AFDD Template Guide 

20 September 2002

.

Air Force 

Basic Doctrine 

Air Force Doctrine Document 1 

17 November 2003

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 1, 

Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.
AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 1

17 NOVEMBER 2003

BY ORDER OF THE

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

 This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.

Thisrevision restructures the entire publication for better presentation of key ideas;

provides a new introduction on the value and relevancy of doctrine (Chapter One);

updates the discussion of National Security Strategy to include homeland security

(Chapter Two); expands discussion on organizational and operation functions of

the Air Force (Chapter Four); changes the function of counterinformation to information operations (page 46), adds a new function on combat support (page 47),

and combines the functions of reconnaissance and surveillance (page 55);

updates discussion on core competencies to reflect new concepts (Chapter

Six); adds a new chapter on linking doctrine to future concepts (Chapter Seven),

and updates historical references throughout.

Supersedes: AFDD 1, September 1997

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Mr. D. Robert Poynor)

Certified by: AFDC/CC (Maj Gen David F. MacGhee, Jr.)

Pages: 116

Distribution: F

Approved by: JOHN P. JUMPER, General, USAF

 Chief of Staff

NOTICE: This publication is available on the AFDPO WWW site at:

http://afpubs.hq.af.mil.
i

FOREWORD

The Air Force and the Nation have been through a profoundly challenging period. Our homeland has been attacked, and we are in the middle of a

war that at times will be fought openly and conventionally, and at other

times in the shadows. The nature of war has changed and so has the Air

Force. Although our fundamental beliefs remain sound, the evolution of

contingency operations, the rapid maturation of space and information warfare, and the leveraging power of information technology have transformed

the effectiveness of air and space power.

The success of our Air Force in meeting the challenges of this rapidly

changing world depends on our understanding and applying our doctrine.

As airmen we have not properly understood or consistently applied our air

and space doctrine. As great operators we have preferred our ability to

improvise over using sound repeatable principles. That’s no longer good

enough—the complex integration required among our fighting elements, the

complexity of joint and combined doctrine, and the uncertainty of rapidly

developing contingency operations demand that our planning and employment be understood and repeatable. It requires that we learn and

practice our own doctrine. We know how to do it right; we have taken the

time to argue it out, write it down, and publish it. We must understand what

it means to be an airman and be able to articulate what air and space power

can bring to the joint fight. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, the Air Force’s

premier statement of our beliefs, is the cornerstone from which all our other

doctrine flows and expresses our Service’s identity. I encourage you to

read it, discuss it, and practice it.

JOHN P. JUMPER

General, USAF

Chief of Staff

17 November 2003
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. i

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ........................... ix

CHAPTER ONE—An Introduction to Doctrine .............................. 1

What is Doctrine? ..................................................................................... 3

What Constitutes Good Doctrine? ............................................................ 4

Levels of Air and Space Doctrine ............................................................ 7

Types of Doctrine ..................................................................................... 8

Air Force Doctrine Development and Revision ........................................ 9

CHAPTER TWO—Policy, Strategy, Doctrine, and War ................ 11

The Relationship Between Policy, Strategy, and Doctrine...................... 11

National Security Strategy ...................................................................... 12

National Military Strategy ....................................................................... 13

The Nature of War ................................................................................. 14

The Changing Character of the American Way of War ......................... 15

A New View of Conflict ......................................................................... 16

CHAPTER THREE—Principles and Tenets.................................. 19

Principles of War .................................................................................... 19

Unity of Command ............................................................................. 20

Objective ............................................................................................ 21

Offensive ............................................................................................ 21

Mass ................................................................................................... 22

Maneuver ........................................................................................... 23

Economy of Force .............................................................................. 24

Security ............................................................................................... 25

Surprise ............................................................................................... 26

Simplicity ............................................................................................ 26

Tenets of Air and Space Power .............................................................. 27

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution .............................. 28

Flexibility and Versatility ..................................................................... 30

Synergistic Effects ............................................................................. 31

Persistence ......................................................................................... 31

Concentration ..................................................................................... 32

Priority ................................................................................................ 32

Balance ............................................................................................... 33
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CHAPTER FOUR—Roles, Missions, and Functions of Air and

Space Power ......................................................................................... 35

Roles ....................................................................................................... 35

Missions .................................................................................................. 35

Functions................................................................................................. 36

Organizational Functions .................................................................... 37

Operational Functions......................................................................... 38

The Operational Functions of Air and Space Power .............................. 39

Strategic Attack .................................................................................. 40

Counterair ........................................................................................... 41

Counterspace ...................................................................................... 42

Counterland ........................................................................................ 43

Countersea ......................................................................................... 45

Information Operations....................................................................... 46

Combat Support .................................................................................. 47

Command and Control ........................................................................ 49

Airlift .................................................................................................. 50

Air Refueling ...................................................................................... 51

Spacelift .............................................................................................. 52

Special Operations .............................................................................. 53

Intelligence ......................................................................................... 54

Surveillance and Reconnaissance....................................................... 55

Combat Search and Rescue ............................................................... 56

Navigation and Positioning ................................................................. 57

Weather Services ............................................................................... 58

CHAPTER FIVE—Expeditionary Air Force Organization ...... 59

The Air and Space Expeditionary Force ................................................. 60

The Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force ........................................ 61

Joint Organization Fundamentals ............................................................ 63

Commanders and Staffs ..................................................................... 65

Span of Control/Command ................................................................. 65

Command Relationships and Authorities................................................. 66

CHAPTER SIX—Core Competencies and Distinctive Capabilities.......................................................................................................... 73

Core Competencies ................................................................................ 74

Developing Airmen ............................................................................. 74

Technologies-to-Warfighting ............................................................... 74

Integrating Operations ........................................................................ 75
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Distinctive Capabilities............................................................................ 76

Air and Space Superiority................................................................... 76

Information Superiority ....................................................................... 78

Global Attack ...................................................................................... 79

Precision Engagement ........................................................................ 80

Rapid Global Mobility ......................................................................... 80

Agile Combat Support ........................................................................ 81

CHAPTER SEVEN—Linking the Future to the Present: Vision,

Operating Concepts, and Doctrine ................................................... 83

Vision ...................................................................................................... 84

Operating Concepts ................................................................................ 85

Doctrine .................................................................................................. 86

EPILOGUE........................................................................................... 87

Suggested Readings............................................................................ 89

Glossary................................................................................................. 91
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vii

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This document is the premier statement of US Air Force basic doctrine.

It has been prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air

Force (CSAF). It establishes general doctrinal guidance for the application

of air and space forces in operations across the full range of military operations, from nuclear or conventional warfare, to military operations other

than war (MOOTW), and to operations within the homeland. It should

form the basis from which Air Force commanders plan and execute their

assigned air and space missions and act as a commander within a Service,

joint, or multinational force.

APPLICATION

This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) applies to all active duty,

Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel.

The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive.

Therefore, commanders need to consider not only the contents of this

AFDD, but also the particular situation when accomplishing their missions.

SCOPE

Air Force capabilities, to include people, weapons, and support systems,

can be used across the range of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This document discusses the fundamental

beliefs that underpin the application of the full range of Air Force air, space,

and information capabilities to accomplish the missions assigned by the

President and the Secretary of Defense.
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ix

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS

Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs

upon which AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDD expands on

or supports these statements.

 Air and space doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs,

warfighting principles, and terminology that describes and guides the

proper use of air and space forces in military operations.

 Doctrine shapes the manner in which the Air Force organizes, trains,

equips, and sustains its forces.

 Doctrine consists of the fundamental principles by which military forces

guide their actions in support of national objectives.

 Doctrine should be used with judgment.

 Air and space doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge gained primarily

from the study and analysis of experience, which may include actual

combat or contingency operations, as well as experiments or exercises.

 The US Air Force provides the Nation a unique capability to project

national influence anywhere in the world on very short notice. Air and

space forces, through their inherent speed, range, and flexibility, can

respond to national requirements by delivering precise military power

to create effects where and when needed.

 The “American way of war” has long been described as warfare based

on either a strategy of annihilation or of attrition and focused on

engaging the enemy in close combat to achieve a decisive battle. Air

and space power, if properly focused, offers our national leadership

alternatives to the annihilation and attrition options.

 Unity of command is vital in employing air and space forces.

 Air and space forces can pursue tactical, operational, or strategic objectives, in any combination, or all three simultaneously.

 Centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power

are critical to effective employment of air and space power. Indeed, it

is the fundamental organizing principle for air and space power,

having been proven over decades of experience as the most effective

and efficient means of employing air and space power.

 Air and space power is inherently a strategic force and an offensive

weapon.
x

 Unlike other forms of military power, air and space power may simultaneously hold all of an enemy’s instruments of power at risk—military,

economic, and political.

 Effective organization is critically important to effective and efficient

operations.

 The air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) is the organizational

structure for deployed Air Force forces. The AETF presents a joint

force commander with a task-organized, integrated package with the

appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force protection.

 The AETF commander—the commander, Air Force forces

(COMAFFOR)—is the Air Force warfighter.

 The axiom that “airmen work for airmen, and the senior airman works

for the joint force commander (JFC)” not only preserves the principle of

unity of command, it also embodies the principle of simplicity.

 The AETF commander—the COMAFFOR—is the Air Force warfighter,

and exercises the appropriate degree of control over the forces assigned,

attached, or in support of the AETF.

 The Air Force prefers—and in fact, plans and trains—to employ forces

through a COMAFFOR who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and

space component commander (JFACC).
1

CHAPTER ONE

AN INTRODUCTION TO DOCTRINE

“Doctrine.” This word has a mixed reputation. It frequently conjures

mental images of dry, arcane, lofty discussion by distant academicians and

theorists, of unproven theories and unfulfilled promises, of little apparent

use to the average airman trying to do a job down at the unit level. To many,

its utility has not been readily apparent; after all, for many in the Air Force,

doctrine has seemingly not had an impact on one’s career or job performance.

This view is changing. Today the Air Force has moved beyond the past

practice of operating under unspoken rules of thumb, and bits of handeddown wisdom on what worked and why. Since the mid-1990s the Air Force

has captured this accumulated body of knowledge, which, while actually a

form of doctrine, hadn’t been consciously or formally recognized as such.

Doctrine is, after all, those beliefs, distilled through experience and passed

on from one generation of airmen to the next, that guide what we do; it is

our codified practices on how best to employ air and space power. For far

too many years, the Air Force’s basic doctrine document was its only visible

doctrine. Written at the “strategic” level of discussion, its high level of

abstraction simply didn’t translate down to what most airmen did day-today. Thus, except as a statement of corporate principles, published Air

Force doctrine wasn’t very relevant to the average airman.

“That was then; this is now.” Today, the Air Force has expanded its

library of doctrine. The number of doctrine documents has grown to cover

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine.

It represents the central beliefs for waging

war in order to achieve victory. Doctrine is

of the mind, a network of faith and

knowledge reinforced by experience which

lays the pattern for the utilization of men,

equipment, and tactics. It is the building

material for strategy. It is fundamental to

sound judgment.

—General Curtis E. LeMay
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most aspects of air and space

warfighting. These publications

capture those “bits of handeddown wisdom,” as well as

recent thinking on expeditionary

organization and emerging

operational concepts such as

effects-based operations. Taken

together, these publications express why air and space power

is different from other forms of

military power, how it should be

organized and employed, and

why it’s best to do things certain ways. Also, by capturing

these concepts on paper, the

Air Force is now able to express

itself to numerous internal and

external communities—doctrine

is also an educational tool. By

bringing all these ideas together

in a coherent fashion, doctrine

captures our Service’s identity.

In the current turbulent environment of expeditionary operations and the

emerging arena of homeland security, doctrine provides an informed starting point for the many decisions airmen must make in what seems to be a

continuous series of deployments. We no longer face the challenge of

starting with a blank sheet of paper; with doctrine, airmen now have a good

outline that lays out the basic issues:

 What is my mission? How should I approach it?

 What should my organization look like, and why?

 What are my lines of authority within my organization and within the joint

force?

 What degrees of control do I have over my forces?

 How am I supported? Who do I call for more support?

From one operation to the next, many things are actually constant. Doctrine, properly applied, often can provide a 70-, 80-, or even 90-percent

Although air officers have not

been prolific writers, they have

expressed their beliefs freely . . . .

In fact, one may almost say that the

Air Force has developed an oral

rather than a written tradition.

—Frank Futrell

Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine:

Basic Thinking in the United

States Air Force, 1907-1960
3

solution to most questions, allowing leaders to focus on the remainder,

which usually involves tailoring for the specific operation.

WHAT IS DOCTRINE?

Air and space doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs, warfighting principles, and terminology that describes and

guides the proper use of air and space forces in military operations.

It is what we have come to understand, based on our experience to date.

The Air Force promulgates and teaches this doctrine as a common frame of

reference on the best way to prepare and employ air and space forces.

Subsequently, doctrine shapes the manner in which the Air Force

organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces. Doctrine

prepares us for future uncertainties and provides a common set of understandings on which airmen base their decisions. Doctrine consists of the

fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions

in support of national objectives; it is the linchpin of successful military

operations. It also provides us with common terminology, conveying

precision in expressing our ideas. In application, doctrine should be used

with judgment. It must never be dismissed out of hand or through

ignorance of its principles, nor should it be employed blindly without due regard for the mission and situation at hand. On the other

hand, following doctrine to the letter is not the fundamental intent. Rather,

good doctrine is somewhat akin to a good “commander’s intent”: it

provides sufficient information on what to do, but does not specifically say

how to do it. We must strive above all else to be doctrinally sound, not

doctrinally bound.

Air and space doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge gained

primarily from the study and analysis of experience, which may

include actual combat or contingency operations, as well as experiments or exercises. As such, doctrine reflects what has worked best

with full consideration of what has worked poorly. In those less frequent

instances in which experience is lacking or difficult to acquire (as in, for

example, nuclear operations), doctrine may be developed through analysis

of exercises, wargames, and experiments.

It must be emphasized that doctrine development is never complete. Any

given AFDD is a snapshot in time—a reflection of the thinking at the time

of its creation. Innovation has always been a key part of sound doctrinal

development and must continue to play a central role. Doctrine will evolve
4

as new experiences and advances in technology point the way to the

operations of the future.

WHAT CONSTITUTES GOOD DOCTRINE?

Good doctrine informs,

provides a sound departure

point, and allows flexibility;

bad doctrine overly bounds

and restricts creativity. If

not properly developed, and

especially if parochialism is

allowed to creep in, doctrine

will point to suboptimal solutions. Parochialism and other

biases can come from within a Service as well as between Services.

Professionals will still have honest differences of opinions, but when those

opinions are not based on sound warfighting practices, inefficiency and

ineffectiveness frequently result. Good doctrine can help, but it must be

intelligently applied.

One way to explore good doctrine is to use a “compare and contrast”

model to walk through some key issues. This technique also amplifies the

point that doctrine should be written broadly, allowing decision makers

latitude in interpretation and flexibility in application, yet be specific enough

to provide informed guidance. This technique also illustrates the use of

doctrine in explaining contentious issues and how doctrine can be used to

think more effectively about the best means to integrate various aspects of

military power and organization. In the following discussion, there may be

overlap among some of the principles expressed; this is desirable in that

frequently there are different aspects or nuances to a particular issue. In

doctrine, language is important.

Doctrine is about warfighting...not physics. This principle specifically

addresses the perceived differences between operations in the air and in

space. Air and space are separate domains requiring exploitation of different sets of physical laws to operate in, but are linked by the effects

they can produce together. By using the phrase “air and space” instead

of “aerospace” we acknowledge the inherent differences in the two

media and the associated technical and policy-related realities without

deviating from our vision. To achieve a common purpose, “air” and “space”

Adherence to

dogmas has destroyed more armies

and cost more battles

than anything in war.

—J. F. C. Fuller
5

need to be integrated. Therefore, Air Force doctrine focuses on the best

means to obtain warfighting effects regardless of the medium in which a

platform operates. As an example, airmen should be concerned with the

best means of employing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

(ISR) capabilities, not whether a particular ISR platform is airborne or

in orbit. This is requisite to achieving true integration across any given

collection of forces.

Doctrine is about effects...not platforms. This focuses on the desired

outcome of a particular action, not on the system or weapon itself that

provides the effect. Doctrine states that airmen should, for example, seek

to achieve air superiority, but doctrine does not focus on which platforms

should be used to achieve that effect. A parallel example of this is seen in

the recognition that bombers are not “strategic,” nor are fighters “tactical.”

Similarly, it does not matter if an F-16 or a B-52 accomplishes a given task,

or whether a particular platform is manned or unmanned, or whether a

C-17 or a C-130 delivers a certain load, or if a particular ISR platform is airborne or in orbit; the outcome of the mission, the effect

achieved, is what’s important. Thus, Air Force doctrine does not explicitly tie specific weapon systems to specific tasks or effects.

Doctrine is about using mediums...not owning mediums. This illustrates the importance of properly using a medium to obtain the best

warfighting effects, not of carving up the battlespace based on Service

or functional parochialism. Focusing on using a medium is a vital first

step to integration of efforts. “Ownership” arguments eventually lead

to suboptimal (and usually at best tactical) application of efforts at the

expense of the larger, total effort.

Doctrine is about organization...not organizations. Modern warfare

demands that disparate parts of different Services, different nations, and

even differing functions within a single Service be brought together intelligently to achieve unity of effort and unity of command. However, merely

placing different organizations together in a battlespace is insufficient to

meet these demands. A single, cohesive organization is required with clearly

defined lines of command and commanders with requisite authorities at

appropriate levels. Doctrine explains why certain organizational structures

are preferred over others and describes effective command relationships

and command authorities; this facilitates the rapid standup of joint and

Service organizations during rapidly evolving situations. Ultimately, doctrine is not about whether one particular element is more decisive than
6

another, nor about positing that element as the centerpiece of joint

operations; it’s the total, tailored joint force that’s decisive. Getting to that

effective joint force requires smart organization.

Doctrine is about synergy...not segregation. True integration of effort

cannot be achieved by merely carving up the battlespace. While segregation may have some benefit and may appear the simplest way, from a

command and control viewpoint, to manage elements of a diverse joint force,

it may actually suboptimize the overall effort. It guarantees that the whole

will never be greater than the sum of its parts. For example, airmen should

have access to the entire theater of operations to maximize their ability to

achieve the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives; they should not be

restricted from any area due to unnecessarily restrictive fire control measures. Also, segregating the battlespace into smaller areas of operation

may create competition for scarce, high-demand, low-density capabilities

and reduce combat effectiveness.

Doctrine is about integration...not just synchronization. Synchronization is “the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to

produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.”

Integration, by comparison, is “the arrangement of military forces and their

actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole” (Joint Publication [JP] 0-2). Synchronization is, in essence, deconfliction in time and

space between different units. It is a useful means to plan and execute

operations and to prevent fratricide (for example, “be out of area X by time

Y, because of a preplanned artillery barrage at that time to support another

ground unit’s subsequent maneuver”). However, it doesn’t scale up to the

operational level and hence is not the best means for achieving the maximum potential of a joint force. Synchronization emphasizes timing, while

integration considers priority and effect to be both efficient and effective

with scarce resources. Synchronization is bottom-up; integration, on the

other hand, starts at the top with a single cohesive plan and works downward. Synchronization is an additive “sum of the parts” model, while

integration may produce geometric results. This is not to say that synchronization is bad. For surface forces, it is very useful for managing their

scheme of maneuver. However, from an airman’s perspective, synchronization is a tactical tool and doesn’t necessarily scale up to the operational

level. Thus, airmen should seek to integrate, not merely synchronize, joint

operational planning.

