United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on National Security and 

Foreign Affairs, Committee on 

Oversight and Government Reform, 

House of Representatives 

COMBATING 

TERRORISM 

Law Enforcement 

Agencies Lack 

Directives to Assist 

Foreign Nations to 

Identify, Disrupt, and 

Prosecute Terrorists 

May 2007 

 

GAO-07-697 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2007

COMBATING TERRORISM 

Law Enforcement Agencies Lack 

Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to 

Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute 

Terrorists 

Highlights of GAO-07-697, a report to the 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 

National Security and Foreign Affairs, 

Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

Following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies that 

provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to assist 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, these 

strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement the guidance to 

enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism or how they should 

do so. While one of the strategies tasked State with developing and 

coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we found State did not 

develop or coordinate the development of a plan to use the combined 

capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, or 

prosecute terrorists. In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which charged the NCTC with 

developing a plan to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to 

combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, 

which was approved by the President in June of 2006. According to NCTC, 

State, Justice, and DHS officials, implementing guidance for the plan is 

under development, and they would not discuss the contents of the plan or 

the guidance. 

Some LEAs have increased efforts to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, 

and prosecute terrorists. For example, DHS has implemented its Container 

Security Initiative to screen U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports, and State has 

expanded its Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. However, we found 

that because most LEAs, with the exception of the FBI, have not been given 

clear guidance, they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities on 

helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one 

country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities between two 

U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations intended to 

identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and 

foreign nation LEAs. In addition, we found LEAs generally lacked guidance 

on using resources to assist foreign nations in addressing terrorist 

vulnerabilities and generally lacked performance monitoring systems and 

formal structures for sharing information and collaborating. We also found 

that, because comprehensive needs assessments were not conducted, LEAs 

may not be tailoring their full range of training and assistance to address key 

terrorism vulnerabilities in foreign countries. 

U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism Exercises 

Source: GAO.

Three U.S. national strategies, 

developed in the wake of the 9/11

attacks, directed U.S. law 

enforcement agencies (LEA) to

focus on the prevention of terrorist

attacks. The strategies called for

LEAs to intensify their efforts to 

help foreign nations identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

GAO was asked to assess (1) the 

guidance for LEAs to assist foreign

nations to identify, disrupt, and

prosecute terrorists and (2) the 

extent to which LEAs have 

implemented this guidance. 

What GAO Recommends

We recommend that the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 

ensure that the implementing 

guidance for its NCTC’s plan for 

combating terrorism articulates a

clear strategy for using LEAs to 

help foreign nations combat 

terrorism. We also recommend that

State, Justice, and DHS explore 

enhancements to overseas 

coordination mechanisms and

develop clear guidance and 

performance monitoring to enhance 

efforts to help foreign nations 

combat terrorism. 

NCTC stated it had already begun to 

implement our recommendations. 

DHS generally agreed with our 

recommendations. State and 

Justice stated they would consider 

ways to improve overseas

coordination, but did not indicate 

whether they concurred with our 

other recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

National Strategies Have Provided Broad Guidance but Lack Key 

Elements for a Strategic Plan and Interagency Collaboration 13 

LEA Efforts to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and 

Prosecute Terrorists Have Been Limited by Several Factors 21 

Conclusion 44

Recommendations 45

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 50 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland 

Security 52 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Justice 53 

GAO Comments 61 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 63 

GAO Comments 67 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 68 

Table 

Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency

Collaboration in the National Strategies, for Foreign 

Nation Assistance to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute 

Terrorists 17

Figure 

Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct 

Counterterrorism Exercises 27 

Page i GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Abbreviations 

ATA Antiterrorism Assistance 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CSI Container Security Initiative 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DS Bureau of Diplomatic Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy 

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

LEA Law enforcement agency 

LEGAT Legal Attaché 

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 

NSC National Security Council 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

RAP Regional Action Plans 

RSO Regional Security Officer 

S/CT Department of State/Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism 

WMD Weapons of mass destruction 

USMS U.S. Marshals Service 

USSS United States Secret Service 

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Page ii GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 25, 2007

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security 

 and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security 

 and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Shays: 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), combating 

terrorism has become the nation’s top national security goal and the 

highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law enforcement 

agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State), Justice (Justice), 

and Homeland Security (DHS)—including the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS)—operate from U.S. embassies overseas and 

assist foreign nation governments on a broad array of law enforcement 

issues, such as investigating crime, reducing illegal drug activity, 

controlling borders and immigration, and protecting U.S. embassies and 

diplomats from attack. Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the 

wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, directed that law enforcement activities

be increasingly focused on the prevention of further terrorist attacks, 

including helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists. This includes technical assistance, such as antiterrorism 

training and the provision of technologies used to identify terrorist threats, 

and operational assistance, such as joint U.S.-foreign nation investigations 

and operations against terrorists. This new focus on working with foreign 

nations to prevent terrorist attacks represents a notable shift from pre-9/11 

objectives, with potentially significant implications for the strategies, 

resources, and overseas presence of U.S. LEAs. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), combating 

terrorism has become the nation’s top national security goal and the 

highest strategic objective at U.S. embassies worldwide. Law enforcement 

agencies (LEA) from the Departments of State (State), Justice (Justice), 

and Homeland Security (DHS)—including the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS)—operate from U.S. embassies overseas and 

assist foreign nation governments on a broad array of law enforcement 

issues, such as investigating crime, reducing illegal drug activity, 

controlling borders and immigration, and protecting U.S. embassies and 

diplomats from attack. Three U.S. national strategies, developed in the 

wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, directed that law enforcement activities

be increasingly focused on the prevention of further terrorist attacks, 

including helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists. This includes technical assistance, such as antiterrorism 

training and the provision of technologies used to identify terrorist threats, 

and operational assistance, such as joint U.S.-foreign nation investigations 

and operations against terrorists. This new focus on working with foreign 

nations to prevent terrorist attacks represents a notable shift from pre-9/11 

objectives, with potentially significant implications for the strategies, 

resources, and overseas presence of U.S. LEAs. 

Because of the continuing threat of terrorist attacks against the United 

States and its embassies, diplomats, and citizens abroad, you requested 

that we evaluate the federal government’s efforts to implement national

security strategies to use its LEAs to assist foreign nations in identifying, 

disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. Specifically, you asked us to assess 

(1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented 

Because of the continuing threat of terrorist attacks against the United 

States and its embassies, diplomats, and citizens abroad, you requested 

that we evaluate the federal government’s efforts to implement national

security strategies to use its LEAs to assist foreign nations in identifying, 

disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. Specifically, you asked us to assess 

(1) the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists and (2) the extent to which LEAs have implemented 

Page 1 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
this guidance. We agreed that this review would be limited to U.S. law 

enforcement efforts overseas to assist foreign nations in identifying, 

disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and would not focus on (1) U.S. 

domestic law enforcement efforts to combat terrorism; (2) other 

instruments of national power—including military, intelligence, 

diplomatic, or financial—currently being used to combat terrorism; and 

(3) U.S. efforts to combat terrorist financing, since we had recently 

completed a review of this effort.1

To assess the guidance for LEAs to assist foreign nations in identifying, 

disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists, we analyzed the National Security

Strategy of the United States of America, the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism,2

 the 9/11

Commission Report, and related legislation to determine if the strategies 

contained key elements that we have recommended3

 and the Government 

Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires, such as clearly defined

objectives, roles and responsibilities, leveraged funding, and monitoring 

systems. We also discussed the guidance with representatives from State, 

Justice, and DHS, along with embassy and LEA officials involved with 

working with foreign nation counterparts. To assess the extent to which 

 1

GAO, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S. Efforts 

to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad,

GAO-06-19 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2005). The report found that the Departments of

Justice, State, and Treasury lacked a strategic plan to carry out this effort; roles and 

responsibilities needed clarification; there was no mechanism to determine resource needs; 

and there was no monitoring system to assess progress.

2

In addition to the strategies discussed in this report, the White House has released a 

number of other strategies related to the War on Terrorism, including (1) the September 

2004 National Border Patrol Strategy and (2) the May 2006 National Strategy to Combat

Terrorist Travel. For this report, we focused on the strategies released shortly after the 9/11 

terrorist attacks that discussed the use of LEAs to combat terrorism and assist foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, in order to determine the extent to

which LEAs had implemented these strategies in the 5 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

We also included any updates to these strategies to ensure that there was a strategic 

continuum in the use of LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute

terrorists.

3

GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for 

Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005); GAO, 

Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); 

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to 

Terrorism, GAO-03-519T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003); and GAO, Executive Guide: 

Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, 

GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 

Page 2 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
LEAs have implemented this guidance to assist foreign nations, we 

reviewed State, Justice, and DHS strategic plans and annual performance 

reports; requested all implementing guidance; and asked that each agency 

provide a listing of their general accomplishments in assisting foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also conducted 

detailed work in four countries with key roles in combating terrorism, 

where we met with LEA, embassy, and foreign nation officials. We are not 

naming the specific countries we visited for this review due to diplomatic 

and security concerns. After our work abroad, we reviewed and verified 

our overall observations with senior representatives from each department

and agency. We also met with National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 

officials to brief them on our observations and to determine the status of 

ongoing efforts to develop a plan to use all elements of national power, 

including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials would not discuss the 

plan, its contents, or any issues raised in this report. According to NCTC 

officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was still under 

development as of March 1, 2007. During the course of our work we 

experienced considerable delays obtaining information from Justice and 

State, which resulted in this report being issued several months later than 

initially planned. We were eventually able to obtain information sufficient 

for answering our objectives. We conducted our work between August 

2005 and March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the President issued a series of 

national strategies, beginning in 2002 and updated in 2006, that provided 

broad direction for overseas U.S. law enforcement efforts to assist foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. These strategies 

collectively called for reorienting U.S. LEAs to proactively work to prevent 

terrorist attacks at home and abroad. However, they lacked key 

components, such as clearly defined objectives, roles and responsibilities, 

and procedures for working across agency boundaries toward a common 

goal, necessary for a strategic plan and for facilitating interagency 

collaboration. Further, they did not articulate which LEAs should 

implement the general guidance or how they should do so. For example, 

officials from seven LEAs as well as embassy officials in the four countries 

we visited told us that they had received little-to-no guidance from the 

Results in Brief 

Page 3 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
National Security Council (NSC), NCTC,4

 or State, Justice, and DHS on 

how to implement the directive to assist foreign nations to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Only the FBI received and has issued 

some implementing guidance—for example, stating that it planned to 

increase its presence abroad and increase joint operations with foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. While one of the 

three strategies tasked State with developing and coordinating U.S. efforts 

to combat terrorism abroad, we found that State did not develop or 

coordinate a plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help 

foreign nations combat terrorism. In December 2004, Congress passed the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (the 2004 

Intelligence Reform Act),5

 which charged the NCTC with developing a plan

to use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat 

terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had drafted a general plan, which 

was approved by the President in June 2006. According to NCTC officials, 

the implementing guidance for the plan was still under development as of 

March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss the plan, its contents, or the 

implementing guidance. 

Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to help foreign 

nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, the FBI 

has increased its overseas activities, DHS has worked with foreign nations 

to implement the Container Security Initiative, and State has expanded its 

Antiterrorism Assistance program to improve foreign nation capacities to

combat terrorism. Despite such actions, we found that because most 

LEAs, with the exception of the FBI, have not been given clear guidance,

they lacked clearly defined roles and responsibilities for helping foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example, in one 

country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities between two 

U.S. LEAs may have compromised several joint operations intended to 

identify and disrupt potential terrorist activities, according to the U.S. and 

foreign nation LEAs involved in these efforts. In addition, we found that 

departments and LEAs generally lacked guidance on setting funding 

priorities and providing resources to assist foreign nations to identify, 

 4

The NCTC was created by Congress as part of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). NCTC’s mission includes developing plans that 

coordinate the use all elements of national power, including LEAs, to combat terrorism and 

prevent terrorist attacks. As detailed in the background section of this report, the NCTC

reports directly to the President on matters of strategic operational planning for

counterterrorism and works under the policy direction of the NSC.

5

P.L. 108-458, section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 404o). 

Page 4 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result, for example, we found that 

State’s office responsible for coordinating all U.S. assistance to combat 

terrorism abroad was hampered by a lack of resources, limiting its ability 

to carry out this vital function. LEAs also lacked performance monitoring 

systems to determine the effectiveness of their technical or operational 

assistance and, as a result, found it difficult to assess whether they were 

making progress in their efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism. 

In addition, embassies generally lacked formal structures for LEAs to 

share information and collaborate on operational efforts to assist foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; LEA and embassy 

officials told us that existing embassy structures do not provide a means 

for all LEAs at embassies to work collaboratively to assist foreign nations 

to combat terrorism. We also found that, because comprehensive needs 

assessments were not conducted to identify technical and operational 

assistance needs in the four countries we visited, the full range of 

assistance that LEAs could provide may not be utilized to address foreign 

nations’ needs for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. 

