and John West of Internews. The Institute’s 

Center of Innovation for Media and Conflict is under the 

direction of Vice President Daniel Serwer. This report is 

one of a series analyzing media in conflict situations.

Yll Bajraktari, now at Harvard University’s Kennedy 

School of Government, was a program specialist at the 

Center of Innovation on Media and Conflict. Christina 

Parajon, now at the Yale Law School, was a senior 

program assistant with the Institute’s Center on PostConflict Peace and Stability Operations. 

Yll Bajraktari and Christina Parajon

Media and Conflict

Afghanistan as a Relative Success Story

Summary

The development of media in post-Taliban Afghanistan has been relatively successful 

(compared with both the Taliban regime and other countries subject to international 

intervention) in establishing free and responsible expression despite the lack of electricity, harsh terrain, absence of viable media outlets during the Taliban regime, and a 

conservative religious society that subordinates women. However, Afghanistan’s media 

development remains incomplete. Since it still faces many challenges, the international 

community must continue to assist and support it. 

Three main processes contributed to Afghanistan’s initial media success: the proliferation of local media, especially radio; the government’s increased capacity to communicate; and international media that filled gaps that otherwise might have become 

problematic. This three-pronged approach in Afghanistan may provide useful lessons for 

other societies emerging from conflict. 

Introduction

Today Afghanistan’s media are lauded as a development success story in light of the 

obstacles and challenges the country faced after the Taliban regime was defeated in 

2001. Although remnants of the Taliban still threatened security, development, and 

stabilization, Afghanistan looked as if it had managed to establish a relatively free flow 

of information and a number of solid media outlets capable of informing its citizenry. 

In the years immediately following the end of Taliban rule, Afghanistan demonstrated 

that despite a history of protracted conflict and restricted information, progress in media 

building was possible and success attainable. 

These early successes were most prominent in three areas of media development: 

local media outlets, especially radio; the national government’s communication with its 

citizens; and international broadcasters’ presence in Afghanistan. 

Each area of the Afghan media developed independently, yet local, national, and international actors planted the seeds of strong media by reaching high levels of communica-
2

tion and coordination in the early days of reconstruction. Through further examination of 

the current media situation, however, it becomes apparent that cultivating the seeds of 

free media requires continuous effort. Afghanistan, therefore, offers a positive example of 

media development yet also shows the inherent fragility of media in a post-conflict society 

and the rapidity with which early successes can deteriorate. 

Useful lessons can be learned from this example of media development immediately 

after a society’s transition to democracy. Media development also has important implications in the medium and long term for both the host government and the international 

actors involved the reconstruction mission. 

Radio Delivering Information to the Afghan People

During the Taliban regime, media outlets were banned almost entirely. Only one radio 

station operated under strict control of the Taliban in Kabul. This station did not provide 

informational or educational programming but rather operated solely as a channel for conveying religious messages. A small number of Afghans had access to international broadcasts from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the Voice of America (VOA), 

but they listened in utmost secrecy and only in areas where the Taliban had failed to seize 

household radios. Television and the Internet were banned altogether. Left with few alternative sources of information, the Afghan people grew accustomed to tuning in for news 

and information to the adhoc radio stations operating clandestinely within Afghanistan or 

those they could pick up from abroad. Through necessity Afghanistan developed a strong 

radio culture over the years.

The fall of the Taliban initiated a new era. Years of oppression and civil war had devastated Afghanistan both economically and socially. The reconstruction mission undertaken 

in Afghanistan faced daunting challenges, including harsh terrain, little to no infrastructure, and high levels of illiteracy. The mission also had to contend with the legacy of a 

draconian attitude toward media. Afghanistan’s conservative religious society did not 

initially regard as a priority the creation of diverse, independent media outlets that would 

inform citizens, cover elections, and hold government officials accountable. 

Several socioeconomic factors have contributed to the persistence of radio culture in 

Afghanistan. Electricity is generally available only in larger cities and even there only 

in the afternoon. In addition the majority of households cannot afford a television in a 

country where the annual gross domestic product is $8.8 billion ($800 per capita). Despite 

the emergence of broadcast and cable television in Afghan cities today—and some limited 

access to satellite television more remotely—television has made relatively little headway. 

