United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 22-1076

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER SAEMISCH,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge,

Selya and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

Zainabu Rumala, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for 

appellant.

Raquelle L. Kaye, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom 

Rachael S. Rollins, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

appellee.

June 5, 2023
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us, for the 

first time, to address the so-called "turnover" statute. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3664(n). Under this legislation, prison inmates are 

required to put "substantial resources" acquired while 

incarcerated toward unpaid restitution obligations. Id. 

Concluding, as we do, that the district court's application of the 

statute was both lawful and within the compass of its discretion, 

we affirm its order regarding the disposition of the appellant's 

funds.

I

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the 

case. In March of 2019, a jury convicted defendant-appellant 

Christopher Saemisch of distributing child pornography. See 18 

U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). Following his conviction, the district 

court sentenced him to a 360-month term of immurement and a 

lifetime of supervised release. It also ordered him to make 

restitution to the victims of his crime. See id. § 2259; see also

Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 443-48 (2014) (explaining 

special method of calculating restitution in child pornography 

cases). 

The district court's restitution order, incorporated in 

its amended judgment, fixed the restitution amount at $18,000. 

Additionally, the order stated that "[p]ayment of the restitution 

shall begin immediately and shall be made according to the 
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requirements of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial 

Responsibility Program while the [appellant] is incarcerated and 

according to a court-ordered repayment schedule during the term of

supervised release." 

During the appellant's incarceration, the government 

learned that his inmate trust account — an account maintained for 

him by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) into which "[f]amily, friends, 

or other sources" may make deposits, 28 C.F.R. § 506.1 — reflected 

a balance of $10,956.36. Citing an amalgam of statutory 

provisions, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613(a), 3664(m), (n), the government 

moved for an order authorizing the BOP to "turnover to the Clerk 

of the Court all funds held" in the appellant's account, to be 

used "as payment towards" his outstanding restitution obligation. 

At the time, the appellant had paid no more than a few hundred 

dollars on account of that debt.1

Proceeding pro se, the appellant opposed the motion. He 

explained that — between October 1, 2020 and August 13, 2021 — he 

had received money from three principal sources: $10,555 from the 

settlement of a lawsuit brought to recover the value of items 

stolen from him after he was arrested; $1,725 in COVID-related 

1 In the court below, the government asserted that the 

appellant had paid only $46.82 toward restitution. Record 

evidence, though, suggests that the government's assertion may 

have undershot the mark. The apparent discrepancy is not material 

for present purposes, and we do not attempt to resolve it. 
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stimulus checks issued by the federal government, see 26 U.S.C. 

§§ 6428, 6428A, 6428B; and monthly wages earned while working in

prison.2

Relatedly, the appellant noted that he was participating

in the BOP's Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP). See

28 C.F.R. § 545.10-11. Through the IFRP, fifty percent of the 

appellant's monthly earnings from prison wages was to be allocated 

to his restitution obligation.

Against this backdrop, the appellant argued that 

turnover of his accumulated funds was not warranted for four 

reasons. First, he argued that his direct appeal was pending and 

that, therefore, the turnover motion was premature.3 Second, he 

argued that both the funds obtained from the lawsuit and the

stimulus checks were beyond the reach of the turnover statute 

because they were not income. Third, he argued that the stimulus 

checks were exempt from turnover because Congress intended that 

money to be used to bolster the economy. Fourth, he argued that, 

2 The appellant worked in a UNICOR job. "UNICOR is the trade 

name for Federal Prison Industries, Inc., a government corporation 

that provides work and training opportunities for federal 

inmates." United States v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 43, 45 n.4 (2d Cir. 

2000); see 28 C.F.R. § 345.11(a). During the period for which the 

appellant provided data, his monthly prison wages ranged from a 

low of $23.23 to a high of $138.98.

3 We subsequently affirmed the appellant's conviction and 

sentence. See United States v. Saemisch, 18 F.4th 50, 66 (1st 

Cir. 2021). Consequently, this ground of objection has been 

rendered moot.
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as required by the court's earlier order, he had made all payments 

required by the IFRP in a timely manner.

The district court found the appellant's objections

wanting. Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n), 

the court entered a turnover order. The order directed the BOP to 

turn over the full amount contained in the appellant's inmate trust 

account ($10,956.36) to the Clerk of the Court for application 

toward the appellant's outstanding restitution obligation. This 

timely appeal followed.

