United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Oversight of Government Management, the 

Federal Workforce, and the District of 

Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

DOE’s International 

Radiological Threat 

Reduction Program 

Needs to Focus Future 

Efforts on Securing 

the Highest Priority 

Radiological Sources 

January 2007 

 

GAO-07-282 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

January 2007

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

DOE’s International Radiological Threat 

Reduction Program Needs to Focus 

Future Efforts on Securing the Highest 

Priority Radiological Sources 

Highlights of GAO-07-282, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

Following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, U.S. and 

international experts raised

concerns that unsecured 

radiological sources, such as 

strontium-90 and cesium-137, were

vulnerable to theft and could be

used to make a dirty bomb. In

response, DOE established the 

International Radiological Threat

Reduction program to secure highrisk sources in other countries. 

GAO was asked to (1) assess DOE’s 

progress in helping other countries 

secure their high-risk sources, (2)

identify DOE’s current and planned

program costs, and (3) describe

coordination between DOE and 

U.S. and international agencies to

secure sources in other countries.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making several 

recommendations to DOE to better 

prioritize sites to be selected for 

security upgrades and strengthen 

program management practices,

including developing a long-term 

sustainability plan to protect DOE’s 

investment in security upgrades. In

addition, GAO is asking Congress

to consider providing NRC with 

authority and a direct 

appropriation to conduct 

regulatory development activities

to help improve other countries’ 

security over sources. DOE said 

that our recommendations were 

helpful and would further 

strengthen its program. NRC said 

it would work closely with relevant 

executive branch agencies and

IAEA if Congress acts upon our 

matter for consideration. 

Since 2002, the Department of Energy (DOE) has upgraded the security of 

hundreds of sites in other countries that contain radiological sources and 

has achieved noteworthy accomplishments, including removing radioactive 

material in Chechnya. However, DOE has made limited progress securing 

many of the most dangerous sources located in waste storage facilities and 

hundreds of sources across Russia contained in radioisotope thermoelectric 

generators (RTG). When DOE expanded the program from the former 

Soviet Union to a global effort, it also expanded the types of sites that 

required upgrades. As a result, as of September 2006, almost 70 percent of 

all sites secured were medical facilities, which generally contain one 

radiological source. Furthermore, DOE has not developed a long-term plan 

to ensure that security upgrades will be adequately sustained once installed. 

From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent 

approximately $108 million to improve the security of sources in other 

countries. However, funding for the program has steadily declined in recent 

years, and future funding is uncertain because the agency places a higher 

priority on securing special nuclear material such as plutonium and highly 

enriched uranium. 

DOE has improved coordination with the Department of State and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to secure sources in other countries. 

DOE, however, has not always integrated its efforts efficiently. For example,

DOE did not transfer $5 million from its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to 

NRC for strengthening international regulatory controls over radiological 

sources, despite a Senate Appropriations Committee report directing DOE to 

do so. In addition, gaps in information sharing between DOE and the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have impeded DOE’s ability to 

target the most vulnerable sites in IAEA member states for security 

improvements. 

Recovered RTG Containing Large Amounts of Strontium-90 

Source: DOE.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-282.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5 

Background 8

Although DOE Has Improved the Security of Many Sites 

Worldwide, It Has Not Developed a Long-Term Plan to Sustain

the Improvements, and Many Dangerous Radiological Sources 

Remain Unsecured 9 

DOE Has Spent Approximately $108 Million to Secure Radiological 

Sources Worldwide, but Future Program Funding Is Uncertain

because of an Increased Emphasis on Securing Special Nuclear 

Materials 33

Coordination with State and NRC Has Improved, but DOE Still 

Faces Coordination Problems Securing Radiological Sources 

Worldwide 43

Conclusions 55

Recommendations for Executive Action 57 

Matters for Congressional Consideration 59 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 59 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 64 

Appendix II DOE’s IRTR Program Expenditures, Allocated 

by Region, as of August 31, 2006 68 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Energy 70 

Appendix IV Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 75 

Tables 

Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of 

September 30, 2006 13 

Table 2: DOE and Other Countries’ Removal of RTGs in Russia 16 

Table 3: DOE’s IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of 

August 31, 2006 34 

Page i GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Table 4: DOE’s Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006 40 

Figures 

Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security 

Upgrades 12

Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia 16 

Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded 

by DOE 19 

Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing 

Radiological Sources 23 

Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator 

with Holes in the Roof 29 

Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic 30 

Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations 39 

Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources 

and Unsecured Spent Fuel 51 

Page ii GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Abbreviations 

ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organization 

DOE Department of Energy 

EC European Commission 

EU European Union 

EWGPP Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium 

Production Program 

FSU Former Soviet Union 

GSSP Global Search and Secure Program 

GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

HEU Highly Enriched Uranium 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IRSRA Iraq Radiological Source Regulatory Authority 

IRTR International Radiological Threat Reduction Program 

NDF Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 

SNRCU State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

January 31, 2007 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight 

 of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, 

 and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S. and 

international experts raised concerns that unsecured radiological sources 

were vulnerable to theft and posed a significant security threat to the 

United States and the international community. Radioactive material, such 

as cobalt-60, cesium-137, and strontium-90, is encapsulated or sealed in 

metal—such as stainless steel, titanium, or platinum—to prevent its 

dispersal and is commonly called a sealed radiological source. Sealed 

radiological sources are used worldwide for many legitimate purposes, 

such as medical, industrial, and agricultural applications. These 

applications include radiation treatment for cancer patients, food and 

blood irradiation, and oil drilling. However, the total number of these 

sources in use worldwide is unknown because many countries do not 

systematically account for them. It is estimated that thousands of these 

sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned—commonly referred to as 

orphan sources. If certain types of these sources were obtained by 

terrorists, they could be used to produce a simple and crude, but 

potentially dangerous, weapon—known as a radiological dispersion 

device, or dirty bomb. 

The amount of radiation emitted by these sources varies based on the size 

and type of the source. For example, teletherapy machines, which are 

used to treat cancer patients and are found in hospitals and oncology 

clinics, contain a single cobalt-60 source ranging from about 1,000 to 

10,000 curies.

1

 DOE officials have estimated that there are approximately 

 1

A curie is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. In modern nuclear physics, it is defined 

as the amount of substance in which 37 billion atoms per second undergo radiological 

disintegration. In the international system of units, the becquerel is the preferred unit of 

radioactivity. One curie equals 3.7 x 1010 becquerels. 

Page 1 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
2,000 teletherapy sources located primarily in developing nations around 

the world. Additionally, strontium-90 sources contained in large devices 

known as radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG), designed to 

provide electric power to navigational facilities such as lighthouses and 

weather stations, contain between 25,000 and 250,000 curies. U.S. and 

Russian officials have estimated that there were more than 1,050 RTGs 

produced and distributed throughout the former Soviet Union. These 

devices present a particularly high security risk because of their high 

levels of radioactivity and inadequate protection. The Department of 

Energy (DOE) has reported that the RTGs likely represent the largest 

unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. Waste storage facilities 

also pose a considerable threat if left unsecured because any one of these 

facilities can store, at any given time, up to 3 million curies of material. 

In 2001, a congressional report directed DOE to use a portion of its fiscal 

year 2002 supplemental appropriation to address the threat posed by dirty 

bombs.2

 In response to the congressional requirement, the National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)3

 established the Radiological 

Threat Reduction Task Force to identify, recover, and secure vulnerable, 

high-risk radiological sources, budgeting $20.6 million for the program in 

fiscal year 2002. The program initially focused on securing sources in the 

countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because DOE officials 

determined this region had the greatest number of vulnerable sources. In

2003, at the direction of the Secretary of Energy, DOE expanded the scope 

of the program to secure sealed sources worldwide, ultimately establishing 

the International Radiological Threat Reduction (IRTR) Program. The 

program’s primary objective is to protect U.S. national security interests 

by (1) implementing rapid physical security upgrades at vulnerable sites 

containing radioactive sources; (2) locating, recovering, and consolidating 

lost or abandoned high-risk radioactive sources; and (3) supporting the 

development of the infrastructure necessary to sustain security 

enhancements and supporting regulatory controls, including the 

development of regional partnerships to leverage international resources. 

In addition, DOE has established a program to recover sealed sources 

produced and distributed in the United States, known as the U.S. 

 2

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-350, at 431 (2001). 

3

NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (2000), with 

responsibility for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors 

programs. 

Page 2 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Radiological Threat Reduction program.4

 Part of this program’s mission is 

to recover U.S.-origin sources on a case-by-case basis that were supplied

by DOE to other countries under the Atoms for Peace program.5

The IRTR program is administered by NNSA with support from multiple 

national laboratories, including Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

(PNNL), Sandia National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory, Remote Sensing Laboratory, Brookhaven 

National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los 

Alamos National Laboratory.6

 The national laboratories’ responsibilities 

include (1) assessing the physical security requirements of countries 

participating in the program, (2) recommending specific upgrades to 

strengthen radiological source security, and (3) ensuring that 

recommended upgrades are properly installed. 

IRTR is one of eight programs within DOE’s Global Threat Reduction 

Initiative (GTRI). These programs are responsible for identifying, securing, 

and removing and/or facilitating the disposition of high-risk, vulnerable 

nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the world that 

pose a potential threat to the United States and the international 

community.7

 In September 2006, DOE reorganized GTRI to consolidate its 

nuclear and radiological threat reduction programs. As a result, the IRTR

program was integrated into a newly combined nuclear and radiological 

threat reduction effort that focuses on three major geographic areas—

North and South America, Europe and Africa, and Asia and countries of 

 4

GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded Recovery

of Sealed Radiological Sources, GAO-05-967 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2005). 

5

The Atoms for Peace Program was established in the 1950s for the purpose of promoting

peaceful domestic and international exploration, development, and advancement of

nuclear energy. Under the auspices of the program, DOE and its predecessor agencies 

provided many countries with sealed radiological sources. 

6

DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. The mission of DOE’s 

22 laboratories has evolved. Originally created to design and build atomic weapons, these 

laboratories have since expanded to conduct research in many disciplines—from highenergy physics to advanced computing. 

7

In addition to the IRTR program, GTRI consists of the U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction,

the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, the Russian Research Reactor 

Fuel Return, the U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance, Emerging

Threats and Gap Materials, Global Research Reactor Security, and BN-350 programs. 

Page 3 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
the former Soviet Union.8

 As part of this restructuring, DOE issued new 

program guidance assigning priority rankings to the types of sites and 

radiological sources that will be secured in the future. 

The Department of State (State) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) also fund efforts to secure radiological sources in other countries, 

though on a much smaller scale than DOE. State provides overall policy 

direction for U.S. government international radiological source security 

efforts and has broadened international support for the International 

Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Code of Conduct, as well as guidance on 

the import and export of radiological sources.9

 State also provides IAEA 

with funds to, among other things, conduct training, workshops, and 

advisory missions to improve member states’ security practices and 

procedures. NRC has advised and provided guidance on the development 

of programs in Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan to improve nuclear 

regulatory controls over radiological sources, including establishing 

radiological source inventories and promoting the development of laws, 

rules, and regulations governing controls over this material. 

In addition to IAEA, the European Commission (EC) also provides 

assistance to countries—primarily those that are candidates or potential

candidates for joining the European Union (EU)—to improve the security

of sites containing radiological sources.10 EC activities in this area are a

component of its efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. 

 8

The countries of the former Soviet Union include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, 

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 

9

The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources serves as a guide

in developing policies, laws, and regulations on maintaining the safety and security of

radiological sources. It is not, however, legally binding. The code, which was revised in 

2003, includes, among other things, enhanced requirements for the security of sources. As 

of December 2006, 88 countries, including the United States, had committed to implement

the code. Further, in September 2004, IAEA’s Board of Governors approved new guidance

on the import and export of sources, which is designed to help countries ensure that highrisk sources are supplied only to authorized end-users. As of December 2006, 37 countries, 

including the United States, had committed to implement the import/export guidance. 

10The EC manages foreign assistance programs for its 27 EU member states. 

Page 4 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
In 2003, we issued a report at your request focusing on U.S. and 

international efforts to secure sealed radiological sources.11 We

recommended, among other things, that the Secretary of Energy take the 

lead in developing a comprehensive plan to strengthen controls over other 

countries’ sealed sources. This report (1) assesses the progress DOE has 

made in implementing its program to help other countries secure their 

sealed radiological sources, (2) identifies DOE’s current and planned 

program costs, and (3) describes DOE’s coordination with other U.S. 

agencies and international organizations to secure radiological sources in

other countries. To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation

on the IRTR program from DOE and its national laboratories and 

conducted interviews with key program officials. We also visited four 

countries that are major recipients of DOE assistance to improve 

radiological source security—Georgia, Lithuania, Poland, and Russia—to 

observe how equipment and training were being utilized and to discuss the 

implementation of the program with foreign officials. In addition, we 

analyzed cost and budgetary information, conducted a data reliability 

assessment of the data we received, and interviewed knowledgeable

program officials on the reliability of the data. We determined that these 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More details 

about the scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We 

conducted our review from November 2005 to December 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain 

radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program’s 

inception in 2002. These achievements include the removal of cesium and 

cobalt sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya and providing 

security upgrades to vulnerable sites in Greece prior to the 2004 Olympics. 

However, many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources still 

remain unsecured, particularly in Russia. Specifically, 16 of 20 waste

storage sites across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while more 

than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are 

vulnerable to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to 

broaden the program’s scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also 

expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as 

Results in Brief 

 11GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control 

Sealed Radiological Sources Need Strengthening, GAO-03-638 (Washington, D.C.: May 16,

2003). 

Page 5 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical 

facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. Several DOE 

and national laboratory officials with whom we spoke questioned the 

benefit of upgrading such a large number of medical facilities, while higher 

priority sites—such as waste storage facilities and RTGs—remained 

unsecured. In addition, DOE’s program does not address the 

transportation of radiological sources from one location to another, a 

security measure that DOE and international officials have identified as 

the most vulnerable link in the radiological supply chain. DOE has 

experienced numerous problems and challenges implementing its program 

to secure radiological sources worldwide, including a lack of cooperation 

from some countries and access to sites with dangerous material. 

Furthermore, some high-risk countries have not given DOE permission to 

undertake security upgrades at all. Finally, DOE has not developed a plan

to ensure that countries receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain 

them over the long term. This is particularly problematic, given the 

number of problems we identified during our site visits with the 

maintenance of security equipment and storage facilities funded by DOE. 

For example in Georgia we found that a facility containing RTGs and a 

seed irradiator—which has thousands of curies of cesium-137—had 

several large openings in the roof. In Lithuania, we visited an oncology

clinic and observed that the security cable, which is used to secure a 

teletherapy machine’s cobalt-60 source, had been broken for almost a 

month. A DOE physical security specialist told us that the cable was the 

most important security feature installed by DOE because it triggered an 

alarm that was connected to the source. 

From its inception in 2002 through August 31, 2006, DOE spent 

approximately $108 million to implement its program to secure 

radiological sources worldwide. A majority of the funds spent—$68 

million—was to (1) conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites 

containing radiological sources; (2) install physical security upgrades at 

these sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and 

surveillance cameras; and (3) help countries draft laws and regulations to 

increase security and accounting of sources. In addition, DOE provided 

$13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to strengthen controls over 

radiological sources in IAEA member states. The remainder, or $26.5 

million, paid for program planning activities such as developing program 

guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and conducting studies. 

Russia received almost one-third of total DOE funding, which focused 

primarily on orphan source recovery, RTG removal and disposal, and 

physical security upgrades at waste storage facilities. DOE officials told us 

that securing radiological sources in other countries is a lower priority 

Page 6 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
than securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as plutonium and 

highly enriched uranium. As a result, recent budget allotments for 

radiological security activities were reduced, and future funding for the 

program is uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE may 

be unable to meet outstanding contractual commitments in the countries 

where it has installed more than $40 million in security upgrades. To offset 

anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to obtain international 

contributions from other countries but efforts to date have produced 

limited results. 

DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological 

sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has 

involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction 

activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the 

agencies. Additionally, DOE and NRC supported a State-led interagency 

effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source Regulatory Authority and

develop a radiological regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. However, DOE has 

not always integrated its nuclear regulatory development efforts 

efficiently. For example, DOE and NRC disagreed about whether, as 

directed by the Senate Appropriations Committee, DOE should have 

transferred $5 million from its fiscal year 2004 appropriation to NRC for 

the purpose of strengthening international regulatory controls over 

radiological sources. Ultimately, the funds were not transferred, causing 

friction between the agencies. In addition, DOE has not adequately 

coordinated the activities of multiple programs within the agency 

responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other 

countries. For example, in Poland we found that radiological sources were 

secured at a storage facility by DOE’s radiological program while spent 

nuclear fuel—located next to the sources in the same storage facility—had 

not been secured by DOE’s nuclear security upgrades program. Polish 

officials told us they could not understand why the separate DOE 

programs had not coordinated their efforts to ensure that all of the 

material was secured at the same time. DOE has generally improved 

coordination with IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries’ 

radiological sources and has developed bilateral and multilateral 

partnerships with IAEA member states to improve their regulatory 

infrastructures. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between 

DOE and IAEA, and with the EC, have impeded DOE’s ability to target the 

most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to avoid possible 

duplication of efforts. 

To help ensure that DOE’s program focuses on securing the highest 

priority radiological sources, we are recommending that the Secretary of 

Page 7 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Energy and the Administrator of the NNSA, among other things, (1) limit 

the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that 

receive security upgrades to only those deemed the highest risk; (2) 

accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in Russia as practicable; and 

(3) develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that 

includes, among other things, future resources required to implement such 

a plan. 

Furthermore, if the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure 

development is the key to the long-term sustainability of radiological 

source security efforts, it should consider providing NRC with authority 

and a direct appropriation to conduct these activities. The appropriation 

would be provided to NRC in lieu of providing the funds to DOE or 

another agency to reimburse NRC for their activities. 

The small size, portability and potential value of sealed radiological 

sources make them vulnerable to misuse, improper disposal and theft. 

According to IAEA, the confirmed reports of illicit trafficking in 

radiological materials have increased since 2002. For example, in 2004, 

about 60 percent of the cases involved radiological materials, some of 

which are considered by U.S. government and IAEA as attractive for the 

development of a dirty bomb. Although experts generally believe that a 

dirty bomb could result in a limited number of deaths, it could, however, 

have severe economic consequences. Depending on the type, amount, and 

form, the dispersed radiological material could cause radiation sickness 

for people nearby and produce serious economic, psychological and social 

disruption associated with the evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the 

contaminated area. Although no dirty bombs have been detonated, in the 

mid-1990s, Chechen separatists placed a canister containing cesium-137 in

a Moscow park. While the device was not detonated and no radiological

material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have the

capability and willingness to use radiological sources as weapons of 

terror. 

Background 

A 2004 study by the National Defense University noted that the economic

impact on a major populated area from a successful dirty bomb attack is 

likely to equal, and perhaps exceed, that of the September 11, 2001, attacks 

on New York City and Washington, D.C. According to another study, the 

economic consequences of detonating a series of dirty bombs at U.S. 

ports, for example, would result in an estimated $58 billion in losses to the 

U.S. economy. The potential impacts of a dirty bomb attack could also 

produce significant health consequences. In 2002, the Federation of 

Page 8 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
American Scientists concluded that an americium radiological source 

combined with one pound of explosives would result in medical 

supervision and monitoring required for the entire population of an area 10 

times larger than the initial blast. 

The consequences resulting from the improper use of radiological sources 

are not theoretical. Some actual incidents involving sources can provide a 

measure of understanding of what could happen in case of a dirty bomb 

attack. In 1987, an accident involving a teletherapy machine containing 

about 1,400 curies of cesium-137, which is generally in the form of a 

powder similar to talc and highly dispersible, killed four people in Brazil 

and injured many more. The accident and its aftermath caused about $36 

million in damages to the region (Goiania) where the accident occurred, 

according to an official from Brazil’s Nuclear Energy Commission. In 

addition to the deaths and economic impact, the accident created 

environmental and medical problems. For example, 85 houses were 

significantly contaminated and 41 of these had to be evacuated. The 

decontamination process required the demolition of homes and other 

buildings and generated 3,500 cubic meters of radioactive waste. Over 

8,000 persons requested monitoring for contamination in order to obtain 

certificates stating they were not contaminated.

DOE has improved the security of hundreds of sites that contain 

radiological sources in more than 40 countries since the program’s 

inception in 2002. However, despite these achievements, such as removing 

dangerous sources from a waste storage facility in Chechnya, many of the 

high-risk and most dangerous sources remain unsecured, particularly in 

Russia. DOE officials told us that the program has barely “scratched the 

surface” in terms of securing the most dangerous sources in the former 

Soviet Union. Specifically, removing dangerous sources from 16 of 20 

waste storage facilities across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while 

more than 700 RTGs remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are 

vulnerable to theft or potential misuse. In 2003, when DOE decided to 

broaden the program’s scope beyond the former Soviet Union, it also 

expanded the types of sites that required security upgrades. As a result, as 

of September 2006, almost 70 percent of all sites secured were medical 

facilities, which generally contain one radiological source. In addition, 

DOE’s program does not address the transportation of radiological 

sources from one location to another, a security measure that DOE and 

international officials have identified as the most vulnerable link in the 

radiological supply chain. DOE has experienced numerous problems and 

challenges implementing its program to secure radiological sources 

Although DOE Has 

Improved the Security 

of Many Sites 

Worldwide, It Has Not 

Developed a LongTerm Plan to Sustain 

the Improvements, 

and Many Dangerous 

Radiological Sources 

Remain Unsecured 

Page 9 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
worldwide, including a lack of cooperation from host country officials. 

Finally, DOE has not developed an adequate plan to ensure that countries 

receiving security upgrades will be able to sustain them once installed. 

DOE Has Secured over 300 

Sites Worldwide, but Many 

High-Priority Radiological 

Sources Remain 

Unsecured 

Since DOE began its program in 2002, it has taken steps to secure 

radiological sources in more than 40 countries and has achieved some 

noteworthy accomplishments. For example, DOE told us that it has (1) 

facilitated the removal of 5,500 curies of cobalt-60 and cesium-137 sources 

from a poorly protected nuclear waste repository in Chechnya, the 

location of continuing political unrest in southeastern Russia; (2) 

constructed storage facilities in Uzbekistan, Moldova, Tajikistan and 

Georgia so that sources can be consolidated at one site to strengthen their 

long-term protection; and (3) increased security at 21 sites in Greece prior 

to the 2004 Olympics, including providing 110 hand-held radiation 

detection devices for first responders.12 DOE secured, among other things, 

facilities with blood irradiators containing cesium chloride and a large 

industrial sterilization facility. 

According to DOE, it has neither the resources nor staff to 

comprehensively address and secure the tens of thousands of vulnerable 

radiological sources worldwide on its own. As a result, it has enlisted the 

support of regional partners and IAEA to implement programs to help 

other countries find, characterize and secure their most dangerous 

sources. DOE works with partner countries to identify sites where highrisk sources may be located and provides the equipment and training to 

conduct searches. Once the sources have been located, DOE enlists the 

support of IAEA or partner countries to transfer them to a secure facility.

For example, DOE established a regional partnership with Lithuania to 

facilitate orphan source recovery efforts both in Lithuania and in 

neighboring countries. DOE purchased radiation detection equipment and 

trained Lithuanian specialists to initiate orphan source recovery efforts. 

Lithuania was able to identify 41 former Soviet military and industrial sites 

that potentially held high-risk radiological sources. Subsequently, 

Lithuania assisted DOE in initiating search and secure efforts in Estonia 

 12The hand-held radiation detection equipment was provided under DOE’s Cooperative 

Radiological Instrument Threat Reduction program. This program is designed to help 

DOE’s international radiological threat reduction program to ensure that other countries’ 

law enforcement officials are provided with the necessary equipment and training to detect 

and mitigate radiological security threats. 

Page 10 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
and Latvia, which resulted in the discovery and disposition of orphan 

sources. 

Despite these achievements, DOE’s program has not adequately addressed 

many high-priority sources. In 2003, the Secretary of Energy directed 

NNSA to expand its program to secure radiological sources worldwide, 

which increased both the number of countries targeted to receive DOE 

assistance and the types of sites to be secured. Expanding the program 

into many countries outside of the former Soviet Union—the initial focus 

and attention of DOE’s program—resulted in the addition of many medical 

facilities that contained lower priority sources that were now being 

targeted for physical security upgrades. 

As of September 30, 2006, DOE’s program had completed the installation 

of physical security upgrades at 368 sites in over 40 countries. However, a 

majority of sites secured do not represent the highest-risk or the most 

vulnerable sources. Of the total sites completed, 256—or about 70 

percent—were hospitals and oncology clinics operating teletherapy 

machines used to provide radiation treatment to cancer patients. These 

machines generally contain a single cobalt-60 radiological source ranging 

from about 1,000 to 10,000 curies. In 38 of the 41 countries—or 93 

percent—DOE had upgraded at least one hospital or oncology clinic. 

According to DOE, many of the countries that are included in its global 

program have medical facilities with radiological sources. As a result, 

these facilities were targeted for upgrades. In addition to the medical 

facilities, DOE has completed security upgrades at 47 research institutes, 

35 commercial and industrial sites, and 30 waste storage facilities. Figure 1 

depicts the countries receiving security upgrades, and table 1 provides a 

breakdown of the total number and types of facilities upgraded by DOE, as 

of September 30, 2006. 

A Majority of Sites Secured by 

DOE Are Hospitals and 

Oncology Clinics 

Page 11 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Figure 1: Countries Receiving DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades 

Russia and FSU:

Russia

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Estonia

Georgia

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Latvia

Lithuania

Moldova

Tajikistan

Ukraine

Uzbekistan

Africa:

Ethiopia

Morocco

Tanzania

Europe:

Albania

Bulgaria

Greece

Poland

Serbia

Middle East:

Afghanistan

Egypt

Iraq

Jordan

Yemen

Latin America:

Bolivia

Chile

Colombia

Ecuador

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Nicaragua

Panama

Peru

Asia-Pacific: 

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Philippines

Vietnam

Countries shaded in grey indicate implementation

Regions

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE data and Map Resources (map).

Page 12 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Table 1: DOE-Funded Physical Security Upgrades by Facility, as of September 30, 

2006 

Site type 

Number of sites 

completed by DOE

Percent of total 

number of sites 

completed by DOE 

Number of 

countries where 

this type of site

has been

completeda

Medical 256 70% 38

Research institutes 47 13 19

Commercial/Industrial 35 10 17

Waste storage 

facilities(Radons)b

30 8 22

Total 368 100%c41

Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data. 

Note: According to DOE, there are about 2,249 sites worldwide that would be likely candidates for 

physical security upgrades. As of September 2006, DOE had completed upgrades at about 16 

percent of these sites. 

a

Many of the countries received physical security upgrades for more than one type of facility.

b

Waste storage facilities are specifically identified as Radons in the FSU. 

c

Percentage does not add up to 100 due to rounding. 

Six national laboratory officials and security specialists responsible for 

implementing the program told us that although progress had been made 

in securing radiological sources, DOE had focused too much attention on 

securing medical facilities at the expense of other higher-priority sites, 

such as waste storage facilities and RTGs. In their view, DOE installed 

security upgrades at so many of these facilities primarily because the 

upgrades are relatively modest in scope and cost. For example, a typical 

suite of security upgrades at a medical facility costs between $10,000 to

$20,000, depending on the size of the site, whereas the average cost to 

remove and replace an RTG in the Far East region of Russia is about 

$72,000 based on 2006 dollars. 

Officials from three of the four recipient countries we visited also raised

concerns about DOE’s focus on securing radiological sources at so many 

medical facilities. For example, staff responsible for operating the 

teletherapy machines in hospitals in Lithuania and Poland told us that the 

cobalt-60 sources contained in the teletherapy machine did not pose a 

significant security risk. In their view, it was highly unlikely that the 

sources could be easily removed from these machines and that it would 

take more than one highly skilled and determined intruder to remove the 

source and transport it out of the facility without being detected or 

Page 13 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
dangerously exposed to radiation.13 In fact, while emphasizing the 

importance of securing medical facilities, DOE officials stated that getting

medical and security staff to buy into the need for improved security has 

been a consistent challenge for the program. Further, Russian officials told

us that radiological sources in hospitals did not pose a comparable risk to 

RTGs or lost or abandoned sources. DOE has not offered to fund any 

security upgrades of Russian medical facilities since its funds are focused 

on securing RTGs, Radons, and orphan sources. 

According to five national laboratory officials and security specialists, 

completing upgrades at medical facilities also served to demonstrate rapid 

program progress because the upgrades are completed relatively quickly. 

DOE has relied upon an indicator that focuses on the number of sites that 

have been upgraded, or “sites secured.” While sites completed is the 

primary metric used by DOE, the program does compile and track several 

additional activities, including the amount of curies secured, countries that 

receive regulatory assistance, and orphan sources recovered.

In measuring program performance, the Director of IRTR said that the 

number of sites completed demonstrated conclusively that work has been 

completed and represents the best available measurement. In discussions 

with other high-level DOE officials about the program, they consistently 

identified the number of sites upgraded as evidence that the program had 

been achieving results and reducing the threat posed by radiological 

sources overseas. However, PNNL and Sandia National Laboratory 

officials told us that the measurement used by DOE does not demonstrate 

how the program is reducing threats posed to U.S. national security 

interests. In their view, this measurement is one-dimensional and does not 

adequately distinguish lower-priority sites from higher-priority sites. 

DOE has made limited progress removing hundreds of RTGs containing 

high-priority sources which, according to DOE, likely represent the largest 

unsecured quantity of radioactivity in the world. These devices were 

designed to provide electric power and are suited for remote locations to

power navigational facilities such as lighthouses and meteorological 

stations. Each has activity levels ranging from 25,000 to 250,000 curies of 

strontium-90—similar to the amount of strontium-90 released from the 

Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in 1986. As of September 30, 2006, 

Hundreds of RTGs Remain 

Unsecured in Russia 

 13Sandia National Labatories determined that a source could be easily removed from a

teletherapy machine using basic tools and drawings. 

Page 14 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
DOE had funded the removal of about 13 percent of all RTGs located in

Russia’s inventory. Until early 2000, approximately 1,049 RTGs were in 

Russia. Of those, approximately 317 RTGs have been removed over the 

past several years, according to DOE and Russian officials. DOE funded 

about 40 percent of those removed (132 RTGs) and Norway, France, and 

Russia funded the removal of the remaining 185.14 However, an estimated 

732 RTGs, representing several million curies of radioactivity, remain 

unsecured. 

A majority of RTGs are located along coastlines in three major regions—

the Baltic, Artic and Far East. To date, DOE has focused the majority of its 

efforts on removing RTGs along the Arctic coast. However, more than 90

RTGs remain operational along the Baltic coast under control of the 

Russian Ministry of Defense, which DOE does not plan to remove. DOE 

officials said that the program will now focus its efforts almost exclusively 

in the Far East because DOE expects other countries to remove RTGs 

from the Baltic region. Figure 2 shows the location of the remaining RTGs 

in Russia, and table 2 summarizes DOE’s efforts, along with other 

countries, to remove RTGs in Russia.

 14Norway has committed to securing an additional 77 RTGs along the Arctic coast, 

including the Kola Peninsula. Specifically, Norway agreed to remove 30 RTGs in 2006, 30 in 

2007 and 17 in 2008. 

Page 15 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Figure 2: Location of RTGs Remaining in Russia

Sea of

Okhotsk

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE data and Map Resources (map). 

