In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Western District 

GREG HALDERMAN,

Respondent,

v.

CITY OF STURGEON, et al.,

Appellants.

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WD82668

FILED: January 21, 2020

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOONE COUNTY

THE HONORABLE JEFF HARRIS, JUDGE

BEFORE DIVISION THREE: LISA WHITE HARDWICK, PRESIDING JUDGE,

ALOK AHUJA AND THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, JUDGES

The City of Sturgeon, Mayor Gene Kelly, and Board of Aldermen members Tyler 

Patterson, Rhonda Dawson, Travis Sutton, and Danny Joiner, (collectively, “the City”) 

appeal the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Greg Halderman 

on his petition for judicial review of an administrative decision, which he filed after he 

was removed as Chief of the Sturgeon Police Department. The City contends the court 

erred in holding that the removal proceeding was a contested case and that the City 

violated Halderman’s right to due process under the Missouri Constitution when it 

removed him from office without holding a contested case hearing. The City further 

argues that, even if the court properly found that this was a contested case, the court 

erred in ordering Halderman to be reinstated with back pay because those were 
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improper remedies. Because the judgment is not final and this case is not eligible for 

interlocutory appeal under Rule 74.01(b), we dismiss the appeal. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Halderman was appointed Chief of the Sturgeon Police Department in October 

2013. On March 15, 2017, Mayor Kelly sent Halderman a notice of a meeting during 

which the Board of Aldermen was going to consider removing him as police chief. The 

notice alleged that just cause existed for Halderman’s removal because he was unable 

to perform his duties with reasonable competence or safety as a result of alcohol abuse; 

he committed acts that constituted a reckless disregard for the safety of the public or 

another law enforcement officer; and he was in violation of the written established 

employment policy. The notice identified four specific events over a three-year period 

that the City alleged constituted just cause for Halderman’s removal. Enclosed within 

the notice of meeting were several documents related to the four specific instances of 

alleged misconduct. The notice stated that the Board of Aldermen would consider his 

removal at a closed meeting on March 27, 2017, at which time Halderman would be 

afforded the opportunity to be heard, together with any witnesses, evidence, and 

counsel of his choosing.

During the Board of Aldermen’s closed meeting on March 27, 2017, the City did 

not call any witnesses to testify. Halderman, who was represented by counsel, testified 

and presented eleven witnesses. The Board of Aldermen voted 3-1 to remove 

Halderman from office. Halderman was given written notice of the grounds of his 

removal on April 4, 2017. 
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Halderman subsequently filed a petition against the City, Mayor Kelly, and the 

Board of Aldermen for judicial review of the decision, damages, and injunctive relief. In 

Count I, Halderman asked the court to review the removal decision as a contested case, 

and he asserted that the removal decision violated his due process rights, was 

unsupported by competent and substantial evidence, was made upon unlawful 

procedure, was arbitrary and unreasonable, and constituted an abuse of discretion. As 

an alternative to Count I, Halderman requested in Count II that the court review the 

removal decision as a non-contested case. In Count III, Halderman alleged that the 

removal decision violated his right to due process under the Missouri Constitution 

because the removal hearing was “devoid of the procedural protections guaranteed to 

him under” the Missouri Constitution. In Count IV, Halderman alleged that the City 

wrongfully discharged him in violation of public policy because his removal was 

retaliatory. In Count V, Halderman alleged Mayor Kelly and the Board of Aldermen 

wrongfully terminated him because his removal was retaliatory. In Count VI, Halderman 

alleged that Mayor Kelly and the Board of Aldermen tortiously interfered with his 

employment contract with the City by causing the City to breach the contract by 

removing him without just cause. Counts I, II, and IV were asserted against the City 

only; Count III against the City, Mayor Kelly, and the Board of Aldermen1; while Counts 

V and VI were asserted against only Mayor Kelly and the Board of Aldermen, but not 

the City. 

In each individual count, Halderman alleged that he suffered damages, including 

lost wages and benefits, emotional distress, and injury to his reputation. For all claims, 

 1 Mayor Kelly and the Board of Aldermen were sued in both their personal and official capacities.
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he requested the relief of: (1) an order reversing the removal decision or, alternatively, 

a de novo hearing of the Board of Aldermen’s decision as a non-contested case; (2) his 

reinstatement as chief of police and the removal of all documents related to his removal 

proceeding from his personnel file; (3) back pay and lost benefits; (4) compensatory 

damages for his injuries, including lost wages and benefits, emotional distress, and 

injury to his reputation; (5) punitive damages; and (6) costs and attorneys’ fees.

Halderman moved for partial summary judgment on Counts I and III. After 

briefing and argument, the court granted the motion on February 15, 2019, concluding 

that the removal of a chief municipal law enforcement officer under Section 106.273, 

RSMo 2016,2 is a contested case under the Missouri Administrative Procedure Act (“the 

Act”); that Halderman’s removal hearing did not comply with the required procedures for 

contested cases; and that the City’s failure to comply with the requirements of a 

contested case proceeding deprived Halderman of due process. The court ordered 

Halderman to be reinstated with back pay. The court advised that parties that, if the 

City decided to remove Halderman following his reinstatement by the court, the City had 

to comply with and conduct removal proceedings in accordance with Section 106.273 

and Section 536.010, et seq.