Doctrine is about preserving national treasure...not being a national

treasure. Good doctrine should not be an advertisement for a particular
7

aspect of the Air Force or for a Service. Doctrine is about warfighting, not

bragging rights. It is about achieving the optimum effects with the minimum

expenditure of manpower and material.

Doctrine is about what’s important...not who’s important. Good

doctrine should point to the important things a commander should do and

explain why they should be done. It should not be an advertisement for any

particular element of the Air Force, nor assert the relative value of any one

Service over another. Different parts of the United States Armed Forces

do different things, and each has its own utility depending on the situation.

It’s all about the right capability to best accomplish the mission.

Doctrine is about the right force...not just equal shares of the force.

This addresses the proper mix of Service components within a joint force.

Some believe that a joint force requires equal parts of all the Services. This

is an incorrect view. As one senior Air Force officer said, “joint warfighting

is not like Little League baseball, where everybody gets a chance to play.”

Any given joint force should be tailored appropriately for the task at hand.

Some operations will be ground-centric, others air-centric, and others

maritime-centric. The composition of the joint force and the tasks assigned

its various elements should reflect the needs of the situation.

LEVELS OF AIR AND SPACE DOCTRINE

The Air Force places air and space doctrine at different levels and depths

in the form of basic, operational, and tactical doctrine.

 Basic doctrine states the most fundamental and enduring beliefs that

describe and guide the proper use, presentation, and organization of air

and space forces in military action. It describes the “elemental properties” of air and space power and provides the airman’s perspective.

Because of its fundamental and enduring character, basic doctrine

provides broad and continuing guidance on how Air Force forces are

organized, employed, equipped, and sustained. Because it expresses

broad, enduring fundamentals, basic doctrine changes relatively slowly

compared to the other levels of doctrine. As the foundation of all air and

space doctrine, basic doctrine also sets the tone and vision for doctrine

development for the future. AFDD 1 is the airman’s basic doctrine.

 Operational doctrine, contained in AFDD 2-series publications, describes more detailed organization of air and space forces and applies

the principles of basic doctrine to military actions. Operational doctrine
8

guides the proper organization and employment of air and space forces

in the context of distinct objectives, force capabilities, broad functional

areas, and operational environments. Operational doctrine provides the

focus for developing the missions and tasks that must be executed through

tactical doctrine. Doctrine at this level changes a bit more rapidly than

basic doctrine, but usually only after deliberate internal Service debate.

A unique subset of operational level doctrine is Air Force operational

tactics, techniques, and procedures (AFOTTP). AFOTTP describe how

operations centers and other command and control nodes function and

how they plan and employ air, space, and information capabilities to achieve

desired effects and objectives at the operational level of war.

 Tactical doctrine describes the proper employment of specific Air Force

assets, individually or in concert with other assets, to accomplish detailed

objectives. Tactical doctrine considers particular objectives (stopping

the advance of an armored column) and conditions (threats, weather,

and terrain) and describes how Air Force assets are employed to accomplish the tactical objective (B-1s dropping anti-armor cluster munitions).

Tactical doctrine is codified as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP)

in Air Force TTP (AFTTP) -3 series manuals. Because tactical doctrine

is closely associated with employment of technology, change may occur

more rapidly than to the other levels of doctrine. Also, due to their

sensitive nature, some of these documents are classified.

TYPES OF DOCTRINE

There are three types of doctrine: Service, joint, and multinational. Each

is published at basic, operational, and tactical levels.

 Service doctrine, such as the AFDD and AFTTP series, outlines Service capabilities and guides the application of Service forces.

 Joint doctrine, as it applies to air and space power in joint operations,

describes the best way to integrate and employ air and space forces with

land and maritime forces in military action. Joint doctrine is published in

the joint publication system.

 Mulitinational doctrine, as it applies to air and space doctrine,

describes the best way to integrate and employ our air and space forces

with the forces of our allies in coalition warfare. It establishes principles,

organization, and fundamental procedures agreed upon between or among

allied forces. When developed as a result of a treaty, as in North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) doctrine, multinational doctrine is directive.
9

AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT AND REVISION

Air Force doctrine is developed through the Headquarters, Air Force

Doctrine Center (AFDC). AFDC is involved in many levels of doctrine

development. It is responsible for the development of Air Force doctrine, is

the Air Force focal point for development of joint doctrine, and reviews the

development of Air Force TTPs (AFTTP-3 series publications and

AFOTTPs).

Air Force doctrine belongs to the user, the Air Force at large, not to

AFDC. To ensure the credibility and relevance of doctrine, AFDC oversees a doctrine development process that brings in expertise from across

the Service. Twice a year, AFDC convenes the Air Force Doctrine Working Group (AFDWG), a colonel-level executive body of major command

(MAJCOM) and key Air Staff representatives, who deliberate and vote on

doctrine development proposals to create or revise Air Force doctrine and

to review Air Force positions within joint doctrine. During votes, AFDC

remains neutral and does not vote except to break a tie.

When doctrine is to be created or revised, AFDC convenes an Air Force

Doctrine Working Committee (AFDWC) composed of subject matter

experts from across the Service on the topic under discussion. This committee identifies the key ideas to be expressed and develops the basic

outline of the document. AFDC then develops a draft publication, coordinates it across the Air Force, resolves issues, obtains formal approval, and

publishes the final publication. Capstone and keystone publications (AFDD

1, AFDD 2, and the AFDD 2-X series) are approved by the Chief of Staff

of the Air Force; all others (AFDD 2-X.X series) by the AFDC commander.

Each AFDD is reviewed two years after its approval for currency. If

the AFDWG votes for revision, the publication goes back into the development cycle. If circumstances warrant, an AFDD can be put into an out-ofcycle revision prior to its normal two-year review.
10
11

CHAPTER TWO

POLICY, STRATEGY, DOCTRINE, AND WAR

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICY, STRATEGY, AND

DOCTRINE

Policy, strategy, and doctrine are frequently used interchangeably when

in fact they have different uses. Because each may impact or inform the

others, it is important to understand the differences.

 Policy is guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is

to be accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain

avenues and not others. Thus, while doctrine is held to be relatively

enduring, policy is more mutable. Policies may change due to changes in

national leadership, political considerations, or for fiscal reasons. At the

national level, policy may be expressed in such broad vehicles as the

National Security Strategy (NSS) or Presidential Executive Orders. Within

military operations, policy may be expressed not only in terms of objectives, but also in rules of engagement (ROE)—what we may or may not

strike, or under what circumstances we may strike particular targets.

 Strategy defines how operations will be conducted to accomplish

national policy objectives. Strategy originates in policy and addresses

broad objectives and the plans for achieving them. It is a plan of action,

a matching of means to ends.

 Military doctrine presents considerations on how a job should be

done to accomplish military goals. It is a storehouse of analyzed

experience and wisdom. Military doctrine is authoritative, but unlike

policy, is not directive.

Now the first, the grandest, and most decisive

act of judgment which the Statesman and

General exercises is rightly to understand in this

respect the war in which he engages, not to take

it for something, or wish to make it something,

which by nature of its relations it is impossible

for it to be.

—General Carl von Clausewitz
12

Doctrine evolves from military experience and theory and addresses how

best to use military power. In practice, as leaders develop strategies for

particular contingencies, political, economic, or social considerations may

dictate strategic and operational approaches that modify or depart from

accepted doctrine. As an example, doctrine may support long-range, air-toair engagements beyond visual range; ROE, however, may require visual

identification of all targets before firing due to political concerns over fratricide or collateral damage. If policy seriously affects the application of

doctrine, military commanders should describe for political leaders the

military consequences of those adaptations. However, because war is

“an instrument of policy,” military commanders must ensure that policy

governs the employment of military power and thus tailor their operations

accordingly.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The National Security Strategy (NSS) aims to guarantee the sovereignty

and independence of the United States, with our fundamental values and

institutions intact. It provides a framework for creating and seizing opportunities that strengthen our security and prosperity. It provides unifying

direction in the application of the diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments of national power. It encompasses national defense,

foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance; and it aims, among

other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position and a

defense posture capable of preventing and, when necessary, defeating

hostile action.

The NSS provides the context that underpins our plans and actions by

describing the security environment and threats and describing in general

terms the nature and style of our response. As such, it evolves over time

according to the international environment. During the Cold War, facing the

Soviet Union as a peer competitor, a policy of containment dominated our

strategy. During the ‘90s, when the threat to the Nation was more ambiguous, a new strategy evolved centered on engagement. More recently, faced

with a worldwide terrorist threat, our strategy has evolved accordingly, to

include an unprecedented emphasis on homeland security and a deliberate

shift toward preemption as a viable consideration. These changes in overall

strategy drive changes to military capabilities, worldwide posture, and

functional and geographic focus of the US Armed Forces. In the event of

armed conflict, national strategy will be tailored to meet national security

objectives and terminate conflicts on terms favorable to US interests.
13

The new emphasis on homeland security has been deemed so important

it warranted creation of a new, separate strategy document. The resulting

National Strategy for Homeland Security outlines the requirements to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, protect us and reduce our

vulnerability to terrorism, and to quickly respond to minimize damage and

recover from attacks that do occur. This was driven home by the 11

September 2001 terrorist attacks on our Nation and the recognition of our

Nation’s vulnerabilities to this new form of warfare. Military forces

contribute to homeland security in their conduct of missions overseas,

homeland defense, and support to civil authorities.

There is also a family of other, more specific strategies maintained by

the United States that are subsumed within the twin concepts of national

security and homeland security. The National Strategy for Combating

Terrorism defines the US war plan against international terrorism. The

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

coordinates efforts to deny terrorists and states the materials, technology,

and expertise to make and deliver WMD. The National Strategy to

Secure Cyberspace describes initiatives to secure information systems

against deliberate, malicious disruption. The National Defense Strategy

sets priorities for the military. All of these documents and other specific

strategies fit into the framework established by the National Security

Strategy of the United States and National Strategy for Homeland

Security, which together take precedence over all other national strategies,

programs, and plans.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The National Military Strategy (NMS) provides the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, developed in consultation with the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the combatant commanders, to the President and

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) on the strategic direction of the Armed

Forces. It assesses the strategic environment and describes the military’s

role—as an integral part of a national effort—in achieving the President’s

national security objectives and priorities. It also describes the critical

objectives, tasks, force employment concepts, and capabilities necessary to

execute the Secretary’s National Defense Strategy.

The NMS describes the objectives, concepts, tasks, and capabilities

necessary to implement the goals set for the military in the NSS and its

supporting documents and forms the basis for formal planning within the
14

Joint Strategic Planning System. Like NSS, NMS evolves as the international environment, national strategy, and national military objectives change.

As an example of evolving national military objectives, recent strategy

documents contain new emphasis on defending the homeland and achieving

military transformation.

To execute the NMS, our military forces must not only be trained,

organized, and equipped to fight, but must also be ready to engage across

the spectrum from war to military operations other than war (MOOTW),

and as part of a joint, multinational, or interagency force.

NATURE OF WAR

Three enduring truths

describe the nature of war.

These truths, Clausewitzian

in origin, are not likely to

change, even as technology

provides what is often referred

to as a “transformation” or

“revolution in military affairs.”

Despite technological advances and the best of plans

and intentions, war will never

be as straightforward in execution as we planned, nor free

of unintended consequences.

The means may change, but the

fundamental character and risks of warfare will remain.

 War is an instrument of policy. Victory in war is not measured by

casualties inflicted, battles won or lost, number of tanks destroyed, or

territory occupied, but by the achievement of (or failure to achieve)

national policy objectives. More than any other factor, national policy

objectives—one’s own and those of the enemy—shape the scope, intensity, and duration of war. To support national policy objectives, military

objectives and operations must be coordinated and orchestrated with

nonmilitary instruments of power.

 War is a complex and chaotic human endeavor. Human frailties and

irrationality shape war’s nature. Uncertainty and unpredictability—what

many call the “fog of war”—combine with danger, physical stress, and

The fundamental nature of war does

not change.
15

human fallibility to produce

“friction,” a phenomenon that

makes apparently simple operations

unexpectedly and sometimes even

insurmountably difficult. Sound

doctrine, leadership, organization,

moral values, and training can lessen

the effects of uncertainty,

unpredictability, and unreliability

that are always present

 War is a clash of opposing wills.

An enemy can be highly unpredictable, even irrational. War is not

waged against an inanimate or static

object, but against a living, calculating

enemy, one who often does not think as we think nor holds the same

values we do. Victory results from creating advantages against a thinking adversary bent on creating his own advantages. This produces a

dynamic interplay of action and reaction. While physical factors are

crucial in war, national will and leadership are also critical components

of war. National resolve—the determination to prosecute on one side

and to resist on the other—can be a decisive element.

CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN WAY OF

WAR

The US Air Force provides the Nation a unique capability to project

national influence anywhere in the world on very short notice. Air

and space forces, through their inherent speed, range, and flexibility, can respond to national requirements by delivering precise

military power to create effects where and when needed. With

expanding space and information capabilities, the Air Force is rapidly

developing the ability to place an “information umbrella” over friends and

foes alike. This provides national political and military leaders with

unprecedented knowledge of world events; fosters rapid, accurate military

decisions; and directly complements the Service’s air and space power

forces, while at the same time denying potential adversaries access to

useful information on our own plans, forces, and actions. The US Air

Force, in fielding advanced, highly effective, lethal and nonlethal systems,

provides national leaders and joint force commanders (JFCs) unique

capabilities across the range of military operations.

National will and resolve can

determine a conflict’s outcome.
16

Early airpower advocates argued that airpower could be decisive and

could achieve strategic effects. While this view of airpower was not proved

during their lifetimes, the more recent history of air and space power

application, especially since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, has proven that air

and space power can be a dominant and frequently the decisive element of

combat in modern warfare. Air and space power is a maneuver element in

its own right, coequal with land and maritime power; as such, it is no longer

merely a supporting force to surface combat. As a maneuver element, it

can be supported by surface forces in attaining its assigned objectives. Air

and space power has changed the way wars are fought and the manner in

which the United States pursues peacetime efforts to protect the nation’s

vital interests.

In the late 20th Century, wars were traditionally conceived in three linear,

sequential phases. First, in-place or rapidly-reacting forces halted the initial

attack, perhaps trading space to buy time. Second, additional combat power

was built up in theater while limited offensive action weakened the enemy.

Finally, a decisive ground-centric counteroffensive was launched.

Classically, the end-state was seen as the product of the ground-based

counterattack. These three phases, while necessary in this view to complete military victory, were not time urgent but sequential and generally

treated with equal urgency.

More recently, however, the nature of the threats and the way we choose

to deter and fight those conflicts have changed. The United States is faced

with adversaries who may seek to offset our technological superiority through

asymmetric means, threatening the use of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons; information attacks; terrorism; urban warfare; or antiaccess

strategies, either overseas or at home. Therefore, we must seize the

initiative from the aggressor as soon as possible. Military capabilities that

are vulnerable to preset time lines risk attack of those time lines. Delay in

decisively and quickly halting an enemy may force a difficult and costly

campaign to recover lost territory. Additionally, the asymmetric threats of

lost coalition support, diminished credibility, and emerging incentives for other

adversaries to begin conflict elsewhere are real. Thus, a new way of

looking at conflict is emerging.

NEW VIEW OF CONFLICT

Under the previous model, land- and sea-based airpower was frequently

seen as instrumental in halting the enemy’s initial moves. Once the enemy

was halted, airpower was usually husbanded to support the eventual
17

surface counteroffensive.

However, in this new view of

warfare, the prompt, continued,

aggressive application of air

and space power in the opening phase may actually constitute the conflict’s decisive

phase. Thus, this first phase

need not be a precursor to a

buildup of ground forces and

conventional counterattack.

This early, aggressive application of air and space power, in

parallel operations against

many objectives simultaneously, may force the enemy

beyond his offensive culminating point, resulting in a

turnover in initiative in our

favor. It may even be possible during this early phase

to hold the enemy’s war aims

directly and immediately at risk

or defeat them sooner rather

than later in a conflict. As

the initiative and options of

the aggressor decrease over time, ours increase. In certain instances, we

may attain our objectives during this initial phase, and follow-on

diplomatic initiatives may conclude the conflict. If a buildup and counteroffensive are required, the application of air and space power can

shape the size and nature of the follow-on ground action.

The “American way of war” has long been described as warfare

based on either a strategy of annihilation or of attrition and focused

on engaging the enemy in close combat to achieve a decisive battle.

Air and space power, if properly focused, offers our national leadership alternatives to the annihilation and attrition options. These

include the ability to coerce and compel adversaries in MOOTW, while

risking relatively fewer American lives. This provides different avenues to

influence potential adversaries in ways that are not necessarily connected

to land warfare. It is possible to directly affect adversary sources of strength

and will to fight by creating shock and destroying enemy cohesion without

Assessing the impact point of a

precision bomb through the dome of a

key regime building, Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM.
18

close combat. While such attacks may not totally eliminate the need to

directly engage the adversary’s fielded military forces, it can shape those

engagements so they will be fought at the time and place of our choosing

under conditions more likely to lead to decisive outcomes with minimized

risk to friendly forces. The aggressive use of air and space power can also

reduce the size of forces needed for conflict termination, risking fewer

American lives.

A vital part of the new approach to warfare is the emerging arena of

effects-based operations (EBO). A further step away from annihilation or

attrition warfare, EBO explicitly and logically links the effects of individual

tactical actions directly to desired military and political outcomes. By

focusing on effects—the full range of outcomes, events, or consequences

that result from a specific action—commanders can concentrate on meeting objectives instead of managing target lists. Effects-based actions or

operations are those designed to produce distinct, desired effects while avoiding unintended or undesired effects. This new conceptual model requires

that airmen think through the full range of outcomes, choose those that will

best achieve objectives, and find ways to mitigate those that will impede

achieving them. Air and space power offers many different ways to achieve

a given effect; the effort of thinking through actions in this manner should

yield commanders and national leaders many options beyond attrition or

annihilation. Therefore, adoption of EBO also requires that airmen

advocate air and space power’s capabilities in terms of desired effects

rather than targets.
19

CHAPTER THREE

PRINCIPLES AND TENETS

The role of the Air Force is to defend the United States and protect its

interests through air and space power, guided by the principles of war and

the tenets of air and space power. Airmen must understand these fundamental beliefs as they apply to operations in the air, space, and information

realms. This chapter presents these principles and tenets.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Throughout the history of conflict, military

leaders have noted certain

principles that tended to

produce military victory.

From ancient times to

today, certain “truths” of

warfare have emerged.

Known as the principles

of war, they are “those

aspects of warfare that are

universally true and

relevant” (JP 1). As members of the joint team, airmen should appreciate how

these principles apply to all forces, but must fully understand them as they pertain

to air and space forces. Air and space forces, no matter which Service operates

the systems and no matter which type of platform is used, provide unique capabilities through operations in the third dimension. The principles of war—unity of

command, objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of force, security,

surprise, and simplicity—are guidelines that commanders can use to form and

select courses of action and concepts of operation.

Every art has its rules and maxims. One must study

them: theory facilitates practice. The lifetime of one

man is not enough to enable him to acquire perfect

knowledge and experience. Theory helps to

supplement it, it provides a youth with premature

experience and makes him skillful through the mistakes

of others.

—Frederick the Great

Principles of war have governed conflicts

since earliest times.
20

These principles, listed in Figure 3.1, represent generally accepted “truths” which have

proven to be effective throughout history. Of

course, even valid principles are no substitute for sound, professional judgment—but

to ignore them completely is to assume

unnecessary risk. The complexity of war in

general, and the unique character of each war

in particular, preclude commanders from using

these principles as a checklist to guarantee

victory. Rather, they serve as valuable guides

to evaluate potential courses of action.