Northern Sea Route = 396 RTGs

= Approximately

45 RTGs

Moscow

Russia

Finland

Sweden

Norway

Ukraine

China

Kazakhstan

Japan

Mongolia

South Korea

North Korea

Baltic Sea =

93 RTGs

Arctic Ocean

Sea of

Japan

Bering Sea

Kara

Sea

White Sea =

98 RTGs

Far East =

145 RTGs

Kola 

Peninsula

Table 2: DOE and Other Countries’ Removal of RTGs in Russia 

Region Baltic Far East Arctic Total

a

Total estimated RTG inventory in Russia 96 233 720 1049b

DOE removal in fiscal year 2004 0 0 63 63

DOE removal in fiscal year 2005 3 25 24 52

DOE removal in fiscal year 2006 0 0 17 17

Total DOE removals to date 3 25 104 132c

Estimated DOE-partner countries removal d d185d185d

Estimated remaining RTGs in Russia 93 208 431 732d

Source: GAO analysis based on DOE data. 

Note: For the purpose of our analysis, we are combining the Northern Sea route and White Sea route 

and labeling them the Arctic region. 

Page 16 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
a

Because Russia has not comprehensively tracked the existing number of RTGs, DOE and Russian 

figures for the total number of RTGs differ, as do the number of RTGs recovered. Russian officials 

have cited varying figures regarding the total number of RTGs that exist in Russia. Russia has

documented that at least 670 RTGs exist throughout the Russian Federation territory. However, other 

Russian sources estimated that the number of RTGs in Russia ranges from 605 to 700. 

b

The total does not include the 16 RTGs removed in other former Soviet Union countries (13 in the 

Ukraine and 3 in Georgia). 

c

DOE is now engaged in the removal of an additional 27 RTGs in the Far East. 

d

An additional 185 RTGs were removed by DOE partner countries, including Russia, Norway, and 

France. However, the exact breakdown by region for these RTG removals was not known by DOE. 

DOE assumed that these 185 RTGs were removed from the Arctic region. 

DOE officials told us that the Far East region is now a priority for RTG 

removal because Russian Ministry of Defense officials have specifically

requested DOE’s assistance for the Far East and provided DOE with a 

prioritized list of RTGs to be removed. In addition, other countries have 

expressed a willingness to support future RTG removal in the Baltic 

region. For example, according to DOE, in February 2005 Denmark 

announced that it had reached an agreement with Russia to replace and 

remove all RTGs in the Baltic region. Other European nations, including 

Germany, have also offered assistance. However, Russian officials told us 

that assistance from Germany has not materialized and that Denmark had 

rescinded its offer to provide assistance. Moreover, these officials 

expressed concern regarding DOE’s decision to fund the removal of RTGs 

exclusively from the Far East region. In their view, the RTGs in the Baltic 

are more vulnerable and should be removed as soon as possible because 

of their accessibility and proximity to large population centers. According 

to DOE officials, if international funding for removal of these vulnerable 

RTGs does not materialize, IRTR will likely have to fund the Baltic effort. 

According to DOE and Russian officials, RTG removal is complex and 

future efforts will face a number of challenges. No comprehensive 

inventory of RTGs exists and, as a result, the actual number of these 

devices is unknown. RTGs were originally manufactured in Estonia, but 

the company dissolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and all the 

records were lost. The Russian organization that originally designed them 

is currently developing a database of known RTGs in Russia—with U.S. 

funding and support—to reconstruct records and develop a reliable 

accounting of the total number of devices produced. However, this effort 

has been ongoing for years and remains incomplete. Officials from the 

Russian organization told us that they lack confidence that the precise 

number and location of RTGs, both in Russia and other countries of the 

former Soviet Union, will ever be known. 

Page 17 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
RTGs contain sources with high levels of radioactivity, and their removal 

requires specialized containers for their transport and adequate storage 

capacity to securely house them once removed. Russian officials reported 

that RTG removal had been slowed due to a lack of both. To address the 

need for containers and space, DOE has enlisted Canada’s support to 

provide funds to Russia for constructing an additional 17 containers for 

transporting RTGs, bringing the total to 36. However, this effort is not 

scheduled to be completed until early to mid-2007.15 DOE is also 

supporting the construction of storage facilities at two locations in the 

Russian Far East, Vladivostok and Kamchatka. When completed, the

Vladivostok facility is expected to house 150 to 200 RTGs. Moreover, a 

smaller storage building is under construction at Kamchatka, which will 

store RTGs until they can be shipped to Vladivostok for permanent 

storage. According to DOE, the Vladivostok facility houses 25 RTGs that 

were recovered from the Russian Far East. By the end of 2006, Vladivostok

is scheduled to house 33 additional recovered RTGs. 

Finally, Russian officials told us that future RTG removal efforts will 

depend on finding a viable, alternative energy source to replace power 

supplied by radiological sources contained in RTGs. DOE has initiated a 

project to provide alternative power sources, including wind and solarpowered energy panels to accelerate RTG removal. However these 

replacements are not always viable. For example, navigational lighthouses 

located in northern Russia experience severe weather and limited daylight 

4 to 5 months per year and cannot rely on solar power during the winter 

months. Russian Ministry of Defense officials have stated that the 

navigational devices are critical and that they will not approve removal of 

any additional RTGs without a viable energy source to replace them. 

Figure 3 shows a navigational beacon with a solar-powered replacement 

energy source funded by DOE that we observed during our fieldwork. 

 15According to DOE, this is part of a larger funding commitment by Canada for $2 million to 

support radiological source security in Russia. 

Page 18 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Figure 3: Replacement Solar-Powered Navigational Beacon Funded by DOE 

Source: GAO.

DOE also noted that RTG removal and replacement has been slowed by 

challenges in project negotiation with Russian officials. For example, costs 

of RTG removal and transport have consistently risen as a result of 

increased Russian price demands and the failure of the Russian 

government to contribute funds to the effort. DOE has also experienced

long delays while waiting for the Russian Ministry of Defense to approve 

the release of information regarding certain RTGs. Inadequate funding to 

support RTG removal has extended the deadline for completion from 2014 

to 2021. 

As an interim measure to help reduce the risk posed by RTGs that have not 

yet been removed, DOE has equipped a select number of RTGs with alarm 

systems that are remotely monitored via satellite as part of a pilot project. 

Specifically the alarm consists of sensors that monitor, among other 

things, vibrations of the device and the source’s movement. Because the 

Page 19 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
source is inside the RTG, the alarms on both the device and its source emit 

regular, electronic signals to a regional base station. If the signals are 

interrupted, then the alarm is triggered. As of September 2006, DOE had 

funded the installation of these security systems for 24 RTGs in the Baltic 

region and 20 RTGs in the Far East region. According to DOE, the cost of 

the alarm system is about $5,000, and about $8,000 to establish the 

regional base station. DOE officials said they will continue to install 

security upgrades to RTGs as an interim measure, as long as the costs 

remain at those levels. 

In addition to RTGs, DOE also has made limited progress securing 

radiological sources stored at waste storage facilities in Russia and 

Ukraine. DOE has determined that the storage facilities in Russia and 

Ukraine are the most vulnerable in the world and pose a significant risk, 

due to the very large quantities of radioactive sources currently housed at 

each site. According to DOE, waste storage facilities can store up to 3 

million curies of radioactive waste. However, upgrades at a majority of 

these facilities throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly in Russia 

and Ukraine, remain incomplete. To date, upgrades at 4 of 15 Radons in 

Russia have been completed since DOE began work in 2002. According to

DOE, upgrades are under way at seven additional Radons. However, work 

has been delayed at several of these facilities. According to DOE, delays in

upgrades to Radons were due in large part to delays in the Russian 

certification process of physical equipment for upgrades at these types of

facilities. In addition, reorganization and managerial changes at the 

primary Russian agency with oversight authority over construction at 

Radon facilities presented challenges for DOE officials trying to gain 

access to Radons for physical security assessments. Furthermore, DOE 

officials noted that progress has been slowed because several Radon 

managers were unwilling to participate in the program until they received 

assurances from DOE that their Radon would receive a level of funding 

comparable to larger Radons. 

Waste Storage Facilities Need 

to Be Secured in Russia and 

Ukraine 

DOE has not completed upgrades at any of Ukraine’s five Radon sites, one 

of which contains all 13 RTGs recovered in Ukraine. According to DOE 

officials, initiating work at the Radons has been problematic because 

Ukrainian officials have designated some sites as “sensitive” and thus 

denied DOE access to them. As a result, security upgrades have been 

delayed for at least 2 years. In May 2005, Ukraine agreed to provide DOE 

access to two of the five sites, and security upgrades at those facilities are 

under way. DOE plans to complete the remaining three Radons by 2010 

but have found that Ukraine is impeding access to these additional sites. 

Page 20 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
In addition, DOE has identified 49 vulnerable waste storage facilities 

worldwide for assistance and has completed work at 26 of these sites in 

several countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, 

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Lithuania. DOE is also undertaking 

upgrades at 23 additional sites. However, DOE has not addressed sites in 

the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, 

Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Libya, Peru, Serbia, and South 

Africa. It was unclear, based on our discussions with DOE officials, when, 

if ever, security upgrades would be completed in these countries. 

Although IAEA officials told us that transportation of high-risk radiological 

sources is the most vulnerable part of the nuclear and radiological supply 

chain, DOE determined that source transport is generally outside the 

scope of the program. Some DOE officials have expressed concern about 

the lack of security during the transport of radiological sources and 

questioned whether transportation should be a component of DOE’s 

program. For example, a May 2005 DOE analysis concluded that DOE was 

addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc basis, and the existing 

method of providing transportation security had serious limitations. The 

analysis also noted that DOE’s current approach is resource limited and 

lacked a commitment to integrate transport security into all countries 

participating in the program. According to DOE’s 2003 program guidelines, 

DOE will fund transportation security upgrades only in Russia and 

Uzbekistan because the United States had international agreements with 

these countries to provide liability coverage when transporting 

radiological sources. As a result, DOE security specialists were not 

pursuing transportation security-related projects with the majority of 

countries participating in the program. However, DOE noted that its 

national laboratories were working with the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor states to strengthen 

transportation security regulations and procedures to reduce the risks of 

theft or diversion of nuclear and other radioactive materials in transit. 

Transportation of High-Risk 

Sources Is a Critical Gap in 

DOE’s Program 

In every country we visited, host country officials identified the 

transportation of sources as a critical vulnerability and a priority for 

security upgrades. Moscow Radon officials told us that transportation 

security had emerged as one of their top priorities. DOE has, in fact, 

provided a fleet of transport vehicles for the Moscow Radon, including 

guard vehicles, escort vehicles, and cargo trucks for transporting both 

liquid and solid waste. However, Radon officials told us that they also 

needed a reliable communication system to ensure the security of sources 

in transit. Consequently, the Moscow Radon funded a satellite-linked cell 

phone to facilitate communication and to monitor vehicles that transport 

Page 21 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
radiological sources. However, at another Radon site we visited in Russia, 

a similar communications system did not exist. Moreover, officials from 

this site told us that their fleet of transportation vehicles was about 30 

years old and needed to be replaced. These officials stated that they 

requested funds from DOE for the vehicle replacement but were told that 

no funds were available.

Another aspect of transportation security concerns equipment containing 

small, easily transportable sources—typically weighing less than 25 

pounds with an average radioactivity level of several curies. DOE 

estimates that about 10,000 of these smaller sources exist in several 

different countries. Specifically these sources, such as americium and 

beryllium, are used in the oil and gas industry for exploration purposes. 

According to DOE, these sources routinely move from one base camp to 

another with limited security, making them vulnerable to theft and 

potential misuse. We saw first-hand how vulnerable these sources were 

during our visit to one industrial facility where we observed a truck used 

to transport a cesium-137 source to a remote gas exploration site. Host 

country officials showed us how easy it would be to remove the sources 

from the truck as they were being secured with a simple lock. In addition, 

country officials told us that although some trucks are equipped with 

mobile phones, many areas along transportation routes are remote, and 

the phones often have no signal. Figure 4 shows an unsecured truck used

to transport radiological sources. 

Page 22 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Figure 4: Unsecured Transportation Vehicle Containing Radiological Sources 

Source: GAO.

Truck compartment that holds sealed sources during transport.

DOE has taken some steps to address this problem, but agency officials 

said that securing mobile sources is too costly and should be the 

responsibility of private industry. In this regard, DOE initiated efforts with 

U.S. industry partners to identify better ways to secure sources that have 

industrial applications and are frequently in transit. In February 2006, DOE 

attended a forum with NRC and the Society for Petroleum Engineers to 

discuss security issues and develop best practices within the industry to

better control radiological sources used overseas for industrial purposes.16

 16DOE identified the Society for Petroleum Engineers, which is an organization that 

represents petroleum companies’ engineers and petro-physicists. Its membership includes 

both service operators, like Chevron and British Petroleum, and service providers, like 

Halliburton. 

Page 23 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
In September 2006, as part of the broader reorganization of its Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative, DOE established new guidance for selecting 

sites to receive physical security upgrades. Under the new guidance, DOE 

has combined its radiological and nuclear material security efforts to 

develop a single threat reduction strategy. This integrated strategy 

prioritizes security efforts, based most importantly on the attractiveness of 

the different types of radiological and nuclear material and (1) their 

proximity to U.S. strategic interests, such as military bases overseas or 

commercial ports; (2) external threat environment within the country; and

(3) internal site vulnerability, which measures existing physical protection 

on site. This new criteria also increased the level of the design basis threat 

required to secure each type of material. For example, sources having a 

curie level exceeding 1,000 could have the same priority for security 

upgrades as certain amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. As 

a result, RTG security remains a high priority, while in DOE’s view, some 

medical radiological sources could also be considered a high priority. 

However, when we asked DOE officials in September 2006 about the 

relative priority of medical sites, they said all of the sites that were 

upgraded under the old guidance would still be considered high priority 

under the new criteria. 

DOE Has Revised Its 

Criteria for Site Selection 

and Increased the Level of 

Upgrades Required to 

Secure Certain Sites and 

Sources 

DOE’s previous guidance, developed in 2003, based site selection on a 

minimum threshold level—measured in curies—of radiological sources 

present at a particular location.17 In addition, the guidance factored in 

other conditions such as the location of the site, the security conditions of 

the site, and evidence of illicit trafficking in the country. According to 

DOE, in a presentation made to us in September 2006, this guidance gave 

equal treatment to all sites within countries receiving security upgrades. 

This guidance did not clearly discriminate between the different types of

sites secured and whether they were considered to be the highest priority. 

For example, securing a waste storage facility, which can contain up to 

three million curies, was given the same weight as securing an oncology 

clinic with one source containing 1,000 curies. Security measures 

recommended for radiological sources were based on a threat scenario of 

one outsider penetrating the facility, equipped with a handgun while 

working with one complicit insider. However, the new guidance 

significantly increases the threat by advancing a more intense scenario, 

 17DOE identified 10 radioisotopes of concern: americium-241, californium-252, cesium-137, 

cobalt-60, curium-234, iridium-192, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, radium-226, and 

strontium-90. 

Page 24 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
including six outsiders with automatic weapons and 10 kilograms of 

explosives working with one complicit insider. As a result, DOE officials 

said that future upgrades to secure radiological sources will have to be 

strengthened to meet the new protection levels. Additional enhancements

at some sites are now being considered to address a more robust designbasis scenario. 

Numerous Problems and 

Challenges Impeded DOE’s 

Efforts to Secure HighPriority Radiological 

Sources at High-Risk 

Radiological Sites 

DOE experienced numerous problems and challenges during program 

implementation that impeded its efforts to secure radiological sources. As 

a result, some projects were delayed, and in some extreme cases, DOE 

was unable to implement its program at all. DOE said it was limited in its 

ability to enhance physical protection in several countries because IRTR is 

a voluntary program. For example, high-risk countries such as Nigeria and 

Turkey were unwilling to cooperate to implement security upgrades. In 

addition, Mexico declined DOE upgrades, although DOE had identified 

several vulnerable sites. While Mexico has continued to decline physical

security assistance, Mexican officials have since agreed to accept 

regulatory infrastructure development assistance. 

