Filed 1/5/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re WILLIAM JIM MORSE on 

Habeas Corpus.

 D077483

 (Super. Ct. No. EMH-000347)

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Jeffrey Bruce Jones, Judge. 

Petition denied.

Benjamin Salorio, Public Defender, Darren Bean, Deputy Public 

Defendant for Petitioner.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael 

Pulos and Joy Utomi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

William Jim Morse petitions for a writ directing the superior court to 

reverse its finding under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (Welf. & Inst. 

Code,1 § 6600 et seq.) (SVPA) that there is probable cause to believe 

petitioner is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory behavior without 

treatment or custody. The court during the section 6602 probable cause 

hearing sustained petitioner’s objection based on People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 

Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) to portions of the experts’ psychological evaluations, 

1 Unless noted otherwise, all further statutory references are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

but nonetheless found the remaining evidence was sufficient to support a 

finding that petitioner met the criteria of a sexually violent predator (SVP).2

At the probable cause hearing, a court must “review” the SVP petition. 

(See § 6602, subd. (a).) The petition, in turn, must be supported by 

statutorily mandated evaluations that in some, if not most, cases rely on a 

broad array of sources dating back years, if not decades, that an evaluator 

must consider under the SVPA as part of his or her standardized assessment 

of a person. 

Petitioner argues that the court correctly found Sanchez applied at the 

probable cause hearing; that, after sustaining his hearsay objection to the 

experts’ evaluations, there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s 

probable cause finding; and that the People “waived” their right to assert 

section 6602 is an implied exception to the hearsay rule by failing to raise 

this specific ground at the hearing. Petitioner therefore argues the petition 

must be dismissed. 

As we explain, we conclude the court erred in sustaining petitioner’s 

hearsay objection at the section 6602 hearing. We find the SVPA as a whole, 

and section 6602 in particular, evince a legislative intent to allow a court to 

consider hearsay in the experts’ evaluations when making a probable cause 

determination. In our view, requiring an evaluator to rely on nonhearsay 

only in preparing his or her evaluation of a person, or requiring the People to 

produce at an interim probable cause hearing independent foundational 

2 A “ ‘Sexually violent predator’ means a person who has been convicted 

of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a 

diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and 

safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually 

violent criminal behavior.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).)
3

evidence to support the historical information relied on by evaluators, would 

undermine the purpose of such a hearing and the SVPA in general.

Our decision finds further support in that a person at a section 6602

hearing is afforded various procedural safeguards, including the assistance of 

counsel, the right to cross-examine the evaluators and challenge their 

findings, and the ability to call witnesses.

We note, however, that our decision is limited to a section 6602

probable cause hearing. At an SVP trial, the People must still proffer 

nonhearsay evidence in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is 

an SVP subject to civil commitment. 

In light of our decision, we conclude there is ample evidence in the 

record to support the court’s probable cause finding. We thus deny 

petitioner’s writ petition.

OVERVIEW

On February 20, 2020, the El Centro District Attorney filed a petition 

to commit petitioner as an SVP. The petition was supported by the 

evaluations of psychologists Erik Fox and G. Preston Sims. In connection 

with their evaluations, the doctors reviewed petitioner’s background, 

criminal, prison, and mental health records, and records of the qualifying 

sexual offense. Petitioner refused to be interviewed by Dr. Fox; he thus 

completed his evaluation by relying on about 39 sets of documents, which he 

identified, including dates, in his evaluation. 

Petitioner did agree to an interview with Dr. Sims, who also reviewed 

voluminous records identified in his evaluation. The doctors in their 

evaluations concurred that petitioner met the definition of an SVP as 

provided under the SVPA.
4

Qualifying Sexually Violent Offense

As described in the doctors’ evaluations,3 petitioner’s February 2012 

Imperial County Probation Report (sometimes, probation report) noted 

deputies on January 24, 2010, responded to a physical altercation in a trailer 

park where petitioner was then living. Deputies contacted petitioner and 

discovered he had been hiding in the bedroom closet of seven-year-old4 Jane 

Doe. Petitioner claimed while hiding he heard Jane Doe’s 16-year-old cousin 

asking to be orally copulated by Jane Doe, and saw him exposing his penis to 

his cousin. Petitioner further claimed he confronted the cousin and a fight 

ensued. 

Deputies searched petitioner’s RV positioned adjacent to the victim’s 

residence. Inside the RV deputies found “images of child erotica, notebooks 

with handwritten text discussing child sex and an intention to engage in sex 

with children, literature discussing sex with children in foreign countries, 

and baby dolls with red paint on their vaginal areas.” 

According to the probation report, deputies on February 10, 2010,

interviewed Jane Doe’s mother. She disclosed she had met petitioner about 

two months earlier, he was the caretaker of the trailer park, and an 

acquittance of her boyfriend. She also disclosed petitioner had given her 

daughter “underwear and toys”; he had “frequently followed her daughter 

around”; and her daughter had reported petitioner “touched or tickled her in 

the underwear area.”

3 The documents relied on by the evaluators are not included in the 

appellate record. We thus cite to the evaluations in summarizing the facts of 

petitioner’s qualifying sexual offense and the other information relied on by 

the experts in determining petitioner met the criteria of an SVP.

4 Dr. Fox in his report stated Jane Doe was seven years old, whereas Dr. 

Sims stated she was six years of age.
5

On February 23, Jane Doe was taken to the Chadwick’s Children 

Center for a forensic interview. The probation report notes the following 

statements were then taken: “Jane Doe said she was watching Strawberry 

Shortcake when the defendant entered her room. He sat next to her on the 

bed and placed his hands on her upper/inner thigh. Jane Doe said she was 

scared and told her mother. On a separate occasion, Jane Doe said she was 

taking out the trash when the defendant began chasing after her. Jane Doe 

said she was very scared. Jane Doe further said that the defendant had 

given her a doll that had a hole on the ‘private parts’ area. On one occasion, 

he kissed the victim’s doll on the vaginal area. The victim said the defendant 

repeatedly attempted to take her to the beach and had given her underwear 

and a Sea World towel. The victim lastly said that the defendant had 

attempted to kiss her. Jane Doe reiterated that she was afraid and did not 

like him at her house.” 

Although charged with multiple counts, petitioner pleaded guilty to a 

single count of committing lewd acts upon Jane Doe, a child under the age of 

14. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) The court sentenced petitioner to 12 years 

in prison.

Dr. Fox’s Evaluation

Dr. Fox opined that petitioner’s conviction under Penal Code section 

288, subdivision (a) qualified as “sexually violent offense” under section 6600, 
6

subdivision (b).5 Dr. Fox also opined that petitioner has a diagnosed mental 

disorder that predisposes him to the commission of criminal sexual acts.

(§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) 

With respect to his latter finding, Dr. Fox reviewed petitioner’s 

psychological history. Dr. Fox noted there was limited information on this 

subject matter. Dr. Fox cited to a Clearwater, Florida supplemental police 

report from 1995 in which petitioner had been arrested for kidnapping and 

false imprisonment of a nine-year-old child. Subsequent to his arrest, 

petitioner’s mother was interviewed by an investigating officer. She stated 

petitioner had a “long history of drug related problems” that led her to “kick” 

petitioner out of the house on several occasions.

Dr. Fox also addressed petitioner’s educational, employment, 

relationship, and psychosexual history, as set out in the probation report. 

This history shows petitioner completed the ninth grade; served in the United 

States Army for three years6; and had at least four children. Dr. Fox noted 

the probation report provided some background information regarding 

petitioner, including about his father who died in combat while serving in the 

United States Army, and about his mother, who died in 2010.

5 As relevant here, a “ ‘sexually violent offense’ means the following acts 

when committed by force, violence, duress, menace, fear of immediate and 

unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person, or threatening to 

retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person, and that are 

committed on, before, or after the effective date of this article and result in a 

conviction or a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, as defined in 

subdivision (a): a felony violation of Section . . . 288 . . . of the Penal

Code . . . .” (§ 6600, subd. (b).)

6 Petitioner stated during his interview with Dr. Sims that he served one 

year in the Army and then left because his mother had health problems.
7

Regarding petitioner’s psychosexual history, Dr. Fox in his evaluation 

noted there also was a dearth of information on this subject matter, 

particularly as a result of petitioner’s refusal to submit to a clinical interview. 

Dr. Fox noted the probation report provides evidence that in the qualifying 

crime petitioner attempted to “groom” Jane Doe; that Jane Doe’s mother was 

often intoxicated, making the victim “particularly vulnerable”; and that the 

Facts of Offense Sheet dated February 14, 2012 listed the titles of videos 

petitioner had in his possession at the time of the qualifying crime. These 

titles included: “ ‘6-9 years. Girls Fuck. Little Cunts. Fucked by big daddy. 

Rape little girl.’ ‘5 mins. Russia. 7 yo Fucked by Daddy.’ ‘Hot little vaginas 

from Germanyu. 4-6 yrs—raped by 2 daddies.’ Thailand-Bankok babes—

pretens 5 yrs, 6yrs. Hot 8 yrs old getting pussy fucked by old dude.[ ] etc. . . .”

