IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWA RE IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
SHERRY LONG, ) ) Defendant-Below/Appellant, )

) v. ) C.A. No. CPU4-16-000917 ) STATE OF DELAWARE, )

) Plaintiff-Below/Appellee. ) )

Submitted: October 21, 2016 Decided: December 13, 2016
Sherry Long Victoria Counihan, Esq. 321 Wooddale Avenue Department of Justice New Castle, DE 19720 820 North French Street Self-Represented Appellant

Wilmington, DE 19801 Attorney for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT This is an appeal from a decision by the Justice of the Peace Court No. 13 finding in favor of Plaintiff-Below/Appellee State of Delaware Benefit Payment Control Unit (the “Division” 1 ), of the Department of Labor’s Division of Unemployment Insurance. The Division brings this M otion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) pursuant to Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 56 . A hearing on the

1 The Division is the agency responsible for maintai ning the solvency of Delaware’s Unemployment Compen sation Administration Fund, which provides wage earners wh o become unemployed through no fault of their own w ith unemployment benefits until they re-enter the labor market.2

Motion was held on September 2, 2016. During the h earing, the question surfaced of whether the Court has jurisdiction in this matter. Specifically, the Court questioned
whether it could issue an order for the collection of a debt based upon a decision by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. At the c onclusion of the hearing, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental br iefing on the issue of jurisdiction. The Division complied with the Court’s briefing ord er; however, Sherry Long (“Defendant”) failed to submit any additional mater ial. This is the Court’s decision
on the Motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits with the Division, effective February 5, 2012, and began rec eiving benefits in the amount of $281.00 per week. After receiving these benefits f or six months, Defendant applied for an extension, which became effective on August 5, 2012, and again began receiving benefits in the amount of $281.00 per wee k. Defendant continued to receive the extension weekly benefits from August 1 1, 2012 through December 29,
2012. On January 23, 2013, the Division issued a Notice o f Determination finding that Defendant had been disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits as of April 21, 2012 (the “Disqualificatio n Determination”). The notice stated that an overpayment would be established, an d Defendant had a right to appeal3

the Disqualification Determination. Defendant did not pursue an appeal, and the Disqualification Determination became final on Febr uary 2, 2013. On March 1, 2013, the Division issued two notices d etermining Defendant had been overpaid unemployment insurance benefits for w hich she was later found to be disqualified (the “Overpayment Determinations”). T he Overpayment Determinations found that Defendant had been overpaid unemployment benefits in the amount of $4,496.00 from April 21, 2012 to August 4, 2012; an d $5,620.00 from August 11, 2012 to December 29, 2012. Defendant appealed both Over payment Determinations to an Appeals Referee. After a hearing on the merits, th e Appeals Referee upheld both of the Overpayment Determinations. On April 15, 2013, Defendant appealed the Appeals R eferee’s decision to the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (the “Board”). The Board affirmed the Appeals Referee’s decision, and found Defendant lia ble for the overpayments of unemployment benefits. On May 8, 2013, Defendant a ppealed the Board’s decision to the Superior Court; however, the Superior Court dismissed the action on October 3, 2013 because Defendant failed to prosecute the a ppeal. Accordingly, the Board’s decision upholding the Overpayment Determinations b ecame a final administrative
order. Pursuant to the authority in 19 Del. C. § 3325 and 30 Del. C. § 545 , the Division began collection proceedings of the amounts owed by withholding a portion of Defendant’s future unemployment benefits and by int ercepting Defendant’s tax4