In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE developed a 

prioritization model that ranked countries as high, medium, and low risk.18

To date, DOE has initiated work in 49 of the countries identified as 

priorities for assistance. Our analysis showed that DOE attempted to 

initiate efforts to secure radiological sources in 31 high-priority, 17 

medium-priority and one low-priority country. Consequently, about 40 

percent of countries receiving assistance do not represent the highestpriority countries. According to DOE officials, medium and low-priority 

countries-—more than one-third of the total in DOE’s program—were 

selected because these countries had expressed a willingness to receive 

assistance. 

We found a variety of problems and challenges that affected DOE’s ability 

to implement its program in several of the countries targeted for 

assistance. These included, among other things, problems with foreign 

contractor performance and lack of adequate physical infrastructure to 

 18In targeting countries to receive assistance, DOE first assessed the vulnerability of 

radiological sources in 191 countries. Based on this assessment, DOE determined that 100 

of these countries were a high priority and were targeted for assistance. Within the 100 

countries, DOE further refined the priority list and ranked countries as either high, 

medium, or low priority. 

Page 25 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
support security upgrades. DOE officials said that various combinations of 

these and other impediments resulted in delays implementing security 

upgrades in about 75 percent of all countries participating in the program. 

DOE also stated that many of these problems were identified and 

corrected during quality assurance visits by DOE inspection teams. 

Contractor performance emerged as a key challenge. Six DOE officials 

told us that contractor performance and selection of reputable, reliable incountry contractors was critical to successful project implementation. 

DOE asserted that it has to maintain flexibility in selecting foreign 

contractors because most of the countries do not follow normal Western 

business practices. In DOE’s view, problems arising from contractor 

performance resulted from “security culture” and language barriers, which 

caused miscommunication. Some problems we found with reliable incountry contractors included the following: 

• In Bulgaria, a contractor installed steel security doors—which protected 

radiological sources—with the hinges on the outside of the door. As a 

result, a potential transgressor could have unhinged the door and accessed 

the sources; 

• In Kazakhstan, a contractor provided security manuals and procedures for 

newly installed equipment in English instead of the native language. As a 

result, DOE officials found that the hospital staff had not changed the

security codes and were not well versed in proper security procedures; 

and 

• In Georgia, hospital staff told us that the contractor did not train them on 

operating the alarm systems. 

DOE did, however, report working with competent contractors in Poland, 

Lithuania, and Egypt that resulted in timely project implementation. DOE 

project managers for these countries told us that contractors conducted 

adequate training and followed up with security upgrades maintenance. 

Several DOE officials told us that implementing security upgrades also 

presented challenges due to inadequate physical infrastructure. In these 

countries, the types of challenges included lack of reliable electricity, a 

backup power source, and telecommunications at sites containing 

radiological sources. For example, in both Nicaragua and Tanzania, DOE 

officials said that frequent power outages diminished the detection 

capability of security alarms installed and that neither country had a 

Page 26 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
backup source of power to operate the security alarms and security 

lighting provided by DOE. 

DOE has not developed an adequate comprehensive strategy to better 

ensure that physical security upgrades that have been installed, and the

security training that has been provided, will be effectively sustained over 

the long term. DOE’s current guidance states that DOE will sustain 

upgrades by providing countries with a 3-year warranty on newly installed 

security equipment and preventative maintenance contracts, as well as 

providing training on newly installed equipment for operational staff at the 

sites. However, DOE has not formulated a long-term sustainability plan 

that identifies expected completion dates for each country, including an 

exit strategy, and approaches for sustaining upgrades, including how host 

countries will financially continue maintenance of upgrades following 

DOE warranty expiration. In fact, a senior DOE official told us that 

responsibility for drafting and implementing long-term sustainability 

should be that of the host country. Furthermore, DOE has not adequately 

addressed the lack of regulatory infrastructure to provide oversight of 

source security in a majority of countries to receive DOE assistance. 

DOE officials responsible for program implementation said that they were

uncertain that security upgrades installed would be sustained by countries 

once DOE assistance was no longer available. In fact, our analysis showed

that these officials had confidence that the security upgrades would be 

sustained in only 25 percent of the countries. Specifically, officials pointed 

out that countries, such as Bangladesh or Tajikistan, would be unlikely to

sustain upgrades because they do not have the resources to maintain the

equipment and have not identified or allocated funding to maintain them 

beyond the 3-year warranty period. In addition, several host-country 

officials with whom we met expressed similar concerns. For example, 

hospital administrators in three countries told us that hospital budgets 

were already strained and that they could not be certain that funding 

would be available once the warranties expired. Moreover, hospital 

administrators told us it was difficult to estimate the level of resources 

needed to sustain the upgrades because DOE had not provided them with 

future maintenance costs. 

Several sites that received DOE upgrades have already experienced 

maintenance problems. For example, in Georgia, we found that a storage 

facility containing RTGs and a seed irradiator—which has thousands of 

curies of a cesium-137 source—had several large openings in the roof. 

When we asked host government officials about the cause of the openings, 

DOE Has Not Developed a 

Plan to Ensure the LongTerm Sustainability of 

Physical Security 

Upgrades

Page 27 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
they stated that a recent storm had shifted the metal sheets covering the

storage facility’s roof. The officials did not state when the roof would be 

fixed or how funds would be allocated for the repair. In addition, we found 

that surveillance monitors were not being used at a medical facility. In 

fact, according to the hospital staff, the monitors, which were not broken, 

had been turned off for several days.

In Lithuania we visited an oncology clinic and observed that the security 

cable, used to secure a teletherapy machine’s cobalt-60 source, had been 

broken for almost a month. According to a DOE physical protection 

specialist, the cable was the most important security feature because it 

triggered an alarm directly connected to the teletherapy machine’s “head,”

which contains the radiological source. According to DOE, this was 

subsequently corrected as part of program assurance procedures. In 

addition, in Poland, we visited a research facility containing a 22,000 curie 

irradiator. We observed that the motion detection device in the room 

housing the irradiator was not working because of the high level of 

radioactivity present. According to the in-country contractor, the device 

had been disabled at least three times since the equipment was installed 

about a year earlier. Figure 5 shows the temporary storage facility with 

large openings in the roof, and figure 6 shows the broken cable at the 

oncology clinic. 

Page 28 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Figure 5: Storage Facility Containing RTGs and a Seed Irradiator with Holes in the 

Roof 

Source: GAO.

Page 29 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Figure 6: Broken Security Cable at the Oncology Clinic 

In addition to maintenance problems, we also found that a lack of 

adequate training on newly installed equipment further raised questions 

about the long-term success of the program. According to the hospital staff 

at a facility in Georgia, they had not received adequate training from the 

in-country contractor on how to operate the installed alarm systems. We 

found similar problems in other countries we visited. For example, at 

Source: GAO.

Page 30 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
some of the hospitals, security codes allowing entry into rooms where 

sources were located had not been changed on a regular basis. Also, at one 

medical site, more than 50 staff had access to the security code for a room 

storing a radiological source of about 1,250 curies. A DOE physical 

security specialist reported that the security code had not been changed 

from the default settings in at least three FSU countries. Furthermore, this 

specialist noted that staff in charge of protecting the equipment had 

copied security access codes onto checklists that were readily accessible 

to unauthorized staff in about 15 countries. 

According to DOE, another key element of sustaining security of sources 

is having an organized, competent guard force. In general, the guard force 

serves as a critical communications link between the facility staff and the 

response force. We found that several of the 49 countries did not possess 

adequate guard or response forces, and in several cases, the guard forces 

in these countries were untrained and unarmed. Specifically, at one site 

that DOE upgraded, the guard with whom we spoke was unarmed and had 

no viable form of communication in the case of an emergency. At the same 

site, the guard told us that he shared responsibility for site security with an 

individual who served as a guard on a part-time basis in exchange for 

being able to live at the site. Moreover, we found that the absence of a 

reliable source of electricity made it difficult to complete and ensure the 

sustainability of alarms and motion detection devices in some of the 

countries receiving upgrades. For example, both Ecuador and El Salvador

have limited telephone line access. As a result, according to DOE, the local 

guard forces could not be contacted immediately after an alarm was 

triggered at a site containing radiological sources. Consequently, security

alarms installed in lesser developed countries may have marginal longterm impact. 

At some of the facilities we visited, there appeared to be a well trained 

guard force equipped with flashlights, radios, walkie-talkies, or cell 

phones. However, we also found that even at locations where improved 

security systems were in place, only a single guard was present and had no 

reliable method of contacting a response force. In these types of 

situations, according to DOE, the site is very vulnerable to theft. At one 

facility in Lithuania, we were told that the police were located about 30 

minutes from the site. At that facility, we observed that the guards were 

not equipped with guns, and officials were not sure they were always 

present. However, DOE did fund remote monitoring equipment, which 

allowed the local police force to view the site 24 hours per day from the 

police station. 

Page 31 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
According to IAEA experts and at least five DOE and NRC senior level 

officials, a strong and independent nuclear regulatory authority that is able

to provide effective radiological source oversight is critical to program 

sustainability. A key function of a nuclear regulatory body is to establish 

procedures for the control of radiological sources, including the 

development of a basic registry of sources. The absence of reliable 

registries in many countries impeded DOE’s ability to identify a 

comprehensive list of sites to upgrade. Also, the absence of such a list 

complicates DOE’s ability to determine when it has completed its program 

in a particular country. More specifically, DOE physical security 

specialists told us that sources that had been identified and inventoried at

various hospitals were subsequently moved to another location within the 

facility or are no longer being used. Consequently, some of the upgrades 

that DOE installed had limited security impact, or DOE has had to fund 

additional upgrades for the same source. 

We previously reported that DOE was focusing its source security program 

too narrowly on physical security upgrades and not taking into account

respective countries’ long-term needs to develop better nuclear regulatory

infrastructures.19 DOE recognized the critical role of regulatory

infrastructure development midway through the program and 

subsequently added a small regulatory infrastructure development 

component that is designed to support the creation and strengthening of 

effective and sustainable national regulatory infrastructures. DOE officials 

told us that the department’s regulatory infrastructure development efforts 

are meant to complement the more comprehensive efforts of IAEA. In 

1994, IAEA established a “model project” program to enhance countries’ 

regulatory capacity, and the program was available to any member state 

upon request. IAEA continues to provide a variety of regulatory 

infrastructure support services and training to both member and 

nonmember states to support radiological source security and safety. 

The director of the IRTR program said that the long-term impact of DOE’s 

program would likely have been enhanced had there been a stronger 

regulatory infrastructure in place to support the recommended security 

upgrades efforts in many of the countries. However, many countries 

participating in the IRTR program—specifically lesser developed 

countries—lack an independent regulator. According to IAEA, as many as 

 19GAO-03-638. 

Page 32 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
110 countries worldwide lacked the regulatory infrastructure to 

adequately protect or control sealed sources as of 2003. 

As of August 31, 2006, DOE spent approximately $108 million to 

implement the IRTR program. This money was spent to, among other 

things, conduct vulnerability assessments at a variety of sites containing 

radiological sources and to install physical security upgrades at these 

sites, such as hardened windows and doors, motion sensors and 

surveillance cameras. Russia received almost one-third of total DOE 

funding—about $33 million—which focused primarily on orphan source 

recovery, RTG removal and disposal and physical security upgrades at 

waste storage facilities. However, one-fourth of total expenditures—about 

$26.5 million—paid for program planning activities such as development 

of program guidance documents, hiring private consultants, and 

conducting studies. The program has also carried over large balances of 

unspent, unobligated funds each fiscal year since its inception in 2002, 

because of, among other things, large supplemental appropriations at the 

onset of the program and systemic delays in project implementation. DOE 

officials told us that securing radiological sources in other countries is a 

lower priority than securing more dangerous nuclear materials, such as 

plutonium and highly enriched uranium. As a result, DOE reduced funding

for radiological security activities and future funding for the program is 

uncertain. DOE program officials are concerned that DOE may be unable 

to meet outstanding contractual commitments to maintain the more than 

$40 million in upgrades already installed. 

As of August 31, 2006, DOE had spent about $108 million to implement the 

IRTR program. A majority of this money—$68 million—was spent to (1) 

physically secure sites containing radiological sources; (2) locate, recover, 

and dispose of lost or abandoned sources; and (3) help countries draft 

laws and regulations to increase security and accounting of sources. In 

addition, DOE provided $13.5 million to IAEA to support activities to 

strengthen controls over radiological sources in IAEA member states. 

However, one-fourth of the total budget—about $26.5 million—was spent 

on program planning activities not directly attributed to a specific country, 

such as hiring private consultants, and building a database for

international law enforcement officials. Table 3 provides a breakdown of 

DOE program expenditures. 

DOE Has Spent 

Approximately $108 

Million to Secure 

Radiological Sources 

Worldwide, but 

Future Program 

Funding Is Uncertain 

because of an 

Increased Emphasis 

on Securing Special 

Nuclear Materials 

DOE Expenditures Have 

Focused Primarily on 

Physical Security 

Upgrades and Recovering 

Lost or Abandoned 

Sources; However, About 

$26.5 Million Has Been 

Spent on Program 

Planning Activities

Page 33 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Table 3: DOE’s IRTR Program Expenditures by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006 

Dollars in thousands 

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005

FY 2006 (through 

August 31, 2006) 

Total (and

 percentage of total)

Physical security upgrades $0 $4,348 $10,497 $15,210 $12,840 $42,895 (40%)

Orphan source recoverya0 878 8,069 9,633 4,342 22,922 (21) 

Regulatory infrastructure 

support 0 0 375 757 913 2,045 (2)

IAEA 3,000 684 4,170 5,098 460 13,412 (13) 

Strategic development 3,821 3,524 5,436 5,466 3,702 21,949 (20)

All other program activitiesb0 0 2,582 1,327 596 4,505 (4)

Total $6,821 $9,434 $31,129 $37,491 $22,853 $107,728

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE. 

a

Includes Russia Orphan Source Recovery and Global Search and Secure programs (GSSP). 

b

Includes DOE-funded consultant reports and development of program protocol, guidelines, and 

standards. 

Physical security upgrades to secure sites containing radiological sources 

accounted for the largest program expenditure—almost $43 million. The 

majority of DOE-funded upgrades were at hospitals and oncology clinics. 

DOE also funded upgrades at other types of facilities that utilize or store 

radiological sources and materials, including waste storage facilities, 

commercial and industrial facilities, and other research institutes. While 

DOE estimates that costs for each facility type range from $15,000 to 

secure a medical facility to $50,000 to secure a waste storage facility, 

actual expenditures for securing sites varied based on factors such as 

regional labor rates, conditions of existing infrastructure, and remoteness 

of location. 

DOE officials stated that cost estimates of upgrade projects included 

vulnerability assessments, equipment costs and installation, and warranty 

contracts covering equipment maintenance for three years. DOE physical 

security specialists conducted vulnerability assessments to identify 

security weaknesses at facilities, including adequacy of the local guard 

force, exposed windows and doors, and access to sources. In some 

instances, mostly at lower-risk sites, DOE authorized contractors 

responsible for equipment installation to conduct these assessments with 

direction from DOE. The contractors provided DOE with reports and 

photographs that summarized findings and proposed recommended 

upgrades. Types of upgrades installed varied based on assessment findings 

Page 34 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
and host country laws and policies, but standard equipment packages 

consisted mostly of hardened windows and doors; motion sensors and 

alarms; access control systems, such as coded keypads or swipe card 

entry; security cameras; and video monitoring. At some sites, DOE also 

provided guard forces with enhanced communication equipment, 

including radios and mobile panic buttons that send emergency signals to

local police or security companies. Installation costs also included training 

for on-site personnel that would be responsible for operating the 

equipment. 