To ensure that LEAs, a key element of national power, are fully focused on

assisting foreign nations to identify and prevent future terrorist attacks 

and protect Americans around the world, we are making 

recommendations to the NCTC, NSC, and three executive departments 

with LEAs stationed abroad. We recommend that the Director of the 

NCTC, in consultation with the NSC, ensure that the implementing 

guidance for the NCTC’s plan for combating terrorism (1) articulates a 

clear strategy to implement the national strategies’ goal of using U.S. LEAs 

to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists; (2) 

clarifies roles and responsibilities for each LEA for implementing the goal; 

(3) provides guidance to LEAs on setting funding priorities and providing 

resources to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists; (4) requires comprehensive needs assessments for foreign 

nations and tailored assistance programs to address those needs; and (5) 

requires a monitoring system to report on accomplishments or progress. 

In addition, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the 

Secretaries of Homeland Security and State each take the following two 

actions: 

• Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and bureaus

on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the national 

strategies’ goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs to assist foreign 

nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. 

Page 5 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
• Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective department 

and Congress accurate reporting on that department’s accomplishments, 

impediments, and planned improvements in its LEAs’ efforts to help 

foreign nations combat terrorism. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the 

U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security take the 

following action: 

• Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to improve 

information-sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for assisting 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from DHS, Justice, 

and State, which are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV. 

DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the 

report and said it would take action to implement them based upon 

direction from the NSC and NCTC. 

Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance interagency 

coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will work with NCTC to 

address guidance to implement the NCTC plan. Justice did not indicate

whether it concurred with our recommendations that the Attorney General 

issue clear guidance to LEAs or establish a monitoring system for ongoing 

efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism. Justice also expressed 

concern that our analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational 

and technical assistance. 

State said it would consider working with relevant LEAs to improve the 

coordination of law enforcement activities overseas. State did not indicate 

whether it concurred with our recommendations that the Secretary of 

State issue clear guidance and establish a monitoring system for ongoing 

efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism. State also indicated that 

we did not fully reflect the department’s lack of resources necessary to 

carry out its mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to combat terrorism 

abroad and provided additional information on its Regional Strategic 

Initiatives and the role of DS. 

The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report and stated that

it is in the process of implementing the plan in conjunction with other 

departments and agencies, including the law enforcement agencies. 

According to NCTC, it has already begun to implement the 

Page 6 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
recommendations made to NCTC in our report. We also received technical 

comments from State, DHS, Justice, and NCTC, which we have 

incorporated throughout the report where appropriate. 

State, Justice, and DHS each include LEAs that operate from U.S. 

embassies. LEAs abroad work on a wide array of law enforcement issues, 

including those that cover criminal enterprises, drug cartels, visa and 

immigration fraud, financial crimes, criminal and terrorist threats against 

U.S. embassies and personnel, and fugitive capture and extraditions. LEA 

assistance can include technical assistance, such as the provision of 

training in police techniques and legal reforms, as well as investigative or 

operational assistance, which can support efforts such as joint teams of 

U.S. and foreign nation LEAs working together to stop crimes, illegal drug

operations, or terrorists attacks. 

LEAs face a number of challenges in working with foreign nations to 

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In particular, LEAs lack arrest 

authority overseas and therefore heavily rely on the cooperation of the 

foreign nation. The degree of cooperation and the capabilities of foreign 

nation law enforcement agencies vary widely. According to FBI officials, 

forging partnerships with foreign nation LEAs can be an arduous and 

sometimes impractical task. They said that the ability to engage in joint 

investigations with foreign nation LEAs was dictated both by the will and 

the ability of their counterparts to engage in complex investigative 

techniques. 

The Department of Justice’s primary goal is preventing terrorist attacks 

within the United States and promoting the nation’s security, as well as 

investigating and prosecuting those who have committed, or intend to 

commit, terrorist attacks in the United States. Four Justice LEAs have a 

permanent overseas presence, including the FBI; DEA; the Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and the U.S. Marshals 

Service (USMS). 

The FBI is charged with protecting the United States from terrorist 

attacks; preventing, disrupting, and defeating terrorist operations; 

improving efforts to combat terrorism with U.S. state and local LEAs by 

expanding the use of multiagency Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF); 

and expanding operational partnerships with foreign nation law 

enforcement and intelligence agencies to disrupt and prevent terrorism. 

The FBI operates abroad through its Legal Attaché (LEGAT) offices 

Background 

Department of Justice 

Page 7 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
located in 59 U.S. missions around the world. The FBI’s Web site states 

that LEGATs (1) coordinate international investigations with their foreign 

nation colleagues; (2) cover international leads for domestic U.S. 

investigations; (3) link U.S. and international resources in critical criminal

and terrorist areas to protect Americans at home and abroad; and (4) 

coordinate FBI training, including counterterrorism classes, for police in 

their geographic regions. According to the FBI, a July 2005 Memorandum 

of Understanding Concerning Overseas and Domestic Activities of the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigations controls the interaction of the CIA and the FBI in regard to 

foreign counterterrorism operations abroad. 

DEA’s mission is to target organizations that pose the greatest drug threats 

to American citizens. It cooperates closely with foreign nations to help 

them identify, disrupt, and prosecute those involved in the illegal drug

trade to reduce the availability of illicit drugs. DEA has around 696 

officials in 63 countries.

ATF’s mission is to enforce regulations on the firearms and explosives 

industries, assist other LEAs during criminal and post-blast investigations, 

conduct ballistics analysis, and trace the origins of guns and bombs used 

during criminal activity. ATF provides ballistics training and tracing 

assistance to foreign nation police, and, ATF officials told us, its analytical

capabilities could be used to trace the origins of explosives used in 

terrorist bombings, and to help identify and capture terrorist cells. ATF 

has a permanent presence in four countries with a total of 10 officials. 

The USMS’s mission is to track, apprehend, and extradite fugitives 

domestically and internationally, as well as protect federal judicial 

officials, including judges, attorneys, and jurors. USMS officials told us 

that USMS has provided assistance and training to foreign nation LEAs in 

establishing systems for protecting judicial officials. USMS has a 

permanent presence in three countries with a total of 7 agents. In addition, 

USMS currently has 16 agents in Iraq and 5 in Afghanistan. 

DHS’s primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 

States and reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism by detecting, 

deterring, and mitigating terrorist threats. It is also responsible for border 

security, and extending the zone of security beyond U.S. borders by 

working with foreign nations to identify, prioritize, and interdict threats. 

We examined three DHS LEAs that work from U.S. embassies abroad, 

Department of Homeland 

Security 

Page 8 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
including ICE, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the United 

States Secret Service (USSS). 

ICE’s primary mission is to protect the United States and uphold public 

safety by identifying criminal activities and eliminating vulnerabilities that 

pose a threat to U.S. borders. By investigating threats to U.S. border 

security, ICE seeks to eliminate the potential threat of terrorist acts 

against the United States. As of December 2006, ICE had 298 investigative

agents in 52 offices in 41 countries. 

CBP’s primary mission includes preventing terrorists and terrorist 

weapons from entering the United States. CBP officials generally operate

at U.S. ports of entry along the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada, but 

also operate in parts of the Caribbean and other countries around the 

world. CBP has 943 personnel deployed to 28 countries abroad. The duties 

of these personnel include preclearing passengers flying to the United 

States, working at foreign nation maritime ports abroad in search of 

weapons of mass destruction, as well as working to address CBP activities 

in-country and general CBP related support at embassies. In addition, CBP 

works to protect global supply lines from terrorism through both bilateral 

and multilateral fora. 

The USSS’s primary mission includes protecting the U.S. President, the 

Vice President, their families, and other high-ranking U.S. government 

officials from terrorism and other threats, as well as investigating and

facilitating prosecution of financial and electronic crimes, counterfeit 

currency, and identity theft. USSS officials operate abroad with 54 agents 

staffed to 19 offices in 15 countries. 

The Department of State’s primary mission is to “create a more secure, 

democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people 

and the international community.”6

 According to State’s Strategic Plan for

2004 to 2009, State is charged with developing, coordinating, and 

implementing American counterterrorism policy. Within State, the Office 

of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism’s (S/CT) mission is to develop and 

lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all instruments of 

national power, including law enforcement, diplomacy, economic power, 

Department of State 

 6

Fiscal year 2004 to 2009 Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan; source: 

http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm. 

Page 9 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
intelligence, and military. S/CT provides foreign policy oversight and 

guidance to all U.S. government activities to combat terrorism, including

those of U.S. LEAs operating abroad.

DS is the department’s law enforcement arm.7

 The Bureau’s Regional 

Security Officers (RSO) are responsible for protecting the embassy, its 

diplomats, and their families from criminal and terrorist attacks. The RSO 

is the ambassador’s senior advisor on law enforcement and security 

issues. RSOs investigate passport and visa fraud, conduct 

counterintelligence investigations, and can provide investigative 

assistance to local, state, and federal agencies. DS personnel also monitor 

and analyze terrorist activities and threats, train foreign police in 

antiterrorism procedures, and protect U.S. and foreign dignitaries. DS has 

approximately 590 RSO special agents assigned to 202 Foreign Service

posts throughout the world, making it the most widely represented U.S. 

LEA overseas. 

The National Security Act of 1947 created the NSC to improve the 

coordination of national security concerns among executive departments 

and agencies.

8

 The act charges the NSC with more effectively coordinating 

the policies and functions of the departments and agencies related to 

national security. Specifically, the act states that the function of the NSC 

shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, 

foreign, and military policies relating to national security to enable the 

departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters 

involving national security. 

The NSC is chaired by the President. According to the White House, its 

regular attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory) include the Vice 

President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the

Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the 

statutory military advisor to the NSC, and the Director of National 

National Security Council 

 7

DS in its current form is an outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 

Antiterrorism Act of 1986. (P.L. 99-399; 22 U.S.C. 4801 et. seq.) It has a broad mandate, in 

furtherance of the Secretary of State’s responsibilities under this Act, to protect and 

perform protection functions in relation to U.S. missions and personnel overseas. As

relevant to this report, DS’s specific law enforcement authorities are largely defined by 22

U.S.C. 2709, which confer on DS a lead law enforcement role with respect to passport and 

visa fraud. 

8

50 U.S.C. 402(a),(b). 

Page 10 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Intelligence is its intelligence advisor. The Attorney General and the 

Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend 

meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive 

departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are also invited 

to attend meetings when appropriate.

The 9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission created 

by congressional legislation in late 2002 and charged with preparing a full 

and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the 9/11 terrorist 

attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the 

attacks.9

 The commission was also mandated to provide recommendations 

designed to guard against future terrorist attacks. On July 22, 2004, the 

commission released its public report. 

The commission identified a number of weaknesses in the ability of U.S. 

LEAs to identify and disrupt terrorist threats to the United States. For 

example, it reported that the vast majority of LEAs did not consider 

protecting Americans from terrorist threats their primary goal. With the 

exception of one portion of the FBI, the commission found that very little 

of the U.S. law enforcement community was engaged in combating 

terrorism before the 9/11 attacks, despite each agency’s ability to make 

contributions to the U.S. effort. For example, the commission found that: 

The 9/11 Commission 

• USMS had almost 4,000 agents on 9/11 and was expert in tracking 

fugitives, but its expertise was not used to identify and apprehend 

terrorists. 

• DEA had more than 4,500 agents on 9/11, and there were a number of 

occasions when DEA agents were able to introduce sources to the FBI or 

CIA for counterterrorism use, despite the agency having no direct mission 

to combat terrorism. 

• The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),10 with its 9,000 border 

patrol agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 2,000 immigration special agents, had 

perhaps the greatest potential to develop an expanded role in 

counterterrorism. However, INS was instead focused on the formidable 

 9

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-306, Title VI. 

10INS was abolished by the Homeland Security Act, and its responsibilities were divided 

among ICE, CBP, and Citizens and Immigration Services, which are now part of DHS. 

Page 11 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
challenges posed by illegal entry over the southwest border, criminal 

aliens, and a growing backlog in applications for naturalizing immigrants.

• USSS had the mission to protect the President and other high-ranking 

officials, and its agents did not become involved with counterterrorism 

efforts except when terrorist assassination plots were rumored or 

suspected. 

• The Customs Service (which is now part of DHS) deployed agents at all 

points of entry into the United States to screen imported goods and collect

duties, and while these agents worked alongside INS agents, the two 

groups did not regularly cooperate on joint investigations. 

• ATF was used only occasionally by the FBI as a counterterrorism resource 

prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, despite its expertise in ballistics and 

explosives tracing. The ATF’s laboratories, investigators, and analyses 

were critical to the investigation of the February 1993 bombing of the 

World Trade Center and the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 

Federal Building in Oklahoma City. 

The commission noted that counterterrorism investigations often 

overlapped with or were cued by other criminal investigations, such as for 

money laundering or smuggling contraband, and that, because of this 

nexus between counterterrorism and criminal investigations, LEAs could 

fundamentally expand U.S. efforts to identify and disrupt terrorist threats 

to America. 

