UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________) RHONDA D. THEUS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 14-1280 (ABJ) ) SELENE FINANCE LLC, et al. , ) ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION Plaintiff Rhonda D. Theus filed this pro se lawsuit against defendants Selene Finance LLC (“Selene”) 1 and Clearmont LLC (“Clearmont”), bringing claims related to a foreclosure on real property located in Macomb County, Michigan. Selene has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on several grounds: lack of federa l subject-matter jurisdiction ; improper service of process; improper venue; and failure to state a claim. 2 Selene’s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. [Dkt. # 7] (“Mot.”); Statement of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. [Dkt. # 7-1] (“Mem.”). The Court finds that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over this action and that plaintiff has fail ed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and so the case will be dismissed.

1 In its motion to dismiss, Selene Finance LP notes that it has b een improperly sued as Selene Finance LLC. Selene’s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. [Dkt. # 7] at 1. 2 Defendant Clearmont has not entered an appearance in this caseor responded to the complaint in any way. The Court notes, however, that there is li ttle indication that Clearmont was ever served with process or otherwise notified of this lawsuit. See Aff. of Service [Dkt. # 4] (reflecting copies of mailing labels addressed to Clearmont and Selene and an affidavit of service relating only to defendant Selene).BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a Michigan residentwho filed the complaint in this case on July 24, 2014. Compl. [Dkt. # 1]. The citizenship of defendant Selene is not r eadily apparent, and defendant Clearmont is a citizen of Michigan. See, e.g. , Compl. at 10 (“warranty deed” attached to complaint stating that Clearmont is “a Michigan Limited Liability Company”) . Although the complaint is difficult to decipher, plaintiff’s allegations appear to concer n a foreclosure on real property located in Macomb County, Michigan. See id. at 2. The complaint does not contain any express allegations against Clearmont or Selene, but plaintiff seems to co ntend that one or both defendants cannot establish they are “the ‘ holder[s] in due course’ of the mortgage note” because they cannot produce original “wet ink signatur e” copies of the mortgage note , deed of trust, or “other similar ‘Security Instrument[s].’” Id. at 4. Plaintiff also alleges that she is entitled to receive $2 81,000 in damages from one or both defenda nts because of fraudulent acts she contends were committed with respect to the foreclosure. Id. at 5–6. On September 16, 2014, the Court issued an order stating: “Upo n review of the complaint, it appears that plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that w ould indicate that thi s Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case.” Order (Sept. 16, 2014) [D kt. # 5] at 1. The Court ordered plaintiff to show cause by October 7, 2014, why the Court had jurisdiction. Id. The Court cautioned plaintiff to keep in mi nd “the legal requirement of c omplete diversity of citizenship of the parties and the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Id. In addition, noting that plaintiff was proceeding pro se , the Court advised plaintiff that failing to

2respond to the potentially dispos itive question posed in the or der could result in the dismissal of plaintiff’s case. Id. at 1–2, citing Fox v. Strickland , 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Defendant Selene file d the pending motion to dismiss on Septemb er 25, 2014. Mot. On September 29, 2014, the Court issue d a Fox Order that informed the pro se plaintiff that failing to respond to the motion to dismiss could result in the dismissal of her case. Fox Order [Dkt. # 8] at 1, citing Fox , 837 F.2d 507. The Court ordered plaintiff to respond to the motion to dismiss on or before October 24, 2014. Id. at 2. The Court also extended the deadline for plaintiff to re spond to the September 16, 2014 order to s how cause until October 24, 20 14, stating that plaintiff could file one pleading in response to both that order and Selene’s motionto dismiss. Id. On October 21, 2014, plaintiff filed a series of “affidavits insupport of plaintiff’s claims” that purportedly responded to the C ourt’s order to show cause and the motion to dismiss. Affs. in Supp. of Pl.’s Claims [Dkt. # 9] (“Pl.’s Affs.”). 3 Selene filed a reply on October 31, 2014. Selene’s Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. [Dkt. # 10].
STANDARD OF REVIEW In evaluating a motion to dismiss under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true . . . and mu st grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted), quoting Schuler v. United States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC , 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, “‘the court need not accept factual inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those inferences

