alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(December 20, 1960)

#### Lee G. Hawkins, Respondent, v. Dec-Art Co., Inc., Appellant, et al., Defendant.

Order entered May 5, 1960, denying defendant-appellant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, reversed on the law, with $20 costs and disbursements to the appellant and motion to dismiss the complaint granted, with $10 costs. The complaint in the original action and the basis on which that action was tried contemplated a recovery not only on common-law negligence but also on statutory grounds. The plaintiff in that complaint alleged that the inflammable and combustible fluids were “ illegally ” stored. If in this new complaint he predicates his right to recovery under section 205-a of the General Municipal Law on that ground, i.e., illegal storage, then that issue could and should have been tried in the. original ease. The complaint was broad enough and the facts adduced sufficient to allow for a determination thereof. On the other hand if he predicates liability in the present case on the roof being defective he does not come within the meaning of that section. In any event the original complaint being sufficiently comprehensive to include liability under section 205-a of the General Municipal Law, he may not again in a new action retry that issue there presented. Concur — Botein, P. J., Rabin, McNally and Noonan, JJ.; Stevens, J., concurs in the result only. .
### §641. Repealed. Pub. L. 96–73, title I, §111(b), Sept. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 541

Section, Pub. L. 91–518, title VIII, §801, Oct. 30, 1970, 84 Stat. 1339; Pub. L. 93–146, §14, Nov. 3, 1973, 87 Stat. 554; Pub. L. 93–496, §10, Oct. 28, 1974, 88 Stat. 1531; Pub. L. 94–555, title I, §108, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2616, provided for promulgation and revision of regulations for adequacy of service and for maintenance of civil actions for enforcement of provisions.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1979, see section 501(a) of Pub. L. 96–73.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Susan Illston

Case 3:09-cv-02531-SI Document 24 Filed 03/18/10 Page 1 of 1
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Gertrude Rothenberg, Respondent, v. Le Huray & Co., Inc., et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision and award of the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Although a long period elapsed between the date of the accident (April 20, 1950) to which the decedent’s cardiac condition has been attributed, and his death (October 20, 1957), there are continued links of association of the two events which sufficiently sustain the award of compensation. The original accident is well established. Decedent was moving a roll of paper weighing from 870 to 900 pounds when a wooden wedge used to help turn it slipped and decedent testified during his lifetime that he “felt a pain in the center of my chest” when he “tried to twist the roll”. He was hospitalized for acute myocardial infarction; and there is adequate medical proof that the accident helped cause it. Decedent was thereafter under continuous medical care until his death. After a period of total disability he was found to be partially disabled; and awards were made and paid for partial disability. There is contemporaneous medical proof taken during his lifetime before the board in which a failure to show improvement in his condition is noted. A new coronary thrombosis occurred in 1957, and there is adequate medical proof connecting the resulting death with the earlier accident. The medical evidence in this respect is substantial. Decision and award unanimously affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s 'Compensation Board.
§ 401.501 Delivery of notices and recipients of notices. ( a ) *Whom must the owner or PAE notify?* The PAE must notify, or ensure that the owner notifies, each tenant and any tenant organization for the project, and post a notice in the project, for all notices required by §§ 401.500 and 401.502.
( b ) *Whom must the PAE notify?* The PAE must notify: ( 1 ) The Chief Executive Officer of the unit of local government and the Executive Director of the Public Housing Authority with jurisdiction over the project location;
( 2 ) The recipient of any Outreach and Training Grant (OTAG) or Intermediary Technical Assistance Grant (ITAG) for the project location; and
( 3 ) Other appropriate neighborhood representatives and other affected parties.
[65 FR 15485, Mar. 22, 2000, as amended at 65 FR 53900, Sept. 6, 2000]
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42282

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PETER CHARLES SEE,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

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)

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)

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 866

Filed: December 16, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of twenty-five years, with a 

minimum period of confinement of eight years, for aggravated assault upon law 

enforcement personnel and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a 

crime, affirmed. 

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Maya P. Waldron, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

________________________________________________

PER CURIAM

Peter Charles See pled guilty to aggravated assault upon law enforcement personnel, I.C. 

§§ 18-915(1), 18-90l(b) and 18-905(a), and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a 

crime, I.C. § 19-2520. In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The 

state also agreed not to pursue an allegation that See was a persistent violator. The district court 

sentenced See to a unified term of twenty-five years, with a minimum period of confinement of 

eight years. See filed an I.C.R 35 motion, which the district court denied. See appeals.
2

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, See’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### § 27.119 Redemption rights.

Only for purposes of redemption rights under the Statute, a foreclosure shall be considered completed upon the date and at the time of the foreclosure sale.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

JAIRUS PRINCE

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 21

- 2946

[ March 10, 2022 ]

Appeal of order denying 3.800 motion from the Circuit Court for the

Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Lawrence M. Mirman

, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562005CF000340

.