However, the commission found that numerous impediments to using U.S.

LEAs to protect America from further terrorist attacks existed prior to 

9/11. For example, the commission found that that no one was in charge of 

using the full capabilities of these agencies to identify and disrupt the 

terrorist threat; roles and responsibilities were not adequately defined; 

accountability was diffuse; and the federal government lacked a 

performance monitoring system to track LEA progress at identifying, 

disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. In addition, the commission found 

that LEAs were not oriented to prevent terrorist attacks. Finally, the

commission found that these agencies cooperated only some of the time, 

and this cooperation did not amount to the type of joint action that 

harnessed the combined capabilities of all U.S. LEAs. 

In recognition of these and other problems, the commission recommended 

that Congress authorize the creation of a single, centralized center for 

The National 

Counterterrorism Center 

Page 12 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
combating terrorism to coordinate all instruments of national power, 

including law enforcement, to prevent another attack. In December 2004,

Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, which created the 

NCTC and charged it with conducting “strategic operational planning” for 

counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power—

including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, 

and law enforcement activities—within and among agencies, with the 

ultimate goal of preventing future attacks against America and its interests 

worldwide. 

The act defined strategic operational planning to include the 

counterterrorism mission, objectives to be achieved, tasks to be 

performed, interagency coordination of operational activities, and the 

assignment of roles and responsibilities. It also required NCTC to monitor 

the implementation of strategic operational plans for each relevant U.S. 

government department or agency. The NCTC is a part of the Office of the

Director of National Intelligence and reports to the Director on matters of 

intelligence collection and analysis; however, on matters of strategic 

operational planning for counterterrorism, the Director of the NCTC 

reports directly to the President. As a result, the NCTC works under the 

policy direction of the NSC on matters of counterterrorism planning. 

A series of national strategies have provided broad guidance for U.S. LEAs 

to help foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

However, the strategies lack essential elements of a strategic plan and for 

facilitating interagency collaboration, and they do not clearly delineate 

what role, if any, the various LEAs should play in assisting foreign nations 

to combat terrorism. While State was charged in the 2003 National 

Strategy for Combating Terrorism with developing and coordinating U.S.

counterterrorism policy abroad, it did not develop a plan to do so, 

because, according to State officials, it lacked sufficient authority and 

resources. The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act requires the NCTC to develop

U.S. governmentwide strategic operational plans to combat terrorism. 

According to the act, NCTC’s planning should include the mission, 

objectives, tasks to be performed, interagency coordination of operational 

activities, and the assignment of roles and responsibilities among 

participating agencies. NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, 

they had drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in 

June 2006. According to NCTC officials, the implementing guidance for the 

plan was still under development as of March 1, 2007. 

National Strategies 

Have Provided Broad 

Guidance but Lack 

Key Elements for a 

Strategic Plan and 

Interagency 

Collaboration 

Page 13 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
A series of national strategies have provided some strategic-level guidance

for U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists. For example, the National Security Strategy, issued in 2002 and 

updated in March 2006, states that the United States will continue to 

encourage regional partners to take up a coordinated effort that isolates 

the terrorists, and help ensure that foreign nations have the law 

enforcement, military, political, and financial tools necessary to disrupt 

and destroy terrorist operations before they reach American borders. 

Additionally, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security primarily 

focuses on domestic efforts to secure America from further terrorist 

attacks. It clarifies the role of LEAs in the post 9/11 world, stating that,

“Our Nation’s highest law enforcement objective must be the prevention of 

terrorist acts—a significant shift from pre-9/11 objectives.” The strategy 

also notes that, in a world where the terrorist threat pays no respect to 

traditional boundaries, the American strategy for homeland security 

cannot stop at the country’s borders. It calls for a sustained and systematic 

international agenda to counter the global terrorist threat and improve 

homeland security, and identifies a number of initiatives in this area, 

including (1) intensifying international law enforcement cooperation and

helping foreign nations fight terrorism and (2) augmenting the FBI’s 

overseas presence by increasing the number of LEGATs around the world. 

It states that Justice, in cooperation with State, is to work with foreign 

nation counterparts on these law enforcement issues. 

Also, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, issued in 2003 and 

updated in 2006, focuses on the United States’ efforts to combat terrorism 

abroad. It also provides greater detail on the objectives and strategies for 

U.S. LEAs in working with their foreign nation counterparts. According to

the strategy, the United States is to: 

National Strategies 

Provide Broad Guidance 

for LEAs to Assist Foreign 

Nations to Combat 

Terrorism 

• Expand, where appropriate, the U.S. law enforcement presence abroad to

further the investigative and operational assistance related to the 

interdiction, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist suspects. 

• Increase technical and operational assistance efforts to help foreign nation 

LEAs acquire the necessary capabilities to fight terrorism through a variety 

of means, including (1) improved legislation, (2) technical assistance, (3) 

new investigative techniques, (4) intelligence sharing, and (5) law 

enforcement training. 

Page 14 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
• Enhance operational assistance to expand international cooperation to 

combat terrorism through expanded sharing of law enforcement 

information. 

In 2006, the White House released updates of the National Security 

Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism. Both updated 

strategies reinforce the basic concepts of using U.S. LEAs to assist foreign 

nations in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists abroad. For 

example, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism supports intensifying 

training and other types of assistance to improve foreign nation LEA 

capacities to identify and disrupt terrorists threats, as well as 

implementing legal reforms aimed at ensuring that foreign nations have 

the necessary laws to carry out this effort, and that investigators, 

prosecutors, and judges have the capacity to effectively prosecute 

terrorists using these new laws. The strategies state that this approach has 

succeeded in identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorist plots since 

the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 

Our past work has stressed the importance of developing a strategy to

combat terrorism that would establish goals, objectives, priorities, 

outcomes, milestones, and performance measures.11 In March 2003, we 

reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be 

accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each 

objective, ensure that funding necessary to achieve the objectives is 

available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and 

identify needed improvements. For example, our past work has found that 

identifying clear roles and responsibilities for each federal agency 

combating terrorism is a major challenge in implementing national 

strategies related to terrorism. 

In addition, GPRA requires each federal agency to develop strategic plans 

that cover a period of at least 5 years and include the agency’s mission 

statement; identify the agency’s general goals and objectives; and describe

how the agency intends to achieve those goals through its activities and 

human, capital, information, and other resources. Under GPRA, strategic 

plans are the starting point for agencies to set annual performance plans

for programs and to measure the performance of the programs in 

achieving those goals. Our past work has found that GPRA has the 

The National Strategies 

Lack Key Elements for a 

Strategic Plan and 

Interagency Collaboration 

 11GAO-03-519T. 

Page 15 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
potential for greatly enhancing agency performance. For example, 

managers can use performance information to identify problems in 

existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and to develop 

corrective actions.12

Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency 

collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1) define 

and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or 

joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding needs by leveraging 

resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible 

policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency 

boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on 

results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts 

through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual 

accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management 

systems.13 We have specifically noted that, given the number of agencies 

involved in U.S. government efforts to combat terrorism, it is particularly 

important that there be mechanisms to coordinate across agencies.14

We found that while the national strategies, as well as their updates in 

2006, provided broad guidance, they lacked key strategic elements, 

including those to promote LEA collaboration in assisting foreign nations 

to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists (see table 1). For example, 

none of the three national strategies established joint agency strategies 

that would capitalize on the unique capacity of each LEA to combat 

terrorism. Further, none of them identified funding needs or leveraged 

resources; reached agreement on roles and responsibilities; or established 

procedures to operate across agency boundaries. Moreover, none of the 

strategies included mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on their 

overall results, nor did they reinforce agency accountability for 

collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports. 

 12GAO-05-927. 

13GAO-06-15. 

14GAO-03-519T. 

Page 16 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Table 1: Status of Key Elements of Strategic Plans and Interagency Collaboration in

the National Strategies, for Foreign Nation Assistance to Identify, Disrupt, and 

Prosecute Terrorists 

Key elements

National 

Security 

Strategy 

 National 

Strategy for 

Homeland 

Security 

National Strategy 

for Combating 

Terrorism 

Common or joint strategy 

Goals and objectives 9 9 9

Roles and responsibilities 

Performance measures 

Funding

Policies to operate across 

agency boundaries 

Mechanisms to monitor, 

evaluate, and report on results

Legend: 9 = Contains key element. 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. national strategies. 

According to the 2003 and 2006 versions of the National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism, State has the lead role in coordinating the 

implementation of the strategy to combat terrorism abroad. However, we 

found that State’s office charged with this mission—State’s Coordinator 

for Counterterrorism (S/CT)—did not develop or implement a plan to use 

the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. According to its mission statement, S/CT 

is to develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all 

instruments of national power, including law enforcement, diplomacy, 

economic power, intelligence, and military. S/CT is to provide foreign 

policy oversight and guidance to all U.S. government activities to combat 

terrorism, including those of U.S. LEAs operating abroad. This includes 

coordinating all U.S. government efforts to improve counterterrorism 

cooperation with foreign governments and participating in the 

development, coordination, and implementation of U.S. counterterrorism 

policy. As discussed below, S/CT has undertaken a number of initiatives to 

coordinate U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, the deputy director of

S/CT told us that the office lacked the staff, resources, and authority 

necessary to meet the national security goal of using LEAs to assist foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

State Department Unable 

to Fully Implement 

National Strategy Goal 

Page 17 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
In addition, we found that: 

• S/CT does not have the authority to direct Justice and DHS LEAs to 

undertake this new mission and therefore has limited ability to lead a 

coordinated governmentwide effort. According to State, Justice, and DHS 

officials, only the NSC and, since December 2004, the NCTC, have the 

authority to ensure that executive branch agencies are working toward the 

common objective of assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists. 

• S/CT cites its bilateral consultations process as a key mechanism to assist 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. The 

consultations can include the participation of multiple U.S. departments 

and agencies. S/CT reported that it had led about 83 of these consultations 

with foreign nations between 2001 and 2005. We asked State for access to

S/CT’s records on the bilateral consultations for each of the four countries 

we visited, and found that S/CT had only conducted consultations for one 

of those countries. When we reviewed the 2002 to 2005 documentation of 

consultations for that country, we found that much of the assistance was 

for counter-drug efforts or general capacity building of the country’s legal 

system, such as training of police in basic investigative techniques. The 

assistance also included a $10 million effort to develop a special 

investigative group within the national police, focused on terrorist 

investigations and crisis response.15 According to representatives from the 

national police force, the U.S. assistance brought about a significant 

improvement in their ability to investigate terrorist attacks, but it was not 

focused on improving their ability to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks. 

In addition, we reviewed the three bilateral consultations held between 

2002 and 2005 for this country and found there was no discussion of any 

initiatives to use the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to assist the 

foreign nation to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

• The 2003 National Strategy to Combat Terrorism directed State to take the 

lead in developing specific regional strategies to defeat terrorism. State 

told us that, in response to a NSC tasking, it began developing interagencycoordinated Regional Action Plans (RAP). However, State officials told us

the RAPs were incomplete, had never been implemented, and were now 

out of date. State said that it transferred management of the RAPs to the 

NCTC in 2005. However, none of the LEAs or embassy officials we met 

 15This effort was funded by State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which was

created in 1983 to assist civilian security and law enforcement personnel in police 

procedures that address terrorism. 

Page 18 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
with said they had received any guidance based on the RAPs, nor any from

the NCTC. 

• In 2006, S/CT began a new effort called the Regional Strategic Initiative 

that stressed a regional approach to combating terrorism. Four Regional 

Strategic Initiatives were established in 2006: for Southeast Asia, Iraq and 

its surrounding region, the Horn of Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean. 

However, based on documentation we reviewed, the Southeast Asia 

initiative did not include the use of the combined capabilities of LEAs to 

assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. For 

example, in the documentation we reviewed—which focused on 

identifying terrorists transiting through a region where several high-profile 

attacks against U.S. interests had occurred—there was only one sentence 

dedicated to law enforcement, and it focused solely on DHS LEAs and 

border control issues. 

A March 2006 report by State’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) found 

that S/CT faced significant problems in meeting its mandate to coordinate 

U.S. counterterrorism assistance to foreign nations. The OIG found that 

S/CT was viewed by many elements of the U.S. government as “marginal” 

to the Global War on Terror. It also found that the difficulty of helping to 

coordinate the wide scope of U.S. counterterrorism efforts abroad 

challenged S/CT and that it had not fulfilled its oversight role over U.S. 

assistance to foreign nations.16 

The OIG also found that some S/CT components lacked sufficient 

resources to carry out their responsibilities and, specifically, that S/CT’s 

regional affairs unit was under funded, and “scarcely” had the resources to 

meet its mandate to provide advice, coordination, and action on regional 

and bilateral counterterrorism issues. The OIG also stated that, if 

counterterrorism is the single most important U.S. priority, State could not 

afford to have the regional affairs unit understaffed, with no career paths 

for its counterterrorism officers. 

