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VIOLENT EXTREMISM: HOW ARE PEOPLE 

MOVED FROM CONSTITUTIONALLY-PROTECTED 

THOUGHT TO ACTS OF TERRORISM? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION 

SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK 

ASSESSMENT 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 15, 2009 

Serial No. 111–48 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

JANE HARMAN, California, Chair 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

THOMAS M. FINAN, Staff Director 

BRANDON DECLET, Counsel 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

MEGHANN PETERLIN, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .................................................................. 1 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment ............................................. 3 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 5 

The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES

Dr. James Zogby, President, Arab American Institute: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Mr. Michael Macleod-Ball, Acting Director, American Civil Liberties Union 

(ACLU), Washington Legislative Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Dr. Stevan Weine, Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the International 

Center of Responses to Catastrophes, University of Illinois at Chicago: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Dr. R. Kim Cragin, Ph.D., Senior Policy Analyst, Rand Corporation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 32 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 34 

(1) 

VIOLENT EXTREMISM: HOW ARE PEOPLE 

MOVED FROM CONSTITUTIONALLY-PROTECTED THOUGHT TO ACTS OF TERRORISM? 

Tuesday, December 15, 2009 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, 

AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Harman, Thompson, Carney, Green, 

Himes, McCaul, Dent, and Broun. 

Also present: Representatives Jackson Lee and Richardson. 

Ms. HARMAN [Presiding.] The subcommittee will come to order. 

The subcommittee’s meeting today to explore whether there are 

risk factors or pre-incident indicators of terrorist activity identified 

by intelligence and law enforcement organizations to enable them 

in thwarting attacks while preserving—let me repeat that—preserving individuals’ right to privacy and civil liberties. 

Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘Violent Extremism: How Are People 

Moved From Constitutionally Protected Thought to Acts of Terrorism?’’ 

Ahmed Abdullah Minni was a member of the West Potomac High 

School wrestling team. His coach described him as ‘‘one of the last 

people’’ he would expect to turn to terrorism. 

Ramy Zamzam, a 22-year-old Howard University dental student, 

was ‘‘tolerant and engaging.’’ 

These two young men, along with three workout buddies from 

the local Gold’s Gym in Fairfax County, were recently arrested in 

Pakistan allegedly attempting to engage in jihad against U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. 

Their disappearance didn’t raise suspicion until one of the boys’ 

families found a farewell video soon after, and their loved ones 

frantically contacted the FBI for help in locating them. 

To almost all who knew him, Najibullah Zazi was just a friendly 

hot dog stand vendor who liked to joke with his customers, not, as 

it is alleged, an al-Qaeda operative plotting an attack on the New 

York City transit system. 

People didn’t know what to make of Major Nidal Hasan. But 

surely no one anticipated that he would carry out the worst domes-
2 

tic terrorist attack since 9/11. In each of these cases, appearances 

proved far different from reality. 

Today, this subcommittee seeks to gain understanding of how 

people who seem like anyone else—those who are capable of interacting socially with friends and colleagues and, in many cases, are 

athletes and scholars—could be recruited or self-recruited to train 

to be terrorists. 

My eyes were opened 4 years ago when a terrorist cell in my district—Torrance, California—was thwarted by attentive law enforcement. 

Excellent police work enabled authorities to connect the dots between a series of gas station robberies and plots to attack local synagogues, recruiting offices, and a military base. The folks who were 

planning to do that are now in jail. 

This isn’t new subject matter for our subcommittee, either. Since 

early 2007, we have held a series of careful hearings to understand 

how someone with radical views, which are protected by our Constitution—let me say that again: radical views which are protected 

by our Constitution—becomes willing to engage in violent behavior 

and, in some cases, to seek to inflict maximum harm on the maximum number of innocent civilians. 

Our earlier efforts have been criticized and, in my view, misunderstood by some civil liberties groups. We drafted a bill creating 

a commission to examine and report on what causes an individual 

like Major Hasan to attack. It passed the House by 404–6 in October 2007. 

Only then did the ACLU, a witness at today’s hearings, which 

had participated in our meetings, object to it. 

Many disagreed that such a commission should examine terrorist 

recruitment on the internet. Yet press reports suggest that at least 

one of the five Alexandria men just arrested in Pakistan posted online comments praising YouTube videos of attacks on a U.S. Army 

convoy hit by a roadside bomb in Kabul. That is when the alleged 

recruiter contacted him. 

YouTube videos may have inspired them to travel to Pakistan. It 

also appears, as I said, that the Taliban recruiter used coded messages and Facebook to communicate with them. 

In his written statement, Mr. Macleod-Ball of the ACLU, who 

has been very helpful to this subcommittee, suggests that ‘‘protecting our First Amendment freedoms will both honor our values 

and keep us safe.’’ 

Of course we must protect these freedoms, but we also must prevent recruiters from cherry-picking kids from our communities and 

sending them to become jihadists overseas. 

I hope our witnesses can help us to separate the intellectual 

process of committing to a political agenda, protected by the First 

Amendment, from the operational process of moving from non-violence to violence, which I am sure everyone on this hearing panel 

agrees is not protected. 

We need to be able to intervene at the right point to stop individuals in our schools, neighborhoods, religious centers, and jails who 

are persuaded by extreme violent messaging, whether through the 

internet, friends, or mentors, to commit violent acts before it is too 

late. 
3 

So what are the triggers? The number of Americans who are either being recruited or are self-recruiting to carry out terrorist attacks here or abroad is growing. So what are the triggers? 

Recently, numbers of young Somali-Americans were recruited in 

Minneapolis to join the Al-Shabaab terror network in Somalia. 

Their families were stunned. Two have carried out suicide bombings. So what are the triggers? 

Then there is David Headley, the American citizen who has now 

been indicted for his alleged roles in the Mumbai attacks last year 

as well as for plotting an attack on a Danish newspaper. This case 

is doubly important to examine because he was an American recruited to attack abroad. So what are the triggers? 

In these cases, terrorist organizations not only successfully recruited Americans but then provided the requisite training to enable those Americans to carry out attacks. 

We don’t have too many more chances to get this right. There is 

a growing list of people suspected of being recruited and ready to 

carry to terror attacks in our country and abroad. 

If we fail to find the right way to protect both security and liberty, the next attack, I fear, could lead to a shredding of our Constitution, something none of us want. 

I want to welcome all the witnesses. In addition to Michael 

Macleod-Ball, we will hear from Dr. Stevan Weine of the University of Chicago; my friend Jim Zogby of the Arab American Institute; and Kim Cragin of RAND. 

All of the Members of this subcommittee, who took oaths to protect and defend the Constitution and to provide for the common defense, look forward to your expert analysis and suggestions for 

tackling this growing threat. Terrorists only have to be right once. 

We have to try our best to be right 100 percent of the time. 

I now yield to the Ranking Member for an opening statement. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I thank the Madame Chair, and thank you for this 

very timely and important hearing. 

I thank the witnesses for being here today. 

Homegrown terrorism is happening right now and right here in 

the United States. As we sit here today, someone or some group of 

people is in the process of being radicalized to extremist ideology. 

Most will limit themselves to radical thoughts and speech that 

are undeniably protected by our Constitution. But there are those 

who are on the path toward violent acts of terrorism, and their 

life’s work is to try to kill us. Unfortunately, finding and stopping 

these individuals is like finding a needle in a haystack. 

Recent cases highlight the fact that the United States is not immune to homegrown terrorism, and the murders at Fort Hood just 

north of my district by Nidal Hasan last month remind us not only 

about domestic radicalization but how vulnerable we really are to 

an attack. 

Thirteen innocent people were brutally murdered and many others injured on November 5 by the hand of a U.S. citizen, a doctor 

and a member of the United States military. The threat is real, 

and we are still at risk in this Nation. Case after case demonstrates this fact. 

Major Nidal Hasan said his allegiance was to the Koran and not 

to the Constitution, tried to get his bosses to prosecute some of his 
4 

patients as war criminals, regularly described the war on terrorism 

as a war against Islam, used a presentation at an environmental 

health class to argue that Muslims were being targeted by the U.S. 

antiterror campaign, and was very vocal about the war, very upfront about being a Muslim first and an American second. 

Daniel Patrick Boyd, a U.S. citizen, and six others were arrested 

in July, charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. According to the FBI, Boyd trained in terrorist training 

camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Then Mr. Zazi—probably one of the biggest threats that we have 

discovered recently in terms of a cell in the United States—working 

on behalf of al-Qaeda, born in Afghanistan, U.S. legal permanent 

resident living in Colorado, charged with conspiracy to use weapons 

of mass destruction. 

David Headley, a U.S. citizen who attended terrorist training 

camps in Pakistan, was living in Chicago and planned attacks 

abroad. We have learned that he was not only planning future attacks but has now been charged with helping to plan the 2008 attacks on Mumbai, India. 

Just over the past few days, we are learning about five young 

men from Virginia, just outside of where we sit here today, who 

traveled to Pakistan, reportedly to link up with members of alQaeda. It appears that these young men were radicalized just miles 

from where we sit here. 

The danger is that we are seeing more and more of these cases, 

more and more individuals who self-radicalize over the internet 

versus being actively recruited by al-Qaeda—individuals who are 

turning to radical—extremist thought—and then turning to terrorism. 

Mr. Smadi, in my home State of Texas, in the United States, was 

illegally in this country and living in Texas—was arrested for plotting to blow up a skyscraper in Dallas, Texas. 

According to the FBI, Smadi made a decision to act to commit 

a significant conspicuous act of violence under his banner of selfjihad. Smadi is just one of several recent cases of ‘‘lone wolf’’ plots. 

The Patriot Act was designed to give law enforcement and intelligence officials the tools that they need to detect terrorist plots. As 

provisions in the Patriot Act are set to expire this month, including 

the ‘‘lone wolf’’ provision, we must not forget that we are still under 

attack and that the threat is very real. 

Waiting until terrorist acts occur and innocent men and women 

and children are murdered is not an acceptable answer. We must 

be able to detect and intercept terrorists early. 

In doing so, we need to answer some fundamental questions. 

How can we identify who is on the path to terrorism without infringing on the rights of those exercising their constitutional freedoms? 

Are there trends and patterns? Are there risk factors that make 

an individual more or less susceptible to going down this path? I 

look forward to hearing the answers to some of these questions. 

Madame Chair, I hope that this will be just the first in a series 

of hearings on this topic and that in the future we will be able to 

hear what the Government is doing to help understand and combat 

the spread of radicalization and terrorist ideology. 
5 

There are outreach programs at the NCTC, at DHS and through 

many of the JTTFs. I would request that in subsequent hearings 

we hear from those and others about what is being done and what 

should be done to stop this problem. 

Finally, I believe it is important to note that the Government 

alone cannot solve this problem. This not only is a National security problem, it is a community problem. We must work together 

with Government, religious leaders, educators, and community 

groups to reduce this threat. 

I would ask that the witnesses discuss not only what can and 

cannot be done by the Government but what really can be done 

outside of the Government. 

With that, Madame Chair, I yield back. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Let me just point out for the Ranking Member that we have held 

a series of hearings on this subject, really for the last 4 years, and 

made a series of site visits. 

The legislation I mentioned was based on a careful series of hearings. We held a hearing a few weeks ago on the threat. I know that 

you were detained in Texas on official business and not able to attend that. But we will continue to focus on this in the hopes of getting it right. 

I now yield 5 minutes for opening remarks to the Chairman of 

the full committee, Mr. Thompson of Mississippi. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Madame Chair, for holding this 

hearing. 

More than 8 years after the 9/11 attacks, it is not particularly 

surprising that we face the growing, ever-changing threat from violent extremists. The Department of Homeland Security, stood up in 

the wake of those attacks, has evolved over the course of these past 

years. 

Yet even amidst changes, there are constants. On one hand, we 

are challenged by the constant and continued threat posed by terrorists, both transnational and domestic. 

We are challenged by groups who are able to locate and recruit 

individuals willing to perpetrate inconceivable acts of violence. 

On the other hand, we are supported by the constant efforts of 

our dedicated law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland security 

professionals who help defend against that threat. 

The other constant is that we, too, have a duty. We must remain 

vigilant. We must be vigilant to ensure that those who bear the 

brunt of detecting, identifying, disrupting, and dismantling efforts 

by terrorists to strike at us—our citizens, our homeland, and our 

allies—have the adequate resources and tools to do so. 

We must be vigilant that we do not slip back into a September 

10, 2001 mentality regarding the sharing of information. 

No matter how we say it—knowing what we know, connecting 

the dots, getting the right information to the right people at the 

right time—we are talking about the same thing. An environment 

in which information is shared is an environment in which better 

decisions can be made and, ultimately, one in which people are 

safer. 

Finally, we must also be vigilant that we are doing everything 

we can to break the links between these groups and individuals 
6 

they are grooming for violence. We, both law enforcement and our 

communities, must keep a watchful eye open for people like Zazi, 

Von Brunn, Smadi. 

But we must also be vigilant that those efforts, resources, and 

tools are applied consistently, in ways that respect the privacy and 

civil liberties of American citizens and do not sacrifice our Nation’s 

values. 

For that reason, I am very glad that we have the witnesses here 

before us this morning. I hope that your insights will help us maintain our both our vigilance and our ideals. 

Welcome to you all, and I thank you for being here. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the Chairman for his remarks and would 

note that other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that 

under committee rules opening statements may be submitted for 

the record. 

[The statement of Hon. Laura Richardson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LAURA RICHARDSON

DECEMBER 15, 2009 

Madame Chair, thank you for convening this very important hearing today focusing on ways to deter, detect, and prevent terrorist attacks while still respecting constitutionally-protected thought. As the newest Member of this subcommittee, I look 

forward to working with you and the other Members on the vital issues that will 

come before us. Madame Chair, I also appreciate your commitment to this important 

and timely subject. And finally, I would like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before Congress today. 

Newspapers and cable channels are constantly updating us on terrorist plots 

thwarted, both here in America and all over the world. Yet often, the story is tragic, 

one of a terrorist attack that that was not stopped in time and succeeded in killing 

and injuring innocent people. It is the purview of this subcommittee to investigate 

how we can minimize the occurrence of these incidents before they reach either the 

planning or final stage. The hearing today is an excellent investigation into the complicated issues that surround this important area of homeland security. 

Everyone here is familiar with the recent news story of the arrests of five men 

in Alexandria with ties to extremists in Pakistan and in the Taliban. This case is 

a perfect example of the issue we are examining today. Yes, it is reported that these 

men held radical beliefs. 

But at what point did their beliefs begin to slide towards criminal action? The 

Constitution does not protect criminal action. This constant balancing act between 

liberty and security is one that this hearing will examine today. 

I am pleased that our distinguished subcommittee and the witnesses before us 

will focus today on the gray area between constitutionally-protected thought and the 

actions and crimes that can result. We should constantly be examining this question 

in light of the state of the world today and the threats that America faces. I look 

forward to hearing from our distinguished panel of witnesses on these issues and 

their thoughts on how to best tread the lines between thought and criminal activity. 

Thank you again, Madame Chair, for convening this hearing. I yield back my 

time. 

Ms. HARMAN. It is now, really, my privilege to welcome our witnesses this morning. We will start with Dr. Jim Zogby, who is the 

president and founder of the Arab American Institute and who appears today because I called him and urged him to fit this hearing 

into his very busy plans for the month. 

AAI serves as a political and policy research arm of the Arab 

American community. Since 1992, Dr. Zogby has written a weekly 

column called ‘‘Washington Watch’’ on U.S. politics that is currently published in 14 Arab and South Asian countries. 

He has authored a number of books, including ‘‘What Ethnic 

Americans Really Think’’ and ‘‘What Arabs Think: Values, Beliefs 
7 

and Concerns.’’ In 2001, Dr. Zogby was appointed to the executive 

committee of the Democratic National Committee and in 2006 was 

named co-chair of the DNC’s resolutions committee. 

He has advised me personally—and numbers of us here—for 

years on the Muslim community. I think it is very important as we 

review this subject again that we understand the fact that most 

members of the Muslim community are law-abiding citizens and 

really want to help us get this right. 

Dr. Macleod-Ball is the acting director of the ACLU at the Washington legislative office. His office works with Congressional offices 

on a nonpartisan basis to ensure that American civil liberties are 

preserved and protected. 

Dr. Macleod-Ball has practiced law and held leading roles in the 

political community, including serving on presidential campaigns. 

His work as an attorney afforded him the opportunity to argue significant cases on privacy and Federal regulatory authority. 

Before this hearing, before his testimony here, he wrote the subcommittee a very thoughtful letter which I have re-read in preparation for this hearing on how to understand this problem and hopefully how to get it right. He has reviewed some draft legislation on 

recruitment that we are considering. 

I very much appreciate your cooperation with us. 

Dr. Weine is a professor of psychiatry and director of the International Center of Responses to Catastrophes at the University of 

Illinois at Chicago, currently serves as the principal investigator of 

a National Institute of Mental Health-sponsored study on adolescent refugees from Liberia and Somalia in the United States. 

Dr. Weine has authored several articles and books, including 

‘‘Testimony and Catastrophe: Narrating the Traumas of Political 

Violence.’’ He was awarded a Career Scientist Award from the 

NIMH on services-based research with refugee families. 

Finally, Dr. Cragin is senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. She is also an adjunct professor at the University of 

Maryland, where she focuses on terrorism-related issues. 

She served 3 months on General Petraeus’ staff in Iraq in 2008, 

and her RAND publications include ‘‘The Terrorist’’—‘‘The Dynamic 

Terrorist Threat,’’ ‘‘Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups 

and the Exchange of New Technologies.’’ 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

in the record, and I would like to start with Dr. Zogby to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. 

Welcome, Dr. Zogby. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES ZOGBY, PRESIDENT, ARAB AMERICAN 

INSTITUTE 

Mr. ZOGBY. Thank you, Madame Chair and Members of the committee. 

The issue before us is, indeed, a critical one. It concerns our National security, to be sure, but it also represents a grave challenge 

to our National character. 

I come at this exploration from several vantage points, some of 

which you mentioned—as an Arab American leader for three decades in my community, having worked with Arab Americans and 

with other Muslim communities as well; as a Ph.D. in Islamic stud-
8 

ies also, someone who did post-doctoral work in the impact on religion in societies under stress; as a pollster who, with my brother 

John Zogby, has intensively polled communities of interest both 

here in the United States, in Europe and across the Middle East; 

and as a participant leader in ethnic coalitions in this country that 

has brought me into close contact with new and not-so-new Americans, watching them move from exile politics into the American 

mainstream. 

Let me begin with a simple observation. Despite real concerns 

that we all share about recent cases involving the arrests of some 

young men seeking association with dangerous international terrorist activity, and the arrests of others who appeared to be on the 

verge of carrying out such activity, we are not Europe. 

Our situation here is fundamentally different than that faced by 

countries on the continent, for several reasons. First and foremost 

is that America is different in concept and reality. 

I have heard and talked to third-generation Kurds in Germany, 

or Algerians in France, or Pakistanis in England who will continue 

to remain on the margins of their societies. They are Turks. They 

are Arabs. Or they are Pakis. They do not become British or German or French. 

On the other hand, becoming American is a very different process. It has brought countless numbers of immigrant groupings into 

the mainstream. It is not the possession of a single ethnic community or a single ethnic group—has the right to define American. 

Within generations, diverse communities and religious—people of 

different religious backgrounds from every corner of the globe have 

become Americans. The important thing is that not only do they 

become Americans, but America becomes changed as well. 

Because of this rich experience, recent immigrants from Arab 

and Muslim countries come to this country, in effect, with the table 

set for them. They find it a—be a fertile ground for the ever-broadening definition of being American. 

Another important difference between our situation and Europe 

is that people here do not stay on the margins. In fact, because of 

the extraordinary social and economic mobility available to immigrants, they, in fact, move into enterprise. 

The Yemeni community in California, which I first met about 30 

years ago, that was picking grapes in the valley are today business 

owners throughout the country, and their children are in colleges 

and, in fact, becoming quite successful. 

It is true we have a problem. But I think we need to put the 

problem into context. The arrests of these young men that we have 

seen is certainly one that we must consider, and we must consider 

not only the impact on our country but also the impact on the communities affected. 