Costs of physical security upgrades also included 3-year warranty 

contracts that cover maintenance costs, such as the cost of remote 

monitoring and spare parts. DOE officials told us that contracts are 

negotiated with contractors responsible for equipment installation and 

require that countries receiving assistance assume the costs of sustaining 

the equipment no later than three years after the upgrades have been 

installed. For the duration of the warranty period, DOE estimated that, on

average, it would cost $40,000 per country, per year to maintain 

equipment.20 This estimate includes sending one DOE team per country, 

per year to conduct assurance visits, any equipment contractors have to 

replace, and costs of remote monitoring systems. 

DOE also spent $23 million to provide countries with radiation detection 

equipment and training to locate and recover lost or abandoned 

radiological sources and secure them in interim or permanent storage 

facilities. DOE has two programs to support orphan source recovery 

efforts—the Russian Orphan Source Recovery program, which is focused 

solely in Russia, and the Global Search and Secure Program, which 

includes search and recovery efforts in other countries receiving DOE 

assistance. More than 80 percent of orphan source recovery expenditures 

were spent in Russia—about $19 million. To support GSSP, DOE spent $4 

million in 11 countries—Azerbaijan, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, 

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Philippines, Romania, Tajikistan, and 

Tanzania. These funds were spent primarily to provide countries with (1) 

standard packages of equipment such as hand-held radiation detection 

monitors and characterization instruments to properly identify recovered 

sources; (2) training workshops on the appropriate use of the equipment; 

 20Number of sites and types of upgrades installed vary per country, and warranty costs may 

vary accordingly. 

Page 35 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
and (3) physical security upgrades at some facilities storing recovered or 

disposed sources. 

In addition, DOE spent about $2 million in ten countries (Bulgaria, 

Colombia, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Moldova, Philippines, 

Thailand, and Vietnam) to help develop national standards and regulations 

for the control and accounting of radiological sources. A majority of these 

funds were spent in the United States—$1.8 million—to develop a set of 

security-based regulations to be utilized by countries with limited 

resources and inadequate radiological source inventories. Once countries

drafted an initial set of regulations, DOE experts reviewed drafts and 

provided feedback and proposals for improvement. DOE also provided 

training workshops and seminars on appropriate regulatory inspection 

practices for radiological source controls and accounting. In particular, 

DOE has been working with regional partners, such as the Australian 

Nuclear Science and Technology Organization (ANSTO), to implement 

many of its regulatory development activities.21 For example, DOE and 

ANSTO have conducted regulatory development training workshops for 

countries located in East Asia and the Pacific region. 

DOE also provided about $13.5 million to IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund to

support efforts to strengthen controls over sources with IAEA member 

states, including technical training on fundamental principles and 

objectives of radiological source security. IAEA established the fund, 

which consists of voluntary budget contributions from other countries, 

after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.22 The fund is designed to 

improve nuclear security in IAEA member states by helping countries to 

protect their nuclear and radiological materials and facilities. Specifically, 

DOE funded IAEA missions that carried out safety and security 

assessments at sites identified by member states containing vulnerable 

radiological sources. Additionally, DOE contributions to IAEA supported 

training conferences and other advisory services. DOE funds also enabled 

IAEA to transport several high-risk sources to secure storage facilities and 

provide conditioning equipment to prepare recovered sources for disposal. 

 21ANSTO operates Australia’s nuclear facilities and conducts nuclear research for the

Australian government.

22For more information on IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, see Nuclear Nonproliferation: 

IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses 

Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005). 

Page 36 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Finally, DOE spent one-fourth of total program expenditures—about $26.5

million—on activities not directly attributed to a specific country. 

Specifically, these costs included, among other things, program planning 

activities such as the development of program guidance documents. For 

example, DOE hired an outside contractor to conduct a review of the 

radiological source security program and to help DOE develop a plan to

guide future efforts. The contractor spent several months interviewing 

agency officials and program staff to assess the strengths and weaknesses 

of the program and the level of DOE coordination with State, NRC, and 

IAEA. The final report provided recommendations to improve 

coordination with other U.S. agencies and within DOE. In addition, DOE 

spent $1.5 million of these funds to facilitate an information exchange with 

Interpol, an international agency that coordinates the law enforcement 

activities of the national police bureaus in each of its member states, in 

order to obtain information about international arrests involving theft or 

smuggling of radiological materials. DOE’s intent was to provide Interpol 

the capacity to contribute law-enforcement data into DOE’s database, 

which contains country-specific information regarding, among other 

things, criminal activity. Funds provided to Interpol paid for computers 

and software and the salaries for two staff located at Interpol headquarters 

in Lyon, France, to set up and operate the database for two years. A DOE 

program manager expressed concern about whether providing funds to 

Interpol would provide tangible results or increase the effectiveness of the 

radiological sources program. This program manager questioned whether 

the Interpol project contributed to the program’s core objectives of 

securing the highest risk, highest priority sources in other countries. 

A senior DOE official told us that these funds—identified by DOE as 

strategic development and program integration funds—were established at 

the onset of the program and were intended to carry out activities not 

directly related to country-specific physical security upgrade projects and

initiatives. This official added that in the early stages of the program, 

expenditures of this type focused primarily on strategic planning, 

developing program technical documents and processes, conducting 

studies, and developing a database of regional country information to 

support program objectives. 

While DOE assistance was spread among 49 countries, Russia received the 

largest amount, $33 million, nearly one-third of total program 

expenditures. DOE’s cost manager for the IRTR program reported that 

expenditures in Russia supported three primary program components: (1) 

orphan source recovery efforts ($18.5 million); (2) RTG removal and

disposal, including alternative energy source development ($7 million); 

Page 37 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
and (3) physical security upgrade projects, including waste repository 

sites ($7.5 million). The 13 other FSU countries received a total of about 

$11 million, with Ukraine being the largest recipient, receiving about $3.5 

million. In addition, about 65 percent of DOE expenditures in FSU 

countries was spent in these countries for services, equipment, and 

materials that were used to improve physical security. 

By comparison, DOE spent significantly less outside the FSU, and 

expenditures in these countries were both modest by comparison and 

disproportionately spent in the United States by DOE’s national 

laboratories for labor, travel, equipment and overhead costs.23 For 

example, the 35 non-FSU countries received a total of about $17 million, or 

just 28 percent of total country-specific expenditures.24 Two-thirds of 

funds spent for non-FSU countries were spent in the United States. 

Furthermore, five countries in Africa received no in-country expenditures. 

Although many countries in Africa have been defined as high-risk by DOE, 

countries in this region received a total of about $1.3 million, about twothirds the amount spent in one European country—Poland. While 

expenditures in South America were more evenly divided between incountry costs and funds spent in the United States, the region received 

only about $3.5 million spread among 12 countries.25 Figure 7 provides a 

regional breakout of these expenditures. Additionally, see appendix II for 

more details about regional and individual country expenditures for fiscal 

years 2002 through 2006.

 23DOE noted that some of the FSU countries that received DOE assistance had 

comparatively larger infrastructure problems than that of several non-FSU countries and,

in some cases, higher labor rates; and therefore, project implementation costs in the FSU 

countries were proportionally higher. 

24Of the $107.7 million in total program expenditures, $61.7 million could be traced to 

specific country-related expenditures.

25DOE also has funds budgeted to be spent in Mexico, but to date, no funds have been

expended. 

Page 38 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Figure 7: IRTR Program Regional Allocations

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

66%

34%

28% 72%

Non-FSU Russia

and FSU

Bars show the percentage breakdown of total in-country and U.S. expenditures.

In-country costs U.S. implementation costs

Total = $61,664

$17,269 $44,395

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

65%

35%

Dollars in thousands

Source: GAO analysis of DOE cost data.

Europe

45%

55%

Latin

America

51%

49%

Africa

35%

65%

Middle

East

12%

88%

$3,494

$1,277

$4,095

$7,051

Asia

Pacific

56%

44%

$1,352

Russia

$33,172

32%

68%

FSU

$11,223

46%

54%

Page 39 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
As of August 31, 2006, DOE had carried over almost $23 million in unspent 

or unobligated funds for the IRTR program from previous years. Moreover, 

the program consistently carried over a substantial uncosted balance each 

fiscal year throughout the life of the program. For example, for fiscal years 

2003 through 2005, the program carried over uncosted funds totaling $27.4 

million, $34.1 million, and $22.4 million, respectively. According to the 

program’s director, a majority of carryover balances were due to, among 

other things, large supplemental appropriations at the onset of the 

program and delays in implementing security upgrade projects. As we 

reported in 2004, large carryover balances are not uncommon in DOE 

nuclear nonproliferation programs—especially in Russia—because of, 

among other things, difficulties in negotiating and executing contracts and 

the multiyear nature of programs.26 Table 4 shows DOE total budget and

uncosted balances for fiscal years 2002 through 2006.27

DOE Has Consistently 

Carried Over Large 

Balances of Unspent and 

Unobligated Funds 

Table 4: DOE’s Budget by Fiscal Year, as of August 31, 2006 

Dollars in 

thousands 

Fiscal year 

Appropriated 

funds 

Funds

obligated

Funds

unobligated

Total

expenditures 

Uncosted

obligations 

Uncosted

balance forwarda

2002 $20,555 $11,799 $11,756 $6,821 $4,978 $16,733

2003 38,000 15,463 21,359 9,433 6,030 27,389

2004 36,000 48,020 17,235 31,128 16,892 34,127

2005 24,800 49,681 10,219 37,492 12,189 22,407

2006 (through 

Aug. 31, 2006) 24,078 33,977 11,832 22,853 11,125 22,957

Total $143,433 $107,727

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

a

Uncosted balance forward is equal to funds unobligated plus uncosted obligations. 

 26GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium Production

Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain, GAO-04-662 (Washington,

D.C.: June 4, 2004). 

27In December 2006, DOE provided GAO with cost data updated as of the end of fiscal year 

2006 reflecting total program expenditures as $113.8 million and total carryover as $17.7

million.

Page 40 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
DOE has significantly decreased IRTR program funding since 2003, and

DOE officials expect further reductions over the next several years. 

Specifically, DOE’s internal budget allotments for the IRTR program have 

gone from a high of $38 million in fiscal year 2003 to $24 million in fiscal 

year 2006. According to a senior DOE official, priorities within GTRI, 

which funds DOE’s nuclear and radiological threat reduction efforts, have 

shifted, and future funding will be redirected to, among other things, 

securing special nuclear material, such as plutonium and highly enriched

uranium (HEU). In particular, DOE has assigned the highest budget 

priority to three specific GTRI elements that address the threats posed by 

an attack using an improvised nuclear device: the (1) Reduced Enrichment 

for Research and Test Reactors program, (2) Russia Research Reactor 

Fuel Return program, and (3) Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear 

Fuel program. The goal of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test 

Reactors program is to get research reactors around the world to convert 

from HEU to low enriched uranium with conversion of all U.S. civilian 

research reactors to be completed by 2014. The Russia Research Reactor 

Fuel Return and Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel programs 

are designed specifically for returning HEU to the United States or Russia 

and are expected to be completed by 2013 and 2019, respectively.28

DOE’s Budget for 

Radioactive Source 

Security Has Been 

Reduced, and Future 

Program Funding Is 

Uncertain 

In contrast, other GTRI elements, including the IRTR program, do not have 

presidential commitment dates for completion and, as a result, are lower 

priorities for funding. DOE’s Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, told us that DOE initially placed a high 

priority on securing radiological material and the Secretary of Energy 

made a personal commitment to this activity. More recently, because of 

budget reductions affecting the entire agency, DOE has had to review and 

evaluate program priorities. This official noted that while the likelihood of 

a dirty bomb attack is much greater than a nuclear attack, the 

consequences in terms of loss of life and the overall catastrophic impact of

the latter would be much greater. He also noted that, if given a choice, he

would place more emphasis on securing radiological sources in the United

States than in other countries. In his view, there is still a significant 

 28For more information on these programs, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE 

Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian 

Research Reactors, GAO-04-807 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004), and GAO, Nuclear 

Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of WeaponsUsable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and Russia, GAO-05-57

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004). 

Page 41 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
amount of work to be done to secure radiological sources in the United 

States. 

Future anticipated reductions in funding for the IRTR program will have 

significant implications for the amount of sources that can be secured in 

other countries. DOE’s initial target for program completion was to secure 

1,500 high-priority sites in 100 countries by 2014. This goal assumed that 

the program would receive $25 million per year over the life of the 

program. DOE officials told us that currently projected budget reductions 

may jeopardize the program’s ability to fund even the existing warranty 

contracts applied to physical security upgrades already installed. 

Moreover, DOE has not determined the extent to which the program will 

fund warranties for future upgrade projects meaning countries will need to 

assume greater financial responsibility for sustaining upgrades. However, 

DOE officials who are responsible for project implementation told us they 

lacked confidence that a majority of countries would be able to maintain 

upgrades without further DOE assistance, mostly because many recipients

do not have adequate resources. For example, DOE officials responsible 

for project implementation said that neither Ukraine nor Tajikistan, where 

DOE has spent a total of about $3.5 million, has identified resources for 

radiological source security once DOE warranties expire. 

In addition, DOE has not fully addressed the cost implications of the 

increased levels of physical security required by the new design basis 

threat assigned to radiological sources under GTRI’s reorganization. 

Although DOE’s new program guidance says that the radiological security 

upgrades strategy will continue to focus on inherently sustainable, lowcost upgrades, it specifically states that the revised threat scenario 

significantly increases the threat that physical security upgrades must 

withstand. As a result, the new guidance states that upgrades will need to 

be significantly enhanced to meet the new threat level. DOE officials have

raised concerns regarding DOE’s ability to sustain low-cost upgrades 

already installed. In light of the program’s ongoing budget reductions, the 

new guidance raises further concern regarding DOE’s ability to sustain the 

increased cost of enhanced upgrades for future projects. 

To offset anticipated shortfalls in funding, DOE plans to seek international 

contributions to secure radiological sources in other countries. DOE 

officials said that several countries, including, Canada, Japan and Norway, 

have inquired about contributing funds directly to GTRI but that, until 

recently, DOE had no authority to accept direct financial support from 

international partners for GTRI activities or to use funds received outside 

of the normal appropriations process. In October 2006, Congress 

Page 42 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
authorized DOE to enter into agreements, with the concurrence of State, 

to receive contributions from foreign countries and international 

organizations for IRTR and other GTRI programs, and to use those 

contributed funds without fiscal year limitation.29 Additionally, Russian 

officials told us that because of the importance of the IRTR program, they 

are interested in providing increased financial commitments to secure 

radiological sources. In particular, the Deputy Head of the Russian Radon 

waste storage facilities, known officially as the Federal Agency for 

Construction and Utilities, told us that the organization would be willing to 

make a sizeable contribution to Radon upgrades. DOE officials stated that 

international source security is not the sole responsibility of the United 

States government and that increased foreign cooperation will be 

necessary to complete program objectives. 

DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC to secure radiological 

sources worldwide. Since we reported on this matter in 2003, DOE has 

involved State and NRC in its international radiological threat reduction 

activities more often and has increased information-sharing with the 

agencies.30 However, DOE has not always integrated its efforts efficiently

and coordinated efforts among the agencies have been inconsistent. 

Moreover, DOE has not adequately coordinated the activities of multiple 

programs within the agency responsible for securing radiological and

nuclear materials in other countries and, at times, this has resulted in 

conflicting or overlapping efforts. DOE has improved coordination with 

IAEA to strengthen controls over other countries’ radiological sources and 

has developed bilateral and multilateral partnerships with IAEA member 

states to improve their regulatory infrastructures. DOE funding to IAEA 

has supported, among other things, IAEA missions to assess the safety and 

security of sites containing radiological sources and IAEA-sponsored 

training programs and regional workshops focusing on radiological source 

Coordination with 

State and NRC Has 

Improved, but DOE 

Still Faces 

Coordination 

Problems Securing 

Radiological Sources 

Worldwide

 29John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,

120 Stat. 2083, § 3113 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2569). Contributions from foreign 

countries to DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation programs are not without precedent. Section

3135 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 

authorized the Secretary of Energy to accept international contributions for the 

Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP). Pub. L. No. 108-

375, 118 Stat. 2170 (2004). Since fiscal year 2005, the EWGPP has received $25.5 million 

from the United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea to support the 

closure of Russian plutonium production reactors by building or refurbishing replacement

fossil fuel plants. 

