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Special Report 196 December 2007

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions .

Contents 

Introduction 2

Security in Baghdad 3

National Dialogue and Reconciliation 5

The Shia Position 6

The Sunni Position 8

Political Climate 10

Political Alliances 11

State Institutions 13

The Southern Governorates 14

Federation and Regional Autonomies 15

Federalism in the South 15

Federalism in the West? 16

Conclusions and Recommendations 16

About the Report

This report is based on conversations in July 2007 with 

a large number of Iraqi political leaders and senior 

government officials, members of Parliament from the 

major parliamentary groups, and a wide range of Iraqi 

citizens from Baghdad and the provinces.

Rend Al-Rahim Francke is a senior fellow in the 

Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace of 

the United States Institute of Peace. A native of Iraq, 

she is executive director of the Iraq Foundation. From 

November 2003 to December 2004 she served as Iraq’s 

representative to the United States and the Iraqi chief of 

mission. She testified about Iraq before the U.S. Senate 

in January 2007.

Rend Al-Rahim Francke

Political Progress in Iraq 

During the Surge

Summary

• The military surge that was launched in February 2007 has improved the security 

situation in Baghdad and adjacent regions. It has curbed sectarian violence in the 

capital and reduced the freedom of action and the support base of insurgents and 

terrorists in the central governorates. 

• The rationale for the surge was to provide an opportunity for political agreements 

to be negotiated among Iraqis, but political progress has been stalled and has not 

matched the security improvements.

• A political settlement is essential for sustaining the security gains and for longerterm stability. Despite the declaration of a national reconciliation plan by Iraqi Prime 

Minister Nouri Al-Maliki in June 2006, by the fall of 2007 only limited progress had 

been made toward reconciling the differences between the political groups and forging a national agenda. 

• The dominance of sectarian political groups has fueled polarization, and the inability of the government and Parliament to adopt crucial legislation is a measure of 

continuing distrust between the groups. Serious political dialogue between the sectbased parties has proved difficult and the results are limited.

• At the same time intra-sectarian rivalries are increasing, particularly in the southern 

governorates, where the Sadris and the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq vie for political and economic control of the region.

• Iraqi institutions have lost ground in the past year. Iraqi ministers from Sunni, Shia, 

and secular groups have withdrawn from the cabinet, adversely affecting the performance of the government. 

• The sectarian blocs that entered Parliament in December 2005 have lost their 

cohesiveness. The Shia United Iraqi Alliance has unraveled, and the Sunni Tawafuq 

coalition is strained. The emergence of tribal forces in Anbar governorate presents 

opportunities and challenges to the Sunnis and the Shia alike. 

• As the sectarian blocs weaken and the Anbar tribes seek a political role, new alliances 

are beginning to emerge, and some may succeed in crossing sectarian and regional 

divides.
• The debate in Washington has been restricted to the level and duration of U.S. troop 

presence in Iraq. In the coming months, the debate should turn to means of supporting the political process and strengthening governance in Iraq as a path to stability.

• Bottom-up approaches to reconciliation and accommodation do not obviate the need 

for a broader political settlement. The United States should support a sustained international mediation effort led by the UN Security Council resulting in an Iraqi compact 

endorsed by Iraq’s neighbors and the international community.

• Iraqi efforts to develop cross-sectarian political alliances and national platforms need 

to be encouraged. The incorporation of the Anbar tribes into national politics is 

important to sustaining security gains.

• A competent national government in Baghdad is essential to the long-term stability of 

Iraq. A weak government will be unable to ensure the internal and external security of 

the country or manage revenues. More effort and resources are needed to strengthen 

the competence and effectiveness of the Iraqi government. 

Introduction

The military surge under way since February 2007 was prompted by the rationale that 

reducing sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and curtailing insurgency and terrorist 

attacks would create a breathing space for political and social groups to engage in national reconciliation and agree on common principles and policies. The U.S. administration 

expected to see a binary relationship emerge between military and political achievement 

that would lead to stable conditions and permit U.S. troop reduction. Does such a binary 

relationship exist? Has the expanded military presence with its new operating strategies 

increased security, reduced sectarian violence, and controlled insurgent and terrorist 

attacks? If violence has decreased, have government and political forces found a respite 

to engage in the necessary trust-building measures and dialogue for reconciliation? What 

are Iraq’s political prospects as the surge continues?

By the end of summer 2007 the security situation had improved in Baghdad and its 

environs but was still in flux: The political process, however, lagged far behind the military 

effort. During this period impassioned debate about Iraq took place in Washington, but it 

was almost exclusively confined to discussion regarding the timing and pace of U.S. troop 

withdrawal. Very little, if any, debate concerned the steps necessary to bring about political conditions in Iraq conducive to troop reduction and eventual withdrawal. Although the 

consensus in Washington is that political stability in Iraq serves the interests of the United 

States and constitutes the best exit strategy, policymakers in Washington risk losing sight 

of the political dimension of the relationship between military and political achievement. 

From now until March 2008, when General David Petraeus is due to give his second report 

to Congress, the United States needs to assess the political situation in Iraq and undertake 

intensive efforts to promote Iraq’s political stability.

This report is based on conversations held with Iraqis in Iraq in July 2007 and in 

Beirut, Lebanon, and Amman, Jordan in October–November 2007. These conversations 

included Iraqi political leaders and senior government officials, members of Parliament 

from the major parliamentary groups, as well as a wide range of Iraqi citizens from Baghdad and the provinces. The author met in Baghdad with senior political leaders, notably 

the president of Iraq, the prime minister, the vice presidents, and several ministers, as well 

as members of Parliament from the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the Sunni Tawafuq 

bloc, and the pan-Iraqi secular Iraqia bloc. In addition, the author spoke with residents of 

Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Diwaniya, Anbar, and Salah Eddin governorates. The report is based 

on personal accounts and exchanges and private and public reports.

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its 

goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. 

The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, 

skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in 

conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chairman), President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President, 

Government Affairs, International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, 

American University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, 

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of 

Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

• Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Kathleen Martinez, Executive Director, 

World Institute on Disability • George E. Moose, Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George 

Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Ron Silver, Actor, Producer, 

Director, Primparous Productions, Inc. • Judy Van Rest, 

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. 

Members ex officio

Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State • Robert M. Gates,

Secretary of Defense • Richard H. Solomon, President, United 

States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. Wilson,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, National 

Defense University.
Security in Baghdad

By late July 2007, people who live in the city’s red zone reported having mixed experiences of the security situation.1 Residents of some “hot” neighborhoods said that the 

presence of American troops had a deterrent effect on militias, gangs, and snipers—and 

thus gave comfort to citizens. They complained that Iraqi forces, including the police, 

army units, and the Kurdish paramilitary forces called pesh merga sent down from Kurdistan, did little to confront troublemakers. For example, some neighborhoods in the Amiriya 

district have benefited from increased U.S. military presence and patrols, while others, 

such as Furat and Jihad, were still in conflict because U.S. forces had not intervened. In 

these places Iraqi police and army do a poor job of stopping violence and intimidation. 

A decline in the number of suicide bombings and a decrease in mass sectarian killings 

and kidnappings in the city are thus attributed to the higher U.S. profile. Another factor 

contributing to a sense of greater safety in Baghdad is the success of U.S.-Iraqi initiatives 

south of Baghdad (the so-called “Triangle of Death”), where Sunni tribes have recently 

cooperated with U.S. forces. Residents of some neighborhoods said that for the first time 

in more than a year they have been able to shop in their area in relative peace and stay 

out after dark. 

Other residents said that the surge had done little to improve security in their area, 

citing continuing sectarian purges, assassinations, and mortar attacks that afflicted their 

immediate neighborhoods. They complained that the “clear” operations were not followed 

by the necessary “hold” operations because the Iraqi army did not have the capacity 

to hold. The “build” was nowhere in sight.2 The army is not sufficiently capable, is not 

motivated, is afraid, or is simply not there. Residents of Baghdad regard the Iraqi police 

with extreme suspicion; two Sunnis, one a government official, and the other a citizen, 

said that the Ministry of the Interior should be disbanded and restructured.

Many Baghdadis interviewed in July felt that the security situation was marginally 

better than it had been at the beginning of the year, but they believed the gains were 

precarious and fragile. Many complained that when U.S. forces cleared an area and handed 

it over to Iraqi forces to hold, the neighborhood returned to lawlessness. Snipers have 

emerged as a relatively new and deadly danger in residential neighborhoods. Sniper murders are especially unnerving to residents because they can be both targeted and random. 

Because of fear of snipers, residents of some neighborhoods (particularly women) have 

had to give up their jobs and stay at home. 