Let me say the following. We are engaged in a conflict internationally, there is no question about it. It has repercussions here 

at home. There are those on both sides of the conflict who have 

sought to exploit it, who have sought to cast it as an irreversible 

clash of civilizations. 

Just there are some religious and political leaders and media figures in the Muslim world who have sought to paint America with 

a broad brush of irredeemable evil, there are counterparts here in 
9 

this country who have tried to do the same with Islam. All of this 

exacerbates tension and creates problems on all sides. 

Despite this, the vast majority of American Muslims and Arab 

Americans have rejected this fomenting clash. They have worked 

within the political process available to them. They have fought 

discrimination. They have combated hate crimes. They voice their 

differences in the United States as citizens, not as aliens. 

Nevertheless, it is a fact that some alienated young men from 

these communities have become susceptible to antisocial 

radicalization. This is not new. We have seen it before. 

In the past four decades that I have been involved in politics, we 

have witnessed recruitment into white supremacy and Christian 

nation and militia organizations—the Black Panthers, the Jewish 

Defense League, the IRA, the Tamil Tigers. 

The fact is that the allure of certain ideology and romanticized 

machismo, complete with weapons training and acts of bravado, 

does provide for some of these young men a dangerous cure to the 

alienation and feeling of powerlessness that they experience. 

We are seeing it again. We are seeing it now with a different 

group of people. I have reviewed dozens of these cases. I have 

looked at them up and down. There are multiple differences. We 

have to look at the multiple differences and see what they are, because they can’t all be painted as one simple phenomenon. 

But the pattern of alienation and that leads to violent action as 

a cure to that alienation seems to run through them all. This is 

what we must address. 

I believe that we must address it with a scalpel and not with a 

sledgehammer, because if we, in fact, take a swipe at the whole 

community, we increase the alienation and we change the character of who we are, making it more difficult for us to deal with 

the problem. 

Let me just come to a close by saying that we have to understand 

what we are doing right—not only what is wrong, but what is 

being done right. Recruitment will remain. We have to find a way 

to make young men less susceptible to the recruitment. 

I think if we look at what is going on right, we have leading 

Muslim American organizations actively responding to efforts to 

deal with the problem. 

I can cite the work of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee as 

an example, reaching out to law enforcement, working with their 

communities, working in particular with young people to create political alternatives so they can voice their differences with the policies that lead to the aggravation in a way as citizens seeking recourse. 

Law enforcement is also working with these communities and 

doing so quite effectively. As the situation in Minneapolis or here 

in northern Virginia shows, the work of the FBI or U.S. attorneys 

can be productive and helpful in this situation. 

Finally, we have a President who is creating a different atmosphere and space for discourse with the Muslim world. This is very 

important. The answer is not to change who we are or how we 

react, but to be more of who we are and to continue to do what we 

do best. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Dr. Zogby. 
10 

Mr. ZOGBY. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Macleod-Ball. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MACLEOD-BALL, ACTING DIRECTOR, 

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU), WASHINGTON 

LEGISLATIVE OFFICE 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. Good morning. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Sorry, thank you. 

Good morning, Chair Harman—thank you very much—Ranking 

Member McCaul, full committee Chairman Thompson and other 

Members of the subcommittee. 

Thank you for inviting the ACLU to testify about the importance 

of protecting associational and speech rights while examining violent extremism. 

In 1964, Barry Goldwater said that extremism in the defense of 

liberty is no vice. Extremism is nothing more than a chosen set of 

beliefs and, as such, is protected under the First Amendment. An 

extremist ideology in and of itself must not bring on Government 

censure. 

Violent action, however, whether in the name of ideology or otherwise, deserves condemnation. 

This hearing is entitled ‘‘Violent Extremism.’’ Violence is inherently harmful. Extremism is not. Linking an examination of the 

two implies that an extremist viewpoint leads to violence and that 

violence associated with extremism is more worthy of examination 

than non-ideological violence, even though the latter is more frequent and often causes the same broad and lasting damage. 

We will fully support this subcommittee’s examination of events 

that may explain why individuals choose violence as a means to effect political change. We will steadfastly oppose efforts to examine 

and thus cast official disapproval upon any minority belief system. 

In times of National crisis, we have often failed to live up to our 

democratic ideals. During the Palmer raids, Government created 

150,000 secret files on those who held radical views or associations 

or voiced anti-Government policies. Lawyers who complained about 

this were subject to investigation themselves. 

The Lusk Committee and the New York Legislature in the 1920s 

produced a report on revolutionary radicalism which smeared liberals, pacifists, and civil libertarians as agents of international 

communism. 

In the early Cold War era, Senator Joseph McCarthy’s subcommittee and the House UnAmerican Activities Committee ruined 

the careers of many loyal Americans based purely on their associations. 

In the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI ran a domestic counterintelligence program that attempted to suppress political dissent, opening over half a million domestic intelligence files and identifying 

thousands of individuals to be rounded up in a National emergency. 

Instead of focusing on violations of law, these official efforts targeted people based upon their beliefs and associations. 
11 

The security threat then was no less real during the first Red 

Scare and during the Cold War, and yet Government abused its 

power in responding to those threats. 

There is some cause for similar concern today. A flawed 2007 

New York police report claimed that terrorist acts are linked to the 

adoption of certain beliefs and that there is a uniform four-step 

radicalization process from belief to association to terrorism. 

But the report was based on just five cases and ignored the fact 

that millions of people progressed through some or all of these very 

same steps without ever committing an act of violence. 

Ignoring those flaws, the Virginia Fusion Center cited the same 

report in designating the State’s universities as nodes of 

radicalization requiring law enforcement attention. 

A 2008 report by the Senate Homeland Security Committee also 

restated the same flawed theories in arguing for a National strategy to counter the influence of the ideology. 

More recently, however, countervailing studies have begun to appear. A comprehensive United Kingdom analysis concluded that 

there is no single pathway to extremism. Facing marginalization 

and racism was identified as a key factor making an individual receptive to extremist ideology. 

A 2008 National Counterterrorism Center paper cited America’s 

greater diversity and civil rights protections to explain lower levels 

of homegrown terrorism here. 

In Senate testimony, one terrorism expert blamed moral outrage 

at abuses of detainees and the perception of a war against Islam 

as the primary cause of violence, not ideology. He recommended 

against any measure that would tend to alienate the Muslim community. 

This subcommittee, I would say, is showing admirable sensitivity 

to the issue just by holding this hearing. We don’t question whether this subcommittee should examine violent extremism but, rather, how it should do so. 

Singling out for examination violent actions committed by adherents to a particular ideology for scrutiny would predetermine an 

outcome that would unfairly cast suspicion on all those who share 

any part of that belief or ideology. It would perpetuate a perception 

of alienation that helps fuel the violence. 

Instead, our best defense lies in a renewed dedication to the protection of associational speech and religious rights. Congress should 

focus the Government’s antiterrorism research on actual terrorist 

acts and those who commit them, rather than on an examination 

of those who have particular beliefs or who express dissent. 

Fear should not drive our Government policies. Protecting our 

First Amendment freedoms will both honor our values and keep us 

safe. 

Thank you for consideration of our views, and I want to pay special thanks to the Chair for her constant outreach to our office on 

these issues. 

[The statement of Mr. Macleod-Ball follows:] 
12 

1The Constitution of the United States, Amendment 1: ‘‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 

the Government for a redress of grievances.’’ 2See, United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1943); Roth v. 

United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 3See, New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL W. MACLEOD-BALL

DECEMBER 15, 2009 

Good morning Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the American Civil 

Liberties Union, its hundreds of thousands of members, countless additional supporters and activists, and fifty-three affiliates Nation-wide, about the importance of 

zealously safeguarding our constitutionally-protected freedoms while we strive to 

understand how individuals become violent extremists. The ACLU recognizes that 

Government has an obligation to protect society from terrorists and other violent 

criminals, and that studying previous terrorist attacks and the people who committed them could provide clues useful to preventing future acts of violence. But 

Congress must tread carefully when attempting to examine people’s thoughts or 

classify their beliefs as inside or outside the mainstream to avoid infringing on fundamental rights that are essential to the functioning of a healthy democracy. Sacrificing our civil liberties in the pursuit of security is unwise, unnecessary, and according to several recent studies, counterproductive to preventing extremist violence. 

Barry Goldwater, accepting the Republican nomination for the Office of President 

of the United States in 1964 said that ‘‘Extremism in the defense of liberty is no 

vice!’’ This subcommittee must keep in mind that extremism is nothing more than 

a chosen set of beliefs and, as such, is absolutely protected under the First Amendment. Asking whether extremist ideology is the precipitator of violence or not presumes that a connection exists between the belief system and the commission of violence. But recent empirical studies of terrorism downplay such a causal connection. 

To assume without evidence that everyone of a particular faith or ideology is a 

threat because of the actions of a few would betray American values and waste security resources. An extremist ideology, in and of itself, must not bring on Government 

censure. Violent action, on the other hand, whether in the name of ideology or otherwise, 

deserves the full-throated condemnation of the Government and its people. As this 

committee carries on its work on this issue, it has the opportunity to set a sterling 

and courageous example for the Nation by focusing on the root causes of violence, 

while fully respecting the rights of all individuals to hold views that may be different—or even abhorrent—to the great majority of the country. We will fully support this subcommittee’s examination of the historical events that may tend to explain why particular individuals choose to use violence as a means to effect social 

or political change in a manner that threatens the National security. We will steadfastly oppose any effort to examine, and thus cast official disapproval upon, any minority belief system. Any such effort would chill the First Amendment rights of 

those involved and be an unfair slap at untold numbers of wholly innocent Americans. 

I. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom of 

religion, speech, press, petition, and assembly.1 These protections are based on the 

premise that open and unfettered public debate empowers democracy by enriching 

the marketplace with new ideas and enabling political and social change through 

lawful means.2 These freedoms also enhance our security. Though ‘‘vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials’’ 

have to be endured under our constitutional system of Government, the uninhibited 

debate these freedoms guarantee is recognized as ‘‘essential to the security of the 

Republic’’ because it ensures a Government responsive to the will of the people.3

Moreover, as Justice Brandeis explained, our Nation’s Founders realized that the 

greater threat to security lay not in protecting speech, but in attempting to suppress 

it: 

‘‘Those who won our independence... knew that order cannot be secured merely 

through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage 
13 

4Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–376, (1927), (Brandeis, J., Concurring). 5Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. 

Senate, 94th Cong., Final Report on Supplemental Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (Book III), S. Rep. No. 94–755, at 385 (1976), available at: 

http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/html/ChurchB3l0196b.htm. 6Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. 

Senate, 94th Cong., Final Report on Supplemental Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans (Book III), S. Rep. No. 94–755, at 386 (1976), [CHURCH REPORT] available at: http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/book3/html/ 

ChurchB3l0196b.htm. 7 Id, at 387. 

8Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU, Oxford, (1990) 

p. 16. 9The Lusk Committee: A Guide to the Records of the Joint Committee to Investigate Seditious 

Activities: A Guide to the Records Held in the New York State Archives, available at: http:// 

www.archives.nysed.gov/a/research/resltopicslbusllusk.shtml. 10 CHURCH REPORT, at 388. 

thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds 

hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies, and that the 

fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as 

applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing 

majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should 

be guaranteed.’’4

II. HISTORICAL ABUSE

Unfortunately, in times of National crisis we have often failed to recognize the 

strength of our democratic ideals. Indeed the ACLU was founded in 1920 to come 

to the defense of immigrants, trade unionists, and political activists who were illegally rounded up by the thousand in the infamous Palmer raids during America’s 

first ‘‘red scare,’’ a period of significant anarchist violence. Rather than focusing on 

finding the perpetrators of the violence, the Government sought anyone who supported similar political views, associated with disfavored organizations or wrote or 

spoke in opposition to Government policies. Lawyers who complained of the abuse, 

which included torture, coerced confessions, illegal searches and arrests, were subject to investigation themselves.5

The Department of Justice General Intelligence Division (GID), the precursor 

agency to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), collected 150,000 secret files 

‘‘giving detailed data not only upon individual agitators connected with the radical 

movement, but also upon organizations, associations, societies, publications and social conditions existing in certain localities.’’6 By the GID’s own account the 

warrantless searches, arrests, and deportations were not particularly useful in identifying suspected terrorists or other criminal activity. Rather, its claimed success 

was in ‘‘wrecking the communist parties in this country’’ and shutting down ‘‘the 

radical press.’’7 The New York State Legislature also initiated a 2-year investigation 

into the spread of radical ideas. The Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate Seditious Activities (commonly referred to as the Lusk Committee) ultimately produced a report, Revolutionary Radicalism: Its History, Purpose and Tactics, which 

‘‘smeared liberals, pacifists, and civil libertarians as agents of international Communism.’’8 Though thousands were arrested, few were prosecuted or deported and 

little incriminating information was obtained during the committee’s investigation.9

Studying radicals was apparently of little help in finding actual terrorists. 

In the years that followed, due in part to the public outcry over the red scare 

abuses, the Department of Justice would reform its policies to focus strictly on violations of law, but these reforms would not hold.10 The Cold War brought about a second red scare characterized by Congressional witch hunts orchestrated by Senator 

Joseph McCarthy’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, which ruined the careers of many loyal Americans 

based purely on their associations. At the same time, and sometimes in support of 

these Congressional investigations, the FBI ran a domestic counter-intelligence program (COINTELPRO) that quickly evolved from a legitimate effort to protect the 

National security from hostile foreign threats into an effort to suppress domestic political dissent through an array of illegal activities. The Senate Select Committee 

that investigated COINTELPRO (the ‘‘Church Committee’’) said the ‘‘unexpressed 

major premise of... COINTELPRO is that the Bureau has a role in maintaining 

the existing social order, and that its efforts should be aimed toward combating 
14 

11 Id., at 7. 12 Id., at 27. 13 Id., at 6–7. 14 Id., at 5. 15 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–298 (1961). See also, Dennis v. United States, 341 

U.S. 494 (1951); and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 16 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 17 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 18 Id, at 462. See also, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Shelton v. Tucker, 

364 U.S. 479 (1960); and, Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961). 19Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 

those who threaten that order.’’11 Once again, instead of focusing on violations of 

law, these investigations targeted people based on their beliefs, political activities 

and associations. In his Church Committee testimony White House liaison Tom 

Charles Huston, author of the infamous ‘‘Huston Plan,’’ explained the hazards of 

this shift in focus: 

‘‘The risk was that you would get people who would be susceptible to political considerations as opposed to national security considerations, or would construe political considerations to be national security considerations, to move from the kid with 

a bomb to the kid with a picket sign, and from the kid with the picket sign to the 

kid with the bumper sticker of the opposing candidate.’’12

FBI headquarters opened over 500,000 domestic intelligence files between 1960 

and 1974, and created a list of 26,000 individuals who would be ‘‘rounded up’’ in 

the event of a National emergency.13 The FBI used the information it gleaned from 

these improper investigations not for law enforcement purposes, but to ‘‘break up 

marriages, disrupt meetings, ostracize persons from their professions and provoke 

target groups into rivalries that might result in deaths.’’14

III. REFORM

Fortunately this period also saw the Supreme Court begin to take a more principled stance in protecting First Amendment rights. In a number of cases addressing 

convictions under the Smith Act, which criminalized advocating the violent overthrow of the United States or membership in any organization that did, the Supreme Court began drawing a distinction between advocacy of violence as a tactic 

of political change and incitement to violence: ‘‘the mere abstract teaching . . . of 

the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence is not 

the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.’’15

These cases culminated in Brandenberg v. Ohio, in which the Court established that 

advocacy of violence could be criminalized only where ‘‘such advocacy is directed to 

inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 

action.’’16

The Court also strengthened the concept of freedom of association during this 

time in a series of cases involving attempts to suppress the National Association for 

the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP): 

‘‘Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than 

once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech 

and assembly.’’17

The Court repeatedly struck down State government attempts to compel disclosure of NAACP membership lists in these cases, citing ‘‘the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s association’’ and acknowledging the 

need to protect these rights from even subtle and unintentional Government interference.18

This recognition that the official investigation of an organization or its membership could impermissibly discourage or ‘‘chill’’ the exercise of constitutionally protected political rights is critically important to the present discussion regarding the 

study of violent extremism. Indeed the Court’s co-temporal decision in a case reviewing a conviction for contempt of Congress following a witness’s refusal to ‘‘name 

names’’ before the House Un-American Activities Committee makes the point more 

explicitly.19 While the Court recognized Congress’s broad investigative powers inherent to its legislative function, and its unquestioned authority to hold recalcitrant 

witnesses in contempt, it also held that abuse of the investigative process could lead 

to an unconstitutional abridgment of protected rights. Moreover, the Court detailed 

the severe harms that can result even from mere investigation: 
15 

20 Id, at 197–198. 21Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376, (1927), (Brandeis, J., Concurring). 22Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, New York Police Department, Radicalization in the West: 

The Homegrown Threat, p. 6, (2007). This report seems to draw heavily from an earlier FBI 

Intelligence Assessment, ‘‘The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad,’’ (May 10, 

2006), though it is not cited. 23See, ACLU press release, ‘‘Fusion Center Declares Nation’s Oldest Universities Possible 

Terrorist Threat,’’ (Apr. 6, 2009), at: http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/fusion-centerdeclares-nation%E2%80%99s-oldest-universities-possible-terrorist-threat. 

‘‘The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify, against his will, 

about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference. And when those forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, 

unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the witness may be disastrous. This effect is even more harsh when it is past beliefs, expressions or associations that are disclosed and judged by current standards, rather 

than those contemporary with the matter exposed. Nor does the witness alone suffer 

the consequences. Those who are identified by witnesses, and thereby placed in the 

same glare of publicity, are equally subject to public stigma, scorn and obloquy. Beyond that, there is the more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend 

to adhere to the most orthodox and uncontroversial views and associations in order 

to avoid a similar fate at some future time. That this impact is partly the result 

of nongovernmental activity by private persons cannot relieve the investigators or 

their responsibility for initiating the reaction.’’20

IV. CONTEMPORARY INVESTIGATIONS OF TERRORISM

We do not provide this history to argue that Congress cannot or should not investigate terrorism—far from it. The danger posed by modern terrorists is real and 

Congress must understand the scope and nature of the threat and exercise its authorities to the utmost in overseeing the Government’s response, holding our military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies accountable, and crafting sensible 

legislation that enhances security while protecting the rights of innocent persons. 

But the security threat was no less real during the first red scare and during the 

Cold War. The question is not whether Congress should respond but how it should 

respond. History tells us that conflating the expression of unorthodox or even hostile 

beliefs with threats to security only misdirects resources, unnecessarily violates the 

rights of the innocent, and unjustly alienates communities unfairly targeted as suspicious. Justice Brandeis argued that ‘‘[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify 

suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It 

is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.’’21

Unfortunately the Government has recently produced ill-conceived and methodologically flawed reports that claim not only that terrorist acts are linked to the 

adoption of certain beliefs but that there is a uniform process of ‘‘radicalization’’ in 

which one progresses from belief to association to terrorism. The New York Police 

Department report, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, published 

in 2007, purports to identify a four-step ‘‘radicalization process’’ that terrorists go 

through, but even the authors of the study admit crucial limitations to the application of their theory, namely: 

• that not all individuals who begin the process pass through all the stages; 

• that many ‘‘stop or abandon this process at different points;’’ and finally, 

• that ‘‘individuals do not always follow a perfectly linear progression’’ through 

the four steps.22

So these are not consecutive steps along a path at all, but rather four stones scattered in the woods which a terrorist or anyone else wandering through may or may 

not touch. 

