area handbook series

Portugal

a country study



Portugal

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Eric Solsten

Research Completed

January 1993
On the cover: The Tower of Belem, on the outskirts of

Lisbon, dates from the early sixteenth century.

Second Edition, First Printing, 1994.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Portugal : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress ; edited by Eric Solsten. — 2d ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)

(DA Pam ; 550-181) Rev. ed. of: Area handbook for Portugal / coauthors, Eugene

K. Keefe . . . [et. al.]. 1st ed. 1976. "Research completed January 1993."

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 285-300) and index.

ISBN 0-8444-0776-3

1. Portugal. I. Solsten, Eric, 1943- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Area handbook for Portugal. IV. Series. V. Series: DA Pam ; 550-181.

DP517.P626 1993 93-30722

946.9—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-181

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by

the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under

the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the

Department of Army. The last page of this book lists the other

published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

in

Acknowledgments

This edition supersedes Portugal: A Country Study, published in 1976. The authors wish to acknowledge their use of portions of that

edition in the preparation of the current book.

Various members of the staff of the Federal Research Division

of the Library of Congress assisted in the preparation of the book.

Sandra W. Meditz made helpful suggestions during her review of

all parts of the book. Timothy L. Merrill assisted in the preparation of some of the maps, checked the content of all the maps, and

reviewed the sections on geography and telecommunications.

Thanks also go to David P. Cabitto, who provided graphics support; Wayne Horn, who designed the cover and chapter art; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed editing and production and edited

portions of the manuscript; Andrea T. Merrill, who provided in- valuable assistance with regard to tables and figures; and Barbara

Edgerton, Alberta Jones King, and Izella Watson, who performed

word processing.

The authors also are grateful to individuals in various United

States government agencies who gave their time and special

knowledge to provide information and perspective. These individuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country

Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department of the Army;

and Scott B. MacDonald of the Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency, who offered advice in the preparation of sections of the

manuscript. In addition, the authors wish to thank various members of the staff of the Embassy of the Republic of Portugal in Washington for their assistance.

Others who contributed were Harriett R. Blood and the firm

of Greenhorne and O'Mara, who assisted in the preparation of

maps and charts; Mimi Cantwell, who edited the chapters; Beverly

Wolpert, who performed final prepublication editorial review;

Judite Fernandes, who read and commented on portions of the text; and Joan C. Cook, who prepared the index. Linda Peterson of the

Library of Congress Composing Unit prepared camera-ready copy,

under the direction of Peggy Pixley. The inclusion of photographs was made possible by the generosity of various individuals and public and private agencies.

v

Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile XV Introduction xxiii Chapter 1. Historical Setting l Walter C. Opello, Jr. ORIGINS OF PORTUGAL 4 Early Inhabitants 4

Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians 5 Romanization 6 Germanic Invasions 6 Muslim Domination 7 Christian Reconquest 8 FORMATION OF THE MONARCHY 9 Afonso Henriques Becomes King 10

Territorial Enlargement 10 Settlement and Cultivation 12

Political and Social Organization 13 Control of the Royal Patrimony 16 Development of the Realm 18 THE HOUSE OF AVIS 19 Wars with Castile 20

Anglo-Portuguese Alliance 21

Social Revolution 21 Intradynastic Struggle 22

Assertion of Royal Supremacy 23

MARITIME EXPANSION 23

Early Voyages 24

Sea Route to India 26

Empire in Asia 31 Colonization of Brazil 32

Counter-Reformation and Overseas

Evangelization 32

IMPERIAL DECLINE 34

Dynastic Crisis 34

vii
Iberian Union 35

Restoration 37

Development of Brazil 38

Absolutism 39

Peninsular Wars 41 CONSTITUTIONALISM 43

Revolution of 1820 43

War of the Two Brothers 45

Moderate vs. Radical Liberals 46

Rotativismo 48

Portuguese Africa 48

REPUBLICANISM 49

The First Republic 51 Military Dictatorship 54

The New State 55

The Social State 60

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 63

Howard J. Wiarda

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 66

DEMOGRAPHY 70

Population Size and Structure 73

Emigration 75 FAMILY AND KINSHIP RELATIONS 79

Family 80

Women 82

The Extended Family and Kinship Relations 84

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL CLASSES 85

The Elite 88

The Middle Class 90

The Lower Class 91 A New Portugal? 92

ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC GROUPS 94

RELIGION AND THE ROLE OF THE ROMAN

CATHOLIC CHURCH 96

History 96

The Salazar Regime 98

Changes after the Revolution of 1974 98

Religious Practices 99

Non-Catholic Religious Groups 102

EDUCATION 103

SOCIAL WELFARE 108

Social Welfare Programs 109

Health Care 109

vm
Housing 110

Chapter 3. The Economy 113

Eric N. Baklanoff

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE . . 117 The Economy of the Salazar Regime 117 Changing Structure of the Economy 120

Economic Growth, 1960-73 and 1981-90 122 REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 123

Nationalization 125

The Brain Drain 127 ROLE OF THE CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR 128

The Nonflnancial Public Enterprises 128

The General Government 130

Macroeconomic Disequilibria and Public Debt 132

HUMAN RESOURCES AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION . . 134

Employment and Sectoral Composition

of the Labor Force 134

Wages and the Distribution of Income 137

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 139

Agricultural Zones 140

Crops and Livestock 141 Forestry and Fishing 142

Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform 143

Agricultural Policy and the European Community ... 144

THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 145

Industrial Regions 146

Industrial Organization 146

Energy and Mineral Resources 148

SERVICES 150

Commerce and Tourism 150

Transportation and Communications 152

Banking and Finance 153

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 155

Composition and Direction of Trade 156

The Balance of International Payments 158

Tourism and Unilateral Transfers 159

Foreign Direct Investment 160

External Public Debt 162

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 165

Howard J. Wiarda

THE REVOLUTION OF 1974 AND THE TRANSITION

TO DEMOCRACY 169

The Salazar-Caetano Era 169

ix
Spmola and Revolution 171 The Transition to Civilian Rule 174

Consolidation of Democracy 176

THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM 180

Constitutional Development 181 The Presidency 183

The Council of State 185

The Prime Minister 185

The Council of Ministers 186

The Assembly of the Republic 187

The Judiciary . 190

Civil Service 191 Local Government 192

Autonomous Regions and Macau 194

The Electoral System 195

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 196

Political Parties 197

Interest Groups 202

Political Events since 1987 207

THE MEDIA 210

FOREIGN RELATIONS 212

Africa 213

Western Europe 214

United States 216

Other Countries and Areas 217

Chapter 5. National Security 221

Jean R. Tartter HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 224

The Military in the Salazar Era 225

The Role of the Armed Forces in Africa 227

ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PORTUGUESE

POLITICAL LIFE 229

The Military Takeover of 1974 230

The Armed Forces in Political Life after 1975 234

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS UNDERLYING THE

PORTUGUESE DEFENSE POSTURE 237

THE ARMED FORCES 239

Army 241 Navy 244

Air Force 246

Conditions of Service 249

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 253

Defense Expenditures 256

x
PORTUGAL AND NATO 257

BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS WITH

OTHER COUNTRIES 258

DOMESTIC DEFENSE PRODUCTION 260

PUBLIC ORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY 261

The Police System 262

National Republican Guard 262

Public Security Police 263

Other Police Forces 264

Intelligence Services 264

Terrorist Groups 266

JUDICIAL SYSTEM 267

Criminal Law Procedure 268

Incidence of Crime 270

Penal System 271

Appendix. Tables 275

Bibliography 285

Glossary 301

Index 305

Contributors 327

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions, 1992 xxii

2 The Reconquest, 1185-1250 14

3 The Portuguese Empire and Routes of Exploration,

Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries 30

4 Historical Regions 68

5 Topography and Drainage 72

6 Estimated Population Distribution by Age and Sex,

2000 76

7 Structure of Education System, 1992 106

8 Economic Activity, 1992 148

9 Transportation System, 1992 154

10 Organization of the Armed Forces, 1992 240

11 Major Military Installations, 1992 242

12 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1992 254

13 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1992 255

xi

Preface

Like its predecessor, this study attempts to review the history

and treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant social,

political, economic, and military aspects of Portugal. Sources of

information included books, scholarly journals, foreign and domestic newspapers, official reports of government and international

organizations, and numerous periodicals on Portuguese and in- ternational affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the

book, and brief comments on some of the more valuable sources recommended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. A Glossary is also included.

Spellings of place-names used in the book are in most cases those

approved by the United States Board on Geographic Names. Exceptions are the use of Lisbon rather than Lisboa, the Portguese

form of the capital's name, and Azores rather than Acores.

Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion ta- ble is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measures (see table 1, Appendix).

The body of the text reflects information available as of January 1993. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been

updated: the Introduction discusses significant events that have oc- curred since the completion of the research, and the Bibliography

includes recently published sources thought to be particularly helpful

to the reader.

xiii

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Portuguese Republic.

Short Form: Portugal.

Term for Citizen(s): Portuguese (singular and plural); adjective

Portuguese.

Capital: Lisbon (Portuguese, Lisboa).

Geography: 92,080 square kilometers; land area: 91,640 square

kilometers; includes Azores (Portuguese, Acores), and Madeira

islands.

NOTE—The Country Profile contains updated information as available.

XV
Topography: Hills and mountains north of Tagus River (Rio

Tejo); rolling plains to south.

Climate: Varied with considerable rainfall and marked seasonal

temperatures in north; dryer conditions in south with mild temperatures along coast but sometimes very hot in interior. Society

Population: Estimated at 10.5 million in 1992; growth rate of 0.4

percent in 1992.

Education and Literacy: Primary education (age six to twelve)

and junior high school (age thirteen to fifteen) free and compulsory,

but because many children began working at early age, education

ended at the primary level for many. Senior high school (age six- teen to seventeen) had academic and vocational components.

Twelfth grade (age eighteen) prepared youths for university and

technical college. Estimated literacy rate 85 percent for those over age fifteen in 1990.

Health: Uneven provision of health care; health care available

ranged from high quality to that prevalent in the Third World.

Many Portuguese, especially those living in rural areas, not able

to enjoy liberal health benefits provided for in legislation. Infant

mortality rate greatly improved in last few decades to estimated

rate of 10 per 1,000 in 1992. Life expectancy seventy-one years

for males and seventy-eight for females in 1992.

Language: Portuguese.

Ethnic Groups: Homogeneous Mediterranean stock on mainland,

Azores, and Madeira Islands. Less than 100,000 citizens of black

African descent, who immigrated in 1970s to Portugal from its former colonies in Africa; small number of Gypsies; small Jewish

community.

Religion: Nominally Roman Catholic 97 percent; Protestant denominations 1 percent; others 2 percent.

Economy

Gross Domestic Product (GDP—see Glossary): Purchasing power

equivalent estimated at US$87.3 billion in 1991 (US$8,400 per capita). Economy stagnant during second half of 1970s and first half

of 1980s because of world economic slump and extensive nationalizations during Revolution of 1974. Between 1986 and 1990, GDP

grew at 4.6 percent each year.

xvi
Agriculture: Made up 6.1 percent of GDP and employed about

17.8 percent of labor force in 1990. Small farms in north, larger

farms in south; productivity and mechanization below European

Community (EC —see Glossary) levels; imports more than half of

food needs. Major crops: grain, corn, rice, potatoes, olives, grapes,

cork; important livestock: pigs, cattle, sheep, chickens; dairy farms

mostly in northwest. EC membership threatened long-term sur- vival of southern grain-growing and cattle-raising farms; farms

producing rice, vegetables, and wine likely to fare well. Industry: 38.4 percent of GDP in 1990. Concentrated in two

regions: Lisbon-Setubal, much heavy industry (steel, shipbuilding, oil refineries, chemicals); and Porto-Aveiro-Braga, mostly light

industry (textiles, footwear, wine, food processing). In 1990 ownership of industries varied: light industry usually privately owned;

heavy industry often state owned; high technology manufacturing

often foreign owned.

Services: 55.5 percent of GDP in 1990; accounted for 47 percent

of work force. Tourism important component of service sector; 19.6

million visitors in 1991.

Imports: In 1990 imports of goods and services accounted for about

47 percent of GDP. Manufactured goods (machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals) accounted for about 75 percent of merchandise imports, food and beverages for about 10 percent, and

raw materials (mostly petroleum) for about 16 percent.

Exports: In 1990 exports of goods and services accounted for about

37 percent of GDP. Manufactured goods accounted for 80 per- cent of merchandise exports in 1989. In 1990 textiles, clothing, and

footwear made up 37 percent of total export value; machinery and

transport equipment, 20 percent; forest products, 10 percent; and

agricultural products, 8 percent.

Major Trade Partners: EC major trading partner, buying nearly

75 percent of Portugal's exports, and supplying nearly 74 percent

of its imports in 1992. Germany and Spain the most important

trading partners. Only 3.0 percent of Portugal's imports in 1992 came from the United States; Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) accounted for less than 4 percent.

Balance of Payments: Despite negative trade balances, large earnings from tourism and remittances from Portuguese living abroad,

in addition to direct foreign investment and EC transfers, result- ed in generally favorable balances of payments (US$3.5 billion in

1990).

xvii
Exchange Rate: In March 1993, 151.04 escudos (Esc—see Glossary) per US$1.

Fiscal Year: Calendar year. Transportation and Communications

Railroads: Railroad network amounting to about 3,600 kilometers

in 1990, of which about 450 kilometers were electrified. Except for several small railroads owned by mining industry and Lisbon's subway system, all of Portugal railroad network operated by the state company, Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses (CP).

Roads: Total road network amounting to about 73,660 kilometers, of which 61,000 surfaced (bituminous, gravel, and crushed

stone); 140 kilometers limited-access divided highway.

Inland Waterways: 820 kilometers of navigable inland waterways;

relatively unimportant to economy; used by shallow-draft craft limit- ed to 300-metric-ton capacity.

Ports: Lisbon, LeixSes, and Sines fully equipped with adequate

warehousing facilities. Also important: Viano do Castelo, Aveira,

Figueira daFoz, Setubal, Portimao, Ponta Delgada (Azores), and

Velas (Azores).

Civil Airports: 65 total, 62 usable; 36 with permanent surface run- ways. Lisbon's Portela Airport, major European air terminal and

transit point. International flights also scheduled to Porto, Faro,

Santa Maria (Azores), Sao Miguel (Azores), and Funchal

(Madeira).

Telecommunications: Generally adequate facilities. Integrated net- work of coaxial cables and microwave; numerous AM and FM radio

stations; International Telecommunication Satellite Corporation

(INTELSAT) and European Telecommunication Satellite Corporation (EUTELSAT) service.

Government and Politics

National Government: Constitution of 1976, substantially revised

in 1982 and 1989, established system of government, both presidential and parliamentary. Division of executive power between president and the government (prime minister and his cabinet, the

Council of Ministers). Division of legislative power between government and parliament (Assembly of the Republic). Government

responsible to parliament, from which prime minister and most

cabinet members come. President, government, and parliament

xvin
have varying degrees of power and influence over each other. President elected every five years in nationwide vote; Mario Alberto

Nobre Lopes Soares elected in 1986 and 1991. Assembly of the

Republic, with 230 to 235 members, elected every four years if legislative period completed. Earlier election possible if parliament

dissolved.

Politics: Free and democratic, with variety of parties articulating

wide range of political viewpoints. Four main parties consistently

in parliament since 1976: Portuguese Communist Party (Partido

Comunista Portugues—PCP); Socialist Party (Partido Socialista

PS); Social Democrat Party (Partido Social Democrata—PSD); Social Democratic Center Party (Partido do Centro Democratico

Social—CDS). Political system gradually being dominated by PSD

and PS. In 1987 and 1991 national elections, PSD won with slight

majorities and formed governments with its leader, Anibal Cavaco Silva, as prime minister. PS secured 29.3 percent of the vote

in 1991; PCP, 8.8 percent; CDS, 4.4 percent.

Legal System: An independent judiciary guaranteed by the constitution. Constitution also provides for Constitutional Court to review constitutionality of legislation, Supreme Court of Justice

to oversee regular courts, both civil and criminal, and Supreme

Administrative Court to supervise system of administrative courts. In addition, constitution mandates the appointment of ombudsman to protect rights of Portuguese citizens by investigating their

complaints about actions of state authorities.

Local Government and Administration: Constitution provides

for a number of administrative regions, but not yet realized. In meantime, mainland divided into eighteen districts, each named

after its capital. Districts responsible for police, elections, and

monitoring local government. Local government managed by 305

municipalities, further divided into about 4,000 parishes. Elections

for governing assemblies of municipalities held every four years. Autonomous Regions and Macau: Archipelagoes of Azores and

Madeira enjoyed extensive autonomy since 1976. Each had own

assembly; sent members to national parliament; government's

representative to each region was minister of the republic. Macau,

consisting of peninsula attached to the Chinese mainland and two

islands, Portugal's last colony. According to agreement between

Lisbon and China, Macau to become part of China in 1999, but

to retain its free-market economic system.

Foreign Relations: Historically aloof from European affairs except

xix
for 1386 Treaty of Windsor with Britain. Neutral in World War

II, but permitted Britain and United States military use of Azores.

Since end of World War II, formed many international links. Most

notably: founding member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) in 1949, joined the United Nations (UN) in 1955, European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961, Council of Europe in 1976, European Community (EC) in 1986, and

Western European Union (WEU) in 1988.

National Security

Armed Forces (1993): Total personnel on active duty, 50,000

(17,600 conscripts); army 27,200 (15,000 conscripts); navy, 12,500

(800 conscripts); air force, 11,000 (1,800 conscripts). Reserves (all services), 210,000.

Major Units: Army has six territorial commands with one composite brigade, three infantry brigades, and one special forces

brigade; navy has three commands (mainland, Azores, and

Madeira) and 2,500 marines organized into three battalions (two

infantry, one police); air force has one operational command of

eighteen squadrons, including three attack squadrons.

Military Equipment (1993): Army has about 200 tanks, 350 ar- mored personnel carriers, variety of other combat vehicles; 300

pieces of towed artillery; fifty-one TOW (tube-launched, optically

tracked, wire-guided) missiles, sixty-five Milan wire-guided missiles, and seventeen SAM (surface-to-air) missiles; and 240 recoilless launchers. Navy had three submarines, eleven frigates

(including three MEKO 200s), and twenty-nine patrol and coastal

boats. Air force had 40 Alpha Jets, about seventy A- 7 and A-7P

Corsairs, and six Lockheed P-3B Orion maritime reconnaissance

aircraft. Major transport aircraft included six C-130H Hercules

and forty-four CASA C-212 planes of various types.

Military Budget 1992: US$1.7 billion, 2.0 percent of GDP.

Foreign Military Treaties: Founding member of NATO. Treaty

signed in 1951 and periodically renewed permits United States use

of Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in Azores.

Internal Security Forces: National Republican Guard (Guarda

Nacional Republicana—GNR), heavily armed paramilitary constabulary, consisted in 1990 of about 19,000 personnel organized

into battalions in major cities and companies in district capitals.

xx
Equipped with Commando armored cars and Alouette II helicopters. Available to quell demonstrations and labor unrest. Public

Security Police (Policia de Seguranca Publica—PSP), paramilitary

force responsible for security in urban areas, consisted of 17,000

personnel in 1990. Subsection, Intervention Police, could be

deployed anywhere in the country. Fiscal Guard (Guarda Fiscal),

border control force with staff of 8,500 in 1990, also investigated tax evasion and financial fraud.

xxi
International boundary

District boundary ® National

capital O District capital

Districts are named after their respective capitals. Lisbon is the capital ot Lisboa district. 25 50 Kilometers

"I. / /

Castelo

Mlantic

Ocean

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

10

l

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions, 1992

xxii
Introduction

ON APRIL 25, 1974, scores of junior Portuguese Army officers staged a coup d'etat that in a manner of hours toppled the

authoritarian regime that had ruled their country for nearly half a century. The virtually bloodless coup was followed by what be- came known to the world as the Revolution of 1974 as Portugal's

archaic and repressive governing system was swept away in a period

of political and social turbulence. The young officers, members of

the secret Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas

Armadas—MFA), wished to end the wars their country had been

fighting in its African colonies since the early 1960s. Their modest

aim of changing Portugal's political leadership, however, let loose

long pent-up social and political energies that soon turned into a

veritable revolution and kept Portugal in the headlines of the world's

newspapers for the next eighteen months. A nervous Western Europe looked on as Portugal's governing and financial elites fled the

country or were exiled, as a variety of forces vied for dominance

and the Stalinist Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista

Portugues—PCP) seemed close to seizing power, as leading banks

and businesses were nationalized, and as large estates were collec- tivized by landless peasants.

The revolution eventually played itself out. Many of its feared

consequences, such as a communist takeover or a civil war, did

not occur. Moreover, many of the actions, for example nationalizations and collectivizations, that were implemented during the

revolution, had been reversed to a great extent by 1993, and the

serious damage done to the overall economy was gradually being

repaired. The economy grew rapidly in the second half of the 1980s

and continued to show respectable growth rates in the early 1990s.

As another indication of improving economic health, Portugal's

currency, the escudo (for value of the escudo—see Glossary), was

strong enough to be placed in the exchange rate mechanism of the

European Monetary System in April 1992.

The revolution's legacy also had a positive side, however, and

nearly two decades after the sequence of events that began in April

1974, some remarkable achievements could be seen. After centuries of isolation and backwardness, Portugal had become an in- tegral part of Western Europe through its membership in the

European Community (EC—see Glossary). In the first half of 1992,

Portugal assumed the presidency of the EC and fulfilled the obligations of this office in a professional manner. Even more significant,

xxni
perhaps, were the establishment and consolidation of a system of

parliamentary democracy. After a troubled start, this democracy,

watched over by a free and vigorous press, had given the country

a strong and competent government able to bring about peaceful

change

Portugal has a glorious past. It is the oldest European nationstate, having attained its present extent by about 1200, centuries

before neighboring Spain or France became unified states. In the

early decades of the fourteenth century, Portugal began a period

of exploration that within a hundred years gave it an empire that

literally spanned the globe.

The wealth the empire brought mainland Portugal had woeful

long-term consequences, however. The country's leaders turned

away from Europe and its political and technological advances. Portugal's economy battened on the colonies, rather than developing

through competition with other European countries. Because Portugal was too small a country to defend its extensive possessions,

much of the empire was soon lost. Even into the second half of

the twentieth century, however, enough of the empire remained

that Portugal continued to exist somewhat outside the world econ- omy. The colonies provided the mainland with foodstuffs and raw

materials and were a captive market for low-quality Portuguese

manufactures. A greater threat to the long-term well-being of the

Portuguese people than the country's backward economy, however, was perhaps the state of its social and political institutions. Long

ruled by a tiny oligarchy supported by the military and a rigid

authoritarian church untouched by the Reformation, the mass of

the Portuguese population was passive and ignorant. The nation's

wealth was reserved for a few, most of whom lived in Lisbon. The

small middle class was docile and without experience in government.

The European Enlightenment had a powerful exponent of its ideas in the Marques de Pombal, who attempted a thorough-going

reform of Portugal in the third quarter of the eighteenth century.

His reforms were paternalistically enforced from above, however,

and after his fall from power were soon reversed. The early nineteenth century saw the fashioning of a constitutional monarchy,

but parliamentary politics was soon a cynical rotation of public office among members of a small elite in Lisbon. Most of the population

labored neglected and illiterate in the countryside.

A more serious attempt at parliamentary democracy occurred

in 1910 when a republic, the so-called First Republic, was proclaimed. Suffrage was restricted, however, and most Portuguese were

without the right to vote. The small urban middle class that was

active in the republic's affairs formed into numerous personalistic

xxiv
parties that soon showed themselves incapable of governing. The

dozens of inefficient governments in the republic's brief life of six- teen years did not win many Portuguese to the cause of parliamentary democracy. Anticlerical laws also alienated many, as did

frequent instances of corruption.

When a coup by junior military officers in 1926 put an end to the First Republic, few regretted the death of Portuguese parliamentary democracy. But no member of the military was able to effec- tively direct Portugal's affairs, and a young economist, Antonio

de Oliveira Salazar, gradually came to govern the country. First as minister of finance, then as prime minister beginning in 1932,

he brought a new order and stability to the country. In 1933 an

authoritarian, traditionalist, statist system, the New State (Estado

Novo), was inaugurated to protect Portugal from both Western

liberal democracy and communism.

Salazar directed this regime until he was incapacitated by an ac- cident in 1968. He was succeeded by Marcello Jose das Neves

Caetano, who governed until April 1974. The governing system

they ruled attempted to shield Portugal from such modern problems

as labor strife, rapacious wealth, and departure from traditional

concepts of personal morality. Salazar outlawed labor unions,

replacing them with organizations that were supposed to bring labor

and capital together in such a way that class conflict was avoided.

He banned all political parties except one official party, rigorously controlled the press, and carefully supervised the country's few

schools. Mindful of the social changes a modernizing economy en- genders, he even attempted to arrest commercial change and stop

the expansion of the country's small industrial sector. An extensive system of informants and an efficient secret police easily countered the regime's few opponents.

Portugal's authoritarian regime lasted for nearly half a century. It loosened its strictures on the economy somewhat after 1959,

and the Portuguese economy grew at a very rapid rate until 1974.

It permitted a few elections in which dissenting voices were heard

but to no lasting effect. The press was allowed a slightly greater

degree of freedom in the early 1970s, but otherwise the regime re- mained firmly in control.

The sudden collapse of the regime in April 1974 surprised every- one. Also unexpected were the engineers of its collapse, young

officers who served in the military, long the regime's chief support. These officers were brought to their extreme action by the

regime's stubborn determination to retain Portugal's African colonies. Having served on the front lines and seen the human costs of the wars firsthand, the officers knew that defeating the strong

xxv
rebel movements in these colonies was beyond Portugal's power.

They staged the April coup to stop further futile bloodshed. Their

simple coup became a revolution.

The sudden and unexpected collapse of the regime created a political vacuum. Decades of political repression had left the Portuguese people with no practical experience of governing themselves.

The widespread hatred of the regime barred its major figures from

any active role in politics. A few younger politicians active within

the regime were seen as sufficiently untainted to continue to be

involved in public affairs. Their experience allowed them to as- sume leadership positions in several parties located on the moderate right of the political spectrum. Francisco Sa Carneiro took

control of the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democratico—PPD), and Diogo Freitas do Amaral, a law professor, came

to head the Party of the Social Democratic Center (Partido do Centro Democratico Social—CDS). Mario Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares,

who had long opposed the regime and had endured imprisonment

and exile because of his open resistance, returned to Portugal within

days of the coup to lead the newly reestablished Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS). Communists had been active underground

for decades under the leadership of the Stalinist Alvaro Cunhal,

who directed the PCP from Eastern Europe. Like Soares, Cunhal

also returned to Portugal immediately after the coup and plunged

into the turbulent politics that filled the capital's streets and squares. Because the PCP alone among political parties had a sizeable

organized infrastructure in place, it occupied a political space greater

than its actual strength.

Political power was by no means limited to these parties, which

in the first months of the revolution had marginal roles, but was

held by a broad variety of groups. Numerous splinter groups to the left of the PCP were soon active and made themselves known

through street demonstrations. The PCP-controlled labor union

Intersindical emerged from its semi-underground position and

worked alongside the often independent Workers' Committees,

which quickly began taking control of numerous factories and businesses. The MFA, with its select military force, the Continental

Operations Command (Comando Operacional do Continente

COPCON), wielded much power, as well. The most visible politician of the first months of the revolution was General Antonio

de Spmola, who became the president of the country's interim

government.

Given this array of forces, there was no one center of power.

Groups formed temporary alliances, giant street rallies attempted

to influence the direction of politics, the PCP placed its people in

xxvi
many key positions in the country's public institutions, and politi- cal parties to the right of the PCP attempted to prevent a communist takeover. Given its nature as an organized and disciplined

force, the military was the single most important element during

the revolution, although most officers were not radicals.

A series of provisional governments was formed that with time

became increasingly leftist and dominated by radical military

officers. An attempted rightist coup by Spinola in March 1975

caused a leftist countermovement, a wave of nationalizations of

banks and other businesses, and the seizure of many large farms

in southern Portugal. Attempts to bring the revolution to the north

backfired, and that region's smallholders offered the first successful resistance to the revolutionary left's program to turn Portugal

into a socialist state. Another indication that the country as a whole did not wish a revolutionary government was the April 1975 election of the Constituent Assembly, in which parties to the right of the PCP had

an overwhelming majority. The assembly had no legislative powers but had as its sole purpose the drafting of a constitution for a democratic government. It began this work against the backdrop

of an increasingly radical revolution.

During the summer of 1975, splits appeared within the MFA

itself. Moderate elements favoring a political program akin to Scandinavian social democracy gained the upper hand in the organization, deposed the most radical of all the provisional governments

in September, and put in place the last of these six governments, one destined to last until the first constitutional government came

into existence in July 1976. An attempted coup in November 1975

by extremists was put down by a counterattack led by moderates.

The arrest of several hundred radical officers and the dissolution

of COPCON ended the radical stage of the Revolution of 1974.

The military remained active in politics, however. Although the

African wars ended when the colonies were granted independence

in 1975, elements of the military were determined to defend the

accomplishments of the revolution. The MFA arranged with the

drafters of the constitution that the military would retain guardian rights over the new democracy, ensuring that it remained true

to "the spirit of the revolution." The constitution of 1976 provided for a strong president who, with the help of a military-dominated

Council of the Revolution, could veto any legislation that reversed

such revolutionary actions as the extensive nationalizations of 1975.

General Antonio dos Santos Ramalho Eanes, the hero of the

November 1975 countercoup, was elected the new democracy's first xxvn
president in 1976. An austere man of unquestioned integrity, Eanes

could be trusted to preserve the revolution's gains.

The first regular parliamentary elections were held in April 1976.

The winner was the PS with 35 percent of the vote, far ahead of

its competitors, but not enough for an absolute majority in the new

unicameral parliament, the Assembly of the Republic. With its lead- er Soares as prime minister, the PS formed a minority government

that governed for eighteen months. When it fell because of a motion of censure, the PS formed a governing coalition with the Christian democrat CDS that lasted another year. Enormous social and

economic problems, including the return of an estimated 600,000

Portuguese settlers and demobilized soldiers from Africa, combined

with factionalism and personal rivalries, were the undoing of these

first two constitutional governments. Eanes then appointed a series of nonpartisan caretaker governments composed of experts and

technocrats in the hope that they could better deal with pressing

issues and govern until the next parliamentary elections mandated by the constitution for 1980.

Each of the three caretaker governments failed, and Eanes was

forced to call for early elections in December 1979, even though

parliamentary elections would still have to be held the following

year. The Democratic Alliance (Alianca Democratica—AD), a coalition of the PPD—now called the Social Democrat Party (Partido

Social Democrata—PSD)—the CDS, and several smaller groups,

won the election, but without a majority. The coalition formed a government with the forceful and charismatic PSD leader Sa Carneiro as prime minister. The AD won the October 1980 election,

as well, and governed Portugal until 1983. New elections were called that year because the AD, without the leadership of Sa Carneiro,

who had died in a December 1980 plane crash, had disintegrated,

and no effective government could be formed.

During its time in power, however, the AD coalition had effect- ed some far-reaching constitutional amendments that strengthened

the system of parliamentary government. With the support of the

PS, which gave the AD the required two-thirds majorities, constitutional amendments were passed in 1982 that weakened the power of the president and strengthened both the prime minister and

the legislature. The presidency remained an essential governing

institution, but the balance of political power shifted to favor the

cabinet and the legislature, as in most other Western democracies.

A further amendment ended the military's guardianship over the new democracy. The amendment eliminated the Council of the

Revolution, through which the military had frequently vetoed legislation, and replaced it with the Constitutional Court, which functions

xxvin
in the same manner as similar bodies in other parliamentary

democracies. President Eanes, easily reelected in late 1980 for a second five-year term, signed the amendments into law, although

he opposed them because they reduced the president's powers and

returned the military to the barracks.

After the 1983 parliamentary elections, the PS formed a coali- tion government with the PSD. The huge losses stemming from

the many firms nationalized during the revolution, the enormous

expansion of the numbers of those employed by the state, the ef- fects of the two oil-price hikes of the 1970s, and the flight of much

entrepreneurial talent from Portugal had left the economy in a desperate state. Inflation was as high as 30 percent a year, and

many workers had real earnings lower than those of the early 1970s. In addition, many companies were in such financial straits that

wages were often months in arrears. No government had been able to deal with these economic

problems in a meaningful way. The AD and PS combination that

had effected some vital constitutional changes was not able to amend

the constitutional provisions that declared the revolution's nationalizations irreversible. In addition, the country's labor laws in essence guaranteed employees jobs for life and made rational deployment of labor nearly impossible. Given these circumstances,

the PS-PSD government had to make some very difficult decisions

and became unpopular as the economy worsened. The alliance,

troubled also by personal rivalries, collapsed in early 1985.

The PSD began its political ascent in the 1985 parliamentary

elections. As the senior partner in the coalition and with its leader

Soares as prime minister, the PS was blamed by voters for the

failures of the fallen government; it polled only 20.8 percent of the

vote, compared with 36.3 percent in 1983. Despite its participation in the government, the PSD won more votes than ever before, 29.9 percent, and for the first time was the party with the

most parliamentary seats. Much of the PSD's success was due to

its new leader, Anibal Cavaco Silva, who waged a clever campaign

and presented his party in a new light. His personal qualities of

austerity, probity, and competence appealed to many Portuguese,

who saw in him, an economist and former minister of finance, some- one who could deal with the country's serious problems.

Cavaco Silva formed a minority single-party government with

himself as prime minister and managed to remain in power for nearly a year and a half. He was fortunate in that painful economic

decisions made by the previous government began to bear fruit during his time in office. Portugal's accession to the EC at the beginning

of 1986 also benefited the country; the first of the organization's

xxix
extensive aid packages began to improve Portugal's backward in- frastructure almost immediately. When a motion of censure brought

down the PSD government in the spring of 1987, Soares, elected

president in early 1986, decided to call new elections in July 1987

rather than form another weak single-party or coalition government.

The improving economy and the feeling on the part of many

Portuguese that the PSD was taking their country in the right direction allowed the party to win an absolute parliamentary majority

in the national elections of 1987. The 50.2 percent of the vote gave

the party a solid parliamentary majority, the first in the new democracy, and permitted the formation of a strong single-party

government. Cavaco Silva's government also became the first to serve out the entire four-year legislative term. In 1991 Cavaco Sil- va led his party to a second victory in which it again won more

than 50 percent of the vote and 135 seats in the 230-seat parliament.

For many observers, the PSD's electoral successes and the stability of the Cavaco Silva government indicated that Portugal's new

democracy, the Second Republic as it is often called, had at last taken root. During the first decade of the new political system, there were numerous weak governments, and four national elections were

called because no effective governing coalitions were available. This

instability caused some observers to fear that Portugal's second at- tempt at parliamentary democracy might eventually prove as unsuccessful as was the First Republic.

The Second Republic was more fortunate than the First Republic

in several regards, however. Despite its serious problems, Portugal had come to enjoy a much greater prosperity and a higher level of education than in the first decades of the century. As a result,

the Portuguese were better able to understand public affairs than

in the past. In addition, the new government possessed a greater

legitimacy because it was based on universal suffrage and high rates of voter participation. Portugal was also lucky to have a number

of capable politicians committed to establishing parliamentary

democracy. Also vital was the willingness of the military to abide

by the laws of the new republic. All of these factors contributed

to the eventual success of the new political system.

However healthy Portuguese democracy was by the 1990s, it still exhibited some shortcomings. Factionalism, whether caused by

ideology or personal ambition, was still noticeable. Strict party dis- cipline ensured a degree of party unity, but party "barons" sometimes put personal welfare before that of their parties. Small parties

centered around an individual were less common than in the past,

but in the 1985 elections a big winner was a short-lived group

pledged to President Eanes. The parties sometimes overshadowed

xxx
the Assembly of the Republic as centers of political power, but internal reforms, increased support staff, and an evolving institu- tional ethos had increased that body's performance to the benefit

of parliamentary democracy.

By the early 1990s, Portuguese democracy appeared to be moving to a two-party system consisting of the PSD and the PS. The

two parties together won nearly 80 percent of the vote in the 1991

national elections and between them controlled 90 percent of the

seats in parliament. As of early 1993, there was no reason to think

this dominance would be upset in the near future.

The PSD, in power since early 1980 through coalitions with parties first to its right, then to its left, and then through both minority

and majority single-party governments, gradually came to occupy

a large place in the middle of the political spectrum. Generally,

the PSD held views similar to those advocated by liberal Republicans in the United States. Anibal Cavaco Silva, the party's leader

since 1985, remained very popular with Portuguese voters, and

the government he formed after the October 1991 elections was

expected to remain in power for the entire legislative period scheduled to end in late 1995.

Portugal's other leading political party, the PS, had lost its early

dominance but far outdistanced its nearest rivals, the PCP and the

CDS. The PS had been troubled by leadership problems and in- ept campaigns since Soares resigned as its head to campaign for the presidency in the mid-1980s. However, it renamed dominant

in many areas and won the 1989 local elections. The PS had gradually moved to the center of the political spectrum, having long abandoned the fierce advocacy of socialism that characterized it in the

mid-1970s. Indeed, by the early 1990s, its positions on main is- sues were often hard to distinguish from those of the PSD. To the

right of the PSD was the Christian democratic CDS. Long led by

its founder Diogo Freitas do Amaral, who nearly won the presidency

in 1986, the CDS had seen a steady erosion of support in national

elections during the 1980s. The party was last part of a government in early 1983, and only a weakening of the PSD seemed likely to bring it back into power as a coalition partner.

The only major political party not regarded as a wholehearted

supporter of liberal democracy was the PCP. Parties to its right never saw the PCP as a suitable coalition partner, however, and

after the constitution of 1976 became effective, it was never part

of any cabinet. The PCP had many supporters in some southern

areas, both rural and industrial, but rival parties were making headway even in these traditional strongholds. The PCP remained resolutely Stalinist even into the 1990s, expelling members who sought

xxxi
to reform it. The PCP's share of votes declined during the 1980s,

and by the 1991 election it had lost half its support. This decline

and an aging membership suggested that the PCP was condemned

to political marginality.

The first decade of the Second Republic was marked by frequent

political missteps and failures; the decade was also a very difficult one for Portugal's economy, and in some years there were real declines in both wages and production. This situation was a painful contrast to the accelerated rates of growth between 1960 and

1973 when the Salazar-Caetano regime had allowed partial eco- nomic liberalization and increased foreign investment. Growth ended, however, when the revolution's extensive nationalizations and

the subsequent mismanagement of the government's large holdings were exacerbated by the global recession caused by the oil price

hikes of 1973 and 1979.

Austerity measures undertaken in the mid-1980s and large transfers of financial aid to Portugal by the EC led to a sustained period of growth in the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s that was among the best achieved by member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD—

see Glossary). Growth was further strengthened by substantial direct foreign investment (US$15 billion in the 1989-92 period) and the

government's sales of many companies nationalized during the revo- lution (nearly US$6 billion in the same period). However favorable these trends were, during the remainder of the 1990s the

resourcefulness of Portugal's businesspeople and politicians will be

seriously challenged by long-term structural problems in Portugal's economy and its complete opening by 1995 to competition

from more efficient rivals in the EC.

Portugal's agricultural sector is only one-half to one-fourth as productive as those of most other EC member states, despite US$2

billion of EC funds that had been invested in modernization ef- forts between 1986 and the early 1990s. Although nearly one-fifth

of the work force was engaged in agriculture in the early 1990s,

as much as one-half of the food the country consumed had to be

imported. The small fragmented farms of the north are probably

too small for efficient farming. Progress has been made in introducing modern methods and equipment to the large estates in the south,

many of which were collective farms for a time, but as a whole

the sector remains overstaffed and backward.

The industrial sector consists of three components: modern

foreign-owned plants that produce a large variety of sophisticated

products; a large, generally unprofitable state-owned sector, often

concentrated in heavy industry; and privately owned, often quite xxxn
small and labor-intensive manufacturing firms that have managed

to survive international competition because of protective tariffs and low wages. Modern high-technology companies are likely to continue to prosper in the 1990s. The nationalized sector is being

privatized by the Cavaco Silva government, and those companies

that appear to have a promising future have found buyers. Portugal's privately owned companies, active in textiles, shoe manufacturing, food processing, and similar activities, are likely to find the

1990s difficult. Often too small to purchase or use modern equipment and slow to learn the latest managerial methods, a good number of these firms might well not survive the decade.

Portugal's service sector is also in the throes of meeting the

challenges of the European single market (see Glossary). Tourism

remains vital to the country and is being upgraded. The financial sector is being transformed by foreign firms that have set up companies in Portugal. The many banks the government nationalized

in 1975 were being sold off at a brisk rate in the early 1990s. Portuguese banking as a whole is overstaffed and underautomated,

but foreign competition is forcing the sector to strive for greater

efficiency.

The government also attempted to deal with legacies of both the

Salazar regime and the revolutionary period when it proposed

streamlining the state bureaucracy and reforming labor laws. Persistence is needed to deal with the deadening effects of a too large

and unresponsive government bureaucracy, which during Salazar'

rule had come to regulate much of everyday life and then was ex- panded in the revolutionary mid-1970s. The bureaucracy takes

many of the state's resources and through extensive regulation

hinders ordinary citizens in their dealings with state authorities and

firms in the conduct of their business. Labor laws passed during

the revolution made dismissing employees very difficult. Attempts

to reform employment methods have had only moderate success and foundered on union resistance. Companies have circumvented some of these laws by resorting to fixed-term work contracts,

but personnel management practices still had not been put on a wholly rational footing as of the early 1990s.

Portugal needs a well-trained work force in order to fare well

in an increasingly competitive world economy. More Portuguese

are being educated than ever before, even at the university level,

which long had been reserved for a tiny elite. It was estimated,

however, that in the early 1990s up to 20 percent of Portuguese

over the age of fifteen were illiterate. This illiteracy rate represented a striking improvement over the 1930 rate of 68 percent but was xxxm
still much higher than the European average. Even at the beginning of the 1990s, most Portuguese had had only five or six years

of schooling, and the percentage of children attending school beyond the sixth grade was below the EC average by a wide margin.

Morale in the teaching profession was also low because teachers,

like most state employees, were very poorly paid. EC financial transfers to Portugal to raise the standards of the country's education were significant, but much remained to be done before Portuguese

schooling corresponded to that of other West European countries.

The severity of the education system's problems is matched by

the serious problems found throughout Portugal's social welfare

and health systems. A comprehensive social welfare system had

been established by law in the second half of the 1970s but never

fully realized, and benefit payments and pensions were set at a very

low level. Significant progress had been made in reducing infant

mortality and dealing with some other health problems, but public health care is not generally up to West European standards.

The country' s backwardness when measured against the rest of the

EC, with the exception of Greece, is striking and could be seen

as a legacy of Portugal's long isolation from Europe and the repres- sion of the Salazar regime.

Given the advances made in the two decades after 1974, however,

Portuguese have reasons to rejoice. Poverty remains, especially in rural areas, and housing is frequently inadequate, but the population as a whole lives better than ever before. The traditional necessity to emigrate to find employment that had forced millions of

Portuguese to leave their country, especially in the 1960s when

Paris, in effect, became the second largest Portuguese city, has less- ened greatly. Many Portuguese can now find employment at home,

if not in rural regions where emigration is still the rule, then along

the coasts where most Portuguese have come to live. The improved

economy also gives young Portuguese a greater choice in occupations and a chance for social mobility.

A modernizing society also presents Portuguese with opportunities for a better life. Portuguese society is more varied than

during the Salazar period. The free media have brought the outside world to the Portuguese and engendered a greater liberality in how people lived. Divorce was permitted in the old regime, but

abortion not legalized until 1984. The change went through despite the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church, which has

become less influential. More Portuguese women work outside the

home, and if occupational opportunities are not yet as great as those

enjoyed by women in Northern Europe, Portuguese women are

freer than their mothers. Until 1969, for example, Portuguese

xxxiv
women who were not heads of households had to have the permission of their husbands or male relatives to obtain passports. In the

new Portugal, in contrast, a government agency existed with the

purpose of preventing discrimination against women.

The greatest achievement of the Portuguese people since 1974,

however, and the one that has allowed and encouraged other positive developments and permitted confidence about the future, is the consolidation of a system of parliamentary democracy, the first successful such system in the country's history. It is hoped that a modern political system responsive to the people's needs will allow the Portuguese to prepare for the next century in a united

Europe.

October 9, 1993 Eric Solsten

XXXV

Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Ruins of Roman temple in Evora
THE HISTORY OF PORTUGAL can be divided into seven broad periods. The first begins in the Paleolithic period and ex- tends to the formation of Portugal as an independent monarchy.

During this period, Lusitania, that portion of the western Iberian

Peninsula known today as Portugal, experienced many waves of

conquest and settlement by Iberos, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans,

Swabians, Visigoths, and Muslims. Of these successive waves of

people, the Romans left the greatest imprint on present Portuguese

society.

The second broad period of Portuguese history runs from the

founding of the monarchy in 1128 until the disappearance of the

House of Burgundy, Portugal's first dynasty, in 1383. During this period, the monarchy was established and expanded by reconquering territory from the Muslims and populating those lands with

Christian settlers. Consolidation and economic development were

furthered by policies designed to increase agricultural productivity.

The third period begins with the founding of the House of Avis,

Portugal's second ruling dynasty. During this period, Portugal ex- perienced a dynastic struggle that brought the House of Avis to the throne, a series of wars with Castile that threatened the independence of the new kingdom, a social revolution, a second dynastic

struggle, and the assertion of royal supremacy over the nobility.

The fourth period begins in 1415 when the Portuguese seized

Ceuta in Morocco, thus beginning Portugal's maritime expansion.

During this period, Portugal explored the west coast of Africa, dis- covered and colonized Madeira and the Azores, opened the pas- sage to India around Africa, built an empire in Asia, and colonized

Brazil.

The fifth period, that of imperial decline, begins with the dynastic crisis of 1580, which saw the demise of the House of Avis.

During this period, Portugal was part of the Iberian Union until

1640, when the monarchy was restored and a new dynasty, the

House of Braganca, was established. This period includes the advent of absolutism in Portugal and ends with the Napoleonic in- vasions in the early 1800s.

The sixth period, the period of constitutional monarchy, begins

with the liberal revolution of 1820, which established in Portugal

for the first time a written constitution. This period includes a civil war in which constitutionalists triumphed over absolutists, the winning of independence by Brazil, and the exploration of Portugal's

3
Portugal: A Country Study

African possessions. It ends with the collapse of rotativismo (see Glossary) in the early twentieth century.

The final period begins in 1910 with the downfall of the monarchy and the establishment of the First Republic. This period in- cludes the corporative republic of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar; the

collapse of that regime on April 25, 1974; and the establishment

of Portugal's present democratic regime, the Second Republic.

Origins of Portugal

The Iberian Peninsula is a geographic unit encompassing a number of distinct regions distinguished by different climate and geomorphology, such as Andalusia, Castile, Galicia, and Lusitania.

Lusitania, which now encompasses the modern nation-state of Portugal, is generally set off from the other regions of the peninsula

by areas of higher elevation running parallel to the Atlantic coast,

greater rainfall, and a more moderate climate. It was this regional

distinctiveness, as well as the internal geography of Lusitania—an

area largely open to the south but hemmed in by mountains on

the east and the Atlantic Ocean on the west—that gave rise to a

culturally and socially distinct people, the Portuguese, and later to an independent nation-state, Portugal.

Early Inhabitants

Lusitania has been inhabited since the Paleolithic period, and

implements made by humans have been found at widely scattered

sites. The Ice Ages did not touch Lusitania, and it was only after the disappearance of the Paleolithic hunting cultures that a warmer

climate gave rise to a river-centered culture. At the end of the

Paleolithic period, about 7000 B.C. , the valley of the Tagus River

(Rio Tejo) was populated by hunting and fishing tribes, who lived

at the mouths of the river's tributaries. These people left huge

kitchen middens containing the remains of shellfish and crustaceans,

as well as the bones of oxen, deer, sheep, horses, pigs, wild dogs,

badgers, and cats. Later, perhaps about 3000 B.C., Neolithic peoples constructed crude dwellings and began to practice agriculture.

They used polished stone tools, made ceramics, and practiced a

cult of the dead, building many funerary monuments called dol- mens. By the end of the Neolithic period, about 2000 B.C., regions

of cultural differentiation began to appear among the Stone Age

inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula, one of these being the western

Megalithic culture. Present-day Portugal is thus rich in Megalithic

neocropolises, the best known of which are at Palmela, Alcalar,

Reguengos, and Monsaraz.

4
Historical Setting

The Paleolithic and Neolithic periods were followed by the Bronze

Age and the Iron Age (probably between 1500 and 1000 B.C.).

During this time, the Iberian Peninsula was colonized by various

peoples. One of the oldest were the Ligures, about whom little is known. Another were the Iberos, thought to have come from North

Africa. The Iberos were a sedentary people who used a primitive

plow, wheeled carts, had writing, and made offerings to the dead.

Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians

In the twelfth century B.C. , Phoenicians arrived on the west coast of the Iberian Peninsula in search of metals and founded trading

posts at Cadiz, Malaga, and Seville. They traded with the peoples

of the interior, taking out silver, copper, and tin and bringing in eastern trade goods. Between the eighth century and sixth century

B.C., successive waves of Celtic peoples from central Europe in- vaded the western part of the peninsula, where the topography and

climate were well suited to their herding-farming way of life. They

settled there in large numbers and blended in with the indigenous

Iberos, giving rise to a new people known as Celtiberians. Their

settlements were hilltop forts called castros, many vestiges of which

remain in northern Portugal.

Later, during the seventh century B.C., Greeks arrived and

founded several colonies, including Sargunto on the Mediterrane- an coast and Alcacer do Sal on the Atlantic coast. During the fifth century B.C., the Carthaginians replaced the Phoenicians and

closed the Straits of Gibraltar to the Greeks. The Carthaginians

undertook the conquest of the peninsula but were only able to per- manently occupy the territory in the south originally controlled by

their Phoenician and Greek predecessors. The Carthaginian oc- cupation lasted until the defeat of Carthage by the Romans in the

third century B.C.

The Romans made the former Carthaginian territory into a new

province of their expanding empire and conquered and occupied

the entire peninsula. This invasion was resisted by the indigenous

peoples, the stiffest resistance coming from the Lusitanians who

lived in the western part of the peninsula. The Lusitanians were

led by warrior chieftains, the most powerful of whom was Viriato.

Viriato held up the Roman invasion for several decades until he was murdered in his bed by three of his own people who had been

bribed by the Romans. His death brought the Lusitanian resistance

to an end, and Rome relatively quickly conquered and occupied

the entire peninsula. The Portuguese have claimed Viriato as the

country's first great national hero.

5
Portugal: A Country Study

Romanization

After the conquest was completed, the Romans gathered the in- digenous peoples into jurisdictions, each with a Roman center of

administration and justice. Olissipo (present-day Lisbon) served

as the administrative center of Roman Portugal until the founding of Emerita (present-day Merida, Spain) in A.D. 25. By the

beginning of the first century A.D. , Romanization was well underway in southern Portugal. A senate was established at Ebora

(present-day Evora); schools of Greek and Latin were opened; in- dustries such as brick making, tile making, and iron smelting were

developed; military roads and bridges were built to connect administrative centers; and monuments, such as the Temple of Di- ana in Evora, were erected. Gradually, Roman civilization was

extended to northern Portugal, as well. The Lusitanians were forced

out of their hilltop fortifications and settled in bottom lands in Roman towns (citanias).

The citanias were one of the most important institutions imposed on Lusitania during the Roman occupation. It was in the citanias that the Lusitanians acquired Roman civilization: they learned Latin, the lingua franca of the peninsula and the basis of modern Portuguese; they were introduced to Roman administration and

religion; and in the third century, when Rome converted to Christianity, so did the Lusitanians. The Roman occupation left a profound cultural, economic, and administrative imprint on the entire

Iberian Peninsula that remains to the present day.

Germanic Invasions

In 406 the Iberian Peninsula was invaded by Germanic peoples

consisting of Vandals, Swabians, and Alans, anon-Germanic people

of Iranian stock who had attached themselves to the Vandals. Within two years, the invaders had spread to the west coast. The Swabians were primarily herders and were drawn to Galicia because

the climate was similar to what they had left behind. The Vandals

settled to the north of Galicia but soon left with the remnants of

the Alans for the east. After the departure of the Vandals, the

Swabians moved southward and settled among the Luso-Romans,

who put up no resistance and assimilated them easily. The urban

life of the citanias gave way to the Swabian custom of dispersed

houses and smallholdings, a pattern that is reflected today in the

land tenure pattern of northern Portugal. Roman administration

disappeared. The capital of Swabian hegemony was present-day

Braga, but some Swabian kings lived in the Roman city of Cale

(present-day Porto) at the mouth of the Rio Douro. The city was

6
Historical Setting

a customs post between Galicia and Lusitania. Gradually, the city came to be called Portucale, a compound oiportus (port) and Cale.

This name also referred to the vast territory to the immediate north

and south of the banks of the river upstream from the city.

With large parts of the peninsula now outside their control, in 415 the Romans commissioned the Visigoths, the most highly

Romanized of the Germanic peoples, to restore Rome's hegemony.

The Visigoths forced the Vandals to sail for North Africa and defeat- ed the Swabians. The Swabian kings and their Visigothic overlords held commissions to govern in the name of the emperor; their

kingdoms were thus part of the Roman Empire. Latin remained

the language of government and commerce. The Visigoths, who

had been converted to Christianity in the fifth century, decided

to organize themselves into an independent kingdom with their capital at Toledo. The kingdom was based on the principle of absolute monarchy, each sovereign being elected by an assembly of

nobles. Visigothic kings convoked great councils made up of bishops

and nobles to assist in deciding ecclesiastical and civil matters. Visigoths gradually fused with the Swabians and Hispano-Romans

into a single politico-religious entity that lasted until the eighth century, when the Iberian Peninsula fell under Muslim domination.

Muslim Domination

In 7 1 1 Iberia was invaded by a Muslim army commanded by

Tariq ibn Ziyad. The last Visigothic king, Rodrigo, tried to repel

this invasion but was defeated. The Muslims advanced to Cordoba and then to Toledo, the Visigothic capital. The last resistance

of the Visigoths was made at Merida, which fell in June 713 after a long siege. In the spring of 714, a Muslim army commanded

by Musa ibn Nusair marched to Saragossa and then to Leon and

Astorga. Evora, Santarem, and Coimbra fell by 716. Thus, within

five years, the Muslims had conquered and occupied the entire

peninsula. Only a wedge of wet, mountainous territory in the ex- treme northwest called Asturias remained under Christian control. In Lusitania land was divided among Muslim troops. However, bad crops and a dislike for the wet climate put an end to the short-lived Muslim colonization along the Rio Douro. Muslims preferred the dry country below the Tagus River because

it was more familiar, especially the Algarve, an area of presentday Portugal where the Muslim imprint remains the strongest.

The Muslim aristocracy settled in towns and revived urban life; others fanned out across the countryside as small farmers. The

Visigothic peasants readily converted to Islam, having only been

7
Portugal: A Country Study

superficially Christianized. Some Visigothic nobles continued to practice Christianity, but most converted to Islam and were con- firmed by the Muslims as local governors. Jews, who were always an important element in the urban population, continued to exercise a significant role in commerce and scholarship.

Al Andalus, as Islamic Iberia was known, flourished for 250

years, under the Caliphate of Cordoba. Nothing in Europe ap- proached Cordoba's wealth, power, culture, or the brilliance of

its court. The caliphs founded schools and libraries; they cultivated

the sciences, especially mathematics; they introduced arabesque

decoration into local architecture; they explored mines; they developed commerce and industry; and they built irrigation systems,

which transformed many arid areas into orchards and gardens. Fi- nally, the Muslim domination introduced more than 600 Arabic

words into the Portuguese language.

The Golden Age of Muslim domination ended in the eleventh

century when local nobles, who had become rich and powerful,

began to carve up the caliphate into independent regional city-states

(taifas), the most important being the emirates of Badajoz, Merida,

Lisbon, and Evora. These internecine struggles provided an opportunity for small groups of Visigothic Christians, who had taken

refuge in the mountainous northwest of the peninsula, to go on

the offensive against the Muslims, thus beginning the Christian

Reconquest of Iberia.

Christian Reconquest

Although their empire had been defeated by the Muslim onslaught, individual Visigothic nobles resisted, taking refuge in the

mountain stronghold of Asturias. As early as 737, the Visigothic

noble Pelayo took the offensive and defeated the Muslims at Covadonga, for which he was proclaimed king of Asturias, later Leon. Subsequent kings of Asturias-Leon, who claimed succession

from Visigothic monarchs, were able to retake Braga, Porto, Viseu,

and Guimaraes in northern Portugal, where they settled Christians around strongholds. For 200 years, this region was a buffer zone across which the frontier between Christians and Muslims

shifted back and forth with the ebb and flow of attack and counterattack. The creation of Portugal as an independent monarchy is clearly

associated with the organization of the military frontier against

the Muslims in this area. This buffer zone between Christian and

Muslim territory was constantly being reorganized under counts ap- pointed by the kings of Leon. The territory known as Portucalense

3
Historical Setting

was made a province of Leon and placed under the control of

counts, who governed with a substantial degree of autonomy

because the province was separated from Leon by rugged mountains. In 1096 Alfonso VI, king of Leon, gave hereditary title to the

province of Portucalense and Coimbra as dowry to the crusaderknight Henry, brother of the duke of Burgundy, upon his marriage to the king's illegitimate but favorite daughter, Teresa.

Although Henry was to be sovereign in Portucalense, it was recog- nized by all parties that he held this province as a vassal of the

Leonese king. Henry set up his court at Guimaraes near Braga.

He surrounded himself with local barons, appointed them to the

chief provincial offices, and rewarded them with lands. Bound by

the usual ties of vassal to suzerain, Henry was expected to be loyal

to Alfonso and render him service whenever required. Until Alfonso's death in 1109, Henry dutifully carried out his feudal obli- gations by attending royal councils and providing military assistance

in the king's campaigns against the Muslims. Alfonso's death

plunged the kingdom of Leon into a civil war among Aragonese,

Galician, and Castilian barons who desired the crown. Count Henry

carefully stayed neutral during this struggle and gradually stopped

fulfilling his feudal obligations. When he died in 1 1 12, his wife Teresa inherited the county and initially followed her husband's policy

of nonalignment.

The victor in the struggle for the Leonese crown was Alfonso

VII, who, when he ascended the throne, decided to assert his suzer- ainty over Teresa, his aunt, and her consort, a Galician nobleman named Fernando Peres. Teresa refused to do homage and

was forced into submission after a six-week war in 1127. Her barons, who saw their fortunes and independence declining, took this opportunity to align themselves with her son and the heir to the

province, Afonso Henriques, who had armed himself as a knight.

Supported by the barons and lower nobility, Afonso Henriques

rebelled against his mother's rule. On July 24, 1128, he defeated

Teresa's army at Sao Mamede near Guimaraes and expelled her

to Galicia, where she died in exile. Afonso Henriques thus gained

control of the province of Portucalense, or Portugal, as it was known

in the vernacular.

Formation of the Monarchy

Afonso Henriques was a robust, visionary young man of about

twenty years of age when he acquired control of the province of

Portugal. He was anxious to free himself from Leon and establish

9
Portugal: A Country Study

his own kingdom. Consequently, he invaded Galicia and defeated

Fernando Peres and the Galician barons at the Battle of Cerneja.

This action brought a response from Alfonso VII, who had in the

meantime proclaimed himself emperor. He ordered the Galician

barons to make war on Afonso Henriques, who, threatened by Muslims from the south recently reinvigorated by the Almohads from

Morocco, made peace with Alfonso VII in 1137 at Tuy.

Afonso Henriques Becomes King

After the peace of Tuy, Afonso Henriques temporarily turned

his attention to the Muslim threat in the south. In 1 139 he struck

deep into the heart of Al Andalus and defeated a Muslim army

at Ourique, a place in the Alentejo. After this battle, Afonso Henriques began to be referred to in documents as king. In 1140 he

renewed his claim on southern Galicia, which he invaded. This

action again sparked a reaction by Alfonso VII who, in return,

marched on Portugal. The two armies met at Arcos de Valdevez

and engaged in a joust won by the Portuguese knights. Afonso Henriques's self-proclamation as king was finally recognized in 1143

at the Conference of Samora when Alfonso VII recognized him

as such, although, because he was an emperor, Alfonso VII still considered Afonso Henriques his vassal. Territorial Enlargement

Afonso Henriques was a brilliant military commander and during his reign reconquered more Muslim territory than any other

of the Christian kings on the peninsula. He established his capital

at Coimbra, and as early as 1135 he built a castle at Leiria. In 1147 he took advantage of a series of religious rebellions among

the Muslims, and, with the help of a passing fleet of English, Flemish, and German crusaders bound for Palestine, captured Lisbon

after a seventeen-week siege. Continued internecine fighting among

the Muslims, Lisbon's strategic location, and additional help from

passing fleets of crusaders eventually allowed Afonso Henriques

to advance across the Tagus and capture and hold large sections

of the Alentejo. As a result of this vigorous prosecution of the reconquest, the pope officially recognized Afonso Henriques as king of

Portugal in 1 179 and granted him all conquered lands over which

neighboring kings could not prove rights. At his death in 1185,

Afonso Henriques had carved out an officially recognized Christian

kingdom that extended well into Muslim Iberia.

Sancho I (r. 1 185-121 1), Afonso Henriques's son and heir, continued to enlarge the realm. In 1189 he captured the Muslim castle

10
Afonso Henriques, founder and first king of Portugal (r. 1139-85)

Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington

i 1
Portugal: A Country Study

at Alvor, the city of Silves, and the castle at Albufeira. These

territories however, were retaken by the Muslims and had to be

reconquered by his son and heir, Afonso II (r. 121 1-23). With the

help of his brother-in-law, Alfonso VIII of Castile, Afonso retook

territory in the Alentejo, fighting major battles at Navas de Tolosa in 1212 and Alcacer do Sal in 1217. Sancho II (r. 1223-48)

conquered additional territory in the Alentejo and carried the

Reconquest into the Algarve, where Muslim armies were defeated at Tavira and Cacela in 1238. The Reconquest was completed by

Afonso III (r. 1248-79) in 1249 when he attacked and defeated an

isolated enclave of Muslims ensconced at Faro in the Algarve. This

last battle, which extended Portuguese territory to the sea, established the approximate territorial limits Portugal has had ever since

(see fig. 2). Settlement and Cultivation

The rapid advance of Afonso Henriques from Coimbra to Lisbon created a vast, relatively uninhabited tract of land between

north and south. The repopulation of this deserted territory with

Christian settlers began immediately. Afonso Henriques invited

many of the crusaders to remain after the siege of Lisbon and

granted them lands, especially at Atouguia and Lourinha, as payment for their help. In addition, Sancho I directed most of his time

and energy to settling the new monarchy, for which he is known

as The Populator (O Povoador). He sent agents abroad, especially

to Burgundy, the land of his ancestors, to recruit colonists, who

settied at various places, but especially at Vila dos Francos (presentday Azambuja). Such communities spread rapidly throughout the

realm thanks to the protection of the king, who saw in them not

only a way to populate the kingdom but also a way to diminish

the power of the nobility.

The vacant territory between north and south was also filled by

various monastic orders, including the Franciscans, Dominicans,

and Benedictines. The Roman Catholic Church granted charters

to the orders to build monasteries and cultivate the surrounding

land. The most successful of these orders were the Benedictines,

who built a monastery at Alcobaca and planted the surrounding

land in orchards that remain to this day. This monastery grew to over 5,000 monks and occupied a huge territory stretching from

Leiria in the north to Obidos in the south, including the port-town

of Pederneira (present-day Nazare).

In the valley of the Tagus and to the south, settling communities of unarmed colonists was too dangerous; therefore, early

12
Historical Setting

Portuguese kings called upon religious-military orders to fortify,

cultivate, and defend this territory. Founded in the early twelfth

century to wage war against infidels and protect pilgrims, these

religious orders of knights had become powerful in the Holy Land

and in many areas of Europe. Several orders of knight-monks were

given huge tracts of land in the Tagus Valley and the Alentejo as recompense for their military service to the king at a time when

he had no standing army on which to rely. The most successful

of these knight-monks was the Order of the Templars, which was

granted territory on the Rio Zezere, a tributary of the Tagus, where

they built a fortified monastery in Templar fashion at Tomar. The

Templar domain gradually grew to encompass territory from Tomar in the north to Santarem in the south and as far west as the

lands of the Benedictines at Alcobaca. As more territory in the

Alentejo was reconquered, additional orders were granted tracts of land to defend and cultivate. The Order of the Hospitallers was

given land surrounding Crato; the Order of the Calatravans (later

Avis) was established at Evora; and the Order of the Knights of

Saint James was given lands at Palmela.

Political and Social Organization

Afonso Henriques and subsequent Portuguese kings ruled by

divine right until a constitutional monarchy was established in the

early nineteenth century. The early kings were assisted by a royal

council composed of the king's closest advisers and friends from

among the higher nobility and clergy. The royal council was staffed by a number of functionaries, such as the chancellor, who kept the

royal seal and was the highest official in the land; the notary, who

gave advice on legal matters; the scribe, who wrote the king's let- ters and documents (many early kings were illiterate); and the

majordomo, who commanded the king's household guard.

When questions of exceptional importance arose, the king would

convoke the cortes, an expanded royal council that brought together

representatives of the three estates of the realm: nobility, clergy,

and commoners. The first such cortes was called in 1211 at Coimbra in order to legitimate the succession of Afonso II, Afonso Henriques' s grandson, to the throne, as well as to approve certain laws

of the realm. After the Cortes of Leiria, which was convoked in 1254 by Afonso III, representatives of the self-governing settier communities began to attend. Cortes were convoked at the king's will and were limited to advising on issues raised by the king and

presenting petitions and complaints. Resolutions passed by the

cortes did not have the force of law unless they were countersigned

13
Portugal: A Country Study

Figure 2. The Reconquest, 1185-1250

by the king. Later, the cortes came to limit the power of the king

somewhat, but gradually the monarchy became absolute. The cortes was convoked less and less frequently, and in 1697 it stopped being called altogether.

As to territorial administration, northern Portugal was subdivided

into estates {terras), each a quasi-autonomous political and economic

unit of feudal suzerainity governed by a nobleman (donatdrio) whose

title to the land was confirmed by the king. Religious administration

14
Historical Setting

was carried out by the Roman Catholic Church, which divided

the north into bishoprics and parishes. In the south, administration was the responsibility of the military orders: Templars,

Hospitallers, Calatravans, and Knights of Saint James. In the

center, administration fell to the monastic orders: Benedictines,

Franciscans, and Dominicans. The towns and communities of settlers, as well as a certain amount of land around them, were owned

by the king, who was responsible for regulating them.

The settler communities (concelhos) were each recognized by a

royal franchise, which granted local privileges, set taxes, specified

rights of self-government, and controlled the relationship among

the crown, the concelho, and the donatdrio, if the community was

located within a terra. Each concelho governed itself through an

assembly chosen from among its resident "good men" (homens-bons);

that is, freemen not subject to the jurisdiction of the church, the

local donatdrio, or the special statutes governing Muslims and Jews.

Each concelho was administered by a local magistrate, who was as- sisted by several assessors selected from among the homens-bons of

the assembly. The tutelary power of the king was represented by

an official {alcalde) appointed by the king, who was empowered to intervene in local matters on the king's behalf when necessary to ensure justice and good administration. The degree of self- government of these communities gradually declined as the monarchy became increasingly centralized.

During its formative stages, Portugal had three social classes: clergy, nobility, and commoners. By virtue of the religious fervor

of the times, the clergy was the predominant class. It was the most

learned, the wealthiest, and occupied the highest office in the realm:

the chancellorship. The clergy comprised two categories; the bishops

and parish priests of the regular church hierarchy and the abbots

and monks of the religious and military orders. These two categories were divided into the higher clergy (bishops and abbots) and low

clergy (priests and monks). The clergy enjoyed various privileges

and rights, such as judgment in ecclesiastical courts according to canon law, exemption from taxes, and the right to asylum from

civil authorities within their churches.

The next social class, the nobility, owed its privileged position

above all to its collaboration with the king in the reconquest. The

highest level among the nobility was made up of the "rich men"

{homens-ricos) who owned the largest feudal estates, had private

armies, and had jurisdiction over great expanses of territory. Below them were the lesser nobility, who held smaller estates and were

entrusted with the defense of castles and towns but did not have

15
Portugal: A Country Study

private armies or administrative jurisdiction. Below the lesser nobility were the highest class of free commoners, the villein-knights,

who maintained their own horses and weaponry, serving the king

as required. These knights were often encouraged to settle in or near the colonial communities of the frontier where they were granted special privileges and organized raids against the Muslims for their own profit.

The commoners formed the bottom of the social strata. Among

them, the serfs were the lowest group. The most numerous group,

they were bound by heredity to the estates of the crown, nobility,

and clergy, where they were occupied in agriculture, stockraising, and village crafts. Serfs could become free by serving as colonists in the underpopulated territories in the south. The se- cond lowest group consisted of the clients, that is, freemen who

did not own property and received protection from an overlord in

exchange for service. Above the clients were the villein-knights,

who formed a stratum that merged the commoners with the nobility. Finally, outside the basic social structure were the slaves, usually

Muslim captives, who tilled the lands of the military orders in the

Alentejo.

Control of the Royal Patrimony

Disputes over land ownership became an increasing source of

conflict between the crown and the upper nobility and clergy. Land

ownership was important because the crown's main source of revenue was taxes from the great estates and tithes from lands owned

directly by the king. But in medieval Portugal, hereditary title to land did not exist in any developed legal form. As the original grants

of land were obscured by passing years, many of the upper nobility

and clergy of the church came to believe that they held their land

by hereditary right. Thus, each time a new king ascended the

throne, the crown had to review land grants and titles in order to assert its authority and reclaim land removed from the king's

patrimony.

The first king to confront this problem was Afonso II, who dis- covered when he ascended the throne in 1211 that his father, Sancho I, had willed much of the royal patrimony to the church. In

1216, after a lengthy legal battle between the crown and the Holy

See over various provisions of Sancho's will, the pope recognized

Afonso IPs right to maintain the royal patrimony intact. From 1216

until 1221 , the Portuguese crown asserted this general right by re- quiring those who had received donations from previous kings to apply for letters of confirmation. The crown thus created the power

16
Historical Setting

to review grants to nobles and ecclesiastical bodies.

The process of confirmation was carried a step further when the

king appointed royal commissions authorized to investigate land

ownership, especially in the north where much of the feudal land

tenure predated the creation of the monarchy. These inquiries, as they were called, gathered evidence from the oldest, most ex- perienced residents in each locale without consulting local nobles

or church officials. They revealed a large number of abuses and

improper extensions of boundaries, as well as conspiracies to defraud

the crown of income. The first inquiry found that the church was

the biggest expropriator of royal property. The archbishop of Braga,

angered by the activities of the commissions, excommunicated Afonso II in 1219. The king responded by seizing church property and

forcing the archbishop to flee Portugal for Rome. In 1220 the pope

confirmed the king's excommunication and relieved him of his oath

of fealty to the Holy See. This dispute between church and crown

ended temporarily when the excommunicated king died in 1223

and his chancellor arranged an ecclesiastical burial in exchange for the return of the seized church property and the promise that fu- ture inquiries would respect canon law.

The conflict between the church and crown concerning property was finally resolved during the reign of King Dinis (r. 1279-1325).

In 1284 Dinis launched a new round of inquiries and in the fol- lowing year promulgated deamortization laws, which prohibited

the church and religious orders from buying property and required

that they sell all property purchased since the beginning of his reign.

For this action against the church, Dinis, like his father and grandfather, was excommunicated. This time, however, the king refused

to pledge obedience to the pope and established once and for all the power of the Portuguese crown to regulate and control the royal

patrimony.

This power allowed Dinis to nationalize the most powerful and

wealthy of the military-religious orders. The Calatravans, founded in Castile, had in effect become Portuguese when the town of

Avis was bestowed upon them by Afonso and they became known

as the Order of Avis. In 1288 the Knights of Saint James, also of

Castilian origin, became Portuguese when the order elected its own

master. In 1312, as the result of an investigation into the activities of the Templars, Pope Clement V suppressed this order and trans- ferred their vast properties in Portugal to the Hospitallers. Dinis was able to prevail upon the pope to give this wealth to a newly

founded Portuguese military- religious order called the Order of

Christ, which was initially situated at Castro Marim but was later

17
Portugal: A Country Study

moved to Tomar. After nationalization, most of these orders be- came chivalric bodies of quasi-celibate landowners. The Order of

Avis, however, remained on a war footing and contributed significantly to Portugal's independence from Castile. The Order of

Christ also remained a military-religious order, and its wealth was

later used by Prince Henry the Navigator to pay for the voyages

of discovery.

Development of the Realm

Having established the boundaries of the national territory, as- serted their authority over the church and nobility, and gained control over the resources of the military orders, Portuguese kings began

to turn their attention to the economic, cultural, and political development of the realm. This was especially true of King Dinis,

who is referred to by the Portuguese as The Farmer (O Lavrador)

because of his policies designed to encourage agricultural development. He decreed that nobles would not lose their standing if they

drained wetlands, settled colonists, and planted pine forests. The

pine forests were to produce timber for the shipbuilding industry,

which Dinis also encouraged, the crown having already at that time

begun to look toward the sea for future fields of conquest.

Dinis chartered many settlements of colonists on lands conquered

from the Muslims and authorized the holding of fairs and markets

in each of these, thereby creating a national economy. He laid the

basis for Portugal's naval tradition by bringing the Genoese, Emmanuele Pessagno (Manuel Pecanha in Portuguese) to Portugal

in 1317 to be the hereditary admiral of the Portuguese navy. Maritime commerce was encouraged when Dinis negotiated an agreement with Edward II of England in 1 303 that permitted Portuguese

ships to enter English ports and guaranteed security and trading

privileges for Portuguese merchants. Dinis provided the impetus

for the development of Portuguese as a national language when

he decreed that all official documents of the realm were to be writ- ten in the vernacular. Finally, Dinis stimulated learning when, in

1290, he founded an academic center similar to the "General

Studies" centers that had been created in Leon and Aragon. In

1308 this center was moved to Coimbra where it remained, ex- cept for a brief time between from 1521 to 1537, and became the

University of Coimbra, Portugal's premier institution of higher

learning.

Afonso IV (r. 1325-57) continued his father's development policies. He also improved the administration ofjustice by dismissing

corrupt local judges and replacing them with judges he appointed.

When a large Muslim army landed on the peninsula in 1340,

18
Historical Setting

Afonso IV allied himself with the king of Castile, Alfonso XI, and

the king of Aragon in order to do battle against this threat to the

Christian kingdoms. Afonso sent a fleet commanded by Manuel

Pecanha to Cadiz and marched overland himself to meet the Muslim army, which was destroyed at the Battie of Salado.

When Afonso's grandson and heir, Fernando I (r. 1367-83),

ascended the throne, the economic productivity of the country had

been so greatly disrupted by a plague that had ravaged the country in 1348 and 1349 that he found it necessary to take measures

to stimulate food production. In 1375 he promulgated a decree,

called the Law of the Sesmarias, which obliged all landowners to cultivate unused land or sell or rent it to someone who would. The

law also obligated all who had no useful occupation to work the

land. This decree had its intended effect and led to the rebuilding

of the country's wealth. Fernando also stimulated the development

of the Portuguese merchant fleet by allowing all shipbuilders who

constructed ships of more than 100 tons to cut timber from the royal

forests and by exempting the owners of these ships from the full tax on the exports and imports of their first voyage. He also established a maritime insurance company into which owners of merchant ships of more than fifty tons paid 2 percent of their profits

and from which they received compensation for shipwrecks.

The House of Avis

When Fernando died in 1383, he left no male heir to the throne.

His only daughter, Beatriz, was married to Juan I, king of Castile.

The marriage writ stipulated that their offspring would inherit the

Portuguese crown if Fernando left no male heir and that, until any

children were born, Portugal would be ruled by a regency of Fer- nando 's widow, Leonor Teles. When Fernando died, Leonor as- sumed the regency in accordance with the marriage writ. The

assumption of the regency by the queen was badly received in many

Portuguese cities because Leonor was a Castilian and considered an interloper who intended to usurp the Portuguese crown for Castile and end Portugal's independence. Leonor's principal rival for control of the throne was Joao, the master of the Order of Avis

and illegitimate son of Fernando's father, Pedro I (r. 1357-67). On

December 6, 1383, Joao broke into the royal palace and murdered

Count Andeiro, a Galician who had been Fernando's chancellor.

Leonor Teles fled to the town of Alenquer, the property of the

queens of Portugal. She appealed to Juan I for help, and he in- vaded Portugal in January 1384. Leonor abdicated as regent. In

Lisbon the people proclaimed Joao governor and defender of the

19
Portugal: A Country Study

realm. Joao immediately began to prepare an army and sent a mission to England to recruit soldiers for his cause. Wars with Castile

The bourgeoisie of Lisbon, enriched by commerce, decided to support Joao and donated substantial sums for war expenses.