Dr. Fox described an incident from the probation report that took place 

after petitioner had been arrested for the qualifying crime. An undercover 

agent from Immigration and Custom Enforcement was placed in petitioner’s 

Imperial County Jail cell because authorities were concerned by petitioner’s 

“intent to access child pornography and have sex with children in foreign 

countries.” The agent befriended petitioner; they had a number of 

conversations about child pornography and sex with children; and petitioner 

agreed to purchase child pornography videos from the agent on petitioner’s 

release. 

After making bail, petitioner went to the agent’s motel room to 

purchase the videos. The probation report, relied on by Dr. Fox, noted a 

hidden camera and microphone in the motel room recorded the following:

“ ‘. . . [T]he pornographic videos contained images of a “ten-year-old getting 

fucked by a dog,” a five year-old “Brazilian bitch being raped by a man with a 

cock the size of fuckin Great Dane” and a little girl getting her “cherry 
8

popped.” [The undercover agent] said he would sell the videos to him for 

$100. The defendant said $100 was a significant amount and that he needed 

a preview before purchasing them. He then told [the undercover agent] he 

would purchase his toiletries from [a department store] in exchange for the 

videos. On February 1, 2012, he eventually paid [the undercover agent] $50 

for the videos.’

“The defendant made several alarming statements such as . . . ‘I fucked 

my own mother,’ ‘My daughter sucked my dick when she was like eight years 

old,’ and ‘I will protect fucking people that are like me. All my fucking life I 

knew I wasn’t the only one, the only so-called fuckin molester or the only 

fuckin pervert.’ The defendant added a pimp in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico had 

given him a child and that children commonly went for $400. [The 

undercover agent] suggested that they travel to Mexico to have sex with 

children. Enthused by the idea, the defendant invited himself and began to 

plan the trip. He said they needed to have a ‘business plan.’ The defendant 

said he was seeking more than sex and wanted a ‘real relationship’ with a[n] 

11 year-old. Once he would ‘fuck’ her, nobody could touch her, he said. The 

defendant said he needed to give the children’s mother[ ] money to calm down 

the children. Therefore, they drove to [a location] to access a [bank’s] 

automatic [teller] machine; the defendant withdrew $800. Officers 

subsequently arrested him in the parking lot.”

Dr. Fox noted petitioner was accused of molesting another victim, who 

came forward on April 8, 2010. Dr. Fox’s evaluation referenced an April 8 El 

Centro Police Department Narrative regarding this incident, which was 

summarized in the probation report. The probation report noted criminal 

charges from this incident, involving a six-year-old girl in which petitioner 
9

was accused of molesting and grooming the victim, were dropped as part of 

petitioner’s guilty plea to the qualifying crime involving Jane Doe. 

The probation report nonetheless provided details regarding this 

separate incident.7 The victim reported to her father that petitioner 

“touched her vagina, that his penis entered her vagina[ ] and that it hurt her. 

The victim confirmed it was Mr. Morse who molested her and remarked that 

he bought her toys. An El Centro Police Department Investigation Report 

dated 5-9-11 also indicates the victim stated Mr. Morse placed his mouth on 

her ‘peepee’ for a long time while inside Mr. Morse’s recreational vehicle.”

Dr. Fox noted that while petitioner was incarcerated in 2011 at the 

Imperial County Regional Adult Detention Facility, deputies during a routine 

inspection found papers in petitioner’s cell that “contained writing and 

drawings that appeared to be of female children in various states of undress 

and provocative poses.” Dr. Fox reviewed the drawings and reported one of 

the drawings “displays a female with her legs spread open and a caption of 

her saying, ‘Fuck me hard daddy!’ Underneath the image is the quote, 

‘Seems he has a daughter that just loves to fuck.’ ” Other writings on the 

papers included, “ ‘Little girls inside of blacked out minivans in Lost Angelles 

Cal. Arcade Fun.’ ”

In 2012, while in prison for the qualifying crime, deputies discovered a 

number of contraband pictures while searching petitioner’s bed area. Dr. Fox

noted there were seven small pictures depicting “various dolls and very young 

girls who looked between the ages of 4 and 7.” 

Dr. Fox described an incident in 2015 when an inmate complained 

petitioner was creating “ ‘[d]isgusting drawings of children and cartoon 

7 As discussed post, Dr. Sims questioned petitioner about this incident 

during the forensic interview.
10

characters showing their private parts.’ ” The source of the report is not 

given by Dr. Fox. Dr. Fox went on to note that shortly after the inmate 

complained, there was a physical altercation between petitioner and other 

inmates. Dr. Fox added, “I found no other mention of the child sexual 

material but given the history of such, it seems plausible Mr. Morse was 

creating it again.”

Dr. Fox also addressed an incident in February 2019 when petitioner 

walked across the prison yard “completely naked.” Dr. Fox did not provide a 

source of this information. Dr. Fox in his evaluation noted petitioner claimed 

to have done so for attention because he was fearful as a result of being a 

convicted sex offender.

Dr. Fox listed petitioner’s adult criminal history, which is extensive

dating back to 1982, and includes petitioner’s 1995 conviction in Florida for 

false imprisonment of a nine-year-old child, as briefly noted ante. The 

criminal history also includes a section on petitioner’s “Institutional 

Behavior,” which recounted more than 10 violations while petitioner was 

incarcerated for the qualifying crime, including the February 2019 incident 

when petitioner walked across the prison yard naked. 

The evaluation also includes petitioner’s substance abuse, medical, and 

psychiatric history. Regarding the latter, among other details Dr. Fox stated 

the probation report noted petitioner admitted to being diagnosed with 

schizophrenia at the age of 10. According to Dr. Fox, petitioner’s medical 

records, including an IEX report dated March 4, 2019, “reveal Mr. Morse is 

diagnosed with a number of mental disorders including Bipolar Disorder, 

Antisocial Personality Disorder, and Pedophilic Disorder.”

 When Dr. Fox briefly met with petitioner and attempted to conduct a 

forensic examination, petitioner then was in custody in the Mental Health 
11

Crisis Bed level of care, which Dr. Fox opined was “similar to an acute 

inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.” Shortly thereafter, petitioner was 

transferred to an “Intermediate Care Facility” because, Dr. Fox further 

opined, petitioner needed a “higher level of care . . . than that which the 

prison can provide.”

Dr. Fox reviewed petitioner’s Clinical Summary and Case Formulation 

dated August 21, 2019, which described petitioner’s psychiatric treatment 

history, most of which was from his incarceration for the qualifying offense. 

From this information, and other records summarized ante, Dr. Fox 

concluded that petitioner “has not been stable psychiatrically for some time”; 

that he is “court ordered to take psychiatric medication involuntarily which 

highlights his lack of treatment compliance”; that petitioner’s antipsychotic 

mediation therefore was being “administered intramuscularly”; and that he 

suffers from auditory hallucinations and paranoid thoughts, as also 

documented in progress notes from 2018 by the Mental Health Services 

Delivery System, where petitioner again admitted to being schizophrenic.

Based on his review of these extensive records, Dr. Fox opined under 

the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition

(DSM-5), that petitioner’s has the following diagnostic profile: “302.2 

Pedophilic Disorder, Non-Exclusive Type, Sexually Attracted to Females”; 

“305.00 Alcohol Use Disorder, Mild”; “305.20 Cannabis Use Disorder, Mild”; 

“305.60 Stimulant Use Disorder, Cocaine, Mild”; and “298.8, Other Specified 

Schizophrenia Spectrum and Psychotic Disorder.” 

Regarding his diagnosis of pedophilic disorder, Dr. Fox noted the DSM5 lists the criteria of this disorder as follows: “A. Over a period of at least six 

months, recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or 

behaviors involving sexual activity with a prepubescent child or children 
12

(generally age 13 years or younger). [¶] B. The individual has acted on these 

sexual urges, or the sexual urges or fantasies cause marked distress or 

interpersonal difficulty. [¶] C. The individual is at least age 16 years and at 

least five years older than the child or children in Criterion A.”

Dr. Fox opined that petitioner met the above criteria, noting his 

prepubescent victims, including Jane Doe, were only six or seven years of age. 

Dr. Fox continued, “The evidence shows he groomed each of these vulnerable 

children and had written about his desire to have sex [with] children. 

Further evidence of his sexual interest in children is noted by officers who 

confiscated child pornography from his vehicle after his arrest in 2010. Then, 

after detection for molesting the 7-year-old victim [Jane Doe], Mr. Morse 

befriended a cellmate who he later purchased child pornography from. He 

then made arrangements to have sex with children in Mexico. Mr. Morse 

also disclosed he had forced his 8-year-old daughter to orally copulate him. 

The cellmate was actually an undercover agent. Later in 2011, 2012, and 

2015 while in custody, Mr. Morse was in possession of images and writings he 

created regarding sexual interest in children. Consequently the timeline for 

the disorder is met. Mr. Morse has obviously acted upon his urges and the 

age requirements are established. Mr. Morse’s incarceration has caused him 

obvious marked distress and interpersonal difficulty. The criteria for 

Pedophilic Disorder are met.” Dr. Fox then went on to address the remaining 

disorders discussed ante.