What is dangerous is that the each of the four steps the NYPD describes involve 

constitutionally-protected religious and associational conduct, and the authors ignore the fact that millions of people may progress through one, several, or all of 

these ‘‘stages’’ and never commit an act of violence. Moreover these conclusions are 

based on just five terrorism cases, clearly a statistically insignificant sample from 

which to draw such sweeping conclusions. Yet the Virginia Fusion Center has cited 

the NYPD report, as well as Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and FBI reports, in designating the State’s universities and colleges as ‘‘nodes of radicalization’’ 

requiring law enforcement attention and characterized the ‘‘diversity’’ surrounding 

a Virginia military base and the State’s ‘‘historically black’’ colleges as possible 

threats.23

The NYPD report drew quick condemnation from the civil liberties and Muslim 

communities. The Brennan Center for Justice issued a memo complaining of the re-
16 

24 Aziz Huq, ‘‘Concerns with Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, N.Y. Police Dep’t, 

Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,’’ New York University School of Law, Brennan Center for Justice, (Aug. 30, 2007), at: http://brennan.3cdn.net/ 

436ea44aae969ab3c5lsbm6vtxgi.pdf. See also, Coalition Memo to the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Regarding ‘‘Homegrown Terrorism,’’ American 

Civil Liberties Union et al. (May 7, 2008) available at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/ 

35209leg20080507.html. 25Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition, CountertERRORism Policy: MACLC’s Critique 

of the NYPD’s Report on Homegrown Terrorism, (2008), at: [sic]. 26 United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Majority 

and Minority Staff Report, ‘‘Violent Islamist Extremism, The Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat,’’ (May 8, 2008). 27 Coalition Letter to the Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman and the Honorable Susan M. Collins, 

May 14, 2008, available at: http://www.muslimadvocates.org/documents/ 

temporarylHSGAClreport-AlliedlresponselFINAL.pdf. 28See for example, Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience, (June 27, 2007), particularly the 

testimony of Lidewijde Ongering and Marc Sageman, available at: http://hsgac.senate.gov/ 

public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing—ID=9c8ef805-75c8-48c2-810dd778af31cca6. 29 Alan Travis, ‘‘MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain,’’ The Guardian, (August 20, 2008) at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1 and; Alan 

Travis, ‘‘The Making of an Extremist,’’ The Guardian (Aug. 20, 2008) at: http:// 

www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism. 30 Id. 31 National Counterterrorism Center Conference Report, Towards a Domestic 

Counterradicalization Strategy, (August 2008). Notwithstanding the conclusion, the paper 

inexplicably went on to examine how the United States could better adopt U.K. counterterrorism 

strategies. 

port’s ‘‘foreseeable stigmatizing effect, and its inferential but unavoidable advocacy 

of racial and religious profiling.’’24 New York City Muslim and Arab community 

leaders formed a coalition in response to the NYPD report and issued a detailed 

analysis criticizing the NYPD for wrongfully ‘‘positing a direct causal relation between Islam and terrorism such that expressions of faith are equated with signs of 

danger,’’ and potentially putting millions of Muslims at risk.25

A subsequent report by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee (HSGAC) entitled Violent Islamist Extremism, The Internet, and the 

Homegrown Terrorism Threat ignored this criticism and simply re-stated the 

NYPD’s flawed radicalization theories in arguing for a National strategy ‘‘to counter 

the influence of the Ideology.’’26 Again, Muslim and Arab civil liberties organizations 

united to issue a joint letter complaining that the HSGAC report ‘‘undermines fundamental American values’’ and ‘‘exacerbates the current climate of fear, suspicion 

and hatemongering of Islam and American Muslims.’’27

It is important to recognize the impact these dubious reports have on the Muslim 

and Arab community, as explained in their thoughtful responses, because the 

HSGAC heard testimony from several witnesses who cited the growth of 

Islamophobia and the polarization of the Muslim community as risk factors that 

could raise the potential for extremist violence.28 Unfairly focusing suspicion on a 

vulnerable community tends to create the very alienation these witnesses claimed 

could lead to homegrown terrorism. 

Indeed a more recent United Kingdom analysis based on hundreds of case studies 

of individuals involved in terrorism reportedly concluded that, contrary to the NYPD 

study, there is no single identifiable pathway to extremism and ‘‘a large number of 

those involved in terrorism do not practice their faith regularly.’’29 Moreover, the 

study reportedly identified ‘‘facing marginalization and racism’’ as a key vulnerability that could tend to make an individual receptive to extremist ideology.30 The 

conclusion supporting tolerance of diversity and protection of civil liberties was 

echoed in a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) paper published in August 

2008. In exploring why there was less violent homegrown extremism in the United 

States than the United Kingdom, the authors cited the diversity of American communities and the greater protection of civil rights as key factors.31

It is also important to remember that Muslim and Arab groups aren’t the only 

ones affected by the Government’s inappropriate reliance on an unsubstantiated 

theory of radicalization. Non-violent protest groups have repeatedly been targeted 

for surveillance and infiltration by law enforcement over the last several years 

based on their opposition to Government policies from both sides of the political 

spectrum. An assessment published by DHS last year warned that right-wing ex-
17 

32See, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Assessment: Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment (Apr. 7, 

2009), available at http://wnd.com/images/dhs-rightwing-extremism.pdf. 33 Universal Adversary Dynamic Threat Assessment, Eco-Terrorism: Environmental and Animal Rights Militants in The United States, (May 7, 2008), available at http://wikileaks.org/ 

leak/dhs-ecoterrorism-in-us-2008.pdf. 34T.J. Greaney, ‘Fusion Center’ Data Draws Fire over Assertions, Colombia Daily Tribune, 

(March 14, 2009), available at http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/mar/14/fusioncenter-data-draws-fire-over-assertions/. 35Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 

dictionary/Extremism. 37 Id. at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence. 37 Uniform Crime Reports, Crime in the United States, 2008, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, Table 1 (2009), at: http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/data/ 

tablel01.html. 38Marc Sageman, testimony before the Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience, p. 2, (June 27, 

2007), available at: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&- 

HearinglID=9c8ef805-75c8-48c2-810d-d778af31cca6. 39 Id., at 5. 

tremists might recruit and radicalize ‘‘disgruntled military veterans.’’32 An intelligence report produced for DHS by a private contractor smeared environmental organizations like the Sierra Club, the Humane Society, and the Audubon Society as 

‘‘mainstream organizations with known or possible links to eco-terrorism.’’33 Similarly, a Missouri Fusion Center released an intelligence report on ‘‘the modern militia movement’’ that claimed militia members are ‘‘usually supporters’’ of presidential 

candidates Ron Paul and Bob Barr.34 Slandering upstanding and respectable organizations does not just violate the rights of these groups and those who associate with 

them, it wastes security resources and undermines public confidence in the Government. 

V. DISTINGUISH EXTREMISM FROM VIOLENCE

By its title, this hearing focuses on ‘‘Violent Extremism’’. The phrase presents two 

distinct concepts as if they were one. Extremism is defined in somewhat circular 

fashion by one dictionary as the ‘‘advocacy of extreme measures or views’’.35 Extremism is a state of mind or a set of beliefs. There is nothing about the notion of extremism that necessarily denotes violence. And, as Goldwater suggested, some forms 

of extremism are to be admired. But all forms of extremism are entitled to protection under our Constitution. 

Violence on the other hand is entitled to no such deference. The same source defines ‘‘violence’’ as the ‘‘exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse’’.36 It is 

an invasive force intended to do harm and, as such, qualifies for no constitutional 

protection. By linking the two, there is an implicit suggestion that an extremist 

viewpoint necessarily leads to violent action. There is the further suggestion that 

violence associated with extremism is somehow worse—or more worthy of examination—than other forms of violence. 

Reliable evidence to support these suggestions, however, is not readily available 

despite popular belief to the contrary. Violence having no discernible tie to ideology 

occurs far more frequently and has far wider impact than violence assumed to arise 

out of extremist views. It would be a mistake to dismiss ‘‘regular crime’’ as not causing the same broad and lasting damage to society that terrorism does. Consider the 

societal impact of student shootings at Virginia Tech and Columbine, the anthrax 

attacks and the sniper shootings in Washington, DC, and elsewhere in the country— 

not to mention gang violence, and violence against women, children, and the elderly. 

The FBI reported there were 1,382,012 violent crimes committed in the United 

States in 2008, including 16,272 murders and 89,000 rapes.37 The question that 

confounds us is always what possible motives could move these individuals from a 

life of non-violence to the commission of such acts. 

In testimony before the HSGAC, Dr. Marc Sageman, who conducted empirical 

studies of actual terrorists, downplayed the role of religious belief as a driver of violence: ‘‘... there has been far too much focus on ideology in trying to understand 

radicalization. In my observations of Islamist terrorists, I came to the conclusion 

that there were not Islamic scholars’’ 38 (emphasis in original). Instead, Sageman 

cited moral outrage at the Iraq war, abuses of U.S. detainees in Abu Ghraib and 

‘‘GITMO,’’ and the perception of a western ‘‘War against Islam’’ as causal factors, 

and warned against taking any counterterrorism measures that would tend to ‘‘alienate the Muslim community.’’39

It is possible that an impartial panel to study terrorism will find that in some 

instances, an individual’s adoption of a certain belief system influenced a decision 
18 

40Marc Sageman, testimony before the Hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Violent Islamist Extremism: The European Experience, p. 5, (June 27, 

2007), available at: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ 

index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&HearinglID=9c8ef805-75c8-48c2-810d-d778af31cca6. 41Letter from Senator Joseph Lieberman to Dr. Eric Schmidt, Chairman of the Board and 

Chief Executive Officer, Google, Inc., (May 19, 2008) at: http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/ 

release.cfm?id=298006. 42Statement of Lt. Col. Joseph Felter, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, ‘‘The Internet: A Portal to Violent Islamist Extremism,’’ (May 

3, 2007), at: http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/224.pdf. 43Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376, (1927), (Brandeis, J., Concurring). 

to commit a violent act. However, it is also just as possible that such a panel will 

find that in other instances, other factors wholly unrelated to ideology or extremism 

will be the key factors motivating the violent actions. The important element, however, is to examine the violence—not the belief system held by the violent actor. The 

subcommittee must ensure that the examination does not single out violent actions 

committed by adherents to any particular faith or ideology for scrutiny. To do so 

would pre-determine an outcome and cast a chilling net over all those non-violent 

individuals who happen to share all or some of the characteristics or beliefs of those 

studied. Moreover, to do so would tend to perpetuate the perception of alienation 

that, according to some, fuels the violence. Significantly, in this regard, one can 

infer that a renewed dedication to the protection of civil liberties, including 

associational, speech, and religious rights, is our best defense. As Dr. Sageman suggested, ‘‘we must continue to promote core American values of justice and fairness 

and fight those elements in our society that try to single out and antagonize part 

of our nation.’’40

VI. INAPPROPRIATE FOCUS ON THE INTERNET

The HSGAC report also places inordinate and inappropriate significance regarding the role of the internet in the radicalization process. The internet is simply a 

tool for communication and the expression of ideas. The concern is that identifying 

ideas and the tools that transmit them as a key part of our security problem increases the likelihood that censorship on the internet will be part of a proposed solution. Indeed, shortly after the publication of the HSGAC report Senator Lieberman 

sent a letter to Google calling on them to take down ‘‘terrorist content.’’41

Government censorship violates the First Amendment and undermines democracy. Moreover, any attempt to censor the internet would be futile and counterproductive. Electronic content is ubiquitous and easily transferable. Media removed 

from one source is often duplicated elsewhere, and a closed website can soon reopen 

in another guise and at another location. Lt. Col. Joseph Felter, Ph.D., Director of 

the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, told the HSGAC that ‘‘[a]ttempts 

to shut down websites have proven as fruitless as a game of whack-a-mole.’’42 Such 

attempts at censorship would only bring greater attention to the objectionable content. 

VII. CONCLUSION

The ACLU recommends that Congress treat unsubstantiated theories about 

radicalization with skepticism and focus the Government’s anti-terrorism research 

efforts on actual terrorist acts and those who commit them rather than on the adoption of beliefs or the expression of dissent. Such efforts will likely be more successful 

at providing a clear picture of the threats we face and the appropriate methods we 

need to employ to address them without violating the constitutional rights of innocent persons. Fear should not drive our Government policies. As Justice Brandeis 

reminds us, 

‘‘To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless 

reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing 

from speech can be deemed clear and present unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full 

discussion... Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule 

if authority is to be reconciled with freedom.’’43

Protecting our First Amendment freedoms will both honor our values and keep 

us safe. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

We will now hear testimony from Dr. Weine. 
19 

STATEMENT OF STEVAN WEINE, PROFESSOR OF PSYCHIATRY 

AND DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTER OF RESPONSES TO CATASTROPHES, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT 

CHICAGO 

Dr. WEINE. Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, Chairman 

Thompson, distinguished subcommittee Members, thanks for the 

opportunity to testify before you today. 

I am a psychiatrist, as you heard, who works collaboratively with 

refugee and migrant communities to address priority needs in 

those communities. 

Over the past 2 years, a group of Minnesota Somalis crossed the 

line to violent radicalization through their involvement with AlShabaab. They went to Somalia, they attended training camps and 

they conducted operations. 

The recruits were males between the ages of 17 and 30. They 

were born in Somalia, raised in refugee camps in Kenya, then came 

as refugees to the United States when they were children and were 

raised in an impoverished, divided community. They included highachieving high school and college students. 

In all other ways, the recruits were indistinguishable from the 

other members of their community. What motivated them? Their 

movement towards violent radicalization could be explained by 

multiple push and pull factors. 

Most in the Somalia refugee community in Minnesota are subject 

to push factors that distinguish them from other American Muslims, such as war exposure, forced displacement, living in refugee 

camps, poverty, ghettoization, secondary migration, inadequate 

services, and family instability. 

Pull factors also played a key role—internet exposure to violence 

in Somalia and to extremist political and ideological views, the Somali warrior tradition, the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. 

All these factors were skillfully manipulated by recruiters who 

were former Al-Shabaab fighters who reached out to potential recruits through social networking technology and face-to-face contacts. 

The result was that at least 18 Somalis left home in Minnesota 

and flew to Somalia without telling their parents. Seven have been 

killed. Four are in custody. Seven are believed to be in Somalia. 

Can violent radicalization occur with more Somali Americans? In 

my opinion, U.S. Somalis remain highly susceptible to violent 

radicalization as long as Al-Shabaab is active in Somalia. Recruiters’ previous success in convincing the best and brightest young 

men from that community to go their way shows how susceptible 

these young Americans are. 

Now, the FBI’s success in apprehending some recruiters and preventing more from mobilizing is encouraging, but several key concerns remain. Others may have been radicalized and recruited but 

did not mobilize, and they are still there. Wannabe or ‘‘lone wolves’’ 

amongst that community could emerge. 

No broader preventive efforts have tried to lessen the susceptibility to recruiters. There is a stark disconnect between counterterrorism and both community policing and service provision in these 

refugee communities. 
20 

Recent events have shown that young men from Muslim refugee 

and migrant groups from other failed states with violent extremism 

are also susceptible to violent radicalization. 

What steps could help? Now, as a prevention researcher with refugee and migrant communities, I know that prevention, like terrorism itself, is local. Families and communities, local police and 

services providers—they all need to be centrally involved. They are 

in the best positions to identify who is most at risk. 

But in order to provide help, they require guidance and support. 

We should draw upon psycho-social and public health expertise and 

apply it to preventing homegrown terrorism. 

I recommend the following steps. No. 1, conduct research to identify the protective resources in families and communities that mitigate against violent radicalization. 

No. 2, develop and implement parenting education initiatives to 

protect against radicalization and recruitment. 

No. 3, develop and implement community-level prevention that 

increases community support for at-risk youth such as mentoring, 

especially where recruiters are known to be active. 

No. 4, strengthen the collaboration between at-risk communities 

and local police and service providers. 

Now, to take these steps, we need scientifically rigorous, conceptually-based investigations of how radicalization and recruitment 

occur. Journalistic reports are helpful, but they are not enough to 

develop prevention. 

We have started to work with families of recruited Somali youth 

so we can together develop effective preventive interventions and 

spread those around. 

But of course, the needs for this type of preventive work can be 

found in several diaspora communities throughout the United 

States. The problem is this. Presently, no Government entity exists 

that is committed to sponsoring this research. 

We need a multidisciplinary commission or institution that 

would develop and sponsor investigation into the family and community dimensions of violent radicalization in the United States 

and would work with governmental, non-governmental, and community partners. 

In conclusion, the recruitment of United States Somalis as well 

as other recent examples of homegrown terrorism demonstrate that 

in addition to intelligence gathering and law enforcement, we need 

new approaches in counterterrorism for managing those risks, 

through working with communities and families. 

If not, recruiters will continue to know better how to find and 

help potential recruits than we will. Thank you. 

[The statement of Dr. Weine follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVAN WEINE

DECEMBER 15, 2009 

Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished subcommittee Members, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today to discuss: (1) How 

people are moved from constitutionally-protected thought to acts of terrorism; (2) 

what steps could help to prevent this movement. I will do so by focusing on the recent violent radicalization of U.S. Somalis in Minnesota, one of a recent number of 

worrisome instances of ‘‘homegrown terrorism’’. 
21 

I am a psychiatrist and researcher with more than 15 years’ experience conducting a NIH-funded program of investigating, intervening, and collaborating with 

multiple refugee and immigrant communities. I lead the Working Group on Somali 

Youth and Psychosocial Counterterrorism, an interdisciplinary group comprised of 

psychiatry, psychology, nursing, and public health professionals. When we look at 

present efforts to understand and prevent violent radicalization, we see a lack of 

adequate conceptualization of family and community processes impeding progress in 

the development of effective prevention strategies. 

In my testimony I will describe what is known about those who mobilized and 

show that there is a set of contextual risks for violent radicalization deserving of 

our attention. I propose strategies derived from public health interventions for managing the risks of violent radicalization that focus on ways to enhance community 

and family protective resources for those at risk. 

RECRUITMENT IN MINNESOTA

On October 29, 2008, 27-year-old Shirwa Ahmed of Minneapolis detonated one of 

six coordinated car bombs attacking the presidential palace, the Ethiopian consulate, and the UNDP in Hargeisa-Bosaso, Somalia in a coordinated attack organized by the Al-Shabaab extremist organization (Thomas and Ryan, 2008). This attack killed at least 30 people, including U.N. aid workers. The U.S. Government allowed his body to return to Minneapolis where he was buried. 

Between late 2007 and Autumn 2008 an estimated 20 or more Somali refugee adolescent boys and young men living in the Minneapolis area secretly left their 

homes and flew to Somalia to join militant extremist training camps run by the AlShabaab extremist organization. These men crossed a line into violent radicalization 

through involvement with Al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization 

with known ties to al-Qaeda. Specifically, several men recruited others in Minneapolis and provided financial support to those who traveled to Somalia to fight 

on behalf of Al-Shabaab; several attended terrorist training camps operated by AlShabaab and then fought on behalf of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. 

Drawing a distinction between radicalization and violent radicalization is important. For the Somalis who mobilized, the issue is not only or necessarily one of 

radicalization, defined as commitment to extremist political or religious ideology. 

Terrorist researchers argue that our central concern should be on preventing violent 

radicalization and not radicalization per se. It’s not what people say or think, but 

whether they commit violent acts that counts. 

Because this investigation is on-going, youth are still at large, and some families 

are not trustful enough to talk to outsiders, at present not all facts are public or 

even known. What is publically known regarding the Minnesota Somalis is that 

thus far seven have been killed, four are in custody, three of whom have pled guilty, 

and seven are at large, believed to be in Somalia. 

This movement towards violent radicalization is not limited to Minnesota Somalis. 

A 24-year-old Somali man who lived for 20 years in Copenhagen was identified as 

the man who carried out the December 3, 2009 suicide bombing that killed 23 people in Mogadishu at a medical school graduation ceremony (Houreld, 2009). In September 2009, Omar Mohamed, an 18-year-old Somali American from Seattle, detonated a suicide bomb in Somalia against peace-keepers that killed 25 African Union 

peacekeepers. In 2005 in London, two child dependents of asylum seekers from Somalia, Yasin Omar and Ramzi Mohammed, became failed bombers. In October 2007 

an unnamed 21-year-old Somali business student from Ealing, United Kingdom, 

joined Al-Shabaab and made a suicide attack in Baidoa. 

Table 1 summarizes what we know about those who mobilized from Minnesota. 