But Baghdad is full of anomalies. A predominantly Sunni area in the northeast has 

a sizable Shia population, and the two communities continue to live peacefully, albeit 

under the protection of an “enlightened” group of the Mahdi army militia. The militia not 

only provides the residents (Sunni and Shia) with protection but also mans checkpoints 

and controls entry into the neighborhood, distributes gas and kerosene, regulates the 

supply of electricity from private generators, and offers other services to the population. 

Zayyuna, an upper-middle-class neighborhood that houses many former Iraqi army officers, is still mixed and peaceful. Al-Atayfiya is a predominantly Shia area with a sizable 

Sunni population. It has stayed quiet in the shadow of the influential Baratha mosque 

and under the wing of the mosque’s powerful imam, Sheikh Jalal Eddin Al-Saghir, who is 

also a member of Parliament (MP) for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI, formerly 

SCIRI). The militia that protects the mosque also protects the area’s inhabitants, both 

Sunni and Shia.

The reality of Sunni-Shia fighting that Baghdad and other mixed areas witnessed 

in 2006–07 is far murkier than Western press reports convey. Sectarian fighting is not 

restricted to politically motivated militias, and labeling perpetrators of violence as either 

“Sunni terrorists or insurgents” or “Jaish Al-Mahdi” militias oversimplifies and masks 

the complex facts on the ground. The lawless conditions originally triggered by terrorist 

attacks (presumed to be Sunni), counterattacks by militias (presumed to be Shia), and

Many Baghdadis interviewed in July 

felt that the security situation was 

marginally better than it had been 

at the beginning of the year, but 

they believed the gains were precarious and fragile.
the impotence of Iraqi security forces in effect paved the way to other forms of violence 

cloaked in sectarian garb. 

Violence in neighborhoods now includes family vendettas avenging former murders 

and assassinations or revenge killing of former Baathists accused of criminality under the 

previous regime. The skein of violence is further tangled by the proliferation of gangs that 

are mini-mafias masquerading as sectarian or political militias. These groups are actually 

only interested in profit, and they engage in the lucrative trade of killing or evicting 

residents, looting their homes, and renting the houses to new residents. In the absence 

of law enforcement, the competition among rival mafias expands the range of targeted 

violence.

To the distress of the Sunnis, Baghdad is increasingly a Shia city, either because Sunnis 

are being pushed out or are choosing to leave. The geographic area of the capital in which 

Sunnis are now a majority and feel safe is shrinking. For example, some Sunni parts of 

Saydiya, a fierce battleground between Sunni and Shia militias, are now Shia controlled. 

Shia political parties and militias have taken over large sections of the city. Although 

this control reduces sectarian killing, it is a source of extreme anxiety to Sunni political 

groups, who fear above all the loss of the capital. 

In the past year Sunnis who left Baghdad increasingly were escaping to Jordan rather 

than moving to safer Sunni areas of Iraq thereby affecting the country’s demographic 

profile. Their exodus is causing consternation to the leaders of the community, who see 

their numbers, political position, and leverage shrinking. A major Sunni demand now is 

not only to halt sectarian cleansing but to create the conditions in which refugees and 

displaced persons can return to their original homes and restore the former demographic 

composition of the city. 

Increased security in the capital has been bought at a high price. Neighborhoods are 

less mixed, although reports of complete sectarian homogeneity in neighborhoods are 

exaggerated. Moving between neighborhoods is more difficult because of barriers and 

checkpoints. Where U.S. and Iraqi forces are not present, militias of one stripe or another 

exercise control. Even where physical barriers are not evident, Baghdadis think of neighborhoods somewhat as cantonments. 

Iraqi security officials are concerned that terrorists squeezed out of Anbar, Diyala, and 

the area south of Baghdad are moving to Kirkuk, where suicide bombings have risen dramatically, and Salaheddin, and worry that Mosul (Naynawah governorate), so far relatively 

quiet, will be the next frontier for terrorists. Despite these concerns, Iraqi security officials 

are optimistic that security will improve, and they believed in July that the surge had 

already shown results. During meetings in July, a senior Iraqi official affirmed that of the 

446 neighborhoods in Baghdad only 5 percent were classified as “insecure” in June, compared to 10 percent earlier in the year. Iraqi officials also cited the increased competence, 

readiness, and intelligence capacities of Iraqi military forces, which have led in recent 

months to the foiling of terrorist attacks and the capture of terrorists. In July, both Iraqi 

officials and citizens expressed their belief that the surge, including the increased U.S. 

troop deployment in neighborhoods and the establishment of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), required more time to be fully effective. 

In a statement that many respondents considered unfortunate, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki declared on July 14, 2007, that the Iraqi forces were ready and able to 

assume responsibility for the security of the country.3 This statement was patently 

unrealistic, as Maliki aides acknowledged, and even Maliki himself had to backtrack. 

It is doubtful whether Iraqi forces on their own can professionally and competently 

maintain the security of the International Zone (IZ), formerly the green zone, let 

alone the entire country.

By late October 2007, Iraqis who spoke with the author in Beirut and Amman confirmed that the security in Baghdad had improved significantly. Neighborhoods that had 

been shuttered reopened for business, circulation within and across neighborhoods was 

In the past year Sunnis who 

left Baghdad increasingly were 

escaping to Jordan rather than 

moving to safer Sunni areas 

of Iraq thereby affecting the 

country’s demographic profile.

By late October 2007, there was a 

new sense of confidence that the 

security crisis and the sectarian 

fighting were under control.
easier and safer, and there was a new sense of confidence that the security crisis and the 

sectarian fighting were under control. However, most of them were concerned about the 

sustainability of this improvement, and the Sunnis still felt vulnerable in Baghdad and 

worried about the changed demographics of the capital. Meanwhile, Iraqis from the southern governorates reported that increased tensions between rival militias presented security risks for the population and affected the delivery of services and economic recovery. 

 Many Iraqis do not want to see U.S. forces leave anytime soon. Harith Al-Dhari, 

the radical Sunni leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars, declared on July 17 that 

the association did not favor an immediate and precipitate withdrawal but only wanted 

a schedule. The Sadris, the one Shia group that had been vocal against the American 

presence, have moderated their position. In private conversations moderate Sadri parliamentarians have strongly opposed any troop drawdown in the near future. Even Muqtada 

Al-Sadr (following his long and mysterious absence in spring 2007) declared that his 

movement wanted a gradual troop drawdown linked to the increasing capacity of Iraqi 

forces. Although in April 2007 the Sadr bloc in Parliament launched a petition calling for 

the United States to schedule troop withdrawal and obtained the signatures of 144 MPs, 

the Sadris have not highlighted this issue. Their temporary boycott of Parliament in May 

was not over the presence of U.S. troops but was prompted instead by the second bombing of the shrine in Samarra and the failure of the government to protect it, investigate 

the bombings, and rebuild it.4

National Dialogue and Reconciliation

The gravest problem in Iraq now concerns the power relations between Sunni and Shia 

political groups. Arab-Kurdish relations, while always sensitive, are on the margin of this 

central question, at least for the moment. Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish political leaders have 

failed to forge a common vision for the state.5 They have not articulated common national 

objectives or reached acceptable power-sharing agreements. Any serious effort at national 

reconciliation must address these fundamental questions. In discussing political progress 

in Iraq, this report focuses exclusively on Arab-Arab relations in Iraq, and does not address 

any of the outstanding issues that involve Iraqi Kurds, such as the status of Kirkuk.

The national reconciliation initiative launched by Prime Minister Maliki in June 2006 

as part of his government’s program has been stalled by the lack of political will, conflicting interests, and the absence of thoroughgoing, sustained negotiations. The legislative 

items in the initiative, such as the de-Baathification law, have languished at different 

points along the path to approval. Disarming the militias, another pillar of the reconciliation initiative, is unrealistic, given the absence of political will, economic weakness, 

the absence of Iraqi forces able and willing to confront the militias and fill the security 

vacuum, and other obstacles. 

The national reconciliation conferences held in fall 2006, which included meetings with 

tribal figures, former army officers, religious leaders, and civil society organizations, were 

about form rather than substance. These fleeting media events did nothing to address 

deep-seated fears and distrust regarding sensitive topics such as de-Baathification. The 

committee charged with reviewing the Constitution submitted its work to Parliament in 

June. By late October none of its recommendations had been debated in Parliament, as 

many of the issues are of a sensitive political nature and the political parties expect the 

debates to be contentious. A number of constitutional issues, including Article 140 of the 

Constitution regarding the status of Kirkuk and the powers of the presidency, were left 

out of the committee’s deliberations.6

Both Shia and Sunnis recognize that the difficulties in passing the legislative agenda 

related to national reconciliation, including the laws on de-Baathification and amnesty, 

are symptoms rather than causes of deeper political divisions among the political groups. 