The OIG found that, in accordance with State’s mandate in the 2003 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, S/CT had worked hard to 

exercise its interagency lead in developing Regional Action Plans. 

However, according to the inspection report, observers reported to the 

 16U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector 

General, Inspection of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, OIG Report

ISP-I-06-25A (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006). 

Page 19 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
OIG that the exercise did not produce concrete, comprehensive strategies, 

although it did produce a useful dialogue and the first detailed matrix of 

current and planned U.S. counterterrorism strategies in each region. 

The OIG report made numerous recommendations intended to improve 

S/CT’s ability to coordinate U.S. assistance to combat terrorism abroad. It 

made several recommendations about adding staff to individual units, but 

did not make broader recommendations on overall organizational 

structure or funding levels. According to an OIG official, as of January 26,

2007, S/CT was in the process of addressing all of the report’s 

recommendations directed to it. 

In responding to our draft report, State indicated that S/CT continues to be

hampered by the lack of resources discussed in the March 2006 State OIG 

report, limiting S/CT’s ability to coordinate the U.S. government’s 

international counterterrorism activities. In addition, State said that our 

draft did not give its new Regional Strategic Initiatives sufficient credit and

that law enforcement coordination was a key aspect of the process. 

However, State did not provide us additional information to support this 

position and did not comment on our finding that the one Regional 

Strategic Initiative we reviewed showed little involvement by U.S. or 

foreign nation law enforcement agencies. 

In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, 

creating the NCTC and charging it with developing strategic operational 

plans to combat terrorism using every element of national power, 

including those of U.S. LEAs. Under the act, the NCTC is expected to (1) 

conduct strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities; (2) 

integrate all instruments of national power in such planning, including law 

enforcement, diplomatic, military, intelligence, and financial activities; (3) 

assign roles and responsibilities to lead departments and agencies; (4) 

ensure that agencies have access to intelligence and intelligence support 

needed to execute their counterterrorism plans and accomplish their 

assigned activities; and (5) monitor implementation of these operational 

plans. 

In June 2006, the NCTC Director testified before Congress that the lack of

a detailed plan to ensure full implementation of the national security 

NCTC Has Drafted Plan for 

Combating Terrorism, but 

Implementing Guidance Is 

Still under Development 

Page 20 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
strategy had been a void that stretched back for decades.17 According to 

the director, what has long been missing is a plan to ensure that national

strategies are implemented at the operational level in a coordinated, 

integrated fashion, and that there has been no formal process to translate 

the national strategies into strategic and tangible objectives, assigned to 

lead agencies, with roles and responsibilities clearly defined. In addition, 

there has been no plan to ensure the coordination, integration, and 

synchronization of joint departmental operations, or any effort to monitor 

the combined impact of the multiple agencies engaged in implementing 

the national security strategy. 

NCTC officials told us that, in response to the act, they had drafted a 

general plan, which was approved by the President in June of 2006. 

According to NCTC officials, implementing guidance for the plan was still 

under development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss the 

plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance. 

Some LEAs have taken steps to increase their efforts to assist foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, including the 

expansion of the FBI presence abroad; assistance to help foreign nations 

identify and disrupt terrorist threats at certain maritime ports; and 

antiterrorism training to assist foreign nation law enforcement personnel. 

However, LEA efforts have been hindered by a lack of (1) clearly 

articulated roles and responsibilities to assist foreign nations in combating 

terrorism; (2) guidance on setting funding priorities and providing 

resources to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess progress at 

identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and reducing terrorist 

attacks; (4) formal structures to promote joint investigations and 

operations between U.S. and foreign nation LEAs and coordinate LEA 

technical assistance to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) comprehensive 

country needs assessments to tailor LEA technical and operational 

assistance to specific foreign nation needs for identifying, disrupting, and 

prosecuting terrorists. 

LEA Efforts to Assist 

Foreign Nations to 

Identify, Disrupt, and 

Prosecute Terrorists 

Have Been Limited by 

Several Factors 

 17Admiral John Scott Redd, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign 

Relations, June 13, 2006. 

Page 21 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Some LEAs have increased their efforts to help foreign nations combat 

terrorism. For example, the FBI is attempting to operationally assist 

foreign nations to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks before they occur,

and it has responded to specific terrorist attacks by assisting foreign 

nations to identify and prosecute the suspected terrorists. In addition, new 

programs have been specifically designed to assist foreign nations to 

identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats, such as the DHS Container 

Security Initiative (CSI). Moreover, some existing technical assistance 

programs, like State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, have been

significantly expanded in an effort to improve foreign nation capabilities. 

While this list is not all inclusive, these represent some significant U.S. 

efforts to use U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to combat terrorism. We 

found that these three efforts were limited by a variety of factors. 

In our past work, we found that, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI 

has permanently realigned a substantial number of its domestic field 

agents from traditional criminal investigative programs to 

counterterrorism investigations.18 In 2002, the FBI Director announced 

that, in keeping with its new priorities, the agency would move more than 

500 field agent positions from its drug, violent crime, and white-collar 

crime programs to counterterrorism. The FBI has transferred more agent 

positions to work on counterterrorism than it had originally announced, 

including through the short-term reassignment of additional field agents 

from drug and other law enforcement areas. Prior to the FBI’s change in

priorities, about 25 percent of the FBI’s field agent positions were 

allocated to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime 

programs. As a result of the staff reprogramming and funding for 

additional special agent positions received through various appropriations, 

the FBI staffing levels for these areas had increased domestically to about

36 percent in 2004 and represented the single largest concentration of FBI 

resources. 

The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the United 

States will augment the FBI’s overseas presence. The FBI’s Strategic Plan 

states that it will expand the role of its LEGAT offices overseas from that 

of a simple liaison office to one with a dynamic operational partnership 

with foreign nation counterparts. According to Justice and FBI documents 

and officials, this includes undertaking joint investigative and operational 

LEAs Have Taken Steps to 

Assist Foreign Nations 

Combat Terrorism 

The FBI Has Made Some Effort 

to Increase Assistance to 

Foreign Nations, but it Faces 

Staffing Limitations 

 18GAO, FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform 

and Address Priorities GAO-04-578T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2004). 

Page 22 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
partnerships with foreign nation LEAs to identify and stop terrorist attacks 

against U.S. interests around the globe. We found that the FBI has both 

responded to specific terrorist attacks by operationally assisting foreign 

nation LEAs to identify and prosecute terrorists involved in those attacks,

as well as tried to proactively assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, 

and prosecute terrorists. In one country we visited, the FBI provided 

limited but vital operational assistance to locate terrorist suspects and 

provided key evidence for their successful prosecution. In another country 

we visited, the FBI was working proactively with ICE and with foreign 

nation counterparts to track suspicious migrants and identify and disrupt 

potential terrorists before they entered the United States. 

In addition, in response to our requests for their accomplishments 

assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, the 

FBI provided some anecdotal information on its cooperation with and 

assistance to foreign nations. For example, in one country where terrorists 

had attacked U.S. citizens, foreign nation authorities permitted the FBI to

participate in witness interviews. In another example, foreign nation 

officials planning to provide amnesty to approximately 2,000 criminals 

allowed the FBI to document the criminals’ biometric data prior to their 

release. In a third example, the FBI provided approximately $1 million 

worth of forensic equipment to support a foreign nation’s law enforcement 

entities. However, FBI officials told us they lacked a centralized database

or a performance monitoring system needed to collect, store, and report 

on their accomplishments and, therefore, were unable to provide us with a 

systematic or comprehensive set of accomplishments in assisting foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

According to the FBI, it has increased the number of personnel and offices 

abroad since 2001. In May 2007, the FBI reported that, prior to 9/11, the 

FBI had 127 agents and 74 support personnel stationed in 44 LEGATs and 

four suboffices; however, as of May 2007, the FBI stated that it now has 

167 agents and 111 support positions staffing its 59 LEGATs and 14 

suboffices abroad. In addition, the FBI has revised the number of 

countries covered by regional offices, in an effort to reduce the geographic 

span of coverage for the LEGAT offices. For example, before 2005, LEGAT 

Paris provided coverage for 17 countries in Africa. However, since the 

regional LEGAT office in Rabat, Morocco, LEGAT Paris has covered only 

France and Monaco. 

Despite these actions, we found that the impact of the FBI’s expansion and 

realignment to combat terrorism has been limited in some posts overseas. 

We found during overseas work in 2006 that while the FBI has increased 

Page 23 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
its overseas offices, not all of those offices had been staffed with 

permanent positions, or permanent positions remained unfilled. For 

example, although the FBI had permanent LEGAT offices in two countries 

where there had been terrorist attacks against American interests, we 

found at the time of our fieldwork in 2006 that temporary FBI staff were 

filling slots designated as permanent staff positions. Both FBI 

headquarters staff and agents in the field at all four countries we visited 

said that it was essential to have long-term rotations in a country in order 

to establish the types of working relationships with foreign country LEAs 

needed to effectively assist them to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists. 

Further, the LEGATs in three of the four countries we visited said they 

generally lacked the resources, time, and staff to develop the close, 

collaborative relationships necessary to develop joint investigations or 

operations. In one country we visited, where FBI rotations are generally

limited to 1 year and the current LEGAT was there for only a 90-day tour, 

the LEGAT told us that he and his staff had little interaction with the 

national LEAs in the country because of their short tours. In contrast, in

the fourth country, which had the greatest number of LEAs of any 

embassy we visited, and where the LEGAT office was more fully staffed 

with permanent FBI agents and analysts, the FBI was providing both 

investigative and operational assistance to the foreign nation to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

FBI headquarters management, as well as two temporary duty agents in 

the field, told us in 2006 that, while the LEGAT positions were approved

for the two countries that had temporary staff filling the permanent FBI 

slots, the FBI had difficulty filling the positions due to the bureau’s lack of 

career incentives or overseas staffing culture. In 2006, the deputy assistant 

director of the counterterrorism division told us that the FBI has had 

difficulty staffing overseas LEGAT positions for years and that, despite 

recent transformation efforts, it has not yet solved the problem of staffing 

overseas positions by providing career rewards and incentives to agents or

by developing a culture that promotes the importance and value of 

overseas duty. As a result, permanent FBI positions were either unfilled or 

staffed with nonpermanent staff on temporary duty, and the LEGATs have 

been limited in their ability to work with foreign nations to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

In December 2006, FBI officials told us that, in an attempt to improve 

staffing at high-threat posts, the FBI Director implemented career 

incentives in June 2006 to encourage staff to volunteer for overseas 

Page 24 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
placement.19 In May 2007, the FBI stated that this career incentives 

package addressed the difficulties encountered in staffing the high threat 

LEGAT offices.20

In responding to our draft report in May 2007, the FBI stated that all of the 

LEGAT positions at its nine highest threat posts were now staffed with 

full-time, permanent LEGAT staff. Specifically, the FBI stated that it now 

has permanent, full-time FBI personnel assigned to the two high-threat 

countries where we found only temporary staff in 2006. However, the FBI 

provided no additional documentation to support this contention. In 

addition, the FBI observed that in two of the four locations we visited, 

both arguably high-threat posts, the respective LEGATs departed post out 

of the normal rotational cycles and with little advance notice, creating

temporarily unfilled positions. However, in one of those posts, we were 

told that the position was difficult to fill and it would not be permanently 

filled for almost a year. 

The FBI stated that it also relies on short-term rotations of 2 to 6 months 

and temporary short term assignments to supplement permanent staff. 

According to the FBI, through the use of deputies, assistant LEGATs and 

temporarily assigned personnel, LEGATs are able to establish and 

maintain liaison with principal law enforcement and intelligence/security

services in designated foreign territories while meeting the FBI’s 

international responsibilities in international terrorism, foreign 

counterintelligence, organized crime, and general criminal matters. 

However, FBI officials at headquarters and overseas in all four countries 

we visited agreed that the types of relationships necessary to facilitate 

joint investigations and operations with foreign nations cannot be built or 

sustained by agents on short-term, temporary assignments at overseas 

posts. 

CSI, which targets for inspection at foreign seaports high-risk cargo 

shipments before they leave for the United States, was created after the

9/11 terrorist attacks and requires U.S. law enforcement personnel to be 

physically colocated with foreign nation LEAs to identify and disrupt 

terrorist threats to America. As more than 11 million cargo containers are 

CSI Works with Foreign 

Nations, but It Has Had 

Limitations 

 19Because these incentives had just been implemented, we did not assess their impact on 

staffing problems abroad. 

20Because FBI provided these comments after our audit time frames, we were unable to 

verify the FBI’s statement. 

Page 25 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
off-loaded at U.S. seaports each year, CSI was developed to extend the 

U.S. zone of security outward by working with foreign nation counterparts 

to identify and examine sea containers that pose a risk for terrorism. 

Under the initiative, foreign governments allow CBP personnel to be 

stationed at foreign seaports to use intelligence and automated risk 

assessment information to target shipments identified as at risk of 

containing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or other terrorist 

contraband. As of September 2006, CSI was in place at 50 ports overseas in 

29 countries, with a 2007 goal of being operational in 58 ports.