II

The appellant is now represented by counsel, and he 

challenges the district court's decision to grant the turnover 

motion. Viewed from a high level of generality, he advances two 

contentions. First, he contends that the turnover order 

"impermissibly supersede[s]" provisions in the restitution order 

that dictate both the timing and amount of his restitution 

payments. Second, he contends that — even if the turnover order 

is not entirely invalid — the district court needed to make certain 

factual findings before it granted the government's motion. 

We assume, favorably to the appellant, that these claims 

of error are preserved. Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 

(1976) (explaining that pro se filings are "to be liberally 

construed"). Consequently, we review the district court's 

turnover order for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kidd, 
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23 F.4th 781, 785 (8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Rand, 924 F.3d 

140, 142 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Within that rubric, we 

"examin[e] the court's subsidiary factual findings for clear error 

and its answers to abstract legal questions de novo." United 

States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 283 (1st Cir. 2012); see United 

States v. Troy, 618 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that 

"questions of statutory interpretation . . . entail de novo 

review").

III

A

We start with the appellant's contention that the 

turnover order is invalid because it "impermissibly supersede[s]" 

provisions in the restitution order. Because this contention is 

premised on a perceived conflict between the terms of the two 

orders, some context is useful.

As noted above, the appellant's restitution order stated 

that he was to "begin [payment of restitution] immediately." The 

order specified that "[p]ayment of the restitution . . . shall be 

made according to the requirements of the [IFRP] while the 

[appellant] is incarcerated." Although the restitution order does 

not otherwise describe the IFRP's payment terms, the record makes 

manifest that the IFRP requires the appellant to allocate fifty 

percent of his monthly wages to restitution. The appellant 

contends that, because the restitution order requires payments to 
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be made "according to . . . the [IFRP]," the district court could 

not authorize turnover of any amount exceeding fifty percent of 

his monthly wages unless the court first amended the restitution 

order. We do not agree. 

Congress has directed district courts to "issue[] and 

enforce[]" restitution orders under the Mandatory Victims 

Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664, including orders in child 

pornography cases, see id. § 2259(b)(3). As relevant here, the 

MVRA establishes procedures for district courts to follow when 

fashioning such restitution orders, see, e.g., id. § 3664(a)-(f), 

and creates mechanisms for adjusting those orders once they have 

issued, see, e.g., id. § 3664(k). In addition, the MVRA grants 

the government authority to enforce a restitution order after it 

comes into effect. See id. § 3664(m). 

Of particular pertinence here, the MVRA requires certain 

defendants to apply to their restitution obligation any sudden 

windfalls that they receive. Section 3664(n) — the statutory 

provision relied on by the district court and around which this 

appeal revolves — states in relevant part that "[i]f a person 

obligated to provide restitution . . . receives substantial

resources from any source . . . during a period of incarceration, 

such person shall be required to apply the value of such resources 

to any restitution . . . still owed." Id. § 3664(n).
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By its terms, this statutory provision establishes a 

conditional obligation that extends to incarcerated defendants who 

owe restitution. That conditional obligation is triggered by a 

defendant's receipt of "substantial resources," id., which courts 

have held to mean a "windfall[] or sudden financial injection[]," 

United States v. Hughes, 914 F.3d 947, 951 (5th Cir. 2019); accord

United States v. Carson, 55 F.4th 1053, 1056 (6th Cir. 2022). 

Because section 3664(n) targets only resources that are 

"substantial," the windfall or sudden injection of funds must be 

"considerable in amount, value, or worth." Substantial, Webster's 

Third New International Dictionary (1993); see Carson, 55 F.4th at 

1057. The receipt of such a windfall obligates a defendant — if 

ordered by the district court — to "apply the value" of that 

windfall to any unpaid restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n); see

Carson, 55 F.4th at 1056 ("If [a defendant] receives any windfall, 

that amount would automatically apply toward his restitution 

obligation.").

In the case at hand, the district court found that the 

appellant received funds that qualified as "substantial resources" 

under section 3664(n). The appellant's settlement payment easily 

fits within that taxonomy. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n) (expressly 

identifying "settlement" payments as eligible for turnover); see

also Carson, 55 F.4th at 1058 (explaining that, where inmate 

otherwise earned "no more than a hundred dollars a month in wages," 
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his receipt of "a few thousand dollars" constituted receipt of 

substantial resources). Similarly, the COVID-related stimulus

checks remitted to the appellant fit within that taxonomy. See

United States v. Stark, 56 F.4th 1039, 1041 (5th Cir. 2023) (per 

curiam) (concluding that COVID stimulus payments constitute 

"substantial resources" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n))). Before 

us, the appellant does not reprise the claim, made below, that 

Congress intended the stimulus payments to be immune from turnover. 

Any such claim is, therefore, waived. See United States v. 

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

Inasmuch as the appellant plainly received funds falling 

under the umbrella of section 3664(n), his argument necessarily

hinges on whether the district court could compel him to apply 

those funds to his unpaid restitution obligation and, if so,

whether the court could require that he apply those funds 

immediately as a lump-sum payment. The appellant posits that 

resolving these issues requires us to determine the extent to which 

the turnover order conflicts with the terms of the restitution 

order. In his view, the restitution order establishes a payment 

plan (the IFRP) that limits the amount of money he is required to 

pay toward restitution to fifty percent of his monthly wages. By 

applying a lump sum that greatly exceeds fifty percent of his wages 

to his restitution obligation, the appellant's thesis runs, the 

turnover order contravenes the terms of the restitution order. 
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Building on this foundation, the appellant suggests that — in the 

absence of either amendment of the restitution order or a default 

on the payment plan — there is no justification for ordering the 

turnover of additional funds (even funds that constitute 

"substantial resources").

The government approaches the issue from a different 

angle. It says that — through section 3664(m) of the MVRA —

Congress empowered the district court to enforce orders of 

restitution in several ways. One such way is to compel a defendant 

to turn over the full value of any windfall that he receives while 

in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m), (n).

The government's approach is more consistent with the 

text and purpose of both the MVRA generally and section 3664(n) 

specifically. Through the MVRA, Congress sought "to ensure that 

victims of a crime receive [prompt and] full restitution." Dolan

v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 612 (2010). As one means of 

achieving that goal, Congress expanded the government's authority 

to enforce orders of restitution. See United States v. Ridgeway, 

489 F.3d 732, 736 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that, in enacting 

the MVRA, Congress "g[ave] the [g]overnment a broader grant of 

authority to enforce restitution orders"). In addition, Congress 

supplied the government with a better stocked armamentarium for 

collecting unpaid restitution. Although Congress specifically 

enumerated certain of the mechanisms within this armamentarium, 
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see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613, 3664(m)(1)(A)(i), it did not restrict 

the government's ability to collect restitution to the enumerated 

mechanisms alone. Instead, Congress clarified that the government 

may use "all other available and reasonable means" to ensure that 

defendants promptly and completely satisfy restitution 

obligations. Id. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(ii). 

In this case, the district court — through its reference

to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m) in the turnover order — implicitly 

determined that immediate application of the windfall amount to 

the outstanding restitution obligation was an "available and 

reasonable" means of enforcing the restitution order. Thus, the 

question reduces to whether that determination is supportable. 

The MVRA does not define what it means for a method of 

enforcement to be "available." "When Congress uses a term in a 

statute and does not define it, we generally assume that the term 

carries its plain and ordinary meaning." City of Providence v. 

Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2020); see Octane Fitness, LLC v. 

ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 553 (2014). The plain 

and ordinary meaning of the term "available" is "capable of use 

for the accomplishment of a purpose" or "immediately utilizable." 

Available, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993); 

see Available, Oxford English Dictionary Online (3d ed. 2022) 

(defining "available" as "[a]ble to be used" or "at one's 

disposal"). 
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The district court's order plainly indicates that the 

court understood the turnover of the funds in the appellant's 

inmate trust account to be an immediately utilizable means through 

which the appellant could be compelled to satisfy his outstanding 

restitution obligation. So, too, the order plainly indicates the 

court's understanding that such a turnover was justified by section 

3664(n). We conclude that both the structure and the text of the 

MVRA support this decision.

In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the tenet

that statutory provisions must be interpreted by reference to the 

structure and context of the broader statutory scheme in which 

they reside. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 

(2014); see also United States v. Seward, 967 F.3d 57, 66 (1st 

Cir. 2020). The MVRA generally commits determinations regarding 

the timing of restitution payments to the district court's 

discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)-(3), (k). And section 

3664(n) contains nothing to suggest that this general principle

should not apply with unabated force to situations in which a 

defendant receives a sudden and substantial infusion of cash.

We add, moreover, that the text of section 3664(n)

reinforces the idea that district courts retain broad discretion 

in determining how the value of the substantial resources may be 

put toward restitution. In enacting section 3664(n), Congress 

established a clear directive: a defendant must "apply" the value 
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of the newly received substantial resources to restitution. Id.

§ 3664(n); see Apply, Webster's Third New International Dictionary

(1993) (defining "apply" as "to use for a particular purpose"); 

Apply, Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining "apply" as 

"to appropriate and devote to a particular use"). And although 

section 3664(n) is silent as to how or when those resources must 

be applied to restitution, that gap is filled by the statutory 

directive that such a turnover obligation must be "reasonable." 

18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(ii).

As we have written in other settings, "[r]easonableness 

is a concept, not a constant." McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24, 

36 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Ocasio, 914 

F.2d 330, 336 (1st Cir. 1990)). "What is 'reasonable'" will 

"necessarily var[y] from case to case." Lopez v. Garriga, 917 

F.2d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, "[w]hat is reasonable in one 

set of circumstances may be unreasonable in another set of 

circumstances." United States v. Pagán-Rodríguez, 600 F.3d 39, 42 

(1st Cir. 2010). And some cases will be on the margin, requiring 

the district court to choose between reasonable, but conflicting, 

alternatives.

Here, the district court's decision to require immediate 

payment was reasonable under the circumstances. Although the 

appellant complains that he needs the money targeted for turnover 

for communication purposes and hygienic items, there is nothing in 
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the record to suggest that his future earnings will be insufficient 

to cover those costs. After all, the appellant does not dispute

that he will continue to earn income through his job at the prison. 

He will retain fifty percent of his prison wages under the IFRP. 

The retained portion will enable him to satisfy his general needs 

to the extent that those needs are not already met by the BOP. 

See United States v. Lillard, 935 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2019) 

(explaining that section 3664(n) only applies to defendant's 

receipt of substantial resources during period of incarceration 

"because, during such a period, defendants can rely on the [BOP] 

to provide for their subsistence needs"). 

What is more, the district court's turnover order is in 

keeping with Congress's expressed intent in enacting both section 

3664(n) and the MVRA writ large. In enacting section 3664(n), 

Congress sought to ensure "that windfalls received by prisoners 

from all sources . . . will go to pay victims" and "not to the 

prisoner." 142 Cong. Rec. S3379 (1996) (statement of Sen. Charles 

Grassley). That intent matches the intent that underlies the MVRA 

as a whole: "ensur[ing] that victims of a crime receive [prompt 

and] full restitution." Dolan, 560 U.S. at 612. The district 

court's decision to require immediate payment of what remains of

the appellant's windfall amount serves both of these aims. That 

fact — coupled with the appellant's failure to show a demonstrated 
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need for the funds — anchors our conclusion that the district 

court's requirement of immediate payment was reasonable.

B

Contrary to the appellant's importunings, the mere 

circumstance that the restitution order contains a payment 

schedule does not demand a different result.4 When a defendant 

obtains substantial resources while in prison, section 

3664(m)(1)(A)(ii) and section 3664(n), in combination, empower the 

district court to enforce the defendant's obligation to apply newly 

emergent funds, constituting substantial resources, toward unpaid 

restitution immediately, notwithstanding the existence of a 

payment schedule. See Rand, 924 F.3d at 142-44 (explaining that 

payment schedule does not function as "shield against collection" 

and permitting turnover notwithstanding fact that defendant's 

restitution payments were not to begin, under existing order, until 

after release from prison). 

4 We assume, without deciding, that the restitution order 

establishes a payment schedule. The order states that restitution 

payments "shall be made according to the requirements of the 

[IFRP]." In turn, the IFRP requires the appellant to remit fifty 

percent of his monthly wages to restitution. Evidence in the 

record suggests, though, that the district court may have referred 

to the IFRP simply to identify the mechanism through which 

restitution payments were to be made. If that is the case, the 

default presumption would be that the order does not establish a 

payment plan. See United States v. Diehl, 848 F.3d 629, 631 (5th 

Cir. 2017); United States v. Wykoff, 839 F.3d 581, 582 (7th Cir. 

2016).
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This case illustrates the practical wisdom of such a 

rule. The payment schedule contained in the initial restitution 

order only accounted for funds that the appellant either possessed

or was reasonably expected to possess when the order was entered. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) (requiring that restitution order 

account for defendant's current assets and projected earnings). 