Nevertheless, according to a prominent Sunni politician, no real political dialogue has 
taken place among the political parties in the governing coalition. The Political Council 

for National Security, composed of nineteen political party leaders and designed to discuss 

and resolve political and strategic issues, is practically moribund. The Council of Ministers (cabinet) is not a suitable forum for dialogue because ministers are rarely decision 

makers in their own parties, and the cabinet as a whole does not have authority over 

political issues. In Parliament a committee has formed to follow up on national reconciliation issues, but Parliament as a whole is too fragmented, indecisive, and fraught with 

personality clashes. According to senior members, debate of politically sensitive topics 

among senior officials is usually superficial and inconclusive. Efforts at serious discussion 

in Parliament degenerate into mutual accusations and verbal fights. 

A complicating factor for national dialogue among Sunnis and Shia is the growing 

importance of the Sunni tribes in Anbar, Diyala, and south of Baghdad. As late as October 

2007 these tribes were not formally part of the national political process and were not 

represented by any organized party. Although the government welcomes their efforts at 

fighting al Qaeda, Shia parties in government perceive them as groups that at best have 

had strong links to the insurgency and may have been part of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist 

apparatus. Prime Minister Maliki has held talks with these groups, but neither Maliki nor 

other Shia religious parties have a strategy for dealing with them politically or incorporating them in state institutions.7

At the popular level, among the “red zone Iraqis,” the squabbles between political 

parties acquire reality only insofar as they affect their daily lives and physical security. 

The withdraw of ministers from the cabinet and the failure to appoint new ministers have 

resulted in poor social services; the rivalry between Shia militias in Basra, Karbala, and 

other cities in the south has cost the lives of scores of civilians. Thus the political turmoil 

contributes to the suffering and deprivation of Iraqi citizens in very tangible ways, and 

ordinary people are helpless and feel victimized by politics. They recognize that the power 

conflicts are playing out at the highest political levels, which they cannot hope to influence, in Baghdad, in the provinces, and with Iraq’s neighbors. The reactions of Iraqis from 

all walks of life to the political stalemate range from bewilderment and incomprehension 

to anger, condemnation, and suspicions of deep conspiracy.

The Shia Position 

Shia leaders face the dilemma of reconciling two opposites. On the one hand they are eager to 

assert fully their demographic dominance in politics: in this sense, demography is democracy. 

On the other hand, they need to engage with the Sunnis to build the state. Shia hardliners 

favor what is called the “80 percent option”—that is, a Shia-Kurdish ruling alliance—arguing 

that such an alliance can run the country without the Sunnis. Even Humam Hammudi, senior 

MP from ISCI and head of the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC), whom many view as 

a moderate and conciliatory figure, can be hawkish. Hammudi did not see the usefulness of 

reconciliation: “What is there to reconcile? Sunnis are unwilling to acknowledge their minority status and act accordingly.”8 As far as he and many Shia are concerned, democracy entitles 

the Shia to rule as the majority, and reconciliation is another word for concessions.

Nevertheless, Shia politicians have told the author that they are willing to forgo the 

rewards of strict democracy by making concessions to the Sunnis (and Kurds) in the interest of national coexistence. Since the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council in 2003, 

the Shia parties have been willing to accept the principle of consensus in decision making 

(ijma in Islamic jurisprudence) as the necessary counterbalance to democracy, but this has 

meant giving veto power to the Kurds and Sunnis over certain issues (such as the ratification of the constitution) and renders decision making cumbersome and often impossible. 

The Shia say they are trying to find a middle ground but claim that the Sunnis do not 

cooperate and resort to obstructionist tactics, such as boycotting parliamentary sessions 

or cabinet meetings. In practice the 80 percent option is not a real choice at present 

because of the disarray within the Shia bloc, as described below.

Debate of politically sensitive 

topics is usually superficial and 

inconclusive. Efforts at serious 

discussion in Parliament degenerate into mutual accusations.

The political turmoil contributes to the suffering and 

deprivation of Iraqi citizens in 

very tangible ways, and ordinary people are helpless and 

feel victimized by politics. 
Several Shia leaders complained that the difficulty in talking to the Sunnis stems from 

Sunni reluctance to understand and accept the new political order: They cannot accept 

that they are no longer in control and that the Shia have the upper hand in the political 

process. Consequently, willfully or subconsciously, they thwart political progress. The Shia 

political parties believe that virtually all Sunnis are “hidden” sectarians who support Sunni 

supremacy, and Sunni demands for a nonsectarian state conceal their desire to restore 

Sunni power. 

At a visceral level Shia leaders affiliated with the religious parties find it hard to disassociate Sunni from Baath, pointing to past oppression by the Baath regime and alleged 

Sunni support for an insurgency with strong Baathist roots. Therefore the Shia fear the 

return of the Sunnis, who they believe will be a vehicle for the return of the Baath. In 

such a scenario, not only would they lose all their gains, but they would be subjected to 

renewed persecution. Many Shia suspect a Baathist or terrorist conspiracy to eliminate 

Shia leadership and cite the assassinations of Sayed Baqir Al-Hakim, Izzeddin Selim, Ali 

Al-Adhadh, and others as validation of their suspicions. 

Along with this fear, in conversations with the author Shia party leaders expressed a 

sense of entitlement: They believe that after centuries of oppression, it is their turn to 

rule. Senior leaders in ISCI and Dawa tend to define democracy as the rule of the (demographic) majority—therefore the rule of the Shia. They convey these fears and ambitions 

in numerous explicit and implicit ways to the Shia population at large. Although these 

Shia leaders concede that not all Sunnis are Saddamis or Baathis, they maintain that all 

Sunnis benefited from Saddam’s regime. 

A contributing factor to Shia anxieties is the reappearance of Baathist groups in Iraq 

and their revitalization outside Iraq. After a couple of years of silence, Baathis recovered 

after 2005 and began to form cells around the country, including in southern cities. 

Baath pamphlets, press releases, and propaganda circulated under new names, such as 

the Awdah (Return) party, but eventually explicitly under the Baath banner. To the great 

fear and distrust of the Shia, a few Sunni members of Parliament have been arguing for 

legalizing the Baath party and allowing it to reenter the political arena in Iraq.9

The Shia in government and Parliament fear the Sunnis they work with every day. 

They consider them at best tolerators of the insurgency or at worst collaborators with 

it. In March 2007 Nassir Al-Janabi, an MP from the Sunni Tawafuq, was accused by the 

government of working with Sunni assassination groups. After initial reluctance, the 

Sunni Tawafuq expelled him from their parliamentary ranks. Janabi is now a fugitive in 

Syria. Shia officials claim to have evidence incriminating other Sunni leaders in insurgent 

activities. Shia officials expressed a widely held view that some prominent Sunni MPs 

from the Sunni Tawafuq bloc in Parliament were associated with insurgent groups such as 

the Twenties Revolution Brigades and the Army of Muhammad. The government has also 

accused household staff and guards of Sunni leaders of aiding terrorist groups and possessing illegal weapons. The suicide bomber who detonated himself in Parliament in April 

2007, killing Mohammed Awadh, a Sunni MP, allegedly belonged to the retinue of a Sunni 

parliamentarian. As a result of these fears, Shia officials are reluctant to share security 

information with their Sunni colleagues. Thus when Salam Al-Zawbai, the deputy prime 

minister, complained that he was not informed of security arrangements and strategies, Ali 

Al-Adib, a senior MP with the Shia UIA reportedly confirmed his complaint, saying it was 

only natural since Zawbai could not be trusted with security information.10

Members of ISCI and Dawa blame Iraq’s neighbors and, more recently, the United States 

for aiding and abetting Sunni intransigence. In ranking the causes of problems in Iraq, 

the Shia place the meddling of Arab states at the top of their list. Their prime culprits 

are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, and Jordan. They believe that these 

countries are relentlessly hostile to Shia rule in Iraq, will go a long way to thwart it, and 

therefore turn a blind eye to the flow of money, arms, and volunteers to the insurgency. 

They also accuse Arab neighbors of encouraging Sunni political groups that have joined 

the political process to harden their positions and hold out for unreasonable demands. 

Shia believe that after centuries of 

oppression, it is their turn to rule.

Members of ISCI and Dawa 

blame Iraq’s neighbors and, 

more recently, the United States 

for aiding and abetting Sunni 

intransigence.
According to this interpretation Shia leaders worry that the Sunni Tawafuq bloc is not 

interested in reconciliation because it expects to gain a larger share of power in Iraq by 

being intransigent and getting support from Iraq’s Arab neighbors.

