COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00513-CR

BRENDA GAY KIERNAN 

A/K/A BRENDA 

HUDSON BRITTAIN

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. Introduction

In a single issue, Appellant Brenda Gay Kiernan a/k/a Brenda Hudson 

Brittain appeals the trial court‟s judgment convicting her of murdering her mother.

We affirm.

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Kiernan gave four interviews and a written statement to police on the day 

she reported her mother‟s death. In the second interview, Kiernan confessed 

that she shot her mother. Kiernan filed a motion to suppress all of her 

statements, which the trial court denied, and which denial Kiernan does not 

appeal. The trial court filed findings of fact along with its conclusion that 

Kiernan‟s statements were voluntary. During trial, all of Kiernan‟s statements 

were admitted into evidence and published to the jury over Kiernan‟s renewed 

objections.

At the close of evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of trial, Kiernan 

submitted to the trial court her request that the jury charge include instructions on

the voluntariness of her statements with regard to the influence of alcohol,

improper influences, and failure to receive or waive her statutory warnings. The 

trial court denied these requests. The jury found Kiernan guilty as alleged in the 

indictment and assessed her punishment at life imprisonment, and the trial court 

entered judgment on the verdict.

III. Jury Charge

In our review of error in a jury charge, we first determine whether error 

occurred; if error did not occur, our analysis ends. See Abdnor v. State, 871 

S.W.2d 726, 731–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see also Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 

23, 25B26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Kiernan focuses her argument on “[g]eneral 

involuntariness, under [a]rticle 38.22[,] § 6,” complaining that the trial court 
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should have granted her request for the issue of voluntariness to be included in 

the jury charge during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.

With regard to jury instructions on voluntariness, the court of criminal 

appeals has explained that “[s]ection 6 expressly dictates the content of that 

instruction to be as follows: „unless the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the statement was voluntarily made, the jury shall not consider such 

statement for any purpose nor any evidence obtained as a result thereof.‟”

2

 

Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 175 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (emphasis 

added).

Here, the trial court included the following instruction in the jury charge: 

You are instructed that unless you believe from the evidence 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged statements introduced 

into evidence as State‟s Exhibits Nos. 47, 49, 50 & 51 were freely 

and voluntarily made by the defendant without compulsion or 

persuasion,[

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] or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you shall 

not consider such alleged statements for any purpose nor any 

evidence obtained as a result thereof.

This instruction is substantially the same as the one set out in and required by 

article 38.22, section 6, and Kiernan does not complain about the trial court‟s 

inclusion of additional language in the instruction. Further, Kiernan does not 

 

2See also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6 (West 2005) (stating 

same).

3

The trial court apparently incorporated language from code of criminal 

procedure article 38.21, which states, “A statement of an accused may be used 

in evidence against him if it appears that the same was freely and voluntarily 

made without compulsion or persuasion, under the rules hereafter prescribed.” 

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.21 (West 2005).
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explain how or why the trial court erred by submitting this instruction instead of 

the ones she proposed. Because the trial court provided Kiernan with the 

required instruction under article 38.22, section 6, we overrule her sole issue.

IV. Conclusion

Having overruled Kiernan‟s sole issue, we affirm the trial court‟s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: September 22, 2011