Halderman’s counsel informed the City on February 17, 2019, that Halderman 

would be returning to work on February 19, 2019. On February 18, 2019, the City 

informed Halderman that he was being placed on administrative leave without pay 

pending a formal hearing on his position as chief of police. The City filed a motion to 

stay, amend, or clarify the circuit court’s February 15, 2019 partial summary judgment to 

 2 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016.
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address when Halderman was to be reinstated. In response, Halderman filed a motion 

for an order to show cause as to why the City should not be held in contempt for 

violating the court’s order to reinstate Halderman with back pay. The court did not rule 

on the motion for an order to show cause and allowed the parties to come to an 

agreement regarding the logistics and details surrounding Halderman’s reinstatement. 

The court issued a judgment on March 11, 2019, to reiterate that its partial summary 

judgment on Counts I and III was a distinct judicial unit that should be considered final 

for purposes of appeal and that no just reason existed for delaying an appeal. The City 

filed this appeal.3

APPEALABILITY OF JUDGMENT

Before we can reach the merits of the issues in the appeal, we have a duty to 

determine, sua sponte, whether we have the authority to hear this appeal. First Nat’l 

Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo. 

banc 2017). “The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give 

a right to appeal, no right exists.” Id. (citation omitted). “A prerequisite to appellate 

review is that there be a final judgment.” Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. 

banc 1997) (citation omitted); § 512.020(5). A final judgment “resolves ‘all issues in a 

case, leaving nothing for future determination.’” First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 

S.W.3d at 221 (citation omitted).

Rule 74.01(b) “provides a limited exception to this finality requirement.” Id. 

Where multiple claims are presented in an action, “Rule 74.01(b) authorizes a trial court 

 3 While this appeal was pending, the City held another removal hearing on April 30, 2019, during which it 

afforded Halderman all of the procedures required for contested cases under the Act. Again, the Board of 

Aldermen voted 3-1 to remove Halderman from office. Halderman did not seek judicial review of that 

decision.
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to enter judgment on one or more – but fewer than all – of the claims in an action and 

make that judgment a ‘final judgment’ for purposes of section 512.020(5) by certifying 

that there is no just reason to delay the appeal of that judgment.” Id. at 221-22. The 

circuit court’s designation is not conclusive, however. Gibson, 952 S.W.2d at 244. 

Instead, “[i]t is the content, substance, and effect of the order that determines finality 

and appealability.” Id. The court’s “designation is effective only when the order 

disposes of a distinct ‘judicial unit.’” Id.

The Supreme Court has explained what constitutes a distinct judicial unit:

A distinct “judicial unit” is defined as the final judgment on a claim, 

and not a ruling on some of several issues arising out of the same 

transaction or occurrence which does not dispose of the claim. Further, 

an order addressing some of several alternative counts, each stating only 

one legal theory to recover damages for the same wrong, is not 

considered an appealable judgment while the other counts remain 

pending because the counts are concerned with a single fact situation. It 

is “differing,” “separate,” “distinct” transactions or occurrences that 

permit a separately appealable judgment, not differing legal theories 

or issues presented for recovery on the same claim.

First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 222 (internal quotations and citation 

omitted).

Applying these principles to this case, the six counts set forth in Halderman’s 

petition are merely different legal theories seeking to recover the same relief (reversal of 

the removal decision, reinstatement, back pay and lost benefits, compensatory 

damages, punitive damages, and costs and attorneys’ fees) for the same underlying 

wrong – his removal as chief of police. The only distinction between the six counts is 

that the appealed counts challenge the removal decision on procedural grounds, while 
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the pending counts challenge the removal decision on substantive grounds.4 All of the 

counts, however, are concerned with the single fact situation of Halderman’s removal. 

Moreover, the circuit court’s disposition of Counts I through III did not have the effect of 

fully resolving all claims against any of the defendants; Count IV remained pending 

against the City, while claims remained pending against Mayor Kelly and the Board of 

Aldermen in Counts V and VI. 

The pending counts in this case “clearly arise from the same set of facts, and the 

same transactions and occurrences, as the counts supposedly appealed.” See Gibson, 

952 S.W.2d at 244. Because the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment “did 

not resolve a single, distinct judicial unit,” the partial summary judgment was neither a 

final nor appealable judgment. First Nat’l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 223. 

Therefore, we have no authority to hear Halderman’s appeal. Id. 

CONCLUSION

The appeal is dismissed. 

_____________________________________

LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE

ALL CONCUR.

 4 We recognize that Count I challenges the removal decision on both procedural and substantive grounds. 

The court relied on only the procedural grounds to grant summary judgment in favor of Halderman on this 

count.