Money also arrived from the bourgeoisie in Porto, Coimbra, and

Evora. The majority of the nobility, among whom national senti- ment was not well developed and feudal customs based on oaths

of vassalage were still obeyed, took the side ofJuan of Castile, which

gave him the support of fifty castles. A few nobles, however, in- cluding Alvaro Pais, Joao Afonso, and Nun'Alvares Pereira, were more attuned to national sentiment and sided with Joao.

In March 1384, Juan marched on Lisbon, which he besieged

by land and sea. In April, in the Alentejo, Nun'Alvares Pereira

defeated the Castilians at the Battle of Atoleiros, a victory that result- ed from the new military tactic of forming defensive squares from

dismounted cavalry because the Portuguese had far fewer troops

than the enemy. The siege of Lisbon was broken after seven months

by an outbreak of the plague in the Castilian camp, and Juan

retreated to Seville to prepare another invasion the following year. The retreat of the Castilians gave Joao an opportunity to legitimate his claim to the throne. In March 1385, a cortes was sum- moned to resolve the succession. Joao's case was argued by Joao

das Regras, who attacked the claims of the various pretenders to the throne. On April 6, the opposition ended and Joao was

proclaimed king as Joao I (r. 1385-1433). The new king named

Nun'Alvares Pereira constable of Portugal. At the same time, a contingent of English longbowmen began to arrive. Nun'Alvares

Pereira marched north in order to obtain the submission of Braga, Guimaraes, and other places loyal to Juan, who responded by

sending an army to attack Viseu. The Portuguese routed this Castilian force at Rancoso using the same new military tactic that

had brought them victory at Atoleiros. Juan, nonetheless, was still intent on besieging Lisbon and led his army southward. Joao I and

Nun'Alvares Pereira decided to engage Juan's army before it ar- rived in the capital. The two armies met on the plain of Aljubarrota about sixty kilometers north of Lisbon on August 14, 1385.

Using the same tactic of defensive squares of dismounted cavalry

that had brought them success in previous battles, a force of 7,000

Portuguese annihilated and scattered a Castilian army of 32,000

in little more than thirty minutes of combat. Although additional

battles were fought and final peace was not made with Castile

20
Historical Setting

until October 1411, the Battle of Aljubarrota secured the independence of Portugal for almost two centuries.

Anglo-Portuguese Alliance

English aid to the House of Avis set the stage for the cooperation with England that would be the cornerstone of Portuguese for- eign policy for more than 500 years. In May 1386, the Treaty of

Windsor confirmed the alliance that was born at Aljubarrota with

a pact of perpetual friendship between the two countries. The next

year, John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, son of Edward III, and

father of Henry IV, landed in Galicia with an expeditionary force

to press his claim to the Castilian throne with Portuguese aid. He

failed to win the support of the Castilian nobility and returned to England with a cash compensation from the rival claimant.

John of Gaunt left behind his daughter, Philippa of Lancaster,

to marry Joao I in order to seal the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. By

this marriage, celebrated in 1387, Joao became the father of a gener- ation of princes called by poet Luis de Camoes the "marvelous

generation," who led Portugal into its golden age. Philippa brought

to the court the Anglo-Norman tradition of an aristocratic education and gave her children good educations. Her personal qualities were of the highest, and she reformed the court and imposed

rigid standards of moral behavior. Philippa provided royal patronage for English commercial interests that sought to meet the Portuguese desire for cod and cloth in return for wine, cork, salt, and

oil shipped through the English warehouses at Porto. Philippa'

sons were accomplished. Her eldest son, Duarte, authored moral

works and became king in 1433; Pedro, who traveled widely

and had an interest in history, became regent when Duarte died

of the plague in 1438; Fernando, who became a crusader, participated in the attack on Tangiers in 1437; and Henrique—Prince

Henry the Navigator—became the master of the Order of Avis and

the instigator and organizer of the early voyages of discovery.

Social Revolution

The crisis of 1383-85 that brought Joao I to the throne was not

only a dynastic revolution but also a social one. Joao I distrusted

the old aristocracy that had opposed his rise to power and promoted the growth of a new generation of nobility by confiscating the

titles and properties of the old and distributing them to the new. He thus formed a new nobility based on service to the king.

Joao rewarded members of the urban bourgeoisie that had supported his cause by giving them positions and influence and by

allowing them to send representatives to the king's royal council.

21
Portugal: A Country Study

Artisans grouped themselves according to professions into guilds

and were permitted to send delegates to the governing chamber

of Lisbon, where they were actively involved in the administration of the capital and other cities. The king also surrounded himself with skilled legalists who professionalized royal administration

and extended royal jurisdiction at the expense of the old aristocracy.

This new class of bureaucrats, having studied Roman law at the

university, defended the Caesarist principle that the will of the king

had the force of law. This belief encouraged the later development

of absolutism in Portugal and pitted the king against the landed

nobility, especially the old aristocracy that wished to regain its lost power and privilege.

Intradynastic Struggle

The future of the House of Avis seemed assured by the presence

of Joao' s five legitimate sons, but the king also provided for his

illegitimate children as he had been provided for by his father. Joao

conferred on his bastard son Afonso the hereditary title of duke

of Braganca and endowed him with lands and properties that

amounted to the creation of a state within a state supported by a huge reserve of armed retainers. The House of Braganca accumulated wealth to rival that of the crown and eventually assumed the

leadership of the old aristocracy in opposition to Avis.

When Joao I died in 1433, the crown was assumed by his eldest son, Duarte, who died five years later of the plague. Before his

death, Duarte convoked a cortes in order to legitimate the compilation of Portuguese royal law, but the work was not completed

until the reign of his son, Afonso, and is, therefore, named the

Afonsine Ordinances. He also declared that the grants of land so lavishly awarded by his father to his supporters would have to be

confirmed, as was the custom at the start of each reign.

Afonso was six years old when his father died and his mother,

Queen Leonor of Aragon, assumed the regency. There was opposition to the assumption of all authority by a woman, and Leonor

agreed that Duarte 's brother, Pedro, should become regent. This was opposed by Afonso, duke of Braganca, the eldest illegitimate son of Joao I. Both men aspired to gain influence over the young

king by marrying him to their daughters. The populace of Lisbon

strongly favored Pedro and acknowledged him as regent. Pedro

received confirmation for his regency by summoning the cortes at Evora and paved the way for his continuance in power by arranging the marriage of his daughter Isabel to the young king, who,

when he reached his majority in 1446, agreed to the match and

asked his uncle to continue the regency.

22
Historical Setting

The duke of Braganca reasserted his ambitions and was able to influence the young king to dismiss Pedro by convincing him that

his uncle was plotting to seize the throne. Pedro was banished to

his estates. When rumors of a plot against him surfaced, he decided

to resist and marched on Lisbon, where he had the support of the

populace. Pedro was met by the troops of the king and the duke

of Braganca at the Battle of Alfarrobeira on May 24, 1449, where

he was killed and his army defeated. This battle resulted in the

enlargement of the property and wealth of the illegitimate line of

the House of Avis, which allowed it to enjoy enormous influence over the pliable Afonso V until his death in 1481.

Assertion of Royal Supremacy

When Afonso 's son and heir, Joao II (r. 1481-95), assumed the

throne, the power of the Bragancas and their supporters had reached

its height. The new king, who was more resolute than his father,

convoked a cortes at Evora, where he imposed a new written oath

by which nobles swore upon their knees to give up to the king any

castle or town they held from the crown. At Evora commoners

complained about the abuses of the nobility and asked for the abolition of private justice and the correction of abuses in the collec- tion of taxes. The king ordered that all nobles present their titles of privilege and that his constables be admitted to their estates in order to investigate complaints concerning administration.

These measures provoked a reaction by the nobility led by the

powerful Fernando, duke of Braganca, who conspired against the

king with the help of the king of Castile. Upon learning of the in- trigues of Fernando, the king accused the duke of treason and tried

him at a special court in Evora. He was sentenced to death and

beheaded in the main square on June 29, 1484. The king confiscated his properties and those of his accomplices, some of whom

were also killed, while others fled Portugal. A second conspiracy was hatched by the duke of Viseu, but it, too, was discovered, and

the duke was killed, perhaps by the king himself, in Setubal. These

events established the supremacy of the crown over the nobility once and for all. Maritime Expansion

The maritime expansion of Portugal was the result of the threat

to Mediterranean commerce, especially the trade in spices, that

had developed very rapidly after the crusades. Spices traveled by

various overland routes from Asia to the Levant, where they were

loaded aboard Genoese and Venetian ships and brought to Europe. Gradually, this trade became threatened by pirates and the

23
Portugal: A Country Study

Turks, who closed off most of the overland routes and subjected

the spices to heavy taxes. Europeans sought alternative routes to Asia in order to circumvent these difficulties. The Portuguese led the way in this quest for a number of rea- sons. First, Portugal's location on the southwesternmost edge of

the European landmass placed the country at the maritime cross- roads between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Second, Portugal was by the fifteenth century a compact, unified kingdom led

by an energetic, military aristocracy, which, having no more ter- ritory on the peninsula to conquer, sought new fields of action overseas. Third, Portuguese kings were motivated by a deeply held belief that their role in history was as the standard-bearers of Christianity against the Muslims. Fourth, Portugal's kings had, since the

founding of the monarchy, encouraged maritime activities. Dinis

founded the Portuguese navy, and Fernando encouraged the construction of larger ships and founded a system of maritime insur- ance. Finally, Portugal led the world in nautical science, having

perfected the astrolabe and quadrant and developed the lantinerigged caravel, all of which made navigating and sailing the high

seas possible.

Early Voyages

Portugal's maritime expansion began in 1415 when Joao I seized

Ceuta in Morocco, the western depot for the spice trade. The mili- tary campaign against Ceuta was launched for several reasons. First, war in Morocco was seen as a new crusade against the Muslims

that would stand Portugal well with the church. Second, there was

a need to suppress Moroccan pirates who were threatening Portuguese ships. Third, the Portuguese wanted the economic benefit

that controlling Ceuta' s vast market would bring to the crown. Fi- nally, the campaign against Ceuta was seen as preparatory to an

attack on Muslims still holding Granada. The possession of Ceuta

allowed the Portuguese to dominate the Straits of Gibraltar.

After the conquest of Ceuta, Prince Henry the Navigator, who

had participated in the campaign as an armed knight, settled at Sagres on the extreme end of Cape St. Vincent, where in 1418

he founded a naval school. He continued to direct Portugal's early maritime activity. As the master of the Order of Christ, Prince

Henry was able to draw on the vast resources of this group to equip

ships and pay the expenses of the early maritime expeditions. Prince

Henry was motivated by scientific curiosity and religious fervor,

seeing the voyages as a continuation of the crusades against the

Muslims and the conversion of new peoples to Christianity, as well

as by the desire to open a sea route to India.

24
Monument to the ~

'

Discoveries, Lisbon \

Courtesy Embassy of

Portugal, Washington

Shortly after the school was established, two of Prince Henry's

captains discovered the island of Porto Santo, and the following

year the Madeira Islands were discovered. In 1427 Diogo de Silves,

sailing west, discovered the Azores archipelago, also uninhabited.

Both Madeira and Porto Santo were colonized immediately and

divided into captaincies. These were distributed to Prince Henry's captains, who in turn had the power to distribute land to set- tlers according to the Law of the Sesmarias.

Prince Henry's plan required the circumnavigation of Africa.

His early voyages stayed close to the African coast. After repeated

attempts, Gil Eanes finally rounded Cape Bojador on the west coast of Africa in present-day Western Sahara in 1434, a psychological,

as well as physical, barrier that was thought to be the outer boundary

of the knowable world. After passing Cape Bojador, the exploration of the coast southward proceeded very rapidly. In 1436 Gil

Eanes and Afonso Baldaia arrived at the Senegal River, which they

called the River of Gold because two Africans they had captured were ransomed with gold dust. In 1443 Nuno Tristao arrived at the Bay of Arguin off the coast of present-day Mauritania. These

voyages returned African slaves to Portugal, which sparked an in- terest in the commercial value of the explorations, and a factory was established at Arguin as an entrepot for human cargo. In 1444

Dinis Dias discovered the Cape Verde Islands, then heavily forested,

and Nuno Tristao explored the mouth of the Senegal River. In

25
Portugal: A Country Study

1445 Cape Verde was rounded, and in 1456 Portuguese arrived

at the coast of present-day Guinea. The following year, they reached

present-day Sierra Leone. Thus, when Prince Henry died in 1460,

the Portuguese had explored the coast of Africa down to Sierra

Leone and discovered the archipelagoes of Madeira, the Azores,

and the Cape Verde Islands.

Sea Route to India

After the death of Prince Henry, the Portuguese continued to explore the coast of Africa, but without their earlier singleness of

purpose. A dispute had arisen among the military aristocracy over whether Portugal could best achieve its strategic objectives by con- quering Morocco or by seeking a sea route to India. Duarte had

continued his father's Moroccan policy and undertook a military

campaign against Tangiers but was unsuccessful. Afonso V ordered

several expeditionary forces to Morocco. In 1458 he conquered Alcazarquivir; in 1471 he took Arzila, followed by Tangiers and

Larache. Afonso 's successors continued this policy of expansion

in Morocco, especially Manuel I (r. 1495-1521), who conquered

Safim and Azamor. The Moroccan empire was expensive because

it kept Portugal in a constant state of war; therefore, it was abandoned by Joao III (r. 1521-57), except for Ceuta and Tangiers.

In 1 469 Afonso V granted to Fernao Gomes a monopoly of trade

with Guinea for five years if he agreed to explore 100 leagues (about

500 kilometers) of coast each year. A number of expeditions were

carried out under this contract. In 1471 Portuguese sailors reached

Mina de Ouro on the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) and ex- plored Cape St. Catherine, two degrees south of the equator. Mina

de Ouro became the chief center for the gold trade and a major

source of revenue for the crown. The islands of Sao Tome and Principe were also discovered in 1471, and Fernao do P6 discovered

the island that now bears his name in 1474.

During the reign of Joao II, the crown once again took an active role in the search for a sea route to India. In 1481 the king

ordered a fort constructed at Mina de Ouro to protect this potential source of wealth. Diogo Cao sailed farther down the African

coast in the period 1482-84. In 1487 a new expedition led by Bartolomeu Dias sailed south beyond the tip of Africa and, after having lost sight of land for a month, turned north and made landfall on a northeast-running coastline, which was named Terra dos Vaqueiros after the native herders and cows that were seen on shore.

Dias had rounded the Cape of Good Hope without seeing it and

had proven that the Atlantic connected to the Indian Ocean.

26
Arches of the Royal Cloister at the Monastery ofSanta Maria da Vitdria, Batalha

Courtesy Daniele Kohler

Monastery of Santa Maria da Vitdria, Batalha

Courtesy Walter Opello

27
Portugal: A Country Study

In the meantime, Joao sent Pero da Covilha and Afonso de Paiva,

who were versed in warfare, diplomacy, and Arabic, on a mission

in search of the mythical Christian kingdom of Prester John.

Departing from Santarem, they traveled to Barcelona, Naples, and

the island of Rhodes, and, disguised as merchants, entered Alexandria. Passing through Cairo, they made their way to Aden, where

they separated and agreed to meet later in Cairo at a certain date.

Afonso de Paiva went to Ethiopia, and Pero da Covilha headed

for Calicut and Goa in India by way of Ormuz, returning to Cairo

via Sofala in Mozambique on the east coast of Africa. In Cairo

he learned from two emissaries sent by Joao II that Afonso de Paiva

had died. One of the emissaries returned to Portugal with a letter containing the information Pero da Covilha had collected on his

travels. Da Covilha then left for Ethiopia where he was received

by the emperor but not allowed to leave. He settled in Ethiopia,

married, and raised a family. The information provided in his letter complemented the information from the expedition of Bartolomeu

Dias and convinced Joao II that it was possible to reach India by

sailing around the southern end of Africa. He died during preparations for this voyage in 1494.

Manuel I assumed the throne in 1495 and completed the preparations for the voyage to India. On July 8, 1497, a fleet of four

ships commanded by Vasco da Gama set sail from Belem on the

outskirts of Lisbon. The expedition was very carefully organized,

each ship having the best captains and pilots, as well as handpicked

crews. They carried the most up-to-date nautical charts and navigational instruments. Vasco da Gama's fleet rounded the Cape of

Good Hope on November 27, 1497, and made landfall at Natal

in present-day South Africa on December 25. The fleet then

proceeded along the east coast of Africa and landed at Quelimane

in present-day Mozambique in January 1498, followed by Mombasa in present-day Kenya. An Arab pilot directed the fleet to India. After sailing for a month, the fleet reached Calicut on the

Malabar coast in southwest India. In August, after sailing to Goa,

the fleet left for Portugal, arriving in September 1499, two years

and two days after the departure. In 1500 Manuel organized a large fleet of thirteen ships for a second voyage to India. This fleet was commanded by Pedro Alvares Cabral and included Bartolomeu Dias, various nobles, priests,

and some 1,200 men. The fleet sailed southwest for a month,

and on April 22 sighted land, the coast of present-day Brazil. Cabral

sent a ship back to Lisbon to report to Manuel his discovery, which

he called Vera Cruz. The fleet recrossed the Atlantic and sailed

to India around Africa where it arrived on September 13, 1500.

28

30
Historical Setting

After four months in India, Cabral sailed for Lisbon in January

1501 , having left a contingent of Portuguese to maintain a factory

at Cochin on the Malabar coast (see fig. 3). Empire in Asia

Having discovered the sea route to India, Manuel organized suc- cessive fleets to that region in order to establish Portuguese commercial hegemony. In 1505 Francisco de Almeida left Lisbon with

a fleet of 22 ships and 2,500 men, 1,500 of whom were soldiers. Invested with the title of viceroy of India, Almeida was instructed

to conclude alliances with Indian rulers, set up factories, and build

forts on the east coast of Africa, which he did at Mombasa and

at Kilwa in present-day Tanzania before arriving in India. After

his arrival, he fortified the island of Angediva and Cochin. He imposed a system of licenses on trading vessels that threatened to ruin

the Muslim traders, who reacted by seeking spices in Malacca in

present-day Malaysia and the Sunda Islands in the Malay Archipelago and sailing directly to the Persian Gulf, bypassing India.

Almeida sought to suppress this trade and secure Portuguese commercial hegemony. He was joined in this effort by two more fleets sent from Lisbon, one under the command of Tristao da Cunha

and the other under Afonso de Albuquerque, who had been appointed Almeida's successor as viceroy. Cunha explored Madagascar and the coast of east Africa, occupied the island of Socotra (now

part of Yemen), and built a fort at the mouth of the Red Sea, before sailing to India. Albuquerque ravaged the Oman coast and

attacked Ormuz, the great entrepot at the mouth of the Persian

Gulf, where he began constructing a fort. The activities of the Portuguese motivated the Muslims to take

military action. The sultan of Egypt, allied with the Venetians and

Turks, organized a large armada that crossed the Indian Ocean

to Diu, where it was engaged by a Portuguese fleet. On February

2, 1509, a great sea battle was fought and the sultan's armada destroyed. This victory assured Portuguese commercial and military

hegemony over India and allowed Portugal to extend its empire

to the Far East. Albuquerque established his capital at Goa, which he attacked

and occupied in 1510. In 1511 he departed for the conquest of

Malacca, the emporium for the spice trade and trade with China,

which he accomplished in August of that year. After returning to Goa, Albuquerque made plans to occupy strategic positions in the

Persian Gulf and Red Sea. On his first expedition, he failed to take

Aden and returned to Goa. His second expedition, which was to be his last, attempted to conquer Ormuz and Aden, as well as seize

31


Portugal: A Country Study

Mecca. During this expedition, Albuquerque fell ill and returned

to Goa, where he died in 1515.

When Manuel I died in 1521, his son and heir, Joao III, sent expeditions to the islands of Celebes, Borneo, Java, and Timor,

all part of the Malay Archipelago. Relations were established with

Japan after the visits of Francisco Xavier and Fernao Mendes Pinto

in 1549. Portuguese captains founded factories in China and took

possession of Macau in 1557.

Colonization of Brazil

The growth of Portuguese interests in the Americas was slow,

the king being absorbed with establishing Portuguese hegemony

in Asia. In addition, the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, arranged

by Pope Alexander VI, divided the unexplored world between Spain

and Portugal and forbade Portugal from exploring beyond a meridian drawn 1 ,600 kilometers miles west of the Cape Verde Islands.

In 1502 Fernao Noronha was given a three-year commercial monopoly on dyewood in return for exploring 300 leagues (about 1 ,500

kilometers) of the Brazilian coast each year. During the last years

of Manuel Fs reign, the first colonists were sent to Brazil to establish a sugar industry. Additional colonists were sent during the reign

of Joao III, and, in 1530, Martim Afonso de Sousa was named

major captain of Brazil and invested with the power to distribute

land among captains or donatdrios, much as had been done in

Madeira when it was colonized a century before. These captaincies were large strips of land that extended from the coast into the

interior. The captains settled colonists in their respective captaincies and were required to provide them protection and justice.

Because captaincies were independent of one another and hence

weak, they were unable to defend themselves from foreign pirates.

Consequently, Joao III appointed a governor general with authority over the captaincies. The first governor general, Tome de Sousa, was appointed in 1549 and established his capital at Sao Salvador

da Baia. He defeated French pirates in a naval engagement in the

bay of Rio de Janeiro. Intensified colonization under de Sousa began in the form of coastal settlements and spread to the interior. The colonists cultivated indigenous crops, especially manioc, and

introduced new ones such as wheat, rice, grapes, oranges, and

sugarcane from Madeira and Sao Tome. Sugar soon became

Brazil's most important export.

Counter-Reformation and Overseas Evangelization

The eruption of the Protestant Reformation in the first decades

of the sixteenth century brought forth a Roman Catholic response,

32
Historical Setting

the Counter-Reformation, a determined campaign to strengthen

the Roman Catholic Church and restore religious unity to Europe.

One of Rome's key instruments to purify doctrine and root out

heresy was the Inquisition. The Counter-Reformation soon reached

Portugal, and Joao III was granted permission to establish the Court

of Inquisition in 1536. The court did not began its work until 1539

when the first inquisitor general was replaced by a religious zealot,

the archbishop of Evora, who stood for public confession and immediate execution. As elsewhere, the Inquisition in Portugal dealt

with all forms of heresy, corruption, and disbelief, but its main

victims were the so-called New Christians, Jews who had convert- ed to Christianity after Manuel I had ordered in 1497 the expulsion from Portugal of all Jews who refused to accept the Christian

faith. Many Portuguese believed that the New Christians secretly

practiced Judaism at home, and the Inquisition was used to stop

such an "abomination." Courts of the Inquisition functioned in

larger settlements around Portugal. The first auto-da-fe, or public burning of a heretic, took place in 1540 in Lisbon. In the next

150 years, an estimated 1,400 people perished in this manner in

Portugal.

Another of Rome's strongest weapons in the Counter-Reformation was the Society ofJesus, a religious order founded by Ignatius

de Loyola in 1539. The order was dedicated to furthering the cause

of Catholicism and propagating its teachings in missions among

nonbelievers. In 1540 three of Loyola's followers—Simao Rodrigues, who was Portuguese; Paulo Camerte, who was Italian; and

Francisco Xavier, who was Spanish—arrived in Portugal. Simao

Rodrigues became the tutor of the king's son and later founded

Jesuit schools at Coimbra and Evora. By 1555 the Jesuits had control of all secondary education in the realm and by 1558 had es- tablished a university in Evora.

Joao III invited the Jesuits to carry out their apostolic mission

in the lands of Portugal's overseas empire. Francisco Xavier left Portugal in 1541 for India as a result of the king's request. He ar- rived in Goa in 1 542 and immediately began proselytizing among

the indigenous inhabitants, converting many thousands. From Goa

he went to Cochin and Ceylon; in 1545 he traveled to Malacca,

and in 1549, to Japan, where he stayed for two years. After return- ing to Goa, in 1552 he went to China, where he died.

Evangelization began in Brazil in 1549 with the arrival of six Jesuits led by Father Manuel de Nobrega, who accompanied Tome

de Sousa, the first governor general. They built a church at Sao

Salvador da Bafa, as well as schools at Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.

They also evangelized northern and southern Brazil. In the south,

33
Portugal: A Country Study

Father Jose Anchieta opened a school for Indians and authored

the first grammar in a native language, Tupf-Guarani. The Jesuits

built churches, schools, and seminaries. They settled the indigenous

inhabitants in villages and defended them against attempts to enslave them.

Imperial Decline

Portugal's empire in Asia made its monarchy the richest in Europe and made Lisbon the commercial capital of the world. This

prosperity was more apparent than real, however, because the newfound wealth did not transform the social structure, nor was it used

to lay the basis for further economic development. The country's

industry was weakened because the profits from Asian monopolies were used to import manufactured goods. As the empire in

Asia was a state-run enterprise, no middle class or commercial sector independent of the crown of any consequence emerged as it had

in other parts of Europe. Moreover, the persecution of the Jews,

who possessed vital technical skills, robbed the country of an important force for modernity and reinforced feudal elements. Adding to the drain on the economy was the large amount of money

spent on sumptuous palaces and churches.

Because the wealth from the discoveries did not produce a middle class of competent, trained individuals to whom the affairs of

state gradually fell, leadership in Portugal remained in the hands

of the king and the military aristocracy. Moreover, the imperial

system had intensified the already centralized system of government, which meant that the quality of national policy was closely

tied to the abilities of the top leadership, especially the king himself. Unfortunately, the House of Avis did not produce a king of

great merit after Joao II, and Portugal entered a long period of

imperial decline.

Dynastic Crisis

WhenJoao III died in 1557, the only surviving heir to the throne was his three-year-old son, Sebastiao, who took over the government at the age of fourteen. Sickly and poorly educated, Sebastiao

proved to be mentally unstable, and as he grew to young manhood he developed a fanatical obsession with launching a great cru- sade against the Muslims in North Africa, thus reviving the

Moroccan policy of Afonso V. In 1578, when he was twenty-four

years old, Sebastiao organized an army of 24,000 and assembled

a large fleet that left Portugal on August 4 for Alcazarquivir.

Sebastiao 's army, poorly equipped and incompetently led, was

defeated, and the king, presumed killed in battle, was never seen

34
Historical Setting

again. A large number of the nobility were captured and held for ransom. This defeat, the most disastrous in Portuguese military

history, swept away the flower of the aristocratic leadership and

drained the coffers of the treasury in order to pay ransoms. Worse,

it resulted in the death of a king who had no descendants, plunging Portugal into a period of confusion and intrigue over the succession.

With Sebastiao 's death, the crown fell to his uncle, Henrique,

the last surviving son of Manuel I. Henrique's crowning solved

the succession crisis only temporarily because Henrique was an in- firm and aged cardinal who was unable to obtain dispensation from

the pope to marry. There were several pretenders to the throne, one of whom was Philip II of Spain, nephew of Joao III. When Henrique died in 1580, a powerful Spanish army com- manded by the duke of Alba invaded Portugal and marched on

Lisbon. This force routed the army of rival contender, Antonio,

prior of Crato and the illegitimate son ofJoao Ill's son Luis. Portugal was annexed by Spain, and Philip II was declared Filipe I of Portugal.

Iberian Union

After Philip was declared king of Portugal, he decreed that his

new realm would be governed by a six-member Portuguese council; that the Portuguese cortes would meet only in Portugal; that

all civil, military, and ecclesiastical appointments would remain

Portuguese; and that the language, judicial system, coinage, and

military would remain autonomous. Philip supported the two in- stitutions in Portugal that he believed might unite the two countries: the Jesuits and the Inquisition. One result was that New

Christians were persecuted even more severely.

The incorporation of Portugal into the Iberian Union was ac- cepted by the Portuguese nobility without much difficulty. The royal court had used the language and etiquette of Castile since the

fifteenth century, and much serious work had been done in Castile

by Portuguese writers, who were conscious of belonging to a com- mon Iberian culture. In the countryside, however, there developed

a current of resistance that took the form of a messianic cult of the

"hidden prince," Sebastiao. Members of this cult believed that

Sebastiao did not actually die at Alcazarquivir but would return

to deliver Portugal from Spanish domination. This cult became

deeply rooted, and over the years a number of impostors appeared

and sparked rebellions, all of which were easily put down. To this day, Sebastianism (Sebastianismo), or the nostalgic longing for the

unattainable, is a continuing feature of Portuguese life.

35
Portugal: A Country Study

During the reign of Philip II, the terms of the proclamation of

the union of the two crowns were generally upheld. With Philip's

death in 1598 and the ascension to the Spanish throne of his son, Philip III, much less respect began to be paid to the provision that

preserved Portugal's autonomy. Philip III did not visit Portugal

until 1619, very near the end of his reign, and he began to appoint

Spaniards to the six-member governing council as well as to lesser posts. His son and heir, Philip IV, had no interest in government

and consequently turned over the administration of Portugal to the

duke of Olivares. The duke alienated Portuguese of all classes, in- cluding the hispanophile elite. In order to prop up the waning power

of the Spanish monarchy, he levied excessive taxes and troop requisitions on Portugal to support Spanish military activities, especially against France. Moreover, he sought to unify Portugal with

Spain. In 1637 a rebellion broke out in Evora when the Spanish attempted to collect these taxes by force. Portuguese nobles were summoned

to Madrid and ordered to recruit soldiers for war against France.

The Portuguese nobility, encouraged by Cardinal Richelieu of

France, who promised to support a Portuguese pretender with soldiers and ships, began to conspire against the Spanish. During the

1637 rebellion, the populace acclaimed Joao, duke of Braganca,

as king. The duke, who was the nearest noble to the House of Avis, was Portugal's leading aristocrat and largest landowner. The choice

of the populace was supported by the nobility, which conspired to make Joao king. The duke, who was cautious, initially resisted ac- cepting the Portuguese crown, but eventually began to equip a pri- vate army. In 1640 the Catalans rebelled against Philip IV, and,

thus encouraged, Joao's supporters went into action on December 1 . They entered the royal palace and arrested Portugal's Spanish

governor, the duchess of Mantua, a cousin of the king of Spain.

Five days later, the duke of Braganca arrived in Lisbon and was crowned as Joao IV (r. 1641-56), thus restoring the Portuguese

monarchy and founding a new ruling dynasty, the House of

Braganca.

Although Portugal's seaborne empire had begun to decline before the sixty years of incorporation in the Iberian Union, the

"Spanish captivity," as this period is called by the Portuguese,

hastened this process. The Portuguese, who were dragged into

Spain's wars with England and Holland, began to see those two

countries attack their holdings in Asia, as well as in Brazil. By the

time independence was regained, Portugal's empire was greatly

reduced, having lost its commercial monopoly in the Far East to the Dutch and in India to the English. Only the resolute action

36
Historical Setting

of Portuguese settlers had saved Brazil from the Dutch, who had

attacked Rio de Janeiro and Baia, and occupied Pernambuco.

Restoration

Joao IV was proclaimed king by a cortes convoked in 1641 . Faced

with the general ruin of the realm and threats to his crown from

Spain, his first act was to defend the kingdom. He immediately

created a council of war, appointed military governors in the

provinces, recruited soldiers, rebuilt forts, and constructed an arms

foundry. At the same time, he vigorously sought diplomatic recognition of his monarchy and Portugal's independence from Spain.

On June 1, 1641, Joao IV signed an alliance with Louis XIII of

France and soon made peace with Holland and England. By the

time of his death in 1656, Joao IV had consolidated and restored

the monarchy by making peace with former enemies, recouped some lost colonial possessions, and defeated Spanish attempts to reincorporate Portugal into the Iberian Union.

When Joao died, his queen, Lufsa de Gusmao, became regent

because the royal couple's oldest son, Teodosio, had died three years before his father and their youngest son, Afonso, was only ten years

old. Although a disease in infancy had left Afonso partially paralyzed and had impaired his intelligence, his mother succeeded in

having him proclaimed king. Afonso VI (r. 1662-67) grew into a

degenerate who preferred riding, coursing bulls, and watching cockfights. His marriage to Marie-Francoise Isabelle of Savoy was annulled, and, in 1667, aware of the need for a successor, Afonso

consented to his own abdication in favor of his brother, Pedro. During this period, the Portuguese managed to fight off the last at- tempt by Spain to reincorporate them into the Iberian Union by

defeating the Spanish invaders at Ameixial near Estremos. In 1666,

three years after this victory, Spain at last made peace and recognized Portugal's independence.

When Afonso abdicated, he was banished to Terceira Island in

the Azores and his brother, who had married Marie-Francoise, as- sumed the regency of the throne until Afonso 's death in 1683, af- ter which he ruled in his own right as Pedro II until 1706. During

his regency, Pedro had given the task of producing a coherent eco- nomic policy to Luis de Menenses, count of Ericeira, who was appointed head of the treasury. Known as the "Portuguese Colbert,"

Ericeira implemented mercantilist policies in Portugal similar to those of France. These policies sought to protect Portuguese in- dustries against foreign competition. He published laws to enforce

sobriety and criticized luxury. Ericeira organized the textile industry

and imported looms from England. He stimulated the national

37
Portugal: A Country Study

production of wool and silk by decreeing that only Portuguese wool- ens and silks could be worn. Development of Brazil

Having lost the empire in Asia, Portugal's policy makers turned

their attention to Brazil, where they intensified the cultivation of

sugar, cotton, and spices. This expansion of agriculture required

a great deal of labor, which led to the importation of slaves from

Angola and Guinea. Amerindians were saved from this fate by the

Jesuits, who protected them from enslavement.

The southern part of Brazil was occupied first and the north,

later, owing to resistance put up by Amerindians allied with French

pirates. In 1580 the Portuguese conquered Paraiba and, later, Sergipe. In 1603 they penetrated to Ceara and, later, to Para, where

they founded the city of Belem. In 1637 Pedro Teixeira launched

a daring expedition into the Amazon Basin, following the river to

its headwaters near the Pacific coast. During the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries, various expeditions were sent into the in- terior, especially at the end of the seventeenth century when gold was discovered.

These expeditions were made up of adventurers known as bandeirantes (after the Portuguese word for flag) because they traveled

under the flag of their leader, who took with him kin, friends, slaves,

and friendly Amerindians. These expeditions, which followed rivers into the interior, lasted years. The most notable bandeirantes were

Pais Leme, who traveled for seven years throughout present-day

Minas Gerais, and his son-in-law, Manuel Borba Gato, who dis- covered several sources of gold on the Rio das Velhas. In addition

to gold, diamonds were also found in abundance. The discovery

of gold and diamonds sparked a gold rush from all over the world

to Brazil and from the central zones to the interior, which devastated

Brazilian agriculture. The gold and diamonds enriched the Portuguese crown and allowed it to spend lavishly on imported goods

and baroque palaces, thus destroying once again the initiatives previously taken for indigenous economic development.

Brazilian gold also encouraged England to update its commercial relations with Portugal. The Methuen Treaty of 1703 allowed

the Portuguese a preferential duty on wine exported to England,

in return for which Portugal removed restrictions on the importation of English-made goods. The Portuguese market was soon absorbing 10 percent of the English export trade, which represented an increase of 120 percent above the quantity of goods imported

to Portugal before the treaty. Portuguese exports to England, mainly

38
Historical Setting

wine, rose by less than 40 percent. Gold from Brazil was used to pay for this trade imbalance.

Absolutism

Pedro II was succeeded by Joao V (r. 1706-50), a youth of seventeen. He was an energetic king who introduced absolutist rule into

Portugal, copying the style of the royal court of Louis XIV of

France. Brazilian gold allowed Joao V to spend lavishly on major

architectural works, the greatest being the royal palace at Mafra,

begun in 1717, which sought to rival the Escorial in Spain. He

also endowed the University of Coimbra with an elegantly decorated library, and built the Aqueduct of Free Waters (Aqueduto

das Aguas Livres) that brought water to Lisbon. Joao encouraged

the development of decorative arts such as furniture design, clockmaking, and tapestry weaving. He pursued mercantilist policies

to protect indigenous industries, including papermaking at Lousa,

glassmaking at Marinha Grande, and textile weaving at Covilha.

He subsidized the publication of notable works such as Caetano

de Sousa's Historia Genealogica da Casa Real. In general, Joao V animated what has been called Portugal's second renaissance.

Joao V died in 1750 and was succeeded by his son Jose I (r. 1750-77), who was indolent and placed the reins of government

into the hands of Sebastiao Jose de Carvalho e Melo, later the Marques de Pombal. A petty noble who managed to surmount Portugal's rigid class system by a combination of energy, intelligence,

good looks, and a shrewd marriage, Pombal became the veritable

dictator of Portugal. Once Portugal's ambassador to Britain and

Austria, Pombal had been influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment. Realizing how backward Portugal was, he sought through

a ruthless despotism to reform it and create a middle class. On the morning of November 1, 1755, a violent earthquake shook

Lisbon and demolished most of the city. Thousands were killed

in the subsequent fire and tidal wave. Pombal, who was at Belem

at the time, energetically took appropriate measures. He improvised hospitals for the injured, controlled prices for various services, requisitioned food from the countryside, and organized public

security. He decided to rebuild the city after a survey of the ruins.

Under the direction of the architect Eugenio dos Santos and the

engineer Manuel da Maia, a master plan for a new city was drawn

up. The old city center was cleared of rubble and divided into

squares of long avenues and cross streets. New buildings conforming

to a standard architectural style were quickly erected using the latest construction techniques. Lisbon thus emerged from the earthquake

39
Portugal: A Country Study

as Europe's first planned city. Flanked by the Praca do Rossio at one end and the Praca do Comercio at the other, this quarter of

the city is known today as the Baixa Pombalina.

For his prompt and efficient action, Pombal was elevated to chief

minister, which allowed him to consolidate his power. Desiring to destroy all forces within the society that could oppose his plans for modernizing Portugal, he began systematically to annihilate them,

beginning with the nobility. An attempt on the life of the king on

September 3, 1758, provided Pombal with a pretext to take action

against the nobility. He accused many nobles of responsibility for the attempt and arrested about 1,000 individuals. Many confessed

under brutal torture and were executed.

Pombal also attempted to rid Portugal of the Jesuits, whom he

accused of taking part in the attempt on the king's life. He searched

the houses belonging to the Jesuits, confiscated their belongings,

closed their schools, and, in 1759, expelled them from the kingdom and its overseas possessions. In an effort to restrain the church,

Pombal broke diplomatic relations with the Holy See in 1760 and

imprisoned the bishop of Coimbra.

Pombal' s economic policies were inspired by the protectionist

doctrines of Colbert, which gave royal companies monopolies in

certain fields. Following the initiatives in this regard established

by the count of Ericeira, Pombal prohibited the export of gold and

silver. In order to increase cereal cultivation, he prohibited the growing of grape vines in certain areas of the country. He protected

the winemaking industry by founding, in 1756, a company with

a monopoly on exporting port wine. Pombal created other companies with exclusive rights to commercial activities in various

regions of Brazil, as well as a fishing and processing company for sardines and tuna in Portuguese waters. He transformed the silk industry into a textile industry and turned over the operation of

the glassmaking factory at Marinha Grande to a British manager,

who introduced new manufacturing techniques.

Pombal also made notable changes in the area of education. After expelling the Jesuits and confiscating their schools, he took the

first steps toward establishing a system of public instruction. He

founded a commercial school and established schools, paid for with

a special tax, in the major cities. In addition, Pombal instituted numerous reforms of the university, whose decline he blamed on

the Jesuits. He created two new departments—mathematics and

philosophy—and increased the number of professors in the already

existing departments. He put forward new methods of instruction

based on the writings of Luis Antonio Verney and Antonio Nunes

40
Historical Setting

that stressed observation and experience, and set up laboratories, a natural history museum, a botanical garden, and an observatory.

Jose I died in 1777 and was succeeded on the throne by his daughter Maria I (r. 1777-92), who dismissed Pombal and banished him

to the village of Pombal. She immediately freed hundreds of

prisoners, restored the old nobility to its former status, reestablished relations with the Holy See, revoked laws against the cler- gy, abolished many of the state companies, and generally dismantled

Pombal' s dictatorship. The strong, secular society that Pombal

hoped to create did not materialize, and the old social and eco- nomic order quickly restored itself. Peninsular Wars

The events of the French Revolution, especially the regicide of

Louis XVI and the Terror, made the rest of Europe's monarchs

fear for their lives. The Portuguese monarchy, like others, took measures to prevent the infiltration of revolutionary propaganda

into the kingdom. Maria I, who suffered nightmares and fits of

melancholy, imagined that she was damned. In 1792 she turned

the reigns of government over to her second son, Joao, who was

prince of Brazil. As the situation in France deteriorated, Portugal

signed treaties of mutual assistance with Britain and Spain in 1793. In the same year, the Spanish army, reinforced by 6,000 Portuguese

troops, attacked France across the Basque frontier. In 1794 the

French launched a major counterattack, which forced the combined

Spanish-Portuguese army to retreat from French territory. The

French army reached the Ebro River and threatened Madrid.

In 1795 Spain made peace at Basel with France without consulting the Portuguese. Despite having fought with the Portuguese

against France, the Spanish now allied themselves with the French

and signed a secret treaty at San Idelfonso in 1800. In 1801 France

and Spain sent the Portuguese an ultimatum threatening to invade

Portugal unless it abandoned its alliance with Britain, closed its ports to the British and opened them to French and Spanish ships,

and handed over one-quarter of its territory as a guarantee for Spanish territories held by Britain. The Portuguese refused to comply,

and the Spanish marched into the Alentejo in May. After two weeks

of fighting, the "War of the Oranges," as it is known, was con- cluded in 1801 at Badajoz. According to the terms of the peace

treaty, Portugal agreed to close its ports to British shipping, granted

commercial concessions to the French, paid an indemnity, and ceded Olivenca to Spain.

When Napoleon became emperor in 1804, he renewed his struggle with Britain. The British declared a naval blockade of France,

41
Portugal: A Country Study

and, in retaliation, Napoleon decreed that all nations of Europe

should break relations with Britain. Portugal declared itself neutral in the struggle. Napoleon ordered the Portuguese to close their

ports to the British, which they were prepared to do if they could

do so without breaking relations with their old ally. In October

1807, Napoleon signed a treaty with Spain at Fontainebleau, ac- cording to which France and Spain agreed to invade Portugal and

partition the country, one-third going to France, one-third to Spain,

and one-third to Spain's chief minister, Manuel de Godoy.

On November 17, 1807, an army of French and Spanish sol- diers under the command of the French general Andoche Junot

entered Portugal and marched on Lisbon. The British were in no

position to defend their ally; consequently, the prince regent and

the royal family left for Brazil. On November 27, Junot 's army

took control of Lisbon.

French occupation eventually sparked rebellions among the

populace, and provisional juntas were organized in several cities. The junta in Porto, to which other local juntas finally pledged obedience, organized an army and, with British help, was able to defeat a strong French force at Lourinha on August 21, 1808. After this defeat, the French opened negotiations with the Portuguese and

signed the Convention of Sintra, which provided for the evacuation of Junot 's forces. The government was placed in the hands

of the juntas. In January 1809, the prince regent designated a British

officer, William Carr Beresford, to reorganize the Portuguese army,

granting him the rank of marshall and commander in chief. In March 1809, French troops under the command of General

Nicholas Soult invaded Portugal once again. Entering the country from Galicia, they occupied Chaves and marched on Porto. A combined Portuguese-British army, commanded by Sir Arthur

Wellesley, pushed Soult back to Galicia and defeated another French

army at Tavera in Spain, after which Wellesley was made the duke

of Wellington.

The expulsion of Soult 's forces gave the Anglo-Portuguese army

time to prepare for Napoleon's third invasion, which was ordered

in 1810. The third French army under the command of General

Andre Massena entered Portugal at Guarda and marched to Viseu.

Because Wellington's forces held the main roads, Massena took

his army across the Bugaco Mountains and marched on Coimbra,

which he sacked. Wellington withdrew his army southward, lur- ing Massena into positions he had prepared at Torres Vedras. Finding the positions impenetrable, Massena, far from his source of

supply and short of food, withdrew his forces. Wellington pursued

42
Historical Setting

Massena and overtook him at Sabugal where his army was defeated.

Massena retreated from Portugal.

Constitutionalism

Although the ideology of liberalism was known in Portugal in

the late 1700s by way of the American and French revolutions,

it was not until after the Peninsular Wars that it became a force

with which the monarchy had to contend. Freemasonry introduced

by foreign merchants played an important role in spreading liberal doctrines in Portugal. In 1801 there were five Masonic temples

in Lisbon, and the first Portuguese grand master was elected in

1804. The three French invasions encouraged the spread of liberal ideas. In 1812 Freemasons founded the Sinedrio, a secret society

that propagated revolutionary ideas. Radical ideas were also dis- cussed by Portuguese who lived in London or Paris where they

had observed and been influenced by the functioning of the British

and French systems. Newspapers and pamphlets, despite the

vigilance of the crown's censors and police, were smuggled into

Portugal and widely read by a small and increasingly important

educated elite, called the afrancesados, who wanted to reconstruct Portugal on the French model. After the Peninsular Wars, the exiles themselves returned to Portugal and began to agitate for a constitutional monarchy. One of these was General Gomes Freire

Andrade, the grand master of Portuguese Masons, who became

the leader of liberals in Portugal. The liberals were eventually to be successful because of a crisis of royal leadership.

Revolution of 1820

In 1816 Maria I, after twenty-four years of insanity, died, and

the prince regent was proclaimed Joao VI (r. 1816-26). The new

king, who had acquired a court and government in Brazil and a

following among the Brazilians, did not immediately return to Portugal, and liberals continued to agitate against the monarchy. In

May 1817, General Gomes Freire Andrade was arrested on trea- son charges and hanged, as were eleven alleged accomplices. Beresford, who was still commander in chief of the Portuguese army, was popularly blamed for the harshness of the sentences, which

aggravated unrest in the country. The most active center of Portuguese liberalism was Porto, where the Sinedrio was situated and

quickly gaining adherents. In March 1820, Beresford went to Brazil

to persuade the king to return to the throne. His departure allowed

the influence of the liberals to grow within the army, which had

emerged from the Peninsular Wars as Portugal's strongest insti- tution. On August 24, 1820, regiments in Porto revolted and

43
Portugal: A Country Study

established a provisional junta that assumed the government of Portugal until a cortes could be convoked to write a constitution. The

regency was bypassed because it was unable to cope with Portugal's financial crisis, and Beresford was not allowed to enter the

country when he returned from Brazil.

In December 1820, indirect elections were held for a constitutional cortes, which convened in January 1821. The deputies were

mostiy constitutional monarchists. They elected a regency to replace

the provisional junta, abolished seignorial rights and the Inquisition, and, on September 23, approved a constitution. At the same

time, Joao VI decided to return to Portugal, leaving his son Pedro

in Brazil. Upon his arrival in Lisbon, Joao swore an oath to uphold the new constitution. After his departure from Brazil, Brazilian

liberals, inspired by the independence of the United States and the

independence struggles in the neighboring Spanish colonies, began to agitate for freedom from Portugal. Brazilian independence was proclaimed on October 12, 1822, with Pedro as constitutional

emperor.

The constitution of 1822 installed a constitutional monarchy in

Portugal. It declared that sovereignty rested with the nation and

established three branches of government in classical liberal fashion.

Legislative power was exercised by a directly elected, unicameral

Chamber of Deputies; executive power was vested in the king and

his secretaries of state; and judicial power was in the hands of the

courts. The king and his secretaries of state had no representation

in the chamber and no power to dissolve it. Two broad divisions emerged in Portuguese society over the is- sue of the constitution. On the one hand were the liberals who

defended it and, on the other, the royalists who favored absolutism.

The first reaction to the new liberal regime surfaced in February

1823 in Tras-os-Montes where the count of Amarante, a leading

absolutist, led an insurrection. Later, in May, Amarante once again

sounded the call to arms, and an infantry regiment rose at Vila

Franca de Xira, just north of Lisbon. Some of the Lisbon garrison

joined the absolutists, as did the king's younger brother, Miguel,

who had refused to swear to uphold the constitution. After the

Vilafrancada, as the uprising is known, Miguel was made generalissimo of the army. In April 1824, Miguel led a new revolt—the

Abrilada—which sought to restore absolutism. Joao, supported by

Beresford, who had been allowed to return to Portugal, dismissed

Miguel from his post as generalissimo and exiled him to France.

The constitution of 1822 was suspended, and Portugal was governed

under Joao's moderate absolutism until he died in 1826.

44
Historical Setting

War of the Two Brothers

Joao's death created a problem of royal succession. The rightful heir to the throne was his eldest son, Pedro, emperor of Brazil.

Neither the Portuguese nor the Brazilians wanted a unified monarchy; consequently, Pedro abdicated the Portuguese crown in favor

of his daughter, Maria da Gloria, a child of seven, on the condition that when of age she marry his brother, Miguel. In April 1826,

as part of the succession settlement, Pedro granted a new constitution to Portugal, known as the Constitutional Charter. Pedro

returned to Brazil leaving the throne to Maria, with Miguel as regent.

The Constitutional Charter attempted to reconcile absolutists

and liberals by allowing both factions a role in government. Unlike the constitution of 1822, this document established four

branches of government. The legislature was divided into two chambers. The upper chamber, the Chamber of Peers, was composed

of life and hereditary peers and clergy appointed by the king. The

lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies, was composed of 111

deputies elected to four-year terms by the indirect vote of local as- semblies, which in turn were elected by persons meeting certain

tax-paying and property-owning requirements. Judicial power was

exercised by the courts; executive power by the ministers of the

government; and moderative power by the king, who held an absolute veto over all legislation.

The absolutists, however, were not satisfied with this compromise, and they continued to regard Miguel as the legitimate successor to the throne because he was Portuguese whereas Pedro was Brazilian. In February 1828, Miguel returned to Portugal to take the oath of allegiance to the charter and assume the regency.

He was immediately proclaimed king by his supporters. Although

it initially appeared that Miguel would abide by the charter, pres- sure mounted for a return to absolutism. A month after his return,

Miguel dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of

Peers and, in May, summoned the traditional cortes of the three

estates of the realm to proclaim his accession to absolute power.

The Cortes of 1828 assented to Miguel's wish, proclaiming him

king as Miguel I and nullifying the Constitutional Charter.

This usurpation did not go unchallenged by the liberals. On May

18, the garrison in Porto declared its loyalty to Pedro, Maria da

Gloria, and the Constitutional Charter. The rebellion against the

absolutists spread to other cities. Miguel suppressed these rebellions, and many thousands of liberals were either arrested or fled

to Spain and Britain. There followed five years of repression.

45
Portugal: A Country Study

In Brazil, meanwhile, relations between Pedro and Brazil's political leaders had become strained. In 1831 Pedro abdicated in favor

of his son, Pedro II, and sailed for Britain. He organized a military expedition there and then went to the Azores, which were in

the hands of the liberals, to set up a government in exile in March

1831 . In July 1832, Pedro occupied Porto, which was subsequently besieged by the absolutists. In June 1833, the liberals, still encircled at Porto, sent a force commanded by the duke of Terceira

to the Algarve. At the same time, a liberal squadron defeated the

absolutists' fleet near Cabo Sao Vincente. Terceira landed at Faro

and marched north through the Alentejo to capture Lisbon on July

24. A stalemate of nine months ensued. The absolutists controlled

the rural areas, where they were supported by the aristocracy and

the peasantry. The liberals occupied Portugal's major cities, Lisbon and Porto, where they commanded a sizeable following among

the middle classes. Finally, the Miguelists lifted their siege of Porto and marched on Lisbon, but they were defeated at Evora-Monte.

Peace was declared in May 1834, and Miguel, guaranteed an an- nual pension, was banished from Portugal, never to return. Pedro

restored the Constitutional Charter.

Moderate vs. Radical Liberals

Pedro survived his victory by less than three months. After his

death, fifteen-year-old Maria da Gloria was proclaimed queen as Maria II (r. 1834-53). Despite their victory over the absolutists,

the liberals were themselves divided between moderates, who sup- ported the principles of the charter, and radicals, who wanted a return to the constitution of 1822. Maria's first government was made up of moderates headed by the duke of Palmela, whose

government collapsed in May 1835. He was succeeded by the duke

of Saldanha, whose government fell in May 1836. In July 1836,

radicals were elected from Porto by advocating a return to the constitution of 1822 as a way of resolving Portugal's economic crisis. When these deputies arrived in Lisbon, they were met by demonstrations supporting their cause. The following day, the moderate

liberal government collapsed, and, in September, the radicals, led

by Manuel da Silva Passos, formed a new government. The radicals nullified the Constitutional Charter and reestablished the constitution of 1822 until it could be revised by a constituent cortes

to make it more compatible with changed social and economic cir- cumstances.

The actions of the radicals resulted in a violent reaction from

the moderates, who saw their power threatened and considered the

charter the symbol of the liberal victory in the War of Two Brothers.

46
Historical Setting

As a compromise, the Constituent Assembly, convoked in March

1838, attempted to reconcile the constitution of 1822 and the Constitutional Charter. In April 1838, Portugal's third constitution was

approved. The document abolished the royal moderative power

and returned to liberalism's classical tripartite division of government into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It reaffirmed,

as did the 1822 constitution, that sovereignty rested with the nation. It abolished the Chamber of Peers and substituted a Chamber of Senators, and it established direct election of the Chamber

of Deputies, although only selected citizens were allowed to vote. The monarch's role was enhanced, and the Chamber of Senators was restricted to leading citizens, or notables.

The radicals, now called Septemberists after the September 1836

revolution, held office until June 1841. On that date, they were

replaced in a bloodless coup d'etat by moderates, who abolished

the 1838 constitution and restored the charter. Antonio Bernardo

da Costa Cabral, who organized and led the revolt, took various measures designed to reform Portugal's political, economic, and

social systems. Some of these measures, especially new sanitary

regulations that prohibited burials in churchyards, stirred the rural

countryside, still Miguelist, into active resistance against the liberal government in Lisbon.

The women of the Minho region, who had traditionally played an important role in churchyard burials, began to demonstrate

against the authorities. Supported by the rural nobility and cler- gy, the Maria da Fontes, as this movement was called, spread

throughout the rural north. Unable to suppress it by force, the

government of Costa Cabral fell on May 20, 1846. The new government, a confusing hodgepodge of radicals and moderates, rescinded

the cemetery regulations. The government divided when the duke

of Palmela, who was its prime minister, called for new elections

in October, hoping to unite the moderates, themselves divided into

two factions. This development sparked a reaction by the Septemberists, who were particularly strong in Porto, where they rebelled

and set up a provisional junta. The duke of Saldanha, Palmela'

replacement, attempted without success to suppress the Septemberist rebellion, which by now had spread beyond Porto to other

areas. With the country on the brink of a second civil war, Queen

Maria sought help from the Quadruple Alliance, consisting of Brit- ain and France, as well as Spanish and Portuguese liberal elements.

After the alliance imposed a naval blockade and sent troops, the

Septemberists capitulated, Saldanha resigned, and a peace agreement was signed on June 29, 1847. Costa Cabral returned to power.

47
Portugal: A Country Study

Rotativismo

In 1851 Saldanha staged a revolt and, supported by the garri- son in Porto, gained control of the government and sent Costa

Cabral into exile. Saldanha and his followers were called Regenerators because they recognized the need to modify the charter to make it more compatible with the social and political situation.

These modifications appeared as amendments, the first of which was a new electoral law that made the franchise more acceptable

to the Septemberists. Gradually, government became stabilized.

The Septemberists began to be referred to as Historicals and, later,

Progressives.

The Regenerators and Progressives were not political parties in

today's sense of the term. The electorate comprised less than 1 per- cent of the population; therefore, the Regenerators and Progressives were essentially loose coalitions of notables, or leading citizens,

based on personal loyalties and local interests. Elections were held

after a change in governing factions to provide the new faction with

a majority in the legislature. By tacit agreement, one faction would

govern as long as it was able and then turn over power to the other.

After 1856 this practice of alternating factions at regular intervals,

called rotativismo, was all but institutionalized and produced rela- tively stable government until the end of the nineteenth century.

Portuguese Africa

With the advent of rotativismo and subsequent political stability,

the attention of Portugal turned toward its colonial possessions in

Africa. In East Africa, the chief settlement was Mozambique Is- land, but there was little control over the estates of the mainland

where Portuguese of mixed ancestry ruled as feudal potentates. In

West Africa, the most important settlements were Luanda and Benguela on the Angolan coast, linked to Brazil by the slave trade con- ducted through the African island of Sao Tome. It was during this period that the Portuguese began to send expeditions into the interior. In 1852 Antonio Francisco Silva Porto explored the interior of

Angola. In 1877 a scientific expedition led by Hermenegildo Capelo

and Roberto Ivens, two naval officers, and Alexandre Serpa Pinto, an army major, departed from Luanda and traveled to the Bie

region in central Angola, where they separated. Serpa Pinto ex- plored the headwaters of the Cuanza River in Angola and followed

the course of the Zambezi River to Victoria Falls in present-day

Zimbabwe. Exploring areas now part of South Africa, he crossed

the Transvaal and arrived in Natal in 1879. In 1884 Capelo and

48
Historical Setting

Ivens departed from Mocamades on the coast of Angola and crossed

the continent through entirely unexplored territory, arriving at Quelimane on the east coast of Mozambique in 1885. In the same year, Serpa Pinto and Augusto Cardoso explored the territory around

Lake Nyassa. Various Portuguese, such as Paiva de Andrade and

Antonio Maria Cardoso, explored the interior of Mozambique.

Despite Portugal's historical claim to the Congo region, the

colonial ambitions of the great powers of the day—Britain, France,

and Germany—gave rise to disputes about its ownership. Portugal therefore proposed an international conference to resolve the

disputed claim to the Congo. This conference, which met in Berlin in 1884-85, awarded the Congo to the king of Belgium and

established the principle that in order for a claim to African terri- tory to be valid, the claimant had to demonstrate "effective occupation," not historical rights. The Berlin Conference, as it is known,

resulted in the partition of Africa among the European powers,

and awarded Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea to Portugal.

In 1886 Portugal signed two treaties that delimited the boundaries between Portuguese territories and those of France and Germany. France and Germany recognized Portugal's right to exercise

sovereignty in the interior territory between Mozambique and Angola. This claim was represented on a map, annexed to the treaty

with France, on which the claimed territory was colored red. In order to validate this claim, the Portuguese published the "rosecolored map" and organized successive expeditions into the interior

between Mozambique and Angola. Meanwhile, the British were

also exploring the territory from south to north under the auspices

of Cecil Rhodes, who had designs on the territory for the construction of a railroad that would run from Cape Town through central

Africa to Cairo.

Portugal protested against the activities of the British in what

they considered to be their territory. The British, having signed

a number of treaties with African chiefs, claimed that the territory was under their protection and refused to recognize the rose-colored

map. Moreover, they said the territory was not Portuguese because

Portugal had not effectively occupied it as required by the terms

of the Berlin Conference. Portugal proposed that the conflicting

claims be resolved through arbitration. Britain refused and sent the Portuguese an ultimatum, on January 11, 1890, demanding

the withdrawal of all Portuguese forces from the disputed territory.

Portugal, faced with the armed might of the British, complied.

Republicanism

The ultimatum of 1890 caused astonishment and indignation in

49
Portugal: A Country Study

Lisbon. As a result, the Progressive government fell and a nonparty government came to power. The ultimatum was strongly

denounced by Portugal's growing band of republicans, who had

organized themselves into a formal party in 1878. The republicans

based their appeals on crude nationalism and played on the fears of many that a continuation of the inept government of the liberals would make Portugal either a British colony or a province of

Spain. Teachers, journalists, small-business persons, clerks, and

artisans were drawn to republicanism, with its appeals to nationalism, universal suffrage, separation of church and state, and the

abolition of the monarchy and nobility, which were seen as irra- tional institutions that sapped the strength of Portugal.

The appeal of republicanism was also enhanced by the collapse

of rotativismo. After 1890 the system ceased to function smoothly.

Conflicts between the Regenerators and Historicals, formerly set- tled in secret, were brought into the open in an effort to generate

public support for the system. But open debate proved to be unsettling in Portugal's depoliticized society. By 1906 neither faction

could attain a parliamentary majority. In that year, the republi- cans managed to elect from Lisbon four deputies who proceeded

to create tumultuous scenes in parliament. In May 1907, the situ- ation came to a standstill. The king, Carlos I (r. 1889-1908), dis- solved parliament and gave to Joao Franco, a conservative reformist

who had bolted from the Regenerators to form his own party, the

power to govern by decree. Joao Franco's dictatorship was con- demned by all political parties, and the republicans attempted an

unsuccessful coup d'etat. A crackdown on the republican move- ment followed. On February 1, 1908, the king and the royal family were attacked by two disgruntled republicans as they crossed the

Praca do Comercio by open landau. The king and his youngest

son were killed, and his oldest son, Manuel, survived a bullet wound

in the arm. Manuel, who was eighteen at the time, became king

as Manuel II (r. 1908-10). In an effort to salvage the monarchy, Joao Franco stepped down

as prime minister and went into exile. New elections were held,

but factionalism among the Regenerators and Historicals prevented

the formation of a stable government even after six attempts. On

October 1, 1910, the appearance in Portugal of the president of

the Brazilian republic after a visit to Germany provided a pretext

for extensive republican demonstrations. On October 3, the army

refused to put down a mutiny on Portuguese warships anchored

in the estuary of the Tagus and took up positions around Lisbon.

On October 4, when two of the warships began to shell the royal

palace, Manuel II and the royal family fled to Britain. On October

50
Manuel II, Portugal's

last king (r. 1908-10)

Courtesy Embassy of

Portugal, Washington

5, a provisional republican government was organized with the

writer Teofilo Braga as president.

The First Republic

In May 1911, the provisional government held elections for the

Constituent Assembly, which undertook to write a new constitution. This document, which appeared on August 21, abolished the

monarchy and inaugurated Portugal's first republican government.

The constitution secularized the state by disestablishing the church,

forbidding religious instruction in the public schools, and prohibiting the military from taking part in religious observances. It granted workers the right to strike and opened the civil service to merit

appointments. The blue and white flag of the monarchy was replaced

with one of red and green, embellished with an armillary sphere

in gold.

The constitution vested legislative power in a bicameral Congress

of the Republic. The upper house, called the Senate, was indirectly

elected from local governments for six-year terms; the lower house,

or Chamber of Deputies, was directly elected for three-year terms. Executive power was vested in a cabinet and prime minister responsible to the Congress, which also chose the president of the republic, the nominal head of state. The Constituent Assembly became

the first Congress by electing one-third of its members to the Senate;

the remaining two-thirds constituted the Chamber of Deputies.

51
Portugal: A Country Study

The Portuguese Republican Party (Partido Republicano

Portugues—PRP) was Portugal's first political party in the modern

sense of the term. Although its base of support was primarily ur- ban, the PRP had a nationwide organization that extended into

the rural areas. It did not remain unified, however. In 191 1 moderate and radical republican deputies divided over the election by

the Constituent Assembly of the new president of the republic. The

candidate of the radical republicans, led by Afonso Costa, was

defeated by the candidate of the moderates, led by Manuel Brito

Camacho and Antonio Jose de Almeida, who opposed Costa's in- transigent republicanism and feared that he would gain control of

the new government. The split widened at the PRP Congress in

October 1911 when the moderates where hooted down and left in

disgust. The moderates then formed the Republican National Union

(Uniao Nacional Republicana—UNR), the directorate consisting

of Camacho, Almeida, and Aresta Branco. The UNR was essentially a personal clique of several moderate leaders whose purpose was to get through parliament a program that would mitigate the

impact of the more radical republican government. After this breakup, the PRP became known as the Democratic Party (Partido

Democratico—PD)

In February 1912, the UNR leadership itself split into two republican splinter parties. The immediate cause of the rift was disagreement over the UNR program and rivalry between Camacho and

Almeida. The rump, led by Camacho, was renamed the Republi- can Union (Uniao Republicana—UR), and its members became

known as Unionists. The other group, led by Almeida, was called

the Republican Evolutionist Party (Partido Republicano Evolucionista—PRE), and its followers became known as Evolutionists.

The program of the PRE was quite similar to that of the UR, but

it urged a policy of moderation and conciliation and advocated

proportional representation and revision of intolerant laws.

The splintering of the original PRP, personalism, and petty

squabbles produced acute governmental instability during the First Republic. In its fifteen years and eight months of existence, there were seven elections for the Congress, eight for the presidency, and

forty-five governments. Instability was also encouraged by the

government's total dependency upon the Congress, where no sta- ble majority could be organized. This political turmoil led to several periods of military rule during the First Republic and eventually

to its overthrow.

In January 1915, senior military officers, who were becoming

increasingly alienated from the republic, imposed a period of mili- tary rule at President Manuel de Arriaga's request. In May of the

52
Historical Setting

same year, however, prorepublican junior officers and sergeants

returned the government to civilians and held new elections. The

PD, led by Afonso Costa, won the day. In 1916 Prime Minister Costa, who feared that a German vic- tory in World War I would mean the loss of Portugal's African

colonies of Mozambique and Angola, sent an expeditionary force

of 40,000 men to fight on the side of the Allies. Poorly trained and

equipped, the force suffered horrendous casualties in Flanders. This

debacle, as well as severe food shortages caused by the war mobilization, paved the way for a second military intervention in December 1917, led by Major Sidonio Pais. Pais, who had held a diplomatic post in Prussia some years before, was sympathetic to Germany and antiliberal. He was an energetic, charismatic in- dividual who sought to build a broadly based popular following.

Gradually, however, he came to rely on upper-class youths, young

army officers, students, and sons of big landowners, who were anti- liberal and traditionalist. In December 1918, Pais was assassinated by a radical republican corporal recently returned from the front. Portugal's government was returned to civilians.

Political instability continued under civilian government. A smallscale civil war erupted in northern Portugal as monarchists led by

Henrique Paiva Couciero attempted to restore the monarchy. A

wave of violence swept the country, and leading republican figures,

including the prime minister, were murdered. Political instability

and violence brought economic life to a standstill. The middle class,

which had initially supported the republic, began to turn toward

traditional values as liberal and republican ideals were increasingly discredited.

By 1925 the republic had become the butt of ridicule and cynicism. It never satisfactorily resolved its dispute with the church,

against which some of its first legislation had been directed. Official anticlericism made it impossible for many to accept the republic

and stimulated the development of a politically involved Catholic

intelligentsia in opposition to the parliamentary regime. The apparitions at Fatima in 1917 occurred at the height of Prime Minister

Costa's anticlerical campaign. Those dissatisfied with the republic viewed the authoritarian governments established in Italy (in

1922) and Spain (in 1923) as attractive alternatives.

Many military officers, despite their previous negative ex- periences in government, thought that only they could save Portugal from disintegration. Their inclination to intervene once again was heightened by grievances over low pay and poor equipment.

During the last thirteen months of the republic, there were three

attempts to overturn the regime. The last of these was successful.

53
Portugal: A Country Study

On May 26, 1926, General Manuel Gomes da Costa, the coup

d'etat's leader selected by the young officers who had organized

it, announced from Braga his intention to march on Lisbon and

take power. This announcement was followed by a massive military uprising that met little resistance. On May 28, General Gomes

da Costa symbolically entered Lisbon, a dramatic gesture emulating Benito Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922. Prime Minister

Antonio Maria da Silva resigned on May 29, and the First Republic was ended.

Military Dictatorship

The coup d'etat was bloodless because no military units came

to the aid of the government. On May 30, the president of the

republic, Bernardino Machado, turned the reins of power over to CommanderJose Mendes Cabecadas, a naval officer and staunch

republican, not to General Gomes da Costa, the titular leader of

the military uprising. This action resulted in two months of behindthe-scenes infighting among various factions of the military. The

promonarchist tendency within the May 28 Movement, as the coup was called, allied itself with right-wing but not necessarily monarchist junior officers who wanted some form of authoritarian state. In the hope of preventing the rise of a monarchist or authoritarian

regime, Mendes Cabecadas formed a joint government with Gomes

da Costa on June 1. OnJune 17, Gomes da Costa ousted Mendes

Cabecadas and his followers from the provisional government.

General da Costa's supremacy was temporary; he too was ousted on July 9. On the same day, General Oscar Fragoso Carmona was named head of the military government.

The military government was now in the hands of monarchists

and authoritarian officers, and it seemed as if a restoration of the

monarchy would follow. This was not to be, however, because of

the reaction that such an outcome could have provoked among a

substantial number of republicans within the officer corps. Carmona, who was both a republican and a devout Catholic, was ac- ceptable to a broad range of views. He carefully preserved a balance

between pro- and antimonarchists and pro- and anticlerical officers in order to ensure that the military regime would survive. On March

25, 1928, General Carmona was elected to the presidency of the

republic and appointed Colonel Jose Vicente de Freitas, a staunch

republican, as prime minister, which virtually assured that the

monarchy was not going to be restored, at least not during the mili- tary dictatorship.

Carmona named Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, a professor of political economy at the University of Coimbra, as minister of finance.

54
Historical Setting

Salazar accepted the post on April 27, 1928, only after he had

demanded and had been granted complete control over the expenditures of all government ministries. In his first year at the Ministry of Finance, he not only balanced the budget but achieved a

surplus, the first since 1913. He accomplished this feat by centralizing financial control, improving revenue collection, and cutting

public expenditures. Salazar remained minister of finance as military prime ministers came and went. From his first successful year

as minister of finance, Salazar gradually came to embody the financial and political solution to the turmoil of the military dictatorship, which had not produced a clear leader. Salazar easily

overshadowed military prime ministers and gradually gained the

allegiance of Portugal's young intellectuals and military officers,

who identified with his authoritarian, antiliberal, anticommunist

view of the world. Moreover, Salazar' s ascendancy was welcomed

by the church, which saw in him a savior from the anticlericalism

of the republicans. It was also welcomed by the upper classes of

landowners, businessmen, and bankers, who were grateful for his success in stabilizing the economy after the financial crisis of the

First Republic.

The New State

As Salazar came to be seen as the civilian mainstay of the military dictatorship, he increasingly took it upon himself to lay out

the country's political future. He set forth his plans in two key

speeches, one on May 28, 1930, and the other on July 30 of the same year. In the first, he spoke of the need for a new constitution

that would create a strong authoritarian political order, which he

dubbed the New State (Estado Novo). In the second, he announced

his intention to establish such a state. The military approved of

Salazar' s speeches, and on July 5, 1932, after the collective resignation of the government of General Julio Domingos de Oliveira,

which had come to power two years earlier, he was appointed prime

minister.

Salazar came from a peasant background. He had studied for the priesthood before turning to economics at the University of

Coimbra, where he received his doctorate in 1918 and afterward

taught. While a faculty member, he earned a reputation as a scholar

and a writer, as well as a leader in Catholic intellectual and politi- cal movements. After taking up the reins of government, he re- tained his professorial style, lecturing the cabinet, his political

followers, and the nation. Salazar never married and lived ascetically. A skillful political manipulator with a capacity for ruthless- ness, he was a respected rather than a popular figure.

55
Portugal: A Country Study

The period of transition to the authoritarian republic promised

after the military takeover in 1926 ended in 1933 with the adoption of a new constitution. The 1933 constitution, dictated by Salazar, created the New State, in theory a corporate state representing

interest groups rather than individuals. The constitution provided

for a president directly elected for a seven-year term and a prime

minister appointed by and responsible to the president. The rela- tionship of the office of prime minister to the presidency was an ambiguous one. Salazar, continuing as prime minister, was head

of government. He exercised executive and legislative functions,

controlled local administration, police, and patronage, and was lead- er of the National Union (Uniao Nacional—UN), an umbrella

group for supporters of the regime and the only legal political or- ganization.

The legislature, called the National Assembly, was restricted to members of the UN. It could initiate legislation but only concerning matters that did not require government expenditures. The

parallel Corporative Chamber included representatives of cultural and professional groups and of the official workers' syndicates

that replaced free trade unions.

Women were given the vote for the first time, but literacy and

property qualifications limited the enfranchised segment of the

population to about 20 percent, somewhat higher than under the

parliamentary regime. Elections were held regularly, without opposition.

In 1945 Salazar introduced so-called democratic measures, in- cluding an amnesty for political prisoners and a loosening of censorship, that were believed by liberals to represent a move toward

democratic government. In the parliamentary election that year, the opposition formed the broadly based Movement of Democratic Unity (Movimento de Unidade Democratica—MUD), which

brought democrats together with fascists and communists. The opposition withdrew before the election, however, charging that the

government intended to manipulate votes. General Norton de Matos, a candidate who opposed Carmona in the 1949 presidential

election, pulled out on the same grounds. In 1958 the eccentric

General Humberto Delgado ran against the official candidate,

Admiral Americo Tomas, representing the UN. Delgado pointedly campaigned on the issue of replacing Salazar and won 25 per- cent of the vote. After the election, the rules were altered to provide

for the legislature to choose the president.

Salazar 's was a low-keyed personalist rule. The New State was

his and not a forum for a party or ideology. Although intensely

patriotic, he was cynical about the Portuguese national character

56
that in his mind made the people easy prey for demagogues. He

avoided opportunities to politicize public life and appeared uncomfortable with the political groups that were eventually introduced

to mobilize opinion on the side of the regime's policies. Politics

in Salazar's Portugal consisted of balancing power blocs within the

country—the military, business and commerce, landholders, colonial

interests, and the church. All political parties were banned. The

UN, officially a civic association, encouraged public apathy rather

than political involvement. Its leadership was composed of a small

political and commercial elite, and contacts within ruling circles were usually made on an informal, personal basis, rather than

through official channels. Within the circle, it was possible to dis- cuss and criticize policy, but no channels for expression existed outside the circle. The UN had no guiding philosophy apart from support for Salazar. The tenets of the regime were said to be authoritarian government, patriotic unity, Christian morality, and the work ethic. Despite a great deal of deference paid to the theory of the corporate

state, these tenets were essentially the extent of the regime's ideological content. Although the regime indulged in rallies and youth

movements with the trappings of fascist salutes and paraphernalia, it was satisfied to direct public enthusiasm into "fado, Fatima, and football" —music, religion, and sports.

57
Portugal: A Country Study

A devout Roman Catholic, Salazar sought a rapprochement with

the church in Portugal. A concordat with the Vatican in 1940 reintroduced state aid to Roman Catholic education, but Salazar resisted involving the church—which he called "the great source of our national life" —in political questions. His policies were aimed essentially at healing the divisions caused within Portuguese society by

generations of anticlericalism. Although the church had consistently

supported Salazar, the regime came under increasing criticism by

progressive elements in the clergy in the 1960s. One such incident

led to the expulsion of the bishop of Porto. Whatever may be said of h'is political methods, Salazar had an

exceptional grasp of the techniques of fiscal management and,

within the limits that he had set for the regime, his program of

economic recovery succeeded. Portugal's overriding problem in

1926 had been its enormous public debt. Salazar's solution was

to achieve financial solvency by balancing the national budget and

reducing external debt. This solution required a strong government capable of cutting public expenditures and reducing domestic consumption by raising taxes and controlling credit and trade.

In a few years Salazar singlemindedly achieved a solvent currency, a favorable balance of trade, and surpluses both in foreign

reserves and in the national budget.

The bulk of the Portuguese remained among the poorest people

in Europe, however. The austerity that Salazar's fiscal and eco- nomic policies demanded weighed most heavily on the working class and the rural poor, forestalling the development that would raise

their standards of living. Outside the cities, traditional patterns of

life persisted, especially in the conservative north, which had been

stabilized by evenly distributed poverty and was a stronghold of

support for the regime. To create an atmosphere of rising expectations without having the means to satisfy them, Salazar argued,

would return the country to the chaotic conditions Portugal had

known earlier in the century.

Stable government and a solvent economy would eventually at- tract foreign investment regardless of the attitude abroad to the

nature of Salazar's regime. Cheap labor and the promise of competitive prices for Portuguese-made goods provided an incentive

for investment, particularly in labor-intensive production, which was becoming uneconomic in Northern Europe. Priority was given,

however, to colonial development. Salazar insisted that the overseas territories be made to pay for themselves and also to provide

the trade surpluses required by Portugal to import the essentials

that it could not produce itself. In essence, he updated Portuguese

58
Historical Setting

mercantilist policy: colonial goods were sold abroad to create a sur- plus at home.

In the years before World War II, Salazar cultivated good rela- tions with all major powers except the Soviet Union. Intent on

preserving Portuguese neutrality, he had entered into a nonintervention convention with the European powers during the Spanish

Civil War (1936-39); however, Soviet activity in Spain and the

leftward course of the Spanish Republic persuaded him to support

Francisco Franco's nationalists, with whom more than 20,000 Por- tuguese volunteers served. The war in Spain also prompted Sala- zar to mobilize a political militia, the Portuguese Legion, as a counterweight to the army.

Although he admired Benito Mussolini for his equitable settle- ment of Italy's church-state conflict, Salazar found the "pagan"

elements in German Nazism repugnant. He opposed appeasement,

protested the German invasion of Poland in 1939, and would ap- pear to have been among the first, with Winston Churchill, to express confidence in ultimate Allied victory as early as 1940. Portugal

remained neutral during World War II, but the Anglo-Portuguese

alliance was kept intact, Britain pledging to protect Portuguese neutrality. The United States and Britain were granted bases in the

Azores after 1943, and Portuguese colonial products—copper and

chromium—were funneled into Allied war production. Macau and

Timor were occupied by Japan from 1941 to 1945.

Portugal became a charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) in 1949, and in 1971 Lisbon became headquarters for NATO's Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT).