refunds. The Division was able to recoup $1,367.00 from Defendant using these methods. Defendant currently owes the Division $8, 875.50 in unemployment benefits overpayments. On October 22, 2015, the Division brought a debt action against Defendant in Justice of the Peace Court No. 13, to recover th e amounts due from overpayments. On March 8, 2016, Defendant filed a counterclaim in the amount of $1,368.00, seeking recovery of reductions in unemployment bene fit payments the Division withheld. The Justice of the Peace Court held a tr ial on March 9, 2016, and entered judgment in favor of the Division in the amount of $8,829.00 plus costs. On March 24, 2016, Defendant filed an appeal to this Court. The Division filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on August 9, 2016. The Court conducted a hearing on the Motion on September 2, 2016, where the jurisdiction issue surfaced. The question cent ered upon the Court’s authority to
hear an action where the claim arose out of and is based upon an administrative decision by the Board to collect overpayment benefi ts. The Court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue of juris diction, and reserved decision on the Motion. On September 30, 2016, the Division fi led its Opening Brief on the issue of jurisdiction. Although Defendant was afforded t he opportunity to address the issue of jurisdiction, Defendant did not file a Res ponse.5 PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS The Division contends that this Court has jurisdic tion to hear this debt action and issue a judgment based upon a decision by the B oard. In support of its position, the Division argues the Court has jurisdiction unde r the plain meaning of the unambiguous statute codified in 19 Del. C. § 3325 . The Division argues that under
section 3325 , the Division may collect an overpayment of unempl oyment benefits by bringing a “civil action in a court of competent ju risdiction.” The Division contends that based upon principles of statutory constructio n and case law construing sections of the Delaware Code, the Court has jurisdiction to hear this action to collect a debt overpayment owed to a state agency. Moreover, the Division references other sections o f Title 19 which require appeals to be filed exclusively with the Superior C ourt. The Division argues the General Assembly never intended Section 3325 actions for the collection of overpayment debts to be filed exclusively in the Su perior Court, but instead in any “court of competent jurisdiction.” The Division ma intains if the legislature meant for these cases to be heard exclusively in Superior Cou rt, it would have so specified in the statute. The Division maintains the plain language of the statute is evidence of the legislature’s intent to allow the Division to file actions, such as this one, in any court that hears civil actions, subject to the limitation s of amounts in controversy. Furthermore, the Division contends that the Delaware Administrative Procedures
Act (the “ APA ”) does not apply in this case, because the APA does not apply to6

decisions of either the Division or the Board. The Division acknowledges that appeals from case decisions made by State agencies and boards must be filed with the Superior Court pursuant to the APA . However, the Division contends the instant action is not an appeal of an agency decision, but rather a separate action to collect debts owed as a result of a final, and no longer ap pealable, agency decision. Therefore, the State reasons that since the APA does not confer jurisdiction in debt matters, the Court must look to the Delaware Code a nd the Delaware Constitution to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdictio n. With respect to this Court, the Division notes tha t the Delaware Constitution grants the Court of Common Pleas jurisdiction over all civil actions at law where the matter or thing in controversy does not exceed $50, 000. The Division argues that the instant matter, which is a civil action at law seek ing to collect a debt owed to a state agency in an amount less than $50,000, falls square ly within this Court’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Division maintains that the Justic e of the Peace Court had jurisdiction to hear this matter, because the amoun t in controversy did not exceed the court’s $15,000 jurisdictional limit. For these re asons, it is the Division’s position that not only does the Superior Court have jurisdiction to hear this matter, but also the Justice of the Peace Court and the Court of Common Pleas, because they are all courts of competent jurisdiction with an amount in controversy not in excess of their
constitutional limits.7

Because this Court has jurisdiction to hear the ap peal, the Division argues this Court must grant its Motion for Summary Judgment. The Division maintains that there are no issues of genuine material facts. The Division asserts that the Board’s ruling affirming the Overpayment Determinations is a final administrative order, which is not reviewable by this Court. The Divisio n argues Defendant’s sole remedy to challenge the Board’s decision was to pursue an appeal with the Superior Court, which process Defendant began, but did not continue to pursue. This led to the Superior Court dismissing Defendant’s appeal, and t he Board’s decision became a final order. As a result, the Division argues that Defendant is required by law to repay the outstanding principal balance owed to the Divis ion with interest and court costs. Although Defendant did not provide this Court with a response on the issue of jurisdiction, Defendant does vehemently oppose the Division’s Motion. However, Defendant’s opposition is based upon her not being afforded the opportunity to argue her case before the Justice of the Peace Cour t. Specifically, Defendant claims she was not able to argue the issue of disqualifica tion of benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(1) . For these reasons, Defendant implores this Court to deny the Division’s Motion, and allow her a chance to present her posit ion at trial.
LEGAL STANDARD Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 56(c) provides that “[t]he judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, a nswers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, i f any, show that there is no genuine8

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” 2 If the record reveals that material facts are in dispute, or if the factual record has not been developed thoroughly enough to allow t he Court to apply the law to the factual record sub judice, then summary judgment mu st be denied. 3 “In considering a motion for summary judgment the c ourt must view the facts in a light favorable to the non-moving party and ac cept, as true, all undisputed factual
assertions.” 4 This Court will grant a motion for summary judgmen t when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving part y is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. 5 However, a motion for summary judgment will be de nied when “a more thorough inquiry into the facts is desirable to cla rify the application of the law to the
circumstances.” 6
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction Before the Court can address the Division’s Motion, it first must decide the threshold question of jurisdiction. As a prelimina ry matter, I agree with the Division
that the APA does not apply in this case. The instant matter b efore the Court is not a review of an agency decision, but rather a debt col lection action. For this reason, the Court must look to the Delaware Code for guidance.

