[H.A.S.C. No. 95-34]

HEARING

ON TIIE

PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 20, 1977

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

99-707 WASHINGTON : 1977
IIOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARIED SERVICES

NINETY-FIFTII CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

MELVIN PRICE, Illinois, Chairman

CIIAPLES E. BENNETT, Florida BOB WILSON. California

SAMUEL S. STRA'TON. Now York \VILLIAMN L. DICKINSON, Alabama

ELAlA II. IHOR). issouri G. WILLIAM\ WHITEIHURST, Virginia

Li'CIEN N. NEDZI, Alichi an FLOYD 1). SPENCE. South Carolina

I HA LEI H. WI LS()-N, (ilifornia1 DAVID C. TREEN, Louisiana

IiBERT L. LEG(GETT. California ROBIN L. BEARD. Tennessee

RICHARD C. WHITE, Texas DONALD J. MITCHELL, New York

UIL Nit lLS, Alabama MARJORIE S. IIOLT, Mlaryland

JACK BRINKLEY, Georgia ROBERT W. DANIEL, Jn., Virginia

m murT i. (BOB) MOLLOIIAN, ELW D I. (BUD) HILLIS, Indiana

DAVID F. EMERY, -Maine West VirgInia I 

DA N DANI EL, Virginia PAUL S. TRIPLE, JR., Virginia

G. V. (SONNY) Mi )NTGO-MERY, ROBERT E. BADIIAM, California

) isLisissip i

IIAROLD RUNNELS, New lexico

LES ASPIN, Wisansin

i: )NALD V. DELLI'MS, California

-A1E;N Lll .1. DAVI'S, South Cnrolinal

PATRICIA St' IIROEDIER, Cclorado

AiRAHA[ KAZEN, .Jn., Texas

ANTONI I1. WO)N PAT, Guam

1;11)l1 CARR, Michi'tan

J1DI LLO , California

LARRY cD)ONALI), Georgii

THOMAS J. DOWNEY, New York

GOODLOE E. MYRON, Maryland

ChA RLES WIJIITLEY, North Carolina

JOHN J. Foon, Staff Dircetor

(II)
[H.A.S.C. No. 95-34]

HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ON THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES

Iii 4USE OF REPmFSENTATvES,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

ahulinguyton. D.C., Thu]sday, October 20, i7.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room 2118,

Rayburn House Office 13uilding, Melvin Price (chairman of the commitee) presidingr.

The CIsuux. The committee will be in order.

The Chair has a short statement to make before we start.

Mr. J. T. M. Reddan, our former special counsel for the Investin'ations Subcommittee was employed 1 the committee on a part-time

basis earlier in the year. Mr. Stratton has requested that Mr. Reddan

again be retained on a consultant basis.

Mr. Reddan's knowledge of investigative procedure and his knowledge of the Defense Department can prove very valuable to the

subcommittee.

The contract will be for a period of 1 year at a rate not to exceed

$3.000 annuallY.

The regulations of the Committee on House Administration require

contracts to be approved by the full committee prior to submission to

House Administration for approval.

Therefore, if there are no objections we will approve the proposal to

retain Mr. Reddan as a consultant: an I will forward the request to

the Committee on House Administration. There being no objection I

will take that action.

The committee is meeting this afternoon to hear Gen. George S.

Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will present testimony on the Panama Canal Treaty.

General Brown, will you proceed with whatever statement you care

to make.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE S. BROWN, USAF, CHAIRMAN OF THE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General 3urow-. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here to discuss

the security aspects of the proposed Panama Canal Treatv.

The Jloit ('hiefs of Staff reconize the Panama Canal as a maior

defense asset. the use of which enhances U.8. caplabiity for timelY

reinforcement of U.S. forces. The strategic milit ry vflIue of the cinal

is reflected in our ability to accelerate the shift of military forces and

logistic support by sea between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The

strategic value of the canal is not expected to change sibstant iallv

(1)
2

thirtoualiolt the life of the new Panama Canal Treaty and beyond, so

(Jlig the canal provides the sole means of transiting ships across the

.Amricani Co, t i nln t.

K.S. military im crests in the Panama Canal are in its use, not its

OW riiiii iJ)p. 'IlleV lnre, anv new treaty must sure that access to and

S clmitv of the Pamla Canial are protected in times of war and peace.

Thl aminmee is provided by a permanent regime of nentrality to be

malm iinA ibv the IAited States and Panama which specifies that the

Calm will ireiaini open to all world shipping at reasonable tolls, witho h d >!nilnat ion, ii accordance with specific rules of neutrality, and

that it Will always be opixrated efficiently 11nder rules that ar'e 'just,

cqlit hlo. 1111(1 rea,-onable and necesary for safe navigation and efficiei iv. mt arv operation.

1 ).n of tile Panama Canal has two components: Internal

e:11 and exfterniil defense. Both are presently the responsibility of

t h U.S. ( overiineit.

I iteiial secwitY entails nrveillance and control. It is primarily

cOn'ccriid with coun ein g sabotage and terrorist activities. Currently

the ( Cana Zone's police and ecurity forces are responsible for internal

security. h reymired, reiinforceient is provided by the U.S. militamv lits ii ied to U.S. Southern Comimand. linder the new

Panama Caal Treaty there will no longer be a Canal Zone and police

fmwctions will become the responsibility of the Government of

Panam. However, the Canal Commislon will continue to provide

5(ciiiritv for canal installations. The military units of U.S. Southern

Command will be available to augment the Panamanian forces and

Collmmission guards.

External defense is concerned with defense against armed attack by

hostile forces usmin gerrilla or conventional tactics. Under the new

Panama, Canal Treaty, the United States will have primary responsibility for the defense of the canal during the balance of this century.

Under the new Panama Canal Treaty, the Panamanian Guardia Nacional and appropriate U.S. forces commander will develop plans in

comitcrt to provide for mutual defense. the Joint Chiefs of Staff will

contline to plan for rapid reinforcement of U.S. Southern Command

ill tHie event of eluemra'elircy need.

Our capability to defend the Panama Canal will be enhanced

thr)o101) coop)elation with the Government of Panama. The new

t reaty provides a. basis for such cooperation between the United States

and11( Pan ama. I'hle alliance relationship s1(ould develop anid strengthen

during the life of tie Panama Canal Treaty and le enhanced by the

nieuitralit y treaty. I' regime of neutrality provided in the neutrality

rea calls for a canal open to all ships of all nations ii times of peace

or war. It specifically provides that United States and Planamanian

11aval hI ips hall I rasit t expedit iously wit hout impediments or precomn-

(lit 1o11. Since hot Ih ile listed Stales and Panama agree to this rerilne,

01 rlih- to ake tihie mea siPs tiat We ma v deem to be necessary to

lmia mntli the canal's neut reality is assi'red.

FolP tIhjese rcasotis. tle Joimint C chiefs of Staff support tIe treaty as

Ibciin 2' protective of tlie military interests of the I mted States anld as

plovid iii'' ,1 oleci ire basis fo. defemise of tile canal.

Thamk yon. i\Iri'. ( 'fsaim tan.

Th'm ( ' n:u.o . Thlamik you. (General Bm'own, for yoiir I atemnent.
3

General, which military installations and facility are alhli

for disposition 1d11( er the proposed treaty, and whi baI)es hCl will Ibo

retained under our control under the treaty, and when will the act ion

take pl)ac e

Gelnera I Bu(owN. tder the terms of tI t great y, o f Co u ise. t le (C 'na Il

Zone itself goes out of being. And those defense installations refervedI

to c011111only in treaty language as "lands iand wNaters" wlich are not

required for the defense of the canal or the operation of the cai1n1 are

turiied over to Panama.

I have a factslheet, Mr. Chairman, of the military installations listed,

and I am trving to find it.

During the life of the treaty, the United States may use the following major defense site>. They are: Howard Air Fioree Base, Fort

Kobbe, Rodman U.S. Naval Station, Fort Clayton, Albrook Ai r Force

Station-west of the runway-and the Corozal Army Reservation.

On the Atlantic side, they are Fort Davis, Fort hernan, Galeta

Island, and the Navy pipeline which transits the entire isthmus.

There are other areas that we wil have use of in a coordination fashion, and I will define that in a minute.

On the Pacific side they include Quarry Heights, U.S. Naval Headquarters at Amnador, Empire Range, Fort Clayton training area,

Corundu Heights housing, and Fort Aiador.

On the Atlantic side, they include the Pina Range, Fort Sherman

training area, Fort Gulick and Coco Solo housing.

Now, concerning those areas that are defined as major military areas

of coordination. There the U.S. rights are the same as defense sites,

except that exterior security of these military areas of coordination

are the responsibility of Panama. \Ve plan to use combined patrolsthat is Panamanian with U.S. membership. And the U.S. flag mva not

be flown, and no change in the basic character and functions of these

areas will be made without the consent of both military forces.

The United States shall control and schedule training and be responsible for safety on the ranges.

I think that, Mr. Chairman, outlines what we have left. But I think

you asked me what we would relinquish.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General BrowN. Unfortunately, my papers are not arranged in that

fashion, so I would have to take a moment here to pull them out.

The following major U.S. Forces transfers are required on the first

day of the treaty, which is defined as 6 months following ratification.

We will have to move an aviation batallion, temporarily. from Albrook, where it is east of the runway, across to the west side of the

runway, and subsequently on a permanent basis to Howard Air Force

Base.

We will have to relinquish the headquarters currently ued Iy the

193d Infantry Brigade from Fort Amador, and we will temporarily locate the headquarters on Alblrook Air Force Station. toimpoirrih, and subsequently when facilities are prepared at Fort Clayton. Then. 8 years sulbsequent to the treaty signing, we transfer certain

other major facilities. The Corundu Air Force Antenna Farm will be

moved to Howard Air Force Base, and the Fort Kobbe complex. PX warehouses that are not on defense installations will be collocated. There are other facilities, but thev are associated with the

canal rather than defense installations.
4

I will be happy to list those too if you would like that for the record.

The CrAIRAN. I think you can list them for the record.

General BRowN. Yes, sir. The Naval Industrial Reserve Shipyard

reverts to Panama, with a U.S. recapture clause for priority U.S. use.

Tlie canal railroad reverts to Panama with U.S. priority use.

The U.S. Army Tropic Center which conducts environmental tests

of military material will be continued. The navigational activities are

also to be continued, subject to a separate arrangement.

The U.S. Army Atmospheric Science Laboratory, which provides

meteorological data for Central and South America also will continue,

ibllt under a separate arrangement.

It is also provided the United States may conduct all of these activities that I have listed, and some others I will list, during the life

of the treaty. They are the oceanographic activities, the InterAmerican Geodetic Survey activities, the humanitarian relief operations, and the schooling for Latin American military.