3 The Court notes that plaintiff states in the “Affidavit of Jurisdiction” that she “asserts that a Temporary Restraining Order be e ffectuated against Defendants in the instant matter.” Pl.’s Affs. at 2. To the extent plaintiff may have intended to seek a temporary restraining order in this case, she has entirely failed to comply with the Local Rules of this Court pertaining to applications for temporary restraining orders. See LCvR 65.1(a). 3are not supported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must th e [c]ourt accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions.’” Lyles v. Hughes , No. 13-0862 (RJL), 2015 WL 1263148, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2015), quoting Disner v. United States , 888 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2012); see also Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd. , 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011); see also Browning v. Clinton , 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plainti ff bears the burden of establish ing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Shekoyan v. Sibley Int’l Corp. , 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2002). Federal courts are cour ts of limited jurisdiction and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp.
v. EPA , 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our juris diction.”). “[B]ecause subject- matter jurisdiction is ‘an Art[icle] III as well as a statutory requi rement . . . no action of the pa rties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.’” Akinseye v. District of Columbia , 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003), quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, unlike when deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court “is not limite d to the allegations of the complaint.”
Hohri v. United States , 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds , 482 U.S. 64 (1987). Rather, “a court may c onsider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the ques tion [of] whether it has jurisdic tion to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics , 104 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000), citing Herbert v. Nat’l

4Acad. of Scis. , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms. , Inc. v. FDA , 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In addition, “‘[i]t is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdictio n may not be waived, and that courts may raise the issue sua sponte .’” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC , 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008), quoting Athens Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker , 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Indeed, a federal court must raise the issue because it is “forbidden – a s a court of limited jurisdiction – from acting beyond [its] authority.” Id . A district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), when it i s evident that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Evans v. Suter , No. 09-5242, 2010 WL 1632902, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010), citing Hurt v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir ., No. 07-5019, 2008 WL 441786 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2008); Scholastic Entm’t, Inc. v. Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc. , 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003); Zernial v. United States , 714 F.2d 431, 433–34 (5th Cir. 1983).
II. Failure to State a Claim “To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint mu st contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is p lausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In Iqbal , the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly : “First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations c ontained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 678–79. A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misco nduct alleged.” Id. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement ,’ but it asks for more than a sheer

5possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. , quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 566. A pleading must offer more than “‘labels and conclusions’” or a “ ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” id. , quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclus ory statements, do not suffice.” Id. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the co mplaint is construed liberally in the plaintiff’s favor, and a court should grant theplaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived fr om the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, a court need not accept inferen ces drawn by the plaintiff if those inferences are unsupported by fac ts alleged in the complaint, n or must a court accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions. See id. ; see also Browning , 292 F.3d at 242. In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a c ourt may ordinarily consider on ly “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice.” Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao , 226 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (D.D.C. 2002).
III. Pro Se Standard of Review Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se , the Court notes that “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’” and that “‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
ANALYSIS The limited original jurisdiction of federal courts extends only to “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and the parties are “citizens of different States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332( a)(1), and to cases that aris e under federal law. See 28 U.S.C.