Portugal also maintained a defensive military alliance (the Iberian

Pact, also known as the Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression)

with Spain that dated from 1939. Admission to the United Nations (UN) was blocked by the Soviet Union until 1955. In 1961

Indian armed forces invaded and seized Goa, which had been Portuguese since 1510. Into the early twentieth century, the European settler communities in Portuguese Africa had virtual autonomy, and colonial

administrations were perpetually bankrupt. Lisbon's concern in Angola and Mozambique was to make good the Portuguese claim

to those territories, and pacification of the interior was still underway in the 1930s. Control over the colonies was tightened under

Salazar.

The Colonial Act of 1930 stated that Portugal and its colonies were interdependent entities. The New State insisted on increased

production and better marketing of colonial goods to make the overseas territories self-supporting and to halt the drain on the

59
Portugal: A Country Study

Portuguese treasury for their defense and maintenance. New land was opened for settlement, and emigration to the colonies was en- couraged.

Portugal ignored the UN declaration on colonialism in 1960,

which called on the colonial powers to relinquish control of dependent territories. Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea were made

provinces with the same status as those in metropolitan Portugal

by constitutional amendment in 1951 . Armed resistance to the Portuguese colonial administration broke out in Angola in 1961 and

had spread by 1964 to Mozambique and Guinea. By 1974 Portugal had committed approximately 140,000 troops, or 80 percent

of its available military forces, to Africa; some 60 percent of these were African. Portuguese combat casualties were relatively light,

and fighting consisted of small-unit action in border areas far from

population centers. Only in Guinea did rebel troops control substantial territory. Portuguese forces appeared to have contained

the insurgencies, and although large numbers of troops were re- quired to hold the territory, Portugal seemed to some observers

capable of sustaining military activity in Africa indefinitely. These same observers considered that, from a military standpoint, the wars had been won. The wars did not interrupt the colonial production on which Por- tuguese economic stability depended. Indeed, they had provided

a windfall to economic development in Angola and Mozambique,

both with large settler communities. A large rural development

project was underway in the Cahora Bassa region of Mozambique,

as was the exploitation of oil in Cabinda enclave near Angola. More

colonial income was being diverted into social services for Afri- cans and Europeans, and in areas of medicine and education better facilities were thought to be available in Luanda and Lourenco

Marques (now Maputo) than in Lisbon. However, forced native

labor remained a factor in the economic development of Portuguese

Africa into the 1960s. Foreign investment capital often came to the colonies from countries whose governments had officially con- demned Portuguese colonialism.

No one except Pombal left so broad a mark on modern Portuguese history as Salazar. For nearly forty years, he completely

dominated Portuguese government and politics. He died on July

27, 1970, more than two years after suffering an incapacitating

stroke brought on by a freak accident.

The Social State

President Tomas appointed Marcello Jose das Neves Caetano

to succeed Salazar as prime minister, although the regime did not

60
Historical Setting

admit for some time that Salazar would not be returning to power. Caetano was a teacher, jurist, and scholar of international reputation who had been one of the drafters of the 1933 constitution.

Considered a moderate within the regime, he had taken unpopular stands in opposition to Salazar. He had resigned as rector of

Lisbon University in 1960 in protest over police repression of stu- dent demonstrations. Unlike Salazar he came from the upper middle

class, was ebullient and personable, and sought contact with the

people.

It was clear from the start that Caetano was a different sort of

leader. He spoke of "evolution within continuity," change fast enough to keep up with expectations but not so fast as to antagonize

conservatives. He brought technocrats into the government and

eased police repression. The elections held in 1969 were the freest in decades. He even altered the nomenclature of the regime; the

New State became the Social State, but it remained essentially an

authoritarian regime.

In contrast to Salazar, Caetano advocated an expansionist eco- nomic policy and promoted rapid development and increasing

consumption without, however, supplementing the means of

production. The consequence of liberalization was the first perceptible inflation in years, reaching 15 percent on such workingclass staples as codfish and rice in the early 1970s.

Prime Minister Caetano had inherited Salazar' s office but not

his power nor, apparently, his skill as a politician and economist.

President Tomas, meanwhile, had emerged with greater authority,

as Salazar' s death put him in a position to exercise the constitutional authority of the presidency to the fullest. Deeply conservative and supported by an entrenched right wing within the official political movement, Tomas employed threats of an army coup to oppose Caetano 's policy of liberalization. Caetano took a harder

line on Africa in an effort to head off opposition by the president

and the officers close to him.

As the events of spring 1974 were to demonstrate, the regimes

of Salazar' s New State and Caetano 's Social State had depended

on personalities. In existence for nearly fifty years, the institutions

of the corporate state had never put down roots in Portuguese political soil. Apathy had not implied support. On April 25, 1974,

the officers and men of the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas Armadas—MFA) ousted Caetano and Tomas, paving the way for a junta under General Antonio de Spmola to take

command of the Portuguese Republic.

* * *

61
Portugal: A Country Study

A comprehensive introduction to the history of the Iberian Peninsula is a two-volume study by Stanley G. Payne, A History of Spain

and Portugal. The best history of Portugal in the English language

up to the First Republic is H. V. Livermore's A New History of Portugal. A succinct survey of Portugal's overseas empire is C.R. Boxer's Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 1415-1825. Douglas L. Wheeler provides a thorough treatment of the First Republic in

Republican Portugal. A sympathetic portrait of Antonio de Oliveira

Salazar can be found in Hugh Kay's Salazar and Modern Portugal.

Salazar's New State is analyzed by Howard J. Wiarda in Corporatism

and Development and by Tom Gallagher in Portugal: A TwentiethCentury Interpretation. The standard history of Portugal in Africa is James Duffy's Portuguese Africa. Walter C. Opello, Jr. covers re- cent history in his book, Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

62
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Monsaraz, a medieval village near the Spanish frontier
AS A RESULT OF CHANGES wrought by the Revolution of

1974, Portugal in the 1990s would be almost unrecognizable to per- sons who knew the country twenty or thirty years ago. The Revolution of 1974 set loose social and political forces that the country

had not seen before on such a large scale and which could not be

entirely controlled. The revolution, in turn, had occurred and had

such a profound impact because of other, gradual social pressures

that had been building for decades and even centuries. In the

mid-1970s, these changes exploded to the surface. In the aftermath

of the revolution, as Portuguese society continued to modernize

and the country was admitted as a full member of the European

Community (EC—see Glossary), social change continued, but not

so frenetically and dramatically as during the revolutionary

mid-1970s.

Before 1974 Portugal was a highly traditional society. It resembled what historian Barbara Tuchman has called the "Proud Tower" of pre-World War I European society. Class and social divisions were tightly drawn and defined, society was organized on a rigidly

hierarchical and authoritarian basis, and social relations were often

stiff and formal. One was born into a certain station in life and was expected to stay there and to accept that fact; social mobility was limited. Class standing and class relations were clearly delineated by criteria of birth, dress, speech, and manner of behavior.

Visitors often remarked that in Portugal one could still find a nineteenth-century society existing within a twentieth-century

context. Even within this rigid, very conservative, and traditionalist

society, however, considerable change was beginning to occur,

particularly during the 1960s as economic development accelerated. The trade unions had grown in size and assertiveness. The middle class was emerging as a numerically larger and sociologically more important element than before. A new business-industrial

class had grown up alongside, and frequently overlapped with, the more traditional landed and noble class. In addition, Portugal ex- perienced urbanization; at the same time, many Portuguese left the country in search of better opportunities abroad. Literacy was

also rising, though slowly. As modernization and social change began to accelerate in the 1960s and early 1970s, discontent with the

closed and authoritarian regime of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar

(1928-68) and his successor Marcello Jose das Neves Caetano

65
Portugal: A Country Study

(1968-74) also began to mount. These and other pressures culminated in the Revolution of 1974.

Following the revolution, which led to the establishment of

democracy in Portugal, societal pressures continued. Pressures for education, land, jobs, better health care, housing, social equality,

and solutions to Portugal's pressing social problems mounted. Portugal remained, even with the economic growth of the 1980s and

early 1990s, a poor country compared to West European standards.

Moreover, rising expectations were threatening to overwhelm the

democratic regime's capacities for resolving the problems. Portugal's full economic participation in the EC at the end of 1992, at which time it would no longer have the protection of high tariff barriers, added to social tensions and uncertainties. Thus, as Portugal began the 1990s, the promise of a new, stable, democratic

era of development coexisted with a fear of what the future might

bring.

The Physical Environment

Portugal shares the Iberian Peninsula with Spain, although it is only about one-sixth as large as its neighbor. Including the Azores

(Acores) and Madeira, the country has a total area of 92,080 square

kilometers. Portugal lies on the westernmost promontory of continental Europe. The rugged Pyrenees Mountains separate Iberia

from the heart of the European continent, and Portugal is even

farther distant across the vastness of Spain. Distance and isolation

have created in Portugal a sense that it is a part of Europe geographically but apart from it culturally, socially, economically, politically, and even psychologically. Even in the early 1990s, Lisbon

(Lisboa) was a two-to-three-day drive from Paris.

Portugal is bounded on the west and south by the Atlantic Ocean

and on the north and east by Spain. The country's shape is roughly

that of a rectangle, with its short sides on the north and south and

its long sides on the east and west. Portugal's Atlantic coastline

is 837 kilometers long; its northern and eastern frontiers with Spain

are 336 and 839 kilometers long, respectively.

Historically, Portugal emerged as a separate country during centuries of struggle with the Spanish provinces of Leon and Castile.

Even hundreds of years after Portugal broke away from Spain for the last time in 1640, fears remained in the country that it might

one day be swallowed up by larger and more powerful Spain,

perhaps not militarily, but culturally and economically. That sen- timent is expressed by the Portuguese proverb that "neither a good

wind nor a good marriage ever come from Spain." Meanwhile,

Portugal's long coast had given it an "Atlantic vocation" and

66
The Society and Its Environment

propelled its historic ventures of global exploration and colonization.

Portugal is not a homogeneous country geographically. The physical environment varies enormously, creating several distinct geographic regions that, in turn, have shaped the culture of the people

and their economy and society. Northern Portugal is a mountainous, rainy region, characterized by many small farms and vineyards. The Portuguese nation began in this region, fending off Leon

and Castile while simultaneously driving the Moors south and eventually out of the peninsula. It is a desolate area of rocky hillsides where smallholders have eked out a meager existence for hundreds

of years. This region is also said to be the origin of the strongest

Portuguese national values of hard work, thrift, traditionalism, Roman Catholicism, and practicality. It is also an area, however, that has lost many of its inhabitants through emigration.

Central Portugal, between the Rio Douro in the north and the

Tagus River (Rio Tejo), including the capital city of Lisbon and

its environs, is less homogeneous. The central coastal region consists of dunes and pine forests, and many residents of the area earn

their livelihood from fishing. The central eastern areas, known as the Beira, consist mainly of small and medium-sized farms, with some mining and light industry. The greater Lisbon area, including both the city and its suburbs, accounts for most of the nation's commerce and much of its industry.

Southern Portugal, known as the Alentejo (literally, ''beyond

the Tagus") is an area of gently rolling hills and plains dominated

by extensive estates with large-scale agriculture and grazing. It was

traditionally also a land of often embittered tenant farmers and

peasants. In contrast to the conservative north, the Alentejo was

an area of radical political movements; for a long time, the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues—PCP)

was the strongest party in the region.

The extreme south of Portugal is known as the Algarve. It is a dry region of smallholdings, grazing, and fishing, and coastal

towns. This is the area of Portugal most strongly influenced by

the Moors; even today Moorish influence is present in the region's

dialect and architecture. With its warm climate and Mediterrane- an sky, the Algarve has also become a center for tourism and a home to many foreign retirees. Historically, Portugal was divided administratively into six provinces that corresponded closely to these natural geographic di- visions (see fig. 4). The north consisted of two provinces, the coastal Minho and the interior Tras-os-Montes. The center was made up

of Beira and Estremadura, and the south consisted of the Alentejo

67
Portugal: A Country Study

, : — — — —

Figure 4. Historical Regions

and the Algarve. Later these historical provinces were further subdivided for administrative purposes, but the historical names have

been retained in popular usage (see fig. 1). Even though it is a small country, Portugal has a wide variety

of landforms, climatic conditions, and soils. The major difference

is between the mountainous regions of the north and, across the

Tagus River, the great rolling plains of the south. Within these

two major regions are further subdivisions that reflect the country's

68
The Society and Its Environment

vast differences. The Minho and Tras-os-Montes are both mountainous, but whereas the former is green with abundant rainfall,

the latter is dry and parched. The Beira Litoral and Estremadura

are younger geologically and contain sandstone, limestone, and vol- canic rock. Beira Alta (Upper Beira) is mountainous and forms

a barrier across the center of Portugal, but Beira Baixa (Lower

Beira) is dry and windswept, an extension of the Spanish plateau.

The Alentejo consists of gentle hills and plains. Because it is one

of the driest areas in the country, it is not suitable for intensive

agriculture. The area does support cattle raising, as well as cork

oak and some grains. It is separated from the Algarve by two mountain ranges, the Serra de Monchique and the Serra do Caldeirao.

Geography and topography are also reflected in the climate. The

mountainous regions of the north are considerably colder than the

south. Winter snows in the Serra da Estrela (which contains Portugal's highest peak at 1,986 meters) and the Serra do Geres near

the northern Spanish border may block roads for a time. The

weather along the northern coasts and in the center of the country

is milder; Lisbon has an average high temperature of 14°C in January and 27°C in August. Southern Portugal is warmer. The ocean moderates coastal temperatures, but the interior of the Alentejo can be quite warm, with temperatures sometimes above 40 °C during the summer months. Because of its Mediterranean climate, most

of Portugal's rainfall occurs in the winter, the north receiving much

more rain than the south.

Portugal has ten major rivers, five of which have their origins

in Spain. The Rio Minho begins in Spanish Galicia and for a dis- tance of seventy-four kilometers forms the northern Portuguese

frontier with Spain. The Rio Douro is of great importance to the commerce of northern Portugal. It also originates in Spain and flows

the entire width of Portugal before emptying into the Atlantic at Porto, the country's second largest city. The Rio Douro is navigable

by small craft for its full distance of 198 kilometers in Portugal;

historically the river was used to transport casks of port wine to Porto. Its steep banks are terraced with vineyards, and the valley

of the Rio Douro is one of the most picturesque in all Portugal.

The Tagus River is the country's longest river, has the largest

drainage basin, and is the most important economically. It is navigable only eighty kilometers upstream, but that includes the vast es- tuary on which Lisbon is located. The Tagus estuary is the best

natural port on the European continent and able to handle large

ocean-going vessels. It also contains the Cacilhas drydocks, the

largest in the world.

69
Portugal: A Country Study

The most important river in the south is the Rio Guadiana,

which, flowing north to south, forms part of the border with Spain.

Other important rivers in Portugal include the Rio Lima and the

Rio Tamega in the north, the Rio Mondego in the center, and

the Rio Sado and Rio Chanca in the south.

The soil systems of Portugal are usually sandy, arid, and acid,

reflecting the soils of the Iberian Peninsula generally. Soil in the

north can be rocky. Northern Portugal is better suited for agricul- ture than the south because of abundant rainfall, but with proper

irrigation the south could support more intensive agriculture.

About one-fourth of Portugal is covered by forests (mainly pine

and deciduous oak); if such cultivated tree crops as olives, cork

oak, almonds, chestnuts, and citrus are counted, about one-third

of the country's area is tree covered. In the northern mountains,

pine, oak, poplar, and elm trees are prevalent. Vegetation is more

varied in the central region and includes citrus trees and cork oak.

The warm, dry south contains many areas of rough pasture, as well as abundant cork oak.

In addition to continental Portugal, the country's territory also includes the Azores and Madeira islands. The Azores consist of

nine inhabited islands and several uninhabited rock outcroppings

1 ,280 kilometers west of the mainland in the Atlantic Ocean. The

archipelago has an area of 2,278 square kilometers and a population of about 250,000. The Azores produce sufficient foodstuffs for internal consumption and some exports, but they remain even poorer than the mainland. The Madeira archipelago, located about 560

kilometers miles west of North Africa, consists of two inhabited

and several uninhabited islands. With a total area of 788 square

kilometers and a population of about 270,000 people, the archipelago is severely overpopulated (see fig. 5). Demography

By the early 1990s, Portugal's population was just over 10 million, a little more than triple the 3.1 million estimated to live in

the country in 1801. The main causes for this slow growth were

a high infant mortality rate for much of these two centuries and

an emigration rate so extreme that in one decade, the 1960s, the

country's population actually fell. These trends have reversed in recent decades. The country's infant mortality rate at the beginning of the 1990s—10 per 1,000 in 1992—remained somewhat

higher than the European average but was one-fifth of that

registered two decades earlier. Emigration also slowed markedly

as prosperity appeared in Portugal in the second half of the 1980s.

Moreover, in the second half of the 1970s a massive influx of

70

QoCfo de Cddiz

25

International boundary

National capital

Populated place

Spot elevation in meters

100 Kilometers

50 75 100 Miles

Figure 5. Topography and Drainage

72
The Society and Its Environment

refugees from former Portuguese colonies in Africa caused a population surge. Population Size and Structure

Although population estimates are available for earlier years, the

first official Portuguese census was taken in 1864. It showed a population of approximately 4.3 million (see table 2, Appendix). Thereafter, the population increased slowly at rates often well under 1 percent per year. Only during the 1930s and 1940s did the population increase at over 1 percent per year. During the 1960s, the

population actually fell by over 300,000 and in 1970 amounted to about 8.5 million. During the early 1970s, population continued

to fall or was stagnant. This demographic trend was the result of

widespread emigration. Many Portuguese left their country in these

years to find employment abroad or to avoid military service in

the wars Portugal was fighting in its colonies in Africa. In 1974 the country's population showed its first sizeable increase

and by 1981 reached nearly 9.8 million, 1.2 million more than it had been ten years earlier. The settling in Portugal of an estimated

500,000 to 800,000 refugees from the country's African colonies

accounted for most of this increase. During the first half of the 1980s,

the population grew at a rate of about 0.8 percent a year, then

declined. As of the early 1990s, population growth was estimated

at 0.4 percent a year. By the beginning of 1992, the population

of Portugal, including the Azores and Madeira, was estimated at nearly 10.5 million. Population specialists projected that if exist- ing trends continued, the country's population would peak at 10.8

million in 2010 and fall to 10.5 in 2025.

This population is not evenly distributed. As of the late 1980s,

continental Portugal had an average population density of 109.6

persons per square kilometer, but some districts were much more

crowded than others. The eastern districts bordering Spain, with

the exception of Faro, had the lowest population density, ranging

between 17.0 per square kilometer in Beja and 35.6 per square

kilometer in Guarda. Coastal districts from the northern border

down to and including Setubal registered the highest concentrations of people. The districts of Lisbon and Porto, with 770.2 and

697.5 persons per square kilometer, respectively, were as densely

populated as many urban regions of Northern Europe (see table

3, Appendix).

Some of these differences in population density result from to- pography. Mountainous regions typically contain fewer people

than flat coastal regions. But some differences result from migration from one area to another within Portugal or from migration

73


Portugal: A Country Study

abroad. During the period 191 1-89, five districts, all of them bordering Spain in the east, lost population: Guarda lost about one-fourth

of its population, Beja and Castelo Branco lost about one-tenth,

and Braganga and Portalegre each lost about one-twentieth. The

only eastern district posting a gain in this period was Evora, which

grew by about one-sixth. Two inland districts, Vila Real and Viseu,

showed almost no growth; another inland district, Santarem, with

significant industrial employment, grew by one-half. All coastal

districts gained in population during this period. Coimbra and Faro

grew by one-fourth, Aveiro and Braga doubled their populations,

the districts of Lisbon and Porto increased by two-and-one-half

times, and Setubal increased more than three times. The Azores

showed almost no gain in population, but that of Madeira grew

by two-thirds.

The main areas of population growth were urban centers and

the district capitals. The urban-industrial centers along the coast

Lisbon, Porto, and Setubal—took in the largest numbers of new

immigrants. However, only the cities of Lisbon and Porto had significant populations, approximately 830,000 and 350,000, respectively, at the end of the 1980s. They were followed by Amadora

with 96,000 (part of greater Lisbon), Setubal with 78,000, and

Coimbra with 75,000. At the beginning of the 1990s, therefore, some two-thirds of all Portuguese still lived in what were classified as rural areas despite the significant growth of some urban areas. The Lisbon area was the region of greatest population growth

in absolute terms, in part because it was the seat of much of the

country's governmental apparatus, as well as its manufacturing

and service-sector jobs. Until the 1960s, the area's population in- creases were mainly inside the city of Lisbon, but since then the

suburbs have grown most rapidly. The central city's population

remained largely stagnant or even declined in some years, whereas

that of the suburbs surged. High city rents, crowding, the decline

of old neighborhoods, pollution, and the squeezing out of housing

by commercial enterprises were among the causes of this new suburbanization of Lisbon's outlying districts. Government population estimates showed that in the late 1980s

women outnumbered men by a wide margin and that the number

of old persons in Portugal was unusually high. The 1864 census and every census since has shown that women outnumber men.

In 1988 this was the case in all but two of the districts of continental Portugal, Beja and Braganga. The greatest disproportions were

found in northern and central areas where male emigration was

most intense. However, during the 1980s, men formed the majority

in twenty-two of the country's 305 municipalities. Eighteen of these

74
The Society and Its Environment

statistically unusual municipalities were in southern Portugal.

Portugal has long had an aging population. The percentage of

the population under age thirty has been decreasing since 1900.

Moreover, the rate at which the country's population has aged ac- celerated as ever more young Portuguese males in their physical

prime left the country. Between 1960 and 1990, the percentage of

those under fifteen fell from 29.0 to 20.9, whereas the percentage

of those sixty-five and older rose from 8.1 to 13.1. The north had

a disproportionate number of old and very young people, mainly

those still too young to migrate. In some areas of Portugal where

employment has been available, this preponderance was not the

case. Lisbon and the growth areas of Santarem and Setubal had

a disproportionate share of those of working age, between twenty

and sixty-five (see fig. 6). Emigration

Portugal has long been a nation whose people emigrated. Socially significant emigration first occurred in the fifteenth century

and sixteenth century during the great explorations. Although the

Portuguese established trading posts at many places in Africa and

Asia, Brazil was the main colony of settlement. Later, numbers

of Portuguese settled in the African colonies of Angola and Mozambique.

Emigration on a massive scale began in the second half of the

nineteenth century and continued into the 1980s. Between 1886

and 1966, Portugal lost an estimated 2.6 million people to emigration, more than any West European country except Ireland.

Emigration remained high until 1973 and the first oil shock that

slowed the economies of West European nations and reduced employment opportunities for Portuguese workers. Since then, emigration has been moderate, ranging between 12,000 and 17,000 a year

in the 1980s, a fraction of the emigration that occurred during the

1960s and early 1970s.

The main motive for emigration, at least in modern times, was

economic. Portugal had long been one of the poorest countries in

Europe. With the countryside able to support only a portion of farmers' offspring and few opportunities in the manufacturing sector,

many Portuguese had to go abroad to find work. In northern Portugal, for example, many young men emigrated because the land was divided into "handkerchief-sized" plots. In some periods, Por- tuguese emigrated to avoid military service. Thus, emigration in- creased during World War I and during the 1960s and early 1970s,

when Portugal waged a series of wars in an attempt to retain its African colonies.

75
Portugal: A Country Study

AGE-GROUP

MALES FEMALES

J

1

5 4 3 2 1 1 PERCENTAGE

2 3 4 5

Source: Based on information from Grande Enciclopedia Portuguesa e Brasileira, 9, Lisbon, 1987, 408.

Figure 6. Estimated Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 2000

For centuries the majority of emigrants were men. Around the turn of the century, about 80 percent of emigrants were male. Even

in the 1980s, male emigrants outnumbered female emigrants two

to one. Portuguese males traditionally emigrated for several years

while women and children remained behind. For several decades

after World War II, however, women made up about 40 percent

of emigrants.

The social effects resulting from this extensive and generally male

emigration included an aging population, a disproportionate number of women, and a slower rate of population growth. Childbearing

76
The Society and Its Environment

was postponed, and many women were obliged to remain single or to spend many years separated from their husbands. In some

areas where emigration was particularly intense, especially in the

north, villages resembled ghost towns, and visitors noted that only

women appeared to be working in the fields. Although emigration brought with it untold human suffering,

it had positive effects, as well. The women who stayed behind be- came more independent as they managed the family farm and fended for themselves. Emigrants abroad absorbed the more open and

pluralistic mores of more advanced countries; they also learned

about independent labor unions and extensive social welfare programs. The money that emigrants sent back to Portugal from their

job earnings abroad became crucial for the functioning of the Portuguese economy. Quite a number of the Portuguese who had done

well abroad eventually returned and built houses that were considerably better than the ones they had left behind years earlier. During the latter half of the nineteenth century and during much

of the twentieth century, the greatest number of emigrants went

to the Western Hemisphere. The Americas were seen as a New

World offering hope, jobs, land, and a chance to start fresh. Between 1864 and 1974, the Americas received approximately 50 per- cent of all Portuguese emigration.

Brazil was the destination of choice. In addition to the climate,

ties of history, culture, and language attracted the Portuguese to Brazil and enabled them to assimilate easily. Despite occasional

tensions between them and the Brazilians, the Portuguese saw Brazil

as a land of the future with abundant land and jobs. Hence, about

30 percent of Portugal's emigrants settled there between 1864 and

1973. A final surge of Portuguese emigrants was caused by the

Revolution of 1974, when an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Portuguese

associated with the former regime fled or were exiled to Brazil. According to government estimates, more than 1 million Portuguese were living in Brazil in the 1980s.

Among the other Latin American countries, Venezuela has

ranked second to Brazil in terms of Portuguese emigration and Argentina third. Other Latin American countries have received only

a few Portuguese immigrants, for the Portuguese, like other peoples, preferred to go to countries where their fellow countrypeople

could help them get settled. Emigration to North America was also heavy. By the late 1980s,

it was estimated that more than 1 million Portuguese and persons

of Portuguese descent lived in the United States and 400,000 lived

in Canada, most notably in Toronto and Montreal. Significant Por- tuguese migration to the United States began in the nineteenth

77
Portugal: A Country Study

century. Early in the twentieth century, substantial Portuguese communities were established in California, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. Since the 1950s, the most intense migration has been

to the northeast—Rhode Island and Connecticut—and to cities in

southeastern Massachusetts.

Portuguese emigration to the United States often involved whole

families, rather than just the men. For this reason, emigrants to the United States settled permanently, unlike Portuguese emigrants

to Northern Europe, who were mostly men who set out alone with

the intention of returning home after a few years. Another characteristic of the Portuguese migration to the United States was that

many migrants were fishermen from the Azores who came to work

in areas offshore of New England. Others migrated from Madeira

and Sao Tome.

Portugal was never as successful at stimulating emigration to its African territories as it wanted to be. For centuries the number

of Europeans in these territories was small. Faced with competition from other European imperialist powers in the nineteenth century, Portugal sought to fill up its vast African spaces with people.

The state allowed prisoners to work off their sentences by settling

in Africa, offered land grants and stipends to prospective settlers,

encouraged its soldiers assigned there to stay, and tried to lure other

Europeans to settle there to augment the thin Portuguese population. These efforts were not notably successful, however, and Portuguese emigration to Africa never amounted to more than 4 percent

of total emigration.

With mounting opposition in the 1960s to its efforts to retain

its African territories, Portugal's settlement efforts again reflected

political, as well as economic, motives. The government tried to persuade the unemployed, especially those in the north, to settle in Africa rather than emigrate illegally to Europe, but in the long run was unsuccessful in these efforts. Even the construction of major

dams and other infrastructure projects in the territories failed to lure significant numbers of settlers. By the mid-1970s, the African

colonies were lost, and Portugal was flooded with refugees from

these areas instead of providing emigrants to them.

Upwards of 1 million Portuguese or persons of Portuguese des- cent were living in the country's African colonies in 1974 when

these colonies gained independence. Most of these settlers left the

former colonies rather than live under the rule of the MarxistLeninist groups that came to power. Sizeable numbers went to South Africa and to Brazil, but an estimated 800,000 returned to Portugal, where they increased the already high unemployment

rate and added to the social and political tensions of the late 1970s.

78
The Society and Its Environment

Eventually, however, most of these returnees were assimilated into

Portuguese society, and some of them achieved notable political or financial success. During the first half of the twentieth century, most Portuguese

emigrating from their country went to Portugal's colonies or to the Western Hemisphere. This pattern changed dramatically in

the 1950s when Western Europe began to experience an economic

boom that lasted at least up to the first oil crisis of 1973. The boom

created millions of jobs, and Portuguese migrants traveled north

to fill them. Alongside Italians, Spaniards, Turks, North Africans,

and others, Portuguese worked in restaurants, in construction, in

factories, and in many other areas. Although much of the work

was menial and poorly paid, such employment provided signifi- cant economic advancement for many Portuguese. By the late 1960s, an estimated 80 percent of Portuguese emigrants went to Europe. Many of these emigrants did so illegally, without the re- quired documents, because the lure of Europe's prosperity was too strong to be resisted. France was the most popular destination. By the early 1970s,

it was estimated that 8 percent of Portugal's population lived there. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had the next

largest contingent. There were also sizeable Portuguese communities in Switzerland, Belgium, Britain, and the Netherlands.

Chaotic economic and social conditions resulting from the Revolution of 1974 caused a slight surge of emigration in the later 1970s,

but it never again reached the levels of the 1960s and early 1970s.

During the 1980s, the rate of emigration slowed as revolutionary turmoil subsided and the economy began to grow. Greater

governmental efficiency and membership in the EC attracted much

foreign investment and created jobs. Portuguese no longer had to go abroad to find economic opportunity.

Family and Kinship Relations

The deep-reaching political, economic, and social changes that

Portugal has experienced in the last few decades have left their mark

on the family, women's place within society, and the role of kinship relations. Women were the most affected, for a modernizing

economy offered them a greater range of choices than they had

in previous times, and the radical reforms enacted after the Revolution of 1974 gave them much greater rights. Kinship relations,

whether based on biology or social relationships, were perhaps the

least affected, for they remained vitally important in how Portuguese

lived and worked with one another.

79
Portugal: A Country Study

Family

The patriarchal and nuclear family traditionally has served as the norm and the ideal in Portugal. Until the constitution of 1976 was promulgated, the father was seen as the head of the family,

and his wife and children were obliged to recognize his authority.

He, in turn, was obliged by law to support and protect his family.

The men worked outside the home, and women were expected to care for the children and manage household affairs. Marriage was

considered permanent; divorce was virtually unknown. During the

period of Salazar's rule from 1928 to 1968, the family was even

seen as the primary institution of politics. Voting was organized

under the regime, the New State (Estado Novo), on a family

basis—only "heads of households" (usually men but sometimes

women) could vote. Although the nuclear and patriarchal family was the ideal, the

cultural patterns varied considerably depending on class status and

region. Upper- and middle-class families corresponded most closely to the ideal. Women remained at home tending the children and

rarely ventured out unaccompanied, and husbands managed their

businesses or followed their professions. Peasant and working-class

families were marked by greater variation. In northern Portugal,

for example, names and property were often passed on through

the mother because of the absence abroad of male heads of households for long periods. The fact that women could inherit land in Portugal gave women in rural areas some independence, and many

of them managed their own farms, took their produce to market,

and did much heavy work elsewhere seen as suitable for men. The

absence of men because of emigration meant that many women

never married and also resulted in a higher rate of illegitimacy than

in other Mediterranean countries.

The slow modernization of the Portuguese economy, the increasing employment of women outside the home, and the emigration

of many women, as well as the spread of new ideas about the place

of women and the nature of marriage, gradually changed the nature of the Portuguese family, despite the attempts of Salazar's Es- tado Novo to preserve the male-dominated nuclear family. The

Revolution of 1974 responded to these long pent-up social pressures. The reforms enacted after the revolution established in the civil code that men and women are equals in marriage, with the same

rights to make family decisions. Divorce became much easier, and

the number of divorces increased from 1,552 in 1975 to 5,874 in 1980 and 9,657 in 1989. The number of separations, formerly the

main method of ending a marriage, fell from 670 in 1975 to 70

80
81
Portugal: A Country Study

in 1980 but climbed to 195 in 1989. Illegitimacy was no longer

to be mentioned in official documents because such mention was

regarded as discriminatory; the frequency of births out of wedlock

rose from 7.2 percent to 14.5 percent between 1975 and 1989. Abortion under certain conditions became legal in 1984. Maternal leave

with full pay for ninety days was established for working mothers

in 1976. A small family allowance program was also instituted that

made payments at the birth of a child and all through his or her

childhood. Family planning also became an integral part of Portugal's social welfare program; the number of children born per

woman fell from 2.2 in 1980 to 1.7 in 1985 and 1.5 in 1988.

Relations within the family came to resemble more closely those

of the rest of Western Europe. Children were less respectful to their

parents, dating without chaperones was the rule, and outings in mixed gender groups or as couples were taken for granted—all things

that would not have happened during much of the Salazar era.

Still, some characteristics of Portuguese family life have remained

constant. Marriage and kinship networks in Portugal are often based on social and political criteria as much as on love or natural at- traction. To a degree that often surprises outsiders, many Portuguese marriages are arranged, even in the early 1990s. For the

peasant class, considerations of land are often most important in

determining marriage candidates. Marriages might be arranged

to consolidate property holdings or to tie two families together rather

than as a result of the affection two people might feel for one

another. Middle-class families often have status and prestige considerations in mind when they marry. Among the upper classes,

marriage might be for the purposes ofjoining two businesses, two

landholdings, or two political clans. Women

The constitution of 1976 guaranteed Portuguese women full equality for the first time in Portuguese history. Until the reforms

made possible by the Revolution of 1974, Portuguese women had

notably fewer political, economic, or personal rights than the women

of other European countries. In family matters, they were subordinate to their husbands, having to defer to male decisions about

how the children should be reared and educated. It was only in 1969 that all married women obtained the right to obtain a pass- port or leave Portugal without their husbands' consent. Equality for women was not attained through steady progress, but rather after reverses and defeats. For centuries, Portuguese

women were obliged by law and custom to be subservient to men. Women had few rights of either a legal or a financial nature and

82
The Society and Its Environment

were forced to rely on the benevolence of their male relatives. Late

in the nineteenth century and early in the twentieth century, some

educated persons saw the need for women's equality and emancipation. A small Portuguese suffragette movement formed, and some young women began to receive higher educations. Shortly after the proclamation of the First Republic in the fall of 1910, laws were

enacted establishing legal equality in marriage, requiring civil marriages, freeing women of the obligation to remain with their husbands, and permitting divorce. However, women were still not

allowed to manage property or to vote. Salazar's New State meant the end to these advances. The constitution of 1933 proclaimed everyone equal before the law "except for women, the differences resulting from their nature and

for the good of the family." Although the regime allowed women

with a secondary education to vote (men needed only to read and

write), it once again obliged women to remain with their husbands.

The Concordat of 1940 between the Portuguese government and

the Roman Catholic Church gave legal validity to marriages

within the church and forbade divorce in such marriages. Later

amendments to the civil code, even in the 1960s, cemented the husband's dominance in marriage.

The constitution of 1976 brought Portuguese women full legal

equality. Anyone eighteen or over was granted the right to vote,

and full equality in marriage was guaranteed. A state entity, the

Commission on the Status of Women, was established and from

1977 on was attached to the prime minister's office. Its task was

to improve the position of women in Portugal and to oversee the

protection of their rights. This entity was renamed the Commission for Equality and Women's Rights (Comissao para a Igualdade e Direitos das Mulheres) in 1991.

The position of women improved as a result of these legal re- forms. By the early 1990s, women were prominent in many professions. Thirty-seven percent of all physicians were women, as were many lawyers. Slighdy more than half of those enrolled in higher

education were women. Working-class women also made gains.

A modernizing economy meant that many women could find employment in offices and factories and that they had a better stan- dard of living than their mothers.

Despite these significant gains, however, Portuguese women still have not achieved full social and economic equality. They remain

underrepresented in most upper-level positions, whether public or

private. Women usually hold less than 10 percent of the seats

in the country's parliament. Women are also rarely cabinet members or judges. In the main trade unions, women's occupancy of

83
Portugal: A Country Study

leadership positions is proportionally only half their total union

membership, and, on the whole, working-class women earned less than their male counterparts.

The Extended Family and Kinship Relations

The extended family and kinship relations, including ritual kinship, are also important. The role of the godparent, for example,

has an importance in Portugal that it lacks in the United States. Being a godparent implied certain lifetime obligations, such as helping a godchild in trouble, arranging admission to a school, finding employment, or furthering a professional or political career. The godchild, in turn, owes loyalty and service to the godparent.

The system is one of patronage based on mutual obligation.

Political kinship networks can consist of several hundred persons. Such extended networks are especially prevalent among the

elite. Members of the elite are bound not only by marriage and

family, but also by business partnerships, friendships, political ties, university or military academy bonds, and common loyalties. It has long been the practice to have such family connections in the

government so as to be able to extract favors and contracts. The

elite and middle-class families also try to have a "cousin," real or ritual, in all political parties so that their interests are protected no matter which party is in power. Sometimes the parties or in- terest groups are just "fronts" for these family groupings. These

extended families also try to have members in different sectors of

the economy, both to enhance profits and to enable each sector

to support and reinforce the others. Although these extended family

networks are difficult for outsiders to penetrate, some observers

regard them as the country's most important political and economic

institutions, of greater real consequence than political parties, in- terest organizations, or government institutions.

The poor and working class lack the extended family networks

of the middle class and the wealthy. Kin relations outside the nuclear

family are weak. Little premium is placed on building economic

alliances through an extended family network because there is lit- tle wealth to be shared or gained. Similarly, there is no reason to build strong political connections because the poor lack political

power. However, a poor person might succeed in persuading a lo- cal landowner or village notable to serve as godfather to his chil- dren. In that way, the individual becomes part of a larger network,

expecting favors in return for loyalty and service. If that network

becomes wealthy or achieved political prominence, then the poor

person attached to it might also expect to benefit—perhaps by obtaining a low-level government job. But if it falls, the individual

84
The Society and Its Environment

also falls. The entire Portuguese local and national system is based on these extended family and patronage ties, which are often as important as formal institutions.

Social Structure and Social Classes

For centuries the most distinctive feature of Portugal's social structure was its remarkable stability. Portuguese society was long

cast in an almost premodern, quasifeudal mold. It was based on

strong considerations of rank, place, and class. The system consisted of a small elite at the top, a huge mass of peasants at the

bottom, and almost no one in between. Because Portugal's industrialization arrived late, the country did not experience until late in the nineteenth century some of the class changes associated with

rapid economic development in other nations. When industrialization finally did come, Salazar's dictatorship held its sociopolitical effects in check almost to the very end. Then these pent-up

changes exploded in the Revolution of 1974.

Historically, Portuguese society consisted of two main classes: nobility and peasants. Social prestige, political power, and economic

prosperity were based on the ownership of land. The land was con- centrated in large estates owned by a small elite that had obtained

lands and titles during the reconquest of the peninsula from the

Moors. As the Portuguese armies drove the Moors farther and far- ther south, their leaders acquired rights to the use and eventually

ownership of the lands they had conquered. These titles were con- firmed by the king in return for the landowners' loyalty and ser- vice. It was, in its origins, a classical feudal contract but derived

in the Portuguese case from warfare and territorial conquest. The

Roman Catholic Church also held vast lands. From the very birth

of Portugal, then, landed, governmental, military, and religious

authority were closely bound.

The rest of the population counted for very little in this social

order. The small traditional middle class, consisting of soldiers,

merchants, artisans, and low-level bureaucrats, lacked any solidarity as a class or sufficient numbers to give it political power. The re- maining 90 percent of the population eked out meager existences

as tenant farmers, serfs, and peasants. Little social mobility existed.

Instead, one accepted one's station in life and did not rebel against

it; rebelling was not only forbidden but also seen as an affront to God's immutable laws. Generation after generation, down through

the centuries, this rigid, unyielding, hierarchical social structure

persisted.

It was not unusual that from the twelfth century through the four- teenth century, Portugal's formative years as a nation, the country

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Portugal: A Country Study

was organized in this two-class system and on a feudal basis; such

organization was the norm in Europe. What was surprising was

that this class system and all its rigidities lasted through the seventeenth century, when the system became even more consolidated,

and beyond. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a "new rich" class emerged that was based on commerce and in- vestment, but members of this class bought land, intermarried with

the old elite, and thus perpetuated the two-class system.

Even in the twentieth century, despite the onset of modernization, this structure persisted. With economic stimulus, a new middle

class began to emerge. But it largely imitated upper-class ways

disdaining manual labor, cultivating genteel virtues, and distancing itself from the lower classes—and was coopted into the elite's way of thinking and behaving. In addition, an industrial work force began to grow up alongside the traditional peasantry. However,

under Salazar its labor unions were kept under control, and the

workers had no independent bargaining power. Just as the emerging

middle class joined the elite, the emerging working class was kept

down as a sort of urban "peasantry." In this way, the essentially

conservative and two-class system of Portugal was perpetuated even

into the era of industrialization.

Under Salazar the regime did little to ameliorate the social inequalities that had long existed in Portugal. Salazar recognized that

his strength lay with the conservative, traditional elements, especially the strongly Catholic peasantry of the north, so he did little to increase literacy or improve the road system that would lead

to increased mobility, urbanization, and the eventual undermining of his power. He also tried consciously to keep Portugal isolated

from the modernizing and culture-changing currents of the rest of Europe. His corporative system brought some benefits to the

workers, but it also kept them under the strict control of the re- gime. Moreover, during Salazar' s rule, Portugal lagged even further

behind other nations in terms of housing, education, and health

care. Several sociological studies carried out in the 1960s confirmed

that Portugal's ossified, hierarchical social structure continued even

into modern times. One study found four social categories: an upper class of industrialists, proprietors, and high government offi- cials accounting for 3.8 percent of the population; a middle stratum

of rural proprietors, military officers, teachers, and small-scale en- trepreneurs constituting 6.9 percent; a lower-middle stratum of

clerks, low-level civil servants, military enlisted men, and rural shopkeepers adding up to 27.2 percent; and a majority—62.1 percent

consisting of workers, both rural and urban. Another study located

86
Obidos, a small town in the region of Estremadura

Street scene in Alfama, the oldest quarter of Lisbon

Courtesy Daniele Kohler

87
Portugal: A Country Study

1 to 2 percent of the population in the upper class, 15 to 20 per- cent in the middle class, and 75 percent in the lower class. Both

studies, carried out independentiy, arrived at strikingly similar conclusions.

Yet, even with all this rigidity, class change was beginning to occur as a result of the slow modernization of the economy. Some

groups were losing their traditional status and social power and

were being displaced by groups better able to function in the evolving economy. These changes can be shown through a closer ex- amination of the various groups that made up the country's elite, middle, and lower classes. The Elite Before the Revolution of 1974, Portugal's elite could be divided

into five groups; the nobility, the large landowners, the heads of

large businesses, the members of learned professions, and highranking military officers. These elites were closely connected and

intertwined in numerous complex ways.

The oldest group historically was the nobility. It generally traced

its origins to the formative period of Portuguese history. The monarchy had frequently granted noble titles to the elite in return for loyalty and service. In modern times, this nobility continued fre- quently to use the titles of duke, count, or marquis. A title was

a symbol of status and was often eagerly sought, although the younger, more liberal generation frequently scoffed at such titles. Some

of the titled nobility went into the learned professions or high

government service. In the modern age, a titled nobility seemed

anachronistic, but in Portugal this elite lingered on. A second group, often overlapping with the first, consisted of

large landowners, or latifundidrios. They were chiefly concentrated

in the Alentejo, but other areas of Portugal, such as the Beira and

Ribatejo, also contained large estates. Increasingly, this landholding

element had become absentee landlords, settling in Lisbon and leav- ing their estates in the hands of managers. In Lisbon, the landed

elites frequently diversified into business and industry but kept their

estates, sometimes as profit-making enterprises, but most often as symbols of status. This elite was also in the process of being eclipsed

when the Revolution of 1974 occurred.

More important than either of these first two groups were busi- ness people and industrialists. These elements had come to promi- nence in Portugal in the 1960s and early 1970s as Portuguese

economic growth accelerated and the country industrialized. The

business elite was often well educated and had emerged from the

middle class. It filled the ranks of managers, administrators, and

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The Society and Its Environment

company presidents. Quite a number married, or their children

married, into the nobility or the landed class. As Portugal continued

to develop economically, the business groups gained in influence,

particularly as the survival of the regime came to depend on a prosperous economy.

A fourth group among the elite consisted of the learned professions, including university professors. Medicine as a profession had

traditionally enjoyed particular prestige in Portugal. Lawyers similarly enjoyed prestige; many of them went into government service or became managers of banks and major companies. University

professors were also valued: Salazar and Caetano were both university dons, and their cabinets often included several professors. The

high prestige stemmed in part from the fact that university education was so rare in Portugal and a professor far rarer still; it also stemmed from the need for technical expertise in the government.

Because of the large number of university professors, Salazar' s re- gime was often referred to as a catedratocracia, a term derived from

the Portuguese word for university chair, cdtedra. The fifth elite was the military officer corps. These were men,

often from middle- or lower middle-class ranks, who had made it to the top in a very important institution: the armed forces. Education and the military, in fact, were among the few means open

to ambitious middle-class youth to rise in the social scale in highly

class-conscious Portugal. The military officers did not always mingle

well with the upper-class civilians, but the power and importance

of the armed forces meant they had to be paid serious attention. In addition, many of the banks, large businesses, and elite family

groups, as a way of protecting their interests, placed military officers on their payrolls.

These elites were closely interrelated. A landowner living in the

city might go into business or banking; a wealthy business person

or industrialist might buy land. They themselves or their children

would acquire an education and enter the learned professions. Busi- ness elites formed groups in which they owned diverse holdings:

typically, insurance, hotels, construction, banking, real estate, and

newspapers. They hired university professors and military officers to help administer these holdings—or as an "insurance policy."

Some members of the group held government positions—often car- rying out private and public activities simultaneously. These groups were tightly inbred and often overlapping, with powerful politicaleconomic-military connections.

The Revolution of 1974 largely destroyed this oligarchic system.

Many of the old political elites associated with the regime were

forced into exile, and others had their businesses confiscated. Almost

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Portugal: A Country Study

all lost their positions and many of their holdings as a result of the

revolution. Many members of the old elite eventually found their

way back to Portugal and some began again to prosper in the late 1980s. But the strength of the elite was nowhere near so great as

it was before 1974 and may have been ended permanently.

The Middle Class

The middle class in Portugal had long been growing in size but

grew more rapidly beginning in the early 1960s as economic growth

quickened. Depending on the criteria used, at the beginning of the

1990s Portugal's middle class could account for 25 to 30 percent

of the population.

The traditional principle of political science states that the growth

of a middle class brings greater social stability and better chances

for the flourishing of democracy. However, the correlation of

middle-class stability and democracy does not necessarily hold in

Portugal. The reason for this lack of correlation stems from the

fact that "middle class" in Portugal has two definitions. One defi- nition is based on social and cultural criteria and the other on eco- nomics. The definition using economic criteria is the easiest to state: everyone above a certain income level but below another income

level is middle class. This criterion includes some less wealthy professionals, business people, soldiers, government workers, small farmers who own their own lands, clerks, and better-off industrial

workers. This list includes a large variety of persons of diverse oc- cupations with little connecting them in terms of education, family background, or political values.

According to the socio-cultural definition of middle class, per- sons belonging to the middle class do not engage in manual labor,

disdain it, and tend to feel a sense of superiority to those below

them in the social hierarchy. The social-cultural definition regards

professionals, business and commercial elements, military officers,

and government workers as middle class, but not enlisted members of the military, farmers, or industrial workers, no matter what

their earnings. This latter definition of middle class results in a

smaller group, more homogeneous in outlook than that resulting

from purely economic criteria. If the older, more traditional variety of middle class with its es- sentially aristocratic values (disdain for manual labor, for example) proved to be the prevailing model even in the 1990s, Portugal

would remain essentially a two-class society divided between those

who work with their hands and those who do not. A two-class so- ciety increases chances for division, class conflict, and even civil war. By contrast, the emergence of a large and independent middle

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The Society and Its Environment

class defined by economic categories rather than socio-cultural traits favors the growth of social pluralism and political stability. As both

definitions of the middle class are employed in Portugal, predicting the country's future is more difficult than elsewhere in Western

Europe.

An indication that economic criteria have greater validity than

in the past is that Portugal's middle class, traditionally deeply divided on a host of social and political issues, increasingly votes for the moderate, centrist Social Democrat Party (Partido Social

Democrata—PSD). The PSD has come to be seen by its foes, as well as its supporters, as a "bourgeois" party. The Portuguese

working class, in contrast, has voted increasingly for the Socialist

Party (Partido Socialista—PS), although the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues—PCP) also has won

some of its votes. The Lower Class

Portuguese have long used the all-encompassing term o povo to describe the l^wer class. povo means "the people," but the term

has a class connotation, as well. Analysts of Portuguese society have

postulated that o povo encompasses perhaps four main groups, in- cluding agricultural workers who either own or do not own land

and organized and unorganized labor in urban areas. Ownership of land is the main criterion for subdividing the poor

in rural areas. There is a strong regional difference in ownership.

Portugal's north is noted for its small farms and self-employed small

farmers. Farmers who own land tend to be independent, rather

conservative, and strongly Catholic in their beliefs. They tend to vote for the center and center-right political parties. Within this class of smallholders, some are better off than others. Some are obliged to work part-time on other farms. Many offspring of smallholders migrate to the cities or emigrate abroad. Their female rela- tives often remain behind to till the land.

The rural poor of the south in the Alentejo, like those of the north, are often referred to as "peasants," but that catchall term obscures

important regional differences between these two groups. Relatively

few of the o povo in the Alentejo own their own land. Instead, they

work on the region's large estates, some full-time, others perhaps

only two days a week. Their politics are often radical, and, in contrast to the smallholders of the north, they tend to vote for socialist and communist parties. The Alentejo was the area most strongly

affected by the Revolution of 1974, and many of the large estates were nationalized and designated for agrarian reform or were taken over in a land seizure by their workers.

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Portugal: A Country Study

Urban areas also have two major groups of the working class,

mainly defined in terms of whether or not they are politically

organized. The unorganized lumpen proletariat, usually recent

arrivals from the countryside, are often unemployed or underemployed. Members of the urban working class who belong to labor

unions are considerably better off and could be regarded as the

"elite" of Portugal's lower classes. The lumpen proletariat live in urban slums, the most extensive

of which are in Lisbon. Migrants from the countryside, they are

often illiterate and not members of a labor union. Many can find no regular work but are employed in menial jobs on a part-time

basis. The slums they live in are often partly hidden from view

behind walls or fences and even in the early 1990s frequently lacked

electricity, water, and sewerage systems. The housing in these slums

is often fabricated from any available materials, including fiber

glass, cardboard, and tin; hence, these areas are called in Portuguese

bairros de lata—neighborhoods of tin. In addition to physical hardships, slum dwellers have to contend with violence and crime. Portugal's increasing prosperity since the second half of the 1980s has

not yet been sufficient to efface these districts, which look as if they

are part of the Third World.

Portugal's organized working class has a better standard of liv- ing than does the unskilled and unorganized poor. Their salaries are relatively high, and they are strongly entrenched in Portugal's

key industries. Portugal has a long history of urban trade unions.

Under Salazar's corporative system, they were strictly controlled,

but after the Revolution of 1974 they became major actors in the

political system and managed to secure decent wages for their membership.

A New Portugal?

Portugal was long a closed, hierarchical, elitist, rigidly structured

society whose social institutions seemed to be more nineteenth cen- tury than twentieth. Portugal was called a "society of uniforms"

because people could be identified and their class rank determined

by the clothes they wore, their manner of speech, and how they

walked and carried themselves. Social structure was seen as immutable, and persons were expected to accept their station in life. Other than a few slots in the university or the military officer corps, few opportunities existed for upward mobility.

The Revolution of 1974 destroyed, undermined, or at least precipitated the toppling of many of these hierarchical institutions. In the years since then, Portuguese society has become more flexi- ble. More opportunities for social mobility have appeared, and old

92
A fishing boat at Aveiro in Northern Portugal

A fisherman uses cattle to draw in fishing boats at Aveiro. Courtesy Daniele Kohler

93
Portugal: A Country Study

categories of place and position have became blurred. Portuguese

society has become more egalitarian, pluralist, and democratic, and

there was more of what the Portuguese liked to call movimento

(change, dynamism, or movement).

In the years following the mid-1970s, the country's middle class grew in size and solidarity, the working class enjoyed a rising stan- dard of living, and the number of entrepreneurs and technicians

increased markedly. The most significant of these changes was the

growth of a sizeable and more stable middle class that offered the

hope for a more stable and democratic country. The middle class largely replaced the old elite and came to dominate most Portuguese

social and political institutions: the political parties, the church,

business, the military officer corps, government and bureaucracy, and even union leadership. Thus, a major class shift occurred.

It has begun earlier in the century, continued through the Salazar

era, and by the early 1990s appeared to have been consolidated.

This shift from upper- to middle-class leadership could give Portugal the basis for stable, democratic rule that it lacked before.

Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups

Portugal's population is remarkably homogeneous and has been

so for all of its history. This lack of ethnic variety helped it become

the first unified nation- state in Western Europe. For centuries Portugal had virtually no ethnic, tribal, racial, religious, or cultural

minorities. Almost all Portuguese speak the national language,

almost all are Roman Catholic, and almost all identify with Portuguese culture and the nation of Portugal. Whereas neighboring

Spain was deeply divided along ethnic, linguistic, and regional lines

all through its history, Portugal, which historically represented but one of the Iberian Peninsula's many regional entities, was united.

In Portugal, ethnic unity and homogeneity were the rule, rather

than the exception.

Although Portugal lacks socially significant ethnic differences, some regional differences exist. The north is generally more conservative and Catholic than the south and is said to be less "tainted" by Moorish or Islamic influences. Regional dances, dress,

festivals, and customs were once very distinctive, but modern communications and transportation have opened up and connected

formerly closed regions and produced a greater homogeneity. The

Portuguese language still exhibits regional differences, and linguists can often pinpoint a person's geographic origin from his speech,

but these differences are not extreme enough to impede understanding among Portuguese.

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The Society and Its Environment

Protestants live in Portugal, but they are largely confined to the

communities of foreigners residing in the country. The small but

growing Muslim population from North Africa, mainly guest workers attracted by Portugal's new prosperity, is concentrated in the

Algarve and in Lisbon. The Jewish population in Portugal is very

small (from 500 to 1 ,000) and, like the Protestant population, mainly

limited to foreign residents.

Portugal has a sizeable Gypsy population, perhaps as many as 100,000, most of whom live in the Algarve. Despite government

efforts to integrate them into the larger society, Gypsies remain

a group apart, seminomadic, earning their living by begging,

fortune-telling, handicrafts, and trading.

Portugal's foreign community numbered about 90,000 in 1987.

It consists mainly of Africans (about 40 percent), Spaniards, British, Americans, French, and Germans, most of whom live in Porto, Lisbon, the area around Cascais, the Algarve, and the Azores

and Madeira. These communities are not large and generally do

not become involved in Portuguese life. Portugal's long colonial history, more than half a millennium,

has left some traces of ethnic diversity. In the early 1990s, the in- digenous residents of the former colonies were found mainly in Lisbon, particularly after the colonies were granted independence in the mid-1970s. Groups of Angolans, Mozambicans, Sao Tomans,

Timorese, Goans, and Macaoans have settled in the capital city,

and, along with Brazilian immigrants, ended Portugal's traditional

ethnic homogeneity.

The Goans come from the Indian subcontinent and are usually

educated, Roman Catholic, and Portuguese speaking. They are

better assimilated than most other groups. The Macaoans are generally of Chinese descent, and many had opened businesses. Another group from Asia, the Timorese, are not as well educated as the other eastern groups. A population of varying size of black immigrants from Portugal's African colonies often lives together in small ghettos in Lisbon and does not generally assimilate. Many

of these minorities use Portugal as a stopping-off point en route

to more prosperous countries in Western Europe, but as the Portuguese economy began to improve in the second half of the 1980s, more chose to stay permanently. These ethnic minorities from the

former colonies are not fully assimilated and often face, to a varying degree, racial and cultural prejudice. The small size of these

diverse ethnic groups, however, prevents their apartness from being

a serious social problem.

The only group from the former colonies that is fully assimilated, despite some cultural and adjustment problems, is the group

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Portugal: A Country Study

coming from the former colonies in Africa who are of Portuguese

descent. They have much the same racial and cultural background

as the Portuguese themselves. Some of them, like some of the

Brazilians, did very well in their cultural homeland and even be- came wealthy.

Religion and the Role of the Roman Catholic Church

Portugal is profoundly Roman Catholic. According to a com- mon saying, "To be Portuguese is to be Catholic"; in the early

1990s, approximately 97 percent of the population considered it- self Roman Catholic—the highest percentage in Western Europe.

Only about one-third of the population attends mass and takes the

sacraments regularly, but nearly all Portuguese wish to be baptized and married in the church and to receive its last rites. Portugal is Roman Catholic not only in a religious sense, but

also socially and culturally. Although church and state were for- mally separated during the First Republic (1910-26), a separation

reiterated in the constitution of 1976, the two still form a seamless

web in many areas of life. Catholic precepts historically undergird

the society as well as the polity. The traditional notions of authority,

hierarchy, and accepting one's station in life all stem from Roman

Catholic teachings. Many Portuguese holidays and festivals have

religious origins, and the country's moral and legal codes derive

from Roman Catholic precepts. The educational and health care systems have long been the church's preserve, and whenever a

building, bridge, or highway is opened, it receives the blessing of

the clergy. Hence, although church and state are formally separated, absolute separation is not possible in practice.

History

Portugal was first Christianized while part of the Roman Empire. Christianity was solidified when the Visigoths, a Germanic

tribe already Christianized, came into the Iberian Peninsula in the

fifth century (see Germanic Invasions, ch. 1). Christianity was nearly extinguished in southern Portugal during Moorish rule, but in

the north it provided the cultural and religious cement that helped

hold Portugal together as a distinctive entity (see Muslim Domination, ch. 1). By the same token, Christianity was the rallying

cry of those who rose up against the Moors and sought to drive

them out (see Christian Reconquest, ch. 1). Hence, Christianity

and the Roman Catholic Church predated the establishment of the

Portuguese nation, a point that shaped relations between the two. Under Afonso Henriques (r. 1 139-85), the first king of Portugal

and the founder of the Portuguese state, church and state were

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The Society and Its Environment

unified into a lasting and mutually beneficial partnership (see For- mation of the Monarchy, ch. 1). To secure papal recognition of

his country, Afonso declared Portugal a vassal state of the pope.

The king found the church to be a useful ally as he drove the Moors

toward the south and out of Portuguese territory. For its support

of his policies, Afonso richly rewarded the church by granting it vast lands and privileges in the territories conquered from the

Moors. The church became the country's largest landowner, and

its power came to be equal to that of the nobility, the military orders, and even, for a time, the crown. But Afonso also asserted his

supremacy over the church, a supremacy that—with various ups

and downs—was maintained.

Although relations between the Portuguese state and the Roman

Catholic Church were generally amiable and stable, their relative

power fluctuated. In the thirteenth century and fourteenth century, the church enjoyed both riches and power stemming from its role in the reconquest and its close identification with early Portuguese nationalism. For a time the church's position vis-a-vis the

state diminished until the growth of the Portuguese overseas empire made its missionaries important agents of colonization.

In 1497, reflecting events that had occurred five years earlier

in Spain, Portugal expelled the Jews and the remaining Moors

or forced them to convert. In 1536 the pope gave King Joao III

(r. 1521-57) permission to establish the Inquisition in Portugal to enforce the purity of the faith (see Counter-Reformation and Overseas Evangelization, ch. 1). Earlier the country had been rather

tolerant, but now orthodoxy and intolerance reigned. The Jesuit

order was placed in charge of all education. In the eighteenth century, antichurch sentiment became strong.

The Marques de Pombal (r. 1750-77) expelled the Jesuits in 1759,

broke relations with Rome, and brought education under the state's control (see Absolutism, ch. 1). Pombal was eventually removed

from his office, and many of his reforms were undone, but anticlericalism remained a force in Portuguese society. In 1821 the In- quisition was abolished, religious orders were banned, and the

church lost much of its property. Relations between church and

state improved in the second half of the nineteenth century, but

a new wave of anticlericalism emerged with the establishment of

the First Republic in 1910 (see The First Republic, ch. 1). Not

only were church properties seized and education secularized, but

the republic went so far as to ban the ringing of church bells, the

wearing of clerical garb on the streets, and the holding of many

popular, religious festivals. These radical steps antagonized many

deeply religious Portuguese, cost the republic popular support, and

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Portugal: A Country Study

paved the way for its overthrow and the establishment of a conservative right-wing regime.

The Salazar Regime

Under the dictatorship of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar (r. 1928-68), the church experienced a revival (see The New State,

ch, 1). Salazar was himself deeply religious and infused with Roman Catholic precepts. Before studying law he had been a seminarian; his roommate at the University of Coimbra, Manuel

Gongalves Cerejeira, later became cardinal patriarch of Lisbon.

In addition, Salazar' s corporative principles and his constitution

and labor statute of 1933 were infused with Roman Catholic

precepts from the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931).

Salazar' s state was established on the principles of traditional

Roman Catholicism, with an emphasis on order, discipline, and

authority. Class relations were supposed to be based on harmony

rather than the Marxist concept of conflict. The family, the parish, and Christianity were said to be the foundations of the state. Salazar went considerably beyond these principles, however, and

established a full-fledged dictatorship. His corporative state con- tinued about equal blends of Roman Catholic principles and

Mussolini-like fascism. In 1940 a concordat governing church-state relations was signed

between Portugal and the Vatican. The church was to be

"separate" from the state but to enjoy a special position. The Concordat of 1 940 reversed many of the anticlerical policies undertaken

during the republic, and the Roman Catholic Church was given

exclusive control over religious instruction in the public schools.

Only Catholic clergy could serve as chaplains in the armed forces. Divorce, which had been legalized by the republic, was again made

illegal for those married in a church service. The church was given

formal "juridical personality," enabling it to incorporate and hold

property.

Under Salazar, church and state in Portugal maintained a comfortable and mutually reinforcing relationship. While assisting the

church in many ways, however, Salazar insisted that it stay out

of politics—unless it praised his regime. Dissent and criticism were

forbidden; those clergy who stepped out of line—an occasional parish priest and once the bishop of Porto—were silenced or forced

to leave the country.

Changes after the Revolution of 1974

In the Portuguese constitution of 1976, church and state were

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The Society and Its Environment

again formally separated. The church continues to have a special

place in Portugal, but for the most part it has been disestablished.

Other religions are now free to organize and practice their beliefs. In addition to undergoing constitutional changes, Portugal be- came a more secular society. Traditional Roman Catholicism

flourished while Portugal was overwhelmingly poor, rural, and il- literate, but as the country became more urban, literate, and secular

the practice of religion declined. The number of men becoming

priests fell, as did charitable offerings and attendance at mass. By

the early 1990s, most Portuguese still considered themselves Roman Catholic in a vaguely cultural and religious sense, but only

about one-third of them attended mass regularly. Indifference to religion was most likely among men and young people. Regular

churchgoers were most often women and young children.

The church no longer has its former social influence. During

the nineteenth century and on into the Salazar regime, the church was one of the most powerful institutions in the country—along

with the army and the economic elite. In fact, military, economic,

governmental, and religious influences in Portugal were closely in- tertwined and interrelated, often literally so. Traditionally, the first son of elite families inherited land, the second went into the army,

and the third became a bishop. By the early 1990s, however, the

Roman Catholic Church no longer enjoyed this preeminence and

had fallen to seventh or eighth place in power among Portuguese

interest groups.

During the height of the revolutionary turmoil in the mid-1970s,

the church had urged its communicants to vote for centrist and

conservative candidates and to repudiate communists, especially

in northern Portugal, but after that period the church refrained

from such an overt political role. The church was not able to pre- vent the enactment of the constitution of 1976, which separated

church and state, nor could it block legislation liberalizing divorce

and abortion, issues it regarded as moral issues within the realm

of its responsibility. By the 1980s, the church seldom tried to in- fluence how Portuguese voted, knowing such attempts would probably backfire.

Religious Practices

The practice of religion in Portugal shows striking regional differ- ences. Even in the early 1990s, 60 to 70 percent of the population

in the traditionally Roman Catholic north regularly attended reli- gious services, compared with 10 to 15 percent in the historically

anticlerical south. In the greater Lisbon area, about 30 percent were

regular churchgoers.

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Portugal: A Country Study

The traditional importance of Roman Catholicism in the lives of the Portuguese is evident in the physical organization of almost

every village in Portugal. The village churches are usually in prominent locations, either on the main square or on a hilltop overlooking the villages. Many of the churches and chapels were built in

the sixteenth century at the height of Portugal's colonial expansion and might and were often decorated with wood and gold leaf

from the conquests. In recent decades, however, they have often

been in disrepair, for there are not enough priests to tend them.

Many are used only rarely to honor the patron saints of the vil- lages.

Much of the country's religious life has traditionally taken place

outside the formal structure and official domain of the Roman

Catholic Church. This is especially true in rural areas where the

celebration of saints' days and religious festivals are popular. The

most famous of Portuguese religious events is the supposed apparition of the Virgin Mary to three children in 1917 in the village

of Fatima in the province of Santarem. Hundreds of thousands

of pilgrims have visited the shrine at Fatima in the belief that the

pilgrimage could bring about healing.

Rural Portuguese often seek to establish a close and personal

relationship with their saints. Believing God to be a remote and

inaccessible figure, they petition patron saints to act as inter- mediaries. This system of patronage resembles that operating

in the secular realm. To win their saint's goodwill, believers present the saint with gifts, gave alms to the poor, and demonstrate

upright behavior, hoping that the saint might intercede on their

behalf with God.

Women tend to practice their religion more than men do, as evidenced by church attendance. In addition, the Virgin Mary,

who is the most popular of the spiritual mediators, is often

revered more than Jesus and serves as the patron of religious processions. The image of the Virgin, as well as that of Christ, is commonly displayed, even in labor union offices or on signs in

demonstrations.

The Roman Catholic Church sometimes criticizes religious folk practices for dividing people from their God. The church cannot

monitor all folk customs, however, and such practices continue even

in the 1990s. Moreover, the church recognizes that many Portuguese feel at least as much loyalty to their saints and customary

religious practices as they do to the more formal church. For these reasons, it is not unusual that the church tolerates and sometimes

even encourages these practices as a way of maintaining popular

adherence to Roman Catholicism.

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Streetcar in Lisbon

Children playing in a Lisbon courtyard

Courtesy Daniele Kbhler

101
Portugal: A Country Study

Other aspects of Portuguese folk religion, including witchcraft,

magic, and sorcery, are not approved by the official church. For- mal religion, folk beliefs, and superstition are frequently jumbled

together, and in the popular mind all are part of being Roman

Catholic. Particularly in the isolated villages of northern Portugal, belief in witches, witchcraft, and evil spirits is widespread. Some

persons believe in the concept of the "evil eye" and fear those who

supposedly possess it. Again, women are the main practitioners.

Almost every village has its "seers," practitioners of magic, and

"healers." Evil spirits and even werewolves are thought to inhabit

the mountains and byways, and it is believed that people must be

protected from them. Children and young women are thought to be particularly vulnerable to the "evil eye."

As people became better educated and moved to the city, they

lost some of these folk beliefs. But in the city and among educated

persons alike, superstition can still be found, even in the early 1990s.

Sorcerers, palm readers, and readers of cards have shops, particularly in poorer neighborhoods, but not exclusively so. In short, a

strong undercurrent of superstition still remains in Portugal. The

formal church disapproves of superstitious practices but is powerless to do much about them.

In contrast to the Catholicism found in Spain, Portuguese

Catholicism is softer and less intense. The widespread use of folk practices and the humanization of religion made for a loving though

remote God, in contrast to the harshness of the Spanish vision.

In Portugal, unlike in Spain, God and his saints are imagined as forgiving and serene. In Spain the expressions depicted on the faces of saints and martyrs are painful and anguished; in Portugal they

are complacent, calm, and pleasant.

Non-Catholic Religious Groups

For most of Portugal's history, few non-Catholics lived in the

country; those who did could not practice their religion freely. Until

the constitution of 1976 was enacted, laws restricted the activities of non-Catholics. By the early 1990s, only some 50,000 to 60,000

Protestants lived in Portugal, about 1 percent of the total population. They had been kept out of the country for three centuries

by the Inquisition. However, the British who began settling in Portugal in the nineteenth century brought their religions with them.

Most belonged to the Church of England, but others were

Methodists, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Presbyterians. Protestantism remained largely confined to the foreign communities.

The 1950s and 1960s saw the arrival of Pentecostals, Mormons,

and Jehovah's Witnesses, all of whom increased in numbers more

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The Society and Its Environment

rapidly than the earlier arrivals did. All groups, however, were hampered by prohibitions and restrictions against the free exercise of

their religions, especially missionary activities. These restrictions were lifted after the Revolution of 1974. The

constitution of 1976 guarantees all religions the right to practice

their faith. Protestant groups have been recognized as legal entities with the right to assemble. In addition, Portuguese who are both Protestant and conscientious objectors have the right to apply for alternative military service. The Roman Catholic Church,

however, still seeks to place barriers in the way of Protestant missionary activities. The Jewish community in Portugal numbered between 500 and

1 ,000 as of the early 1990s. The community is concentrated in Lisbon, and many of its members are foreigners. The persecution of

Portuguese Jewry had been so intense that until recent decades Portugal had no synagogue or even regular Jewish religious services.

The few Jewish Portuguese were hence isolated from the main cur- rents of Judaism. Their community began to revive when larger

numbers of foreign Jews (embassy personnel, business people, and

technicians) began coming to Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s. In northern Portugal, there are a few villages of Marranos, descendants of Jews who converted to Christianity to avoid persecution

and whose religion is a mixture ofJudaism and Christianity. Portugal's Muslim community consists of a small number of immigrants from Portugal's former colonies in Southern Africa and

larger numbers of recent immigrant workers from Northern Africa, mainly Morocco.

Education

Even before Portugal emerged as an independent country in the

twelfth century, it had monastic, cathedral, and parish schools. The

education provided by these schools was based on the teachings

of the Roman Catholic Church, rote memorization, and a deductive system of reasoning. The educational system expanded through

the founding of primary and secondary schools in larger settlements

and the establishment in 1290 of the University of Coimbra, one

of the oldest universities in the world. The system was infused with

the principles of authority, hierarchy, and discipline. Although local authorities, both municipal and ecclesiastical, had some say about

the management of local schools, officials in Lisbon, most of them

clerics, determined the curriculum and selected textbooks and in- structors. Education was thus firmly under the control of the church

and civil authorities. The introduction of the Inquisition in the 1530s

103
Portugal: A Country Study

served to further "purify" teaching; in 1555 the Jesuits were given

much control over education.

A reaction against church- and Jesuit-dominated education set in during the eighteenth century. Reformers such as Luis Antonio Verney sought to infuse Portuguese education with the ideals

of the Enlightenment. The reforms were carried out by the Marques de Pombal, prime minister from 1750 to 1777, who expelled

the Jesuits in 1759, created the basis for public and secular primary

and secondary schools, introduced vocational training, created

hundreds of new teaching posts, added departments of mathematics and natural sciences to the University of Coimbra, and in- troduced new taxes to pay for these reforms.

During the nineteenth century, educational reform was slow and

halting. Reforms initiated in 1822, 1835, and 1844 were left un- completed and largely unimplemented. However, at the beginning

of the century, the first schools for girls were opened in Lisbon.

Other new schools included the Agricultural Institute, polytechnical schools in Lisbon and Porto, new medical schools in the same

two cities, and a new department of liberal arts in Lisbon. The

educational system remained highly elitist, however, with illitera- cy rates of over 80 percent and higher education reserved for a small

percentage of the population. When the First Republic was established in 1910, efforts were made to overcome these problems. New

universities were created in Lisbon and Porto, new teacher training colleges were opened, and a separate Ministry of Public In- struction was established. The republican government sought to reduce illiteracy, reintroduce (as with Pombal) a more secular content to education, and to bring more scientific and empirical

methods into the curriculum. But these reforms largely stopped

when the republic was overthrown in 1926 and the military and

Salazar came to power.

Salazar authorized the creation of a new technical university in

Lisbon in 1930. But for the next three decades, educational innovation lagged, illiteracy remained high, vocational training was

almost nonexistent, and Portugal reverted to a situation of quasifeudalism characterized by the most backward economy and education in Western Europe. Only in the mid-1960s did the country

make public education available for all children between the ages

of six and twelve. The government enacted laws to equalize educational opportunities, but implementation lagged behind. However, more elementary and preparatory schools were opened, and universities were established in Lisbon and other regional centers. The Revolution of 1974 and the overthrow of the Salazar re- gime disrupted the education system. Students challenged teachers,

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The Society and Its Environment

and all groups challenged administrators. For a time after the revolution, faculty and curriculum were highly politicized as socialist,

communist, and other groups vied for control of the schools and

the school system. During the 1980s, however, as Portuguese politics quieted and returned to the center, the education system also became less frenetic, greater emphasis was placed on learning, and

efforts were made to raise the level of the country's schools closer

to that of the rest of Europe.

The Portuguese educational system is governed by the constitution of 1976. The constitution guarantees the right to create pri- vate schools. It proposes to eliminate illiteracy, to provide special

education to those children who need it, and to preserve the au- tonomy of the universities. It guarantees the rights of teachers and

students to take part in the democratic administration of the schools. In addition to the overall guidance provided by the constitution,

Portuguese education is governed by decree-laws promulgated by

the executive branch, some of which date from the eighteenth

century.

As of the early 1990s, preschool education in Portugal was limit- ed. Most preschools were private, but government regulation and

involvement in preschool education was increasing. Primary education consisted of four years in the primary cycle and two years

in the preparatory, or second, cycle (see fig. 7). Most primary

schools were public. Many Portuguese living in rural areas received

only the primary cycle of schooling. The preparatory cycle (fifth

and sixth grades) was intended mainly for children going on to secondary education. Provision was also made for attendance by

older students who might already be working.

Secondary education was roughly equivalent to junior and senior

high schools in the United States. It consisted of three years of a

unified course curriculum, followed by a two-year complementary

course (tenth and eleventh grades). A twelfth-grade course prepared

students to take the university and technical college entrance ex- aminations.

Portuguese primary school enrollments were close to 100 per- cent in the early 1990s, and immense strides had been made in

eliminating illiteracy, especially among the young; an estimated

literacy rate of 85 percent was achieved among those over age fifteen in 1990. After primary school, however, school enrollments dropped

off sharply. Only 30 percent of children attended secondary schools,

and only 20 percent were enrolled in the twelfth grade.

A new vocational education program was introduced in 1983.

By the late 1980s, it was training 10,000 to 12,000 young people

a year, about 6 to 7 percent of an age-group. The program was

105
Portugal: A Country Study

GRADUATE STUDY

School Year 18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

UNIVERSITY

J J

TWELFTH YEAR

COMPLEMENTARY COURSE

UNIFIED COURSE

PREPARATORY CYCLE

PRIMARY CYCLE

H

IG

H

E

R

P

R

IM

A

R

Y

PRESCHOOL

Figure 7. Structure of the Education System, 1992

106
The Society and Its Environment

conceived as a three-year course that would permit students to enter

the work force with a set of skills after the eleventh grade. In the early 1990s, higher education included four older universities (Lisbon, Coimbra, Porto, and the Technical University of

Lisbon), as well as six newer universities (Nova University in Lisbon and others in Minho, Aveiro, Evora, in the Algarve, and in

the Azores). The university sector also included the private Catholic

University and the Free University, both in Lisbon. In addition,

there were special postsecondary institutes, schools, and academies

such as the Institute of Applied Psychology, the social welfare in- stitutes of Lisbon and Porto, the engineering institutes of Lisbon,

Porto, and Coimbra, an agricultural college at Coimbra, technical colleges in Santarem and in the Algarve, and a school of education at Viseu.

Admission to the university is a highly competitive process, although it can be waived if a student obtains a high score in the

final examinations from secondary school. Only about 10 percent

of college-age students attend one of the country's universities or postsecondary institutes, compared with 50 percent in the United

States. Thus, higher education is by no means universal but rather

oriented toward a small elite. This elite, in turn, tends to dominate

government, big business, and the professions.

The average length of study at the university level is five years

and leads to the awarding of a licentiate, although some schools

have two-year programs and others offer a bachelor's degree. Doctorates are awarded in some departments after further advanced

studies, an oral examination, and the defense of a thesis. The faculties had four ranks as of the early 1990s: full professors, associate professors, lecturers, and assistants. Full professors

could be appointed directly, or their appointments might come

through competitive examinations. Full professors receive life appointments; persons of other ranks are under contract. University

staffs, including faculty, are part of the civil service and receive

pay and pensions like other civil servants. The Portuguese educational system is highly centralized. Despite some efforts at decentralization in the constitution of 1976, the

Ministry of Education and Culture in Lisbon sets education policy

for the entire nation. Local or regional districts have litde independent authority to tax, with the result that funds, curriculum, policy,

and other matters are set at the national level. As of the early 1990s, Portugal still had an illiteracy rate that

ranged between 14 and 20 percent according to various studies and

estimates, although many of those who could not read were older

people. Another serious problem was low school enrollment after

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Portugal: A Country Study

the primary cycle, especially in rural areas, where many children

begin work at an early age. As of 1987, 87.4 percent of Portuguese

completed less than the upper level of secondary school, a rate that

had improved only slightly in recent decades and was much in- ferior to the EC average of 54 percent. Facilities and equipment

at all levels are often outdated and in short supply. Although the

number of school teachers has increased greatly in recent years, teachers are poorly paid, and their overall morale is poor. Many

specialists hold that the curriculum at the secondary level needs

to be revised to make it more relevant in preparing young people

for their working lives. In addition to more modern facilities, the

universities need to increase their enrollments and support research more strongly.