In 2005, we reported that CSI had led to improved information sharing 

between U.S. and foreign customs staff and a heightened level of bilateral 

cooperation and international awareness of the need to identify and 

disrupt terrorist threats.21 However, we also found that several issues 

limited its effectiveness. These included the inability to fully staff some 

ports because of diplomatic constraints, such as the need for foreign 

government permission, and practical considerations, such as workspace 

limitations. In addition, the technologies used to detect WMDs have 

limitations. We concluded that, given these issues, CBP had limited 

assurance that inspections conducted under CSI were effective at 

detecting and identifying terrorist WMDs. 

At the CSI location we visited, an ICE law enforcement agent was 

colocated at a foreign nation maritime port and worked directly with 

foreign nation law enforcement officials in their security area. The ICE 

official had been there 2 years and was learning the local language; he and

foreign nation officials agreed that, by working closely together during 

that time, they had developed a trusting, collaborative relationship 

necessary to conduct joint investigations. While this effort had not led to 

the identification or disruption of terrorist-related shipments, the foreign 

nation customs control director said that, to his knowledge, this was the 

first time that a U.S. law enforcement official was colocated with foreign 

nation LEAs to conduct joint investigations to identify and disrupt terrorist 

threats against the United States. He recommended greater efforts to 

colocate U.S. law enforcement officers with other counterparts in the 

country. He also recommended that, to improve collaboration, U.S. 

 21GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment 

Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts, GAO-05-557 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005). 

Page 26 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
officials should learn the local language and work within the local law 

enforcement offices for extended periods. 

In 1983, State established the ATA program to train civilian security and

law enforcement personnel from friendly governments in police 

procedures that address terrorism. DS administers the ATA program. DS 

officers work with the foreign country’s government and a team from that

country’s U.S. mission to develop training in areas such as bomb 

detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, 

maritime protections, and VIP protection. (See fig. 1 for an example of 

ATA training to foreign nation LEAs.) 

Figure 1: U.S. ATA-Trained Foreign Police Conduct Counterterrorism Exercises 

According to State’s Congressional Budget Justifications, after the 9/11

terrorist attacks, ATA program funding more than tripled, from 

approximately $38 million in fiscal year 2001 to over $122 million in fiscal 

year 2006. A March 2006 report by State’s OIG recognized that ATA 

funding and the number of students trained had increased. However, the 

report also stated that the program’s procedures should be improved. 

Specifically, the report recommended that ATA courses should receive 

State Has Expanded the ATA 

Program 

Source: GAO.

Page 27 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
timely, independent, in-depth evaluations to establish and maintain quality 

control.22

LEA efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists have been limited by several factors. Specifically, we found that 

LEAs generally lacked (1) clearly defined roles and responsibilities to 

assist foreign nations; (2) guidance on setting funding priorities and 

providing resources to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists; (3) performance monitoring systems to assess 

progress at identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists and reducing 

terrorist attacks; (4) formal structures needed to promote joint 

investigations and operations between U.S. and foreign nation LEAs and 

coordinate LEA technical assistance to foreign nation LEAs; and (5) 

comprehensive country needs assessments to tailor LEA technical and

operational assistance to specific foreign nation needs for identifying, 

disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists. 

Our past work has stressed the importance of a strategy to combat 

terrorism that would clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each

agency for meeting specific objectives related to combating terrorism. 

Moreover, in a large-scale interagency effort where interagency 

collaboration is essential, such as this effort to use the combined 

capabilities of each LEA to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists, we have recommended that agencies agree on roles 

and responsibilities so each agency understands its role and how it 

supports the greater overall effort. 

We found that the national strategies’ broad strategic objectives have not 

been clearly translated to agency-specific roles and responsibilities. In 

particular, with the exception of Justice and the White House issuing some 

guidance to the FBI, we found Justice, DHS, and State had not issued 

guidance to their component LEAs to implement this new national 

security goal of assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute 

terrorists, and most U.S. LEAs—including ATF,23 CBP, DEA, DS, ICE, 

LEA Efforts to Assist 

Foreign Nations Have 

Been Limited by Several 

Factors 

Most LEAs Lacked Clearly 

Defined Roles and 

Responsibilities 

 22On November 16, 2006, we initiated a review of the ATA program, including the extent to 

which State has assessed program outcomes and achieved program objectives. 

23ATF officials told us that ATF incorporated terrorism-prevention into its strategic plan 

but that it had not received or issued guidance specific to assisting foreign nations to 

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

Page 28 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
USMS, and USSS—continued to operate based on their traditional 

objectives and guidance. As a result, LEAs lacked clearly defined roles and 

responsibilities for implementing the broad objective articulated in the 

national strategies to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists. 

As of February 2007, no single LEA was in charge of coordinating or 

directing the efforts of all the U.S. LEAs to assist foreign nations to 

identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. Some of the presidential 

directives governing LEA activities had not been updated since the mid to 

late 1990s, and with the exception of the FBI, none of the other LEAs had 

been provided guidance to make assisting foreign nations to identify and

disrupt terrorist threats a primary mission. 

The FBI has been given some guidance on its roles and responsibilities 

from the White House and Justice. The FBI traditionally has had the 

general statutory authority to conduct, both domestically and overseas, 

investigations related to criminal and terrorist activities, including those 

overseas.24 Under the general authority, the Attorney General, in

regulations, has placed the FBI in the lead agency role for investigating

crimes of terrorism in the United States.25 In 1995, Presidential Decision 

Directive 39 confirmed the FBI’s lead agency role in investigating 

terrorism. In 2002, the Attorney General issued guidance to the FBI that its 

new priority was to act to prevent terrorist attacks,26 and the FBI has been 

in the process of transforming to meet that mission. 

In 2003, the Attorney General issued further guidance to the FBI 

authorizing it to work with foreign nations to provide investigative and 

technical assistance for combating terrorism.27 In turn, the FBI’s 2004 to 

2009 strategic plan reflects this new direction, stating that the FBI plans to 

increase its presence abroad and increase joint operations with foreign 

nations to combat terrorism. As a result of the guidance, FBI officials in 

Washington and in the countries we visited told us that FBI agents abroad 

 2418 U.S.C. 2331, 2332, and 3052; 28 U.S.C. 533; 28 U.S.C. 3052. 

2528 C.F.R. 0.85(l). 

26Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism

Enterprise Investigations. 

27Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign 

Intelligence Collection. 

Page 29 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
were expected to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists. However, with the exception of the LEGAT in one of

the four countries we visited, FBI officials told us that the implementation 

of that goal was still in transition and that there was some uncertainty as 

to how to accomplish that goal, given their limited staff and other overseas 

duties. 

According to FBI officials, as of December 2006, the issue of roles and 

responsibilities for the LEAs remains unresolved and is still subject to ongoing debates within the administration. DHS officials reiterated similar 

concerns and, in response to our preliminary findings, agreed that their 

roles and responsibilities related to combating terrorism abroad could be 

more clearly articulated to ensure understanding among DHS officials 

working abroad. In particular, DHS officials told us, in January 2007, that 

neither the NSC nor the NCTC have determined who will lead the effort to

use the combined capabilities of the LEAs to assist foreign nations to 

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, or clearly defined their roles and 

responsibilities. State indicated that it was not in charge of LEA efforts to 

assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and 

referred us to Justice and DHS for such plans. State indicated that this was 

the responsibility of the NSC or the White House, and that neither entity 

had clearly defined or identified the roles and responsibilities of State, 

Justice, and DHS LEAs. 

We found other examples related to the lack of guidance on roles and 

responsibilities, including the following: 

• The DEA is a “single mission” agency dedicated to reducing the threat, 

trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Although it has not been given the 

specific goal to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, or prosecute 

terrorists, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it has expanded its 

intelligence capabilities and information sharing, and instituted a formal 

procedure to query its in-country sources on terrorist-related information, 

which is then shared with the FBI and other agencies involved with efforts 

to fight terrorism. In addition, in February of 2004, the Administrator of 

DEA testified before Congress that 

“During December 2001, the DEA formed a Special Coordination Unit at its Special 

Operations Division... [which] coordinates all DEA intelligence and investigations having a 

possible nexus to terrorism and shares information with agencies responsible for

coordinating terrorist intelligence and investigations. DEA drug investigations have 

generated such narco-terrorist related intelligence and investigations both domestically and 

internationally.” 

Page 30 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
• While the strategic plans for both ICE and CBP generally charged them 

with preventing terrorists from entering the United States, neither agency

is explicitly tasked with assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists. Overseas, we found that ICE and CBP were working 

proactively with foreign nation officials in one country we visited to 

identify terrorists threats bound for the United States. However, ICE 

officials, who comprise the primary DHS law enforcement presence 

abroad, were present in the remaining three countries we visited but were 

generally not assisting foreign nation LEAs to identify, disrupt, or 

prosecute terrorists. There were no CBP officials in these three countries. 

The lack of clear guidance was evident when we spoke with DHS officials 

abroad. For example, some ICE and CBP officials told us they were 

responsible for working with foreign nations to stop attacks, while other 

ICE and CBP officials said they did not have that responsibility. ICE 

officials told us in December 2006 that they were not working with foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists because neither the 

NSC, the NCTC, nor DHS had given them any directives or funding to do 

so. 

• Two LEAs—USMS and ATF—indicated that they had not been given clear 

roles in the U.S. effort to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists despite having the capabilities to do so. For example, 

officials from USMS, which specializes in tracking, capturing, and 

extraditing criminals, indicated they had unique skills and capabilities that

could be used to identify and capture terrorists abroad. Similarly, officials 

from ATF, which specializes in tracing weapons and explosives, told us 

they could help identify bombs and other weapons used by terrorists. 

• The USSS has not been tasked with assisting foreign nations to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. According to USSS officials, the service 

does not currently have a role in combating terrorism abroad, nor does it

want this role. However, it could provide assistance in investigative 

techniques and information sharing on terrorist-related cases. USSS 

officials said that the service wants to maintain its traditional focus and 

not assume new responsibilities related to combating terrorism. 

Page 31 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
• RSOs are charged with providing a safe and secure environment for the 

conduct of U.S. foreign policy.28 A key responsibility for RSOs is 

identifying and disrupting terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies and 

personnel. However, the RSOs have been given no post 9/11 guidance from 

State on how to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists, and RSOs voiced confusion about this role. In three of the four

countries we visited, RSOs told us that State has never given the RSOs the 

goal to work with foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists, and RSOs have never been given a specific role or directives to

implement this aspect of the national security strategy. However, we did 

find some cases where RSOs were undertaking initiatives to assist the 

foreign nation identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. In one country, the 

RSO was critical in embassy efforts to support the foreign nation to 

capture and prosecute terrorists responsible for attacks against Americans 

and others. In that same country, an assistant RSO stationed at a 

consulate, working with foreign nation police, exposed a criminal 

operation selling counterfeit and legitimate visas and other travel 

documents that could be used by terrorists to gain entry into the United 

States. In commenting on our findings, a senior official with DS agreed 

that the primary responsibility of RSOs was the protection of the embassy 

and its officials, and said that additional directives would be needed from 

the NSC if RSO responsibilities were to be expanded to include assisting 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In 

commenting on the draft report, State indicated that broadening DS’s law 

enforcement mandate to play a broader role could require statutory 

changes in addition to new directives. 

At the four embassies we visited, we found State had not provided 

guidance on how to use LEA assets to assist foreign nations to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Ambassadors or deputy chiefs of 

missions at each embassy we visited voiced their concern that, despite 

combating terrorism being the embassy’s highest priority, they received 

little to no guidance on how to design a coordinated assistance program 

using the full capacities of U.S. technical and operational assistance of 

LEAs, and ensure that LEAs had the necessary goals, skills, capabilities, 

 28RSO authorities are found in the State Department Basic Authorities Act (P.L. 84-885,

section 37; 22 U.S.C. 2709). RSOs are responsible for implementing and managing State’s 

security and law enforcement programs for a geographic region, which includes at least 

one Foreign Service post. RSOs are resident at a particular post and may have constituent

posts within their region for which they are responsible. The RSOs or Post Security 

Officers are responsible for overseeing the day-to-day management of security programs at 

their constituent posts (12 FAM 422.1). The RSOs responsibilities and duties are 

enumerated in 12 FAM 422.2 through 422.5. 

Page 32 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
and time to work closely with foreign nation officials to stop terrorist 

attacks. In all four countries, ambassadors and deputy chiefs of missions 

believed that the roles and responsibilities of LEAs for assisting foreign 

nations to identify and prevent future attacks needed to be clarified. 

Foreign nation officials in two of the countries we visited said that they 

were confused by the number of officers and agencies at embassies 

working on counterterrorism issues, and said they did not know which 

LEA was in charge, or which LEA to work with regarding specific terrorist 

threats. 