I will draw upon this information in light of existing knowledge and theory regarding violent radicalization to address the following questions: 

1. Are there any identifiable risk factors for violent radicalization? 

2. What is the process of movement to violent radicalization? 

3. How should we approach those who joined Al-Shabaab and either have returned or may possibly return at a later date? 

4. Can violent radicalization reoccur with more U.S. Somali youth? 

5. What steps could help to prevent violent radicalization in U.S. diaspora communities? 

1. Are there any identifiable risk factors for radicalization and recruitment? Empirical research on terrorists does not support looking solely at individual-level risk 

factors (Horgan, 2009). Nor does it support the claim that there is a particular profile of terrorists that clearly distinguishes them from the general population, other 

than their involvement in violent radicalization. It supports looking at group or organizational factors, but also not exclusively. Though there is some disagreement in 
22 

the field regarding whether to lean more towards individual or towards group and 

organizational factors, a consensus position is that it is more accurate and productive to focus on the person in context. Stated otherwise, it is important to pay attention both to push factors (social, economic, and cultural conditions impacting upon 

a whole community), pull factors (leading a relative few to engage in violent 

radicalization), and counter-pull factors (efforts working against the impact of pull 

factors). 

All those that engaged in violent radicalization were born in Somalia, raised in 

refugee camps, and were resettled in the United States as refugees during childhood 

or adolescence. They are neither first nor truly second generation, but belong more 

to what is referred to as ‘‘Generation 1.5’’ (Alsaybar, 1999). They were raised in 

large families by single mothers in ghettoized communities, and attended public 

schools. The recruits experienced the stresses common to most refugee adolescents 

due to traumatic histories and community violence, as well as from financial, health, 

family, peer, community, cultural, and school stressors (Ellis et al, 2008). 

They all likely shared an exposure to community-level challenges including poverty and community fragmentation. Many Somalis in Minnesota live in low-income 

housing in impoverished communities, especially the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, 

also known as ‘‘Little Mogadishu’’, which is east of downtown Minneapolis. The center of the Somali community in Cedar-Riverside is a large urban renewal high-rise 

project named the Riverside Plaza, also known as the ‘‘Towers’’, where more than 

3,000 Somalis live. Though originally conceived as a mixed-income community, it is 

highly impoverished, geographically isolated from the rest of the city, and crime-ridden, with drugs, gangs, and drive-by shootings. For example, in Autumn 2008, 

Ahmednur Alia, a 20-year-old college student who aspired to be the president of Somalia, was murdered by another Somali youth while volunteering at a community 

center (Temple-Raston, 2009). Such events have been highly demoralizing to the Somali community and especially youth, including some of those who radicalized. For 

one of the recruits, Mohamoud Hassan, this murder may have contributed to a 

greater susceptibility to radicalization and recruitment. He told a friend, ‘‘I used to 

think that death only happens to old people. But he was young—my age. I guess 

I could die tomorrow.’’(Elliot, 2009) 

Many but not all the men who were mobilized to violent radicalization lived in 

the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, and five lived in the Towers at some point. They 

attended four different high schools and three different colleges and did not all attend the same mosque. Within the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood there are six 

mosques and a plethora of Somali-run malls, small businesses, and restaurants. The 

community is known for its fragmentation along clan and sub-clan lines. There are 

well over 100 non-profit Somali Mutual Assistance Associations seeking funds and 

projects. A few are thriving, but most exist in name only. Ubah Shirwa, publisher 

of Haboon, the Somali magazine in Minneapolis, stated, ‘‘The divisions that existed 

in Somalia exist here, and they are focused on the politics back home’’ (Banarjee, 

2009). The existence of so many divisions within the community impedes the delivery of community-level support as well as community collaboration with social services, health services, and law enforcement. 

Research on U.S. Muslim immigrant communities finds that they are predominantly middle class (only 2 percent reported living in poverty) and not at significant 

risk for radicalization, unlike European Muslims whom, it has been argued, experience a ‘‘failed integration’’ (PEW Research Center, 2007; Ruffer, 2008). The experience of Minnesota Somalis, 60 percent of whom live in poverty, more closely resembles that of Muslim immigrants in the United Kingdom, Spain, and France where 

20 percent or more live in poverty (PEW Research Center, 2007). When surveyed 

in 2007, 15 percent of U.S. Muslims ages 18 to 24 believed suicide bombings could 

be justified (PEW Research Center, 2007, p. 54). Somalis were the first U.S. Muslim 

youth to join an al-Qaeda affiliated extremist organization and act on these attitudes. In part for these reasons, Ralph S. Boelter, the special agent in charge of the 

FBI’s Minneapolis office, stated, ‘‘This case is unlike anything we have encountered’’ 

(Elliot, 2009). 

Still, only a very small number of Somali youth and young adults are known to 

have become involved in terrorism (20) compared to the overall Somali population 

in Minnesota (estimated at 84,000). Think about that from the perspective of Somali 

parents. Parents have far more reason to be concerned about the risks of school 

drop-out, drug use, gang involvement, or even autism, which have much higher 

prevalence in their community. 

Somalis express serious concerns regarding the negative image of their community that has been spread due to media attention focusing on the radicalized boys 

and men. From a community perspective, there are many signs of strength in this 

community, including: Somalis working in all sectors of society (Darboe, 2003), in-
23 

creasing numbers becoming college educated (especially girls), establishment of businesses, establishment of mosques, several Somali community newspapers, magazines, and websites. 

As indicated in Table 1, the mobilization to violent radicalization occurred in two 

waves. The first wave took place in late 2007 and those who mobilized were ages 

24 to 30 (mean 25.8). The second wave took place in Autumn 2008 and those who 

mobilized were younger, between ages 17 and 27 (mean 19.7). All the Somali youth 

and young adults who engaged were male. Here, it is relevant to mention the Somalia warrior tradition (Federal Research Division, 2004). This culturally-inscribed 

coping mechanism guided some boys and young men to take pride in school or 

sports, but could also have lead others towards gang activity or to affiliation with 

militant extremists. 

All the recruits shared in exposure to certain family-level characteristics typical 

of refugee families. These included the experiences of war exposure and forced migration prior to coming to the United States. The U.S. Somali refugees’ experiences 

are like those of other groups that have fled war in their countries and became refugees. Somali refugees were exposed to war-related traumas and losses, escaped, and 

then lived in refugee camps (predominately in Kenya) for years, where youth attended either no school or had some inadequate schooling, and were exposed to radical ideologies (Halcon et al., 2004). As children, the youth who mobilized to violent 

radicalization were either not directly exposed to war violence in Somalia or were 

too young to remember it, though traumatic exposure and memories were highly 

prevalent amongst their parents’ generation. A large epidemiological survey conducted in the Twin Cities found that 37 percent of Somali women and 25 percent 

of Somali men had been tortured and that the torture survivors reported significantly more symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and more physical 

and psychological problems (Jaranson et al., 2004). Nearly half of Somali mothers 

were torture survivors; more than a quarter had no formal education; 70 percent 

were single parents (Robertson et al. 2006). 

In terms of their educational and occupational achievement, the recruits do not 

fit one profile. Two had criminal records. Zakaria Maruf was a former gang member. 

Mohamoud Hassan and Abdisalam Ali attended the University of Minneapolis, and 

Jamal Bana attended the Minneapolis Community and Technical College. That 

higher-achieving youths were targeted by recruiters fits a well-known pattern of recruiters seeking out high-achievers (Gambetta & Hertog, 2007; Horgan, 2009; Post, 

2007). 

In summary, other than being males between 17 and 30, the recruits were not 

distinguishable from other Somalis on the basis of risk factors, and included both 

criminals and high achievers. 

2. What is the process of movement to violent radicalization? Terrorism researchers (Horgan, 2009) have identified some characteristic attitudes in terrorists from 

other contexts that are important elements of the process of movement to violent 

radicalization: Temporary emotional state; dissatisfaction with current activity; desire to do something; identification with victims; belief that there is nothing inherently immoral in violence; an expectation of reward to accompany increased involvement; kinship or other relevant social ties. Reflecting upon these characteristics and 

what has been discussed publically we can make some preliminary claims regarding 

the process of movement. 

These youth were motivated by the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia of which 

the recruiters appeared to make deliberate and strategic use. It is important to recognize that the idea of defending your homeland is not in and of itself a radical idea. 

Thus it was possible for youth to be motivated more by Nationalist sentiments than 

by specifically anti-American or anti-Western sentiments. The recruiters did not 

necessarily have to evoke radical ideas in order to get the youth to want to return 

to Somalia. They could have been radicalized later when they got to Al-Shabaab 

training camps. Indeed, it appears that one youth, Burhan Hassan, a high school 

senior and A student at Roosevelt High School who dreamed of attending Harvard, 

was killed in Somalia by Al-Shabaab, perhaps because he was resistant to violent 

radicalization. 

Community and family members said that they believe the radicalization happened very fast. If this is true, then it could in part be a function of rapidly shifting 

adolescent identity. It could also have been the perceived urgency of the situation 

in Somalia. But it could also be because observers did not see the processes of 

change unfolding in the youth. Retrospectively, families say that the youth were unusually ‘‘pensive’’ and ‘‘serious’’ in the months leading up to their disappearances. 

Because Somali adolescents stayed connected with Somalia through the internet, 

the recruits were likely to have been exposed to violent imagery and extremist ideology on the internet prior to their radicalization. One said, ‘‘Somalis are the most 
24 

wired of all African refugees. When someone is killed, even in a village, we watch 

it on YouTube’’ (personal communication). For example, Mohamoud Hassan read 

jihadist material on the internet and listened lectures by the Yemeni cleric Anwar 

al-Awlaki, as have multiple other terrorist suspects in the United States (Shane, 

2009), including the five U.S. Pakistanis (Gilani and Perlez, 2009). It is likely that 

after being catalyzed by a recruiter, individually and as a group, the new recruits 

went deeper and further into available internet materials. 

Information on the recruiters is still emerging as the investigation is on-going. It 

is reported that the first recruiters were Somalis from Europe who had returned to 

fight in Somalia in 2005. They actively tried to reach Somali youth in Minneapolis. 

These recruiters’ relationships with their recruits suggests some similarities with 

the ‘‘bunch of guys’’ description of Marc Sageman (2005), whereby an informal network of friends together progress deeper and deeper into religious extremism and 

eventual terrorism. However, available evidence also suggests elements of a more 

top-down recruitment process whereby young men with prior militant experience 

and the active support and coordination from the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization 

in Somalia sought out younger men in the United States (Associated Press, 2009). 

At this point, not enough is known to more definitively clarify the issue of whether 

mobilization was more top-down or bottom-up. On November 23, 2009, the FBI unsealed charges filed against eight American citizens involved in the recruitment effort (Elliot, 2009). These included two men accused of recruiting, Cabdalaahi Ahmed 

Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Issee, and a third man, Mahamud Said Omar, accused 

of helping with finances. 

Reports on the on-going investigations in Minneapolis indicate the extent to which 

the Al-Shabaab organization actively reached into the United States. One recruiter, 

Zakaria Maruf, operated from southern Somalia using individual phone calls, conference calls, e-mail, listservs, and Facebook to reach out to other youth in Minnesota, many of whom he knew from his years in Minnesota (Elliot, 2009). He 

wrote, ‘‘Bring your self over here . . . to M-town’’ (Elliot, 2009). A terrorism consultant, Clint Watts, stated ‘‘I think the biggest recruiter for a foreign fighter is the 

former foreign fighter’’ (Banerjee, 2009, emphasis ours). Al-Shabaab also used sophisticated propaganda videos that showed martial arts, automatic weapons, dead 

bodies, and suicide bombers. Terrorism consultant Evan Kohlmann stated, ‘‘I would 

say they were among the most explicit, the most violent, and the most enthusiastic 

videos of any jihadi organization out there’’ (Forliti, 2009). 

Some other critical issues remain unresolved. One key question relates to the precise reason the youths left the U.S. Somalis in Minneapolis debate whether youth 

were recruited to be ‘‘freedom fighters’’ against Ethiopian forces, or to be militant 

extremists to fight the West, or whether they went for what locals call 

‘‘reculturation.’’ The latter is found in many refugee and immigrant communities, 

where wayward adolescents are sent back to their home country to help them get 

back on track through immersion in their culture of origin (Portes & Rumbaut, 

2001). 

Regarding the role of religion in this mobilization, the youth who were first mobilized were regular attendees of Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center, the largest 

Somali mosque in Minneapolis, located 2 miles from Cedar-Riverside. In 2007, 

Zakaria Maruf started attending mosque and speaking with other youth about the 

need to turn to religion. The second wave of youth that mobilized did not come from 

strong religious backgrounds, but found religion after the Ethiopian invasion, when 

Somali nationalist sentiments were on the rise and amplifying religious beliefs. 

Mohamoud Hassan, a 2006 graduate of Roosevelt High School, attended the University of Minnesota where he was vice president of the Minnesota Somali Student 

Union, and became interested in radical Islamic teachings downloaded from the web 

and in going to Somalia. On his Facebook page, Mohamoud Hassan wrote: ‘‘Allah 

will never change the situation of a people unless they change themselves... take 

a sec and think about ur situation deeply what change do u need to make’’ (Elliot, 

2009). His friend reported, ‘‘If it was just nationalism, they could give money. But 

religion convinced them to sacrifice their whole life’’ (Elliot, 2009). Some of these 

youth may have been convinced to participate in extremist activities in response to 

what they may have perceived as the West’s ‘‘non-religious and profane view of the 

world and society’’ (Kalin, 2004, p. 176). 

The known recruiters were male, older, former fighters. In a patriarchal culture, 

they could supply the necessary authority to these youth, many of whom were 

raised by single mothers. One of the recruiters, Zakaria Maruf, knew several of the 

boys through community networks. Many community members assume that there 

are more recruiters in their community that have not yet been identified or charged. 

Terrorist recruitment is said to involve the following stages: Preparing, spotting, indoctrinating, and mobilizing. In this case, preparing and spotting may have taken 
25 

place at sites where Somali youth and young men already gather, such as clubs, 

mosques, living places, and workplaces. Though the recruits became more involved 

in mosques after their radicalization, there is no evidence that imams or mosques 

were directly involved and no charges have been filed against them. 

We do not know for certain how easy or difficult it was to recruit these boys and 

men, however, given that they were able to get some high achievers to go, it appeared relatively easy. We do not know whether: (1) Others were asked but said no 

(and what became of them); (2) others said yes, but were unable to mobilize due 

to logistical difficulties; (3) others said yes, but were stopped by FBI or local police 

actions. 

What is certain is that the mobilized youth did not tell their parents of their intentions before they left. Halima Abdi reported that after her son, Mohamed Hassan, was missing for 10 days she received a phone call: ‘‘Mum, it’s your son 

Mohamed. I came to Mogadishu to fight against the enemies of Somalia’’ (Hassan, 

2009). Parents reported that they suspected that the mosque or clubs were places 

that youth could get recruited. One characteristic of families from Somali is that 

parents do not typically talk with their youth about their daily activities and contacts. Parents are often unaware of what is going on at school or after-school, which 

in most cases puts the youth at risk of poor school performance, dropping out, drugs, 

and gang involvement, but in this case meant less family protection against violent 

radicalization. If anything, parents were acting on the perfectly understandable assumption that going to the mosque is a good thing, certainly better than hanging 

out in the neighborhood where they could be subject to violence or drugs or the 

wrong crowd. To this day, the families of the missing boys and men are divided with 

respect to their allegiance to their mosques. Some with children missing have resisted speaking with the FBI or local law enforcement, believing that if they work 

through the mosque, they have a better chance of seeing their children again. Others have spoken with law enforcement and have spoken out against the mosques. 

In summary, political instability in Somalia, the 2006 Ethiopian invasion, social 

difficulties in U.S. refugee communities, family instability, and local networks, all 

adeptly exploited by extremist recruiters, have together created contextual risks for 

violent radicalization amongst those Somalis resettled as refugees in the United 

States as children and adolescents. 

3. What should be the approach to those who joined Al-Shabaab and either have 

returned or may possibly return at a later date? Presently, three of the recruits have 

pled guilty and are in Federal custody and one is being held in the Netherlands. 

At least seven Minnesota Somali men are believed to be still in Somalia with AlShabaab. This does not rule out the real possibility that there are other U.S. Somali 

men in Somalia, either from Minnesota or from other U.S. locations. Somalis may 

also have mobilized from other locations in the diaspora including Canada, Western 

Europe, or Australia. 

John Horgan, in Walking Away from Terrorism, distinguished between disengagement and deradicalization. Disengagement is when individuals change their roles in 

the movement and reduce their participation in violent activities. Deradicalization 

refers to reducing their commitment to and involvement in violent radicalization 

such that they are not at risk of participation in violent activities. Horgan claims 

that disengagement, not deradicalization, is a more attainable goal but as with violent radicalization, this is a complex process. 

With respect to the Minnesota Somalis, key concerns are whether the recruits 

could commit terrorist acts in the United States or at overseas targets related to 

the United States and its allies as a consequence of their training and indoctrination. One area of deficiency in our field is just how could that risk be determined. 

Despite efforts to develop rigorous assessments, there are as of yet no reliable ways 

to know for certain. 

Another concern is how can we act in such a way to inhibit not only individuals 

but to stop the group movement. The U.S. Government has prosecuted or indicted 

these individuals for their criminal behavior, hoping that this will serve as a deterrent to others. However, one unexamined question is whether Somalis are sufficiently allied with the U.S. law enforcement system to cooperate. Pursuit of individuals could have the unintended consequence of contributing to the movement of others in the United States towards violent radicalization who will see this as an issue 

of oppression of Muslims by the U.S. Government. Recruiters looking for every opportunity will no doubt exploit this and represent it to potential recruits as oppression. 

4. Can violent radicalization reoccur with more U.S. Somali youth? Many in the 

Somali community fear yes and I share their concern. One, they suspect that many 

more U.S. Somali boys and men have been radicalized and recruited (though not 

yet mobilized) than is publically revealed. Two, Al-Shabaab is still active in Somalia 
26 

and on the internet and likely has recruiters on the ground in the diaspora, although it has lost some appeal in Somalia and in the diaspora. Three, the underlying ‘‘push’’ conditions in Minneapolis have not changed, and if anything have become exacerbated in the current economic crisis. Four, no additional preventive 

measures have been put in place that could serve as a ‘‘counter-pull’’. Others in the 

Somali community say that the pull factors were the product of a unique historical 

moment (the Ethiopian invasion) that is unlikely to happen again. But even they 

add that the push factors have not been addressed to any degree and that Somali 

nationalism and Islam will manifest again in a new way. 

What the media hasn’t yet picked up on is the possibility that Somali youth who 

were recruited but not mobilized could decide to act on their own in the United 

States. All it takes is one person with the right weapons to do great harm and 

pierce the American consciousness. Another possibility is that a Somali who wasn’t 

recruited could turn to violent radicalization as either a wannabe or a lone wolf, like 

Dr. Hasan at Fort Hood. 

Some conditions are changing for the better in the Minnesota Somali community. 

More youth are going to college, however they are disproportionately female, as 

many males drop out of high school. More families are moving to the suburbs, where 

they find themselves in less ghettoized and more integrated communities and 

schools. These are expected socioeconomic changes in a refugee community. At the 

same time, the present global economic crisis has impacted U.S. Somalis in terms 

of unemployment and underemployment and cutbacks in already strained social, 

mental health, and educational services. Of special concern is that more Somali 

young people will get U.S. passports and will travel abroad, making it harder to 

monitor and to distinguish those mobilizing for training from those visiting family. 

Thus the improving conditions in the Somali community should not give us false assurance of lower risk for violent radicalization. 

Somalis are not our only concern. Our concern should include all those from failed 

states that house extremist militant movements. At present that includes Pakistan, 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. In the past few weeks we have seen several troubling 

examples of ‘‘homegrown terrorists’’ from the U.S. Pakistani diaspora, including 

David Headley and other U.S. citizens who apparently planned to commit jihadist 

terrorist acts abroad. 

Lastly, the enhanced U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan could have 

the effect of again inflaming U.S. Muslims, including but not limited to Somalis, to 

move towards violent radicalization. 

5. What steps could help to prevent violent radicalization in U.S. diaspora communities? Counterterrorism prevention in the United States is largely approached as 

an activity of intelligence gathering and law enforcement. Regarding the Somali recruitment, the FBI has investigated those who have committed crimes or those 

about to do so (not only expressing radical ideas, but financing or joining or recruiting for a terrorist organization). The 2006 National Implementation Plan gave Federal and local law enforcement more powers to gather intelligence in the United 

States such as travel patterns. But there are limits, say with respect to investigating those who are radicalized perhaps on their way to violent radicalization, 

such that putting all young Somali or Pakistani men on a no-fly list would be regarded as a violation of their constitutional rights. 

The community is regarded as a source for tips and a site for conducting individual investigations. As far as I know, the FBI does not attempt any deliberate or 

systematic community-level involvement or programming. It is left up to local police 

to do the community policing with ethnic minority communities, but outside of large 

urban areas like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, community policing does not 

reliably incorporate counterterrorism activities. And very rarely do those counterterrorism activities move beyond intelligence gathering and criminal investigation to 

include community-based counterterrorism prevention strategies (Downing, 2009). 

Few existing programs have attempted to utilize psychosocial approaches to mitigate radicalization and to prevent recruitment. The most notable effort is the government-run Preventing Violent Extremism initiative in Great Britain (Department 

of Communities and Local Government, 2007). The central aims include: (1) Challenging the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices; (2) Disrupting those who promote violent extremism and supporting the institutions where 

they are active; (3) Supporting individuals who are being targeted and recruited to 

the cause of violent extremism; (4) Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism; (5) Addressing the grievances that ideologues are exploiting. To 

date, this project has reported significant achievements. There is a clear need to 

learn from such programs and let their experience inform the development of U.S. 

initiatives with Somalis and other groups. However, it is also clear that interventions that worked in one sociocultural setting are not readily exportable to another 
27 

without significant and context-specific modification. For example, the scale of Pakistanis in the United Kingdom is simply much greater than that of any particular 

Muslim community in the United States, so that difference would have to be addressed. 

One central aim of counterterrorism is to inhibit potential recruits from joining 

terrorist organizations in the first place. In addition to intelligence gathering and 

law enforcement, especially focused on eliminating recruiters, there is a need to 

work with communities and families to counter radicalization and recruitment. This 

type of practice can utilize a psychosocial perspective and strategies derived from 

public health interventions (Psychosocial Working Group, 2002 & 2003). These could 

operate at multiple levels to both diminish push factors and to enhance counter-pull 

factors. What we learned from the case study thus far indicates some different ways 

this could be approached: 

A. Identify community and family protective resources. 

B. Develop and disseminate credible counter-narratives to those offered by recruiters and websites. 

C. Educate and support parents to increase their knowledge, awareness, and 

prevention skills regarding recruitment of youth. 

D. Address community level push factors through better provision of services 

and resources. 

E. Build community-level preventive interventions that seek to increase community support for youth, especially where recruiters are active. 

F. Enhance community to service organization collaborations. 

G. Form multidisciplinary collaborations. 

A. Identify community and family protective resources. Because Somali youth come 

from families who left Africa and moved to the United States in search of a better 

life, we would attempt to tap into the hopes and dreams that they carry with them. 

Though many live in difficult circumstances, most have reported satisfaction with 

their lives in the United States (Halcon et al, 2004; Robertson et al, 2004). A psychosocial approach is based on the assumption that susceptibility should be modifiable 

by strengthening the family and community protective processes found even amidst 

adversity (Note: protective resources are defined as family and community characteristics that stop, delay, or diminish negative behavioral outcomes, to include violent radicalization, in at-risk refugees and migrants). This basic assumption has 

been validated in a range of public health interventions concerning violence, drug 

use, and HIV in highly adverse conditions (Ashery et al, 1998; Group for Advancement of Psychiatry, 1999; O’Connel et al, 2009; Trickett, 2005). Thus one key research question from a psychosocial perspective is: What are the potentially modifiable family and community protective factors that impact violent radicalization? 

Mixed ethnographic and survey methods such as are being implemented in studies 

of refugee adolescents from other ethnic groups offers means to accurately answer 

this question (Weine, Ware, & Lezic, 2004; Weine, 2006). Findings from other diaspora communities point to the roles of parenting, parental involvement in education, 

organizational outreach to families, mentoring, and faith communities (Weine, 

2009). 

B. Develop and disseminate credible counter-narratives to those offered by recruiters and websites. There has been increased interest in understanding and developing narratives and counter-narratives (Competing Networks and Narratives 

Weekly, 2009; Weine, 2006). From examining the U.S. Somali cases we have identified several potential themes that could be used in narrative scripts for youth and 

for parents: (1) Your families came to United States to get you out of war-torn Somalia, so why should you return there; (2) The conditions of war in Somalia are far 

worse than what you can imagine; (3) The people of Somalia will not look at you 

as a real Somalian, but as an American. They will not welcome you; (4) You are 

not being recruited to fight as a soldier against an army, but to become a terrorist; 

(5) Your family in the United States will suffer greatly if you go to Somalia. If you 

survive, you will be considered a terrorist and a criminal by the U.S. Government; 

(6) You will be subject to divisions and fights between clans and sub-clans in Somalia; (7) You can better serve Somalia by helping to build the diaspora community 

here through your education and career and participation in Somali and American 

civic organizations. 

C. Educate and support parents to increase their knowledge, awareness, and prevention skills regarding recruitment of youth. We would design family interventions 

for Somali families based upon contextual knowledge of the complex social circumstances of refugee and immigrant youth. These interventions would target those 

at the highest risk (e.g. males, ages 12–25, with single mothers). For example, there 

is a profound worry among many U.S. Somalis that parents cannot control the behaviors of teens and young men. However, what is learned from those who are not 
28 

radicalized may help in understanding what can be provided for those at risk of 

radicalization. Some parents and community leaders do actively talk with youth 

about radicalization and recruitment. Through interviews and observations of parents and community leaders and the utilization of qualitative research methods of 

data analysis it should be possible to learn: What exactly do the parents say and 

why, how is it received by youth, and do these messages impact the youths’ behaviors? 

These insights could help to craft parenting education and support interventions 

(e.g. teaching families to talk about recruitment, helping parents to take practical 

steps such as hiding passports and monitoring internet and e-mail use) that aim to 

reduce susceptibility to recruitment through changing family support in a way that 

the community recognizes as helpful. National Institute of Health (NIH)-funded research to support refugee families has been shown to be feasible, acceptable, and 

effective (Weine, 2008). Multi-family groups such as the CAFES (Coffee and Family 

Education and Support) program have been shown to be effective in changing individual behavior by improving family communication (Weine et al, 2005; Weine et 

al, 2006, Weine et al, 2008). Similarly, a Somali Mothers Health Realization intervention has enabled mothers to distance themselves from negative intrusive 

thoughts so as to promote proactive common-sense parenting strategies (Robertson, 

2004). These successful approaches could be extended to countering radicalization 

and recruitment with Somali families, and naturally would require rigorous ongoing assessment to determine their effectiveness in that process. 

D. Address community level push factors through better provision of services and 

resources. Another pressing need is to address the lack of adequate solutions to deal 

with secondary migration, so prevalent among U.S. Somalis. This term reflects the 

movement by most of the Somali refugees to Minnesota from their initial place of 

resettlement elsewhere in the United States. For example, Shirwa Ahmed’s family 

was resettled in Portland and Mohamoud Hassan’s had lived in San Diego. The majority of Somali refugees presently in Minnesota moved there without having funds 

and services dedicated to them; those funds remained in the State of first resettlement (Haines, 1996). This has become a serious deficiency, not least given the high 

number of resettled refugees who move to Minnesota following their initial resettlement. Significant improvements are needed both in decreasing the motivation for 

moving (e.g. not separating refugees from family members and providing adequate 

housing and employment), in counseling those who are considering moving, and in 

providing adequate services to those who nonetheless do relocate to Minnesota. 

Yet another key deficiency is the difficulty in responding to the particular needs 

of adolescent refugees themselves (Ellis et al, 2008). This subgroup of refugees is 

typically the most vulnerable to behavioral and criminal problems, but invariably 

also tends to receive less help from service organizations. For the most part, much 

younger children tend to receive more targeted after-school services and parental involvement in education. Far less help is offered for adolescents and young adults 

to find vocations and to integrate into mainstream society. Addressing these problems in Somali and other groups’ refugee resettlement could play a role in diminishing and limiting the impact and expression of local grievances concerning inadequate educational, health, social, and mental health services, thus reducing the 

‘‘push’’ and improve the counter-‘‘pull’’ in refugee communities. 

E. Build community-level preventive interventions that seek to increase community 

support for youth, especially where recruiters are active. Beyond family interventions, 

we must design interventions that work with U.S. Somalis at multiple community 

levels. For example, it is expected that youth with local role models who have either 

integrated or speak positively about integration are less interested in or supportive 

of radicalization. Through examining these community influences upon youth, drawing upon successful intervention models, and carefully adapting them to the targeted refugee communities, pilot projects could be developed. 

In Minnesota, for example, community projects could aim to: (1) Provide Somali 

male mentors for Somali refugee youth who encourage their development, careers, 

and education; (2) form a network of local and State leadership groups to provide 

leadership development and encourage refugee youth to participate in civic engagement and public service; (3) provide training and tools to imams and community 

leaders on how to identify and prevent recruiters from gaining access to Somali 

youth in the mosques, in order to protect both the youths and their communities 

from harm in the short- and long-term. Because no one intervention is going to 

reach all in a community, deploying multiple interventions in different community 

sectors would be warranted. Pilot projects would necessarily be rigorously assessed 

for feasibility, acceptability, effectiveness with measurable outcomes, and processes 

of change. 
29 

F. Enhance community to service organization collaborations. Successful psychosocial projects with U.S. Somalis must involve communities as active collaborators 

in developing, refining, and testing interventions through partnerships with local 

associations, schools, mosques, and clinics. The establishment and maintenance of 

these partnerships is a considerable challenge. However, successful partnerships 

have been achieved by community services research collaborations working in many 

difficult settings while addressing public health problems that are no less vexing 

than terrorism (Stevenson, 1994) as well as through community policing. Counterterrorism efforts could learn from what prior programs have found regarding impediments to collaboration as well as helpful facilitators, such as incorporating community values, being responsive to local needs, providing incentives, and sharing information (McKay & Paikoff, 2007). 

G. Form multidisciplinary collaborations. This psychosocial approach to counterterrorism does not currently represent a focus of counterterrorism, law enforcement, 

education, social and mental health services, or academic scholarship. To be effective, however, the psychosocial approach to counterterrorism will require input from 

these varied domains. This episode with U.S. Somalis has revealed knowledge and 

practice gaps that call for the development of a new type of program that would enhance law enforcement’s, psychosocial workers’, and community agencies’ abilities to 

prevent, predict, and investigate terrorism in the highly complex and fluid community contexts where they work—in this case, U.S. diaspora communities linked in 

some way with failed states and extremist militant movements. This could be accomplished by bringing together key stakeholders from these arenas through consultation, research, and training to provide constructive interventions for preventing 

the involvement of refugee children and young adults in terrorism. Similar multidisciplinary program models, such as the Yale Child Development-Community Policing Partnership, have proven highly effective in creating and implementing programs concerning child victims of violence (Marans & Berkman, 1997). The specific 

aims of such a collaborative initiative could include: (1) Enabling psychosocial expertise to directly support the decision-making and activities of counterterrorism law 

enforcement; (2) conducting analysis and research on emergent counterterrorism/ 

psychosocial issues that will help to develop and enhance counterterrorism (as described above in the ethnographic study); (3) designing and implementing collaborative programs for terrorism prevention (as described above in the intervention 

pilot study); (4) providing education, training, technical assistance, fellowships both 

to counterterrorism and law enforcement on psychosocial issues and to psychosocial 

workers on counterterrorism. 

CONCLUSIONS

Although a new large wave of Somali recruits going abroad is unlikely to repeat 

itself, there is clearly a substantial risk for homegrown terrorism amongst U.S. Somalis and other Muslim refugee groups from failed states with violent extremism. 

The situation of Somalis in Minnesota is an opportunity to explore a new path in 

counterterrorism for managing those risks through a psychosocial approach. A path 

we may very well need. 
30 

TABLE 1.—INFORMATION ON THE ALLEGED RECRUITED AND RECRUITERS FROM MINNESOTA 

Name Age* Residence in Min- nesota Education & Employment Outcome 

First Wave (left Minneapolis in 2007) Khalid Mohamud Abshir .. 26 ........ Minneapolis ........... Unknown ................................................. Indicted; believed to be in Somalia. Shirwa Ahmed .................. 26 ........ Minneapolis (moved 

from Portland).

2000 graduate of Roosevelt High; 

worked near Towers; became religious in 2003.

Killed October 29, 2008 in suicide 

bombing. 

Salah Osman Ahmed ........ 26 ........ New Brighton ........ Attended North Hennepin Community 

College; worked as security guard.

In Federal custody; pled guilty. 

Kamal Said Hassan .......... 24 ........ Plymouth ................ Worked as waiter near Towers; attended Minneapolis Community and 

Technical College in 2006; on resource committee at mosque.

In Federal custody; pled guilty. 

Badiftah Yusuf Isse .......... 25 ........ Minneapolis (moved 

from Seattle).

Worked at car rental company; Active 

in mosque youth program.

In Federal custody; pled guilty. 

Zakaria Maruf ................... 30 ........ Minneapolis (moved 

from San Diego; lived in Towers).

2000 graduate of Edison High; criminal 

record since age 14; employed at Walmart; also served as recruiter.

Killed July 11, 2009 in Mogadishu. 

Ahmed Ali Omar ............... 24 ........ Minneapolis (lived 

in Towers).

2004 Edison High graduate; emergency 

medical technician.

Believed to be in Somalia. 

Second Wave (left Minneapolis in 2008) Abdikar Ali Abdi ............... ? .......... Hopkins, (a Minneapolis suburb). Attended mosque in St. Paul ................. Believed to be in Somalia. 

Abdisalam Ali .................... 19 ........ Minneapolis (moved 

from Seattle; lived in Towers).

Edison High graduate; president of Somali Student Association; health student at U. Minnesota; wanted to become a doctor. Believed to be in Somalia. 

Jamal Sheikh Bana .......... 19 ........ Minneapolis (moved 

from Georgia).

Engineering student at Minneapolis 

Community and Technical College and Normondale College; worked at Macy’s and as security guard at public housing.

Killed in Mogadishu. 

Burhan Hassan (‘‘Little 

Bashir’’).

17 ........ Minneapolis (lived 

in Towers).

Senior at Roosevelt High School; spent 

a lot of time at mosque; wanted to attend Harvard.

Killed June 4, 2009 in Mogadishu by 

Al-Shabaab. 
31 

Mohamed Hassan 

(‘‘Miski’’).

17 ........ Minneapolis (lived 

in Towers).

Senior at Roosevelt High ........................ Killed in Mogadishu. 

Mohamoud Hassan ........... 21 ........ Minneapolis (moved 

from San Diego).

2006 graduate of Roosevelt High; electrical engineering student at U. Minnesota; vice president Somali Student 

Union.

Killed September 4, 2009 in 

Mogadishu. 

Troy Kastigar .................... 27 ........ Minneapolis ........... 1999 graduate of Robbinsdale Cooper 

High; criminal record; convert to Islam.

Killed in Somalia. 

Mustafa Ali Salat .............. 18 ........ Minneapolis ........... Lived in St. Paul; senior at Harding 

High; member of wrestling team.

Indicted; believed to be in Somalia. 

Recruiters Cabdulaahi Ahmed 

Faarax.

32 ........ Bloomington ........... Former combatant; Divorced father of 2 Indicted; believed to be in Somalia. 

Abdiweli Yassin Isse ......... 24 ........ Minneapolis ........... Unknown ................................................. Indicted; believed to be in Somalia. Mahamud Said Omar ....... 43 ........ Minneapolis (moved 

from Virginia).

Divorced father of 3; worked as a janitor at the Abubaker as-Saddiqui Islamic Center. Indicted (for financing recruitment); held in Netherlands. 

* Age is defined as when they left the United States, not necessarily age when radicalized. For alleged recruiters, ages are at time of indictment in 2009. 
32 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A preliminary version of this paper was presented in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 

March 2009, at the ‘‘Conference on Countering Radicalization and Recruitment,’’ 

sponsored by the Critical Incident Analysis Group and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 

Ministry of Interior. Content of this paper is also excerpted from a manuscript 

under review entitled, ‘‘Combating the Radicalization of U.S. Somali Refugee Youth: 

A Psychosocial Perspective on Counterterrorism’’ by Stevan Weine, John Horgan, 

Cheryl Robertson, Sana Loue, Amin Mohamed, & Sahra Noor. 

BACKGROUND ON WORKING GROUP

The Working Group on Somali Youth and Psychosocial Counterterrorism is an 

interdisciplinary group comprised of psychiatry, nursing, and public health professionals. It was formed as an outcome of a conference in Saudi Arabia in early 

March, 2009, organized by the Research Strategies Network, an affiliate of the Critical Incident Analysis Group, and the Saudi Ministry of Interior, where Working 

Group members presented a case study of the Minnesota Somalis. The Working 

Group includes U.S. and Somali members (biographies attached) who have worked 

extensively in U.S. refugee communities (Somali, Oromo, Bosnian, Kosovar, Burundian, Liberian), with torture/trauma- and migration-affected persons in multiple 

conflict and post-conflict countries, who conduct NIH-funded research programs with 

refugee youth and families, and who work in terrorism studies. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Dr. Weine. I can’t help but observe 

that you described the motivation behind our bill of 2 years ago, 

the one that passed the house 404–6. 

Dr. Cragin, please summarize your testimony in 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF R. KIM CRAGIN, PH.D., SENIOR POLICY 

ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION 

Ms. CRAGIN. I would like to thank the Chair and Ranking Member and the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing 

and Terrorism Risk for inviting me to testify on the subject of terrorist recruitment inside the United States, and—I just hit the talk 

button? Yes? Also to take this opportunity to commend the committee for recognizing the importance of this topic. 

Over the past 14 years, I have explored what motivates individuals to become terrorists as well as what influences communities 

to sympathize with terrorist groups. This research can be found in 

two RAND publications, including ‘‘Dissuading Terror’’ and ‘‘Social 

Science for Counterterrorism.’’ I would be happy to speak further 

about other studies in a classified session. 

Unfortunately, recent events have brought this topic to the forefront. As you know, last week, five young American men were arrested in Pakistan, allegedly trying to make their way to training 

camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. 

Although we have yet to learn fully about the intentions of these 

five men, they appear to be one of several recent examples of U.S. 

citizens and residents who have been susceptible to recruitment by 

al-Qaeda and associated movements. 

Indeed, examples exist of Americans traveling abroad to fight as 

well as participating in training camps abroad in anticipation of 

conducting attacks here at home. 

What happens in these training camps? Bryant Neal Vinas, another individual arrested on terrorism charges, has described activities in a Peshawar camp as follows: An introduction to the AK– 

47 and other guns, followed by a 15-day course in how to make suicide belts and rocketed-propelled grenades, and then graduation. 
33 

So how do individuals end up in these training camps? Research 

conducted at RAND and elsewhere suggests that no single pathway 

towards terrorism exists, making it difficult to determine precisely 

how and why individuals are susceptible to recruitment. 

Having said that, for the remainder of my testimony I will address two questions—first, how do individuals generally progress 

from articulating sympathy to actively participating in terrorism, 

and second, what can we do about it? 

To answer the first question, it is useful to explore the 

radicalization processes that individuals and clusters of individuals 

have gone through, which can be understood as having three 

phases. 

In the first phase, termed availability, environmental factors 

make individuals susceptible to messages and appeals from terrorist groups. Of course, these factors vary according to individual, 

but they might include peer group influences or frustration with 

foreign policy. 

While the first phase can occur on the internet, the second phase, 

termed recruitment, usually occurs after contact between individuals and the clandestine groups. 

That is, our research, as well as others’, suggests that recruitment works best when virtual contact has been strengthened 

through social linkages. Some potential recruitment nodes include 

prayer groups, social clubs, or even criminal gangs in prisons. 