Social Welfare

On most indices of social modernization, Portugal ranks at or near the bottom for all of Western Europe. Even in the early 1990s,

despite some significant economic growth in the second half of the

1980s, Portugal remains relatively poor by West European stan- dards. Although its range of public welfare programs is extensive,

it lacks the funds to fully implement them and to pay substantial

benefits.

Charity and alms-giving were traditionally thought to be the

responsibility of the church. It provided welfare to the poor and

took care of the sick, widows, and orphans. In addition, landowners and employers fulfilled their obligations of Christian charity

by aiding the less fortunate through gifts, assistance, patronage,

and benefits. The charitable institution established by Queen

Leonor in the late fifteen century, Santa Casa de Misericordia, had, even in the early 1990s, offices all through Portugal. Its charitable

operations were financed by the national lottery. This system of charity provided by the church and the elite probably worked tolerably

well through the 1920s, as long as Portugal remained a rural and

Roman Catholic society. But urbanization, secularism, and largescale impersonal organizations rendered the old system inadequate.

Salazar's corporative system attempted to fill the void but did

so poorly. Only in the 1960s, far later than in other countries, were

the first steps taken toward a modern state-run welfare system. As

could be expected, the services this system provided were incomplete, irregular, and woefully underfunded. Urban centers received some benefits, but almost none went to the countryside. During

the revolutionary 1970s, numerous health and social welfare pro- grams were established, but only in the 1980s did Portugal have

the stability and the resources to begin their implementation.

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The Society and Its Environment

Social Welfare Programs

As of the early 1990s, Portugal had a fairly elaborate social welfare system, including programs that provided benefits for the elderly and the seriously ill or disabled. However, the benefits paid by

these programs were still quite low, and an estimated 3 million Por- tuguese lived below the EC poverty line. The programs' benefits were financed by employee and employer

contributions (roughly 10 and 25 percent, respectively). Most of

the programs were the responsibility of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security and were administered by regional social security centers. The Ministry of Health was involved in

programs concerned with medical care. As of the early 1990s, men and women could retire at sixty-five

and sixty-two years of age, respectively, and be eligible for old- age pensions. Miners were eligible for retirement at fifty and merchant sailors at fifty-five years of age. Benefits ranged from 30 to 80 percent of recent average wages. Permanent disability and sur- vivor benefits were also paid. Unemployment benefits could be paid over a period of from ten to thirty months and amounted to 65

percent of earnings, with a maximum of three times the national

minimum wage of about US$300 a month.

As of 1991, maternity benefits amounted to 100 percent of the

mother's pay for a period of three months, one month before and

two months after the birth. Sickness benefits amounted to 65 per- cent of wages for up to 1,095 days; after this period, the benefit was converted to a permanent disability benefit. Accidents at work

were covered by private insurance carried by employers; payments

could amount to two-thirds of basic earnings. Small family al- lowances were paid to help rear children until they reached the age

of fifteen or the age of twenty-five if they were students.

Health Care

Health conditions in Portugal have long been among the poorest in Western Europe. Although recent decades have seen substantial improvements, Portugal still lags behind most of the continent

in some categories of health care. Portuguese life expectancy at birth rose from sixty-two years for men and sixty-seven for women in 1960 to seventy-one and seventy-eight, respectively, in 1992.

The country's infant mortality rate in 1970 was 58 deaths per

1,000—one of the highest in Europe and close to Third World

levels—but by 1992 it had dropped to 10 per 1 ,000. However, the

chief causes of death among the young are infectious and parasitic

diseases and diseases of the respiratory system, a Third World

109
Portugal: A Country Study

pattern found in rural areas and in city slums. Malnutrition and

related diseases are also widespread. The chief cause of deaths

among adults is thrombosis, followed by cancer. About 400 Portuguese die each year from tuberculosis.

The number of doctors, dentists, and nurses increased greatly

between 1960 and the early 1990s. At 26,400 in 1987, the number

of physicians actively practicing medicine in Portugal represented

a fourfold increase over the total in 1960. The number of dentists

expanded even more dramatically, from 120 in 1960 to 5,700 in

1986. As of 1987, the number of medical personnel per occupied

hospital bed was 1.7, compared with 0.24 in 1960. By 1990 there were 2.9 doctors per 1,000 Portuguese, a ratio higher than that

found in most West European countries. However, most medical

personnel are concentrated in urban centers, to the detriment of

those needing health care in rural areas. In the latter areas, folk health practitioners are not uncommon, even in the early 1990s.

Their medical practices are often fused with magical, religious, and

superstitious elements.

Portuguese are able to take advantage of a national health sys- tem that, since the second half of the 1970s, had paid 100 percent

of most medical and pharmaceutical expenses. The system, managed by the Ministry of Health, offers care at large urban hospitals, several dozen regional hospitals, and numerous health centers. The health centers specialize in providing primary care. Care

provided by the national system ranges from the most sophisticated

to basic preventive medicine.

The national health system's overriding problems are the long

waits, frequently months in duration, for medical care, that result from shortages of financial resources, lack of personnel, and in- adequate facilities. Medical facilities in Portugal range from those

of centuries past to the ultramodern. Partly as a result of these in- adequacies, there is a substantial private medical sector that offers better care. Many doctors and other medical personnel work in

both the public and private system, often because of the low salaries paid by the national system.

Housing

Much Portuguese housing is substandard, both in rural and in

urban areas. Many rural villages were not electrified even by the

early 1990s, and villagers often had to carry water from a com- mon source. The influx of rural migrants to urban centers in re- cent decades intensified demand on an already inadequate housing

supply. Although 60 percent of Portuguese rent their houses (80

percent in Lisbon and Porto), rigid rent control laws in effect

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The Society and Its Environment

between 1948 and 1985 had discouraged the construction of apartments, as did a sluggish bureaucracy. As a result, in the late 1980s an estimated 700,000 illegally constructed dwellings existed in Portugal, 200,000 of which were located in the Lisbon area. Some were

built on public or unused private lands. The resulting urban

shantytowns (bairros da lata) often lacked electricity, running water, or sewage systems. In Lisbon's suburbs, gigantic apartment houses were built for the more affluent new city-dwellers, but the supply of decent, af- fordable housing lagged far behind the demand, estimated at 800,000 dwellings for the entire country. A succession of Portuguese

governments recognized this severe housing problem and sought

to do something about it. For example, the National Housing Institute planned to build 70,000 dwellings a year during the 1990s,

and various programs to help people become homeowners had been

put into practice.

* * *

Portugal was long the most understudied country in Western

Europe. The authoritarian nature of the Salazar regime made social science research on contemporary issues all but impossible to carry out; Portuguese social sciences also lagged behind. Despite

these obstacles, some very good studies were done. Among them

were works by Joyce Firstenberg Riegelhaupt in anthropology, Joao

Baptista Nunes Pereira Neto and Aderito Sedas Nunes in sociolo- gy, and Jose Cutileiro's pioneering^ Portuguese Rural Society. Harry M. Makler broke new ground in his investigations of Portugal's

business elite, as did Massimo Livi Bacci in his demographic study,

A Century of Portuguese Fertility.

Social science scholarship has flourished in Portugal since the

Revolution of 1974, as specialists there have looked into many

unexplored aspects of their society. Readers needing sociological

analyses in English will profit from the survey edited by Lawrence

S. Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler, In Search of Modern Portugal,

and the study edited by Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler, Contemporary Portugal. Economic and social data are also found

in the historical surveys Contemporary Portugal by Richard Alan Hodgson Robinson and Portugal: A Twentieth Century Interpretation by Tom

Gallagher.

Among the best political-sociological studies are Nancy Bermeo's

The Revolution Within the Revolution, which deals with revolution in the countryside, and Caroline Brettel's Men Who Migrate, Women

Who Wait, an excellent study of Portuguese emigration. Thomas

111
Portugal: A Country Study

C. Bruneau, Victor M.P. Da Rosa, and Alex Macleod provide

much useful information in their Portugal in Development. Rainer Eisfeld's "Portugal and Western Europe," in Portugal in the 1980s,

edited by Kenneth Maxwell, is also helpful. Finally, Marion

Kaplan's 1991 book, The Portuguese: The Land and Its People, although

not aimed at a scholarly audience, is often highly informative about

contemporary Portuguese society. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

112
Chapter 3. The Economy
Tending wine casks
PORTUGAL'S POLITICAL ECONOMY holds our interest for a number of reasons. First, Portugal, a founding member both of

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA—see Glossary), is one of the

newest members (along with Spain) of the European Community

(EC—see Glossary). Second, scholars interested in revolutionary

change and the associated economic consequences can compare the

Portuguese experience with that of other nations that have undergone rapid systemic transformation. Third, Portugal's recent ex- periment with nationalization of the means of production is of

particular interest to students of industrial organization and public enterprise economics.

As a fledgling member of the EC , Portugal was required to adopt

the EC's Common External Tariff on imports from nonmember

countries and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Portugal

also was required to eliminate all barriers to the movement of goods,

services, and capital between itself and the other members of the

European Economic Community (EEC—see Glossary), as well as

to phase out fiscal subsidies that distort competition. During a transition period ending in 1993, Portugal was a net recipient of

EC funds to assist in the restructuring of its relatively backward

economy.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal's economy was classi- fied by the World Bank (see Glossary) as an upper-middle-income

economy. Its 1990 gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) on a purchasing power parity basis was US$82 billion, and its per

capita GDP was estimated at US$8,364. With a per capita GDP

growth rate of 5.4 percent in 1989, Portugal moved ahead of Greece

to eleventh place among the twelve members of the EC.

Several distinctive features characterized Portugal's economy at the time of its accession to the EC . One of the most striking was

its dependence on foreign "invisible" income. This income, consisting of tourism receipts and emigrant worker remittances,

financed the country's large merchandise trade deficit. The growth

and magnitude of tourism together with the explosive rise of government services largely explain the expansion of the services sector

to nearly 56 percent of GDP in 1990 from 39 percent of GDP in

1973. One of every three Portuguese workers in the active labor

force was engaged in temporary work in high-income countries,

mainly France. These emigrant workers, numbering about 2

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Portugal: A Country Study

million, contributed significantly to Portugal's foreign exchange

income, as well as to the country's household savings. Although

less educated and technically less proficient than their EC counterparts, Portuguese workers are recognized for their strong work

ethic and frugality.

Another distinguishing feature is Portugal's anachronistic agricultural sector, whose overall performance is unfavorable when considered in the context of the country's natural resources and climatic

conditions. In the mid-1980s, agricultural productivity was half that of the levels in Greece and Spain and a quarter of the EC average.

The land tenure system was polarized between two extremes: small

and fragmented family farms in the north and large collective farms

in the south that proved incapable of modernizing. The decollectivization of agriculture, which began in modest form in the late 1970s and accelerated in the late 1980s, promised to increase the

efficiency of human and land resources in the south during the

1990s.

A third economic distinction is the scale and sectoral spread of

Portugal's public enterprises. Before the Revolution of 1974, pri- vate enterprise ownership dominated the Portuguese economy to a degree unmatched in other West European countries; in 1982 the

relative size of Portugal's public enterprise sector (based on an aver- age of value added, employment, and gross capital formation) substantially exceeded that of the other West European economies.

The dispossession of the family-based financial-industrial groups,

together with the " antifascist" purges of the mid-1970s, inflicted a serious "brain drain" on Portugal through the exile of entrepre- neurs and professional managers. Recent Portuguese governments

have recognized the highly politicized public enterprise sector as a major obstacle to the resolution of macroeconomic problems, such

as large fiscal deficits, inflation, and burdensome external debt.

Portugal's commodity trade increasingly has become dominated by the EC , and since the accession of both Iberian countries

to the organization in 1986, Spain has suddenly emerged as a significant trading partner for Portugal. The latter' s major commodity

exports at the beginning of the 1990s included textiles, clothing

and footwear, machinery and transport equipment, forest products

(including pulp and paper and cork products), and agricultural

products (mainly wine). With the rising participation of multinational firms, Portugal also is gaining competitive strength in the

export of higher technology automotive and electronic components

and parts.

Privatization, economic deregulation, debt reduction, and supplyside tax reform became the salient concerns of government as

116
The Economy

Portugal prepared itself for the challenges and opportunities of full participation in the EC's single market in the 1990s. These marketdriven policies deserved much of the credit for Portugal's economic

resurgence. Led by expanding exports and robust capital formation, Portugal's GDP grew by an annual rate of 4.6 percent from

1986 to 1990. During this five-year period, only Japan among the

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD

see Glossary) countries exceeded Portugal's economic performance.

Economic Growth and Structural Change

Portugal's First Republic (1910-26) became, in the words of

historian Douglas L. Wheeler, "midwife to Europe's longest sur- viving authoritarian system." Under the sixteen-year parliamentary regime of the republic with its forty-five governments, growing

fiscal deficits financed by money creation and foreign borrowing

climaxed in hyper-inflation and a moratorium on Portugal's external debt service. The cost of living around 1926 was thirty times

what it had been in 1914. Fiscal imprudence and accelerating in- flation gave way to massive capital flight, crippling domestic in- vestment. Burgeoning public-sector employment during the First

Republic was accompanied by a perverse shrinkage in the share

of the industrial labor force in total employment. Although some headway was made toward increasing the level of literacy under

the parliamentary regime, 68.1 percent of Portugal's population was still classified as illiterate by the 1930 census. The Economy of the Salazar Regime

The First Republic was ended by a military coup in May 1926,

but the newly installed government failed to solve the nation's

precarious financial situation. Instead, President Oscar Fragoso

Carmona invited Antonio de Oliveira Salazar to head the Ministry of Finance, and the latter agreed to accept the position provided he would have veto power over all fiscal expenditures. At the

time of his appointment as minister of finance in 1928, Salazar

held the Chair of Economics at the University of Coimbra and was

considered by his peers to be Portugal's most distinguished authority on inflation. For forty years, first as minister of finance (1928-32)

and then as prime minister (1932-68), Salazar' s political and eco- nomic doctrines were to shape the Portuguese destiny (see The New

State, ch. 1). From the perspective of the financial chaos of the republican period, it was not surprising that Salazar considered the principles of

a balanced budget and monetary stability as categorical imperatives. By restoring equilibrium both in the fiscal budget and in the

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Portugal: A Country Study

balance of international payments, Salazar succeeded in restoring

Portugal's credit worthiness at home and abroad. Because Portugal's fiscal accounts from the 1930s until the early 1960s almost

always had a surplus in the current account, the state had the wherewithal to finance public infrastructure projects without resorting

either to inflationary financing or to borrowing abroad.

At the height of the Great Depression, Premier Salazar laid the

foundations for his Estado Novo, the "New State." Neither capitalist nor communist, Portugal's economy was cast into a quasitraditional mold. The corporative framework within which the

Portuguese economy evolved combined two salient characteristics:

extensive state regulation and predominantly private ownership of

the means of production. Leading financiers and industrialists

accepted extensive bureaucratic controls in return for assurances

of minimal public ownership of economic enterprises and certain

monopolistic (or restricted-competition) privileges.

Within this framework, the state exercised extensive de facto

authority regarding private investment decisions and the level of

wages. A system of industrial licensing (condicionamento industrial),

introduced by law in 1931, required prior authorization from the

state for setting up or relocating an industrial plant. Investment

in machinery and equipment designed to increase the capacity of an existing firm also required government approval. Although the

political system was ostensibly corporatist, as political scientist Howard J. Wiarda makes clear, "In reality both labor and

capital—and indeed the entire corporate institutional network

were subordinate to the central state apparatus."

Under the old regime, Portugal's private sector was dominated

by some forty great families. These industrial dynasties were al- lied by marriage with the large, traditional landowning families

of the nobility, who held most of the arable land in the southern

part of the country in great estates. Many of these dynasties had

business interests in Portuguese Africa. Within this elite group,

the top ten families owned all the important commercial banks,

which in turn controlled a disproportionate share of the national

economy. Because bank officials were often members of the boards

of directors of borrowing firms in whose stock the banks participated, the influence of the large banks extended to a host of commercial, industrial, and service enterprises.

Portugal's shift toward a moderately outward-looking trade and

financial strategy, initiated in the late 1950s, gained momentum

during the early 1960s. A growing number of industrialists, as well

as government technocrats, favored greater Portuguese integration

with the industrial countries to the north as a badly needed stimulus

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The Economy

to Portugal's economy. The rising influence of the Europe-oriented

technocrats within Salazar's cabinet was confirmed by the substantial increase in the foreign investment component in projected capital formation between the first (1953-58) and second (1959-64)

economic development plans. The first plan called for a foreign

investment component of less than 6 percent, but the plan for the

1959-64 period envisioned a 25-percent contribution. The newly

influential Europe-oriented industrial and technical groups persuaded Salazar that Portugal should become a charter member of the

European Free Trade Association (EFTA) when it was organized

in 1959. In the following year, Portugal also added its membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the

International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), and the World

Bank.

In 1958 when the Portuguese government announced the

1959-64 Six-Year Plan for National Development, a decision had

been reached to accelerate the country's rate of economic growth—

decision whose urgency grew with the outbreak of guerrilla warfare

in Angola in 1961 and in Portugal's other African territories thereafter. Salazar and his policy advisers recognized that additional

claims by the state on national output for military expenditures,

as well as for increased transfers of official investment to the "overseas provinces," could only be met by a sharp rise in the country's productive capacity. Salazar's commitment to preserving

Portugal's "multiracial, pluricontinental" state led him reluctantly

to seek external credits beginning in 1962, an action from which

the Portuguese treasury had abstained for several decades.

Beyond military measures, the official Portuguese response to the "winds of change" in the African colonies was to integrate them

administratively and economically more closely with Portugal

through population and capital transfers, trade liberalization, and

the creation of a common currency—the so-called Escudo Area.

The integration program established in 1961 provided for the

removal of Portugal's duties on imports from its overseas territories by January 1964. The latter, on the other hand, were permitted to continue to levy duties on goods imported from Portugal

but at a preferential rate, in most cases 50 percent of the normal

duties levied by the territories on goods originating outside the Es- cudo Area. The effect of this two-tier tariff system was to give Portugal's exports preferential access to its colonial markets.

Despite the opposition of protectionist interests, the Portuguese

government succeeded in bringing about some liberalization of the

industrial licensing system, as well as in reducing trade barriers

to conform with EFTA and GATT agreements. The last years of

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Portugal: A Country Study

the Salazar era witnessed the creation of important privately or- ganized ventures, including an integrated iron and steel mill, a modern ship repair and shipbuilding complex, vehicle assembly

plants, oil refineries, petrochemical plants, pulp and paper mills,

and electronic plants. As economist Valentina Xavier Pintado observed, ''Behind the facade of an aged Salazar, Portugal knew deep

and lasting changes during the 1960s."

The liberalization of the Portuguese economy continued under

Salazar' s successor, Prime Minister Marcello Jose das Neves

Caetano (1968-74), whose administration abolished industrial

licensing requirements for firms in most sectors and in 1972 signed

a free-trade agreement with the newly enlarged EC. Under the

agreement, which took effect at the beginning of 1973, Portugal was given until 1980 to abolish its restrictions on most community

goods and until 1985 on certain sensitive products amounting to some 10 percent of the EC's total exports to Portugal. EFTA membership and a growing foreign investor presence contributed to Portugal's industrial modernization and export diversification between

1960 and 1973.

Notwithstanding the concentration of the means of production

in the hands of a small number of family based financial-industrial

groups, Portuguese business culture permitted a surprising upward

mobility of university-educated individuals with middle-class backgrounds into professional management careers. Before the revolution, the largest, most technologically advanced (and most recently

organized) firms offered the greatest opportunity for management

careers based on merit rather than on accident of birth.

Changing Structure of the Economy

The Portuguese economy had changed significantly by 1973,

compared with its position in 1961. Total output (GDP at factor

cost) grew by 120 percent in real terms. The industrial sector was

three times greater, and the size of the services sector doubled; but

agriculture, forestry, and fishing advanced by only 16 percent.

Manufacturing, the major component of the secondary sector, was

three times as large at the end of the period. Industrial expansion was concentrated in large-scale enterprises using modern technology.

The composition of GDP also changed markedly from 1961 to 1973. The share of the primary sector (agriculture, forestry, and

fishing) in GDP shrank from 23 percent in 1961 to 16.8 percent

in 1973, and the contribution of the secondary (or industrial) sec- tor (manufacturing, construction, mining, and electricity, gas and

water) increased from 37 percent to 44 percent during the period.

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The Economy

The services sector's share in GDP remained constant at 39.4 per- cent between 1961 and 1973. Within the industrial sector, the contribution of manufacturing advanced from 30 percent to 35 percent

and that of construction from 4.6 percent to 6.4 percent.

The progressive "opening" of Portugal to the world economy

was reflected in the growing shares of exports and imports (both

visible and invisible) in national output and income. Further, the

composition of Portugal's balance of international payments altered substantially. From 1960 to 1973, the merchandise trade deficit widened, but owing to a growing surplus on invisibles—including

tourist receipts and emigrant worker remittances—the deficit in the current account gave way to a surplus from 1965 onward. Beginning with that year, the long-term capital account typically

registered a deficit, the counterpart of the current account surplus.

Even though the nation attracted a rising level of capital from abroad

(both direct investments and loans), official and private Portuguese

investments in the "overseas territories" were greater still —hence

the net outflow on the long-term capital account. The growth rate of Portuguese merchandise exports during the

period 1959 to 1973 was 11 percent per annum. In 1960 the bulk

of exports was accounted for by a few products—canned fish, raw

and manufactured cork, cotton textiles, and wine. By contrast, in

the early 1970s, Portugal's export list reflected significant product

diversification, including both consumer and capital goods. Several

branches of Portuguese industry became export-oriented, and in 1973 over one-fifth of Portuguese manufactured output was ex- ported.

The radical nationalization-expropriation measures in the

mid-1970s were initially accompanied by a policy-induced redistribution of national income from property owners, entrepreneurs,

and private managers and professionals to industrial and agricultural workers. This wage explosion favoring workers with a high

propensity to consume had a dramatic impact on the nation's eco- nomic growth and pattern of expenditures. Private and public con- sumption combined rose from 81 percent of domestic expenditure

in 1973 to nearly 102 percent in 1975. The counterpart of over- consumption in the face of declining national output was a contraction in both savings and fixed capital formation, depletion of

stocks, and a huge balance-of-payments deficit. The rapid increase

in production costs associated with the surge in unit labor costs between 1973 and 1975 contributed significantly to the decline in Portugal's ability to compete in foreign markets. Real exports fell between 1973 and 1976, and their share in total expenditures

declined from nearly 26 percent to 16.5 percent.

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Portugal: A Country Study

The economic dislocations of metropolitan Portugal associated

with the income leveling and nationalization-expropriation measures were exacerbated by the sudden loss of the nation's African

colonies in 1974 and 1975 and the reabsorption of overseas set- tlers (the so-called retornados), the global recession, and, as well,

the international energy crisis. Over the longer period, 1973-90, the composition of Portugal's

GDP at factor cost changed significantly. The contribution of

agriculture, forestry, and fishing as a share of total production con- tinued its inexorable decline, to 6.1 percent in 1990 from 12.2 per- cent in 1973. In contrast to the prerevolutionary period, 1961-73,

when the industrial sector grew by 9 percent annually and its contribution to GDP expanded, industry's share narrowed to 38.4 per- cent of GDP in 1990 from 44 percent in 1973. Manufacturing, the

major component of the industrial sector, contributed relatively

less to GDP in 1990 (28 percent) than in 1973 (35 percent). Most

striking was the 16-percentage-point increase in the participation

of the services sector from 39 percent of GDP in 1973 to 55.5 per- cent in 1990. Most of this growth reflected the proliferation of civil service employment and the associated cost of public administration, together with the dynamic contribution of tourism services

during the 1980s.

Economic Growth, 1960-73 and 1981-90

There was a striking contrast between the economic growth and

levels of capital formation in the 1960-73 period and in the 1980s

decade (see table 4, Appendix). Clearly, the pre-revolutionary period was characterized by robust annual growth rates for GDP (6.9

percent), industrial production (9 percent), private consumption

(6.5 percent), and gross fixed capital formation (7.8 percent). By

way of contrast, the 1980s exhibited a pattern of slow-to-moderate

annual growth rates for GDP (2.7 percent), industrial production

(4.8 percent), private consumption (2.7 percent), and fixed capital

formation (3.1 percent). As a result of worker emigration and the

military draft, employment declined during the earlier period by a

half percent annually, but increased by 1.4 percent annually during

the 1980s. Significandy, labor productivity (GDP growth/employment growth) grew by a sluggish rate of 1.3 percent annually in

the recent period compared with the extremely rapid annual growth

rate of 7.4 percent earlier. Inflation, as measured by the GDP deflator, averaged a modest 4 percent a year before the revolution compared with nearly 18 percent annually during the 1980s.

Although the investment coefficients were roughly similar (24

percent of GDP allocated to fixed capital formation in the earlier

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The Bridge of April 25, Lisbon

Courtesy General Directorate of Mass Communication, Lisbon

period; 26.7 percent during the 1980s), the overall investment

productivity or efficiency (GDP growth rate/investment coefficient) was nearly three times greater (28.6 percent) before the revolution than in the 1980s (10.1 percent).

How did Portugal's per capita GDP compare with the average

of the twelve members of the EC, the European Twelve (EC- 12),

during the past three decades? In 1960, at the initiation of Salazar's more outward-looking economic policy, Portugal's per capita GDP was only 38 percent of the EC- 12 average; by the end of

the Salazar period, in 1968, it had risen to 48 percent; and in 1973, on the eve of the revolution, Portugal's per capita GDP had reached

56.4 percent of the EC- 12 average. In 1975, the year of maximum

revolutionary turmoil, Portugal's per capita GDP declined to 52.3

percent of the EC- 12 average.

Convergence of real GDP growth toward the EC average oc- curred as a result of Portugal's economic resurgence since 1985. In 1991 Portugal's per capita GDP climbed to 54.9 percent of the

EC average, gradually approaching the level attained just before

the Revolution of 1974.

Revolutionary Change

The military coup of April 1974, which ousted the long-lived

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Portugal: A Country Study

authoritarian Salazar-Caetano regime, was rapidly transformed into a social revolution that profoundly recast Portugal's political and

economic systems (see Spmola and Revolution, ch. 4). The revolutionary leadership undercut the old elite's economic base by nationalizing the banks and most of the country's heavy and

medium-sized industries; expropriating landed estates in the central and southern regions; and giving independence to Angola,

Mozambique, and other colonies. The last action dismantled the

web of economic relationships, known as the Escudo Area, through

which metropolitan Portugal was linked to its "overseas provinces." In the brief period between the collapse of the old regime in April

1974 and the abortive leftist coup of November 1975, a variety of

economic models were proposed for Portugal by the provisional

Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas Armadas

MFA) governments, including the West European, Yugoslav, and

Albanian models. In the early months following the military coup,

the new Portuguese government's economic orientation could be

described as moderate-reformist. The regime's Economic and Social Program published on May 15, 1974, made no provision for large-scale nationalization of industry or agriculture. The program

simply provided for the "adoption of new measures of government

intervention in the basic sectors of the economy and particularly

in the sectors of national interest, without prejudice to the legitimate interest of private enterprise"; argued for "reform of the tax system so as to rationalize it and ease the tax burden on less welloff groups, with a view of a fairer distribution of income"; recom- mended measures "to stimulate agriculture and gradually reform

the land tenure system"; and, within the sphere of social policy,

favored introduction of "a minimum wage to be progressively ex- tended to all sectors of activity."

The initial moderate-reformist policies reflected the views of

General Antonio de Spmola, who was chosen by the MFA to lead

the coup and to serve as the country's president. Spmola, the

celebrated war hero, favored the establishment of civil liberties and

the creation of democratic institutions. He also advocated rapid

improvement of living standards, a modernized financial structure,

and eventual Portuguese participation in the EC—objectives laid

down in an economic plan he commissioned from Erik Lundberg

of the World Bank. Spmola' s view on the economy and the pace

of decolonization diverged from those of the Coordinating Committee of the MFA, most of whose members were prepared to end

completely the Portuguese presence in Africa and to expand substantially the scope of the public sector. By the early autumn of

1974, events both within and outside Portugal favored the course

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The Economy

chosen by the MFA coordinating committee. Unable to stop the

leftward drift of the country, Spmola resigned in September 1974.

Nationalization

The reorganization of the MFA coordinating committee in March

1975 brought into prominence a group of Marxist-oriented officers who, in league with the General Confederation of Portuguese

Workers-National Intersindical (Confederagao Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional—CGTP-IN), the

communist-dominated trade union confederation known as Intersindical prior to 1977, sought the radical transformation of the

nation's social system and political economy. Abandoning its moderate-reformist posture, the MFA leadership set out on a course

of sweeping nationalizations and land expropriations. During the

balance of that year, the government nationalized all Portugueseowned capital in the banking, insurance, petrochemical, fertilizer,

tobacco, cement, and wood pulp sectors of the economy, as well

as the Portuguese iron and steel company, the major breweries,

the large shipping lines, most public transport, two of the three

principal shipyards, core companies of the Companhia Uniao Fabril

(CUF) conglomerate, the radio and TV networks (except that of

the Roman Catholic Church), and important companies in the

glass, mining, fishing, and agricultural sectors. Because of the key

role of the domestic banks as holders of stock, the government

indirectly acquired equity positions in hundreds of other firms. An

Institute for State Participation was created to deal with the many

disparate (often tiny) enterprises in which the state had thus obtained a majority shareholding. Another 300 small to medium

enterprises came under public management as the government "intervened' ' to rescue them from bankruptcy following their takeover

by workers or abandonment by management.

Although foreign direct investment was statutorily exempted from

nationalization, many foreign-controlled enterprises curtailed or

ceased operation because of costly forced labor settiements or worker

takeovers. The combination of revolutionary policies and negative

business climate brought about a sharp reversal in the trend of direct investment inflows from abroad.

A study by the economists Maria Belmira Martins and Jose

Chaves Rosa showed that a total of 244 private enterprises were

directly nationalized during the sixteen-month interval from March

14, 1975 to July 29, 1976. Nationalization was followed by the consolidation of the several private firms in each industry into state monopolies. As an example, Quimigal, the chemical and fertilizer entity, represented a merger of five firms. Four large companies

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Portugal: A Country Study

were integrated to form the national oil company, Petroleos de Portugal (Petrogal). Portucel brought together five pulp and paper companies. The fourteen private electric power enterprises were joined

into a single power generation and transmission monopoly, Electricidade de Portugal (EDP). With the nationalization and amalgamation of the three tobacco firms under Tabaqueira, the state gained complete control of this industry. The several breweries and

beer distribution companies were integrated into two state firms,

Central de Cervejas (Centralcer) and Unicer; and a single state enterprise, Rodoviaria, was created by joining the ninety-three nationalized trucking and bus lines. The forty-seven cement plants,

formerly controlled by the Champalimaud interests, were integrated

into Cimentos de Portugal (Cimpor). The government also acquired a dominant position in the export-oriented shipbuilding and ship

repair industry. Former private monopolies retained their company designations following nationalization. Included among these were the iron and steel company, Siderurgia Nacional; the rail- way, Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses (CP); and the national airline,

Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP).

Unlike other sectors, where existing private firms were typically consolidated into state monopolies, the commercial banking sys- tem and insurance industry were left with a degree of competition.

By 1979 the number of domestic commercial banks was reduced

from fifteen to nine. Notwithstanding their public status, the re- maining banks competed with each other and retained their in- dividual identities and certain differences in their activities. Before the revolution, private enterprise ownership dominated

the Portuguese economy to a degree unmatched in other West European countries. Only a handful of wholly owned or majority

owned state entities existed; these included the post office, the ar- maments industry, and the ports, as well as the National Development Bank and Caixa Geral de Depositos, the largest savings bank.

The Portuguese government held minority interests in TAP, the

national airline; in Siderurgia Nacional, the integrated steel mill; and in oil refining and oil marketing firms. The railroads, two

colonial banks, and the Bank of Portugal were majority privately

owned but publicly administered. Finally, although privately

owned, the tobacco companies and Radio Marconi were operated

under government concessions.

Two years after the military coup, the enlarged public sector ac- counted for 47 percent of the country's gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), 30 percent of total value added (VA), and 24 percent

of employment. These shares should be compared with 10 percent

of GFCF, 9 percent of VA, and 13 percent of employment for the

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The Economy

traditional public sector of 1973. Expansion of the public sector

since the revolution was particularly noteworthy in heavy manufacturing; in public services, including electricity, gas, transport and

communications; and in banking and insurance. Further, according to the Institute for State Participation, these figures did not

include private enterprises under temporary state intervention, pri- vate enterprises with minority state participation (less than 50 per- cent of the common stock), or worker-managed firms and

agricultural collectives. The Brain Drain

Compounding the problem of massive nationalizations was the

heavy drain of managerial and technical expertise away from the

public enterprises. The income-leveling measures of the MFA

revolutionary regime, together with the " antifascist" purges in fac- tories, offices, and large agricultural estates, induced an exodus

of human capital, mainly to Brazil. This loss of managers, technicians, and business people inspired a popular Lisbon saying, "Portugal used to send its legs to Brazil, but now we are sending our

heads."

Notwithstanding the concentration of the means of production

in the hands of a small number of family-based financial-industrial

groups, Portuguese business culture permitted a surprising upward

mobility of educated individuals with middle-class backgrounds into

professional management careers. Before the Revolution of 1974,

the largest, most technologically advanced (and most recently or- ganized) firms offered the greatest opportunity for management

careers based on merit.

A detailed analysis of Portugal's loss of managerial resources is contained in Harry M. Makler's follow-up surveys of 306 enterprises, conducted in July 1976, and again in June 1977. His study

makes clear that nationalization was greater in the modern, large,

technically advanced industries than in the traditional industries

such as textiles, apparel, and construction. In small enterprises (fifty to ninety-nine employees), only 15 percent of the industrialists had

quit as compared with 43 percent in the larger. In the giant firms

(1 ,000 or more employees), more than half had quit. Makler's cal- culations show that the higher the socioeconomic class origin, the

greater the likelihood that the industrialist had left the firm. He

also notes that "the more upwardly mobile also were more likely to have quit than those who were downwardly socially mobile."

Significantly, a much larger percentage of professional managers (52 percent) compared with owners of production (i.e.,

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Portugal: A Country Study

founders—18 percent, heirs—21 percent, and owner-managers—32

percent) had left their enterprises.

The constitution of 1976 confirmed the large and interventionist

role of the state in the economy. Its Marxist character before the

1989 revisions was revealed in a number of its articles, which pointed to a "classless society" and the "socialization of the means of

production" and proclaimed all nationalizations made after April

25, 1974, as "irreversible conquests of the working classes." The

constitution also defined new power relationships between labor

and management, with a strong bias in labor's favor. All regulations with reference to layoffs, including collective redundancy, were

circumscribed by Article 53. Role of the Consolidated Public Sector

After the revolution, the Portuguese economy experienced a

rapid, and often uncontrollable, expansion of public expenditures

both in the general government and in public enterprises. The lag

in public- sector receipts resulted in large public enterprise and

general government deficits. In 1982 the borrowing requirement

of the consolidated public sector reached 24 percent of GDP, its peak level; it was subsequendy reduced to 9 percent of GDP in 1990.

To rein in domestic demand growth, the Portuguese government was obliged to pursue IMF-monitored stabilization programs in

1977-78 and 1983-85. The large negative savings of the public sec- tor (including the state-owned enterprises) became a structural fea- ture of Portugal's political economy after the revolution. Other

official impediments to rapid economic growth after 1974 included all-pervasive price regulation, as well as heavy-handed inter- vention in factor markets and the distribution of income.

In 1989 Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva succeeded in

mobilizing the required two-thirds vote in the Assembly of the

Republic to amend the constitution, thereby permitting the denationalization of the state-owned banks and other public enterprises.

Privatization, economic deregulation, and tax reform became the

salient concerns of public policy as Portugal prepared itself for the

challenges and opportunities of membership in the EC's single market in the 1990s.

The Nonfinancial Public Enterprises

Following the sweeping nationalizations of the mid-1970s, public enterprises became a major component of Portugal's consolidated public sector. Portugal's nationalized sector in 1980 included

a core of fifty nonfinancial enterprises, entirely government owned.

This so-called public nonfinancial enterprise group included the

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The Economy

Institute of State Participation, a holding company with investments

in some seventy subsidiary enterprises; a number of state-owned

entities manufacturing or selling goods and services grouped with

nationalized enterprises for national accounts purposes (arms,

agriculture, and public infrastructure, such as ports); and a large

number of over 50-percent state-owned subsidiaries operating under private law. Altogether these public enterprises accounted for 25 percent of VA in GDP, 52 percent of GFCF, and 12 percent

of Portugal's total employment. In terms of VA and GFCF, the

relative scale of Portugal's public entities exceeded that of the other

West European economies, including the EC member countries.

Although the nationalizations broke up the concentration of eco- nomic power in the hands of the financial-industrial groups, the

subsequent merger of several private firms into single publicly

owned enterprises left domestic markets even more subject to monopoly. Apart from special cases, as in iron and steel, where the

economies of scale are optimal for very large firms, there was some

question as to the desirability of establishing national monopolies.

The elimination of competition following the official takeover of

such industries as cement, chemicals, and trucking probably

reduced managerial incentives for cost reduction and technical

advance.

As hybrid institutions, public enterprises find it difficult to separate market choices from political considerations. Their poorer economic performance may partially be explained by public

management's frustration at attempting to reconcile impossible

goals: on the one side, a concern for the "bottom line"; on the

other, coping with the distributional struggles of interest groups.

Special interest groups that shape the policies of state-owned firms

include "elite" public enterprise unions aspiring to guarantee employment and above-market wages; consumer groups desiring goods

and services at below user cost or market price; oversight ministries intent upon expanding their authority; and politicians, including chiefs of state, seeking to expand patronage opportunities. As

a vehicle for redistribution, public enterprise often becomes the ser- vant of special interest groups—those who are politically con- nected—rather than a guardian of the public or general interest.

It was not surprising that numerous nationalized enterprises ex- perienced severe operating and financial difficulties. State operations faced considerable uncertainty as to the goals of public

enterprises, with negative implications for decision making, often

at odds with market criteria. In many instances, managers of public

firms were less able than their private- sector counterparts to resist strong wage demands from militant unions. Further, public firm

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Portugal: A Country Study

managers were required for reasons of political expediency to maintain a redundant labor force and freeze prices or utility rates for long periods in the face of rising costs. Overstaffing was particularly flagrant at Petrogal, the national petroleum monopoly, and

Estaleiros Navais de Setubal (Setenave), the wholly state-owned

shipbuilding and repairing enterprise. The failure of the public

transportation firms to raise fares during a time of accelerating in- flation resulted in substantial operating losses and even obsoles- cence of the sector's capital stock. As a group, the public enterprises performed poorly financially

and relied excessively on debt financing from both domestic and

foreign commercial banks. The operating and financial problems

of the public enterprise sector were revealed in a study by the Bank

of Portugal covering the years 1978-80. Based upon a survey of

fifty-one enterprises, which represented 92 percent of the sector's VA, the analysis confirmed the debilitated financial condition of

the public enterprises, i.e., their inadequate equity and liquidity

ratios. The consolidated losses of the firms included in the survey

increased from 18.3 million contos (for value of the conto—see Glossary) in 1978 to 40.3 million contos in 1980, or 4.6 percent to 6.1

percent of net worth, respectively. Losses were concentrated in

transportation and to a lesser extent in transport equipment and

materials (principally shipbuilding and ship repair). The budgetary burden of the public enterprises as a result of their overall

weak performance was substantial: enterprise transfers to the Portuguese government (mainly taxes) fell short of government receipts

in the forms of subsidies and capital transfers. The largest nonfmancial state enterprises recorded (inflation-discounted) losses in

the seven-year period from 1977 to 1983 equivalent to 11 percent on capital employed. Notwithstanding their substantial operating

losses and weak capital structure, these large enterprises financed

86 percent of their capital investments from 1977 to 1983 through

increases in debt, of which two-thirds was foreign. The rapid

buildup of Portugal's external debt from 1978 to 1985 was largely

associated with the public enterprises.

The General Government

The share of general government expenditure (including capital outlays) in GDP rose from 23 percent in 1973 to 46 percent

in 1990 (see table 5, Appendix). On the revenue side, the upward

trend was less pronounced: the share increased from nearly 23 per- cent in 1973 to 39.2 percent in 1990. From a modest surplus before the revolution in 1973, the government balance swung to a wide deficit of 12 percent of GDP in 1984, declining thereafter to

130
The Economy

around 5.4 percent of GDP in 1990. Significantly, both current expenditures and capital expenditures roughly doubled their shares

of GDP between 1973 and 1990: government current outlays rose from 19.5 percent to 40.2 percent, capital outlays from 3.2 per- cent to 5.7 percent.

Apart from the growing investment effort, which included capital transfers to the public enterprises, government expenditure pat- terns since the revolution reflected rapid expansion in the number

of civil servants and pressure to redistribute income, mainly through

current transfers and subsidies, as well as burgeoning interest obligations. The category "current transfers" nearly tripled its share

of GDP between 1973 and 1990, from under 5 percent to 13.4 percent, reflecting the explosive growth of the social security system,

both with respect to the number of persons covered and the upgrading of benefits. Escalating interest payments on the public debt

from less than half a percent of GDP in 1973 to 8.2 percent of GDP

in 1990 were the result of both a rise in the debt itself and higher

real effective interest rates. The narrowing of the government deficit since the mid-1980s

and the associated easing of the borrowing requirement was caused

both by a small increase in the share of receipts (by two percentage points) and by the relatively sharper contraction of current

subsidies, from 7.6 percent of GDP in 1984 to 1.5 percent of GDP

in 1990. This reduction was a direct consequence of the gradual

abandonment by the government of its policy of curbs on rises in

public utility rates and food prices, against which it paid subsidies

to public enterprises.

Tax reform—comprising both direct and indirect taxation—was

a major element in a more comprehensive effort to modernize the

economy in the late 1980s. The key objective of these reforms was

to promote more efficient and market-oriented economic perfor- mance. Beyond considerations of efficiency, a good tax system also should be simple (i.e., easy to administer), fair, and transparent.

Prior to the reform, about 90 percent of the personal tax base

consisted of labor income. Statutory marginal tax rates on labor

income were very high, even at relatively low income levels, especially after the revolution. The large number of tax exemptions

and fiscal benefits, together with high marginal tax rates, entailed

the progressive erosion of the tax base through tax avoidance and

evasion. Furthermore, Portuguese membership in the EC created

the imperative for a number of changes in the tax system, especially the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT—see Glossary).

Reform proceeded in two major installments: the VAT was in- troduced in 1986; the income tax reform, for both personal and

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Portugal: A Country Study

corporate income, became effective in 1989. The VAT, whose nor- mal rate was 17 percent, replaced all indirect taxes, such as the

transactions tax, railroad tax, and tourism tax. Marginal tax rates on both personal and corporate income were substantially cut, and

in the case of individual taxes, the number of brackets was reduced

to five. The basic rate of corporate tax was 36.5 percent, and the

top marginal tax rate on personal income was cut from 80 percent

to 40 percent. A 25 percent capital gains tax was levied on direct

and portfolio investment. Business proceeds invested in development projects were exempt from capital gains tax if the assets were

retained for at least two years. Preliminary estimates indicated that part of the observed increase

in direct tax revenue in 1989-90 was of a permanent nature, the

consequence of a redefinition of taxable income, a reduction in al- lowed deductions, and the termination of most fiscal benefits for corporations. The resulting broadening of the income tax base per- mitted a lowering of marginal tax rates, greatly reducing the dis- incentive effects to labor and saving.

Macroeconomic Disequilibria and Public Debt

Between 1973 and 1988, the general government debt/GDP ratio quadrupled, reaching a peak of 74 percent in 1988. This growth

in the absolute and relative debt was only partially attributable to the accumulation of government deficits. It also reflected the reor- ganization of various public funds and enterprises, the separation

of their accounts from those of the government, and their fiscal consolidation. The rising trend of the general government debt/

GDP ratio was reversed in 1989, as a surge in tax revenues linked

to the tax reform and the shrinking public enterprise deficits reduced

the public-sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) relative to GDP.

After falling to 67 percent in 1990, the general government

debt/GDP ratio is expected to continue to decline, reflecting fiscal restraint and increased proceeds from privatization.

The financing structure of the public deficits has changed since

the mid-1980s under the effect of two factors. First, the easing of

the PSBR and the government's determination to reduce the for- eign debt/GDP ratio led to a sharp reduction in borrowing abroad.

Second, since 1985 the share of nonmonetary financing has in- creased steeply, not only in the form of public issues of Treasury

bills but also, since 1987-88, in the form of medium-term Treasury bonds.

The magnitude of the public-sector deficit (including that of the

public enterprises) had a crowding-out effect on private investment.

The nationalized banks were obliged by law to increase their holding

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The Economy

of government paper bearing negative real interest rates. This massive absorption of funds by the public sector was largely at the ex- pense of private enterprises whose financing was often constrained

by quantitative credit controls.

Portugal's membership in the EC resulted in substantial net

transfers averaging 1.5 percent of annual GDP during 1987-90.

The bulk of these transfers was "structural" funds that were used

for infrastructure developments and professional training. Additional EC funds, also allocated through the public sector, were

designed for the development of Portugal's agricultural and industrial sectors. After 1985 the PSBR began to show a substantial decline, largely as a result of the improved financial position of public enterprises.

Favorable exogenous factors (lower oil prices, lower interest rates, and depreciation of the dollar) helped to moderate operating costs. More important, however, was the shift in government policy. Public enterprise managers were given greater autonomy with respect

to investment, labor, and product pricing. Significantly, the combined deficit of the nonfmancial public enterprises fell to below 2 percent of GDP on average in 1987-88 from 8 percent of GDP

in 1985-86. In 1989 the borrowing requirements of those enterprises fell further to 1 percent of GDP.

In April 1990, legislation concerning privatization was enacted

following an amendment to the constitution in June 1989 that

provided the basis for complete (100 percent) divestiture of nationalized enterprises. Among the stated objectives of privatization were

to modernize economic units, increase their competitiveness, and

contribute to sectoral restructuring; to reduce the role of the state in the economy; to contribute to the development of capital markets; and to widen the participation of Portuguese citizens in the

ownership of enterprises, giving particular attention to the workers of the enterprises and to small shareholders.

The Portuguese government is concerned about the strength of

foreign investment in privatizations and wants to reserve the right

to veto some transactions. But as a member of the EC, Portugal

eventually will have to accept investment from other member countries on an equal footing with investment of its nationals. Significantly, government proceeds from privatization of nationalized

enterprises will primarily be used to reduce public debt; and to the extent that profits will rise after privatization, tax revenues will expand. In 1991 proceeds from privatization were expected to amount to 2.5 percent of GDP.

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Portugal: A Country Study

Human Resources and Income Distribution

One of the striking characteristics of the Portuguese people is their propensity to emigrate (see Emigration, ch.2). In the late 1980s, an estimated 3.5 to 4.0 million Portuguese passport holders were living in foreign lands, equal to over a third of the population residing in Portugal. Emigration, which was once a reflection

of Portugal's international importance as a maritime and colonial

power, became in the twentieth century, according to Thomas G.

Sanders, "a reflection of its poverty and economic weakness." As

a consequence of this population diaspora, large numbers of Portuguese migrants lived in Latin America (mainly Brazil and

Venezuela), industrial Western Europe (mainly France and Germany), Africa (predominantly the Republic of South Africa), and

North America (the United States and Canada). The Portuguese

emigrants to the EC countries, numbering over 1 million, differed

in several ways from those who went overseas: most of them were temporary workers who planned to return to their homeland, and

most originated from the mainland rather than Madeira and the

Azores (Acores).

Portugal's comparative poverty within the EC is closely associated

with lower per capita investment in human and physical capital.

On the other hand, Portuguese workers are recognized for their

strong work ethic, adaptability, and frugality. Among middleincome countries, few can match Portugal for its high family sav- ings rate. Real wage rates over extended time periods closely reflect labor productivity, which in turn is correlated with the factors mentioned above. Although government intervention can temporarily

alter the distribution of income in favor of labor through the

manipulation of wage rates and consumer prices—as indeed happened in the mid-1970s—labor productivity eventually determines

labor's earnings.

Employment and Sectoral Composition of the Labor Force

From 1960 to 1973, Portuguese policy measures supported a shift of resources, including labor, from low-productivity toward highproductivity uses, especially export-oriented industries. Rapid and

accelerated economic growth was reflected in the profound altera- tion of the sectoral composition of the work force. Between 1960

(the year after Portugal became a charter member of EFTA) and

1973, the share of the civilian labor force engaged in agriculture,

forestry, and fishing fell from nearly 44 percent to just under 28

percent, whereas the share of labor engaged in industry (including construction) increased from slightly less than 29 percent to

134
Fruit vendor, Porto Courtesy Andrea Matles Savada

Portuguese fishermen unload their catch. Courtesy Portuguese National Tourist Office, New York

135
Portugal: A Country Study

almost 36 percent, and in the services sector (including transport

and communications) from nearly 28 percent to slightly more than

36 percent. The shift of labor out of agriculture involved a reduction of the number engaged in that sector (a decline of about 550,000

workers between 1960 and 1973), as well as in the proportion of

farmers in the total labor force. Because of heavy emigration, the working population of continental Portugal shrank from more than 3.1 million in 1960 to just 2.9 million in 1973, and employment fell by an annual rate averaging 0.5 percent. The rapid shrinkage in the number of workers in agriculture was not accompanied by an equal or greater rise in the industrial and services sectors. Nearly two out of every three

Portuguese taking up nonagricultural employment during this period did so in another West European country. France was, even

at the beginning of the 1990s, host to about 80 percent of the

emigrant workers, most of whom worked at unskilled or semi-skilled

jobs. The 110,000 Portuguese in Germany, by contrast, had found

higher- skilled work, with some two-thirds employed in industry

in 1977. Consequently, net emigration between 1960 and 1973 ex- ceeded 1 million, a number greater than the natural increase in

the Portuguese population. In the thirteen years of war, from 1961

to 1974, 1.5 million Portuguese had seen military service in Africa, and during 1974 one in every four adult males was in the armed

forces. During this period, unemployment was kept down to about

4 percent (and to less than 3 percent in the early 1970s), largely

because of massive labor emigration to industrialized Western Europe and the military draft. After the revolution, the demobilization of the military draftees

and the return of Portuguese nationals from Africa produced important additions to the mainland population and labor force. From

a combined strength of 220,000 at the beginning of 1974, the armed

forces demobilized some 95,000 persons in that year and 60,000

in 1975. Furthermore, an estimated 500,000 returnees (retornados) were repatriated, mainly from Angola and Mozambique, and most

of them were totally without resources, having had to leave the for- mer colonies with only the barest essentials. Initially, their former

occupations made them difficult to integrate into the metropolitan

economy: 67 percent had held service jobs (as public employees

or office workers), whereas only 20 percent had been engaged in

industry and 4 percent in agriculture. Consequently, the Portuguese

government had to shoulder an extremely heavy burden in the form

of the various benefits granted to the returnees, including cash subsidies, provision of hotel accommodations, and assistance with purchases of essential goods. The sum of these benefits was estimated

136
The Economy

at 14 billion escudos (for value of the escudo—see Glossary) in 1976, or about 1 1 percent of total government spending. In all, the in- crease in the civilian population from 1974 to 1976 was probably

about 900,000, i.e., 10 percent of the total population in 1973.

Following this brief population burst in the number of mainland residents, Portugal's population and labor force resumed their

natural rates of growth; for example, in the 1980-89 decade, the

annual percentage increases were 0.5 percent and 1.4 percent,

respectively. Between 1973 and 1990, Portugal's labor force grew

by more than 1.8 million (see table 6, Appendix), of which more

than half was absorbed in the services sector and over a third in the industrial sector. Although the share of the work force in agriculture, forestry, and fishing resumed its historical relative decline

(from nearly 28 percent of the total in 1973 to almost 18 percent

in 1990), the absolute number of workers in that sector increased

slightly. Industry's share in the labor force remained virtually un- changed between 1973 and 1990 (at about 35 percent), but the ser- vices sector added nearly 1.2 million employees, its share in the

total rising from over 36 percent in 1973 to 47.4 percent in 1990.

A major explanation for this growth of almost 1 1 percent was the

explosive increase of civil service employment after the Revolution of 1974.

Wages and the Distribution of Income

Two approaches are used to determine how income is divided

among citizens of a country. The first approach, involving the size of distribution of income, compares the household income shares

received by the richest 20 percent of the population, the poorest

20 percent, and the three quintiles between these extremes. This

approach yields an income concentration, or Gini ratio: the higher

the ratio, the greater the degree of inequality. Gini ratios can be

useful in comparing the degree of income inequality within a country over time or among countries during the same time frame. The

International Labour Organisation estimates for Portugal indicate

that the Gini ratio changed little between 1967-68 (0.423) and

1973-74 (0.431), corresponding to the end of the Salazar and

Caetano administrations, respectively. By comparison, in the early

1970s, France's Gini ratio was 0.416, Germany's 0.376, and

Sweden's 0.346. It may also be useful to compare the household

income share received by the poorest 40 percent of the population

with the share received by the richest 20 percent. According to this indicator (richest 20 percent and poorest 40 percent), Portugal's

income distribution profile at the end of the Caetano period (3.5)

reveals by comparison relatively greater equality in Spain (2.4) and

137
Portugal: A Country Study

Italy (3.0) but greater relative inequality in Costa Rica (4.6), Mexico

(5.3), and Brazil (9.5). Portugal's income concentration profile, on the other hand, was similar to that of France (3.3) and Argentina (3.6) during the early 1970s.

The second, or functional, approach to income distribution measures the shares going to the various productive factors—en- trepreneurship, land, capital, and labor. Wages and salaries or compensation of employees are concepts that normally show the

proportion of national income or national product going to labor.

In the aftermath of the 1974 military coup, from mid- 1974 to November 1975, the newly formed labor unions within the General

Confederation of Portuguese Workers-National Intersindical (Confederacao Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Intersindical

Nacional—CGTP-IN) greatly increased their strength. The unions

focused on expansion of the public sector, employment guarantees, and income redistribution. In response to labor's demands,

the government instituted income-leveling policies that included

a large increase in the minimum wage for a substantial proportion

of the work force, a freeze on rents, a highly graduated income

tax, and a ceiling on salaries. As a consequence of official measures

affecting wages and salaries (including the US$800 a month ceil- ing on the maximum salary), the average pay gap between unskilled

workers and managers shrank from 1:7 in 1973 to 1:4 in 1975.

To protect increases in nominal wages, prices of essential commodities, particularly food, were fixed at below market levels. Real wages

increased 25 percent between 1973 and 1975, and the share of the

wage bill in national income rose explosively from 52 percent in

1973 to 69 percent in 1975. At the same time, the proportion of

national income flowing to capital and entrepreneurship (including income of artisans and other self-employed workers) was

sharply eroded.

Official policies were also reflected in the distribution of income.

Average wage income of the lowest quintile almost doubled in real terms between 1972 and 1976; the second and third quintiles obtained an increase of 59 percent and 45 percent, respectively; but

the real remuneration of the top 5 percent declined by 19 percent

from 1972 to 1976. In January 1979, the General Union of Workers (Uniao Geral

dos Trabalhadores—UGT) was organized. The UGT was viewed

as a viable, democratic alternative to the CGTP-IN, which, as of

the beginning of the 1990s, continued to be communist dominated, as it had been since its formation. By 1990 these two union

confederations were roughly equal in size, and 30 percent of the

labor force was unionized.

138
The Economy

How has the working class fared since the revolution? Following the short-lived, government-induced wage explosion in 1975-76,

the share of employee compensation in national income (52.9 per- cent in 1979) was again much the same as in 1973 (51.6 percent),

and from 1979 to 1989 that share was on a downward trend. Real

wages per capita increased only 10 percent between 1973 and 1989, a reflection both of slow labor productivity growth (20 percent) during this sixteen-year postrevolutionary period and the widening "tax

wedge," i.e., the higher social security taxes contributed by both

the employer and the employee. Real wages per capita moved on

a downward trend from their peak level in 1976 to their lowest point

(below their level in 1973) in 1984. From 1984 to 1990, real wages

rose each year in response to the brisk demand for labor associated with Portugal's economic recovery. The rate of unemployment

fell to 4.7 percent in 1990, the lowest level since the mid-1970s.

This rate brought the cumulative decline since the unemployment

peak of 1985 (8.5 percent) to 3.8 percentage points. An estimated

250,000 new jobs were added between 1985 and 1990.

The Portuguese government submitted legislation in 1988 to abolish the restrictive individual and collective dismissal regulations

that had been in effect since 1976. Although approved by parliament, the law was declared unconstitutional by the courts. In the

following year, however, the government gained court approval

of less sweeping labor reforms: dismissal procedures were simplified and the conditions eased regarding both the termination of

individual contracts and collective layoffs. Under this law, older

unemployed workers were permitted reduction of the early retire- ment age from sixty- two to sixty. Until the 1989 labor reform, un- employment rigidity was coupled with a high degree of real wage

flexibility. Consequently, adjustment to external shocks, such as the sudden price explosion of imported oil between 1979 and 1980, was effected by reducing real wages rather than the numbers of

employed.

As a result of its EC membership, Portugal received transfers

from the European Social Fund in support of training programs

managed by private firms. The fund's contribution to the Portuguese labor market amounted to 1 percent of GDP in both 1987

and 1988, of which two-thirds was invested in training an estimated 160,000 young persons.

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing employed 17.8 percent of Portugal's labor force but accounted for only 6.2 percent of GDP

in 1990. With the principal exception of the alluvial soils of the

139
Portugal: A Country Study

Tagus River (Rio Tejo) valley and the irrigated sections of the

Alentejo, crop yields and animal productivity remained well below those of the other EC members. Portugal's agro-food deficit (attributable mainly to grain, oilseed, and meat imports) represented

about 2.5 percent of GDP, but its surplus on forestry products

(wood, cork, and paper pulp) offset its food deficit. Portugal's overall agricultural performance is unfavorable when

viewed in the context of the country's natural resources and cli- matic conditions. Agricultural productivity (gross farm output per

person employed) was well below that of the other West European

countries in 1985, at half of the levels in Greece and Spain and

a quarter of the EC average.

A number of factors contribute to Portugal's poor agricultural

performance. First, the level of investment in agriculture was tradi- tionally very low. The number of tractors and the quantity of fertilizer used per hectare were one-third the EC average in the

mid-1980s. Second, farms in the north are small and fragmented;

half of them are less than one hectare in size and 86 percent, less than five hectares. Third, the collective farms set up in the south

after the 1974-75 expropriations proved incapable of modernizing, and their efficiency declined. Fourth, poor productivity is associated with the low level of education of farmers. Finally, dis- tribution channels and economic infrastructure are inadequate in

parts of the country.

Agricultural Zones

Portugal is made up of the mainland and the Azores and Madeira

islands, which altogether amount to a land area of 91,640 square

kilometers, about the size of Indiana. The mainland's land area

of slightly more than 9.2 million hectares is classified as follows

(in thousands of hectares): 2,755 arable land and permanent crops

(including 710 in permanent crops), 530 permanent pasture, 3,640

forest and woodland, and 2,270 other land.

A useful categorization divides the mainland into three distinct

topographical and climatic zones: the south (the Alentejo and the

Algarve), the center (the Tagus River Valley and coastal areas),

and the north (the area between the Rio Douro and the Rio Minho, Tras-os-Montes, and the Beira region).

The north is mountainous, with a rainy, moderately cool cli- mate. This zone contains about 2 million hectares of cultivated land

and is dominated by small-scale, intensive agriculture. High population density, particularly in the northwest, has contributed to a

pattern of tiny, fragmented farms that produce mainly for family

consumption interspersed with larger and often mechanized farms

140
The Economy

that specialize in commercial production of a variety of crops. On

the average, northern levels of technology and labor productivity

are among the lowest in Western Europe. Extreme underemployment of agricultural workers accounts for the north being the principal and enduring source of Portuguese emigrant labor.

The center is a diverse zone of about 75,000 hectares that in- cludes rolling hills suitable primarily for tree crops, poor dryland

soils, and the fertile alluvial soils of the banks of the Tagus River.

A variety of crops are grown on the productive areas under irriga- tion: grains, mainly wheat and corn, oilseeds (including sunflowers), and irrigated rice. Farms located in the Tagus Valley typically are 100 hectares in size. The south is dominated by the Alentejo, a vast, rolling plain

with a hot, arid climate. The Alentejo occupies an area of approximately 2.6 million hectares, about 30 percent of the total area of

mainland Portugal, and produces about 75 percent of the country's wheat. Although much of the area is classified as arable land,

poor soils dominate most of the area, and consequendy yields of

dryland crops and pasture are low by West European standards.

The Alentejo is also known for its large stands of cork oak and its olive groves. The Algarve, less than a third the area of the Alentejo, occupies the extreme southern part of Portugal. This dryland

area is characterized by smallholdings where animal grazing and

fishing are the principal occupations of the inhabitants.

Crops and Livestock

In 1990 wheat was the leading Portuguese grain crop, followed

by corn, which was grown mainly on the small farms of the north.

Rice, although occupying less than one-tenth of the area of either

wheat or corn, was a significant grain crop. Potatoes and corn silage were found throughout the north.

Portugal's leading edible tree crop in the early 1990s was olive

oil. In spite of the importance of olive oil for the economy and the

increasing production of other edible oilseeds, such as safflower

and sunflower, Portugal was a net importer of vegetable fats and

oils. The country produced a variety of horticultural crops, some

of which were exported. As an example, Portugal was a leading

world exporter of tomato paste. In the mid-1980s, over 300,000 hectares were in vineyards. Portugal is one of Western Europe's major producers and exporters

of wines. The most important vineyards are located in the north- ern valleys of the Rio Douro, Rio Mondego, and Rio Lima,

but vineyards are also found in the Algarve and the Setubal Peninsula. Portugal's dessert wines—port and muscatel—and rose

141
Portugal: A Country Study

wines, notably Mateus, are well known abroad. Portuguese red

and white table wines are less well known outside of the country,

but their export and reputation are gradually increasing.

Crop yields, as noted above, and animal productivity remained

well below those of Portugal's European counterparts as of the early

1990s. Yields of dryland crops and pastures are low by EC stan- dards, but yields on irrigated land and in the alluvial soil areas of the Ribatejo are comparable with EC member countries. Portuguese grain-crop yields (kilograms per hectare) are less than a

third of those in Germany and France and about 60 percent of those

in Greece (see table 7, Appendix). Portugal's wheat, corn, and

barley yields compare unfavorably with its European counterparts.

Portuguese rice, grown on irrigated land, shows yields only about

14 percent below those of France and about 25 percent below those

of Spain and Greece.

Although pastureland is scarce, livestock constitutes a signifi- cant share of total agricultural production. Because of growing

domestic demand for animal products and low livestock productivity, Portugal has to import about 10 percent of its meat requirements. Three-fourths of the mainland's milk is produced in the

northwest's coastal areas. The mainland's livestock numbers in 1990 included over 1 .3 million head of cattle, over 5 million sheep, about 2.5 million pigs,

and 860,000 goats. About 18 million chickens supplied the country's poultry industry that year. Forestry and Fishing

As of the early 1990s, over a third of the mainland was forest and woodlands, and commercially valuable timber stands included pine, cork oak, and eucalyptus. Pine is used not only for timber but also for resin, pitch, and turpentine. Eucalyptus, a fast growing import from Australia, has become a major source of pulp

and paper. Cork oak, found mostly in the Alentejo, is the source

of processed cork, a traditional Portuguese export commodity ac- counting for about 60 percent of world sales. The country's long coastline and seafaring tradition make fish- ing a significant, but declining, source of income and jobs. Lisbon, Setubal, Matosinhos, and Portimao are Portugal's main

fishing ports and centers of commercial fish processing. Of the more

than 200 edible species caught in Portuguese coastal waters and

off West Africa, the most valuable is the sardine, an important

source of domestic food supply and, in canned form, a traditional

manufactured export product.

142
The Economy

Notwithstanding Portugal's maritime tradition, the country's

fishing industry in terms of fish catches in 1990 (322,000 tons) compared unfavorably with those of other small European countries,

notably Norway (1,747,000 tons), and Denmark (1,517,000 tons).

Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform

The system of land tenure on the eve of the revolution was

anachronistic. Very large estates in the south-central region coexisted with peasant farming in minute, fragmented plots in the north.

The small farms typically were owner-operated, with the proprietors' families clustering in villages. Absentee landownership characterized the latifundio system with day-to-day operations in the hands

of estate managers. Because of the high concentration of ownership in the south-central provinces, nearly half of the country's

agricultural labor force in 1973 consisted of landless wage-earning

rural workers whose standard of living was extremely low.

Holdings of over 200 hectares (about 0.3 percent of the total number) accounted for 39 percent of all farm land, whereas at the other

end of the scale holdings of less than one hectare (about 39 percent

of the total) represented no more than 2.5 percent of total Portuguese farm land.

The Agrarian Reform Law of July 29, 1975, which laid down

the principles for the expropriation of land, validated de facto land

seizures by rural workers that actually had begun five months earlier. The law provided that expropriation should apply to rural es- tates in the "intervention zone" south of the Tagus River. Lands

that could have been expropriated under the provisions of the Agrarian Reform Law amounted to 1 ,640,000 hectares, but the area oc- cupied by the rural workers reached only 1,140,800 hectares, or about one-fifth of the country's total farm land. On the occupied

land, 449 "collective production units" were set up, bringing various estates of the former owners under a single peasant directorate.

Major expropriations took place in the districts of Evora, Beja, Portalegre, Setubal, and Santarem (see table 8, Appendix). Very large

collective farms were formed in Portalegre and Beja (averaging between about 3,500 and 4,200 hectares); smaller units were created

in Santarem and Setubal (averaging between about 860 and 1,180

hectares).

As Portugal shifted toward moderation and the political center,

collectivized agriculture increasingly was perceived as a counterproductive approach to the problems of the rural south. By the middle of 1990, only one-tenth (104,000 hectares) of the more than

1,080,000 hectares taken from the original landowners was still in possession of the remaining 30 collective farms. The gradual

143
Portugal: A Country Study

decollectivization of agriculture, which began in modest form in

the late 1970s, culminated in a reformed agrarian law enacted by

parliament in late 1988. Under its provisions, the maximum size of properties eligible for reprivatization was increased, and land

could be divided among the heirs to an estate. Many collective farm

members agreed to accept cash payments from the original owners

in order to facilitate change of ownership or received individual

titles to small shares of the former collective production units.

Agricultural Policy and the European Community

Portuguese agricultural markets, both inputs and outputs, were

subjected to substantial policy intervention, particularly after the

revolution. Under the old regime, agricultural pricing policy was

largely oriented toward the provision of low-priced foodstuffs to urban areas, which required extensive controls over imports and

marketing. Three state marketing enterprises were organized after 1974, primarily to manage trade in their respective commodity

groups—cereals, oilseeds, and sugar and alcohol—in pursuit of price

control objectives. Public assistance to farmers and ranchers in- volved subsidizing intermediate inputs, primarily fuels, fertilizers,

and mixed feeds. These subsidies, however, were largely removed

in June 1983. After the revolution, de facto credit subsidies for farmers (often associated with negative real interest rates) entailed very

high transaction costs. As a result, only large farmers had access

to the formal credit system.

As a condition of EC membership, Portugal adopted the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a basic instrument of the community's integration since 1962. The CAP is based on the principles

of common pricing, EC preference, and joint financing. As Portugal adopted the transitional arrangements leading to full compliance with the CAP, both the locus of agricultural decision making

and the level of incentives given by the system of price supports

shifted from the nation to the EC . Portuguese prices of some commodities at the time of entry into the community were well above

the EC levels. Cereal and dairy sectors will experience the most

serious declines in real prices because they benefited most from

price increases in the early 1980s and because they produce the

commodities in chronic surplus in the EC. The Alentejo wheat and

livestock systems, both based on poor soils, will likely become unprofitable during the transition to EC price levels. On the other

hand, the prospects for rice, tomatoes, sunflowers, and potatoes,

as well as Portugal's higher quality wine systems, appear to be

favorable under the CAP regime.

144
Lisnave docks near Lisbon

Courtesy General Directorate of Mass Communication, Lisbon

The Industrial Sector

The growth of Portugal's industrial sector since the revolution was less dynamic than in the 1960-73 period. In this later period,

growth was strongly affected by a number of major events, both

domestic and external: the two oil price hikes, the nationalizations

of 1975-76, and the country's accession to the EC. Nevertheless,

Portugal's industrial production grew at a respectable 4.8 percent

annual rate during the 1980-89 decade, leading GDP growth (2.7

percent annually). The overall industrial index advanced 43 per- cent between 1980 and 1989, with significant divergence in the

growth rates among the subsectors of manufacturing (39 percent);

electricity, gas, and water (74 percent); and mining (74 percent).

Mining output was stagnant from 1980 to 1988, but in the following year it surged by 74 percent as the Neves Corvo copper mine

went into operation. Manufacturing, the largest component of the

industrial sector, also showed marked growth differences among

the several branches. Lumber and cork products, a traditional rural- based industry, declined by 26 percent during the decade; on the

other hand, paper (75 percent), chemicals and plastics products

(97 percent), and nonmetallic mineral products (65 percent) led

the advance in manufacturing.

145
Portugal: A Country Study

Industrial Regions

Manufacturing is concentrated in two major industrial regions:

Lisbon-Setubal in the south-central region and Porto-Aveiro-Braga

in the north. Together they account for about three-fourths of Portugal's net industrial output. The Lisbon area includes such major

industries as iron and steel; shipbuilding and repair; oil refining,

machinery, chemicals, cement, and electronics; and food and beverages. Setubal, about eighty kilometers to the southeast of Lisbon,

also has a large shipyard and automobile assembly and machine

industry plants, as well as cement, woodpulp, cork, and fish processing. Sines, located about 140 kilometers south of Lisbon, is the

site of a major deepwater port and heavy industrial complex. Begun during the Caetano administration, Sines includes an oil refinery, petrochemical plants, and a 1 ,200-megawatt coal-fired

power plant.

Porto is primarily a center of light industry, including textiles,

footwear, furniture, wine, and food processing. Porto is also the

location of the nation's largest petroleum refinery; the other is lo- cated at Lisbon. Portimao is a center for fishing. Aveiro specializes in woodpulp and other wood products but also produces

footwear and machinery. Braga specializes in textiles and cloth- ing, cutlery, furniture, and electronics. Covilha is also an active

textiles area. The two premier industrial regions offer the greatest concentrations of population, thereby stimulating market-oriented manufacturing operations. Furthermore, because of the dependence of

modern industry on imports of raw materials, machinery, and fuel,

the location of processing plants near the two major ports minimizes

their operating costs (see fig. 8). Industrial Organization

Industrial organization in Portugal reflects three major ownership patterns: private domestic firms are concentrated in traditional,

light industries and in construction; public enterprises dominate

mining and major heavy industries, mainly iron and steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, petroleum refining, and electricity;

and subsidiaries of multinational corporations dominate the technically more advanced electronics, automotive, pharmaceutical, and

electrical machinery industries. The foreign investor presence is also important in the pulp and paper, chemical, food products, and

clothing industries. In general, the traditional light industries—textiles, clothing and

footwear, food and beverages, cork products, and furniture—are

146
The Economy

labor intensive and technologically backward. Within this group,

however, the medium-sized establishments (between 100 and 200

employees) enjoy superior management capabilities and higher levels of productivity.

The Portuguese construction industry, which was largely unaffected by the 1975 nationalizations, emerged in the late 1980s

from several years of recession. Since the mid-1980s, EC and lo- cal counterpart funds have financed a variety of infrastructure

projects, including roads, bridges, and sewage and water treatment

plants. Commercial building and house construction was also on

an upward trend after that time.

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, of the twenty-five

largest industrial firms ranked by sales in 1986, ten were public

enterprises (including nine of the largest ten), and nine were subsidiaries of foreign-owned firms. Significantly, by the mid-1980s,

over one-fifth of Portuguese manufacturing sales were by subsidiaries of multinational firms, with their export share even higher.

Seven of the ten largest manufacturing export-oriented firms were

controlled by foreign investors.

By the mid-1980s, the large industrial public enterprises faced

extremely difficult financial problems associated with earlier er- rors in investment and pricing policies. After the second oil shock,

many of these enterprises borrowed heavily abroad to finance in- vestment projects, which often were poorly conceived and poorly

managed. In 1986 operating losses of Quimigal (chemicals), Siderurgia Nacional (steel), and the shipbuilding company Estaleiros

Navais de Setubal (Setenave) totaled 29 billion escudos, or 30 per- cent of total public enterprise losses. As a result of their excessive dependence on debt financing,

Quimigal and Setenave, as well as Companhia Nacional de Petro- qufmica (CNP), a state-owned petrochemical enterprise, had a negative equity or net worth position (i.e., their debts exceeded

their assets). Many of these firms in the mid-1980s were overstaffed

and had concluded wage settlements that were generally higher than

in the private sector. The major state-owned industrial enterprises are candidates for ultimate privatization. In anticipation of their divestiture, they un- derwent financial and managerial restructuring in the late 1980s.

As an example, loss-making enterprises such as CNP and Setenave

had been operating under private management contracts to make

them viable for privatization. Two major privatizations were an- nounced at the end of 1990: Siderurgia Nacional and Petrogal (the

largest state-owned petrochemical firm). To assure that the national

steel company can operate successfully within the EC's single

147
Portugal: A Country Study

— International boundary

(a? National capital • Populated place m Cork ^< Fish processing a Footwear Heavy industry

Light industry n Petrochemical industry

Textiles CQ5 Wine-producing areas Wood products Coal Cr Chromium Si! Tin Cu Copper U Uranium Fe Iron ore W Tungsten

25 50 Kilometers

r 25 50 Miles

Porto

Aveiro CoviIha 1

M[antic

Ocean

A

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

SPAIN

Figure 8. Economic Activity, 1992

market, the Portuguese government was considering selling Siderurgia Nacional to a leading European steelmaker, preferably linked

to a Portuguese minority partner.

Energy and Mineral Resources

Portugal produces less than a quarter of its primary energy re- quirements and depends heavily on imported hydrocarbon fuels,

mainly petroleum. Although efforts were made to locate domestic

148
The Economy

petroleum deposits in the early 1970s, none were found. Coal ac- counts for less than 5 percent of Portugal's primary energy use. Apparent consumption in 1988 is around 2.9 million tons, of which

240,000 tons were mined domestically. Portugal's low-grade anthracite coal, the production of which has stagnated since the

mid-1970s, is mined near Porto. The United States has emerged

as Portugal's main supplier of metallurgical and steam coal. A

5 -million-ton-per-year capacity coal terminal, capable of handling

150,000 deadweight-ton vessels, was scheduled to be completed at Sines early in the 1990s. Because Portugal has no known natural

gas reserves, the government has plans to build a liquified natural

gas terminal at Setubal and a gas distribution network. Portugal's

hydroelectric potential is well developed and provides nearly half

of the economy's electricity requirements.

As a result of Portugal's accession to the EC, the country's energy

sector is rapidly being deregulated and diversified. The state electric power company, Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), planned to invest US$700 million between 1990 and 1995 on dams and hydroelectric equipment. In 1990 EDP completed its second coal-burning

power plant station to reduce its dependency on imported oil. In

addition, coal consumption in the cement industry was forecast to grow as more facilities converted to coal from fuel oil. Portugal's metallic mineral resources are more impressive for their variety than for their contribution to GDP. The most important

mines are in the north, in the mountains of Beira, where tungsten, tin, chromium, and other alloy minerals are mined in commercial quantities. Iron ore is mined in Moncorvo in the upper Douro

Valley; formerly exported in its entirety, the Moncorvo mine

production came to supply the government's integrated iron and

steel works at Seixal near Lisbon and its Maia electric steel plant near Porto. Portugal is a significant world source of tungsten concentrate, most of which is exported. The mine has an annual

production capacity of 1,400 tons of tungsten concentrate. Portugal's metallic mineral production was greatly enhanced

upon the completion of the US$200 million Neves Corvo copper

mine near Castro Verde in southern Portugal—the largest noncoal mining development project in Western Europe. An estimated 33 million tons of 7.8 percent copper were proven at the site as of 1986. The concentrator initially will process one million tons

of ore annually, yielding 400,000 tons of concentrate containing

nearly 150,000 tons of copper. The Neves Corvo operating com- pany is owned 51 percent by the government and 49 percent by

RTZ Metals Group of Britain.