Dr. Fox opined petitioner suffers from a “diagnosed mental disorder” as 

defined in subdivision (c)8 of section 6600, as Dr. Fox found there was a 

8 “ ‘Diagnosed mental disorder’ includes a congenital or acquired 

condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the 

person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting the 

person a menace to the health and safety of others.” (§ 6600, subd. (c).)
13

“direct nexus between [petitioner’s] pedophilic disorder and his lack of 

volitional control.” Dr. Fox added: “First, despite detection and sanction, Mr. 

Morse immediately sought out child pornography to replace what had been 

confiscated. He then made plans and took steps to engage in sex with a child 

in Mexico. Thereafter, while incarcerated, he created images and writings to 

support his deviant sexual interests despite the fact that possession of such 

material imposed a significant danger to his safety. It is therefore clear his 

behavior is not deterred by actual consequences. In Mr. Morse’s case, he is 

also emotionally impaired as a result of his pedophilic disorder. His 

statements and actions establish that he fails to recognize the significant 

psychological consequences to his victims.”

Dr. Fox further opined that without appropriate treatment and 

custody, petitioner was likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior 

as a result of his mental disorder. In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Fox relied 

on the Static-99R, scoring it “in the most conservative manner” by not 

including any incident involving a stranger or any male victims. Dr. Fox 

found petitioner was in the above average risk category for being charged or 

convicted of another sexual offense. Dr. Fox’s evaluation discussed at length 

absolute recidivism rates, as well as the structured risk assessment known as 

the violence risk scale—sexual offense version (VRS-SO), and a variety of 

dynamic factors under this assessment tool.

Dr. Fox went through 17 different factors relative to the VRS-SO. He 

found petitioner’s overall lifestyle is characterized by sexual deviance, 

including grooming at least two of his victims; possessing child pornography;

discussing his sexual history with children with an undercover agent;

acquiring more sexually deviant material from that agent; and making plans 

to travel abroad to have sex with children. Dr. Fox also found that petitioner 
14

in 2010 planned his sexual crime, another factor, by grooming Jane Doe and 

the other young victim. 

Other factors present in the VRS-SO included petitioner suffers from 

some “cognitive distortions”; he “extensively or consistently” uses aggressive 

behaviors “in interpersonal interactions”; he lacks community support if 

released; if released, he will be at risk even on parole given his “thought 

disorder, poor medication compliance, substance abuse history, and limited 

resources”; he is unwilling to comply with community supervision, as he was 

on such supervision when he sexually assaulted Jane Doe, purchased child 

pornography, and made arrangements to have sex with children in Mexico; 

and he exhibits deviant sexual preference, as he showed a consistent and 

marked interest in children and was diagnosed with a paraphilia.

Dr. Fox found various case-specific factors also supported his 

conclusion that if untreated, petitioner was likely to engage in sexually 

violent criminal behavior as a result of his mental disorder. Dr. Fox noted 

the depth and persistence of petitioner’s paraphilic disorder was “quite 

significant,” as petitioner’s victims were vulnerable and he was willing to 

travel outside of the country to serve his sexual deviance. Dr. Fox thus found 

these factors set petitioner apart “from the typical, average, or routine 

pedophile” who, according to Dr. Fox, tend not recidivate, unlike petitioner 

who sought to do so while out on bail for the qualifying crime.

Dr. Fox next reviewed various factors that may mitigate the risk of 

sexual recidivism by petitioner. Dr. Fox found none applied.
15

Dr. Fox also concluded petitioner’s qualifying crime was “predatory,” as 

defined in section (e)9 of section 6600. Dr. Fox noted Jane Doe was at most a 

casual acquaintance, and petitioner only briefly knew his other victim. Dr. 

Fox also noted both relationships were promoted for the primary purpose of 

sexual victimization. As such, he concluded any future sexual offenses 

committed by petitioner were likely to be predatory in nature. 

Dr. Fox also discussed alternate sex offender treatment programs 

available to petitioner. After assessing various factors, Dr. Fox concluded 

that if paroled, community-based voluntary treatment for petitioner would be 

“insufficient.” Dr. Fox therefore concluded petitioner met the criteria of an 

SVP under section 6600, subdivision (a)(1).

Dr. Sims’s Evaluation

Dr. Sims’s interviewed petitioner for one hour and 20 minutes in 

connection with his November 5, 2019 evaluation. Dr. Sims also reviewed 41

sets of documents from the Department of State Hospitals (DSH); myriad 

rules violation reports from petitioner’s medical file generated by the R.J. 

Donovan Correction Facility; and petitioner’s mental health documents dated 

May 3 to October 30, 2019. Dr. Sims concurred with Dr. Fox that petitioner’s 

2012 conviction involving Jane Doe, case No. JCF25010, was a “sexually 

violent offense” under section 6600, subdivision (b). Dr. Sims noted the case 

information showed petitioner had been charged with five counts and he had

pleaded guilty to count 1, with the remaining counts being dismissed under 

the plea.

9 “ ‘Predatory’ means an act is directed toward a stranger, a person of 

casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or an 

individual with whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the 

primary purpose of victimization.” (§ 6600, subd. (e).)
16

Dr. Sims’s evaluation, like Dr. Fox’s, relied extensively on petitioner’s 

February 2012 probation report. Dr. Sims’s factual summary of the 

qualifying sexual offense is thus similar to Dr. Fox’s summary, described 

ante. Dr. Sims’s evaluation, however, included additional information as 

follows: “On February 14, 2012, the undersigned (probation officer) 

interviewed the defendant at Imperial County Jail. Upon introducing myself, 

the defendant immediately asserted, ‘I didn’t do these crimes’ and that he 

had pled to the instant offense since he had to two prior strikes. He added, ‘I 

got railroaded into taking a guilty plea.’ The defendant said the incident 

report had numerous inconsistencies and he referred to police officers as 

‘dirty mother fuckers.’ When asked to explain his relationship to the victim, 

he asked which one of the two victims. The defendant said he was a friend to 

both victims. When referring to Jane Doe, he said he cared for her when the 

mother was sick drunk [sic]. The defendant said he often had dinner at Jane 

Doe’s house and would have a few beers with her mother. He said he was 

living with the other victim’s mother, who was pregnant, and that he had 

helped care for her children. Later, he was accused of molesting her sevenyear-old daughter. He denied engaging in sexual contact with either

victim.” 

Dr. Sims during the clinical interview asked petitioner about the 

incident involving Jane Doe. Petitioner responded he did not remember. 

When Dr. Sims reminded petitioner he was sentenced to 12 years in state 

prison for this offense, petitioner stated the incident was “ ‘erroneous,’ ” and 

added he had “[o]ral copulation with a Child Under 13 years.”

During the interview, petitioner was also asked about the incident 

involving the six-year-old girl, in which charges were brought then dropped 

in return for his guilty plea to the qualifying offense. Petitioner responded,
17

“I was intoxicated and high on medication.” When Dr. Sims’s questioned 

petitioner what effect the sex offense may have had on the little girl, 

petitioner replied, “I doubt it. It was something she was used to.” 

Dr. Sims concurred with Dr. Fox that petitioner’s conviction under 

Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) for the offense on Jane Doe met the 

definition of a “sexually violent offense” under section 6600, subdivision (b). 

Dr. Sims also concurred with Dr. Fox that petitioner has a diagnosed mental 

disorder affecting his emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes him to 

the commission of criminal sexual acts. Similar to Dr. Fox’s evaluation, Dr. 

Sims reviewed petitioner’s background, educational, employment, 

relationship, and sexual history.

In the interview, petitioner told Dr. Sims that both his parents were 

deceased; that he had three brothers; that he was physically and emotionally 

abused by his step-father from age 11 to 13; that he joined the Army when he 

was 18 years old, but left after one year because his mother had health 

problems; that while in the Army he was sexually abused by two soldiers; and 

that also while in the military he was in a coma for 28 days after being “hit in 

the chest by a cannon shell.”

After discussing his relationship history in which petitioner claimed he 

had five children living in Arizona and one in Ohio, all living with women 

other than the two he had previously been married to, he talked about his 

sexual history. When asked how often he thinks about children in a sexual 

way, petitioner initially responded, “[O]nce in a blue moon. I don’t know,” 

then contradicted himself and said, “No.” Petitioner also denied having any 

other type of “sexual problems” or “sexual deviancy.”

Petitioner also discussed his alcohol and drug use during his interview 

with Dr. Sims. When asked if he had any problems with alcohol or drugs, 
18

petitioner stated, “Currently, no. If I get out, I’ll have to join a treatment 

program because I still have ‘stinking thinking.’ I can drink a 12-pack or 

smoke marijuana—it’s legal, but I want to be more functional.”

Dr. Sims also referenced the 1995 incident in Florida in which 

petitioner was convicted of kidnapping. Dr. Sims wrote: “According to the 

police report, the defendant contacted a nine-year-old girl walking on the 

street (he reports he thought the girl victim was a boy) and coerced her to 

stay with him when she was to return home. When contacted by police, he 

lied and stated that ‘he’ was with him (the defendant). The child confirmed 

the lie. When the police searched for them later, the defendant forced the 

child into a dumpster to avoid contact. They were found and the child was 

returned home the same day of the abduction.”