More recently the same Shia groups have started to blame the United States for what 

they believe to be excessive support for the Sunnis. They charge that the United States 

made unwarranted concessions to bring Sunnis into the political fold through elections 

and the constitutional referendum and continues to send signals that it is listening to 

Sunni demands and yielding to Sunni pressure. They believe these actions contribute to 

Sunni intransigence.

The influence of Saudi Arabia on the United States is a major problem for Shia religious 

parties, since the United States shares Saudi (and Iraqi Sunni) fears of Iranian interference 

and could use Sunni empowerment to counter Iran’s influence. Thus the Shia religious 

groups see U.S. support for Sunni tribes in Anbar, and the prospect of incorporating elements from these tribes into the Iraqi army, through the lens of these fears. The Shia 

worry that the United States is fostering and backing Sunni militias that can challenge 

Shia authority and is building an army that may, at a future date, stage a coup against a 

Shia-dominated government. 

At its extreme, this fear becomes a paranoid projection of a U.S. conspiracy to bring 

Sunni Baathists back to power. Many Shia who spoke to the author, both those active in 

politics and ordinary citizens, harbor a fear that the United States is complicit in trying to 

restore Sunnis to power. The insistence of the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq on forming a 

federated region south of Baghdad may be partly a precautionary measure against a feared 

restoration of the Sunnis to power. 

The Sunni Position 

Sunni concerns are the other side of the same coin. The Sunnis have an existential fear 

of Shia domination and cannot accept the reality that they are no longer the ruling elite. 

In Parliament Adnan Al-Dulaimi, the head of the Sunni Tawafuq bloc, accused the Shia of 

“killing Sunnis everywhere” and demanded that the Shia “respect our existence.”11 Even 

Sunnis who were not associated with Saddam Hussein’s regime or opposed it because they 

were Islamists, communists, or non-Baath Arab nationalists feel their loss of power as the 

social elite. Whereas the Shia accuse the Sunnis of hidden sectarianism, the Sunnis accuse 

the Shia of overt and avowed sectarianism and of using democracy and democratic tools 

to justify a sectarian agenda. 

The Shia political position is straightforward and simple—majority Shia rule using 

democratic tools—but the Sunni position is ambiguous. Publicly they reject the model of 

a state built on sectarian quotas. Others are resigned to the system of sectarian quotas 

but want a larger share and role. Despite these misgivings, some Sunnis are beginning to 

regard a sectarian quota system as their insurance policy for participating in the state.

The progressive loss of mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad to the Shia is particularly 

painful to Sunni politicians, clergy, and professionals. Irrespective of demographics, they 

felt that the capital—not Fallujah or Tikrit, which are provincial backwaters—was their 

domain. Under Saddam Hussein’s rule, the intellectual elite concentrated in Baghdad 

and relied on the patronage and privileges provided by the Sunni government. In an 

undeclared class system, Sadr City (established as Revolution City in the late 1950s and 

changed to Saddam City in the 1970s), Shula, and Shaab, all strongholds of the capital’s 

poor Shia population, were not really part of Baghdad but of the distant slums around 

the capital.

The Sunnis fear a Shia hegemony in which they are relegated to second-class status, 

dependent on what the Shia agree to grant them. With loss of power there would be a loss 

of resources, and less access to jobs, education, and commerce. Sunni parliamentarians 

claimed that Sunni academics were being assassinated in greater numbers than Shia, that 



The Sunnis fear a Shia hegemony in 

which they are relegated to secondclass status, dependent on what the 

Shia agree to grant them.
Sunni university professors were being thrown out of their jobs or denied promotion, and 

that Sunni students were kept out of the top colleges and university programs, even if 

their academic performance exceeded that of Shia students. Sunni residents of Baghdad 

continue to complain of the role of Shia militias in the police force and the inherent 

bias of the police against the Sunnis, while Sunni politicians cite the exclusion of former 

army officers from service and the denial of financial resources to the Sunni governorates, 

even for projects approved by the government. In sum Sunnis see a pattern of persistent 

neglect of Sunni interests and demands by what they characterize as a Shia government 

and a Shia power elite. 

According to the leaders of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), the Sunnis want to be full and 

equal partners in government, not 20 percent junior partners. They argue that they are 

excluded from policymaking and not consulted on major decisions concerning security 

or foreign policy. They believe that the government of Prime Minister Maliki confines its 

decision making to a narrow coterie and does not consult with the Sunnis in what is billed 

as a government of national unity.

The Sunnis have to play a delicate game with a weak hand. They believe their rhetoric 

has to be harsh to extract concessions from the Shia, and they cling to the armed groups 

as their defenders. But if they overdo either posture they increase the suspicions of the 

dominant Shia. They must also show their constituency that they can deliver benefits. 

Thus Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi, head of the IIP, often comes across as a hardliner 

because he is aware that his constituency is weighing his accomplishments on their 

behalf against the achievements of the insurgent groups. The Sunnis find themselves in 

a dangerous position: An overreliance on the armed groups makes them hostage to these 

groups and reduces their credibility with the government (and with the United States). 

Distancing themselves from the armed groups leaves them exposed and diminishes their 

credibility within the Sunni community, especially if they do not succeed in delivering 

protection and benefits to the Sunni population. 

Because of their complex position, the Sunni struggle with disagreements in their 

own camp. Within the Sunni Twafuq bloc, members of IIP, the largest component of the 

parliamentary bloc, privately regard Adnan Al-Dulaimi (leader of Ahl Al-Iraq) and Khalaf 

Al-Ulayan (leader of the Front for National Dialogue), both partners of the IIP in the 

Sunni Tawafuq, as impediments to Sunni political progress because of their crude political 

approach and their willingness to act as a cover for insurgent groups. For example, Ulayan 

has repeatedly threatened to resort to “armed resistance” if Sunni demands are not met.12

According to Sunnis in Parliament, Dulaimi has openly declared that he is sectarian. Outside the Sunni Tawafuq and Parliament, Harith Al-Dhari, the head of the Muslim Scholars’ 

Association, represents the radical extreme, and the Sunni Tawafuq openly accuses him of 

supporting al Qaeda and extreme factions of the insurgency.13 To everyone’s relief (especially the Sunnis’), he has left Iraq.

The rising profile of the Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar, Diyala, and the so-called Triangle 

of Death south of Baghdad adds a new factor that is both useful and threatening. The 

tribal elders portray themselves as homegrown champions of the populations in these 

governorates, delivering real benefits by saving the people from the tyranny of al Qaeda, 

bringing in reconstruction funds, and securing thousands of jobs in the police force.14

They are playing an important role in combating al Qaeda and improving the security 

situation in their region, thereby forging close ties with the U.S. military. This places the 

tribes in a position of both political and military strength in their own communities and 

vis-à-vis the national government in Baghdad, enabling them to drive harder bargains 

with the Shia and forcing other Sunni leaders to be at least equally demanding. The invigorated tribes that have allied themselves with the United States may increase the clout 

of the Sunnis as a community, but their rise may diminish the importance of the Sunnis 

currently in Parliament and government. In addition, the success of the Sunni tribal chiefs 
10

in combating al Qaeda may reduce the danger of international terrorism in Iraq but will 

make bargaining even tougher over power sharing and other divisive issues.

Recognizing the necessity to engage in serious political dialogue and the fact that 

existing efforts and frameworks have reached a stalemate, some Shia and Sunnis favor 

international sponsorship and mediation of a national reconciliation process. It should be 

noted, however, that the Shia are less inclined to involve outsiders in internal reconciliation efforts and view any external involvement, whether by the United States, regional 

countries, or the international community, as detrimental to their current position of 

power.

Political Climate

Four years after liberation, with two elections and a new constitution, the Iraqi political 

leaders and the United States have not succeeded in building state institutions that are 

viable, functional, or credible to Iraqi citizens. 

The political situation is in stalemate. The executive branch is unproductive, with 

seventeen of thirty-six ministers either withdrawn from their ministries altogether or 

boycotting cabinet meetings (and one minister jailed on a murder charge). Parliament 

seldom reaches a quorum and rarely reaches a working majority. When it does it can reach 

decisions only about its internal affairs (salaries for MPs, pension plans, recess, and so 

on). Services are virtually nonexistent. Oil production is down to 1.95 million barrels per 

day, far below the prewar high of 2.4 mbd.15 Political leaders across the board are acutely 

aware of the stagnation and failure of state institutions to meet the needs of the country 

but seem mired in helplessness. They disagree about the causes of the paralysis and poor 

performance and cannot agree on remedies. 

