IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deree J. Norman, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 690 C.D. 2020

: SUBMITTED: January 22, 2021

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: March 16, 2021

Deree J. Norman petitions for review, pro se, of the June 18, 2020 Order of 

the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Commission), which adopted the 

findings and recommendations of an administrative law judge (ALJ) and denied Mr. 

Norman’s Exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. The Commission determined that: (1) 

Mr. Norman failed to establish that PECO Energy Company (PECO) improperly 

terminated his electric service for nonpayment; and (2) Mr. Norman proved that he 

was entitled to a five-year payment arrangement on his delinquent account. We 

affirm the Commission’s Order.

Background

Mr. Norman initiated this matter six years ago by filing a Formal Complaint 

with the Commission against PECO on March 16, 2015. At that time, Mr. Norman 

alleged that PECO had threatened to shut off his electric service for nonpayment and 
2

that there were incorrect charges on his bills. Specifically, Mr. Norman alleged that 

PECO used fictitious billing algorithms to increase the amount of his electric bills

during the winter months.

On April 8, 2015, PECO filed an Answer, denying the material allegations of 

the Formal Complaint. PECO alleged that it conducted field investigations in 2011 

and 2015, which confirmed that the bills for Mr. Norman’s service address were

accurate and that his electric meter was functioning properly. 

Following evidentiary hearings, on July 8, 2016, ALJ Mary Long issued an 

Initial Decision dismissing Mr. Norman’s Formal Complaint. ALJ Long found that 

Mr. Norman failed to satisfy his burden of proving that his electric bills were 

incorrect or that PECO’s meter technology caused his high electric bills. On August 

17, 2016, Mr. Norman filed Exceptions to ALJ Long’s Initial Decision, to which 

PECO replied. 

On July 12, 2017, the Commission issued an Opinion and Order denying Mr. 

Norman’s Exceptions, adopting ALJ Long’s Initial Decision, and dismissing Mr. 

Norman’s Formal Complaint. Mr. Norman timely appealed to this Court on August 

2, 2017. On July 12, 2018, this Court affirmed the Commission’s Order. Thereafter, 

Mr. Norman filed a petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court, which was denied. See Norman v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

1053 C.D. 2017, filed July 12, 2018) (Norman I), appeal denied, 202 A.3d 680 (Pa. 

2019).

Following the issuance of the Commission’s July 12, 2017 Order, PECO 

provided both 10-day written notice and 72-hour telephone notice of termination of 

service to Mr. Norman. PECO terminated Mr. Norman’s electric service for 

nonpayment on August 21, 2017.
3

On August 31, 2017, Mr. Norman filed an Informal Complaint with the 

Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Services (BCS) seeking the restoration of his 

electric service. Certified Record (C.R.) at 14-15. Following an investigation, the 

BCS found, in pertinent part:

4. . . . [O]n 7/19/2017 you contacted PECO regarding the shut-off 

notice. [PECO] requested a payment of $959.94 to avoid termination 

of service. You requested a medical certificate. [PECO] mailed a 

medical certificate to you.[1]

. . . .

7. According to [PECO] records, per your request, on 8/31/2017 a 

medical certificate was faxed to Dr. Ron C[.] Analfi at 215-615-3671.

8. [PECO] has yet to receive a completed medical certificate.

9. [PECO] reported to our office that your total account balance is 

$1[,]909.33. This balance does not include any payments or bills sent 

out on or after 9/6/2017. 

10. [PECO] reported that [it] made one (1) payment arrangement with 

you in the past, and that you broke the agreement.

11. [PECO] reported that you have made one (1) payment over the past 

36 months.

Id. at 13-14. The BCS concluded that because Mr. Norman was no longer a PECO 

customer, he could not “use a medical certificate to circumvent the payment required 

for restoration [of service]” and he did not “ma[ke] a good faith effort to pay [his] 

1 The Commission’s regulations permit a utility company to forestall termination of service

or to restore service to a customer if termination would have adverse medical consequences on an 

occupant of the premises. A customer seeking to avoid termination of service or to restore service

for medical reasons must submit a valid medical certification to the utility company. See 52 Pa. 

Code §§ 56.111-56.118.
4

outstanding balance.” Id. at 15. Therefore, the BCS dismissed Mr. Norman’s 

Informal Complaint.