Dr. Sims also discussed the qualifying crime. Dr. Sims noted after 

deputies contacted petitioner on January 25, 2010, they searched his RV and 

found “[s]everal alarming items” that were “confiscated,” as summarized ante

in connection with Dr. Fox’s evaluation. 

Regarding the incident in the Imperial County Jail when authorities 

placed an undercover agent in petitioner’s jail cell, discussed ante in Dr. Fox’s 

evaluation, Dr. Sims further noted the probation report described the 

following interview after petitioner’s arrest with respect to his purchase of 

child pornography from the agent: “[T]he defendant said that while in jail, he 

had met with [an individual allegedly named] Don Ramon, a man interested 

in child pornography and child sex. He said he wanted to entrap Don Ramon 

and thus posed as a pedophile. Since he wanted Don Ramon arrested, he 

purchased child pornography from him for $50. He further said he had led 

Don Ramon to believe that he would travel to Mexico in order to witness 

more of Ramon’s criminal acts. In reference to the journals in his RV, he said 
19

he knew a few child molesters in Ocotillo and was planning to infiltrate by 

pretending to be one of them. The defendant denied having sex or sexual 

desires towards children. Agents made inquiries as to his initial arrest [on 

the qualifying crime]. The defendant said he was hiding from a biker in the 

child’s room and [he] witnessed a 16-year-old attempt to molest a child. He 

said the child’s mother was asleep, leaving the child unprotected in her 

bedroom.” 

Dr. Sims asked petitioner about the incident involving “Don Ramon.” 

Petitioner responded, “An undercover cop tried to sell me child porn. I told 

him, ‘I don’t know you. I don’t know what the DVDs are about, but I could 

use a ride to Ocotillo.’ All they were trying to do was hook me on a case.” 

Petitioner during the forensic interview also made a “vague reference to 

another sex offense against a separate victim.” Petitioner told Dr. Sims,

“There is one they didn’t indicate. It was nothing to do except me being

drunk. . . . It was a friend I was babysitting. Her mom would get drunk. It 

was in Ocotillo, California.” 

Dr. Sims, as did Dr. Fox, also reviewed petitioner’s rule violation 

reports during petitioner’s incarceration on the qualifying offense. Dr. Sims 

asked petitioner about an incident that occurred in February 2019, when 

petitioner was arrested and taken to the mental health delivery system 

building after walking naked across the prison yard. Petitioner stated, “They 

wouldn’t listen.”

Dr. Sims reviewed petitioner’s extensive psychiatric history dating back 

to 1981. Although petitioner claimed to have left the Army due to his 

mother’s health, Dr. Sims noted while petitioner was serving in the military 

he had a nervous breakdown and was discharged. Dr. Sims also noted that 

petitioner in December 2002 was admitted to Patton State Hospital after 
20

being found incompetent to stand trial. The Discharge Summary dated 

February 23, 2005 relied on by Dr. Sims showed petitioner previously had 

been diagnosed as schizophrenic. An August 20, 2010 Patton State Discharge 

Summary noted petitioner attempted to “lure” one of his female peers into 

the mail bathroom, but was stopped by staff. He also was observed holding 

hands with female peers and “appeared to engage in many behaviors 

indicating he was looking for some erotic satisfaction on the unit.”

Dr. Sims also included in his evaluation Mental Health Documentation 

dated October 26, 2019. Dr. Sims noted these records showed petitioner had 

attempted suicide at least 10-plus times; and had experienced auditory 

hallucinations, paranoia, disorganization, and mood swings. Dr. Sims also 

reviewed and summarized health records of petitioner from R.J. Donovan 

Correctional Facility.

Dr. Sims asked petitioner about his psychiatric history. Dr. Sims 

summarized their conversation as follows: “Mr. Moore stated that he had 

been hospitalized at Atascadero State Hospital ‘a number of times.’ He 

stated, ‘I’m not schizoaffective. I think I’m schizophrenic. I don’t have manic 

episodes.’ He stated that he has auditory hallucinations ‘at times.’ He 

denied having paranoid thoughts. He stated that he currently takes lithium 

and valproic acid, but ‘I don’t notice a difference.’ ” Petitioner during the 

interview admitted several previous suicide attempts, “including breaking a 

razor off in his arm in 2016, drinking gasoline on the yard in 2016 and taking 

someone else’s medications in a suicide attempt, also in 2016.”

When asked to access his risk for sexual re-offense, petitioner told Dr. 

Sims “zero.” When asked why this was case, petitioner replied, “ ‘because I’m 

going to get alcohol treatment. After 12 years of reflection, there’s no way 
21

that I would do the same thing.’ ” Petitioner then denied needing any 

treatment for “sexual offense behavior.”

Based on the foregoing, Dr. Sims diagnosed petitioner using the DSM-5 

as follows: “302.2 Pedophilic Disorder, Sexually Attracted to Females, Nonexclusive type”; “295.70 Schizoaffective Disorder, Depressive Type”; “303.90 

Alcohol Use Disorder, Severe, in a controlled environment”; and “301.7 

Antisocial Personality Disorder.” 

Dr. Sims used the same criteria from the DSM-5 used by Dr. Fox 

regarding the diagnosis of Pedophilic Disorder. Dr. Sims concluded petitioner 

met the criteria, explaining: “Mr. Morse has been reported to view child 

pornography repeatedly, to engage in sexual activity with a 6-year-old and to 

make comments regarding his sexual interest in children, such as ‘My 

daughter sucked my dick when she was like eight years old,’ and ‘I will 

protect fucking people that are like me. All my fucking life I knew I wasn’t 

the only one, the only so-called fucking molester or the only fucking pervert.’ ” 

Dr. Sims found his diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder was warranted 

because petitioner’s “[p]ast symptoms have included auditory and visual 

hallucinations, bizarre delusions, paranoia, grandiosity, extensive mood 

swings with depression and mania, aggressive and assaultive behavior and 

extremely disorganized thinking.” Dr. Sims also found support for this 

diagnosis because petitioner previously had been diagnosed with 

schizophrenia, as he admitted during the interview, and because of his

history of at least 10 suicide attempts.

Dr. Sims then reviewed the factors from the DSM-5 and petitioner’s 

history to diagnose him with Alcohol Use Disorder. Dr. Sims also used the 

criteria from the DSM-5 to explain his diagnosis of Antisocial Personality 

Disorder. Dr. Sims explained: “Mr. Morse’s failure to conform to social 
22

norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing 

acts that are grounds for arrest . . . indicated in hi[s] approximately 31 

arrests and approximately 20 convictions. His deceitfulness is indicated in 

his false imprisonment conviction, in his reporting the death of his mother on 

numerous occasions and in his report that he was posing as an FBI agent to 

entrap ‘Don Ramon.’ His impulsivity and failure to plan ahead is indicated in 

his alcohol abuse and parole and probation violations. His irritability and

aggressiveness and reckless disregard for the safety of others was indicated 

in his arrests and convictions for Battery on Person, Assault with a Deadly 

Weapon, Attempted Murder, Child Cruelty and Lewd Act Upon Child. His 

consistent irresponsibility is indicated in his sporadic work history and 

failure to support five children. His lack of remorse was clearly evident in 

the current interview.”

Dr. Sims also concluded petitioner has a mental disorder affecting his 

volitional and emotional control that predisposes him to the commission of 

criminal sexual acts. Dr. Sims based his conclusion on petitioner’s diagnoses

of Pedophilic Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder, Alcohol Use Disorder, and 

Antisocial Disorder which, when combined, produce such a condition. Dr. 

Sims found that this condition created a “volitional impairment” in light of 

the repetitive nature of petitioner’s sexual offenses, “despite the potential of 

being caught and sanctioned”; and that petitioner repeatedly engaged in such 

sexual acts “despite the victims’ discomfort/distress,” evidencing the condition 

affected his emotional capacity. Dr. Sims thus opined petitioner met the 

definition of “diagnosed mental disorder” under section 6600, subdivision (c).

Dr. Sims also opined that absent treatment or custody, petitioner was 

likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior as a result of his 

diagnosed mental disorder. Dr. Sims found that petitioner’s scores based on 
23

the Static-99 and Static-2002 placed him in the average risk category for 

being charged or convicted of another sexual offense. Dr. Sims nonetheless 

found these scores did not include psychological risk factors, which, when 

considered, supported his finding petitioner in the future was likely to engage 

in sexually violent criminal behavior. 

Focusing on the factors of the structured risk assessment—forensic 

version, Dr. Sims found the factor for sexual preference for children applied 

to petitioner, as Jane Doe was under 14 years of age, and petitioner in the 

past has “expressed an interest in sexual activity with children in his 

statement [to] the undercover agent and his purchasing the alleged child 

pornography at that time.” Other factors found present, or partially present 

by Dr. Sims included petitioner’s sexual preoccupation beyond that 

considered “normal” for an adult; his emotional congruence with children; his 

callousness and lack of empathic connection with others; his grievance 

thinking based on poorly managed anger and a “persistent pattern of verbal 

aggression, angry outbursts, threatening and intimidating behavior”; his 

lifestyle impulsivity, demonstrated by his “sensation-seeking and poor 

tolerance for boredom”; his resistance to rules and supervision; and his 

dysfunctional coping.