149
Portugal: A Country Study

Services

Portugal's services sector dwarfs agriculture and industry, both

as a contributor to GDP and as a source of employment. In 1973

services accounted for 39 percent of GDP; by 1990, that share had

risen to nearly 56 percent. In 1973 services employed slightly over 36 percent of the total labor force, and in 1990 that share reached more than 47 percent. In the latter year, government employed

14.5 percent of the Portuguese labor force, followed by commerce

(11.7 percent), transportation (4.3 percent), financial services (3.2

percent), and other services (12.3 percent).

Commerce and Tourism

Portuguese domestic commerce is dominated by numerous small,

family-owned firms concentrated in the major urban areas. Retail

outlets, around 80,000 in the late 1980s, are declining in numbers

as supermarkets increase their market share. At the same time,

upscale but smaller sales outlets are growing in number, replacing

traditional retail shops. In both retailing and wholesaling, foreign

investor participation is helping to accelerate the modernization

of Portugal's domestic trade.

Foreign tourism is an important component of Portugal's ser- vices sector. Foreign exchange receipts from tourism income

amounted to US$3.58 billion in 1990, compared with US$0.55 bil- lion in 1973 and US$1.15 billion in 1980. This service industry

directiy employed an estimated 150,000 persons, equivalent to nearly 4 percent of the active labor force that year, but indirectly had

strong secondary impacts, particularly on construction. From 1973

to 1990, tourism income as a share of GDP was roughly stable,

fluctuating between 5 and 6 percent. The mid-1970s proved to be an exception: the brief period of radical politics combined with the

global recession led to a halving of foreign arrivals to 2 million in

1975 from over 4 million in 1973 and to a sharp reduction in the

receipts/GDP ratio to 2 percent from 5 percent in the earlier year. There were 7.3 million foreign arrivals in 1981, 16.5 million in

1989, and 19.6 million in 1991.

Of the 16.5 million recorded foreign visitors in 1989, 93 per- cent were from Western Europe. Spaniards, not surprisingly, constituted three-fourths of all visitors, although most of them were

excursionists, that is, visitors staying for a period of less than twentyfour hours. Visitors from Britain, although only 7 percent of the

total, contributed about 30 percent of tourism earnings.

Portugal offers many attractions to vacationers from northern

150
Petroleum refinery near Lisbon

Cement factory in the Estremadura region

Courtesy General Directorate of Mass Communication, Lisbon

151
Portugal: A Country Study

Europe and the United States: medieval castles and other architectural landmarks, a number of which serve as government-operated

inns; more than 100 beaches along the southern coast of the Algarve; and a resort area stretching westward from Lisbon at the

mouth of the Tagus River, notably the famed resorts of Cascais

and Estoril. Other attractions include Portugal's mild climate and

its relatively low cost. The major goals of the Portuguese government for this signifi- cant export industry are to improve the quality of tourism services, to attract visitors to northern locations, to safeguard the environment, and to encourage investment in tourism facilities. Transportation and Communications

Portugal's transportation system in the late 1980s comprised

73,660 kilometers of roads, of which 61 ,000 kilometers were paved; a railroad network of 3,630 kilometers; and 820 kilometers of

navigable inland waterways. Lisbon, on the Tagus estuary, and

the two other major ports at Leixoes, near Porto, and Sines are

fully equipped and have adequate warehousing facilities. Lisbon's

Portela Airport is a major European air terminal and transit point

for some eighteen airlines. Porto and the Algarve, as well as the

Azores and Madeira islands, are also served by international air- ports. Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP), the national airline,

operates flights within the country and also serves major European cities and several large cities in the United States, South America,

and Africa (see fig. 9). Much of Portugal's transportation infrastructure—the nationalized railroad, airline, merchant fleet, and trucking and bus

lines—is to be restructured and/or privatized in the early 1990s.

For example, Caminhos de Ferro Portuguese (CP), the national

railroad, approved a 1988 plan that called for a US$1.5 billion in- vestment to modernize the rail system by 1994. The plan includes

high-speed "super trains" to connect Portugal's major cities and

Lisbon to Madrid. In addition, in the second half of the 1980s the

EC began to give substantial assistance for improving the trans- portation infrastructure.

Portugal is following an ambitious program to modernize its communications system. The Assembly of the Republic approved

in July 1989 the deregulation/liberalization of some telecommunications activities, which will allow private firms to operate complementary services, such as cellular phones, videotex, and highly

value-added services such as fax, audiotex, and voicemail. Radio

and television are also opening to private participation, and reception of satellite television is expanding rapidly.

152
The Economy

Banking and Finance

The importance of the financial system to the economy dwarfs

its direct impact on employment and income. A well-functioning

financial system serves not only to increase the mobilization of sav- ing but also, more importantly, to direct capital resources toward

their most productive uses. Since the mid-1980s, when commercial banking and insurance were reopened to private initiative, the

Portuguese financial system has evolved toward greater liberali- zation, diversification, and internationalization.

Although the private financial sector has grown rapidly, the

eleven nationalized banks and eight public insurance companies

still accounted for 80 percent and 60 percent of their respective markets in 1989. Notwithstanding their improved operating conditions

and higher solvency ratios, the profitability of most nationalized

banks is depressed by their large holdings of low-interest-bearing

public debt. Bad and doubtful loans continue to burden several

state-owned banks. The nationalized banks are also plagued by

undercapitalization, overstaffing, and an excessive branching struc- ture. Many of these banks have large pension liabilities, which,

being unfunded, are not reflected in their balance sheets. The con- tinuing structural problems of the state banks date back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Portuguese government followed a "soft budget" policy that emphasized social or political objectives over market criteria. Banks were required by law to extend

preferential credit, usually at negative real interest rates, to the large

nonfinancial public enterprises, as well as to the general government. Relaxation of the normal banking sanctions against trou- bled or failing public enterprises threatened the capital of the banks

and their own financial viability. The Bank of Portugal's quantitative credit controls served mainly to facilitate commercial bank

financing of the large deficits of the consolidated public sector. The

administrative control of credit penalized private small and mediumsized enterprises, in particular.

Portuguese financial markets experienced accelerated change after the country joined the EC in 1986. Deposit and lending rates were

freed, new money market instruments were introduced, and in

1990, the Bank of Portugal removed credit ceilings on commercial

banks. The Lisbon Stock Exchange was modernized with more

stringent rules governing the disclosure of financial information;

precautions were also taken against insider trading.

Enabling legislation in 1984 allowed private banks and insur- ance firms to be organized. By the late 1980s, six new foreign bank

branches had been established: Manufacturers Hanover Trust,

153
Figure 9. Transportation System, 1992

Chase Manhattan, Barclays, Banque Nationale de Paris, Citicorp,

and Generale de Banque of Belgium. Four majority Portuguese

private banks were also set up: Banco de Comercio e Industria

(BCI), Banco Internacional de Credito (BIC), Banco Portugues

de Investimento (BPI), and Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP).

By December 1990, BCP had become Portugal's leading and fastest growing private commercial bank with total assets of nearly US$6

billion. A number of private investment (para-banking) institutions

154
The Economy

and venture capital funds have also become part of the financial

picture since the mid-1980s.

During the first phase of ' 'partial" privatization—in 1988 before

the 1989 constitutional amendment—the government selected a medium-sized bank (Banco Totta e Agores) and two public insur- ance companies (Alianca Seguradora and Companhia de Seguros

Tranquilidade) as the first to be privatized. Share issues for 49 per- cent of these companies were substantially oversubscribed in 1989.

After passage of the Reprivatization Law in April 1990, the sale of the remaining 5 1 percent of both Tranquilidade and Alianca

shares took place later that year, and an additional 31 percent of

Banco Totta e Acores shares were also sold. Other 100 percent

privatizations of financial firms envisaged for 1991 included the

Banco Portugues do Atlantico, the country's largest commercial

bank.

Significantly, the late 1980s saw the reemergence of some of the

prerevolutionary family groups in Portugal's economic landscape,

particularly in the financial sector. As an example, the Espiritu

Santo family became the majority shareholder in BIC and in the

Espiritu Santo Sociedade de Investimento and was reported to be

attempting to retake control of the Tranquilidade insurance company. The return of some of these dispossessed family groups to Portugal reflects a turnaround in confidence in Portugal's future,

as well as the prospect for reinvestment of large sums of flight

capital.

Notwithstanding the privatization trend, the Portuguese government intends to maintain an important position in the financial

system in addition to its control over central banking through the

Bank of Portugal. The two major financial groups reserved for the

state include, first, the Caixa Geral de Depositos, the largest sav- ings bank; the Banco Nacional Ultramarino (a commercial bank);

and Fidelidade (an insurance company). The second group deals

with international trade and export promotion and consists of Banco

de Fomento e Exterior (an investment bank); Banco Borges e Ir- mao (a commercial bank); and an external credit insurance company, Companhia de Seguros de Creditos (Cosec). Together, these

two financial groups accounted for about 40 percent of Portugal's

banking transactions in 1990.

Foreign Economic Relations

After becoming a charter member of EFTA in 1959, Portugal

became increasingly open to the rest of the world through international trade and other payment flows. In 1990 exports of goods

and services accounted for about 37 percent of Portugal's GDP,

155
Portugal: A Country Study

and imports of goods and services represented about 47 percent

of GDP. The accession of Portugal to the EC on January 1, 1986,

required fundamental changes in the country's commercial and for- eign investment policies. A seven-year transition period ending in 1993 would eliminate most barriers to trade, capital flows, and labor

mobility among the twelve EC member countries. During this period, Portugal was a net recipient of EC financial transfers to help

modernize its agricultural and industrial sectors for competition

in the single market.

To rein in domestic demand growth—mainly the result of the

public sector deficits after 1973 —the Portuguese government was

obliged to pursue IMF-monitored stabilization programs in 1977-78

and 1983-84 to help achieve a return to current account equilibrium in the balance of international payments. Building on the

1983-85 stabilization program and in the context of Portugal's ac- cession to the EC, the Council of Ministers introduced in March

1987 the Program for the Structural Adjustment of the Foreign

Deficit and Unemployment (Piano de Correccao Estrutural do

Deficit Externo e Desemprego—PCEDED), a medium-term program aimed at a lasting correction of structural imbalances

inflation, fiscal deficit, external deficit, and unemployment. The

program's macroeconomic approach included a set of articulated measures involving fiscal, monetary, exchange, and incomes policy. As an instrument of the government's "controlled development

strategy," this program was to be implemented in two stages cover- ing the periods 1987-90 and 1991-94 and is designed to reduce

Portugal's susceptibility to external shocks by strengthening especially the energy and agricultural sectors. Composition and Direction of Trade

Portugal's rising share of manufactured goods in total merchandise exports, which reached 80 percent in 1989, is indicative of the

country's newly industrialized status. Between 1980 and 1988, ex- ports of manufactured goods increased by 10 percent per year by

volume, which was double the rate of its European neighbors, and

Portugal gained market share. The country's major commodity

exports in 1990 included textiles, clothing, and footwear (accounting

for 37 percent of total export value); machinery and transport equipment (20 percent); forest products (10 percent, including pulp and

paper and cork products); agricultural products (8 percent, mainly wine and tomato paste); chemicals and plastic products (5

percent); and energy products (about 4 percent). Portugal's comparative advantage appears to lie with high forestry resources content (wood and cork products, including pulp and paper) and

156
The Economy

labor-intensive products (textiles, clothing, and footwear). With

the participation of multinational firms, Portugal is also gaining

competitive strength in the export of automobiles and automotive

components and electrical and electronic machinery.

When compared with the other EC member countries and the

United States, Portugal has a strong competitive advantage because

of its low wage scale. As an example, 1989 hourly labor costs in

Portuguese manufacturing (in United States dollars) averaged ap- proximately half those of Greece (a country with a similar per capita

GDP), a third those of Spain, and about a fifth of most other West

European countries and the United States. Manufactured goods (notably machinery, transportation equipment, and chemicals) accounted for about 75 percent of merchandise imports in 1989, food and beverages for about 10 percent, and raw materials (mainly crude petroleum) for about 16 percent. Portugal imported about 60 million barrels of oil yearly during the

late 1980s, but the share of crude petroleum varied between 8 and

20 percent of total imports depending on fluctuations in world oil prices.

Portugal's commodity trade is increasingly dominated by the EC

(see table 9, Appendix). In 1990 the EC member countries purchased nearly 74 percent of Portugal's exports and supplied over 69 percent of its imports; in 1985, the year prior to Portugal's membership in the EC , the EC member countries purchased about 63

percent of Portugal's exports and supplied nearly 46 percent of Portugal's imports. Within the EC, the former West Germany, France,

and Britain were Portugal's leading trading partners. But after the

accession of both Iberian countries to the EC in 1986 (and the

dismantling of trade restrictions between them), Spain suddenly

emerged as a significant trading partner, taking over 13 percent

of Portugal's exports in 1990 and providing 14.4 percent of the

latter 's imports. Thus, Spain ranked with West Germany as Portugal's premier national supplier in 1990, ahead of France, Britain, and Italy.

The relative position of the United States in Portugal's import

trade declined sharply from nearly 10 percent of the total in 1985

to 3.9 percent in 1990. Because Portugal heavily imported grain,

soybeans, and animal feedstuffs, its adoption of the CAP led to costly trade diversion from former, more efficient sources, mainly

the United States, to higher-cost continental EC member countries. On the other hand, Portugal's full membership in the EC

will permit its manufacturers to capture a larger share of exports

to EC member countries at the expense of lower-cost exporters from

Latin America and East Asia; similarly, Portuguese producers of

157
Portugal: A Country Study

quality wine are expected to gain market share at the expense of

wine producers in Mediterranean countries that were not fully in- tegrated into the EC. In both these cases, trade diversion will favor

Portuguese entrepreneurs.

Portugal's trade with the previous Escudo Area (its former Afri- can colonies) has fallen sharply since the revolution. Still, a re- structured Angola under a competent, non-Marxist regime could once more offer Portugal significant opportunities for two-way trade

in the late 1990s. The share of Portuguese imports supplied by the

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which

amounted to over 17 percent in 1985 (the year before the collapse

of world oil prices), shrank to below 7 percent in 1990.

The Balance of International Payments

The balance of payments reveals much about how the residents

of a nation- state earn their livelihood by providing goods and ser- vices to foreigners in exchange for goods and services produced

abroad. It may also reveal indirectly whether the country is a net

creditor or net debtor in its dealings with the rest of the world.

The Portuguese international balance is characterized by a protracted and large merchandise trade deficit that is largely offset (financed) by annual surpluses on invisibles, mainly emigrant worker remittances and tourism income. But because of its international

debtor position (including a growing stock of private foreign in- vestment in the country), Portugal annually remits substantial in- terest and dividend payments to foreigners. Portuguese traders rely

predominantly on foreign carriers and insurance firms; as a result,

the current account registers annual net payments (debits) for these

services.

From 1974 to 1984, Portugal's current external deficits were

financed by a combination of foreign reserve drawdowns and offi- cial external borrowing, mainly the latter. In the five-year period

1985-89, three years of current account surpluses (for 1985-87,

totaling nearly US$2 billion) more than offset two years of current

deficits (for 1988-89, totaling US$1.6 billion). Following Portugal's accession to the EC, large and growing inflows of private

capital—direct investment, portfolio investment, and repatriation

of flight capital—resulted in substantial accumulation of foreign

reserves by the Bank of Portugal.

The 1989 balance of international payments was fairly representative of Portugal's position in the late 1980s. The merchandise

trade deficit of US$5.1 billion was more than covered by the joint

income from tourism (US$2.6 billion) and emigrant remittances

(US$3.4 billion). The Portuguese paid exporters and importers

158
The beach at Nazare

Courtesy Alan J. Savada

US$832 million (net) for the use of foreign carrier and insurance

services and remitted US$800 million in net investment income

of interest and dividends (US$1,323 million in payments and

US$521 million in receipts). Although unilateral transfers (which

do not give rise to claims) comprised mainly emigrant worker remittances, net public remittances of US$824 million in favor of Portugal, a recent component of the balance of payments, reflected

mainly EC assistance to Portugal in support of economic restruc- turing.

The algebraic addition of the current account balance ( -US$551

million) and the medium- and long-term capital account (US$2,560

million) netted a "basic balance" of around US$2 billion in 1989.

Tourism and Unilateral Transfers

Measured in terms of arrivals and foreign exchange receipts, Por- tuguese tourism has grown at a phenomenal rate since the early

1980s. Foreign arrivals, which averaged about 7.3 million in 1981-

1982, expanded sharply each year thereafter, stabilized at between

16 and 17 million during 1987-89, and then increased to an esti- mated 18.4 million in 1990. Receipts from tourism rose from

US$1.15 billion in 1980 to US$3.58 billion in 1990.

In 1990 unilateral transfers reached US$6.5 billion (22 percent

of Portugal's current account receipts), of which 73 percent were

private, mainly emigrant remittances. About three-fourths of the

159
Portugal: A Country Study

emigrant remittances originated in Western Europe (mainly France)

and one-fifth in North America (mainly the United States). These

private inflows not only contributed to the country's foreign ex- change earnings, but also represented a significant component of

Portuguese household savings.

Gross public transfers in favor of Portugal amounted to US$1 ,740

million in 1990, of which nearly half (US$837 million) represented

structural funds from the EC in support of the country's economic

and social modernization. The European Social Fund assisted in vocational and professional training; other funds participated in the Specific Plan for the Development of Portuguese Agriculture

(Piano Economico para o Desenvolvimento da Agricultura Portuguesa—PEDAP) and the Specific Plan for the Development of Por- tuguese Industry (Piano Economico para o Desenvolvimento da

Industria Portuguesa—PEDIP). The Portuguese government was

required to cofinance projects funded by these EC transfers. Although Portugal no longer was a member of EFTA, the latter continued to assist the former member country in its economic re- structuring efforts. Finally, included in the category of official unilateral transfers were United States government military and

economic grants that totaled some US$160 million annually for the use of the large United States Air Force base in the Azores.

Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign direct investment increased at an extraordinary pace after Portugal's accession to the EC. From a modest commitment of

around US$166 million in 1986, the annual inflow of investment

controlled and managed by foreigners rose sharply in the following years, reaching US$2.7 billion in 1991 . At the end of that year, the accumulated stock of direct foreign investment exceeded US$8

billion, or eight times its value at the end of 1986.

From the perspective of multinational firms, Portugal is a strong

export base to the emerging single market of 327 million highincome consumers, and since the mid-1980s the country has be- come especially competitive in attracting foreign investment. These

attractions include political stability and a hospitable investment

climate that includes EC investment subsidies, the lowest wage scale among the EC- 12, and programs of economic deregulation and

privatization, as well as robust national economic and export

growth.

The participation of EC-based investors in the annual investment flow to Portugal increased from less than half of the total in 1985-86 to about 70 percent from 1987 to 1990, Britain being the

principal country source. Interesting trends in the composition of

160
The Economy

this investment could be discerned. Britain was the leading country of origin throughout this period, but the United States share

fell sharply from 18 percent of the total investment in 1985-86 to

less than 3 percent in 1989-90. Within the recently enlarged EC,

Spain emerged as a significant direct investor, increasing its share

from only 3 percent of Portuguese new investment in 1985-1986

to over 13 percent in 1989-90. Brazilian investors, whose share was negligible in 1985-86, increased their participation to around

7 percent in 1989-90.

Manufacturing, the destination of just under half of foreign in- vestment inflow in 1985-86, received only 27 percent of the total in 1988-89; by contrast, the services sector's share in total investment flow rose from 45 percent in 1985-86 to over 60 percent in

1988-89. Within that sector, banking and insurance increased their

participation, although investment in wholesale and retail trade

and in hotels and restaurants continued to be significant, reflect- ing foreign investor participation in Portugal's booming tourism

industry. Several new investment projects in the automotive in- dustry were being considered in 1991, including participation by

Japanese and South Korean firms. None, however, approach in

scale the Ford-Volkswagen commitment to organize an automotive complex at Sines. This joint venture capitalized at US$3.2 bil- lion is to manufacture a new European minivan.

Portugal, unlike many other middle-income countries, is remarkably hospitable to foreign investment (foreign-owned enterprises were legally exempted from nationalization during 1975-76). The

growing pace of privatization since 1988, however, gave rise to debate regarding the ultimate ownership and control of major state firms being divested. One school of thought anticipated that privatization would "de-Portugalize" vital sectors of the economy. To

some degree, Prime Minister Cavaco Silva shared this anxiety: "At

the same time, we shall have to foster economic groups in Portugal. These were destroyed at the time of the revolution with nationalization. We need them, as otherwise foreigners will come in

and take over our enterprises and economic strategy will be determined from abroad. Thus we are supporting the new entrepreneurs

in industry and agriculture."

Despite the formation of new Portuguese groups able to compete against foreign-based multinational companies, it is doubtful

that these national firms are sufficient in number, risk capital, and

managerial-technical know-how to absorb most of the large enterprises scheduled for divestiture.

Although the government has succeeded in limiting foreign participation in a number of key enterprises, including the withholding

161
Portugal: A Country Study

of a temporary "golden share" for the state, such limits on for- eign direct investment are to become illegal in 1995, when Portugal's capital movement regulations will come fully into compliance

with those of the rest of the EC members.

Consequently, the prospect of losing national control over large

branches of the economy appears to be the inevitable price of secur- ing Portugal's economic future and closing the income gap between

the Portuguese and their more prosperous neighbors.

External Public Debt

Portugal's external public debt was on a steeply rising trend from

1976 onward, reaching nearly US$18.5 billion at the end of 1987,

its peak dollar magnitude. After that year, early repayments of principal slightly reduced outstanding debt to slightly over US$18.4

billion in 1990. As the proceeds from privatization of nationalized

enterprises are applied to debt reduction, Portugal's external public

obligations will continue to diminish.

Debt-service indicators reveal much about the relative burden

of Portugal's foreign indebtedness, as well as the capacity of the

economy to service this debt (see table 10, Appendix). More rele- vant than the dollar value of the debt is the ratio of public external

debt to GDP, which increased inexorably from 1980 to 1985 (from more than 36 percent to more than 80 percent, its highest level)

and then abruptly fell to just under 29 percent in 1990. Total debt

service (scheduled amortization and interest payments) as a share

of current account credits (foreign exchange income from exporting goods and services, as well as from unilateral remittances) rose from over 15 percent in 1980 to 37 percent in 1985 and thereafter

fell to 16.7 percent in 1990. Portugal's success in reducing its relative external debt-servicing burden by about half between 1985 and

1990 was largely the result of burgeoning export receipts, notably

manufactured goods and tourism income, although growing emigrant worker remittances and transfers from the EC also played

a role. The interest/GDP ratio, which measures the net burden on the

Portuguese economy, more than doubled from 3 percent in 1980

to 6.5 percent in 1985 before falling back to 2.9 percent in 1990.

The external debt/reserves indicator, which compares Portugal's

foreign/public obligations (mainly the stock of long- and mediumterm debt) with its gross foreign assets (mainly liquid foreign ex- change holdings of the Bank of Portugal and the Treasury, with

gold valued at market prices) almost tripled between 1980 and 1985,

when the country's external debt exceeded its official reserves by

67 percent. As a consequence of the rapid buildup of Portugal's

162
Amoreiras shopping and

office complex in Lisbon

Courtesy Alan J. Savada

official reserves from 1985 onward, the external debt/reserves in- dicator was reduced to just over 72 percent in 1990. This massive

accumulation of foreign assets at the disposal of official institutions

reflects not only Portugal's export drive, but also its success in at- tracting direct investments from its EC partners.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

annual economic surveys give an authoritative and readily available exposition of the country's economy with a strong policy orientation. The quarterly Country Report: Portugal and the annual Country

Profile: Portugal from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) provide current economic coverage, and Mark Hudson's Portugal to 1993: Investing in a European Future, also published by EIU, is particularly useful for analysis of Portugal's economy in the context

of that country's accession to the EC. For additional current in- formation on Portugal's private and public sector economic activities, special supplements of the Economist and Financial Times, both

published in London, offer well-written coverage for the nonspecialist. From time to time, Euromoney publishes special reports on up-to-date banking and financial developments in Portugal. The

Bank of Portugal's annual reports provide detailed information,

including copious statistical tables, on the Portuguese economy.

163
Portugal: A Country Study

Valentina Xavier Pintado's Structure and Growth of the Portuguese

Economy, published by the European Free Trade Association, is the

definitive study of the economy during the early Salazar period.

Eric N. Baklanoff s The Economic Transformation of Spain and Portu- gal is a comparative analysis of accelerating economic growth in

the two Iberian countries in response to the new, more open,

market-oriented economic policies initiated in 1959 by the Franco

and Salazar regimes.

Among the more useful books on the postrevolutionary period

in English are Rodney J. Morrison's Portugal: Revolutionary Change

in an Open Economy; the World Bank's Portugal: Current and Prospective Trends, a report based on the findings of a mission to Portugal

in 1978; and Portugal: Ancient Country, Young Democracy, edited by

Kenneth Maxwell and Michael H. Haltzel. This work includes

three chapters on the economy.

Two comparative technical studies that illuminate Portugal's in- tegration with the European Community are Juergen B. Donges,

The Second Enlargement of the European Community and European Integration and the Iberian Economies, edited by George N. Yannopolous.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

164
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Newspaper vendor
ON APRIL 25, 1974, the Portuguese armed forces overthrew the

ruling corporative government in a virtually bloodless coup d'etat. The coup ended a dictatorial regime established by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and carried on by

his successor, Marcello Jose das Neves Caetano, after 1968. What

began, however, as a simple attempt by the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas Armadas—MFA) to replace the

government in power and change its policies quickly became not

only a political event of historic proportions, but also a full-scale social revolution.

The Revolution of 1974, as it came to be known, soon involved

hundreds of thousands of Portuguese who took to the streets. The

highly organized Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista

Portugues—PCP), emerging from exile and the underground, soon

joined forces with the MFA. Many far-left groups also participated in the upheaval, as did the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista

PS). Many members of the country's middle class joined the

process, organizing in a matter of months political parties not per- mitted under the old regime.

On the social side, the events that began in the spring of 1974

drew on the deep frustrations of a society and people emerging from

half a century of dictatorship, isolation, and backwardness. Children rebelled against their parents, enlisted men against officers,

employees against employers, workers against factory owners, and

tenant farmers against absentee landlords.

There were, in short, two revolutions in Portugal: one was a

process of political change that grew from a coup d'etat that aimed

only at changing the governmental structure at the top into a move- ment that touched every political relationship; the other was a pro- found social transformation that seemed bent on toppling all existing

social relationships.

Portugal's opening to democracy attracted worldwide attention

and was closely scrutinized. Portugal was, after all, not a remote

Third World state, but part of Western Europe. It belonged to the

European Free Trade Association (EFTA—see Glossary) and was

a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO). A full-scale revolution on European soil and the possibility of a strong communist party in power made the United States and West European countries uneasy.

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Portugal: A Country Study

Eventually, however, the Portuguese revolution played itself out,

and moderate forces came to direct the country's affairs. Elections

for the Constituent Assembly in 1975 gave mainstream democratic

political parties most of the body's seats and allowed the fashioning of the constitution of 1976. That constitution established

parliamentary democracy while preserving many of the revolution's

radical achievements and pledging a transition to socialism.

Constitutional amendments in 1982 strengthened the powers of

the parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, and the prime

minister, weakened those of the president, and placed the military

under civilian control. Further amendments to the constitution in

1989 erased much of the document's ideological commitment to socialism and permitted the privatization of many of the economic

assets nationalized in 1974 and 1975.

Seven national elections between 1976 and 1991 consolidated

the place of the new system of democratic government, often called the Second Republic. In addition to the PCP and the PS, two other

parties emerged as significant political forces: the Party of the Social Democratic Center (Partido do Centro Democratico Social

CDS), a right-wing Christian democratic party, and the Social

Democrat Party (Partido Social Democrata—PSD), a center-right

group. Until the national election of 1987, when the PSD won a majority in the Assembly of the Republic, the parties to the right

of the PCP had usually formed coalition governments. None of

these governments, however, was strong enough to serve out a four- year legislative period until the PSD government did so in the

1987-91 period. Under the forceful and able leadership of Anibal

Cavaco Silva as prime minister, the single-party PSD cabinet was

able to meet the challenges posed by Portugal's membership in the

European Community (EC—see Glossary). Cavaco Silva led his

party to a second majority in the October 1991 parliamentary elec- tions and formed another PSD government, an indication perhaps

that the new democracy was taking root. The country's first president elected according to the terms of

the constitution also contributed significantly to the establishment

of parliamentary democracy. President Antonio dos Santos Ramalho Eanes (1976-86), although of military background, abided by

the new constitution and submitted to amendments that reduced

his powers and returned the military to the barracks. These ac- tions served the fledgling democracy perhaps even more than his extinguishing the coup of November 1975, the last attempt of the

revolutionary left to seize political control. Mario Alberto Nobre

Lopez Soares, the leader of the PS, succeeded Eanes in 1986 and

became the country's first civilian president in five decades. Soares

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Government and Politics

was an effective and popular president and easily won a second

five-year term in January 1991.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal's democracy was only

a decade and a half old, but the transition to democracy seemed

to have been highly successful. Although the country had many

social and economic problems to solve, the economy had improved

noticeably and political stability had been achieved. A free press served the public, a marked contrast to the censorship of the Sala- zar regime. These developments were testaments that Portugal had

at last found a place in the community of Western democratic nations, a remarkable transition from the long dictatorship and the

subsequent periods of revolutionary upheaval and government

weakness and instability.

The Revolution of 1974 and the Transition to

Democracy

Portugal's experience with democracy before the Revolution of

1974 had not been particularly successful. Its First Republic last- ed only sixteen years, from 1910 to 1926 (see The First Republic,

ch. 1). Under the republic, parliamentary institutions worked poorly

and were soon discredited. Corruption and economic mismanagement were widespread. When a military coup d'etat ended the

republic in 1926, few lamented its passing.

The Salazar-Caetano Era

The republic was replaced by a military dictatorship that

promised order, authority, and discipline. The military regime

abolished political parties, took steps against the small but vocal

Marxist groups, and did away with republican institutions. In 1928

it invited University of Coimbra professor Antonio de Oliveira Sala- zar to serve as minister of finance. In 1932 he became prime

minister. That year marked the beginning of his regime, the New

State (Estado Novo; see The New State, ch. 1). Under Salazar (1932-68), Portugal became, at least formally, a corporative state. The new constitution of 1933 embodied the

corporatist theory, under which government was to be formed of

economic entities organized according to their function, rather than

by individual representation. Employers were to form one group,

labor another, and they and other groups were to deal with one

another through their representative organizations.

In reality, however, Salazar headed an autocratic dictatorship with the help of an efficient secret police. Strict censorship was introduced, the politically suspect were monitored, and the

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Portugal: A Country Study

regime's opponents were jailed, sent into exile, and occasionally

killed. Portugal drifted and floundered under this repressive regime for several decades. Economic conditions improved slightly in the

1950s, when Salazar instituted the first of two five-year economic

plans. These plans stimulated some growth, and living standards

began to rise. The 1960s, however, were crisis years for Portugal. Guerrilla

movements emerged in the Portuguese African colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau (formerly Portuguese Guinea)

that aimed at liberating those territories from "the last colonial

empire." Fighting three guerrilla movements for more than a decade proved to be enormously draining for a small, poor country

in terms of labor and financial resources. At the same time, social

changes brought about by urbanization, emigration, the growth

of the working class, and the emergence of a sizeable middle class put new pressures on the political system to liberalize. Instead, Sala- zar increased repression, and the regime became even more rigid

and ossified. When Salazar was incapacitated in an accident in 1968, the

Council of State, a high-level advisory body created by the constitution of 1933, chose Marcello Caetano (1968-74) to succeed him.

Caetano, though a Salazar protege, tried to modernize and liberalize the old Salazar system. He was opposed, however, by a group

widely referred to as "the bunker," the old Salazaristas. These

included the country's president, Admiral Americo Tomas, the

senior officers of the armed forces, and the heads of some of the

country's largest financial groups. The bunker was powerful enough

that any fundamental change would certainly have led to Caetano's immediate overthrow.

As Caetano promised reform but fell into indecision, the sense began to grow among all groups—the armed forces, the opposition, and liberals within the regime—that only a revolution could

produce the changes that Portugal sorely needed. Contributing to

this feeling were a number of growing tensions on the political and

social scene. The continuing economic drain caused by the military campaigns

in Africa was exacerbated by the first great oil "shock" of 1973.

Politically, the desire for democracy, or at least a greater opening

up of the political system, was increasing. Social tensions mounted, as well, because of the slow pace of change and the absence

of opportunities for advancement.

The decisive ingredient in these tensions was dissension within

the military itself, long a bulwark of the regime. Younger military

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Government and Politics

academy graduates resented a program introduced by Caetano

whereby university graduates who completed a brief training pro- gram could be commissioned at the same rank as academy graduates. Caetano had begun the program because it was becoming

increasingly difficult to recruit new officers as casualties from the

African wars mounted (see The Military Takeover of 1974, ch. 5). Spfnola and Revolution

A key catalytic event in the process toward revolution was the

publication in 1973 General Antonio de Spfnola' s book, Portugal

and the Future, which criticized the conduct of the war and offered a far-ranging program for Portugal's recovery. The general's work

sent shock waves through the political establishment in Lisbon. As

the first major and public challenge to the regime by a high-ranking

figure from within the system, Spfnola' s experience in the African

campaigns gave his opinions added weight. The book was widely

seen—a correct assessment as it turned out—as the opening salvo

in Spfnola' s ambitious campaign to become president.

On April 25, 1974, a group of younger officers belonging to an underground organization, the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas Armadas—MFA), overthrew the Caetano re- gime, and Spfnola emerged as at least the titular head of the new

government. The coup succeeded in hours with virtually no

bloodshed. Caetano and other high-ranking officials of the old re- gime were arrested and exiled, many to Brazil. The military seized

control of all important installations.

Spfnola regarded the military's action as a simple military coup

d'etat aimed at reorganizing the political structure with himself as the head, a renovaqao (renovation) in his words. Within days,

however, it became clear that the coup had released long pent-up

frustrations when thousands, and then tens of thousands, of Portuguese poured into the streets celebrating the downfall of the re- gime and demanding further change. The coercive apparatus of

the dictatorship—secret police, Republican Guard, official party,

censorship—was overwhelmed and abolished. Workers began tak- ing over shops from owners, peasants seized private lands, lowlevel employees took over hospitals from doctors and administrators, and government offices were occupied by workers who sacked

the old management and demanded a thorough housecleaning.

Very early on, the demonstrations began to be manipulated by

organized political elements, principally the PCP and other groups

farther to the left. Radical labor and peasant leaders emerged from

the underground where they had been operating for many years. Soares, the leader of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS)

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Portugal: A Country Study

and Alvaro Cunhal, head of the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues—PCP) returned from exile to Portugal within days of the revolt and received heroes' welcomes.

Who actually ruled Portugal during this revolutionary period was not always clear, and various bodies vied for dominance. Spinola became the first interim president of the new regime in May

1974, and he chose the first of six provisional governments that were to govern the country until two years later when the first constitutional government was formed. Headed by a prime minister,

the moderate civilian Adelino da Palma Carlos, the government

consisted of the moderate Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrata—PPD), the PS, the PCP, five independents, and

one military officers. Beneath this formal structure, several other groups wielded considerable power. In the first weeks of the revolution, a key group was the Junta of National Salvation, composed entirely of highranking, politically moderate military officers. Working alongside

it was a seven-member coordinating committee made up of politically radical junior officers who had managed the coup. By the end

of May 1974, these two bodies worked together with other members in the Council of State, the nation's highest governing body.

Gradually, however, the MFA emerged as the most powerful single group in Portugal as it overruled Spmola in several

major decisions. Members of the MFA formed the Continental

Operations Command (Comando Operacional do Continente

COPCON) composed of 5,000 elite troops with Major (later

Brigadier General) Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho as its commander.

Known universally by his unusual first name Otelo, Carvalho had

directed the April 25 coup. Because the regular police had withdrawn from the public sector during the time of revolutionary tur- moil and the military was somewhat divided, COPCON became

the most important force for order in the country and was firmly

under the control of radical left-wing officers. Spmola formed a second provisional government in mid-July

with army Colonel (later General) Vasco Goncalves as prime

minister and eight military officers, along with members of the PS,

PCP, and PPD. Spmola chose Goncalves because he was a moderate, but he was to move increasingly to the left as he headed four

provisional governments between July 1974 and September 1975.

Spmola' s position further weakened when he was obliged to consent to the independence of Portugal's African colonies, rather than

achieving the federal solution he had outlined in his book. GuineaBissau gained independence in early September, and talks were underway on the liberation of the other colonies. Spmola attempted

172
Street demonstration during the Revolution of 1974

Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington

to seize full power in late September but was blocked by COPCON and resigned from office. His replacement was the moderate General Francisco de Costa Gomes. Goncalves formed a third

provisional government with heavy MFA membership, nine military officers in all, and members of the PS, PCP, and PPD.

In the next year, Portuguese politics moved steadily leftward.

The PCP was highly successful in placing its members in many

national and local political and administrative offices, and it was

consolidating its hold on the country's labor unions. The MFA came

ever more under the control of its radical wing, and some of its members came under the influence of the PCP. In addition, smaller, more radical left-wing groups joined with the PCP in staging huge

demonstrations that brought about the increasing adoption of leftist policies, including nationalizations of private companies.

An attempted coup by Spmola in early March 1975 failed, and

he fled the country. In response to this attack from the right, radical elements of the military abolished the Junta of National Salvation and formed the Council of the Revolution as the country's

most powerful governing body. The council was made responsible to a 240-member radical military parliament, the Assembly of

the Armed Forces. A fourth provisional government was formed, more radical than its predecessor, and was headed by Goncalves,

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Portugal: A Country Study

with eight military officers and members of the PS, PCP, PPD,

and Portuguese Democratic Movement (Movimento Democratico Portugues—MDP), a party close to the PCP.

The new government began a wave of nationalizations of banks

and large businesses (see Nationalization, ch. 3). Because the banks were often holding companies, the government came after a time

to own almost all the country's newspapers, insurance companies,

hotels, construction companies and many other kinds of businesses, so that its share of the country's gross national product (GNP

see Glossary) amounted to 70 percent.

The Transition to Civilian Rule

Elections were held on April 25, 1975, for the Constituent Assembly that was to draft a constitution. The PS won nearly 38 per- cent the vote, and the PPD took 26.4 percent. The PCP, which

opposed the elections because its leadership expected to do poorly, won less than 13 percent of the vote. A democratic right-wing

party, the Party of the Social Democratic Center (Partido do Centro Democratico Social—CDS), came in fourth with less than 8

percent (see table 11, Appendix). Despite the fact that the elec- tions took place in a period of revolutionary ferment, most Portuguese voted for middle-class parties committed to pluralistic

democracy.

Many Portuguese regarded the elections as a sign that democracy was being effectively established. In addition, most members of

the military welcomed the beginning of a transition to civilian

democracy. Some elements of the MFA, however, had opposed

the elections, agreeing to them only after working out an agree- ment with political parties that the MFA's policies would be car- ried out regardless of election results. Following the elections came the "hot summer" of 1975 when

the revolution made itself felt in the countryside. Landless agricultural laborers in the south seized the large farms on which they

worked. Many estates in the Alentejo were confiscated—over 1 million hectares in all—and transformed into collective farms (see Land

Tenure and Agrarian Reform, ch. 3). In the north, where most

farms were small and owned by those who worked them, such ac- tions did not occur. The north's small farmers, conservative

property-owners, violently repulsed the attempts of radical elements

and the PCP to collectivize their land. Some farmers formed rightwing organizations in defense of private landownership, a reversal of the region's early welcoming of the revolution.

Other revolutionary actions were met with hostility, as well. In

mid-July, the PS and the PPD withdrew from the fourth provisional

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Government and Politics

government to protest antidemocratic actions by radical military

and leftist political forces. The PS newspaper Republica had been

closed by radical workers, causing a storm of protest both domestically and abroad. The PS and other democratic parties were also faced with a potentially lethal threat to the new freedom posed by

the PCP's open contempt for parliamentary democracy and its dominance in Portugal's main trade union, Intersindical, or as it came to be known in 1977, the General Confederation of Portuguese

Workers-National Intersindical (Confederacao Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional—CGTP-IN).

The United States and many West European countries expressed

considerable alarm at the prospect of a Marxist-Leninist takeover

in a NATO country. United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told PS leader Soares that he would probably be the

"Kerensky [the Russian social-democratic leader whose short-lived

rule was the prelude to a Bolshevik takeover] of Portugal." The

result of these concerns was an influx of foreign financial aid into

Portugal to shore up groups committed to pluralist parliamentary

democracy.

By the time of the "hot summer" of 1975, several currents could

be seen within the MFA. A moderate group, the Group of Nine,

issued a manifesto in August that advocated nonaligned socialism

along the lines of Scandinavian social democracy. Another group

published a manifesto that criticized both the Group of Nine and

those who had drawn close to the PCP and singled out Prime

Minister Goncalves for his links to the Communists. These differ- ences of opinion signaled the end of the fifth provisional government, in power only a month, under Goncalves in early September.

Goncalves was subsequently expelled from the Council of the Revolution as this body became more moderate. The sixth provisional

government was formed, headed by Admiral Jose Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo; it included the leader of the Group of Nine and

members of the PS, the PPD, and PCP. This government, which was to remain in power until July 1976, when the first constitutional government was formed, was pledged to adhere to the policies advocated by MFA moderates.

Evolving political stability did not reflect the country as a whole,

which was on the verge of anarchy. Even the command structure of the military broke down. Political parties to the right of the PCP

became more confident and increasingly fought for order, as did

many in the military. The granting of independence to Mozambique in September 1975, to East Timor in October, and to Angola in November meant that the colonial wars had ended. The

attainment of peace, the main aim of the military during all these

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Portugal: A Country Study

months of political upheaval, was thus achieved, and the military

could begin the transition to civilian rule. The polling results of

the April 1975 constituent assembly elections legitimized the popular

support given to the parties that could manage and would welcome

this transition.

An attempted coup by radical military units in November 1975

marked the last serious leftist effort to seize power. The leftists were

blocked, however, on November 25 when Colonel Antonio dos Santos Ramalho Eanes declared a state of emergency. The revolutionary units were quickly surrounded and forced to surrender; about

200 extreme leftists were arrested and COPCON was abolished.

The glamour of revolutionary goals had faded somewhat, and people returned to their jobs and daily routines after eighteen months

of political and social turmoil. A degree of compromise was reached

among competing political visions of how the new state should be

organized, and the constitution of 1976 was proclaimed on April

2, 1976. Several weeks later, on April 25, elections for the new

parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, were held.

These elections could be said to be the definitive end of a period

of revolution. Moderate democratic parties received most of the

vote. Revolutionary achievements were not discarded, however.

The constitution pledged the country to realize socialism. Furthermore, the constitution declared the extensive nationalizations and

land seizures of 1975 irreversible. The military supported these com- mitments through a pact with the main political parties; the pact

guaranteed the military guardian rights over the new democracy

for four more years. Consolidation of Democracy

The PS won the first elections for the new parliament, the Assembly of the Republic. The PS took 36.7 percent of the vote, compared with 25.2 percent for the PDP, 16.7 percent for the CDS,

and 15.2 percent for the PCP. Elections for the presidency were

held in June and won easily by General Eanes, who enjoyed the

backing of parties to the right of the communists, the PS, the PPD,

and the CDS.

Although the PS did not have a majority in the Assembly of the

Republic, Eanes allowed it to form the first constitutional government with Soares as prime minister. The PS governed from July

23, 1976, to January 30, 1978. A second government, formed from

a coalition with the CDS, lasted from January to August of 1978

and was also led by Soares. The PS governments faced enormous

economic and social problems, including runaway inflation, high

unemployment, falling wages, and an enormous influx of Portuguese

176
Antonio dos Santos Ramalho

Eanes, president, 1976-86

Anibal Cavaco Silva,

prime minister, 1985-

Courtesy Embassy of

Portugal, Washington

settlers from Africa. The government's failure to fix the economy,

even after adopting a painful austerity program imposed by the

International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), ultimately

forced the PS to relinquish power. The party could be judged successful, however: it had governed Portugal democratically for two

years and helped thereby to consolidate the new political system.

After the collapse of the PS-CDS coalition government in July 1978,

President Eanes formed a number of caretaker governments in the

hope that they would rule until the parliamentary elections mandated by the constitution could be held in 1980. There were, therefore, three short-lived governments appointed by President Eanes.

These governments were led by Prime Minister Alfred Nobre da

Costa from August 28 to November 21, 1978; Carlos Mota Pinto

from November 21, 1978, to July 31, 1979; and Maria de Lourdes

Pintasilgo (Portugal's first woman prime minister) from July 31,

1979, to January 3, 1980.

The weakness of these governments and the failure of the PS

and the PPD, now renamed the Social Democrat Party (Partido

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Portugal: A Country Study

Social Democrata—PSD), to form a coalition government forced

President Eanes to call for interim elections to be held in December 1979. Francisco Sa Carneiro, the dynamic leader of the PSD

and a fierce personal rival of Soares, put together a coalition of

his own PSD, the CDS, the Popular Monarchist Party (Partido

Popular Monarquico—PPM), and another small party to form the

Democratic Alliance (Alianca Democratica—AD). The AD downplayed its intentions to revise the constitution to reverse the nationalizations and land seizures of the mid-1970s and advocated

a moderate economic policy. The coalition won 45.2 percent of

the vote in the elections, or 128 seats, for a majority of 3 in the

250-seat assembly. The PS, which had also formed an electoral coalition with several small left-wing groups, suffered a drubbing and

won only 27.4 percent, a large drop compared with 1976 results. The PCP, in coalition with another left-wing party, gained slightly.

Sa Carneiro became prime minister in January 1980, and the

tenor of parliamentary politics moved to the right as the government attempted to undo some of the revolution's radical reforms.

The powers conferred on the presidency by the constitution of 1976

enabled President Eanes to block the AD's centrist economic policies, however. For this reason, the AD concentrated on winning

enough seats in the October 1980 elections to reach the two-thirds

majority necessary to effect constitutional change and on electing someone other than Eanes in the presidential elections of December 1980.

Portuguese voters approved of the movement to the right. In

the parliamentary elections, the AD coalition increased the number of its seats to 134, the PS held steady at 74 seats, and the PCP

lost 6 seats for a total of 41. The AD's win was not complete,

however, because President Eanes was easily reelected in December. In contrast to the election of 1976, when Eanes was supported by the PS and parties to its right, he was backed in 1980 by

the PS, the PCP, and other left-wing parties. Voters admired Eanes

for his integrity and obvious devotion to democracy. His election,

however, made constitutional change less certain because the AD

did not have by itself the required two-thirds majority. The AD

also suffered a serious loss when its dynamic leader, Sa Carneiro,

died in a plane crash just two days before the presidential election.

His successor was Franciso Pinto Balsemao, the founder and edi- tor of the Expresso newspaper.

The AD coalition remained in power until mid- 1983, forming two

governments with Balsemao as prime minister. In combination with

the PS, which also desired fundamental changes in the political sys- tem, the AD was able to revise the constitution. Amendments were

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Government and Politics

passed that enhanced the power of the prime minister and the

Assembly of the Republic at the expense of the president and the

military (see Constitutional Development, this ch.). The revised

constitution was promulgated in September 1982.

Although the AD government had achieved its main objective

of amending the constitution, the country's economic problems

worsened, and the coalition gradually lost popular support. Balsemao also tired of the constant political skirmishing needed to hold

the AD together and resigned in December 1982. Unable to choose

a successor, the AD broke apart. Parliamentary elections in April

1983 gave the PS a stunning victory that increased its parliamentary seats to 101. After long negotiations, the PS joined with the

PSD to form a governing coalition, the Central Bloc (Bloco Central), with Soares as prime minister.

The Central Bloc government was fragile from its beginning and

lasted only two years. Faced with serious and worsening economic

problems, the government had to adopt an unpopular austerity poli- cy. Administrative and personality difficulties made relations within

the government tense and resulted in bitter parliamentary maneuvers. Overshadowing these difficulties was the upcoming presidential election in early 1986. Soares made clear his ambition to succeed

Eanes, who, according to the constitution, was not allowed to seek a third consecutive term. A split within the PSD over its presidential candidate ended the coalition government in June 1985.

In new assembly elections held in October 1985, the PS, blamed

by the public for the country's severe economic problems, such

as a 10 percent fall in wages since 1983, suffered serious losses and

lost almost half its seats in the Assembly of the Republic. The PCP's

electoral coalition lost six seats; the PSD won thirteen more seats because of new leadership; and the CDS lost almost a third of its seats. The big winner was a party formed by supporters of President Eanes, the Party of Democratic Renovation (Partido Renovador Democratico—PRD), which, although only months old, won

nearly 18 percent of the vote and forty-five seats. The party's vic- tory stemmed from the high regard Portuguese voters had for President Eanes.

No party emerged from the October 1985 elections with anything even close to an absolute majority. Hence, the 1985-87 period was unstable politically. The new head of the PSD, economist

Anibal Cavaco Silva, as prime minister headed a minority PSD

government that managed to survive for only seventeen months.

Its success was attributed partly to support from the PRD, which

as a young party wished to establish itself, although it was a motion

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Portugal: A Country Study

of censure presented by this party in the spring of 1987 that eventually brought the government down. Cavaco Silva also benefited

from the internal dissension of other parties.

The presidential election of 1986 did not yield a winner in the

first round. The candidate of the CDS and the PSD, Diogo Freitas do Amaral, won 46.3 percent of the vote compared with 25.4

percent for Mario Soares. Freitas do Amaral, the candidate of a united right, profited from the left's mounting of three candidates. In the two-candidate runoff election in mid-February, Soares won

with 51.3 percent of the vote, getting the support of most left-wing

voters. The PCP supported him as the lesser of two evils, even though Soares repeatedly reminded voters that he, perhaps more

than anyone else, had prevented the Communists from coming to power in the mid-1970s.

Cavaco Silva came to have full control of his party, the PSD.

As prime minister, he governed boldly and pushed, through his

influence in the parliament, for a liberalization of the economy.

He was fortunate in that external economic trends and the infusion of funds from the European Community (EC—see Glossary)

after Portugal became a member in 1986 enlivened the country's

economy and began to bring an unaccustomed prosperity to Portuguese wage earners. Confident therefore that his party could win

in parliamentary elections, Cavaco Silva maneuvered his political

opponents into passing a vote of censure against his government

in April 1987. Instead of asking for a new government composed

of a variety of parties on the left, President Soares called for elec- tions in July.

Cavaco Silva had judged the political situation correctly. The

PSD won just over 50 percent of the vote, which gave it an absolute majority in the parliament, the first single-party majority since

the restoration of democracy in 1974. The strong mandate enabled Cavaco Silva to put forward a more clearly defined program

and perhaps to govern more effectively than his predecessors. The

emergence of a single-party government supported by a parliamentary majority was for many observers the coming of age of Portuguese democracy.

The Governmental System

Portugal made remarkable political progress after 1974. It replaced the authoritarian-corporatist regime of Salazar, and, as of the early 1990s, the country appeared to have successfully made

the transition to democracy. Although political and governmental

problems remained, the government was popularly elected, it functioned according to the constitution, and, since the mid-1980s, had

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Government and Politics

done so with notable stability. The successful transition to democracy

in the Iberian Peninsula since the mid-1970s (in Spain, as well as

in Portugal) may be thought of as one of the most significant politi- cal transformations of the late twentieth century.

Constitutional Development

Portugal is governed under the constitution of 1976 whose preliminary drafting was largely completed in 1975, then finished and offi- cially promulgated in early 1976. At the time the constitution was

being drafted, a democratic outcome was still uncertain because the

country was in the midst of a revolution. Even after a leftist coup

had been put down in November 1975, it was not known if the armed

forces would respect the assembly and allow work on the constitution to go forward. The MFA and leftist groups pressured and ca- joled the assembly, and there was much discussion of establishing a revolutionary and socialist system of government. Moreover, not

all of the assembly's members were committed to parliamentary

democracy. The membership was intensely partisan, with some 60

percent of the seats occupied by the left. After great struggle, the Constituent Assembly eventually adopted

a constitution that provided for a democratic, parliamentary sys- tem with political parties, elections, a parliament, and a prime minister. The document also established an independent judiciary and

listed a number of human rights. Noteworthy features of the constitution include its ideological content, its provision for the role of

the military, and its dual presidential-parliamentary system.

The constitution was a highly charged ideological document that

included numerous references to socialism, the rights of workers,

and the desirability of a socialist economy. It severely restricted pri- vate investment and business activity. Many of these articles were

advanced by PCP representatives in the Constituent Assembly, but

they were also advocated by members of the PS, who at that time,

for electoral reasons, were seeking to be as revolutionary as the far

left. The resulting document proclaimed that the object of the republic was "to ensure the transition to socialism." The constitution also urged the state to "socialize the means of production and abolish

the exploitation of man by man," phrases that echoed Marx's

Communist Manifesto. Workers' Committees were given the right to supervise the management of enterprises and to have their representatives elected to the boards of state-owned firms. The government,

among many admonitions along the same vein, was to "direct its work toward the socialization of medicine and the medicopharmaceutical sectors.

'

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Portugal: A Country Study

The constitution gave the military great political power through

the role given to the MFA-controlled Council of the Revolution

that, in effect, made the MFA a separate and almost co-equal

branch of government. The council was to be an advisory body

to the president (who was at first likely to come from the military

itself) and would function as a sort of constitutional court to en- sure that the laws passed by parliament were in accord with the

MFA's desires and did not undermine the achievements of the revolution. The council was also to serve as a high-level decision-making

body for the armed forces themselves. The council was a concession to the MFA for allowing the Constituent Assembly to sit and

promulgate a new "basic law." Some members of the Portuguese

left, especially the PCP, supported the council in the hope that they

would continue to enjoy MFA support even if they lost ground with

the electorate. The final innovative feature of the constitution was its provision for a system of government that was both presidential and

parliamentarian. The Constituent Assembly favored two centers of power in order to avoid both the dangers of an excessively strong

executive, as was the case during the Salazar period, and the weaknesses of parliamentary instability, as was the case in the First

Republic.

The constitution was controversial from the start. It was widely

seen in political circles as a compromise document because all participants in its drafting had been able to incorporate in it provisions they found vital. The constitution's parliamentary sections

had the support of the PS, the PSD, and the CDS; its socialistic content had the support of the PCP and its allies and the PS.

Even before the constitution became law, politicians had agreed

to change some provisions after the five-year period in which

changes were prohibited had elapsed. Objections to the document

centered on its ideological content, its economic restrictions, and

its recognition of a military role in the governance of the country.

The CDS, the party furthest to the right among the groups that

had participated in the document's drafting, refused to ratify it. The CDS did agree to abide by the constitution in the interim,

however.

By the early 1980s, the political climate was ripe for constitutional reform. The center-right coalition AD, formed by the PSD,

the CDS, and the monarchist party, the PPM, was in power; the

PS had been voted out of office, and the PCP was politically iso- lated. The first amendments, enacted in 1982, dealt with the constitution's political arrangements. Although many of the economic

provisions of the constitution had been not been implemented and

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were, in effect, being ignored, there were not yet enough votes to reach the required two-thirds majority needed to amend them.

The 1982 amendments were enacted through the combined votes of the AD and the PS. This combination of center-right and centerleft political forces managed to end the military's control of Portuguese politics (see The Armed Forces in Political Life after 1974,

ch. 5). It abolished the Council of the Revolution, controlled by

the military, and replaced it with two consultative bodies. One of

these, the Higher Council of National Defense, was limited to com- menting on military matters. The other, the Council of State, was

broadly representative of the entire country and did not have the

power to prevent government and parliamentary actions by declaring them unconstitutional. Another amendment created a Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of legislation.

Because ten of its thirteen judges were chosen by the Assembly of

the Republic, the court was under parliamentary control. Another

important change reduced the president's power by restricting

presidential ability to dismiss the government, dissolve parliament,

or veto legislation.

Despite these amendments, centrists and conservatives continued

to criticize the constitution as too ideological and economically restrictive. Hence, the constitution was amended again in 1989. Many

economic restrictions were removed and much ideological language

eliminated, while governmental structures remained unchanged.

The most important change enabled the state to privatize much

of the property and many of the enterprises nationalized during

the mid-1970s.

Further amendments were to become possible in 1994. Political

scientists speculated that the electoral system might be amended

so that Portuguese living abroad could vote in presidential elec- tions, a change that had long been sought. Another change could

be the introduction of the concept of the "constructive vote of no

confidence" used in Germany to help shore up minority governments. This parliamentary provision would permit a government

to remain in place despite a vote of no confidence if the parliament could not form an alternative government and would pre- vent purely negative majorities from destroying a government. As

of the early 1990s, a Portuguese government that received a vote

of no confidence had to resign.

The Presidency

Although Portugal's government includes a parliament, an as- sembly, and a cabinet needing parliamentary support, its president has considerable power. As noted above, this dual system was

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a response to the Portugal's experiences with parliamentary instability and dictatorship. Yet, the extent of the president's power,

even after the 1982 revision of the constitution, was not always clear. As a result, at times the relationships among the main institutions

of the Portuguese system remained somewhat ambiguous.

The president is elected by majority vote in nationwide ballot- ing. The term of office is five years, and no president may serve more than two consecutive terms. Real power is vested in the office of the president, who is not merely a symbol of national unity, but

rather the chief of state. In times of national crisis, presidents can make or unmake governments, and even in situations when, for example, the government is weak and no party has a majority, they can exercise considerable influence behind the scenes. According to the terms of the 1989 revised edition of the constitution, the president's powers and duties include acting as supreme

commander of the armed forces, promulgating laws, declaring a

state of siege, granting pardons, submitting legislation to the Constitutional Court for approval, making many high appointments,

and, when needed, removing high officials from their posts. The

president also calls elections, convenes special sessions of the Assembly of the Republic, dissolves this body in accordance with law,

and appoints the prime minister.

The 1982 amendments to the constitution reduced the powers

of the presidency somewhat, mainly by specifying the periods in

which presidents may not dissolve the assembly (during the first six months after the assembly's election, in the last six months of

a president's term, and during a state of siege or an emergency)

and stipulating when they may dismiss a government ("only when

this becomes necessary to secure the regular functioning of the

democratic institutions"). The presidential veto power was reduced

in that a simple majority in the assembly can override presidential

vetoes. The power of pocket veto was also abolished. According

to the 1982 amendments, the president must either accept legislation or reject it. The presidency is intended for a national figure of great prestige and ideally one above partisan politics. As of the early 1990s,

Portugal had had only two presidents since the constitution was

promulgated in 1976. General Eanes was elected in 1976 and easily reelected to a second term in 1980. In 1986 PS leader Soares was elected to the presidency, but only in the runoff election after he had gained the support of the PCP and the PSD. In January

1991, he easily won reelection for a second term. These two men were genuinely popular presidents because of

their statesmanlike qualities and their obvious devotion to their

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Government and Politics

country's welfare. General Eanes was widely regarded as the man

who made possible Portugal's transition to centrist democracy af- ter the tumult of the revolution. He was politically moderate and

a conciliator who remained apart from the country's contending

factions. In Portugal's democratic transition, Soares was also seen

as a heroic figure who had fought tenaciously, first against the Sala- zar regime, enduring both imprisonment and exile, and later against

Communist rule. He was also the country's first civilian president

since the First Republic.

The Council of State

The Council of State, which in the 1982 constitutional reform

replaced the Council of the Revolution, functions as a high-level

advisory body to the president. Its members consist of the president of the Assembly of the Republic, the prime minister, the president of the Constitutional Court, the ombudsman, the chairpersons

of the regional governments, former presidents, five citizens ap- pointed by the president, and five persons elected by the Assembly of the Republic.

The council is a broadly consultative group with deep roots in

Portuguese history. It is a kind of throwback to an earlier Portuguese

concept of corporative, regional, or functional representation.

However, it has no executive power and in recent times has been

called into its advisory capacity only rarely. As a result, membership on it has come to be mainly honorary.

The Prime Minister

The prime minister of Portugal heads the government and

manages the nation's affairs on a daily basis. The prime minister

chooses or approves cabinet ministers and directs or coordinates

their actions. The office thus differs from that in Britain, where

the prime minister is the first among equals. Moreover, the entire

cabinet bears responsibility for its actions, not the prime minister

alone. The prime minister also directs the operations of the armed

forces, although the president is formally the commander in chief. In other matters as well, the prime minister is autonomous, and

the president has no right to direct the prime minister's policies.

Unlike the president, the prime minister is elected indirectly.

As in other parliamentary systems, the prime minister is the lead- er of the largest party in the parliament or the head of a coalition

of parties. The prime minister's term may last for up to four years, through an entire legislative period, after which time new elections are held. However, the prime minister may call earlier elections.

The prime minister may ask for a vote of confidence from the

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Portugal: A Country Study

parliament, but he can also be ousted by a vote of no confidence

or through a leadership change in his own party. If a prime minister

proves incompetent, loses support, or fails to provide needed national direction, the president may also request that a new government be formed.

In the ten years following the Revolution of 1974, Portugal was

governed by nearly a dozen weak and short-lived governments;

the number of prime ministers was not large, however, because

all but two of them headed more than one cabinet. After mid- 1985,

the political system attained a greater stability when Anibal Cavaco Silva, head of the Social Democrat Party (Partido Social- Democrata—PSD), formed first a minority government and then

a majority government that lasted the entire 1987-91 legislative

period. After his party won 50.4 percent of the vote in the 1991

national elections, Cavaco Silva formed another government that

enjoyed an absolute parliamentary majority.

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers, or cabinet, is the state's highest ex- ecutive institution. The council consists of the prime minister and

fifteen to eighteen cabinet ministers. Most ministers come from

the parliament, but they are not required to do so. In coalition

cabinets, the majority of ministers usually belongs to the coalition's

largest party, that of the prime minister, and the remaining

ministers come from other coalition parties. Once in the cabinet, a member of parliament has to relinquish, at least temporarily,

his or her seat in that body.

The Council of Ministers has both administrative and policymaking functions, is responsible for national security and defense

affairs, and is in charge of the day-to-day implementation of government policy. In addition, Portugal's cabinet has extensive legisla- tive powers by virtue of its power to pass decree-laws within areas

of its responsibility. It can also be granted the right by the Assembly of the Republic to pass legislation in areas of responsibility usually reserved to parliament, its "relatively reserved legislative

powers." Because getting a bill through the assembly was often

a slow process, the Council of Ministers often made use of this right.

The council is responsible both individually and collectively for its actions, first to the prime minister and ultimately to the parliament. In Portugal, the minister with the greatest power is the minister

of finance, who prepares the budget and oversees the finances of

the other ministries. Ministers are assisted by politically appointed

secretaries of state, who vacate their positions when their ministers leave the council. As allowed by Article 203 of the 1989 revised

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Assembly of the Republic, Lisbon

Courtesy Andrea Matles Savada

constitution, a number of ministers sometimes meet together and

form what the constitution terms "councils of specialized ministers" to work on matters of mutual concern. They can call on their

secretaries of state and civil servants for assistance and can submit

the results of their collaboration to the entire cabinet for review.

Additional bodies were later created to assist individual ministers on the council as a whole. In 1984 the Office of Techno-Legislative

Support, under the minister ofjustice, was formed to assist the council in drafting legislation. A number of superior councils assist ministers with studies and planning. Examples of this kind of body

are the Superior Council of Finance and the National Board of Education. In addition to advising ministers, these bodies meet with

groups affected by government decisions.

The Assembly of the Republic

According to the Portuguese constitution, the country's unicameral

parliament, the Assembly of the Republic, "is the representative

assembly of all Portuguese citizens." The constitution names the

assembly as one of the country's organs of supreme authority and,

in Article 114 of the 1989 revised constitution, charges it to exercise its powers both separately and interdependently with the president, the government, and the courts.

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Portugal: A Country Study

The assembly's power derives from its power to dismiss a government through a vote of no confidence, to impeach the president,

to change the country's laws, and to amend the constitution. In

addition to these key powers, the constitution grants to the Assembly

of the Republic extensive legislative powers and substantial control over the budget, the right to authorize the government to raise taxes and grant loans, the power to ratify treaties and other kinds

of international agreements, and the duty to approve or reject decisions by the president of the republic to declare war and make

peace. The assembly also appoints many members of important

state institutions, such as ten of the thirteen members of the Constitutional Court and seven of the sixteen members of the Higher

Council of the Bench.

The constitution requires the assembly to quickly review and

approve an incoming government's program. Parliamentary rules allow the assembly to call for committees of inquiry to examine

the government's actions. Political opposition represented in the

assembly has the power to review the cabinet's actions, even though

it is unlikely that the actions can be reversed. For example, as few

as ten members can request that the assembly ratify the government's decree-laws not belonging to the cabinet's exclusive jurisdiction. As little as one-fifth of the assembly can call for a motion

of censure, although an absolute majority of the assembly is re- quired to sustain the censure. Party groups can also call for inter- pellations that require debates about specific government policies.

The assembly consisted at first of 250 members, but the constitutional reforms of 1989 reduced its number to between 230 and

235. Members are elected by popular vote for legislative terms of

four years from the country's constituencies (eighteen in mainland

Portugal, one each for the autonomous regions of the Azores

(Acores) and Madeira, one for Portuguese living in Western Europe, and one for those living in the rest of the world). The number of voters registered in a constituency determines the number

of its members in the assembly. Constituencies vary greatly in size. As of the early 1990s, as many as three dozen representatives came

from the Lisbon district and as few as three from some inland districts. The autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira each

sent five members to the assembly.

According to the constitution, members of the assembly represent

the entire country, not the constituency from which they are elected. This directive was reinforced hi practice by the strong role of political parties in regard to members of the assembly. As of the early

1990s, party leadership, for example, determined in which areas candidates were to run for office, thus often weakening members'

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Government and Politics

ties to their constituencies. Moreover, members of the assembly

were expected to vote with their party and to work within parliamentary groups based on party membership. Party discipline was

strong, and insubordinate members could be coerced through a

variety of means. A further obstacle to members' independence was that their bills first had to be submitted to the parliamentary

groups, and it was these group leaders who set the assembly's agenda. The leader of the assembly, its president, was selected from

the group leaders.

Assembly sessions are scheduled to run from mid-October to midJune, but often extend beyond this period because of uncompleted business. When the body is not in session, it is represented by

its Standing Committee, headed by the president of the as- sembly and composed of assembly members chosen to reflect the

larger body's political composition. The committee monitors the

president and the government and can call for meetings of the entire assembly if necessary.

Much of the assembly's work is done in committees, both per- manent and ad hoc. Committee membership is to reflect the as- sembly party makeup, and members are usually not allowed to serve on more than two committees. The committees examine legislative proposals, most of which come from the government rather

than from the assembly itself after a first reading in the assembly.

Appropriate witnesses and expert testimony can be called; for cer- tain types of legislation, labor legislation for example, concerned

parties have to be heard. Once a committee approves a bill, the

bill can receive a second reading and a plenary vote. The Portuguese parliament did not enjoy much prestige initially. Its efficacy was impeded by the absence of adequate resources and

staff and the lack of an efficient infrastructure of committees and

subcommittees. This institutional inadequacy buttressed the traditional lack of respect the Portuguese felt for their governing insti- tutions. To the public, the assembly personified democracy's defects in that it was inefficient, quarrelsome, splintered, and patronagedominated. Its members were frequently seen as putting partisan

interests ahead of the interests of the nation or of using their

parliamentary positions to enhance their private careers and for- tunes. In newspaper editorials and cartoons, parliament members

were often portrayed as buffoonish, silly, and irrelevant. Polls in 1978 and 1984 found that the Portuguese saw parliament as less important than the president, the prime minister, or the cabinet.

It was thus not surprising that at times Portuguese democracy

seemed insufficiently rooted. Yet, democracy had survived the unstable period after the revolution, and, despite all its problems, many

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Portugal: A Country Study

Portuguese had come to see the Assembly of the Republic as indispensable to its preservation. In addition, reforms of the parliament's organization and practices, as well as increased numbers

of skilled and experienced staffers, had improved the body's effi- ciency.

The Judiciary

The constitution provides for the Constitutional Court; the

Supreme Court ofJustice and the Supreme Administrative Court,

both of which have subordinate courts; and a variety of special

courts, including a military court system. It states that the courts are the "organs of supreme authority competent to administer

justice in the name of the people." The courts are also designated

as "independent and subject only to the law."

The Constitutional Court, called into existence by the constitutional reform of 1982, judges whether legislative acts are legal and

constitutional. Among other duties, this court also ascertains the

physical ability of the president to carry out presidential functions

and examines international agreements for their constitutionality.

Ten of its thirteen members are chosen by the Assembly of the

Republic.

The Supreme Court of Justice is designated the "highest court

of law," but "without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court," and heads the court system that deals with civil and

criminal cases. The courts of first instance (the first courts to try a case) are the municipal and district courts; the courts of second

instance are, as a rule, courts of appeal. As of the early 1990s, there were four of these latter courts. The Supreme Court ofJustice may

serve as a court of first instance in some cases and as an appeals

court in others.

The Supreme Court of Administration examines the fiscal and

administrative conduct of government institutions. It is not con- cerned with the state's political decisions or legislation. One sec- tion of this court deals with administrative disputes; below it are

three courts of first instance. Another section deals with tax dis- putes and is supported by courts of first and second instance. In

addition to these courts, there is a Court of Audit situated in the

Ministry of Finance.

Overseeing the nominations, training, promotions, transfers, and

professional conduct of Portugal's judges are the Higher Council

of the Bench and the Superior Council of the Administrative and

Fiscal Courts. These bodies have the right to discipline judges whose

conduct does not comply with the law. Also looking after the rights

of the citizens is the ombudsman, elected by the Assembly of the

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Government and Politics

Republic for a four-year term. In the early 1990s, this official received some 3,000 complaints a year from Portuguese who felt they had been improperly dealt with by state institutions.

The Portuguese legal and judicial system is based on Roman

civil law and was heavily influenced by the French system. It differs from the United States or British legal systems in that a complete

body of law is found in the codes. As a result, judicial reasoning

is deductive, and prior cases or precedent play little role. A judge

is therefore seen mainly as a civil servant whose role is to discover

and apply the appropriate law from the codes, not to interpret it or to apply new sociological findings. Hence, judges enjoy less prestige than in a system based on common law. In addition, law is seen as more fixed and immutable than in the United States, al- though over time it does change. The historically authoritarian nature of Portugal's system of government is often attributed to this centralized and hierarchical legal system.

Portugal's legal system is considered relatively fair and impartial. During the Salazar regime, the courts were loyal servants of

the New State, and high officials of the regime were all but immune from judicial proceedings. After the Revolution of 1974,

Salazar-appointed judges were largely removed in favor of revolutionary ones, and certain groups—such as workers and peasants

were often favored over owners and employers before the law. With

time, however, the courts have come to function with greater impartiality. Most criticism centers on the fact that the courts are slow

and overburdened. Long periods of time are often required for the

legal system to deal with even routine matters, nor have the courts adequately kept pace with new judicial issues, such as drugs and

white-collar crime.

Civil Service

According to Article 266 of the revised constitution, public administrative authorities shall "seek to promote the public interest,

while observing those rights and interests of citizens that are protected by law. " Furthermore, the next article states that the struc- ture of public administration shall be such as to avoid bureaucracy,

to bring the state's services close to the people, and to involve the

people in decision making. Citizens are entitled to be informed of

proceedings in which they are directly concerned and of decisions

affecting them.

These provisions were a reaction to Portuguese administrative

traditions and to the abuses and favoritism of the Salazar era. As

of the early 1990s, however, opinions remained divided about

whether the Portuguese state was less "bureaucratic" than it had

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Portugal: A Country Study

been in the past. The 1970s saw a tremendous increase in the number of persons employed by central and local governments (from

205,000 in 1968 to 550,000 in 1986) and the issuance of many regulations that slowed public administration. To counter these trends, numerous reforms were enacted in the 1980s to streamline government services and make public employees more responsive to the

public's needs. For example, civil servants were encouraged to see themselves as servants of the public rather than as wielders of state power. Moreover, many trivial but time-consuming and otherwise onerous bureaucratic regulations were revoked. An example of this kind of reform was that photocopies rather than original documents

could be used when dealing with government offices. Portugal's

entry into the EC was also forcing a modernization of the public

sector. Portugal's public employees are classified as either public functionaries, those employed by the national government, or as administrative functionaries, those employed by local authorities. In

1986 national government employees accounted for 83 percent of

government employees. Some 70 percent of these government workers were employed by the Ministry of Education and Culture and

the Ministry of Health. As part of a concerted effort to reduce Portugal's traditional centralization of government, Lisbon's share of

public employees of all kinds was reduced from 52.7 percent in

1978 to 44 percent in 1986.

The civil service's cumbersome and unfair classification and pay

structures were also reformed during the 1980s. The pay of public

employees came to be taxed more than it had been in the past.

Career structures were simplified. Care was taken, however, that no public employee receive less pay than under the old system.

The recruitment of new public employees is also newly regulated. Candidates vie for state positions in public competitions.

Juries select candidates in a way that guarantees fairness. Public

employees are also allowed to be members of the main Portuguese

labor unions.

Local Government

Portugal has long been a centralized political system not only

in terms of its legal system, but also in terms of its system of public administration. The pattern, like the legal system, derives from

Roman law and the French Napoleonic Code. The result was that

Portugal's central authorities kept most powers for themselves and

administered the country from Lisbon. Local government remained

underdeveloped and passive.

192
Government and Politics The framers of the constitution of 1976 sought to change this pattern of centralization. Article 238 of the 1989 revised constitution states that "local authorities on the mainland shall be the parishes, municipal authorities and the administrative regions." A plan

for dividing Portugal into seven administrative regions (five based on the country's major river basins, and one each for the Porto

and Lisbon metropolitan areas) had been worked out in the mid1970s, but in the early 1990s its implementation had not yet been

effected. Fear of officials in the capital that they would lose power

to local authorities was seen as a principal reason for this delay.

Article 291 of the revised constitution of 1989 states that until

the administrative regions have been created, the highest level of

subnational government will be the mainland's eighteen districts,

administrative divisions established in the nineteenth century. In

the early 1990s, these eighteen districts (each bearing the name

of its capital) constituted the layer of government between the national government and local government. Portugal is not a federal

state, and the districts have no legislative powers. District officials conduct elections, maintain public order, and exercise what the

Portuguese term "administrative tutelage" by monitoring the per- formance of local government. Each district is directed by a civil governor, who is a political appointee.

The districts do not function as administrative bodies. As a result,

most of the national government's activities are carried out by the

ministries within territorial divisions that they establish and that

do not necessarily correspond with those of the districts. The district governor is not seen as occupying a higher position than ministerial officials. Because the administrative regions envisioned in the constitution had not been established as of the early 1990s, Portugal's lo- cal government at that time consisted of 305 municipalities, further

subdivided into about 4,000 parishes. Despite its name, a parish

has no ecclesiastical functions but merely provides social assistance

and maintains voter registration lists. An elected parish assembly

meets four times a year and chooses the parish board, which serves

as the parish's government. The board draws up the parish's budget, executes the parish assembly's laws, and manages its public

business. The size of these bodies is determined by the population

of the parish.

Municipalities, like parishes, are classified as urban or rural,

except for those of Lisbon and Porto, which are classified as metropolitan areas. A municipality is governed by a municipal as- sembly, half of whose members are elected every four years and

half of whom are the presidents of parish boards operating within

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Portugal: A Country Study

the municipality. A municipal assembly meets five times a year, and its members are unpaid. A municipality's executive body is the municipal chamber. Its members (aldermen) are elected, serve year-round, and are paid. The chamber is headed by a president

(mayor). The president of a municipal chamber is the candidate

for that body who received the most votes. Each chamber has a

council, composed of representatives from a variety of organizations, which serves as a consultative body. The size of these municipal bodies is determined by the number of registered voters within a municipality.

The many tasks managed by a municipality are carried out

both by city employees and private firms considered part of the

municipal government. Funds to pay for these tasks come both from

the national government and local sources (taxes, licensing fees,

etc). The constitution stipulates that these local authorities should

be financially independent, and plans exist to establish by law

a system of local finance that will arrange the "fair apportionment" of public funds between the state and local authorities. As

of the early 1990s, however, over 90 percent of the funds used by

local government were still national in origin. In addition, the national government was obliged to see that these funds were spent

properly, thereby reducing even further the independence of local authorities.

Autonomous Regions and Macau

The archipelagoes of the Azores and Madeira had long enjoyed

a substantial degree of administrative autonomy when in 1976 the

new constitution established them as autonomous political regions.

According to the constitution, political autonomy was granted in response to the islands' geographical, economic, social, and cul- tural characteristics and because of "the historic aspirations of the

peoples of the islands to autonomy." This autonomy, however,

"shall in no way affect the [Portuguese] State's full sovereignty

and shall be exercised within the limits of the Constitution."

The constitution grants the autonomous regions a number of

powers, among them the power to legislate in areas relating specifically to them, execute laws, tax, supervise local public institutions, and participate in drafting international agreements that affect them. This last provision has meant that Azorean officials have

participated in talks between the United States and Portugal about

military bases located on their islands.

The national government is represented by the minister of the

republic, who functions in much the same manner as the president

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Government and Politics

of the republic does on the mainland. The minister has veto powers similar to those of the president. If the autonomous regions'

governing organs have acted contrary to the dictates of the constitution, they may be dissolved by the president of the republic.