On August 18, 2017, Mr. Norman filed an Application for Stay of the 

Commission’s July 12, 2017 Order with this Court. On September 12, 2017, this 

Court dismissed the Application for Stay without prejudice because Mr. Norman did 

not first seek relief with the Commission pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1781(a).2

On September 15, 2017, Mr. Norman filed a Petition for Stay with the 

Commission, asking the Commission to stay enforcement of its July 12, 2017 Order 

while he pursued his appeal with this Court. On December 7, 2017, the Commission 

issued an Opinion and Order denying the Petition for Stay. Applying the criteria set 

forth in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Process Gas Consumers Group, 

467 A.2d 805 (Pa. 1983),

3

the Commission found that Mr. Norman failed to establish

that he would likely succeed on the merits of his appeal or that he would suffer 

irreparable harm without the issuance of a stay. The Commission also determined

that granting a stay would adversely affect the public interest, stating:

A public utility is entitled to full payment for service provided to 

customers and all customers are obligated to pay for the utility service 

2 Pa. R.A.P. 1781(a) (emphasis added) provides: “Application for a stay or supersedeas of 

an order or other determination of any government unit pending review in an appellate court on 

petition for review or petition for specialized review shall ordinarily be made in the first instance 

to the government unit.”

3

In Process Gas, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a stay pending appeal is 

warranted if: (1) the petitioner makes a strong showing that he is likely to prevail on the merits; 

(2) the petitioner has shown that without the requested relief, he will suffer irreparable injury; (3) 

the issuance of a stay will not substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings; and 

(4) the issuance of a stay will not adversely affect the public interest. 467 A.2d at 808-09. The 

Supreme Court further stated: “[I]t is essential that the unsuccessful party, who seeks a stay of a 

final order pending appellate review, make a strong showing under the[se] criteria in order to 

justify the issuance of a stay.” Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
5

provided to them. Otherwise, a customer’s unpaid bills are included in 

the utility’s uncollectible expenses and ultimately paid for by other 

utility customers. Mr. Norman had failed to sustain his burden of proof 

that his bills were too high. Thus, upon the dismissal of his [Formal] 

Complaint and the issuance of our final July [12,] 2017 Order, Mr. 

Norman became obligated to pay for the utility service provided to him. 

Granting the Petition [for Stay] would likely cause PECO to include 

Mr. Norman’s unpaid bills within PECO’s uncollectible expenses and 

thereby cause harm to other utility customers in the form of increased 

costs.

Comm’n Op. & Order, 12/7/17, at 10-11 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 

added). Mr. Norman did not appeal or otherwise challenge this ruling.

On December 15, 2017, Mr. Norman sent an email to PECO’s counsel 

requesting the restoration of his electric service under 52 Pa. Code §§ 56.115 and 

56.191.

4

 He attached to this email a December 15, 2017 letter from a certified 

4 The regulation at 52 Pa. Code § 56.115 states: “When service is required to be restored 

under this section and [52 Pa. Code] §§ 56.114, 56.116-56.118 and 56.191, the public utility shall 

make a diligent effort to have service restored on the day of receipt of the medical certification. In 

any case, service shall be reconnected within 24 hours. . . .”

The regulation at 52 Pa. Code § 56.191 states, in relevant part: 

(b) Timing. When service to a dwelling has been terminated, the public utility shall 

reconnect service as follows:

(1) Customers.

(i) Within 24 hours . . . upon receipt by the public utility of a valid 

medical certification. . . . 

. . . .

(2) Applicants. When the applicant has met all applicable conditions:

(i) Within 24 hours . . . upon receipt by the public utility of a valid

medical certification. The public utility is not required to modify or 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
6

registered nurse practitioner, who stated that Mr. Norman has severe sleep apnea and 

needs electricity to operate his CPAP machine. C.R. at 111-12. By letter dated 

December 18, 2017, PECO’s counsel informed Mr. Norman that because PECO had 

terminated his service for nonpayment in August 2017, he was no longer a PECO 

customer. Id. at 117. PECO’s counsel directed Mr. Norman to contact PECO’s 

customer service department to apply for new service. Id.

On December 27, 2017, while Norman I was still pending in this Court, Mr. 

Norman filed a second Formal Complaint with the Commission against PECO. In 

that Formal Complaint, Mr. Norman alleged that: (1) PECO improperly terminated 

his electric service on August 21, 2017; (2) PECO did not offer him a payment 

arrangement before or after terminating his service; and (3) there were incorrect 

charges on his final bill. 

On January 18, 2018, PECO filed an Answer, denying the material allegations 

of the Formal Complaint. PECO alleged that it terminated Mr. Norman’s service for 

his failure to pay a past due balance of $1,760.68, after providing Mr. Norman with 

the legally required pre-termination notices. PECO further alleged that it terminated 

Mr. Norman’s service via an underground dig because Mr. Norman denied PECO 

access to his electric meter. Finally, PECO alleged that because Mr. Norman was 

no longer a PECO customer following the lawful termination of his service, he was 

not entitled to a payment arrangement. 