A number of factors contribute to the failure of state functions. Although there are 

leaders of political groups and factions in Iraq, no credible national leaders with broad 

national appeal have emerged in the post-Saddam era. The major political groups and 

their leaders are identified with a limited ethnic, sectarian, religious, or even regional 

constituency. The fragmentation of politics is exemplified by the most-used word in the 

Iraqi political lexicon, mukawwinat, constituent parts, as in “the constituent parts of Iraq 

society,” which has replaced the expression “Iraqis.” Sectarian groups follow their own 

narrow interests and build positions for self-defense. The most senior Shia and Sunni leaders in Iraq acknowledged in conversations that the political groups are driven more by 

fear than by any national vision. One of the consequences of the narrow agendas is the 

cabinet’s failure to act cohesively in implementing a unified program for reconstruction 

and social and economic revival.

The absence of unified and uncontested leadership in both the Shia and the Sunni 

camps (in contrast to the Kurdish bloc) hinders deal making and agreement on important 

political issues. Combined with the absence of strong leadership, the disarray within the 

Shia UIA and the Sunni Tawafuq parliamentary blocs makes voting on crucial laws difficult. Many of these laws are political in nature and affect the power relations of the 

parties in the country. Thus they require either a negotiated deal, which is unfeasible 

without strong and unified leadership, or a majority vote in Parliament, which is not 

achievable on critical issues because of the divergent interests of these groups, even 

within the same bloc. 

The most hopeful indicator is the recognition by senior politicians of all parties that 

successive Iraqi governments have failed to restore normalcy and stability and to deliver 

what the people need, although they differ on the causes of failure. There is universal 

frustration and exasperation with the stalemate among the political class and citizens 

alike. Although leaders of the different parties acknowledge that political solutions are 

needed, they do not agree on what these solutions might be. At the same time intricate 

Byzantine political activity goes on in Baghdad. According to many politicians the negoIn Iraq, no credible national 

leaders with broad national 

appeal have emerged.
11

tiations, bargaining, deal making, and deal breaking witnessed in summer 2007 are the 

most hectic since the government’s formation in spring 2006. Political dramas continue 

to occupy the political elite, but so far there is a great deal of motion without obvious 

progress.

Political Alliances

Shifts and fractures in political blocs have affected both the Shia UIA and the Sunni 

Tawafuq. These fractures affect the national political context in Baghdad as well as conditions in the governates.

The Fadhila was the first party to withdraw from the Shia UIA in March 2007.16 The 

Sadris, who withdrew their ministers from the cabinet in April and temporarily suspended 

their participation in Parliament in June 2007, are by no means bound by the Shia UIA, 

whether they are in or out of Parliament.17 The Dawa is divided into the Maliki camp, the 

Jafari camp, and the Tandhim Al-Iraq, none of which feel particularly bound by Shia UIA 

discipline, but they are likely to stick with the Shia UIA mainstream. Some of the twentyfive independents within the Shia UIA bloc have formed the secular-leaning Arab National 

Group, headed by Qassem Daoud. Thus only ISCI and the Dawa to varying degrees, remain 

committed to a united Shia UIA platform. 

Outside Baghdad and the national Parliament the Shia UIA is even more fractured. 

In Basra, Diwaniya, Nasriya, Samawa, and Amara, political differences and rivalries have 

erupted in armed confrontations and deadly clashes among the groups that comprise 

the Shia UIA coalition, resulting in many deaths on all sides, disruption of the provincial 

economies and services, and rampant corruption. It is an open question whether lack of 

cohesion at the top in Baghdad leads to warfare in the provinces, or whether the competition for power and resources in the provinces is so powerful that it impedes political 

agreements at the top. Either way, it is no longer possible to see the Shia UIA as the 

united Shia coalition Ayatollah Sistani so adamantly called for before the elections of 

January and December 2005.

A similar though less overt divergence of interests has occurred within the Sunni 

Tawafuq, creating tensions between its partners. IIP takes political positions to bolster 

its status with the Sunni public (partly in anticipation of provincial elections) and in the 

political power structure. Although IIP has hawks as well as moderates and often acts 

in ways that Shia consider obstructionist, it remains the most flexible party in the Sunni 

Tawafuq bloc and the most open to dialogue and deal making. Following the accusation 

that Nassir Al-Janabi was involved in insurgency activities, the April suicide bombing in 

Parliament, the discovery of weapons caches in the houses of some Sunni leaders, and 

the infiltration of their guards by would-be terrorists, pragmatists in IIP are beginning to 

view partners like Adnan Al-Dulaimi (Ahl Al-Iraq) and Khalaf Al-Ulayan as a burden whose 

only value is to provide voting strength in Parliament and possibly connections with the 

more dogmatic elements of the Sunni community. 

A new factor in the Sunni political game is the emergence of the tribes in Anbar, and 

increasingly in Diyala and south of Baghdad, as a vital and menacing force. The tribes 

pose a medium-term political threat to both the Sunni Tawafuq and the Shia UIA. Because 

they have provided security, funds, and jobs, they are gaining credibility within their 

communities and with the United States, thereby challenging Sunni politicians now in 

Parliament, and are eager for provincial elections to take place in Anbar to demonstrate 

their strength. The question now confronting the Sunni Tawafuq partners is how to deal 

with the new Sunni actors, and specifically how to take advantage of increased Sunni 

national visibility and leverage provided by the Anbar tribes in negotiation with the Shia 

UIA and Kurds without losing out to them politically. 

Shifts and fractures in political 

blocs have affected both the Shia 

UIA and the Sunni Tawafuq.
12

With the possibility of provincial elections in 2008 and national elections in December 

2009, the balance of power between the tribal forces in Anbar, Diyala, and Salaheddin, on 

the one hand, and the Sunni Tawafuq group, especially the IIP, on the other, may shift in 

favor of the tribes in these regions. The current Sunni alliance could fracture, leading to 

fragmentation or the formation of new alliances. The Sunni parties already in the political 

process are faced with the difficult choice of becoming the allies of these tribes or their 

rivals. Reshuffling to address these new factors may mean the end of the Sunni Tawafuq 

and the emergence of new Sunni alliances.

The tribal forces present a different problem for the Shia parties. According to his close 

advisers, Prime Minister Maliki met with some of the tribal leaders as early as 2006 but 

did not develop a strategy to bring them into the political fold, and the government is 

still ambiguous about its support for the tribes. Shia leaders fear that U.S. support for 

these groups will create legitimized, U.S.-supported Sunni militias that might eventually 

challenge the government. Disputes have arisen between the Anbar tribes and the government about the appropriate size and level of funding of a police force in the province. In 

the short term, the Shia parties controlling the government may find ways of exploiting 

the tribes against their Sunni partners in government, such as Adnan Al-Dulaimi and 

Khalaf Al-Ulayan or even the IIP. Indeed the prime minister’s office has floated trial 

balloons occasionally to test the possibility of appointing ministers nominated by the 

Anbar tribes, particularly after the withdrawal of the Tawafuq ministers from government 

in early August. 

The empowerment of the tribes, through money, arms, and local support, will strengthen the bargaining power of the Sunnis as a whole. In the long term, the Shia fear that 

the inclusion of resurgent Sunni tribal elements in the Iraqi armed forces will bring back 

Baathis to the army and to the government. The Shia parties that dominate the government therefore have the delicate task of wooing the tribes without turning them into a 

threat, balancing the influence of the tribes within the Sunni community against the 

influence of the Sunni Tawafuq parties and maneuvering to prevent the emergence of a 

unified and powerful Sunni front.

Recognizing that the political process is at a standstill and other state functions 

(legislation, services, economic improvement) are paralyzed, since May 2007 the political 

parties and blocs have been exploring new political alliances, some to support the government, others to form a new government. In May 2007 the Fadhila party, the Sadris, the 

(secular) Iraqia group, and the small (Sunni) Hewar group headed by Salih Mutlaq met to 

discuss the possibility of forming a new front opposed to the Maliki government. Some 

favored declaring a formal opposition and withdrawing from government en masse, but 

others were reluctant. In the end neither the IIP nor the Sadris, deemed essential components of an opposition front, were prepared to join; the project was put on hold. 

More significantly, ISCI and the Kurds, whose strategic alliance antedates the war of 

2003, have sought to build a broader alliance that can produce a majority in Parliament 

and bolster the government. With Fadhila’s walkout from the Shia UIA and the strained 

relations between ISCI and the Sadr movement, ISCI was left with only Dawa as a reliable 

partner within the Shia UIA, in addition to some of the independents within the bloc. The 

strategy therefore involved forming an alliance of “moderates”, comprising ISCI, Dawa, 

the KDP and PUK, and seeking the inclusion of IIP.18 An agreement between the two 

Shia parties and the Kurdish parties was relatively straightforward and was reached in July 

2007. Persuading IIP to join the alliance has involved tough and sometimes acrimonious 

discussions. Frustrated and hoping to force the issue on the reluctant Sunnis, on August 

16, 2007, the two Shia parties and the Kurdish parties formally signed an agreement for 

a moderate alliance without the IIP. 