30GAO-03-638. 

Page 43 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
security. However, significant gaps in information-sharing between DOE 

and IAEA, and with the European Commission, have impeded DOE’s 

ability to target the most vulnerable sites for security improvements and to 

avoid possible duplication of efforts. 

DOE Has Improved Efforts 

to Coordinate Its Program 

Activities, but 

Governmentwide 

Coordination Is 

Inconsistent 

In recent years, DOE has improved coordination with State and NRC and 

has taken steps to work more collaboratively with U.S. agencies to secure

radiological sources in other countries. An example of improved U.S. 

coordination is the interagency effort to establish a radiological source 

regulatory infrastructure in Iraq. Since 2003, with the support of DOE and 

NRC, State has led the effort to establish the Iraq Radioactive Source 

Regulatory Authority (IRSRA) and develop a radiological regulatory 

infrastructure in Iraq. State and DOE provided IRSRA with equipment, 

training, technical assistance, and funding to help the new agency assume 

increased responsibility for establishing radiological source regulations 

and procedures consistent with international standards.31 Specifically, with 

funding and logistical support from DOE, State coordinated several 

meetings in Amman, Jordan, in 2004 and 2005 to provide IRSRA personnel 

training by IAEA staff. These meetings resulted in the development of new 

Iraqi laws and regulations for the regulation, transport, import and export

of radiological sources, including physical security requirements. DOE 

experts reviewed draft Iraqi laws and regulations for their relevance to the 

security of radiological sources, and NRC provided guidance for 

developing import and export controls for radiological sources. State also

funded procurement of mobile radiation detection equipment so that Iraqi

regulatory personnel can survey various cities to search for orphaned 

radiological sources. This equipment, provided by DOD’s Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency, included radiological handling, measurement, and 

protective equipment, such as radiation meters, respirators, and protective 

clothing. Hand-held radiation equipment from DOE has also been 

transferred to Iraqi agencies for border monitoring. DOE experts also 

trained IRSRA officials and personnel on how to conduct vulnerability 

assessments.

 31For more information on U.S. efforts to secure radiological sources in Iraq, see 

Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery Efforts and 

Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions, GAO-05-672 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

7, 2005). 

Page 44 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Finally, to financially support IRSRA’s efforts, State provided a portion of

$1.25 million in funding from its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 

(NDF),32 to IAEA for training and other assistance to IRSRA, including an 

IAEA review of Iraq’s draft laws and regulations.33 State also used a portion 

of this funding to purchase a specially equipped vehicle that can be driven

through neighborhoods to detect unsecured radiological sources. DOE and 

State officials told us that although the Iraq project is a unique 

circumstance, it is an example of improved U.S. government coordination

to strengthen controls over radiological sources and could provide a 

model for future efforts. 

Although coordination among the agencies has improved, these efforts 

have been inconsistent and there is no comprehensive governmentwide 

approach to securing radiological sources overseas. We reported in 2003 

that DOE’s efforts to secure sources in other countries had not been well

coordinated with those of other U.S. agencies. Specifically, DOE had not 

fully coordinated with State and NRC to leverage program resources, 

maximize available expertise, avoid potential duplication of efforts, and 

help ensure the program’s long-term success. We also recommended that

DOE take the lead in developing a comprehensive governmentwide plan to 

strengthen controls over sources in other countries. In response to our 

report, DOE hired a consultant to determine, among other things, whether 

gaps exist in agency program activities with respect to securing

radiological sources worldwide and what role and responsibilities DOE 

should assume in coordinating U.S. government efforts. 

In December 2004, the consultant reported that although DOE had 

addressed many of its issues with State and NRC, more effective 

coordination was needed. Moreover, the consultant stated that the lack of

effective coordination among these agencies posed the greatest potential

for conflict, as a result of differing mandates and conflicting philosophical 

 32According to senior State officials, NDF is designed to permit rapid response to 

unanticipated or unusually difficult, high-priority requirements such as efforts to (1) halt 

the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, their delivery systems, 

related technologies, and other weapons; (2) destroy or neutralize existing weapons of

mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventional weapons; and (3) prevent the 

diversion of weapons-related scientific and technical expertise of the former Soviet Union. 

33In 2005, State also provided DOE $1.24 million from NDF to support DOE’s search and 

secure program. These funds paid for the deployment of radiological detection and 

characterization equipment to several countries to search, locate, and consolidate high-risk 

radiological sources. 

Page 45 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
approaches to radiological source security. Specifically, effective and 

systematic coordination between U.S. agencies has been impeded at times 

because individual agency missions differ and, as a result, agency efforts 

have been, at times, at odds with one another. For example, the consultant 

reported that NRC had expressed concern that DOE’s regulatory 

infrastructure development activities infringed on a decades-long NRC 

function. Furthermore, DOE is primarily concerned with security of 

sources while NRC has traditionally focused more on safety issues related 

to the use of sources. The report also concluded that the debate between 

DOE and NRC over the importance of the safety versus the security of 

radiological sources had negatively impacted effective coordination 

between the two agencies. 

DOE, State, and NRC have differed on, among other things, funding and 

implementation of regulatory infrastructure development activities in 

other countries. For example, in May 2003, NRC’s Office of International

Programs sought $5 million in appropriated funds to assist its regulatory 

counterparts in the FSU and countries of central and eastern Europe to 

enhance (1) existing laws, rules, and regulations governing use of 

radiological sources; (2) mechanisms used to track radiological sources, 

such as databases and registries; and (3) day-to-day regulatory oversight of 

sources. NRC stated in its request that DOE’s physical security

enhancements would not likely be sustained in the medium to long-term 

absent clear, enforceable regulatory requirements. Moreover, NRC sought 

to assist DOE by providing assistance to regulatory authorities in the FSU, 

where a majority of DOE’s efforts were focused at the time. 

NRC officials noted that the biggest challenge they have faced has been 

identifying adequate, reliable, and predictable funding to support 

international assistance activities. NRC, unlike other U.S. government 

agencies, has largely relied upon other agencies—Departments of State, 

Energy and Defense—to support its international programs and is required 

by law to recover about 90 percent of its annual budget authority through 

licensing and inspection fees assessed on the U.S. nuclear industry. 

Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear industry has raised concerns about using 

NRC funds to support international assistance. Despite these funding 

limitations, NRC has a long history of supporting regulatory strengthening 

efforts in the countries of central and eastern Europe and the FSU. These 

efforts have included training other countries’ regulators in all aspects of 

licensing and inspection procedures and developing a control and 

accounting system for nuclear materials. 

Page 46 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
In July 2003, the Senate Appropriations Committee directed that $5 million 

out of certain amounts appropriated to NNSA be made available to NRC 

for bilateral and international efforts to strengthen regulatory controls 

over radioactive sources that are at the greatest risk of being used in a 

dirty bomb attack.34 In September 2003, according to the Director of the 

NRC Office of International Programs, NRC and the Director of DOE’s 

International Materials Protection, Control and Cooperation program 

reached an initial agreement in principle, whereby DOE would provide 

NRC with $1 million per year for 5 years to conduct regulatory activities in

countries outside of Russia. 

According to DOE officials, the funds were never transferred because the 

Senate withdrew the direction to allocate the funds to NRC during 

conference negotiations because the House did not provide comparable 

language in its report. DOE officials added that the provision directing the 

transfer to NRC did not appear in the final conference report and was not 

included in the appropriation legislation. Furthermore, these officials 

added that DOE was directed by guidance received from House Energy 

and Water Development Subcommittee staff to not transfer the funds. 

According to a senior NRC official in the Office of International Programs, 

the conference report included a joint explanatory statement, which 

directed that allocations set forth in the House and Senate reports “should 

be complied with unless specifically addressed to the contrary in the 

conference report and statement of the managers.”

35 NRC asserts that this 

reinforced the intent of the original Senate report, and that without 

language to further clarify or to state otherwise, NRC should have received 

the funding as originally directed by the Senate Appropriations 

Committee. The conference report does not specifically address this 

funding issue.36

In addition, in 2003, NRC requested $1 million from State to support 

radiological source-related regulatory strengthening activities in Ukraine. 

Specifically, NRC proposed to develop a national registry of radiological 

sources and strengthen Ukraine’s overall radiological source-related laws, 

rules, and regulations. NRC chose Ukraine because of its relatively large 

 34See S. Rep. No. 108-105, at 117 (July 17, 2003), accompanying S. 1424, the Senate version 

of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2004. 

35See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-357, at 45 (Nov. 7, 2003). 

36Although a committee report is not legally binding, it is viewed as expressing the will and 

intent of the relevant congressional committees. 

Page 47 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
inventory of high-risk radioactive sources; the stability of its existing 

nuclear regulatory infrastructure; and NRC’s long-standing history of 

assisting Ukraine’s nuclear regulatory authority, the State Nuclear 

Regulatory Committee of Ukraine (SNRCU). NRC requested funding for 

the Ukraine project from State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.

The total cost of the project was estimated at $2.2 million. 

The original proposal, as approved by State, stated that the project’s aim 

was to establish key elements of a national system to provide long-term 

security of high-risk radioactive sources in Ukraine by utilizing NRC’s 

overall expertise and experienced contractor personnel. Furthermore, the 

proposal stated that because NRC and its contractors had been involved in

an identical program in Armenia for the previous 2 years the effort in 

Ukraine would capitalize on those experiences, utilizing much of that 

background data and materials. However, managers for NDF projects 

ultimately decided that State would not use NRC resources and would 

undertake and manage the project itself, even though the agency had no 

prior experience in directly supporting regulatory infrastructure 

development in Ukraine. According to a State official, the agency made 

this decision because, among other things, NRC planned to hire a 

contractor—the Ukrainian State Scientific and Technical Center—to 

manage the project, which would have increased the project’s overall cost

by about 20 percent.37

State officials said that their approach departed from that which was 

originally envisioned by NRC in the original proposal in many respects. 

However, the NDF has always reserved the right to implement its projects 

as it deems appropriate. These officials added that State chose to work 

directly with the Ukrainian regulator instead of the State Scientific and 

Technical Center because, among other things, the approach streamlined 

oversight and accountability for project performance and reduced 

overhead expenses. According to the NDF manager of the Ukraine project 

through October 2005, the Ukraine project experienced significant delays. 

However, State officials told us the project is currently on track. Following 

a November 30, 2006 meeting with State officials to discuss our draft 

report, State provided us a letter from the Deputy Chairperson for SNRCU 

dated December 4, 2006. The letter states that SNRCU views the Ukraine

 37NRC officials told us that for projects in Ukraine, NRC typically provides the regulatory 

expertise and contracts directly with the State Scientific and Technical Center to manage

the completion of project tasks. 

Page 48 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
project as one of the most successful and efficient international assistance

projects between the United States and Ukraine and that the project was 

implemented in the shortest possible time period. 

Finally, State and NRC raised concerns when DOE with IAEA developed a

set of draft regulations on the physical security of radiological sources. 

Although the draft regulations had not been through a formal IAEA review 

process, DOE had intended to distribute them during IAEA-sponsored 

training workshops to assist member states to strengthen regulatory 

controls over their sources. Specifically, NRC officials expressed 

significant concerns that DOE was planning to distribute unofficial 

guidance to countries that was in conflict with U.S. regulations. In a 

December 2004 memorandum to the Deputy Director General of Nuclear 

Safety and Security at IAEA, NRC stated that publishing interim guidance 

that had not been reviewed in advance, and as a result may need to be 

substantially modified, was neither efficient nor effective. State officials 

told us that their chief concern was the manner in which any such 

guidance would be construed abroad. These officials added that many of 

the specific problems associated with the original DOE draft guidance lie 

with internal issues regarding the process for reviewing security 

documents at IAEA. In addition, they said that concerns over the 

development of IAEA guidance on security of radioactive sources, which 

preceded development of the draft regulations, are long standing and that 

State has worked consistently with IAEA to develop and implement a 

consistent process for preparation and review of security guidance similar 

to the established process used by IAEA to develop safety guidance. 

Following informal discussions with State and NRC, DOE did work with 

the agencies to ensure that draft guidance was consistent with established 

domestic and international guidance and protocols. IAEA has since 

proposed a new Nuclear Security Series and review process, and the DOE 

draft regulations will now support a new IAEA Security Series document 

entitled “Security of Radioactive Sources,” which was coordinated with 

State and NRC. 

Our 2003 report concluded that DOE has the primary responsibility for 

helping other countries to strengthen controls over their radiological 

sources. We recommended that DOE take the lead in developing a 

comprehensive governmentwide plan to accomplish this goal. In addition,

DOE’s consultant report stated that DOE, in its view, is the only U.S. 

government agency with the resources to focus solely on international 

source security. Similar to our recommendation, the consultant report 

recommended that DOE take the lead in adopting an interagency, sitePage 49 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
specific approach to international radiological source security, including

development of a long-term strategy that leveraged resources and 

leadership of other agencies. DOE officials said the department has not 

implemented these recommendations to initiate and lead a 

governmentwide plan for the security of radiological sources in other 

countries because it does not have the mandate to instruct other U.S. 

agencies on how to conduct their efforts, and other agencies’ programs are 

not within DOE’s control. However, DOE is currently taking steps, as part 

of the GTRI reorganization, to address several coordination issues within 

the department, including establishing regional points of contact to 

interface with other U.S. agencies to coordinate interagency efforts. 

DOE’s Efforts Have Not 

Been Well-Coordinated 

within the Department, 

and Program Overlap Has 

Led to Inefficiencies 

The 2004 consultant report also concluded that DOE had not adequately 

coordinated the activities of multiple programs within DOE that are 

responsible for securing radiological and nuclear materials in other 

countries. As a result, these programs often worked at cross-purposes. 

For example, we visited a site in Poland that housed several nuclear 

facilities including a radiation waste management plant and Poland’s 

nuclear research reactor. Country officials managing the site told us that 

DOE had conducted vulnerability assessments of each of the facilities, one 

of which stored several high-risk radiological sources as well as spent fuel

from the research reactor. Although the material was collocated in the 

same storage facility, we observed that the sources had been secured in a 

locked cage by the IRTR program, but the spent fuel had no security and

was being stored unprotected in underground canisters. Figure 8 shows 

secured radiological sources collocated with unsecured spent fuel 

contained in underground storage. 

Page 50 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Figure 8: Storage Facility Containing Secured Radiological Sources and Unsecured Spent Fuel 

Source: GAO.

Arrow shows location of unsecured spent fuel containers

stored underground.

Polish officials told us that installation of DOE physical security upgrades 

at the site had been inconsistent and not adequately coordinated by DOE. 

Furthermore, security officials that had installed the physical security 

upgrades told us that the overall security in the facility was inadequate, 

given the types of nuclear and radioactive material being housed there. 

The director of the site said that he expressed concern to DOE about the 

lack of security of the spent nuclear fuel and requested similar upgrade 

improvements. However, he said that it was his understanding that DOE’s 

radiological program was only authorized to fund radiological source 

security upgrades and not the security of spent nuclear fuel, which was the 

responsibility of DOE’s nuclear security upgrades program. 

The director of the facility, and his staff, said that it was unclear to them 

why DOE could not concurrently secure nuclear and radiological material

stored at the same site and what can and cannot be secured by different 

DOE entities. The director added that it sends the wrong signal to host 

country officials when DOE programs have such different security 

approaches and time frames for implementing security upgrades. 