Ambassadors or deputy chiefs of mission, who are responsible for trying 

to coordinate law enforcement agencies at embassies, stated that—given 

the strategic importance of stopping further attacks, and the complexity of 

disparate U.S. programs and agencies that can be used to assist foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists—they believed that 

State should consider appointing an officer with law enforcement 

experience or training who would be dedicated to helping embassies 

develop, implement, and monitor U.S. law enforcement efforts. They 

suggested that a “coordinator for combating terrorism” could be placed in

high-threat posts to integrate LEA capabilities and ensure use of their full

expertise to cover the range of vulnerabilities terrorists could exploit to 

harm U.S. interests. 

During our work in four countries, we found numerous issues related to

the lack of clear guidance on roles and responsibilities of LEAs in assisting 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For example: 

• In the four countries we visited, ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, 

and political officers, who were responsible for implementing this new 

national security goal, said that they lack the guidance, training, and 

funding to effectively use LEA technical or operational assistance to assist 

foreign nations. As a result, they questioned whether they could effectively 

implement and coordinate a joint U.S.-foreign nation assistance effort to 

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists that pose a threat to U.S. citizens 

and interests. 

• In one country we visited, the lack of clear roles and responsibilities 

between ICE and the FBI led to both investigative and operational 

problems, according to foreign nation, ICE, and FBI officials. ICE was 

responsible for tracking special interest aliens, while the FBI was 

responsible for identifying terrorists trying to enter the United States. 

Because it was unclear whether some of these special interest aliens were 

migrants or potential terrorists—and ICE and FBI were not given clear 

Page 33 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
guidance to determine which LEA had the lead role—foreign nation and 

agency officials noted instances where joint U.S.-foreign nation 

investigations or operations were poorly coordinated. As a result, ICE and 

FBI, unknowingly working with different foreign nation LEAs, moved in 

on the same subject. According to the foreign nation law enforcement and

FBI officials, such actions may have compromised several of their 

investigations. 

• In another country we visited, neither DHS nor the former agencies that 

now largely constitute ICE and CBP—including the Customs Service and

INS—were given a role when State designed the embassy’s extensive 

program to assist in controlling and documenting migration flows across a 

known terrorist-rich border region, despite their expertise in border 

control, immigration, and customs issues. State officials told us that they

were given no guidance to seek the expertise of DHS or these agencies 

when State designed the program in 2002. These agencies were 

subsequently abolished and their responsibilities divided among new 

entities in DHS, yet DHS officials told us in January 2007 that they were 

unaware of the program and had never been consulted on it. According to

embassy officials, the key goal of the program related to identifying, 

disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists crossing this border region, has not 

resulted in the prosecution of any terrorists. 

• In a third country that served as both a source country and a transit point 

for terrorists, the ambassador told us that, despite the need for DHS 

expertise to improve border control, he has delayed approving three full 

time DHS positions because of a mismatch between his and DHS’s views 

on DHS’s specific roles and responsibilities once in-country. The 

ambassador said that he believed the DHS representatives should be 

colocated with foreign nation police at airports, maritime ports, 

immigration offices, customs offices, and land borders to develop the 

strong collaborative relationships necessary to conduct joint 

investigations or operations. However, he was concerned that the DHS 

officials would principally work from the embassy. 

In commenting on our findings, officials from State, Justice, and DHS 

agreed that there was a lack of clear guidance instructing LEAs to assist 

foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. Officials noted

that the NSC and now the NCTC have the authority to compel U.S. LEAs to 

work together in a coordinated, systematic fashion to help stop terrorist 

attacks. Officials said that no executive department has the authority to 

direct the LEAs from other departments to focus on this goal, and they 

noted that recommendations to individual agencies would not result in a 

unified multidepartmental effort to help foreign nations combat terrorism. 

Page 34 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
In a February 2007 letter to GAO, the Senior Counsel for National Security 

Affairs at Justice stated that, for operational assistance to foreign nations, 

the FBI was designated the lead federal LEA with jurisdiction to 

investigate terrorism-related crimes. However, this view was not shared by

other LEAs in Washington and in the embassies we visited. LEAs, 

including Justice’s FBI, USMS, ATF, and DEA; DHS’s ICE, CBP, and USSS; 

and State’s RSOs all told us there was no lead LEA charged with using the 

combined capabilities of federal LEAs to assist foreign nations identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In December 2006, FBI officials agreed 

that the issue of which LEA would lead this effort was still unresolved. 

Our guidelines on developing an effective collaborative strategy note the

importance of identifying needs and addressing them by leveraging 

resources to meet strategic objectives. In addition, in our past work on 

agencies creating strategic plans to meet GPRA requirements, we reported 

that the alignment of activities and resources is critical.29 In this review, 

however, we found that State, Justice, DHS, and their LEAs lacked clear 

guidance on setting funding priorities to meet the national security goal of 

helping foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

Officials from State, Justice, and DHS told us that they are attempting to 

fund a broad array of LEA activities abroad with limited staffing and funds, 

and without guidance from the NSC on reprioritizing funds from other 

activities to assist foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists. As a result, their efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists have been hindered. For example, a 

March 2006 report by State’s OIG found that S/CT lacked adequate 

resources to meet its mandate to coordinate U.S. counterterrorism 

assistance abroad. The OIG found that S/CT’s regional affairs unit was 

under-funded to provide advice, coordination, and action on regional and 

bilateral counterterrorism issues and that, if counterterrorism is the single 

most important U.S. priority, State could not afford to have the regional

affairs unit understaffed. 

In addition, as noted above, while the FBI has reprioritized and realigned a 

significant amount of its resources domestically from criminal

investigation to efforts to combat terrorism, we found that this 

realignment has been limited overseas. For example, senior FBI officials 

Executive Departments and 

LEAs Lacked Clear Guidance 

on Setting Funding Priorities 

for Assisting Foreign Nations to 

Combat Terrorism 

 29GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 

Page 35 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
from the Counterterrorism Division and the Office of International 

Operations told us that they lacked funds to establish offices and 

permanently fill LEGAT positions in some high-threat posts. Furthermore, 

DHS officials from ICE and CBP agreed that NSC has not provided 

guidance on how to reprioritize funding to assist foreign nations to 

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. As a result, officials said they 

were limited in their ability to undertake new initiatives in this area or to 

fully staff existing positions already approved by embassies. 

In the countries we visited, we observed that this lack of guidance limited

the embassies’ ability to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists. In four countries we visited, ambassadors, deputy 

chiefs of mission, and others indicated that, due to the lack of guidance

from either the NSC, NCTC, or their executive departments, LEA 

headquarters in Washington have generally not reallocated funding from 

lower priority activities to support the new national priority of assisting 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In one 

country, the ambassador said that the most significant concern facing the 

embassy was the mismatch between U.S. objectives and available funding

for assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism. 

In all four countries we visited, embassy, LEA, and foreign nation officials 

identified terrorist transit and border vulnerabilities as the primary 

challenges; yet, in three of these countries, officials said that, due to 

funding not being realigned to support the goal of assisting foreign nations 

to combat terrorism, they did not provide specific assistance to foreign 

nation LEAs to address these needs. Specifically, ICE officials in one 

country told us that because funding had not been reprioritized, ICE had 

not provided training to foreign nation LEAs to counter immigration, 

travel, and border threats. In another country, although the embassy 

wanted DHS officials to assist the foreign nation for port security, 

customs, and immigration, DHS officials from a regional office were 

unable to provide this assistance because funding limitations restricted 

their ability to visit the country, and, moreover, they were focused on 

performing their other responsibilities when they were able to visit. 

In all four countries we visited, there was more funding designed to assist 

foreign nations combat illegal drugs and criminals than to combat 

terrorism, despite the fact that efforts to combat terrorism were the 

highest priority of each embassy. For example, in one country with an 

extremely high terrorist threat to American interests globally, State 

provided more than six times the amount of funding to stop illicit drugs 

and crime ($220.2 million) than it did for antiterrorism assistance ($34.5 

Page 36 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
million) from fiscal years 2002 to 2006. We found similar issues at the 

other three embassies we visited. For instance, in one country, the deputy 

chief of mission told us that most of the training and assistance funding 

there was dedicated for counter narcotics efforts, even though drugs were 

no longer a key strategic concern in that country. From fiscal years 2002 to

2006, this country received $12.3 million in funding intended to combat 

drugs, compared with $8.8 million for assisting the foreign nation to 

combat terrorism. 

Based on a review of our findings, State Department officials representing 

offices involved with U.S. efforts to combat crime, drugs, and terrorism 

abroad, agreed that there was significantly more funding available for 

combating crime and drugs than for assisting foreign nations to combat 

terrorism. However, officials said that some of the funding allotted to help

foreign nations to combat crime and drugs was fungible and could be used 

to combat terrorism. We found that, in all four countries we visited, 

embassies used funding intended for objectives such as combating crime 

and drugs, and improving law enforcement and judicial capacity, to assist 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In other 

instances, embassies allowed some key needs to not be fully addressed 

because funding had not been reprioritized from other activities. 

In a February 2007 letter to GAO, Justice stated that the ability of foreign 

nations to combat terrorism depends on having functioning law 

enforcement and judicial sector institutions and professionals capable of 

carrying out complex investigations and prosecutions. While these 

capabilities are not terrorism specific, they are often prerequisites to an 

ability to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, Justice stated. As a 

result, some general capacity building training can potentially provide a 

benefit to a foreign nation’s ability to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists. 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security, the 2004 Intelligence Reform

Act, and GPRA all require the monitoring of LEA performance to measure 

progress toward stated goals and objectives. The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security addresses the need for accountability in the nation’s 

efforts to combat terrorism. It states that every department or agency

involved with combating terrorism will create performance monitoring 

systems that will allow agencies to measure their progress, make resource 

allocation decisions, and adjust priorities accordingly. In addition, the 

2004 Intelligence Reform Act charged the NCTC with monitoring the 

implementation of strategic operational plans to combat terrorism and 

obtaining information from each department, agency, or element of the 

LEAs Are Not Systematically 

Assessing Their 

Accomplishments or Progress 

in Assisting Foreign Nations to 

Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute 

Terrorists 

Page 37 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
U.S. government relevant for monitoring the progress of each entity in

implementing such plans. Moreover, GPRA requires that agencies in 

charge of U.S. government programs and activities identify goals and 

report on the degree to which goals are met. Our own past work has also 

stressed the importance of a strategy to combat terrorism that would 

establish goals, objectives, priorities, outcomes, milestones, and measures 

to use in monitoring performance. 

We found that none of the LEAs had in place a systematic method for 

determining progress or documenting their accomplishments in assisting 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, either for 

technical or operational assistance. As a result, these departments or 

agencies generally found it difficult to assess whether they were making 

progress implementing this national security goal, or to determine what 

was needed to improve their overall assistance to foreign countries. 

To ensure we fully reflected U.S. efforts in assisting foreign nations, we 

requested from all eight LEAs a comprehensive list of all key 

accomplishments from 2001 to 2005. However, LEA and executive 

department officials told us that, because they have no systematic method 

of documenting their efforts to assist foreign nations, they could provide 

anecdotal information but no comprehensive list of accomplishments. 

State, Justice, and DHS agreed they lacked systems to systematically 

document their accomplishments or assess their progress in assisting 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. State said that 

its bureau performance plans, State’s annual Country Reports on 

Terrorism, and U.S. mission performance plans allowed them to both 

monitor progress and document the department’s accomplishments. 

According to State’s Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, each mission, 

including all the U.S. agencies located in the country, develops mission 

performance plans that outline the intended goals, priority initiatives, and 

performance indicators for the mission. However, based on our review of 

these documents, we found they were not sufficiently detailed to clearly

determine the role of State, Justice, or DHS LEAs, or their 

accomplishments or progress, in meeting this national security goal. 

Page 38 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Justice, along with FBI, DEA, ATF,30 and USMS officials, said that it was 

not monitoring its progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, 

or prosecute terrorists. The FBI indicated that it was in the process of 

developing such a system. 

DHS officials told us that neither the NSC nor the NCTC have directed

executive branch agencies to systematically assess their performance and 

progress in assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists. Officials from DHS, including those from ICE, CBP, and USSS, 

agreed that they had no performance measures at the national strategic 

level to measure LEA success at assisting foreign nations to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, and that DHS was not compiling this 

information at the agency level. 

Due to the lack of performance information, we could not conduct or 

provide a full assessment of all three departments’ LEAs’ progress in 

assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

In one of the countries we visited, we met with the Director of State’s 

International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), which provides training

to foreign nation LEAs from 12 countries in the region. The director said 

that, because no independent, governmentwide evaluations were being 

conducted of U.S. training efforts, it was impossible to determine whether 

the general training that was provided was improving the ability of the 

foreign nation to combat terrorism. 