The four parties stress than any alliance will be open to all who wish to support the 

government and the political process. Nevertheless, an alliance of moderates implies that 

those outside it are extreme in some sense or at least excluded. Other groups may be 

spurred to join or may intensify their efforts to form a counteralliance. 

The empowerment of the tribes, 

through money, arms, and local 

support, will strengthen the 

bargaining power of the Sunnis 

as a whole.
13

State Institutions

Nearly half the cabinet seats have been either vacant or nonoperational since August, 

with the withdrawal or resignation of Sadri and Iraqia ministers and the boycott of the 

Sunni Tawafuq ministers. This shortfall does not seem to make a difference since even 

with a full house, the government was unable to discharge its executive responsibilities 

and had little control over the tools of governance. According to government officials the 

prime minister, who is commander in chief, has only limited authority over the army. The 

police in the provinces are under the control of the party that controls each governorate, 

while the national police are only tenuously controlled by the interior ministry. In areas 

like Basra, Amara, and Dhi Qar, where coalition forces have either withdrawn or reduced 

their numbers, the government has not been able either to maintain law and order or to 

contain internecine fighting between rival Shia militias.

The government has struggled to control oil resources. The militias in the south fight 

over control of the oil sector and oil smuggling. Tolls collected by militias at every stage 

of the operation—from fees on overland transport to sale of smuggled crude and import 

of refined products—provide enormous revenues and drive the wars of the militias in cities 

like Basra. Indeed control over oil facilities and the oil sector in the south is a major cause 

of intra-Shia fighting in the governorate of Basra and the struggle over political control 

of the provincial council.19

The government’s record of service delivery has been poor. Fuel shortages create long 

gas lines that snake around city blocks, as well as a thriving black market in oil products, 

largely controlled by militias and mafias. Residents complain that even black-market fuel 

is in short supply. The scarcity of fuel for power plants exacerbates the electricity shortage, 

and owners of private generators frequently cannot find fuel to operate them. The health 

sector suffers from a shortage of supplies and equipment at a time of rising demand as a 

result of endemic violence. Physicians, who have been especially targeted by terrorists, are 

fleeing the country, creating a crisis that recently prompted the government to try to ban 

their travel. Services are only somewhat better in the southern provinces than they are in 

Baghdad and the central area, although accurate comparative data on fuel availability and 

the health sector are hard to obtain. 

The most promising new development, designed to end the deadlock of the executive 

branch, was the decision in mid-July to create “quartet rule” comprising of the prime 

minister and the three-man presidential council: Jalal Talabani, Adel Abdel Mahdi, and 

Tariq al-Hashimi. This arrangement was to achieve a number of objectives. Members of 

the presidential council believed that Prime Minister Maliki was making decisions without 

consulting sufficiently with the partners in the national coalition. The quartet would lead 

to more consultation in decision making and ensure Shia, Kurdish, and Sunni input and 

endorsement. In addition, Hashimi and the Sunnis complained that the government took 

strategic and security decisions without consulting the Sunnis, and the Sunnis had little 

say in governance. Quartet rule gives Hashimi, on behalf of the Sunni Tawafuq, equal 

input. Ideally the quartet will overcome the impediment of a fractured cabinet by providing consensus among the major political blocs.

Parliament has also been mired in problems. The top party leaders rarely attend meetings and the legislative process is often paralyzed by the absence of a quorum. Factional 

bickering is intense, and the crisis precipitated by the removal of Mahmoud Mashhadani 

as speaker and his subsequent reinstatement is symptomatic of the distrust between the 

Shia and Sunni factions. In addition to these problems, Parliament in reality has little 

power because the most important legislative issues it faces have political dimensions that 

require negotiations between the leaders of the political groups. Parliament can vote on 

such legislative matters only after leaders make political agreements and decisions, and 

the parliamentary vote is a tool to ratify these agreements. Thus the hydrocarbon law, the 

revenue-sharing law, the law on de-Baathification, and the law regulating the authorities 

of the provincial councils, among others, are stalled in Parliament for lack of decisions 
14

by the leadership of the parliamentary groups. At times lack of a quorum masks lack of 

agreement on sensitive legislation.

The Southern Governorates

The withdrawal of coalition troops from southern governorates has led to intensified 

confrontations between rival militias, especially Badr, the military arm of ISCI, and Jaish 

Al-Mahdi, the military wing of the Sadr movement. Weak government institutions and 

law enforcement capability have also given rise to new militias and cults, such as the 

Sarkhis and Jund Assamaa, quasi-mystical, armed groups that operate on the periphery of 

the political order. Ordinary residents of the south who wish to carry on quiet lives must 

negotiate their way through dangerous political crosscurrents.

Elections for provincial councils in the south took place in January 2005, and governors were elected by the new provincial councils. At the time the Sadr movement formally 

boycotted the elections, although individual Sadris did run. Predictably elections did not 

spell an end to political problems. In Basra the governor from the Fadhila party is bitterly 

opposed by ISCI and Dawa council members, who have tried hard to remove him from 

office. The economic stakes are high in Basra, and the city is reportedly overrun by militias 

whose primary concern is control of the city’s oil economy. According to residents, political 

assassinations of rivals and revenge killings of Baathis are rampant and underreported by 

local authorities and the national government. The small Sunni community in the governorate has come under severe pressure, and Sunni mosques have been systematically 

burned down. Residents claim that the political, military, and economic influence of Iran 

in Basra is higher than anywhere else in the south.

In Diwaniya, Nasriya, and Simawa, ISCI controls the provincial councils but, as a 

resident of Diwaniya asserted, the Mahdi army controls the streets. The police in these 

governorates belong to Badr and ISCI, but they are constantly challenged by the Mahdi 

army and often threatened in their own homes. Deadly clashes between the Mahdi army 

and the ISCI-affiliated police in these governorates have spiked, necessitating intervention by the Iraqi army. 

The Karbala provincial council is split among Dawa, ISCI, Sadris, and the Islamic Action 

Party. The governorate maintains a precarious political balance, but because it shares a 

border with Anbar and is adjacent to the Triangle of Death southwest of Baghdad, the city 

of Karbala has been the target of suicide bombers and car explosions. As a result, security 

at the entry points to the city and within the city is very tight. Amara (Maysan) and Kut 

(Wasit) councils are controlled by Sadris and the Mahdi army, although clashes with the 

local police and Iraqi army are frequent. In Amara the Sadris are said to control both the 

legal and the illicit traffic of goods from Iran.

Only Najaf appears to be quiet and prospering. ISCI fully controls the city, and despite 

the assassination in the summer of an aide to Sistani, there is no serious challenge to 

ISCI’s authority at present. As a result of the stability, Najaf’s economy is in better shape 

than other governorates in the south. In addition to control of governorate institutions, 

Ammar Al-Hakim, the son of ISCI leader Kadir Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, founded and presides 

over a huge and expanding charitable organization called Shaheed Al-Mihrab, which has 

established private schools and a string of summer schools, helps orphans throughout the 

south, delivers assistance to displaced families, runs women’s organizations and women’s 

education programs, and provides countless other social services that neither the state 

nor the governorate is providing. Some residents worry that the present calm will not 

endure because the Sadris will not cede Najaf so easily and will at some point contest 

ISCI’s control. 

Residents of the southern governorates believed that if elections for provincial councils 

took place in their governorates soon, the Sadris would make considerable gains. Because 

the Sadr movement boycotted the elections of January 2005, the present provincial counWeak government institutions 

and law enforcement capability 

have also given rise to new 

militias and cults.
15

cils do not reflect its true strength. The weak performance since the 2005 elections of 

the national government and the provincial governments, both dominated by ISCI and 

Dawa, has probably increased support for the movement. In conversations in summer 

2007, residents of the southern provinces believed that the prospect of provincial elections would intensify fighting among the Shia militias in their regions. Some southern 

residents expressed growing dissatisfaction with all religious parties, which, they felt, 

have failed to respond to the needs of citizens, tolerated corruption, and engaged in 

violent competition. 