The third phase of the radicalization process yields a commitment to action on the part of certain individuals. This final step 

has been the most difficult to isolate in research. 

In some instances, a specific grievance appears to have acted as 

a final trigger. Another common factor, at least for diaspora communities, appears to be participation in a training camp abroad. 

I am often asked what motivates terrorism. Is it ideology, politics, or poverty? My answer is yes, all three, to varying degrees. 

So how can we best intervene in this process? If determining how 

individuals become terrorists is difficult, then deriving intervention 

strategies is even more problematic. 

Our research suggests that we best intervene before individuals 

depart for training camps, because these experiences tend to 

harden their commitment towards violence. Yet in many instances, 

individuals have not engaged in illegal activities prior to their departure. 

These circumstances have proven to be the most difficult, and so 

I would like to focus on them for the rest of my testimony. 

First, beyond U.S. borders, the U.S. Government could work with 

partner nations to pressure those recruiters who have shown success at reaching Americans. It is well known that al-Qaeda is interested in recruiting new fighters from the United States. This is not 

a new phenomenon. 

So as partner nations work towards muting the voices of recruiters who have reached susceptible individuals within their own 

countries, the United States could encourage them to extend these 

programs to focus on western recruits. 

Second, within the United States. The U.S. Government could 

work with local community leaders to develop programs that re-
34 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ 

CT338/. 

duce susceptibility to messages articulated by al-Qaeda and associated movements. 

The case of the five youths arrested in Pakistan last week reportedly was brought to the attention of U.S. authorities through Muslim community leaders. I cannot imagine how difficult it was for 

these community leaders to call U.S. authorities. Regardless of the 

outcome, we owe them a great deal of respect and gratitude. 

Nonetheless, more could be done. In Singapore, for example, a 

group of Muslim scholars have worked with individuals arrested on 

terrorism charges and their families to help reintegrate these individuals back into the community. 

A similar model could be used for U.S. citizens and residents who 

are accused of participating in training camps abroad, which brings 

me back to the original question of how and why do individuals become terrorists? 

Clearly, more needs to be done to get a better understanding of 

this phenomenon, yet I would urge you not to leave it at that. 

As we move forward, we also need a better understanding of how 

al-Qaeda and associated movements retain the loyalty of their recruits and, perhaps more importantly, why individuals choose not 

to become terrorists, for if we are truly going to develop barriers 

to al-Qaeda recruitment in the United States, then it is equally important that we understand the motives of those who reject alQaeda’s overtures. Thank you. 

[The statement of Ms. Craigin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KIM CRAGIN 1

DECEMBER 15, 2009 

UNDERSTANDING TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS 2

I would like to thank the Chair and Ranking Member and the House Committee 

on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and 

Terrorism Risk Assessment for inviting me to testify on the subject of terrorist recruitment inside the United States and also to take this opportunity to commend 

the committee for recognizing the importance of understanding how and why individuals become susceptible to recruitment by al-Qaeda and associated movements. 

Over the past 14 years, during the course of my research on terrorism and insurgency, I have explored the topics of what motivates individuals to become terrorists, 

as well as what influences communities to sympathize with terrorist groups. This 

research can be found in a number of RAND publications, including Terrorism and 

Development, Dissuading Terror, and more recently Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together, which was released in the Spring 2009. 

Both issues—individual motivations and community support—are important to 

understanding the challenges of terrorist recruitment inside the United States. For 

example, potential exists for terrorist groups to persuade U.S. citizens and residents 

to ‘‘pick up a gun’’ and conduct attacks either in the U.S. homeland or abroad. Potential also exists for terrorist groups to garner financial or other forms of support 

from local communities inside the United States. Indeed, recent events have brought 

the topic of terrorist recruitment to the forefront of U.S. homeland security. 
35 

3Waqar Gilani and Jane Perlez, ‘‘5 US Men arrested in Pakistan Said to Plan Jihad Training,’’ New York Times 11 December 2009; Jerry Markon, ‘‘Pakistan arrests 5 N. VA men, probes 

possible jihadist ties,’’ The Washington Post, 10 December 2009. 4Kevin Johnson, ‘‘Alleged terror threat seen as ‘most serious’ since 9/11; suspect bought 

chemicals to make bombs, feds say,’’ USA Today, 25 September 2005. 5Michael Wilson, ‘‘From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect,’’ New York Times, 26 September 2009. 6Peter Slevin and Spencer S. Hsu, ‘‘Arrests in Chicago drive home global nature of terrorism 

threat,’’ Washington Post, 20 November 2009. 7 Andrea Elliot, ‘‘A Calls to Jihad, Answered in America,’’ New York Times, 12 July 2009. 8Michael Wilson, ‘‘From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect,’’ New York Times, 26 September 2009. 9Kim Cragin, ‘‘Early History of al-Qaeda,’’ The Historical Journal, November 2008. 10 Andrew Silke, ed, Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism 

and its Consequences, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd 2003). 

As you know, last week, five young American men were arrested in Pakistan, allegedly trying to make their way to militant training camps that exist along the 

Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Initial reporting suggests that these individuals pursued at least two different avenues to reach these training camps—an Islamic school 

and an extremist organization—and yet were rebuffed due to their ‘‘western demeanor’’ and lack of language skills.3 Although we have yet to learn fully about the 

intentions of these five men, they appear to be one of several recent examples of 

U.S. citizens and residents who have been susceptible to recruitment by al-Qaeda 

and associated movements. 

In September of this year, for example, Najibullah Zazi, a Denver resident, pled 

not guilty to conspiracy to detonate bombs inside the United States. Zazi reportedly 

traveled from the United States to Pakistan in August 2008 and, according to investigators, participated in a militant training camp in that country.4 Upon his return 

to the United States, Zazi allegedly purchased chemicals to build a bomb, planning 

to detonate it in New York City, although he never followed through with the attack, apparently tipped off that he was under suspicion by authorities.5

Similarly, the FBI arrested David C. Headley, formerly known as Daood Gilani, 

in October 2009 and accused him of scouting potential targets in advance of the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai that killed 165 people.6 And, in October 2008, 

Shirwa Ahmed blew himself up in Somalia, becoming the first known American suicide bomber. He, along with approximately 20 other young Americans over the past 

8 years, had traveled to Somalia to participate in local training camps and fight 

with al-Shabaab.7 So examples exist of U.S. citizens and residents traveling abroad 

to fight in local insurgencies, traveling abroad to fight U.S. forces, as well as participating in training camps abroad in anticipation of conducting attacks here at home. 

What happens in these militant training camps? Bryant Neal Vinas, another individual arrested on terrorism charges who pled guilty to terrorism-related charges 

in January 2009, has provided investigators with unique insight. Bryant Neal 

Vinas, a convert to Islam, departed for Afghanistan in late 2007 after visiting multiple jihadist websites. He reportedly described activities in a Peshawar training 

camp as follows: an introduction to the AK–47 and other guns, followed by a 15- 

day course in how to make suicide belts and rocketed propelled grenades and then 

graduations.8 Other information suggests that al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan historically also have included classes on political Islam, essentially in an attempt to indoctrinate new recruits in what some would refer to as the violent Salafi 

jihadi movement.9 Indeed, training camps clearly play a key role in solidifying individuals’ commitment to al-Qaeda and associated movements. The question remains, 

how do individuals end up in these training camps? 

Unfortunately, research conducted at RAND and elsewhere suggests that no single pathway towards terrorism exists, making it somewhat difficult to identify overarching patterns in how and why individuals are susceptible to terrorist recruitment 

as well as intervention strategies.10 Having said that, I am going to attempt to generalize from the findings from our research as much as possible, while still providing specific examples of nuances in terrorist motivations whenever appropriate. 

For the remainder of my testimony, I will address two basic questions. First, how 

do individuals progress from articulating sympathy for al-Qaeda and associated 

movements to actively participating in terrorist activities? And, second, what can we 

do about it? 

HOW DO INDIVIDUALS BECOME TERRORISTS?

To answer this question, it is useful to explore the radicalization processes that 

individuals and clusters of individuals have gone through as they progressed from 

being sympathetic to the al-Qaeda worldview to being willing to ‘‘pick up a gun.’’ 
36 

11 Ami Pedhazur, ‘‘The Culture of Death: Terrorist Organizations and Suicide Bombings,’’ presented at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC as part of the Eisenhower Speaker 

Series, 17 February 2005. 12Paul Temelty, ‘‘An In-Depth Look at the London Bombers,’’ Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 

15, 28 July 2005. 13This concept also was used by Javed Ali, Senior Intelligence Office, Department of Homeland Security, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs entitled, ‘‘Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in US Cell Blocks?’’ 

19 September 2006. 14 ‘‘White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism,’’ Singapore 

Government, 7 January 2003. 15See, for example, Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends 

and Perspectives, Denmark: Centre for Cultural Research, January 2005; and Peter Nesser, 

Jihad in Europe: A Survey of the Motivations of Sunni Islamist Terrorism in the Post-Millennium Europe, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2004. 16Philip Zimbardo and C. Hartly, ‘‘Cults Go to High School: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Initial Stage in the Recruitment Process, Cultic Studies Journal, Vol. 2. No. 1, 1985, 

pp 91–147. 

These processes can be understood as having three separate and distinct phases. 

In the first phase, termed ‘‘availability’’ environmental factors make certain individuals susceptible to appeals from terrorist groups. Of course, these factors are likely 

to vary according to individual, but they might include being brought up in a family 

that articulates a violent Salafi worldview, frustration with local government policies, peer group influences, or frustration with foreign policies. 

For example, in his research on suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories, 

Ami Pedhazur has noted that one particular cell played soccer together prior to 

their recruitment into Hamas.11 Shazhad Tanweer, one of the 7 July 2005 London 

bombers, apparently had expressed frustration with U.K. foreign policy, particularly 

the conflict in Iraq.12 Of course, that is not to say that all soccer players or individuals frustrated with the conflict in Iraq are potential terrorist recruits, but rather, 

at the ‘‘availability’’ stage multiple factors can make al-Qaeda’s appeal attractive. 

While the first phase, ‘‘availability’’, can occur on the internet, the second phase, 

termed ‘‘recruitment and indoctrination’’ occurs after initial contact between individuals and the clandestine group. That is, our research as well as others’, suggests 

that terrorist recruitment works best when virtual contact has been backed up by 

or strengthened through social linkages. In examining the second ‘‘recruitment’’ 

phase, it is useful to focus on ‘‘nodes’’ or gateways through which individuals come 

into contact with terrorist recruiters, members or leaders.13 Some potential recruitment nodes include prayer groups, sports clubs, charitable organizations, or even 

criminal gangs and prisons. For example, in December 2001, Singaporean authorities disrupted a plot to attack Western as well as local targets in that country. According to a White Paper released by that government, some of the arrested individuals had been recruited through religious study groups in Singapore.14

Importantly, these nodes vary according to country and community. So it is difficult to identify a laundry list of potential recruitment nodes worldwide. If any commonalities exist in recruitment nodes, they appear to be best grouped into ‘‘diaspora 

communities’’—so for example, the United States, the United Kingdom or Singapore—versus ‘‘majority Muslim communities, such as Indonesia, Yemen or Algeria.’’15 That is, we have found some general commonality in the types of recruitment 

nodes in these locations. But al-Qaeda and affiliated movements have demonstrated 

a remarkable ability to adapt to different recruiting environments, adjusting both 

message and method of recruitment. 

The third phase of the radicalization process yields a commitment to action on the 

part of certain individuals. To be honest, this final step has been the most difficult 

to isolate during the course of our research, because it seems to vary the most individual by individual. In some instances, a specific grievance appears to have acted 

as a final trigger. So, for example, Galib Andang aka Commander Robot, a former 

member of the now defunct Moro Nationalist Liberation Front in the Philippines, 

was motivated in part by the death of his grandmother at the hands of the Filipino 

Army. Other common factors, at least for diaspora communities, appear to be isolation from the broader Muslim community and participation in a foreign jihad. Somehow the process of participating in a training camp and fighting overseas makes individuals more willing to engage in terrorism back home as well. 

I should say, at this point, that my description of radicalization processes for individual terrorists and sympathizers is not particularly unique. That is, Philip 

Zimbardo, who is probably best known for his Stanford prison experiment, has observed similar processes with the recruitment of high school students into cults in 

the United States.16 But I find it a useful construct to understanding all the various 

factors that motivate individuals to ‘‘pick up a gun.’’ 
37 

So I am often asked, ‘‘What motivates terrorism? Is it ideology, politics or poverty?’’ And my answer is, ‘‘Yes, all three, at least to varying degrees.’’ The key question for us today is how can we best intervene in this process? 

WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT IT?

Unfortunately, if determining how individuals become terrorists is difficult, then 

deriving intervention strategies is even more problematic. As I previously implied, 

our research suggests that it would be best to intervene before individuals depart 

the United States for training camps abroad, because experiences in these camps 

tend to harden their commitment towards al-Qaeda and associated movements. Yet, 

in many instances, individuals have not engaged in illegal activities prior to their 

departure. It is these circumstances that have proven to be the most difficult and 

so I would like to focus the rest of my testimony on them. And, indeed, much can 

be learned from how other countries have attempted to deal with this dilemma. 

First, beyond U.S. borders, the U.S. Government could work with partner nations 

abroad to pressure those ideologues and recruiters who have shown particular success at reaching susceptible U.S. and other Western recruits. It is well-known that 

al-Qaeda and associated movements are interested in recruiting new fighters from 

the United States; this is not a new phenomenon. Wadih el-Hage, for example, testified that al-Qaeda focused recruitment efforts on him in anticipation of the 1998 

U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania due to his American passport. So 

while partner nations, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, work towards muting the voices of ideologies and recruiters who have reached susceptible 

individuals within their own countries, the United States could encourage them to 

extend these programs to those focused on Western recruits as well. 

Second, within the United States, the U.S. Government could work with local 

Muslim community leaders to develop programs that reduce their youths’ susceptibility to messages articulated by al-Qaeda and associated movements. The U.S. Government already has established ties with Muslim community leaders. And, indeed, 

the aforementioned case of the five youths arrested in Pakistan last week reportedly 

was brought to the attention of U.S. authorities through Muslim community leaders. 

I cannot image how difficult it was for these community leaders to call U.S. authorities and, regardless of the outcome, we owe them a great deal of respect and gratitude. Nonetheless, more could be done. 

In Singapore, for example, a group of Muslim scholars have led a number of different programs to develop barriers to radicalization in that country. These scholars 

have formed a Religious Rehabilitation Group that works with individuals arrested 

on terrorism charges and their families to help re-integrate these individuals back 

into the community. A similar model could be used for U.S. citizens and residents 

who are accused of participating in training camps abroad. Similarly, several scholars who work with the Religious Rehabilitation Group have established their own 

English language blogs to refute on-line claims by al-Qaeda and associated movements. This approach also could be attempted in the United States. Finally, like 

with efforts to combat recruitment into criminal gangs or cults, U.S. law enforcement and other entities could help local community members develop programs to 

inhibit youths’ susceptibility to al-Qaeda recruitment. Notably, with any of these potential initiatives, it is important to emphasize that U.S. law enforcement should 

continue to partner with local Muslim community leaders to prevent them and others from any potential backlash. 

Which brings me back to the original question of—how and why do individuals 

become terrorists? Clearly, more needs to be done on the part of academics to get 

a better understanding of this phenomenon. Yet I would urge you not to leave it 

at that. As we move forward, we also need a better understanding of how al-Qaeda 

and associated movements retain the loyalty of their recruits. And, perhaps more 

importantly, why individuals choose not to become terrorists. For if we are truly 

going to develop barriers to al-Qaeda recruitment in the United States, it is equally 

important that we understand the motives of those who reject al-Qaeda’s overtures. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Cragin. 

Thank you to all the witnesses. I think this testimony is extremely helpful. We will now proceed to questions, and I yield myself 5 minutes. 

To all the witnesses, let me just read a list here. John Walker 

Lindh. Lackawanna Six. Brooklyn Bridge plot. Columbia shopping 

mall bomb plot. Lodi, California sleeper cell. Sears Tower-MiamiFBI bomb plot. Adam Gadahn. Torrance terror cell, which I men-
38 

tioned earlier. Fort Dix six. Somali Americans disappear from Minneapolis—we have just heard about that. Bronx terror plot. Shooting at the Arkansas military recruiting station. Najibulla Zazi. 

David Headley. Tarek Mehanna. Nidal Hasan. And most recently 

the five in Alexandria, Virginia. 

This is a long list. I don’t want just to list Arab Americans or 

Muslim Americans. But this is a long list of U.S. residents or U.S. 

citizens, in most cases, who are somehow experimenting with terror. 

While I agree with you, Mr. Zogby, that we need a scalpel and 

not a sledgehammer, and while I agree with you, Mr. Macleod-Ball, 

that we should focus on actual terrorist acts and not someone’s belief system—I truly agree with that—we need to do something 

here. 

We need to intervene. Hopefully we will not intervene after the 

fact, but we will find exactly the right place to intervene to prevent 

these terror actions. So our second two witnesses, Dr. Weine and 

Dr. Cragin, have suggested ways to learn more. 

I would like to ask our first two witnesses what strategies do you 

think we, the United States Government, this subcommittee, 

should undertake to intervene at the right moment to prevent acts 

of terror by people like the list I just read against the United 

States? 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. Thank you, Chair Harman. I think there 

were a lot of good ideas expressed by all of the witnesses here 

today. I would reiterate our point that you start with the violence. 

You don’t start with the ideology. 

Adding to the list, we could also add any number of Ku Klux 

Klan—— 

Ms. HARMAN. I agree with you. 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL [continuing]. Weather Underground or—— 

Ms. HARMAN. Right. 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL [continuing]. Symbionese Liberation Army. 

There are any number of examples of terrorist action within our 

country. 

By starting with the ideology and saying that you are going to 

define those—you are going to examine those acts, you are predetermining the outcome in a way that your conclusions will tend 

to cast aspersions on the entire Muslim community. 

Ms. HARMAN. I agree with your definition of the problem. What 

is the solution? 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. The solution is to start with a different universe of actions. As you are examining historical events—actions— 

you look at what moves different people in different contexts from 

a nonviolent to a violent situation. 

I think that is the best way—first of all, you are looking at actual 

historical events and not making assumptions about the future, but 

you are also—by definition, if you are starting with a different universe of people, you are not predetermining a focus on the Muslim 

community. 

Ms. HARMAN. Dr. Zogby. 

Mr. ZOGBY. You asked the question of the hour, and it is the critical one. Let me just make a couple observations about the list you 

read. In many ways, they can be broken up into different groups. 
39 

But with the exception of two, they were all stopped. They were 

stopped because we were doing things right. 

The cooperation with the Muslim community, the outreach to the 

Muslim community, the significant work of law enforcement using 

the tools that are available to them and working with the communities, has been effective in every one of these instances in stopping. 

In the case of Nidal Hasan, which is, of course, a horrific act of 

terror and of—and an awful incident, law enforcement failed. I 

think we have to say that. 

I mean, there was a failure here—failure to collect the—to connect the dots, and because the—our hands were tied because of restrictive ways we approach guns, gun laws, and gun information, 

the fact that he went and bought a weapon that is not to be used 

for hunting or for sharpshooting but had—we have records of this 

man in contact with someone that we have on a terrorist watch 

list. 

We have all of the information that you gave us of his very questionable—I am sorry, Congressman McCaul—of his questionable 

activities while in the military, and yet the dots were never connected. The different agencies weren’t talking to each other about 

what was going on there. 

That is a problem that we, I think, will have to look more closely 

at. But what to do about it? I think we are doing things right. We 

are stopping these people. We are invigorating cooperation between 

law enforcement and the communities. 

We are changing the tone of the debate in our country that I 

think is bringing more people forward ready to cooperate, which is 

why people have turned in people and are working with law enforcement to stop this problem. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

My time has expired. I just want to observe that Dr. Cragin said 

we ought to say thank you to the law-abiding members of these 

communities who do turn in family members or point law enforcement toward problems with family members, and so I think that 

is a very good suggestion, and I would like to say thank you to 

those community members. 

We have a full group of Members. That is because this hearing 

is so interesting. I would like to ask unanimous consent that Ms. 