Newspaper and magazine industries are also profoundly challenged because of difficult 

terrain and devastated infrastructure that effectively limit print media distribution and 

make consistent delivery nearly impossible. Literacy rates in Afghanistan, in the range of 

29 percent for men and below 12.6 percent for women, further challenge the capacity of 

print media.1 

Given this situation the majority of the early media development efforts in Afghanistan 

wisely focused on radio stations. Radio reached the most remote parts of Afghanistan, 

while television and newspapers did not. Consequently radio was able to serve the people’s 

needs much better than print or television. Increased international broadcasting to postconflict Afghanistan also nurtured the radio culture. Radio emerged the clear winner, 

requiring lower costs and simpler maintenance.

Local radio could play a role in bonding the citizens of Afghanistan and building social 

networks of trust and reciprocity in ways that the central government could not. Faced 

with a new reality, government lacked communication capabilities; thus it was up to radio 

outlets to lead citizens in this new environment. In such a socially and ethnically divided 

country, local media were one of the few civil-society actors that could bring together 

different languages, ease regional tensions, and educate without bias. 

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

non-partisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflictmanagement tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with 

knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chairman), President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President, 

Government Affairs, International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, 

American University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, 

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of 

Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

• Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Kathleen Martinez, Executive Director, 

World Institute on Disability • George E. Moose, Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George 

Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Ron Silver, Actor, Producer, 

Director, Primparous Productions, Inc. • Judy Van Rest, 

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. 

Members ex officio

Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State • Robert M. Gates,

Secretary of Defense • Richard H. Solomon, President, United 

States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. Wilson,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, National 

Defense University.

Local media were one of the few 

civil-society actors that could bring 

together different languages, ease 

regional tensions, and educate 

without bias.
3

International organizations rushed to help create local media outlets in Afghanistan. 

Local media development accelerated under the aegis of Internews, which provided 

support from 2002 to 2004. The radio network that Internews helped create included 

twenty-nine separate local stations linked to a countrywide syndication network with 

programming available twenty-four hours a day, resulting in a dramatic increase in the 

variety of information available to the local stations. 

Official radio stations operated by the Taliban were tools of propaganda and indoctrination. The Internews project challenged the notion of radio as a tool to control the 

content and timing of information made available to the people. Since the fall of the 

Taliban, Internews has established thirty-two radio stations with an estimated reach of 

about 11 million listeners (approximately 37 percent of the population).2 These stations 

were diverse in their programming and content. This diversity reinforced the idea that 

the consumers are the citizens and they, rather than the producers of information, control 

what information they receive and when they receive it.

Not only did these stations exponentially increase the variety of information available 

to local communities, but the increased flow of information also offered a wide range 

of differing opinions and views. The stations mixed languages within the same programs 

and offered interviews and popular-culture pieces. It became common, for instance, for 

the local stations to air an interview in which questions were posed in Dari and responses 

were given in Pashtu. The practice of mixing languages underscored the need for ethnic 

acceptance and reconciliation in the country. Radio’s ability to further the goals of a multilingual society speaks to the media’s ability to bridge ethnic divides within and across 

communities. Instead of fragmenting the country along ethnic and religious lines as in 

some other interventions (e.g. Bosnia and Iraq), Afghan media played a more integrative 

role. 

The radio network also supported leadership development among young journalists living in local communities. Local stations brought individuals who might have lacked journalistic experience but showed interest in community involvement together with those 

who had previously practiced professional journalism. A vast literature on civil society 

and development theory suggests that there is potential to develop a new generation of 

leaders through training and mentoring programs that assist youth to realize their interest 

in media and journalistic outlets.3

In many communities these local radio stations were the first local media. Citizens 

were intrigued by their novelty and became eager to play active roles in organizing and 

managing the stations. As a result of such participation, each local news and programming segment developed its own personality, reflecting the interests of a particular community. This dynamism produced an amazing pluralism among the twenty-nine different 

stations operating across the country. The variety of programs that arose throughout 

Afghanistan in response to local demands was unprecedented: quiz shows, drama series, 

poetry, geography, and special reports on a range of development topics such as women’s 

health and agriculture. The array of homegrown programs produced by each station provided material for a network-wide syndicated program that drew upon hundreds of locally 

produced shows. Through syndication communities could hear popular shows from other 

communities, creating shared interests and knowledge across the country. 