His later windfall constituted a sudden and unusual infusion of 

cash that was not anticipated when the district court crafted its 

initial order. It would, therefore, make no sense to construe the 

initial order's payment schedule as a bar to the district court's 

authority (pursuant to sections 3664(m) and (n)) to determine the 

timing through which the value of the appellant's later-acquired 

windfall should be applied to restitution.

The appellant's reliance on Hughes, 914 F.3d at 949, and 

United States v. Martinez, 812 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2015), 

is mislaid. Neither of those cases turned on an inmate's receipt 

of substantial resources. See Hughes, 914 F.3d at 951; Martinez, 

812 F.3d at 1203-07.

C

We summarize succinctly. Section 3664(m)(1)(A)(ii) 

authorizes the use of all "available and reasonable means" to 

enforce restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(ii). When a 

defendant receives a sudden, unanticipated windfall while in 

prison, and is required by section 3664(n) to surrender the 
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proceeds, an order requiring the application of those funds to an 

outstanding restitution obligation is permissible as long as the

timing and manner of their application is reasonable. Here, the 

court's decision to compel the appellant to apply almost the entire 

balance of his windfall to unpaid restitution without delay was 

reasonable under the circumstances. 

That ends this aspect of the matter. We hold that —

under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m) and (n) — the district court had the 

authority to order the BOP to turn over the substantial resources 

garnered by the appellant and remaining in his trust account, so 

that those funds could be applied immediately to the appellant's

outstanding restitution obligation.

IV

This leaves the appellant's assertion that the district 

court overstepped the bounds of its discretion by ordering the 

turnover of substantial resources without first making certain 

antecedent factual findings. That assertion encompasses two 

independent claims, which we treat separately.

A

We begin with the appellant's claim that the district 

court was required to assess his financial circumstances before 

granting the government's turnover motion. In particular, the 

appellant contends that the court needed to consider the matters 

limned in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)(A)-(C), such as the appellant's 
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assets, projected earnings, and financial obligations. We think 

not.

By its terms, section 3664(f)(2) only applies when the 

district court is fashioning its original restitution order. See

United States v. Tarnawa, 26 F.4th 720, 724 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 142 S. Ct. 2887 (2022); Lillard, 935 F.3d at 834-35. The 

statute's commands have no application to a district court's 

decision to authorize a turnover under sections 3664(m) and (n). 

The text of section 3664(f)(2) leads inexorably to this 

conclusion. The statute states that it applies "[u]pon [the 

court's] determination of the amount of restitution owed to each 

victim." 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). That determination occurs only 

once in the lifecycle of a restitution order — and it must be made

before the court issues the original restitution order.

To cinch the matter, the statute is framed as a set of 

instructions regarding the information that the district court 

must include "in the restitution order." Id. Neither section 

3664(f)(2) nor section 3664(n) in any way suggests that those 

instructions have any application when a court, months or years 

later, considers whether and to what extent a turnover of

substantial resources may be appropriate. Cf. Tarnawa, 26 F.4th 

at 724-25 (declining to "import" section 3664(f)(2) factors into 

section 3664(k) because there is no textual link between them).
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The structure of section 3664(n) fortifies this 

conclusion. Unlike section 3664(f), section 3664(n) does not 

contain any reference to factors relating to a defendant's 

financial condition. That omission is critically important, given 

that courts generally should presume that Congress "acts 

intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of 

a statute but omits it in another." Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. 

MacLean, 574 U.S. 383, 391 (2015); see United States ex rel. 

Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2013). 

Giving weight to that presumption here, it is conspicuously clear 

that Congress's decision not to embed in section 3664(n) language 

directing courts to consider a defendant's financial circumstances 

was deliberate and that, therefore, Congress did not intend that 

such factors should inform the turnover calculus. 

That is game, set, and match. We hold that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by issuing the turnover order 

without making any findings anent the section 3664(f)(2) factors.

B

Sounding a loosely related theme, the appellant argues

that the district court needed to make a different collocation of 

findings. In his view, the court had to identify and 

"distinguish[]" the source of the funds in his trust account and 

determine whether those funds could be applied toward restitution 

before authorizing a turnover.
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To put this argument into perspective, we note that a 

total of $12,280 in funds that fit within the "substantial 

resources" taxonomy were deposited into the appellant's inmate 

trust account between November of 2020 and March of 2021. Five 

months then elapsed before the government moved for a turnover 

order in August of 2021.