Based on these factors, Dr. Sims opined that petitioner’s score on the 

structured risk assessment—forensic version, was 33, which “placed him at a 

‘high’ level of psychological need.” 

Dr. Sims also considered protective risk factors. He found the risk of 

reoffense by petitioner may be reduced as a result of petitioner’s chronic pain. 

However, Dr. Sims found other protective risk factors, such as completing a 

comprehensive sex offender treatment program or having been in the 

community without sexually reoffending, did not apply to petitioner.
24

Dr. Sims also evaluated not only whether it was “likely” petitioner 

would sexually reoffend, but also whether such an offense would be 

“predatory” in nature as defined in section 6600, subdivision (e). Dr. Sims

opined that if petitioner does sexually reoffend, it will likely be predatory 

given his offense against Jane Doe, who was merely a “casual acquaintance”

with whom petitioner had no substantial relationship.

Based on all of the foregoing, and despite petitioner’s Static-99R and 

Static-2002R scores, Dr. Sims concluded petitioner “represents a substantial 

danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk of committing a future violent 

sexual offense. Therefore, . . . he is likely to engage in sexually violent 

predatory criminal behavior as a result of his diagnosed mental disorder 

without appropriate treatment and custody.”

SVP Petition, the Probable Cause Hearing, and the Writ Petition

As noted, the El Centro District Attorney filed a petition in February 

2020 to commit petitioner as an SVP. The petition was supported by the 

evaluation of Drs. Fox and Sims, which were attached to the petition. In 

April 2020, the court held a probable cause hearing under section 6602. The 

People did not call any witnesses, and submitted on the evaluations of the 

two doctors. The petitioner also did not call any witnesses. 

Relying on Sanchez and People v. Superior Court (Couthren) (2019) 41 

Cal.App.5th 1001 (Couthren), petitioner at the hearing objected to the 

evaluations on the ground they presented facts based on case-specific 

hearsay. Therefore, petitioner argued the experts’ opinions lacked proper 

foundation and the petition should be dismissed. The court sustained the 

objection. 

However, after sustaining the objection, the court found there was 

sufficient admissible evidence to support the finding that petitioner “is a 
25

person that would fall under the SVP law.” In making this finding, the court 

noted the qualifying offense involving Jane Doe was a “sexually violent 

offense” as defined under section 6600, subdivision (b).

The court then turned to the other requirements of the SVPA and 

found they too were satisfied, noting: “[E]ven with the objection being 

sustained, there’s sufficient evidence in the file to support the opinion that 

the qualifying crime was predatory in that even Mr. Morse was stating to the 

interviewer—and that’s not hearsay at that level—that the child was a 

neighbor kid and that, you know, certain statements about the child’s mother 

and her behavior and that sort of thing. So there’s probable cause.

“I’m not saying any further burden of proof than that. But there’s 

probable cause to believe that it was predatory in nature. Mr. Morse 

acknowledged to the interviewer that he did at least have schizophrenia.

“He doubted that he had schizoaffective disorder. But that’s a mental 

disorder and, therefore, the interviewer or the author of the report [i.e., Dr. 

Sims], which was submitted [to the court] on April the 15th, had sufficient 

basis for the opinion that he suffers from a mental disorder that makes it 

likely that he will commit sexually violent acts in the future, at least as a 

probable cause standard.” 

On May 12, 2020, petitioner filed a writ petition. The People on June 

25 filed an informal response, and Petitioner on July 8 filed a reply to that 

response. On July 14, this court ordered the People to show cause why the 

relief sought in the petition should not be granted. The People responded by 

filing a return on August 6, and the petitioner filed a traverse on September

8.
26

DISCUSSION

As noted, petitioner contends the court impermissibly relied on 

hearsay, including his interview statements to Dr. Sims and, despite 

sustaining his objection under Sanchez, to other case-specific facts in the 

evaluations in making its probable cause finding. Absent this inadmissible 

hearsay, he contends there is insufficient evidence to support the probable 

cause finding; and therefore, the petition must be dismissed.

Currently, there is a split in the Court of Appeal whether an evaluation 

based on case-specific facts from hearsay sources is admissible at a section 

6602 probable cause hearing to establish a person may be an SVP. 

(Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 1001 [inadmissible]; Bennett v. Superior 

Court (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 862 (Bennett) [same].) This issue is now pending 

before our high court. (Walker v. Superior Court (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 682

(Walker) [admissible], review granted September 9, 2020, S263588.)

A. Statutory Overview

The SVPA “allows for the involuntary commitment of certain convicted 

sex offenders, whose diagnosed mental disorders make them likely to 

reoffend if released at the end of their prison terms.” (Cooley v. Superior 

Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 235 (Cooley).) To be committed, the trier of fact

must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is an SVP. (Id. at p. 

243.) 

As noted, the SVPA defines an SVP as “a person who has been 

convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who 

has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the 

health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in 

sexually violent criminal behavior.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).) The People must 

also prove that the sexually violent criminal behavior the person is likely to 
27

engage in will be predatory in nature. (People v. Hurtado (2002) 28 Cal.4th 

1179, 1186.)

Before the People may file a petition to commit a person as an SVP, the 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) must first screen him 

or her, generally at least six months before his or her scheduled release date. 

(§ 6601, subd. (a).) “If as a result of this screening it is determined that the 

person is likely to be a sexually violent predator, the [CDCR] shall refer the 

person to the [DSH] for a full evaluation of whether the person meets the 

criteria in Section 6600.” (§ 6601, subd. (b).)

Once a person is referred to DSH, he or she is evaluated under a 

standardized assessment protocol developed by DSH to determine whether he 

or she may be an SVP. The “standardized assessment protocol shall require 

assessment of diagnosable mental disorders, as well as various factors known 

to be associated with the risk of reoffense among sex offenders. Risk factors 

to be considered shall include criminal and psychosexual history, type, 

degree, and duration of sexual deviance, and severity of mental disorder.”

(§ 6601, subd. (c).) 

A person is initially evaluated by two mental health professionals 

designated by the DSH. (§ 6601, subds. (c) & (d).) If both evaluators concur 

“that the person has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to 

engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody,” 

the DSH forwards a request for a petition for civil commitment under section 

6606 to the county in which the person was convicted of the offense for which 

he or she is currently incarcerated. (§ 6601, subds. (d) & (i).) “Copies of the 

evaluation reports and any other supporting documents shall be made 

available to the attorney . . . who may file a petition for commitment.”
28

(§ 6601, subd. (h)(1).) If the county’s designated counsel concur with the 

recommendation of DSH, “a petition for commitment shall be filed in the 

superior court.” (§ 6601, subd. (h)(1).)

“Upon filing of the petition and a request for review under this section, 

a judge of the superior court shall review the petition and determine whether 

the petition states or contains sufficient facts that, if true, would constitute 

probable cause to believe that the individual named in the petition is likely to 

engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her 

release. If the judge determines that the petition, on its face, supports a 

finding of probable cause, the judge shall order that the person be detained in 

a secure facility until a hearing can be completed pursuant to Section 6602.” 

(§ 6601.5.)10

Regardless of whether the court conducts a “paper review” under 

section 6601.5 (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 690), a person alleged to 

be an SVP is entitled to a probable cause hearing. (§ 6602, subd. (a).) The 

probable cause hearing is somewhat “analogous to a preliminary hearing in a 

criminal case; both serve to ‘ “ ‘weed out groundless or unsupported charges ... 

and to relieve the accused of the degradation and expense of a . . . trial.’ ” ’ 

[Citation.]” (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 247.)

At the probable cause hearing, the court “shall review the petition and 

determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual 

named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory 

10 “An order issued by a judge pursuant to Section 6601.5, finding that the 

petition, on its face, supports a finding of probable cause to believe that the 

individual named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually violent 

predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release, shall toll that person’s 

parole pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 3000 of the 

Penal Code, if that individual is determined to be a sexually violent 

predator.” (§ 6601, subd. (j).)
29

criminal behavior upon his or her release.” (§ 6602, subd. (a).) At the 

hearing, the individual is “entitled to assistance of counsel.” (Ibid.) “If the 

judge determines there is not probable cause, he or she shall dismiss the 

petition and any person subject to parole shall report to parole. If the judge 

determines that there is probable cause, the judge shall order that the person 

remain in custody in a secure facility until a trial is completed . . . .” (Ibid.)

A trial is required to determine whether the person is, by reason of a 

diagnosed mental disorder, a danger to the health and safety of others in that 

the person is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence upon his or her 

release from the jurisdiction of the [CDCR] or other secure facility.” (§ 6602, 

subd. (a).) A person alleged to be an SVP is “entitled to a trial by jury, to the 

assistance of counsel, to the right to retain experts or professional persons to 

perform an examination on the person’s behalf, and to have access to all 

relevant medical and psychological records and reports.” (§ 6603, subd. (a).) 

If neither the person deemed to be an SVP nor the attorney petitioning for 

commitment demand a jury trial, “the trial shall be before the court without a 

jury.” (Id., subd. (f).) “A unanimous verdict shall be required in any trial.” 

(Id., subd. (g).)