Now there is a qualification on that schooling, in that the U.S. Army

School of the Americas at Fort Gulick may be continued for 5 years,

but subsequent arrangements would be subject to agreement by the two

governments.

The CuLA]h.[A-N. With the disposition of these installations, will

replacements be required for them?

General lnowN. T he major unit replacements that will be required

are some facilities to support the relocation of the helicopter unit at

Howar-d Air Force Base, principally in the way of matting or aprons

for parking and operations, and a home for the headquarters of the

1903d Infantry Brilade.

The CHAIRAN. What cost is involved in those replacements?

General BRowx. There are some costs involved, Mr. Chairman, and

we have got those here.

The temporary move of the headquarters is estimated to cost half

a million dollars, and a half a million, also, for the temporary relocation of the Army aviation battalion.

The permanent moves-I have got to stress these figures are based on

getting all new facilities according to existing standards-cost for the

10Bd Infantry Brigade headquarters at Fort Clayton is listed as $10.1

million: the 210th Aviation battalion at Howard Air Force Base is

$9.3 million, and $0.8 million for other miscellaneous buildings. PX

wariehoiisinug is at 84%i million, and the Cornndu Antenna Farm at

$S million.

The CHAIRMAN. TIaik Von.

Mr. Stratton.

Mr. S-zvrI'ox. Thank von, ri. Chairman.

General, I (lollt have "any great problem with the basic pairt of the

t reatv. The thing that concerns me is what happens after the year 2000. We have had a debate over in the Senate, and general acknowle(lgement that the treaty does not spell out that right. and a apparently efforts are lmlade to spell it out.

You have not really discussed the question that T think is the serious

(jilest ion, and that is, how do we (lefend tle Panama Caial after all

of our forces are out of Pana ma in the yeair 2000 ?

Firsj of all, let nli( j iist ask a couple of prelonmiary questions.
5

Once the United States is out of Panama, Panama would not be

regarded by itself as one of the major military powers in the world,

would it ?

General BROwN. Obviously not, with just under 2 million population

and no military force other than the Guardia Nacional.

Mr. STRATTON. Then we would have, would we not, a very valuable

strategic piece of real estate controlled by a relatively powerless country? And doesn't that create a power vacuum that could represent

some threats?

General BRowN. I don't believe so, Mr. Stratton, because under the

regime of neutrality, anything we see as a threat to that regime of

neutrality, it seems to me we can respond to the protect that regime of

neutrality. In addition to which I might add, by the terms of the

treaty, Panama has agreed that no foreign military forces will be

stationed on her soil.

Mr. STRATTON. Well, we are not talking about the treaty. I am talking about military threats.

You addressed most of your comments before congressional committees on the problem created by an aroused Panamanian citizenry.

I would certainly agree. If Panana has control of the canal they would

have to be out of their minds to try to destroy it or to prevent its

operation.

But what about the threat from Cuba? What about the threat from

Russia?

Let me put it this way: From a military point of view, wouldn't it

be infinitely better for us to have at least some forces in the Panama

Canal area to deter an attack from the outside, rather than to have

to mount that attack from Gitmo or Roosevelt Roads, Homestead,

after Cuban paratroopers, let's say, had already landed in the Canal

Zone?

In other words, why don't we. if we really mean to defend the canal

after the year 2000. maintain a base so that we could deter an attack with antiaircraft guns, with planes patroling, and so on, rather

than to have to try to storm ashore after the Cuban or Soviet paratroopers had already taken over the canal?

General BROwN. Mr. Stratton, by this treaty, after the year 2000 the

United States will not maintain forces on the ground for the defense

of the canal. That will be a responsibility of Panama. And both

countries agree to the neutrality of the canal. In addition to which,

should we feel that neutrality-that regime of neutrality is threatened,

it seems to me the United States is perfectly capable of doing whatever we have a political will to do.

I would grant you, it would be easier, simpler and less costly to

repel this invasion force you visualize, if we are there, but it doesn't

mean we can't do it if we are not there.

Mr. STPmrroN. I don't know how you could storm ashore without

ruining the canal in the process. If we are really going to defend the

canal, and if it is really vital to our national interest after the year

2000, which I think it is, it seems to me we ought to insist from Panama, in return for all the millions of dollars we are giving them and

all the installations we are giving them, we have at least one military

base there to deter an attack.
6

General 1 BrowN. Well. Mr. Stratton. you note the absence of the

word "vital" in my statement. I don't agree with you. I think that is

a matter of iidginient. I don't think the canal is vital to the United

State. I think the Uit( d States will continue to be a viable nation,

even if the canal were closed or disrupted.

Mr. SPlnrox. That is where we differ.

Gener:l Browx. That is in a literal sene. I acknowledge your point

to defend the cinal would be easier. simpler, and cheaper if we were

to have Some semlblance of military force there for that purpose. But

after the year 2000. we don't have that. resp-onsibilitv.

The CHAIRAN. The committee will recess for a few moments while

the members go over and respond to the rollcall vote, and then we will

return. It may be we may be interrupted again because we have the B-1

amendment coming 111p very shortly.

Mr. STRA1TON. I want to go and vote and defend the B-1, but I certainly hope we would not accept a treaty in this form without putting

in something that would make it a little easier and less costly for us

to defend it.

[Short recess.]

Mr. CHAR.LS WLSON. AVe will proceed., General, until the chairman

returns just to save a little time for von.

The chairman asked von which bases the United States would retain control over under the treaty. I wonder if you could identify those

five bases. Yon named five, I think. Would you identify those again,

please ?

General Bnowx. That are, retaine(l, Mr. Wilson?

Mr. CHARLES' WLSON. Yes.

General BROwN. Yes.

Those, that will be retained, that is among the major installations,

are: Howard Air Force Base. which is the operating jet base down

there; Fort Kobbe, Rodman U.S. Naval Station, Fort Clayton, and

that part of Albrook Air Force Base that is west of the runway. and

Corozal Army Reservation, Fort Davis, Fort Sherman, Galeta Island,

and the Navy pipeline.

Mr. CHARLES W1iLsoN. There are more than five bases that we will

retain United States control over.

General BROwN. Oh, yes, sir, I have got apples and oranges here. I

would say if you are looking at major installations, we would list

Howard, Kobbe, Clayton, Albrook. Davis, and Sherman. T hen we

have certain supporting facilities stcli as the Navy communications

site, the pipel ie, Army reservation, and so on.

So I wolld say among the major there are six.

Mr. (IIAILEus WILsoN. I see.

I wonder. General, if yon cold speci fy the terms of the 345 million.

General BroWN. Specify the terms of what?

Mr. CV ARES Wi N. Would you (delMeate the use of the $345

Imillio packa-e of loans aind credits we ane zliven to Pamnama for defenuse and developments

(GJenera I l - OWN. Yes, sir.

I'l(. economic coipeinsat ion to Pa namI breaks out in this manner:

'10 ceils per Pamua llau toll, whish i etIl'ted to generate A0 to

50 million a year lrom the tolls. a(1julA>e(d pelriodically ill p)ropo'tionl

to t Ile (han!e> 1 1'. Wholesale Price I(lex for Iiarill fact ured good.;
7

a fixed additional $10 Imlillion per year from reven1e- anl another 10

million per year. if available, from revewuws. And if tiot available in a

particular year, that payment can be carried over.

Then an additional $10 million a ye1r for certain services. such as

police, fire, and sanitation, adjn.sted' for inflat ion every 2 years.

By a separate bilateral acreeiient, S81 5 m illion ill loans, in-leu 01g

$50 million in foreign milita rv sales credits over a IO-y(,r pero(lh fal

Export Bank loan of $200 mill ion over 5 yeari,>- a1d a hol sing in vestment guarantee of $75 million over a 5-year period. Aid an overseas

private investment corporationi guaranteed loan of -2) million.

Mr. CHARLES XiiSON. Those are the items that make up the 9845

million ?

General Bizowx. The latter four do make up the $)45 million, yes, sir.

Mr. CHARLES WILSox. Is this a one-time cost? You mentioned some

military assistance over a period of 10 years.

General BROwN. These funds that I outlined in detail are to g)o to

the Panamanian Government, and none of them will come from appropriated funds. There will be no request to the Congress for money

to do this, but the Congress will be asked to underwrite the FMS

credits.

Mr. CHARLES I'ILsox. Of course. we have got to put, the money in

these banks, though they will be getting the loans.

Are there any annual defense-related costs to the United States

under this assistance program? For example, if Panama wants the

compensation for loss of jobs that will result from the base closures?

General BROwN. Let me ask Geniral Dolvin, who served as the dofense negotiator on the team, to join me. le is an expert in this.

General DOLVIN. No, sir, there is no cost identifiable or associated

with base closures.

Mr. CHARLES WILSON. General, either vou or Genieral Rogers, I

believe, felt this treaty was a reasonable thing for the Department

of Defense and for the Joint Chiefs to support. If I am not mistakenthis is front newspaper reports I read-you are alleged to have stated

that the canal could not be defended at the present time anyway. Is

that correct.

General BRowN. No, sir. I have not inade a statement to that effect.

I think the canal can be defended. What I have said is that the canal

can be interrupted, andi we could not guarantee that wouldn't happen.

Mr. CIHARLEs Wuisox. That is uider the present circumstances.

General Bjzowx. Under any circumstances.

Mr. CHARLES WiLsoN. This has always been the case.

General BRowN. Yes.

lMr. CHLkaEs WILSON. So the treaty doesn't necessarily change that

situation ?

General BRowN. The treaty won't cliane that no, sir.

Mr. CIHARLES WILSON. Will our troOps be under a foreign command

then?

General BROwN. No, sir. Our troops will remain under U.S. coinmand, all the time, and of course, they are on]lv going to be there

through the balance of this century.

Mr. CHARLEs WLs(). Mr. Whlithii rst.

Mir. WH1ITETURs'r. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
8

General, I read your testimony in addition to hearing you deliver

the balance of it. In the third paragraph on page 2, thelast sentence,

"The military units of U.S. Southern Command will be available to

augment the Panamanian Forces and commission guards."

When you say "will be available," do you mean on our initiative, on

their initiative ? Would you define that statement and amplify that

a little further?

General BRowx. Yes, sir. This is during the balance of the century

during the treaty period. We will have U.S. military forces present

in P1anama, and it will be our responsibility to defend the canal during

the balance of the century. So in answer to your question, it will be

on our initiative that we employ those forces.

Mr. WITEHURST. OK. Then, what happens after the treaty period?

General BnowN. After the treaty period, there will be no U.S.

forces. It will be Panama's responsibility to do that. If we feel that

the neutrality of the canal is threatened, we can act unilaterally, in

whatever manner, in my judgment, is called for. And if we have, as

I said before, the political will to do it.

Mr. WHITEHiUnST. The political will to do it, right? What is stated

in the treaty with regard to after the year 2000?