An example of the success of local media development is Radio Arman a station 

launched in Kabul by three Afghans who returned from the diaspora to build Afghanistan’s 

first private radio station. In late 2002 the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) provided financial support matched by the founders of Radio Arman to jump-start 

Kabul’s first private radio station.4 By May 2003, Radio Arman was airing twenty-four 

hours a day throughout Kabul province. The majority of shows were hosted by women disc 

jockeys, a significant step for Afghanistan. Under Taliban rule, women were not allowed 

to work, go to school, speak on the radio, or show their faces in public. 

The success of Afghanistan’s local media development results partly from its people’s 

enthusiasm to embrace change. At the local level the Afghan population, with the help 

The consumers are the citizens 

and they, rather than the producers of information, control 

what information they receive 

and when they receive it.

The success of Afghanistan’s local 

media development results partly 

from its people’s enthusiasm to 

embrace change. 
4

of international organizations, was genuinely enthusiastic about the prospect of creating 

media outlets in their various forms. Radio enjoyed enormous support among community 

leaders because of its outreach capacity and ability to sidestep restraints imposed by 

illiteracy. The radio stations not only served to inform the citizens about the latest news 

developments but also played an increasing role in community building by launching talk 

shows that helped people confront taboo social issues as a community. 

However, issues such as Islam, ethnic tension, the role of the warlords in crime, are all 

subjects that journalists must approach with utmost caution. The government in Kabul, 

under increasing pressure from the resurrected Taliban in some parts of the country, does 

not hesitate to intervene and prevent media outlets from broadcasting stories. Because 

the media explosion is fuelling social change and a spirit of accountability, the government believes that the media sometimes play into the Taliban’s hand and thus undermine 

progress. Journalists have been detained and intimidated by the authorities because of 

stories they have covered and challenges they have made to the authorities in Kabul.5

Enhancing Government Capacity to Communicate

Governments that come to power in extraordinary circumstances—as is generally the case 

in post-conflict societies—are often unprepared to handle local press immediately and 

effectively, let alone the twenty-four hour hubbub of international media. This was particularly true of the new Afghan government, which needed to communicate clearly and 

forthrightly to a population undergoing rapid political, economic, and social change and 

simultaneously to the information-hungry international media. With thirty-four provinces, 

some still under the de facto control of warlords, the central government needed a strong 

voice that could be heard by its people in the capital, throughout the provinces, and all 

the way to the United States. 

Selected in December 2001 to chair the Afghan Transitional Administration (and later 

as interim president and president), Hamid Karzai initially lacked the capacity to reach 

out to the public, which gained him the reputation of acting as the “mayor of Kabul” 

rather than the president of the country. Increasing the Afghan government’s capability 

to communicate with its people and their capacity to communicate with the government 

was clearly a crucial component of media development within the overall stabilization 

and reconstruction mission. An international strategic communications consulting firm, 

the Rendon Group, was contracted to work on developing this capacity. The Rendon 

Group worked with the presidential palace staff to improve its communications and press 

capacity. Some critics view their work with mixed feelings because of the high cost of 

the contract.6

In terms of its communication capabilities with citizens, the situation in which the 

government found itself was grave. Years of Taliban rule left communication infrastructure 

almost at the level of the monarchy that had ended thirty years earlier. The government 

in Kabul needed to transform this antiquated approach to the press into a modernized 

capacity to speak to Afghan citizens and international audiences. Typically two press 

releases were released each day to relay the basic facts of the president’s actions. If, for 

example, the ambassador of the United States visited, the visit would be reported, but its 

substance—the reasons that prompted it, the policy matters discussed, diplomatic messages conveyed—was absent from this press release. Often those responsible for writing 

the release were not present at the official event and could not provide a reliable account 

of what had transpired. 

In addition, there was organizational disarray in the presidential palace press team, 

which operated separately from the Ministry of Information. Although news broadcasts 

were burgeoning, the president and his press staff were uninformed of their content. No 

effective system was in place to allow the presidential palace staff to communicate with 

the provinces. Local journalists were required to undergo intensive security checks to enter 

Journalists have been detained 

and intimidated by the authorities because of stories they have 

covered and challenges they have 

made to the authorities in Kabul.
5

the palace to speak to officials. Dialogue between citizens and the central government 

was virtually nonexistent. 