On February 1, 2018, Mr. Norman filed a Petition for Restoration of Service 

with the Commission. In his Petition, Mr. Norman averred that his electric service 

eliminate the payment required to restore service if a medical 

certificate is presented. . . .

52 Pa. Code § 56.191(b)(1)(i) and (2)(i).
7

should be restored because he “has fully complied with the requirements [of] 52 Pa. 

Code § 56.115.” Id. at 49. Mr. Norman attached the December 15, 2017 letter from 

the nurse practitioner regarding his sleep apnea. On March 5, 2018, Mr. Norman 

filed with the Commission a Motion to Compel and Sanction PECO for failing to 

restore his electric service. 

ALJ Marta Guhl held an evidentiary hearing on June 22, 2018. On October 

19, 2018, ALJ Guhl issued an Initial Decision granting in part and denying in part 

Mr. Norman’s Formal Complaint. ALJ Guhl concluded that Mr. Norman failed to 

prove that PECO improperly terminated his service, that there were incorrect charges 

on his final bill, or that PECO violated any applicable statute or regulation with 

regard to his request for a medical certification. ALJ Guhl concluded, however, that 

Mr. Norman proved that he was entitled to a five-year payment arrangement under 

Section 1405(b)(1) of the Public Utility Code (Code), 66 Pa. C.S. § 1405(b)(1).5

Thus, ALJ Guhl directed PECO to re-calculate Mr. Norman’s bills to reflect his 

current charges plus an amount equal to one-sixtieth of his unpaid balance. ALJ 

Guhl further directed that if Mr. Norman adheres to the payment arrangement, PECO 

shall not suspend or terminate his service (except for valid safety or emergency 

reasons) or assess late payments or finance charges on his account.

5 Section 1405(a) of the Code authorizes the Commission to establish payment 

arrangements between a customer and a public utility. 66 Pa. C.S. § 1405(a). Section 1405(b)(1) 

of the Code provides:

The length of time for a customer to resolve an unpaid balance on an account that 

is subject to a payment arrangement that is investigated by the [C]ommission and 

is entered into by a public utility and a customer shall not extend beyond:

(1) Five years for customers with a gross monthly household income level not 

exceeding 150% of the [f]ederal poverty level.

66 Pa. C.S. § 1405(b)(1).
8

On November 8, 2018, Mr. Norman filed Exceptions to ALJ Guhl’s Initial 

Decision. Mr. Norman’s 32 enumerated exceptions fell into three categories: (1) 

hearsay objections to PECO’s evidence that it sent a medical certification form to 

Mr. Norman’s physician; (2) PECO’s termination of his electric service; and (3) the

accuracy of PECO’s billing with regard to his past due balance. See Comm’n Op. 

& Order, 6/18/20, at 21-22 & n.13.

PECO filed a Reply to the Exceptions, averring that “[Mr. Norman’s 

E]xceptions demonstrate that he wants to re-litigate his billing dispute with PECO 

and continue to use the [Commission’s] administrative process to harass PECO and 

avoid paying his PECO bill. [Mr. Norman] has not paid for electricity since October 

2014.” C.R. at 313.6

On June 18, 2020, the Commission issued an Opinion and Order denying Mr. 

Norman’s Exceptions and affirming ALJ Guhl’s Initial Decision. The Commission 

ordered, in pertinent part:

1. That the Exceptions of [Mr.] Norman filed on November 8, 2018, to 

the Initial Decision of [ALJ] Guhl issued October 19, 2018, . . . are 

denied[] . . . .

. . . .

3. That the [Formal] Complaint of [Mr.] Norman filed against PECO . 

. . on December 27, 2017, regarding the request for a payment 

arrangement is granted[] . . . .

4. That PECO . . . shall calculate the bills for [Mr.] Norman[] . . . in 

order for [Mr. Norman] to pay his current charges[,] plus an amount 

equal to one sixtieth . . . of the balance accrued on the account[] . . . .

6 PECO also noted that Mr. Norman filed a similar complaint with the Commission against 

Philadelphia Gas Works, his gas utility provider, alleging “billing discrepancies,” which was still 

being litigated. C.R. at 313.
9

5. That as long as [Mr.] Norman[] . . . keeps the payment schedule 

stated in this Opinion and Order, PECO . . . shall not suspend or 

terminate his utility service[,] except for valid safety or emergency 

reasons[,] or assess late payments or finance charges against his 

account.

Comm’n Op. & Order, 6/18/20, at 29-30.7 Mr. Norman now petitions this Court for 

review.