The principles are independent, but tightly fused in application. No one

principle should be considered without due consideration of the others. These principles are not all-inclusive; the art of developing air and

space strategies depends upon the airman’s ability to view these principles

from a three-dimensional perspective and integrate their application accordingly. The principles of war, combined with the additional tenets of air

and space power discussed later in this chapter, provide the basis for a

sound and enduring doctrine for the air and space forces of America’s joint

force.

UNITY OF COMMAND

Unity of command ensures concentration of effort for every

objective under one responsible commander. This principle emphasizes that all efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common

objective. Air and space power’s operational-level perspective calls for

unity of command to gain the most effective and efficient application.

Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved

by vesting a single commander with the authority to direct all force

employment in pursuit of a common objective. The essence of successful

operations is a coordinated and cooperative effort toward a commonly

understood objective. In many operations, the wide-ranging interagency

and nongovernmental organization operations involved may dilute unity of

command; nevertheless, a unity of effort must be preserved to ensure

common focus and mutually supporting actions.

Unity of command is vital in employing air and space forces. Air

and space power is the product of multiple capabilities, and centralized command and control is essential to effectively fuse these

Principles of War

Unity of Command

Economy of Force

Maneuver

Objective

Security

Offensive

Mass

Surprise

Simplicity

Figure 3.1. Principles

of War
21

capabilities. Airmen best understand the entire range of air and space

power. The ability of airpower to range on a theater and global scale imposes theater and global responsibilities that can be discharged only through

the integrating function of centralized control under an airman. That is the

essence of unity of command and air and space power.

Objective

The principle of objective is concerned with directing military operations toward a defined and attainable objective that contributes to

strategic, operational, and tactical aims. In application, this principle

refers to unity of effort. Success in military operations demands that all

efforts be directed toward the achievement of tactical, operational, and

ultimately, strategic, aims. In a broad sense, this principle holds that

political and military goals should be complementary and clearly

articulated. A clear NMS provides focus for defining campaign or theater

objectives. At the operational level, campaign or theater objectives determine military priorities. It is important to consider the impact time and

persistence have on attaining the objective. Short-term solutions to longterm problems must be avoided when defining the force’s objectives.

The objective is important due to the versatility of air and space forces.

From the outset, air and space forces can pursue tactical, operational,

or strategic objectives, in any combination, or all three simultaneously. From an airman’s perspective, then, the principle of objective

shapes priorities to allow air and space forces to concentrate on theater or

campaign priorities and seeks to avoid the siphoning of force elements to

fragmented objectives.

Offensive

The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the

initiative. Offensive is to act rather than react and dictates the time, place,

purpose, scope, intensity, and pace of operations. The initiative must be

seized as soon as possible. The principle of the offensive holds that offensive action, or initiative, provides the means for joint forces to dictate

battlespace operations. Once seized, the initiative should be retained and

fully exploited.

This principle is particularly significant to air and space warfare because

air and space power is best used as an offensive weapon. While

defense may be dictated by the combat situation, success in war is
22

generally attained only while on the offensive. Even highly successful

defensive air campaigns such as the World War II Battle of Britain were

based upon selective offensive engagements.

Air and space forces are inherently offensive at the tactical level—even

when employed in operational or strategic defense. Control of air and space

is offensive in execution. History has generally shown that a well-planned

and executed air attack is extremely difficult to stop. The speed and range

of attacking air and space forces give them a significant offensive advantage over surface forces and even defending air and space forces. In an

air attack, the defender often requires more forces to defend a given

geospatial area than the attacker requires to strike a set of specific targets.

Although all military forces have offensive capabilities, airpower’s ability

to mass and maneuver, and its ability to operate independently or simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and/or strategic levels of warfare,

provides JFCs a resource with global reach to directly and rapidly seize the

initiative. Whether deploying forces and supplies into a region, conducting

combat operations, or providing information superiority over an enemy, air

forces provide the JFC the means to take the offensive. From the beginning of an operation, air forces can seize the initiative by flying over enemy

lines and around massed defenses to attack the enemy directly. Through

prompt and sustained offensive actions designed to attain operational and

strategic objectives, air forces cause the enemy to react rather than act,

deny them the offensive, and shape the remainder of the conflict.

Mass

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power

at the most advantageous place and time to achieve decisive results. Concentration of military power is a fundamental consideration in all

military operations. At the operational level, this principle suggests that

superior, concentrated combat power is used to achieve decisive results.

Airpower is singularly able to launch an attack from widely dispersed

locations and mass combat power at the objective. From an airman’s perspective, mass is not based solely on the quantity of forces and materiel

committed. Mass is an effect that air and space forces achieve through

effectiveness of attack, not just overwhelming numbers. Today’s air

and space forces have altered the concept of massed forces. The speed,

range, and flexibility of air and space forces—complemented by the

accuracy and lethality of precision weapons and advances in information
23

technologies—allow them to achieve mass faster than surface forces. In

the past, hundreds of airplanes attacked one or two major targets each day.

Massed bomber raids revisited targets often, intending their attacks to gradually attain cumulative operational- or strategic-level effects over time.

Today, a single precision weapon that is targeted, based upon superior

battlespace awareness, can often cause the destructive effect that took

hundreds of bombs in the past. In an inversion of previous platform-totarget ratios, modern precision munitions now permit a single aircraft to

confidently strike several targets. Emerging information warfare (IW)

capabilities also present new opportunities to mass effects against critical

targets.

Airlift and air refueling provide a significant and critical capability to

mass lethal and nonlethal forces on a global scale. The rapid mobility of

airlift enabled the airborne assault during Operation JUST CAUSE, which

played a pivotal role in massing US forces in Panama. The capability of air

forces to act quickly and mass effects, along with their capability to mass

other lethal and nonlethal military power, combine the principle of mass

with the next principle, maneuver.

Maneuver

 Maneuver places the enemy in a position of disadvantage through

the flexible application of combat power in a multidimensional combat space.

Air and space power’s ability to conduct maneuver is not only a product of

its speed and range, but also flows from its flexibility and versatility during

the planning and execution of operations. Maneuver, like the principle of

offensive, forces the enemy to react, allowing the exploitation of successful

friendly operations and reducing friendly vulnerabilities. The ability to quickly

integrate a force and to strike directly at an adversary’s strategic or operational centers of gravity is a key theme of air and space power’s maneuver

advantage. Air maneuver allows engagement anywhere, from any

direction, at any time, forcing the adversary to be on guard everywhere.

 Many Bombers: One Bomber:

 One Target Many Targets

Mass:

1945

Mass:

Today
24

Additionally, the principle of maneuver is not limited to simple weapons

delivery. Airpower’s global awareness, global reach, and global presence

enabled the airlift operation in 1994 that provided combat power to deter

Iraqi movements into Kuwait.

Whether it involves airlift or attack aircraft, in small or large numbers,

the versatility and responsiveness of airpower allow the simultaneous application of mass and maneuver. Consider airlift operations

such as SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, PROVIDE HOPE in the former

USSR, or PROVIDE PROMISE in Bosnia, or combat operations such as

ALLIED FORCE in Serbia, ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, or

IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq—airpower has played a critical role in

American diplomacy by providing unmatched maneuverability.

Economy of Force

 Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of

forces. Its purpose is to allocate minimum essential resources to secondary efforts. This principle calls for the rational use of force by selecting the

best mix of air and space power. To ensure overwhelming combat power is

available, maximum effort should be devoted to primary objectives. At the

operational level, commanders must ensure that any effort made towards

secondary objectives does not degrade achievement of the larger operational or strategic objectives. This principle requires airmen to maintain a

broader operational view even as they seek to obtain clearly articulated

objectives and priorities.

Economy of force may require a commander to establish a balance in

the application of airpower between attacking, defending, delaying, or

conducting deception operations, depending on the importance of the area

or the priority of the objective or objectives. Also, priorities may shift

rapidly; friendly troops in contact might drive a change in priority from one

type of mission (e.g., interdiction) to another (e.g., close air support). Although this principle suggests the use of overwhelming force in one sense,

it also recommends guarding against the “overkill” inherent in the use of

excessive force. This is particularly relevant when excessive force can

destroy the gaining or maintaining of legitimacy and support for an operation.

While this principle was well developed before the advent of airpower, it

highlights precisely the greatest vulnerability of air and space power employment. The misuse or misdirection of air and space power can reduce
25

its contribution even more than enemy action. Ill-defined objectives can

result in the piecemeal application of air and space forces with the resultant

loss of decisive effects.

Security

The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire

unexpected advantage. Friendly forces and their operations must be

protected from enemy action that could provide the enemy with unexpected

advantage. The lethal consequences of enemy attack make the security of

friendly forces a paramount concern. This principle also enhances our

freedom of action by reducing the vulnerability of friendly forces. Gaining

or maintaining control of the air, space, and information media provides

friendly forces a significant advantage.

Air and space power is most vulnerable on the ground. Thus,

force protection is an integral part of air and space power employment. Fixed bases are especially vulnerable as they not only must withstand aerial and ground attacks, but also must sustain concentrated and

prolonged air activities against the enemy. This must be a particular focus

of operations during peace support or crisis situations, when forces may

operate from austere and unimproved locations, in small units, or in crowded

urban settings and face threats to security from individuals and groups as

well as possible military or para-military units. Security also may be obtained by staying beyond the enemy’s reach. Air and space forces are

uniquely suited to capitalize on this through their global capabilities. Not

only can they reach and strike at extended range, but they also can distribute data and analysis as well as command and control across a worldwide

span.

Security from enemy

intrusion conceals our

capabilities and intentions, while allowing

friendly forces the freedom to gather information on the adversary—

the type of information

that creates the opportunity to strike the

enemy where they will

least expect it. Security provides freedom from and to attack.
26

Critical to security is the understanding that security embraces

physical security and security of the information medium. Information has always been part of air, land, and sea warfare; now,

with the proliferation of information technologies, it becomes even more

central to the outcome of a conflict.

Surprise

Surprise leverages the security principle by attacking the enemy at a

time, place, or in a manner for which they are not prepared. The

speed and range of air and space forces, coupled with their flexibility and

versatility, allow air forces to achieve surprise more readily than surface

forces. The final choice of timing and tactics rests with the commander of

air and space forces, because terrain and distance are not inhibiting factors

in the air and space environment.

Surprise is one of air and space power’s strongest advantages. On 11

November 1940, Admiral Andrew Cunningham delivered a crushing air

attack from the British aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious on the Italian

naval base of Taranto. While the British lost 2 of 21 attacking aircraft, they

left 3 battleships in sinking condition, 2 cruisers badly damaged, and 2

fleet auxiliaries sunk. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, the US raid on

Libya, and the opening day of the air campaign during DESERT STORM

highlight other examples where airpower achieved resounding surprise.

Air and space forces can enhance and empower surface forces to achieve

surprise. The rapid global reach of airpower also allows surface forces to

reach foreign destinations quickly, thus seizing the initiative through

surprise.

Simplicity

Military operations, especially joint operations, are often complex. Simplicity calls for avoiding unnecessary complexity in organizing, preparing, planning, and conducting military operations. This ensures

that guidance, plans, and orders are as simple and direct as the objective

will allow. Simple guidance allows subordinate commanders the freedom to

operate creatively within their battlespace. Common equipment, a common

understanding of Service and joint doctrine, and familiarity with procedures

through joint exercises and training, can help overcome complexity. Straightforward plans and unambiguous organizational and comand relationships

are central to reducing it.
27

TENETS OF AIR AND SPACE

POWER

The application of air and space

power is refined by several fundamental guiding truths. These truths are

known as tenets. They reflect not only

the unique historical and doctrinal

evolution of airpower, but also the

specific current understanding of the

nature of air and space power. The

tenets of air and space power, listed in

Figure 3.2, complement the principles of war. While the principles of

war provide general guidance on the application of military forces,

the tenets provide more specific considerations for air and space

forces. They reflect the specific lessons of air and space operations over

history.

The tenets state that air and space power:

 Should be centrally controlled and decentrally executed

 Is flexible and versatile

 Produces synergistic effects

 Offers a unique form of persistence

 Must achieve concentration of purpose

 Must be prioritized

 Must be balanced

As with the principles of war, these tenets require informed judgment in application. They require a skillful blending to tailor them to the

ever-changing operational environment. The competing demands of the

principles and tenets, for example mass versus economy of force, concentration versus balance, and priority versus objective, require an airman’s

expert understanding in order to strike the required balance. In the last

analysis, commanders must accept the fact that war is incredibly complicated and no two operations are identical. Commanders must apply

their professional judgment and experience to the principles and

tenets as they employ air and space power in a given situation.

Tenets of Air & Space Power

Centralized Control &

Priority

Decentralized Execution

Persistence

Flexibility & Versatility

Balance

Synergistic Effects

Concentration

Figure 3.2. Tenets of Air and

Space Power
28

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution

Centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space

power are critical to effective employment of air and space power.

Indeed, they are the fundamental organizing principles for air and

space power, having been proven over decades of experience as

the most effective and efficient means of employing air and space

power. Because of air and space power’s unique potential to directly

affect the strategic and operational levels of war, it must be controlled by

a single airman who maintains the broad, strategic perspective necessary

to balance and prioritize the use of a powerful, highly desired yet limited

force. A single air commander, focused on the broader aspects of an

operation, can best mediate the competing demands for tactical support

against the strategic and operational requirements of the conflict.

Centralized control of air and space power is the planning, direction,

prioritization, synchronization, integration, and deconfliction of air and space

capabilities to achieve the objectives of the joint force commander. Centralized control of air and space power should be accomplished by an

airman at the air component commander level who maintains a broad

theater perspective in prioritizing the use of limited air and space assets

to attain established objectives in any contingency across the range of

operations. Centralized control maximizes

the flexibility and effectiveness of air and

space power; however, it must not become

a recipe for micromanagement, stifling the

initiative subordinates need to deal with

combat’s inevitable uncertainties.

Decentralized execution of air and

space power is the delegation of execution

authority to responsible and capable lowerlevel commanders to achieve effective

span of control and to foster disciplined

initiative, situational responsiveness, and

tactical flexibility. It allows subordinates

to exploit opportunities in rapidly changing, fluid situations. The benefits inherent

in decentralized execution, however, are

maximized only when a commander clearly

communicates his intent.

The flexibility of an air

force is indeed one of its

dominant characteristics ....

Given centralized control of

air forces, this flexibility

brings with it an immense

power of concentration which

is unequaled in any other form

of warfare.

—Air Chief Marshal Sir

Arthur Tedder
29

Centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space power

provide theater-wide focus while allowing operational flexibility to meet

theater objectives. They assure concentration of effort while maintaining

economy of force. They exploit air and space power’s versatility and

flexibility to ensure that air and space forces remain responsive, survivable,

and sustainable.

Modern communications technology provides a temptation towards increasingly centralized execution of air and space power. Although several

During LINEBACKER II in December 1972, B-52s were to provide the

main strike effort against targets in

Hanoi and Haiphong. B-52s had been

employed in the theater since 1965, but

mainly against targets in South Vietnam. Although Strategic Air Command

(SAC) retained control of the bombers,

most of the mission planning was performed in theater by 8th Air Force at

Guam. Thus, by the time LINEBACKER II commenced, they had developed

tactics and procedures for employing B-52s in the regional threat environment,

as was shown during operations in Spring 1972 to stem the North Vietnamese

offensive. However, when LINEBACKER II started, complete responsibility for

mission planning was handed to SAC headquarters in Nebraska; 8th Air Force

planners simply arranged for air refueling and fighter support. The first night’s

strikes sent the B-52s into Hanoi in three waves, each one a linear string of

three-ship cells, all using the same attack azimuth, altitude, and timing, and

employing the same post-release turn into headwinds at the precise time the

bombers were over the heaviest surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses. To the

amazement of the 8th Air Force planners, these tactics, reminiscent of World

War II bombing raids, were again employed on the second and third nights. After

heavy losses the third night, and after protests from the theater, mission

planning was handed over to 8th Air Force at Guam, although HQ SAC still

controlled the targets. In contrast to the earlier stereotyped attacks, subsequent

strikes used multiaxia attacks so that all the packages were over the target areas

at the same time. This not only reduced the time the bombers were exposed to

enemy defenses, but also simplified the planning requirements for the supporting jamming, chaff, refueling, and WILD WEASEL packages. Even though more

B-52s were lost during the remainder of LINEBACKER II, the overall loss rate

was much lower than the opening nights.

Although the lessons of LINEBACKER II have been and continue to be

debated, one element stands out: overcentralization of planning and execution

by a staff far removed from the battle can be deleterious. In contrast to the 8th

Air Force planners in theater, HQ SAC planners, although thoroughly familiar

with nuclear weapons delivery tactics, were unfamiliar with the threat environment and did not have a full appreciation of the conventional weapons tactics

available to B-52 crews. This example illustrates the axiom of passing

responsibillity for planning and execution down to the echelon best suited for

the task.
30

recent operations have employed some degrees of centralized execution,

such command arrangements will not stand up in a fully stressed, dynamic

combat environment, and as such should not become the norm for all air

operations. Despite impressive gains in data exploitation and automated

decision aids, a single person cannot achieve and maintain detailed situational awareness when fighting a conflict involving many simultaneous

engagements taking place throughout a large area. A high level of centralized execution results in a rigid campaign unresponsive to local conditions

and lacking in tactical flexibility. For this reason, execution should be

decentralized within a command and control architecture that exploits the

ability of strike package leaders, air battle managers, forward air controllers, and other front-line commanders to make on-scene decisions during

complex, rapidly unfolding operations. Nevertheless, in some situations,

there may be valid reasons for execution of specific operations at higher

levels, most notably when the JFC (or perhaps even higher authorities) may

wish to control strategic effects, even at the sacrifice of tactical efficiency.

Flexibility and Versatility

Air and space power is flexible and versatile. Although often used

interchangeably, flexibility and versatility are different. Flexibility allows

air and space forces to exploit mass and maneuver simultaneously. Flexibility allows air and space operations to shift from one campaign objective to

another, quickly and decisively; to “go downtown” on one sortie, then hit

fielded enemy forces the next; to rerole assets quickly from a preplanned

mission to support an unanticipated need for close air support of friendly

troops in contact with enemy forces. Versatility is the ability to employ air

and space power effectively at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels

of warfare. Air and space forces, unlike other military forces, have the

potential to achieve this unmatched synergy through asymmetric and parallel operations.

Parallel operations are operations coordinated to occur simultaneously

and continuously against a broad spectrum of targets. Used appropriately,

parallel operations can generate sufficient force to overwhelm the enemy,

resulting in paralysis that provides the leverage to dominate operations in all

mediums. Properly planned and executed in parallel attacks, air and space

power can attain effects which present the enemy with multiple crises

occurring so quickly that there is no way to respond to all or, in some

cases, any of them. Such a strategy places maximum stress on both enemy

defenses and the enemy as a whole.
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Synergistic Effects

Air and space power produces synergistic effects. The proper

application of a coordinated force can produce effects that exceed the

contributions of forces employed individually. The destruction of a large

number of targets through attrition warfare is rarely the key objective in

modern war. Instead, the objective is the precise, coordinated application

of the various elements of air, space, and surface power to bring disproportionate pressure on enemy leaders to comply with our national will. Air

and space power’s overwhelming ability to observe adversaries allows us

to counter their movements with unprecedented speed and agility. Air and

space power is unique in its ability to dictate the tempo and direction of an

entire warfighting effort from MOOTW through major conflict.