In addition to information barriers between Kabul and the provinces, another organizational problem stemmed from the presidential palace’s inexperience in handling the 

international media. For months Afghanistan was the focal point of international observers. International journalists stationed in Kabul were eager to report each and every 

post-Taliban development. The Karzai government’s inability to communicate with the 

international audience and to satiate its curiosity with reliable information created yet 

another problem for the fledgling government in Kabul. 

One of the first things required was to work with the presidential palace press staff to 

establish a way to improve the president’s awareness of news and news reporting. This 

effort consisted of assembling daily news clippings from the BBC, VOA, and Radio Free 

Afghanistan in a comprehensive press briefing. This simple daily procedure was the first 

step in helping the president become better informed of world and domestic news and 

eventually in transforming the previously isolated palace into a more-informed, communicative voice of official Afghanistan. In addition, the Rendon Group undertook to professionalize the presidential palace press office staff. Scheduling practices, incentive systems, 

and established hierarchy had not existed. A structured daily routine bred a professional 

ethos and yielded increased efficiency in the new press office. 

Another important step was to assist the presidential palace in hosting press conferences on a level that could accommodate major actors in the international media such as 

Cable News Network (CNN) and the BBC. The ability to organize and smoothly run international press conferences is a key component in developing a government’s communication 

capacity. As one former consultant who worked in Afghanistan said, “The international 

media is a monster that needs to be fed. If the new government cannot feed this monster, 

someone else will.” A government cannot appear to be running a country if it is silent. 

With so many countries invested and interested in Afghanistan, the voice of official Kabul 

was of crucial importance to the success of the post-conflict reconstruction mission. 

Although a good deal remains to be done, the main accomplishments in helping the 

Kabul government build its communication capacity were increasing the flow of information into and out of the government and increasing the quantity and quality of the 

government’s messages to international audiences. 

International Actors Step In as Needed

International broadcasters play three important roles in Afghanistan: They provide coverage when major news merits international attention, coverage that holds the government 

accountable, and professional training for local journalists. 

International broadcasting in Afghanistan began with Radio Liberty during the Soviet 

occupation (1985–1993 and thereafter). Using stringers from Pakistan and five of the 

Central Asian republics, this service effectively reached pockets of Afghanistan. After 

the events of September 11, Thomas Dine, president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

became convinced that a separate Radio Free Afghanistan (RFA) service was necessary. 

RFA was created in January 2002 as an integrated Dari and Pashtu service rather than two 

separate services, breaking with the standard practice of the VOA. 

As a new international broadcasting service, RFA initially provided two hours of original 

broadcasts to Afghanistan daily, plus one hour of repeat programming. The first thirty 

minutes of each broadcast were in Pashtu, followed by thirty minutes in Dari. In early 

2002, RFA doubled transmission hours from three to six hours per day. 

RFA’s coverage of the June 2002 loya jirga, Afghanistan’s grand assembly, established 

its reputation for comprehensive, accurate, timely, and balanced reporting. The loya jirga 

is a centuries-old Afghan institution that leaders in the country convene to choose new 

kings, adopt constitutions, and decide important political matters and disputes. The pro-

“The international media is a 

monster that needs to be fed. If 

the new government cannot feed 

this monster, someone else will.”
6

cess covered by RFA was set in motion by the Bonn agreement of December 5, 2001, to 

select the next government.7 

The national government at the time had no means of disseminating reliable information about the loya jirga, and the local stations were far too amateur to provide quality 

coverage of such an elaborate political event. RFA filled the gap with objectivity and 

reliability. Specifically RFA journalists reported on the preparation, elections, and implementation of the loya jirga. The service appointed a bilingual speaker as coverage coordinator. In accordance with its commitment to accuracy, RFA’s reporters entered the tent 

and broadcast live via satellite telephone. Given that the loya jirga is critical to Afghan 

sociopolitical change, RFA’s ability to reliably cover it showed its ability to report breaking 

news relevant to Afghan society.

In addition to professionally covering the loya jirga, RFA reporters played a role in holding the government accountable. They had instructions to cover the national government’s 

actions in general and to provide not just facts but also criticism. By pinpointing the areas 

in which the government did not adequately meet civic needs—such as roads and health 

care—the service played a muckraking role. Citizens saw that media are not only a way to 

gain factual information, but also a means to demand their citizenship rights. 