Jackson Lee, who is not a Member of the subcommittee, can sit 

with us and ask questions after other Members. Any objection? So 

ordered. 

Now I yield 5 minutes to the Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madame Chair, again. 

Behind me is an illustration of homegrown terrorism arrests 

since November 2008, and I think that this picture really says it 

all and why this hearing is so important. 

Again, Madame Chair, thank you for holding this hearing. This 

is a threat. You know, I was a Federal prosecutor and a thought 

itself is not a violation of the law. 

So, Mr. Macleod-Ball, I agree with you that a belief or an ideology is not a prosecutable offense. Always a conspiracy requires an 

overt act. An overt act is the first step towards completing a conspiracy which does make it a violation of the law. 
40 

However, it always starts with an ideology. It always begins with 

a radical idea or a belief that eventually does come to fruition—not 

in every case, thank God, but in the cases that we have seen. We 

have been able to stop a lot of these cases, fortunately, but some 

have not. 

I think the Hasan case, Dr. Zogby, is a very good illustration of 

a case that failed, was a whole failure of law enforcement, as you 

said. I think that was absolutely correct. 

When we had a major in the Army, the United States Army, at 

the largest military installation in the United States just north of 

my district having communications with one of the top al-Qaeda recruiters in Yemen, having communications with Pakistan—this information apparently was in the hands of the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force in Washington, one of the members from the Department of 

Defense, and yet that information was not shared with the very 

base where the major resided. 

Don’t you think General Cone, who I talked to at the memorial 

service—we buried 13 soldiers there, and I talked to the wounded, 

who said, ‘‘Yes, he screamed Allahu Akbar as he shot us.’’ Don’t 

you think that General Cone may have liked to have had that information that he had a major at his base that was communicating 

with a top al-Qaeda recruiter in Yemen? 

Yet that didn’t happen. That information was not shared with 

the military, with Fort Hood. I know that may be a little bit—I 

think it is on point, because this man radicalized, and what we 

don’t know is whether he radicalized all on his own or whether he 

had a little bit of help from the outside. 

What can we do—and I have so many questions I could bring up 

today, but that case is a classic case of failure. What can we do better to ensure that there are no more Hasans out there? As General 

Cone told me, how many more are out there? 

They are a threat to our United States military because we know 

al-Qaeda targets the United States military. It is out of their play 

book. They targeted Fort Dix. They bring back their play book time 

and time again, like they did with the World Trade Center, and 

like they will probably try to do with the Capitol. 

How can we stop another Hasan case from happening again? I 

will direct that to anybody on the panel—Dr. Cragin, I don’t know 

if—you seem to—anybody who would like to tackle that. 

Ms. CRAGIN. Sure. I mean, I can start, and then please feel free. 

I would say, first of all, I would like to get away from the term 

‘‘self-radicalization.’’ There are some examples of that, but overwhelmingly there is normally a mentor—I think the term was 

used—involved in the radicalization process. 

So like I said during my testimony, I mean, one thing is to actually start focusing some attention on these mentors. That attention 

doesn’t necessarily have to be law enforcement attention, but I 

think that is one way to do it. 

But I also think, unfortunately—you know, Timothy McVeigh— 

I am from Oklahoma, so Timothy McVeigh also got through, right? 

So I think that we are not going to be able to stop all of the lone 

wolves, and that is sort of an unfortunate reality that we are facing 

today. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Anybody else on the panel? 
41 

Dr. WEINE. Yes, I think that prevention is the right word, and 

the question is how you think about prevention. 

I think it is important to think about prevention not strictly from 

a law enforcement point of view but, say, from a community policing point of view and from a public health point of view, where we 

try to establish relationships, change people’s thinking and change 

people’s behavior in such a way to catch them upstream before they 

go too far down the line. 

I believe we are not doing that right now. I think counterterrorism as I see it in the microcosm of, say, the Somali community 

in Minneapolis is limited to FBI criminal investigation. With all 

due respect to those people who do that important work, I think 

that there are still shortcomings in the area of community policing 

and preventive approach. 

There are good people in those communities, parents and community leaders, who want to support these efforts, but they are not 

involved and engaged. That is what prevention means. That is 

what I think we have to be doing more of. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Dr. Weine, let me just say, I completely agree with 

you. I worked as a Federal prosecutor, worked with Joint Terrorism Task Forces. 

I think one thing that we need to do a better job—is reaching out 

to the Muslim community and getting involved in the community, 

where we can identify the 1 percent or less than 1 percent of potential threats. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. McCaul, let Dr. Zogby respond to your question briefly. 

But to all Members, let’s try to stick strictly to the 5 minutes to 

be fair to everybody. 

Mr. ZOGBY. It does not begin with ideology. Ideology is the paint 

on the surface that is already there. He said, ‘‘Allahu Akbar.’’ He 

did not mean ‘‘Allahu Akbar.’’ What he meant was, ‘‘I am going to 

kill you, I hate you, I am angry, really angry.’’ 

It is sort of like—you know, when I used to teach religion, I used 

to say, ‘‘The meaning of a word is how it is used.’’ If somebody says, 

‘‘Oh, Jesus Christ,’’ that doesn’t mean that they are a devout believer. It usually means they are angry. Or, ‘‘Oh, Jesus Christ,’’ I 

am excited. We cannot allow the abuse of language to mask purpose, to take our attention off what is going on. 

That is why I agree with Mr. Macleod-Ball. You judge the actions, not the language. In another era, as Peter Bergen said on 

CNN the other night, Major Hasan may have turned to Maoism or 

may have turned to some other ideology. 

The language of the moment to describe anger, to describe the 

conflict we are having and the deep alienation that I am feeling, 

is this language of religion. Do not let them confuse us with what 

the real is—with what is really going on here, because that is when 

we start using the sledgehammer. 

As I am watching the media, CNN covering this problem of what 

happened in Pakistan, showing Muslims on the Mall on Service 

Day, when they were committing themselves to service to our country, praying, that was the backdrop. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 
42 

Mr. ZOGBY. The message this sends to Muslims is very dangerous, and we have to be careful. Judge the action. The susceptibility will be there. We have to deal with the susceptibility, not 

with the language they use. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Dr. Zogby. 

I now yield 5 minutes to the Chairman of the full committee, Mr. 

Thompson. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Madame Chair. 

Excellent panel. Thank all of you for your testimony. 

One of the things I want to do is try to broaden the discussion. 

We just saw a broad panel of where arrests have taken place, but 

it only focused on a very narrow, tight arrest for certain kinds of 

things. 

One of the things I want us to do as a committee is look at acts 

of violence, extremism, in its totality, not in a very narrow focus, 

so that we can understand that the debate here is important, but 

is a part of a broader debate that we need to take as a committee. 

Specifically, for each witness, can you identify for the committee 

the broader violent extremist potential that exists here, and what 

groups may be part of it here in this country, so we can see the 

bigger picture of the discussion? 

I will take Dr. Zogby, and we will go down. 

Mr. ZOGBY. I can just tell you that not being someone in law enforcement himself but in constant contact with law enforcement because that is what we do in our work, they are deeply concerned 

since—and it is no secret—since the election of our President with 

white supremist movements that are a lot of chatter and a lot of 

danger and a lot of concern. 

I think that that is an area that is something we have to look 

at, because the susceptibility, especially in an economic downturn, 

and especially in time of war, and especially now with this sense 

of revenge about Government is a problem. I think we have to take 

a very close look at that and continue to look at it. It is the other 

language that is used today. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. I want to say this in the right way. I don’t 

want to name groups and cast aspersion on them simply by naming 

them in this context. 

But historically, there are many groups in our country, some of 

which I referenced in my testimony and in my previous answer, 

and there are either remnants of those groups left today or there 

are people who believe the same things and act to further those beliefs. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes. Well, and I guess—and I accept that, but if 

you can talk about the ideology rather than the name of the group, 

if that would give you a little—— 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. Well, let me just—let me go about it this 

way. Does Timothy McVeigh have more in common with an Islamic 

terrorist or with any Christian believer? 

I think most people would say with any Islamic terrorist. It is 

not the belief that is the defining moment. It is as Dr. Zogby said, 

that is the paint that may be present. It may be present in any situation. 
43 

But you start with the propensity for violence, however that may 

be caused, and then you add the background material that gives 

the person the basis for going forward after he or she already has 

the propensity to violence. 

So I am very reluctant to talk about it in that way, because I 

think it starts with the factors that create the propensity to violence, which some of the other witnesses mentioned in their testimony. 

Dr. WEINE. Thank you. I am concerned about the place where 

three broad processes interact, so No. 1 is failed states, people who 

come from failed states, where the—No. 2 is where there are violent extremist movements and organizations. No. 3 is that they 

now exist in refugee or migrant communities in this country that 

face many challenges of daily life. 

So the Somalis certainly fit that, but so do several other communities that we have to be concerned about. I think this is very challenging. 

The other broad thing that concerns me is the issue of movement, migration, secondary migration within the United States. 

So I would like to share this fact with you, that there are presently, say, about 84,000 Somalis in Minnesota. Probably only about 

20,000 of them were resettled there. That means that about 60 

more thousand of them came from another State in the United 

States where they were primarily resettled. 

This represents a shortcoming, systematic shortcoming, in the 

U.S. refugee resettlement system, because when they move to another State, they don’t come with services attached. So this is a 

setup for underserved refugee community. 

We might think about what other populations in the United 

States are—also fit that pattern. Thank you. 

Ms. CRAGIN. Just to answer your question quickly, in my written 

testimony, I talk about the model of the radicalization process. We 

actually stole it from—we derived it from Phil Zimbardo’s work on 

cults. 

So if you were to broaden the community with that radicalization 

process, it would include both criminal gangs and cults, and that 

is one way of broadening it without looking at ideology or naming 

specific groups. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Dent for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

I will start with Dr. Zogby. My regards to your cousin Charles. 

First, you know, we are often told that the United States is less 

susceptible to homegrown terrorism than European nations, and I 

think you sort of alluded to that earlier in your remarks. 

Do you believe that is still the case? You know, if the United 

States is less susceptible, could you go into why? 

Mr. ZOGBY. The important thing to understand here is that having dealt with and gone and talked to some of these groupings in 

Europe—actually, it was something the State Department and another program I did with BBC was interested in kind of seeing the 

differences between what is going on here and going on there. 
44 

The degree of alienation is fundamentally different there than 

here. Here, the problem exists on the margins. There, it is much 

more widespread. 

The Somali kids didn’t tell their parents. The Pakistani kids here 

in—the kids here in northern Virginia didn’t tell their parents. 

That tells you something right away. 

The community base of support in Europe for this problem of 

radicalization is very different than here, where the problem, as I 

said, exists on the margins and the parents actually turn them in, 

or their peers will turn them in. 

So I say that becoming American—the process of becoming American is determinative in this instance. It is the more compelling 

force that is the antidote to this radicalization and this sense of 

alienation. 

I think we have to—and that is why I say at the end of the day 

what we have to do is more of what we do, and do it better, instead 

of less of that. 

Mr. DENT. Well, the reason I asked the question—because you 

just saw the map that was held up a moment ago. When you saw 

all these recent incidents around the country, it has caused me to 

think—I always was under the impression, too, that Europe was 

more susceptible to this type of radicalization than the United 

States. 

But given what has happened in recent weeks and months, I 

have started to question that in my own mind. 

Mr. ZOGBY. That is why I suggest, sir, if you look at each one— 

take them apart, see where the patterns are and where the patterns aren’t. The Fort Hood one is fundamentally different than 

Minneapolis. 

You know, I would just say to Dr. Weine that one of the things 

from Somali experts I understand—and people in that community 

in Minneapolis—is that since the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, 

the lure of Shabaab has gone down. 

The important thing again in Minneapolis is that the parents 

turned them in—— 

Mr. DENT. Yes. 

Mr. ZOGBY [continuing]. And the United States attorney had the 

full cooperation of the parents, and the parents looked upon this 

arrest as a relief, because the people who were preying on their 

kids were gone. 

I think that, you know, we are doing it well. It is not the mainstream. It is the margins. We have to continue to ensure that it 

stays on the margins. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. 

Dr. Cragin, you know, we have received a variety of opinions, 

mixed opinions, on how Government should engage religious leaders to address the issue of radicalization. 

As you know, some say there should be increased cooperation between law enforcement and Muslim clergy and religious leaders, 

since they are certainly in a position to deter Muslim teenagers 

from going down the path of violent radicalization. 

Others suggest that Government involvement would likely backfire, causing moderate voices we hope to encourage to be discredited as Government propaganda. 
45 

Do you believe that the Government and law enforcement officials should more actively engage with Muslim religious and clergy 

leaders? How can this be done without discrediting these leaders? 

Ms. CRAGIN. Sure, absolutely. Let me start by saying one thing— 

and to agree with Dr. Zogby on the fact that I don’t think that we 

see the susceptibility level here as we do in Europe. 

But one thing that you do see that is common between the two 

of them is a separation of these cells or these bunch of guys from 

their own Muslim community, which makes law enforcement and 

relying on Muslim communities to interact with law enforcement 

even more problematic. 

That is, they are not separating from American society themselves, but they are even separating from their own Muslim community a little bit. So this makes this engagement even more problematic. 

But I do tend to think that engaging, like the way our law enforcement are, with local Muslim community leaders is the way to 

go, and that there—if you do not—if you are wanting to protect 

civil liberties and you are not wanting really intrusive law enforcement tactics, then the way to go is to continue to engage the Muslim community leaders, and—I agree with Dr. Zogby—like we have 

done successfully. 

I think these are really—we have some really great examples of 

how this has worked in this country. 

Mr. DENT. Well, thank you. 

For Mr. Macleod-Ball, do you believe that domestic radicalization 

is a very real threat in the United States? 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. There are many threats in the United 

States, and that is one among them. I think perhaps we are talking 

about some semantic issues when we talk about the objections that 

we have voiced in the past to some of the subcommittee’s ideas. 

In my written testimony—we had 1.3 million violent crimes in 

the United States reported in 2008. Is that a threat? Certainly it 

is a threat. Part of that threat is what you mentioned. 

There are some people that are motivated through ideology, certainly. There is many people who are motivated through something 

other than ideology. So the ideologically based threats—sure, they 

exist, and we ought to be investigating those along with the various 

other threats at the committee’s discretion. 

Mr. DENT. Yield back. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Carney, 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

You have stimulated so many questions, and we don’t—this will 

be a long series of hearings, I hope, at some point. 

Dr. Zogby, I appreciated your making the distinction, forcing us 

to make the distinction. I would like your opinion, though. Do you 

think the case of Somalia, as we have spent a lot of time talking 

about today, is somehow fundamentally different than those who 

are recruited to expand some sort of international caliphate? 

Mr. ZOGBY. It may very well be. That does not mean that we 

should not have taken measures to protect these kids—— 

Mr. CARNEY. Of course. 
46 

Mr. ZOGBY [continiuing]. From recruitment and engagement in 

activities that are antithetical to who we are and what we want. 

But there is a fundamental problem here, and if I can just take 

a moment to look at it, it is the problem of exile politics. I think, 

you know, ultimately, we are going to have to make a decision as 

a country what route we go on this one. 

I remember growing up in a situation where there was no such 

thing as dual citizenship. Now you can have dual citizenship with 

many countries all over the world. Now you can vote in elections 

in countries all over the world while you are in this country as an 

American citizen. 

Now you can be a Bush administration official in the Department 

of AID and you can go and run for office in Lebanon for parliament 

and then decide whether or not you want to come back to the 

United States or not. 

You know, and I spoke with the JDL before, and these guys floating back and forth and doing whatever they do—I think we have 

some issues here we have to look at as a country. 

I grew up in a situation where when I saw the pictures of George 

Washington crossing the Delaware, I was on the boat with him. 

When I saw Lewis and Clark on the frontier, I was with them. I 

mean, it was my story. 

We are inhibiting that story from becoming the dominant American narrative when we are in a situation today where we encourage dual citizenship, people voting in other elections, and the next 

step is, ‘‘Oh, my God, Ethiopia invaded my country. I am going to 

go and defend my country.’’ 

We have to ask questions. When our Department of State funded 

the elections in Iraq in this country and the co-chair of the Republican Party of San Diego is quoted in the L.A. Times saying, ‘‘At 

last, for the first time in my life, I will get to vote,’’ and I said, 

‘‘What the heck is going on here? You just voted in the Presidential 

election in this country. That is your country here. Make a choice, 

man.’’ I think we have to look a that. 

That is not going to make—I am not going to be popular with 

both parties, and even with people in my own community, but I do 

think that if we do not take the issue of becoming American—take 

it seriously, make it work, all that it means, I think we are running down a road here that is going to ultimately get us in trouble 

everywhere. 

Not just in the Middle East but as conflicts emerge everywhere 

around the world, we are going to have people saying, ‘‘That is my 

fight. That is my fight. IRA, that is my fight. Israel, that is my 

fight. Arabs, that is my fight. Pakistan, that is my fight.’’ That is 

not a good situation for us to be in as a Nation. 

Mr. CARNEY. What do you suggest in terms of public diplomacy? 

Mr. ZOGBY. Public diplomacy—I think that we have to tell the 

American story. We have to tell it there. We have to tell it here. 

We have to encourage people becoming American here. 

We have to work with the full gamut of institutions and the processes that have worked for us in the past to make these kids feel 

that there is an opportunity for them to fully participate. 

The fact is if we hire more Arab Americans and Muslims in Government, if we open law enforcement to their ranks, if we do more 
47 

of what we do well, the lure of overseas will pass by them completely. 

They came here or their parents came here to be part of this. We 

have to make sure that they are a part of it and identify with it 

fully. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. 

Dr. Weine, I want to switch gears a little bit, and since you are 

from Illinois I have a question concerning the potential movement 

of hundreds of Gitmo detainees to Illinois. 

This is for all of you, actually. Is that going to have some kind 

of impact on recruitment, do you think? Is it going to be a damper 

to recruitment? What is your opinion on the transfer of the detainees? 

Dr. WEINE. I know that there is a vigorous political dialogue taking place in Illinois about that, and I am really not in a position 

to comment on that. 

I think that in terms—— 

Mr. CARNEY. No, no, I am not asking about the political dialogue. 

I am asking from your professional opinion, is this going to have 

some kind of impact—— 

Dr. WEINE. Well—— 

Mr. CARNEY [continuing]. On recruitment? 

Dr. WEINE [continuing]. I think that recruiters are very clever, 

and recruiters are always looking for a way to manipulate events 

to their advantage. I am sure that recruiters will find a way to manipulate that to their advantage. That doesn’t mean that that 

shouldn’t be done—moving Gitmo detainees into Illinois—or not. I 

think that should be evaluated on a different level. 

But I think that the point in terms of prevention is we need to 

find ways to stay one step ahead of where recruiters are. 

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Macleod-Ball? 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. Although I am not a psychiatrist, I would 

like to add that unless the the movement of the detainees also includes a commitment to due process and to actually provide rights 

to all of the detainees to determine definitively what their status 

is, then I think that would serve as the basis for recruiters seeking 

to point to the United States treating folks with something other 

than justice. 

Mr. CARNEY. Dr. Cragin. 

Ms. CRAGIN. I have always been in favor of shutting down Guantanamo Bay because it has been used as big rhetorical device in the 

al-Qaeda media. 

But I would agree that wherever you decide to move it you would 

want to give the detainees due process in order to tamp down as 

much of that rhetoric in the future, yeah. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Broun of Georgia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Dr. Zogby, your last testimony was extremely refreshing to me, 

and I have long been a believer that the hyphenization of America 

is one of the biggest problems we have with radicalization and all 

these other things. 
48 

I think it is true in Europe because if you look there, you see the 

radicals coming out of a community that is not allegiant to their 

own country or not even allegiant to the European Union but is allegiant to that radical element within their community. 

I think a common language—English as the official language of 

America—is absolutely critical for us to help further exactly what 

you are saying. I think stopping the dual citizenship is absolutely 

critical, and all those things. 

I appreciate your testimony in that regard, because I could not 

agree with you any further. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. ZOGBY. I did not mean some of that, and let me just explain 

what I do mean. What I do mean—I do oppose the dual citizenship, 

and I do think we have to move people from exile into the mainstream. 