Persistence

Air and space power offers a unique form of persistence. Air,

space, and information operations may be conducted continuously against a

broad spectrum of targets. Air and space power’s exceptional speed and

range allow its forces to visit and revisit wide ranges of targets nearly at

will. Air and space power does not have to occupy terrain or remain constantly in proximity to areas of operation to bring force upon targets. Space

forces in particular hold the ultimate high ground, and as space systems

advance and proliferate, they offer the potential for “permanent presence”

over any part of the globe; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are offering

similar possibilities from the atmosphere. Examples of persistent

operations might be maintaining a continuous flow of materiel to peacetime

distressed areas; constantly monitoring adversaries to ensure they cannot

conduct actions counter to those agreed upon; assuring that targets are kept

continually out of commission; or ensuring that resources and facilities are

denied an enemy or provided to an ally during a specified time. The end

result would be to deny the opponent an opportunity to seize the initiative

and to directly accomplish assigned tasks.

Factors such as enemy resilience, effective defenses, or environmental

concerns may prevent commanders from quickly attaining their objectives.

However, for many situations, air and space operations provide the most

efficient and effective means to attain national objectives. Commanders

must persist in air and space operations and resist pressures to divert resources to other efforts unless such diversions are vital to attaining theater

goals or to survival of an element of the joint force. Given sufficient time,
32

even the most devastating strategic effects can be circumvented by

resourceful enemies; the goal is to keep pressure on and not allow

the enemy that time.

Concentration

Air and space power must achieve concentration of purpose. The

versatility of air and space power makes it an attractive option for almost

every combat task. Airmen must guard against the inadvertent dilution

of air and space power effects resulting from high demand. One of

the most constant and important trends throughout military history has

been the effort to concentrate overwhelming power at the decisive

time and place. The principles of mass and economy of force deal directly

with concentrating overwhelming power at the right time and the right place

(or places). With forces as flexible and versatile as air and space forces,

the demand for them will often exceed the available forces and may result

in the fragmentation of the integrated air and space effort in attempts to

fulfill the many demands of the operation. Depending on the operational

situation, such a course of action may court the triple risk of failing to achieve

operational-level objectives, delaying or diminishing the attainment of

decisive effects, and increasing the attrition rate of air forces—and consequently risking defeat.

Priority

Air and space power must be prioritized. Demands for air and

space forces (because of their flexibility and versatility) will likely overwhelm air commanders in future conflicts unless appropriate priorities are

established. Only theater-level commanders of land and naval components can effectively prioritize their individual air and space support

requirements to the JFC, and only then can effective priorities for the use

of air and space forces flow from an informed dialogue between the

Strategic air attack is wasted if it is dissipated

piecemeal in sporadic attacks between which

enemy has an opportunity to readjust defenses or

recuperate.

—General H. H. “Hap” Arnold
33

JFC and the air component commander. The air commander should

assess the possible uses of his forces and their strengths and capabilities

to support the overall joint campaign, air operations, and the battle at

hand. Limited resources require that air and space forces be applied

where they can make the greatest contribution to the most critical current

JFC requirements. The application of air and space forces must be

balanced among their abilities to conduct operations at all levels of war,

often simultaneously. The principles of mass, offensive, and economy

of force, the tenet of concentration, and the airman’s strategic perspective

all apply to prioritizing air and space forces.

Balance

Air and space operations must be balanced. Balance is an essential

guideline for air commanders. Much of the skill of an air commander is

reflected in the dynamic and correct balancing of the principles of war and

the tenets of air and space power to bring air and space power together to

produce a synergistic effect. An air commander should balance combat

opportunity, necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and the impact on accomplishing assigned objectives against the associated risk to friendly air and

space forces. An air commander is uniquely—and best—suited to determine the proper theaterwide balance between offensive and defensive

operations, and among strategic, operational, and tactical applications.

Commensurate with this capability is the air commander’s responsibility to

adequately communicate the intended effects of air and space power to the

JFC and other component commanders, especially those schooled in

surface operations. Technologically sophisticated air and space assets will

be available only in finite numbers; thus, balance is a crucial determinant for

an air commander.
34
35

CHAPTER FOUR

ROLES, MISSIONS, AND FUNCTIONS OF AIR

AND SPACE POWER

In order to describe what air and space power in general, and the Air

Force in particular, bring to the Nation, we must first explain the distinctions

among roles, missions, and functions. Although these terms are frequently

used interchangeably, each has a specific meaning.

In brief, the primary function of the Services is to organize, train, and

equip forces to perform a role—to be provided to and employed by a combatant commander in the accomplishment of a mission to achieve a specific

effect. Based upon the effect desired and the mission assigned, airmen

accomplish a series of discrete tasks that cumulatively deliver the desired

effects.

ROLES

Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services were established by law. The role of the Air Force is to organize,

train, and equip aviation forces “primarily for prompt and sustained

offensive and defensive air operations” (National Security Act, 1947). This

basic charter has essentially remained unchanged to the present.

MISSIONS

Missions are the tasks assigned by the President or SecDef to the

combatant commanders. Combatant commanders take these assigned

tasks and develop mission statements, operational objectives, and concepts

of operations; they then in turn assign specific tasks to subordinate

The airplane is the only weapon which can engage

with equal facility, land, sea, and other forces . . .

—Major General Frank M. Andrews

US Army Air Corps, 1938
36

commanders. By tailoring these tasks to meet the commander’s guidance

and desired objectives, Air Force component commanders in turn develop

component mission statements, objectives, and concepts of operations at

their level.

FUNCTIONS

The functions of the Military Departments are those specific

responsibilities that enable the Services to fulfill their legally

established roles. The Air Force functions are based on the statutory

responsibilities outlined in 10 USC § 8013 (b), which are known as “organize, train, and equip” activities. Specifically, these include “recruiting;

organizing; supplying; equipping; training; servicing; mobilizing; demobilizing; administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel);

maintaining; the construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment;

and the construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and

utilities; the acquisition, management and disposal; and the management of

real property or natural resources” (Department of Defense Directive

[DODD] 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its

Major Components).

It is important to note that while DODD 5100.1 charges Air Force forces,

for example, to “conduct ... prompt and sustained combat operations in the

air” and to “gain and maintain general air supremacy,” DODD 5100.1

does not determine exactly how these functions are to be accomplished. These details are left to the Service to develop, based on available

technologies and operational experience, much of which is eventually

expressed in doctrine and, pursuant to 10 USC § 153(a)(5), the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in joint matters.

One way to think about the difference between functions and missions is

to distinguish between the functions a Service performs under the auspices

of the administrative branch of the chain of command and those functions

provided to a joint force commander via the operational branch of the chain

of command. Along these lines, it is useful to make a distinction between

“organizational functions” (those activities required to develop and sustain

the Air Force as a corporate entity) and “operational functions” (those

warfighting activities involving the application of air and space power to

achieve specific military effects).
37

Organizational Functions

Organizational functions span the range of activities that provide the

institutional infrastructure underpinning a modern air force. These

include such activities as accessions, training, and education; research,

development, and acquisition; budget preparation and submission; general

administration; logistics support; conducting operational testing and evaluation; determining Service force requirements and making recommendations

concerning force requirements to support national security objectives; as

well as operating vehicles, systems, and craft. Many of these activities

directly relate to the “organize, train, and equip” responsibilities assigned to

each Service.

Implicit in these functions is the creation and maintenance of forces and

organizations necessary to fulfill the assigned role. Specifically, the Air

Force “is responsible for the preparation of the air and space forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war and military operations short of

war, and, ... for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air

Force to meet the needs of war” (DODD 5100.1).

The key organizational functions of the Air Force include the following: (Note: This is an abbreviated list extracted from DODD 5100.1.)

 To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the conduct of prompt

and sustained offensive and defensive combat operations in the air and

space—specifically, forces to defend the United States against air and

space attack in accordance with doctrines established by the JCS, gain

and maintain general air and space supremacy, defeat enemy air and

space forces, conduct space operations, control vital air areas, and establish local air and space superiority, except as otherwise assigned herein.

 To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for appropriate air and

missile defense and space control operations, including the provision of forces as required for the strategic defense of the United

States.

 To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic air and

missile warfare.

 To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support and

air logistic support to the Army and other forces, as directed, including airlift, air and space support, resupply of airborne operations,

aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications.
38

 To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for air transport for the

Armed Forces, except as otherwise assigned.

 To provide launch and space support for the Department of

Defense, except as otherwise assigned.

 To develop appropriate Service doctrine and TTP.

 To organize, train, equip, and provide land-based tanker forces for the

in-flight refueling support of strategic operations and deployments of

aircraft of the Armed Forces and Air Force tactical operations.

 To organize, train, equip, and provide forces for the support and

conduct of special operations, psychological operations, and

electronic warfare operations.

 In support of maritime operations, conduct, through air and space

operations, surface sea surveillance and antisurface ship warfare;

antisubmarine warfare and antiair warfare operations to protect sea lines

of communications; aerial minelaying operations; and air-to-air

refueling in support of naval campaigns.

 To organize, train, equip, and provide forces to support space operations.

Operational Functions

The organizational functions assigned to the Services are broadly written

and do not prescribe the operational paradigms to fulfill these tasks. This

allows the Services the flexibility to develop the best operational models

based on the available technology and the lessons of experience. These

operational functions are the next intellectual level in describing how the Air

Force fulfills its role.

Operational functions are tied to achieving specific effects.

Effects are outcomes, events, or consequences resulting from specific

actions; effects should contribute directly to desired military and political

outcomes. This requires commanders and planners to explicitly and

comprehensively link, to the greatest extent possible, each tactical action

to strategic and operational objectives. This linkage is at the heart of

effects-based operations (EBO), which are those actions taken against

enemy systems designed to achieve specific effects that contribute directly

to objectives. Commanders and planners must have a clear understanding

of national security and campaign objectives and those actions necessary to

create effects that cumulatively result in the desired end state.
39

Air and space power is tremendously flexible and can perform many

tasks. In terms of describing those key functions air and space power

presents to the joint force, an operational function should meet several

criteria:

 It must be planned and executed at the operational level by a component commander

 It must be a warfighting (operational) task, not an organizational

(administrative) task

 It should create an effect at the operational level

 It should describe a finite operation that delivers air and space power

to the JFC

Using these criteria, the following list of seventeen key operational

functions is derived:

 Strategic Attack  Air Refueling

 Counterair  Spacelift

 Counterspace  Special Operations

 Counterland  Intelligence

 Countersea  Surveillance and Reconnaissance

 Information Operations (IO)  Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

 Combat Support  Navigation and Positioning

 Command and Control (C2)  Weather Services

 Airlift

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS OF AIR AND SPACE POWER

The principles of war provide a foundation of warfighting principles

universally held by the joint community. The tenets of air and space

power refine these further by adding context, from the airman’s perspective, about how air and space power should best be applied. The

functions of air and space power take this discussion to the next level of

granularity, by describing the actual operational constructs airmen use to

apply air and space power to achieve objectives.

The Air Force’s operational functions, shown in Figure 4.1, are the broad,

fundamental, and continuing activities of air and space power. They
40

are not necessarily unique to the Air

Force; elements of other Services

may perform them or similar activities to varying degrees, but

together they do represent the means

by which Service forces accomplish

the missions assigned to joint force

commanders by the President,

SecDef, and combatant commanders. These basic functions have

evolved steadily since airpower’s

inception. Air Force forces employ

air and space power globally through

these basic functions to achieve

strategic-, operational-, and tacticallevel objectives. These battleproven functions can be conducted

at any level of war and enable the

Air Force to shape and control the

battlespace.

Strategic Attack

Strategic attack is defined as offensive action conducted by command authorities aimed at generating effects that most directly

achieve our national security objectives by affecting the adversary’s

leadership, conflict-sustaining resources, and strategy. Strategic

attack is a concept, not just a function. As a concept, strategic attack builds

on the idea that it is possible to directly affect an adversary’s sources of

strength and will to fight without first having to engage and defeat their

military forces. Strategic attack may

also be used to prevent the enemy

from attacking our vulnerable points, essentially denying them their war aims.

Adding in the concept of effects-based

operations takes it further.

Military forces are highly interconnected entities. Through strategic

attack, military commanders can

directly affect adversary leadership

Air & Space Power Functions

Strategic Attack

Counterair

Counterspace

Counterland

Countersea

Information Operations

Combat Support

Command & Control

Airlift

Air Refueling

Spacelift

Special Operations

Intelligence

Surveillance & Reconnnaissance

Combat Search & Rescue

Navigation & Positioning

Weather Services

Figure 4.1. Air and Space Power

Functions

Air and Space power provides

strategic force to the nation
41

perceptions (either by isolation, deception, or exploitation) and cut off

their fielded forces from their leadership and societies, as well as directly

attack the adversary’s capacity to sustain military forces in the field. While

strategic attack may not totally eliminate the need to directly engage the

adversary’s fielded military forces, it can shape those engagements so they

will be fought at the time and place of our choosing under conditions more

likely to lead to decisive outcomes with the least risk for friendly forces.

Understanding strategic attack is critically important to future joint

operations. Air and space power is inherently a strategic force and an

offensive weapon. Unlike other forms of military power, air and

space power may simultaneously hold all of an enemy’s instruments

of power at risk—military, economic, and diplomatic. Employed properly, it offers the capability of going to the heart of the enemy sources of

strength, avoiding prolonged attrition-based surface combat operations as a

precursor. Strategic attack is not an argument for replacing ground combat

with airpower; the ground battle will often still be necessary. Strategic

attack simply offers JFCs another option, a flexible one that can go to the

heart of an enemy and attain a variety of effects directly at the strategic

level. It is thus the articulation of what modern air and space power can

bring to the joint table as a maneuver force in its own right. Strategic

attack, as envisioned today, is more than just a function—it is also a

different approach for thinking about war. It is the manifestation of

the airman’s perspective: thinking about defeating the enemy as a

system.

Counterair

Even though strategic attack best describes the airman’s overall vision

for striking at the enemy, counterair is the pivotal prerequisite for success.

Counterair consists of operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction, degradation, or disruption

of enemy forces. Counterair’s two elements, offensive counterair (OCA)

and defensive counterair (DCA), enable friendly use of contested airspace

and disable the enemy’s offensive air and missile capabilities to reduce the

threat posed against friendly forces. The entire offensive and defensive

counterair effort should be controlled by one air officer, under the unity of

command principle and the centralized control-decentralized execution

tenet, in order to assure that concentration of effort and economy of force

requirements are met. Air and space superiority normally should be the

JFC’s first priority for air and space forces.
42

Offensive counterair (OCA) consists of operations to destroy, degrade,

or disrupt enemy air and missile power as close to its source as possible and

at a time and place of our choosing. Because air and space forces are

inherently offensive and yield the best effect when so employed, OCA is

often the most effective and efficient method for achieving the appropriate

degree of air superiority. OCA operations include the suppression of enemy air defense targets, such as aircraft and surface-to-air missiles or local

defense systems, and their supporting C2. OCA operations protect friendly

forces and vital interests by destroying or degrading enemy offensive air

and missile threats before they bring their effects to bear against us. This is

freedom from attack that enables action by friendly forces—freedom to

attack. The aircraft and missile threat may include fixed- and rotary-wing

attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, air-,

land-, and sea-launched cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and air-to-surface

missiles.

Defensive counterair (DCA) entails detection, identification, interception, and destruction of attacking enemy air and missiles and normally takes

place over or close to friendly territory. DCA concentrates on defeating the

enemy’s offensive plan and on inflicting unacceptable losses on attacking

enemy forces. DCA is synonymous with air defense and consists of active

and passive operations to defend friendly airspace and protect friendly forces,

materiel, and infrastructure from enemy air and missile attack.

Counterspace

 Counterspace involves those kinetic and nonkinetic operations conducted

to attain and maintain a desired degree of space superiority by the destruction, degradation, or disruption of enemy space capability.

Such operations may include operations against a third-party nation with

space capabilities supporting an adversary’s interests. The main objectives

The field for air superiority is not a straightforward issue

like a naval battle or a land battle; it is not even a series of

combats between fighters; it is frequently a highly complex

operation which may involve any or all types of aircraft. It

is a campaign rather than a battle, and there is no absolute

finality to it so long as enemy aircraft are operating.

—Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder
43

of counterspace operations are to allow friendly

forces to exploit space capabilities, while negating the enemy’s ability to do the same. They

can be conducted by air, space, land, sea,

information, or special operations forces (SOF).

Effective counterspace operations depend on

space situational awareness to provide an understanding of global space operations and

is derived from C2, ISR, and environmental

information. Like counterair, counterspace

operations have an offensive and a defensive

component.

Offensive counterspace (OCS) operations deny, degrade, disrupt,

destroy, or deceive an adversary’s space capability or the service provided

by a third-party’s space asset(s) to the adversary at a time and place of our

choosing through attacks on the space nodes, terrestrial nodes, or the links

that comprise a space system. These operations range from dropping

ordnance on terrestrial nodes of space systems to jamming enemy satellite

uplink or downlink frequencies. OCS operations initiated early in a contingency can result in an immediate advantage in space capabilities and

control of the space medium.

Defensive counterspace (DCS) operations preserve space capabilities, withstand enemy attack, restore/recover space capabilities after an

attack, and reconstitute space forces. DCS operations should be proactive

in nature to protect our capabilities and prevent the adversary from disrupting overall friendly operations. Suppression of threats to friendly space

capabilities is a key of DCS operations. An example of DCS operations

from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the destruction of adversary,

ground-based global positioning system (GPS) jammers to preserve freedom to employ GPS-aided munitions by friendly forces.

Counterland

 Counterland is defined as air and space operations against enemy land

force capabilities to create effects that achieve JFC objectives. The main

objectives of counterland operations are to dominate the surface environment and prevent the opponent from doing the same. Although historically

associated with support to friendly surface forces, counterland operations

may encompass the identical missions, either without the presence of

friendly surface forces or with only small numbers of surface forces

Space capabilities are a

vital aspect of air and

space power.
44

providing target cueing.

This independent or

direct attack of adversary surface operations by air and space

forces is the key to

success when seizing

the initiative during

early phases of a conflict. Counterland

provides the JFC two

discrete air operations for engaging enemy land forces: air

interdiction (AI), in which air maneuver indirectly supports land maneuver or directly supports an air scheme of maneuver, and close air support 

(CAS), in which air maneuver directly supports land maneuver.

Interdiction is a form of joint maneuver with joint means. Interdiction

consists of operations to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly

forces. Joint force interdiction needs the direction of a single commander

who can exploit and coordinate all the forces involved, whether air-,

space-, surface-, or information-based. Air interdiction is air and space

power’s application of interdiction. Air interdiction is a form of aerial

maneuver that destroys, disrupts, diverts, or delays the enemy’s surface

military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or

otherwise achieve its objectives. The joint force air and space component

commander (JFACC) is normally the supported commander for AI. Using

the JFC’s priorities, the JFACC executes AI to provide effects for friendly

forces executing a land scheme of maneuver. Joint air forces provide responsive AI across the theater, unconstrained by battlefield boundaries. They

should be free to attack the right targets with the right munitions at the right

time. AI is directed against enemy land force capabilities and associated

infrastructure that contribute directly to or are maneuvering to reinforce the

ground battle. AI affects the enemy’s ability to command, mass, maneuver,

supply, and reinforce available combat power. Surface, air, and special

operations commanders need to assist in identifying the crucial targets;

decide when, where, and how to attack them; and determine how surface

operations and interdiction can best complement each other to achieve the

JFC’s objectives and to create opportunities for other maneuver elements

Air and space power can dominate the surface

environment.
45

to exploit. AI levies requirements on air planners and air and

space operations center (AOC)

personnel to plan, execute, and

assess AI in coordination with

surface components, when

appropriate.