Generally speaking RFA’s commitment to maximizing broadcast reliability and availability solidified the service as a trusted source of information and has also improved Afghan 

opinion of the United States. Today nearly two-thirds of Afghan radio listeners listen to 

RFA, according to the results of a survey conducted for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 

The same 2004 survey, carried out by the InterMedia Survey Institute from August 17 to 

October 2, 2004, also showed that when asked about reliability of the news and information broadcast, strong majorities considered RFA and VOA trustworthy. 

The United States was not the only Western broadcaster to enter the scene during 

Afghanistan’s media development phase. In addition to RFA the BBC has provided news 

to the Afghan people. Today 58 percent of listeners tune to RFA and 57.3 percent to the 

BBC. Not only does the BBC World Service provide news coverage in Afghanistan, it also 

supported media development immediately after the transition to the Karzai government. 

In February 2002 the World Service began to assist Afghanistan media activities. With a 1-

million-pound grant from the UK government’s Department for International Development, 

the BBC provided equipment and training to two radio studios and some 150 journalists 

in Kabul and the region.8

The work by RFA and the BBC shows the way international broadcasters complement 

Afghanistan’s ongoing efforts to develop the government’s communication capacity as well 

as the local media. These international services provided information when the Afghan 

media could not. 

In many parts of the country international media also provided education and training. 

Several broadcasters created programming for farmers seeking new agriculture methods, 

teachers designing new lesson plans, and those who wanted language training. For example, “New Home, New Life,” a daily BBC program, is credited with blending drama with 

educational programs and social content in a clear, socially acceptable way, in accordance 

with traditional values and religion.9

Both RFA and the BBC helped reconstruction by providing information to every corner 

of Afghanistan. Thus there was little danger that these international broadcasters would 

incite violence or derail the reconstruction process. But despite the success of international broadcasters in Afghanistan, it is important to recognize that the relationship 

between reconstruction missions and international broadcasters may not always be so 

beneficial, or even benign.

Cause for Concern 

The Afghan media were virtually nonexistent less than six years ago, yet it developed into 

a promising new force for social and political change. Strategically the initial media develCitizens saw that media are not only 

a way to gain factual information, 

but also a means to demand their 

citizenship rights.

These international services 

provided information when the 

Afghan media could not. 
7

opment efforts were successful and paved the way for a future of vibrant local media, professional national communication capacity, and responsible international media coverage. 

Notwithstanding, the outlook since initial intervention in 2002 is troubling. Recently the 

fledgling media sector has come under attack from several institutions of Afghan society, 

including the government, police, militias, and Islamic clerical councils.

The advocacy organization Media Watch compiled a list of threats to media freedom in 

Afghanistan from January 2006 through February 2007. According to its report harassment 

of media outlets and professionals included beatings, insults, fines, intimidation, detention of journalists, and lawsuits against media outlets.10

One of the more troubling trends of the Afghan government has been its increasing 

tendency to restrict information and journalism. On June 12 and 19, 2006, the Afghan 

Intelligence Agency issued a directive to accomplish this aim. The agency distributed a list 

of restrictions on Afghan journalists to limit reports of the country’s deteriorating security situation. According to Sam Zarifi, a research director at Human Rights Watch, “The 

intelligence service’s restrictions are a blatant intrusion on the freedom of Afghanistan’s 

fledgling media.”11 Among the types of information that were banned were “negative 

propaganda, interviews, and reports which are provocative or slanderous and which are 

against the presence (in Afghanistan) of the international coalition forces and ISAF.”12

Overtly pro-Western feelings had paved the way for cooperation by various actors in the 

reconstruction mission and facilitated coordination between burgeoning sectors of media. 

Now, however, there is evidence that the government seeks to prohibit public expression 

that contradicts or criticizes it. 

The directive also restricts “those materials that deteriorate people’s morale and cause 

disappointment to them, and publication of gossip and rumors which are against the security and welfare of society.” It considers critical media to be deleterious to social morale, 

when in reality critical media are a force for social cohesion in consolidating democracies. 

Moreover, the directive states, “News of terrorist activities must not come as the lead 

story of the news.” 

Previous success attributed to the government vis-à-vis media development seems 

diminished in light of these current attempts to stifle free flows of information.13 Uncertain of how to handle negative information, the government seems to prefer to stifle 

rather than address these claims. The media, and especially local media, which initially 

developed as a diverse community capable of providing free information, may now be less 

able to fulfill this crucial role. 

