The Honorable Lyle E. Str om, United States District Judge for

the District of Nebraska, adopting the Report and Recommenda tion of the Honorable Kathleen A. Jaudzemis, United States Magistrat e Judge for the District of Nebraska. ___________ No. 96-2909

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Steven C. Taylor, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: January 15, 1997 Filed: February 18, 1997

___________ Before BEAM, ROSS, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Ste venC. Taylor appeals the district court's denial of hi s 1
mo tionto suppress evidence gathered pursuant to Taylor' s warrantless arrest. We affirm.I. BACKGROUND

Omaha police arrested a drug d ealer in April 1995, who agreed to cooperate with authorities. The newly acquired informant knew his source of methamphetamine only as "Steve," but provided police with "Steve's" telephone numbe r, address, and a description of his ve hicle. Officers checked out this information and identifie d Ste venTaylor as the supplier. Under the officers' supervision , the in formant then called Steve and arranged for delivery o f methamphetamine to room 103 of the Savannah Suites Motel. Th e informant warned that "Steve" was "famous for being late" but that he always arrived with drugs as promised. The final phone c all was placed at 6:00 in the evening, and a tape recording of th e conversation reveals "Steve" p romising that he was on his way. At 7:00 p.m. Taylor arrived at room 103 of the Savannah Suites an d foundpo lice waiting. Taylor was arrested and searched. He wa s carrying an ounce and a half o f methamphetamine, a scale, a loaded .38-caliber revolver, and a se t of nunchakus. Taylor was informed of his rights, agreed to be interviewed and quickly confessed. After he was indicted, Taylor moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of his arrest, including the items recovered from his person and his incriminating statements. He argued that the arrest was unsupported by probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The mag istrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and made a recommendatio n that the motion be denied, whi ch recommendation the district court adopted. Taylor then entered a conditional plea of guilty t o charge s that he possessed methamphetamine with the intent t o distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and that, as-3-

afelon, he violated 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm. He appeals the suppression ruling.

II. DISCUSSION We will only overturn a district court's finding of probable cause to make a warrantless arrest if it is clearly erroneous
. UnitedStates v. Morgan , 997 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1993)
. Determining probable cause to arrest requires the court to f ocus on the mo ment the arrest was made and to ask whether "the facts an d circum stances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which the y had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committedor was co mmittingan offense." Beck v. Ohio , 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)
. This calculation "does not dep end upon individual facts; rather it depends on the cumulative effect of the facts in the totality o f the circumstances." United States v. Brown , 49 F.3d 1346, 134 9 (8th Cir. 1995). Taylor relies on United States v. Everroad , 704 F.2d 403 (8th Cir. 1983) to argue that his mere presence in a location known to be the site of criminal activity was insufficient to establis h probable cause for his arrest. This is a correct statement of the law, but it has very little relevance to these facts. Taylor was not arrested merely because of his physical location. The Omah a police believed Taylor was committing a crime because o f intelligence provided by a previously unknown informant. Th e pertinent inquiry, then, is wh ether the informant was sufficiently trustworthy to support the officers' belief that Taylor was engaged in criminal activity.Tay lor reports that the objections were sustained based o n

Fed eral Rule of Evidence 403. Our review of the transcrip t indicates that the objections were not based on undue prejud ice but on relevance, which is guided by Rule 401. We review ruling s based oneither provision for abuse of discretion. United States v
. Johnson , 934 F.2d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1991) (Rule 403) and Unite d States v. Scholle , 553 F.2d 11 09, 1124 (8th Cir. 1977) (Rule 401). -4- "Where a previously unknown informant provides information , the informant's lack of a track record requires < some independen t veri fication' to establish the reliability of the information. " United States v. Amaya , 52 F.3d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Brown , 49 F.3d at 1349). This confirmation can consist o f ver ifyingdetails that would not, standing alone, lead police t o suspe ct a crime. United States v. Wilson , 964 F.2d 807, 809-1 0 (8th Cir. 1992).
Here, the informant correctly identified Taylor's address , phone number, vehicle and firs t name. He also correctly predicted that Taylor would arrive at room 103 of the Omaha Savannah Suites ona cer tain date, even including a warning that Taylor would b e late. Taken together, these facts established sufficient grounds to support a belief that Taylo r was committing or had committed an offense involving drug trafficking. At the suppression hearing, de fense counsel sought to explore the in formant's criminal history, arguing that the informant' s prior convictions undermined his credibility. The magistrat e judge sustained objections to this l ine of inquiry, which Taylor asserts was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. 2-5-

When an informant's data is at least partially corroborated, attack s upon credibility and reliability are not crucial to th e finding of probable cause. Un ited States v. Gladney , 48 F.3d 309, 313 (8th Cir. 1995); United St ates v. Humphreys , 982 F.2d 254, 259 (8thCir. 1992). Therefore, the police were not required t o investigate the informant's criminal background before lendin g credence to a story which they had already confirmed in many respects. The magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion i n excl udingevidence of the informant's criminal record or polic e knowledge thereof.

III. CONCLUSION

We hav e carefully considered each of Taylor's arguments an d find them to be without merit. The decision of the district court is affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.