Jairus Prince, Malone, pro se

.

No appearance required for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

C IKLIN

, G ERBER and F ORST

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

69–012 2007

110th Congress, 1st Session – – – – – – – – – – – – – House Document 110–76 

VETO MESSAGE ON H.R. 3043 

MESSAGE 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

NOTIFICATION OF THE VETO OF H.R. 3043, THE DEPARTMENTS 

OF LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, 

AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2008 

NOVEMBER 14, 2007.—Ordered to be printed 


hmoore on PRODPC68 with HMRPTE:\Seals\Congress.#13

hmoore on PRODPC68 with HMRPT
(1) 

To the House of Representatives: 

I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 3043, the 

‘‘Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008.’’

This bill spends too much. It exceeds the reasonable and responsible levels for discretionary spending that I proposed to balance 

the budget by 2012. The Congress is on a path to spend $205 billion more over the next 5 years than I requested. This puts a balanced budget in jeopardy and risks future tax increases. This year, 

the Congress plans to overspend my budget by $22 billion, of which 

$10 billion is for increases in this bill. Health care, education, job 

training, and other goals can be achieved without this excessive 

spending if the Congress sets priorities. 

This bill continues to fund programs that are duplicative or ineffective. The Congress continues to fund 56 programs totaling more 

than $3.2 billion that I proposed to terminate because they are duplicative, narrowly focused, or not producing results. 

This bill does not sufficiently fund programs that are delivering 

positive outcomes. For example, Reading First, a critical initiative 

that is demonstrating results, receives a 61 percent cut, even 

though low-income students enrolled in Reading First schools posted a more than 10-point improvement in reading proficiency from 

2004 to 2006. 

This bill has too many earmarks. I set out clear goals for the 

Congress to reform the earmarking process. The Congress chose 

not to put earmarks in bill text, instead including nearly all in report language, and they did not reach the goal of cutting the cost 

and number of earmarks by at least half. This bill contains more 

than 2,200 earmarks totaling nearly $1 billion. Congressional earmarks divert Federal taxpayer funds to localities without the benefit of a merit-based process, resulting in fewer resources for national priorities or unnecessary spending above the requested level. 

I urge the Congress to send me a fiscally responsible bill that 

sets priorities. Americans sent us to Washington to achieve results 

and be good stewards of their hard-earned tax dollars. Because the 

legislation violates that commitment, I must veto this bill. 

GEORGE W. BUSH. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, November 13, 2007. 

Æ 


hmoore on PRODPC68 with HMRPT
#### § 3288.3 Definitions.

The following definitions apply in this part:

*Act* means the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 5401-5426.

*Appropriate order* means an order issued by HUD or an order that is enforceable under state law.

*Date of installation* means the date all utilities are connected and the manufactured home is ready for occupancy as established, if applicable, by a certificate of occupancy, except as follows: if the manufactured home has not been sold to the first person purchasing the home in good faith for purposes other than resale by the date the home is ready for occupancy, the date of installation is the date of closing under the purchase agreement or sales contract for the manufactured home.

*Day* means a calendar day.

*Defect* means any defect in the performance, construction, components, or material of a manufactured home that renders the home or any part of the home not fit for the ordinary use for which it was intended, including, but not limited to, a defect in the construction, safety, or installation of the home. For purposes of state certification under § 3288.205, HUD will find it acceptable if the threshold for the state's program is functionally equivalent to this definition.

*Dispute resolution provider* means a person or entity providing dispute resolution services for HUD.

*Homeowner* means a person who purchased or leased the manufactured home in good faith for purposes other than resale.

*HUD* means the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.

*Installer* means the person who is retained to engage in, or who engages in, the business of directing, supervising, controlling, or correcting the initial installation of a manufactured home.

*Manufactured home* has the same meaning as the term “manufactured home” as defined in 24 CFR 3280.2.

*Manufactured Housing Consensus Committee or MHCC* means the consensus committee established pursuant to section 604(a)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 5403(a)(3).

*Party or parties* means, individually or collectively, the manufacturer, retailer, or installer of a manufactured home in which a defect has been reported in accordance with § 3288.20.

*State Administrative Agency* means an agency of a state that has been approved or conditionally approved to carry out the state plan for enforcement of the standards pursuant to section 623 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 5422.

*Timely reporting* means the reporting of an alleged defect within 1 year after the date of installation of a manufactured home in accordance with § 3288.20.

*Timely resolution* means the resolution of disputes among manufacturers, retailers, and installers within 120 days of the time a request for dispute resolution is made, except that if the defect presents an unreasonable risk of injury, death, or significant loss or damage to valuable personal property, the resolution must be within 60 days of the time a request for dispute resolution is made.
#### In the Matter of Fay Smokler, Respondent, v. Robert E. Herman, as State Rent Administrator, Appellant.

In a proceeding to review a determination of the State Rent Administrator, made July 30, 1959, which denied the petitioner landlord’s protest to 13 orders of the Local Rent Administrator establishing maximum rents for 13 apartments on the basis of a new service or facility consisting of assigned outdoor parking space, the State Rent Administrator appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated February 10, 1960, annulling his said determination and declaring that such parking facilities are not subject to the Emergency Rent Control Laws of the State and to the regulations thereunder. Order affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Beldock, Acting P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
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Uni

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Stat

es D

istr

ict C

ourt

For t

he N

orth

ern 

Dis

trict

 of C

alifo

rnia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERARDO BENITO CHANG,

Plaintiff,

    v.

THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY,SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant                                                                      /

No. C 09-1607 MMC

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The parties having reached a settlement of the above-titled action at the settlement

conference conducted February 25, 2010,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s claims alleged herein against defendant be

dismissed without prejudice; provided, however, that if any party hereto shall certify to this

Court, within thirty (30) days, with proof of service of a copy thereon on opposing counsel,

that the agreed consideration for the settlement has not been delivered, the foregoing order

shall stand vacated and the action shall forthwith be restored to the calendar to be set for

trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:  February 26, 2010                                                    MAXINE M. CHESNEYUnited States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01607-MMC   Document 38   Filed 02/26/10   Page 1 of 1

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
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      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
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### §914. Obligation guarantees

#### (a) Authorization

The Secretary of Transportation, under the authority of section 831 of this title, shall guarantee obligations of the Milwaukee Railroad for purposes of providing employee protection in accordance with the terms of the employee protection agreement entered into under section 908 of this title. Guarantees under this section shall be entered into without regard to the requirements of subsection (g) of section 831 of this title.

#### (b) Obligations as administrative expense

Any obligation guaranteed pursuant to this section shall be treated as an administrative expense of the estate of the Milwaukee Railroad.

#### (c) Limit on aggregate unpaid principal amount

The aggregate unpaid principal amount of obligations which may be guaranteed by the Secretary pursuant to this section shall not exceed $75,000,000.

#### (d) Limit on total liability

The total liability of the Milwaukee Railroad in connection with benefits and allowances provided under an employee protection agreement entered into under section 908 of this title shall not exceed $75,000,000.

#### (e) Liability of United States respecting section 908 agreements

Except in connection with obligations guaranteed under this section, the United States shall incur no liability to employees in connection with any employee protection agreement entered into under section 908 of this title.

#### (f) Applicability of section 22404 of title 49

Section 22404 of title 49 shall not apply to any obligation guaranteed under this section.

(Pub. L. 96–101, §15, Nov. 4, 1979, 93 Stat. 743; Pub. L. 96–448, title VII, §701(a)(3), Oct. 14, 1980, 94 Stat. 1959; Pub. L. 117–58, div. B, title I, §21301(j)(3)(E), Nov. 15, 2021, 135 Stat. 692.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 831 of this title, referred to in subsec. (a), was repealed by Pub. L. 105–178, title VII, §7203(a)(2), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 477, except for subsec. (c) of that section, which was renumbered and transferred to section 823(b) of this title by section 7203(a)(4) of Pub. L. 105–178. Section 823(b) of this title was subsequently repealed by Pub. L. 117–58, div. B, title I, §21301(b)(1)(A), Nov. 15, 2021, 135 Stat. 683.

#### Amendments

2021—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 117–58 substituted "Section 22404 of title 49" for "Section 836 of this title".

1980—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 96–448 inserted "to employees" after "no liability".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1980 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 96–448 effective Oct. 14, 1980, see section 710(d) of Pub. L. 96–448, set out as a note under section 1170 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.
#### Edward Lamb, Appellant, v. Vincent M. Gaughan et al., Respondents.

Order unanimously affirmed, with $25 costs and disbursements. (Appeal from order of Erie Special Term denying plaintiff’s motion to dismiss counterclaim interposed by defendant Vincent Gaughan and denying* motion for judgment of foreclosure and sale as against defendant Margaret Gaughan.) Present — Bastow, J. P., Goldman, Halpern, McClusky and Henry, J.J.
### §§87, 88. Repealed. Pub. L. 89–554, §8(a), Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 632, 634, 645, 646

Section 87, acts Mar. 3, 1883, ch. 101, §2, 22 Stat. 484; Oct. 28, 1921, ch. 114, §1, 42 Stat. 208; Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 462, 43 Stat. 1145; 1946 Reorg. Plan No. 3, §403, 11 F.R. 7876, 60 Stat. 1100, related to plats of townships and lists of lands sold.