Subsequent to our visit, DOE sent a letter to Polish government officials in 

March 2006 offering to return to Poland and provide further DOE technical 

and financial support to protect the nuclear material stored at the facility. 

Within the IRTR program, different components of the program are led 

primarily out of two DOE national laboratories, and we found that the 

laboratories, at times, applied different approaches to securing 

radiological sources. For example, according to a senior DOE program 

Page 51 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
manager, each laboratory employs its own physical security specialists 

and in turn, applies its own approach to conducting vulnerability 

assessments and selecting physical security upgrades. During our site 

visits, we observed that similar types of facilities varied in terms of the 

types of upgrades installed and that security measures were not 

standardized. For example, we toured numerous oncology clinics and 

found that, although they housed the same equipment and radiological

sources, they had received different upgrades as a result of assessments 

conducted by different laboratory security specialists. Specifically, 

teletherapy units in certain countries had fiber optic cables attached to the 

sources that sent alarm signals if the device was tampered with. Security 

specialists traveling with us at those sites told us that the cable was the 

key security feature for this type of device. However, during a meeting 

with a senior security specialist from a different laboratory, we were told 

that his teams do not install fiber optic cables as part of security upgrades

to the same devices because the cables can break. 

We also found that DOE’s IRTR program components are not wellcoordinated. For example, more than one program manager told us that 

DOE had not consistently coordinated its orphan source recovery efforts 

or regulatory infrastructure development assistance with physical security 

upgrades. According to officials responsible for managing the majority of 

the program’s physical security upgrade projects, IRTR program managers 

did not coordinate efforts that resulted in multiple visits to the same 

country. In their view, this caused confusion within the recipient countries 

because country officials had difficulty understanding why some parts of 

the same DOE program were being addressed separately. Officials from 

Sandia National Laboratories, the lead for GSSP, told us that projects were 

often implemented independently from physical security upgrade projects 

and that Sandia did not routinely coordinate its efforts with those of PNNL 

prior to initiating search and secure activities. PNNL officials, who 

brought this matter to our attention, concurred and stated that GSSP 

officials did not routinely consult with their physical security specialists 

prior to visiting countries with which PNNL had already established 

relationships. 

Furthermore, according to PNNL officials, DOE’s regulatory infrastructure 

development team had visited several countries without coordinating with 

the physical security upgrade teams. According to a DOE program 

manager, host country officials were frequently uncertain whether these 

two components were part of the same program. According to PNNL, this 

fragmented approach created confusion and required them to explain to

country officials that the program components were meant to complement 

Page 52 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
one another. The lead official for regulatory infrastructure development 

activities told us that future visits would be better planned to ensure that 

an integrated approach to source security was undertaken. 

Finally, we found coordination problems between IRTR and the U.S. 

Radiological Threat Reduction program, which is primarily responsible for 

domestic source recovery efforts, including repatriating U.S.-origin 

radiological sources in other countries. U.S. Radiological Threat Reduction

program officials said there have been limited opportunities to share 

information or to assess the potential to coordinate international source 

recovery activities so as to leverage DOE resources. For example, the 

domestic program recently discovered a large quantity of unsecured 

radiological sources in South America. The sources were no longer in use 

and were inadequately secured. Officials managing DOE’s domestic 

program informed IRTR mangers of the finding and the location of the 

sources. However, IRTR officials declined to immediately secure the 

sources because the country where they were discovered, which is 

considered high risk, is not scheduled for IRTR upgrades until 2011. As a 

result, the sources will remain unsecured until the international program 

completes upgrades in this country.

In our discussions, DOE officials recognized that coordination within the 

department needed to be improved and that a comprehensive and 

consistent approach to threat reduction efforts between its nuclear and

radiological programs should be established. They acknowledged that it

was inefficient for multiple DOE teams to visit the same sites as part of 

different programs to address multiple threat reduction activities. To that 

end, DOE’s recent reorganization of GTRI is designed to create a more 

streamlined structure that is organized geographically to address all threat 

reduction activities more effectively. Specifically, DOE plans to increase 

efficiency and improve coordination by (1) integrating multiple GTRI 

programs working in the same country or at the same sites; (2) 

redistributing workloads across the radiological and nuclear programs; 

and (3) improving relationships with host country officials by tailoring 

comprehensive strategies and incentives to more effectively meet unique

country-specific conditions. 

Page 53 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
DOE has improved coordination with IAEA in recent years to strengthen

controls over other countries’ radiological sources and has developed 

several successful bilateral and multilateral partnerships with countries 

around the world to support and share the agency’s international efforts. 

IRTR’s director told us that these partnerships have helped to foster 

increased awareness of the security of sources through country-specific 

training and regional workshops. For example, with the assistance of 

IAEA, DOE has established a partnership with the Australian Nuclear 

Science and Technology Organization through which DOE has increased 

opportunities to conduct physical security assessments and strengthen 

regulatory inventories of radiological sources in Southeast Asia. 

Specifically, ANSTO has identified and facilitated communication with 

several high-risk countries, which has helped DOE gain access to 

countries that DOE had difficulty initiating contact with, like Vietnam. 

DOE has also provided funding to support, among other things, IAEAsponsored training programs and regional workshops focusing on 

radiological source security. 

Despite Some 

Improvements, Critical 

Information-Sharing Gaps 

between DOE and IAEA 

Have Impeded DOE’s

Efforts to Target the 

Highest Priority Sites for 

Security Upgrades

DOE also coordinated with Russia and IAEA as part of the Tripartite 

Initiative to conduct physical security assessments and install upgrades at

102 sites in 13 FSU countries—Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, 

Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, 

Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The objective of the Tripartite Initiative was to

improve the security of dangerous radioactive sources in the FSU. We 

noted in our 2003 report that, in its early stages, the Tripartite Initiative 

was not well planned, that initial efforts were ad hoc, and a more 

systematic approach to program activities was needed.38 However, an 

IAEA official recently told us that coordination with DOE has improved 

significantly as the program evolved.

Despite the success of the Tripartite Initiative, critical information gaps 

exist between DOE and IAEA that impede DOE’s ability to target the most 

vulnerable sites and countries for security improvements. First, according 

to DOE, IAEA has not shared with them, the countries that IAEA considers 

the most in need of security assistance. Second, although DOE funds IAEA 

appraisal missions—known as Radiation Safety and Security 

Infrastructure Appraisals—to assess the weaknesses in radioactive source 

security in IAEA member states, IAEA does not provide DOE with the 

findings of these missions because member state information is 

 38GAO-03-638. 

Page 54 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
considered country-sensitive and confidential. The objective of these 

missions is to evaluate, among other things, the quality of regulatory 

controls countries exercise over their radiological sources. Results of the 

appraisals are formalized into action plans that provide the framework for 

subsequent IAEA assistance to improve the security of sources. Because 

IAEA does not provide DOE with the results of the missions, DOE is 

unable to effectively prioritize those sites that the missions identified to be 

most vulnerable. DOE officials told us that the lack of country-specific 

information has been an ongoing problem that limits DOE’s ability to 

effectively leverage its resources to maximize program impact and 

effectiveness. 

We also found that little coordination exits between DOE and the 

European Commission, which has resulted in the potential for overlap in 

assistance and duplication of efforts. Specifically, the EC provides 

financial support through IAEA, and on a bilateral basis, to secure 

radioactive sources in countries that are candidates for EU membership. 

EC officials told us that no formal communication exists with the United 

States on matters related to radioactive source security assistance, and as

a result, each is largely unaware of the specific sites and locations the 

other is securing, or whether recipient countries are receiving too little or

too much assistance. DOE officials told us that coordination with the EC 

has been conducted primarily at IAEA donor meetings. 

The EC has coordinated with IAEA to provide assistance to its member 

states to improve control over radiological sources. Specifically, the EC 

works jointly with IAEA on several action projects to strengthen the 

security of radiological materials used for nuclear and non-nuclear 

purposes, including upgrading regulatory infrastructures, installing 

physical security upgrades and, as appropriate, disposing of vulnerable 

radiological sources. As a result of these efforts, the EC has worked with 

IAEA in several regions, but has focused primarily on the Caucasus, 

Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Mediterranean countries. 

DOE has achieved noteworthy accomplishments in improving the security 

of radiological sources at hundreds of sites in more than 40 countries. We 

recognize that DOE faces a considerable challenge in securing other 

countries’ most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of these 

sources and their widespread dispersal. However, when DOE decided to

expand its program beyond securing sites in Russia and the FSU, it 

diverted a significant portion of its limited program funding away from 

securing the highest priority and most dangerous radiological sources. 

Conclusions 

Page 55 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Instead of focusing increased attention on these highest priority threats, 

such as RTGs, DOE allocated significant program funding resources to 

securing medical facilities that, in our view—as well as several DOE 

officials associated with the program—pose considerably less threat to 

U.S. security interests. While many of the RTGs cannot be removed until 

alternate energy sources are developed to replace them, removing as many 

RTGs as possible, or securing them until they can be removed, should be a 

critical component of DOE’s radiological threat reduction efforts. 

We believe that DOE’s current reorganization of its nuclear and 

radiological threat reduction efforts is a step in the right direction toward 

improving the management of the program. However, there are still many 

significant management issues that need to be addressed and resolved. 

DOE has not paid adequate attention to the long-term sustainability of the 

equipment, which could jeopardize the significant investment made to 

improve the security of radiological sources in many countries. The 

security equipment and upgraded storage facilities funded by DOE will 

require a long-term commitment by the countries to help ensure their 

continued use and operation, and it is not clear to us that a sustained 

stream of funding will be made available by DOE or by recipient countries 

to maintain and/or replace aging or defective equipment. Moreover, there 

are continuing concerns that many of the countries do not have adequate 

nuclear regulatory infrastructures in place to promote sustainability. 

Without a comprehensive sustainability plan that adequately addresses a 

country’s ability to reliably install and maintain upgrades and provide 

adequate oversight for source security, DOE risks losing a significant 

portion of its investment to improve the security of radiological sources in

many countries. Furthermore, DOE’s decision to increase physical security

requirements for sites selected for upgrades, based on revised threat 

protection criteria, may have significant cost implications for a program 

that is already facing severe budget reductions. This raises concerns 

because DOE has not adequately evaluated the increased costs associated 

with its elevated threat protection criteria. 

This may also be an opportune time for DOE to streamline the program, 

particularly in light of budget reductions. We question, for example, how 

certain program activities, such as the development of the Interpol 

database, directly contribute to the program’s core mission of securing 

radiological sources in other countries. There are other management 

issues that require DOE’s attention. First, DOE has not developed 

meaningful performance measurements to demonstrate the extent to 

which the radiological threat has been reduced as a direct result of its 

efforts, including measuring the impact of training and distinguishing 

Page 56 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
between the types of sources secured. Second, we recognize the pool of 

reliable contractors to implement security projects and provide adequate 

training may be limited in some countries. However, many project delays 

could be avoided in the future if DOE developed specific selection criteria 

or a set minimum standard for foreign contractor qualifications. 

Improving radiological source security is a shared responsibility. DOE’s 

investment has been significant and reflects a commitment to addressing 

the problem. However, DOE should not underwrite the majority of the 

costs on behalf of the international community. Specifically, certain EU 

accession candidates and FSU countries, most prominently Russia, should 

be willing to contribute more resources to improve the security of 

dangerous and vulnerable sources in their own countries. In addition, DOE 

now has the authority to accept foreign contributions for GTRI programs 

from other interested countries, such as Canada, Japan, and Norway. 

However, gaps in communication between DOE and international 

partners, such as IAEA and the EC, significantly impede effective global 

radiological threat reduction. 

Finally, developing foreign countries’ nuclear regulatory organizations is a 

well recognized and critical component in strengthening radiological 

source security worldwide. NRC has a long-standing history of promoting 

regulatory controls in the FSU and should, in our view, play a more 

prominent role in this regard. DOE’s refusal to transfer $5 million from its 

appropriations to NRC to conduct regulatory development activities, 

despite the direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 

underscores NRC’s limited ability to provide international assistance, 

while reliant on funding from other agencies. Most of the coordination 

problems we identified between NRC and other agencies could have been

avoided if NRC had its own stream of predictable and reliable funding for 

international regulatory development, rather than having to rely on DOE 

or State for funds. However, without a direct appropriation, NRC will 

continue to depend on other agencies for funds, thus increasing the 

likelihood that similar problems will occur in the future. 

To help ensure that DOE’s program focuses on securing the highest 

priority radiological sources and sites, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security 

Administration take the following two actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 57 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
• Limit the number of hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources 

that receive security upgrades to only those deemed as the highest-risk, 

and 

• To the extent possible, accelerate efforts to remove as many RTGs in 

Russia and, as an interim measure, improve the security of those 

remaining until they can be removed from service. 

Furthermore, we recommend that Secretary of Energy and the 

Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration take the 

following seven actions to improve program management: 

• Develop a long-term sustainability plan for security upgrades that 

includes, among other things, future resources required to implement such 

a plan; 

• Reevaluate program activities and eliminate those that do not directly 

contribute to securing the highest priority radiological sources in other 

countries; 

• Conduct an analysis to determine the projected costs associated with 

increased security upgrades in light of newly proposed threat protection 

criteria and limit the number sites to receive increased security upgrades 

until such an analysis has been completed; 

• Establish meaningful performance measurements that demonstrate real

risk reduction and go beyond a quantitative listing of the number countries 

and sites that have received physical security upgrades; 

• Apply a more rigorous approach to foreign contractor selection to help 

reduce potential project delays in the future; 

• Seek assurances from recipient countries that plans are in place to 

maintain security-related equipment and facilities funded by the United 

States; and

• Develop strategies to encourage cost sharing with recipient countries, 

including Russia and EU accession countries. 

Finally, in an effort to improve coordination, the Secretary of Energy and 

the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in 

consultation with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, should work with IAEA and European 

Commission officials to consider ways to systematically improve 

Page 58 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
information sharing to maximize and leverage resources and institutional 

expertise. 

If the Congress believes that regulatory infrastructure development is the 

key to the long-term sustainability of radiological source security efforts, it 

should consider providing NRC with authority and a direct appropriation 

to conduct these activities. The appropriation would be provided to NRC 

in lieu of providing the funds to DOE or another agency to reimburse NRC 

for its activities. Should the Congress decide to do so, NRC’s efforts need 

to be fully coordinated with those of State, DOE, and IAEA. 

We provided DOE and NRC with draft copies of this report for their review 

and comment. DOE provided written comments, which are presented as

appendix III. NRC’s written comments are presented as appendix IV. NRC 

also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report. 

NRC neither agreed nor disagreed with our matter for congressional 

consideration, which would provide NRC with the legal authority and a 

direct appropriation to conduct international regulatory activities for 

radiological source security. However, NRC stated that if Congress acts 

upon our matter for consideration, NRC would work closely with State, 

relevant executive branch agencies, and IAEA to implement the program. 

In its written comments, DOE agreed with our conclusion that the 

department faced a considerable challenge in securing other countries’ 

most dangerous radiological sources, given the number of these sources 

and how widely dispersed they are. Furthermore, DOE stated that 

enormous amounts of dangerous material have not been secured, although 

the IRTR program has achieved a great deal of threat reduction in a short 

period of time. DOE stated that the recommendations were very helpful

and would further strengthen its program. 

DOE also noted that it had measures in place—as a result of its 

reorganization of GTRI—to address program challenges and concerns that 

we raised, such as site prioritization; quality assurance/sustainability; 

coordination; and transportation. We recognized in the report that the 

reorganization of the program was a step in the right direction toward 

improving program management. However, as we noted in our report, 

many significant management issues still need to be addressed and 

resolved despite the reorganization. That is why we believe it was 

important to offer recommendations to improve program management and 

source prioritization efforts. 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 59 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
In other comments, DOE stated that the IRTR program uses a number of 

factors to determine priority levels for the sites it selects to upgrade in 

addition to the amount of radioactivity contained in radiological sources. 