General BtowN. After the year 2000, it says the Government of the

United States and the Government of Panama agree to maintain the

regime of neutrality. That is article IV. It is without condition.

Now, I am not a lawyer, but the lawyers I have talked to say if we

sought to define all of the conditions under which we might want to

act 23 years from now, we probably would miss some. We would restrict ourselves if we did that. Now we are totally unrestricted. We

have an obligation, as I read this, to maintain that regime neutrality,

as well as a right to do so.

Mr. WTNrrJxH iURsT. Another question, I just scribbled this down based

on my own feelings about what I have read regarding the treaty.

Why does the Guardia Nacional need the kinds of numbers of

weapons they are scheduled to get under the treaty?

General Browx. Well, let's be specific. Let me detail the types of

weapons they are to get. And what these weapons do is provide a

modest amount of mobility and firepower of what I would say is of a

light or minor nature. There are a few helicopters. I am sorry

Mr. WHrITEHURST. That is all right.

General Browx. I have it here.

Mfr. W1HTE1tRST. Maybe I have exaggerated.

General Browx. It amounts to a few patrol cra ft, light intercoastal

boats, an(l a few helicopters.

Mr. W rirEUIns'T. How about tanks and APC's?

G general BuowN. I don't remember seeing them on the list.

.Wr wr TE ii nsT. There are no fanks or A PC's on the list ?

( general Brow-'-. No. j lere we are. Excuse me.

The -rolid force program incildes tlie forlwition of one light infant ry l)rigalde of three J)a fal iolls. and one eing erinomlopany a rmeld

with light arms-M-16's and --G nahiic gilS, Si -miill iieter liortar,

anI 90-miliieter rec(oilless rifles, the navy progroiii-14 )trol boats

and 7 lanidig craft ;i te air force program-two C-130's and one

Ild icopter.

Mr. WHIrrviisT. I believe I lost I minute of my time while yoU

were looking for that.
9

General Bnowx. At least.

Mr. W"I IT EHURST. I Thank you, Mr. Ciairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. White.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Stratton was asking you what happen after 20 some-odd years.

Shouldn't there really be an option to renew in this treaty, as anyone would want in a contract when they had a large investment, so we

would know what would happen after 20 years?

General BRowN. Well, Mr. White, I don't know. That is a judgmi!ent.

Our negotiators apparently didn't think so.

Mr. WHITE. What do you think?

General BROWN. I think that it is important that the United States

ratify this treaty, and that we divest ourselves of the last vestigte of

colonialism the United States has around the world.

Mr. WHITE. General Brown, we had the President of Panaima

here. President Torrijos is not an elected official, as I understand, of

Panama.

The rAiYhts of the United States to defend the canal, and the rights

of our snips to go to the front of the line, are not clarified in the treaty.

There was, I believe, an attempt to try to clarify the ambiguities of

the language.

Don't you think the clarity should be in the treaty? The terms of

the treaty should not be dependent on the judgment of an individual

who may be deposed, who was not actually electecd by the will of the

people'? General Browx. Again, this is currently under debate in the Senate, and in the Senate committee. And I dont know that I am qualifled to -judge.

I find the neutrality treaty adequate as it is stated. I do find the

statement issued after the meeting of General Torrijos and President

Carter to be helpful in the way of clarification.

Mr. WHITE. Would von rely on that if you were the President?

Would you 1,0lv on that statement

General BzowN. Yes. ii. We haven't negotiated a treaty with General Torrijo. We have a treaty between the United States and Panama. President Carter is not going to be around in the year 2000.

M1r. WAVTE. But he was elected and that is different from the one

who is a usurper of power.

You wentione(d the obligation to go in after some 20-odd years. Is

that what. You testified before ? We have an obligation to go in at

the expiration of the treaty ?

General BROWN. I think we have the obligation to maintain the

regime of neutrality. Whether we can achieve and maintain tie icgime of neutrality throllghIi diplomatic action or o e actions other

than direct military actions. I don't know.

Mr. W ll:. Well. in other words, it is possible at the expiration of

the treaty, that a Panamanian Government coull interpret this treaty

as obliiITing this country to go in with military force to enforce

neuitralf v

General Bnowx. Absolutely, in my judgment.

[r. Warum. Even though' we didn't, have any authority derived

from an existing treaty, because there would be no treaty-correct ?

General BRowx. There will be only the treaty of neutrality subsequent to the turn of the century. ye5, sir.
10

Mr. Ifr:. if vo had been President at the present time, would

V01 have recoIlicnded these treaties?

( iceal Pi BRowN. Oh. veC5 sit. I have worked hard to accomplish

these treaties, and I must say I wasn't clever enough to see the regime

0 neutIr1alitv-the neutrality treaty in the form it is in-but the Joint

Chief of Staff and I advocated that we had to have that neutrality

i)to the indefinite future. and we had to have expeditious passage

(d .S. miiiVl ve-sels. It is not iin the main treaty because it smacks

of pelpetuity. It is perpetuity.

Alr. Wi Ir. Even the obligation to use military force, when this

gOV0rmilenilt iiiav hot desire to use military force If the Panamanian

oer inmient (alis on this country to enter militarily after the expiration of the treaty we would be required to

( general Bowx. No, Mr. White.

I don't feel the Fnited States will have to do anything the United

States doesn't want to do. but I do feel we have an obligation under

t iis reaty to maintain that regime of neutrality. We may seek to do

it hy diplomatic actioii. We don't have to send in military forces.

Mr. WHIITE. My time has expired.

Thank you, General.

I' Cl")N . Mrs. Holt.

Mrs. Hour. I read your statement, and I understand von made the

statement that the canal is not vital to U.S. interests. I would like you

to clarifv that statement and tell me what you mean.

neral uowx. II the exchange with Congressman Stratton he

used the word "vItal," and ouitlined a certain scenario, and I made

the point that he would note in reading my statement the absence of

the word "vital," because in a literal sense I think the United States

wo l4 coniiiule to remain a viable nation even if the canal were closed.

Alls. IHP r. Don't you t hink the small size of our fleet today makes

it (Vil more lilpe-htive that we have free flow between the Atlantic

,HP! the Paciiie

ien EjI iw . (do. and I so testified on the Senate side.

I think. yon know. if we 11it in fact tiirly a two-ocean Navy,

WO wOI L sfil walt the oanaI. We would still have use for it, but it

WOUIdnit be as importalnt a mil liv asset as i is oday because of

ii i -ize of (oiu fle4t, ill part. So without questionsi. I 1 hink it has becmc more important, althowlh the mi vement of U.S. Navy vessels

ihlnghli. the C al 1\('anma w hei vo look at ilthe hii:tovy over the

ye II-i nI t I Ie la 2 YeaIs we I have o1ly m to\ve(dI abLout i) to 26 vesse ls

Mis)I, iLT I ) it nieii YOU i thiik it is,- more important or it

],-It t \-(I, v Ii)olt-aiit

neiraI I i:ew. I thikll as long as the U.S. Navy is of ihie size it

i-. it i- imi pol kth to the I ited l11te 1hat Ihat 'nnh reiaii open

aiiti l1e aid hibl lo illhe .S. Navy.

P-. i lois. I (ont See how in the wvoid 1ndev this art ide lY the

l Pj'm who are :dhiSing i you. ('l lelievc that we (oill([ act unilatera: I to aia1:11ain mw in iiity. I enlit '-Ie how yo caln oet that out of

1.1 Wie I N% tiot all wa V1ii the woihl.

( nneiaI BiowsN. Well. I viless we just have a disa reemIent.

's. Ilor. What <lo yO\Iu tlilk the oiet oil worlwhINiVde shipping

w(Mid he if th e (8nal fell into han1(1S that didn't permIit free passage?

I low do \Ou think it would affect the world
11

General BRowN. Well. in the first place. let me say that we are indulging in an academic disctission. I don't see that conditions ever obtaining. But the united States today pts tirough the canal about

7 percent of our seaborne cargo.

In the rest of the world, of course. Japan profits greatly by 1the

canal, and there are some nations of Latin America, ok lombia

and Ecuador, and those on the IPacifi id. thicat it Is nc;:4 1!;p01i a ttI

to their viability to have the canal.

Mrs. JIOLT. SO tile loSs of the IIe of LIe canal woul e a trlimlno1 10115

weapon in the hlanids of somebody who wailed to use it ili that

direction?

General BRowx. Oh, it would be a weapon. And I assume if somlwbody had it who wanted to create difficulty ind they sought to close

it-and it can be closed withotit going down there. you k ow-you

can send a missile over there and close it, destroy it. But I don't timk

that is a reasonable scenario.

Things bigger than the Panama Canal are at stake if vo start sliooting nuclear rockets. And you can't hit accurately enolLgh with a nonnuclear rocket to do any good.

The Panama Canal ceases to be an issue at that point. 'le world

has got a bigger problem.

irs. HOLT. Don t think Genera1 ao it is a lot more subtle than

that? I certainly feel the strategy we are seeing being used today is

more the usurpiniy of righlits, using oil or other weapons as a tool. I

think that that is the danger here. I wonder if yoi don't agree with

me?

General BROWN. I can understand the use of commodities like oil

as a weapon. or other resources. I don't know what would be gainedd

by taking the canal in some manner and then seeking to deny its use

to certain powers for some purpose. Again, it just doesn't seem like

a viable scenario to me.

The CHAIRLIAN. -Mr. Treen.

Mr. TREEN. Tlank von, ir. Chairman.

General Brown, during World War II was the Panama Canal open

to German. Japanese. Italian shipping ?

General BROWN. Yes; under the existing treaty today, we guarantee the canal is open and free for the pssage of all ships during peace

and war.

Mr. TIlEE. Did we actually have German shi)s transition the canal

during World War II ?

General BRowN. No; the United States was able to keep them from

getting there.

Mr. TIEExN. Neither military nor merchant ships of any of the colntries we were at war with went through tile canal during the war

General BNowx. I don't think there was a single belligerent >hip

of the Axis. owners that transited the canal (hiring World AVWar II.

Nfr. You don't tliink we would reallY let 11("m coliie lhrouJI

there if they tried, do you ?

General B-owx. No; that is the point. We can int erDict thK ap- proaches, with the Navy, an1d with such air power as needed. amd

in the event we Thould 11iss ome, I cit glarait c it XvOildut et away.

Mr. TREEN. 1Uder the new treaty, between now an d the Yea r 2u,

what are our riglts in that realrd witl respect t-let's to- we went

to war with Jap an?
12

General Buowx. Precisely the same. The canal is open to all shipP1inlg in peace and war.

ir. TREEN. But if we went to war with Japan. is there any doubt

il yOUr iniiid between now and the year 2000, that we wouldn't let

Japanese ships transit the canal ?

General BlzowN. Not only that, I don't think they would be silly

enough to trv.