“If the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent 

predator, the person shall be committed for an indeterminate term to the 

custody of the [DSH] for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure 

facility.” (§ 6604.) Once a person has been found to be an SVP, the DSH 

must conduct annual mental health examinations, reporting to the court 

whether the person continues to meet the definition of an SVP. (§ 6604.9, 

subd. (a).) The report to the court must recommend whether unconditional 

discharge or conditional release to a less restrictive alternative (that would 

adequately protect the community) is in the person’s best interest. (Id., subd. 
30

(b).) If the DSH does not recommend either unconditional discharge or 

conditional release, a person may still petition for conditional release without

the recommendation or concurrence of the DSH. (§ 6608, subd. (a).)

B. The Section 6602 Hearing Pre-Sanchez

The SVPA is “sparse in its description of the procedural requirements 

for a probable cause hearing” (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 691), 

merely requiring the court to “ ‘review the petition’ ” and determine whether 

or not there is “ ‘probable cause’ ” to believe the person named in the petition 

is an SVP. (Ibid., quoting § 6602, subd. (a).) 

Before our high court decided Sanchez in 2016, case law dating back at 

least to 1998 had recognized that at a section 6602 probable cause hearing a

person had more rights than a mere “paper review” of the petition, as 

provided in section 6601.5 (In re Parker (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1460

(Parker)); that a person instead had the right under section 6602 to 

“challenge the facts on which the petition was filed, i.e., the underlying 

attached experts’ evaluations” (id. at p. 1468); and to present both oral or 

written evidence. (Id. at pp. 1469–1470.) Although the opinions of experts 

could be admitted through the hearsay reports of the experts, a person at the 

probable cause hearing also had the right to “challenge the accuracy of such 

reports by calling such experts for cross-examination . . . and call[ing] such 

other witness who, upon a proper showing, the superior court judge finds to 

have relevant evidence.” (Ibid.)

Our high court in 2001 approvingly cited to Parker in connection with 

the “show cause hearing” under section 6005, applicable to a petition for 

unconditional release of a person committed as an SVP. (People v. Cheek 

(2001) 25 Cal.4th 894, 899 (Cheek).) Cheek construed section 6605 to grant a

person the same rights to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses as 
31

he or she has under section 6602, as Parker had found. (Cheek, at p. 900

[noting “[s]ection 6605, like section 6602, provides for a pretrial hearing and 

grants the defendant the right to be present and to be represented by an 

attorney at that hearing,” and noting the “parallel language and function of 

sections 6605 and 6602 indicate that section 6605 should be construed to 

grant a defendant the same rights to present evidence and cross-examine 

witnesses as he [or she] has under section 6602”].)

In 2002, our high court addressed the “scope and substance” of a section 

6602 probable cause hearing. (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 235.) Cooley 

found the purpose of such a hearing was for the court to determine whether a 

“reasonable person could entertain a strong suspicion that the [attorney] 

petitioner has satisfied all the elements required for a civil commitment as an 

SVP.” (Id. at p. 236.) Although section 6602, subdivision (a) describes the 

hearing to merely require only probable cause that a person is “ ‘likely to 

engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior’ ” upon his or her 

release, Cooley concluded the trial court in determining probable cause under 

this statute must consider “whether (1) the offender has been convicted of a 

qualifying sexually violent offense . . . ; (2) the offender has a diagnosable 

mental disorder; (3) the disorder makes it likely he or she will engage in 

sexually violent criminal conduct if released; and (4) this sexually violent 

criminal conduct will be predatory in nature.” (Cooley, at p. 236.) 

Walker recognized that in dicta Cooley observed that the SVPA “ ‘does 

not provide any specific procedural requirements for the probable cause 

hearing,’ but it again endorsed Parker’s interpretation of the statutory 

requirements. (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 245, fn. 8.) The Court [in 

Cooley] explained: ‘Although the petitioner is allowed, despite their hearsay 

nature, to present the contents of any reports that form the basis of the petition 
32

as evidence, the alleged sexual predator is allowed to cross-examine the 

expert concerning the evaluation and can call the expert to the stand for that 

purpose. ([Parker, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th] at pp. 1469–1470.) The person 

named in the petition is thus allowed to ‘challenge the accuracy’ of the 

evaluations by experts who found that he or she met the criteria for an SVP.

(Id. at p. 1470.)’ ([Cooley, at p. 245, fn. 8].)” (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 692–693.)

C. Sanchez and Hearsay

Hearsay is evidence of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the 

truth of the matter stated. Unless an exception applies, hearsay is 

inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subds. (a) & (b).) We apply an “abuse of 

discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the 

admissibility of evidence, including one that turns on the hearsay nature of 

the evidence in question [citations].” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 

725.) 

One exception to the hearsay rule is found in Evidence Code section 

801.11 Subdivision (b) of this statute generally permits an expert witness to 

base his or her opinion on matters made known to the expert, “whether or not 

admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert 

11 This statute provides: “If a witness is testifying as an expert, his 

testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: [¶] (a) 

Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the 

opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and [¶] (b) Based on matter 

(including his special knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education) 

perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or 

before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that 

reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the 

subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law 

from using such matter as a basis for his opinion.” (Evid. Code, § 801.)
33

in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates.” 

(Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (b).)

Before Sanchez, another broad exception to the hearsay rule was based 

on the principle that “out-of-court statements offered to support an expert’s 

opinion are not hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of the 

matter asserted. Instead, they are offered for the purpose of assessing the 

value of the expert’s opinion.” (People v. Dean (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 186, 

193.) Our high court in Sanchez found this principle conflicted with the rule 

that “an expert has traditionally been precluded from relating case-specific

facts about which the expert has no independent knowledge.” (Sanchez, 

supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 676.) 

Sanchez thus rejected this principle, reasoning: “When an expert relies 

on hearsay to provide case-specific facts, considers the statements as true, 

and relates them to the jury as a reliable basis for the expert’s opinion, it 

cannot logically be asserted that the hearsay content is not offered for its 

truth. In such a case, ‘the validity of [the expert’s] opinion ultimately turn[s] 

on the truth’ [citation] of the hearsay statement. If the hearsay that the 

expert relies on and treats as true is not true, an important basis for the 

opinion is lacking.” (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 682–683.)

Sanchez continued: “What an expert cannot do is relate as true casespecific facts asserted in hearsay statements, unless they are independently 

proven by competent evidence or are covered by a hearsay exception.” 

(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 686.) The Sanchez court thus found that 

case-specific facts related by the People’s gang expert to the jury concerning a 

defendant’s gang membership were inadmissible because “[t]hey were recited 

by the expert, who presented them as true statements of fact, without the 

requisite independent proof.” (Id. at p. 670.)
34

In contrast to case-specific facts asserted in hearsay statements, 

Sanchez noted that its “decision does not call into question the propriety of an 

expert’s testimony concerning background information regarding his 

knowledge and expertise and premises generally accepted in his field.” 

(Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 685.) Thus, an “expert may still rely on 

hearsay in forming an opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he 

did so. Because the jury must independently evaluate the probative value of 

an expert’s testimony, Evidence Code section 802 properly allows an expert to 

relate generally the kind and source of the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion 

rests. A jury may repose greater confidence in an expert who relies upon 

well-established scientific principles . . . . There is a distinction to be made 

between allowing an expert to describe the type or source of the matter relied 

upon as opposed to presenting, as fact, case-specific hearsay that does not 

otherwise fall under a statutory exception.” (Sanchez, at pp. 685–686.)

D. The Court of Appeal Decisions in Bennett, Couthren, and Walker

Bennett was the first of two cases in 2019 to find Sanchez applied to a 

section 6602 probable cause hearing to render inadmissible part of a

defendant’s evaluations based on case-specific facts from hearsay sources. In 

Bennett, the Court of Appeal addressed whether criminal background 

information stemming from a 2012 incident in which the defendant was 

arrested for two rape-related offenses, which charges were ultimately 

dropped when the victim could not be located, could be used to support the 

experts’ determination in their evaluations, and in their testimony at the 

section 6602 hearing, that the defendant met the criteria of an SVP. 

(Bennett, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 868–869). 

Both experts in Bennett relied extensively on the 2012 incident, using 

police and probation reports for the descriptions of the alleged offense, an 
35

incident the defendant denied during his forensic interviews. (Bennett, 

supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 869.) One of the experts stated in his evaluation, 

and during his testimony at the probable cause hearing, that absent the 2012 

incident—which had only led to the defendant’s conviction for failing to 

register, a non-sexually violent offense under the SVPA—he likely would not 

have found the defendant was an SVP based solely on defendant’s two 1986 

rape convictions. (Ibid.) However, this same expert in his evaluation stated 

he “ ‘tend[ed] to believe the [rape] victim’ ” over the defendant, and therefore 

found the defendant’s “ ‘rape behavior’ ” extended between 1986 and 2012. 

(Ibid.) The trial court, after sustaining the defendant’s hearsay objection to 

the experts’ evaluations regarding the 2012 rape incident, nonetheless found 

there was probable cause the defendant was an SVP. (Id. at pp. 872–873.)