These other factors include (1) known terrorist threat in the 

country/region; (2) current level of security at the site; and (3) the 

proximity of the site in relationship to potential strategic targets of U.S. 

interest. In our report, we stated that site selection was based on a number 

of factors, including those specifically noted by DOE in its written 

comments. We also pointed out in our report that DOE’s guidance on site 

selection has not clearly discriminated between the different sites secured 

and which sites were to be considered the highest priority. We are 

encouraged that DOE is explicitly linking its prioritization guidelines to a 

site’s proximity to potential strategic targets of U.S. interest. However, it 

remains to be seen how consistently DOE will apply this criteria to its site 

selection process in the future. In a related comment, DOE stated that it 

will continue to accelerate RTG recoveries but must also address high 

priority medical and other sources. In our view, this action by DOE would

be consistent with the key conclusions and recommendations in our 

report. Our recommendations specifically state that DOE should, to the 

extent possible, remove as many RTGs in Russia and limit the number of 

hospitals and clinics containing radiological sources that receive security 

upgrades to only those deemed to be the highest risk. 

With regard to quality assurance and program sustainability issues, DOE 

stated that it employs a standard process that ensures quality assurance 

for the security equipment that it installs. This process includes, among 

other things, conducting post-installation visits by technical experts for 

the purpose of assuring that all equipment and systems are installed as 

agreed upon. DOE also noted that despite these measures, it would further 

investigate its process to identify and implement additional improvements. 

We think DOE should take these steps because, as discussed in our report, 

we identified several problems with malfunctioning equipment and other

maintenance problems at sites containing radiological sources. DOE also 

noted that it has a short-term sustainability program for every site that it 

upgrades that includes a 3-year warranty as well as preventative 

maintenance contracts and training for operational staff. DOE believes 

that we should revise the report to indicate the existence of the 3-year 

warranty. Our report recognizes that DOE’s program guidance calls for 

preventative maintenance contracts and training. We also noted that DOE 

provides a 3-year warranty, and we gave DOE credit for providing this 

coverage. Our main point remains—which DOE explicitly agreed with—

that DOE has not developed a long-term sustainability plan for the 

equipment it has installed. Nevertheless, we clarified our report language,

Page 60 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
as appropriate, to state that DOE does have a short-term sustainability 

plan but has not developed a long-term plan to maintain the security 

upgrades completed. 

Regarding coordination, DOE cited numerous examples in its written 

comments of close cooperation with other U.S. government agencies, 

other DOE elements, and international partners on matters pertaining to 

international radiological source security. We believe the report fairly 

characterized DOE’s coordination efforts in each of these areas. 

Specifically, we noted that DOE had improved coordination with State and 

NRC since we reported on this matter in 2003 and has increased 

information-sharing with the agencies. In addition, we believe our 

characterization of coordination problems within the department is 

correct. Our evaluation was based on information provided by an 

independent consultant’s report as well as our own analysis of conditions 

we found within the department pertaining to inconsistent and, at times, 

inadequately coordinated efforts by different DOE programs responsible 

for threat reduction activities in the same country. As we noted in the 

report, DOE officials recognized that coordination within the agency

needs to be improved and that a comprehensive and consistent approach 

to threat reduction efforts between nuclear and radiological threat 

reduction activities should be established. We also noted in the report that

DOE’s September 2006 reorganization of its GTRI efforts is designed to 

create a more streamlined structure that is organized along three 

geographic regions, which could improve program coordination. 

On a related matter, DOE stated that we should have given IAEA an 

opportunity to review and address some of the issues raised in our report 

about limited information sharing, which impeded DOE’s ability to target 

the most vulnerable sites and countries for security improvements. Since 

this information was provided to us by DOE officials, it is unclear to us 

what benefit would have been achieved by providing a draft of this report 

to IAEA for review and comment of DOE’s views. Our report notes that 

DOE has, despite some information-sharing problems with IAEA, 

improved coordination with the agency in recent years to strengthen 

controls over other countries’ radiological sources. 

Finally, with regard to transportation of sources, DOE commented that, 

among other things, it had been working with the U.S. Department of 

Transportation, IAEA, and key IAEA donor countries to strengthen 

transport security regulations. We added this information to our report 

based on DOE’s comments. DOE also stated that it was working with 

Russia to enhance the security of radioactive materials, including 

Page 61 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
providing cargo trucks and escort vehicles for the Moscow waste storage 

facility. We had already recognized this fact in the report. More broadly, 

however, we believe that the report accurately and fairly depicts the 

limitations of DOE efforts regarding transportation security. A primary 

source of information for our observation came directly from a DOE 

analysis—cited in the report—which concluded that the department was 

addressing transportation security on an ad-hoc basis and that the existing 

method of providing transportation security had serious limitations and 

lacked a commitment to integrate transport security into all countries 

participating in the IRTR program. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary of 

Energy; the Secretary of State; the Administrator, National Nuclear 

Security Administration; the Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 

the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be made available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 62 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page 

of this report. Key contributors to this report include Erika D. Carter, Glen 

Levis, Mehrunisa Qayyum, Keith Rhodes (GAO’s Chief Technologist), and

Jim Shafer. 

Sincerely yours, 

Gene Aloise 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

Page 63 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

We focused our review primarily on the Department of Energy (DOE), 

since it is the lead federal agency for improving the security of radiological 

sources worldwide and provides significant funds for that purpose. We 

also performed work at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and 

Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C., which also provide 

assistance to help other countries secure their sealed radiological sources. 

In addition, we reviewed program-related activities and interviewed 

program officials from Argonne National Laboratory in Argonne, Illinois; 

the Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington; Sandia National 

Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico; the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria; and the European Commission

(EC) in Brussels, Belgium. We also met with nongovernmental 

organizations, including, the Council on Foreign Relations and the 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In November 2005, we 

attended the Trilateral Commission meeting held in the United Kingdom, 

which discussed international approaches to securing radiological sources 

against terrorism. 

We visited four countries to determine how DOE has implemented its 

program to secure radiological sources overseas. We selected these 

countries based on several criteria, including where DOE has spent the 

most funds since 2002. Overall, these four countries represented about 

$37.4 million, or about 35 percent, of overall program expenditures. We 

selected Lithuania and Poland since, among other reasons, DOE officials 

told us that these were model countries in securing radiological sources 

and implementing effective physical security upgrades. Also, we selected 

Russia and Georgia because they received significant program funds, 

totaling about $34.2 million of the $107.7 million. In addition, thousands of 

radiological sources are located in these two countries. In the case of 

Russia, it contains the majority of RTGs worldwide and operates 44 

percent of all Radons in the former Soviet Union.

During our review, we observed physical security upgrades at all types of

sites: medical, industrial, research, storage facilities, and RTGs. For 

instance, we visited numerous medical and industrial sites throughout 

Lithuania and Poland. Specifically in Lithuania, we visited the Radiation 

Protection Center, Vilnius Oncology Institute Clinic, Klaipeda City 

Hospital, the Kaunas Oncology Clinic, and Saiuliu Oncology Hospital, as 

well as the Lithuanian Institute of Physics and the Maisiagala Repository. 

In Poland, we visited the Regionaine Centreem Kriwodawstwa I 

Krwiolecznictwa (Children’s Hospital) as well as the Glowny Urzad Miar 

(Main Measurement Office), Polytechnic Institute of Lodz, Radioisotope 

Page 64 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Center (Polatom), Geofizyka Krakow, Radioisotope Waste Management 

Plant in Swierk, Technical University Institute of Applied Radiation 

Chemistry, and the Technical Institute of Applied Physics. At each 

location, we interviewed facility staff who were responsible for 

implementing radiological source security procedures and using the 

monitoring equipment funded by DOE. Facility staff included—but was 

not limited to—doctors, clinical technicians, and other medical support 

staff. At each site, we met with local guards to determine how well they 

were trained and equipped. We also interviewed host country contractors 

who were responsible for installing and maintaining physical security 

upgrades. 

We also met with host government officials in both countries. In Lithuania 

we met with officials from the Ministry of Economy; RATA (Lithuanian 

Radioactive Waste Management Agency); the Radiation Protection Center

(nuclear regulatory organization); and the Ministry of Environment. In 

Poland, we interviewed officials from the National Atomic Energy Agency 

(Poland’s nuclear regulator), the Department of Environmental Hygiene,

and the Ministry of Health. 

We also visited Russia and Georgia to obtain a first-hand look at waste 

facilities that contain radiological sources. Specifically, we visited the 

Moscow Radon site at Sergiev Posad, located about 90 kilometers from

Moscow and the St. Petersburg Radon site, located about 80 kilometers 

from St. Petersburg. While in Russia we also met with the key federal 

agencies responsible for radiological source management and oversight. 

Specifically, we met with several high-level officials from Rostechnadzor, 

Russia’s nuclear regulator (the Federal Environmental, Industrial and 

Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia); the Federal Agency for 

Construction and Utilities; and the Department for Nuclear and Radiation 

Safety at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, we interviewed 

directors of both the Moscow and St. Petersburg Radon facilities; officials

of the IBRAE Institute (Russian National Academy of Sciences); and 

directors of VNIITFA (Russian National Technical Physics and Automation 

Research Institute), the designer of RTGs. Moreover, after meeting with 

officials from the Kurchatov Institute, which is primarily responsible for 

the RTG removal, we visited three sites where RTGs had been removed 

and replaced with alternative energy sources. 

In Georgia, we visited the Mtsheta national repository located at the 

Institute of Physics near Tbilisi, Georgia, as well as Georgia’s temporary 

national storage facility that stores many high-risk radiological sources, 

including six RTGs and a seed irradiator. Regarding Georgia’s medical 

Page 65 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

sites, we also visited the National Cancer Center of Georgia and the 

Kutaisi Oncological Center and interviewed staff and guards who were 

responsible for source security. We met with officials from the Nuclear 

and Radiation Safety Service of the Ministry of Environmental Protection 

and Natural Resources (Georgia’s nuclear regulator), the Nuclear and 

Radiation Safety Department, the Institute of Radiobiology, and the 

Chamber of Control. 

To assess the progress of DOE’s efforts to help other countries secure 

their sealed radiological sources, we obtained and analyzed

documentation on DOE’s International Radiological Threat Reduction 

Program (IRTR), including project work plans for each country and 

program activity; strategic planning documents; and internal briefings. For 

example, we reviewed DOE’s Action Plan to Secure and Control ForeignOrigin Source Materials for Radiological Dispersal Devices (April 2003), 

and Programmatic Guidelines for Site Prioritization and Protection 

Implementation (September 2006). We supplemented the documentation 

with interviews with senior level DOE officials responsible for 

implementing the IRTR program. 

To specifically determine the status of efforts across the 49 countries 

receiving DOE’s assistance, we reviewed DOE’s Project Management 

Information System database to construct a summary table that included

factors, among other things, the number of sites completed; host country 

agencies and international organizations involved in radiological source

security; and program accomplishments and challenges. To identify 

challenges DOE faces in securing sources in other countries and to assess 

sustainability efforts, we collected and analyzed (1) IRTR program trip 

reports for all countries participating in the program, and (2) testimonial 

evidence obtained from project managers, security specialists, and 

contracting officers to identify all programmatic and management 

challenges. Furthermore, we performed a comprehensive review and 

analysis of trip reports from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006. 

To assess current and planned program costs of U.S. programs that 

provide assistance to secure radiological sources in other countries, we 

reviewed budget documents from DOE and NRC detailing program 

expenditures from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006. We obtained

responses from key agency database officials to a number of questions 

focused on data reliability, covering issues such as data-entry access and

the accuracy and completeness of the data. For DOE specifically, to

determine how much DOE had budgeted and spent through August 31, 

2006, to secure radiological sources in other countries, we reviewed 

Page 66 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

element of cost reports detailing program expenditures by country, 

national laboratory, and program objective per fiscal year to determine the 

amount spent in-country and the overall carryover of unspent and 

unobligated funds. Furthermore, to determine planned program costs for 

DOE, we reviewed DOE’s congressional budget request for fiscal year 2007 

and met with senior DOE officials to learn about DOE’s plans for 

addressing reduced program funding. Follow-up questions were added 

whenever necessary. Caveats and limitations to the data were noted in the 

documentation, where necessary. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, based on work we 

performed to ensure the data’s reliability. 

To assess the extent to which coordination has occurred within DOE as 

well as on an interagency basis, we obtained and analyzed documents 

from DOE, NRC, and State regarding their radiological threat reduction 

and nonproliferation activities. We interviewed several senior officials at 

NRC, including the Senior Advisor for Nuclear Security, a senior foreign 

policy advisor for the Office of International Programs, and a Senior 

Engineer. At State, we interviewed several high-level officials, including 

the Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety from the Bureau of

International Security and Nonproliferation. We also reviewed State, NRC, 

and DOE documents regarding Iraq work to highlight interagency 

coordination. To address the level of coordination with international 

organizations, we met with senior officials at the International Atomic 

Energy Agency and the European Commission, including the Director of 

Nuclear Safety, and a senior official from the External Relations 

Directorate, respectively. Finally, we met with the Director of the Nuclear 

and Radiation Safety Centre from the Armenian Nuclear Regulatory 

Authority to learn about NRC’s role in providing regulatory assistance to 

Armenia. 

We performed our review in Washington, D.C., and other locations, from 

November 2005 to December 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Page 67 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II: DOE’s IRTR Program 

Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as of Appendix II: DOE’ August 31s, 2006 IRTR Program 

Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as of 

August 31, 2006 

Dollars in thousands

Recipient Country U.S. Costs In-country costs Total spent

Former Soviet Union

Russia $10,451 $22,721 $33,172

Ukraine 1,490 2,000 3,490

Lithuania 736 588 1,324

Georgia Republic 359 662 1,022

Kazakhstan 327 519 846

Uzbekistan 282 490 772

Moldova 344 441 785

Azerbaijan 214 557 771

Kyrgyzstan 329 282 611

Tajikistan 321 204 525

Latvia 223 28 251

Armenia 172 26 198

Estonia 114 44 158

Belarus 247 223 470

Subtotal $15,609 $28,785 $44,395

Africa 

Ethiopia $91 $0 $91

South Africa 69 0 69

Kenya 15 0 15

Nigeria 104 0 104

Morocco 306 322 628

Tanzania 237 131 368

Libya 2 0 2

Subtotal $824 $453 $1,277

Europe

Poland $538 $1,387 $1,925

Bulgaria 442 419 861

Greece 397 259 656

Serbia 138 177 315

Albania 332 6 338

Subtotal $1,847 $2,248 $4,095

Page 68 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix II: DOE’s IRTR Program 

Expenditures, Allocated by Region, as of 

August 31, 2006

Dollars in thousands

Recipient Country U.S. Costs In-country costs Total spent

Latin America

Colombia $401 $913 $1,314

Panama 114 100 214

Peru 210 176 386

Nicaragua 72 45 117

El Salvador 82 67 149

Chile 201 110 311

Ecuador 158 152 310

Argentina 124 9 133

Brazil 90 15 105

Honduras 122 20 142

Guatemala 104 42 146

Bolivia 101 66 167

Mexico 0 0 0

Subtotal $1,779 $1,715 $3,494

Asia-Pacific 

Indonesia $244 $359 $603

Philippines 235 196 431

Vietnam 112 2 114

Bangladesh 161 43 204

Subtotal $752 $600 $1,352

Middle East 

Iraq $4,250 $206 $4,456

Afghanistan 607 0 607

Yemen 68 48 116

Jordan 188 56 244

Egypt 955 526 1,481

Turkey 146 1 147

Subtotal $6,214 $837 $7,051

Total $27,025 $34,638 $61,664

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOE. 

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

Page 69 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Energy 

Department of Energy 

Page 70 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy 

Page 71 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy 

Page 72 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy 

Page 73 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Energy 

Page 74 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear Appendix IV Regulatory Commission : Comments from the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission 

Page 75 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix IV: Comments from the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission

(360642) Page 76 GAO-07-282 Nuclear Nonproliferation
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