It may be too soon to tell why the media situation in Afghanistan retrogressed for 

certain, but several implications may be drawn. The government was inexperienced in 

dealing with the international press. This weakness was addressed in the initial development phase. What was neglected was the government’s inexperience in dealing with local 

media outlets and indigenous television, print, and radio outlets. Thus the relationship 

between local media and the government was still weak as the security situation began 

deteriorating over the past eighteen months. As a result of inexperience the government 

felt threatened by local media’s exposure of its loosening grip on security and acted to 

suppress such reports. Now the government has taken actions seen as counterproductive 

to a truly free press, and journalists who oppose the government on this issue are revered 

as heroes. 

Conclusions 

The initial success of media development in Afghanistan depended on some unusual 

circumstances. Coordination among the international donors and organizations was good, 

and the international support for the intervention in Afghanistan was strong. The presidential palace staff, local communities, and international broadcasters were all open to 

the principles of free and independent media. The national government, local media, and 

Recently the fledgling media 

sector has come under attack 

from several institutions of 

Afghan society, including the 

government, police, militias, and 

Islamic clerical councils.

There is evidence that the government 

seeks to prohibit public expression that 

contradicts or criticizes it.
international broadcasters developed a synergistic relationship so that information barriers 

were chipped away and Afghan citizens could benefit from diverse, objective, and constant 

streams of news and information. Where one part of the foundation was weak, another 

part could compensate. 

Lessons learned in Afghanistan include 

• International interveners should move quickly to increase the availability, variety, reliability, and objectivity of information available.

• It is crucial that the new government’s voice be heard, and this may require substantial assistance. 

• Local media can help restore trust and reciprocity when developed in tandem with the 

government’s capacity to support a free press.

• The international press can fill important gaps, improving coverage and enhancing 

government accountability. It can also reach parts of the country not covered by other 

outlets because of technical and infrastructural problems.

Policy implications from Afghanistan include 

• Reconstruction missions must remain engaged with the government several years 

after the initial capacity to communicate is developed. Legal experts working alongside media experts should assist the host government to create legislation to protect 

freedom of the press and integrity of reporting. 

• Legislation on the books is not enough. Requisite institutions, as well as oversight 

mechanisms, must be in place to ensure that the national government cannot rescind 

these freedoms as easily as it grants them. 

• The international press corps that reports in post-conflict environments has an ongoing responsibility to collaborate with the reconstruction mission. The press can play a 

watchdog role in these societies and provide assistance to local media in investigating 

the sources and severity of attacks on media freedom.

Notes

1. United Nations, Human Development Report, Afghanistan, 2006, http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/

countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_AFG.html.

2. www.internews.org/activity/infrastructure/radio.shtm.

3. Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael Foley, The Civil Society Reader (Hanover, N.H.: New England University 

Press, 2003); Bernard Bray and Larry W. Chappell, “Civic Theater for Civic Education,” Journal of Political Science 

Education 1 (2005); Catriona McKinnon and Iain Hampsher-Monk, eds., The Demands of Citizenship (New York: 

Wellington House, 2000). 

4. www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2003/fs030827.html.

5. www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,2065443,00.html.

6. www.truthout.org/docs_2005/121305E.shtml.

7. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, United Nations Resolution 1383 (2001), www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7234.doc.

htm, accessed June 14, 2007.

8. “World Service Trust to Assist Afghanistan Media Reconstruction Activities,” www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/

pressreleases/stories/2002/02_february/08/trustafghanistan.shtml, accessed June 14, 2007.

9. Altai Consulting, “Afghan Media—Three Years After,” Nationwide Media Evaluation Project, USAID/OTI 

(2005), 51.

10. Azizullah Habibi, “Journalism Freedom Report 10,” Media Watch Afghanistan (March 27, 2006), www.

internews.org/pubs/afghanistan/060327JournalismFreedomReport10.pdf.

11. “Afghanistan: Remove New Restrictions on Media,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2006), http://

hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/21/afghan13605.htm, accessed August 21, 2007. 

12. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, National Security Directorate, June 22, 2006, http://hrw.org/pub/2006/

afghanistan062206.pdf, 1.

United States 13. Ibid, 1.

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.