Close air support (CAS)

provides direct support to help

friendly surface forces in

contact with enemy forces carry

out their assigned tasks. These

operations require detailed

integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

Commanders can build on the tactical effects of close air support by orchestrating it with other surface and air operations to produce operationallevel effects. In fluid, high-intensity warfare, the need for tight control,

the unpredictability of the tactical situation, the risk of fratricide, and the

proliferation of lethal ground-based air defenses make close air support

especially challenging.

CAS can provide a tremendous tactical advantage when supporting

ground forces. Although in isolation it rarely achieves campaign-level

objectives, at times it may be the more critical mission due to its contribution

to campaign objectives. CAS should be planned to prepare the conditions

for success or reinforce successful attacks of surface forces. CAS can

halt attacks, help create breakthroughs, cover retreats, and guard flanks.

To be most effective, however, CAS should be used at decisive points in a

battle and should normally be massed to apply concentrated combat power

and saturate defenses.

Countersea

 Countersea functions are an extension of Air Force capabilities into

a maritime environment. The identified specialized collateral tasks are

sea surveillance, antiship warfare, protection of sea lines of communications through antisubmarine and antiair warfare, aerial minelaying, and

air refueling in support of naval campaigns. Many of these collateral tasks

translate to primary functions of air and space forces such as interdiction,

counterair, and strategic attack. As with the air and space functions,

countersea operations are designed to achieve strategic-, operational-, or

CAS creates devastating tactical effects.
46

tactical-level objectives in the pursuit of joint force objectives. The

objective is to gain control of the medium and, to the extent possible,

dominate operations either in conjunction with naval forces or independently.

Information Operations

 Information operations (IO) are actions taken to influence, affect, or

defend information, systems, and/or decision-making to create

effects across the battlespace. IO must be integrated into air and space

component operations in the same manner as traditional air and space

capabilities. IO can create effects across the entire battlespace and

provide advantages to a commander assigned an operational mission.

IO is an integrated effects-based approach to provide the mechanism

to plan, task, command, and control these capabilities. More specifically,

it is those activities that influence or affect the adversary’s “observeorient-decide-act” (OODA) loop while protecting our own. Whether the

target is national-level decision making, military C2, or an automated

industrial process, the target’s OODA loop process dictates the opportunities and vulnerabilities. IO is not focused on making decision loops

work; rather, it defends our loops and influences or affects the adversary’s

loops. Information operations primarily include non-kinetic actions. IO is

performed through the integration of influence operations, network warfare

operations, and electronic warfare operations.

Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect

operations, communicate commander’s intent, and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive battlespace. These

effects should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary

decision process, which aligns with the commander’s objectives. The

elements of influence operations are counterpropaganda operations,

psychological operations, military deception, operations security, counterintelligence operations, and public affairs operations. These elements allow

the commander to convey information and indicators to audiences; shape

the perceptions of decision makers; secure critical friendly information;

protect against espionage, sabotage, and other intelligence gathering activities; and communicate unclassified information about Air Force activities to

the global audience.

Electronic warfare operations are those military actions involving the

use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic
47

spectrum or to attack the enemy across the electromagnetic battlespace.

Control of the electromagnetic spectrum is gained by protecting friendly

systems and countering adversary systems. The electronic warfare spectrum is not limited to radio frequencies; it also includes optical and infrared

regions. The operational elements of electronic warfare operations are

electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

Network warfare operations are the integrated planning and employment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the digital

battlespace. Network warfare operations are conducted in the information

domain, which is composed of hardware, software, data, and human components. Within this domain are the networks on which our information and

information systems operate. Networks in this context are defined as any

collection of systems transmitting information. This includes but is not

limited to radio nets; satellite links; tactical digital information links

(TADIL); telemetry; digital track files and supervisory control and data

acquisition (SCADA) systems; telecommunications; and wireless communications networks and systems. The operational elements of network

warfare operations are network attack, network defense, and network

support.

Combat Support

Combat support is the essential capabilities, functions, activities,

and tasks necessary to create and sustain air and space forces. It

includes the procurement, maintenance, distribution, and replacement of

personnel and materiel. In warfighting terms, combat support is “the

science of planning and carrying out the movement, maintenance, and

protection of forces, as well as ensuring an effective combat support command and control process of those forces.” Air Force combat support

consists of those activities designed to field and support a specific military

capability across the full spectrum of military operations and includes

logistics, personnel, communications, financial management, security

forces, services, safety, civil engineering, health services, historian’s

office, public affairs, legal services, and chaplaincy. Operations are

those functions that employ military capabilities. For the Air Force,

this means aircrew members, missile launch officers, etc., using their

aircraft, missiles, munitions, and other weapons systems to achieve

military objectives. Combat support and operations together create combat capability.
48

Agile combat support (ACS) is the

timely concentration, employment, and

sustainment of US military power

anywhere—at our initiative, speed,

and tempo—that our adversaries

cannot match. Agility in combat support

is crucial to meeting the demands of

today’s rapidly changing environment.

With the cold war over and new threats

springing up in every corner of the

globe, combat support must have the

capability to quickly focus and refocus

support activities and resources. The

need to establish operations in days

instead of weeks or months and to

support massive operations that are

executed at lightning speed with almost

daily changes in requirements demands

a combat support capability that is

responsive and flexible.

Combat support creates, sustains, and protects all air and space capabilities to accomplish mission objectives across the spectrum of military operations. It ensures responsive right-sized expeditionary support forces for

joint operations that are achievable within resource constraints. Thus,

ACS provides the foundation to support air and space expeditionary task

force (AETF) operations enabling the capabilities that distinguish air

and space power—speed, flexibility, and global perspective.

Expeditionary

combat support

(ECS) comprises the

expeditionary subset

of ACS. ECS includes

the essential capabilities, functions,

activities, and tasks

necessary to employ

and sustain all elements of aviation

and ground combat

Agile combat support allows

the Air Force to meet changing

needs.

ACS supports mission accomplishment.
49

operations forces in a deployed location. ECS provides those capabilities

associated with deployment, reception, beddown, employment, sustainment,

and redeployment in support of Air Force or joint operations.

ECS efficiently provides essential support while minimizing footprint

forward. Comprehensive analysis and advance force structuring enable

planners to assess mission requirements, operating environment, aircraft

and munitions configurations, and other sustainment requirements. The

core combat support portion of an AETF is identified and generically

prioritized well in advance of any tasking. The AETF is shaped based

on specific mission requirements. This factor enables leaders and their

planners at every level to assess preparation, training, movement, support,

and sustainment on a routine basis. Additionally, given this task force structure, lift is fully optimized in a balanced push/pull system that anticipates

as well as rapidly responds to sustainment requirements.

Command and Control (C2)

 Command is the legal authority exercised over subordinates by virtue

of rank or assignment. Command is also the art of motivating and directing

people and organizations into action to accomplish missions.

Control is the process and system by which commanders plan and guide

operations. Commanders should rely on delegation of authorities and

commander’s intent as methods to control forces. However, although

commanders may delegate authority to accomplish the mission, they

cannot delegate the responsibility for the attainment of mission objectives.

C2 is the exercise

of authority and direction by a properly

designated commander over assigned

and attached forces

in the accomplishment of the mission.

C2 includes both the

process by which the

commander decides

what action is to be

taken and the systems C2 is vital to all Air Force operations.
50

that facilitate planning, execution, and monitoring of those actions.

Specifically, C2 includes the battlespace management process of planning,

directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations.

C2 involves the integration of a system of procedures, organizational

structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and communications designed to enable a commander to exercise authority and direction

across the range of military operations. Air and space forces conduct the

C2 function to meet strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

Air Force forces are employed in a joint force context by a joint force

commander. C2 of those forces can be through a Service component

commander or a functional component commander if more than one

Service’s air and space assets are involved. This officer, the JFACC, should

normally be the Service commander with the preponderance of air and

space assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air and space

operations. Centralized C2 of air and space forces under a single

airman is a fundamental principle of air and space doctrine.

Airlift

Airlift is the transportation of personnel and materiel through the

air, which can be applied across the

entire range of military operations

to achieve or support objectives and

can achieve tactical through strategic effects. Airlift provides rapid

and flexible mobility options that

allow military forces as well as

national and international governmental agencies to respond to and

operate in a wider variety of circumstances and time frames. It

provides US military forces the

global reach capability to quickly

apply strategic global power to various crisis situations worldwide

by delivering necessary forces.

The power projection capability

that airlift supplies is vital since Airlift supports global reach and

global power.
51

it provides the flexibility to get rapid-reaction forces to the point of a crisis

with minimum delay. Airlift can serve as American presence worldwide,

demonstrating our resolve, as well as serve as a constructive force during

times of humanitarian crisis or natural disaster.

Air Force airlift missions encompass passenger and cargo movement,

combat employment and sustainment, aeromedical evacuation, special

operations support, and operational support airlift. These missions can

be tasked in a variety of ways: Channel, Air Mobility Express (a special

category of Channel), special assignment airlift mission (SAAM), special

air mission (SAM), joint airborne/air transportability training (JA/ATT), or

exercise and contingency missions. These missions are executed using

four delivery concepts that work together to provide efficient and effective

mobility: airland, airdrop, hub-and-spoke, and direct delivery.

Air Refueling

Air refueling is the

in-flight transfer of fuel

between tanker and receiver aircraft. It forms one

leg of the air mobility triad and

contributes it missions to the

accomplishment of air mobility tasks. An aircraft’s ability

to remain airborne is limited

by the amount of available fuel.

Air refueling increases the

range, payload, loiter time, and

ultimately the flexibility and versatility of combat, combat support, and

mobility aircraft. By increasing range or endurance of receivers, it is a

force enabler; by allowing aircraft to take off with higher payloads and not

sacrifice payload for fuel, it is a force multiplier.

Air Force air refueling assets employ to accomplish six missions: nuclear

operations support, global strike, airbridge support, aircraft deployment,

theater support, and special operations support. Air refueling assets are

versatile and can accomplish either boom or drogue refueling. A variety of

refueling rendezvous techniques can be planned to facilitate operations,

including point parallel, en route, anchor, radar, and receiver directed.

Air refueling contributes to mission

accomplishment.
52

Spacelift

Spacelift delivers satellites,

payloads, and materiel to space.

Assured access to space is a key

element of US national space policy

and a foundation upon which US national security, civil, and commercial

space activities depend. The Air Force

is the DOD Service responsible for

operating US launch facilities.

During periods of increased tension

or conflict, spacelift’s objective is to

deploy new and replenishment space

assets as necessary to meet US space goals and achieve national security

objectives. To satisfy this requirement, spacelift must be functional and

flexible, capable of meeting the Nation’s full range of national security,

commercial, and civil launch requirements. Equally important, spacelift

must be timely and responsive to the users’ needs.

The Air Force provides spacelift for four basic purposes:

 Deploying space systems to fulfill new requirements for satellite service.

 Sustaining existing space systems whose individual satellites are nearing

the end of their useful life, predicted to fail, or have failed.

 Augmenting existing space systems with redundant or additional capability to enhance space system performance or increase system

survivability should national security dictate.

 Servicing and maintaining existing or newly deployed space systems.

Spacelift can be pursued from two approaches:

 Launch-on-schedule. Due to requirements to ensure spacelift availability for all US users, the Air Force conducts launch operations based

on a launch-on-schedule approach. All users are scheduled for spacelift

based on priority as well as launch vehicle and payload readiness. Changes

to published schedules require the formal coordination and approval from

all parties affected, or preemption of the existing schedule by the Secretary of Defense.

Spacelift supports new and

existing systems.
53

 Launch-on-demand. This approach provides an alternative means of

spacelift whereby launches may occur when required to accommodate

user needs. Launch-on-demand dictates spacelift capability must be

obtained in advance of specific requirements.

Special Operations

Special operations are the use of special airpower operations (denied

territory mobility, surgical firepower, and special tactics) to conduct the

following special operations functions: unconventional warfare, direct

action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense,

psychological operations, and counterproliferation. To execute special

operations, Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) are normally

organized and employed in small formations capable of independent,

supported, and supporting operations, with the purpose of enabling timely

and tailored responses across the range of military operations.

Distinctive from normal conventional forces, AFSOF may accomplish

tasks at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of war or other contingency operations through the conduct of low-visibility, covert, or

clandestine military actions. Air Force special operations are usually conducted in enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territories and may

complement or support general-purpose force operations. AFSOF are normally part of a joint special operations forces (SOF) team that provides

combatant commanders with a synergistic capability to accomplish specialized tasks. AFSOF may also be employed as an integral part of a joint

task force’s (JTF) conventional air component.

The difference between special operations and conventional operations

lies in the degree of physical and political risk, degree of overtness, operational techniques, mode of

employment, independence

from friendly support, and

dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous

assets. That setting is one

often dominated by high risk

and political, environmental,

and operational constraints. In

addition, governments often

view the use of SOF as a means SOF operate at all levels of war.
54

to control escalation in

situations in which the

use of conventional

forces is unwarranted

or undesirable. Accordingly, theater

combatant commanders may choose to

employ SOF, working

either independently or

in support of conventional forces, to

operate in rear areas to

exploit enemy weaknesses or collect intelligence that would not otherwise be available. However, SOF can also

operate as a strategic force independent of theater combatant commanders. Such employment should be carefully coordinated to prevent

conflict with other operations.

Intelligence

Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, processing,

integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information

concerning foreign countries or areas. Specifically, intelligence efforts will

focus on: foreign military capabilities; political groups; political, social, and

technological developments; or particular geographic regions. The art of

intelligence is rapidly turning information gathered through surveillance and

reconnaissance into an accurate, predictive, and actionable format that can

be used to assist planning, execution, and evaluation of air and space operations.

The overall objective of intelligence is to provide battlespace awareness

to commanders and combat forces to enable them to successfully plan,

operate, and assess results across the range of military operations. Effective air intelligence results when actionable information derived from a

detailed understanding of adversary systems, capabilities, and intentions is

delivered in time to make germane planning and operational decisions on

how, when, and where to engage enemy forces. Intelligence provides

accurate, relevant, timely, and predictive analysis to support military

operations to achieve the desired effects of the commander. Air

AFSOF provides a synergistic capability to a

JTF.
55

intelligence evaluates the adversary as

a “system of systems” to predict likely

effects on key adversary capabilities

when action is taken against them to

meet military objectives. It integrates

surveillance and reconnaissance

assets to reduce uncertainties while

planning, provides timely information

during execution, and provides combat assessment through battle damage

and munitions effectiveness assessments.

Intelligence organizations integrate

technical and quantitative assessments

with analytical judgments based on

detailed knowledge of the way the

enemy thinks and operates. Intelligence personnel also must maintain an

independent perspective. Commanders anticipate that even the best intelligence doesn’t guarantee a complete picture, especially when the enemy is

practicing camouflage, concealment, and deception, or when the intelligence

is derived from a single source. Still, accurate and timely intelligence gives

commanders the best available estimate of enemy capabilities, centers of

gravity, and courses of action to plan future air and space operations.

Surveillance and Reconnaissance

Surveillance is the function of systematically observing air, space,

surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual,

aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance is a

continuing process, not oriented to a specific target. In response to the

requirements of military forces, surveillance must be designed to provide

warning of enemy initiatives and threats and to detect changes in enemy

activities.

Air and space-based surveillance assets exploit elevation to detect enemy initiatives at long range. For example, its extreme elevation makes

space-based missile-launch detection and tracking indispensable for defense

against ballistic missile attack. Surveillance assets are now essential to

national and theater defense and to the security of air, space, subsurface,

and surface forces.

Intelligence provides battlespace

awareness.
56

Reconnaissance complements surveillance by obtaining

specific information about the

activities and resources of an

enemy or potential enemy

through visual observation

or other detection methods;

or by securing data concerning the meteorological,

hydrographic, or geographic

characteristics of a particular

area. Reconnaissance generally has a time constraint associated with the tasking.

Surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and their associated

support systems are tailored to provide the flexibility, responsiveness,

versatility, and mobility required by the strenuous demands of fluid, global

taskings. Intelligence critical to the prosecution of current combat operations is evaluated and transmitted in near-real time to those elements

having a need for that information.

Reconnaissance forces possess multiple and diverse capabilities. Because these capabilities are valuable across all levels of war, their specific

employment at any one level should consider possible effects on other

levels. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance must operate together,

enabling commanders to preserve forces, achieve economies, and accomplish campaign objectives. They are integral to gaining and maintaining

information superiority.

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

Air Force CSAR is a specific task performed by rescue forces to

recover isolated personnel during war or MOOTW. Accomplished

with a mix of dedicated and augmenting assets, CSAR is an element of

personnel recovery (PR). PR is the umbrella term for operations focusing

on recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from danger. The

Air Force organizes, trains, and equips personnel to conduct CSAR

operations, using the fastest and most effective means, across the range

of military operations. Air Force combat rescue forces deploy to conduct CSAR with dedicated rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, specially trained

aircrews, and support personnel in response to geographic combatant

Surveillance and reconnaissance

forces possess many capabilities.
57

commander taskings.

Rescue forces may

also conduct collateral missions such as

non-combat search and

rescue (SAR), emergency aeromedical

evacuation, humanitarian relief, international

aid, noncombatant

evacuation operations,

counterdrug activities,

support for National Aeronautics and Space Administration flight operations, and other missions as directed by the combatant commander and the

commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR).

CSAR is an integral part of US combat operations and must be considered across the range of military operations. CSAR consists of those air

operations conducted to recover distressed personnel during wartime or

contingency. It is a key element in sustaining the morale, cohesion, and

fighting capability of friendly forces. It preserves critical combat resources

and denies the enemy potential sources of intelligence. Although all USAF

weapon systems have the inherent capability to support CSAR operations,

the USAF maintains certain forces specifically dedicated for search,

rescue, and recovery operations.

Navigation and Positioning

Navigation and positioning provide accurate location and time of reference in

support of strategic, operational, and

tactical operations. For example, space-based

systems provide the global positioning system,

airborne-based systems provide air-to-surface

radar, and ground-based systems provide various

navigation aids. Navigation and positioning help

air forces by: accurate rendezvous for air

refueling; synchronization of effort via a common timing capability; and position, location,

and velocity for accurate weapons delivery,

ingress/egress, as well as search and rescue.

CSAR operates across the range of military

operations.

Navigation and positioning are vital to Air

Force operations.
58

Navigation and positioning are key elements of information superiority and

global awareness.

Weather Services

Weather services provided

by the Air Force supply

timely and accurate environmental information,

including both space environment and atmospheric

weather, to commanders for

their objectives and plans at

the strategic, operational, and

tactical levels. It gathers,

analyzes, and provides

meteorological data for mission planning and execution.

Environmental information is integral to the decision process and timing

for employing forces and planning and conducting air, ground, and space

launch operations. Weather services also influence the selection of targets, routes, weapon systems, and delivery tactics, and are a key element

of information superiority.

Timely and accurate weather

information supports decision-making

processes.
59

CHAPTER FIVE

EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION

During much of the cold war, most Air Force officers did not have to

seriously think about warfighting organization. War plans generally focused

on either a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe or a rematch in Korea.

If not already overseas, a unit’s deployment was scripted; it would fall in on

a predesignated base overseas, under the control of a predesignated commander, and would perform an expected set of missions in a certain region

of the theater. Units trained according to their role in a given operation plan

(OPLAN). Thus, since most scenarios were “canned,” airmen had little

need to think about how to organize and operate without established bases

and support.

Things have changed considerably since the end of the cold war. With

fewer forces forward, the US relies much more heavily on projecting forces

from the continental United States (CONUS). Also, the NATO-centric

“major theater war” scenario has given way to more numerous, ad hoc

deployments for unanticipated missions. As a result, we became “expeditionary.” Forces no longer deploy according to a fixed script. There may

not be a mature command structure to fall in on, much less a “warm” base

ready for operations. Indeed, the entire joint force may have to be

assembled on the fly with a mix of in-theater and deploying forces, even as

Note: This chapter presents the basics of Service and joint expeditionary organization.

See AFDD 2, Organization, Planning, and Employment of Aerospace Power, for more

detailed discussion.

It appears that, when Germany determined to go into

Norway, the staff of the supreme command determined what

proportion of air, ground, and naval elements would

comprise this expeditionary force. It then designated a

commander and thereafter there was complete unity of

command, and no interference from the three arms of the

service thus combined. Here is a lesson which we must

study well.

—General H. H. “Hap” Arnold
60

a crisis unfolds. But

this is no excuse for

poor preparation. We

have to think things

through before we are

called, even if we are

not as certain where or

when we will be called

upon to act.

Since the first Persian Gulf War in 1991,

the Air Force has

deployed forces numerous times, either for new contingencies or while

rotating forces in support of standing operations. These lessons were

captured in Service doctrine publications in time for Operation ALLIED

FORCE, which saw the first test of our expeditionary organizational model—

the AETF. The good news: in principle, it worked. Since then, we have

fine-tuned it. We have also learned much about how to integrate a joint

force efficiently and effectively. While sometimes things didn’t always

work as well as we hoped, we noted the lessons and adjusted our doctrine.

Now, when called upon—as we recently were in Afghanistan and Iraq—

we have a set of proven organizational principles to build on. When intelligently applied, the AETF model can assist some of the heavy thinking

during the early stages of a contingency.

Effective organization is critically important to effective and efficient operations. Service and joint force organization and command relationships—literally, who owns what, and who can do what with whom, and

when—easily create the most friction within any operation. Therefore, it is

absolutely imperative that airmen understand the fundamentals of Air Force

and joint organization and command relationships.

AIR AND SPACE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

To alleviate pressures created by post-cold war downsizing and an

unexpected growth in smaller but diverse regional commitments, the Air

Force established the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) concept as a

means to provide forces and support on a rotational, and thus, a relatively

more predictable basis. These AEFs, however, only provide a source of

readily trained operational and support forces. Because they do not provide

for a commander (specifically, a COMAFFOR) or the necessary command

The Air Force is an expeditionary force.
61

and control mechanisms (AOC and A-Staff), they, by themselves, are not

discrete, employable entities. Forces sourced from AEFs will fall in on

in-theater command structures, which are usually provided by regional

numbered air forces (NAFs), and may link up with in-theater Air Force

forces. Thus, while AEF forces may deploy, they will stand up as part of

an AETF, not as their own warfighting entity. In short, the AEF is the

mechanism for managing and scheduling forces for expeditionary

use; the AETF is the Air Force warfighting organization presented

to a JFC.

AIR AND SPACE EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE

The AETF is the organizational structure for deployed Air Force

forces. The AETF presents a JFC with a task-organized, integrated

package with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control,

and force protection. Regardless of the size of the Air Force element, it

will be organized along the lines of an AETF. While the task force model

itself is not new, its emphasis within the Air Force is recent. To understand

its basis, we should first look at the joint definition of a task force:

task force—1. A temporary grouping of units, under one

commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific

operation or mission. 2. A semipermanent organization of units,

under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying out a

continuing specific task. (JP 0-2)

The AETF leverages this fundamental concept, presenting a scalable,

tailorable organization with three elements: a single commander,

embodied in the COMAFFOR; appropriate command and control

mechanisms; and tailored and fully supported forces. Each of these

elements will be examined in detail.

 “Single Commander . . .”

A single commander presents a single Air Force face to the JFC and

results in clear lines of authority both ways. Within the task force, there is

only one person clearly in charge; for the superior commander, there is only

one person to deal with on matters regarding Air Force issues. The axiom

that “airmen work for airmen, and the senior airman works for the

JFC” not only preserves the principle of unity of command, it also

embodies the principle of simplicity. The AETF commander—the

COMAFFOR—is the senior Air Force warfighter and exercises the
62

appropriate degree of control over the forces assigned, attached, or

in support of the AETF. Within the joint force, these degrees of control

are formally expressed as operational control (OPCON), tactical control

(TACON), or support. Within Service lines, the COMAFFOR exercises

administrative control (ADCON).

AETFs, when established, will form up within a NAF. In almost all

instances, a NAF will be the most senior Air Force warfighting echelon to

be offered to a joint commander. If the entire NAF is engaged, the NAF

commander will be the COMAFFOR; smaller operations may be scaled

appropriately. Thus, depending on the size of the AETF, the rank of the

COMAFFOR may run from lieutenant general to lieutenant colonel. Within

the AETF, units will form up as expeditionary wings, groups, squadrons,

flights, detachments, or elements, as necessary to provide reasonable spans

of internal control and maintain unit cohesion. The COMAFFOR should

normally be designated at a command level above the operating forces and

should not be dual-hatted as commander of one of the subordinate operating units. This allows the COMAFFOR to focus at the operational level of

war, while subordinate commanders lead their units at the tactical level.

 “Appropriate Command and Control Mechanisms . . .”

The COMAFFOR requires command activities to exercise operational

control and Service control. OPCON is usually exercised through an

AOC; ADCON is exercised through an A-Staff.

The character of the AOC may vary, depending on the type of

operation. It may be one of the large, fixed combined air and space operations centers (CAOCs) found overseas, or a new AOC deployed for that

operation. For mobility-centric operations, the operations center may be

one of the regional air mobility operations control centers or even the tanker

airlift control center (TACC) at Scott AFB. Space operations may leverage the Space AOC at Vandenberg AFB. Frequently, these centers will

work together in a mutually supporting command arrangement, with one of

them designated as the supported center. While the AOC is organic to Air

Force operations, with proper augmentation from the other Services and

coalition partners, it may evolve into a joint or combined air and space

operations center (JAOC or CAOC), depending on the type of operation

and whether the COMAFFOR is also acting as the joint or combined force

air and space component commander (JFACC or CFACC).
63

The A-Staff oversees the deployment and sustainment of Air Force forces

and is the mechanism through which the COMAFFOR exercises ADCON

responsibilities. These sustainment activities are sometimes referred to as

“beds, beans, and bullets.”

The AOC and the A-Staff should be tailored in size and function

according to the operation. Not all operations require a “full-up” AOC

with over 1,000 people or a large A-Staff. Smaller operations, such as

some humanitarian operations, can in fact make do with a small control

center that does little more than scheduling and reporting. Also, not all

elements of the AOC and A-Staff need be forward; some may operate

“over the horizon,” providing distributed support to the forward element

electronically, reducing the forward footprint.

 “Tailored and Fully Supported Forces . . .”

 The AETF will be tailored to the mission. It should draw first from

in-theater resources, if available. If augmentation is needed, or if intheater forces are not available, the AETF will draw as needed from the

AEF currently on rotation. These forces, whether in-theater or deployed

from out of theater, should be fully supported with the requisite maintenance, logistical, health services, and administrative elements. These forces

will form up within the AETF as expeditionary wings, groups, squadrons,

flights, detachments, or elements, as necessary to provide reasonable spans

of control and command elements at appropriate levels.

In summary, the AETF is an expeditionary force formed under a JFC for

a temporary period of time to perform a specified mission. The AETF

provides the JFC with a tailored package of air, space, and information

capabilities in a structure that preserves Air Force unity of command. An

AETF can be sized as a NAF, wing, group, or a mix of echelons as appropriate, depending on the level and nature of the conflict and the size of the

air and space component required.

JOINT ORGANIZATION FUNDAMENTALS

When a crisis requires a military response, the regional combatant

commander will usually form a joint task force (JTF) to provide that

response. If Air Force forces are part of that JTF, they will stand up as an

AETF within the JTF. The AETF will normally coalesce around the NAF

in that particular region. The AETF commander, as the COMAFFOR, will
64

provide the single Air Force face to the JTF commander. Other Services

may also provide forces and will stand up as separate Army, Navy, and

Marine forces, each with their respective commander (COMARFOR,

COMNAVFOR, and COMMARFOR). This JTF organization, along purely

Service lines, is the most basic joint force organization (see Figure 5.1).

Each separate Service component commander usually exercises OPCON

over his/her forces, as delegated from the JFC.

Organizing by Service, however, does not allow for the true integration

of key functional activities—especially air and space power. Further, Army,

Navy, and Marine forces are usually assigned individual areas of operation

(AOs), which are subsets of the JFC’s joint operating area (JOA); this

less-than-total view of the battlespace presents a tactical perspective. By

comparison, an air component commander has the same JOA-wide

perspective as the JFC.

Because all four Services have forces that operate in the air medium,

and two of them have land forces, the designation of functional commanders allows greater synergy by integrating similar activities across Service

boundaries. Functional component commanders can also focus their planning and execution above the tactical, AO level, at the operational level of

war. However, the designation of joint force air, land, maritime, and special

operations component commanders (JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC

respectively) is at the discretion of the JFC (see Figure 5.2).

If a functional component commander is designated, he/she will normally

be selected from the Service component providing the preponderance of

those forces and the ability to command and control those forces. The Air

COMMAFFOR

Air Force

Forces

COMARFOR

Army

Forces

COMMARFOR

Marine Corps

Forces

COMNAVFOR

Navy

Forces

Joint Force

Commander

Figure 5.1. Joint task force organization along purely Service lines.

This is the most basic joint force organization.
65

Force prefers—and in fact, plans and trains—to employ forces

through a COMAFFOR who is also dual-hatted as a JFACC. Functional component commanders normally exercise OPCON of their own

Service forces and TACON of other Services’ forces made available to

them. Thus, a COMAFFOR acting as a JFACC exercises OPCON of Air

Force forces and TACON of any Navy, Army, and Marine aviation assets

made available to the JFACC (i.e., those forces not retained for their own

Service’s organic operations).

Commanders and Staffs

“Commanders command; staffs support.” Within a joint force, only

those with the title of “commander”—i.e., the joint force commander, the

Service component commanders, and the functional component commanders—may exercise any degree of operational control over forces. Only

commanders have the legal and moral authority to place personnel in harm’s

way. Under no circumstance should staff agencies, including those of the

JFC’s staff, attempt to direct forces unless specifically delegated that

responsibility by the JFC.

Span of Control/Command

Caution should be applied when multihatting commanders. Too many

“hats” may distract a commander from focusing on the right level of war at

Figure 5.2. A joint task force organization with functional and Service

component commanders. This represents the Air Force’s preferred

joint force organization.

COMMAFFOR

Air Force

Forces

COMARFOR

Army

Forces

COMNAVFOR

Navy

Forces

COMMARFOR

Marine Corps

Forces

Joint Force

Commander

JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC
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the right time, or may simply overwhelm him/her with detail; of equal

importance is the fact that a commander’s staff can usually operate effectively only at one level of war at a time. If a commander must wear several

hats, it is generally safer if the several responsibilities lie at the same level of

war. Thus, it is entirely appropriate for a JFACC to also serve as the area

air defense commander (AADC), the airspace control authority (ACA),

and the space coordinating authority, since all four functions lie at the

operational level, and all four functions are supported through the same

control node (the AOC). To alleviate the overload, a multihatted

commander may delegate some functions (but not the ultimate responsibility) to appropriate deputies.

More challenging are those instances when a commander’s hats span

several levels of war, as in the case when the JFC (normally acting at the

theater-strategic level) is also acting as a functional component commander

(operational level), and also as the commander of one of the operating

(tactical) units. In such cases, the commander may be inadvertently drawn

to the tactical level of detail at the expense of the operational-level fight.

Also, dual- or multihatting a functional or Service component commander

as the JFC raises a special caution in itself, as it

 “... may place this commander in an unwieldly position, foster a

parochial single-Service or component view of overall joint

operations and component contributions, and create potential

conflicts of interest.” (JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning

Guidancc and Procedures)

Thus, caution is needed when multihatting commanders, as it tends to

create “part-time commanders.”

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND AUTHORITIES

Clear and effective command relationships are central to effective

operations and organizations. In order to apply the principles of war

and tenets of air and space power to any organization, airmen must fully

understand the terms of command and support that underpin today’s

organizations and operations. A working understanding of command

terminology is essential to understanding the relationships among components and the responsibilities inherent in organizations.

The authority vested in a commander must be commensurate with the

responsibility assigned. In other words, the commander with responsibility
67

for a particular mission should have the necessary authority to carry out

that mission. Levels of authority include the four types of command

relationships—combatant command (command authority) (COCOM),

operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support.

These are “warfighting” authorities that flow through joint channels, from

the SecDef to the combatant commanders, to JFCs, and to component

commanders. The combatant commander will attach various forces to the

JFC and will specify the degree of control over each force element in terms

of OPCON, TACON, or support. The JFC should in turn delegate appropriate authorities to the various component commanders. Thus, a

COMAFFOR/JFACC actually exercises only those authorities delegated

to him by the JFC.

Administrative control (ADCON) is a Service command authority, and

flows through Service, not joint, channels. This authority is not an operational command authority, but provides the requisite authority for Services

to execute their individual “organize, train, and equip” functions.

COCOM is non-transferable command authority established by law

(Title 10 [“Armed Forces”], United States Code, section 164.) COCOM

is exercised by commanders of combatant commands as directed by

the President or the SecDef and cannot be delegated. COCOM is the

authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of

command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training,

and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the

command.

OPCON is command authority exercised by commanders at any

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON may

be delegated within the chain of command. When forces are transferred

between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining

commander will exercise over these forces must be specified by the

SecDef. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in

operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON should not, however, include the authority to change the

Service’s internal organization of its forces. Component forces (e.g., the

AETF and its subordinate mix of expeditionary wings, groups, or squadrons) “should remain organized as designed and in the manner accustomed

through training” (JP 0-2, UNAAF). OPCON is inherent in COCOM.
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OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and

forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative

direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training

necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON should

be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations and is

normally exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and

Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON does not

include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration,

discipline, internal organization, or unit training (it does, however, include

authority for joint training). JFCs exercise OPCON of assigned and

attached Air Force forces through the COMAFFOR.

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that

is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

TACON is inherent in OPCON. TACON may be delegated to, and exercised at, any level at or below the level of combatant command. It includes

sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or

tactical use of supporting forces. Unless otherwise specified, TACON

involves no responsibilities for organization, logistics, training, or discipline.

A visible example of TACON is the COMAFFOR, when acting as the

JFACC, produces an air tasking order (ATO) that provides detailed instructions for joint air assets made available by other Service components for

tasking. TACON also includes the authority to command and position forces

to achieve mission objectives. For example, a JFACC functioning as the

AADC with TACON over Army PATRIOT forces would have the authority to specify which asset/battery will be responsible for providing which

portion of the air defense coverage for the joint force (exact placement of

the assets/battery should normally be left to the Army component commander). The commander exercising TACON is responsible for ensuring

communications with the controlled unit.

Support is a command authority that aids, protects, complements,

or sustains another force. It is usually used when neither OPCON

nor TACON is appropriate, normally when a functional combatant commander is assisting a regional combatant commander (for example, United

States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) forces placed in support of
69

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)). The SecDef specifies

support relationships between combatant commanders.

The supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects

of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint

operations planning authority. In the context of joint operations planning,

this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff. The supporting commander provides augmentation forces or

other support to a “supported commander” or develops a supporting plan.

This includes the designated combatant commands and defense agencies

as appropriate.

JFCs establish support relationships within their own organizations to

emphasize or clarify priorities, provide a subordinate with an additional

capability, and/or combine the effects of similar assets. This is normally

done by directing one force (the “supporting force”) to provide support to

another force (the “supported force”). The supported commander has the

authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General

direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives,

timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. A supported relationship does not

include authority to position supporting units but does include authority to

direct missions or objectives for those units. In contrast to the previous

TACON example, the JFACC/AADC (as supported commander for

counterair) is interested in the support provided by other assets (Army SAMs)

rather than where they are positioned. Another example would be a JFACC’s

request for Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) support to engage a

time sensitive target, but he is not involved with where the ATACM launchers are positioned. Under a supported relationship, the supporting unit is

responsible for ensuring connectivity.

ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate

or other organizations with respect to administration and support, to

include organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment,

personnel management, unit logistics, individual/unit training, readiness,

mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the

operational missions of the subordinate command or other organizations.

ADCON is not a warfighting authority like that found in COCOM,

OPCON, TACON, or support relationships. Normally the

COMAFFOR will exercise ADCON of all Air Force personnel assigned
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or attached to the Air Force component command. G-series orders

implement Service ADCON authority by detailing those aspects of support that are necessary for the mission, and the relationship the gaining

organization possesses over assigned or attached units and personnel. For

example, the authority to exercise ADCON could include such elements as

building a tent city, ordering supplies and equipment, authorizing training

sorties, conducting exercises, working assignment actions for personnel,

developing budget requests, protecting personnel, and recommending awards

and decorations. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) authority is

inherent in command authority, and is distinct from ADCON. However,

G-series orders implementing ADCON may incorporate references to

UCMJ authority. In specific contingency operations, the G-series order

may retain one or more of these authorities in the parent unit.

ADCON of Guard and Reserve Forces: Normally, the COMAFFOR

will exercise full ADCON over all active Air Force units and personnel

assigned or attached to the Air Force component. However, ADCON

over personnel of the Air Reserve Components (ARCs) (the Air Force

Reserve and Air National Guard) is assigned as follows: (1) under full

mobilization (10 U.S.C. #12301(a)) of the ARCs, the active Air Force will

assume full ADCON over all mobilized ARC forces; (2) under less than full

mobilization, ADCON will be specified as follows: the respective ARC

will retain full ADCON over all unit personnel and individual mobilization

augmentees (IMAs). Full mobilization of the ARCs requires specific action

by Congress. While the ARCs normally retain full ADCON over their

respective forces in cases of less than full mobilization (“volunteer” status

or selective or partial mobilization), they have agreed to transfer specific

ADCON elements to the gaining active Air Force organization in appropriate cases.

Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander

or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force

components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint rear

area coordinator exercises coordinating authority for rear area operations

among the component commanders). Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of

combatant command. Coordinating authority may be granted and modified

through a memorandum of agreement to provide unity of command and

unity of effort for operations involving National Guard, Reserve Component

(RC), and active component forces engaged in interagency activities. The

commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between
71

the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement.

The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing

directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other

matters. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship

between commanders, not an authority by which command may be

exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to

operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the missions and

capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

Direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) is that authority granted

by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or

coordinate an action with a command or agency within, or outside of,

the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than

operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination

relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. It

is most appropriately used to streamline communications and operations

between tactical elements without relinquishing command by the higher

authority.
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CHAPTER SIX

CORE COMPETENCIES AND DISTINCTIVE

CAPABILITIES

The Air Force’s fundamental service to the Nation is to develop, train,

sustain, and integrate the elements of air and space power to execute its

functions across the spectrum of operations. Core competencies, shown in

Figure 6.1, and their supporting distinctive capabilities are at the forefront of

the Air Force’s strategic perspective and therefore at the heart of the

Service’s contribution to our Nation’s total military capabilities and strategic

vision. They are not doctrine, but are enablers of our doctrine. They

begin to translate the central beliefs of doctrine into understandable concepts, and thus contribute to a greater understanding of

doctrine.

The history of the Air Force reveals fundamental competencies that are at the core

of our ability to develop and deliver air and

space power. These unique institutional qualities set the Air Force apart from the other

Services and every other military force in the

world. By identifying and keeping these

competencies foremost in our vision, we can

more effectively advance these unique capabilities, as well as the ultimate

effects we provide to the Nation. The Air Force continually nurtures these

areas of expertise, making us the preeminent air and space force in the

world. Previously, we distilled these into six distinctive capabilities which

Air power is not made up of airplanes alone. Air

power is a composite of airplanes, air crews,

maintenance crews, air bases, air supply, and sufficient

replacements in both planes and crews to maintain a

constant fighting strength, regardless of what losses may

be inflicted by the enemy. In addition to that, we must

have the backing of a large aircraft industry in the

United States to provide all kinds of equipment, and a large training

establishment that can furnish the personnel when called upon.