Mr. TIIEEN. And we wouldn't be silly enough to let them.

General BROWN. Exactly.

-Alr. TIEEN. But after the year 2000. we have a different situation,

don't we

General BrowN. After the year 2000, no, I don't think we do, Mr.

Treen, because we can still interdict the approaches to that canal. We

have the capability if it is our national determination and will to do

so.

Mr. TREEN. OK, I will grant you that for the moment. But we

wouldn't have the power actually, other than that, to prevent the transit

of the canal ?

General BRowx. No- not like such a thing as refusing to provide a

pilot.

Mr. TREEN. let's suppose that the Panamanian Government in the

year 2001 decided that it would close the canal to Japanese shipping,

Japan being an important ally of ours at that time. We would have

the obligation. I gather, under your responses to Congressman White,

to take such steps to guarantee that the Japanese would be permitted

to use the canal ?

General BRowx. I think we would be permitted to have the right to

maintain the neutrality which would include the free, unimpeded,

nondiscriminatory use of the canal. So whether Japan is an ally or

not we should act.

Mr. TRE. If Japan were a belligerent at that time, we would

really have the obligation to insure it had the right to go through

the canal under the guarantee of neutrality?

General BrowN. But that right doesn't say, you know, we have to

ga ran tee free passage across the Pacific.

Mr. TrEEx. I understand that. But we do have, under your interpretation of the treaty, the obligation to guarantee the neutrality and

the use of that canal by all countries, whether they are friendly or not

at that time. The )oiit I am leading pll) to. if we would not move to

implement o111 ariiaraiitee or ieutrality in the year 2001, in a case where

loving to en force that neutral itv would be against our interests we

in effect, would be repudiating the treaty--it would seem to me. So

that Panaa then would say, von don't come in here to eniforce nentral it v. If voi choose not to the treaty is repudiated.

General B3wN. No: because if we read tlis, it says the United

States of America and the lRepImblic of Pammna azlree to maintain the

reg-ime of neintrility.

AM. TEx. If we dou't come in and help them maintain, if (e don't

go in there to maintain the neutrality, it seems to me then there is an

a rmmmen t that ' an be made 1 by ilitermiationial lawyers that we repudiated thle orea t. General 1 Ii w N. I am j isl not (Ilal ified to eSt i fy on that.
13

Mr. TREEN. Of course, there is nothing to prevent Panama from repudiating the treaty. Countries have repudiated treaties over the course

of history. They may feel the treaty, the neutrality treaty that begins in the year 2000 is a handover from the colonialism and may decide

to repudiate that treaty. If that is the case, do you think this country

would move, or should move at that tinie, if Panama said the United

States can't use it any more ?

General BROWN. As I stated, Mr. Treen. because of the words here,

"agree to maintain," unconditionally stated, that we not only have the

right, but we have an obligation.

This doesn't mean the use of military force necessarily. But I think

we do have an obligation and a right to act, if, in fact, that regime of

neutrality is threatened. If Panama seeks to exclude the free movement

or free passage by ships of any nation, I think we have an obligation

and a right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nichols.

Mr. NICHOLs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Brown, you mentioned that we were going to move aviation

battallion to Howard Air Force Base, and the 193d Brigade to Albrook

and Fort Clayton, and another installation to Fort Roby. All these

installations are in the canal zone? I am not f amiliar with them.

General BROwN. Yes; they are all in the canal zone.

Mr. NICHOLS. It is really a transfer of people within the zone itself?

General BROwN. Yes; it is. That is exactly right.

Mr. NIcHOLs. Would you describe what you understand the relationship of General Torrijos and the country of Panama to be with

the Soviet Union and Communist Cuba?

General BRowN. Panama does not have diplomatic relations with

the Soviet Union as does the United States.

Mr. NICHOLS. Do they not trade with them, General?

General BRowN. Panama has sought to interest the Soviet Union in

some economic activity in Panama, and our information is without suiccess to date.

Now, there is a newspaper office, TASS, operating in Panama. But at

the moment that is about the extent of it.

Mr. NICHOLS. And with Cuba?

General BRowx. And with Cuba, they do enjoy diplomatic relations. There has been a military visit by officers of the Guardia Nacional of Panama to Cuba. General Torrijos has also, I think, visited

Cuba.

There are Cubans in Panama in the strength today of probably between 100 and 200, doing the normal things, that is, the diplomatic mission, some newspapers, some business enterprises, but that is the

extent of it according to the information I have.

Mr. NICHOLs. Thank you. General.

You know the admiration I have for vou, it relates to your exper- tise, your knowledge, plus your tremendous service record during World War II and elsewhere. I am disturbed, nonetheless. It is my understanding that four former Chiefs of Naval Operations. I suppose becrinning with Admiral Anderson. and Ollie Burke. and Admiral

Kearnev and Thomas Moorer have all gone on record in a joint statement for continued U.S. control of the canal.
14

Admiral Moorer, whom I know you hold in high esteem, having

served with him, I believe he stated in military affairs there is no substitute for ownership of the territory and ability to control and deny

the waters and air space thereof.

Frankly. General Brown, the thing that I think disturbs my constituents. and this Congress.man the most, if I could just discuss a hypothetical situation; if we are going to make plans we need to look at

various possibilities. The country of Panama could become a satellite

nation to either the Soviet Union or Communist Cuba. If that should

happen, and if a shooting war erupted, let me ask you, don't you believe from a military standpoint that we would be much better served

if we retained the canal, if our people were there, rather than relinquishing our rights to the canal ?

General BRowN. Mr. Nichols, you know to get into this discussion

is kind of like getting into play in the last play of the game.

I don't think we would ever let that condition occur.

I must acknowledge, in the scenario you have outlined, that the

only answer is "yes, we would be in a better position," if we had some

concern-that is either to retain or adjust-I have some concern for

communism in that part of the world, and I think it would be bad. It

would be against our interests.

On the other hand, it seems to me that coninunism thrives on instability, on unrest, on dissatisfaction. And I think if we are concerned

about communism coming into Panama, that the conditions that would

invite communism would be far more apt to pertain under the condition where we failed to ratify these treaties than if we ratified them.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHTAIMAN. Mr. Dickinson.

Mr. DICKINsoN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I understand your statement. But it seems to me that your

statement, as a member of the JCS, is basically couched in terms of the

military situation and what our legal rights are, as opposed to the

pragmatic political considerations which we all have to be concerned

with.

Perhaps I am wrong. but that is the way I tend to view it.

Even if we hadnt been kicked out of \ietnam, when we were, if we

had withdrawn nuder the Vietniamization Mr. Laird, and others, liked

to talk of, I conl d'It ill my wildest direams ever picture us getting

emnbroiled again in a conflict abrnoad. I don't care what the terms of

our wit hdraw 1al were, and I dol't tlnkii You do. Once we left Vietnam,

no matter wlat happene(1, if 11e North Viictinamies e had not honored

the treaty we entered into with ihe m, had th1ey abrog'ated it and 1one

back into Sonth Vietnam, I do't think we would have sent troops

back.

I think tlie saie applies to o r pr1' e (>c il n orea : it is mo re a token

PrCSelnue now. When wU withdraw'Y un derl the present plan, I don't

think politically tiat this ('mm11iv, eveli If ill(h North invaded the

South, is -o!ng to be wvillingZ to (1ullit i rool)-our troops into Korea

8aI 11. Woul I you a,"1ree wNiIthi thaf, or would you di2a1'Cre with that

Geeral BuowN. Welt, 1, of course. Iiope you vo r'e wron')l because WO

8 going 1 1o I a VScr thou a nd1 airmien over therv. We are goin1gf
13

to leave several thousand communications and intelligence Special lid.

1 would guess when it is all done, I have forgotten ine mmjber-, but

we are gomg to have 9,000 to 10,000 Aiericalls there. Now does It tak(.

40,000 Americans to be hostcag-e to our action or doet it take I).,oo. I

don't know.

Mr. DiciCNsoN. I believe, as longy as we have America troops st ationed there, probably we will defend them or do whatever ia necesarv

to extricate them, one or the other-probably extricate them so they

might go sonic other place. But I can't see Us recomnitting ourselves

to a land war anywhere in Asia. What bothers mue is that wnen I see a

draw-down of our presence in Panama, then under what scenario

would we be prepared to reconmit Would we commit our troops

there if we had an expeditionary force from the Soviet Union, or

from some place else, invade Panama Perhaps. but we really don't.

see this happening. What I fear is that as our presence is withdrawn,

through the year 2000, whatever happens internally there, I think we

are going to have to live with it, and write it otT.

This is the thing that bothers ine and bothers so many of us, I

believe. By withdrawing our presence, leaving the place physically,

then unless we have a real invasion, and an amphibious landing by

some foreign party, I don't see us going back in and committing

American trops to defend what we presently would, if we had maintalied our presence there.

So this is a political matter more than a military matter, I think.

The willingness-and you used the phrase, the political will of the

United States; this is the thing that bothers me, not our military c apability. Once we withdraw. are we willing to return ? I don't think that

we are. What do you think?

General BROWN. Mr. Dickinson, that is why in my response to an

earlier question, I tried to make the point that the Unitied States wouHl

use the means appropriate to the requirements of the problem. In all

cases I don't think that would necessarily be military force.

On the other hand, it seems to me the most likely circumstances

would be where the canal is disrupted by some dissident element in

Panama, and it could very well be that the Panamanians would need

help in the form of engineering help, andl maybe some security

troops for a temporary time. It isn't a matter of going down there aind

fighting a war. In which case we might very well recognize article

IV of the treaty and provide that.

I would hope that there is never a requirement to fight a g-round

war in Asia. A lot of us have felt for years, and our predecessors,

that we should never get involved in such a venture. And we have

been in it twice in my short career.

Mr. DICKINSON. And we got bloody both times.

Thank you. My time is up. But to extralpolite from the alNwer. if

I might, Mr. Chairman, I can readily envision a situation where even

the people of Panama mijht wnmt the intervention of Ithe Uniited

States for further security when, in fact, the titular head, whoever

le might be. a dictator or what e\'er oovernmiient. might not want it.

So we would have our hands tied and be hanistrung. so to speak.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CuAIRMAN. Mr. Mont gomerv.
16

Mr. MONTGO-MERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up on what Congressman Dickinson was talking about.

I think you have one thing on your side as far as I am concerned on

th treaty, and your position. But I agree with Mr. Dickinson, if the

alloonl went up in Korea, as it did in Vietnam, we would have to

Zo back into South Korea. I am not sure how well we could get

Americans to come forward and participate again in Vietnam or in

>outh Korea.

One thing you have on your side, however, after 20 years or after

:0 years, if something were to happen in Panama, I believe we could

(et Americans to rally. They have been taught in schools over the

years that the Panama Canal is ours. WAe worked for it, and we paid

iOr it.

Mr. DICINSON. Would you yield there?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Yes.

Mr. DICKINSON. I want to add a personal note, General.

I have three sons, one was drafted and served his 2 years. The

secondd one missed the draft. The third is draft age now. He is 18.

I can't envison any circumstances I would willingly let him go into

dhe service to save Panama, Korea. Vietnam-you name it-in view

of what has presently happened. I think this pretty well reflects the

attitude of the American people.

General BROwN. Mr. Dickinson. I am deeply distressed to have a.

member of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives talk in that manner

Mr. DICKINsoN. That is exactly the way I feel.

General BRowN [continuing]. Because you and I share responsibility for the Armed Forces of the United States. If you reasoning is because of the will of the people as you see it-tile support of this

thing-and the belief that the Congress is behind it and all that, that

is something I am not as well able to judge as you. But if it is on things

that are internal to the military establishment

Mr. DICKINsON. Oh, no, no.

General BrowN [continuing]. Then I have got to take exception

Mr. DICiUNsoN. It doesn't have anything to do with the military. I

am just saying we have been willing to sacrifice to (,o to war, to make

whatever conmmitments are necessary in the interest of national security. Those who decided they didn't want to par-ticipate. we now bring

them back and embrace them. We are even talking about giving them

veterans benefits. I can't see drafting my third son involuntarily to go

oIf and fight a war for somebody ele in the interest of our national

security. 1 think the American people will agree with me.

Mr. MONTGOMER. Back to m y point. What I was trying to driive at

is that the mail to iMemnbers from all over the country is runnmig 70

to 80 in favor of keeping the canal. If the Aierican people want the

canal, I don't know why we don't keep it. If t le 1 balloon (roes up down

there, then we will tackle that roblell when it comes forward.

General Browiie i hing that our people seem to be together

o at this time. hey want the canal, and t hey want to keep the

('8al81.

I I1,d th le privilege of going to see tie comm issioning of an LPA,

m hlibiols 1andine ship, aircraft, with tle Marines on it. It is the

serouid one we bIilt and it is one of o1 largest military warships.
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18

Mr. McDONALD. Isn't that part of our colonial vestige, if we are

going to include Panama, that is not secretive, is it'?

General B3owN. Mr. McDonald, we have no concern for anything

omside defense in Guantanamo. We don't have anything that appears

like the Governor's Mansion on the hill in Guantanamo.

Mr. McIOxAD. Are you suggesting it is U.S. sovereignty?

General BnowN. it is not.

Mr. McDoNAU. The Supremne Court has ruled it is. On what basis

do vou say It is not

General Bizowx. Because a child born of other than American parents in the Canal Zone is not an American citizen. Goods purchased

(town there must be declared i1 customs you enter these United

States as a couple of examples.

Mr. McDoNALD. Well, that means it is not sovereignty, when the

Supreme Court has ruled that it is? Are you going against the Supreie Court ruling ?

General BROWN. Mr. Congressman, I won't quarrel with the Supreme

Court.

Mr. McDONALD. I should hope not, General, if you do, you cite a

different authority.

General J

3 ROWN. I don't know what it is you are specifically referring

to.

Mr. McDONALD. Well, the Supreme Court decision in the early part

of the century very specifically reaffirms our sovereignty over that.

That was an issue. Are you not aware of that decision, in IVWdsoa v.

A haw, in 1907? President Taft stated at that time:

It is hypercritical to contend that the title of the United States is imperfect,

and that the territory described does not belong to this Nation, because of the

oiission of some of the technical terns used in ordinary conveyances of real

edtate.

That is Wilson v. Shaw, by the Supreme Court in 1907.

General BRowN. Yes, sir, I am generally familiar with that, but not

in lhe s1 eciic fashion that you outline.

Mr. McDox-xim. General, let's go on to another point.

You talk about instability, unrest and dissatisfaction is where comnntimnsii bireds. We will have to agree, the instability and dissatisfaction led to lie htingarjian revolution in 1965, and we did nothing.

We have a bad track record standing up to conununism.

1o concoevnedJ that we aire not going to be able to stand up if we

OV(er mWOVe olt of the canal too.

The CJAiMAN. Mr. Treen.

Mr. TENA. I ask the gentleman be allowed to have 1 additional minu14 and I ask hinm to yield to 1e.

T IFAiMA. W itlmit object ion.

Mr. MCDoNxAm. I yiel( to the gent leman from Louisiana.

Mr. I 1n ilerstand, AMr. Mcd)onald. the treaty talks about us

I aving thme iighl its as if we are sovercigi-rights that would be the

sam 10 as i we were severe 1g, wiWch wild s1 est to me from a leg al

sitan(lpoint nhat mciis we do not have title to tIe lan1d as we did witi

Alaska, hOr (1o We \h mve title smeh as whemn we plirchmased the Louisiana

territory.

I 11 1(811 not nigH iig witi von about what we ought to do in the

( 1. Hinht 1 11r1oW leXaI point of whether hi ie Canal Zone is soy-
19

,ereign in the same sense as owned territory, I think the treatyN itself

says as if we were sovereign, would be entire redundant language

if we were sovereign.

Mr. AMCDONALD. fr. Treen, it points out the reversionary title if we

give it up it goes back to Panama. If Panama doesn't want it it goes

back to Colombia. If Colombia doesn't want it it goes back to Spain.

If Spain doesn't want it. I suppose it goes back to the Aborigines.

The Supreme Court ruled we have sovereignty in 1)(1petnity, which.11

seems like a long time, but it only lasted( a few decades.

The CuARMrAx. We have Mr. IHansen to testify. I would like to conclude this hearing as soon as possible.

We have another important armed services matter pendingl before the

House at the present time.

Do You have any final sum-up on this question, or Mr. McDonald's

question?

General BRoWN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think that the question of

sovereignty is as Mr. Treen has pointed out, and I think personally

would leave it to the lawyers to interpret that.

I am aware of the Supreme Court decision which has been cited.

However, I am also aware of the things that we do in daily practice

and those we don't do to show that we are sovereign. It is not in that

sense.

I notice in Secretary Dean Rusk's testimony of last week, before

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that he made one point

which I felt was very cooent; and that was that the existing treaty

is not a sufficient legal basis for the United States to act. Whereas the

new treaty would be in the eves of a world court, in his judgment,

and probably the United Nations.

But certainly not the United Nations in the case of the 1903 treaty,

where even our friends would vote against us.

Now I understand. in part, what Mr. McDonald has said. because

he has expressed-and I catler that is what he was talking about wheni

he was talking about his strong stomach-that there is a feeling

throughout the country, which I recognize, and that is, that the Unite d

States keeps backing down and never stands up to the principles to

show the determination and the strength that we all believe this country has and should have. But I am not personally convinced tihat the

Panama Canal Treaty issue is the issue on which to stand up. I think it

would be counterproductive. I think it would work against the intere ts

of the United States. with all of Latin America, and in fact. and with

all of the Third World, and in fact with our own friends like France

and the United Kingrdom, who are well aware of our attitude at the

time they sought to do tI-inc about the Suez Canal.

So I think, given the fact that we have been working at this thiny

for over 13 years, that the principles under which these tr( tics were

negotiated were known publicly, anl a voice was not raised in opposition-there was not a concerted act icn to suspend or divert the action

during these 13 years under four Presidents-that to do so now would

be completely contrary to the best interests of the United State>. in mY

judgment.

The Crmin'mrx. Thank you very much, General.

We appreciate, your testimony and the time you have given to the

committee this afternoon.
20

Thank you.

General BiowN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness will be our colleague, the Honorable George Hansen from the great State of Idaho.

Mr. Hansen.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE HANSEN, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM IDAHO

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify

before you today and I am going to be reasonably brief because I do

know we have a very vital issue on the floor of the House in the Consideration again of the B-1 bomber.

I guess I am going to be here to somewhat rebut some of the opinion

that was expressed previously by the gentleman from the Air Foree

and the Joint Chiefs, and perhaps give some aid and comfort to Mr.

McDonald, Mr. Montgomery. and Mr. Dickinson, and some of the

others who were expressing a different point of view.

Mr. Chairman, most of this has been rehashed. I do have some new

material, I think I would like to enter into for just a moment, then

perhaps we can go to questions.

I would like to address myself just briefly to this point of sovereigntv. I have been doing a lot of studying. I guess you become quite a

student of these things over a peilod of time. And it is absolutely clear

that the Supreme Court said in the case that was cited earlier that the

United States has title to that property, sovereignty or not. It has title

to that property. It is ours. It was purchased four times. Once from

the French-the rights for construction of the canal-once from the

Colombians. We cleared the title, the Panamananis didn't. We cleared

the title by indemnifying the Colombians. Then we purchased it from

the Panamanians. And finally, of course, we purchased it from the

landowners themselves.

The Supreme Court verified this, and they said we own it just as we

own Alaska, and Alaska is now a Stzte. I don't care whether you want

to play legal games or not. It is a matter of fact that the United States

owns that property, and I get a little tired of all this political banter

about whether we own the property or] not. hllat colloqiiy about lack

of confidence in the military of the United States was very interesting.

I think there is a lack of confidence in some respects. We could have

won that war in Vietnam if we lial unleaslied the nmil it arv I ]h way

they are able to operate-but we didlnt. We saw some bunlin.r. We

saw some bad things happen over there that showed we Iiad weaknm ss,

an( we weren't able to deal witi tle situation, especially on a iited

basis.

Thnw for ]Is to )have ile military line up like 2:ood little soldiers

1)ehinid the Clhief Executive. and nobody dare speak out with regard

to P1anam a, son ihinli u . so close to home, does distirb the majority

of Americans. ThlIe Puifla ' C:!?:1il i'- the ie Ihat hinds our two great

coasts o]I two ocean1s, and I h ink people do Iive a feeling in watchini

1 le lnrreiit x'acillaiion that indeed it is l1:1r4 1 tirst :1nd really l ad

to feel (mfi(lence in ltie imilit arY conIliiali(l of tlie nited States of

Aierica.

I don'i blame fr. I)ickiinsoli for 01e wIy ] lie feels Witli regard to

hi soil 5eVi iin the miilii't Y.
21

I I t in is t I I rost 1i1 1 if It I It I loe ()I 1 1

th1e II 11110 ( ( 114( to f t I I II I 1, I It \ I 1 - I A 1 1 2

oN( troops, ad too tof l> If1 f 11 1p

al Iroa d W lo a re I II ldfl(Iv ti 1_4 II. \ , n I,1 5 1 ' 1i

att nViL a .tIi S tim , it CPI IeIevo ii I ll I i i ili l . I c H 8

Chi44 of StaFf of 11", P.S. Air fort' d d l Ih II(

I wAN- III ubm)llt it I'm. t he reo rdl. \ 1 0 1.AI1 i 1

T he VA III\ lPI\ N. 0I )j )Hi. (i Yl II 11 1)4 I IInI I 1

[lile folU \\llg 11lI(ila"1I11 \V~1> 1I \ t41 >1 I Iw I

Fu I (j.\io l \I A 1)11s 1U 1,(IKI A\in. 1 1< P% 1 M A ( ' A

111(it .10 Aug, 1074 I l iamI b .ll E V t 

I)r-ilciphl (Il cmiceptual IrAnIIIwM ri bor 50 1101 n W W " fln, 1A 14

treaty, provides f4r the p)r'II wl lu lit V i - 1 8

Pallamla. O wn!l Tredty, deals M\~il In ela to q~~l r I o felll d tl'( r'

Tru1tiYs would eliter into (ffect ofter PA11i ditil ;I W 41 ( Im i Ki i

(IY I CIt iple Vt. I 'tll r I( tit r;i I I I,2aIy 111 he of > il ' I I, 1 II ! 5

tt(! VAII010n HI Cna reaty wAIl teritilluttu ill all wspn-S( ou :;1 1) 01,

2. IY l';IaIUII I,; ICt8 1110j E u18 deuel se z:o & , Im is. -Y vl1 w

TIKAet SOON;s 01,Inth Py- OFr limpely :Ifn u of, I APA SM

,;1valeviie Iiniiitalry :[0 -:111ago lies il liltw nrllwl;. woft IV K A itb

TA hIvilo e the shift of ii lary fimm owl KYJSllA .I 11 1loniI I

AIhYlir4tic IIIOKI Psill i l l( ljjt alld I ( g Ii t liKIzt. I lji li Id

>l iII 1 11 18:1YIL CIII Ar1 ill itS Its,. \ il0 mvi4w8 i4 p Thj. i I; 1T 

w\I u ld wa lslro thI t crelss I u all (I urt f lt , I l'uin i t P ny

tImn ( f w ar a 11 paZ1 v.

3. As I 'rF sid t ( 4. 111 Vi' It:;s Q-1141 w11 . Ni hnv i 1;.1 WwA 1 1 1

ri114t to protect old d\\ i i 1t i\ 4n Iii I'w i 1 I t I 1 IiI

unIItiI the lo (, d ( of Ithis I ,n t II ry 11. w! w I iea n 1tit ( ro K 1li n t n y w

the It gi it 11j4F tit(, 11m i tenoa A the -iuli'v K pil;4 iNm F1 Q I Jl V

we maiy dokellj iler"Isszry." 4. Thf, Air Ftir ,cl aw ivvly partikil lim edit i lt AVVVId' lownn ilt (if A! lv tl -t 

(iecs f the pr.()jw (d I retIics, nIrI fully support, inn. 4 Pay Nlywd pin

5n1 4it inii iindy lllYlip ()i;f Kinb 1101 d(vell[ 4in nt IN a 

all: lt.N SLtuN a which woubt I tOit siwni' rnwl imp t an ov Ill it-il .( 1

itle (t(PI l i 011:1 \)(IIl:k ho n vA\i l I" liltI llet S4II v 1

le ) .SY 11i loT 'ratus lhw colml, ti( propisoI l OP I

provide .111 odoqualie b si - ffi 0 2 dnir r ll' er Il it

5. It is importmit t1it oi permai:: ok 1248l u I

AwIId our. uIlpprt for the 4)1p1op l 'Ilj\ 4ilis1

MA I OSIA(. It is Ar allI mrowi lwi Kw it 481 N' I

I t di121 d1401 i ll l\ Ivl I hill I \ w lI 2) 1 1

ll hit ( p)i l t is to 14illYh le \\n1 A m I \t \1 w I al t

(pN d 6) l( i.

is O ,ille lizol of O liclh -Wll:ItL

a 1va II ,Ye Io z 'nl llt 'f l(T n

Atlhowt5 anld AneIVAe )eIMPS A I \(1w A

Thadt Is fl tPOd tr th 'W lillro \ I In I

seeln I is (v it 1.(!1 tll ("I1' \

(110 Int l e 11(If I 1)O l 1, 1 I ilIIIla \h 7 \a ),

I o t lr s t I 'N -t A i l ) i l s ( ) t i li , % \ w t

Iu l )a(y 11 v a N IIlor 

'M Ml WO II I I') Ie o l 1 In

e xIS1 11 -( l)('hW("(I1 W hl Is W(h( I I e Int I K \ us, :i,11 11- t :

is told U .S4. cli izenls andt( w Iatf PtIa I an In en ar I , II- :.!1
22

It goes on to quote P1resident Carter in saving something that I

don't think in light of the Dole interception that President Torrijos

wonld accept. It says:

As IPIresident Carter has stated. "We will have operating control and the right t(( plotect and defend the Panama Canal with our own military forces until the

emd of this century. Under a separate neutrality treaty, we will have the right Sass Ole the ni inteinince of the permanent neutirality of the canal as we may

deeni1 Ilecessar"'

Timt is a unilateral statement, "as we may deem necessary." and I

don't think Panama wOidl accept it that way. And I would challenge

this administration to see if Panama would agree to that statement.

The final thing, Mr. Chairman, and that is point 5-anid to me this is

the "gag rule" or "half -gag rule"' if von would. This is where you put

t he lid on the military. This is the Singlaub situation.

It says: "It is important that our personnel, particularly our senior

people, understand our support for the proposed treaties." And if

that isn't an implied threat that your future military career would be

Jeopardized if you speak out contrary to the administration position,

"I'll eat your hat."

I would like to make a couple of other points, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know whether it has been brought up or not, and that is this:

that I come from the West. I come from a rural area. I come from an

area where water rights are important. I don't know of one farmer

in the world who would give up his water rights to the comunuity

for any kind of a neutral situation or any similar circumstance on

the assumption that somehow he might have some kind of control over

it or access to it if things got really tight-if water were short. Now,

compare this to the Panama treaty proposals where we, in a sense,

are giving up our "water ri-hts."

1What we are (koin' in giving up the Panama Canal under the cireiimstances proposed in these treaties, is giving up our rights to have

final determination of the use of that facility. I think that is extremely

aioe .If thins are short, if thins are tight. then anything short

of an act of agression or an act of war, may not be sutlicient for us

to cope with the sit wat ion.

N>)v, lef me just point this out. We know the Panalmynius want to

dieit some of te water for their own purposes. We know that they

ay, ncwO (1 Ig to the en-ioimeitil impact report. move into the

watt rsheds ai czuse some dest IricItion. I know for' a fact, due to conveiset ions wit Ohe ( Canal Zone (oveoi, that we rI'e in a water-short

comijit ion tmlre1lhdy with bar-lv enouyhi i) (et thriough some of the years

11i(d be ab)e Io keep ihe tIafi goi1g full time.

If we a1low Pa nam ia to (lest roy I lie watersheds to a deLriee, are we

goi)'Z to hilve a ftiil-time canal or part-time canal? Are we going to

have to cI"n! ii the operate ions o I I hat (nial P Ider oit r own manageli ln t1. we kimow wlere we s 1' md. and the record speaks for itself.

( 'an we liarantee that under M Unaninian control ?

Second. how abo it the short age of iimone ?

P1Iiniiiiam is 11 1onuiit ry with apploxlro i lv I I, million people. which

are heavi l in delt. Will t hey "reach ill and tap the till-- the capital

ircs (''ve Ik' p I (Is for t le canal ?

The poit iW'd Ipl-(slIr fm. social spemlidll'g will surely (Wuse Panama

11 oo i1t o SICh alial ifliMuis est ablisld for desilt at io1 or renewal of

i lie lot'ks. Will they be able to resist the (1:11oi' for low-cost housing,
23

or will we end uip with a cirta imnent of lie operation HicaUse the icaal

facilities are allowed to rim down?

And how about trained personnel?

Six months after t hat treaty is in force all people t tere will 1,e !(o; In"

under Panamanian law. That is a dictator svs0, c). hot h civil 8a w as

well as criminal law. And are these people "oino. to wilIin2ly 1 rail

their Panamanian replacements? We could wel end lp with the Cops

of Engineers running the canal.

With this sort of training and disruption, can we have an efficient

operation ? Can we have a full-time operation. And can we use it when

we want to? I gets down to a problem of shortages-shiortages of water,

of money and of trained personnel.

Are we then going to have a shortage of access of the use of that

canal in a time of need ?

Then there is the insurgency problem. I think it is the most spineless attitude I have ever seen to say we have got to get out of there

under the threat there might be some kind of violence or terrorism.

It is absolutely unreal, Mr. Chairman, because I feel that the U.S.

Marines can handle any problem. I would certainly bank on them

a lot more than I would on the Panamanian militia to protect that

facility. The attempt or the inclination to disturb the facility would

be a lot more real under Torrijos' control than it would under our own

control. The Panamanians know we don't economically depend on it

as heavily as they do. It wouldn't economically destroy or seriously

handicap the United States if something were to happen to the canal.

But if Torrijos has it, what happens then? He is dependent on it. It

would be the biggest economic facility in his country. If somebody

wants to pull a coup and do something to upsete, his apple cart, what

is the easiest thing to do? It is to politically and economically damage

him by curtailing his operation.

It seems to me the temptation to disrupt the service of the Panama

Canal is magnified immensely by transferring it out of the hands of

the United States of America to Torrijos' control. I think it is absolutely economic foolishness and military suicide-for the United States

to make a move like this.

In my letter of October 17, 1977, to General Jones, I made the points

presented to you today and asked: "In light, of the controversy over the

Dole interception, are the assurances contained in your message still

valid ?" This should certainly be explored.

And there is such a taint on these treaties. Mr. Chairman.

There are these massive bank loans with Panama, which I helped to

expose. I filed a lawsuit against Sol Linowitz which caused him to

resign from the board of directors of Marine Midland Bank. All sorts

of things have been going on that would be considered to be. "hankypanky." And as far as I can see there is only one set of people who really

stand to benefit out of this, outside of the money we pour out to Latin

America in general, and that is 60 or 80 U.S. attorneys who represent

these foreign interests and those sitting as directors of big int ernational

banks and multinational corporations who are goinz to have their

kitty's fattened because of the amount of money they will get under

the circumstances provided 1by the proposed treaties.

I hate to put it this blntly, Mr. Chairman. but it is a rip-ofl of

the American people. It is billions of dollars out of the pockets of
24

American citizens being funneled into the pockets of vested interests.

I don't think the people of the United States are in a mood to tolerate

it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank Mr. Hansen for his very strong testimony.

Of course, I agree fully with everything he says. I would like to thank

him for carrying on the fight.

I would say today if they had a vote in the Senate, that the treaty

wolild not be ratified. I think the administration's strategy and philosophy is to delay bringing the vote up in the Senate until they can build

their strength up.

There are people, Mr. Chairman, like George Hansen, and others, if

they will keep this issue before the American people, I believe we can

win in the Senate. And I know we can win it in the House. And as I

said to General Brown, if the American people want to keep the

Panama Canal, let's keep it, and see what the consequences are later

on down the road.

It is just like you say, it is a bad deal. And I have noticed the military

that I have talked to, and that have testified before our committees.

the stand they have taken. They seem to be very, very uncomfortable

in taking the stand of defending the treaty and saying that the canal

will be safe and the military can protect our interests in Panama.

M1r. HANsEN. Thank you.

The CIAIRMAN. Mr. Whitelurst.

Mfr. WHITEHURST. Congressman Hansen, you are preaching to a

small choir, but you are preaching anyway. I have no questions.

The ChARMAN. Mr. MacDonald.

Mr. M1CDONAD. Thank you, MIr. Chairman.

Let me compliment you on your excellent presentation. I am sorry

the general couldn't stay around. I understand his need to pass out,

however. I wish he would have stuck around. I think it would have

been an anecdote to some of the toxins lie has been picking up in recent

months. I was rather shocked to hear the general in summation come

out with one fairly tale after another. One is this illusion we have had

four Presidents operating openly to the American people on the

Panama Canal. And it is just not fair to sabotage this at this time

after we have lhad such an opportunity in the past to speak up.

Mr. Ifansen, you are certainly an expert, and one who has followed

the Panama Canal issue, as Congressman Montgoiery already stated

yoU have led the fi-ht. Yoii are to be complimented for that very

excellent work.

I* your opinion do von feel the American people have been treated

honlestl y on this down through the years? I can remember, it was just

1 year ago this mouth. that the then Candi(date Carter told us in a

se(0md television debate we were not (roing to (6\0 up control of the

Pammiii Caial. I e took more or less that position.

T hat statement lasted less than 1 year, for a maiin that was not going

to lie to us. Do yo feel like the administration has been honest on this

isSue ? We only got, the treaty about I day before they had that circus

down there with the signing.
25

Mr. HANSEN. That is a leading question, Mr. McDonald. I think

you about answered it with the question.

Mr. MCDoNAi. The (eneral is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. He is supposed to be a knowledgeable man. IHe is supposed to be

a patriot. He just stated it is more or less -dirty pool" to come up at this

time and suggest there is something wrong with it, after we have had(l

all this time-four Presidents, to express our disapproval. 14p to this

time we have always been told we are just negotiating.

Mr. HANSEN. I would say this, Mr. McDonald. You are certainly

right in what you are saying. In fact, I found that everybody seems

to have been included in the negotiations except the Congress of the

United States who have continuously been on record against any giveaway of the Panama Canal. Tlen they cone and say we, along with the

people of the United States, are supposed to accept it. I think it is time

that the people downtown-I dont care which political party they

represent-that they understand there is a group of people up here on

Capitol Hill who represent the people of the United States.

The next time they ought to take us in on a thing like this then they

wouldn't come up with a problem like they are facing today.

Mr. McDo _NA1. He mentioned a former Secretary, I assume Dean

Rusk, the same one I know from Georgia who has stated in the World

Court we might not be able to uphold our rights there in Panama

unless we kind of go along with this treaty. To my understanding,

the Connally reservation which would keep the World Court fingers

out of it is still in effect. Were you aware the Connally reservation

has been repealed?

Mr. HANSEN. There are certain people in this country who would

like to subject, us to a World Court.

However, the laws of the United States still apply and the Connally

reservation is still valid.

Mr. McDONALD. The Connally reservation says we don't submit to

the World Court issues we feel are internal matters. There is no reason

in the world I see we would be submitting a Panama Canal question

to the World Court unless we lost our senses.

Mr. HANsEN. I agree, Mr. McDonald.

This business regarding the Panama Canal operation is an internal

affair, that is exactly what it is. Regarding the matter of sovereignty

which, I think you brought up earlier, I think it ought to be put to rest.

People issue. Many say the phrase "as if we were sovereign" is a

weakened position of sovereignty.

This is not true. In fact, there was no real sovereignty able to be

expressed in the area at the turn of the century because Panama was a

fledgling nation, only days old when the United States recognized

their independence and when we made the original agreement.

Point 1 in the 1903 treaty, said that the United States guarantees

Panama's sovereignty.

Panama in return then guaranteed us their sovereignty over the

Canal Zone.

On that assumption, then, the United States moved into the area as

a vestige of the Monroe Doctrine, and we asserted sovereignty for

Panama and for ourselves.
26

AVo cua ra ntee(d Panama's sovereinty and in doing so we guaranteed

our own SOverei gnv which, in a sense we are saying in the pinase,

"as if we were soverei."

This was assertion of sovereignty. it was an assertion of power by

the United States. Whether anybody likes it or not, we are sovereign.

And the Supreme Court certified mur sovereignty when it said wve are

the titled owner of that area. It is our property. I However, it is riI lu-

]ois to a rgxue so vere1 ignty and ownership. The real arIonent now is do

we give it awvy or not ?

I think it will be a disaster if we (1o.

I mlght ask at this point. Mr. Chairman, permission to also insert

in the record alongy with the message to commands from General Jones,

my letter to Genera Jones confronting him on this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. HANSEN. Thank you.

[The following information was received for the record:]

OCTOBER 17. 1977.

DaAR GENERAL JONES: I am deeply appreciative of your integrity and many

years of service to our country. I regret that it is necessary to confront you with

a ma tter of serious concern.

However. I am in possession of an August 20 message which you sent to all

major Air Force coninands regarding the Panamna Canal, the contents of which

I have this day released to the Press.

It is appalling that you have apparently "gagged" all Air Force personnel,

especially those senior officers whose true opinion would be of great use to the

public and the security of this nation.

The information I received along with your nessage indicate that, "Paragraph

5 of this message makes it quite clear that we, as military personnel, are expected

to support these treaties," atid that any action otherwise would be highly

detrimental to a military career. It is quite apparent to me that this is a clever

but still blatant attempt to deprive the American people of the full information

to which they are entitled on a matter so serious.

In light of the controversy over the Dole interception, are the assurances contained in your message still valid? The question is particularly pertinent in light

of the recent so-called agreement between Carter and Torrijos which was not

signed by either person and which was gutted by statements of Torrijos on his

return to Panama.

If a Senior Officer did express a contrary opinion could he expect the same

treatineiit as General Singlaub?

In light of your contention in paragraph 2 does this mean that the United

States with no control over the Canal would have to make good any operational

deficits of the Canal's operation or pay for amy needed maintenance.

Did you receive any pres-sure from the White House for your own support or

to !e11( such a message to t he members of your conlnand ?

Your comments in pa ragrap 2 show signiticait contradiction between what

the military is telling itself about the military value of the Panima Cainal and

what they were telling the public in past Senate hearings. I would like to know

exact y what the official military posit ion really is.

Fu rtheriore, I have seriotis doubts that in light of recent controversies over

i reat y i ite (rpret atioi tI hat the Palna1mania ns would accept the unilateral aut hority

of Presi (tell1 ( 'a rte's sta tmenlelit ill mia gra ph " %Xhich says tlht the I ni ted

St aes. will have ihe right to assure the lintellatce of tle perillalleit

neuil.rlif t v of ilile Canl (1.,; ,Io'i fl ' / fO'm'NN urf/." (E luphasis added.)

As I a1 realy iave st oIng ildlica ti ins of nii incrouls comilililis of senior miii hary

personnel wilo are bci hg "suielied." I 1iiist delliad an ilumlediate retratctioii

of this "muzzliig" order along with piroper apologies from you aid any higher

alithor1ity r0 pOiSill.

i nally. ill your siateiient s to tie Coligress. th e public, or your cominiil. I

wo ild s Ironllly sugg('st tIhaIt yol arrive at a collsisie cy 0hat is compatible with

nat rioll security n1d with tile basic riglhs of iiidividuils ill a flie nat ion. I

assure you tiat iy colleagilies will )'(' mInost initerested ill obser viing the a tiol 4)f
27

the high command of the nation's armed forces during deliberations over the

proposed Panama Treaties in the days ahead.

Your expeditious reply to my questions will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

GFoPCE HANSEN,

Minber of Conyrss.

OCT~oiiERi 21, 1J77.

DEAR AIR. IANSEN: The thrust of your let fer of 17 October 1977 comnernilml'

my message to Air Force coiinianders on the Panam ('aal Treaties appear to

be contained in the assertion that the message has gaggedd" all Air Force

personnel. That assertion is mistaken. The message was categorically not a g.g order. It

was not intended to muzzle Air Force senior conimaiders. ii nact, the last senteiice of my letter makes clear that my intent was rather to let senior Air Force

commanders know why the Air Force supported the treaties-not to dictate their

personal opinions. The message of 20 August 1977 was a straightforward communication to the

Air Force's senior managers of an cdicial position arrived at by the President

and supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was nothing unusual about

the message, and I felt no pressure to send it.

We expect and encourage our people to voice their free opinion on proposed

courses of action. Once a decision has been arrived at, however, they are expected

to support established policies. This (toes not mean that they are thereafter prohibited from expressing their personal views when, for example, questioned by

the Congress. Quite the contrary, by custom, policy, and law when asked by

Congressional Committees for their personal views our people are expected to ,say

what they think-and the record will show they have.

I fully endorse the proposed treaties. This is my personal view, as well as my

view as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Since renegotiation of the existing treaty began in 1964, four Presidents have

supported the search for a new agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been

deeply involved in the negotiations at every phase. During the most critical stages

which occurred over the past two years, a senior military officer representing

the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been a member of

the negotiating team.

The Joint Chiefs have discussed these matters with senior military commanders, have weighed carefully the national security aspects of alternative

courses of action, have participated fully in the evolution of the treaties' terms,

and unanimously favor ratification.

Sincerely,

General, USAF, Chief of Staff.

WHo CAN SAY WHAT ?--DISAGREEMENT ARISES OVER CANAL OPINIoNs

(By Bruce Callander)

WAsHINGTON.-SometimeS what you said isn't nearly as important as what

people say you said or what people think you meant in saying it.

Ever since the Joint Chiefs of Staff voiced their unanimous endorsement of the

Panama Canal treaties, some members of Congress have been trying to prove

that (1) they were under pressure from the White House to do so and (2) the

services have told their members generally that if they can't say anything nice

about the pacts, they shouldn't say anything at all.

Gen. George Brown, chairman of the JCS, has found a number of occasions to

challenge the first premise. In a recent Florida speech lie noted that the chiefs

frequently differ with presidential decisions and say so, at least within the executive branch. But, said Brown, the chiefs really favor the Panama atgreenments and

didn't have to be coerced by the White House to say so publicly. (Last week's

issue).

