NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SANDRA D. PEARSON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 21

- 35339
D.C. No. 3:19

- cv - 05746

- TLF

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Theresa Lauren Fricke, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 11, 2022 * * Seattle, Washington Before: BOGGS, ** * HURWITZ, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
S andra D. Pearson appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act

. We have jurisdiction

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United S tates Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

APR 15 2022
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the district court’s decis ion de novo

. See Smith

v. Kijakazi , 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021). We will reverse only if the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not support h is decision with substantial evidence or applied the wrong legal standard. Id. For the following reas ons, we
affirm.
1. T he ALJ did not err in giving little weight to Dr. Gary McGuffin ’s opinion

. An ALJ may give little weight to a n examining physician’s opinion that is contradicted by another doctor if the ALJ can provide “ specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Ford v. Saul , 950 F.3d 1141, 115 5 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Lester v. Chater , 81 F.3d 821, 830

– 31 (9th Cir. 1995))

. T he ALJ provided four specific and legitimate re asons supported by substantial evidence for giving little weight to Dr. McGuffin’s opinion : (1) it c onflict ed with the opinions of Dr s
. Landon Poppleton and Paul
Jacobsen , s ee Tommasetti v. Astrue , 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) ; (2) it

c onflict ed with Pearson’s daily activities , s ee Rollins v. Massanari , 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) ; (3) it wa s equivoca l in some key findings , s ee Tommasetti , 533 F.3d at 1041 ; and (4) it wa s v ague about what supportive supervision Pearson
would need , s ee Meanel v. Apfel , 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999)

. 1

1 The ALJ also found that Dr. McGuffin’s opinion was internally inconsistent. Even if this reason was not supported by substantial evidence, a ny error by the ALJ3

2. Nor did the ALJ err in giving little weight to the opinions of Dr s
. Michael Brown and John Robinson

. An ALJ may give little weight to “ the opinion
of a non

- examining physician by reference to specific evidence in the medical
record.” Sousa v. Callahan , 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998). T he ALJ provided three reasons based on reference s to specific evidence in the medical
record for giving little weight to the opinions : (1) i nconsisten cy with the medical
evidence , s ee Tommasetti , 533 F.3d at 1041 ; (2) i nconsisten cy with Pearson’s daily
activities , s ee Rollins , 261 F.3d at 856 ; and (3) e quivoca tion in some key findings ,

s ee Tommasetti , 533 F.3d at 1038

. 3. T he ALJ did not err at step two , as the ALJ was not required to find that six of Pearson’s impairments were severe , because t he inquiry is “merely a
threshold determination meant to screen out weak claims

. ” Buck v. Berryhill , 869
F. 3d 1040, 1048

– 49 (9th Cir. 2017) ; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

. Moreover, any

error at step two in finding that these impairments were not severe w as harmless , because the ALJ adequately considered these impairments , and the limitations imposed by them, in assessing Pearson’s residual functional capacity

. See Lewis v.
Astrue , 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).

in relying on it was harmless

. See Molina v. Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining legal standard) ; Bayliss v. Barnhart , 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding inconsistency between an opinion and the record by itself sufficient to reject an opinion).4

4

. T he ALJ did not err in discounting Pearson’s tes timony about the severity of her symptoms. An ALJ can “reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Trevizo v. Berryhill , 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). The ALJ provided three reason s for discounting Pearson’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms: (1) she failed t o seek treatment for her sleep apnea for an extended period , s ee Burch v. Barnhart , 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) ; (2) she received only conservative treatment for her neck, shoulder, back, hip, leg, and knee pain ,

s ee Parra v. Astrue , 481 F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) ; and (3) her daily activities were inconsistent with her testimony about her memory deficits , s ee Lingenfelte r v.
Astrue , 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007)

. 5. Finally, the ALJ did not err by discounting the testimony of Pearson’s daughter , Tiffany Leach

. An ALJ may disregard lay testimony by giving “reasons

germane to each witness for doing so.” Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 613 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lewis v. Apfel , 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001)). Here, the ALJ gave a germane reason for rejecting Leach’s testimony, as
Leach did not describe any limitations beyond what Pearson described in her own
testimon y
. See Valentine v. Comm ’ r Soc. Sec. Admin. , 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009)

. A FFIRMED
.