Section 88, R.S. §2242; acts Oct. 28, 1921, ch. 114, §1, 42 Stat. 208; Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 462, 43 Stat. 1145, related to receipt of illegal fees by registers.
#### GINNEGAW et al., Respondents, v. CORNING, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

March 16, 1905.)

Action by Henry Ginnegaw and another against Anna Coming.

PER CURIAM.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, unless the appellant, on or before April 15, 1905, file and serve the printed papers on appeal, as provided by rule 41, in which event said motion is denied; and, in case said printed papers are not served and filed as above provided, upon filing due proof of such default the respondents may enter an order dismissing said appeal absolutely, with costs, without further notice.
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STIPULATION BY BENDER AND SHARP AND 

[PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 

CASE NO. C 09-02114 RS

Greg L. Lippetz (State Bar No. 154228) 

glippetz@jonesday.com 

Cora L. Schmid (State Bar No. 237267) 

cschmid@jonesday.com 

JONES DAY 

1755 Embarcadero Road 

Palo Alto, CA 94303 

Telephone: 650-739-3939 

Facsimile: 650-739-3900 

Attorneys for Defendant Sharp Electronics 

Corporation 

David N. Kuhn (State Bar No. 73389) 

Attorney-at-Law 

144 Hagar Avenue 

Piedmont, CA 94611 

Telephone: (510) 653-4983 

E-mail: dnkuhn@pacbell.net 

Attorney for Plaintiff Gregory Bender 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

Gregory Bender, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., 

NEC Corporation of America, 

Pioneer Electronics (USA) Inc., and 

Sharp Electronics Corporation, 

Defendants. 

Case No. C09-02114 RS 

STIPULATION BETWEEN 

GREGORY BENDER AND SHARP 

ELECTRONICS CORPORATION 

AND [PROPOSED] ORDER OF 

DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AND 

COUNTERCLAIMS WITH 

PREJUDICE 

Plaintiff Gregory Bender (“Bender”) and Defendant Sharp Electronics Corporation 

(“Sharp”) inform the court that they have reached agreement on the terms of dismissal of the 

claims in the above-entitled action and hereby submit this Stipulation of Dismissal. 

 Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties hereby move 

for an order dismissing all claims by Bender in this action, WITH PREJUDICE, with each party 

to bear its own costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees. 

SO STIPULATED. 

*E-Filed 8/24/10*

Case 3:09-cv-02114-RS Document 96 Filed 08/24/10 Page 1 of 2
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STIPULATION BY BENDER AND SHARP AND 

[PROPOSED] ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 

CASE NO. C 09-02114 RS

Dated: August 23, 2010 

Respectfully submitted, 

Jones Day 

By: /s/ Greg Lippetz 

Greg L. Lippetz 

State Bar No. 154228 

JONES DAY 

1755 Embarcadero Road 

Palo Alto, CA 94303 

Telephone: 650-739-3939 

Facsimile: 650-739-3900 

Counsel for Sharp Electronics Corporation 

In accordance with General Order No. 45, Section X(B), the above signatory attests that 

concurrence in the filing of this document has been obtained from the signatory below. 

Dated: August 23, 2010 By: /s/ David Kuhn 

David N. Kuhn 

Attorney-at-Law 

144 Hagar Avenue 

Piedmont, California 94611 

Telephone: (510) 653-4983 

Counsel for Plaintiff Gregory Bender 

PURSUANT TO STIPULATION, IT IS SO ORDERED: 

DATED: ______________, 2010 By: 

THE HON. RICHARD SEEBORG 

United States District Court Judge 

SVI-81247v1 

August 23

Case 3:09-cv-02114-RS Document 96 Filed 08/24/10 Page 2 of 2
###### Editorial Note on Part 5

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 5 appear at 65 FR 16715, Mar. 29, 2000.

#### § 5.107 Audit requirements for non-profit organizations.

Non-profit organizations subject to regulations in the part 200 and part 800 series of title 24 of the CFR shall comply with the audit requirements of 2 CFR part 200, subpart F. For HUD programs, a non-profit organization is the mortgagor or owner (as these terms are defined in the regulations in the part 200 and part 800 series) and not a related or affiliated organization or entity.

[62 FR 61617, Nov. 18, 1997, as amended at 80 FR 75934, Dec. 7, 2015]
#### In the Matter of G. Gary Sousa, Appellant, v. New York State Council Knights of Columbus Foundation et al., Respondents.

Motion by John F. Symonds and others to appear as *amicus*curia, granted to the extent of permitting the movants to file a brief. Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur; Nolan, P. J., not voting.