Each autonomous region has a legislative assembly elected for four-year terms. The d'Hondt method (see Glossary) is used to determine voting results. A president heads a regional government

composed of regional secretaries, which reflects the party composition of the regional assembly. This government is politically

responsible to the regional assembly in the same manner that the

national government is responsible to the Assembly of the Republic.

Among other powers, the regional assembly has the right to initiate legislation, review the regional government's budget, and vote motions of censure. A regional government has powers similar to those of the national government, and its members direct a number of regional secretariats that correspond to the mainland's ministries. Local government in the autonomous regions corresponds

to the mainland's municipalities and parishes.

Macau consists of a peninsula attached to the Chinese mainland

and two islands with a total area of about seventeen square kilo- meters. In 1987 its population is estimated at 435,000 persons.

Portuguese explorers first reached Macau in the early sixteenth century; it became a Portuguese colony in 1557. According to an agree- ment in 1987 between Portugal and China, Macau is to become

a "special administrative region" of China on January 20, 1999.

Even after this date, however, Macau will be allowed to maintain

its capitalist economy, and Portuguese will remain its official lan- guage. Until 1999 Macau will remain a Special Territory of Portugal. Although the territory's highest executive official is a governor

appointed by the president of Portugal, Macau enjoys a substantial

degree of autonomy and has its own legislative assembly.

The Electoral System

The constitution states that the people exercise political power

through universal, equal, direct, secret, and periodic elections. All

citizens over the age of eighteen have the right to vote, and those over the age of twenty-one have the right to hold public office, under conditions of equality and freedom. Portuguese citizens are obliged to register to vote, but voting itself is voluntary. Freedom

of association is guaranteed and is defined to include the right to establish or join political parties and "through them to work

democratically to give form to the will of the people and to organize

political power."

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Portugal: A Country Study

Elections for the president's term of five years in Portugal's semipresidential system are by popular vote. If a candidate fails to receive an absolute majority on the first ballot, a runoff election between

the two leading candidates is to be held within two weeks.

Elections for the four-year legislative terms of the Assembly of

the Republic are by proportional representation in each constituency. Portugal uses the d'Hondt method of proportional representation, which is based on the highest average method and favors

large parties by awarding them a greater percentage of assembly

seats than the percentage of votes they won. Small parties are protected in that there is no minimum percentage of votes they must

receive to gain a seat in the assembly. Nonetheless, unless these

parties are members of a coalition, they rarely win a seat in the

assembly. The d'Hondt method was adopted because it leads to stronger, more stable governments in countries that are deeply

divided and have multiple parties.

Municipal elections, which serve as a barometer of public opinion on the national government, are held every four years. In contrast to national elections, this schedule is maintained because local governments do not fall. The national parties participate in these

elections.

Political Dynamics

In the early 1990s, Portuguese politics operated at several differ- ent levels. The constitution and the laws constituted the first level. This formal structure of government often appears rigid, legalistic, and impenetrable, especially to outsiders. Yet, these legal

and constitutional structures are more obvious and more easily

understood than the other levels of the Portuguese system of government.

The second level consists of political parties and interest groups.

Because of its legalistic tradition, a strict separation exists in Portugal between the formal governmental system and the sphere

of political parties and interest groups. Portuguese tend to respect

their formal system of government but to denigrate political parties and interest groups. As Portuguese democracy flourished

through the 1980s, however, political parties and interest groups

gained greater acceptance as an integral part of the system of government.

Unlike these first two levels, the third level of Portuguese politics is largely invisible and is the most difficult for outsiders to penetrate and comprehend. This level consists of the informal connections, family relationships, interpersonal ties, kinships, and

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Government and Politics

patronage networks that are so much the heart of the Portuguese

political system. Seldom spoken of or described by the Portuguese,

these relationships enable the Portuguese system to function and

to cut through vast layers of red tape.

Many of the informal networks that had long steered Portuguese

affairs were severely disrupted by the Revolution of 1974 when

many families and extended clans lost their property and their

positions. However, many of these networks were rebuilt in subsequent years, and others were formed by the forging of new political and economic relationships. Knowledge of this third level of Portuguese politics is crucial for a full understanding of the for- mal and the informal dynamics within the Portuguese political

system.

Political Parties

As Portugal became democratic after 1974, it also developed a

political party system with a full spectrum of parties that ranged

from the far left to the far right. During the Salazar-Caetano re- gime, only one party was legal, the National Union (Uniao

Nacional—UN), later renamed the National Popular Action (Ac- cao Nacional Popular—ANP). The UN/ANP was dissolved in the

first weeks of the revolution, and a great variety of new parties soon

replaced it. Some political parties emerged very quickly because they already

existed in preliminary form. Several factions of the old UN/ANP,

for example, became separate political parties after the revolution. The socialists and, to a far greater extent, the Communists

already had underground groups operating in Portugal, as well

as organizations in exile. Finally, some opposition elements had

formed "study groups" that served as the basis of later political

parties.

The party system increased in importance during the Second

Republic. Large, strong parties were fostered under the d'Hondt

method of proportional representation, and parties soon began to receive state subsidies. The parties' strength was also bolstered by

their exclusive right to nominate political candidates and by the

strict party discipline they enforced on successful candidates once

they entered parliament. By the beginning of the early 1990s, only

four parties regularly won seats in the parliament, and two were

so much stronger than the others that Portugal seemed on the way

to an essentially two-party system.

Far Left

Far-left groups, most importantly the Portuguese Democratic

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Movement (Movimento Democratico Portugues—MDP), had considerable influence in the early part of the revolution. Consisting

mostly of students and intellectuals, these groups were augmented

by leftists from all over the world who flocked to Portugal to wit- ness and participate in the revolution. They often engaged in guerrilla tactics, street demonstrations, and takeovers of private lands

and industries. On their own, these groups could mount major

demonstrations; in alliance with the PCP, they could be even more

formidable. Since the heady revolutionary days of the mid-1970s,

however, most of these groups have been absorbed into the larger

parties or dissolved. As of the beginning of 1990s, some far-left groups were still active at the universities and in intellectual cir- cles, but they were seen as a fringe phenomenon and lacked their

former disruptive capacity.

Portuguese Communist Party

The main party on the revolutionary left in Portugal was for decades the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista

Portugues—PCP). The PCP had a long history of defiance to the

Salazar dictatorship, and many of the party's leaders had spent

long years in jail or in exile. Party members who remained in Portugal worked underground where they formed associations and or- ganized the labor union Intersindical. The party was strongly

Stalinist and Moscow-oriented.

Returning from exile in 1974, the PCP's leaders, many of whom

were reputed to be capable and formidable politicians, tried to seize power by means of a coup, allying themselves with revolutionary

elements in the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas

Armadas—MFA). The party came close to seizing power in 1975

but failed because moderate elements within the armed forces and

the political parties to the right of it were committed to Western

democracy. Extensive financial aid from Western countries to these

parties also contributed to the PCP's ultimate defeat. The PCP, along with its far-left allies, got 17 percent of the vote

in the first democratic election in Portugal in 1975, and for several elections after that it held its position at approximately 12 to 19

percent of the vote. But during the 1980s, as Portugal moved away

from the radical politics of the mid-1970s and began to prosper

economically, the PCP's popularity declined to less than 10 per- cent of the vote. The party remained strong in the trade unions,

but younger members of the party challenged the old leadership

and questioned the party's hard-line Stalinist positions. Some of

these young challengers were expelled from the party. The collapse

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of communism in Europe, the aging of the party's leadership (the

party had been headed by Alvaro Cunhal since 1941) and of its membership, and the party's poor showing in elections indicate

that the party either will have to transform itself fundamentally

or fade away as a political force. Socialist Party

The history of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS) in Portugal dates back to the late nineteenth century. Like the PCP, it was persecuted and forced into exile by Salazar. The party was

reestablished in 1973 in the Federal Republic of Germany (West

Germany) under the leadership of Mario Soares, who had opposed

the regime as a young man and had been imprisoned for his politi- cal activities. Soares returned to Portugal a few days after the coup

of April 25, 1974, and the PS began to function openly as a politi- cal party. It had both a moderate and a militant wing, but its militancy was tempered by the articulate and politically shrewd

Soares. The PS, as one of the two largest parties in Portugal, has often

formed governments. During the revolutionary situation in

1974-75, the socialists were looked on as the most viable moderate opposition to the PCP. The PS therefore received considerable foreign support, as well as domestic votes, that it might not

otherwise have had. It regularly received about 28 to 35 percent

of the vote; it was in power from 1976 to 1978 and in a governing

coalition with the PSD from 1983 to 1985.

In power the PS followed a moderate, centrist program. As the

Portuguese electorate became more conservative in the 1980s,

however, the party lost support. In the 1985 election, it got only

20.8 percent of the vote, although this percentage improved slightly

in the 1987 national elections. The party won the 1989 municipal

elections, but despite an impressive improvement in the 1991 national election when it polled 29.3 percent of the vote, it still lagged

far behind the PSD. Persistent leadership problems dating from

when Soares left the party in 1986 when he was elected president

and inept campaigns were seen as causes of the party's secondary

position in Portuguese politics. At times the disputes between the

moderate and Marxist factions were renewed, but the party as a whole had moved far enough to the right that in the 1991 national

election the PS had difficulty distinguishing itself from the PSD

on most major issues. Social Democrat Party

The Social Democrat Party (Partido Social Democrata—PSD)

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emerged as the somewhat open and tolerated opposition under

Caetano in the early 1970s. For a time, the PSD, then known as the Popular Democratic Party (Partido Popular Democrata—PPD),

adopted the reformist political doctrines popular during the revolutionary period of the mid-1970s. It was soon overtaken, however,

by the PS as the main opposition party, and it moved toward the

democratic center. The radical constitution of 1976 was drafted

and promulgated with its help, but even then the PSD was committed to its revision.

The PSD's fortunes generally improved as revolutionary fervor

waned. In the earliest postrevolutionary elections, the PSD got

about 24 to 27 percent of the vote, second to the PS. It had scored

well in the conservative north of Portugal but not in the revolutionary south. As the party began to occupy the broad center of

the political spectrum under the dynamic leadership of Francisco

Sa. Carneiro, the PSD's electoral support grew. In 1978 the PSD

formed an electoral coalition, the Democratic Alliance (Alianca

Democratica—AD), with two other parties and came to power in

early 1980 with Sa Carneiro as prime minister. After the formation of this government, the PSD remained in government throughout the 1980s and into the first half of the 1990s, either as part

of a coalition, in a minority single-party cabinet, or as a majority

single-party government.

The AD won the parliamentary election of October 1980, but

the coalition's forward movement slowed somewhat after the death

of Sa Carneiro in a plane crash in December 1980. His successor,

Expresso founder and editor Francisco Pinto Balsemao, lacked Sa

Carneiro 's forcefulness and charisma. The party formed an elec- toral coalition, the Central Bloc, with the PS in 1983 and was in

government until 1985 when the coalition ended. For two years, the PSD formed a minority government with its new leader, Anibal

Cavaco Silva, as prime minister. In the 1987 national elections,

the PSD won the Second Republic's first absolute parliamentary

majority, a feat the party repeated in the 1991 elections. By consistently favoring free-market policies, the PSD benefited from Portugal's improved economy after the country joined the EC in 1986

and the electorate returned to a more conservative position after the radical politics of the mid-1970s.

Party of the Social Democratic Center

The Party of the Social Democratic Center (Partido do Centro

Democratico Social—CDS) is a Christian democratic party to the

right of the political spectrum. Although not officially a religious

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Government and Politics

party, the CDS is mainly linked to conservative Portuguese Catholicism and most of its officials and followers are Roman Catholic.

Unlike some other Christian democratic parties, the conservative

CDS does not advocate liberation theology (see Glossary). The party was founded in 1975 by Diogo Freitas do Amaral, a respected politician and a professor of administrative law.

The CDS won 15.9 percent of the vote in the 1976 elections and

for a time formed a government with the PS. It increased its power when it formed an electoral coalition with the PSD in 1979 and

was in power until the coalition ended in 1983. Since then the party

has lost much of its electoral support, gaining only a little more

than 4 percent of the vote in the 1987 and 1991 parliamentary elec- tions. The strength of the PSD at the polls meant that the CDS

was no longer needed to form center-right governments. A decline

of the PSD seems the only opportunity for the CDS to return to power, either with the PSD or with the PS.

Far Right

As of the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal had not had a strong

far-right party since the fall of the Salazar-Caetano regime. Most

of those associated with the old regime were driven into exile during the revolution, and all far-right parties were declared illegal.

Some of the prohibitions against right-wing political activities still remained law, although in the 1980s many of those associated with

the former regime had returned to the country and a handful had

reentered politics. Rather than establishing new right-wing parties, conservatives and supporters of the old regime were most likely to be active politically through the PSD or the CDS.

Popular Monarchist Party

The Popular Monarchist Party (Partido Popular Monarquico

PPM) favors the restoration of the Braganca royal family, over- thrown in 1910. Their program is complicated, however, by the

existence of several competing Braganca pretenders to the throne.

The PPM stands for a constitutional and limited monarchy similar to the one in Spain. This would mean that the monarch is a ceremonial chief of state, not a ruling head of government. The

PPM has argued that a monarchy would help unify the government, promote stability, and give the country a single, if mainly

symbolic, head. In addition, the PPM campaigned for ecological concerns. Only once, in the 1987 elections for the EC, did the PPM

win even 3 percent of the vote. Generally it won less than 1 percent. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the PPM was

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was part of the AD governing coalition, which consisted mainly

of the CDS and the PSD.

Other Parties

Portugal has a number of other, largely personalistic parties that

rally around a single leading personality rather than an issue or program. Most of these are small parties, frequently rising and fall- ing quickly, and they command little electoral strength. These personalistic parties are often used as bargaining chips in the larger

political arena, where their modest support might be traded for a cabinet post or other position. An exception to some of these rules

is the Party of Democratic Renovation (Partido Renovador Democratico—PRD), made up of supporters of President Eanes. In the

national elections of 1985, the PRD received 17.9 percent of the vote and seemed poised to emerge as a major electoral contender.

In the national elections of 1987, however, it got just under 5 per- cent of the vote. After Eanes himself withdrew from politics, the

party faded away, winning only 0.6 percent of the vote in the 1991

elections. Interest Groups

Despite the flourishing of democracy since 1974, interest groups

are not a significant force in Portugal. Portuguese politics are pluralist but to a lesser degree than in many other countries, especially when compared with the United States. Whereas the United

States had over 50,000 interest groups functioning in Washington

alone as of the early 1990s, the number functioning in Portugal was probably less than 100.

Armed Forces The armed forces in Portugal trace their origins to the armies

and military orders of medieval times. The orders were often au- tonomous from the state, and, because they were formed during

the reconquest, may have predated it. Hence, the armed forces came to be thought of—and thought of themselves—as a separate

unit in society, independent of any civil authority and perhaps above

it. Even at the beginning of the 1990s, the military still had to some

extent this sense of aloofness and of ideals of a higher order.

Up until the 1980s, the military had been the ultimate arbiter

of Portuguese national politics. In the nineteenth century, the armed

forces participated in chaotic, man-on-horseback politics. Military cum civilian factions "rotated" (rotativismo) in and out of power

with frequent regularity. The armed forces helped usher in the

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Government and Politics

Portuguese Republic in 1910 and ended it in 1926. The military

brought Salazar to power and served as an indispensable prop of

his dictatorship.

It was the armed forces that overthrew Caetano in 1974, and

the MFA that launched the revolution. The MFA took pains to retain special powers by creating the Council of the Revolution,

which guaranteed the armed forces the power to prohibit legislation that they saw as harmful to the revolution's democratic achievements. The military agreed, however, that these powers were to be of limited duration.

During the 1980s, the political and social roles of the armed forces diminished. The 1982 constitutional amendments reduced the mili- tary's political power by abolishing the Council of the Revolution,

thereby ending the military's guardianship over Portuguese politics.

The National Defense Law of 1982 put the military completely

under civilian control. In addition, the armed forces were significantly reduced in size and budget. On the other hand, Portuguese

officers became better educated, more technologically sophisticated,

and more professional.

By the beginning of the 1990s, the Portuguese armed forces

had a social role similar to that of armed forces in other West

European countries. Only extreme events could possibly pull Portugal's soldiers back into politics, although like any other interest

group they did lobby to protect their interests, benefits, budget,

and position in society.

Roman Catholic Church

Like the armed forces, the Roman Catholic Church in Portugal

also declined in influence during the 1980s. The church, along with

the military, had been one of the historical corporate units in soci- ety, predating the state and then existing parallel to it. As a result,

Portugal was historically a Roman Catholic nation. Roman Catholicism not only was the sole religion of the country, but also per- meated the culture, the legal system, the society, and the polity.

Salazar derived many of his corporatist beliefs from the papal encyclicals, and during his long rule the church served as an indispensable pillar of the regime.

In recent decades, however, as society has become more secularized, the church has come to play a lesser role in people's lives. During the 1974-76 period, the church helped turn the population

away from the appeals of communism and radicalism, but since

those tumultuous years the church has been quiescent politically.

The church has, however, expressed itself on some issues, such as

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the legalization of abortion, on which it feels morally obliged to take a public stance. Polls of Portuguese show that the church's

ranking among main interest groups has fallen from second- or third-most influential to seventh- or eighth-most influential. Economic Elites

The "oligarchy" was the third of the historical triumvirate of

power in Portugal (armed forces, church, and oligarchy) to be in

decline. Many of the old oligarchical families trace their origins

to the Reconquest. They acquired their land, position, and titles, and eventually peasants and cattle, as the Reconquest drove the

Moors farther south, opening up new territories for settlement.

This oligarchy, armed with titles of nobility granted it by the

royal family in return for loyalty, dominated Portuguese politics for centuries. But over time, its character changed. In the south

of Portugal, the Alentejo, the landowning class became increasingly absentee landlords, leaving managers in charge of its estates and moving to Lisbon. In the north, where smallholdings predominated, many members of the oligarchy became impoverished—or went into businesses like wine making. During the reign of Salazar, members of the elite went into banking, insurance, construction, and similar fields in which they could establish oligopolies

and monopolies based on their close ties with the government.

After the Revolution of 1974, this economic elite was stripped

of power. Its properties were confiscated, many from the elite were

jailed or sent into exile, and the group lost all political power. In

addition, members of the elite were barred from participating in

politics or from forming political movements of their own because

of laws forbidding far-right political activity.

As of the early 1990s, most of the exiles had been permitted to return to Portugal, and those who had spent time in jail were freed. Some of the elite managed to regain their power by taking advantage of the economy's need for financial expertise, but the elite as a whole did not regain its old financial position. Its political in- fluence remained limited, as well, and only one member of the old

Salazar regime had been elected to parliament.

Organized Labor

Portuguese trade unionism has a history of militancy and radical- ism. Its roots go back to the late nineteenth century when modern

industry first appeared. The unions grew during the period of the

First Republic, 1910-26, when they enjoyed freedom to organize.

It was in this period that Marxist, Bolshevik, Trotskyite, anarchist,

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Government and Politics

and syndicalist ideas were discussed and disseminated. Although

the labor movement was small, a reflection of the low level of Portuguese industrialization, it was active and vocal.

During the Salazar-Caetano era, militant unions were abolished,

and the labor movement was forcibly subordinated to corporatist

controls. Many labor leaders were jailed or sent into exile. Some

cooperated with the new corporative system; others organized a

militant, Communist-controlled underground labor organization.

With time this union, Intersindical, was well enough established

that the government actually dealt with it almost as if it were a

legal bargaining agent.

During the Revolution of 1974, Intersindical, or as it came to be known in 1977, the General Confederation of Portuguese

Workers-National Intersindical (Confederacao Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional—CGTP-IN), was at

last able to function as a legal labor organization, and it expanded

rapidly. Controlled by the Communists, the CGTP-IN was closely

associated with the PCP's bid for power and for a time was the

only union permitted to function. Soon, however, it faced opposition from the Socialist labor organization, the General Union of Workers (Uniao Geral dos Trabalhadores—UGT). For a time, the

Communist labor group was overwhelmingly dominant, but during the 1980s the UGT grew in size, especially in the service sector, and by the end of the decade its overall membership was about

half that of the CGTP-IN. Many other small unions were active

at the beginning of the 1990s, most notably those representing highly

specialized professions such as airline pilots. There was also a Christian democratic trade union movement.

After 1974 organized labor emerged as a powerful force in Portuguese politics, although its influence waned somewhat after the

revolutionary period. Union membership was not high, and as of

the early 1990s only about 30 percent of the work force was unionized. The Communist-led unions were not able to block the constitutional amendments of 1982 and 1989, which reduced the

radical legacy of the revolution. Moreover, some unions backed

away from the intense ideological unionism of the 1970s in favor

of more limited and practical objectives.

Middle Class

Portugal had long been an essentially two-class society consisting of elites and peasants between which existed a small class of

artisans, soldiers, and tradespeople. With the acceleration of in- dustrialization and economic development after the 1950s, this middle class began to grow. As it came to prefer democracy and a more

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open West European society, it provided the strongest opposition

to the Salazar-Caetano regime. As a result, the middle class participated strongly in the Revolution of 1974 and the political maneuvering that followed. In the following decade, after the old elites were shunted aside by the revolution and labor organizations lost power, the middle class emerged as Portugal's most important class. At the beginning of the 1990s, the middle class constituted some

25 to 30 percent of the population. The most important Portuguese

institutions were dominated by the middle class: the military officer corps, the Roman Catholic Church, political parties, public administration, the universities, and commerce and industry.

The middle class remained divided on many social and political

issues, however. For example, political leadership in Portugal was

solidly middle class and spanned all parties from the far left to the

far right. The success of the PSD under Cavaco Silva both in parliament and in the election of 1987 was perhaps an indication,

however, that Portugal's new socially significant middle class was

developing a degree of social cohesion.

The commercial segment of the middle class defended its interests through the PSD and the CDS and also through some large representative organizations. The leading organizations of this type were

the Portuguese Industrial Association (Associagao Industrial Portuguesa—AIP), founded in 1860, the much larger Confederation

of Portuguese Industry (Confederacao da Industria Portuguesa

CIP), founded in 1974, and the Portuguese Confederation of Commerce (Confederacao do Comercio Portugues—CCP), founded in

1977. These organizations, and others like them, met with important labor groups and with government officials and lobbied behind the scenes to better the conditions under which Portugal's new

middle class had to work.

Students and Intellectuals

Students and intellectuals in Portugal had long been influential

out of proportion to their numbers. This influence was a conse- quence of higher education's exclusivity. The small percentage of

the population who passed the difficult university entrance exams

was widely respected, and Portugal's lower classes looked up to educated persons as their intellectual and political mentors.

Intellectuals and students were among the leading advocates of a republic in 1910. Although hostile to the republic, Salazar was

also an intellectual and recruited so many of his fellow university

colleagues into his administration that it was sometimes called a "regime of professors." Much of the opposition to Salazar and

Caetano, however, was made up of intellectuals and students who

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Government and Politics

formed the "study groups" that served as the nuclei for what later became political parties. Intellectuals and students were very active in the Revolution of 1974, and, as of the beginning of the 1990s,

many intellectuals served in high positions in government and the

political parties.

Universities in Portugal were traditionally heavily politicized,

especially during the revolutionary upheavals of the 1970s. Socialist,

Communist, and other far-left groups competed for dominance on

the campuses (mainly at the historical universities in Lisbon and

Coimbra) and in publishing houses, newspapers, and study centers where intellectuals congregated.

Rising enrollment pressures, the competition of new regional

universities and technical institutes, and the desire to find good

jobs in the more affluent Portugal of the 1980s sapped the students'

enthusiasm for political action. Many preferred to finish their courses and degrees and secure a rewarding professional position

rather than to engage in constant political activity. As a result, Portugal's institutions of higher learning became calmer politically;

they also became better, more serious universities.

Peasants

Peasants were long the neglected and forgotten people of Portuguese politics. Although the largest group numerically, they were

the weakest politically. Nonparticipation was encouraged by Salazar's strategy of keeping the peasants illiterate and apathetic.

The peasants comprised a variety of groups. A basic distinction

exists between the conservative peasants of the north who own their

small plots of land and the peasants of the south who have no land,

live under conditions of tenancy, and have been receptive to the

appeals of radical political groups. The PCP, for example, had

quietly organized southern peasants under its banner even during

the Salazar era. During and after the Revolution of 1974, the south,

especially the Alentejo, was a hotbed of land seizures, radical political action, and strong voting preferences for the PCP.

Since the revolution, however, both the PS and the PSD have

made electoral inroads into what were PCP strongholds in the south.

The rural areas were once again to some degree de-politicized,

although the countryside would never return to the quiescence of

decades past, despite the large numbers of farmers and agrarian

laborers who migrated to urban areas or went abroad.

Political Events since 1987

The parliamentary election ofJuly 1987 was a milestone in the

consolidation of Portuguese democracy: for the first time in the

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Portugal: A Country Study

Second Republic, it gave a single party, the PSD, an absolute

majority in the Assembly of the Republic and permitted the for- mation of a strong single-party government. The party's leader,

Anibal Cavaco Silva, ran an efficient campaign that stressed the

PSD's competence and pragmatism and avoided the ideological

arguments common to Portuguese politics. The party won a comfortable majority of 148 seats in the assembly when 50.2 percent

of the voters, a stunning increase over the 29.9 percent who voted

for it in the 1985 elections, decided Portugal needed to continue

the PSD's program of reducing the government's role in the econ- omy. Most of the PSD's increased share of the votes came from

the virtual collapse of the PRD and the severe losses of the CDS.

The PS improved significantly its performance compared to 1985,

whereas the PCP continued its decline toward political marginality.

An improving economy contributed to the PSD victory, but also essential to its success was the party's leader since 1985, Anfoal

Cavaco Silva. He captured the imagination of many Portuguese,

who saw him as a welcome alternative to traditional Portuguese

politicians. Cavaco Silva differed from Portugal's narrow governing elite in many respects. He was not from Lisbon but came from

a lower-middle class southern family. He was not a lawyer but an

economist who had earned his doctorate from the University of

York in Britain and subsequently had taught economics in Lisbon.

Although for a time minister of finance in the early 1980s, he did

not favor political games and intrigues but publically disdained these

aspects of party politics. Observers frequently characterized Cavaco

Silva as somewhat aloof and arrogant, more interested in competence than connections. Through hard work and intelligence, he was able to thwart even powerful members of his own party who

resisted reform and modernization. These qualities won Cavaco

Silva the votes of many younger people and members of the middle class. Supported by a majority in parliament, Cavaco Silva' s government, in which he served as prime minister, aimed at a liberalization of the Portuguese economy. A principal goal was to further

revise the constitution by removing much of its ideological language.

The two-thirds majority this undertaking required was achieved

with help from the PS. Another goal was a reform of the constitution's provisions relating to the dismissal of employees; these provisions were so strict that firings were very difficult. Some relaxation

of labor law was achieved but not nearly that which had been envisaged. A general strike in early 1988 and a judgment from the

Constitutional Court that the government's proposals were unconstitutional prevented radical reform in this area (see Wages and

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Mario Soares,

president,

1986-

Courtesy Embassy of

Portugal, Washington

the Distribution of Income, Ch. 3). The Cavaco Silva government

had much more success in privatizing land and businesses nationalized in 1975 (see Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform, ch, 3; Industrial Organization, ch. 3). By the end of 1991 , many of the largest

companies seized by the state had been returned in whole or in part

to the private sector, and further privatizations were scheduled.

A presidential election was held in January 1991, at the end of

Mario Soares 's five-year term. Faced with only token opposition,

Soares won reelection easily, taking 70 percent of the vote. Such

was the expectation of his victory that the PSD did not even field a candidate. Despite his reputation as a highly partisan leader of

the PS and the narrowness of his victory in 1986, Soares had quickly

become a very popular president. In general, he and Cavaco Silva

got along well with one another as they carried out the duties of

their respective offices. Soares interfered only rarely in the working of the cabinet and legislature, and when confronted with difficult political issues he called upon the Constitutional Court for a decision. He instituted a practice of informal town meetings throughout Portugal where he learned of the concerns of the average citizen. An articulate speaker, he was later able to voice these concerns himself and plead publicly for the betterment of social conditions. Soares

also represented his country ably abroad.

Parliamentary elections were held in October 1991 after the Cavaco Silva government had completed the four-year legislative term,

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Portugal: A Country Study

the first government to do so in the Second Republic. Although

the PSD was expected to win a majority, few expected it to better

its results of 1987. It did so, however, by a tiny margin and once

again achieved an absolute parliamentary majority. An economy

that had performed better than the EC average, thanks in part to the billions of dollars the organization had transferred to Portugal

since 1986, helped Cavaco Silva achieve his second triumph, but

his own popularity also played a role. He conducted a highly ef- fective campaign centered on his capabilities as prime minister.

Assurances from Cavaco Silva that he would not serve in a PSD

government that did not have a clear majority probably caused

many voters to favor his party. As in 1987, the PSD did well in

all parts of the country. It failed to come in first in only one district, compared to three in 1987, an indication that the old regional cleavages were disappearing as the country modernized and

became more prosperous.

The PSD's main opponent in the 1991 election was the PS, which

polled 29.3 percent of the vote, a significant improvement over the

results of 1987 and 1985. The PS's success, despite a poorly run campaign and long-standing leadership problems since Soares had

relinquished his role, indicated that Portugal was perhaps moving

toward an essentially two-party system. Although the PS trailed

the PSD badly in this election, it had won the local elections of

1989. The PS and the PSD seemed to be the only parties in Portugal able to increase their votes. They had also come to resemble one another so closely that their differences on main issues had be- come marginal.

The PRD, which had scored such a success in the 1985 elec- tions, failed to win a single seat. The PCP received only 8.8 per- cent of the votes cast, a result that showed the party to be in a steady

and steep decline. It remained tied to old orthodoxies, approving

the reactionary coup in Moscow in August 1991 , for example. The

CDS won 4.4 percent of the votes for five seats in parliament. It did not seem likely to be politically significant in the future, ex- cept perhaps as a coalition partner with one of the two largest

parties.

The Media

During the long Salazar regime, the media operated under strict authoritarian control. The press was heavily censored, radio and

television were government-controlled, and writers who violated

the regime's guidelines were subject to severe sanctions. Even the

lists of books requested by readers from the National Library in Lisbon were reviewed by secret police officials. Foreign magazines

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Government and Politics

were similarly inspected before being put on the newsstands; sometimes whole stories were blotted out. The controls and censorship were stifling and led to a pervasive and boring conformity in the

media.

Under Caetano the rules were relaxed somewhat. Some novelists

and essayists were able to publish critical and controversial works

without punishment. The press occasionally spoke out indirectly,

providing long analyses of elections in Chile or West Germany,

for example, that everyone understood to be a commentary on the

absence of free elections in Portugal. Only the weekly newspaper

Expresso was strong enough to test the regime's tolerance with vir- tually every issue. After the coup of April 25, 1974, the mass communications media underwent a radical transformation. One of the first acts of

the revolutionary government was to abolish censorship. But as the revolution veered to the left, some portions of the media were

seized by opponents of the views they expressed. Two of the most

celebrated cases involved the closing of the Socialist Party newspaper

Republica and the Roman Catholic Church's Radio Renascenca.

Government involvement in the media greatly increased when

the banks were nationalized. Because most banks owned at least one newspaper, the state found itself the owner of many newspapers.

With time, however, the government divested itself of these properties. By the beginning of the 1990s, no newspapers in Portugal were government owned, and the country had a completely free press. Although the state still operated radio and television broadcasting

systems, the constitution states that they are to provide equal ac- cess to political parties, in or out of power. Large interest groups

are also to have access to the state-owned electronic media.

At the beginning of the 1990s, about thirty newspapers were published daily in Portugal. They ranged from excellent newspapers

like Publico, an independent, and the historic Didrio de Noticias, a newspaper of record, to sensationalistic crowd-pleasers such as Correio da Manha. Publico, founded in 1990, had sections dealing with

both Lisbon and Porto and provided perhaps the most national news. Two excellent weekly newspapers filled the place taken in

the United States by Time and Newsweek: Expresso, which had fought

bravely for press freedom before the revolution, and Independente,

founded in 1988, which included pages enlivened by wicked satires of public figures. In addition to these publications, Portugal

had a variety of specialized magazines.

In 1975 all commercial broadcasting facilities except those belonging to the Roman Catholic Church were nationalized. As of

the beginning of the 1990s, however, hundreds of private radio

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Portugal: A Country Study

stations were in operation, in addition to the large Roman Catholic

radio system Radio Renascenca. The state broadcasting system was named Radiodifusao Portuguesa (RDP). Television service was

furnished by the state system, Radiotelevisao Portuguesa (RTP),

which broadcast on two channels. At the beginning of the 1990s,

however, plans were being made to establish privately owned tele- vision in Portugal.

Portugal's film industry is very small. It produces mainly short

films and documentaries for local television. Few full-length films are made in Portugal, and those that are have not found a market

abroad. However, a few Portuguese directors, the veteran Manoel

de Oliveira and Paolo Rocha, for example, are highly esteemed

by film cognoscenti the world over. Book publishing is more prosperous, within the limits of the lo- cal market. Portugal has more than fifty publishing houses. They

publish books by Portuguese authors but also do a major business

in translations of foreign authors. During the mid-1970s, works

by Marx, Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and other writers on the left dominated the bestseller lists. In the period since then, Portuguese

readers have turned to a greater diversity of authors. The country's relatively high illiteracy rate of about 15 percent and the fact that most Portuguese read littie make for a small market. As a result,

books are expensive, and printings of even bestselling books are usually limited to 2,000 to 3,000 copies.

Foreign Relations

The Revolution of 1974 did not merely transform Portugal's

domestic politics; it led to a transformation of its foreign relations,

as well. For centuries Portugal's foreign relations were directed away

from Europe, first down the South Atlantic and to Africa, then

to Brazil and the Orient. Lisbon's relations with Europe were limit- ed to an alliance dating from 1386 with Britain, another Atlantic

country, that was intended to protect it from Spain and any other

European power that might threaten Portugal's independence and

its vast empire. Over the centuries, much of this empire was lost. Preserving what remained of this empire, the country's African

colonies and a few other small entities, became the core of Portuguese foreign policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Moreover, the Portuguese saw themselves as a people with an "Atlantic vocation" rather than as an integral part of Europe.

Postwar developments for a time buttressed the traditional atti- tude that Portugal's true concerns and interests lay in the South

Atlantic and beyond and away from Europe. Portugal became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

212
Government and Politics (NATO) not for what its army could do in Central Europe but

for the importance of the Azores as a site for military bases. Other

than permitting the United States access to these islands, Portugal's contribution to the alliance was negligible.

The wave of anticolonialism that swept through the Third World

after World War II sparked rebellion in Portugal's African colonies. Lisbon's great efforts to quell these struggles for independence

intensified the metropole's traditional interest in Africa. In the end,

however, Portugal was not strong enough to put down the wars

of independence. In fact, the great expenditure of manpower and

revenue in the African wars was the main cause of the Revolution

of 1974. The revolution brought to power members of the military who were determined to end the fighting, and within a matter

of eighteen months Portugal's empire was gone.

Shorn of its colonies, Portugal was forced to concede that its fu- ture lay in Europe, a revolutionary change in the country's view

of its place in the world. It became a member of the EC in 1986

and enjoyed the benefits and endured the change that this membership entailed. Portugal's most important foreign relationship,

its relationship with the United States, changed only in degree,

not in kind. In other respects, however, Portugal began a whole

new era in its foreign policy.

Africa

During the 1960s and early 1970s, Portugal waged three colonial wars simultaneously on the African continent (see The Role of the

Armed Forces in Africa, ch. 5). These campaigns hurt the economy,

drained morale, and gradually became politically unpopular. The

end of the wars in Africa brought independence to the colonies

almost immediately. The manner in which independence was granted, however, and the results that were produced proved to be highly

controversial.

In his unsettling book, Portugal and the Future, General Antonio

de Spmola had proposed stopping the wars, finding a peaceful reso- lution, and granting independence to the colonies. But he wanted

to maintain good relations with the colonies and to link them with

Portugal and possibly Brazil through a Portuguese- speaking Lusitanian confederation of nations that would resemble the British

Commonwealth. This proposal was rejected by the radical and more

impatient members of the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento

das Forcas Armadas—MFA).

In Guinea-Bissau, after brief negotiations and a cease-fire, Portugal granted independence to its former colony and turned power over to the Marxist African Party for the Independence of Guinea

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Portugal: A Country Study

and Cape Verde (Partido Africano pela Independencia de Guine

e Cabo Verde—PAIGC). Cape Verde also became independent

but did not become part of Guinea-Bissau. In the much larger ter- ritory of Mozambique, Portugal turned over the reins of government to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de

Libertacao de Mozambique—FRELIMO), another MarxistLeninist guerrilla group. And in Angola, Portugal's most valuable African colony, power was given to the similarly MarxistLeninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

(Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola—MPLA) which,

among the three factions fighting for independence, was the only one allied with the Soviet Union. The smaller colony of Sao Tome

and Principe also became independent.

The haste with which independence was granted and the simple

turning of power over to the very Marxist-Leninist elements Portugal had been fighting, without any further guarantees, had a number of serious consequences. Hundreds of thousands of Portuguese

settlers were stranded, many of whom had lived in the colonies

for generations. They lost their homes, land, and positions. Most

of them returned to Portugal, where many lived in squalid conditions and added to the country's unemployment problems. Their

departure left the African colonies without the teachers, educators,

managers, and other trained personnel needed to make a successful transition to independence. Plagued by continuing civil wars and violence, political conditions and living standards in the newly independent states deteriorated.

Portugal's relations with these former colonies long remained

strained, for they felt they had been abandoned by the mother country. With time, however, relations improved, trade resumed, Portuguese educators and technicians were welcomed back, and new

ties among the Portuguese-speaking nations began to be forged.

Portugal served as a useful intermediary in arranging agreements

to reduce conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. In 1984, for ex- ample, Portugal sponsored the Nkomati Accords between Mozambique and South Africa by which the two latter countries agreed

to stop supporting guerrilla groups in each other's territory. The

three countries later agreed to manage the giant Cahora Bassa

hydroelectric power plant for the benefit of all. Although Portugal

will no longer play a large role in Africa, its special relationship

with the continent's Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) countries

make it likely that it will play a role of some importance.

Western Europe

At the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal's relations with Western

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Government and Politics

Europe were closer than ever before. Historically, Portugal had

remained aloof from Europe, its main link to the continent being

a long-standing alliance with Britain. In 1949 Portugal became a founding member of NATO, in 1955 it joined the United Nations

(UN), in 1960 it became a part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the following year joined the Organisation

for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD—see Glossary). Portugal signed a free-trade agreement with the European

Economic Community (EEC—see Glossary) in 1972 and gained

admittance to the Council of Europe (see Glossary) in 1976. In

1988 Portugal became a member of the Western European Union

(WEU—see Glossary).

Portugal's application to the EC in 1977 marked a major change

in its relationship with Europe. After years of negotiations, it was

granted admission on January 1, 1986. Becoming part of the EC

affected not only the country's economy but also government and

society (see Foreign Economic Relations, ch. 3). As the poorest

member of the EC , Portugal would receive large grants from the

EC bodies to bring the country's infrastructure, living conditions,

and education up to the level of the community's other members.

The formation of the EC ' s single market in 1 993 would be another

step toward Portugal's integration into Europe.

As a result of these and many other international ties, traditional issues of whether Portugal would be First, Second, or Third

World, socialist or capitalist, European or South Atlanticist were no longer issues at the beginning of the 1990s. Portugal had be- come part of the community of Western, European, democratic

states. Nevertheless, Portuguese worry at times whether their country's identity may be lost in this larger community and whether

its industry and commerce will be able to compete in the large tariff- free single market. Although it has prospered since it joined the

EC in 1986, the real economic challenges will come in the 1990s.

EC membership has meant that Portugal has close voluntary re- lations with Spain for the first time in its history. Until then Portugal had maintained a wary distance from its large neighbor,

although once, against its will, it had actually been a part of Spain

for sixty years (1580-1640). For the most part, however, Portugal

has looked to its alliance with Britain for support in remaining in- dependent. Although the Portuguese no longer believe that Spain

poses a military threat, they are concerned that the stronger Spanish

economy could gradually absorb them.

After the revolution, relations between the two countries were

tense at times. As a means of tempering disputes, a treaty of 1977

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Portugal: A Country Study

set up a Luso-Iberian Council to promote cooperation. In addition, the countries' prime ministers have held occasional summit

meetings since 1983. The most serious disagreements have centered on the access of Spain's modern fishing fleet to Portuguese

waters. Spain won on this issue but made some economic concessions to Portugal in return. Some of the tensions between Portugal and Spain during the

1980s had a military origin, however. When Spain joined NATO

in 1982, the Portuguese feared that an Iberian Command would

be created with the result that Portuguese forces would come under the control of Madrid. Portuguese objections to this proposal

ended when Spain was included under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Portugal kept its long-standing role under NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT)

(see Portugal and NATO, ch. 5). Portuguese ties with Britain, also an Atlantic power, date from

the signing in 1386 of the Treaty of Windsor, the longest-lasting

alliance in the Western world. The two countries had long secured

mutual benefits from this treaty. Portugal sought British protection against Spain and later France; Britain saw Portugal as its point of access on the European continent when other avenues were

closed. This was the case at times during the Napoleonic period

and during World War II when Britain was allowed to use the

Azores for military purposes. Also binding the countries together was substantial British investment over the centuries, most nota- bly in Portugal's wine and port industries.

Portugal traditionally has maintained good relations with France,

mainly to balance Spain's power. Portugal also has strong feelings

of affinity with France, and French intellectual trends have had

a steady following in Lisbon. French influence is seen in the Portuguese legal system and administrative system. Until recently,

when it was displaced by English, French was the second language

of educated Portuguese. Many working-class Portuguese also have

links with France. During the 1950s and 1960s, some three-quarters

of a million Portuguese emigrated to that country in search of work.

United States The United States and Portugal traditionally have considered

each other friends and allies. These sentiments were reinforced by

the large number of Portuguese immigrants to the United States and the growing economic and political importance of this Portuguese community. Since 1943, when the United States built the

Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in the Azores, American interests in Portugal have been mainly strategic and military. In return for

216
Government and Politics

the use of this vitally important base, the United States gave mili- tary aid to Portugal. Portugal also benefited from the European

Recovery Program (ERP), more commonly known as the Marshall Plan. During the 1960s and early 1970s, however, relations

between the two countries were sometimes strained because the

United States took an anticolonial stand with regard to Portuguese

Africa.

United States officials were not worried initially by the Revolution of 1974. They assumed that General Spinola, a military man

and a conservative, would maintain control. As the revolution

moved sharply to the left, however, and it appeared possible the

PCP might come to power, United States officials became uneasy.

Frank Carlucci, the United States ambassador in Lisbon, directed a campaign to aid democratic groups. The United States and its NATO allies provided assistance to the Socialists and Socialist trade

unions because they were viewed as the best alternative to a Communist takeover. The United States also sought to rally the moderate elements within the military and in Portugal generally. The

campaign paid off as Portugal remained democratic.

United States assistance, presence, and involvement remained

high during the late 1970s. But as Portuguese politics came to resemble those of other West European nations during the 1980s, United

States assistance declined. In 1983 the base agreement was

renegotiated, but Portuguese officials were subsequendy disappointed by a reduction in American military aid. As part of the base

agreement, the Luso-American Development Foundation was creat- ed to promote economic and cultural ties between the two countries. The next base negotiations, scheduled for the early 1990s,

are certain to be onerous as the two countries each seek to realize

their respective aims. The United States will continue to have a keen interest in the Lajes Air Base, the only such base available,

while Portugal, less dependent on the United States as it becomes

integrated into Europe, will have a strong hand at the negotiating

table (see Bilateral Military Relations with Other Countries, Ch. 5). Other Countries and Areas

At the beginning of the 1990s, Portugal still retained a special

interest in its former colony Brazil, although the Portuguese con- tinued to occasionally look down on Brazilians as "people from

the tropics," just as Brazilians had their own jokes about the Portuguese. Relations between the two countries were shaped by

Brazil's much greater size and more powerful economy. For this reason, Brazilian investment in Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s was considerably greater than Portuguese investment in Brazil.

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Portugal: A Country Study

Brazilian telenovelas (soap operas) also dominated Portuguese tele- vision, leading to additional resentments. In general, however,

relations between the two countries are good, although as of the

early 1990s, any "special" relationship was now largely historical, cultural, and nostalgic, rather than a reflection of concrete

interests. Portugal also seeks to maintain good relations with North Afri- can and Middle Eastern countries, in part because of geography

and in part because Portugal depends entirely on imported oil. Its "tilt" toward the Islamic countries sometimes produced strains in

United States-Portuguese relations, particularly when the Middle

East was in turmoil and the United States wished to use its bases

in the Azores in pursuit of its own Middle Eastern policies.

East Timor, Portugal's former colony on the eastern half of the

island of Timor in Indonesia, remained a concern for Lisbon in

the early 1990s. Portuguese setders first came to the island in 1520,

but it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that

Portugal had control of the territory. In 1975 war broke out between rival groups striving for independence from Portugal. Late

in the year, Indonesian troops invaded to stop the fighting, and

in 1976 East Timor was declared part of Indonesia. As of the early

1990s, continuing resistance on the part of Timorese guerrillas

against Indonesian rule had claimed the lives of as many as 100,000

people.

As of the early 1990s, the UN continued to regard Portugal as the administering authority in East Timor. Portuguese officials, for their part, believed that their country had a moral obligation

to remain involved in the affairs of its former colony. Through a

variety of diplomatic moves, Lisbon attempted to move the Indonesian government to arrange a settlement that could bring peace

and even independence to East Timor. Indonesia refused to loosen

its hold on the territory because it feared such an action might embolden other areas restive under its control, such as West Irian,

to seek independence.

* * * During the Salazar era, the authoritarian nature of the regime

made it difficult to carry out serious, scholarly research; in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution of 1974, some of the research was partisan and ideological. More recently, a wealth of scholarship has begun to emerge.

The Salazar era is covered in Antonio de Figueiredo's Portugal:

Fifty Years of Dictatorship; Hugh Kay's Salazar and Modern Portugal;

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Government and Politics

and Howard J. Wiarda's Corporatism and Development. Richard Alan

Hodgson Robinson's Contemporary Portugal and Tom Gallagher's

Portugal: A Twentieth Century Interpretation are thoughtful and analytical introductions to Portuguese affairs. Especially valuable are

the edited volume by Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler, Contemporary Portugal, and that by Graham and Douglas L. Wheeler, In Search of Modern Portugal, incorporating papers from

the meetings of the Conference Group on Modern Portugal.

The revolutionary period of the mid-1970s is covered well in Kenneth Maxwell's articles in Foreign Affairs and the New York Review

of Books, and in Douglas Porch's The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution. A more specialized account is Nancy Bermeo's The Revolution Within the Revolution.

Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz's Constitution of the Countries of the World provides a text and commentary on the constitutional changes of the post-Salazar period. Good treatments of

political events and of the main forces involved are in Thomas C

Bruneau's Politics and Nationhood, Bruneau and Alex Macleod's Politics in Contemporary Portugal, Walter C. Opello's Portugal's Political Development, and Portugal in the 1980s, edited by Kenneth Maxwell.

A skeptical view of Portuguese developments is provided in Howard

J. Wiarda's The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal; a more

hopeful perspective by the same author is Politics in Iberia. (For fur- ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

219

Chapter 5. National Security
Afonso Henriques, patron of the Portuguese Armed Forces,

at the Battle of Ourique in 1139
IN THE SEVENTEEN YEARS following the Revolution of 1974

that restored democratic rule to Portugal, the armed forces underwent striking changes. The counterinsurgency warfare of 1961-74

in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea (present-day

Guinea-Bissau) brought an expansion of the personnel strength of

the armed forces to 250,000. By early 1992, however, military forces were down to about 61 ,000. The army, reduced to scarcely 20 per- cent of its peak strength, suffered by far the greatest cut. The drastic contraction of the armed forces was accompanied

by a redefinition of the nation's security policies. Until 1974, the resources of all three services were dedicated to suppressing the

independence movements of the African territories. Although Portugal was one of the original members of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), its principal contribution was in the form

of strategic facilities, notably the United States base in the Azores

(Agores), which was viewed as indispensable for reinforcing the

alliance in the event of conflict with the Soviet and Warsaw Pact

forces. Portugal did maintain two army divisions at home, one committed to NATO and the other to the defense of the Iberian

Peninsula under the terms of a long-standing treaty with Spain,

the Iberian Pact (also known as Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression). Both divisions were staffed far below their authorized strengths.

After the restoration of elective government in 1976, Portugal

adopted a more active role with respect to NATO. Determined

to offer more than basing facilities, it committed itself to maintain

a modern army unit, the First Composite Brigade, for potential

deployment in northeastern Italy under NATO command. A Special Forces Brigade and a number of thinly staffed and underequipped infantry and artillery regiments were responsible for the

defense of continental Portugal and the Azores and Madeira ar- chipelagoes. The navy and air force were reorganized to emphasize defense against potential maritime threat in the waters within

the Portugal-Madeira-Azores triangle (also known as the strategic

triangle).

The equipment of the three services was, however, approaching obsolescence, and they were ill-prepared to handle the new

defense obligations. Portugal depended on assistance from the

United States and other NATO allies for its major weaponry, but

the rate of delivery fell short of essential requirements. Nonetheless,

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Portugal: A Country Study

the United States had supplied maritime reconnaissance aircraft and had agreed to furnish F-16 interceptor aircraft, air defense

missile systems, and a variety of helicopters, including combat

helicopters needed by the First Composite Brigade. Germany had

provided three new frigates, giving the Portuguese Navy a limited

but up-to-date antisubmarine capability.

The military-led revolution of April 1974 dismantled the repressive system established by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and maintained by his successor, Marcello Jose das Neves Caetano. For two

years after the 1974 coup, the armed forces were the dominant ele- ment in the political system, although the military leadership it- self was torn into bitterly competing factions. Under the constitution

of 1976, a politico-military body—the Council of the Revolution

retained review powers over the actions of the civilian government.

This transition stage ended in 1982 when the constitution was amended to subordinate the military to the elective political forces. The National Defense Law, passed in the same year, limited the

mission of the armed forces to defense of the country against external threat, contrary to the traditional view of senior officers that

the armed forces were also responsible for safeguarding the nation's

internal security and the stability of its institutions. Although the

military remained involved in defense policy matters, its weight

in civilian political affairs had declined with the reduction in the

size of the armed forces and the shrinking military threat in Europe.

Historical Background

The military has played a major role in the development of Portugal throughout the country's history. During the Middle Ages,

the armed forces drove the Moors out of the country and resisted

Spanish attempts to end Portugal's newly won independence. During the Renaissance, Portuguese navigators and explorers established settlements and trade routes around the world, and the armed

forces played an important role in establishing and maintaining

the greatest empire then known (see Maritime Expansion, ch. 1). The glories of conquest and riches of trade were short-lived. A

military disaster took place when King Sebastiao led his poorly pre- pared army to defeat against the Moors in Morocco in 1578. Portugal was left leaderless without a legitimate heir, and the country soon came under the rule of Philip II of Spain, who had a valid

claim to the throne. Although Spain did not actually occupy Portugal, it involved Portugal in its numerous dynastic and religious wars. As a result, Portugal lost most of its navy when it joined the

Spanish Armada against Portugal's former ally, England. Portugal

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National Security

also lost much of its empire in the Far East to the Dutch (see Imperial Decline, ch. 1). After Portugal threw off Spanish domination in 1640, it created

a permanent army of 4,000 cavalrymen and 20,000 infantrymen,

based on a conscription system covering all able-bodied men. Portugal renewed its alliance with England and was subsequently drawn

into many European wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Portugal was occupied by Napoleon's troops in 1807. British forces came to Portugal's aid, driving the French out of the

country and then, using Portugal as a base of operations, out of

Spain in 1813. During the middle and late nineteenth century, the

army was instrumental in the exploration and effective occupation

of Angola and Mozambique.

A military revolt ended the Portuguese monarchy in 1910. Portugal attempted to maintain neutrality during World War I but was drawn into the conflict both in Europe and in Africa and fought on the side of the Allies. After Germany declared war on Portugal

in March 1916, some 200,000 men were conscripted. An expeditionary force of two divisions saw service in France, sustaining heavy

casualties at the Battle of Lys in April 1918. Other troops clashed

with the German East African colonial army in Mozambique.

The First Republic (1910-26) had a precarious existence marked

by a rapid turnover of governments, coup attempts, and plots.

Eventually, in 1926, the mounting social disorder and discontent over the civilian governments' interference in military matters

precipitated an unopposed military takeover. Disagreement among

the military factions over the goals of their intervention brought

only further instability. By 1928, however, anew military-civilian

cabinet was in place under a nonpartisan president, General Oscar Fragoso Carmona. The civilian minister of finance, Auconio

de Oliveira Salazar, became the most powerful figure in the government. In 1932, Salazar was appointed prime minister, bringing

the military dictatorship to an end.

The Military in the Salazar Era The new prime minister was able to counteract anti-Salazar sen- timent in the military by publicly flattering the armed forces and

by exempting them at first from ruthless cuts in government spending. Although the backward state of the army's weaponry had by

1935 become acute, Salazar refused to address the need for modernization until the army reduced its overstaffing. In 1936, he appointed himself minister of war and in the following year introduced

a major reorganization, including the pensioning of many senior

officers to clear the way for younger, more dynamic officers. Officer

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Portugal: A Country Study

pay remained low; marriages had to be approved, and officers were

pressured to choose wives from the wealthier classes so they would

have an alternative source of income. The effect was to perpetuate

familial links between the higher military and the economic elites. Salazar also formed several paramilitary organizations to offset the army's monopoly of armed strength. The most notable of these was the Portuguese Legion. Its members were the most loyal partisans of Salazar' s regime, the New State (Estado Novo). At its peak, the legion had 20,000 personnel trained and commanded by

active or retired army officers. It was subject to military control

when called upon to cooperate with the regular armed forces. Although not formally abolished until 1974, it was never more than

a militia at the service of the regime and presented no threat to the power of the orthodox military establishment.

Fearing that the success of the Spanish republican forces during

the Spanish Civil War would lead to communist domination of the

Iberian Peninsula, Salazar gave material and diplomatic aid to Francisco Franco's nationalist forces while maintaining a formal

neutrality. A special volunteer force of 18,000 led by regular army

officers was recruited to fight as part of Franco's army. When the

civil war ended in 1939, Portugal and Spain negotiated the Treaty

of Friendship and Nonaggression (Iberian Pact). The pact committed the two countries to defend the Iberian Peninsula against

any power that attacked either country and helped to ensure Iberian

neutrality during World War II. The Azores were considered to be of prime strategic importance

in the war. The Allies feared a possible German move to occupy

the islands and needed their naval and air bases to combat Nazi

submarine attacks against Allied shipping and to support transatlantic air links. In 1943, mindful of German defeats and Portugal's treaties with Britain, Salazar acceded to Britain's request for

facilities in the Azores. Later, the United States was also permitted to establish bases in the islands. Portugal recognized the American need for transit facilities to support its continued military

presence in Western Europe after the war, and it authorized con- tinued use of the Lajes Air Base in the Azores until the arrangement was formalized in the bilateral Defense Agreement of 1951

(see Bilateral Military Relations with Other Countries, this ch.).

Portugal became one of the twelve charter members of NATO

in 1949. Although the organization's collective security provisions

did not apply to Portugal's overseas possessions, membership in NATO enabled the armed forces to acquire sophisticated weaponry

and training from the United States and other NATO member

countries. However, Portugal's colonial policies after fighting began

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National Security

in Africa in 1961 formed an obstacle to its full participation in the

NATO system.

The Role of the Armed Forces in Africa

The Portuguese presence in Africa dates from the sixteenth cen- tury when fuel and water stations were established for ships en- route to the spice market of Goa. Portugal neglected these outposts

for a time after the pepper trade declined. British and German

colonial ambitions after 1885, however, led the Portuguese to undertake a series of military campaigns to control the interior of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. The effort to subdue

the African colonies was a slow process that was not completed until 1915. The costly campaigns were pursued by the Lisbon authorities to maintain prestige and to keep the oversized military establishment gainfully occupied.

Salazar strongly rejected pressures from the European powers

to decolonize after World War II. He was grimly determined to maintain Portugal's overseas empire. Salazar's successor in 1968,

Marcello Caetano, continued the struggle against the African in- dependence movements in spite of its drain on resources and

manpower.

Angola

The first uprising against Portuguese rule in Africa occurred in

Angola in March 1961, when primitively armed Bakongo tribal nationalists in the extreme north of the province attacked several

coffee plantations, massacring white Portuguese owners and their

families, as well as black African workers who refused to cooperate. Bloody retribution followed at the hands of local whites and

blacks who had suffered at the hands of the insurgents. The revenge

killings abated only in May 1961, when 10,000 troops arrived to reinforce the 6,000 white soldiers and a similar number of locally

conscripted Africans already in Angola. Under the leadership of

Holden Roberto, the insurgents found sanctuary across Angola's

northern and northeastern borders in the Democratic Republic of

the Congo (present-day Zaire). Roberto's group eventually became

the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional

de Libertacao de Angola—FNLA), one of the three major antiPortuguese guerrilla forces. Portuguese units, relying heavily on

aerial bombardment and strafing attacks, managed to stabilize the

military situation in the north. They brought large segments of the

population into aldeamentos (controlled villages), similar to the stra- tegic hamlets used during the Vietnam conflict.

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Portugal: A Country Study

The intermittent warfare dragged on into the mid-1960s, and

as many as 70,000 troops (40,000 of them European) were involved

in the Angolan conflict. By 1966, two rival insurgent groups gradually superseded the FNLA. One was the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de

Angola—MPLA), a communist-oriented group supported militarily

by the Soviet Union and other communist countries. The other was the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

(Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA),

based among the Ovimbundu in the south.

From the mid-1960s until the April 1974 coup, Portuguese

government forces were generally in control. Insurgency continued,

however, as long as the guerrilla movements could obtain sanctu- ary in neighboring states. The long years of conflict increasingly

damaged the morale of both the military and a large segment of

the Portuguese people. A few months after the revolutionary government came to power in Lisbon in 1974, it began negotiations with

the Angolan factions. Full independence was granted on November 1 1

, 1975. Portugal officially announced its losses in Angola as

1 ,526 killed in action and 1 ,465 noncombat deaths. Other sources estimated a much higher mortality figure.

Portuguese Guinea

In Portuguese Guinea (present-day Guinea-Bissau), the struggle against Portuguese rule began officially in January 1963,

although there had been earlier acts of sabotage by members of

the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano pela Independencia de Guine e Cabo Verde

PAIGC). PAIGC was a Marxist movement guided by the Maoist

concept of achieving revolution through the rural peasantry. By

1968 PAIGC claimed control of nearly 70 percent of the territory

and half the population of the province, the Portuguese being confined largely to the towns and major villages of the coastal area. Under a vigorous new governor, General Antonio de Spinola, regular forces numbering 33,000 (about half Africans) were supplemented by local armed militia based in strategic villages. PAIGC

nevertheless kept up its pressure by guerrilla raids mounted from

neighboring Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. The military sit- uation was already deteriorating in 1973 when Soviet surface-toair missiles (SAMs) were introduced and a number of Portuguese

planes were shot down. Portuguese pilots became reluctant to fly, and as a result Portugal had to curtail the air attacks that had been

highly effective against guerrilla operations.

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After Spinola returned to Lisbon in 1973, military morale eroded because the soldiers felt that they were fighting an unwinnable war in a territory of little value. A few months later, the revolutionary government that had recently come to power in Portugal

began negotiations for withdrawing Portuguese troops from the

province. Portugal recognized Guinea-Bissau as an independent

state in September 1974. Portuguese losses in Portuguese Guinea

were reported to be 1,656 killed in action and 696 noncombat

deaths.

Mozambique

The insurgency in Mozambique began in the extreme northern

areas of the province in 1964 and was led by guerrilla forces of

the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Liberta- cao de Mozambique—FRELIMO). FRELIMO was well armed

by various communist countries, and its fighters were trained by

the Chinese. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities, Portugal

had about 16,000 troops in the province, all deployed in the north

where the FRELIMO attacks were concentrated. For several years, Portuguese forces were able to prevent the guerrillas from moving

southward. They could not end the warfare, however, because the

guerrillas had a sanctuary to which they could retreat and a constant source of arms. Eventually the guerrillas were able to skirt the Portuguese strength in the north and mount incursions into

the relatively unprotected center. Of the 60,000 government troops ultimately involved in Mozambique, 35,000 were black Africans, 10,000 were white Africans,

and the remaining 15,000 were from Portugal. This relatively large

force faced approximately 8,000 insurgents. Despite this numerical superiority, the Portuguese government was unable to counter

the guerrillas' tactics, which included ambushes, selective terrorism,

and severing road and rail links. By September 1975, when the

former province became independent as the People's Republic of

Mozambique, Portuguese losses were officially reported as 1,606

killed in action and 724 noncombat deaths.

Role of the Military in Portuguese Political Life

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Portuguese military

played a prominent role in national life. Although the army was

itself divided ideologically, it often acted as a liberal influence among

the political groupings striving for power. During the events leading up to the revolution of 1910, the military remained on the sidelines, lending strong backing neither to the monarchy nor to the

republican politicians. When the revolt broke out, loyalist units

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Portugal: A Country Study

were of little help to the monarchy because of the republican sympathies of junior officers and sergeants.

During the highly unstable First Republic (1910-26), military

power seekers frequently dominated the political scene. The army

itself became severely factionalized as a result of its involvement

in domestic political disputes. The junior officers who carried out

the coup of May 28, 1926, were united in little more than their

disdain for the civilian politicians. Their actions were also inspired

by the government's failure to deal with their grievances over pay,

equipment, discipline, and professional status. Political turmoil con- tinued unabated; a countercoup in 1927 was put down with much

bloodshed and harsh punishment of the troops involved. Salazar,

then a civilian university professor, was appointed minister of

finance by the military government and given sweeping powers

to curb loose spending policies.

Although military dissent surfaced several times after Salazar'

s

elevation to prime minister in 1932, he was able to keep rebellious

officers under control without depriving the many officers with liberal convictions of their careers. Nevertheless, political reliability

rather than professional competence was likely to determine the

rate of promotion. Disillusioned senior officers entered hopeless

presidential contests against the official candidates, who were also high military figures. In 1958, a previously solid supporter of the

regime, General Humberto Delgado, defied Salazar by running

against the official candidate, Admiral Americo Tomas. Delgado was easily defeated, but he received a quarter of the vote, considered a credible showing. In 1961 Salazar' s unyielding colonial

policy touched off a major conspiracy in the senior ranks of the

military. Salazar succeeded, however, in rallying the army and

paramilitary forces loyal to him to bring about a rapid collapse of

the coup attempt. Dissent within the military did not vanish,

however, and the regime remained wary. In 1965, for example,

it felt sufficiently threatened by the presence of Delgado in neighboring Spain that its intelligence agents assassinated him.

The Military Takeover of 1974

As the inconclusive colonial wars of the 1960s and early 1970s

dragged on, support for them turned to indifference at home. Separated from home and family during repeated twenty-four-month

tours of duty, military professionals felt increasingly estranged and

demoralized. White officers, especially those commanding black

troops, were often hostile to the white settlers over their treatment

of blacks and in many cases were sympathetic to black aspirations

for freedom. The mounting antiwar sentiment in Portugal was

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reflected in a growing rate of desertion and failures of conscripts

to report for duty. Evasion of combat by unenthusiastic conscripts

and university graduates commissioned as junior officers (milicianos)

became increasingly common. Many of the milicianos formed a radical element that agitated against Portugal's involvement in overseas wars.

Traditionally, the officer corps had been the preserve of younger sons of wealthy families and sons of officers who could afford

the tuition charged by the Military Academy. Military careers were

sought by wealthy candidates more for prestige than reward be- cause pay was relatively poor compared with that of other professions. The low salaries of senior officers, however, were often

augmented by remunerative sinecures as corporation board members. Extended periods of leave to work in the private sector were

not unusual.

In 1958 the Military Academy, failing to attract sufficient numbers of cadets needed for the army, ended its tuition requirements,

and henceforth the student body was dominated by sons of shopkeepers, smallholders, and lower-level provincial bureaucrats who

could not have afforded a university education earlier. This new

class of cadets expected that after graduation they would enter the

peaceful garrison life at home or in the colonies that the Portuguese

army had known for generations. Instead, they were thrown directiy

into the colonial wars and eventually became the disgruntled captains who instigated the revolution.

A number of events in the 1960s and 1970s helped to coalesce

revolutionary sentiment in the military. One such event was the loss of Portuguese Goa. In 1961 the Portuguese enclave of Goa on the

coast of India was threatened by an Indian invasion force of some

30,000. The 3,000 Portuguese troops in Goa were badly equipped

and unprepared to put up more than token resistance. In spite of

Salazar's insistence that the colony should be defended, it was quickly overrun. Salazar punished the army for its failure to make a stand

by ordering a number of dismissals and other penalties. The army,

in turn, blamed the Goan debacle on Salazar and resented the

punishments that they felt humiliated the entire officer corps. Further undermining the loyalty of career officers was Decree

Law 353-73, issued by the government of Prime Minister Marcello Caetano. The decree law stated that nonregular officers, in most

cases milicianos commissioned after a short army course, would be

permitted to convert to a regular commission at their conscript rank

and to receive the same consideration for promotion as those who

had graduated from the Military Academy. Career officers felt that the decree undermined their status in the army, as well as in society.

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Portugal: A Country Study

The growing dissatisfaction, based largely among junior career

officers, led to the formation in 1973 of the Captains' Movement.

This ad hoc committee of career officers—mostiy captains—initially

banded together to give voice to their professional grievances. In

a short time, the captains found that their grievances were shared

by career officers of the navy and the air force, as well as noncareer

officers of all services. The Captains' Movement became the Armed

Forces Movement (Movimento das Forcas Armadas—MFA) and

emerged in November 1973 as a full-blown dissident group whose

clandestine membership ranged across the political spectrum. In

addition to the question of professional status, officers were dis- contented over their low pay and long postings abroad under harsh

conditions. They were also disturbed over the lack of modern equipment to match the arms furnished to the African insurgents by the

Soviet Union, the East European countries, and China. The United

States and several other NATO countries had imposed an embargo on the shipment of arms to Portugal that might be employed

against the African liberation movements.

Dissatisfaction among senior officers with the government's con- duct of the colonial wars was centered in two groups. The right

wing was associated with General Kaulza de Arriaga, the former

commander in chief in Mozambique, who conspired to seize power

to enforce a military solution to the wars in Africa. More moderate officers, such as Chief of Staff General Francisco de Costa

Gomes and General Spinola, who had been named deputy chief

of staff, favored negotiation with the liberation movements. Spinola' s influential book, Portugal and the Future, advocating a loose

confederation with the African colonies because military victory was impossible, hardened the resolve of the increasingly radical

MFA plotters.

In March 1974, when Spinola and Costa Gomes failed to ap- pear at a public ceremony in which they were to endorse existing

policy in Africa, Caetano fired both of them. A premature coup

attempt followed Spinola' s dismissal, but loyal troops turned back

a column marching on Lisbon. No shots were fired, but many

officers were arrested or transferred. Five weeks later, on April 25,

1974, the main group of MFA conspirators deposed the Caetano

government without resistance by the loyalist forces. The chief ar- chitect of the meticulously planned coup was the leftist Major (later

Brigadier General) Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

The MFA quickly appointed a board of seven officers—the Junta

of National Salvation—with General Spinola at its head to govern

the country according to the MFA program. Assuming power for the first time in almost fifty years, the military pledged that authority

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would be transferred to a new government when constitutional in- stitutions freely chosen by the people had been established.

Friction developed almost immediately between the thenanonymous leadership of the MFA and President Spinola' s junta

over the issue of the pace and direction of decolonization. The MFA

favored immediate dissolution of the links with the colonies and

withdrawal of Portuguese forces, whereas Spinola favored a gradual

solution leading to limited autonomy within a Portuguese federation. Most conscript officers and men were anxious to abandon

the struggle in Africa and return home. Although Spinola had wide

popular appeal, his position was shaky because he was viewed as insufficiendy committed to the revolution by radicals controlling

the MFA. A powerful weapon in the hands of the MFA was an

elite military organization—Continental Operations Command

(Comando Operacional do Continente—COPCON)—with Carvalho at its head. Formed in July 1974 of paratroopers, marines,

and army commandos, its mission was to control rising political

and labor violence at a time when the police were reluctant to ap- pear on the streets to enforce the law. In September 1974, after his rightist supporters attempted without

success to dislodge the left-wing inner circle of the MFA from control, Spinola resigned the presidency. The leftist climate within the

military strengthened as the MFA continued to shift radical officers into key positions while sidelining those considered to lack revolutionary zeal. Nevertheless, when officers were able to express their

choice by ballot, support for the left wing seemed weak, and many

officers were eager to return to the barracks.

After conservative military units backing Spinola mounted an

abortive countercoup in March 1975, Spinola and other officers were forced to flee to Spain by helicopter. The MFA moved rapidly to consolidate its control, setting up a Council of the Revolution that consisted of the leading MFA officers. The council had

the power to control the presidency and a veto over the legislative process.

Elections held for the Constituent Assembly in April 1975 showed

the Communist and ultra-left parties to be in the minority. The

MFA continued to advance revolutionary plans but became increasingly factionalized in the mounting political turbulence. The an- gry reaction to takeovers of the pro-Socialist opposition newspaper

and of the Roman Catholic radio station by ultra-leftists, together

with attacks against Communists by conservative northern peasants,

attested to a shift in the tide against radical elements.

Discipline began to break down within the armed forces under

the anarchic conditions prevailing in the late summer and fall of

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Portugal: A Country Study

1975. Moderates, still a majority among the officers, gradually improved their position. A left-wing coup attempt by air force

paratroopers and various Lisbon army detachments was decisively put down by a well-organized countercoup on November 25,

1975. COPCON was dissolved, Carvalho and 200 other radical

officers were arrested, and others were purged from the armed

forces. With the moderate element of the MFA firmly in charge,

the military formally agreed to hand power back to the civilians after a new constitution was drawn up.

The Armed Forces in Political Life after 1975

The Council of the Revolution relinquished legislative power to the national parliament elected in April 1976, and two months later executive power was handed over to General Antonio dos Santos

Ramalho Eanes upon his election as president. Eanes had served

briefly as army chief of staff, and it was widely felt that having

a military man as president would reduce the likelihood of renewed

military involvement in politics. Eanes would only agree to become

president if he were also made chief of staff of the armed forces. Thus Eanes served as both president and chief of staff until 1981,

when the two positions were separated. In 1982 Eanes was deprived

of exclusive power to select the chiefs of staff, who subsequently were appointed by the president acting upon a formal proposal of

the government. Eanes was reelected for a second presidential term,

but in early 1986 he was succeeded by the former prime minister,

Mario Alberto Nobre Lopes Soares, who thus became the first nonmilitary head of state in sixty years. Under Article 273 of the constitution of 1976, the armed forces

had the "historic mission of guaranteeing the conditions permitting the pluralist and peaceful transition . . . towards democracy

and socialism." Nevertheless, under Article 275, the armed forces were to be strictly nonpartisan and were not to use their arms or

their ranks to "influence or impede the selection of a particular

democratic path." The Council of the Revolution was retained.

Its membership consisted of the president, the chief and deputy

chief of staff and the three service chiefs, the prime minister if a

military person, and fourteen MFA officers. The council advised

the president on the selection of a prime minister and had veto power

over pending legislation, as well as decision-making power over

military regulations and appointments. The MFA leaders declared

that they had no desire to retain these powers permanently but only

until the democratic system was fully established.

The continued existence of the Council of the Revolution be- came a political issue when the council frustrated the government

234
Portuguese marines practicing an assault landing

Portuguese infantry during an air assault exercise Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington

235
Portugal: A Country Study

by vetoing a number of laws, including those dealing with mili- tary reform and the denationalization of banks and industry. In 1982 a center-right coalition government that had run on a platform of constitutional change was eventually able to force through

amendments that dissolved the Council of the Revolution and re- moved the residual military powers over the elected civilian government. The council was replaced by the Higher Council of National

Defense, whose powers are only advisory and are limited to questions of national defense and the organization, functioning, and

discipline of the armed forces. It also confirmed officer promotions

to general rank. The revised Article 273 of the constitution re- stricted the mission of the armed forces to "safeguarding national

independence, the integrity of the territory, and the freedom and

security of the population against any external aggression or threat,

while respecting democratic institutions." In justifying these

changes, the minister of defense explained that the government

"deemed it inadvisable to provide legal pretexts which might one day be invoked to justify appeals for the intervention of the military in resolving internal political problems by means alien to democracy and the Constitution."

The subordination of Portugal's military to the civilian authorities was codified by the National Defense Law of 1982. It was passed

in November of that year by the Assembly of the Republic over

the objections of President Eanes who feared that the armed forces

would be politicized by allowing the minister of defense to choose

the chief of staff and the heads of the three services.

In spite of the measures taken in 1982 to divest the military of

its remaining political powers, the military retained for a time considerable weight in matters of security. It also continued to feel a measure of responsibility for maintaining internal stability. In 1982 for example, the Association of the 25th of April, a club dominated by left-wing former members of the MFA, was founded to "fight for the preservation of the ideas" of the revolution of April

25, 1974.

By the early 1990s, however, under a determined prime minister

and a strong minister of defense, the political influence of the mili- tary had waned. The National Defense Law of 1991 further

strengthened civilian control. The law increased the power of the

chief of staff and made him directly responsible to the minister of

defense. Senior officers regarded as troublemakers or too active

politically had been eased aside, and Portugal's military leadership differed little from that of other West European nations.

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National Security

Strategic Concepts Underlying the Portuguese Defense

Posture

Historically, Portugal has had two essential security objectives:

the protection of its colonial empire and the maintenance of its status as a distinctive national entity on the Iberian Peninsula. The nation's geographic position—a band of territory on the Atlantic coast, isolated from the main powers of Europe—has always been central to its strategic thinking. Portugal has never been strong enough

to defend itself without assistance, but it had a long tradition of

resistance to the presence of foreign troops on its soil. Accordingly, it has followed a policy of aligning itself with the leading naval

power of the time. Its alliance with Britain, first established by the

1 386 Treaty of Windsor, was periodically reaffirmed until the twentieth century. After World War II and the creation of NATO, a

close relationship with the United States came to be regarded as

essential to preserving the country's overseas possessions. The

nation's territorial integrity has not been even remotely threatened

since the Napoleonic period, nor have immediate concerns of

national security been the most compelling factors in military

planning or the decision to join NATO. Rather, the country's participation in NATO until the mid-1970s was primarily aimed at winning political and military support for its colonial policies in Africa.

Portugal made only a marginal contribution to NATO during

the Salazar and Caetano eras, and its involvement in Africa alienat- ed it from the other members of the alliance. However, the prevailing Portuguese attitude after 1974 was favorable to greater

Portuguese activity in NATO and the defense of the West, based on recognition of the dangers represented by the Soviet Union and

the Warsaw Pact. Public opinion polls in Portugal reflected a decidedly pro-Atlantic, pro-NATO sentiment, especially when compared

with that of other countries in NATO's southern tier, such as Spain

and Greece. The events of 1974-75, when Portuguese Communists

gained control of important functions of the state and deeply

infiltrated the military, solidified the majority perception that the

nation's interests lay in association with the West European community and NATO. The upheavals of 1974-75, together with

Moscow's role in supporting the African liberation movements,

inclined the Portuguese military leaders to regard the Soviet

Union as a hostile power against which the country must constantly

remain vigilant. In geostrategic terms, the country is perceived as a narrow strip

along the Atlantic flank of the Iberian Peninsula that, together with

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Portugal: A Country Study

the archipelagoes of Madeira and the Azores, forms the Portuguese

"strategic triangle." It occupies an intermediate position between

the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas and between Europe and

Africa. The strategic triangle is crossed by important sea and air lines of communication, linking North America and the east coast of South America to Europe, southern Africa to Europe, and the

Mediterranean lands to Northern Europe. In the event of an East- West confrontation, the defense of these waters would be imperative for reinforcing the European southern flank. The Portuguese

territories and waters would also be critical to control over the Straits of Gibraltar. The Lajes Air Base in the Azores, in addition to its advanced position for air resupply, is ideal for surveillance of the

Atlantic and the conduct of antisubmarine warfare. As stated by

United States Secretary of State George Shultz in 1984: "The

Azores base is pivotal if the United States is to react effectively to military challenges in Europe or to threats to Western security outside NATO."

The military doctrine incorporated in the Portuguese strategic

concept emphasizes the role of air and naval components to protect

communications linking the Azores, Madeira, and the Portuguese

mainland. This task has always necessitated the employment of

naval vessels equipped for antisubmarine warfare and the use of

the "angles" of the strategic triangle as bases for maritime patrol

and interceptor aircraft. Another part of Portuguese strategic thinking

stresses the growing ability of the North African countries—Morocco,

Algeria, and Libya—to engage in modern military operations.