Bennett concluded that the trial court had properly sustained the 

defendant’s hearsay objection at the probable cause hearing because the 

evaluations included case-specific facts from the 2012 incident that were 

derived from hearsay sources, and these facts were neither proven by 

competent evidence nor subject to a hearsay exception. (Bennett, supra, 39 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 868, 880.) In so doing, Bennett rejected the People’s 

argument that the formal rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, did 

not apply at a section 6602 hearing. (Bennett, at pp. 878, 882.) Because the 

case-specific facts relied on by the experts were “central” to the court’s 

probable cause finding, the court ordered the SVP petition dismissed. (Id. at 

p. 868.)

A few months later, the Court of Appeal in Couthren followed Bennett 

in concluding case-specific facts in evaluations that were derived from 

multiple hearsay sources were inadmissible at a section 6602 hearing. 

(Couthren, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005.) In so doing, Couthren rejected 
36

the People’s argument that long-standing precedent, and that section 6602’s 

directive that a trial court “ ‘review the petition,’ ” allowed the People to prove 

probable cause through the evaluations despite the experts’ reliance on 

hearsay. (Couthren, at pp. 1014–1015.)

Couthren on the one hand recognized that SVP evaluations are 

typically comprehensive and based on myriad sources, including “probation 

and police reports, investigative reports from prosecuting agencies, court 

records and transcripts, face-to-face interviews with the SVP defendant, 

prison and hospital rule violation reports, records of arrests, convictions and 

juvenile dispositions, and hospital records, including staff treatment notes, 

medication reports, and attendance records.” (Couthren, supra, 41 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1010–1011.) Couthren on the other hand concluded that

“[e]ach level of hearsay, the expert evaluation, the police report, and the 

victim’s statement, must fall within an exception to be admitted into 

evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1201.)” (Couthren, at p. 1011.)

As noted, Walker disagreed with Bennett and Couthren that a probable 

cause finding at a section 6602 hearing could not be based on evaluations 

that included case-specific facts derived from hearsay sources. Walker

instead concluded a court reviewing evaluations at this hearing may consider 

hearsay within those evaluations in determining whether there is probable 

cause a person is an SVP. (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 686.) The 

court thus found substantial evidence supported the trial court’s probable 

cause finding and denied Walker’s writ petition. (Ibid.)

Walker first took up the issue of what a petition must include when a 

court “reviews” it at section 6602 hearing. In light of the “integral role” the 

experts play in the initiation of an SVP petition (Walker, supra, 51 

Cal.App.5th p. 695), the court determined these evaluations “must be deemed 
37

incorporated into the petition, regardless of whether the People physically 

attach them to the petition at the time of filing or provide them to the court 

under separate cover.” (Id. at pp. 695–696.) We agree with Walker on this 

point, and note in the instant case petitioner’s evaluations were both 

attached to the petition and provided to the court at the section 6602 hearing.

Walker next addressed the main issue we also face: whether a court 

reviewing an SVP petition and the evaluations on which it is based may 

“consider the entirety of an evaluation or only such portions as do not contain 

otherwise inadmissible double hearsay.” (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 

696.) The court concluded the trial court could review the entirety of the 

experts’ evaluations in determining probable cause, reasoning as follows: 

“We note that the language of section 6602(a) . . . requires the trial judge to 

determine probable cause based on a review of ‘the petition,’ which we 

understand to include the evaluations, not just some portion of the petition 

and evaluations whose admissibility is independently established. But even 

if we conclude the language of section 6602(a) is ambiguous on this point, our 

analysis of the [SVPA’s] structure and purpose (Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 

p. 247) confirms that section 6602(a) excepts the evaluations and any 

information contained within them from the hearsay rule, allowing the trial 

judge to consider the reports in their entirety.” (Walker, at p. 696.)

For support, Walker relied on the dicta in Cooley that the petitioner 

attorney at a probable cause hearing “ ‘is allowed, despite their hearsay 

nature, to present the contents of any reports that form the basis of the 

petition as evidence.’ ” (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 694, quoting 

Cooley, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 245, fn. 8.) 

For additional support, Walker turned to section 6601, the provision of 

the SVPA requiring two concurring psychological evaluations prior to the 
38

filing of an SVP petition. The court recognized the number of categories of 

information and requirements prescribed by the Legislature that experts 

must consider in adhering to a “ ‘standardized assessment protocol.’ ” 

(Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 696, quoting § 6601, subd. (c).) As we 

have noted, this includes “ ‘assessment of diagnosable mental disorders, as 

well as various factors known to be associated with the risk of reoffense 

among sex offenders. These risk factors include criminal and psychosexual 

history, type, degree, and duration of sexual deviance, and severity of mental 

disorder.’ ” (Walker, at p. 696, quoting § 6601, subd. (c).) 

Based on section 6001’s requirement the experts include all such 

information in their reports, Walker recognized “[m]uch of this broad array of 

historical information will be found in hearsay sources. Indeed, the 

evaluations in this case reveal that both evaluators relied on a variety of 

hearsay sources, including court records, probation reports, Walker’s record 

of arrest and prosecutions, and Walker’s prison central file recounting 

incidents during his incarceration. The Legislature clearly intended for 

evaluators to rely on hearsay sources in their evaluations, as the alternative 

would be to require that evaluators reinvestigate a lifetime worth of 

historical information comprising the person’s ‘criminal and psychosexual 

history,’ a near-impossible task for which a psychologist is ill-suited. And 

given that the evaluations necessarily contain considerable amounts of casespecific hearsay, the Legislature must have intended the trial judge to review 

this hearsay in reviewing the reports. Were this not the case, most of the 

historical information included in the evaluations at the Legislature’s behest 

would be subject to exclusion.” (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 696–

697.)
39

Because Walker concluded section 6602 provided an exception to the 

hearsay rule, it further concluded that Sanchez did not apply at the probable 

cause hearing, reasoning as follows: “As has long been understood, 

exceptions to the Evidence Code’s rule against hearsay (Evid. Code, § 1200) 

may be found in statutes outside the Evidence Code, and in judicial decisions. 

[Citations.] We conclude that when the [SVPA] directs the superior court to 

‘review the petition’ in determining probable cause (§ 6602(a)), the act 

establishes just such an exception to the hearsay rule. This exception 

allows—indeed requires—the trial court to consider the expert evaluations on 

which the petition necessarily depends, including case-specific facts obtained 

from hearsay sources described within the evaluations. Because these 

evaluations and their contents are ‘covered by a hearsay exception’ specific to 

SVP probable cause hearings, they are not subject to exclusion under 

Sanchez.” (Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 694–695.)

E. Section 6602 Is an Implied Exception to the Hearsay Rule

We find Walker’s reasoning persuasive on the issue before us. We 

agree with Walker that section 6602’s requirement that a trial court “review” 

the petition (and evaluations) in making a probable cause finding is 

indicative of legislative intent that this statute, when viewed in light of the 

SVPA as a whole, creates an implied exception to the hearsay rule, thus 

allowing the court to review the entirety of the evaluations in making this 

determination. 

As summarized ante, Drs. Fox and Sims in their psychological 

evaluations of petitioner relied on broad array of historical information in 

adhering to the statutorily mandated “standardized assessment protocol” 

developed by DHS. The experts were required not only to assess petitioner 

for any “diagnosable mental disorders,” but also for the various risk factors 
40

associated with the risk of reoffense among sex offenders. (See § 6601, subd. 

(c).)

In completing this task, both experts each reviewed about 40 sets of 

documents from myriad sources, including the 2012 probation report; police 

reports; prison and hospital rule violation reports; criminal history records; 

hospital and medical records, including prior to petitioner’s incarceration on 

the qualifying crime, when he was admitted both to Patton and Atascadero 

State Hospitals; and during his incarceration, when he received psychiatric 

treatment, including hospitalization(s) as an acute psychiatric patient.

Requiring independent proof of such historical information from these 

myriad sources, as a condition to its admission at the probable cause hearing,

first would place an enormous burden on experts in performing their 

standardized assessment protocol of a person; and second on the People in 

having to proffer competent evidence at what amounts to an interim hearing 

before an SVP trial can be set. Such a requirement, if applied in the instant 

case, would have severely limited the information available to the court in 

making its probable cause determination, even if this information was highly 

relevant on this issue. (See Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 696–697 

[requiring evaluators to “reinvestigate a lifetime worth of historical 

information comprising the person’s ‘criminal and psychosexual history,’ ” in 

order to rely on such information in their SVP evaluations, would be a “nearimpossible task for which a psychologist is ill-suited”].) We thus conclude, as 

did Walker, that section 6602 is an implied exception to the hearsay rule.

We also find persuasive the point made in Walker that our high court in 

situations not unlike ours has sought to avoid duplicity in the presentation of 

evidence at an interim hearing (i.e., section 6602) and at a subsequent trial 

(i.e., sections 6003 and 6004). (See Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 697, 
41

citing Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645 (Manton).) Our high 

court in Manton reversed a conservatorship judgment because the trial court 

erred in admitting at trial a conservatorship investigation report containing 

hearsay that was properly admitted at an interim hearing to determine 

whether the proposed conservatee was gravely disabled. (Id., at pp. 651–

652.)