8

Analysis

Preliminarily, we note that it is difficult to discern the precise issues Mr.

Norman wishes to raise on appeal, because he identifies different issues in his 

Petition for Review than in the Statement of Questions Involved and Summary of 

Argument sections of his appellate brief.

9

 While we could find waiver on this basis, 

7

In their appellate briefs, both Mr. Norman and PECO state that PECO restored Mr. 

Norman’s electric service on September 10, 2020. See Norman Reply Br. at 10; PECO Br. at 17.

8 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, 

whether an error of law was committed, or whether the necessary findings of fact are supported by 

substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.

9 For example, in the Summary of Argument section of his brief, Mr. Norman does not 

address the issues raised in either his Petition for Review or his Statement of Questions Involved, 

but instead attempts to re-litigate the factual matters before ALJ Long and the Commission in 

Norman I. Mr. Norman asserts:

In the absence of inuendo, unsubstantiated rhetoric, and the clear 

misrepresentation of fact exercised by PECO, condoned and validated by ALJ[]s 

and adopted by the [Commission], the [f]acts presented herein will sustain that [Mr. 

Norman’s] Complaint which originally intended to call [into] question . . . the 

unlawful systematic increases in usage proffered by PECO which unjustifiably 

increased the company’s revenue. The collaborative agenda of PECO, ALJ[]s and 

the [Commission] to ensure that the complaint would not expose PECO’s 

transgression soon became a referendum on bias, coverup and the deviation from 

the P[ennsylvania] [r]ules of [l]aw and established [l]egal [s]tandards.

(Footnote continued on next page...)
10

we decline to do so because, upon review of Mr. Norman’s pro se filings and the 

certified record, we are able to glean the following preserved issues for appeal: (1) 

whether PECO properly terminated Mr. Norman’s electric service on August 21, 

2017; (2) whether PECO was required to offer him a payment arrangement to resolve 

his unpaid balance; and (3) whether PECO complied with Mr. Norman’s requests

for a medical certification. See Pa. R.A.P. 1513(d)(5) (providing that, in an appellate 

petition for review, “the omission of an issue from the statement [of objections] shall 

not be the basis for a finding of waiver if the court is able to address the issue based 

on the certified record”).

1. Termination of Service

First, Mr. Norman asserts that “the Commission erroneously concluded that 

there is nothing to indicate that PECO did not follow proper notice procedures” 

before terminating his electric service on August 21, 2017. Pet. for Rev. at 1; see

Norman Br. at 15 n.2. We disagree.

Section 1406(a)(1) of the Code permits a public utility to terminate service for 

a customer’s “[n]onpayment of an undisputed delinquent account.” 66 Pa. C.S. § 

The facts will further sustain that PECO engaged in unlawful strongarm 

tactics to install more advanced Smart Meters in the homes of PECO customers, 

outside of the purview of the P[ennsylvania] [r]ules by misrepresentations and the 

concealment of a customer’s legal requirement in an effort to further its ulterior 

motive to gain unfettered control of electric usage of its customer to the extent that 

said customers could not[] easily notice and or prove when usage amount are 

unlawfully manipulated (ramped up) to increase company revenue. 

Finally, the facts will further sustain that the presiding ALJ[]s on more than 

one occasion ignored, misapprehended and or intentionally deviated from the 

P[ennsylvania] [r]ules of [l]aw and established [l]egal [s]tandards.

Norman Br. at 19. This Summary of Argument plainly violates our appellate rules. See Pa. R.A.P. 

2118 (“The summary of argument shall be a concise, but accurate, summary of the arguments 

presented in support of the issues in the statement of questions involved.”) (emphasis added). 
11

1406(a)(1). However, a public utility may do so only after giving the customer 

proper notice. See 66 Pa. C.S. § 1406(b)(1). Section 1406(b)(1) of the Code requires 

a public utility to give a customer the following pre-termination notices:

Prior to terminating service under [Section 1406(a) of the Code], a 

public utility:

(i) Shall provide written notice of the termination to the customer at 

least ten days prior to the date of the proposed termination. The 

termination notice shall remain effective for 60 days.

(ii) Shall attempt to contact the customer or occupant to provide notice 

of the proposed termination at least three days prior to the scheduled 

termination, using one or more of the following methods:

(A) in person;

(B) by telephone. Phone contact shall be deemed complete upon 

attempted calls on two separate days to the residence between 

the hours of 8 a.m. and 9 p.m. if the calls were made at various 

times each day; or

(C) by e-mail, text message or other electronic messaging format 

consistent with the [C]ommission’s privacy guidelines and 

approved by [C]ommission order.