—General H. H. “Hap” Arnold

Figure 6.1. Core Competencies

Core Competencies

Developing Airmen

Technology-to-Warfighting

Integrating Operations
74

we referred to as our “core competencies”—air and space superiority,

information superiority, global attack, precision engagement, rapid global

mobility, and agile combat support. Upon reflection and discussion, we

learned that certain elements are more fundamental to who we are as an

Air Force; how leaders, commanders, and colleagues view us; and how we

develop our capabilities for joint warfighting. These are our institutional air

and space core competencies—those that, in fact, make the six distinctive

capabilities possible: developing airmen, technology-to-warfighting, and

integrating operations. These three air and space core competencies form

the foundation upon which we organize, train, and equip, and are the

cornerstone of our strength as a military Service.

CORE COMPETENCIES

Developing Airmen

The ultimate source of

combat capability resides in the

men and women of the Air

Force. The value of strategy,

technology, and organization is

diminished without professional airmen to leverage their

attributes. Our total force of

active, Guard, Reserve, and

civilian personnel is our largest

investment and most critical

asset. Our airmen are steeped

in an expeditionary ethos.

Therefore, from the moment they step into the Air Force, we are dedicated

to ensuring they receive the education, training, and professional development necessary to provide a quality edge second to none. The full

spectrum capabilities of our Service stem from the collective abilities of

our personnel; and the abilities of our people stem from a career-long

focus on the development of professional airmen.

Technology-to-warfighting

 The vision of airmen fundamentally altered the way in which we

approach military operations. As a leader in the military application of

air, space, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technology,

Air Force men and women are the

ultimate source of combat capability.
75

the Air Force is committed to innovation to guide

research, development, and fielding of unsurpassed capabilities. Just as the advent of powered flight revolutionized joint warfighting,

recent advances in low observable technologies;

space-based systems; manipulation of information; precision; and small, smart weapons offer

no less dramatic advantages for combatant

commanders. The Air Force nurtures and

promotes its ability to translate our technology

into operational capability—to prevail in

conflict and avert technological surprise.

Integrating Operations

Effectively integrating the diverse capabilities found in all four Service

branches remains pivotal to successful joint warfighting. Innovative operational concepts and the efficient integration of all military systems—air,

land, maritime, space, and information—ensure maximum flexibility in the

delivery of desired effects across the spectrum of conflict. The Air Force

contributes to this enduring objective as each element of air and space

power brings unique and essential capabilities to the joint force. Our innate

ability to envision, experiment, and ultimately, execute the union of a myriad

of platforms and people into a greater, synergistic whole is the key to maximizing these capabilities. Yet, effective integration involves more than

smart technology investment—it also requires investigation of efficient joint and Service organization, and innovative operational thinking.

Thus, continued investment in our people to foster critical analysis and

intellectual flexibility is equally important to our technology development.

Collectively, our air and space core competencies reflect the visions of the

founders of airpower, are recognized by our joint “customers,” and serve to

realize the potential of air and space forces. We foster ingenuity and

adventure in the development of the world’s most professional airmen. We

thrive on transitioning new technologies into practical systems while we

encourage intellectual innovation at every level of war. And, we drive

relentlessly toward integration to realize the potential and maturation of

air and space capabilities.

Our proficiency in these three air and space core competencies underpin

our ability to contribute to joint warfighting, producing effects across the

spectrum of conflict. Our continued focus on and nurturing of these core

The Air Force uses

technology to prevail in

conflict and avert

technology surprise.
76

competencies will enable us to remain the world’s greatest air and space

force.

DISTINCTIVE CAPABILITIES

Our distinctive capabilities, listed in Figure

6.2, represent the combination of professional

knowledge, air and space power expertise,

and technological fluency that, when applied,

produces superior military capabilities or

effects. These capabilities stem from two

sources: functions that are best accomplished

only by air and space forces and functions

that achieve the most benefit to the Nation

when performed by air and space forces.

They are the basic areas of expertise that the Air Force brings to any activity across the spectrum of military operations, whether as a single Service

or in conjunction with other Services in joint operations. As with the core

competencies, these capabilities also are not doctrinal constructs.

The distinctive capabilities are not necessarily unique to the Air Force,

but represent what the Air Force does better than any other organization.

They make possible the effective integration of platforms, people, weapons,

bases, logistics, and all supporting infrastructure. What distinguish the Air

Force’s distinctive capabilities from those of the other Services are the

speed and the global nature of our reach and perspective. In this context,

the distinctive capabilities represent air and space power capability embodied in a well-trained and equipped Air Force. Fulfilling the premise of a

distinctive capability may require employment of more than one air and

space power function. Likewise, a particular function may be employed to

provide its element to more than one distinctive capability. For example, the

function of airlift may apply to global mobility or precision engagement,

and reconnaissance may apply to both information superiority and precision engagement.

Air and Space Superiority

Gaining air and space superiority is a vital first step in military operations.

Control of air and space enhances and may secure freedom of action for

friendly forces in all geographical environments—land and sea as well as

air and space. Air and space superiority provides freedom to attack

Figure 6.2. Distinctive

Capabilities

Distinctive Capabilities

Information Superiority

Air and Space Superiority

Global Attack

Precision Engagement

Agile Combat Support

Rapid Global Mobility
77

as well as freedom from

attack. Success in air,

land, sea, and space operations depends upon air and

space superiority.

Various degrees of control are possible. Superiority

is that degree of dominance

that permits friendly land,

sea, air, and space forces to

operate at a given time and

place without prohibitive interference by the opposing

force. Supremacy is that degree of superiority wherein opposing air

and space forces are incapable of effective interference anywhere in a

given theater of operations. While air and space supremacy is most

desirable, it may exact too high a price. Superiority, even local or

mission-specific superiority, may provide sufficient freedom of action to

accomplish assigned objectives.

To gain control of the air, friendly forces must counter enemy air, missile,

and air-defense artillery threats not only to assure full force protection for

surface forces, but also to enable full flexibility to conduct parallel warfare

across the theater of operations. The flexibility of air and space power may

tempt commanders to divert it to other tasks. The theater commander must

correctly balance requirements; it is the role of the air component commander to articulate the crucial enabling role of air and space superiority.

Relaxing pressure on the enemy’s air forces may allow them to gain air

superiority, with disastrous results. As an example, Hitler’s decision during World War II to divert the Luftwaffe from direct attack of the Royal

Air Force (RAF) to the bombing of cities allowed the RAF the breathing

space it desperately needed to reconstitute.

A parallel construct applies to space. Like air superiority, space

superiority provides the freedom to conduct operations without significant

interference from enemy forces. In future conflicts, other nations may

have a variety of space-based capabilities, from force application and information warfare to sophisticated imaging and communications systems. To

ensure our forces maintain the ability to operate without being seen, heard,

or interfered with from space, it is essential to gain and maintain space

Air and space superiority is critical to

any operation.
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superiority. Defensive counterspace operations are a major concern of the

JFC today in order to preserve his or her ability to conduct ISR, to command and control forces, and to communicate and navigate.

Information Superiority

Information superiority is the ability to collect, control, exploit, and

defend information while denying an adversary the ability to do the

same. Like air and space superiority, information superiority includes

gaining control over the information realm and fully exploiting military

information functions. Information superiority was the first function of the

Air Force. Early balloons and airplanes became spotters for Army commanders who wanted information in order to gain an advantage over an

adversary and improve their decisions on the battlefield. Today, the Air

Force is the major operator of sophisticated air- and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and is the Service most

able to quickly respond to the information they provide. The instantaneous

global reach of modern information systems is as vital to the Air Force’s

strategic perspective as any air or space weapon. Today, advanced microchips and communications allow the concept of information superiority

to be a strategic component of warfare. For example, information superiority enabled the US to make a timely response to the October 1994 Iraqi

force buildup that threatened Kuwait, possibly preventing a second invasion

of that country. In 2003, it enabled coalition air forces to respond with

remarkable speed and agility to a series of time-sensitive targets against

senior Iraqi leadership.

Additionally, information technology can directly or indirectly affect

national or group leadership, population, and infrastructure, bypassing direct

military confrontation. Information superiority contributed to convincing

the belligerents in Bosnia to negotiate and conclude the Dayton Accords.

Dominating the information spectrum is as critical to conflict now as

controlling air and space, or as occupying land was in the past, and is seen

as an indispensable and synergistic

component of air and space power.

Whoever has the best ability to gather,

understand, control, and use information has a substantial strategic

advantage. Emerging concepts and

Information superiority allows

the Air Force to operate most

effectively.
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tools of information warfare allow commanders to deny, destroy, corrupt, or

otherwise manipulate an adversary’s information and command and

control.

 One of a commander’s primary tasks is to gain and maintain information

superiority, with the objective of achieving an effective command and control of assigned forces that functions faster than that of the adversary. The

eventual goal of information superiority is greater than just having more

information than an opponent; information must be accurate, usable, and

tailored for the user. Information superiority effects include the ability of

our commanders to consistently make accurate decisions more rapidly than

the enemy. This places increasing strain on enemy leaders and forces,

causing ever-increasing “friction” of war and shock at unexpected events.

Dominating the information spectrum not only holds the promise of improving the speed and quality of our OODA loop, but also suggests the emerging

opportunity to significantly degrade and influence our adversary’s cycle

time, as well as the quality of the information within the cycle—and

ultimately shape his perception of the situation and courses of action open

to him.

Global Attack

 All military Services provide strike capabilities, but the ability of the Air

Force to attack rapidly and persistently with a wide range of munitions

anywhere on the globe at any time is unique. Depending on the assigned

mission and the specific system required, the responsiveness of air and

space forces can be instantaneous. The decline of both total force structure and worldwide bases has decreased the size of our forward presence

and forced the US military to become primarily an expeditionary force.

The Air Force, with its growing space forces, its intercontinental ballistic

missiles, and its fleet of multirole

bombers and attack aircraft supported

by a large tanker fleet, is ideally suited

to such operations. Our Service is able

to rapidly project power over global

distances and maintain a virtually

indefinite “presence” over an adversary. When combined with our inherent strategic perspective, Air Force

operations can be the first and potentially most decisive element in Air Force power projection.
80

countering an adversary’s aggression. The ability to continuously observe

an adversary’s actions from space and then, when provoked, to swiftly

respond with a wide variety of capabilities provides the true essence of

deterrence.

Precision Engagement

Increasingly, air and space power is

providing the “scalpel” of joint Service

operations—the ability to apply discriminate force precisely where required.

Precision engagement is the ability to

command, control, and employ forces to

cause specific strategic, operational, or

tactical effects. The Air Force is clearly

not the only Service capable of precise

employment of its forces, but it is the

Service with the greatest capacity to

apply the technology and techniques of

precision engagement anywhere on the

face of the Earth in a matter of hours.

In addition to the traditional application

of force, precision engagement includes

nonlethal as well as lethal force. Functions such as the close surveillance of

peace agreements between belligerents by airborne and space-based

assets, the employment of AFSOF in small-scale but precise operations,

or the rapid response of airlift to the source of an erupting humanitarian

disaster are prime examples of precision engagement. Precision engagement represents a global capability not only to win wars, but also the ability

to drive crises to peace. As demonstrated in recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, air and space power’s ability to concentrate in purpose—

whether or not massing in location or concentrating in time—challenges

traditional understandings of precision and creates opportunity for a different approach to harnessing military power to policy objectives.

Rapid Global Mobility

Rapid global mobility refers to the timely movement, positioning, and

sustainment of military forces and capabilities through air and space, across

the range of military operations. Today, global mobility has increased in

Target—before and after.
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importance to the point where

it is required in virtually every

military operation. US forces

overseas have been reduced

significantly, while rapid

power projection based in the

CONUS has become the

predominant military concept

of operation. Operations

ENDURING FREEDOM and

IRAQI FREEDOM showed America’s adversaries just how quickly our

air forces can mobilize, deploy, and prepare for war. Advanced elements

were provided within hours of the decision to deploy. New, lean logistics

measures have shifted the emphasis from large parts inventories to rapid

resupply through intertheater and intratheater airlift. Improvements in

communications systems allow us to better manage the massive volume

of information required to keep track of widely dispersed force deployments and shifting supply inventories. The result has been greater

efficiency in the ability to support operations with a smaller force and

support structure.

In theaters where only minimal forces are forward deployed, the value

of global mobility is maximized since the key to successful contingency

operations is the capability of the US to rapidly deploy forces to aid friendly

nations. It is the particular competence of air and space forces to most

rapidly provide what is needed, where it is needed. Bombers, fighters,

missiles, airlifters, and space systems can transit global distances in minimum time to directly achieve strategic objectives, whether to dissuade,

deter, contain, inhibit, disrupt, destroy, supply, or support.

Agile Combat Support

How the Air Force supports the forces we deploy forward is as critical

as what is deployed and how it gets there. The need to provide highly

responsive force support is certainly not unique to the Air Force, but a force

poised to respond to global taskings within hours must also be able to

support that force with equal facility. This includes all elements of a

forward base-support structure: maintenance, supply, transportation,

communications, services, engineering, security, health services, finance,

legal services, and chaplaincy. Each of these areas must be integrated to

form a seamless, agile, and responsive combat support system of systems.

Global lift maximizes effective

operations.
82

Many of the same recent

improvements in communications that have allowed the

Air Force to provide precise

global-engagement capabilities

have also provided the ability

to integrate information and

transportation technologies

achieving rapid improvements in

the ability to provide truly

responsive support. The objective of the agile combat support

concept is to support operations more responsively and

effectively, while reducing

the overall “footprint” of

forward-deployed support

elements.

Although support to contingency operations is absolutely

critical to our success as a force, agile combat support is not just a concept

for deployed operations. Every facet of our Service must be focused on

providing what ultimately is combat support, whether it is better educated

warriors, better home-base support for members and their families, better

methods to manage our personnel system, or more efficient processes

with which to conduct business—those things that keep our people trained,

motivated, and ready. Equally important to a technologically dependent

Service like our own is agility—in our acquisition and modernization processes, our educational courses, our organizations, our innovation to meet

future challenges, and our ability to adapt to the changing world around us.

Agile combat support is critical to

operational success.
83

CHAPTER SEVEN

LINKING THE FUTURE TO THE PRESENT:

VISION, OPERATING CONCEPTS, AND

DOCTRINE

The doctrinal maxims of this document are based on experience,

hard-won with the blood of airmen, and tempered by advances in technology. If properly employed, doctrine can lead to great success, and if

ignored, can lead (and has led) to disaster. Therein lies the challenge:

doctrine must convey the lessons of the past to guide current operations,

but still must be flexible enough to adapt to change. Yet while forming that

baseline for current operations, doctrine also provides a baseline for future

thinking. One way to put this relationship into perspective is to understand

the different uses of vision, operating concepts, and doctrine.

If placed along a continuum, vision, operating concepts, and doctrine

provide a model for thinking about future technology, operating constructs,

and doctrine in a coherent framework.

 ision V statements focus the Service on key operating constructs and

desired operational capabilities from about fifteen years out and

beyond. Vision serves to focus technology investments toward achieving these capabilities. Emerging technologies are best investigated

through wargaming techniques. As future concepts are envisioned, it is

important to also examine doctrine to support these potential capabilities.

Vison provides the basis for wargaming, and the results of wargaming

may point to doctrinal considerations requiring further examination.

 As technologies mature to the point where their performance can be

reasonably bounded as a new, separate system or part of another

New conditions require, for solution—and new

weapons require, for maximum application—new and

imaginative methods. Wars are never won in the past.

—General Douglas MacArthur
84

system, they can be examined within the framework of an operating

concept. An operating concept generally looks out from five to fifteen

years, and postulates reasonable operating scenarios that, through

analytical means, examine a range of issues such as employment,

operating environment, command and control, logistics, organization,

and planning considerations. Experiments are the most useful method

for evaluating operating concepts. Operating concepts define the

parameters of envisioned capabilities, and experiments provide a basis

for doctrinal considerations.

 Doctrine is focused on near-term operational issues and talks to the

proper employment of current capabilities and current organizations.

Doctrine addresses how best to employ, how to organize, and how to

command today’s capabilities. Doctrine is best examined and validated

in exercises, which train current forces and personnel in current procedures and missions. Through wargaming and experiments, doctrinal

concepts can be tested to assist in matching envisioned capabilities to

sound doctrinal practices.

Using the vision-operating concepts-doctrine construct, the Air Force

can look into the future and consider the long-term impacts of advanced

technologies such as laser weapons, unmanned aerial combat vehicles, and

new space capabilities, and conceptual advancements such as global strike.

As this framework builds from the general (long term) to the specific (near

term), airmen can investigate a wide range of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities issues at the appropriate point

during technology development, concept exploration, and systems acquisition.

ISION V

Vision statements and vision documents do not address capabilities that

are immediately at hand; instead, they leverage the promise of emerging

technologies to describe desired operational capabilities. As an example, in

the mid-1990’s the Air Force stated a vision to attain the ability to find, fix,

target, track, and engage anything that moves on the Earth’s surface. Such

a capability was obviously not attainable anywhere in the immediate near

term. However, this vision served to focus resource investment to attain

that capability, for example, on sensor technologies, on data collection and

assessment tools, on command and control across great distances, etc. Similarly, the US Army many years ago saw the potential of emerging night

vision technologies. Guided by a corporate vision to be able to fight at night,
85

the Army made necessary technology investments. Eventually, these

resulted in a wide array of night vision equipment, underpinned by the

necessary tactics, techniques, and procedures, that now allow the Army to

fight around the clock, effectively giving no pause to the enemy.

Vision-type capabilities are best investigated through wargames. In such

evaluations, current doctrinal principles need not apply to allow a free range

of investigation. However, current doctrine, especially in terms of missions

and organization, can be used to provide a baseline from which to gauge

relative degrees of success and change.

OPERATING CONCEPTS

As technologies mature to the point where their performance may be

reasonably bounded (e.g., quantified in terms of range, speed, effectiveness, etc.) and their employment may be adequately described as a finite

system, they may be examined within a model that places them in a reasonably realistic operational scenario. Within that scenario, metrics may be

applied to gauge the relative effectiveness of the new system and the

impact to other elements in the scenario, such as command and control

structures, sustainability, and force structure trade-offs.

Doctrine can assist in initially developing a new operating concept. As

an example, the airborne laser (ABL), designed to destroy enemy ballistic

missiles shortly after launch, can be placed in an operating concept that

explores its place within the existing defensive counterair mission. Since

the overall counterair mission is normally assigned to the JFACC, the operating concept could explore how a JFACC might integrate the ABL into the

existing suite of DCA capabilities, looking at such issues as decision aids,

planning factors, employment trade-offs among other DCA capabilities, and

basing issues. Similarly, if the Service decided to also examine the ABL in

an antisatellite role, operating concept developers could use existing

counterspace doctrine to examine the impact to the existing decision

making and C2 structures, similarly looking at information and planning

requirements. Based on a rigorous analysis, Air Force planners could

also use the operating concept to develop the initial baseline for the

tactical doctrine (TTP) necessary to support the new weapon system as it

enters the active inventory. When initial prototypes eventually are available

through the acquisition process, test organizations can fine-tune the TTP for

that specific system so that the TTP is ready when the system enters active

service.
86

Operating concepts are not limited to examinations of new technology;

they may also be used to examine new operational paradigms. Examples

include the operating concepts the Air Force is currently exploring, such as

global strike, global response, global mobility, integrated base defense, and

others. An operating concept places these new paradigms in the context of

an operational-level model and explores their relative effectiveness within

the joint force.