In responding to our findings, State Bureau of International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) officials involved with the administration 

of the ILEA program agreed that it was critical to conduct independent,

long-term impact evaluations to verify that training was actually improving 

the foreign nation capabilities to combat terrorism. The officials indicated

that, in the past, they had conducted such studies, but that funding for the 

evaluations was suspended in fiscal year 2003, and that without adequate 

funding, they had not been able to undertake these activities. The officials 

said that, without such studies, it was impossible to determine whether the 

training was actually increasing the ability of foreign nations to identify, 

 30In response to our draft report, ATF’s technical comments stated that ATF has systems in 

place to monitor its progress and accomplishments in program areas, including assistance 

given to foreign nations; however, ATF did not provide us with documentation to support

their position. Further, ATF does not have a specific program to assist foreign nations to 

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists.

Page 39 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
disrupt, or prosecute terrorists. To be effective, impact studies should 

include assistance provided by all departments, such as that provided by 

State, Justice, and DHS.

We found in our past work that effective interagency collaboration is 

essential, as laid out in the national strategies and as provided for in the 

2004 Intelligence Reform Act. And we have identified necessary elements 

for collaboration across agencies. However, we found that LEAs abroad 

lacked formal mechanisms to promote collaboration among LEAs to 

combat terrorism. 

Domestically, to improve collaborative investigations and operations 

among various LEAs within the United States, the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security supported the expanded use of structures called Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF),31 which combine the national and 

international investigative capacity of the federal government with state 

and local knowledge and capabilities in an effort to identify and detect 

terrorist groups and prevent them from carrying out attacks against the 

United States. The 9/11 Commission further supported the use of JTTFs, 

noting that, by expanding their use, the FBI could leverage the expertise,

manpower, and resources of federal, state, and local LEAs. 

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI expanded the number of 

JTTFs from 35 to over 100 by 2005. According to the FBI, JTTFs have 

played a central role in virtually every significant terrorism investigation, 

prevention, or interdiction within the United States. These include the

conviction of Ramzi Yousef and Eyad Mahmoud Ismal for conspiracy in 

the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 2004 arrest in New York of 

Yassin Muhiddin Aref on money-laundering charges connected to a 

possible terrorist plot to kill a Pakistani diplomat. 

We found that State has generally not created structures, similar to JTTFs, 

at embassies to foster collaborative LEA efforts to assist foreign nations to

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. FBI officials told us that neither

the FBI nor State had considered implementing this model at embassies, 

but said that State should consider doing so. In addition, ambassadors, 

deputy chiefs of mission, and LEA officials abroad said that while they had 

LEAs Generally Lacked 

Mechanisms for Collaboration 

Abroad 

 31Agencies and departments that participate in JTTFs include FBI, DEA, USMS, ATF, ICE, 

CBP, USSS, the Department of Defense, Coast Guard, the Department of Treasury, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Park Police, and state and local 

partners, such as the state and local police. 

Page 40 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
received no directives from State to consider such a model, they 

supported implementing such a concept at the embassies we visited. In 

addition, DHS officials told us, in January 2007, that neither the NCTC nor 

the NSC had developed policies to facilitate joint LEA investigations and 

operations abroad. In three of the four embassies we visited, we found that 

the embassies still generally retained pre-9/11 structures for information 

sharing and collaboration among LEAs, and LEAs noted that the 

embassies had not been reoriented to harness the combined capabilities of 

all LEAs in a collective effort to prevent another terrorist attack on the 

United States or its interests. 

We were told by officials at the four embassies we visited, and by some 

State and LEA officials in Washington, that missions generally use law 

enforcement working groups to share information or to coordinate LEA 

activities at embassies. Based on our work at embassies, we found that 

these working groups did not function in an integrated, collaborative 

manner, and were not focused on joint investigative or operational efforts 

to identify and disrupt terrorist acts. We were told that these groups often 

met infrequently and usually discussed general, nonoperational 

information. For example, in one country we visited with an extremely 

high terrorist threat, an FBI official told us that the law enforcement 

working group had never been asked to try to identify or disrupt any of the 

terrorists on the most wanted lists of the departments of State or Defense, 

or of the foreign nation itself. In general, LEAs told us that terrorist 

information was not always shared or acted on across all key agencies at 

the missions, including the LEAs. 

While none of the embassies we visited had implemented formal 

structures that ensured information sharing and collaboration among all 

U.S. LEAs for assisting foreign nations to combat terrorism, one embassy 

did have a structure that included some collaborative LEA elements. At 

that embassy, the ambassador had created a fusion center and a working 

group to combat terrorism. The fusion center colocated FBI, DHS, and 

other assets in a common workspace. As potential terrorist information 

was received in the fusion center, each agency could check its databases 

for information needed to identify or locate the terrorists. This information 

was then operationalized through the members of the working group, who 

would use their contacts with the foreign nation to conduct joint 

investigations or operations. According to the ambassador and the LEAs, 

despite some continuing instances of coordination problems between 

some LEAs at the post, this structure had significantly improved 

coordination and operations among both U.S. and foreign nation LEAs. 

Page 41 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
While ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and other embassy officials 

generally supported implementing formal structures for integrated, 

collaborative LEA efforts at embassies, they noted some challenges to 

doing so. For example, the RSO and LEGAT in one country we visited 

strongly supported a formal structure for integrated, collaborative LEA 

efforts at the embassy. The RSO said that for such a structure to work 

properly, all the agencies must be colocated in the same room, share space 

and telephones, and work together constantly on joint investigations and 

operations. 

However, according to the LEGAT, LEAs were not colocated at the 

embassy and several LEAs, such as USSS, ICE, CBP, and the 

Transportation Security Administration, were all located apart from the 

main embassy building at his post. As a result, the LEAs were not able to

access the combined databases of each agency. He said that bringing these 

elements together would likely require construction of an additional 

secure facility and dedicated classified connections to each LEA’s 

respective headquarters office. In addition, he also recommended that 

foreign nation law enforcement officials be included in a new 

collaborative LEA structure, but he noted that this would raise 

classification issues, since much of the terrorist related information 

cannot be shared with foreign nationals. Despite these challenges, he said

creating a formal structure at the embassy for integrated collaboration, 

information-sharing, and joint operations could be very helpful. State 

officials, in commenting on our findings, stated that both security and 

space limitations could be a challenge to colocating LEAs at embassies. 

In our past work, we found that identifying and addressing needs and 

leveraging resources was an essential element of a strategic plan and for 

interagency collaboration.32 The United States provides a broad range of 

technical assistance to foreign nations related to legal reforms and 

improving the general capacity of police, prosecutors, and judges. State 

provides training programs under the ATA program, a training program 

designed to address foreign nation capabilities to combat terrorism, and 

the INL programs. In addition, the FBI provides some foreign nation 

training overseas and at its National Training Center at Quantico, VA. 

Justice also administers the International Criminal Investigative Training

Assistance Program, which works to build the general capacity of foreign

nation LEAs. It also administers the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, 

LEAs Lack Comprehensive 

Country Needs Assessments 

 32GAO/GGD-96-118, GAO-05-927, and GAO-06-15. 

Page 42 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Assistance, and Training program, which, for example, through its 

Resident Legal Advisor program, assists foreign nations with legal reform 

efforts and can include assistance in crafting needed legislation and 

revising existing terrorism law, as well as assistance to prosecutors and 

judges in utilizing new and revised terrorism law to process terrorist 

suspects. In two of the four countries we visited, we found that Justice 

officials were working with foreign nations to draft new legislation. In one 

case, a Justice official assisted the foreign nation in passing legislation to 

make it a criminal offense to possess fraudulent passports; such passports 

can be used by terrorists to travel to the United States. 

We found a lack of a single, comprehensive country needs assessment, 

which considers all U.S. assistance for addressing the country’s needs in 

combating terrorism. As a result, State, Justice, DHS, and their LEAs may 

not be tailoring and targeting their full range of training and assistance to 

assist foreign countries to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. For 

example, according to embassy officials in three of the four countries we 

visited, terrorist transit across their borders was a key vulnerability, yet

there was no comprehensive effort by State, Justice, DHS, or their LEAs to 

provide training to the foreign nation border patrols, immigration officers, 

and customs agents to identify and disrupt terrorists transiting their 

borders. 

In one of the countries we visited, the Director of State’s ILEA stated that, 

to be effective, comprehensive governmentwide needs assessments should 

be conducted and that State, Justice, and DHS should coordinate their 

training programs to meet the key terrorism vulnerabilities in each 

country. This could include combined training of small, vetted units of 

police, prosecutors, and judges on how to collaboratively investigate and 

prosecute terrorists, as well as training needed to identify and capture 

terrorists involved with transnational travel. 

Further, in responding to our preliminary findings, State/INL officials 

involved with administering the ILEAs agreed that it was critical to 

conduct needs assessments. The officials indicated that, in the past, they 

had conducted such studies, but that funding was suspended in fiscal year 

2003. The officials said that, without adequate funding, they had not been 

able to undertake these activities and, without such assessments, it was 

impossible to determine training needs. 

Moreover, we found that an embassy’s ability to provide effective, 

targeted, and coordinated assistance to meet country needs could vary 

significantly. For example, in one country we visited, despite problems 

Page 43 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
with the foreign nation’s legal system that hindered terrorist prosecutions, 

the embassy had no on-going programs to assist the foreign nation to 

strengthen terrorism laws and train police, investigators, prosecutors, and 

judges to develop the capacity of the legal system to prosecute terrorists. 

Embassy officials told us that because of these limitations in the legal 

system, foreign nation LEAs were not the most effective instruments for 

combating terrorism, and instead the embassy relied on the use of the 

military and other assets to combat terrorism. 

In contrast, another embassy successfully employed a variety of State and

Justice programs to assist the foreign nation to identify, arrest, and 

prosecute terrorists, despite limitations in the foreign nation’s legal system

that hindered successful prosecutions. In that country, the embassy, in 

close cooperation with the foreign nation, used State’s ATA and INL assets 

to train a specialized unit of the local police to capture terrorist suspects. 

The U.S.-foreign nation team then assembled a small task force of foreign

nation investigators, prosecutors, and judges, and, using Justiceadministered funds, provided specialized training to develop a case using 

recently passed legislation. The case resulted in the successful prosecution 

of the terrorists accused of killing Americans and others at popular tourist 

sites. 

Combating terrorism is the United States’ top national security priority at 

home and at embassies abroad. Since 9/11, U.S. national strategies have 

consistently called for using all elements of national power to combat 

terrorism, including changing the role of LEAs. In particular, these 

strategies have called for expanding LEAs’ overseas activities to include 

working with foreign nations and building their capacity toward a shared

goal of identifying and disrupting terrorist plots, and bringing these 

terrorists to justice in courts of law. In response, some LEAs have taken 

steps to expand existing programs or initiate new technical assistance 

efforts to, among other things, help train foreign police, prosecutors, and

judges. The FBI has made efforts to work more closely with foreign 

counterparts on operational efforts to detect and disrupt terrorist attacks 

before they occur. 

However, while the national strategies have articulated this change in

direction and emphasis, they have not provided specific roles, objectives, 

resources, or mechanisms for determining success. At the embassies we 

visited, ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission voiced their concern 

that, despite counterterrorism being the embassy’s highest priority, they 

received little to no guidance on how to determine country assistance 

Conclusion 

Page 44 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
needs in this area; design a coordinated assistance program using the full 

capacities of U.S. LEAs; and ensure that the LEAs had the necessary 

directives, capabilities, and time to work closely with foreign nation 

officials to stop terrorist attacks. As a result of these weaknesses, LEAs, a 

key element of national power, are not being fully used abroad to protect 

U.S. citizens and interests from future terrorist attacks. 

Looking forward, the United States needs to develop clear implementing 

guidance for integrating the variety of overseas LEA activities assisting 

foreign nations to combat terrorism. We recommend that the Director of 

the NCTC, in consultation with the NSC, ensure that the implementing 

guidance for the NCTC’s plan for combating terrorism clearly articulates 

the specific objectives for each LEA, clarifies their roles and

responsibilities, and proposes actions linked to available resources and 

directed at the most pressing needs for assisting foreign nations to 

identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. In addition, since these 

activities are central to the overall U.S. effort to combat terrorism, DHS, 

Justice, and State need to ensure that their component agencies have clear 

guidance to implement the national security strategies’ goal of using the 

full capabilities of LEAs to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists, and also need to assess progress toward objectives 

and provide regular reporting to Congress on the results, impediments, 

and planned improvements. 

We recommend that the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the 

NSC, ensure that the implementing guidance for the NCTC’s plan for 

combating terrorism: 

Recommendations 

• Articulates a clear strategy to implement the national security goal of 

using the combined capabilities of LEAs to help foreign nations identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

• Clarifies the roles and responsibilities of each LEA for (1) helping enhance 

the capabilities of foreign police, prosecutors, and judges for combating 

terrorism; and (2) working more closely with foreign nations on 

operational efforts to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

• Includes a mechanism for comprehensively (1) assessing the needs of 

foreign nations for identifying, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorists; (2) 

deciding which needs U.S. LEAs should help address; (3) determining 

which U.S. LEA programs or activities are best suited to address those 

needs; and (4) ensuring that U.S. LEAs are provided guidance on setting 

Page 45 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
funding priorities and providing resources to address those needs. 