(D) In the case of electronic notification only, the customer must 

affirmatively consent to be contacted using a specific electronic 

messaging format for purpose of termination.

66 Pa. C.S. § 1406(b)(1) (emphasis added); see 52 Pa. Code §§ 56.321(1), 56.331.

Here, PECO’s witness, Dana McCollum, testified that on July 13, 2017, the 

day after the Commission’s July 12, 2017 Order, PECO issued a written termination 

notice to Mr. Norman for nonpayment of his past due balance of $1,760.68. Notes 

of Testimony (N.T.), 6/22/18, at 50, 52. On July 19, 2017, Mr. Norman contacted 
12

PECO regarding the termination notice, and a PECO representative informed Mr. 

Norman that he would need to make a minimum payment of $959.94 (50% of his 

unpaid balance), in order to avoid termination. Comm’n Op. & Order, 6/18/20, at 3.

Because Mr. Norman did not make any payment, PECO proceeded with its

72-hour termination notice. Id. PECO called Mr. Norman four times between 

August 7, 2017 and August 15, 2017, and a PECO representative spoke directly with 

Mr. Norman on August 15, 2017. N.T., 6/22/18, at 56-57; see C.R. at 28. Ms. 

McCollum testified regarding the August 15, 2017 telephone call as follows:

[The PECO representative] offer[ed] [Mr. Norman] the 

minimum payment option again. This time it’s offered for 60[%] of the 

account balance, which would have been $1,188.58[,] that he could post 

to retain his service. But at this point the service is not guaranteed, 

because . . . the notice process has been satisfied. So the service can be 

terminated at this point at any day.

[Mr. Norman] was advised that . . . the [Commission’s] formal 

case[] . . . was closed. That there had been no payment since 2014. 

And [Mr. Norman] explained that he was going to court for the matter. 

And again he was advised that the case was closed, service was not 

guaranteed. . . .

N.T., 6/22/18, at 58. The Commission credited Ms. McCollum’s testimony, see 

Comm’n Op. & Order, 6/18/20, at 11, and we will not disturb that credibility 

determination on appeal. See Kviatkovsky v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 618 A.2d 1209, 

1211 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (stating that the Commission, as the ultimate factfinder, 

determines the weight and credibility of the evidence presented, and its findings are 

conclusive on appeal as long as they are supported by substantial evidence).

Further, Mr. Norman admitted, both at the hearing and in an August 15, 2017 

email to PECO’s counsel, that he received the requisite 10-day written notice and 

72-hour telephone notice before his service was terminated. N.T., 6/22/18, at 8, 59-
13

60 & PECO Ex. 7. Therefore, we conclude that PECO properly terminated Mr. 

Norman’s service for nonpayment on August 21, 2017. 

Next, Mr. Norman asserts that because he appealed the Commission’s July 

12, 2017 Order to this Court, PECO was prohibited from terminating his service 

until the resolution of that appeal. Norman Br. at 26-31. Essentially, Mr. Norman 

claims that because he was still challenging the accuracy of his unpaid bills in 

Norman I, his account was not “undisputed” as required for termination of service 

under Section 1406(a)(1) of the Code. We disagree.

There is no provision in either the Code or the Commission’s regulations that 

prohibits a public utility from terminating service for nonpayment while an appeal 

of a Commission order is pending. Rather, the Commission’s regulations 

specifically state that “a public utility may terminate service after giving proper 

notice in accordance with [the Commission’s regulations], whether or not a dispute 

is pending.” 52 Pa. Code § 56.164 (emphasis added).

10

Furthermore, Section 316 of the Code provides that any Commission finding, 

determination, or order “shall be prima facie evidence of the facts found and shall 

remain conclusive upon all parties affected thereby, unless set aside, annulled or 

modified on judicial review.” 66 Pa. C.S. § 316 (emphasis added). In other words, 

the disputed charges at issue in Norman I became “conclusive” upon the 

Commission’s issuance of its July 12, 2017 Order, even while Mr. Norman’s appeal 

was pending, and remained conclusive unless and until this Court reversed or 

modified that decision on appeal.