Manton reasoned: “If the report were admissible at both the initial 

hearing and a subsequent court trial, the two proceedings would be

essentially identical in terms of the acceptable range of evidence to be 

considered.” (Manton, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 651.) In order to avoid such 

redundancy, Manton construed legislative intent as allowing investigation 

reports to be admissible only at the hearing. (Ibid.) 

The law is well settled that experts’ evaluations and hearsay in them 

are inadmissible at an SVP trial. (See e.g., Walker, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 698; People v. Yates (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 474 (Yates) [same]; People v. 

Roa (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 428 (Roa) [same].) Not unlike the statutory 

scheme in the conservatorship statutes, the SVPA requires a court at the 

section 6602 hearing to “review the petition,” but no such language exists in 

sections 6003 and 6004 governing SVP trials. 

Applying the reasoning of Manton, we can infer a legislative intent that 

hearsay is admissible in a section 6602 probable cause hearing where the 

court “reviews” the petition and the experts’ evaluations. Otherwise, the 

interim section 6602 hearing and the SVP trial—where hearsay is not 

allowed—would be nearly “identical in terms of the acceptable range of 

evidence to be considered,” a conclusion Manton, albeit under the 

conservatorship statutes, sought to avoid absent “clear legislative intent to 

the contrary.” (See Manton, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 651; see also Walker, 
42

supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 698 [relying on Manton in finding it “highly 

unlikely the Legislature intended for a prosecutor to procure independent 

evidence for the vast amount of case-specific hearsay information contained 

in a psychological evaluation—including criminal history, familial and 

relationship history, medical information, and a defendant’s prison 

disciplinary record—at a probable cause hearing, and then again at a 

subsequent trial”].)

For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Walker and disagree with 

Bennett and Couthren in concluding section 6602, when viewed in light of the 

SVPA as a whole, impliedly allows a court at a probable cause hearing to 

consider hearsay in the neutral experts’ evaluations when making a probable 

cause determination. 

As a result of our decision, we conclude that Sanchez is inapplicable at 

a section 6602 probable cause. We also conclude the People did not waive (or, 

more appropriately, forfeit) any potential hearsay objection under section 

6602 by failing to raise it at the probable cause hearing, as petitioner 

contends, inasmuch as our decision derives from construction of section 6602 

and presents a question of law that we have now resolved against petitioner. 

(See People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166 [noting questions of 

statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo].)
43

F. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Probable Cause 

Finding

Considering the evaluations of Drs. Fox and Sims in their entirety, we 

conclude the court’s probable cause finding is supported by substantial 

evidence. Petitioner’s conviction for a violation of Penal Code section 288, 

subdivision (a) in 2012 constituted a “sexually violent offense.” (See §§ 6600, 

subd. (b) & 6600.1 [providing: “If the victim of an underlying offense that is 

specified in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 is a child under the age of 14, the 

offense shall constitute a ‘sexually violent offense’ for purposes of Section 

6600”].)

Petitioner was also found to have a “diagnosed mental disorder.” (See 

6600, subd. (c).) Drs. Fox and Sims both found he suffered from Pedophilic 

Disorder among other disorders, and both found this condition affected 

petitioner’s emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes him to the 

commission of criminal sexual acts. 

Indeed, the evaluations show that petitioner groomed seven-year-old 

Jane Doe in connection with his qualifying offense by buying her “underwear 

and toys” and giving her a sexually explicit doll. In addition, when deputies 

searched petitioner’s RV located adjacent to the trailer where Jane Doe lived,

they found images of “child erotica, notebooks with handwritten text 

discussing child sex and an intention to engage in sex with children, 

literature discussing sex with children in foreign countries, and baby dolls 

with red paint on their vaginal areas.” Also found in petitioner’s possession 

at the time of commission of the qualifying crime were videos titled, by way of 

example only, “ ‘6-9 years. Girls Fuck. Little Cunts. Fucked by big daddy. 

Rape little girl’ ” and “Hot 8 yrs old getting pussy fucked by old dude.[ ]

etc. . . .”
44

After his arrest, petitioner sought to purchase, and eventually did 

purchase after making bail, child pornography from the undercover agent. 

Petitioner at the same time made plans to travel to Mexico with the agent to 

have sex with children, claiming he was hoping to have a “real” relationship 

with an 11-year-old girl, whom he could “fuck” after paying off the girl’s 

mother. Petitioner also admitted to the agent that he was a “molester” and 

“pervert” and he would “protect” others just like him; and that his daughter 

had “sucked [his] dick when she was like eight years old.”

When questioned by Dr. Sims about “Don Ramon,” petitioner claimed 

his intention in buying the child pornography videos from the agent, and 

agreeing to travel with this individual to Mexico to have sex with children, 

was all part of his plan to “entrap” this individual; and that petitioner gave a 

similar story when asked by Dr. Sims about journals found in petitioner’s 

possession that referenced sex with children, claiming his intention was to 

“infiltrate” a group of child molesters in Ocotillo by acting like one of them.

Additional evidence to support the finding petitioner has a diagnosable 

mental disorder of pedophilia stems from petitioner’s incarceration. In 2011, 

during a routine inspection deputies found papers and drawings in 

petitioner’s cell. Dr. Fox reviewed the drawings. He noted one of the 

drawings displayed a “a female with her legs spread open and a caption of 

her saying, ‘Fuck me hard daddy!’ Underneath the image is the quote, 

‘Seems he has a daughter that just loves to fuck.’ ” Another drawing/writing 

of petitioner provided, “ ‘Little girls inside of blacked out minivans in Lost 

Angelles Cal. Arcade Fun!’ ”

As also summarized in the evaluations, there were myriad references to 

petitioner suffering from schizophrenia. Petitioner also admitted to Dr. Sims 

during the forensic interview that he suffered from this condition. Both 
45

doctors opined petitioner suffered from Schizophrenic Disorder, which 

contributed to their opinion he had a “diagnosed mental disorder” under 

section 6600, subdivision (c).

Both evaluators found petitioner’s mental disorders affect his emotional 

and/or volitional capacity predisposing him to commit criminal sexual acts. 

The evaluators noted petitioner committed the qualifying crime against Jane 

Doe while on community supervision. They also noted that even after he was 

charged with multiple counts including lewd act on a child under the age of 

14, while out on bail petitioner purchased child pornography from the 

undercover agent and made plans with the agent to travel to Mexico to have 

sex with children. And, despite the potential for being caught and 

sanctioned, petitioner while incarcerated in 2011, 2012, and 2015 was found 

to be in possession of writings and drawings of a sexual nature involving 

prepubescent females. 

Both evaluators concluded from their review of myriad medical and 

psychiatric records that petitioner was psychologically unstable. Dr. Fox 

noted petitioner’s lack of compliance in taking his antipsychotic medication, 

which required a court order and was given intramuscularly. Dr. Sims noted 

petitioner on multiple occasions attempted suicide, including during his 

incarceration on the qualifying crime. Petitioner also admitted attempting 

suicide during his interview with Dr. Sims. Both evaluators noted 

petitioner’s medical and psychiatric history showed he suffered from auditory 

hallucinations, paranoia, and disorganization. Petitioner during his 

interview with Dr. Sims also admitted “at times” to having auditory 

hallucinations. And both evaluators noted petitioner’s extensive criminal 

history, his inability to conform to social norms and behave lawfully, his 
46

sporadic work history, and his lack of remorse for his sexual acts against 

Jane Doe and other victims.

In addition, Dr. Fox found petitioner’s Static-99R score placed 

petitioner in the above average risk category for being charged or convicted of 

another sexual offense. As summarized ante, Dr. Fox also found multiple 

factors in the VRS-SO assessment suggested that if left untreated, petitioner 

was likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior as a result of his 

disorders.

Although Dr. Sims found petitioner’s Static-99R and Static-2002 scores 

placed petitioner in the average risk category for being charged or convicted 

of another sexual offense, in assessing petitioner under the structured risk 

assessment—forensic version, Dr. Sims opined petitioner’s score placed him 

at a “high” level of psychological need. Among other factors summarized 

ante, Dr. Sims found the factor for sexual preference for children applied to 

petitioner, based not only on his conviction under Penal Code section 288, 

subdivision (a) in the qualifying crime, but also on his repeated interest in 

engaging in sexual activity with prepubescent females.

Finally, both experts concurred that if left untreated or absent custody, 

petitioner’s sexually violent criminal behavior will be predatory in nature. 

Both evaluations noted petitioner’s qualifying crime was “predatory” (see § 

6600, subd. (e)), as Jane Doe was a person of casual acquaintance with whom 

petitioner had no substantial relationship, and the primary purpose of his 

relationship with Jane was sexual victimization. (See ibid.)

We reiterate our decision in this case—that hearsay in the 

psychological evaluations of a person may be considered by the court in its 

“review” of an SVP petition—is limited to the probable cause hearing in 

section 6602. The People at an SVP trial may not satisfy their evidentiary 
47

burden by relying on hearsay, unless independently proven by competent 

evidence or covered by a hearsay exception. (See Walker, supra, 51 

Cal.App.5th at p. 702; Yates, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 476; Roa, supra, 11 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 452-453.)

DISPOSITION

The petition is denied.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

AARON, J.