UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5199

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

PATRICK WAYNE DULA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr., 

District Judge. (1:09-cr-00035-WO-1)

Submitted: May 20, 2010 Decided: May 24, 2010

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sol Z. Rosen, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Anna Mills 

Wagoner, United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Patrick W. Dula pled guilty, pursuant to a plea 

agreement, to one count of possession with intent to distribute 

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) 

(2006), and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance 

of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 

(2006). The district court sentenced Dula to a total of eightyseven months of imprisonment and ten years of supervised 

release. On appeal, Dula argues that the district court abused 

its discretion in imposing a ten-year term of supervised release 

on the drug count because the plea agreement and the plea 

hearing colloquy pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 only mentioned 

a minimum of three years of supervised release. We affirm.

Dula did not object to the district court’s imposition 

of the ten-year term of supervised release in the district 

court, and we therefore review his claim under the plain error 

standard of review. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 

(4th Cir. 2010). To demonstrate plain error, Dula “must show 

that an error (1) was made, (2) is plain (i.e., clear and 

obvious), and (3) affects substantial rights.” Id. 

In this case, the drug count carried a maximum of 

twenty years of imprisonment and a period of at least three 

years of supervised release. The statute specifying the maximum 

punishment does not state a maximum term of supervised release. 
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21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); see United States v. Pratt, 239 F.3d 

640, 647-48 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[A] defendant convicted under 

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), could, in theory, receive a term of 

supervised release of up to life.”). Consistent with the 

statutory provision, the plea agreement stated that Dula 

understood that, as to the drug count, he “shall be sentenced to 

a term of imprisonment of not more than twenty years, a fine not 

to exceed $1,000,000, or both. Any sentence imposing a term of 

imprisonment shall impose a term of supervised release of at 

least three years in addition to such term of imprisonment.” 

Thus, Dula was clearly given notice in the plea agreement that 

three years was the minimum term of supervised release, not the 

maximum.

In accepting a guilty plea, the district court must 

inform a defendant during the plea hearing of, among other 

things, “any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, 

fine, and term of supervised release.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 

11(b)(1)(H). In this case, the district court conducted a 

thorough colloquy with Dula that ensured he understood the 

proceedings, the charges to which he was pleading guilty, and 

the terms of the plea agreement. The court specifically 

informed Dula that “the maximum possible penalty that could be 

imposed as to Count 1 includes a term of imprisonment of not 

more than 20 years, a period of supervised release of not less 
4

than 3 years, a fine of not more than $1 million or twice the 

gross gain or loss caused by the violation, whichever is 

greater, a special assessment of $100.” Dula indicated that he 

understood these possible penalties.

Dula’s citation of the supervised release provisions 

in the sentencing guidelines is misplaced. The guidelines 

specifically provide that “[t]he term of supervised release 

shall not be less than any statutorily required term of 

supervised release.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 5D1.2(c) (2008). Thus, the guidelines do not limit the term 

of supervised release in this case. Finally, the district 

provided a reasoned explanation, based on Dula’s prior drug 

convictions, supporting its decision to impose the specific term 

of supervised release on the drug count.

The district court did not err in imposing the tenyear term of supervised release on the drug count. Accordingly, 

we affirm Dula’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED