Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 1, 2020 / Notices 77147 

1The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR 

parts 730–774 (2020), originally issued pursuant to 

the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 4601– 

4623 (Supp. III 2015)) (‘‘EAA’’), which lapsed on 

August 21, 2001. The President, through Executive 

Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 2001 

Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by successive 

Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in 

effect under the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)) 

(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President 

signed into law the John S. McCain National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 

which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 

2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While 

Continued 

Telecommunications and Information 

Administration (NTIA), Department of 

Commerce. 

ACTION: Announcement of meeting. 

SUMMARY: The FirstNet Authority Board 

will convene an open public meeting of 

the Board and Board Committees. 

DATES: December 9, 2020; 11:00 a.m. to 

1:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST); 

WebEx. 

ADDRESSES: The public meeting will be 

conducted via WebEx. Members of the 

public may listen to the meeting and 

view the slide presentation by visiting 

the URL: https://

stream2.sparkstreetdigital.com/ 

20201209-firstnet.html?id=20201209- 

firstnet. WebEx information can also be 

found on the FirstNet website 

(FirstNet.gov). 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

For General Information: Janell Smith, 

(202) 257–5929, Janell.Smith@

FirstNet.gov. 

For Media Inquiries: Ryan Oremland, 

(571) 665–6186, Ryan.Oremland@

FirstNet.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background: The Middle Class Tax 

Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 

(codified at 47 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.) (Act) 

established the FirstNet Authority as an 

independent Authority within NTIA. 

The Act directs the FirstNet Authority 

to ensure the building, deployment, and 

operation of a nationwide Interoperable 

Public Safety Broadband Network. The 

FirstNet Authority Board is responsible 

for making strategic decisions regarding 

the FirstNet Authority’s operations. 

Matters to be Considered: The 

FirstNet Authority will post a detailed 

agenda for the Combined Board and 

Board Committees Meeting on 

FirstNet.gov prior to the meeting. The 

agenda topics are subject to change. 

Please note that the subjects discussed 

by the Board and Board Committees 

may involve commercial or financial 

information that is privileged or 

confidential, or other legal matters 

affecting the FirstNet Authority. As 

such, the Board may, by majority vote, 

close the meeting only for the time 

necessary to preserve the confidentiality 

of such information, pursuant to 47 

U.S.C. 1424(e)(2). 

Other Information: The Combined 

Board and Board Committees Meeting is 

accessible to people with disabilities. 

Individuals requiring accommodations, 

such as sign language interpretation or 

other ancillary aids, are asked to notify 

Janell Smith at (202) 257–5929 or email: 

Janell.Smith@FirstNet.gov at least five 

(5) business days (December 2) before 

the meeting. 

Records: The FirstNet Authority 

maintains records of all Board 

proceedings. Minutes of the Combined 

Board and Board Committees Meeting 

will be available on FirstNet.gov. 

Dated: November 24, 2020. 

Janell Smith, 

Board Secretary, First Responder Network 

Authority. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26421 Filed 11–30–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Foreign-Trade Zones Board 

[B–48–2020] 

Foreign-Trade Zone (FTZ) 201— 

Holyoke, Massachusetts, Authorization 

of Production Activity, ProAmpac 

Holdings, Inc. (Flexible Packaging 

Applications), Westfield, 

Massachusetts 

On July 27, 2020, ProAmpac 

Holdings, Inc., submitted a notification 

of proposed production activity to the 

FTZ Board for its facility within 

Subzone 201D, in Westfield, 

Massachusetts. 

The notification was processed in 

accordance with the regulations of the 

FTZ Board (15 CFR part 400), including 

notice in the Federal Register inviting 

public comment (85 FR 47166, August 

4, 2020). On November 24, 2020, the 

applicant was notified of the FTZ 

Board’s decision that no further review 

of the activity is warranted at this time. 

The production activity described in the 

notification was authorized, subject to 

the FTZ Act and the FTZ Board’s 

regulations, including Section 400.14. 

Dated: November 24, 2020. 

Andrew McGilvray, 

Executive Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26498 Filed 11–30–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DS–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Order Renewing Order Temporarily 

Denying Export Privileges 

Mahan Airways, Mahan Tower, No. 21, 

Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way, 

Tehran, Iran 

Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard a/k/a 

Kosarian Fard, P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates; 

Mahmoud Amini, G#22 Dubai Airport Free 

Zone, P.O. Box 393754, Dubai, United Arab 

Emirates, and P.O. Box 52404, Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates, and Mohamed 

Abdulla Alqaz Building, Al Maktoum 

Street, Al Rigga, Dubai, United Arab 

Emirates; 

Kerman Aviation a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation, 

42 Avenue Montaigne 75008, Paris, France 

Sirjanco Trading LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates 

Mahan Air General Trading LLC, 19th Floor 

Al Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, 

Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates 

Mehdi Bahrami, Mahan Airways—Istanbul 

Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil Apt No: 101 

D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli Istanbul, Turkey 

Al Naser Airlines a/k/a al-Naser Airlines 

a/k/a Al Naser Wings Airline a/k/a Alnaser 

Airlines and Air Freight Ltd., Home 46, AlKarrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, 

Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, 

Baghdad, Iraq, and, Al Amirat Street, 

Section 309, St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour, 

Baghdad, Iraq, and, P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 

911399, Amman 11191, Jordan 

Ali Abdullah Alhay a/k/a Ali Alhay a/k/a Ali 

Abdullah Ahmed Alhay, Home 46, AlKarrada, Babil Region, District 929, St 21, 

Beside Al Jadirya Private Hospital, 

Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak Street, Qatif, 

Saudi Arabia 61177 

Bahar Safwa General Trading, P.O. Box 

113212, Citadel Tower, Floor–5, Office 

#504, Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab 

Emirates, and PO Box 8709, Citadel Tower, 

Business Bay, Dubai, United Arab Emirates 

Sky Blue Bird Group a/k/a Sky Blue Bird 

Aviation a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Ltd a/k/a Sky 

Blue Bird FZC, P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al 

Khaimah Trade Zone, United Arab 

Emirates 

Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam 

Muhammad Anwar Nur Shammout a/k/a 

Issam Anwar, Philips Building, 4th Floor, 

Al Fardous Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al 

Kolaa, Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17–18 

Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, W1W 

8RP, United Kingdom, and Cumhuriyet 

Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, Cad. Hazar 

Sok. No.14/A Silivri, Istanbul, Turkey; 

Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations, 15 

CFR parts 730–774 (2020) (‘‘EAR’’ or 

‘‘the Regulations’’), I hereby grant the 

request of the Office of Export 

Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’) to renew the 

temporary denial order issued in this 

matter on May 29, 2020. I find that 

renewal of this order, as modified, is 

necessary in the public interest to 

prevent an imminent violation of the 

Regulations.1


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77148 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 1, 2020 / Notices 

Section 1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the 

EAA (except for three sections which are 

inapplicable here), Section 1768 of ECRA provides, 

in pertinent part, that all orders, rules, regulations, 

and other forms of administrative action that were 

made or issued under the EAA, including as 

continued in effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in 

effect as of ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13, 

2018), shall continue in effect according to their 

terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or 

revoked through action undertaken pursuant to the 

authority provided under ECRA. Moreover, Section 

1761(a)(5) of ECRA authorizes the issuance of 

temporary denial orders. 

2Section 766.24(d) provides that BIS may seek 

renewal of a temporary denial order for additional 

180-day renewal periods, if it believes that renewal 

is necessary in the public interest to prevent an 

imminent violation. Renewal requests are to be 

made in writing no later than 20 days before the 

scheduled expiration date of a temporary denial 

order. Renewal requests may include discussion of 

any additional or changed circumstances, and may 

seek appropriate modifications to the order, 

including the addition of parties as respondents or 

related persons, or the removal of parties previously 

added as respondents or related persons. BIS is not 

required to seek renewal as to all parties, and a 

removal of a party can be effected if, without more, 

BIS does not seek renewal as to that party. Any 

party included or added to a temporary denial order 

as a respondent may oppose a renewal request as 

set forth in Section 766.24(d). Parties included or 

added as related persons can at any time appeal 

their inclusion as a related person, but cannot 

challenge the underlying temporary denial order, 

either as initially issued or subsequently renewed, 

and cannot oppose a renewal request. See also note 

4, infra. 

3The May 29, 2020 renewal order was effective 

upon issuance and published in the Federal 

Register on June 4, 2020 (85 FR 34,405). Prior 

renewal orders issued on September 17, 2008, 

March 16, 2009, September 11, 2009, March 9, 

2010, September 3, 2010, February 25, 2011, August 

24, 2011, February 15, 2012, August 9, 2012, 

February 4, 2013, July 31, 2013, January 24, 2014, 

July 22, 2014, January 16, 2015, July 13, 2015, 

January 7, 2016, July 7, 2016, December 30, 2016, 

June 27, 2017, December 20, 2017, June 14, 2018, 

December 11, 2018, June 5, 2019, and May 29, 2020, 

respectively. The August 24, 2011 renewal followed 

the issuance of a modification order that issued on 

July 1, 2011, to add Zarand Aviation as a 

respondent. The July 13, 2015 renewal followed a 

modification order that issued May 21, 2015, and 

added Al Naser Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, and 

Bahar Safwa General Trading as respondents. Each 

of the renewal orders and each of the modification 

orders referenced in this footnote or elsewhere in 

this order has been published in the Federal 

Register. 

4Pursuant to Sections 766.23 and 766.24(c) of the 

Regulations, any person, firm, corporation, or 

business organization related to a denied person by 

affiliation, ownership, control, or position of 

responsibility in the conduct of trade or related 

services may be added as a ‘‘related person’’ to a 

temporary denial order to prevent evasion of the 

order. 

5Balli Group PLC and Balli Aviation settled 

proposed BIS administrative charges as part of a 

settlement agreement that was approved by a 

settlement order issued on February 5, 2010. The 

sanctions imposed pursuant to that settlement and 

order included, inter alia, a $15 million civil 

penalty and a requirement to conduct five external 

audits and submit related audit reports. The Balli 

Group Respondents also settled related charges 

with the Department of Justice and the Treasury 

Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

6See note 4, supra, concerning the addition of 

related persons to a temporary denial order. 

Kosarian Fard and Mahmoud Amini remain parties 

to the TDO. On August 13, 2014, BIS and Gatewick 

resolved administrative charges against Gatewick, 

including a charge for acting contrary to the terms 

of a BIS denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)). In addition 

to the payment of a civil penalty, the settlement 

includes a seven-year denial order. The first two 

years of the denial period were active, with the 

remaining five years suspended conditioned upon 

Gatewick’s full and timely payment of the civil 

penalty and its compliance with the Regulations 

during the seven-year denial order period. This 

denial order, in effect, superseded the TDO as to 

Gatewick, which was not included as part of the 

January 16, 2015 renewal order. The Gatewick LLC 

Final Order was published in the Federal Register 

on August 20, 2014. See 79 FR 49,283 (Aug. 20, 

2014). 

7Zarand Aviation’s export privileges remained 

denied until July 22, 2014, when it was not 

included as part of the renewal order issued on that 

date. 

8The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of 

Foreign Assets Control (‘‘OFAC’’) designated Sky 

Blue Bird and Issam Shammout as Specially 

Designated Global Terrorists (‘‘SDGTs’’) on May 21, 

2015, pursuant to Executive Order 13224, for 

‘‘providing support to Iran’s Mahan Air.’’ See 80 FR 

30,762 (May 29, 2015). 

9The November 16, 2017 modification was 

published in the Federal Register on December 4, 

2017. See 82 FR 57,203 (Dec. 4, 2017). On 

September 28, 2017, BIS and Ali Eslamian resolved 

an administrative charge for acting contrary to the 

terms of the denial order (15 CFR 764.2(k)) that was 

based upon Eslamian’s violation of the TDO after 

his addition to the TDO on August 24, 2011. 

Equipco (UK) Ltd. and Skyco (UK) Ltd., two 

companies owned and operated by Eslamian, also 

were parties to the settlement agreement and were 

added to the settlement order as related persons. In 

addition to other sanctions, the settlement provides 

that Eslamian, Equipco, and Skyco shall be subject 

to a conditionally-suspended denial order for a 

period of four years from the date of the settlement 

order. 

I. Procedural History 

On March 17, 2008, Darryl W. 

Jackson, the then-Assistant Secretary of 

Commerce for Export Enforcement 

(‘‘Assistant Secretary’’), signed an order 

denying Mahan Airways’ export 

privileges for a period of 180 days on 

the ground that issuance of the order 

was necessary in the public interest to 

prevent an imminent violation of the 

Regulations. The order also named as 

denied persons Blue Airways, of 

Yerevan, Armenia (‘‘Blue Airways of 

Armenia’’), as well as the ‘‘Balli Group 

Respondents,’’ namely, Balli Group 

PLC, Balli Aviation, Balli Holdings, 

Vahid Alaghband, Hassan Alaghband, 

Blue Sky One Ltd., Blue Sky Two Ltd., 

Blue Sky Three Ltd., Blue Sky Four Ltd., 

Blue Sky Five Ltd., and Blue Sky Six 

Ltd., all of the United Kingdom. The 

order was issued ex parte pursuant to 

Section 766.24(a) of the Regulations, 

and went into effect on March 21, 2008, 

the date it was published in the Federal 

Register. 

This temporary denial order (‘‘TDO’’) 

was renewed in accordance with 

Section 766.24(d) of the Regulations.2

Subsequent renewals also have issued 

pursuant to Section 766.24(d), including 

most recently on May 29, 2020.3 Some 

of the renewal orders and the 

modification orders that have issued 

between renewals have added certain 

parties as respondents or as related 

persons, or effected the removal of 

certain parties.4

The September 11, 2009 renewal 

order continued the denial order as to 

Mahan Airways, but not as to the Balli 

Group Respondents or Blue Airways of 

Armenia.5 As part of the February 25, 

2011 renewal order, Pejman Mahmood 

Kosarayanifard (a/k/a Kosarian Fard), 

Mahmoud Amini, and Gatewick LLC (a/ 

k/a Gatewick Freight and Cargo 

Services, a/k/a Gatewick Aviation 

Services) were added as related persons 

to prevent evasion of the TDO.6 A 

modification order issued on July 1, 

2011, adding Zarand Aviation as a 

respondent in order to prevent an 

imminent violation.7

As part of the August 24, 2011 

renewal, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco 

Trading LLC, and Ali Eslamian were 

added as related persons. Mahan Air 

General Trading LLC, Equipco (UK) 

Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. were added as 

related persons by a modification order 

issued on April 9, 2012. Mehdi Bahrami 

was added as a related person as part of 

the February 4, 2013 renewal order. 

On May 21, 2015, a modification 

order issued adding Al Naser Airlines, 

Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa 

General Trading as respondents. As 

detailed in that order and discussed 

further infra, these respondents were 

added to the TDO based upon evidence 

that they were acting together to, inter 

alia, obtain aircraft subject to the 

Regulations for export or reexport to 

Mahan in violation of the Regulations 

and the TDO. 

Sky Blue Bird Group and its chief 

executive officer, Issam Shammout, 

were added as related persons as part of 

the July 13, 2015 renewal order.8 On 

November 16, 2017, a modification 

order issued to remove Ali Eslamian, 

Equipco (UK) Ltd., and Skyco (UK) Ltd. 

as related persons following a request by 

OEE for their removal.9

The December 11, 2018 renewal order 

continued the denial of the export 

privileges of Mahan Airways, Pejman 

Mahmood Kosarayanifard, Mahmoud 

Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco 

Trading LLC, Mahan Air General 

Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Al Naser 

Airlines, Ali Abdullah Alhay, Bahar 

Safwa General Trading, Sky Blue Bird 

Group, and Issam Shammout. 

On October 28, 2020, BIS, through 

OEE, submitted a written request for 


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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 1, 2020 / Notices 77149 

10A party named or added as a related person 

may not oppose the issuance or renewal of the 

underlying temporary denial order, but may file an 

appeal of the related person determination in 

accordance with Section 766.23(c). See also note 2, 

supra. 

11Engaging in conduct prohibited by a denial 

order violates the Regulations. 15 CFR 764.2(a) and 

(k). 

12The third Boeing 747 appeared to have 

undergone significant service maintenance and may 

not have been operational at the time of the March 

9, 2010 renewal order. 

13See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 

sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/ 

20120919.aspx. 

renewal of the TDO that issued on May 

29, 2020. The written request was made 

more than 20 days before the TDO’s 

scheduled expiration. Notice of the 

renewal request was provided to Mahan 

Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali 

Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa 

General Trading in accordance with 

Sections 766.5 and 766.24(d) of the 

Regulations. No opposition to the 

renewal of the TDO has been received. 

Furthermore, no appeal of the related 

person determinations made as part of 

the September 3, 2010, February 25, 

2011, August 24, 2011, April 9, 2012, 

February 4, 2013, and July 13, 2015 

renewal or modification orders has been 

made by Kosarian Fard, Mahmoud 

Amini, Kerman Aviation, Sirjanco 

Trading LLC, Mahan Air General 

Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, Sky Blue 

Bird Group, or Issam Shammout.10

II. Renewal of the TDO 

A. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to Section 766.24, BIS may 

issue or renew an order temporarily 

denying a respondent’s export privileges 

upon a showing that the order is 

necessary in the public interest to 

prevent an ‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 

766.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be 

‘imminent’ either in time or degree of 

likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS 

may show ‘‘either that a violation is 

about to occur, or that the general 

circumstances of the matter under 

investigation or case under criminal or 

administrative charges demonstrate a 

likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As 

to the likelihood of future violations, 

BIS may show that the violation under 

investigation or charge ‘‘is significant, 

deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur 

again, rather than technical or negligent 

[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘lack of information 

establishing the precise time a violation 

may occur does not preclude a finding 

that a violation is imminent, so long as 

there is sufficient reason to believe the 

likelihood of a violation.’’ Id. 

B. The TDO and BIS’s Requests for 

Renewal 

OEE’s request for renewal is based 

upon the facts underlying the issuance 

of the initial TDO, and the renewal and 

modification orders subsequently issued 

in this matter, including the May 21, 

2015 modification order and the 

renewal order issued on December 2, 

2019, and the evidence developed over 

the course of this investigation, which 

indicate a blatant disregard of U.S. 

export controls and the TDO. The initial 

TDO was issued as a result of evidence 

that showed that Mahan Airways and 

other parties engaged in conduct 

prohibited by the EAR by knowingly reexporting to Iran three U.S.-origin 

aircraft, specifically Boeing 747s 

(‘‘Aircraft 1–3’’), items subject to the 

EAR and classified under Export 

Control Classification Number 

(‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.b, without the required 

U.S. Government authorization. Further 

evidence submitted by BIS indicated 

that Mahan Airways was involved in the 

attempted re-export of three additional 

U.S.-origin Boeing 747s (‘‘Aircraft 4–6’’) 

to Iran. 

As discussed in the September 17, 

2008 renewal order, evidence presented 

by BIS indicated that Aircraft 1–3 

continued to be flown on Mahan 

Airways’ routes after issuance of the 

TDO, in violation of the Regulations and 

the TDO itself.11 It also showed that 

Aircraft 1–3 had been flown in further 

violation of the Regulations and the 

TDO on the routes of Iran Air, an 

Iranian Government airline. Moreover, 

as discussed in the March 16, 2009, 

September 11, 2009 and March 9, 2010 

renewal orders, Mahan Airways 

registered Aircraft 1–3 in Iran, obtained 

Iranian tail numbers for them (EP–MNA, 

EP–MNB, and EP–MNE, respectively), 

and continued to operate at least two of 

them in violation of the Regulations and 

the TDO,12 while also committing an 

additional knowing and willful 

violation when it negotiated for and 

acquired an additional U.S.-origin 

aircraft. The additional acquired aircraft 

was an MD–82 aircraft, which 

subsequently was painted in Mahan 

Airways’ livery and flown on multiple 

Mahan Airways’ routes under tail 

number TC–TUA. 

The March 9, 2010 renewal order also 

noted that a court in the United 

Kingdom (‘‘U.K.’’) had found Mahan 

Airways in contempt of court on 

February 1, 2010, for failing to comply 

with that court’s December 21, 2009 and 

January 12, 2010 orders compelling 

Mahan Airways to remove the Boeing 

747s from Iran and ground them in the 

Netherlands. Mahan Airways and the 

Balli Group Respondents had been 

litigating before the U.K. court 

concerning ownership and control of 

Aircraft 1–3. In a letter to the U.K. court 

dated January 12, 2010, Mahan Airways’ 

Chairman indicated, inter alia, that 

Mahan Airways opposes U.S. 

Government actions against Iran, that it 

continued to operate the aircraft on its 

routes in and out of Tehran (and had 

158,000 ‘‘forward bookings’’ for these 

aircraft), and that it wished to continue 

to do so and would pay damages if 

required by that court, rather than 

ground the aircraft. 

The September 3, 2010 renewal order 

discussed the fact that Mahan Airways’ 

violations of the TDO extended beyond 

operating U.S.-origin aircraft and 

attempting to acquire additional U.S.- 

origin aircraft. In February 2009, while 

subject to the TDO, Mahan Airways 

participated in the export of computer 

motherboards, items subject to the 

Regulations and designated as EAR99, 

from the United States to Iran, via the 

United Arab Emirates (‘‘UAE’’), in 

violation of both the TDO and the 

Regulations, by transporting and/or 

forwarding the computer motherboards 

from the UAE to Iran. Mahan Airways’ 

violations were facilitated by Gatewick 

LLC, which not only participated in the 

transaction, but also has stated to BIS 

that it acted as Mahan Airways’ sole 

booking agent for cargo and freight 

forwarding services in the UAE. 

Moreover, in a January 24, 2011 filing 

in the U.K. court, Mahan Airways 

asserted that Aircraft 1–3 were not being 

used, but stated in pertinent part that 

the aircraft were being maintained in 

Iran especially ‘‘in an airworthy 

condition’’ and that, depending on the 

outcome of its U.K. court appeal, the 

aircraft ‘‘could immediately go back into 

service . . . on international routes into 

and out of Iran.’’ Mahan Airways’ 

January 24, 2011 submission to U.K. 

Court of Appeal, at p. 25, ¶¶ 108, 110. 

This clearly stated intent, both on its 

own and in conjunction with Mahan 

Airways’ prior misconduct and 

statements, demonstrated the need to 

renew the TDO in order to prevent 

imminent future violations. Two of 

these three 747s subsequently were 

removed from Iran and are no longer in 

Mahan Airways’ possession. The third 

of these 747s remained in Iran under 

Mahan’s control. Pursuant to Executive 

Order 13224, it was designated a 

Specially Designated Global Terrorist 

(‘‘SDGT’’) by the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 

Control (‘‘OFAC’’) on September 19, 

2012.13 Furthermore, as discussed in the 


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14The Airbus A310s are powered with U.S.-origin 

engines. The engines are subject to the Regulations 

and classified under Export Control Classification 

(‘‘ECCN’’) 9A991.d. The Airbus A310s contain 

controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 

percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a 

result are subject to the Regulations. They are 

classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or 

reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. 

Government authorization pursuant to Sections 

742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. 

15OEE subsequently presented evidence that after 

the August 24, 2011 renewal, Mahan Airways 

worked along with Kerman Aviation and others to 

de-register the two Airbus A310 aircraft in France 

and to register both aircraft in Iran (with, 

respectively, Iranian tail numbers EP–MHH and 

EP–MHI). It was determined subsequent to the 

February 15, 2012 renewal order that the 

registration switch for these A310s was cancelled 

and that Mahan Airways then continued to fly the 

aircraft under the original French tail numbers (F– 

OJHH and F–OJHI, respectively). Both aircraft 

apparently remain in Mahan Airways’ possession. 

16See note 14, supra. 

17See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 

sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/pages/ 

20120919.aspx. Mahan Airways was previously 

designated by OFAC as a SDGT on October 18, 

2011. 77 FR 64,427 (October 18, 2011). 

18 Kral Aviation was referenced in the February 

4, 2013 renewal order as ‘‘Turkish Company No. 1.’’ 

Kral Aviation purchased a GE CF6–50C2 aircraft 

engine (MSN 517621) from the United States in July 

2012, on behalf of Mahan Airways. OEE was able 

to prevent this engine from reaching Mahan by 

issuing a redelivery order to the freight forwarder 

in accordance with Section 758.8 of the 

Regulations. OEE also issued Kral Aviation a 

redelivery order for the second CF6–50C2 engine 

(MSN 517738) on July 30, 2012. The owner of the 

second engine subsequently cancelled the item’s 

sale to Kral Aviation. In September 2012, OEE was 

alerted by a U.S. exporter that another Turkish 

company (‘‘Turkish Company No. 2’’) was 

attempting to purchase aircraft spare parts intended 

for re-export by Turkish Company No. 2 to Mahan 

Airways. See February 4, 2013 renewal order. 

On December 31, 2013, Kral Aviation was added 

to BIS’s Entity List, Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 

of the Regulations. See 78 FR 75,458 (Dec. 12, 

2013). Companies and individuals are added to the 

Entity List for engaging in activities contrary to the 

national security or foreign policy interests of the 

United States. See 15 CFR 744.11. 

19Pioneer Logistics, Gulnihal Yegane, and Kosol 

Surinanda also were added to the Entity List on 

December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75,458 (Dec. 12, 

2013). 

20The BAE regional jets are powered with U.S.- 

origin engines. The engines are subject to the EAR 

and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. These aircraft 

contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more 

than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and 

as a result are subject to the EAR. They are 

classified under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or 

reexport of these aircraft to Iran requires U.S. 

Government authorization pursuant to Sections 

742.8 and 746.7 of the Regulations. 

21See 76 FR 50,407 (Aug. 15, 2011). The July 22, 

2014 renewal order also referenced two Airbus 

A320 aircraft painted in the livery and logo of 

Mahan Airways and operating under Iranian tail 

numbers EP–MMK and EP–MML, respectively. 

OEE’s investigation also showed that Mahan 

obtained these aircraft in November 2013, from 

Khors Air Company, another Ukrainian airline that, 

like Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines, was added 

to BIS’s Entity List on August 15, 2011. Open 

source evidence indicates the two Airbus A320 

aircraft may have been transferred by Mahan 

Airways to another Iranian airline in October 2014, 

February 4, 2013 Order, open source 

information indicated that this 747, 

painted in the livery and logo of Mahan 

Airways, had been flown between Iran 

and Syria, and was suspected of ferrying 

weapons and/or other equipment to the 

Syrian Government from Iran’s Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

In addition, as first detailed in the 

July 1, 2011 and August 24, 2011 orders, 

and discussed in subsequent renewal 

orders in this matter, Mahan Airways 

also continued to evade U.S. export 

control laws by operating two Airbus 

A310 aircraft, bearing Mahan Airways’ 

livery and logo, on flights into and out 

of Iran.14 At the time of the July 1, 2011 

and August 24, 2011 orders, these 

Airbus A310s were registered in France, 

with tail numbers F–OJHH and F–OJHI, 

respectively.15 The August 2012 

renewal order also found that Mahan 

Airways had acquired another Airbus 

A310 aircraft subject to the Regulations, 

with MSN 499 and Iranian tail number 

EP–VIP, in violation of the 

Regulations.16 On September 19, 2012, 

all three Airbus A310 aircraft (tail 

numbers F–OJHH, F–OJHI, and EP–VIP) 

were designated as SDGTs.17

The February 4, 2013 renewal order 

laid out further evidence of continued 

and additional efforts by Mahan 

Airways and other persons acting in 

concert with Mahan, including Kral 

Aviation and another Turkish company, 

to procure U.S.-origin engines—two GE 

CF6–50C2 engines, with MSNs 517621 

and 517738, respectively—and other 

aircraft parts in violation of the TDO 

and the Regulations.18 The February 4, 

2013 order also added Mehdi Bahrami 

as a related person in accordance with 

Section 766.23 of the Regulations. 

Bahrami, a Mahan Vice-President and 

the head of Mahan’s Istanbul Office, 

also was involved in Mahan’s 

acquisition of the original three Boeing 

747s (Aircraft 1–3) that resulted in the 

original TDO, and has had a business 

relationship with Mahan dating back to 

1997. 

The July 31, 2013 renewal order 

detailed additional evidence obtained 

by OEE showing efforts by Mahan 

Airways to obtain another GE CF6–50C2 

aircraft engine (MSN 528350) from the 

United States via Turkey. Multiple 

Mahan employees, including Mehdi 

Bahrami, were involved in or aware of 

matters related to the engine’s arrival in 

Turkey from the United States, plans to 

visually inspect the engine, and prepare 

it for shipment from Turkey. 

Mahan Airways sought to obtain this 

U.S.-origin engine through Pioneer 

Logistics Havacilik Turizm Yonetim 

Danismanlik (‘‘Pioneer Logistics’’), an 

aircraft parts supplier located in Turkey, 

and its director/operator, Gulnihal 

Yegane, a Turkish national who 

previously had conducted Mahan 

related business with Mehdi Bahrami 

and Ali Eslamian. Moreover, as 

referenced in the July 31, 2013 renewal 

order, a sworn affidavit by Kosol 

Surinanda, also known as Kosol 

Surinandha, Managing Director of 

Mahan’s General Sales Agent in 

Thailand, stated that the shares of 

Pioneer Logistics for which he was the 

listed owner were ‘‘actually the property 

of and owned by Mahan.’’ He further 

stated that he held ‘‘legal title to the 

shares until otherwise required by 

Mahan’’ but would ‘‘exercise the rights 

granted to [him] exactly and only as 

instructed by Mahan and [his] vote and/ 

or decisions [would] only and 

exclusively reflect the wills and 

demands of Mahan[.]’’ 19

The January 24, 2014 renewal order 

outlined OEE’s continued investigation 

of Mahan Airways’ activities and 

detailed an attempt by Mahan, which 

OEE thwarted, to obtain, via an 

Indonesian aircraft parts supplier, two 

U.S.-origin Honeywell ALF–502R–5 

aircraft engines (MSNs LF5660 and 

LF5325), items subject to the 

Regulations, from a U.S. company 

located in Texas. An invoice of the 

Indonesian aircraft parts supplier dated 

March 27, 2013, listed Mahan Airways 

as the purchaser of the engines and 

included a Mahan ship-to address. OEE 

also obtained a Mahan air waybill dated 

March 12, 2013, listing numerous U.S.- 

origin aircraft parts subject to the 

Regulations—including, among other 

items, a vertical navigation gyroscope, a 

transmitter, and a power control unit— 

being transported by Mahan from 

Turkey to Iran in violation of the TDO. 

The July 22, 2014 renewal order 

discussed open source evidence from 

the March–June 2014 time period 

regarding two BAE regional jets, items 

subject to the Regulations, that were 

painted in the livery and logo of Mahan 

Airways and operating under Iranian 

tail numbers EP–MOI and EP–MOK, 

respectively.20 In addition, aviation 

industry resources indicated that these 

aircraft were obtained by Mahan 

Airways in late November 2013 and 

June 2014, from Ukrainian 

Mediterranean Airline, a Ukrainian 

airline that was added to BIS’s Entity 

List (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of 

the Regulations) on August 15, 2011, for 

acting contrary to the national security 

and foreign policy interests of the 

United States.21 Open source 


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and issued Iranian tail numbers EP–APE and EP– 

APF, respectively. 

22See http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 

sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/ 

20140829.aspx. See 79 FR 55,073 (Sep. 15, 2014). 

OFAC also blocked the property and property 

interests of Pioneer Logistics of Turkey on August 

29, 2014. Id. Mahan Airways’ use of Pioneer 

Logistics in an effort to evade the TDO and the 

Regulations was discussed in a prior renewal order, 

as summarized, supra, at 14. BIS added both Asian 

Aviation Logistics and Pioneer Logistics to the 

Entity List on December 12, 2013. See 78 FR 75,458 

(Dec. 12, 2013). 

23Both of these aircraft are powered by U.S.- 

origin engines that are subject to the Regulations 

and classified under ECCN 9A991.d. Both aircraft 

contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more 

than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and 

as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their 

location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 

9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to 

Iran requires U.S. Government authorization 

pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the 

Regulations. 

24The evidence obtained by OEE showed Ali 

Abdullah Alhay as a 25% owner of Al Naser 

Airlines. 

25Both aircraft were physically located in the 

United States and therefore are subject to the 

Regulations pursuant to Section 734.3(a)(1). 

Moreover, these Airbus A320s are powered by U.S.- 

origin engines that are subject to the Regulations 

and classified under Export Control Classification 

Number ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A320s contain 

controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more than 10 

percent of the total value of the aircraft and as a 

result are subject to the EAR regardless of their 

location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 

9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to 

Iran requires U.S. Government authorization 

pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the 

Regulations. 

26This evidence included a press release dated 

May 9, 2015, that appeared on Mahan Airways’ 

website and stated that Mahan ‘‘added 9 modern 

aircraft to its air fleet [,]’’ and that the newly 

acquired aircraft included eight Airbus A340s and 

one Airbus A321. See http://www.mahan.aero/en/ 

mahan-air/press-room/44. The press release was 

subsequently removed from Mahan Airways’ 

website. Publicly available aviation databases 

similarly showed that Mahan had obtained nine 

additional aircraft from Al Naser Airlines in May 

2015, including MSNs 164 and 550. As also 

discussed in the July 13, 2015 renewal order, Sky 

Blue Bird Group, via Issam Shammout, was actively 

involved in Al Naser Airlines’ acquisition of MSNs 

164 and 550, and the attempted acquisition of 

MSNs 82 and 99 (which were detained by OEE). 

27The Airbus A340s are powered by U.S.-origin 

engines that are subject to the Regulations and 

classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340s 

contain controlled U.S.-origin items valued at more 

than 10 percent of the total value of the aircraft and 

as a result are subject to the EAR regardless of their 

location. The aircraft are classified under ECCN 

9A991.b. The export or re-export of these aircraft to 

Iran requires U.S. Government authorization 

pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the 

Regulations. 

28There is some publicly available information 

indicating that the aircraft Mahan Airways is flying 

under Iranian tail number EP–MMR is now MSN 

615, rather than MSN 416. Both aircraft are Airbus 

A340 aircraft that Mahan acquired from Al Naser 

Airlines in violation of the Regulations. Moreover, 

both aircraft were designated as SDGTs by OFAC 

on May 21, 2015, pursuant to Executive Order 

13224. See 80 FR 30,762 (May 29, 2015). 

29The BAE Avro RJ–85 is powered by U.S.-origin 

engines that are subject to the Regulations and 

classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The BAE Avro RJ– 

85 contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at 

more than 10 percent of the total value of the 

aircraft and as a result is subject to the EAR 

regardless of its location. The aircraft is classified 

Continued 

information indicated that at least EP– 

MOI remained active in Mahan’s fleet, 

and that the aircraft was being operated 

on multiple flights in July 2014. 

The January 16, 2015 renewal order 

detailed evidence of additional attempts 

by Mahan Airways to acquire items 

subject the Regulations in further 

violation of the TDO. Specifically, in 

March 2014, OEE became aware of an 

inertial reference unit bearing serial 

number 1231 (‘‘the IRU’’) that had been 

sent to the United States for repair. The 

IRU is a U.S.-origin item, subject to the 

Regulations, classified under ECCN 

7A103, and controlled for missile 

technology reasons. Upon closer 

inspection, it was determined that IRU 

came from or had been installed on an 

Airbus A340 aircraft bearing MSN 056. 

Further investigation revealed that as of 

approximately February 2014, this 

aircraft was registered under Iranian tail 

number EP–MMB and had been painted 

in the livery and logo of Mahan 

Airways. 

The January 16, 2015 renewal order 

also described related efforts by the 

Departments of Justice and Treasury to 

further thwart Mahan’s illicit 

procurement efforts. Specifically, on 

August 14, 2014, the United States 

Attorney’s Office for the District of 

Maryland filed a civil forfeiture 

complaint for the IRU pursuant to 22 

U.S.C. 401(b) that resulted in the court 

issuing an Order of Forfeiture on 

December 2, 2014. EP–MMB remains 

listed as active in Mahan Airways’ fleet 

and has been used on flights into and 

out of Iran as recently as December 19, 

2017. 

Additionally, on August 29, 2014, 

OFAC blocked the property and 

interests in property of Asian Aviation 

Logistics of Thailand, a Mahan Airways 

affiliate or front company, pursuant to 

Executive Order 13224. In doing so, 

OFAC described Mahan Airways’ use of 

Asian Aviation Logistics to evade 

sanctions by making payments on behalf 

of Mahan for the purchase of engines 

and other equipment.22

The May 21, 2015 modification order 

detailed the acquisition of two aircraft, 

specifically an Airbus A340 bearing 

MSN 164 and an Airbus A321 bearing 

MSN 550, that were purchased by Al 

Naser Airlines in late 2014/early 2015 

and were under the possession, control, 

and/or ownership of Mahan Airways.23

The sales agreements for these two 

aircraft were signed by Ali Abdullah 

Alhay for Al Naser Airlines.24 Payment 

information reveals that multiple 

electronic funds transfers (‘‘EFT’’) were 

made by Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar 

Safwa General Trading in order to 

acquire MSNs 164 and 550. 

The May 21, 2015 modification order 

also laid out evidence showing the 

respondents’ attempts to obtain other 

controlled aircraft, including aircraft 

physically located in the United States 

in similarly-patterned transactions 

during the same recent time period. 

Transactional documents involving two 

Airbus A320s bearing MSNs 82 and 99, 

respectively, again showed Ali 

Abdullah Alhay signing sales 

agreements for Al Naser Airlines.25 A 

review of the payment information for 

these aircraft similarly revealed EFTs 

from Ali Abdullah Alhay and Bahar 

Safwa General Trading that follow the 

pattern described for MSNs 164 and 

550, supra. MSNs 82 and 99 were 

detained by OEE Special Agents prior to 

their planned export from the United 

States. 

The July 13, 2015 renewal order 

outlined evidence showing that Al 

Naser Airlines’ attempts to acquire 

aircraft on behalf of Mahan Airways 

extended beyond MSNs 164 and 550 to 

include a total of nine aircraft.26 Four of 

the aircraft, all of which are subject to 

the Regulations and were obtained by 

Mahan from Al Naser Airlines, had been 

issued the following Iranian tail 

numbers: EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP– 

MMG (MSN 383), EP–MMH (MSN 391) 

and EP–MMR (MSN 416), 

respectively.27 Publicly available flight 

tracking information provided evidence 

that at the time of the July 13, 2015 

renewal, both EP–MMH and EP–MMR 

were being actively flown on routes into 

and out of Iran in violation of the 

Regulations.28

The January 7, 2016 renewal order 

discussed evidence that Mahan Airways 

had begun actively flying EP–MMD on 

international routes into and out of Iran. 

Additionally, the January 7, 2016 order 

described publicly available aviation 

database and flight tracking information 

indicating that Mahan Airways 

continued efforts to acquire Iranian tail 

numbers and press into active service 

under Mahan’s livery and logo at least 

two more of the Airbus A340 aircraft it 

had obtained from or through Al Naser 

Airlines: EP–MME (MSN 371) and EP– 

MMF (MSN 376), respectively. 

The July 7, 2016 renewal order 

described Mahan Airways’ acquisition 

of a BAE Avro RJ–85 aircraft (MSN 

2392) in violation of the Regulations 

and its subsequent registration under 

Iranian tail number EP–MOR.29 This 


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under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or re-export to 

Iran requires U.S. Government authorization 

pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 of the 

Regulations. 

30Specifically, on December 22, 2016, EP–MMD 

(MSN 164) flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran, Iran. 

Between December 20 and December 22, 2016, EP– 

MMF (MSN 376) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran 

to Beijing, China and Istanbul, Turkey, respectively. 

Between December 26 and December 28, 2016, EP– 

MMH (MSN 391) flew on routes from Tehran, Iran 

to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 

31The Airbus A320 is powered with U.S.-origin 

engines, which are subject to the EAR and classified 

under Export Control Classification (‘‘ECCN’’) 

9A991.d. The engines are valued at more than 10 

percent of the total value of the aircraft, which 

consequently is subject to the EAR. The aircraft is 

classified under ECCN 9A991.b, and its export or 

reexport to Iran would require U.S. Government 

authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 

of the Regulations. 

32The Airbus A340 is powered by U.S.-origin 

engines that are subject to the Regulations and 

classified under ECCN 9A991.d. The Airbus A340 

contains controlled U.S.-origin items valued at 

more than 10 percent of the total value of the 

aircraft and as a result is subject to the Regulations 

regardless of its location. The aircraft is classified 

under ECCN 9A991.b. The export or re-export of 

this aircraft to Iran requires U.S. Government 

authorization pursuant to Sections 742.8 and 746.7 

of the Regulations. On June 4, 2018, EP–MMT (MSN 

292) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, Iran. 

33See 83 FR 27,828 (June 14, 2018). OFAC’s 

related press release stated in part that ‘‘[o]ver the 

last several years, Otik Aviation has procured and 

delivered millions of dollars in aviation-related 

spare and replacement parts for Mahan Air, some 

of which are procured from the United States and 

the European Union. As recently as 2017, Otik 

Aviation continued to provide Mahan Air with 

replacement parts worth well over $100,000 per 

shipment, such as aircraft brakes.’’ The twelve 

additional Mahan-related aircraft that were 

designated are: EP–MMA (MSN 20), EP–MMB 

(MSN 56), EP–MMC (MSN 282), EP–MMJ (MSN 

526), EP–MMV (MSN 2079), EP–MNF (MSN 547), 

EP–MOD (MSN 3162), EP–MOM (MSN 3165), EP– 

MOP (MSN 2257), EP–MOQ (MSN 2261), EP–MOR 

(MSN 2392), and EP–MOS (MSN 2347). See https:// 

home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0395. See 

also https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/ 

sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/ 

20180524.aspx. 

34Flight tracking information showed that on 

December 10, 2018, EP–MMB (MSN 56) flew from 

Istanbul, Turkey to Tehran, Iran, and EP–MME 

(MSN 371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, 

Iran. Additionally, on December 6, 2018, EP–MMF 

(MSN 376) flew from Bangkok, Thailand to Tehran, 

Iran, and on December 9, 2018, EP–MMQ (MSN 

449) flew on routes between Dubai, United Arab 

Emirates and Tehran, Iran. 

35See 83 FR 34,301 (July 19, 2018) (designation 

of Mahan Travel and Tourism SDN BHD on July 9, 

2018), and 83 FR 53,359 (Oct. 22, 2018) 

(designation of My Aviation Company Limited and 

updating of entry for Mahan Travel and Tourism 

SDN BHD on September 14, 2018). 

36OFAC’s press release concerning its 

designation of My Aviation Company Limited on 

September 14, 2018, states in part that ‘‘[t]his 

Thailand-based company has disregarded numerous 

U.S. warnings, issued publicly and delivered 

bilaterally to the Thai government, to sever ties 

with Mahan Air.’’ My Aviation provides cargo 

services to Mahan Airways, including freight 

booking, and works with local freight forwarding 

entities to ship cargo on regularly-scheduled Mahan 

information was corroborated by 

publicly available information on the 

website of Iran’s civil aviation authority. 

The July 7, 2016 order also outlined 

Mahan’s continued operation of EP– 

MMF in violation of the Regulations on 

routes from Tehran, Iran to Beijing, 

China and Shanghai, China, 

respectively. 

The December 30, 2016 renewal order 

outlined Mahan’s continued operation 

of multiple Airbus aircraft, including 

EP–MMD (MSN 164), EP–MMF (MSN 

376), and EP–MMH (MSN 391), which 

were acquired from or through Al Naser 

Airlines, as previously detailed in 

pertinent part in the July 13, 2015 and 

January 7, 2016 renewal orders. Publicly 

available flight tracking information 

showed that the aircraft were operated 

on flights into and out of Iran, including 

from/to Beijing, China, Kuala Lumpur, 

Malaysia, and Istanbul, Turkey.30

The June 27, 2017 renewal order 

included similar evidence regarding 

Mahan Airways’ operation of multiple 

Airbus aircraft subject to the 

Regulations, including, but not limited 

to, aircraft procured from or through Al 

Naser Airlines, on flights into and out 

of Iran, including from/to Moscow, 

Russia, Shanghai, China and Kabul, 

Afghanistan. The June 27, 2017 order 

also detailed evidence concerning a 

suspected planned or attempted 

diversion to Mahan of an Airbus A340 

subject to the Regulations that had first 

been mentioned in OEE’s December 13, 

2016 renewal request. 

The December 20, 2017 renewal order 

presented evidence that a Mahan 

employee attempted to initiate 

negotiations with a U.S. company for 

the purchase of an aircraft subject to the 

Regulations and classified under ECCN 

9A610. Moreover, the order highlighted 

Al Naser Airlines’ acquisition, via lease, 

of at least possession and/or control of 

a Boeing 737 (MSN 25361), bearing tail 

number YR–SEB, and an Airbus A320 

(MSN 357), bearing tail number YR– 

SEA, from a Romanian company in 

violation of the TDO and the 

Regulations.31 Open source information 

indicates that after the December 20, 

2017 renewal order publicly exposed Al 

Naser’s acquisition of these two aircraft 

(MSNs 25361 and 357), the leases were 

subsequently cancelled and the aircraft 

returned to their owner. 

The December 20, 2017 renewal order 

also included evidence indicating that 

Mahan Airways was continuing to 

operate a number of aircraft subject to 

the Regulations, including aircraft 

originally procured from or through Al 

Naser Airlines, on flights into and out 

of Iran, including from/to Lahore, 

Pakistan, Shanghai, China, Ankara, 

Turkey, Kabul, Afghanistan, and 

Baghdad, Iraq. 

The June 14, 2018 renewal order 

outlined evidence that Mahan began 

actively operating EP–MMT, an Airbus 

A340 aircraft (MSN 292) acquired in 

2017 and previously registered in 

Kazakhstan under tail number UP– 

A4003, on international flights into and 

out of Iran.32 It also discussed evidence 

that Mahan continued to operate a 

number of aircraft subject to the 

Regulations, including, but not limited 

to, EP–MME, EP–MMF, and EP–MMH, 

on international flights into and out of 

Iran, including from/to Beijing, China. 

The June 14, 2018 renewal order also 

noted OFAC’s May 24, 2018 designation 

of Otik Aviation, a/k/a Otik Havacilik 

Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi, of 

Turkey, as an SDGT pursuant to 

Executive Order 13224, for providing 

material support to Mahan, as well as 

OFAC’s designation as SDGTs of an 

additional twelve aircraft in which 

Mahan has an interest.33 The June 14, 

2018 order also cited the April 2018 

arrest and arraignment of a U.S. citizen 

on a three-count criminal information 

filed in the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey involving 

the unlicensed exports of U.S.-origin 

aircraft parts valued at over $2 million 

to Iran, including to Mahan Airways. 

The December 11, 2018 renewal order 

detailed publicly available information 

showing that Mahan Airways had 

continued operating a number of aircraft 

subject to the EAR, including, but not 

limited to, EP–MMB, EP–MME, EP– 

MMF, and EP–MMQ, on international 

flights into and out of Iran from/to 

Istanbul, Turkey, Guangzhou, China, 

Bangkok, Thailand, and Dubai, UAE.34

It also discussed that OEE’s continued 

investigation of Mahan Airways and its 

affiliates and agents had resulted in an 

October 2018 guilty plea by Arzu 

Sagsoz, a Turkish national, in the U.S. 

District Court for the District of 

Columbia, stemming from her 

involvement in a conspiracy to export a 

U.S.-origin aircraft engine, valued at 

approximately $810,000, to Mahan. 

The December 11, 2018 order also 

noted OFAC’s September 14, 2018 

designation of Mahan-related entities as 

SDGTs pursuant to Executive Order 

13224, namely, My Aviation Company 

Limited, of Thailand, and Mahan Travel 

and Tourism SDN BHD, a/k/a Mahan 

Travel a/k/a Mihan Travel & Tourism 

SDN BHD, of Malaysia.35 As general 

sales agents for Mahan Airways, these 

companies sold cargo space aboard 

Mahan Airways’ flights, including on 

flights to Iran, and provided other 

services to or for benefit of Mahan 

Airways and its operations.36


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Airways’ flights to Tehran, Iran. My Aviation has 

also provided Mahan Airways with passenger 

booking services. See https://home.treasury.gov/ 

news/press-releases/sm484. 

37Specifically, on May 26, 2019, EP–MMJ (MSN 

526) flew from Damascus, Syria to Tehran, Iran. In 

addition, on May 24, 2019, EP–MNF (MSN 547) 

flew on routes between Moscow, Russia and 

Tehran, and on May 23, 2019, EP–MMF (MSN 376) 

flew from Dubai, UAE to Tehran. 

38See 84 FR 21,233 (May 14, 2019). 

39These 747s are registered in Iran with tail 

numbers EP–FAA and EP–FAB, respectively. 

40OFAC’s press release concerning these 

designations states that Qeshm Fars Air was being 

designated for ‘‘being owned or controlled by 

Mahan Air, as well as for assisting in, sponsoring, 

or providing financial, material or technological 

support for, or financial or other services to or in 

support of, the IRGC–QF,’’ and that Flight Travel 

LLC was being designated for ‘‘acting for or on 

behalf of Mahan Air.’’ It further states, inter alia, 

that ‘‘Mahan Air employees fill Qeshm Fars Air 

management positions, and Mahan Air provides 

technical and operational support for Qeshm Fars 

Air, facilitating the airline’s illicit operations.’’ See 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ 

sm590. See also https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/ 

20190124.aspx. 41The same open sources indicate this aircraft 

continues to operate on flights within Iran to 

include a May 11, 2020 flight from Tehran, Iran to 

Kerman, Iran. 42Publicly available flight tracking information 

shows that on November 23, 2019, EP–MME (MSN 

371) flew from Guangzhou, China to Tehran, Iran, 

and on November 21, 2019, EP–MMF (MSN 376) 

flew on routes between Istanbul, Turkey and 

Tehran, Iran. Additionally, on November 20, 2019, 

EP–MMQ (MSN 449) flew from Kuala Lumpur, 

Malaysia, to Tehran, Iran. 43Publicly available flight tracking information 

shows that on May 8, 2020, EP–MMD (MSN 164) 

flew on routes between Bangkok, Thailand and 

Tehran, Iran, and on May 10, 2020, EP–MMF (MSN 

376) flew on routes between Dubai, UAE and 

Tehran. In addition, on May 9, 2020, EP–MMI 

(MSN 416) flew on routes between Shanghai, China 

and Tehran. 

44Publicly available flight tracking information 

shows that on November 13, 2020, EP–MMQ (MSN 

449) flew on routes between Istanbul, Turkey and 

Tehran, Iran, and on November 15, 2020, EP–MMI 

(MSN 416) flew on routes between Shenzhen, China 

and Tehran. 

45See 85 FR 52,321 (Aug. 25, 2020). 

46PTMS Aero, PTAK, PTKEU, and Sunarko 

Kuntjoro were each indicted in December 2019 on 

Continued 

The June 5, 2019 renewal order 

highlighted Mahan’s continued 

violation of the TDO and the 

Regulations. An end-use check 

conducted by BIS in Malaysia in March 

2019 uncovered evidence that, on 

approximately ten occasions, Mahan 

had caused, aided and/or abetted the 

unlicensed export of U.S.-origin items 

subject to the Regulations from the 

United States to Iran via Malaysia. The 

items included helicopter shafts, 

transmitters, and other aircraft parts, 

some of which are listed on the 

Commerce Control List and controlled 

on anti-terrorism grounds. The June 5, 

2019 order also detailed publicly 

available flight tracking information 

showing that Mahan continues to 

unlawfully operate a number of aircraft 

subject to the EAR on flights into and 

out of Iran, including on routes to and 

from Damascus Syria.37

The June 5, 2019 order also described 

actions taken by both BIS and OFAC to 

thwart efforts by entities connected to or 

acting on behalf of Mahan Airways to 

violate U.S. export controls and 

sanctions related to Iran. On May 14, 

2019, BIS added Manohar Nair, Basha 

Asmath Shaikh, and two co-located 

companies that they operate, Emirates 

Hermes General Trading and Presto 

Freight International, LLC, to the Entity 

List pursuant to Section 744.11 of the 

Regulations, including for engaging in 

activities to procure U.S.-origin items on 

Mahan’s behalf.38 On January 24, 2019, 

OFAC designated as SDGTs Flight 

Travel LLC, which is Mahan’s general 

service agent in Yerevan, Armenia, and 

Qeshm Fars Air, an Iranian airline 

which operates two U.S.-origin Boeing 

747s 39 and is owned or controlled by 

Mahan, and also linked to the Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force 

(IRGC–QF).40

The December 2, 2019 renewal order 

noted that OEE’s on-going investigation 

revealed that U.S.-origin passenger 

flight and database management 

software subject to the Regulations was 

provided to a company in Turkey and 

subsequently used to facilitate and 

service Mahan’s operations into and out 

of Turkey in further violation of the 

Regulations. 

Additionally, open source 

information, including flight tracking 

data and news articles published in 

October 2019, showed that Mahan 

Airways was now operating a U.S.- 

origin Boeing 747 on routes between 

Iranian airports in Tehran, Kish Island, 

and Mashhad. This aircraft, bearing 

Iranian tail number EP–MNB, appears to 

be one of the three aircraft that Mahan 

illegally acquired via Blue Airways of 

Armenia and U.K.-based Balli Group 

that resulted in the issuance of the 

original TDO.41 See supra at 10–12. 

Evidence was also described in the 

December 2, 2019 renewal order 

showing that on or about November 11, 

2019, Mahan caused, aided and/or 

abetted the unlicensed export of a U.S.- 

origin atomic absorption spectrometer, 

an item subject to the Regulations, from 

the United States to Iran via the UAE. 

Finally, publicly available flight 

tracking information showed that 

Mahan continued to unlawfully operate 

a number of aircraft subject to the EAR 

on flights into and out of Iran, including 

on routes to and from Guangzhou, 

China, Istanbul, Turkey, and Kuala 

Lumpur, Malaysia.42

The May 29, 2020 renewal order cited 

Mahan’s operation of EP–MMD, EP– 

MMF, and EP–MMI, aircraft originally 

acquired from Al Naser Airlines, on 

international flights into and out of Iran 

from/to Bangkok, Thailand, Dubai, UAE, 

and Shanghai, China in violation of the 

TDO and EAR.43 The May 29, 2020 

renewal order also detailed the 

indictment of Ali Abdullah Alhay and 

Issam Shammout, parties added to the 

TDO in May and July 2015, respectively, 

in the United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia. Alhay and 

Shammout were charged with, among 

other violations, conspiring to export 

aircraft and parts to Mahan in violation 

of export control laws and the embargo 

on Iran beginning around August 2012 

through May 2015. 

OEE’s on-going investigation since the 

May 29, 2020 renewal order further 

demonstrate the nature of Mahan 

Airway’s prior actions and its continued 

actions in violation of the TDO and the 

Regulations, both directly and through 

its widespread network of procurement 

agents, front companies, and 

intermediaries. In particular, Mahan 

Airways continues to operate a number 

of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, 

but not limited to, EP–MMQ and EP– 

MMI, on international flights into and 

out of Iran from/to Shenzhen, China and 

Istanbul, Turkey, respectively. These 

flights have continued since the October 

28, 2020 renewal request was 

submitted.44

In addition, OEE and its U.S. 

Government partners, including OFAC 

and the Department of Justice, have 

continued their multi-faceted efforts to 

hold Mahan Airways and its widereaching network of affiliates, front 

companies and agents accountable for 

violations of U.S. export control laws. 

BIS, for example, issued a TDO on 

August 19, 2020, denying for 180 days 

the export privileges of Indonesia-based 

PT MS Aero Support (‘‘PTMS Aero’’), 

PT Antasena Kreasi (‘‘PTAK’’), PT 

Kandiyasa Energi Utama (‘‘PTKEU’’), 

Sunarko Kuntjoro, Triadi Senna 

Kuntjoro, and Satrio Wiharjo Sasmito 

based on their involvement in the 

unlicensed export of aircraft parts to 

Mahan Airways—often in coordination 

with Mustafa Ovieci, a Mahan 

executive.45 These parties also 

facilitated the shipment of damaged 

Mahan parts to the United States for 

repair and subsequent export back to 

Iran in further violation of U.S. laws. In 

both instances, the fact that the items 

were destined to Iran/Mahan was 

concealed from U.S. companies, 

shippers, and freight forwarders.46


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77154 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 1, 2020 / Notices 

multiple counts related to this conspiracy in the 

United States District Court for the District of 

Columbia. 

47https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ 

sm1098. 

48https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iraniannational-and-uae-business-organization-chargedcriminal-conspiracy-violate-iranian. 

49Eliasbachus’ arrest and arraignment were 

detailed in the June 14, 2018 renewal order, as 

described supra at 21. 

Also, on August 19, 2020, OFAC 

designated UAE-based Parthia Cargo, its 

CEO Amin Mahdavi, and Delta Parts 

Supply FZC as SDGTs pursuant to 

Executive Order 13224 for providing 

‘‘key parts and logistics services for 

Mahan Air . . . .’’ The OFAC press 

release further states in part that 

Mahdavi ‘‘has directly coordinated the 

shipment of parts on behalf of Mahan 

Air.’’ 47 Mahdavi and Parthia Cargo were 

also indicted in the United States 

District Court for the District of 

Columbia for violating sanctions on 

Iran.48

Additionally, in October 2020, the 

U.S. District Court for the District of 

New Jersey sentenced Joyce Eliasbachus 

to 18 months of confinement based on 

her role in a conspiracy to export $2 

million dollars’ worth of aircraft parts 

from the United States to Iran, including 

to Mahan Airways.49

Through these efforts and others, OEE 

and its law enforcement partners are 

continuing their efforts to disrupt 

Mahan’s illicit acquisition of aircraft 

and parts as well as its role in 

transporting or forwarding such items. 

C. Findings 

Under the applicable standard set 

forth in Section 766.24 of the 

Regulations and my review of the entire 

record, I find that the evidence 

presented by BIS convincingly 

demonstrates that the denied persons 

have acted in violation of the 

Regulations and the TDO; that such 

violations have been significant, 

deliberate and covert; and that given the 

foregoing and the nature of the matters 

under investigation, there is a likelihood 

of imminent violations. Therefore, 

renewal of the TDO is necessary in the 

public interest to prevent imminent 

violation of the Regulations and to give 

notice to companies and individuals in 

the United States and abroad that they 

should continue to avoid dealing with 

Mahan Airways and Al Naser Airlines 

and the other denied persons, in 

connection with export and reexport 

transactions involving items subject to 

the Regulations and in connection with 

any other activity subject to the 

Regulations. 

III. Order 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, that MAHAN AIRWAYS, Mahan 

Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. 

Jenah Exp. Way, Tehran, Iran; PEJMAN 

MAHMOOD KOSARAYANIFARD A/K/ 

A KOSARIAN FARD, P.O. Box 52404, 

Dubai, United Arab Emirates; 

MAHMOUD AMINI, G#22 Dubai 

Airport Free Zone, P.O. Box 393754, 

Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and P.O. 

Box 52404, Dubai, United Arab 

Emirates, and Mohamed Abdulla Alqaz 

Building, Al Maktoum Street, Al Rigga, 

Dubai, United Arab Emirates; KERMAN 

AVIATION A/K/A GIE KERMAN 

AVIATION, 42 Avenue Montaigne 

75008, Paris, France; SIRJANCO 

TRADING LLC, P.O. Box 8709, Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates; MAHAN AIR 

GENERAL TRADING LLC, 19th Floor Al 

Moosa Tower One, Sheik Zayed Road, 

Dubai 40594, United Arab Emirates; 

MEHDI BAHRAMI, Mahan AirwaysIstanbul Office, Cumhuriye Cad. Sibil 

Apt No: 101 D:6, 34374 Emadad, Sisli 

Istanbul, Turkey; AL NASER AIRLINES 

A/K/A AL–NASER AIRLINES A/K/A 

AL NASER WINGS AIRLINE A/K/A 

ALNASER AIRLINES AND AIR 

FREIGHT LTD., Home 46, Al-Karrada, 

Babil Region, District 929, St 21, Beside 

Al Jadirya Private Hospital, Baghdad, 

Iraq, and Al Amirat Street, Section 309, 

St. 3/H.20, Al Mansour, Baghdad, Iraq, 

and P.O. Box 28360, Dubai, United Arab 

Emirates, and P.O. Box 911399, Amman 

11191, Jordan; ALI ABDULLAH ALHAY 

A/K/A ALI ALHAY A/K/A ALI 

ABDULLAH AHMED ALHAY, Home 

46, Al-Karrada, Babil Region, District 

929, St 21, Beside Al Jadirya Private 

Hospital, Baghdad, Iraq, and Anak 

Street, Qatif, Saudi Arabia 61177; 

BAHAR SAFWA GENERAL TRADING, 

P.O. Box 113212, Citadel Tower, Floor5, Office #504, Business Bay, Dubai, 

United Arab Emirates, and P.O. Box 

8709, Citadel Tower, Business Bay, 

Dubai, United Arab Emirates; SKY 

BLUE BIRD GROUP A/K/A SKY BLUE 

BIRD AVIATION A/K/A SKY BLUE 

BIRD LTD A/K/A SKY BLUE BIRD FZC, 

P.O. Box 16111, Ras Al Khaimah Trade 

Zone, United Arab Emirates; and ISSAM 

SHAMMOUT A/K/A MUHAMMAD 

ISAM MUHAMMAD ANWAR NUR 

SHAMMOUT A/K/A ISSAM ANWAR, 

Philips Building, 4th Floor, Al Fardous 

Street, Damascus, Syria, and Al Kolaa, 

Beirut, Lebanon 151515, and 17–18 

Margaret Street, 4th Floor, London, 

W1W 8RP, United Kingdom, and 

Cumhuriyet Mah. Kavakli San St. Fulya, 

Cad. Hazar Sok. No.14/A Silivri, 

Istanbul, Turkey, and when acting for or 

on their behalf, any successors or 

assigns, agents, or employees (each a 

‘‘Denied Person’’ and collectively the 

‘‘Denied Persons’’) may not, directly or 

indirectly, participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the EAR, 

or in any other activity subject to the 

EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, license exception, or export 

control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR, or engaging in any 

other activity subject to the EAR; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or from any 

other activity subject to the EAR. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf 

of a Denied Person any item subject to 

the EAR; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

a Denied Person of the ownership, 

possession, or control of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States, 

including financing or other support 

activities related to a transaction 

whereby a Denied Person acquires or 

attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from a Denied Person of any 

item subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States; 

D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the 

United States any item subject to the 

EAR with knowledge or reason to know 

that the item will be, or is intended to 

be, exported from the United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by a Denied 

Person, or service any item, of whatever 

origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by a Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States. For 

purposes of this paragraph, servicing 

means installation, maintenance, repair, 

modification or testing. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 231 / Tuesday, December 1, 2020 / Notices 77155 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to a Denied Person 

by ownership, control, position of 

responsibility, affiliation in the conduct 

of trade or business may also be made 

subject to the provisions of this Order. 

Fourth, that this Order does not 

prohibit any export, reexport, or other 

transaction subject to the EAR where the 

only items involved that are subject to 

the EAR are the foreign-produced direct 

product of U.S.-origin technology. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Sections 766.24(e) of the EAR, Mahan 

Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali 

Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa 

General Trading may, at any time, 

appeal this Order by filing a full written 

statement in support of the appeal with 

the Office of the Administrative Law 

Judge, U.S. Coast Guard ALJ Docketing 

Center, 40 South Gay Street, Baltimore, 

Maryland 21202–4022. In accordance 

with the provisions of Sections 

766.23(c)(2) and 766.24(e)(3) of the EAR, 

Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, 

Mahmoud Amini, Kerman Aviation, 

Sirjanco Trading LLC, Mahan Air 

General Trading LLC, Mehdi Bahrami, 

Sky Blue Bird Group, and/or Issam 

Shammout may, at any time, appeal 

their inclusion as a related person by 

filing a full written statement in support 

of the appeal with the Office of the 

Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 

Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South 

Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– 

4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

Section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. A renewal 

request may be opposed by Mahan 

Airways, Al Naser Airlines, Ali 

Abdullah Alhay, and/or Bahar Safwa 

General Trading as provided in Section 

766.24(d), by filing a written submission 

with the Assistant Secretary of 

Commerce for Export Enforcement, 

which must be received not later than 

seven days before the expiration date of 

the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be provided 

to Mahan Airways, Al Naser Airlines, 

Ali Abdullah Alhay, and Bahar Safwa 

General Trading and each related 

person, and shall be published in the 

Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

P. Lee Smith, 

Performing the Non-exclusive Functions and 

Duties, of the Assistant Secretary of 

Commerce for Export Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26434 Filed 11–30–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

[Docket No. 201118–0304] 

RIN 0694–XC070 

Impact of the Implementation of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 

on Legitimate Commercial Chemical, 

Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical 

Activities Involving ‘‘Schedule 1’’ 

Chemicals (Including ‘‘Schedule 1’’ 

Chemicals Produced as Intermediates) 

During Calendar Year 2020 

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and 

Security, Commerce. 

ACTION: Notice of inquiry. 

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and 

Security is seeking public comments on 

the impact that implementation of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention, through 

the Chemical Weapons Convention 

Implementation Act of 1998 and the 

Chemical Weapons Convention 

Regulations, has had on commercial 

activities involving ‘‘Schedule 1’’ 

chemicals during calendar year 2020. 

The purpose of this notice of inquiry is 

to collect information to assist BIS in its 

preparation of the annual certification to 

the Congress on whether the legitimate 

commercial activities and interests of 

chemical, biotechnology, and 

pharmaceutical firms are harmed by 

such implementation. This certification 

is required under Condition 9 of Senate 

Resolution 75 (April 24, 1997), in which 

the Senate gave its advice and consent 

to the ratification of the CWC. 

DATES: Comments must be received by 

December 31, 2020. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any of the following methods (please 

refer to RIN 0694–XC070 in all 

comments and in the subject line of 

email comments): 

• Federal rulemaking portal (http://

www.regulations.gov). You can find this 

notice by searching under its 

regulations.gov docket number, which is 

BIS–2020–0039; 

• Email: PublicComments@

bis.doc.gov. Include RIN 0694–XC070 in 

the subject line of the message. 

All filers using the portal or email 

should use the name of the person or 

entity submitting the comments as the 

name of their files, in accordance with 

the instructions below. Parties 

submitting business confidential 

information should clearly identify the 

business confidential portion at the time 

of submission, file a statement justifying 

nondisclosure and referring to the 

specific legal authority claimed, and 

also provide a non-confidential 

submission. 

For comments submitted 

electronically containing business 

confidential information, the file name 

of the business confidential version 

should begin with the characters ‘‘BC.’’ 

Any page containing business 

confidential information must be clearly 

marked ‘‘BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL’’ 

on the top of that page. The 

corresponding non-confidential version 

of those comments must be clearly 

marked ‘‘PUBLIC.’’ The file name of the 

non-confidential version should begin 

with the character ‘‘P.’’ The ‘‘BC’’ and 

‘‘P’’ should be followed by the name of 

the person or entity submitting the 

comments or rebuttal comments. Any 

submissions with file names that do not 

begin with a ‘‘P’’ or ‘‘BC’’ will be 

assumed to be public and will be made 

publicly available through http://

www.regulations.gov. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

questions on the Chemical Weapons 

Convention requirements for ‘‘Schedule 

1’’ chemicals, contact Douglas Brown, 

Treaty Compliance Division, Office of 

Nonproliferation and Treaty 

Compliance, Bureau of Industry and 

Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, 

Email: Douglas.Brown@bis.doc.gov. For 

questions on the submission of 

comments, contact Willard Fisher, 

Regulatory Policy Division, Office of 

Exporter Services, Bureau of Industry 

and Security, U.S. Department of 

Commerce, Email: RPD2@bis.doc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

In providing its advice and consent to 

the ratification of the Convention on the 

Prohibition of the Development, 

Production, Stockpiling, and Use of 

Chemical Weapons and Their 

Destruction, commonly called the 

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or 

‘‘the Convention’’), the Senate included, 

in Senate Resolution 75 (S. Res. 75, 

April 24, 1997), several conditions to its 

ratification. Condition 9, titled 

‘‘Protection of Advanced 

Biotechnology,’’ calls for the President 

to certify to Congress on an annual basis 

that ‘‘the legitimate commercial 

activities and interests of chemical, 

biotechnology, and pharmaceutical 


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