But it is wonderful that I am an Arab American. American is the 

noun. Arab is the adjective. I have a heritage that I am proud of. 

It gives me no end of joy—— 

Mr. BROUN. Well, I apologize for interrupting you, but just for 

the sake of time—— 

Mr. ZOGBY. Yes. 

Mr. BROUN [continuing]. We all come from different backgrounds. 

We have different beliefs. We have different heritages. But being 

an American—— 

Mr. ZOGBY. Yes. 

Mr. BROUN [continuing]. Is the most important thing, in my opinion, for all of us. 

Mr. ZOGBY. The meaning of that being American is that we eat 

spaghetti, and we eat tabouli, and we eat latkes, and we are, in 

fact, this diverse culture of people that all has become America, 

and America has become changed, too. 

Mr. BROUN. I agree with you, and we ought to focus on being 

Americans. 

Mr. ZOGBY [continuing]. Focus on that and the American story. 

I agree with you on that part. 

Mr. BROUN. Well, I was glad to hear you—— 

Mr. ZOGBY. Thank you. 

Mr. BROUN [continuing]. Your earlier testimony. But nowhere is 

the threat more real than in the alarming manifestation of homegrown terrorism and the mutating nature of the terrorist threat. 

Fort Hood was a horrible example of radicalization turning from 

ideology—an ideological expression to terrorism and an act. 

Dr. Cragin, it appears that political correctness is a tremendous 

roadblock to addressing radicalization and homegrown terrorism, 

and I would very much like to hear your thoughts on how we can 

address that issue. 

Ms. CRAGIN. I have actually had people say this to me before, 

that political correctness is a roadblock to addressing the issue of 

radicalization. I would say in my experience that that is not necessarily the case. 

There is some discomfort in dealing with the term of ideology. 

But in this sense, to me, ideology is—I think as this panel has suggested, is sort of a broad brush or is a rhetorical device that tends 

to be used. 
49 

But when it comes down to individual motivations, ideology 

doesn’t end up being—research would demonstrate the ideology 

doesn’t end up being one of the primary motivating factors in most 

cases. 

So to me, political correctness, you know, if there is a bit of sensitivity, maybe, but I would say political correctness necessarily 

hasn’t been a barrier, at least in the academic community, to address this problem. It has really been more an interpretation of 

what this ideology means. 

Mr. BROUN. Well, I disagree with you. I think the Fort Hood incident—political correctness was the biggest barrier to preventing 

that terrorist attack that occurred down there, the very tragic terrorist attack that—one of the soldiers that was killed was from my 

district, and I think political correctness was very much in play 

there. 

Changing tracks—I just throw this out—I have got just 1 minute 

left. I believe very firmly that on-the-ground human intelligence 

within communities, whether it is within the radical Muslim community, whether it is within the radical ecoterrorist groups, whether it is with the radical animal protection groups or the others that 

have been mentioned—I would like you-all’s comment about my belief that—on-the-ground human intelligence I think is going to be 

one of the best ways, if not the very best way, of preventing the 

radicalization in—and to stop the process before it gets to a point 

of actually causing a terrorist attack. 

So I throw it out just for the few seconds I have left. 

Mr. Macleod-Ball. 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. Thank you. I think I disagree and agree in 

part with you. I don’t think we can make—be making decisions 

based upon individual associations with groups, no matter how bad 

their reputation may be. 

However, if law enforcement, acting properly, determines that 

there—that it has probable cause to believe that a particular set 

of individuals are appropriate to investigate because they anticipate or have committed unlawful acts, then certainly, they ought 

to go and investigate. 

Mr. BROUN. But you want to wait ’til they actually commit the 

terrorist attack or some—or break the law before we intervene, and 

we have got to intervene before that. 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. Not necessarily. When you have probable 

cause to investigate, it doesn’t necessarily mean that an unlawful 

act has already been committed. You know, we are sort of talking 

hypotheticals here. 

But the law enforcement community has a fairly rigid set of procedures. It has a basis for determining when to open a file, when 

to open an investigation in a particular set of circumstances. 

Those rules have been in place and policies have been in place 

for quite some time. Members of this committee, I am sure, are 

aware of those procedures better than I am, having worked in the 

law enforcement community in the past. 

Mr. BROUN. Madame Chair, my time has expired, but I would 

appreciate a written response from all of you all regarding that 

question. 

Thank you, Madame Chair. 
50 

Ms. HARMAN. That request is acceptable to all of you? Thank you 

very much. 

Now I yield 5 minutes to Mr. Green, of Texas. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

I thank the witnesses for appearing today. 

There are words from South Pacific that are important, I think. 

The song in South—a song has the words ‘‘you have got to be 

taught’’ in it. You are not born an evil person, a terrorist. You have 

to be taught. So you do have some mentoring that takes place 

along the way. 

In the process of being taught to hate, we have the opportunity 

to negate this process. But we cannot do it inconsistently. We really have to develop consistency in dealing with hate, hate speech, 

hate crimes. 

We are right to talk about how persons of ill repute from other 

places can do dastardly deeds, but we must also, with an equal degree of fervor, condemn those who are born right here who have 

been terrorizing people for scores of years. 

We have to use the same language when we talk about the KKK 

and talk about the evil that they represent and be as committed 

to eliminating the KKK and its evil as we are to eliminating others 

who would perpetrate evil. The consistency has to be there. 

Having lived under circumstances where fear was something that 

I had to cope with, I know that we have not done enough to be consistent with our rhetoric. We cannot allow a certain amount of tolerance of hate to exist for some and expect to overwhelm others 

with our desire to do good. 

Dr. King reminded us it is not just the work of evil people or the 

actions of the evil people but the inaction of good people that really 

can make a difference in what we do. 

Good people, people of good will, have to use free speech just as 

people of evil will use free speech. Free speech has to have a price 

when it has hate in it. 

The price doesn’t have to be incarceration. The price has to be 

people of good will stepping forward and saying, ‘‘This is wrong. 

This is hate that you are preaching.’’ 

We have got to get people to a point where they will do this, and 

it has to permeate the entirety of the community to be efficacious. 

So my question to all of you is this. 

How do we make sure or how do we perfect a process that is consistent in approach to evil-doers and not allow homegrown evil to 

receive less attention than evil that may come from without that 

is equally as bad? 

The KKK, I say to you, is an evil organization with evil intent. 

Rarely will you hear it said as I have just said it. But we have no 

problems condemning other evil. Evil is evil. We cannot tolerate it 

under any circumstances. 

I will start with the lady, your commentary on how we can consistently deal with this, please. 

Ms. CRAGIN. Sure. I think as I mentioned earlier, I can’t even 

begin to say how impressed I have been with Muslim community 

leaders in the United States who have done this, who have stood 

up and said, ‘‘No, this is wrong.’’ 

I would agree with you that—— 
51 

Mr. GREEN. If I may just intercede for a moment, I want people 

to stand up and talk about how evil the KKK is, too. 

Ms. CRAGIN. Sure, and—— 

Mr. GREEN. That is what I want to get—— 

Ms. CRAGIN [continuing]. So I was going to say—— 

Mr. GREEN. You know, that is the example. 

Ms. CRAGIN. Right. I was going to say so that is a nice example 

for the rest of us for doing the same thing. 

The one thing I would add to that is then protecting those who 

speak out from backlash, I think, is an important component of this 

as well, and so that there is almost a bandwagoning effect, and so 

that more and more people feel free to speak out. 

But absolutely, I would say they are an example to all of us. 

Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir. 

Dr. WEINE. I think one way to think about this is you are talking 

about counter narratives, counter narratives to hate, counter narratives to extremism, and I think that a counter narrative from one 

corner of our society can be inspiring and helpful to counter a narrative—to those who want to preach counter narratives from other 

segments of society. 

They should be spoken, and they should be listened to. My concern, along with Dr. Cragin, is that we could be doing more, especially the people who are economically disempowered or on the 

margins of society, to preach those counter narratives against hatred and fear. Thank you. 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. I really appreciate your comments, Congressman. You know, the KKK grew out of a radical or reactionary 

Christian philosophy used as the—as part of its history. 

Yet I would say there is more in common between the KKK and 

the Islamist groups who have been—who have attacked our country than the KKK has with mainstream Christian values. 

That is the point, I think, of our comments, is that you have got 

to look not at the ideology that serves as the foundation for the organization but, rather, in their propensity for action. 

Whether you are looking at the KKK, or some radical Islamic 

group who has attacked us, or non-ideological attacks—look at the 

anthrax attacks, or the Columbine shootings, or any of the sort of 

non-ideological—— 

Mr. GREEN. Let me interrupt you and ask the Chair—Madame 

Chair, would you be so kind as to let Dr. Zogby have a comment 

on this, too? 

Ms. HARMAN. I will—— 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. Mr. Green. We were entertaining the 

notion of each Member having one more question. Maybe you 

would like to continue your time and have that count for your additional question? 

Mr. GREEN. I will allow this to be my time. 

Dr. Zogby, please. 

Mr. ZOGBY. I remember during the Clinton years the dialogue— 

the National dialogue on race was an important effort to engage us 

all as a country in an examination of who we are and how we relate to one another. 
52 

He also held, I think, a rather stunning White House event on 

hate crimes that I was a participant in and found it truly moving. 

I think we need more and not less of that. 

I also think if there were—if I were to fault that effort in one 

way, it was that it was too dependent on the President to go from 

place to place, and we didn’t begin a National program of encouraging people independently to begin this conversation in their communities, on their campuses, et cetera. 

Right after 9/11, President Bush did a rather stunning thing 

when he focused the Nation on the American Muslim community 

and said they should not be seen as the enemy. We had an avalanche of people in Hollywood and in various forms of media and 

politics—this House and the Senate passed resolutions. 

People began town meetings in their communities talking about 

it. I will tell you, the measure of our country is that my community, the Arab community, and the Muslim community as well 

never felt as protected and respected even in that most vulnerable 

of times, even when we were witnessing hate crimes like we never 

had before, because of the support we were receiving from institutions around this country. It all started with the President doing 

it. 

I think that we have an opportunity to do that again on many 

levels today and not be afraid to encourage a re-examination and 

a re-commitment to what it means to be America, what it means 

to be a diverse country of many strands woven into a fabric that 

has made us great. 

If we allow that map to define us and to take those—and I maintain isolated events, because each of them—many of them are different. 

Some of them are criminal activity converted to Islam, some of 

them are people who went postal, and some of them are people recruited to fight in foreign engagement, not to attack our country, 

despite the fact that I think that that engagement is wrong and it 

still should be dealt with. 

All of those things are wrong, and we have to look at them, but 

they cannot define our response. That is when I said not a sledgehammer but a scalpel. One of the things to do is to begin this National dialogue not just in this hearing but among all of our people 

so that we, in fact, recommit ourselves to the—— 

Mr. GREEN. I am going to have to thank you, Doctor. I am woefully over. 

Thank you, Madame Chair. You have been more than generous. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Dr. Zogby. 

Members who are interested in doing this will be able to ask one 

more brief question, starting with Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Mr. Green, thank you for that questioning. I think you hit the 

issue—it is hatred, is what we are talking about. 

My grandfather was—lost his job because of the KKK because he 

was a Catholic, and it was a white supremacy—it was a religious 

extremist movement not unlike what we are seeing today in terms 

of a radical Islamic extremist movement. 
53 

Not to categorize all Christians as being that way, or all Muslims 

as being that way, but we are talking about a radical form of hatred, a perverted sense of these religions, these two religions, taken 

to a radical point where action, unfortunately, is taken by some in 

a terrorist event. 

The KKK portrayed terrorism in the United States, in my view, 

you know? I think radical Islam portrays terrorism. They certainly 

did on 9/11. Maybe it is a matter of semantics here, but I do think 

the ideology and the belief system—you can’t take it, you know, out 

part and parcel from the act itself. 

I think it does begin with a belief system that takes an individual to a point where the hatred is such—Dr. Zogby, you said it 

well. When he said, ‘‘Allahu Akbar,’’ what he meant was, ‘‘I hate 

you.’’ That is what he meant, Mr. Hasan at Fort Hood. That is 

what drove him to kill that day. 

So I think the ideology is—the belief system is the beginning of 

the process and the radical belief system. 

I think the great challenge that we have in this country is how, 

within the Constitution, to monitor activities of radical ideology 

and radical beliefs and to be able to prevent and deter that radical 

belief from going the next step into an act of violence. 

So with that, I—if anybody would like to comment on that. 

Ms. HARMAN. That was a brief question. 

[Laughter.] 

Yes, Mr. Macleod-Ball. Briefly, please. 

Mr. MACLEOD-BALL. Briefly, certainly. I believe I disagree with 

your statement that it starts with a radical belief. I think the radical belief could come in the middle. It could come in the end. It 

is the propensity to violence that really is the factor here. 

When you exercise your responsibility to examine these issues, if 

you exclude other ideologies—if you exclude the KKK from your investigation, you run the risk of missing something that is—that 

may be critical to understanding the entire problem. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I completely agree with that. I completely agree 

with that. Yes. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Carney, a question, please. 

Mr. CARNEY. How do you define a question, Madame Chair? 

[Laughter.] 

In the two terms I have been here, I have noticed that we often 

react to fear rather than courage. I am damn tired of that. I got 

to tell you that I was—I am very impressed with the panel and in 

what I have heard today. 

Mr. Zogby, I really want to associate myself with your comments 

on differentiation here and what we can do. To that end, your discussion of being a Yemeni American or an Irish American or whatever the case might be—how much do these folks see themselves 

as a soldier, versus citizen, in these wars that they are involved in? 

Mr. ZOGBY. They do not, and that is the important thing, is that 

the majorities of those communities see that ethnicity as part of 

their heritage and part of their origins, and the land where daddy 

came from. That is the nature of exile politics. 
54 

It is the nature of the kids whose parents came after the Hungarian 1956 revolution was squashed and whose parents kept talking about, ‘‘We are going to go back,’’ and the kids—one generation 

are saying, ‘‘No, this is home.’’ 

That is the process we have to encourage, is that sense that it 

is your heritage, it is your history, you can be proud of it, but this 

has become your new history, and this is the America that we become. 

I therefore think that we don’t want to discourage Yemeni Americans from feeling proud about their heritage in Yemen, but what 

we want to do is make sure that that American side is strengthened and given a sense of purpose so that they identify—the way 

that they express their concern about what is happening in Somalia is by voting for a Congressman who is going to support their 

position on those issues, or by getting engaged in a political discussion about what can America do to change politics in Afghanistan, 

rather than, ‘‘I am becoming a soldier because I don’t really belong 

here.’’ 

It is that alienation we have to cure, and that is the key here. 

Mr. CARNEY. Dr. Weine. 

Dr. WEINE. I think we should remember that these kids—a lot 

of these people who radicalize and get recruited are kids. They are 

17 years old, 18 years old, 19 years old, in high school. They are 

not rational agents, you know, making logical decisions with—you 

know, backed by the full weight of, you know, a balanced view of 

the world. 

They can act impulsively and quickly in response to a charismatic person. That makes them very vulnerable, so—— 

Mr. CARNEY. How desensitized are these kids, do you think? 

Dr. WEINE. Desensitized to—— 

Mr. CARNEY. To violence. 

Dr. WEINE. Well, the ones that I know—they are not violent by 

nature, most of them. In fact, one of them wanted to be a doctor. 

They see themselves as healers, but they are desensitized to violence in their communities subject to a lot of community violence. 

One of the kids who went to Somalia was really struck by—and 

wrote on his Facebook page the drive-by killing of one of the kids 

in Somalia in Minneapolis and said that could happen to me. I 

think that changed his view of the world. 

So the point I want to make is this—you know, it is kind of a 

‘‘it takes a village’’ kind of idea, so teachers, parents, community 

leaders, not just one person in one conversation, but all these people have to be involved in the counter pull against that one recruiter, because ultimately we have got to—we have got to convince 

a 17-year-old acting alone and impulsively to stay on our side and 

not to go to the other side. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Broun. 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Madame Chair. 

Quick question, I believe the only way we are going to stop terrorism in this country or worldwide is for the peace in the Muslim 

community. It is what we are most focused upon now. 
55 

I think it is for peace-loving Muslims all over the world, in this 

country as well as elsewhere, to say, ‘‘That is enough. We have had 

enough of this. We are going to put a stop to it.’’ 

It is true within all communities, whether it is in our communities with the KKK or any other communities. I think the way to 

stop this is for people to be—within that community to say, ‘‘No.’’ 

We are going to prevent it ourselves within our own community. 

Do you agree with that, each of you? If so, how can we promote 

that more so as a committee and as a government, from the U.S. 

Governmental perspective? 

Jump in. 

Dr. WEINE. Yes, I completely agree with that. It concerns me— 

again, to take the Somali example as one indicator of this—that a 

year down the line those parents of those kids who went away— 

nobody has reached out to them. 

They are sitting there with their story. They haven’t told their 

story. They have a story to tell to other community members. Nobody has helped them to do that, not psycho-social workers, not 

community police, not—and they feel victimized not only by what 

happened to their kids but by this lack of response and then by all 

the media attention. 

You, I think, have to find ways to support parents and community leaders like that not just to stand up for community values or 

participate in the community dialogue but to specifically counter 

radicalization and recruitment. 

I think the effort of a bill that was once proposed in general is 

what is needed, a Government entity to address that. So that is 

what I think you could do. 

Mr. BROUN. Well, Doctor, specifically how would you do that, 

though? How would you reach out to these Somali families? How 

would you reach out to any others not only in this country but 

worldwide? 

Dr. WEINE. Well, we are, and I would do it in the spirit of collaboration. Say, you know, ‘‘The best protection of your community 

is going to be people in your community stepping up, but yet we 

know certain things about, say, how to prevent teenagers from 

doing other bad kinds of things like drugs, gang involvement or 

sexually risky behavior, so let’s merge the expertise from science 

and community values and let’s get that work done in community, 

on-the-ground kind of activities.’’ 

Mr. BROUN. Thank you, Doctor. That was quicker than anybody 

else, Madame Chair. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Dr. Broun. 

Let me conclude with no questions but just an observation. First, 

we have a problem, and this subcommittee is dedicated and has 

been dedicated over many years on a bipartisan basis to find a solution, to find the right intervention strategies so that this problem 

of people becoming terrorists, whatever their motivations are, is 

hopefully reduced and we prevent the death of hundreds, thousands, of innocent Americans, probably on American soil, if possible. We have a problem. 

Second point I want to make is that security and liberty are not 

a zero-sum game. I have said this over and over and over again. 

You can either get more of both or less. 
56 

I predict that if we don’t work together on the right intervention 

strategies and there is another major attack or series of major attacks on U.S. soil, the first casualty is going to be our Constitution. 

I don’t want that to happen, and I appreciate the fact that all 

these panelists and many others we consult don’t want that to happen either, and therefore we need to focus on what are the right 

set of intervention strategies. 

Third point is we are not limiting our inquiry to the Arab American community or the Muslim American community. We never 

were limiting it. The comments of numbers of Members about a 

broader inquiry I thought were very valuable. The comments of the 

witnesses about this were very valuable. So I think we have built 

a very good record here. 

Finally, to Dr. Weine, obviously my favorite witness since he 

liked our bill, that bill was well intended. I don’t think any of you 

disputes that. The goal of setting up a multidisciplinary commission was to give us better advice. 

It wasn’t to tell us what to do. It wasn’t to develop a legislative 

strategy. But it was to give us better advice so we would act based 

on information and not just based on emotion, or passion, or personal prejudice that any of us might have. 

So I continue to feel that—not necessarily that that bill has to 

become law—I know there are strong objections—but that working 

together on a better strategy is imperative, and I want to leave 

that message with all of you. I see people nodding, so you are in. 

You are in the tent. 

A strategy perhaps based on a refinement of that old bill, perhaps based on a way to go after recruiters specifically, perhaps 

based on a better understanding of good community policing and 

good community strategies, and certainly including the words 

‘‘thank you’’ to those who are trying to help is a way forward. 

So I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony 

and the Members for very valuable questions. If Members in addition to Dr. Broun have other questions in writing, I hope witnesses 

will comply. 

Having no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

Æ