Regional or religious conflicts in the area or the establishment of

Soviet basing privileges would affect NATO's lines of communications and Portugal's responsibilities. Lisbon's efforts to foster good

relations with the North African countries, especially Morocco, have

as one objective, therefore, the reduction of such risks. Recognizing that with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central Europe and the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact the military

threat to Europe had subsided, the Portuguese political leadership

became increasingly reluctant to assume financial and personnel

commitments needed to carry out NATO missions. As of early

1993, defense strategy was clearly at a transitional stage. According

to official statements, the armed forces would continue to be scaled

down in areas of secondary importance, while efforts would be made

to continue modernization and to achieve high operational efficiency in designated areas, notably air defense, naval patrols, and rapid

reinforcement capability at any point of the national territory. The

break-up of the Warsaw Pact has not, according to the official view,

caused all threats to disappear. There is no guarantee that regional

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National Security

crises, low-intensity conflicts, and religious fundamentalism will not destabilize nations and entire regions. Prime Minister Anibal

Cavaco Silva pointed out in May 1990 that the NATO alliance

had served peace for more than forty years over a vast territory.

It would be rash, he said, for the West to disarm unilaterally and

hurriedly and for the existing balance in Europe to be jeopardized.

Similarly, Portugal was reluctant to assign security responsibilities to the European Community (EC —see Glossary) that would

diminish the standing of NATO as the primary instrument of col- lective self-defense. During the period in late 1990 leading up to the Persian Gulf

conflict, Portuguese political leaders supported the United Nations

(UN) resolution and expressed strong solidarity with the country's

allies. In addition to quickly approving transit facilities in the Azores

and on the mainland, Portugal provided medical assistance teams

and a transport plane for evacuating refugees. A cargo vessel is assigned to support the movement of British forces to the Persian

Gulf, and Portuguese vessels joined NATO standby forces in the

Mediterranean. However, the government announced that Portugal would not contribute ships or troop units to take a direct part

in the conflict, a decision reportedly received with discontent by

senior military officers. The Armed Forces

The three services of the Portuguese armed forces had a combined personnel strength of about 61,000 in 1992: about 33,000

in the army, 15,000 in the navy, and 13,000 in the air force. The

president of the republic is commander in chief of the armed forces,

while the senior military officer is the chief of staff of the armed

forces. The president's formal powers include the right to declare war and appoint the chiefs of staff from names proposed by the

government in power. The president chairs the Higher Council

of National Defense, whose members are the prime minister, the

minister of defense and other cabinet ministers; the chief of staff of the armed forces; the three service chiefs of staff; and the presidents of the regional governments of the Azores and Madeira (see

fig. 10).

Prior to the passage of the National Defense Law of 1982, the

military controlled the passage of laws affecting the armed forces,

established budgetary and procurement policies, and had the power

to veto international agreements involving national defense. The

1982 law was intended to make the military subordinate to civilian

political authority, functioning through the minister of defense, in defense policy matters. Successive governments were reluctant to

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Portugal: A Country Study

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National Security

antagonize the military establishment by depriving it of its former

powers, and initially the chiefs of staff retained practical control over budgets, strategic options, and procurement matters. By the

early 1990s, however, civilian authority incorporated in the 1982

law was being more rigorously applied.

Army

The army's personnel strength was estimated at about 33,000

as of late 1991 . About 75 percent of army personnel were conscripts

serving a twelve-month period of service, and 10 percent were

officers of both career and conscript status. The army was organized

into four military regions (North with headquarters at Porto, Central with headquarters at Coimbra, South with headquarters at Evora, and Lisbon) and two military zones (Madeira with headquarters at Funchal and Azores with headquarters at Ponta Delgada (see fig. 11).

The size of the army had been drastically reduced since 1974,

when it consisted of 21 1 ,000 soldiers of all ranks, the bulk of whom

were committed to the fighting in Africa. During the colonial wars, elements of two divisions remained in metropolitan Portugal; one

of these was earmarked for assignment to NATO's Central Region

along the Rhine River, and the other was assigned to peninsular

defense in the framework of the 1939 Iberian Pact. Both divisions were below 50 percent strength and were equipped with outmoded weapons.

Major revisions in the army structure have occurred since the

withdrawal of troops from the colonies in 1974. Most of the army

is organized along regimental lines. By 1992, it included fifteen infantry regiments, six artillery regiments, three cavalry regiments,

two engineering regiments, one commando regiment, a signals regiment, and a military police regiment. The infantry regiments nor- mally consist of a headquarters battalion, an infantry battalion,

and a training battalion. New recruits are immediately assigned

to one of the regiments, where they receive their basic training.

The infantry regiments bear the names of communities within the

military region where they are located. Forces in the Azores and

Madeira are designated as Home Defense Groups, each consisting of two infantry battalions, one artillery battalion with antiaircraft and coastal guns, and support units.

The army's two most important units are the Special Forces

Brigade and the First Composite Brigade committed to NATO.

Unlike other army formations, which are subordinate to regional

military commanders in the areas where they are located, these

two units are directly subordinate to the army chief of staff. For

241
Portugal: A Country Study

P

ii in IVv

VI

International boundary

Military region boundary

National capital Populated place NATO headquarters Headquarters of military regions and zones

Air bases

Naval headquarters

Lisbon Military Region

South Military Region

Central Military Region

North Military Region Azores Military Zone

Madeira Military Zone

25 50 Kilometers 25 50 Miles

Inset maps for Madeira and the Azores not in scale

A p

AZORES V

TERCEIRA [ZJ SAO MfGUE£Z^~f~^~\

Ponta QelgacsT^, MADEIRA VI

MADE>BA^*£;ncM ^

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Atlantic

Ocean

PusbonJ\

V~^^J%MontijoJt

SPAIN

Figure 11. Major Military Installations, 1992

purposes of logistics and administration, however, the First Composite Brigade is under the commander of the Central military

region.

The Special Forces Brigade, located in the Lisbon area, is composed of 2,000 men organized into two special forces battalions, one infantry battalion, and a logistics battalion. However, some

units are only earmarked for service with the brigade and are still carried within the regimental structure.

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National Security

The organization of the First Composite Brigade was begun in 1976 to replace the division previously committed to NATO. The

brigade is located at Santa Margarida, 120 kilometers northeast

of Lisbon, and maintained at 90 percent of its authorized strength

of 5,200. Designed to conduct delaying and defensive operations,

the brigade would come under Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in periods of crisis or war. It has taken part

in NATO exercises in northeastern Italy. Its constituent units are one mechanized infantry battalion with M-113 armored personnel carriers, two motorized infantry battalions, one armored battalion equipped with M-48A5 tanks, a field artillery battalion

equipped with 155mm self-propelled howitzers, an armored recon- naissance unit, and engineering and signal companies.

Beginning in 1987, the army acted to improve the combat potential of the First Composite Brigade, particularly in overcoming its weaknesses in antitank weaponry and low-level air defense. The

First Composite Brigade would face problems of transport and sup- ply if deployed in Italy at a distance of 2,500 kilometers from its logistics base. Most of the brigade would be airlifted to its assigned

position, with the heavy equipment to follow by sealift. Portugal

does not have sufficient transport aircraft available to move the

unit quickly, nor are there plans to position equipment in Italy in advance of the troops.

Newly enlisted army personnel are generally assigned to a unit

from their own region of the country, where they also receive their

basic training. After about six months of service, enlisted men who

meet educational and other requirements can apply to the sergeants'

school for training as noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Senior

NCOs can qualify for commissions after attending the Higher Military Institute. Discharged personnel are assigned to the reserves. Conscripts

are carried on the reserve rolls until the age of thirty-five. There

is no annual training period, although the call-up system is tested

from time to time.

Young men aspiring for an army career can, after completing

high school, compete for places at the Military Academy located near Lisbon; it had an enrollment of about 500 in 1991. Subsequent training of officers is conducted in the specialized schools

of the various branches of the service. Advanced officer training,

corresponding to the Command and General Staff School and the

Army War College of the United States Army, is carried out at the Institute for Higher Military Studies in Lisbon. The highest

level of professional education, corresponding to the United States National Defense University, is the National Defense Institute.

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Portugal: A Country Study

The students, senior officers of the military, high civil servants,

and leading figures in the private sector, devote half a day for one

year to the program. The army also operates prestigious military

academies at the high- school level, primarily for the children of career officers and NCOs but open to children of civilian families on a restricted basis. Most of the students continue on to university and a civilian career after graduation.

The basic infantry weapon of the Portuguese army is the Heckler and Koch 7.62mm G-3 rifle manufactured domestically under

a German license. Armored units are equipped with M-48A5 tanks

and M-113 armored personnel carriers from the United States,

supplemented by wheeled armored vehicles from a variety of

sources. The principal antitank weapons are TOW (tube-launched,

optically tracked, wire-guided) and Milan wire-guided missiles. In

addition to a few self-propelled howitzers assigned to the First Composite Brigade, the army has an inventory of towed field guns and

coastal artillery. The effort to modernize the NATO-earmarked

First Composite Brigade has priority on resources, which means

that units with home defense missions are equipped with obsolete

weapons. Any substantial improvement is dependent on assistance

from the United States, which has not supplied aid on the scale needed. It is possible that additional armored equipment, modern

artillery, and antitank and air defense weapons will become avail- able after deactivation by the United States Army under the 1990

Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, although Portugal faces competing demands by other NATO countries (see table 12, Appendix).

Navy

Portugal has a strong maritime tradition dating from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, when explorers inspired by Prince

Henry the Navigator reached Madeira, the Azores, and the west

coast of Africa, rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and sailed on

to establish the sea route to India (see Maritime Expansion, ch. 1). Although traditionally the service with the greatest prestige, the

navy declined during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For

a period in the 1950s, this trend was reversed when modern frigates,

corvettes, minesweepers, and patrol vessels are acquired through

military assistance from the United States. After the Revolution

of 1974, the number of operational fighting vessels declined by more

than half, from forty to seventeen. During the colonial wars, the navy was active in efforts to interdict guerrilla movements on rivers, lakes, and coastal waters of Africa. After the withdrawal of the armed forces from Africa, the navy's

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emphasis shifted to home waters, where its missions have been

defined as protecting the sea lanes between the mainland and the

islands of the Azores and Madeira, cooperating with the other

services in the defense of Portuguese territory, patrolling the 200-

mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off Portugal's coast, and

meeting Portugal's NATO responsibilities in the Iberian Atlantic

Command (IBERLANT) zone of operations (see Portugal and

NATO, this ch.).

The chief of the naval staff (an admiral) is supported by the vice

chief of naval staff (a vice admiral), the continental naval com- mander (also a vice admiral), the Azores naval commander (a rear admiral), the Madeira naval commander (a captain), and the Marine Corps commandant (a captain). The main naval base is at Alfeite near Lisbon, as is the Naval Academy. The continental naval

command is at Portimao on the south coast. The commanders in

the Azores and Madeira exercise the concurrent role of NATO is- land commander.

Between the end of the colonial wars in 1974 and 1992, the navy's

personnel strength decreased from 19,400 to 15,300. As of 1992,

about 5,000 of the navy's personnel were conscripts serving for sixteen months. Standards of performance and motivation of career NCO personnel are reported to have been affected by the decline.

Many NCOs, trained at considerable expense by the navy, departed

for private- sector employment. Lack of advancement, wage levels not commensurate with the skills involved, and the diminishing

prestige of naval careers are said to be contributing factors. As a

result of the flight of technicians, previous training and fitness stan- dards could not be maintained.

The principal combat vessels of the Portuguese navy are four

frigates and three submarines of French construction and ten small

frigates (sometimes classified as corvettes) built in Spain and Germany. The French frigates and submarines were commissioned

in the late 1960s, and the corvettes were commissioned between

1970 and 1975, although they were later modernized by the addition of new communications and electronics gear. The navy also operates a number of coastal patrol and auxiliary vessels (see table

13, Appendix). Three modern MEKO-200 frigates were commissioned in 1991. These ships, built in Germany and financed with

the help of seven NATO members, were, at 3,200 tons, much larger

than any other vessels in the existing fleet. They were to be armed

with torpedoes, Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles, the Sea Spar- row SAM, and advanced sonar and fire-control systems. They

would also accommodate two helicopters for antisubmarine operations.

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Portugal: A Country Study

Even with the addition of the MEKO frigates, Portugal has only

a limited capability to carry out its IBERLANT responsibilities.

The main potential threats are submarines that might interdict the

Atlantic sea lanes and mines that could force the closure of ports.

The navy's antisubmarine warfare capability, although improving, is still deemed deficient, particularly in view of the lack of air reconnaissance. The lack of minesweepers to operate in the

Portugal-Madeira-Azores triangle is a further shortcoming in view

of the strategic importance of this zone for European shipping. The

navy has plans to replace its submarines and to purchase ocean- going patrol vessels and minesweepers, but it is not clear how they

would be financed.

The Marine Corps consists of 2,500 men, of whom approximately

half are conscripts. They are organized into two infantry battal- ions and one naval police battalion. The marines are trained for small amphibious operations and shore patrol duties. In addition

to light arms, their equipment includes wheeled armored vehicles,

mortars, and landing craft. Air Force

Although the Portuguese air force did not become an independent service branch until 1952, it has existed since 1912. Portuguese

pilots flew missions in World War I, and Portuguese aircraft are involved in the Spanish Civil War. The air force played a major

role in the colonial wars, attacking guerrilla raiding parties, supporting ground troops, and performing reconnaissance, transport,

and medical evacuation missions. During this period, its strength

increased from about 12,500 in 1962 to a peak of 21,000 in 1973.

After the Revolution of 1974 and the withdrawal from Africa, air force strength shrank as low as 8,000, but it was at a level of 10,300

in 1992. This total included 3,000 conscripts whose service obli- gation is sixteen months, as well as 2,200 airborne troops who were

scheduled to be shifted to army command. The air force's sixteen

squadrons operate from seven principal bases, including six in continental Portugal and Lajes in the Azores. One battalion of the air- borne brigade is at the Monsanto Air Base, one battalion is at Aveiro, and the unit's training center is at Tancos.

The air force has a reputation as a well-trained, dynamically

led, and disciplined service. Its aircraft maintenance and overhaul

facilities at Alverca are considered to be excellent. Nevertheless,

it has not had a clearly defined mission since the end of the Afri- can wars, and its capabilities are limited by the lack of up-to-date

combat aircraft. With the exception of ten Alpha Jets obtained from

France and Germany in the early 1990s, the air force is largely

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Portuguese Navy frigate of the Joao Belo class in a live-fire exercise A Portuguese Navy frigate of the Vasco da Gama class Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington

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Portugal: A Country Study

dependent on the transfer of obsolete aircraft from surplus stocks

of other NATO members.

The backbone of the air forces is composed of two squadrons

of A-7P Corsairs received under the United States military as- sistance program between 1982 and 1985 (see table 14, Appendix).

The air force had previously been dependent on Fiat G-91s in the

attack role. Deliveries of these aircraft from the German air force

began in 1965-66 as partial reimbursement for German use of the

Beja Air Base for training purposes. Portugal has no planes designed

primarily for air defense, but both the A-7Ps and the Fiat G-91s

are equipped with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, providing them

with the means to perform a secondary air defense role. A result of the 1989 review of the Lajes Air Base agreement is the delivery of seventeen F-16A fighters and three F-16Bs (training versions) from the United States beginning in 1994. Although

these are earlier models of the highly regarded F-16 series, the in- troduction of these aircraft will represent a significant upgrading

of the Portuguese air defense capabilities. The F16s will operate

from Monte Real Air Base and from two forward bases in Madeira

and the Azores. As part of the same agreement, Portugal is scheduled to receive a battery of Hawk SAMs and associated radar to boost its air defenses.

In 1988 the air force acquired six Lockheed P-3B Orion maritime reconnaissance aircraft that had previously been in service

in the Australian air force. After modernization in Portugal by the

addition of newer radar and navigation systems, acoustic sensors, and armaments, the aircraft entered service in 1990. Operating

from Montijo Air Base, the aircraft provide the air force with a

patrol capability against submarines within the sea space linking

Portugal with the Azores and Madeira. For reasons of economy,

however, few patrol missions have been flown.

The air force also has in its inventory C-130H Hercules trans- port aircraft intended to provide partial airlift for the First Composite Brigade earmarked for NATO, as well as Spanish-built

CASA C-212 Aviocar light transports, some of which are fitted for additional maritime surveillance, weather reconnaissance, and

survey missions. Two of the C-130s are scheduled to be stretched

to increase their load capacities, and an additional stretched C-130

is to be acquired. No combat helicopters are included in the air force inventory of aging French-built Alouettes and Pumas, the

survivors of a considerable fleet of helicopters used during the wars

in Africa. Under the 1989 Azores review, the United States is committed to supply fifty-seven combat, antisubmarine, and transport

helicopters.

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A major component of the air force modernization plan is the

introduction of an air command and control system for the planning, tasking, and execution of air operations, including coordination with ground and naval forces. The system will be linked

to the Spanish, French, and NATO air defense systems. Although

NATO approved a large share of the funding, a reassessment is underway in light of the dramatic changes in the European security situation.

The Air Force Academy, a four-year institution, is located at Sintra near Lisbon. Elementary pilot training for cadets is con- ducted on Aerospatiale Epsilons, eighteen of which were acquired

from France in 1989 for assembly in Portugal. Jet basic training

follows on Cessna T-37Cs and advanced training on Alpha Jets or Northrop T-38A Talons. Additional officer training, carried

out at the Air College, consists of a basic command course for lieu- tenants, a command and staff course for captains, and the air war

course for colonels. The air force faces major problems arising from career dissatis- faction among its highly trained personnel. Pilots are requesting

permission for transfer to the reserves, indefinite leave, or permanent discharge. As of the early 1990s, the pilot shortfall was esti- mated at about 30 percent. The principal reasons are economic.

Even with flight pay, officers earn much less than commercial pilots. Air force pilots also complain that they do not have sufficient

opportunity to develop and hone their skills. Annual flying times

for pilots and crews are reportedly well below the NATOrecommended minima owing to budgetary and fuel restrictions and

the shortage of serviceable aircraft. Conditions of Service

The armed forces entered a period of transition in the early

1990s that was the source of considerable uncertainty and turmoil

among professional personnel. The severe cutbacks in the size of

the military establishment, particularly the army, and the unsettled status of the military role and missions had a demoralizing

effect. Career prospects seemed increasingly circumscribed, and

the government's budgetary measures made the armed services seem unattractive in comparison with the opportunities in civilian

life. The promotion possibilities were limited by the excessive number of officer personnel. As of 1988, the army's personnel strength

had been reduced to only 20 percent of its strength in 1974. Yet

during the same period, the officer complement had fallen by lit- tle more than half. The air force and the navy experienced more

moderate reductions in staffing between 1974 and 1988. Naval

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Portugal: A Country Study

officer strength had declined slightly, but the number of air force

officers had actually increased.

The armed forces had formerly been admired as the defenders

of democracy for their role in the toppling of the Salazar-Caetano

regime in 1974. Military officers sensed that their profession had

since suffered a decline in social status and prestige and that they were regarded by the public as superfluous. The historic left-wing

and right-wing factions from the 1974-76 period were still distin- guishable in the officer corps, although younger officers who had

entered the service since the end of the colonial wars represented

a separate and growing category. The upsurge of discontent against

the government's perceived indifference to career military personnel was common to all elements, however.

The armed services are forbidden by law from forming unions

to express their demands. This prohibition has been skirted by the

formation of sergeants' "movements" and periodic large dinner

gatherings among the officers. NCOs have also staged mild demonstrations to draw attention to their grievances. NCO advisory commissions have been established by the government, but these have

proven to be ineffective because the officers representing the mili- tary establishment have no authority to negotiate over the issues

raised. The NCOs have sought the elimination of promotions outside the normal sequence, reduction in the maximum time served

at each grade, greater access to officer training courses, improvement in salary scales, and earlier retirement. Although sergeants

could attain officer rank after attending the Higher Military Insti- tute, few could hope to be promoted beyond captain because of

insufficient vacancies at the major level. Naval NCOs have sought more training opportunities and the establishment of new specialties. The sergeants have called for an updating of the Code of Military Justice and Military Disciplinary Regulations, including the

right of assembly and association. In addition to the general feeling that salary levels do not cor- respond to the demands and risks associated with the military profession, officers feel that special benefits they previously enjoyed are being curtailed, including extra tax exemptions, subsidized gasoline, and overtime pay. Prices for food at military commissaries

are no longer significantly below prices in civilian outlets. The

officers have sought a lowering of age limits on active duty at the upper ranks as a means of increasing opportunities for advancement.

The length of compulsory military service was a subject of contention in the early 1990s, and the outcome is likely to have a pronounced effect on the future status of the career service and

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Jet fighters of the Portuguese Air Force Air Force personnel manning a control tower

Courtesy Embassy of Portugal, Washington

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Portugal: A Country Study

on the effectiveness of the armed forces. The army service obligation, which had been twenty-four months at the end of the colonial wars in 1974, had been reduced to sixteen months by 1984 and

to twelve months in 1990. Conscripts in the air force and navy

served for sixteen months. In 1989, of 80,000 young men eligible for military service, 60,000 are deemed physically fit, although only

45,000 were actually inducted. In 1990 the number of inductees was lowered to 35,000. Those considered first for exemptions from

service, in order of priority, are married men, heads of households,

and only sons. Conscientious objector status is recognized, although under the

law, those granted exemption from active service are required to perform civil defense duties. Over 4 percent of those on enrollment

lists file applications as conscientious objectors. Few young people

acknowledge the need for military service, viewing it as a waste

of time during a prime period of their lives. The youth branches

of the main political parties are among those groups advocating

a shorter period of military service.

One plan for reducing the period of conscription to four months

is under discussion in the early 1990s. Under the plan, 20,000 conscripts would be in the service at any single time, 10,000 would

be undergoing a two-month period of accelerated training, and

10,000 would be serving in their units. A safety clause would per- mit the minister of defense to extend the period of service to eight

months for the army and twelve months for the navy and air force

if the needs of the services were not being adequately met. The

government plan called for the introduction of two new recruitment systems: one for volunteers, who would serve a minimum

of eight months, and another for contract enlistments, which might

be as long as eight years, to attract specialists in such fields as telecommunications, electronics, and computer technology. It was

foreseen that the eight-month volunteers would be attracted by a higher wage (about US$200 a month) than conscripts and incentives in the form of preferences for academic study and careers in the police services.

This much discussed service plan is a further source of dis- satisfaction for many in the officer corps who feel that the fourmonth term of service, the shortest of any country in Europe, would

lead to a military establishment that is more costly to maintain and

only marginally effective. Although the total number inducted

each year would increase, the time allowed for training is regarded as insufficient to teach more than basic infantry skills and would

seriously degrade unit performance. Doubts have been expressed

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over the adequacy of the wages and incentives offered to retain a permanent cadre of skilled NCOs and specialists.

Although women have the legal right to volunteer for military

duty and the armed forces are under obligation to accept them,

it was only in the late 1980s that a few women with special qualifications, such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers, were taken into

the officer corps. Several women were also enrolled at the Air Force

Academy to train as pilots. No women were serving in the enlist- ed ranks. As of 1991, fewer than 100 women served in the armed

services, fewer than any other country of NATO.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

The official grade structure of the Portuguese armed forces shows

nine officer ranks for the army and the air force and nine for the

navy (see fig. 12). The rank of general is not subdivided as in the

United States Armed Forces. Officers of the highest rank, that of

general, wear three stars, except for the chief of staff of the armed

forces and the three service chiefs of staff, who wear four stars. The rank of marechal (fleet admiral in the navy) is honorary and,

as of early 1993, is held by only two persons, both retired army

generals. The army and air force each have nine enlisted ranks;

the navy uses only seven (see fig. 13). Officer ranks are displayed

by peak decorations on the headgear and chin cords. The peaked

caps of all three services also bear the Portuguese coat of arms. On the pale gray full-dress uniform of the army, rank designations are displayed in the form of gorget patches for general officers and cuff bars for other officers. On the olive green service uniform,

usually worn with shirt and tie, shoulder board insignia denote

officer ranks. Shoulder boards or sleeve chevrons are worn by enlisted personnel and warrant officers. The highest NCO rank of

first sergeant is denoted by four upward-pointing chevrons.

Army fatigue uniforms are olive green, and combat uniforms

are of camouflage material. The standard headgear for enlisted per- sonnel is a brown beret bearing the national colors of red and green. Armored troops are distinguished by black berets, and paratroops wear green berets. Special forces wear distinctive camouflage uniforms with red berets. The air force uniform is light blue with a peaked cap as stan- dard headgear for both officers and NCOs and berets for other

ranks. All ranks wear garrison caps with nondress uniforms. Stars and sleeve rings denoting ranks are worn on the sleeve cuffs of officer uniforms. Rank chevrons similar to those of the army are worn

on the shoulder by enlisted personnel.

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Portugal: A Country Study

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Portugal: A Country Study

Navy personnel wear either blue wool or white cotton uniforms

for shore or sea duty. In either case, pullover blouses are standard.

Navy enlisted men's headgear is similar to those of other Europe- an navies—round caps with the name of the ship sewn on the headband. Peaked caps, bearing the state arms and designating rank

by peak decoration, are worn by officers and petty officers. Marines wear dark blue berets. Ranks displayed on uniforms consist

of sleeve rings for officers and rank chevrons for NCOs. As in the

other services, warrant officers' ranks are denoted by a combination of chevrons and the coat of arms. Defense Expenditures

The Portuguese defense budget was 197.5 billion escudos

(US$1.25 billion) in 1989, 219.1 billion escudos (US$1.54 billion)

in 1990, and 206.8 billion escudos (US$1.73 billion) in 1991 (for

value of the escudo—see Glossary). Over the period 1978-89, the

defense budget increased by an average of 1.9 percent annually

in real terms. According to a survey by the United States Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), which applied cer- tain adjustments to the official figures for defense, Portuguese mili- tary expenditures rose in real terms from US$1 . 189 billion in 1979

to US$1,457 billion in 1989 (both amounts in constant 1989 dollars).

Portugal's defense outlays are the lowest in NATO with the ex- ception of Luxembourg (Iceland has no military forces). In terms

of defense expenditures per capita, Portugal was the lowest in

NATO (US$141 in 1989) with the exception of Turkey. However,

in terms of the share of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) allotted to defense, most NATO countries spent less than Portugal. Portugal's expenditures on its military establishment had

risen from 4.5 percent of GNP in 1960 to 8.3 percent of GNP during the course of the colonial wars. In the 1980s, defense expenditures averaged 3.43 percent of GNP. Defense outlays, which had

constituted 26.7 percent of the national budget in 1960, rose to nearly 46 percent of the budget during the peak of the overseas wars in 1971. By 1977 defense expenditures had declined to 10 per- cent of central government expenditures, and they remained below 10 percent throughout the 1980s.

In 1988 expenditures were allocated among the services on the

following basis: army, 36.9 percent; navy, 30.6 percent; air force,

22.3 percent; and general staff, 10.1 percent. The largest expenditure category was personnel (64.5 percent), among the highest

in NATO and exceeded only by Belgium and Luxembourg. The

principal cause was the fact that the rapid decline in total staff was

not matched by a decline in the officer roster. Moreover, pension

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payments to demobilized personnel were a significant cost factor. Of the service branches, the army was burdened with the highest

outlay for personnel, amounting to 80 percent of its budget. This

outlay was attributable in part to the large number of officers on

active duty in excess of the army's requirements. By comparison,

60 percent of the navy's budget was absorbed by personnel ex- penses. Portugal's outlays on major equipment items as a share

of the defense budget (13.4 percent) were among the lowest in

NATO, as well. Portugal and NATO

Portugal was one of the founding members of NATO in 1949.

For more than two decades, Portugal's material contribution to the alliance was marginal. Its armed forces were preoccupied with

the fighting in Africa, and its efforts to maintain a colonial empire

alienated it from the other members of the alliance. Nevertheless,

its contribution in the form of strategically located bases and other

military facilities was substantial. Major air bases and ports on the

Portuguese mainland were deemed vital for rapid reinforcement

and sea resupply of NATO forces on the continent. Control of

Madeira was considered crucial for keeping the North Atlantic routes to the Straits of Gibraltar open for allied operations. The

Azores provided essential refueling facilities for the rapid deployment of forces to Central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as a key base for antisubmarine tracking and naval

surveillance.

In the immediate postrevolutionary period when leftist ideology was in the ascendancy in the military, the question of Portugal's continued active participation in the alliance came into

question. In 1975 Portuguese representatives absented themselves

from highly classified NATO discussions. By 1980, however, Portugal had returned to full participation, rejoining NATO's Nuclear

Planning Group and again taking part in NATO exercises. The

establishment of a pro-Western democratic government, followed

by the accession of Portugal to the European Community (EC)

in 1986, inspired renewed interest in an active role in the alliance.

The desire to provide the armed forces with a meaningful military

mission after the African operations ended and to divert them from

further involvement in civilian politics were additional factors in Portugal's willingness to undertake fresh NATO commitments.

Portugal accordingly accepted the obligation to equip the First Composite Brigade to be at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and agreed to increase its surveillance

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Portugal: A Country Study

and control over a large sector of the eastern Atlantic by acquiring

modern frigates and reconnaissance aircraft. The Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT), a major subordinate command under the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

(SACLANT) located at Norfolk, Virginia, has its headquarters at Oeiras, near Lisbon. Since 1982 the IBERLANT commander has

been Portuguese, a vice admiral with a staff of about sixty-five

officers and 200 enlisted personnel mainly from Portugal, the United

States, and Britain. IBERLANT encompasses the area extending

from the northern border of Portugal southward to the Tropic of

Cancer and approximately 1,150 kilometers seaward from the

Straits of Gibraltar. Madeira is within IBERLANT' s area, as are

the Azores after transfer from NATO's Western Adantic Command (WESTLANT) to meet Portuguese concerns. The IBERLANT commander has no permanendy assigned combat forces in peacetime. The IBERLANT staff carries out planning and conducts exercises to ensure the headquarters' readiness

to assume command and logistic support of forces that would be

assigned in a period of tension or war. In addition to the administrative facilities and underground command post at Oeiras, IBERLANT has extensive communications links with SACLANT at Norfolk and other command posts. Other NATO facilities in Portugal include ammunition and fuel depots and strategic reserves

at Lisbon and a reserve airport at Ovar near Porto. NATO also occupies a portion of the Montijo Air Base for the same purpose

and has fuel storage areas and access to the air base in the Azores.

The Portuguese navy participates in exercises with other NATO

fleets, particularly those involving protection of resupply convoys

in the IBERLANT area. When Spain became a member of NATO in 1982, Portugal is concerned that a reorganization of the NATO command structure might follow. Portuguese misgivings focused on the possibility that an integrated Iberian command would be formed under a Spanish commander and that Spain might be entrusted with security

tasks within the area of Portuguese territories for which the Portuguese armed forces were not yet fully equipped. After Spain's

decision in 1986 to remain outside NATO's integrated military

structure, however, the issue of assignment of commands and missions in the Iberian Peninsula and adjacent sea areas became

dormant.

Bilateral Military Relations with Other Countries

Since World War II, Portugal has maintained a significant level of defense cooperation with several NATO countries, but its military

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relations with the United States have been of paramount importance. The United States was granted facilities at Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in the Azores in 1944. Under a 1951 bilateral

defense agreement and subsequent technical agreements, the United

States has continued to enjoy access to this base. Lajes has been an important refueling stop for military transport aircraft and a base for tanker aircraft to refuel fighter aircraft shutding between

the United States and Europe and the Middle East. It has also been

a base for American antisubmarine aircraft that patrolled a large

sector of the sealanes linking the United States Sixth Fleet in the

Mediterranean with its supply depots on the east coast of the United

States. As of 1992, the United States had about 1,200 air force per- sonnel in the Azores.

The use of the Lajes Air Base for non-NATO purposes required

prior clearance by Portugal. When Israel was subjected to a sur- prise attack by Egypt and Syria in October 1973, the Lajes Air

Base was used to support the emergency transport of military supplies to Israel. Portugal was the only NATO country to grant the

United States the use of its facilities during the 1973 crisis. When

UN forces were deployed in 1990 in response to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, Portugal gave early and comprehensive approval

to use Lajes and mainland bases for aerial refueling and moving

United States aircraft and equipment to Saudi Arabia.

The 1951 Azores agreement was extended in late 1983 to per- mit the United States to have continued use of Lajes for seven years

until February 1991. As of 1993, no firm settlement had been

reached to extend the agreement. As part of the 1983 understandings, the United States pledged its best efforts to bring its military

aid up to an annual level of US$125 million. Assistance totaling

US$90 million was provided in fiscal year (FY) 1984 and US$105

million in FY 1985 but, owing to Congressional reductions in the

administration's requests, was lower in subsequent years. Estimated

military assistance obligations in FY 1990 were US$84.6 million.

Disappointment expressed by the Portuguese prime minister with

the level of military aid under the 1983 agreement led to consultations in 1988. As a result, the United States agreed to supply additional weaponry to help Portugal bring its NATO-committed

forces to a more active posture. Portugal's air defense capabilities were also to be strengthened by introducing interceptor aircraft

and modernizing the A- 7 squadrons. Among the additional items

of equipment the United States committed itself to supply were

twenty F-16 fighter aircraft, fifty-seven helicopters of various types, a battery of Hawk SAMs, air defense radar, vehicles, ammunition, and a hydrographic vessel. The previous delivery of P-3

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Portugal: A Country Study

maritime patrol aircraft and the United States contribution to the

MEKO frigate program were aimed at augmenting Portugal's anti- submarine warfare capability in the Atlantic.

The United States has also provided training assistance valued

at about US$2.5 million annually. This aid enabled more than 500

Portuguese personnel to receive professional military education each

year, as well as training in the effective use and maintenance of

weapons systems being delivered under the aid program.

The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) has also been

a substantial supplier of arms to Portugal, transferring excess Fiat

G-91 aircraft, M-48A5 tanks, trucks, and other vehicles. In 1986

West Germany announced that about US$200 million would be

earmarked for the construction of the three MEKO-200 frigates.

The West German air force maintains eighteen Alpha Jets at Beja

Air Base for advanced training of its personnel under an agree- ment dating from 1960. Both the United States and Germany use

the aircraft repair and overhaul facilities at Alverca under contract with the Portuguese air force. Several other NATO countries have

contributed modestly to meet Portugal's military needs, including

components for the MEKO frigates. France operates a missiletracking station on Ilha das Flores in the Azores. In partial compensation, France provided Epsilon training aircraft to the Portuguese

air force in 1989.

According to data compiled by the ACDA, the value of arms

transfers to Portugal amounted to US$370 million between 1984 and

1988. Of this total, US$210 million originated in the United States,

US$30 million in West Germany, and US$20 million in France.

The remaining US$100 million came from a variety of suppliers.

Domestic Defense Production

Portugal has had a small defense industry since the eighteenth

century, consisting originally of a naval arsenal, a gunpowder plant, a cannon foundry, and an arms factory. Beginning in the midnineteenth century, the military's food, supplies, and, later, fuels were provided by a government agency, the Manutencao Militar.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, a factory for supplying

military uniforms and equipment was established. During the 1960s,

the defense industry expanded to meet the specialized requirements

of the antiguerrilla operations in Africa. However, since the end

of the fighting in 1974 and the subsequent scaling back of the armed

forces, production capabilities have exceeded the country's needs.

A modest level of sales abroad have helped the Ministry of Defense

keep production lines open for artillery, mortar, and small arms

ammunition.

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Under Portuguese law, private companies are not permitted to engage in research, planning, testing, manufacturing or overhaul

of equipment exclusively intended for military purposes. These laws

have been interpreted to restrict to government-owned enterprises

the production of bombs, missiles, torpedoes, mines, hand grenades,

propellant powders, and other explosives. The construction of combat aircraft, helicopters, and warships is also limited to nationally

owned companies, although component manufacture could be subcontracted to private firms. In addition to Manutencao Militar, the principal government

enterprises include Oficinas Gerais de Fardamento e Equipamento (OGFE) for production of uniforms and equipment; Oficinas

Gerais de Material de Engenharia (OGME) for the overhaul of

military vehicles; and Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico

(OGMA) for maintenance and repair of all aircraft, avionics, engines, communications, and radar equipment of the Portuguese

Air Force. OGMA also has maintenance contracts for United States

air force and navy equipment and to supply parts and components

to several European aircraft manufacturers. The main ordnance

factory is Industrias Nacionais de Defesa E.P. (INDEP), a producer

of 60mm and 81mm mortars, artillery and mortar munitions, small arms ammunition, machine guns, and, under a German license,

the Heckler and Koch 7.62mm G-3 rifle used by the Portuguese

army. Arsenal do Alfeite near the Lisbon naval base has facilities for building patrol craft, auxiliary ships, and corvettes, but all of

its larger modern vessels have been constructed abroad, and its activities are confined to maintenance and overhaul. Bravia, a

private company, produces a range of wheeled armored personnel

carriers, reconnaissance vehicles, and military trucks.

According to the ACDA, Portugal's arms exports reached a peak

of US$220 million in 1986, falling off to US$40 million in 1989.

In the latter year, arms exports accounted for only 0.3 percent of

total Portuguese exports. In 1989 the minister of defense said that

the defense industry, employing 3,000 to 4,000 people, faced contraction because fewer countries were in the market for arms. Public Order and Internal Security

Following the end of the long authoritarian regime in Portugal

in April 1974, the system of internal security is reorganized. The

Public Security Police (Policia de Seguranga Publica—PSP) and

the National Republican Guard (Guarda Nacional Republicana

GNR), viewed as having been active supporters of the regime, were

put temporarily under military command. As of 1990, internal security is the responsibility of the Ministry ofJustice and the Ministry

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Portugal: A Country Study

of Internal Administration (formerly the Ministry of Interior). The

forces of security were ctotrolled by, and fully responsible to, the

government.

The revolutionary turmoil of 1974 to 1976 imposed a severe challenge to the maintenance of law and order. In addition to oc- casional violence by leftist and rightist groups, the emergence of

separatist activity in the Azores and Madeira posed threats to the

territorial integrity of Portugal. After constitutional government was established in 1976, political violence abated. Between 1980

and 1986, however, an ultra left-wing terrorist group, Popular

Forces of the 25th of April (Forcas Populares do 25 Abril—FP-25),

its name referring to the coup d'etat of April 25, 1974, conducted

a campaign of bombing, assassinations, and bank robberies (see

Terrorist Groups, this ch.).

The Police System

Although the main duties of the police had always been the

prevention, detection, and investigation of crime and the maintenance of public order, their involvement under successive governments in suppressing political and labor organizations left a reservoir

of fear and mistrust among the Portuguese people. The authority

of the police, which was identified with the old regime, was seri- ously compromised by the Revolution of 1974. During the months

after the revolution, there was a sharp rise in crime and disorder

owing to the virtual disappearance of social and moral constraints

imposed by tradition and reinforced by the authoritarian regime.

Until the civilian police forces, disarmed after the revolution, could

be reorganized and retrained to operate in Portugal's new politi- cal environment, armed forces security units assumed responsibility for internal security. By 1976, control of the police apparatus was

returned to civilian authorities in the Ministry of Internal Administration.

Article 272 of the constitution of 1976, as revised in 1982, emphasizes the responsibility of the police to defend the democratic

process and to ensure that they act within the law and do not ex- ceed their authority. In carrying out their mission of preventing

crimes, including crimes against the security of the state, the police are enjoined to observe the rights, freedoms, and safeguards of

citizens. The constitution stipulates that each of the forces of security are to have a single organization for the entire national territory.

National Republican Guard

The GNR was formed in 1913 as a heavily armed paramilitary

constabulary organized up to battalion strength. It was intended

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National Security

as a check against the military and was first employed to confront

monarchist-inspired revolts within the ranks of the armed forces. Although its essential mission was one of maintaining order in the

countryside, the GNR's activities were subsequently extended to those of helping the urban police to control demonstrations and

quell labor unrest. In 1990 the GNR numbered approximately 19,000 officers and

men and was equipped with Commando armored cars and twelve

Alouette II helicopters transferred from the German army. The

guard is organized into battalions stationed in the major cities and

companies and sections in district capitals and smaller communities. Highway patrols are conducted by a separate Traffic Brigade

and by rural units of the GNR.

Reserve and career officers from all branches of the armed forces can be seconded to tours of duty in the GNR on a voluntary basis.

Reservists who are university graduates can apply to continue as GNR officers upon completion of their military obligations.

Public Security Police

The PSP is a paramilitary police force under the jurisdiction the

Ministry of Internal Administration. Its basic mission is the protection of property and public security in urban areas. Before its reorganization in 1953, the urban police had been under the control of provincial governors. During the colonial wars, security

police assault units were dispatched to Africa, where they participated in combat operations against guerrilla forces. The PSP was

reorganized and retrained in 1975, and its heavy equipment was

turned over to the army.

PSP detachments operate from divisional headquarters in Lisbon and from the eighteen districts of continental Portugal, which

are divided into North, South, and Central zones. There are also headquarters for Madeira and the Azores and sectional headquarters

in smaller towns. Greater Lisbon and greater Porto have separate

commands. A specialized traffic service shares highway patrol

responsibilities with the GNR Traffic Brigade. A special group,

the Intervention Police, has mobile sections poised for deployment

anywhere in the country. Criminal investigation and data gathering are centralized under the General Anti-Crime Directorate,

which employs 1,500 specialized officers and investigators. As of

1990, the PSP had a complement of 17,000 individuals. Staff are drawn from among former service personnel. Since the early 1970s,

women have also been recruited for plainclothes investigations and

traffic control assignments.

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Portugal: A Country Study

In 1989, a demonstration by some 1,000 police personnel outside the Ministry of Internal Administration took a violent turn. The police had tried to form a union, but the government rejected

the idea on grounds that the police, as a military organization, were

prohibited by the National Defense Law of 1982 from having a union. The police maintained that they needed a union to improve

working conditions that were marked by long hours and low pay. In the late 1980s, for example, an ordinary patrol officer earned

the equivalent of only US$390 a month.

Other Police Forces

In 1990 the Fiscal Guard (Guarda Fiscal; also known as Treasury Police), a border control force, numbered 8,500 and was

charged with customs inspections and the collection of import duties. In addition, the force investigates smuggling, tax evasion, and illegal

financial transactions, particularly those involving import-export

businesses and currency exchange. Most of its uniformed and plainclothes police are stationed at frontier crossing points, ports, and

terminals of entry. Their monitoring of entries and departures by

foreigners also produces a flow of information needed by internal

security agencies. The Maritime Police has functions similar to a

coast guard service. The Judicial Police, responsible to the minister

of justice, acts in conjunction with the court system in investigating crimes, particularly those involving subversion and terrorism,

and preparing cases for prosecution.

Intelligence Services

The existence in Portugal of an intelligence apparatus for political surveillance and control is as old as the modern state and dates

at least from the sixteenth century. Under Salazar, however, a secret police organization of extensive and pervasive influence became

a formidable component of his authoritarian regime. The secret

police, called the International Police for the Defense of the State

(Polfcia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado—PIDE), although under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, was in fact controlled

directly by Salazar. Under revisions of the law after 1954, PIDE

officers were entitled to act as inquiring magistrates empowered to detain for trial persons suspected of crimes against the state. Suspects were routinely arrested without warrants and often held

for months without specific charges brought against them and

without access to legal assistance. Disappearance and torture were commonplace.

Agents of PIDE carried out covert operations within communist

organizations, the government-run labor unions, the armed forces,

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National Security

the universities, and the Portuguese emigre communities abroad.

During the 1960s and 1970s, PIDE directed its efforts to suppressing

opposition to the war effort in the African colonies, particularly on university campuses, and to tracking down antiregime terrorists responsible for bombing military and strategic installations. Although PIDE was renamed the General Security Directorate

(Direccao Geral de Seguranca—DGS) by Marcello Caetano's

government, it retained its old image. The abhorrence felt for it was so strong that it was abolished in Portugal the day after the

Caetano regime was toppled. Abuses by the security apparatus were

subsequently reported in detail in the Portuguese press, causing even more revulsion among the public. Outrage over the prolonged

detention and torture of suspected terrorists and opposition politicians resulted in the arrest of PIDE-DGS agents and investigations of past operations of the organization.

The lingering specter of PIDE and DGS as pillars of the

authoritarian regime in the memory of the Portuguese people

delayed the establishment of a new civilian intelligence agency for more than a decade. Following an Armenian terrorist attack on

the Embassy of Turkey in 1983, the assassination of a Palestine

Liberation Organization representative at a Socialist International conference the same year, and a number of domestic terrorist attacks, the Portuguese government became convinced of the need

for a new intelligence agency. After the passage of authorizing legislation in late 1984, the Intelligence System of the Republic of Portugal (Sistema de Informacoes da Republica Portuguesa—SIRP)

was established in 1986. SIRP was intended to be the parent body

for three separate intelligence services: the Security Intelligence

Service (Servico de InformacSes e Seguranca—SIS), the Military

Intelligence Service (Servico de InformacSes Militares—SIM), and

the Defense Strategic Intelligence Service (Servico de Informacoes

Estrategicas de Defesa—SIED). SIS, under the minister of inter- nal administration, was given the mission of gathering intelligence

to ensure internal security and to prevent sabotage, terrorism, es- pionage, and acts that could alter or destroy the constitutionally

established state of law. SIM was intended to replace the Military

Intelligence Division of the armed forces, but the transition had

not been effected as of 1993. Military intelligence continued to be

the responsibility of the chief of staff of the armed forces. Its authority was limited to gathering intelligence needed to carry out the missions of the armed forces and to guarantee military security,

although some strategic intelligence collection abroad was reportedly also conducted.

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Portugal: A Country Study

Under the 1984 legislation, SIED, reporting directly to the prime

minister, was to be responsible for producing intelligence needed

to safeguard the independence and external security of the Portuguese state. The government decided to defer the creation of

SIED, however, asserting that the limited financial resources avail- able should be dedicated to developing an effective internal security organization rather than an agency focusing on external

security. Thus, SIS was the only arm of the intelligence apparatus

operating as contemplated in the 1984 legislation. SIS functions

under considerable handicaps, employing only about eighty per- sons as of 1990. Its sole office is in Lisbon, although branches are planned for Porto, Ponta Delgada, and Funchal. SIS agents are not authorized to make searches or arrests, to intercept correspondence or tap telephones, or to intervene in normal criminal cases. Although no SIS agents are known to have been exposed to violence, they are entitled to hazardous duty pay at about 30 percent

above normal civil service scales. The 1984 security law prohibited the employment of former PIDE

agents in any Portuguese intelligence function. Accordingly, SIS was launched with few adequately qualified individuals. In spite

of a public recruiting drive, analysts estimated that it would be some

years before Portugal could boast of a domestic intelligence ser- vice staffed with fully seasoned personnel.

In light of the history of violations of civil rights by PIDE, several

bodies were formed to monitor the activities of the Portuguese in- telligence community. The Council to Oversee the Intelligence Services, composed of three deputies elected by the Assembly of the

Republic, is mandated to review the actions of the intelligence ser- vices and report its findings annually to the Assembly of the Republic. The Commission to Control Data, made up of three judges,

monitors the intelligence data center to protect individuals against

any collection of data violating their rights under the Constitution.

The Superior Intelligence Council, a twelve-member interministerial body, advises the prime minister and coordinated intelli- gence matters. Terrorist Groups

Since the transition to democratic rule was completed in 1976,

the country has been relatively free from subversive or terrorist activity threatening the maintenance of constitutional authority.

The only significant terrorist group, the Popular Forces of the 25th

of April (Forcas Populares do 25 Abril—FP-25), carried out a number of attacks between 1980 and 1986, but at no time did it pose

a major threat to the security of the state. Effective counterterrorism

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National Security

measures and the absence of public support sharply curtailed the

ability of FP-25 to sustain its campaign of violent operations against

the Portuguese government and Western and NATO missions in Portugal.

FP-25 claimed to be a workers' organization dedicated to a struggle against exploitation, misery, and repression. Its stated goals were to defeat "imperialism," to lead a "workers' assault on bourgeois power," and to achieve the violent overthrow of the Portuguese government. The FP-25 also bitterly opposed the United

States and NATO. No evidence of direct ties to other European

terrorist groups existed, although Portuguese authorities asserted

that some financial support had come from Libya. Between 1980

and 1984, most FP-25 actions involved assassinations, bombings,

and bank robberies. Beginning in 1984, the group focused its at- tacks on United States and NATO targets. Mortars were fired at the compound of the Embassy of the United States, at NATO's

IBERLANT headquarters, and at NATO ships anchored in Lisbon harbor. Bombs destroyed a number of cars owned by West

German air force personnel. FP-25 's ability to wage its terrorist

campaign was curtailed by the arrest of a large number of its adherents in June 1984, including Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who

had become a popular hero in Portugal after playing a key role in the Revolution of 1974 (see The Military Takeover of 1974, this ch.). Other obscure radical groups claimed responsibility for subsequent minor bombing attacks, but such acts of terrorism abated

in 1987. As of 1993, Carvalho was free on a conditional basis, and

the issue of a general amnesty for members of FP-25 had aroused

wide public interest. Separatist independence movements have long existed in the

Azores and Madeira archipelagoes. The main group, the Azorean

Liberation Front, has been responsible for many demonstrations

but has not been associated with clandestine activities and violence.

A newer group, the Azorean Nationalist Movement, is regarded

as illegal because Portuguese law prohibits any association advocating the independence of the Azores. The existing system of

autonomy recognized by the constitution of 1976 and subsequent

legislation have endowed the regional governments with considerable rights and gready reduced the appeal of the separatist movements.

Judicial System

Restrictions on freedom of assembly and of the press, on the rights

of association and of public protest, and on the right to strike were removed with the promulgation of the new constitution in April

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Portugal: A Country Study

1976. The constitutionally mandated Council of Social Communication, whose members are elected by the Assembly of the Republic, act as a watchdog to protect freedom of speech and access to the media. The council publicizes abuses, makes recommendations

to the Assembly of the Republic, and has enforcement powers;

however, it has never been required to exercise such powers. There

are two restrictions on civil liberties. "Fascist" organizations are prohibited by law. In addition, persons can be prosecuted for "insulting" civil or military authorities if such an "insult" is intended to undermine the rule of law. Several prosecutions have resulted

under these provisions.

The constitution of 1976 drastically altered the role of the police

to protect civil rights. It gives guidelines for criminal investigation

and treatment of suspects. The constitution specifies that no per- son can be held without trial or imprisoned without a definite sentence. Individuals cannot be deprived of citizenship for political reasons. The principle of habeas corpus is restated and is applied

without exception to both civilian criminal courts and military

tribunals. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is to be answered

by a judge within eight days. Torture and inhumane detention are made illegal. Confessions obtained under duress and any material

obtained by illegal means are declared inadmissible as evidence

in criminal proceedings. The privacy of personal correspondence

and telephone communication is also guaranteed in the constitution, and forcible entry into homes and searches without a judicial

warrant are forbidden.

Criminal Law Procedure

The Portuguese criminal justice system is organized on a national basis. The Ministry ofJustice has control over the court sys- tem, the office of the attorney general, the Judicial Police, and

prisons. The office of the attorney general has a hierarchy parallel

to that of the judiciary. Its representatives prosecute cases in each

of Portugal's judicial districts and their subdivisions. An assistant

deputy attorney general prosecutes cases before the municipal court

at the local level or municipality. At the district level, above the

municipality, the deputy attorney general represents the state before the district court, which houses a panel of one to three judges

to determine guilt or innocence and decide the sentence. Portugal has four judicial regions, each with an appeals court having appellate jurisdiction over cases tried in the district or lower

courts in its area. The districts are Lisbon, with 66 courts; Porto,

with 110 courts; Coimbra, with 80 courts; and Evora, with 60

courts. Appeals are allowed only on the basis of judicial error in

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National Security

the original proceedings. Cases tried in a district court are auto- matically reviewed after sentencing by the appeals court of the

region. The Ministry ofJustice reviews all cases and can intervene

to initiate a formal appeal. Because the appeals process is often

lengthy, bail is frequently allowed the accused during the proceeding, except in cases involving homicide, serious assault, or grand

larceny, or when it is likely that the accused will flee. Persons apprehended while committing a crime are typically held

in preventive detention and are usually not considered eligible for conditional liberty. Persons not caught in the commission of a crime

are usually given conditional liberty on submission of a bail bond

or article of value. An individual taken into custody may not be

held for more than forty-eight hours without being brought before

a prosecuting magistrate who reviews the case and determines

whether the accused person should be held in preventive detention or released on bail. Preventive detention is limited to a maximum of four months for each crime. Because of the cumbersome

and backlogged judicial system and vacant judgeships, however,

detention beyond four months is not unusual for major crimes, such

as murder or armed robbery. For this reason, judges are required

to give priority to cases of those in preventive detention.

Persons unable to afford an attorney have one appointed by the

court. Detainees are given access to their lawyers while awaiting trial. The indictments are made available to the accused and

their attorneys, and charges can be answered in briefs by the

defense attorneys. Presiding judges can dismiss a case on the basis

of a defense attorney's brief or continue the trial at their own

discretion.

A clear procedural distinction exists between arrest and trial. A panel of three judges (which do not include the prosecuting judge)

presides over cases that go to trial. A ministerial delegate assists the judges in reviewing the evidence. At the request of the accused, a jury can be used in trials for major crimes. Provision for a jury

system is a particularly significant innovation of the constitution.

The constitution reaffirms the basic guarantee of a fair trial and

stipulates that trials are to be public except when they could offend

the dignity of the victim, as in cases involving sexual abuse of chil- dren. To avoid the malpractices of the authoritarian SalazarCaetano regime, when agents of the secret police exercised the

power of magistrates, strict judicial supervision over indictments

and trial procedure is provided. An ombudsman, elected to serve a four-year term by the Assembly of the Republic, is Portugal's

chief civil and human rights officer. The ombudsman receives about

269
Portugal: A Country Study

3,500 complaints annually; the majority involve alleged maladministration by the bureaucracy.

Before the Salazar-Caetano era ended in 1974, persons accused

of offenses defined as crimes against the state could be legally detained for periods ranging from six months to three years without

being charged. Suspects convicted of crimes against the state could

be held in prison for renewable three-year terms, which could result in life imprisonment. Those considered less dangerous were exiled to an overseas territory or were obliged to post large bonds

as guarantees of acceptable conduct in the future. Acts and conspiracies of military or civilians against the government were se- verely prosecuted. Advocating or acting in favor of African

liberation movements was considered to be a political offense. Conspiring to participate in antigovernment demonstrations or strikes,

inciting others to strike, or taking part in violence associated with

a strike were punishable under similar laws. Membership in the

Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Portugues

PCP) or in any group dedicated to the violent overthrow of the

government was prohibited.

After the revolution, specific laws against the PCP, which had

been harshly suppressed and forced to operate clandestinely from

1926 to 1974, were voided, allowing the party to participate openly

in Portugal's political life. In spite of the ban on "fascist" organizations, some small extreme right-wing groups function without

interference. The only other remaining restriction on political activity bars simultaneous membership in more than one party.

Although Portugal holds no political prisoners, some of the radical leftist opponents of the regime have claimed that prosecutions

for participating in terrorist organizations are politically motivated. Among these is the 1987 prosecution of sixty-four persons sen- tenced to prison because they were members of FP-25; the most

notable of those sentenced was Carvalho, one of the leaders of the

Revolution of 1974 (see Terrorist Groups, this ch.). According to the United States Department of State's human rights reports, there

appears to be substantial evidence for the criminal charges brought

in these cases, and Carvalho 's conviction was upheld after appeal

to the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice.

Incidence of Crime

In general, the Portuguese are law-abiding people who respect

the virtues of honesty. In addition, social discontent has been kept

low by emigration, which served traditionally as a release for social pressures in both rural and urban areas. Decolonization in Africa,

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National Security

however, brought over 500,000 unemployed refugees to Portugal, some of whom became involved in crime. Some other young adults

and discharged soldiers, unemployed and unable to emigrate,

turned to crime. Nevertheless, statistics on the commission of crime

between 1984 and 1988 showed an actual reduction in most

categories. Drug offenses, however, increased from 1,154 to 1,782.

Portugal is an important transshipment point for narcotics because

of its geographic position near the North African coast and on the

air routes between South America and Western Europe. Indigenous

drug use and production are not, however, considered to be major

problems.

Violent crimes, though not unknown in Portugal, are rare. Murders are generally crimes of passion and only infrequently as- sociated with robbery. Premeditated homicide is punishable by a prison sentence of from sixteen to twenty years, although mitigating circumstances often lead to reduced terms. In 1988, out of a

total of 513 homicide arrests, 205 were for negligent homicide; 331

of the arrested received prison terms. Larceny is by far the most common form of crime. In 1988 over

41 ,000 thefts of all kinds were recorded. They included 12,800 thefts under aggravated circumstances, 4,000 armed or violent thefts,

7,400 cases of breaking and entering, and 5,300 automobile thefts. In 1988 nearly 4,000 cases of fraud and more than 17,000 cases involving bad checks were reported, although few of the latter result- ed in court trials. There were 121 rapes and 165 other sexual

offenses. A total of 10,800 persons were tried for crimes against

the person, although only 73 of these were classified as serious

attacks. Penal System

The Portuguese penal system is under the control of the minister of justice. Portugal had thirty-nine civilian prisons and three

military prisons as of 1988. The civilian prisons included twelve

central prisons, twenty-four regional prisons, and three special

institutions. Their total capacity was 7,633, and the actual population as of December 31, 1987, was 8,361. Of this total, 6,964 were adult males, 475 were adult females, and 922 were youths

under the age of twenty-one. There were 186 military prisoners. The

prison population had remained fairly stable between 1984 and

1988. By far the largest institutions were the central prisons, which

had a total capacity of 4,870. The regional prison capacity was

1,758; the special prison, 706; and the military prisons, 299.

Seven reformatories held 457 male youths, and 211 female juveniles were detained at three institutions. The remainder were

271
Portugal: A Country Study

assigned to observation and social action centers at Lisbon, Porto,

and Coimbra.

The average time served in prisons by adult males is about six months. The incarceration ratio in 1990 is 83 per 100,000 population, comparable to the ratios in neighboring Spain and France

but only one-fifth that of the United States. The type of prison regime to which an offender is sentenced is designated by the district punishment court upon conviction. Youthful offenders are given opportunities to learn trades. The mastery

of a trade while in prison and good behavior are considered in reducing time spent in prison. Individuals convicted three times of the same crime are considered a danger to society and are not usually

eligible for parole. Unlike other prisoners, who might be allowed

to do farm work, they could be kept to a strict prison regime. All prisoners earn money for their work while in prison, and work is considered a necessary part of the rehabilitation process. Occasional complaints of individual mistreatment by police and

prison authorities are investigated by the ombudsman. In 1985 a number of FP-25 prisoners engaged in periodic hunger strikes and

other protests against prison conditions. A stricter regime was imposed on those remaining after ten FP-25 members accused of com- mon crimes escaped from Lisbon's main penitentiary. The United

States Department of State's human rights reports assert that no

independent evidence has appeared confirming the inadequacy of

prison conditions.

* * * Among various studies analyzing Portugal's national security

objectives, a particularly incisive treatment is "Portuguese Defense

Policy," by Alvaro Vasconcelos. Appraising the armed forces' modernization program since the early 1980s, Vasconcelos also dis- cusses Portugal's changing goals during several phases of its membership in the NATO alliance. Portuguese Defense and Foreign Policy

since Democratization, edited by Kenneth Maxwell, contains a number of valuable essays on Portugal's defense policy. A full account

of the involvement of the Portuguese armed forces in the political events of 1974-75 can be found in Douglas Porch's The Portuguese

Armed Forces and the Revolution. Richard Alan Hodgson Robinson's

Contemporary Portugal addresses the relationship between the politi- cal and military leadership during the Salazar and Caetano eras and through the revolution. Works by Tom Gallagher and Thomas C. Bruneau add observations on the interaction between the

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National Security

military and civilian politicians into the 1980s. The Portuguese

justice system and the status of civil rights are briefly surveyed in the United States Department of State's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Data on the size, organization, and armaments of the Portuguese

armed forces can be found in The Military Balance, 1992-93, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, supplemented by information in Jane's Fighting Ships, DMS

Market Intelligence Reports, and occasional reports in the Portuguese

press. Jane's NATO Handbook, 1990-91 contains additional information on the Portuguese defense establishment and on Portuguese

links to NATO and IBERLANT. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

273

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Population, Selected Years, 1801-1992

3 Estimated Population by District and Autonomous Region,

December 1989

4 Selected Economic Indicators, 1960-73 and 1981-90

5 Government Transactions, 1973, 1984, and 1990

6 Composition of Labor Force by Sector, 1960, 1973, and 1990

7 Grain Crop Yields of Selected European Countries, 1990

8 Collective Production Units by District, 1979

9 Foreign Trade by Country, 1985 and 1990

10 External Public Debt and Debt-Service Indicators, Selected

Years, 1980-90

11 Parliamentary Election Results, 1975-91

12 Major Army Equipment, 1992

13 Major Naval Equipment, 1992

14 Major Air Force Equipment, 1992

275

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches

3.3 feet 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2 ) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 0.26 gallons

2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

1.8 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) and add 32

Table 2. Population, Selected Years, 1801-1992 1 (in thousands)

Year Population Year Population

1801 3,115 1950 8,510 1864 4,287 1960 8,889 1878 4,669 1970 8,663 1900 5,447 1981 9,776 1920 6,080 1989 2 10,337 1930 6,802 1992 2 10,448 1940 7,755

1 Includes the population of the Azores and Madeira.

2 Estimate.

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Portugal: A Country Study

Table 3. Estimated Population by District and Autonomous

Region, December 1989

(in thousands)

Administrative Division Population

Districts Aveiro 674.4 Beja 173.2 Braga 784.8 Braganca 182.8

Castelo Branco 218.7 Coimbra 446.7 Evora 171.5 Faro 344.9 Guarda 191.8

Leiria

.

436.5 Lisbon 2,130.6

Portalegre 134.9 Porto 1,695.1 Santarem 459.0

Setubal 817.9 Viana do Castelo 266.9

Vila Real 259.8 Viseu 419.4 Autonomous regions Azores 253.1 Madeira 275.0 TOTAL 10,337.0

Source: Based on information from Portugal, Instituto Nacional de Estatfstica, Estatisticas Demogrdficas: Continente, Acores, e Madeira, 1989, Lisbon, 1990, 34.

Table 4. Selected Economic Indicators, 1960-73 and 1981-90

(in average annual percentage changes)

1960-73 1981-90 Gross domestic product (GDP) 6.9 2.7 Industrial production 9.0 4.8 Private consumption 6.5 2.7 Employment -0.5 1.4 Labor productivity * 7.4 1.3 28.6 10.1 4.0 17.9

* GDP growth rate/employment growth. Source: Based on information from European Community, Commission, Directorate- General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Economy, No. 46, Brussels, December 1990, 126, Table 1; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development, Economic Surveys: Portugal, 1991-1992, Statistical Annex, Paris, 1992,

112.

278
Appendix

Table 5. Government Transactions, 1973, 1984, and 1990

(as a percentage of GDP) 1

1973 1984 1990 Current account Revenues

Direct taxes and social 10.3 17.7 20.0

Indirect taxes , . 10.8 15.2 15.2 Other 1.6 1.7 4.0 Total revenues 22.7 34.6 39.2 Expenditures

13.2 14.4 16.2

1.0 7.6 1.5 4.8 13.6 13.4

0.4 7.1 8.2 Other 0.1 — 0.9 42.7 40.2

Capital account Revenues . . . n.a. 0.3 1.3 Expenditures Investment 2.3 2.6 3.7 0.9 1.6 2.0

3.2 4.2 5.7 Overall balance 2

. . . n.a. - 12.0 -5.4

Lending capacity ( + ) or

1.4 - 13.4 -6.3 —means negligible, n.a. —not available.

1 GDP—gross domestic product.

2 Includes financial transactions and other adjustments. Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- ment, Economic Survey: Portugal, 1981, Paris, 1981, 23, Table 11; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Survey: Portugal, 1988-89, Paris, 1989, 44, Table 15; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- ment, Economic Survey: Portugal, 1991-1992, Paris, 1992, 55, Table 13.

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Portugal: A Country Study

Table 6. Composition of Labor Force by Sector, 1960,

1973, and 1990

I960 1973 1990

Sector Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage

Agriculture,

forestry, and

fishing 1,363 43.6 812 27.8 847 17.8 Industry, including construction... 897 28.7 1,042 35.6 1,655 34.8

Services 866 27.7 1,072 36.6 2,254 47.4 TOTAL * 3,126 100.0 2,925 100.0 4,756 100.0

* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Portugal, Secretaria-General da Assembleia Nacional,

III Piano deFomento para 1968-1973, Lisbon, 1967, 321; Portugal, Presidencia do

Conselho, IV Piano de Fomento, 1974-1979, I, Lisbon, 1973, 75-76, Tables VII and XV; and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Economic Outlook: Historical Statistics, 1960-1990, Paris, 1992, 40-41.

Table 7. Grain Crop Yields of Selected European Countries, 1990

(in kilograms per hectare)

Crop Portugal Greece Spain West Germany France

Cereals 1,731 2,769 2,488 5,790 6,205 Wheat 1,502 1,758 2,373 6,615 6,487 Rice 4,598 6,250 6,397 5,737

Barley 1,171 1,739 2,160 5,432 6,499 Corn 2,462 8,763 6,399 6,789 5,808

Source: Based on information from United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,

Yearbook: Production, 1990, 44, Rome, 1991, 67-80, Tables 15, 16, 17, 19, and 20.

Table 8. Collective Production Units by District, 1979

Average Area

Districts Number of Units Total Area of Units * per Unit *

Evora 165 392,000 2,376

Beja 80 284,258 3,553

Setubal 78 92,000 1,179

Portalegre 61 257,000 4,213 Santarem 51 43,957 862

Lisbon, Castelo Branco, and Faro 14 n > 062 790 PORTUGAL 449 1,080,277 2,406

* In hectares.

Source: Based on information from International Labour Organisation, Employment and Basic Needs in Portugal, Geneva, 1979, 142, Table 71.

280
Appendix

Table 9. Foreign Trade by Country, 1985 and 1990

(in percentages)

Country 1985 1990

Exports, f.o.b. 1 European Community

Britain 14.6 12.1 West Germany 13.7 16.7 France 12.7 15.5 Spain 4.1 13.3

Italy 3.9 4.0 Other 13.5 12.1 Total European Community 2 52.5 73 7 United States - 9.2 4.8 Previous Escudo Area 3 3.9 3.4 OPEC 4 2.5 0.6 Other 21.9 17.5 Total exports 100.0 100.0 Imports, c.i.f. 5 European Community

West Germany 11.5 14.3 France 8.0 11.5

Britain 7.5 7.5 Spain 7.4 14.4

Italy 5.2 10.0 Other 6.3 11.4 Total European Community 45 9 59 \ United States 9.7 3.9 Previous Escudo Area 1.2 0.4 OPEC 17.3 6.8 Other 25.9 19.8 Total imports 100 100

1 f.o.b. —free on board.

2 Including figures for Spain, not yet a member.

3 Former Portuguese colonies in Africa.

* Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.

5 c.i.f. —cost, insurance, and freight. Source: Based on information from Bank of Portugal, Report of the Directors and Economic and Financial Survey for the Year 1990, Statistical Appendix, Lisbon, 1991, Tables

2.2.1 and 2.2.2.

281
Portugal: A Country Study

Table 10. External Public Debt and Debt-Service Indicators, Selected Years, 1980-90

1980 1982 1985 1987 1990

External debt (in millions of United States dollars) .... 8,978 13,464 16,682 18,464 18,434

External debt as a percentage of reserves 1 .... 56.3 110.5 167.2 116.6 72.2 External debt as a

36.3 58.8 80.4 50.3 28.9 Debt service (interest and

amortization) as a percentage

of current account credits . . . 15.2 27.0 37.0 30.6 16.7

Interest payments as a

3.0 5.6 6.5 3.3 2.9 3

1 Reserves consist of gross foreign assets of the Bank of Portugal and the Treasury, with gold valued

at market prices.

2 GDP—gross domestic product.

3 1989. Source: Based on information from Bank of Portugal, Annual Report, Lisbon, various years.

Table 11. Parliamentary Election Results, 1975-91

1975 1976 1979 1980

Seats Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Percentage

Party of Votes of Votes of Votes of Votes PS 1 ... . 115 37.9 107 35.0 74 27.4 74 27.8 PSD 2

. . 80 26.4 73 24.0 128 45.2 134 47.5 CDS 3

. . 16 7.6 42 15.9 4 4 4 4 PCP 5

. . 30 12.5 40 14.6 47 18.8 41 16.9 PRD 6

. 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

1983 1985 1987 1991

Seats Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Percentage Seats Percentage

Party of Votes of Votes of Votes of Votes PS . 101 36.3 57 20.8 60 22.3 72 29.3 PSD . . . . 75 27.0 88 29.9 148 50.2 135 50.4 CDS .. . 30 12.4 22 10.0 4 4.4 5 4.4 PCP . . . 44 18.2 38 15.5 31 12.2 17 8.8 PRD . . 7 7 45 17.9 7 4.9 0.6

1 Partido Socialista (Socialist Party). The PS was in an electoral coalition, the Republican and Socialist Front (Frente Republicana e Socialista—FRS), with several smaller parties for the 1980 election.

2 Partido Social Democrata (Social Democrat Party).

3 Partido do Centro Democratico Social (Party of the Social Democratic Center).

4 The PSD, the CDS, and two smaller parties formed an electoral coalition, the Democratic Alliance (Alianca Democratica—AD), for the 1979 and 1980 elections.

5 Partido Comunista Portugues (Portuguese Communist Party). The PCP formed electoral coalitions with other leftist groups for parliamentary elections beginning in 1979: the United People's Alliance (Alianca Povo Unido—APU) for the 1980, 1983, and 1985 elections; and the Democratic Unitary

Coalition (Coligagao Democratico Unitario—CDU) for the 1987 and 1991 elections.

6 Partido Renovador Democratico (Party of Democratic Renovation).

7 The PRD was not established until 1985.

282
Appendix

Table 12. Major Army Equipment, 1992

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory Tanks M-47 . . . United States 43 M-48A5 -do- 86 Armored vehicles -do- 172 Chaimite V-200 79

Saladin reconnaissance vehicles . . . Britain 8

Ferret Mk 4 scout cars -do- 30 AML 60 armored cars . . . France 40

Self-propelled artillery 155mm M-109A2 howitzers 6 Towed artillery 105mm M-101 -do- 54 105mm M-56 pack -do- 24

24 155mm M-114 howitzers United States 40

Coastal artillery 150mm, 152mm, and 234mm . . Britain and other 27 Mortars 107mm M-30 58

1 90mm i1 onuu

Antitank weapons 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles United States 240 TOW missiles -do- 48 SS-11 wire-guided missiles . . . France 31

-do- 45 Air defense weapons

34 20mm Rh-202 30 322 Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles Britain 12 Chaparral surface-to-air missiles United States 5 Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 55; and Jane's NATO Handbook, 1990-91, Coulsdon, Surrey, United Kingdom, 1990,

461.

283
Portugal: A Country Study

Table 13. Major Naval Equipment, 1992

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory

Frigates Vasco da Gama class (MEKO-200) Germany 3 Joao Belo class France 4

Baptista de Andrade class Spain 4 Joao Continho class Germany and Spain 6 Submarines

Albacora (Daphne) class France 3 Coastal patrol vessels Sao Roque class (converted minesweepers) Portugal 2 Cacine class (large) -do- 10 Dom Aleixo class -do- 2 Albatroz class -do- 6 Amphibious vessels Bombarda class LCT (landing craft, tank) -do- 3 LDM-400 class LCM (landing craft, mechanized) -do- 6 LDM-100 class LCM -do- 3 Source: Based on information from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93, London, 1992, 473-80.

Table 14. Major Air Force Equipment, 1992

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory

Fighter- ground attack A-7P Corsair (including six training versions) United States 38 Alpha Jet France and Germany 10

Fiat G-91 Italy 29 Maritime reconnaissance P-3P Orion United States 6 Transport C-130H Hercules -do- 6 CASA C-212 Aviocar Spain 26

Falcon 20 France 3 Falcon 50 -do- 3 Liaison Reims-Cessna FTB-337G -do- 12 Training

Epsilon TB-30 -do- 18 Cessna T-37C United States 23 Lockheed T-33A -do- 7 Northrop T-38 Talon -do- 12 RF-10 Aerospatiale France 2 Helicopters SA-330 Puma -do- 10 SA-316 Alouette III -do- 35

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-93, London, 1992, 56.

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"The New Parliament in Portugal," Legislative Studies

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Portugal: From Monarchy to Pluralist Democracy. Boulder,

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"Portugal's Parliament: An Organizational Analysis of

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Portugal: A Country Study

Porch, Douglas. The Portuguese Armed Forces and the Revolution. London: Croom Helm, 1977.

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Chapter 5

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300
Glossary

conto—See escudo.

Council of Europe—Founded in 1949 to foster parliamentary

democracy, social and economic progress, and unity among

its member states. Membership is limited to those European

countries that respect the rule of law and the fundamental human rights and freedoms of all those living within their boundaries. As of 1993, its membership consisted of twenty-seven

European countries.

d'Hondt method—Also known as the highest-average method of

determining the allocation of seats to political parties after an

election. It was devised by the Belgian Victor d'Hondt to be

used in electoral systems based on proportional representation. In addition to Portugal, Austria, Belgium, Finland, and Switzerland have adopted the method. Under this procedure, voters do not choose a candidate but vote for a party, each of which

has published a list of candidates. The party winning the most

votes in a constituency is awarded the area's first seat, which

goes to the candidate at the top of the winning party's list. The

total vote of this party is then divided by two, and this amount

is compared with the totals of other parties. The party with

the greatest number of votes at this point receives the next seat

to be awarded. Each time a party wins a seat, its total is divided by the number of seats it has won plus one. This process

continues until all the seats in a constituency are awarded. The

d'Hondt method slightly favors large parties. Because there is no minimum threshold for winning a seat, however, small parties can also elect representatives.

escudo—Basic Portuguese currency unit, consists of 100 centavos. 1,000 escudos are a conto. The exchange rate averaged 27.5

escudos = US$1 in 1975; 53.0 escudos = US$1 in 1980; 170.4

escudos = US$1 in 1985; 144.0 escudos = US$1 in 1988; 157.5

escudos = US$1 in 1989; 142.5 escudos = US$1 in 1990; 144.5

escudos = US$1 in 1991; and 135.0 escudos = US$1 in 1992.

European Community (EC—also commonly called the Community)—The EC comprises three communities: the European

Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic

Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). Each community is a legally distinct

body, but since 1967 they have shared common governing in- stitutions. The EC forms more than a framework for free trade

301
Portugal: A Country Study

and economic cooperation: the signatories to the treaties governing the communities have agreed in principle to integrate their

economies and ultimately to form a political union. Belgium,

France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal

Republic of Germany (West Germany) are charter members

of the EG. Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined on January

1, 1973; Greece became a member on January 1, 1981; and

Portugal and Spain entered on January 1, 1986.

European Currency Unit (ECU)—Instituted in 1979, the ECU is the unit of account of the EC (q.v.). The value of the ECU

is determined by the value of a basket that includes the cur- rencies of all EC member states. In establishing the value of

the basket, each member's currency receives a share that reflects the relative strength and importance of the member's economy.

On September 30, 1992, one ECU was equivalent to US$1 .40. European Economic Community (EEC)—See EC.

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—Founded in 1961,

EFTA aims at supporting free trade among its members and

increasing the liberalization of trade on a global basis, but particularly within Western Europe. In 1993 the organization's

member states were Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

gross domestic product (GDP)—The total value of goods and ser- vices produced by the domestic economy during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by adding the value contributed

by each sector of the economy in the form of profits, compensation to employees, and depreciation (consumption of capital). Most GDP usage in this book is based on GDP at factor

cost. Real GDP is the value of GDP when inflation has been

taken into account.

gross national product (GNP)—Obtained by adding GDP (q. v.

)

and the income received from abroad by residents less payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP valued at market prices is used in this book. Real GNP is the value of GNP

when inflation has been taken into account.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the

World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations (UN) that takes responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments.

The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members when they experience balance-of-payment difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients.

liberation theology—An activist movement led by Roman Catholic

302
Glossary

clergy who trace their inspiration to Vatican Council II (1965),

where some church procedures were liberalized, and the Sec- ond Latin American Bishops' Conference in Medellm (1968),

which endorsed greater direct efforts to improve the lot of the

poor. Advocates of liberation theology—sometimes referred to as "liberationists" —work mainly through Christian Base Communities (Comunidades Eclesiasticas de Base—CEBs). Members of CEBS meet in small groups to reflect on scripture and

discuss its meaning in their lives. They are introduced to a radical interpretation of the Bible, one that employs Marxist ter- minology to analyze and condemn the wide disparities between

the wealthy elite and the impoverished masses in most underdeveloped countries. This reflection often leads members to or- ganize to improve their living standards through cooperatives

and civic improvement projects.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

(OECD)—Established in 1961 to replace the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the OECD is an international organization composed of the industrialized market econ- omy countries (twenty-four full members as of 1993). It seeks

to promote economic and social welfare in member countries,

as well as in developing countries, by providing a forum in

which to formulate and to coordinate policies.

rotativismo—The alternation of political factions at regular inter- vals with little or no change to the political system as a whole.

single market—The Single European Act of 1987 committed the

EC (q.v.) to gradually reduce restrictions so that by the end

of 1992 the EC would constitute a single market in which the

free movement of goods, persons, and capital was guaranteed.