2 CCP Civ. R. 56(c). 3 See Ebersole v. Lowengrub , 180 A.2d 467 (Del. 1962). 4 Donnelly v. Fannie Mae , 2015 WL 6739163, at *2 (Del. Com. Pl. Nov. 3, 201 5) (internal citations omitted). 5 See Id

. 6 Id

.9

The recoupment of overpayment of benefits is govern ed by 19 Del. C. § 3325

. The statute is explicit on how the Division may rec oup the overpayment of unemployment benefits, including the requirement th at the Division issue notices of overpayment prior to any collection action. The st atute is also clear that the judicial appeal process to dispute a decision of overpayment , is exclusively vested in the Superior Court. However, the statute generally ves ts jurisdiction for collection action following the Board’s final determination. A pertinent part of Section 3325 states: No action shall be taken by the Department to colle ct an overpayment of benefits to any person after a period of 5 years from the end of the benefit year, as defined in § 3302(3) of this title , with respect to which such benefits were paid, unless during this 5 year period, the Department has brought a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against the claimant

. 7 Furthermore, the first paragraph of Section 3325 states: In addition to the methods of collection authorized by this chapter, the Department may collect overpayments, interest, pena lties, and other liabilities due under this chapter as provided in § 545, Title 30 of the Delaware Code, § 5402 of the Federal Internal Reven ue Code ( 26 U.S.C. § 5402 ), § 503(m) of the Social Security Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 503(m)

), and any other means available under Federal or State law

. 8 Delaware law grants this Court jurisdiction over al l civil actions at law where the matter or thing in controversy does not exceed $50,000. 9 A debt action based upon amounts a party claims or a certain sum of mon ey due to him or her comes

7 19 Del. C. § 3325 (emphasis added). 8 Id (emphasis added). 9 10 Del. C. § 1322.10

within this jurisdiction. 10 One of the most common instances of its use is fo r debts based upon judgments or obligations of record. 11 The basic rule of statutory construction requires the Court to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. 12 “If the statute as a whole is unambiguous and there is no reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the words used, the court's role is limited to an application of the literal meaning of those words.” 13 The plain reading
of Section 3325

allows the Division to collect overpayments by any means available under State law. This includes bringing debt colle ction actions based upon judgments or obligations of record. The Division brought a d ebt action against Defendant in the Justice of the Peace Court to recover the overpayme nt of benefits based upon a final administrative order. The amount the Division soug ht to recover was under $15,000. Therefore, the Justice of the Peace Court had juris diction over this matter. This Court has jurisdiction to hear civil appeals from t he Justice of the Peace Court, and therefore this matter is properly before the Court.
II. Motion for Summary Judgment Turning to the Motion before the Court, having reso lved the jurisdiction issue, the record reflects that the Board’s decision regar ding the overpayment of benefits became a final order upon dismissal by the Superior Court. Pursuant to Section 3325 ,

10 Benjamin J. Shipman, Handbook of Common-Law Pleading § 52, at 132 (Henry Winthrop Ballantine ed., 3d. 19 23). 11 Id

. 12 See Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Cont rol Bd., Del.Supr. , 492 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1985). 13 In re Adoption of Swanson , 623 A.2d 1095, 1096–97 (Del. 1993).11

Defendant’s sole remedy to dispute the Board’s deci sion is an appeal to the Superior Court, 14 which she commenced but ultimately failed to pursu e. This resulted in the Superior Court dismissing her appeal, making the Bo ard’s decision final. There are no genuine issues of material fact that are in dispute regarding the state’s right to collect the debt. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropr iate under Court of Common Pleas
Civil Rule 56 , and the Division’s Motion is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated supra , the Division’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED . Defendant’s counterclaim seeking the recovery of reductions in unemployment benefit payments the Division withheld is hereby DENIED

. Judgment is entered in favor of the Division in the principal amount of $8,829.00, with post-judgment interest at the contractual rate of 18% and costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________________ Alex J. Smalls, Chief Judge

Sherry Long-OP Dec 13 2016

14 19 Del. C. §3325.