In the nine-month period between the time when the 

appellant received the first windfall payment and the time when 

the government moved for a turnover order, the "substantial 

resources" deposited into the account were comingled with other

funds (such as the appellant's prison wages). The appellant 

contends that this comingling is significant because neither 

prison wages nor the gradual accumulation thereof trigger the 

possibility of turnover under sections 3664(m) and (n). See

Hughes, 914 F.3d at 951; see also Carson, 55 F.4th at 1057; Kidd, 

23 F.4th at 787. 

During the same period, money also flowed out of the 

account: the appellant made expenditures for books, gifts, 

purchases from the commissary, and other sundries. After 

accounting for the more than one hundred transactions (including 

both deposits and withdrawals) that occurred within this time 

frame, the account held a balance of $10,956.36. The government's 

motion sought turnover of that amount.
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Seizing upon the fact that his trust account contained 

a mixture of funds, some of which triggered the possibility of 

turnover and some of which did not, the appellant argues that —

before the district court could order the turnover of a sum of 

money from the account — it should first have identified the source

of that money and restricted any turnover to funds that could 

specifically be earmarked as "substantial resources." We think 

that this suggestion overstates the district court's duty. 

Of course, a district court must examine the source or 

sources of an inmate's account before it may order the turnover of 

funds contained in that account under sections 3664(m) and (n). 

See Kidd, 23 F.4th at 783-85, 787-88 (vacating turnover when source 

of funds in inmate's account was "unknown"). If the examination 

discloses that the account is comprised, wholly or partially, of 

funds properly characterized as "substantial resources," then that

account — up to the total amount of the "substantial resources" —

may be targeted in a turnover order. See id. at 787. If, however, 

the examination discloses that the monies in the account consist 

only of gradually accumulated prison wages or other funds that do 

not qualify as "substantial resources," section 3664(n) is not 

implicated and the district court may not enter a turnover order 

under sections 3664(m) and (n). See id.; Hughes, 914 F.3d at 951.

In this instance, an examination of the trust account 

shows that the balance derived from a combination of sources, 
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including the appellant's prison wages. That comingling, the 

appellant contends, required the district court to conduct 

additional factfinding to trace the source of every dollar 

remaining in his trust account and isolate the amount that stemmed 

from his UNICOR wages. This contention is ill-conceived. Where, 

as here, a district court finds that funds that constitute 

substantial resources have been comingled with other funds in a 

single account, the court should consider whether it is practicable

to segregate the amount of money derived from substantial 

resources.

But money is fungible, see United States v. RiveraIzquierdo, 850 F.3d 38, 45 n.6 (1st Cir. 2017), and in many cases 

it will be impossible for the court to make a dollar-by-dollar 

accounting, tracing individual dollars back to their original 

sources, see United States v. Ayika, 837 F.3d 460, 472 (5th Cir. 

2016) ("[W]hen legitimate money and illegitimate money are placed 

in the same account, and various withdrawals and other deposits 

occur over time, there is no method to determine the exact source 

of any specific dollar or dollars."); United States v. Moore, 27 

F.3d 969, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that, once combined, 

illicitly obtained funds cannot be distinguished from legitimately 

acquired funds). In that event, the court — under sections 3664(m) 

and (n) — may order the turnover of any sum of money up to the 

amount of substantial resources deposited into the account. An 
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important limiting principle is that the district court's turnover 

order must be in an amount that is reasonable under the 

circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A)(ii). 

The order appealed from satisfies these criteria. 

Although the court did not expressly consider whether it was 

practicable to determine how much of the appellant's account 

balance derived from substantial resources, the record makes 

pellucid that — given the pervasive comingling — it would have 

been impossible for the court to segregate the funds that triggered 

the possibility of turnover from those that did not. Thus, it was 

sufficient for the court to find — as it did — that the appellant 

had received substantial resources totaling $12,280, which had 

been deposited into his trust account. That figure then became 

the ceiling for a turnover order, and the court's decision to order 

the immediate turnover of $10,956.36 was reasonable (especially 

since the reason that the account held less than $12,280 was that 

the appellant had already spent some of the money).

Given this reasoning, we reject the appellant's claim 

that additional factfinding was required. Relatedly, we hold that 

the turnover order was within the ambit of the district court's 

discretion. 
- 24 -

V

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

the turnover order is 

Affirmed.