The best venue for investigating operating concepts is through experiments. As in wargaming, current doctrine again need not apply, but it still

can provide a baseline against which to assess the outcomes.

DOCTRINE

Doctrine deals with the best operating practices for current forces, using

currently accepted organizational structures, C2 arrangements, functions,

and missions. By the time new technology is ready to come on-line, it

should have already been examined, via an operating concept-like process,

for impact to existing doctrine. Ideally, doctrine, and especially tactical

doctrine as expressed in TTP, should be ready when the new system or

technology enters the inventory.

Doctrine is not fixed; any given doctrinal position reflects a snapshot in

time. Doctrine can and should evolve based on experience. In circumstances when the Air Force cannot find a unanimous doctrinal consensus, it

may settle on an “agreed-to, least-common-denominator” position that all

players are willing to sign up to. This frequently occurs in emerging mission

areas, where new concepts and terms have yet to solidify across the

Service. It may also occur within joint doctrine when two or more Services propose conflicting changes to joint doctrine; to avoid deadlock, and

to keep the joint doctrine development process in motion, the Services

may consent to “agreed-to” language.
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EPILOGUE

More and more often, our national leadership is calling upon air and space

power as the military instrument of first choice, and they are asking it to

accomplish tasks previously held unworkable—to coerce and to compel.

Air and space power offers joint force commanders more options, including

the ability to go to the heart of an enemy and attain a variety of effects

directly at the strategic level. To support our national leadership, we as

military professionals must think about how to accomplish a spectrum of

missions. We must understand the potential of air and space power, and be

able to plan and employ it to its maximum, and to articulate it within the

context of joint operations.

Air Force doctrine development is never totally complete—it is a

continuous work in progress. We must remain aware of the lessons of

the past—alert and receptive to future technologies and paradigms that

may alter the art of air and space warfare. We must not assume that things

have not or will not change; above all, doctrine must be continually interpreted in light of the present situation. A too-literal reading of doctrine may

fail to accommodate new operational realities. Conversely, the success of

air and space power in the skies over Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq

illuminates the ability of the Air Force to creatively adapt.

But the lessons of the last war are always suspect in the present,

because all conflicts are different—doctrine application requires informed

judgment. Certain principles—like unity of command, objective, and offensive—have stood the test of time. Other ideas—like unescorted daytime

bombing, decentralized command, and the preeminence of nuclear

weapons—have not. If we ignore the potential of space and information

operations and the global and strategic natures of air and space power, we

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes

in the character of war, not on those who wait to adapt

themselves after the changes occur.

—Giulio Douhet
88

may commit the same sins as our forebears. If we ignore the reality that

adaptive, thinking adversaries will seek asymmetric strategies, antiaccess

capabilities, and favorable arenas within which to influence and engage us,

we risk catastrophic surprise. Tomorrow, a new set of conditions and

requirements will prevail. In fact, new conditions and environments are

already emerging. The best hedge is an institutional commitment to learn

from experience and to exploit relevant ideas and new technologies so we

may be the masters of our future, while maintaining those fundamental

principles that remain constant over time.

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine . . .
89

Suggested Readings

Air Force Publications (Note: All Air Force doctrine documents

are available on the Air Force Doctrine Center web page at

https://www.doctrine.af.mil)

AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power

AFDD 2–1, Air Warfare

AFDD 2–2, Space Operations

AFDD 2–3, Military Operations Other Than War

AFDD 2–4, Combat Support

AFDD 2–5, Information Operations

AFDD 2–6, Air Mobility

AFDD 2–7, Special Operations

AFDD 2–8, Command and Control

Joint Publications

JP 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States

JP 0–2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

JP 3–0, Doctrine for Joint Operations

JP 3–30, Command and Control for Joint Operations

JP 5–00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures

Joint Publications

DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major

Components

Other Publications

Boyne, Walter J., Clash of Wings: Airpower in WWII (Simon & Schuster)

1994.

Cowley, Robert, editor, No End Save Victory (G. P. Putnam’s) 2001.

Griffith, Thomas E., MacArthur’s Airmen: General George C. Kenney

and the War in the Southwest Pacific (University Press of Kansas)

1998.
90

Hanson, Victor David, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the

Rise of Western Power (Doubleday) 2001.

Michel, Marshall L., The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last

Vietnam Battle (Encounter Books) 2002.

Momyer, William W., Air Power in Three Wars (Government Printing

Office) 1978.

Murray, Williamson and Allen R. Millet, A War to be Won (Belknap Press

of Harvard University) 2000.

Weinberg, Gerheard L., A World at Arms (Cambridge University Press)

1994.

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Reading List

CSAF’s professional reading list, with links to book reviews, is available

on the Air Force web site at: http://www.af.mil/lib/csafbook/readinglist.shtml.

The list is subject to revision. Readers are encouraged to check the web

site for the most current information.
91

GLOSSARY

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AADC area air defense commander

ABL airborne laser

ACA airspace control authority

ACS agile combat support

ADCON administrative control

AEF air and space expeditionary force

AETF air and space expeditionary task force

AFDC Air Force Doctrine Center

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document

AFDWC Air Force Doctrine Working Committee

AFDWG Air Force Doctrine Working Group

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces

AFTTP Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

AO area of operations

AOC air operations center (JP 1-02); air and space

operations center (USAF)

ARC Air Reserve Components

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATO air tasking order

C2 command and control

CAOC combined air operations center (JP 1-02); combined

air and space operations center (USAF)

CAS close air support

CFACC combined force air component commander (JP 1-02);

combined force air and space component commander

(USAF)

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces

COMARFOR commander, Army forces

COMMARFOR commander, Marine Corps forces

COMNAVFOR commander, Navy forces

CONOPS concept of operations

CONUS continental United States

CSAF Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

CSAR combat search and rescue
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DCA defensive counterair

DCS defensive counterspace

DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized

DOD Department of Defense

DODD Department of Defense Directive

EBO effects-based operations

ECS expeditionary combat support

GPS global positioning system

IMA individual mobilization augmentee

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

IW information warfare

JA/ATT joint airborne/air transportability training

JAOC joint air operations center (JP 1-02); joint air and space

operations center (USAF)

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JFACC joint force air component commander (JP 1-02); joint

force air and space component commander (USAF)

JFC joint force commander

JFLCC joint force land component commander

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander

JOA joint operations area

JP joint publication

JTF joint task force

MAJCOM major command

MOOTW military operations other than war

NAF numbered air force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NMS national military strategy

NSS national security strategy

OAF Operation ALLIED FORCE

OCA offensive counterair

OCS offensive counterspace

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
93

OODA observe, orient, decide, act

OPCON operational control

OPLAN operation plan

PR personnel recovery

RAF Royal Air Force (UK)

RC Reserve Component

ROE rules of engagement

SAAM special assignment airlift mission

SAM special air mission; surface-to-air missile

SAR search and rescue

SCADA supervisory control and data acquisition

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SOF special operations forces

TACC tanker airlift control center

TACON tactical control

TADIL tactical digital information link

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

US United States

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

Definitions

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate

or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including

organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel

management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization,

demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational

missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON.

(JP 1-02)
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air and space expeditionary force. An organizational structure to

provide forces and support rotationally, and thus on a relatively more

predictable basis. They are composed of force packages of capabilities

that provide rapid and responsive air and space power. Also called AEF.

(AFDD 1)

air and space expeditionary task force. A deployed numbered air force

(NAF) or command echelon immediately subordinate to a NAF provided as

the US Air Force component command committed to a joint operation. Also

called AETF. (JP 1-02) [The organizational manifestation of Air Force

forces afield. The AETF provides a joint force commander with a

task-organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of

force, sustainment, control, and force protection.] (AFDD 1) {Italicized

definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for

clarity.}

air and space power. The synergistic application of air, space, and information systems to project global strategic military power. (AFDD 1)

Air Force core competencies. Developing airmen, technologyto-warfighting, and integrating operations are the Air Force core competencies. Core competencies are not doctrine, but are enablers of our

doctrine. They begin to translate the central beliefs of doctrine into

understandable concepts, and thus contribute to a greater understanding of

doctrine. (AFDD 1)

airlift. Operations to transport and deliver forces and materiel through the

air in support of strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. (AFDD 1-2)

airmen. Air Force airmen are those people who formally belong to the

US Air Force and employ or support some aspect of the US Air Force’s air

and space power capabilities. The term airman is often used in a very

narrow sense to mean pilot. An airman is any person who understands and

appreciates the full range of air and space power capabilities and can

employ or support some aspect of air and space power capabilities.

(AFDD 1)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such

placement is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers the units or personnel for the primary function, or

greater portion of the functions, of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail
95

individuals to specific duties or functions where such duties or functions are

primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where

such placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to

specific functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty.

(JP 1-02)

basic doctrine. States the most fundamental and enduring beliefs that

describe and guide the proper use, presentation, and organization of air and

space forces in military action. It describes the “elemental properties” of

air and space power and provides the airman’s perspective. Because of its

fundamental and enduring character, basic doctrine provides broad and

continuing guidance on how Air Force forces are organized, employed,

equipped, and sustained. Because it expresses broad, enduring fundamentals, basic doctrine changes relatively slowly compared to the other

levels of doctrine. As the foundation of all air and space doctrine, basic

doctrine also sets the tone and vision for doctrine development for the

future. AFDD 1 is the airman’s basic doctrine. (AFDD 1)

centralized control. In joint air operations, placing within one commander

the responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a

military operation or group/category of operations. (JP 1-02) [The planning, direction, prioritization, allocation, synchronization, integration,

and deconfliction of air and space capabilities to achieve the objectives of the joint force commander.] (AFDD 1) {Italicized words in brackets

apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

channel airlift. Common-user airlift service provided on a scheduled basis

between two points. There are two types of channel airlift. A requirements

channel serves two or more points on a scheduled basis depending upon the

volume of traffic; a frequency channel is time-based and serves two or

more points at regular intervals. (JP 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad

continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated

by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and

assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant

commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

(JP 1-02) combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable
96

command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States

Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified

combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the

Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot

be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform

those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives,

and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint

training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the

command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised

through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this

authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and

Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command

(command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ

commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary

to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces

to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military

operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (JP 1-02) [Air Force

CSAR is a specific task performed by rescue forces to recover isolated

personnel during war or military operations other than war. Accomplished with a mix of dedicated and augmenting assets, CSAR is an

element of personnel recovery (PR). PR is the umbrella term for

operations focusing on recovering captured, missing, or isolated personnel from danger. Air Force combat rescue forces deploy to conduct

CSAR with dedicated rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft, specially trained

aircrews, and support personnel in response to geographic combatant

commander taskings.] (AFDD 2-1) {Italicized words in brackets apply

only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

combat support. Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat

elements. Also called CS. (JP 1-02) [Provides the foundation for and is

the enabler of the Air Force core competencies. It includes the actions

taken to ready, sustain, and protect personnel, assets, and capabilities

through all peacetime and wartime military operations. Furthermore,

it supports the unique contributions of air and space power: speed,

flexibility, versatility, and global reach.] (AFDD 2-4) {Italicized words

in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}
97

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a

properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are

performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning,

directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of

two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or

two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has

the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but

does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the

appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship,

not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating

authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

coordination. The necessary action to ensure adequate exchange of

information to integrate, synchronize, and deconflict operations between

separate organizations. Coordination is not necessarily a process of gaining

approval but is most often used for mutual exchange of information.

Normally used between functions of a supporting staff. Direct liaison

authorized (DIRLAUTH) is used to coordinate with an organization outside

of the immediate staff or organization. (AFDD 1)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted

to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or

assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or

elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

decentralized execution. Delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. (JP 1-02) [Decentralized execution of air and

space power is the delegation of execution authority to responsible

and capable lower-level commanders to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and

tactical flexibility.] (AFDD 1) {Italicized words in brackets apply only to

the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}
98

direction. Guidance to or management of support staff functions.

Inherent within command but not a command authority in its own right.

In some cases, can be considered an explicit instruction or order. Used by

commanders and their designated subordinates to facilitate, channel, or

motivate support staff to achieve appropriate action, tempo, or intensity.

Used by directors of staff agencies on behalf of the commander to provide

guidance to their staffs on how best to accomplish stated objectives IAW

the commander’s intent. (AFDD 1)

distinctive capabilities. US Air Force distinct areas of expertise are: air

and space superiority, global attack, rapid global mobility, precision engagement, information superiority, and agile combat support. (AFDD 1)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements

thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1–02)

effects. A full range of outcomes, events, or consequences that result from

a specific action. (AFDD 1)

effects-based. Action taken with the intent to produce a distinctive and

desired effect. (AFDD 1)

effects-based operations. Actions taken against enemy systems designed

to achieve specific effects that contribute directly to desired military and

political outcomes. Also called EBO. (AFDD 1)

electronic attack. See electronic warfare.

electronic protect. See electronic warfare.

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or

to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within

electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the

use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons

to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading,

neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a

form of fires. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent
99

or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum,

such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of

weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle

beams).

b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving

passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic

warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

Also called EP.

c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare

involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an operational

commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources

of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the

purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct

of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and

other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing.

Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce

signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack,

and produce measurement and signature intelligence. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources,

facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s

fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and

incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive

measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while

degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include

actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or

disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02) [An integrated application of offensive and defensive actions that deter, detect, preempt, mitigate, or

negate threats against or hazards to Air Force air and space operations and assets, based on an acceptable level of risk.] {Italicized

definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for

clarity.}

functions. The appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or

tasks of an individual, office, or organization. As defined in the National
100

Security Act of 1947, as amended, the term “function” includes functions,

powers, and duties (5 United States Code 171n (a)). (JP 1-02)

influence operations. The integrated planning and employment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the cognitive battlespace.

(AFDD 2-5)

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information

and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02) [Information operations are

the integrated employment of the core capabilities of Influence Operations, Electronic Warfare Operations, Network Warfare Operations, in

concert with specified Integrated Control Enablers, to influence,

disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision

making while protecting our own.] (AFDD 2-5) {Italicized definition

in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

joint doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of

forces of two or more Military Departments in coordinated action toward

a common objective. It is authoritative; as such, joint doctrine will be

followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional

circumstances dictate otherwise. It will be promulgated by or for the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant

commands and Services. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant

elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments

operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a

unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on

the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for

tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air

component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called

JFACC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02) [The joint air and

space component commander (JFACC) uses the joint air and space

operations center to command and control the integrated air and

space effort to meet the joint force commander’s objectives. This title
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emphasizes the Air Force position that air power and space power

together create effects that cannot be achieved through air or space

power alone.] (AFDD 2) {Words in brackets apply only to the Air Force

and are offered for clarity.}

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant

commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational

control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint force land component commander. The commander within a

unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the

proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking

land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing

such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions

and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFLCC.

(JP 1-02)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a

unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on

the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for

tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.

The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing

commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02)

joint publication. A publication containing joint doctrine and/or joint

tactics, techniques, and procedures that involves the employment of

forces prepared under the cognizance of Joint Staff directorates and applicable to the Military Departments, combatant commands, and other authorized agencies. It is approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

in coordination with the combatant commands and Services. Also called

JP. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the

Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander,

or an existing joint force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)
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maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a

position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at

sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The

operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the battlespace through movement in

combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the

enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02) [Air and space power

is a maneuver element in its own right, co-equal with land and

maritime power; as such, it is no longer merely a supporting force to

surface combat. As a maneuver element, it can be supported by

surface forces in attaining its assigned objectives.] (AFDD 1) {Words

in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use

of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war.

These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the

other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after

war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

network attack. Those operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy

information resident in computers and computer networks, to include the

computers and networks themselves. (AFDD 2-5)

network warfare operations. The integrated planning and employment

of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the digital

battlespace. Network warfare operations are conducted in the information

domain, which is composed of hardware, software, data, and human

components. (AFDD 2-5)

network defense. Those defensive measures to protect and defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or

destruction. (AFDD 2-5)

network warfare support. Those operations to provide information to

find, fix, track and assess both adversaries and friendly sources of access

and vulnerability for the purpose of immediate defense, threat recognition,

targeting, planning and engaging in network operations. (AFDD 2-5)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command

authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are
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transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the

gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish)

over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction

necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training

necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational

control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint

force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands

and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational

control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in

and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called

OPCON. (JP 1-02)

operational doctrine. Operational doctrine guides the proper organization and employment of air and space forces in the context of distinct

objectives, force capabilities, broad functional areas, and operational

environments. Operational doctrine provides the focus for developing the

missions and tasks that must be executed through tactical doctrine. Doctrine at this level changes a bit more rapidly than basic doctrine, but usually

only after deliberate internal Service debate. (AFDD 1)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major

operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic

objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link

tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to

accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the

operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring

about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension

of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative

support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical

successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. See also strategic

level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02)

operations security. The process of identifying critical information and

subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and

other activities to identify those actions that can be observed by adversary
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intelligence systems; determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might

obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and select and execute measures

that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly

actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)

policy. Guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be

accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues,

and not others. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership,

political considerations, or for fiscal reasons. At the national level, policy

may be expressed in such broad vehicles such as the National Security

Strategy. Within military operations, policy may be expressed not only in

terms of objectives, but also in rules of engagement (ROE)—what we may

or may not strike, or under what circumstances we may strike particular

targets. (AFDD 1)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation

or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources

of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

(JP 1-02)

strategic attack. Offensive action conducted by command authorities

aimed at generating effects that most directly achieve our national security

objectives by affecting the adversary’s leadership, conflict-sustaining

resources and strategy. (AFDD 1)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a

member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance

or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses

national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level

establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives;

define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of

national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these

objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance

with strategic plans. (JP 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developing and employing instruments of

national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater,

national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)
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support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or

sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action.

2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that

assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation

planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans

or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the

commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or

capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting

commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation

forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense

agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains

another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the

assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or

subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic,

photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02)

synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space,

and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place

and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources

and methods in concert with the operation plan. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that

is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers

within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control

may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of

combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant

commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise

(and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be
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specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient

authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use

of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called

TACON. (JP 1-02)

tactical doctrine. Describes the proper employment of specific Air Force

assets, individually or in concert with other assets, to accomplish detailed

objectives. Tactical doctrine considers particular objectives (stopping the

advance of an armored column) and conditions (threats, weather, and

terrain) and describes how Air Force assets are employed to accomplish

the tactical objective (B-1s dropping anti-armor cluster munitions). Tactical

doctrine is codified as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in Air

Force TTP (AFTTP). Because tactical doctrine is closely associated with

employment of technology, change may occur more rapidly than to the other

levels of doctrine. (AFDD 1)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements

are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to

tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered

arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other

and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02)

task force. 1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander,

formed for the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. A

semipermanent organization of units, under one commander, formed for the

purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task. (JP 1-02)

war. Open and often prolonged conflict between nations (or organized

groups within nations) to achieve national objectives. (AFDD 1)

warfighters. The air and space expeditionary task force (AETF)

commander—the COMAFFOR—is the lead Air Force warfighter and

exercises control over forces, assigned, attached, and in support. These

AETF forces that are engaged in the operational and tactical levels of

warfare are the COMAFFOR’s warfighters. (AFDD 1)