• Requires a monitoring system that provides the executive departments, 

LEAs, and Congress accurate reporting on accomplishments, 

impediments, and planned improvements for LEAs assisting foreign 

nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

We recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretaries of 

Homeland Security and State each: 

• Issue clear guidance to their respective component agencies and bureaus

on how those agencies and bureaus should implement the national 

security strategies’ goal of using the full capabilities of LEAs to assist 

foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. 

• Establish a monitoring system that provides the respective department 

and Congress with accurate reporting on that department’s 

accomplishments, impediments, and planned improvements in their LEAs’ 

efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism. 

We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the U.S. 

Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security: 

• Explore the creation of new structures at U.S. embassies to improve 

information sharing and coordination among U.S. LEAs for assisting 

foreign nations combat terrorism. 

DHS, Justice, and State provided written comments on a draft of this 

report, which are reproduced in appendixes II, III, and IV. 

DHS generally agreed with the findings and recommendations in the 

report. DHS said it would work closely with the NSC, NCTC, Justice, and

State on planning efforts to enhance the ability of DHS LEAs to help 

foreign nations combat terrorism. DHS also plans to issue implementing 

guidance and establish a monitoring system based upon direction from the 

NSC and NCTC. 

Justice agreed to work with State to consider ways to enhance interagency 

coordination at embassies. Justice also said it will work with NCTC to 

address guidance to implement the NCTC plan. Justice did not indicate

whether it concurred with our recommendations that the Attorney General 

issue clear guidance to LEAs or to establish a monitoring system for 

ongoing efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism. Justice 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 46 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
expressed concern that our analysis did not clearly distinguish between 

operational and technical assistance. Justice’s written response also 

includes a February 16, 2007, Justice letter to GAO providing comments on 

a draft statement of fact we provided Justice on January 26, 2007. In its 

February 16, 2007, letter Justice raised several concerns about the 

information we provided in the draft statement of fact, including their 

contention that we (1) misunderstood the roles and responsibilities of 

Justice’s overseas components, and (2) did not clearly define what we 

meant by assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists. Justice’s letter was not based on a complete draft of our report, 

which we provided the department on March 27, 2007. In the March 27 

draft report, we made several changes as a result of (1) Justice’s February

16 letter; (2) the comments we received during exit conferences with 

Justice, State, and DHS; and (3) our own internal review and fact-checking 

processes. Our report (1) clarified the roles and responsibilities of 

Justice’s overseas components, and (2) more clearly defined what we 

meant by assisting foreign nations. In its May 11, 2007, letter formally 

commenting on our draft report, Justice continued to contend that our 

analysis did not clearly distinguish between operational and technical 

assistance. As a result, we have further clarified our discussion of these 

issues. Specifically, we have noted that the purpose of our review was to 

assess the federal government’s efforts to implement the various national 

security strategies that generally guide law enforcement efforts to help 

foreign nations combat terrorism, and to determine if the technical and

operational assistance implemented by the various U.S. departments and 

agencies has been reoriented to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, 

and prosecute terrorists. 

The Department of State said it would consider working with relevant

LEAs to improve the coordination of law enforcement activities overseas. 

State did not indicate whether it concurred with our recommendations 

that the Secretary of State issue clear guidance and establish a monitoring 

system for ongoing efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism. State 

also indicated that we did not fully reflect the department’s lack of 

resources necessary to carry out its mandate to coordinate U.S. efforts to 

combat terrorism abroad. As a result, we have incorporated State’s 

position on this issue into our discussion of State’s ability to effectively 

coordinate U.S. international counterterrorism activities. State also 

believed we had not sufficiently credited the department’s Regional 

Strategic Initiatives as examples of coordinated, interagency efforts to 

guide overseas efforts to combat terrorism. However, State did not provide 

any additional information to support this contention. Finally, State also 

expressed concern about our characterization of the role DS special 

Page 47 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
agents play when working overseas. We clarified our discussion of this 

point in the report, along the lines State suggested in its response. 

The NCTC provided oral comments on a draft of this report. The NCTC 

stated that it is in the process of implementing its plan in conjunction with 

other departments and agencies, including the law enforcement agencies. 

According to NCTC, it has already begun to implement our 

recommendations to NCTC. For example, NCTC stated that its plan 

coordinates all instruments of national power, including law enforcement 

agencies, to combat terrorism. NCTC also said the plan provides direction 

and guidance to the various law enforcement agencies on their efforts to 

help foreign nations combat terrorism and includes coordination 

mechanisms and a monitoring system to track implementation of the plan. 

NCTC did not provide any documentation to verify these statements. 

We also received technical comments from DHS, Justice, State, and the 

NCTC, which we have incorporated throughout the report where 

appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

the report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to interested 

congressional committees and to the National Security Council, the 

Director of the NCTC, the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of State 

and Homeland Security. We will also make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 48 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

Jess T. Ford on (202) 512-4128, e-mail fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for 

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on

the last page of this report. Other GAO contact and staff acknowledgments 

are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours, 

Jess T. Ford

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 49 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the guidance for law enforcement agencies (LEA) to assist 

foreign nations identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists, we reviewed the 

2002 and 2006 versions of the National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America, the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, the

2003 and 2006 versions of the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, the 

9/11 Commission Report, and related legislation. To determine whether 

this strategic level guidance was translated into specific guidance for the

Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security, we analyzed their 

5-year strategic plans and their annual performance reports. In addition, 

we analyzed the national strategies, strategic plans, and performance 

reports to determine if they contained key elements we have

recommended1

 and that are provided for in the Government Performance 

and Results Act (GPRA). These key elements include having clearly 

defined objectives and roles and responsibilities; leveraged funding; and

monitoring systems related to assisting foreign governments to identify, 

disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We also requested all guidance issued by

State, Justice, and DHS to implement the national strategies’ goal to make 

combating terrorism their priority, and any specific guidance to ensure 

their LEAs were assisting foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and 

prosecute terrorists. To verify that our analysis was accurate, we 

conducted detailed discussions with representatives from State, Justice, 

DHS, and the eight LEAs, along with embassy and LEA officials involved

with working with foreign nation counterparts. 

To assess the extent to which LEAs have implemented the strategic 

guidance to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute 

terrorists and determine if the departments and their LEAs were reporting 

on their progress in providing this assistance, we reviewed strategic plans 

and annual performance reports for State, Justice, and DHS and their 

component LEAs, where available. We also asked each department and 

agency to provide a list of its accomplishments in assisting foreign nations 

in this endeavor, including the number of terrorist plots that had been

identified and disrupted, and the number of terrorists prosecuted as a 

result of this assistance, from 2001 to 2005. In addition, we asked for 

documentation on 11 cases highlighted by the State Department as 

successful examples of foreign nations identifying, disrupting, and 

prosecuting terrorists linked with high profile attacks against Americans. 

However, none of the agencies provided a comprehensive list of 

accomplishments or documentation of the role that U.S. assistance played

 1 GAO-05-927, GAO-06-15, and GAO-03-519T. 

Page 50 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

in these cases.2 We also conducted detailed interviews with officials from 

State, Justice, DHS, and their eight LEAs to further determine their 

progress and impediments to fully implementing this strategic guidance. In 

addition, we conducted detailed work in four countries with key roles in 

combating terrorism, where we met with LEA, embassy, and foreign 

nation officials to determine what role U.S. LEAs played in assisting the 

foreign country to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. We did not 

name the specific countries we visited for this review due to diplomatic 

and security concerns. 

After our work abroad, we provided State, Justice, and DHS written 

summaries of our findings, and conducted follow-up meetings with 

department representatives to ensure that our findings accurately 

characterized any guidance provided by the White House, NSC, and NCTC, 

as well as State, Justice, and DHS. We also met with NCTC officials to 

brief them on our observations and to determine the status of their 

ongoing efforts to develop a plan to use all elements of national power, 

including LEAs, to combat terrorism. NCTC officials told us they had

drafted a general plan, which was approved by the President in June 2006. 

According to NCTC officials, the implementing guidance for the plan was 

still under development as of March 1, 2007, and they would not discuss 

the plan, its contents, or the implementing guidance. 

During the course of our work we experienced considerable delays 

obtaining information from Justice and State, which resulted in this report 

being issued several months later than initially planned. We were 

eventually able to obtain information sufficient for answering our 

objectives. We conducted our work between August 2005 and March 2007 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

 2

Although State Department officials said they were unable to find any relevant documents 

related to our case studies, we found detailed reporting on one of our case studies at an

embassy we visited. 

Page 51 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

of Homeland Security 

Page 52 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Justice 

Department of Justice 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 53 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

See comment 1. 

Page 54 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

Page 55 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

See comment 5. 

See comment 6. 

Page 56 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

See comment 7. 

See comment 8. 

Page 57 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

See comment 9. 

See comment 10. 

Page 58 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

See comment 10. 

See comment 11. 

See comment 12. 

Page 59 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Page 60 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

Following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice’s letter dated 

May 11, 2007. 

1. On March 27, 2007, we provided Justice a complete draft report 

reflecting several changes stemming from (1) the comments and 

suggestions we obtained during exit conferences with Justice, DHS, 

and State; (2) Justice’s February 16, 2007 letter; and (3) our internal 

review and fact checking process. As such, a number of the comments 

and concerns Justice raised in the February 16, 2007, letter were 

addressed in our draft report. 

GAO Comments 

2. In response to Justice’s concern about our distinction between 

operational and technical assistance, we have clarified the language

that describes the purpose of our review. This report assesses the 

federal government’s efforts to implement the various national security 

strategies that generally guide law enforcement efforts to help foreign 

nations combat terrorism overseas. As such, our review focused on 

assessing the guidance and implementation of those strategies. We 

also clarified our definition of assistance to differentiate between 

operational and technical assistance and made changes throughout the 

report to clarify when our discussion focuses on operational or

technical assistance. Our definition of what we mean by technical and 

operational assistance is based on language Justice suggested in its 

February 16, 2007, letter.

3. We no longer use the phrase “new strategy” in our report because the 

various national strategies guiding overseas efforts to combat 

terrorism were first published more than 4 years ago. 

4. We include a discussion of the FBI’s strategic guidance in the report. 

5. Even if the LEAs are not specifically required by law to develop plans 

guiding and coordinating their technical assistance efforts, we believe

this is a best-practice and a fundamental aspect of good governance. 

6. The national strategies offer few details on which department should 

have lead responsibility and do not specify what supporting roles other 

departments and agencies should play. 

7. We modified our discussion of FBI LEGATs. 

8. According to State Department’s Strategic Plan for 2004 to 2009, each

mission annually develops mission performance plans that incorporate 

Page 61 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Justice 

the activities of all U.S. agencies and departments located in the 

country. These plans outline the intended goals, initiatives, and

performance indicators for each strategic objective of the mission, and 

the role that each agency and department is expected to contribute in 

order to attain each objective. As such, the plans should include a 

discussion of the progress and accomplishments of law enforcement 

efforts to help foreign nations to combat terrorism. 

9. We modified our discussion of Justice’s overseas personnel. 

10. Our recent work on U.S. efforts to combat terrorist financing found 

significant problems. Specifically, the U.S. government lacks an 

integrated strategy to coordinate the delivery of counter-terrorism 

financing training and technical assistance to countries vulnerable to 

terrorist financing. In addition, the effort does not have key 

stakeholder acceptance of roles and procedures, a strategic alignment 

of resources with needs, or a process to measure performance.1

11. We agree that general assistance to bolster foreign law enforcement 

and judicial sectors is an essential component of the broader U.S. 

effort to combat overseas terrorism. However, the allocation of 

resources for law enforcement programs specifically targeted for 

combating terrorism did not seem to match the preeminent role 

combating terrorism plays in U.S. national security strategies and law 

enforcement agencies’ strategic guidance. 

12. With the exception of the FBI, Justice LEAs reported that they lacked 

clear implementing guidance on how to carry out the broad guidance

contained in the Justice strategic plan and U.S. national security 

strategies. 

 1

GAO-06-19. 

Page 62 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV of State : Comments from the 

Department of State 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

Page 63 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

Page 64 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

See comment 3. 

Page 65 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 66 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated 

May 8, 2007.

1. We added additional discussion of S/CT’s lack of resources. GAO Comments 

2. Our discussion of Regional Strategic Initiatives in the report was 

limited by the information State provided on these activities. Although 

we asked to review all four of the Regional Strategic Initiatives 

completed during 2006, we were only able to review one. State 

provided us no additional information to support the claims it makes in 

its agency comments. 

3. We modified the report to better reflect the role and legal authority of 

Regional Security Officers. 

Page 67 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism
Page 68 GAO-07-697 Combating Terrorism

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, (202) 512-4128, 

email fordj@gao.gov. 

In addition to the individual named above, Dave Maurer, Assistant 

Director; Edward J. George; J. Addison Ricks; Diana Glod; Ernie Jackson;

and Joe Carney made key contributions to this report. 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320365) 
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