Federation and Regional Autonomies

According to its Constitution, Iraq is currently a federation comprising two regions: 

Kurdistan and the rest of the country. The Constitution grants the governorates the right 

to form additional federated regions. In March 2007 a law presented by ISCI, regulating 

the formation of new federated regions, passed by a slim majority in Parliament with 

minimal debate. The law does not address the crucial issues of the relationship between 

the regional government and the national government, or the competencies and authority 

of the regional government vis-à-vis the national government. Although the Constitution 

touches on these points, they are nevertheless the subject of continuing and intense 

debate in Iraq and constitute some of the thorniest questions tackled by the Constitutional Review Committee. 

Federalism in the South

ISCI has led the calls to extend federalism to other parts of Iraq, but other Shia groups 

do not share its enthusiasm. The Sadr movement opposes federalism as a matter of principle, only grudgingly accepting Kurdish federalism; Fadhila and other Shia groups (both 

religious and secular) oppose the specific formula proposed by ISCI. Some political leaders 

and scholars have suggested alternative ideas for federalism or decentralization. The position of the Dawa party is more ambiguous, as it is now inclined to view ISCI as a senior 

partner and go along with the ISCI platform.

ISCI is actively seeking the creation of a single federated state covering all nine governorates south of Baghdad, presumably with Najaf as its capital—what some detractors 

call “Shiistan.” Because a referendum is required to form a federation, ISCI is expending 

considerable financial resources to promote the concept among Iraqis in the south at 

every social level and among numerous social groups. The Shahid Al-Mihrab Institute, 

an ISCI-affiliated non-governmental organization headed by Ammar Al-Hakim, regularly 

holds meetings for women, university students, and other groups to extoll the advantages 

of a southern federation. On the assumption that this southern super-federation is achievable and ISCI will control it, ISCI, like the Kurds, will want to see maximum authority 

given to the federated regions.

However, the situation in southern Iraq is politically quite different from that in Kurdistan, where the two major parties, at times violent rivals, have arrived at a power-sharing 

agreement that allows for unification of the region. Far from a power-sharing agreement, 

ISCI and the Sadr movement are locked in a bloody power struggle in the south. Basra, 

Diwaniya, Nasriya, Samawa, and other cities have witnessed armed conflict, assassinations, and bombings attributable to the rivalry between the two factions. 

Provincial elections in the south are likely to precipitate more violence and lead to 

a stronger showing by the Sadr movement. Other, smaller groups may also merge in the 

competition. Under the circumstances, and if its control of the councils is less certain, 

ISCI could lose its enthusiasm for a greater Shia federated region, and it might look to 

other forms of federation that are more easily managed.

Residents of the southern provinces believed that the prospect 

of provincial elections would 

intensify fighting among the 

Shia militias in their regions.
16

In addition, the tribes of southern Iraq are at best divided over the idea of a grand 

southern federation. Although ISCI has wooed tribes in the south-central area, its 

endorsement is not certain, and the tribes of the far south have agitated against the 

idea. In a recent and striking challenge to the grand southern federation, tribal leaders 

from Basra, Nasriya, Simawa, Diwaniya, and Amara met in July 2007 and declared the 

establishment of a single self-governing (but not federated) region comprising their five 

governorates. The declaration explicitly rejected federalism but was otherwise vague about 

the relationship of this self-governing region to the national government. 

Traditionally, Iraq south of Baghdad has been organized into two distinct cultural and 

economic regions. The mid-Euphrates, centered in Najaf and including Karbala and Hilla, is 

a predominantly urban region organized around the Shia holy sites; the population is predominantly of the clerical and merchant classes. Its economy heavily depends on the pilgrimage from the entire Muslim world to the holy shrines and on the revenue generated by 

the presence of senior Shia marjis (religious authorities who receive religious titles) and the 

hawza, seminaries that attract students from around the Muslim world. Najaf and Karbala 

have always had a more cosmopolitan Muslim complexion than most cities in Iraq.

The second region is the far south, encompassing Basra, Amara, and Nasriya, and is 

tribal and clustered around the historic marshes. Semawa and Diwaniya, with their strong 

tribal cultures, share more characteristics with this region than with the mid-Euphrates. 

The economy heavily depends on agriculture, animal husbandry, and fisheries. The local 

culture tends to be less cosmopolitan and less oriented toward religion than that prevailing in the shrine cities. Tribal folklore is prominent and colorful, and the population 

continues to be attuned to Arab tribal traditions. 

In sum, intense political rivalries that include armed conflict, historical variables, and 

cultural and economic differences make the creation of a single super-federation in the 

south a considerable challenge. 

Federalism in the West?

The Sunnis have accepted the principle of federalism for the Kurds but find it hard to 

reconcile themselves to an overall federated Iraq. At the same time several concerns have 

driven the Sunnis to think about the merits of self-governance and decentralization. A 

primary issue is the composition of the security forces, encompassing the national police 

and the army, both of which are heavily Shia. Efforts by the central government to introduce Iraqi army units in Anbar province have been unsuccessful because of the distrust 

between the population and Shia troops. A locally recruited and managed police force 

answering to the provincial government is a preferable solution, although its relationship 

to the interior ministry is ambiguous (as is the relationship of locally raised police forces 

in other governorates, notably in the south). 

Allocation of revenue is another item of concern to the Sunnis. Sunni leaders from the 

Sunni Tawafuq alliance and the Anbar tribes complain that reliance on national ministries 

often dominated by Shia parties to approve projects and allocate and disburse funds 

has so far been an unproductive experience. They prefer to control their own finances. 

The undercurrent of Sunni thinking is that if Iraq’s national government is going to be 

based on sectarian quotas, therefore giving the Sunnis minority status, then Sunnis need 

autonomous control over certain issues in areas where they are a majority. At present the 

precarious security situation and fluctuating balance of political forces in the majority 

Sunni governorates, as well as the difficult conditions in Shia governorates, make a unifying policy on this issue difficult for Sunnis to reach.

Conclusions and Recommendations

By October 2007 many Iraqi officials and Baghdad residents were willing to state that 

the stepped-up military effort had succeeded in reducing sectarian violence in the capital
17

and squeezing al Qaeda out of traditional strongholds. Yet despite broad recognition that 

the success of the military effort can be sustained only by a political settlement, neither 

the United States nor the Iraqis have matched the military escalation with a comparable 

political acceleration. Iraqis have not used the opportunity provided by the slowdown 

of sectarian killings to engage more effectively in a national dialogue and reach accommodations. The United States, despite its demand for the Iraqi government to meet 

benchmarks, has not made the political process in Iraq its highest priority. Washington 

has not mobilized its considerable political and diplomatic capabilities to confront what 

is undoubtedly the most critical problem endangering regional stability.

The next report from General Petraeus is expected in March 2008, and the intervening period should be a time for U.S. policymakers and Iraqis to devote their energies to 

addressing political and governance problems. While there are constraints on the ability 

to shape political dynamics in Iraq, they should not lead to inaction. With the prospect 

of U.S. troop reductions and redeployment, it is crucial over the next year for the United 

States and the international community to affirm their political engagement with Iraq 

and their commitment to helping Iraqis establish a viable state. Otherwise the intensified 

military effort will have been wasted and U.S. troop presence may be prolonged. 

Three principal initiatives can benefit from U.S. and international engagement and 

support. 

1. International Mediation. President Bush and General Petraeus have both referred 

to the success of bottom-up approaches to reconciliation and security.20 The security 

achievements in Anbar, south Baghdad, and other hotspots will translate into durable 

political success once the tribes in these regions integrate into the Iraqi state at a political level, not only serve as members of a local police force or national army. Although local 

efforts are important as building blocks, they do not preclude or diminish the necessity of 

agreements and accommodations at the top political levels, if only because senior politicians can scuttle or sabotage local successes. 

Forums, such as the one for Iraq and its neighbors or the International Compact for 

Iraq, are useful for engaging the region and the international community, but they do not 

address the heart of the matter, that political leaders need to engage in candid, serious 

negotiations and accept unpalatable compromises. Sectarian entrenchment, fueled by 

killings and purges, has engendered distrust and discouraged candor, making it unlikely 

that leaders can undertake this painful process on their own. 

Iraq urgently needs international mediation to bring the parties together at the highest 

decision-making level to forge a national compact. The negotiations should establish a 

sustained, continuous dialogue and reach agreements on power sharing, the nature of the 

Iraqi state, and compromises on specific national issues such as the Constitution. Iraq’s 

neighbors must be brought into the process to endorse and uphold agreements struck 

by the Iraqi leadership. Once agreements are in place, compliance must be monitored 

by international observers. Although the United States must provide the motivation and 

impetus for such mediation, the process itself should be anchored in an international 

framework, with a UN Security Council resolution and mediators appointed by the Security 

Council. Resolution 1770, which gives the UN a larger role in Iraq, is a starting point for 

the Security Council to do more, but it does not go far enough. 