That probably hasn't satisfied Brown's critics in Congress, but it's hard to

accuse a four-star general of saying something he doesn't mean just to keel) his

boss happy. It's particularly hard in Brown's case because lie has a reputation for

speaking his mind even when it makes presidents unhappy.
2S

So the lawmakers are trying to make hay over the second point-that, having

voiced their approval of the Panama treaties, the chiefs are moving to muzzle

other officers who may share their view.

ThIat very well may be the case. General Brown put the proposition ratlier

clearly in his recent speech. After telling how the chiefs voice their opinions pro

and con in the high councils of government, Brown said, "What we do not do is

'go public' with dissenting views once a decision has been made. Every senior

military officer understands the rules of play. Give your best: say what you

think; advocate a course of action-and when a decision is made, support it.

"If a decision is acceptable, and an officer wishes to speak out publiclyfine. He cam take o(f his uniform, leave active service, and express that

di sagr'e~eet."

In short, once the word has come down, the officer has three options-praise

the decision (if lie approves of it), shut up and support it anyway (if he can)

or get out and howl his head off tif he feels that strongly opposed).

Curiously enough, conigres:s;iial critics of the JCS position do not seel to

have picked up Brown's blunt remarks about dissent in service. But, they have

latched onto another, milder statement by one of the service chiefs and have

made much of it.

In mid-August, Gen. David Jones. AF chief of staff, dispatched a message to

commanders about the canal treaties. The message accompanies this story.

Jones' statement follows closely the description the State Department gave of

the agreements, but it ends with the sentence: "It is important that our personnel.

particularly our senior people, understand our support for the proposed treaties."

Somebody passed a copy of Jones' message to Rep. George Hansen (R-Idalho)

who promptly (1) dispatched I biting note to Jones, (2) cranked up a press

release headed "Has the Milit:lry Been Muzzled on Panama'." and (3) put the

whole business-Jones letter. Hansen note, press release and appropriate remarks-into the Congre'ssional Record.

In his press release, Hansen said. "It is quite evident that any senior officer

who dares express his own feelings will suffer the same fate as General Sin-laub.

I wonder if the Joint Chiefs received a similar message from the White House

demanding their allegiance?"

In the Congressiomnl Record, Hansen said he was "shocked and appalled" by

Jones' letter. The statements, lie said. "are highly indicative of wide-scale

'Singlaubistic' thinking in the military and in addition they provide speculation

of White House terror tactics and bullying."

To clinch his charge that senior officers are coerced, Hansen quoted the unnamed officer who sent hii Jones' message as saying that he opposed the treaties

but now understood that he was not to say so.

Hansen said a good deal more in his press release about the White House's

effort "to subvert the truth," about the treaties' being "a fraud" and about the

administration's "gagging" the military.

He also put a number of (Iuestions to Jones, asking him whether the White

house put pressure on him either to support the treaties or to send the message

to the field.

IPresumnatbily Jones could save time and trouble by sending Hansen a copy

of General Brown's speech. It seems to answer the questions pretty clearly.

DEAR GENERAL JONES: Thank you f;r your reply of October 21 to my letter

(xpressing concern for your message to Air Force Conmmands regarding the

prolos(ed Panita iima Canhai treaties.

however, I a mu ( concerned tIha the problems I posed were not really answered

satisfactorily by your response.

Yomr slateme nt that, the niessa ge is not a gag order for Air Force personnel

is aq)]reciated but aqpareiity not underst ood 1by either Air Force personnel or

ihdv;Idnals involved in related orgainizaitions such as the Air Force Association.

Mili , 1Werson1el have (omplaiiied to me aid to other Members of Congres

thIt they (to 1ot feel free to por'onally express positions contrary to Air Force

1'liey. Th tone of your .!ssaae wlich I earlier brought to your attention. if

I\ lir'a'. certaiilv (loes'it (to 8liyt hing to we-coie (liver1'e opiliolis. Your October

21 let te o iiie ill fI:it noted that your people have opbortlmnjit y for free opinion oiily :1 a dii sioL has bee a'rivod at whic, o core, is low the case. You

col tiiihupd oil to say that they arc then expectedd to support established ipolicie'."
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

29 3 1262 05589 1211

.joint Chiefs of StaJff Chairman, General Georfge Brown, al'-o says that "nilit ry

officers do not go public with dissenting views once a decision is made." Below

your level, including a few advisors, who in the ilit arv ever really enjoyed thI'

input and freedom of expression regarding the lPanamiiia treut I V? The aiser 1>

not one and you know it. You cited freedom of military iiefple Io express 0 ir(i- I1l

views when questioned by the congress. But you must know lh hit such possibilit ie<

are remote. With Gen. Singlaub so fresh in mind, it iS cerl 81 iby obvious tliat ni

military min who values his career would wvant to "buclk the establishment 

Isn't it interesting I hat polls of retired Adiiira ls awl Geerals when t hey ; re

free to speak their wind without coercion, are overwhelmingly 8-aiist the t ratie

(300-7 by recent tabulation).

This week I received a letter from a high ranking retired Air Force officer

who is an Air Force Associition member. ie stated that the "recent NO tional

AFA meeting in Washington . . . Wanted to adopt a resolution condemnliiig tlwt

Canal treaties but General Jiones had stopped the resolution.' Anothi r Senior

Member of the Air Force canplained about paragraph 5 of your message ViH 1h

he said "makes it quite clear that we as military personnel are expected tt sulport these treaties."

Now, General, it is obvious that the assurances you give me that there i, n

muzzling of Air Force personnel, especially Senior Coiinmanders, is not understood by members of the military or affiliated associations.

Therefore I must challenge you to not only tell me that military people and

associates are free to speak but tell them in a way they can believe.

A second major issue revolves around your lightly flipping through the pas-aof recent history to name-drop those Presidents and others who have been i'

support of a new treaty. This gives me no comfort at all, General. Many of thome

same Presidents and certain military officers and Ambassadors like 'Mr. Bunker

have also been the architects of American withdrawal and defeat around the

world for two decades.

The American people are tired of appeasement and incompetence in foreign

affairs which has stalemated us in one war and lost another and now finds us

becoming more and more dependent upon other nations for even those elements

involved in our basic survival. Just look at the oil situation.

Rather than independently achieving energy self-sufficiency, we find ourselves

becoming more and more dependent upon foreign nations both in terms of price

and supply. This can be similarly said of a number of other situations. Now, of

all people, you in the military want to put our twNvo-ocean naval capability and

commercial maritime link between two great sea coasts at the mercy of another

power. With a track record like this, then the political and military leadership of this

nation could hardly wonder why the people are skeptical of not only supporting

the proposed Panama Canal treaties but also of even supporting the military in

its enlistment programs and other necessary ways. One word of advice to you

from one in Congress who has long supported the military is that you have few

real stalwart friends among the liberal elements of Congress and you are Ist

losing the support of the moderates and conservatives.

A third point of concern is that of dichotomy of sales pitch. When high military

officers professing support of the treaties give a strong statement of need for

continued access to the Panama Canal to all military personnel as you did in

your message to all commands and then tell another story to the public. it doesn't

wash well. For instance, in contrast to your message, General Brown before the

House Armed Services Committee on October 21 stated that he doesn't believe

the Panama Canal is "vital" to the United States.

This business of telling different stories to the Civilian and Military sector

of our society is no more toleralble than the situation of President Carter and

General Torrijos, each tolling their own nation that which might sound popular

even though the positions are in contradiction with :ne another.

Finally, any person such as yourself who professes to know what the treaties

are all about must know what you are doing to the pocketbooks of the taxpayers

who support your very existence. Once you have given away, as the treaties propose, the very land which American military bases no", oceu)ny to defend the

Canal, how do you propose to continue such defense after the year 2000 without

the same convenient established bases of operation?! Of course, it is obvious.

You will do just as we do in Europe and other places across the vorld-reii pr

erty from the nations concerned under limited conditions at costs of hundreds

of millions of dollars per year.
30

But it is only money, isn't it General? And buying peace seems so convenient

that some people never want to look back to the lessons of history which shows

that principles, not payofts, preserve the peace.

And General, you had better check the diversion of water problems and water

shed damage possibilities to see it you would have a full-time canal under Panamianialn operation and ownership. You should also check if Panamanian leadership would be able to withstand "tapping the cash register" and using maintenance funds for social programs thereby ending up with a broken-down canal. Just

who be,,ides Uncle Sam would then be called on to step in and pay the tab to

upgrade the facilities?

Aud don't forget to see just how much of the payments proposed in the new

treaties will never get into the Panamanian economy but actually go to service

tue massive debts of General Torrijos.

And General, isn't it more important from the point of view of the citizens of

the United States whom you serve that we keep our two great coasts bound

together by cominucd unimpeded ownership of the Panama Canal than that we

unite the two parts of Panama by surrendering this property?

We are a g ood neighbor and we can perhaps improve upon this. But we will not

be a good neighbor if we give the Canal to Panama with strings attached as

provide(ld in the treaties which could permanently subject them to us in colonial

status. Right now an independent Canal Zone owned by the United States needs

110 interfering in Panamanian affairs to protect and operate the Canal. In your

own message to the commnands you quoted President Carter as stating that "we

u ill have the right to assure 'the maintenance of the permanent neutrality of

the Canal as we may deem necessary." This absolutely means we have the right

to meet any threat in Panama from within or without-which constitutes a

angerous and unnecessary blank check for our involvement and interference in

l'anamanian affairs. The proposed Canal treaties, contrary to claims of proponenits, will deeply involve the U.S. in interventionism, colonialism, and

inperialismn.

General, I strongly feel that some kind of wishful-thinking euphoria has engulfed the high military command in which you serve and honestly believe that

somehow you are operating on limited facts and unrealistic political assurances.

I am prepared to back up this contention if you are concerned enough to discuss

Ihe matter further. In the meantime, I think it is vitally important that I receive

further communication from you regarding the matters raised in this letter.

Sincerely,

GEORGE HANSEN,

Member of Congress.

NOVEMBER 2, 1977.

DEAR MR. HANSEN : Bravo on your stand against the Air Force being stifled in

any adverse comnments on the Canal treaties.

General David Jones' muzzle is particularly galling since he has obviously taken an a('tive political role in this debate.

At our last local Air Force Association (AFA) meeting it was reported from

an at1endee to the recent National AFA meeting in Washington that the conference wanted to adopt a resolution condemning the Canal treaties but General

Jones had stopped the resolution. One man one thought.

From my 33 years association with the Air Force, I would be very skeptical of

the opinion from an Air Force officer as to how many ground troops it would take

to defend any territory.

Sincerely,

The C1r. ux. Thank you very mIuclh, Mr. IHan sn. We appreciate

yolir appearance before the col'mmittee.

i\[i'. I f.\NENsl:. Thank you, M . (Cha-im.

The C IA1L1N. T he comniittee Will adjou'n.

[-W I evupon, the Committee adjouirined at 3:45 p.m.]

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