10 Although Mr. Norman continued to dispute the accuracy of his bills in Norman I, he did 

not dispute that his account with PECO was unpaid and, thus, delinquent. See 66 Pa. C.S. § 

1406(a)(1) (authorizing termination of service for “[n]onpayment of an undisputed delinquent 

account”) (emphasis added).
14

It is true, as Mr. Norman points out, that he requested a stay of the 

Commission’s Order with both this Court and the Commission, seeking to forestall 

the termination of his electric service for nonpayment. As discussed in the 

Background section of this Opinion, supra, this Court dismissed Mr. Norman’s

Application for Stay, without prejudice, because he did not first seek relief with the 

Commission under Pa. R.A.P. 1781(a). Thereafter, Mr. Norman immediately filed 

a Petition for Stay with the Commission, which was denied. Based on its review of 

the record and the Petition for Stay, the Commission concluded that Mr. Norman 

failed to satisfy the legal requirements for a stay pending appeal. Comm’n Op. & 

Order, 12/7/17, at 10-11. Mr. Norman did not subsequently challenge that decision

or file a new request for a stay with this Court. Therefore, we agree with the 

Commission that, absent the issuance of a stay, PECO was not precluded from 

terminating Mr. Norman’s service for nonpayment following the Commission’s July 

12, 2017 Order.

11

2. Payment Arrangement

Next, Mr. Norman asserts that “PECO failed to offer and[/]or respond to [his] 

[r]equest for [a] payment arrangement” before or after terminating his electric 

service. Pet. for Rev. at 1; see Norman Br. at 15, 24-26; Norman Reply Br. at 9. 

The Commission’s regulations outline the procedures a public utility must 

follow if a customer contacts the utility after receiving an initial notice of 

termination. The regulation at 52 Pa. Code § 56.97 provides, in pertinent part:

11 In her Initial Decision, ALJ Guhl incorrectly stated that “there is nothing in the record to 

indicate that [Mr. Norman] requested a stay from the Commonwealth Court regarding any 

potential actions by [PECO].” ALJ Guhl Initial Decision at 8. Despite this error, however, ALJ 

Guhl properly concluded that PECO was not precluded from terminating Mr. Norman’s service on 

August 21, 2017, because neither the Commission nor this Court had granted a stay of the 

Commission’s July 12, 2017 Order. See id. at 8-9.
15

(a) If, after the issuance of the initial termination notice and prior to 

the actual termination of service, a customer or occupant contacts the 

public utility concerning a proposed termination, a public utility shall 

fully explain:

(1) The reasons for the proposed termination.

(2) All available methods for avoiding a termination, including 

the following:

(i) Tendering payment in full or otherwise eliminating the 

grounds for termination.

(ii) Entering a payment arrangement.

(iii) Paying what is past-due on the most recent previous 

company negotiated or Commission payment 

arrangement.

(3) Information about the public utility’s universal service 

programs, including the customer assistance program. Refer the 

customer or applicant to the universal service program of the 

public utility to determine eligibility for a program and to apply 

for enrollment in a program.

(4) The medical emergency procedures.

(b) The public utility shall exercise good faith and fair judgment in 

attempting to enter a reasonable payment arrangement or otherwise 

equitably resolve the matter. Factors to be taken into account when 

attempting to enter into a reasonable payment arrangement include the 

size of the unpaid balance, the ability of the customer to pay, the 

payment history of the customer and the length of time over which the 

bill accumulated. . . .

52 Pa. Code § 56.97(a) and (b) (emphasis added).
16

Here, Mr. Norman contends that PECO failed to offer him a payment 

arrangement before terminating his service in violation of the Commission’s 

regulations.12 However, the record establishes that, prior to terminating his electric 

service, PECO offered Mr. Norman several payment options. Ms. McCollum

credibly testified that in July 2017, PECO offered him a minimum payment option 

in order to avoid termination. N.T., 6/22/18, at 58. Rather than making the requested 

minimum payment, Mr. Norman opted to pursue litigation. Id. at 58-59 & PECO 

Ex. 7. PECO again offered Mr. Norman a minimum payment option in a telephone 

call on August 17, 2017, but Mr. Norman “declined” and stated that he was pursuing 

“business in the court.” N.T., 6/22/18, at 61.

Moreover, the record shows that at the time PECO offered these payment 

options to Mr. Norman, he had an unpaid balance of almost $2,000; had a prior 

payment arrangement with PECO that he did not fulfill; and had not made a payment 

to PECO in almost three years. C.R. at 13-14. Therefore, we conclude that the 

payment options PECO offered to Mr. Norman before terminating his service were 

reasonable under the circumstances. See 52 Pa. Code § 56.97(b). 

Furthermore, the record shows that shortly after terminating his service, 

PECO again offered Mr. Norman two payment options to restore his service, as 

follows:

14) [PECO] has offered two options for restoration [of service]:

A) Pay $1[,]886.90 toward the total account balance, plus a 

$1[,]650.00 reconnection fee.