6§ 1331. It is not clear from plaintiff’s pleadings which type of federal jurisdiction she seeks to invoke. Regardless, plaintiff ha s failed to carry her burden t o show by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the jurisdictional requirements are met her e, and so this case must be dismissed. See Lujan , 504 U.S. at 561; Kokkonen , 511 U.S. at 377. In addition, to the extent any of the federal provisions plaintiff mentions in her responsive pleading could be deemed to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, plaintiff has failed to s tate a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). First, there is not complete diversity in this case, and so 28 U.S.C. § 1332 does not apply.
See Bush v. Butler , 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (“For jurisdiction to ex ist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, there must be complete diversity between the parties, wh ich is to say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”), citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978). Plaintiff states in the complaint that she is a resident of Macomb, Michigan, see Compl. at 1, and she indicates in her filings that defendant Clea rmont is also a citizen of Macomb, Michigan. See id. (case caption reflecting address for Clearmont in Macomb, Michigan); id. at 8 (certificate of service reflecting address for Clearmont i n Macomb, Michigan); Aff. of Service at 2 (copy of mailing label reflecting address for Clearmont in Macomb, Michigan). Moreover, the “warranty deed” plaintiff has attached to the comp laint expressly states that Clearmont is “a Michigan Limited Liability Company.” Compl. at 10. In addition, despite the Court’s attempt to draw plaintiff’s att ention to this issue in the order to show cause, see Order (Sept. 16, 2014) at 1, and de spite Selene’s contention in its motion to dismiss that there is not complete diversity here, see Mot. ¶ 1; Mem. at 6–7, plaintiff does not deny that Clearmont is a citizen of Michigan or otherwise address the issue in her opposition pleading.
See Pl.’s Affs. The closest she comes to a rebuttal is the statement that “[t]he state of MICHIGAN

7is subject to the laws of the United States; principally domici led in the District of Columbia . . . to consist of the Federal Government.” Pl.’s Affs

. at 2. But this does not change the fact that there is not complete diversity here, and so the Court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Second, plaintiff has failed to plead any claim that arises und er federal law in the complaint,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and to the extent she invokes federal provisio ns in her opposition affidavits, she fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In the complaint, plaintiff refers to federal statutes related to count erfeiting, but these criminal provisions do not include a private right of action. See Compl. at 3–4, citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 472–74, and the Counterfeit Deterrence Act of 1992, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 47 1, 474, 474A. And in the affidavits, plaintiff invokes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 U.S.C. § 853 (the criminal forfeiture statute), and several constitutional amendments. See Pl.’s Affs. at 7 (“The entire foreclosure proceeding perpetrated against Plaintiff(s) and its consumer cr edit qualifies as a State Audit and Federal Investigation for accounting frauds in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . .”);
id. at 8 (“State property cannot be taxed and to engage in a Sherri ff’s sale of Plaintiff(s) property as a U.S. Trustee will constitute a criminal recovery by Plaint iff(s), pursuant to 21 USC 853(n)(6)(8).”); id. at 8–9 (“Based on the duality of Plaintiff’s position to enforc e the Organic constitution against Defendants is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in support of the defenses that will follow . . . . Analyzing th is article, the United States, as a matter of law, is domiciled in the District with respect to a State.”) ; id. at 9 (“The laying and collection of taxes imposed by Defendants and its institutions as a so-cal led obligation owed by Plaintiff(s) is Moot based on the taxing powers outlined in the Sixteenth Am endment . . . .”); id. at 10 (invoking

8the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 4 and the First Amendment). None o f these provisions or doctrines, however, amounts to a cause of action here, especially given tha t defendants are not government entities or state actors. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to pro vide any explanation as to how these provisions might entitle her to relief from defendants, or to o therwise state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft , 556 U.S. at 678. In sum, plaintiff has not carried her burden to establish that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, nor has she stated a claim upon wh ich relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court will grant Selene’s m otion to dismiss. In addition, inlight of the deficiencies in plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court will dismiss the complaint sua sponte as to Clearmont. See Evans , 2010 WL 1632902, at *1; see also Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc. , 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The district court may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . where it is ‘patently obvious’ that the plaintiff cannot possibly prevai l based on the facts alleged in the complaint.”), quoting Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n , 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
CONCLUSION For all of these reasons, the Court will grant defendant Selene ’s motion to dismiss, and it will dismiss the complaint sua sponte as to defendant Clearmont. A separate order will issue.

AMY BERMAN JACKSON United States District Judge DATE: April 14, 2015

4 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine holds that “petitioningthe Government for redress of grievances, whether by efforts t o influence legislative or exec utive action or by seeking redress in court, is immune from liability under the antitrust laws.” Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp. , 398 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

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