VAT—Value-added tax. A tax applied to the additional value creat- ed at a given stage of production and calculated as a percentage of the difference between the product value at that stage

and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs.

The VAT is the primary form of indirect taxation applied in

the EEC (q.v.), and it is the basis of each country's contribution to the community budget.

Western European Union (WEU)—Founded in 1948 to facilitate West European cooperation in economic, social, cultural, and

defense matters. Reactivated in 1984 to concentrate on the

defense and disarmament concerns of its nine members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

Portugal, Spain, and Britain), the WEU is headed by a council consisting of its members' ministers of foreign affairs and

303
Portugal: A Country Study

defense. The council meets twice a year; lower-level WEU entities meet with greater frequency.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee

Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the

primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to fur- nish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier

terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through

loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the

growth of productive private enterprises in less developed^eountries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD

hold the same positions in the IFC. The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their

capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the IMF (q.v.).

304
Index

abortion, xxxiv, 82, 99, 204

Abrilada revolt (1824), 44 Accao Nacional Popular (ANP). See National Popular Action ACDA. See United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

AD. See Democratic Alliance Afonsine Ordinances, 22 Afonso (duke of Braganca), 22, 23 Afonso II, 12; landownership under, 16; royal patrimony under, 16 Afonso III, 12, 13 Afonso IV, 18, 19 Afonso V, 22, 23; explorations under, 26; Moroccan campaigns of, 26 Afonso VI, 37 Afonso Henriques: background of, 9; be- comes king, 10; land distribution by,

12; political organization under, 13-16;

religious administration under, 14-15,

96; royal council of, 13; settler communities under, 12; social organization under, 13-16; territorial administration under, 14; territorial enlargement by, 10-12

afraneesados, 43

Africa, 213-14; armed forces in, xxv, 60, 227-34; decolonization of, xxvii, 233; emigration to, 78; exploration of coast

of, 25-26; exploration of interior of, 48-49; partition of, 49; Portuguese liv- ing in, 78; returnees from, xxviii, 73,

75, 78-79, 95, 122, 136-37, 177

Africa, North: relations with, 218, 238

African campaigns, 171, 213-14, 230,

263; arms supplied for, 232; deaths in, 228, 229; military morale in, 229; opposition to, 230-31

African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC),

213-14, 228 AFSOUTH. See Allied Land Forces Southern Europe

agrarian reform, 143-44, 174, 209 Agrarian Reform Law (1975), 143 Agrarian Reform Law (1988), 144

agricultural: development, 18, 40; estates, 91, 124, 184; labor, 16, 143; policy,

144; prices, 144; production, xxxii, 140, 142; zones, 140-41

Agricultural Institute, 104

agricultural products (see also under in- dividual crops): Brazilian, 38; exports of, 156; grain, 141; tree crops, 70, 140,

141, 142

agriculture: decollectivization of, 116, 143-44, 209; in early history, 4, 5, 6,

7, 8, 16; employment in, xxxii, 134,

136, 137; expansion of, 38, 40, 120; ex- port crops, 141; northern, 140-41; as percentage of gross domestic product,

120, 123, 139; productivity of, xxxii, 116, 140; suitability for, 70 AIP. See Portuguese Industrial Association Air College, 249

air force, 238, 246-49; bases, 246; conscripts, 246, 252; downsizing of, 249;

insignia, 253; materiel, 246-48; mission of, 246; modernization plan, 249; number of personnel, 239, 246; origins

of, 246; pilot shortage in, 249; ranks,

253; reorganized, 223; in Spanish Civil War, 246; spending on, 256; training, 249; uniforms, 253; in World War I, 246

Air Force Academy, 249, 253

Alans, 6 Albuquerque, Afonso de, 31-32

Alcalar necropolis, 4

aldeamentos, 221

Alentejo, 10, 13, 16, 67-68; capture of, 10, 12; farmers in, 67, 91, 141; land- owners in, 88, 204; topography of, 67, 140, 141 Alexander VI (pope), 32 Alfonso VI, 9 Alfonso VII, 9, 10 Alfonso VIII of Castile, 12 Alfonso XI, 19 Algarve, 7, 12, 67, 68; geography of, 69,

141; Muslim influence in, 7, 67; topog- raphy of, 140; tourism in, 67

Alianca Democraca (AD). See Democratic

Alliance Alianca Seguradora, 155 305
Portugal: A Country Study

Allied Land Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), 243 Almeida, Antonio Jose de, 52 Almeida, Francisco de, 31 Amadora: population of, 74 Amaral, Diogo Freitas do, xxvi, xxxi, 201; as presidential candidate, 180 Amarante, count of, 44

Americas: emigration to, 77, 134, 160; in- terest in, 32

Anchieta, Jose, 34

Andalusia, 4 Andeiro, Count, 19 Angediva Island, 31 Angola, 49, 227-28; armed resistance by,

60, 170, 227; determination to retain, 59; exploration of, 48; immigrants

from, 95, 136; independence for, 124,

175, 214, 228; made a province, 60; oil in, 60; Portuguese deaths in, 228; set- tlement of, 75, 225; troops assigned to, 228 ANP. See National Popular Action

anticlerical laws, 51, 53, 97, 104; reac- tion to, xxv; reversed, 98 Aqueduct of Free Waters, 39 Aqueduto das Aguas Livres. See Aqueduct

of Free Waters

Arabic language: influence of, on Portuguese, 8, 67

Argentina: emigration to, 77 Arguin: factory at, 25; as slave entrepot, 25 armed forces {see also military), xxiii, xxv-xvi, xxvii, xxviii, 239-56; African missions of, 60, 227-34; autonomy of, 202; breakdown in discipline of, 233;

chief of staff of, 239; civilian authority

over, 239; commander in chief of, 239; conditions in, 249-53; under constitution of 1976, 182, 234-36; deaths of, in African colonial wars, 228, 229;

decline in prestige of, 250; demobilization of, 136; dissension in, 170-71; downsizing of, 223, 249; historical background, 224-29; missions of, 224, 257, 261; morale of, 229, 250; in New

State, 225-27; pay and benefits in, 250; personnel strength of, 223, 239, 249-50; political role of, 202-3, 229-

36; promotions in, 250; purge of, 234; reorganization of, 225; uniforms,

ranks, and insignia of, 253-56

Armed Forces Movement (MFA), xxiii, xxvi, 61, 124, 167, 172, 173, 198, 213, 232; coup by, 171; factions in, xxvii, 233; friction of, with Junta of National Salvation, 233; reorganization of, 125 army, 241-44; assignments in, 243; conscripts, 241, 243; created, 225; demobilization of, 241; downsizing of, 249;

factions in, 230; insignia, 253; liberals

in, 43; materiel of, 244; military regions

of, 241; military zones of, 241; number of personnel in, 239, 241, 249;

officers, 241; organization of, 241;

ranks, 253; reorganized, 42; reserves, 243; revolution by, 43-44; service obligation, 252; spending on, 256, 256;

training in, 241, 243; uniforms, 253

Arriaga, Kaulza de, 232

artisans: under Joao I, 22; and republicanism, 50 Asian empire, 31-32; deterioration of, 36 Assembly of the Armed Forces, 173 Assembly of the Republic, xxviii, 187-90; appointments by, 188, 190-91, 266, 268, 269; committees of, 189; constit- uencies of, 188-89; elections for, 196; members of, 188; popular view of, 189-90; power of, 188; sessions of, 189;

stability of, 208; Standing Committee

of, 189; terms of office in, 188 Associacao Industrial Portuesa (AIP). See Portuguese Industrial Association

Association of the 25th of April, 236

attorney general, 268

austerity measures, xxxii, 177, 179

auto-da-fe, 33 Aveiro, 74; industry in, 146

Avis, House of, 3, 19-23 Azevedo, Jose Baptista Pinheiro de, 175 Azorean Liberation Front, 267 Azorean Nationalist Movement, 267

Azores, 70, 73; autonomy of, 194; British use of, 216; discovered, 25; govern- ment of, 195; Lajes Air Base in, 160, 216-17, 223, 226, 238, 259; legislative assembly in, 195; minister of the republic in, 194-95; powers of, 194, 195;

separatist movement in, 262; strategic importance of, 217, 257, 260

Baixa Pombalina, 40 306
Index

balance of payments, 121, 158-59; under

Salazar, 118

Baldaia, Afonso, 25 Balsemao, Francisco Pinto, 178; as prime

minister, 178, 200; resignation of, 179 Banco Borges e Irmao, 155 Banco Comercial Portugues (BCP), 154 Banco de Fomento e Exterior, 155 Banco Internacional de Credito (BIC), 154 Banco Nacional Ultramarino, 155 Banco Portugues de Investimento (BPI), 154 Banco Portugues do Atlantico, 155 Banco Totta e Acores, 155

bandeirantes, 38 banking {see also financial sector), 153-55;

foreign investment in, 161 Bank of Portugal, 126, 153; foreign re- serves of, 158

banks: commercial, 126; competition among, 126; control of, by elite class, 118; denationalization of, 128; foreign, 153; influence of, 118; nationalized,

xxiii, 124, 125, 127, 153, 174, 211;

privatization of, xxxiii, 153; problems

in, 153 Banque Nationale de Paris, 154

Baptists, 102

Barclays Bank, 154

Battle of Alcacer do Sal (1217), 12

Battle of Alfarrobeira, 23

Battle of Aljubarrota, 20-21

Battle of Atoleiros, 20

Battle of Cerneja, 10

Battle of Lourinha (1808), 42

Battle of Lys (1918), 225

Battle of Navas de Tolosa (1212), 12

Battle of Salado (1340), 19 Bay of Arguin, 25 BCP. See Banco Comercial Portugues

Beatriz (princess), 19 Beira Alta, 69

Beira Beixa, 69

Beira Litoral, 69, 140

Beira province, 67, 140

Beja, 73; expropriations of land in, 143 Beja Air Base, 248

Belgium: Portuguese guestworkers in, 79 Belmira Martins, Maria, 125

Benedictines: monasteries of, 12; regional administration by, 15 Benguela, 48

Beresford, William Carr, 42, 43

Berlin Conference (1884-85), 49; rose- colored map, 49 BIC. See Banco Internacional de Credito Bloco Central. See Central Bloc Bonaparte, Napoleon, 41-42, 225 book publishing, 212 Borba Gato, Manuel, 38 Borneo: exploration of, 32 BPI. See Banco Portugues de Investimento Braga, 74; industry in, 146 Braga, archbishop of, 17 Braga, Teofilo, 51 Braganca (district), 74

Braganca, House of, 3; established, 22, 36

brain drain, 116, 127-28; analysis of, 127; demographic distribution of, 127-28

Branco, Aresta, 52

Bravia, 261

Brazil: attempt by Dutch to take over, 37; colonization of, 32, 75; development of, 38-39; discovery of, 28; emigration to, 127, 134; evangelization in, 33-34; im- migrants from, 95, 96; independence

of, declared, 44; investment from, 161, 217; investment in, 217; relations with, 217-18

Britain: alliance with, 21, 216, 225, 237; blockade of France by, 41; commercial

activity of, in Asia, 36; investment by,

160, 161; Portuguese guestworkers in, 79; relations with, 37, 38; tourists from,

150; trade with, 38-39, 157; ultimatum

of 1890, 49-50 Bucaco Mountains, 42 bureaucracy (see also civil service): under Joao I, 22; in Revolution of 1974,

xxxiii; under Salazar, xxxiii Burgundy, House of, 3 business industrial class, 65, 86, 88-89,

204; emergence of, 88

Cabral, Pedro Alvares, 28

Cacilhas drydocks, 69

Cadiz: ancient trading post at, 5 Caetano, Marcello Jose das Neves, xxv, 60-61, 120, 224; background of, 61; censorship under, 211; discontent with, 65-66, 203; economic policy of, 61;

exiled, 171; military under, 231; political parties under, 197; as prime minister, 60, 170 307
Portugal: A Country Study

Cahora Bassa hydroelectric power plant, 214 Caixa Geral de Depositos, 126, 155 Camacho, Manuel Brito, 52 Camerte, Paulo, 33 Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses (CP),

126, 152 Camoes, Luis de, 21 Canada: emigration to, 77, 134 Cao, Diogo, 26 CAP. See Common Agricultural Policy

Cape Bojador, 25 Capelo, Hermenegildo, 48-49 Cape of Good Hope, 26 Cape St. Catherine, 26 Cape Verde, 26; independence for, 214 Cape Verde Islands: discovered, 25

capital: account, 121; expenditures, 131;

flight, 117; formation, 122; repatriation

of, 158

captaincies, 32

Captains' Movement, 232 Cardoso, Augusto, 49

Carlos I, 50

Carlucci, Frank, 217 Carmona, Oscar Fragoso, 54; as presi- dent, 54, 117, 225

Carneiro, Francisco Sa , xxvi, 178; death

of, xxviii, 178, 200; as prime minister,

xxviii, 178, 200

Carthaginians: conquest by, 5 Carvalho, Otelo Saraivade, 172, 232; ar- rested, 234, 267; convicted, 270 Carvalho Melo, Sebastiao Jose de, 39

Castelo Branco, 74

Castile, 4 Catalan people: rebellion by, 36

Catholic Church, Roman: disestablish- ment of, 51, 99; elite class in, 99; impact of revolution on, 98-99; influence

of, xxxiv-xxxv, 99, 204; land owned

by, 16, 17, 85, 97; middle class in, 206;

official separation of, from state, 96, 98-99; political role of, 203-4; power

of, 97; principles of, 98; relations with, 97; role of, 96-103, 108; under Salazar, 55, 58, 98; schools controlled by,

98, 103; social welfare under, 208

Catholicism, Roman: decline of, 99; humanization of, 102; introduction of, 96;

saints in, 100

Catholic University, 107 Cavaco Silva, Anfbal, xxix, xxxi, 208,

239; characteristics of, 208; economy

under, 161; goals of, 208; popularity of, 209-10; as prime minister, 168, 179, 180, 186, 200; support for, 208, 210 CCP. See Portuguese Confederation of Commerce

CDS. See Party of the Social Democratic

Center

Celebes: exploration of, 32

Celtic peoples, 5 censorship: abolished, 171, 211; under

Salazar, 169, 210-11

census of 1864, 73 Central Bloc (Bloco Central), 179, 200

Centralcer. See Central de Cervejas

Central de Cervejas (Centralcer), 126

Cerejeira, Manuel Goncalves, 98

Ceuta, 24, 26

Ceylon: Jesuits in, 33 CGTP-IN. General Confederation of Portuguese Workers-National Inter- sindical Chamber of Deputies, 44, 45, 47 Chamber of Peers, 45 Chamber of Senators, 47 Champalimaud, 126 Chase Manhattan Bank, 154 Chaves Rosa, Jose, 125

children: government subsidies for, 109;

illegitimacy of, 80, 82; school atten- dance of, xxxiv, 108 China: factories in, 32; Jesuits in, 33; Macau under, 195; materiel from, for African insurgents, 232; military train- ing by, of African insurgents, 229;

trade with, 31

Christianity {see also under individual denominations): conversion to, 6

Christians: Reconquest by, 8-9, 10, 12, 13 Christians, New. See Marranos

chromium, 59

churches: built in Brazil, 33; village, 100 Church of England, 102 Cimentos de Portugal (Cimpor), 126 Cimpor. See Cimentos de Portugal CIP. See Confederation of Portuguese In- dustry

citanias (Roman towns), 6

Citicorp, 154

civil liberties: restrictions on, 268

civil service (see also bureaucracy), 191-92; employment in, 150, 192; middle class 308
Index

in, 206; modernization of, 192; profes- sionalization of, 51; professors as employees of, 107; proliferation ofjobs in, 122, 192; reform of, 192; selection for employment in, 192

civil war, 53

clergy: categories of, 15; disputes of, with

nobility, 16; in early history, 15; land owned by, 16; privileges of, 15

climate, 4, 69; rainfall, 4 CNP. See Companhia Nacional de Petro- qufmica

coal, 149

coastline, 66

Cochin, 31; Jesuits in, 33 Code of Military Justice, 250 Coimbra, 10, 13; French sack of, 42; population of, 74

collectivization, xxvii, 91, 143, 174

Colonial Act of 1930, 59-60

colonies {see also under individual colonies): Asian, 32; development in, 58; estab- lishment of, 67; as factor in economy,

xxiv, 119; granted independence, xxvii, 124, 172, 213; investment in, 121; policies in, 226-27; relations with, 214; self- supporting, 59-60

colonies, African, 25-26, 48-49, 265; de- termination to retain, xxv; emigration

to, 78; immigrants from, 95-96; in- dependence gained by, xxvii, 78, 213; independence struggle in, 119; Por- tuguese living in, 78; returnees from,

xxviii, 95 commerce, 150-52; employment in, 150; middle class in, 206; retail, 150 Commission for Equality and Women's

Rights {see also Commission on the Sta- tus of Women), xxxv, 83 Commission on the Status of Women {see also Commission for Equality and

Women's Rights), 83 Commission to Control Data, 266 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 115, 144 commoners: categories of, 16; in early his- tory, 16 Common External Tariff, 115 communications, 152 Companhia de Seguros de Creditos

(Cosec), 155 Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade,

155

Companhia Nacional de Petroqufmica

(CNP), 147 Companhia Uniao Fabril (CUF): nationalized, 125

concelhos. See settler communities Concordat of 1940, 83, 98 Confederagao de Industria Portuguesa

(CIP). See Confederation of Portuguese

Industry

Confederagao do Comercio Portugues

(CCP). See Portuguese Confederation

of Commerce

Confederacao Geral dos Trabalhadores

Portugueses-Intersindical Nacional

(CGTP-IN). See General Confederation of Portuguese Workers-National

Intersindical Confederation of Portuguese Industry

(CIP), 206

Conference of Samora, 10 Congo, 227

Congregationalists, 102 Congress of the Republic, 51 Constituent Assembly, xxvii, 47, 181;

elections for, 168, 174, 233

Constitutional Charter, 45; nullified, 46

Constitutional Court, xxviii-xxix, 190, 208; appointments to, 188; created, 183

constitution of 1822, 44; reestablished, 46

constitution of 1838, 47

constitution of 1933, 56

constitution of 1976, xxvii, 181; amendments to, xxviii, 168, 178-79, 182-83,

208; armed forces under, 182, 224, 234-36; cabinet under, 186; church under, 98-99; civil rights under, 268; civil service under, 191; controversy over,

182; drafting committee for, 168; econ- omy under, 128; education under, 105; equal rights for women under, 82; ex- ecutive under, 182; judiciary under, 190-91; parliament under, 182; police

under, 262; president under, xxvii, 182, 183-85; prime minister under, 185-86; promulgated, 176, 181; separation of church and state in, 96, 98-99; women under, 82, 83

construction, 147; growth of, 120; of housing, 110; as percentage of gross domestic product, 120, 121; to support

tourism, 150 consumer groups, 129 consumption, 121; growth of, 122 309
Portugal: A Country Study

Continental Operations Command

(COPCON), xxvi, 233; dissolved,

xxvii, 176, 234; formed, 172 Convention of Sintra (1808), 42 COPCON. See Continental Operations

Command

copper, 59, 145, 149 Cordoba, Caliphate of, 8

cork, 70, 140, 141, 142 Corporative Chamber, 56

Correio da Manha, 211

corruption: in government, xxv, 169

cortes, 22; of 1211 (Coimbra), 13; of 1254

(Leiria), 13; of 1385 (Seville), 20; of 1433 (Evora), 22; of 1481 (Evora), 23; of 1641, 37; of 1828, 45

Cosec. See Companhia de Seguros de

Creditos

Costa, Afonso, 52

Costa, Alfred Nobre da, 177 Costa Cabral, Antonio Bernardo da, 47;

exiled, 48 Costa Gomes, Francisco de, 173, 232 Council of Europe, 215

Council of Ministers, 156, 186-87; duties

of, 186; members of, 186; specialized

councils, 187 Council of Social Communication, 268

Council of State, 170, 172, 183, 185 Council of the Revolution, xxvii, 203, 224; eliminated, xxviii, 183, 203, 234, 236; formed, 173, 233; Goncalves expelled from, 175; members of, 234-36;

military control of, 182 Council to Oversee the Intelligence Services, 266 Counter-Reformation, 32-34 coup d'etat, attempted, of 1927, 230; of

1961, 230; of 1975, xxvii, 124, 168, 172-73, 176, 233, 234 coup d'etat of 1841, 47 coup d'etat of 1907, 50 coup d'etat of 1910, 225, 229-30 coup d'etat of 1917, 53 coup d'etat of 1926, xxv, 54, 117, 169, 203, 230 coup d'etat of 1974. See Revolution of 1974 Court of Audit, 190

courts: of first instance, 190; inefficiency

of, 191; military, 190; of second in- stance, 190; special, 190

court system, 190-91; ombudsman for,

190-91

Covilha, 146

Covilha, Pero da, 28 CP. See Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses

crime: drug-related, 271; incidence of, 270-71; types of, 271

criminal justice system {see also judiciary;

see also under courts), 268-70; appeals in, 268-69; attorneys in, 269; control of, 268; ombudsman for, 269-70; organization of, 268; preventive detention in, 269; supervision in, 269; trials in, 269

crusades: of 1415, 24; of 1578, 34-35, 224 CUF. See Companhia Uniao Fabril

cult of the hidden prince, 35 Cunha, Tristao da, 31 Cunhal, Alvaro, xxvi, 199; return from

exile, 171-72

currency: in European Monetary System,

xxiii current account, 121, 158; basic balance

of, 159; public debt as percentage of, 162

current expenditures, 131

da Palma Carlos, Adelino, 172 de Arriaga, Manuel, 52

death, causes of, 109-10

debt, public, 58, 132-33, 162-63; amount

of, 162; interest payments on, 131, 162; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 131; ratio of, to gross domestic product, 132, 162; ratio of, to reserves, 162-63; trend in, 162-63

debt servicing: as percentage of current account, 162; reduction of, 162 Decree Law 353-73, 231-32; reaction to, 231-32

Defense Agreement of 1951, 226

defense industry, domestic, 126, 244, 260-61; production capabilities, 260;

restrictions on, 261; sales by, 260, 261

defense posture: strategic concepts of, 237-39; transitional stage of, 238

defense spending, 256-57; increases in, 256; as percentage of gross national product, 256; on personnel, 256-57

Defense Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED), 265, 266

Delgado, Humberto, 56, 230; assassinat- ed, 230 310
Index

democracy: consolidated, 176-80; established, xxiv; rescinded, xxv, 54-56;

transition to, xxvi-xxix, 169, 174-76, 180-81 Democratic Alliance (AD), xxviii; dis- solved, 189; in elections of 1980, 178; formed, 178, 200 Democratic Party (PD), 52, 172 demography, 70-79

demonstrations. See political demonstrations development: of Brazil, 38-39; economic,

34, 65; in medieval period, 18-19 DGS. See General Security Directorate d'Hondt method, 195, 196, 197 diamonds, 38

Didrio de Noticias, 211

Dias, Bartolomeu, 26, 28

Dias, Dinis, 25

Dinis (king) ("the Farmer"): agricultural development under, 18; land disputes resolved by, 17; maritime activities of, 24

Direccao Geral de Seguranca (DGS). See General Security Directorate

divorce, xxxiv, 80, 98, 99 Dominicans: monasteries of, 12; regional administration by, 15 drug-related crime, 271 Duarte, 21, 22; crusades under, 26

Eanes, Antonio dos Santos Ramalho: as president, xxvii-xxviii, xxix, 168, 176, 234; qualities of, 184-85; state of emer- gency declared by, 176; supporters of, 202

Eanes, Gil, 25 earthquake of 1755, 39 EC. See European Community

Economic and Social Program (1974), 124 economic development plans: first, 119; second, 119 economic disequilibrium, 132-33 economic growth, 122-23; impediments

to, 128 economic policy: of Caetano, 61; mercantilist, 59; of Pedro II, 37; of Pombal,

40; of Salazar, 58-59 Economist Intelligence Unit, 147 economy: backwardness of, xxiv; characteristics of, 115-17; under constitution

of 1976, 128; effect of European Community membership on, 133, 215; impact of isolation on, xxiv; importance

of colonies to, xxiv; in 1980s, xxiii, xxxii; problems in, xxix, 116-17,

122-33, 139-40, 147, 153; under Salazar, xxv, 58-60, 117-20 EDP. See Electricidade de Portugal education (see also schools), 103-8; at- tempts to improve, xxxiv; under constitution of 1976, 105; disrupted by

Revolution of 1974, 104-5; elitism in, 104; government control of, 107; government responsibility for, 97; Jesuit control over, 97, 104; preparatory, 105; preschool, 105; pressures for, 66; primary, 105; problems in, xxxiv, 107-8; public, 40, 104; reforms in, 104;

role of church in, 96, 97; under Salazar, 58; secondary, 105; under Second

Republic, xxx; vocational, 105-7; of women, 83 Edward II: maritime trade with, 18 EEC . See European Economic Community EEZ. See Exclusive Economic Zone EFTA. See European Free Trade Association Egypt: sea battle with, 31

elections: in First Republic, 52; of 1969,

61; in Second Republic, 168

elections, local, 196, 199

elections, parliamentary, 196; of 1976,

xxviii, 176, 201; of 1979, 178; of 1980,

178; of 1983, xxix, 179; of 1985, 179, 199; of 1987, xxx, 180, 199, 200, 201, 207-8; of 1991, 200, 201, 209-10

elections, presidential, 196, 209

elections for Constituent Assembly: of

1820, 44; of 1911, 51; of 1975, 168, 174, 198

electoral system, 195-96

Electricidade de Portugal (EDP), 126, 149

electricity, gas, and water sector: growth

in, 145; as percentage of gross domestic product, 120

elite class, xxiv, 88-90; economic power

of, 118; education of, 107; families, 80; impact of 1974 revolution on, xxiii, 204; inheritances in, 99; kinship net- works of, 84; liberalism among, 43; members of, 88-89; political role of, 204; professions of, 99; under Salazar, 55 311
Portugal: A Country Study

emigrants, remittances from, 77, 115-16,

121, 158, 159-60

emigration, 73-74, 75-79; destinations

for, 77-78; motives for, xxxiv, 73, 75,

77, 122, 134, 141, 216, 231; of professionals, 116; rate of, 70, 75, 136; by

sex, 76; social impact of, 76-77, 136, 170 empire, 224; in Asia, 31-32, 36, 225;

decline of, 34-43, 212, 225 employment: abroad, xxxiv, 73, 79, 95, 134; in agriculture, xxxii, 134; in commerce, 150; decline in, 122; distribution, 134-37; emigration for, xxxiv,

122; in financial sector, 150; in fishing, 134; in forestry, 134; in government,

150; in industry, 117, 134; pressures

for, 66; in public sector, 117; in service

sector, 134-36; in tourism, 150; in transportation, 150 energy resources, 148-49

English language, 216

Enlightenment: impact of, xxiv, 40-41, 104 ERP. See European Recovery Program

Escudo Area, 119; dismantled, 124; trade

with, 158

Espiritu Santo family, 155

Espiritu Santo Sociedade de Investimento, 155 Estado Novo. See New State

Estaleiros Navais de Setubal (Setenave),

130, 147 Estremadura province, 67, 69

ethnic groups (see also under individual

groups), 94-96; homogeneity of, 94; regional differences in, 94

ethnicity, 94-96

Europe: reaction of, to Revolution of 1974, 167, 175; relations with, 214-16 European Community (EC): and agricul- ture, 144; aid from, xxx, xxxii, 147,

156, 159, 160, 180, 215; effect of, on

economy, 133, 156, 215; effect of, on

government, 215; effect of, on society, 215; free trade agreement with, 120; membership in, xxiii, xxix-xxx, 115,

139, 145, 156, 168, 213, 257; presiden- cy of, xxiii; requirements of, 115; security responsibilities of, 239 European Economic Community (EEC):

membership in, 115, 215 European Free Trade Association

(EFTA): assistance from, 160; membership in, 115, 119, 155, 167, 215 European Monetary System: Portuguese currency in, xxiii European Recovery Program (ERP)

(Marshall Plan), 217 European Social Fund: aid from, 139, 160

evangelization, 32-34

Evolutionists. See Republican Evolutionist Party

Evora, 74; expropriations of land in, 143;

rebellion at, 36

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 245

exploration, xxiv, 26, 67, 244; of Africa, 25-26, 48-49; of Angola, 48; of Asia,

32; of Brazil, 32, 38; of Mozambique,

49

exports: of arms, 260, 261; of commodities, 116, 156; of crops, 141, 142, 156; increase in, 156; in manufactured

goods, 157; of minerals, 149; as percen- tage of gross domestic product, 155; products, 121

Expresso, 178, 200, 211

external credits, 119

factionalism: in armed forces, xxvii, 233;

in political parties, xxx-xxi, 50

families, 79-82; children in, 80; elite, 80; equality in, 80; extended, 84-85; godparents in, 84; middle-class, 80; organi- zation of, 80; relations within, 82; women in, 80

family planning, 82 Farmer, the. See Dinis (king) farmers: in the Alentejo, 91; living stan- dards of, 143; in the north, 91; public

assistance to, 144; refusal of, to collectivize, 174; tenant, 85

farms: collective, 143, 174

Faro, 73, 74 Fatima, 53, 57, 100

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- many, Federal Republic of

Felipe I, 35 Fernando, 21 Fernando, duke of Braganca, 23 Fernando I: development under, 19; maritime activities of, 24

Fidelidade, 155

film industry, 212

financial sector (see also banking), xxxiii, 312
Index

153-55; changes in, 153; employment

in, 150; government role in, 155

financial strategy, 118-19

First Composite Brigade, 223, 241-42, 257-58; improvements in, 243;

materiel of, 244; organization of, 243; problems in, 243; support for, 248

Fiscal Guard (Guarda Fiscal), 264

fishing, 40, 67, 142-43; amount of, 143; commercial, 142; growth of, 120; labor

force in, 134, 137, 139; liberalization

of, 153; as percentage of gross domestic product, 120, 122, 139; in Portimao, 146 FNLA. See National Front for the Liberation of Angola

Forcas Populares do 25 Abril. See Popular Forces of the 25th of April Ford-Volkswagen automotive complex,

161

foreign assistance: from European Community, xxx, xxxii, 139; as percentage

of gross domestic product, 139

foreign community, 95

foreign economic relations, 155-63

foreign exchange: income, 116, 160; re- ceipts from tourism, 150

foreign income: from emigrant remittances, 77, 115-16, 121, 158, 159-60; from tourism, 115

foreign investment, xxxii, 58, 160-61; at- tempts to limit, 161-62; from Britain, 160-61; in colonies, 60; in commerce,

150; conditions for, 161; in economic

development plans, 119; in financial

sector, 161; impact of Revolution of 1974 on, 125; increase in, 160; in in- dustry, 146; in manufacturing, 161; in service sector, 161; in tourism, 161; trends in, 160-61

foreign relations, 212-18; history of, 212-13

forestry, 142; exports by, 156; growth of, 120; labor force in, 134, 137, 139; as percentage of gross domestic product,

120, 122, 139; products, 70, 140, 142, 145

forests, 70; amount of, 140, 142 FP-25. See Popular Forces of the 25th of

April France: British blockade of, 41; emigration to, 134, 216; influence of, on le- gal system, 191; invasions by, 42-43;

materiel from, 245, 246-48, 260; occupation by, 42; Portuguese guestworkers

in, 79, 136, 160; relations with, 216;

trade with, 157; war of, with Spain, 41 Franciscans: monasteries of, 12; regional administration by, 15 Franco, Joao: dictatorship of, 50 Franco, Francisco, 59, 226

Freemasons, 43

Free University, 107

Freire de Andrade, Gomes, 43

Freitas, Jose Vicente de, 54

Frelimo. See Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

French language, 216 French Revolution: reaction to, 41 Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique

(Frelimo). See Front for the Liberation

of Mozambique

Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA). See National Front for the Liberation of Angola

Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

(Frelimo), 214, 229

Galicia, 4 Gama, Vasco da, 28

gas, natural, 149 GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP. See gross domestic product General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): membership in, 119 General Anti-Crime Directorate, 263 General Confederation of Portuguese

Workers-National Intersindical (CGTPIN), xxvi, 125, 138, 175, 198, 205; growth of, 205; opposition to, 205 Generale de Banque, 154 General Security Directorate (DGS), 265 General Union of Workers (UGT), 205; organized, 138 geographic regions, 67 geography, 4, 66-70 Germanic invasions {see also under individual

tribes), 6-7 Germany, Federal Republic of (West

Germany), 199; emigration to, 134; materiel from, 224, 245, 246-48, 260, 263; Portuguese guestworkers in, 79, 136; trade with, 157 Gini ratio, 137 313
Portugal: A Country Study

glassmaking, 40 GNP. See gross national product

GNR. See National Republican Guard

Goa: immigrants from, 95; Indian recap- ture of, 59, 231; occupation of, 31

gold, 38 Gold Coast, 26 Gomes, Fernao, 26 Gomes da Costa, Manuel, 54 Goncalves, Vasco, 172, 173-74; expelled from Council of the Revolution, 175 government: church under, 51, 95, 98-

99; education under, 97; effect of European Community membership

on, 133, 215; income-leveling policies, 138; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 174; revenue, 130; role of, in financial system, 155; system of, 189-95 government, local, 192-94; administrative regions in, 193; administrative sys- tem in, 192; districts in, 193; governor

of, 193; municipal assembly, 193-94;

municipalities in, 193-94; parishes in, 193 government, provisional: of 1911, 51; of

1970s, xxvii, xxviii, 168, 172, 173, 178 government deficit, 128, 130-31; effect of, 132-33; financing structure of, 132; as percentage of gross domestic product, 133 government spending, 128, 130-32; pat- terns of, 131; as percentage of gross domestic product, 130 governor of district, 193 Great Depression, 118 Greeks: conquest by, 5 gross domestic product (GDP): composition of, 120, 122; growth of, 115, 117,

120, 122, 145; per capita, 115, 123; ratio of debt to, 132, 162; ratio of interest

to, 162

gross domestic product percentages:

agriculture, 120, 122; borrowing, 128; budget deficit, 133; construction, 120; energy, 120; exports, 155; fishing, 120, 122, 139; foreign assistance, 139; for- estry, 120, 122, 139; government ser- vices, 174; imports, 156; industry, 120, 122; manufacturing, 120, 122; mining,

120; privatization proceeds, 133; public debt, 131, 162; public enterprises, 129; service sector, 115, 121, 122, 150;

tourism, 122, 150

gross national product (GNP): defense spending as percentage of, 256 Group of Nine, 175 Guarda (district), 73, 74 Guarda Fiscal. See Fiscal Guard

Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR).

See National Republican Guard

Guinea, Portuguese, 49; armed resistance by, 60, 170, 228-29; made a province,

60; Portuguese deaths in, 229

Guinea-Bissau: independence for, 172, 213, 229

Gypsies, 95

health care, 109-10; government pay- ments for, 109; role of church in, 96

health care professionals: distribution of, 110; number of, 110

health care system, 110

health facilities, 110

health problems, xxxiv; causes of death, 109-10; malnutrition, 110 Henrique (cardinal), 35 Henrique (prince) ("the Navigator"), 18, 21, 244; death of, 25; as master of Order of Christ, 24; naval school found- ed by, 24 Henry (of Burgundy), 9 Henry the Navigator. See Henrique

(prince)

Higher Council of National Defense: formed, 183; members of, 239; powers

of, 236 Higher Council of the Bench, 188, 190; appointments to, 188 Higher Military Institute, 250

Historia Genealogica da Casa Real (Sousa), 39

Historicals {see also Progressives; Septemberists), 48; conflict of, with Regenerators, 50 Holy See: land claimed by, 16, 17; rela- tions with, 40, 41 housing, 110-11; construction, 110; of

elite, 111; government responsibility

for, 111; lack of, 110-11; pressures for, 66

Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT), 59, 245, 246, 258; area controlled by, 258; commander of, 258; 314
Index

headquarters of, 258

Iberian Pact (1939), 59, 223, 226, 241

Iberian Peninsula: climate of, 4; geogra- phy of, 4 Iberian Union, 35-37, 215 IBERLANT. See Iberian Atlantic Command

Ibero people, 5 IMF. See International Monetary Fund

immigrants (see also returnees from Africa): assimilation of, 95; from colonies, 95

imports: in manufactured goods, 157; of

oil, 148, 157; as percentage of gross domestic product, 156 income: from emigrant remittances, 77, 115-16, 121, 158, 159-60; from invisi- bles, 121; from tourism, 121 income distribution, 121, 122, 127, 129, 134, 137-39; functional approach to, 138; size of, 137-38 INDEP. See Industrias Nacionais de Defesa E.P.

Independente, 211

India: commercial activity of, in Asia, 36; commercial hegemony in, 31; first voyage to, 28; Jesuits in, 33; sea route

to, 26-31; second voyage to, 28-31

industrial dynasties, 1 18; licensing, 118,

119, 120; organization, 146-48; pro- duction, 122; regions, 147

Industrias Nacionais de Defesa E.P. (IN- DEP), 261

industry, xxxii-xxxiii, 145-49; decline of, 34; foreign ownership in, xxxii, 146, 147; growth in, 120, 145; mergers in, 125-26; middle class in, 206; nationalization of, 124, 125; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 120, 122; pri- vate ownership in, xxxii-xxxiii, 146, 209; productivity in, 146-47; under Roman occupation, 6; state ownership

in, xxxii, 146, 147, 147-48; work force

in, 86, 117, 134, 136

infant mortality, xxxiv, 109

inflation, 117; under Caetano, 61; in 1970s, 176; in 1980s, xxix; rate of, 122

infrastructure: development of, 6, 147;

military, 37; projects financed, 118,

147; under Roman occupation, 6 inland waterways, 152

Inquisition, 33, 35; abolished, 44, 97; deaths in, 33; established, 97; expulsions by, 102; schools under, 103-4

Institute for Higher Military Studies, 243

Institute for State Participation, 127, 129; created, 125

Institute of Applied Psychology, 107 insurance services: competition among,

126; foreign investment in, 161; nationalized, 125, 127, 153; privatized, 153

intellectuals, 55; political activities of, 198;

political role of, 206-7

intelligence services, 264-66; powers of, 264-65

Intelligence System of the Republic of Portugal (SIRP), 265, 266

internal security, 261-67; as mission of armed forces, 261; reorganization of, 261

International Labour Organisation, 137

International Monetary Fund (IMF):

austerity program of, 177; membership

in, 119; stabilization program of, 128, 156

International Police for the Defense of the State (PIDE), 264-65

Intervention Police, 263

investment, 131, 158; coefficients, 122-

23; in colonies, 121; constraints on,

117; institutions, 154; productivity, 123

Isabel, 22

Islam. See Muslims

isolation, 66; impact of, on economy,

xxiv; under Salazar, 86

Ivens, Roberto, 48

Japan: investment from, 161; Jesuits in, 33; Pacific islands occupied by, 59; re- lations with, 32 Java: exploration of, 32 Jehovah's Witnesses, 102

Jesuits, 35; activities of, 33; education

controlled by, 97, 104; expelled, 40, 97; founded, 33

Jews: expelled, 97; number of, 103; perse- cution of, 33, 34, 103; population of, 95; role of, 8 Joao. See Joao I Joao, duke of Braganca (see also Joao IV): proclaimed king, 36 Joao I, 19-22; maritime activities of, 24;

nobility under, 21 Joao II: crowned, 23; nobility under, 23 315
Portugal: A Country Study

Joao III, 26; death of, 34; expeditions of, 32; Inquisition established by, 97 Joao IV, 37; crowned, 36 Joao V, 39 Joao VI, 41; accession of, 43; return to Portugal, 44 Joao Afonso, 20 Joao das Regras, 20 John of Gaunt, 21 Jose I, 39; attempted assassination of, 40

joust of Arcos de Valdevez, 10 Juan I, 19 judges, 190, 191 Judicial Police, 264, 268

judicial regions, 268

judiciary, 190-91, 267-72

Junot, Andoche, 42 Junta of National Salvation, 172, 232-33;

abolished, 173; friction of, with Armed

Forces Movement, 233

kinship relations, 79, 84-85; economic,

84, 196-97; godparents in, 84; political, 84

Kissinger, Henry, 175 Korea, Republic of (South Korea): invest- ment from, 161

labor force: agricultural, 143; composition

of, 134-37; dismissal procedures, 139;

distribution of, 134-37, 139; growth of, 137; industrial, 86, 117; percentage of, in unions, 138, 205; in service sector, 150; size of, 136

labor laws, xxix; attempts to reform,

xxxiii; reforms, 139, 208

labor productivity, 122, 141

labor unions: agenda of, 138; government

control of, 86; growth in, 65; leaders

of, exiled, 205; membership of, 205;

origins of, 204-5; outlawed, xxv, 205; percentage of labor force in, 138, 205;

political role of, xxvi, 204-5; specialized, 205; strength of, 138, 205

Lajes Air Base, 216-17, 223, 226, 238,

248, 259

land: arable, 140; area, 66, 140; expropriations of, 143, 207; holdings, 143; pres- sures for, 66; privatization of, 209

land distribution, 12 landowners, 85, 88; abuses of, 17, 143; confirmation of, 16-17, 85 land tenure, 6, 116, 143-44

latifundidrios . See landowners

Lavrador, O. See Dinis (king)

Law of the Sesmarias (1375), 19, 25

legal system: influences on, 191; medieval, 18

Leixoes, port of, 152 Leonor of Aragon, 22, 108

liberalism, 43

life expectancy, 109 Ligure people, 5 Lisbon: captured by Afonso Henriques,

10; earthquake in, 39; economic activi- ty in, 67; immigrants to, 74; industry

in, 146; population of, 74; population

density in, 73; rebuilt, 39-40; religious practice in, 99; suburbanization of, 74 Lisbon Stock Exchange, 153

literacy rate, 65, 212; in First Republic,

117; improvement in, xxxiii-xxxiv, 105; in nineteenth century, 104; in 1990s, xxxiii, 107, 212

livestock, 142

living standards, xxxiv; of farmers, 143; improvement in, xxxiv, 94; of working

class, 94

Louis XIII: alliance with, 37 lower class, 91-92; kinship networks in, 84-85

Loyola, Ignatius de, 33 Luisa de Gusmao, 37 Lundberg, Erik, 124

Lusitania, 4 Lusitanian people, 5 Luso-American Development Foundation, 217

Luso-Iberian Council, 216

Macau: Chinese rule of, 195; immigrants

from, 95; occupation of, 32, 59; population of, 195 Madagascar: explored, 31 Madeira Islands, 70, 73; autonomy of, 194; colonized, 25; discovered, 25; government of, 195; legislative assembly in, 195; minister of the republic in, 194-95; powers of, 194, 195; separatist movement in, 262; strategic importance

of, 257 316
Index

magazines, 211; censored, 210-11 Maia, Manuel da, 39 Makler, Harry M., 127 Malacca: conquest of, 31 Malaga: ancient trading post at, 5 Malaysia: spice trade in, 31 Mantua, duchess of, 36 Manuel I, 26; accession of, 28; death of, 32 Manuel II, 50 manufactured goods: exported, 156; imported, 156 Manufacturers Hanover Trust, 153 manufacturing: foreign investment in, 161; growth in, 145; labor costs of, 157; nationalization of, 127; as percentage

of gross domestic product, 120, 121,

122; sales, 147 Manutencao Military, 260 Maria I: accession of, 41; death of, 43 Maria II (Maria da Gloria), 45; crowned, 46 Maria da Fontes movement, 47 Maria da Gloria. See Maria II Marie-Francoise Isabelle of Savoy, 37 Marine Corps, 246

maritime expansion, 3, 23-34; factors in, 24 maritime insurance, 19 Maritime Police, 264 Marranos, 103; persecution of, 33, 35

marriage, 80; arranged, 82; equality in, 80; separation in, 80-82; women in, 80 Marshall Plan, 217 Masons. See Freemasons

Massena, Andre, 42

materiel: from France, 245, 246-48, 260; from Germany, 224, 245, 246-48, 260, 263; obsolescence of, 223; from Spain,

245, 248; spending on, 257; from Unit- ed States, 223-24, 248, 259-60; value

of, 260

maternal leave, 82 Matos, Norton de, 56 Matosinhos, 142 May 28 Movement, 54 MDP. See Portuguese Democratic Movement

media, 210-12; freedom for, 267, 268; government involvement in, 211; under Second Republic, xxxiv, 211

Megalithic period, 4 Mendes Cabecadas, Jose, 54

Menenses, Luis de (count of Ericeira), 37 mergers, 125-26, 129

Methodists, 102 Methuen Treaty (1703), 38 MFA. See Armed Forces Movement

middle class, 85, 90-91; characteristics of, xxiv; economic definition of, 90; emergence of, 65, 86, 170; families, 80; growth of, 94, 205; impact of, on political system, 90; impact of, on social system, 206; political loyalties of, 91, 206; political role of, 205-6; in Revolution of 1974, 206; social definition of, 90-91; values of, 53, 90-91 Middle East: relations with, 218 Miguel I, 44-45

military (see also air force; armed forces; army; navy): dictatorship, 52, 54-55;

doctrine, 238; intelligence, 265

Military Academy: enrollment in, 243;

students in, 231

military conscripts: exemptions for, 252; number of, 252; recruitment for, 252; reduction of term for, 252-53

Military Disciplinary Regulations, 250

Military Intelligence Service (SIM), 265

military officers, 55, 89, 241; arrest of, in 1975 coup, xxvii; characteristics of, 203; elite in, 231; middle class, 206; morale of, 245, 249; noncommissioned,

243; pay of, 226; social pressures on, 226; training of, 243, 249; women as, 253

military service: alternative, 103, 252;

conscientious objectors to, 252; emigration to avoid, 75, 231; length of, 250-52

minerals, 148-49; export of, 149 Minho province, 67, 69

mining, 145, 149; of copper, 59, 145, 149; growth in, 145; of iron, 149; as percent- age of gross domestic product, 120; of tungsten, 149

Ministry of Defense, 260

Ministry of Education and Culture, 107, 192

Ministry of Employment and Social Security, 109 Ministry of Health, 109, 192 Ministry of Interior, 262

Ministry of Internal Administration, 262

Ministry of Justice, 261, 268

Ministry of Public Instruction: established, 104 317
Portugal: A Country Study

missionaries: restrictions on, 102-3 monarchy: formation of, 9-10 monarchy, constitutional, xxiv, 3-4;

abolished, 51; established, 44; reaction

to, 44; restoration of, 201

monasteries, 12 Monastery of Alcobaca, 12 Monsanto Air Base, 246 Monsaraz necropolis, 4 Monte Real Air Base, 248 Montijo Air Base, 258 Mormons, 102 Morocco: war in, 24, 26, 34-35, 224 Mota Pinto, Carlos, 177 mountains, 68, 69, 140 Movement of Democratic Unity (MUD),

56 Movimento das Forcas Armadas (MFA).

See Armed Forces Movement

Movimento Democratico Portugues

(MDP). See Portuguese Democratic

Movement

Movimento de Unidade Democratica

(MUD). See Movement of Democratic

Unity

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA). See Popular Movement

for the Liberation of Angola

Mozambique, 49; armed resistance by,

60, 170, 229; determination to retain, 59; development in, 60; exploration of, 49; immigrants from, 95, 136; indepen- dence for, 124, 175, 214, 229; made a

province, 60; number of troops in, 229; Portuguese deaths in, 229; settlement

on, 48, 75, 225 MPLA. See Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

MUD. See Movement of Democratic

Unity

Musa ibn Nusair, 7 Muslim conquest, 7-8 Muslim influence, 8, 67 Muslims 7-8, 10, 12, 18-19, 95, 103; cru- sades against, 24, 34-35, 224; expelled, 96, 97, 224; as slaves, 16; trade by, 31 Mussolini, Benito, 59

Napoleonic Code, 191, 192

National Assembly, 56

National Board of Education, 187 National Defense Institute, 243-44

National Defense Law (1982), 203, 224,

236, 239-41

National Defense Law (1991), 236

National Development Bank, 126

National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), 227

National Housing Institute, 111

nationalization, xxvii, 125-27, 173, 174; of agricultural estates, 91; of banks,

124, 125, 174, 211; effects of, 122; of

industries, 124, 125, 145; of insurance,

125; and redistribution of income, 121; of shipping, 125; of transportation, 125 National Library, 210

National Popular Action (ANP), 197

National Republican Guard (GNR), 171, 261, 262-63; formed, 262; materiel of, 263; mission of, 263; number of per- sonnel in, 263

national security: cabinet responsibility

for, 186

National Union (UN), 56, 197; philos- ophy of, 56

National Union for the Total Indepen- dence of Angola (UNITA), 228 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Naval Academy, 245

naval school: of Henrique, 24

navy, 238, 244-46; aid to, 244; bases of, 245; chief of staff, 245; conscripts in, 245, 252; decline of, 244; downsizing

of, 249-50; exercises of, 258; insignia, 256; materiel, 224; missions of, 244-45; mutiny of 1910, 50; number of personnel in, 239, 245; ranks, 253; reor- ganized, 223; under Spanish Armada,

224; spending on, 256, 257; uniforms,

256; vessels of, 244, 245

necropolises, 4

Neolithic period, 4

Netherlands, 225; attempt by, to take over Brazil, 37; commercial activity of, in Asia, 36; Portugese guestworkers in, 79; relations with, 37

neutrality, 59 Neves Corvo copper mine, 145, 149 newspapers, 210-11 New State (Estado Novo), xxv, 55-

60; armed forces under, 225-27; bu- reaucracy under, xxxiii; censorship

under, 169, 210-11; church under, 55, 58, 98, 203; detentions under, 270; 318
Index

economy under, 117-20; education under, 58; isolation under, 86; labor unions under, 86; middle-class opposition

to, 206; plans for, 55, 118; political parties under, 197; politics under, 57; repression under, 169-70; tenets of, 57; tenor of, 56; transition to, 56, 169; vot- ing under, 80; women under, 83 Nkomati Accords, 214

nobility, 85; abuses by, 23; categories of, 15-16; disputes of, with clergy, 16; in early history, 15-16; underJoao I, 21;

killed in crusades, 35; land owned by,

16; modern, 88; origins of, 88; under

Pombal, 40; privileges of, 15-16; property disputes of, 23; restored, 41 Nobrega, Manuel de, 33 Noronha, Fernao, 32 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 249, 257-60; Central Region of, 241; contribution to, 223, 237, 257; exercises, 258; facilities, 258; membership

in, 59, 115, 167, 212-13, 215, 223, 226;

missions in, 257; and Revolution of 1974, 257; Spain as member of, 216, 258 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nuclear Planning Group, 257 Nova University, 107 Nunes, Antonio, 40

October 1973 War, 259 OECD. See Organisation for Economic

Co-operation and Development

Office of Techno-Legislative Support, 187 Oficinas Gerais de Fardamento e Equipamento (OGFE), 261

Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico (OGMA), 261

Oficinas Gerais de Material de Engenharia (OGME), 261 OGFE. See Oficinas Gerais de Fardamento e Equipamento

OGMA. See Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico OGME. See Oficinas Gerais de Material de Engenharia

oil: exploitation of, 60; exploration for, 149-49; imported, 148, 157; price shocks, 145, 147, 170 O Lavrador ("the Farmer"). See Dinis

Olivares, duke of, 36

Oliveira, Julio Domingos de: resignation

of government of, 55

Olivera, Manoel de, 212 OPEC . See Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries O Povoador ("the Populator"). See San- cho I Order of Avis (see also Order of the Calatravans), 17, 18; Henrique as master of, 21; Joao as master of, 19 Order of Christ, 17-18; Henrique as master of, 24 Order of the Calatravans (see also Order

of Avis), 13; nationalized, 17; regional administration by, 15 Order of the Hospitallers, 13; nationalized, 17; regional administration by, 15 Order of the Knights of Saint James, 13; nationalized, 17; regional administration by, 15 Order of the Templars, 13; regional ad- ministration by, 15; suppressed, 17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD), xxxii, 215

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC): trade with, 158

PAIGC. See African Party for the In- dependence of Guinea and Cape Verde

Pais, Alvaro, 20

Pais, Leme, 38

Pais, SidoniO, 53

Paiva, Afonso de, 28 Paiva Couciero, Henrique, 53 Paiva de Andrade, 49

Paleolithic period, 4

Palmela, duke of, 46 Palmela necropolis, 4

Partido Africano pelo Independencia de Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC). See African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde

Partido Comunista Portugues (PCP). See Portuguese Communist Party

Partido Democratico (PD). See Democratic Party

Partido do Centro Democratico Social (CDS). See Party of the Social Democratic Center

Partido Popular Democratico (PPD). See Popular Democratic Party

Partido Popular Monarquico (PPM). See Popular Monarchist Party

319
Portugal: A Country Study

Partido Renovador Democratico (PRD).

See Party of the Democratic Renovation

Partido Republicano Evolucionista (PRE).

See Republican Evolutionist Party

Partido Republicano Portugues (PRP).

See Portuguese Republican Party

Partido Social Democrata (PSD). See Social Democrat Party

Partido Socialista (PS). See Socialist Party Party of the Democratic Renovation

(PRD), 179, 202, 210

Party of the Social Democratic Center

(CDS), 200-201, 206; in elections, 176, 179; founded, 201; platform of, 201; in Revolution of 1974, xxvi, 168, 174

Passos, Manuel da Silva, 46 PCEDED. See Program for the Structural Adjustment of the Foreign Deficit and Unemployment

PCP. See Portuguese Communist Party PD. See Democratic Party Peace of Tuy, 10

peasants, 85; marriage of, 80; oppression

of, 207; political role of, 207 Pecanha, Manuel. See Emmanuele

Pessagno

PEDAP. See Specific Plan for the Develop- ment of Portuguese Agriculture PEDIP. See Specific Plan for the Develop- ment of Portuguese Industry Pedro (Duarte's brother), 21; killed, 23;

as regent, 22 Pedro I (of Brazil), 45; abdicated, 46 Pedro II, 37 Pedro II (of Brazil), 46

Pelayo, 8 penal system, 271-72; incarceration ratio in, 272; ombudsman for, 272; time

served in, 272

Peninsular Wars, 41-43

Pentecostals, 102

Pereira, Nun'Alvares, 20

Peres, Fernando, 9, 10 Persian Gulf war, 239, 259

Pessagno, Emmanuele (Manuel Pecanha): naval exploits of, 19; navy devel- oped by, 18

Petrogal. See Petroleos de Portugal

Petroleos de Portugal (Petrogal), 126, 130

Philip II, 35, 36

Philip III, 36, 224

Philip IV, 36

Philippa of Lancaster, 21

Phoenicians: conquest by, 5 physical environment, 66-70 PIDE. See International Police for the Defense of the State Pintado, Valentina Xavier, 120

Pintasilgo, Maria de Lourdes, 177

Pinto, Fernao Mendes, 32

pirates: European, 23, 32; Moroccan, 24

plague, 22; of 1348-49, 19; of 1384, 20; of 1438, 21

plains, 68 Piano de Correccao Estrutural do Deficit Externo e Desemprego (PCEDED). See Program for the Structural Adjustment

of the Foreign Deficit and Unemploy- ment

Piano Economico para o Desenvolvimento da Agricultura Portuguesa (PEDAP).

See Specific Plan for the Development of Portuguese Agriculture Piano Economico para o Desenvolvimento da Industria Portuguesa (PEDIP). See Specific Plan for the Development of Portuguese Industry P6, Fernao do, 26

police, national, 262; civil rights protect- ed by, 268; control of, 262; duties of, 262; mistrust of, 262

police, secret, xxv, 169-70; abhorrence for, 265; abolished, 171, 265; abuses by, 265; activities of, 210

Policia de Seguranca Publica (PSP). See Public Security Police

Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Esta- do (PIDE). See International Police for the Defense of the State

political demonstrations, 50, 173

political parties (see also under individual parties), 195, 197-202; alliances among,

xxvi-xxvii; banned, xxv, 57, 169; fac- tions in, xxx-xxxi; far left, 197-201; far

right, 201-2; ineffectiveness of, xxivxxv; middle class in, 206; organization

of, 167; popular view of, 196; precursors of, 197, 207; in Revolution of 1974,

xxvi-xxvii, 167; strength of, 197

political system (see also political parties): armed forces in, 234-36; impact of middle class on, 90-91; military control of, 183; structure of, 196-97 Pombal, Marques de, 39-41; impact of Enlightenment on, xxiv; Jesuits expelled by, 97; reforms of, xxiv, 104 320
Index

Popular Democratic Party (PPD) {see also Social Democrat Party), 200; in elec- tions of 1976; in provisional govern- ments, 174; in Revolution of 1974,

xxvi, 174 Popular Forces of the 25th of April

(FP-25), 262; arrests of members of, 267, 270, 272; attacks by, 266-67; goals

of, 267; reaction to, 267 Popular Monarchist Party (PPM), 178, 201-2; support for, 201 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 214, 228

population, 70, 73-75; age distribution in, 74-75, 76; of Amadora, 74; of Coimbra, 74; decline in, 74, 136; density, 73, 140; distribution of, 73; in 1864, 73; Gypsies in, 95; Jews in, 95; of Lisbon,

74; in 1992, 73; of Porto, 74; project- ed, 73; rural, 74; of Setubal, 74; struc- ture, 73-75

population percentages: allowed to vote, 48, 56; attending university, 107; in- volved in agriculture, xxxii; middle

class, 90; in poverty, 109; practicing

religion, 99; Protestants, 102

population statistics: emigration rate, 70; growth rate, 70, 73, 76, 137; infant mortality rate, xxxiv, 70, 109; life ex- pectancy, 109; sex ratio, 74-75, 76

Populator, the. See Sancho I Portalegre: expropriations of land in, 143

Portela Airport, 152 Portimao, 142, 146

Porto, 8; as bastion of liberalism, 43; immigrants to, 74; industry in, 146; population of, 74; population density in, 73 Porto Santo, 25

ports, 126, 152

Portucel, 126

Portugal and the Future (Spnola) , 171, 213, 232

Portugal-Madeira-Azores triangle. See strategic triangle Portuguese Communist Party (PCP),

xxxi, 167, 198-99; decline of, 198-99,

210; in elections, 176, 178, 179, 210; geographic distribution of, 67; leaders

of, exiled, 198; outlawed, 270; peasants

in, 207; in provisional governments,

174; in Revolution of 1974, xxiii, xxvi, 171-72, 173, 174; Stalinism of, xxxixxxii, 198; support for, xxxi, 91

Portuguese Confederation of Commerce

(CCP), 206 Portuguese Democratic Movement

(MDP), 174, 197-98; influence of, 198; members of, 198 Portuguese Guinea. See Guinea, Por- tuguese Portuguese Industrial Association (AIP), 206

Portuguese language: Arabic influence on, 8; as language of Macau, 195; as national language, 18; regional differ- ences, 94

Portuguese Legion, 59, 226; abolished, 226; number of personnel in, 226

Portuguese Republican Party (PRP), 52

post office, 126

poverty, 58; population living in, 109 Povoador, O. See Sancho I PPD. See Popular Democratic Party

PPM. See Popular Monarchist Party

PRD. See Party of the Democratic Renovation PRE. See Republican Evolutionist Party

Presbyterians, 102

president, 183-85; under constitution of

1976, xxvii; duties of, 184; elections for, 176, 180, 184, 196, 209; power of, 183-84; term of office, 184, 196; veto power of, 184

press {see also media; newspapers): control

of, xxv, 210; freedom for, xxiv, 169, 211

Prester John's kingdom: search for, 28

prices: agricultural, 144; fixed, 138 prime minister, 185-86; independence of, 185; indirect election of, 185; term of

office of, 185-86

Principe Island: discovered, 26

prisoners, 271-72; juvenile, 271-72; mili- tary, 271; number of, 271; work by, 272

prisons, 271-72

private sector: creation of, 120; elite domination of, 118; size of, 116

privatization, xxxii, xxxiii, 147-48, 183, 209; enacted, 133; objectives of, 133;

partial, 155; as percentage of gross domestic product, 133; proceeds of, 133

professions, 89; women in, 83 Program for the Structural Adjustment of

the Foreign Deficit and Unemployment

(PCEDED), 156 321
Portugal: A Country Study

Progressives {see also Historical; Septemberists), 48

proletariat, lumpen, 92

Protestant Reformation, 32

Protestants, 95; as conscientious objectors, 103, 252; expelled, 102; number

of, 102

provinces, 67-68 PRP. See Portuguese Republican Party

PS. See Socialist Party PSD. See Social Democrat Party PSP. See Public Security Police public enterprises, 128; denationalization

of, 128; financial condition of, 130; nationalized, 129-30; nonfmancial, 128-

30; overstaffing of, 130; as percentage

of gross domestic product, 129; unions

in, 129

Publico, 211

public order, 216-67

public sector: borrowing, 128, 132, 133; employment in, 117; expansion of, 127;

role of, 128-33; size of, 116, 126-27;

spending, 128

Public Security Police (PSP), 261, 263-64; demonstration by, 264; headquarters of, 263; mission of, 263; re- organized, 263; women in, 263; zones

of, 263

purges: after 1974 revolution, 116, 127 Pyrenees Mountains, 66

Quadragesimo Anno (papal encyclical) (1931), 98, 203 Quadruple Alliance, 47 Quimigal, 125, 147

radio, 152; freedom for, 211; nationalized, 125, 210, 211 Radiodifusao Portuguesa (RDP), 212 Radio Marconi, 126 Radio Renascenca, 212; closed, 211

Radiotelevisao Portuguesa (RTP), 212

railroads, 126, 152 RDP. See Radiodifusao Portuguesa

rebellions: Abrilada, 44; against absolutists, 45; by Catalans, 36; at Evora,

36; of Saldanha, 48; Septemberist, 47; Vilafrancada, 44

Reconquest, 8-9, 10, 12, 13 Regenerators, 48; conflict of, with Histor- ical, 50

religion {see also under individual sects), 96-103; folk customs in, 100-2; histo- ry of, 96-98; practice of, 99-102; superstitions in, 102

religious groups: expelled, 102; restric- tions on, 102-3

remittances from emigrants, 77, 115-16,

121, 158, 159-60

Republic, First, xxiv, 4, 51-54; agitation

for, 206; anticlericalism under, 53, 97; economy under, 117; education under,

104; elections in, 52; end of, 54; instability during, 52, 169; military under,

203, 225, 230; separation of church and

state in, 96; women under, 83

Republic, Second, xxx, 4, 168

Republica, 175, 211 Republican Evolutionist Party (PRE), 52 republicanism, 49-61 Republican National Union (UNR): fac- tions in, 52 Republican Union (UR), 52 Rerum Novarum (papal encyclical) (1891),

98, 203

retirement, 109

retornados. See returnees from Africa

returnees from Africa, 73, 122, 177;

benefits for, 136-37; crimes by, 271; impact of, 78-79, 136, 214; number of, xxviii, 95, 136 Revolution of 1820, 43-44

Revolution of 1974, xxiii, xxvi-xxvii, 61, 167, 171-74, 203, 225, 230-34; armed

forces in, 224; bureaucracy under,

xxxiii; causes of, 65-66, 170, 213; con- sequences of, xxiii, 123-28, 197, 262; and church, 98-99; and class system,

89; and education, 104-5; and elite class, xxiii, 77, 89-90; emigration to es- cape, 77; middle class in, 206; peasants

in, 207; political parties in, xxvi-xxvii; reaction to, 167, 174-75, 217; and society, 92-94; students in, 207; and women, 79 Rhodes, Cecil, 49

Ribatejo, 142

Richelieu (cardinal), 36 Rio Chanca, 70 Rio Douro, 6, 67, 69, 140, 141 Rio Guadiana, 70 322
Index

Rio Lima, 70, 141 Rio Minho, 69, 140 Rio Mondego, 70, 141 Rio Sado, 70 Rio Tamega, 70 Rio Teja. See Tagus River Rio Zezere, 13

rivers, 69

roads, 152; under Roman occupation, 6 Roberto, Holden, 227 Rocha, Paolo, 212

Rodoviaria, 126 Rodrigues, Simao, 33 Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic Church, Roman

Roman law, 191, 192 Roman occupation, 5,6; influence of, on

legal system, 191; legacy of, 6; resto- ration of, 7

rotativismo, 48, 202; collapse of, 50

royal patrimony: confirmation of, 16-17;

control of, 16-18; dispute over, 16-17 RTP. See Radiotelevisao Portuguesa

rural areas: population in, 74 RXT Metals Group, 149

SACEUR. See Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SACLANT. See Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira {see also New

State), 4, 224; appeal of, 55; back- ground of, 55; death of, 60; as minister

of finance, 54-55, 117, 169, 225, 230;

as minister of war, 225; opposition to, 206; as prime minister, 117, 169, 225;

rise to power of, xxv, 117, 203; stroke

of, 60, 170; worldview of, 57

Salazaristas, 170

Saldanha, duke of, 46 Sancho I: territorial expansion by, 10-12 Sancho II, 12 Sanders, Thomas G., 134 Santa Casa de Misericordia, 108 Santarem, 75, 143

Santos, Eugenio dos, 39 Sao Tome Island, 214; discovered, 26; immigrants from, 95; slave trade through, 48

sardine, 142

savings, household, 134, 160

schools, xxxiv, 103; built in Brazil, 33;

conditions in, 108; church control of, 98; enrollment in, 105, 107-8; girls', 104; government control of, xxv; under Pombal, 40; preparatory, 105; primary, 105; public, 40; under Roman

occupation, 6; secondary, 105, 108;

vocational, 105-7

Sebastian. See Sebastiao Sebastianism, 35

Sebastiao, 34-35, 224

Security Intelligence Service (SIS), 265, 266

security policies, 223

seigniorial rights: abolished, 44

Senegal River, 25

Septemberists {see also Historicals; Progressives), 47, 48; rebellion by, 47

serfs, 16, 85 Serpa Pinto, Alexandre, 48, 49

Serra da Estrela, 69

Serra de Monchique, 69

Serra do Caldeirao, 69

Serra do Geres, 69

services sector, xxxiii, 150-55; expansion

of, 115, 120; foreign investment in, 161; labor force in, 134-36, 137, 150;

as percentage of gross domestic

product, 115, 121, 122, 150

Servico de Informacoes e Seguranca

(SIS). See Security Intelligence Service Servico de Informacoes Estrategicas de Defesa (SIED). See Defense Strategic

Intelligence Service Servico de Informacoes Militares (SIM).

See Military Intelligence Service

Setenave. See Estaleiros Navais de Setubal

settler communities {concelhos), 15

Setubal: expropriations of land in, 143; immigrants to, 74; industry in, 146; population of, 74; vineyards in, 141

Seville: ancient trading post at, 5 shipbuilding, 126; nationalized, 125

shipping: nationalized, 125

Shultz, George, 238

Siderurgia Nacional, 126, 147, 148 SIED. See Defense Strategic Intelligence Service

Silva, Anfbal Cavaco, 128

Silva, Antonio Maria da, 54

Silva Porto, Antonio Francisco, 48

Silves, Diogo de, 25 SIM. See Military Intelligence Service

Sinedrio, 43 323
Portugal: A Country Study

Sines: industry in, 146, 161; port of, 152 SIRP. See Intelligence System of the Republic of Portugal

SIS. See Security Intelligence Service Sistema de Informacoes da Republica

Portuguesa (SIRP). See Intelligence

System of the Republic of Portugal

Six-Year Plan for National Development

(1959-64), 119

slaves, 16, 25; importation of, 38; trade

in, 48

Soares, Mario Alberto Nobre Lopes,

xxvi, 175; exiled, 199; popularity of, 209; as president, 168-69, 180, 234; as prime minister, xxix, 176, 179; qualities of, 184-85; return from exile, 171-72, 199

social classes, 85-94; changes in, 88, 94;

divisions among, 65; in early history,

15; identification of, 92; impact of 1974

revolution on, 89-90; mobility among,

65, 85, 92, 120, 127; organization of, 85; perpetuation of, 86-88

Social Democrat Party (PSD) (see also Popular Democrat Party), xxix, xxxi,

168, 199-200, 206; origins of, 200; sup- port for, 91, 186, 200, 208, 210

Socialist Party (PS), 167, 199; in elec- tions, xxviii, 176, 178, 179, 210; leaders of, exiled, 199; origins of, 199; peasants in, 207; platform of, xxi, 199;

in provisional governments, 174; in Revolution of 1974, xxvi, 171-72, 174; support for, 91, 199

social revolution, 21-22

social structure, 85-94

society: changes in, xxxiv-xxxv, 65, 167, 170; effect of European Community

membership on, 133, 215

Society of Jesus. See Jesuits Socotra Island, 31

Soult, Nicholas, 42

Sousa, Caetano de, 39

Sousa, Martim Afonso de, 32 Sousa, Tome de, 32, 33 South Korea. See Korea, Republic of

Soviet Union, 237; materiel from, for African insurgents, 232

Spain: annexation of Portugal by, 35; fear of reannexation by, 37, 66, 215; invest- ment from, 161; materiel from, 245,

248; as member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 216, 258; relations with, 215-16; tourists from, 150; trade with, 116, 157; war of, with

France, 41 Spanish Civil War (1936-39), 59; aid to, 226; participation in, 226, 246

Special Forces Brigade, 223, 241-42; per- sonnel of, 242

Specific Plan for the Development of Por- tuguese Agriculture (PEDAP), 160

Specific Plan for the Development of Por- tuguese Industry (PEDIP), 160

spices: cultivation of, 38; trade in, 23-24

Spmola, Antonio de, xxvi, 61, 171-74; book by, 171, 213, 232; as governor of Portuguese Guinea, 228; as head of Junta of National Salvation, 232; objectives of, 124-25; as president, 124, 172; resignation of, 233

state enterprises: abolished, 41

state of emergency, 176

Straits of Gibraltar, 238, 257

strategic triangle (Portugal-Madeira- Azores triangle), 223, 237-38

students: political activities of, 198; political role of, 206-7

suffrage. See voting rights sugar: as Brazilian export crop, 32 Sunda Islands: spice trade in, 31, 31 Superior Council of Finance, 187 Superior Council of the Administrative and Fiscal Courts, 190 Superior Intelligence Council, 266 Supreme Administrative Court, 190 Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), 216, 258 Supreme Allied Commander Europe

(SACEUR), 216 Supreme Court of Administration, 190 Supreme Court of Justice, 190 Swabians, 6; defeat of, 7; legacy of, 6

Switzerland: Portuguese guestworkers in, 79

Tabaqueira, 126 Tagus River, 4, 69, 140, 141, 142 Tanzania, 31 TAP. See Transportes Aereos Portugueses

tariff system, 119 Tariq ibn Ziyad, 7 taxes: evasion of, 131; increase in revenue

from, 132; local, 194; to pay for re- forms, 104; under Spanish occupation,

324
Index

36; by Turks, on spice trade, 24; value- added, 131-32

tax reform, 124, 131; phases of, 131-32

teachers: morale of, xxxiv, 108; and

republicanism, 50; salaries of, xxxiv, 108

Technical University of Lisbon, 107

Teixeira, Pedro, 38

telephones, 152

Teles, Leonor, 19

television, 152; freedom for, 211; nationalized, 125, 210, 211 Temple of Diana, 6 Teodosio, 37

Tercira, duke of, 46

Teresa (of Leon), 9 Terra dos Vaqueiros, 26

terrorism, 265-67

textile industry, 37-38, 40; exports by,

156, 157 Timor, 218; exploration of, 32; im- migrants from, 95; independence for, 175; occupied by Japan, 59 Tomas, Americo, 56, 61, 170, 230

topography, 67-69; suitability of, for agriculture, 70

torture, 264

tourism, xxxiii, 159-60; in the Algarve,

67; attractions of, 150-52; employment

in, 150; foreign investment in, 161; growth of, 159; income from, 115, 121, 150, 158, 159; as percentage of gross domestic product, 150; volume of, 150, 159

trade {see also exports; imports): with Brit- ain, 38-39; composition of, 156-58;

deficit, 121, 158; direction of, 156; in manufactured goods, 157; with Spain,

116; in spices, 23-24; strategy, 118-19

Traffic Brigade, 263

transportation, 130; employment in, 150; improvements in, 152; infrastructure, 152; nationalization of, 125 Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP),

126, 152 Tras-os-Montes, 67, 69; insurrection in, 44; topography of, 140 Treasury Police. See Fiscal Guard

Treaty of Fontainebleau (1807), 42 Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression

(1939). See Iberian Pact Treaty of San Idelfonso (1800), 41 Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), 32

Treaty of Windsor (1386), 21, 216, 237

Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe

(1990), 244

Tristao, Nuno, 25 Tuchman, Barbara, 65 Turks: restrictions by, on spice trade, 24

UGT. See General Union of Workers

UN. See National Union

UN. See United Nations underemployment, 141 unemployment: benefits, 109; in 1970s,

176; rate, 136, 139 Uniao Geral dos Trabalhadores (UGT).

See General Union of Workers

Uniao Nacional (UN). See National Union

Uniao Nacional para a Independencia

Total de Angola (UNITA). See National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

Uniao Nacional Republicana (UNR). See Republican National Union

Uniao Republicana (UR). See Republican

Union

Unicer, 126

Unionists. See Republican Union

UNITA. See National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

United Nations (UN), 218; admitted to, 59, 215; declaration on colonialism

(1960), 60 United States, 216-17; aid from, 160; emigration to, 77-78, 134, 160; invest- ment from, 161; Lajes Air Base used

by, 226, 248, 259; materiel acquired

from, 223-224, 248, 259-60; military

assistance from, 244, 248, 259; military

relations with, 259; military training

by, 260; reaction of, to Revolution of

1974, 167, 175, 217; relations with, 213, 237; trade with, 157 United States Arms Control and Disar- mament Agency (ACDA), 256

universities, 107; admission to, 107; enrollment, 107; faculties of, 107; faculty ranks in, 107; middle class in, 206;

politicization of, 207; reform of, 40-41, 207

University of Coimbra, 18, 39, 107; es- tablished, 103; reforms in, 104

University of Lisbon, 107 325
Portugal: A Country Study

University of Porto, 107 UNR. See Republican National Union

UR. See Republican Union

urban areas: working class in, 92

urbanization, 65, 170

Vandals, 6; exiled, 7 Venezuela: emigration to, 77, 134 Verney, Luis Antonio, 40; reforms by, 104 Vilafrancada uprising (1823), 44

Vila Real, 74

Viriato, 5 Viseu, 8, 74

Viseu, duke of, 23

Visigoths, 7; Christianity introduced by,

96; reconquest by, 8 voting rights: age for, 195; for emigres,

183; percentage of population extend- ed to, 48, 56; restrictions on, xxiv, 56; under Second Republic, xxx; of women, 56

wages, 137-39; average, 138; increases

in, 139; maximum, 138; minimum,

138; in 1970s, 176; per capita, 139 War of the Oranges, 41 War of the Two Brothers, 45-46 Warsaw Pact, 238-39

welfare, xxxiv, 108-11; lack of funds to implement, 108; private responsibility

for, 108; programs, 109

Wellesley, Sir Arthur (duke of Wellington), 42 Western European Union (WEU), 215

West Germany. See Germany, Federal Republic of West Irian, 218 WEU. See Western European Union

Wheeler, Douglas L., 117 Wiarda, Howard J., 118

wine: export of, 141-42, 157-58; industry, 40, 216 women, 82-84; in armed forces, 253; under constitution of 1976, 82; education

of, 83, 104; equal rights for, xxxivxxxv, 82, 83-84; under First Republic, 83; impact of emigration on, 77; im- pact of 1974 revolution on, 79; independence of, 80; marriage of, 80; maternal leave for, 82; maternity

benefits for, 109; under New State, 83;

in police force, 263; in professions, 83;

religious practice by, 100; roles of, 47; subservience of, 82-83; voting rights of, 56

workers: rights of, 51 Workers' Committees, xxvi, 181 working class: growth of, 170; kinship networks in, 84-85; living standards of, 94; marriage in, 80; after Revolution

of 1974, 139; in rural areas, 92 World Bank: economic plan from, 124; membership in, 119 World War I, 53, 225, 246 World War II: neutrality in, 59

Xavier, Francisco, 32, 33

Zaire, 227

326
Contributors

Eric N. Baklanoff is Research Professor of Economics Emeritus at the University of Alabama.

Walter C. Opello, Jr. is Chairman of Political Science at the

State University of New York at Oswego.

Eric Solsten is Senior Research Specialist in West European

Affairs, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer, who has

written extensively on Western Europe for Country Study

volumes.

Howard J. Wiarda is Professor of Political Science at the

University of Massachusetts/Amherst.

327

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-87 Greece 550-98 Albania 550-78 Guatemala

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550-59 Angola 550-82 Guyana and Belize 550-73 Argentina 550-151 Honduras

550-169 Australia 550-165 Hungary

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550-173 Germany, Fed. Rep. of 550-48 Pakistan 550-153 Ghana 550-46 Panama

329
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o

550-89 Ti in l qi n 550-42 550-80 'Turkey 550-72 XP11111 n 1 1 1 r\LJLUllCo r\i n q 550-74 T Tcranrl 550-162 Poland 550-97 Uruguay

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550-184 Slin aranniv* 550-171 71 mrv a riiA/f* Z_j 1 J. 1 1 L/CX kj VV C JJv ^0-86OU OUlllctlict 550-93 South Africa 550-95 OLIVICL ^r»\/ifi t TTninn KJ H1\JH 550-179 Spain 550-96 Sri Lanka

550-27 Sudan

550-47 Syria 550-62 Tanzania

330





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