OR

12 Mr. Norman does not argue that PECO failed to comply with the other requirements of 

52 Pa. Code § 56.97(a).
17

B) If your income is below 150% of the [f]ederal poverty level, 

your account balance will be entered into a payment 

arrangement. The company will accept $1[,]728.62 to restore 

service. This amount representsthe $1[,]650.00 reconnection fee 

and $78.62 towards the account balance. You must verify your 

income to be below 150% of the [f]ederal poverty level if you 

would like to accept this option. You must contact the company 

to provide income verification.

C.R. at 14. Mr. Norman neither made a payment nor provided the requested income 

verification to PECO. N.T., 6/22/18, at 73-75.13 Therefore, Mr. Norman’s claim

that he “was never offered any [payment] option other than paying the entire amount 

of the previous unpaid balance which was being disputed,” Norman Reply Br. at 8, 

is belied by the record.

14

In any event, after Mr. Norman filed his Formal Complaint with the 

Commission requesting a payment arrangement, the Commission granted him a 

payment arrangement.15 ALJ Guhl specifically rejected PECO’s contention that Mr. 

Norman was not entitled to a payment arrangement because he was no longer a 

PECO customer after the termination of his service. Rather, ALJ Guhl found, based 

13 PECO’s records show that a $70 payment was posted to Mr. Norman’s account on 

September 6, 2017, but Mr. Norman disputed making that payment. See N.T., 6/22/18, at 52 & 

PECO Ex. 1; C.R. at 7; see also N.T., 6/22/18, at 125 (Mr. Norman stated on the record, “I have 

never made a payment for quite some time, because I have been disputing all of these charges. So 

where they got this $70 [payment] from is beyond me.”).

14 In his Formal Complaint, Mr. Norman likewise averred: “PECO has never offered any 

expl[a]nation for any of [my] concerns. PECO has informed [me] to pay all past due charges.” 

C.R. at 5.

15 When a formal payment dispute arises between a customer and a public utility, Section 

1405(a) of the Code authorizes the Commission to (1) “investigate complaints regarding payment 

disputes between a public utility, applicants and customers”; and (2) “establish payment 

arrangements between a public utility, customers and applicants within the limits established by 

this chapter.” 66 Pa. C.S. § 1405(a).
18

on the evidence of record, that Mr. Norman was still a customer, because he filed an 

Informal Complaint seeking restoration of his service within 30 days of the 

termination. ALJ Guhl Initial Decision at 13, 15; see 66 Pa. C.S. § 1403 (defining 

“customer” as including “a person who, within 30 days after service termination . . .

seeks to have service reconnected at the same location or transferred to another 

location within the service territory of the public utility”). Thus, ALJ Guhl 

determined that the Commission was authorized to establish a payment arrangement

for Mr. Norman to resolve his unpaid balance. ALJ Guhl Initial Decision at 14, 16.

ALJ Guhl further found that Mr. Norman’s household income of $1,500 per 

month for a two-person household placed him at 109% of the federal poverty level. 

Id. at 13. Based on this income level, ALJ Guhl determined that Mr. Norman was 

entitled to a five-year payment arrangement. Id.; see 66 Pa. C.S. § 1405(b)(1)

(stating that “[t]he length of time for a customer to resolve an unpaid balance on an 

account . . . subject to a payment arrangement shall not extend beyond[] . . . [f]ive 

years for customers with a gross monthly household income level not exceeding 

150% of the [f]ederal poverty level”). Therefore, ALJ Guhl established a payment 

arrangement for Mr. Norman of one-sixtieth of his past due balance per month

(approximately $32.81 per month) for a period of five years, ALJ Guhl Initial 

Decision at 16-17, and the Commission adopted ALJ Guhl’s findings and 

conclusions on this issue, Comm’n Op. & Order, 6/18/20, at 19, 21-22, 29-30. 

Notably, Mr. Norman does not challenge this portion of the Commission’s decision, 

asserting that “the Commission correctly concluded that [he] met his burden [of 

proving] that he is eligible for a payment arrangement.” Pet. for Rev. at 1.
19

3. Medical Certification

Finally, Mr. Norman asserts several disjointed arguments regarding ALJ 

Guhl’s evidentiary rulings relating to Mr. Norman’s request for a medical 

certification, baldly claiming that ALJ Guhl was biased against him and based her 

rulings on false statements by PECO. See Norman Br. at 10-11, 32. Mr. Norman 

presented similar claims in his Exceptions filed with the Commission, which the 

Commission found to be unsubstantiated and without merit. After reviewing ALJ 

Guhl’s evidentiary rulings and the conduct of the proceedings, the Commission 

concluded:

[Mr. Norman] alleges[] . . . the improper receipt of documentary 

evidence by [ALJ Guhl] based on hearsay grounds. [Mr. Norman] 

asserts that the allowance of documents or testimony sponsored by 

PECO were misrepresentations, falsifications or unacceptable, and 

[based on] the ALJ’s acceptance of conjecture. The Exceptions further 

repeat arguments alleging bias on the part of [ALJ Guhl]. In addition, 

[Mr. Norman] expressly objects to the sufficiency of the evidence 

regarding the receipt (or lack of receipt) of a medical certification from 

PECO. . . . 