2. Develop National Politics. Since 2003 Iraq has suffered from the polarization 

of sectarian politics, with the inevitable result that all negotiations are zero-sum 

games. Policy choices and decisions are measured by the yardstick of factional interest 

rather than national interest. The state has been built on a sectarian premise with a mentality of cronyism and divvying up the spoils, making compromise and accommodation 

among the groups hard to reach. It is essential for Iraq to move away from the cycles 

of identity politics and develop national platforms and national institutions. Mechanisms 

have to be established within state institutions to reinforce their national mission, 

particularly in the armed forces, the national police, the judiciary, and institutions that 

handle the country’s revenues. 

The United States and Iraqis have 

not matched the military escalation 

with a comparable political 

acceleration.
18

Recent developments in Iraq provide a better opportunity than earlier to redefine Iraqi 

politics in terms of cross-sectarianism and national platforms. The breakdown of the Shia 

UIA and the incipient disagreements within Sunni Tawafuq open a path to new crosssectarian, cross-ethnic alliances that can develop issues-based rather than sect-based 

agendas. The rise of the Sunni tribes in Anbar and elsewhere against al Qaeda provides 

an opportunity to reduce distrust and reshape Sunni-Shia dialogue. Countrywide tribal 

forums that bring together Shia and Sunni tribal leaders can provide alternative political 

structures that transcend sectarianism. Social and professional structures that draw on the 

urban middle class can provide the social underpinnings for development of cross-sectarian and cross-ethnic common interests. A further important step in directing Iraq away 

from sectarianism and encouraging national politics lies in changing the current electoral 

law of closed lists and adopting single-candidate, single-district elections.

3. Build Effective Governance. Along with changing the political model, the national 

government must acquire the ability and the tools to govern. As discussed earlier, 

the problems of government are systemic, caused by favoring quotas instead of competence, cronyism, lack of accountability, and corruption. If the executive branch hopes to 

improve performance, this underlying system must change in favor of better standards of 

competence and a professional cabinet structure. More effort is necessary to professionalize and train the civil service and ensure the continuity of experience and knowledge in 

government agencies. 

The argument that the national government can remain weak while provincial governments should be strengthened is unrealistic. A state that is vulnerable to internal threats 

from terrorism, unruly militias, and external challenges from neighbors requires competent 

security institutions, and these can only be provided and managed by the national government. The national government is still, and will continue to be, responsible for the armed 

forces, distribution of revenue, and nationwide infrastructure projects. Outside Kurdistan, 

Iraqis still look to the national government to provide basic services and protection. At 

present the incapacity of the national government is not compensated for by strong provincial governments. Quite the opposite. The ills that bedevil the national government in 

Baghdad are mirrored in equal, if not greater, measure in the provinces. 

Ultimately Iraqis have to make the hard decisions about the shape of the national 

compact, a political settlement, and necessary agreements to build a functioning and 

stable state. Nevertheless, what the United States does (or fails to do) is important in 

influencing political directions and outcomes. 

The United States can play a significant role as a catalyst by providing support and 

assistance strategically and at the operational level and by persuading the international 

community to engage more vigorously and meaningfully in facilitating Iraqi dialogue and 

settlements. It would be dangerous for the United States to allow the debate in Washington over the military to obscure the fact that a political solution is the only feasible 

endgame in Iraq. 
19

Notes

1. The red zone of Baghdad comprises all the areas of the city outside the green zone (now officially the 

International Zone), which is a heavily guarded and walled enclave that houses the U.S. and other embassies, the Iraqi Parliament, and senior government officials.

2. “Clear, hold, and build” is a policy articulated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in her remarks 

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 19, 2005. See www.state.gov/secretary/

rm/2005/55303.htm. “Clear” refers to clearing areas of terrorists and insurgents; “hold” refers to sustaining control over cleared areas; and “build” refers to the reconstruction and economic revival of cleared 

and held areas.

3. Richard A. Oppel Jr., “Iraq Chief Says His Forces Are Able to Secure Country,” New York Times, July 15, 

2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/world/middleeast/15iraq.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.

4. Edward Wong, “Shiite Cleric Has Six Quit Cabinet in Iraq Shake-Up,” New York Times, April 17, 2007, www.

nytimes.com/2007/04/17/world/middleeast/17iraq.html; Kirk Semple, “Majority of Iraq Lawmakers Seek 

Timetable of U.S. Exit,” New York Times, May 12, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/05/12/world/middleeast/

12iraq.html.

5. The discussion in the Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) regarding the preamble to the constitution 

reveals the absence of a common national vision among the leaders who drafted the document. The 

preamble depicts Iraqi society as a collection of ethnic and religious fragments, recounts the history of 

persecution suffered by each community but primarily by the Kurds and the Shia, gives religious leaders a

prominent role in the process of political change, and appeals repeatedly to the (Shia) imams and marjis 

for inspiration. Efforts to change the preamble by eliminating some language were unsuccessful. Only 

additions to the preamble were accepted and included in the draft sent to Parliament.

6. The committee’s recommendations do not cover the powers of the presidency, the preamble, or Article 140,

which deals with Kirkuk, de-Baathification, and other constitutional items.

7. References to Shia parties or Shia politicians refer to the Shia religious groups in Parliament, including 

ISCI, Dawa, the Sadris, and Fadhila, who in 2005 formed the United Iraqi Alliance bloc. It does not refer 

to secular Shia who may belong to other groups, such as Iraqia.

8. Meeting with the author in Baghdad, July 9, 2007.

9. The Baath party has splintered into at least two factions, one led by Izzet al-Douri, reputed to be in 

Yemen, and another by Younes Ahmed, in Syria. There were efforts in Damascus in summer 2007 to reconcile the two groups. See Maad Fayad, “Return of the Baathists?” Asharq Alawsat, February 13, 2007, 

www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=7990. 

10. Ernesto Londono, “For Eminent Sunni, Lessons in Weakness,” Washington Post, February 10, 2007,

www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/09/AR2007020902344.html.

11. “UIA and Tawafuq Exchange Accusations in Parliament of Inciting Sectarianism,” Asharq Alawsat, November 22, 2006.

12. Maad Fayad, “Iraqi Sunni Leaders Threaten ‘Civil War,’” Asharq Alawsat, December 26, 2005, www.asharqalawsat.com/english/pring.asp?artid=id3184; “Leader of Tawafuq Coaliton: We Will Resort to Armed 

Resistance if the Government Does Not Obey Our Demands,” Asharq Alawsat, July 17, 2007, www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issue=10444&article=426336&state=true.

13. “Tawafuq Bloc Attacks ‘Ambiguous Stand’ of Al-Dhari Towards Al-Qaeda,” Asharq Alawsat, October 10, 

2007.

14. “Bomb Kills a Key Sunni Ally of U.S.,” washingtonpost.com, September 1, 2007, and “Abu Risha in an 

Interview Weeks before His Assassination,” Asharq Alawsat, September 15, 2007. 

15. Peter Grier, “Iraq’s Oil Production Falls Short of Goals,” Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 2007, www.

csmonitor.com/2007/0507/p01s02-wome.html.

16. Ernesto Londono, “At Least 146 Shiites Killed Across Iraq,” Washington Post, March 8, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/07/AR2007030700357_3.html.

17. “Sadr Bloc Boycotts Parliament after Shrine Bombing,” Khaleej Times, www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.aspxfile=data/focusoniraq/2--7/June/fpcispmoraq_June54.xml§ion=focusoniraq. 

18. The United States encouraged formation of an alliance of “moderates” as early as December 2006; press 

conference by President George W. Bush, December 20, 2006, Office of the Press Secretary, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/pring/20061220-1.html.

19. International Crisis Group, “Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons From Basra,” Middle East Report, 67–25 (June 

2007). 

20. Presidential radio address on Iraq’s Anbar Province, September 8, 2007, White House Press Secretary, 

usinfo.state.gov (accessed September 10, 2007); “Transcript: Gen. David Petraeus on ‘Fox News Sunday,’” 

June 17, 2007, www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,283553,00.html. 
United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

• Ayatollah Sistani and the Democratization of Post-Ba’athist Iraq, by Babak Rahimi (Special Report, June 2007).

• Constitutional Reform in Iraq: Improving Prospects, Political Decisions Needed, by Neil J. 

Kritz, Sermid al-Sarraf, and J. Alexander Their (USIPeace Briefing, September 2007).

• Iraq: Time for a Change, by Daniel Serwer (USIPeace Briefing, September 2007).

• Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, by Robert M. Perito (Special Report, March 

2007).