On consideration of the allegations of bias on the part of [ALJ 

Guhl] . . . , we shall deny the Exceptions of Mr. Norman. A review of 

the record in this matter fails to disclose any basis for such allegations 

against the presiding ALJ . . . .

Comm’n Op. & Order, 6/18/20, at 20-21; see id. at 23 (concluding that “the presiding 

ALJ exercised the appropriate discretion in all rulings concerning the receipt of 

evidence in this proceeding”). We find no error in this decision.

Although the Commission was unable to determine whether PECO sent a 

medical certification form to Mr. Norman or his physician when he requested one, 

it ultimately concluded that the evidence regarding a medical certification was

“ancillary” to Mr. Norman’s dispute. Id. at 26. We agree.
20

The crux of Mr. Norman’s Formal Complaint was PECO’s failure to offer him 

a payment arrangement before terminating his service or to establish a payment 

arrangement after the termination so that he may resume service. See C.R. at 2 (in 

his Formal Complaint, Mr. Norman averred, “I would like a payment agreement” 

and “I was never given an opportunity to establish a fair and feasible payment 

arrangement”). The Formal Complaint makes no mention of a request for a medical 

certification. See id. In addition, the only issue Mr. Norman raises in his Petition 

for Review is PECO’s failure to offer or establish a payment arrangement. See Pet. 

for Rev. at 1.

In its decision, the Commission stated: “[W]hile Section 1407 of the Code, 

66 Pa. C.S. § 1407, sets out the terms that a [public] utility may impose on a customer 

requesting reconnection of service, it does not divest the Commission of its authority 

to order a payment arrangement pursuant to [Section 1405 of the Code,] 66 Pa. C.S. 

§ 1405[,] for a customer who was lawfully disconnected for nonpayment.” Comm’n

Op. & Order, 6/18/20, at 26 (emphasis added). The Commission then concluded, 

based on the evidence of record, that Mr. Norman was still a customer of PECO and, 

as a customer, he was entitled to a five-year payment arrangement to resolve his 

unpaid balance. Id. at 29. The Commission further ordered that if Mr. Norman 

complies with the payment arrangement established, PECO “shall not” terminate or 

suspend his electric service except for valid safety or emergency reasons. Id. at 29-

30. In other words, Mr. Norman obtained the precise relief he sought by initiating 

these proceedings – a payment arrangement to resolve his significant unpaid balance 

and the restoration of his electric service. See supra note 7.
21

Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s Order.16

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

16 Mr. Norman devotes a significant portion of his appellate brief to arguing that this Court 

should “reopen” his prior case before ALJ Long (involving the accuracy of his electric bills and 

PECO’s “smart meter” technology), asserting claims of ALJ Long’s bias, prejudice, and abuse of 

judicial procedure. See, e.g., Norman Br. at 11-17, 19, 26-31, 33-35. Aside from the fact that Mr. 

Norman did not raise these claims in his Exceptions filed with the Commission, to the extent Mr. 

Norman attempts to re-litigate the factual and evidentiary matters before ALJ Long, they have 

been fully litigated in the proceedings before the Commission and the appellate courts in Norman 

I and, thus, are not properly before this Court.

Mr. Norman’s brief also contains arguments relating to events that allegedly took place 

after the Commission’s June 18, 2020 Order, and he appends several documents relating to these 

claims that are not included in the certified record. See, e.g., Norman Br. at 18 (asserting that 

following the Commission’s decision, “PECO still refused to reconnect [Mr. Norman’s] electric

service unless [he] allowed PECO to exchange his first-generation Smart Meter with a more 

advanced Smart Meter”). However, this Court cannot consider evidence on appeal that was not 

part of the record before the Commission. See Pa. Tpk. Comm’n v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of 

Rev., 991 A.2d 971, 974 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009); Pryor v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Colin Serv. 

Sys.), 923 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Therefore, we will not consider Mr. Norman’s

extra-record evidence or arguments.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deree J. Norman, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 690 C.D. 2020

:

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 16th day of March, 2021, we hereby AFFIRM the June 18, 

2020 Order of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge