a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

February 2007 NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

Progress Made in 

Improving Security at 

Russian Nuclear Sites, 

but the Long-term 

Sustainability of 

U.S.-Funded Security 

Upgrades Is Uncertain

GAO-07-404
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

February 2007

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Progress Made in Improving Security at 

Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term 

Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security 

Upgrades Is Uncertain 

Highlights of GAO-07-404, a report to 

congressional requesters 

Safeguarding nuclear warheads and

materials that can be used to make

nuclear weapons is a primary 

national security concern of the 

United States. Since 1993, the 

Departments of Energy (DOE) and

Defense (DOD) have worked to

improve security at sites housing 

weapons-usable nuclear material

and warheads in Russia and other 

countries. In 1995, DOE established 

the Materials Protection, Control, 

and Accounting (MPC&A) program 

to implement these efforts. GAO

examined the (1) progress DOE has 

made in improving security at 

nuclear material sites in Russia and 

other countries, (2) progress DOE 

and DOD have made in improving

security at Russian nuclear 

warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE

and DOD have undertaken to

ensure the continued effective use 

of U.S.-funded security upgrades. 

To address these objectives, among 

other things, GAO analyzed agency 

documents, conducted interviews 

with key program officials, and

visited four Russian nuclear sites. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOE (1)

revise the metrics it uses to track 

progress in securing buildings with 

weapons-usable nuclear material

and (2) develop a management

information system to track DOE’s 

progress in providing Russia with a

sustainable MPC&A system by 

2013. 

DOE agreed with GAO’s findings

and recommendations. DOD did

not provide written comments. 

Through fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent over $2.2 billion to provide 

security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and other countries 

that house weapons-usable nuclear materials and warheads. With regard to 

securing nuclear material, DOE reports to have “secured” 175 buildings and 

plans to improve security at 35 additional buildings by the end of 2008. 

However, DOE’s reported total of buildings “secured” does not recognize 

that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings because 

DOE considers a building “secured” after it has received only limited 

MPC&A upgrades, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are 

planned. Further, DOE and Russia have developed a Joint Action Plan that 

includes 20 sites and details the remaining work to be accomplished by 2008. 

However, the plan does not include two sites containing many buildings with 

vast amounts of nuclear material where Russia has denied DOE access. 

DOE and DOD report to have improved security at 62 Russian warhead sites

and plan to help secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. The 

departments have improved their coordination mechanisms since our 2003

report, in which GAO reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies for 

installing site security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. Additionally, DOE 

and DOD are using similar approaches to manage large security upgrade 

contracts at warhead sites. DOD has used earned value management (EVM), 

which at early stages can identify cost and schedule shortfalls. DOE has not 

used EVM on its fixed-price contracts, but, during the course of GAO’s 

review, augmented its contract oversight to increase reporting frequency, 

which DOE officials consider a comparable alternative to EVM. 

DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to help ensure that 

Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-funded security 

systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S. assistance ends 

and is working with Russia to develop a joint sustainability plan. However, 

DOE lacks a management information system to track the progress made 

toward its goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 

2013. DOE and DOD’s abilities to ensure the sustainability of U.S.-funded 

security upgrades may be hampered by access difficulties, funding concerns, 

and other issues. Finally, DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with 

assistance to sustain security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites but have not 

reached agreement with Russia on access procedures for sustainability visits 

to 44 sites. As a result, the agencies may be unable to determine if U.S.-

funded security upgrades are being properly sustained. 

Category

Nuclear material

(DOE)

Nuclear warheads

(DOE and DOD)

Progress Spending

$1.3 billion

$920 million

DOE has helped improve security at 175 of 210 buildings with 

nuclear material in Russia and other countries.

DOE and DOD have completed work at 62 of 97 planned sites and 

provided assistance to improve warhead transportation security.

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and DOD data.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-404.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 6

Background 9

Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to Provide 

Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other 

Countries, but DOE’s Reporting of the Number of Buildings 

Secured May Be Misleading 11

DOD and DOE Have Spent About $920 Million to Help Russia Secure 

62 Nuclear Warhead Sites and to Improve Warhead Transportation 

Security 17

Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades Is 

Uncertain because Access Problems and Other Issues May 

Hamper DOE and DOD Sustainability Efforts 22

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 31

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 34

Appendix II: Time Line of Major Events in the History of U.S. Efforts to 

Secure Nuclear Material and Warheads in Russia and Other 

Countries 38

Appendix III: Additional Information on DOE Efforts to Secure Sites with 

Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material in Countries Other Than 

Russia 39

Belarus 41

China 41

Georgia 42

India 42

Latvia 43

Lithuania 43

Kazakhstan 43

Ukraine 45

Uzbekistan 46

Appendix IV: Additional Information on DOE’s National Infrastructure 

and Related Programs 48

Material Consolidation and Conversion 49

Secure Transportation 49

Training and Technical Support Infrastructure 50
Contents

Page ii GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Russian Federation Inspection Implementation 50

Protective Forces Assistance 51

Federal Information System 51

Regulatory Development 51

MPC&A Education 52

Material Control and Accounting Measurements 53

MPC&A Security Culture 53

Taxation and Customs 53

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Energy 55

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58

Related GAO Products 59

Tables Table 1: Status of DOE Security Enhancements at Buildings with 

Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material through the End of 

Fiscal Year 2006 14

Table 2: DOE and DOD Progress in Helping Russia Secure Nuclear 

Warhead Sites 19

Table 3: Seven Elements of Sustainability in DOE’s Guidelines 24

Table 4: DOE Spending on Crosscutting MPC&A Assistance Efforts 

through the End of Fiscal Year 2006 48

Figures Figure 1: Organizational Structure of DOE’s Office of International 

Material Protection and Cooperation 10

Figure 2: DOE Spending to Secure Nuclear Materials in Russia and 

Other Countries through the End of Fiscal Year 2006 12

Figure 3: U.S. Spending on Nuclear Warhead Security in Russia 

through the End of Fiscal Year 2006 18

Figure 4: Map Showing DOE Spending by Country through the End 

of Fiscal Year 2006 for MPC&A Assistance Outside of 

Russia 40
Contents

Page iii GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

EVM earned value management

FIS Federal Information System

HEU highly enriched uranium

MIMS Metrics Information Management System

MOD Ministry of Defense (Russia)

MOM MPC&A Operations Monitoring

MPC&A Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

OMB Office of Management and Budget

Rosatom Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

February 28, 2007 Letr

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

The Honorable Norm Coleman

Ranking Member

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable John D. Dingell

Chairman

Committee on Energy and Commerce

House of Representatives

Safeguarding nuclear warheads and nuclear materials that can be used to 

make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United 

States and Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the 

largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world with unclassified U.S. 

estimates of the number of Russia’s nuclear warheads at the end of the cold 

war ranging from 18,000 to 25,000. Russia also inherited an estimated 600 

metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium—materials that 

could be used to build nuclear weapons.1

 Terrorists or countries seeking 

nuclear weapons could use as little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched 

uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to construct a nuclear weapon. 

During the Soviet era, security systems at Soviet nuclear sites emphasized 

heavy surveillance of site workers with severe penalties imposed on those 

who violated security procedures. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and 

subsequent social, political, and economic changes in Russia and other 

former Soviet republics exposed gaps in the physical security and material 

accounting at sites containing nuclear material and revealed weaknesses in 

these countries’ abilities to secure nuclear sites against internal and 

external threats of theft.

1

Weapons-usable nuclear materials are uranium enriched to 20 percent or greater in 

uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes and any plutonium containing less than 80 percent of 

the isotope plutonium-238 and less than 10 percent of the isotopes plutonium-241 and 

plutonium-242. These types of materials are of the quality used to make nuclear weapons.
Page 2 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Since the early 1990s, there has been concern that unsecured nuclear or 

radioactive material could fall into the hands of terrorists and be smuggled 

into the United States for use in a nuclear weapon or a device that uses 

conventional explosives with radioactive material (known as a “dirty 

bomb”). For example, in January 2007, international media reported that 

authorities in Georgia had seized about 100 grams of highly enriched 

uranium from a Russian citizen who was attempting to sell the material on 

the black market.2

 Key to the United States’ efforts to combat this threat is 

securing nuclear materials and warheads at vulnerable civilian and military 

sites in the former Soviet Union and other countries. In 1991, the Congress 

authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction program to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 

Kazakhstan secure and protect former Soviet nuclear weapons.3

 Members 

of the Congress were concerned that nuclear weapons or materials might 

be lost, stolen, or sold and that nuclear scientists and technicians might be 

persuaded to sell their knowledge to nations or terrorists seeking to 

develop nuclear weapons. Between fiscal years 1992 and 2006, the 

Congress authorized about $9 billion for a variety of nuclear 

nonproliferation programs implemented by DOD and the Department of 

Energy (DOE), including efforts to help Russia and other countries secure 

sites where nuclear material and warheads are located. In 1993, DOE and 

the Russian government began working together to secure sites housing 

weapons-usable nuclear material and, in 1995, DOE established the 

2

We recently reported on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. For additional 

information see GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and 

Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment 

to Other Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006) and GAO, Preventing 

Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection 

Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 

2005).

3

In 1991, the Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, popularly 

referred to as the Nunn-Lugar Act, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former 

Soviet Union, due to concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Pub. 

L. No. 102-228, 105 Stat. 1691 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2551 note). The legislation authorized 

funding to assist the former Soviet Union with its efforts to (1) destroy nuclear, chemical 

and other weapons; (2) transport, store, disable and safeguard weapons in connection with 

their destruction; and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such 

weapons. As a result of this assistance, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned all Soviet 

nuclear weapons on their territories to Russia in the early 1990s.
Page 3 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program, which is 

now administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA).4

 Through its MPC&A program,5 DOE has provided nuclear 

facilities in Russia and other countries with modern nuclear security 

systems that include the following, among other things:

• physical protection systems, such as fences around buildings containing 

nuclear materials; metal doors protecting rooms where nuclear 

materials are stored; and video surveillance systems to monitor storage 

rooms;

• material control systems, such as seals attached to nuclear material 

containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the 

containers, and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into 

areas containing nuclear material; and

• material accounting systems, such as nuclear measurement equipment 

and computerized databases to inventory the amount and type of 

nuclear material contained in specific buildings and to track their 

location.

In 1998, DOE issued guidelines that provide a systematic approach for DOE 

program managers to develop and implement MPC&A systems that meet 

DOE’s objective of helping Russia and other countries secure buildings 

with weapons-usable nuclear material and nuclear warhead storage sites.6

DOE seeks to improve security at nuclear sites in Russia and other 

countries by providing security upgrades that protect against threats of 

theft from both internal adversaries, such as disgruntled nuclear workers 

(called the “insider” threat), and external adversaries, such as terrorist 

4

NNSA is a separately organized agency within DOE that was created by the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65 (2000), with responsibility 

for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs.

5

We reported on U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material and warheads in Russia, including 

DOE’s MPC&A program, most recently in 2003. See GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at 

Russian Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).

6

DOE, Programmatic Guidelines for Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 

Upgrades at Russian Facilities (first published December 1998, revised September 2001 

and December 2005).
Page 4 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

groups. DOE conducts these site security upgrades in two phases known as 

“rapid” upgrades and “comprehensive” upgrades. 

• Rapid upgrades include such improvements as bricking up windows in 

buildings where nuclear material is stored; installing strengthened 

doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; establishing controlled access 

areas around nuclear material; and implementing procedures that 

require the presence of two people when nuclear material is handled 

(called the “two-person rule”). Rapid upgrades are primarily designed to 

be simple, easy to implement and maintain, and result in immediate, 

though limited, improvements to nuclear material security. Rapid 

upgrades include upgrades designed to detect and delay external 

adversaries and sometimes include basic material control and 

accounting equipment and procedures that can be implemented during a 

6-to-12 month period. 

• Comprehensive upgrades include electronic sensors, motion detectors, 

and closed circuit television systems to detect intruders; central alarm 

stations, where guards can monitor cameras and alarms; and 

computerized nuclear material accounting systems. Comprehensive 

upgrades are designed to secure against both internal and external 

threats and are usually put in place over the 18-to-24 months after the 

rapid upgrades have been installed but can be installed concurrently in 

some cases. 

Buildings that contain nuclear material, which DOE considers to be of a 

high proliferation threat receive both rapid and comprehensive upgrades, 

and buildings with nuclear material of less concern may receive only rapid 

upgrades. In addition to providing security upgrades, DOE provides a 

variety of training to foreign officials and nuclear site personnel on how to 

operate MPC&A systems.

In February 2006, DOE changed the metrics it uses to track progress in its 

MPC&A program from measuring the percentage of nuclear material 

secured (out of the estimated 600 metric tons of loose nuclear material in 

the former Soviet Union) to measuring the number of buildings in Russia 

and other countries with weapons-usable nuclear material that have been 
Page 5 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

secured.7 DOE currently plans to secure 210 buildings containing weaponsusable nuclear material in Russia and other countries by the end of 2008.

The United States has also assisted Russia in improving security at nuclear 

warhead storage sites, both temporary sites, such as rail transfer points, 

and permanent sites containing storage bunkers. In 1995, DOD began 

assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) with enhancing 

transportation security for nuclear warheads and security at nuclear 

warhead sites. Also, in 1998, at Russia’s request, DOE expanded the scope 

of its efforts with the Russian Navy from protecting naval reactor fuel to 

helping secure nuclear warheads. In February 2005, President Bush and 

Russian President Putin issued a joint statement on nuclear security 

cooperation, including enhanced cooperation on nuclear terrorism 

prevention efforts.8

 In 2006, Presidents Bush and Putin reaffirmed their 

commitment to completing security upgrades at nuclear material and 

warhead sites in Russia by the end of 2008.9

 DOE and DOD plan to help 

Russia secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by the end of 2008. 

After completing the installation of site security upgrades, DOE and DOD 

provide ongoing technical and financial support to help ensure that U.S.-

funded security upgrades continue to reduce the risk of theft at foreign 

nuclear sites. These efforts are known as sustainability activities. 

Sustainability support is necessary to ensure that U.S.-funded security 

upgrades are properly maintained and continue to support risk reduction 

goals as intended. However, security of nuclear material and warheads in 

Russia and other countries ultimately depends on these countries’ ability to 

sustain the continued operation of U.S.-funded security upgrades after U.S. 

funding ends. In 2002, the Congress directed DOE to work with Russia to 

develop a sustainable MPC&A system to be solely supported by Russia no 

later than January 1, 2013.10

7

DOE, Department of Energy Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Budget Request, National 

Nuclear Security Administration, vol. 1, 514, February 2006.

8

Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security 

Cooperation, February 24, 2005.

9

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President V. V. Putin, July 17, 2006.

10Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-314, 

§ 3156(b)(1) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2343).
Page 6 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

As agreed with your offices, this report addresses U.S. efforts to secure 

nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries by assessing: 

(1) the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other countries 

secure weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) the progress DOE and DOD 

have made in helping Russia secure its nuclear warhead sites, and (3) the 

efforts undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the sustainability and 

continued use of U.S.-funded security upgrades at sites that house nuclear 

materials and warheads in Russia and other countries. 

To address these objectives, we analyzed documentation from DOE and its 

contractors at Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Sandia National Laboratories; 

DOD; and DOD contractors. We conducted interviews with key program 

officials at each of these agencies and at the Department of State. We also 

discussed the implementation of DOE and DOD’s programs with Russian 

officials. However, the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian 

Federation (Rosatom), which is responsible for the production of all 

nuclear materials in Russia and the development, testing, and production of 

Russian nuclear weapons, denied our request for access to facilities under 

its control. We were able to complete our audit objectives by visiting four 

Russian nuclear facilities—civilian, educational, and research institutes not 

under Rosatom’s control—where DOE installed MPC&A upgrades. We 

discussed security issues and the sustainability of MPC&A upgrades with 

officials at these sites. In addition, we analyzed cost and budgetary 

information from DOE and DOD on U.S. efforts to help Russia and other 

countries secure nuclear materials and warheads. We interviewed 

knowledgeable DOE and DOD officials on the reliability of these data, 

including issues such as data entry, access, quality control procedures, and 

the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined these data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our 

scope and methodology can be found in appendix I. We conducted our 

review from April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3 billion 

to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to sites with 

buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other 

countries, and the agency reports to have “secured” 175 buildings 

containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material. 

However, the number of secured buildings does not fully present the extent 

and nature of upgrades made and work remaining to be completed because 

DOE considers a building to be “secure” after it has received only limited 
Page 7 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive 

upgrades have yet to be completed. Specifically, 51 of the 175 buildings 

DOE reported to have “secured” by the end of fiscal year 2006 do not have 

completed MPC&A upgrades. While DOE officials told us that rapid 

upgrades offer a measure of risk reduction against some threats, they also 

noted that rapid upgrades do not meet all of DOE’s risk reduction goals for 

most buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. Further, in response 

to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE is examining the 

impact of an increased design basis threat for its MPC&A program and 

providing additional assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear 

sites. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that 

includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing buildings 

with weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan details the remaining 

scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does not include two key sites 

involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear warheads that contain many 

buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material. 

Because of the sensitive nature of the work conducted at these sites, 

Rosatom has denied DOE’s proposals for upgrading the sites, including 

proposals with less intrusive access requirements, and informed DOE that 

it is not interested in pursuing MPC&A cooperation at these sites. 

Since 1995, DOE and DOD have spent about $920 million to help Russia 

improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites, and the agencies plan to help 

Russia secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. Through the end of 

fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $374 million to help Russia secure 50 

nuclear warhead sites, while DOD spent about $546 million to secure 12 

nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve security for the 

transportation of Russian warheads. DOE plans to provide security 

upgrades at 23 additional sites, and DOD plans to provide upgrades at 12 

additional sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD 

has improved since 2003, when we reported that the agencies had 

inconsistent policies for installing site security upgrades at Russian nuclear 

warhead sites. For example, DOE and DOD have now jointly developed 

common designs for security upgrades at similar Russian warhead sites in 

order to ensure a level of consistency in the assistance provided to these 

sites. We also found that DOE and DOD use similar approaches to 

managing large contracts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear 

warhead sites. DOD has used an earned value management (EVM) system 

to identify cost and schedule variances on contracts to provide security 

upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites so they can be addressed in a 

timely manner. DOE does not require its contractors to implement EVM 

systems on its fixed-price contracts for installing security upgrades at 
Page 8 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Russian warhead sites. However, during the course of our review, the 

department augmented its contract oversight mechanisms, and DOE 

officials believe that their improved oversight system constitutes a 

comparable alternative to an EVM system.

As DOE and DOD near the completion of their security upgrade programs, 

the sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in Russia and 

other countries has become increasingly important for ensuring that the 

substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15 years is not wasted. 

To this end, DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to 

help ensure that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-

funded security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S. 

assistance ends and is working with Rosatom to develop a joint U.S.-

Russian sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management 

information system to assist MPC&A management in tracking the progress 

being made toward its goal of providing Russia a sustainable MPC&A 

system by 2013, similar to the system DOE uses to track the number of 

buildings and sites where it has installed security upgrades. Further, access 

challenges and other issues could impact DOE and DOD’s ability to prepare 

Russia to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades on its own. In 2002, the 

Congress directed DOE to work with Russia to provide a sustainable 

MPC&A system to be solely supported by Russia no later than January 1, 

2013. In response, DOE issued interim guidelines in May 2004 to direct its 

efforts to create a sustainable MPC&A system in Russia and finalized these 

guidelines in December 2006. DOE’s sustainability guidelines include seven 

key elements, such as a site MPC&A operational plan and preventative 

maintenance program. However, access difficulties, sites’ financial ability 

to maintain equipment, and other issues could impact DOE’s ability to 

prepare Russia to sustain security upgrades at nuclear material sites. For 

example, at one facility where DOE completed upgrades in 1998, DOE 

officials were denied access from 1999 through 2002 and, upon returning to 

the facility, found the security upgrades were in a severe state of disrepair. 

As a result, DOE had to spend about $800,000 to correct problems resulting 

from the site’s inability to properly maintain the security upgrades DOE had 

provided. Finally, DOE and DOD also plan to provide Russia with 

assistance to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear warhead 

sites, but access difficulties may prevent the agencies from carrying out 

their plans. Specifically, neither DOE nor DOD has reached an agreement 

with the Russian Ministry of Defense on access procedures for 

sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage sites. Site access or 

alternative means of verification are necessary to ensure that U.S. funds are 

being used to help Russia maintain security upgrades at these sites. If DOE 
Page 9 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense 

on access procedures for sustainability activities at these 44 sites, the 

agencies will be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are 

being properly sustained and may not be able to spend funds appropriated 

for these efforts. 

To strengthen program management and the effectiveness of DOE’s efforts 

to improve security at nuclear material and warhead sites in Russia and 

other countries, we are recommending that the Secretary of Energy, 

working with the Administrator of NNSA, (1) revise the metrics used to 

measure MPC&A program progress to better reflect the level of security 

upgrade completion at buildings reported as “secure” and (2) develop a 

management information system to track DOE’s progress in providing 

Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DOD for comment. DOE 

generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had no 

written comments on our report. DOE provided additional information 

about the metric it uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its 

reasons for not using EVM on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts to 

work with Rosatom on sustainability issues. DOE and DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Background In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to 

secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and, in 1995, DOE 

established the MPC&A program, which is now administered by NNSA. 

DOE’s Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, within 

NNSA, consists of five offices whose collective efforts contribute to 

enhancing the security of nuclear material and warheads in countries of 

concern and to improving the ability to detect illicit smuggling of those 

materials (see fig. 1). Four of these offices implement DOE’s MPC&A 

program, which, among other things, provides security upgrades at nuclear 

sites in Russia and other countries, and the fifth office, the Office of the 

Second Line of Defense, works to improve detection of illegal nuclear 

trafficking activities at border crossings and seaports.11

11The Office of the Second Line of Defense is composed of two programs: the Second Line of 

Defense-Core program and the Megaports Initiative. We recently reported on these efforts, 

which are not discussed in this report. For additional information, see GAO-06-311 and 

GAO-05-375.
Page 10 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 1: Organizational Structure of DOE’s Office of International Material 

Protection and Cooperation 

The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection works with the Russian Ministry 

of Defense, including the 12th Main Directorate—the Russian Defense 

Ministry’s organization for nuclear munitions, the Strategic Rocket Forces, 

and the Navy to install security upgrades at nuclear warhead storage sites. 

The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection also oversees DOE’s security 

upgrades work at naval nuclear fuel sites. The Office of Weapons Material 

Protection upgrades MPC&A systems at sites within the Rosatom nuclear 

weapons complex and also oversees DOE efforts to sustain U.S.-funded 

security upgrades at nuclear sites within the former Soviet Union that are 

not in Russia, such as facilities in Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The Office of 

Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites works to install MPC&A upgrades 

at nonmilitary nuclear facilities throughout Russia and oversees efforts to 

consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and to convert excess 

weapons-usable nuclear material into less attractive forms. The Office of 

Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites also manages DOE’s efforts to 

provide nuclear security assistance to countries outside of the former 

Soviet Union. The Office of National Infrastructure and Sustainability 

manages a variety of crosscutting programs, including transportation and 

protective forces assistance, and oversaw the development of guidelines 

for DOE’s efforts to help ensure that Russia can sustain the operation of 

U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear sites after U.S. assistance ends. 

DOD has also assisted Russia in securing nuclear warhead storage sites, 

both temporary sites, such as rail transfer points, and permanent sites 

containing storage bunkers. In 1995, DOD began assisting the Russian 

Ministry of Defense with enhancing transportation security for nuclear 

warheads and security at nuclear warhead sites. DOD’s efforts to help 

Russia secure its nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve the security 

of warheads in transit are implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction 

Office of International Material 

Protection and Cooperation

Office of

Nuclear Warhead 

Protection

Office of

Weapons

Material 

Protection

Office of

Material 

Consolidation 

and Civilian Sites

Office of

National 

Infrastructure and 

Sustainability

Office of the

Second Line of 

Defense

Source: DOE. 
Page 11 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Agency. Oversight and policy guidance for this work is provided by DOD’s 

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Additional information 

on the history of U.S. efforts to help Russia and other countries secure 

nuclear material and warheads can be found in appendix II.

Since Fiscal Year 1993, 

DOE Has Spent About 

$1.3 Billion to Provide 

Security Upgrades at 

Nuclear Material Sites 

in Russia and Other 

Countries, but DOE’s 

Reporting of the 

Number of Buildings 

Secured May Be 

Misleading

DOE spent about $1.3 billion between fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 2006 

to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to facilities that 

house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries and 

reports to have “secured” 175 buildings containing about 300 metric tons of 

weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union. 

The number of buildings that DOE reports as secured, however, does not 

recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some 

buildings because DOE considers a building to be “secure” after it has 

received only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when 

additional comprehensive upgrades have yet to be completed. Further, in 

response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE is 

examining the impact of an increased design basis threat it uses to measure 

the adequacy of security upgrades provided to Russian nuclear facilities 

and providing additional assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear 

sites. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that 

includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing buildings 

with weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan details the remaining 

scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does not include two key sites 

involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear warheads that contain many 

buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material 

where DOE has been denied access. 

Through the End of Fiscal 

Year 2006, DOE Spent About 

$1.3 Billion for Security 

Upgrades and Other Related 

Assistance at Nuclear 

Material Sites in Russia and 

Other Countries

From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3 billion to 

enhance security at buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear materials 

in foreign countries. The majority of these buildings are located in Russia 

and fall into three categories: Rosatom weapons complex sites, civilian 

sites, and naval fuel sites. DOE has also helped to secure buildings with 

weapons-usable nuclear material in nine other countries.12 Figure 2 shows 

a breakdown of DOE’s spending on MPC&A efforts.

12Additional information on DOE’s MPC&A efforts in countries outside of Russia can be 

found in appendix III.
Page 12 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 2: DOE Spending to Secure Nuclear Materials in Russia and Other Countries 

through the End of Fiscal Year 2006

Note: Figure does not include program management expenses, and amounts have been rounded.

As figure 2 shows, DOE spent about $684.7 million to provide security 

upgrades to civilian, naval fuel, and Rosatom weapons complex sites with 

weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and an additional $131.5 million 

to provide security upgrades to sites located outside of Russia. DOE also 

spent about $493.9 million on additional and related MPC&A efforts in 

Russia, such as assistance for transportation security, providing equipment 

for protective forces at nuclear facilities, and efforts to consolidate nuclear 

material into fewer buildings and sites. According to DOE officials, these 

efforts are important to increasing the overall security of nuclear materials 

in Russia and other countries, and they support DOE’s goal of enhancing 

the security of vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material. 

For example, because DOE believes that nuclear materials are most 

vulnerable while they are in transit, the department has provided Russia 

with specialized secure trucks, armored escort vehicles, and secure 

containers—called overpacks—to improve the security of nuclear material 

transported within and between nuclear sites in Russia. Further, DOE’s 

assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear sites, which includes 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

Civilian, $277.3

Rosatom weapons complex, $313.8

Naval fuel, $93.6

Sites outside of Russia, $131.5

Other assistance, $493.9

7%

10%

24%

21%

38%

Total = $1,310.1

Dollars in millions
Page 13 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

such items as bulletproof vests, helmets, and response vehicles, helps 

ensure that guards at those sites are properly equipped and trained so that 

they can quickly respond to alarms. Additional information on other DOE 

efforts to improve security at sites with weapons-usable nuclear materials 

can be found in appendix IV.

DOE Considers Buildings 

“Secure” After Only Limited 

or “Rapid” Upgrades Have 

Been Installed, Even When 

More Comprehensive 

Upgrades Are Planned

At the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported to have “secured” 175 

buildings containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear 

material in Russia and the former Soviet Union, but 51 of the 175 buildings 

DOE reported to have “secured” as of the end of fiscal year 2006 do not 

have completed MPC&A upgrades. These 51 buildings are located at sites 

in the Rosatom weapons complex. In its program metrics, DOE defined a 

building to be “secure” after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades 

(called rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive upgrades, 

which would further improve security, have yet to be completed.13

The buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE is working 

to improve security fall into four categories: Rosatom weapons complex, 

civilian, naval fuel, and sites outside of Russia. As table 1 shows, all 

planned upgrades have been completed at naval fuel sites and sites outside 

of Russia. The vast majority of remaining buildings that have not yet 

received security upgrades are in the Rosatom weapons complex, where 

DOE has historically had access difficulties, including being denied access 

to key sites and buildings housing weapons-usable nuclear material. 

13DOE officials noted that comprehensive upgrades work is in “varying stages of 

implementation” at these 51 buildings.
Page 14 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 1: Status of DOE Security Enhancements at Buildings with Weapons-Usable 

Nuclear Material through the End of Fiscal Year 2006

Source: DOE.

a

At some sites in the Rosatom weapons complex, DOE counts individual material storage or handling 

areas (material balance areas) within large buildings separately in its program performance 

measurements in an attempt to more accurately reflect the amount of work involved. According to 

DOE, the work that would go into securing a material balance area of this size would be 

commensurate to the work that goes into securing a smaller building.

While DOE officials told us that rapid upgrades offer a limited measure of 

risk reduction against some threats, they also noted that rapid upgrades fall 

short of meeting all of DOE’s risk reduction goals for buildings with 

weapons-usable nuclear material. For example, rapid upgrades generally 

include only limited measures designed to address the insider threat of 

theft, such as establishing a two-person rule and providing certain types of 

tamper indication devices that would set off alarms at guard stations in the 

case of an unauthorized attempt to access nuclear materials. According to 

NNSA, which implements the MPC&A program at DOE, the greatest threat 

DOE faces in its effort to help Russia secure nuclear materials is the threat 

of insider theft. However, the majority of measures to address the insider 

threat at Russian nuclear material sites, such as computerized nuclear 

material inventory databases and barcoding of nuclear material containers, 

are provided in the comprehensive upgrades phase.

DOE Is Examining the 

Impact of an Increased 

Design Basis Threat for Its 

MPC&A Program 

In response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE 

recently analyzed the implications of an increased design basis threat it 

uses to measure the adequacy of security upgrades provided to Russian 

nuclear facilities. The design basis threat is defined as the attributes and 

Site type

Number of buildings 

DOE reports as 

“secured” 

Number of buildings 

where DOE has not 

installed security 

upgrades

Total number of 

buildings where 

DOE plans to 

install security 

upgrades

Rosatom 

weapons 

complexa 92 32 124

Civilian 47 3 50

Naval fuel 21 0 21

Outside of 

Russia 15 0 15

Total 175 35 210
Page 15 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

characteristics of potential adversaries (a group or groups of armed 

attackers) against which a facility’s physical protection systems are 

designed and evaluated. According to DOE, the design basis threat is 

critical to determining an MPC&A system’s effectiveness. In 2005, DOE 

began examining the impact of increasing the number of adversaries 

against which Russian sites with U.S.-funded security upgrades should be 

able to defend themselves. DOE is currently reassessing the effectiveness 

of the security upgrades it has provided through the MPC&A program and 

has increased its emphasis on providing assistance to the protective forces 

at Russian nuclear material sites. Specifically, DOE is currently working 

with a number of sites to relocate guard forces closer to the target nuclear 

material to improve their response times to an incident. For example, at all 

four of the nuclear material sites we visited in Russia, Russian officials told 

us that they were working with DOE to relocate guard forces closer to 

buildings that contain weapons-usable nuclear material at their sites. 

However, DOE is limited in the scope of assistance it can provide to 

protective forces at nuclear facilities in Russia and other countries. For 

example, DOE is neither allowed to provide weapons or ammunition to 

these forces, nor is it allowed to pay the salaries of protective forces at 

these sites. According to DOE officials, the department has provided 

assistance to the protective forces at all nuclear material sites where the 

department has access and agreement to work, including helmets, winter 

uniforms, radios, and other equipment intended to improve their 

effectiveness in responding to alarms and their survivability against 

potential adversaries. 

DOE Plans to Complete All 

Security Upgrades Work by 

the End of 2008 but Lacks 

Access or Agreement to 

Work at Two Key Sites That 

Contain Vast Amounts of 

Nuclear Material

Historically, DOE has had difficulty obtaining access to some sensitive sites 

in Russia, especially within the Rosatom weapons complex. For example, 

we reported in 2003 that DOE’s lack of access to many buildings that store 

weapons-usable nuclear material in the Rosatom weapons complex was 

the greatest challenge to improving nuclear material security in Russia. 

DOE requires access to these buildings to validate Russian security system 

designs and to confirm the installation of equipment as intended. DOE 

signed an access agreement with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy 

(now called Rosatom) in September 2001 that described administrative 

procedures to facilitate access, such as specifying which DOE personnel 

are allowed to make site visits and the number and duration of those visits. 

We reported in 2003 that this access agreement had done little to increase 

DOE’s ability to complete its work at many key sites in the Rosatom 

weapons complex. Since that time, DOE has worked with Rosatom through 

a Joint Acceleration Working Group and other mechanisms to develop 
Page 16 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

alternative access procedures, such as the use of remote video monitoring, 

that have allowed work to progress at some sensitive buildings and sites 

that had previously been inaccessible to DOE project teams. In June 2005, 

DOE and Rosatom signed a Joint Action Plan detailing the remaining scope 

of work to be completed by the 2008 deadline. Rosatom and DOE are using 

this plan to guide cooperative activities and to develop a multiyear budget 

for DOE’s MPC&A program. DOE officials told us that they have been 

granted access to almost all of the sites and buildings covered in the plan 

and that all security upgrades should be completed, as scheduled, by the 

end of 2008. DOE plans to spend about $98 million to complete its planned 

security upgrades at 210 buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear 

material in Russia and other countries by the end of calendar year 2008.

The DOE–Rosatom Joint Action Plan covers 20 Russian civilian and 

nuclear weapons complex sites. However, the Joint Action Plan does not 

include two key sites in the Rosatom weapons complex where Russian 

nuclear weapons are assembled and disassembled. Because of the nuclear 

weapons manufacturing work conducted at these sites, DOE believes these 

two sites contain many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weaponsusable nuclear material. According to DOE officials, the department has 

offered numerous alternative access proposals to try to obtain access to 

install security upgrades at these two sites. For example, in November 

2004, DOE provided senior Russian officials with access to some of the 

most sensitive sites in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, including the 

Pantex nuclear weapons plant in Texas, which is the only U.S. nuclear 

weapons assembly and disassembly facility. However, Rosatom has refused 

to grant DOE officials reciprocal access to analogous Russian sites. 

Because of the sensitive nature of the work conducted at these sites, 

Rosatom has denied DOE’s requests for access, rejected DOE offers to 

provide assistance without access, and informed DOE that it is not 

interested in pursuing MPC&A cooperation at these sites. DOE officials 

expressed very little optimism that Rosatom would allow DOE to help 

improve security at these facilities in the near future.
Page 17 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOD and DOE Have 

Spent About $920 

Million to Help Russia 

Secure 62 Nuclear 

Warhead Sites and to 

Improve Warhead 

Transportation 

Security

Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent about $920 

million to help Russia improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites. The 

agencies plan to help Russia secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by 

the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved since 

2003, when we reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies toward 

providing security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead sites. In addition, 

DOE and DOD are currently taking similar approaches to managing large 

contracts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites. 

DOD has used EVM to identify cost and schedule variances for its contracts 

to install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites at early stages so they 

can be addressed in a timely manner. DOE has not used EVM on its fixedprice contracts to install security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead 

sites, but, during the course of our review, the department augmented its 

contract performance management system to include additional reporting 

mechanisms to identify and address schedule variances, which DOE 

officials believe constitute a comparable alternative to an EVM system. 

DOE believes the benefits of EVM techniques do not justify the additional 

costs to implement them on fixed-price contracts. 

DOE and DOD Helped 

Russia Improve Security at 

62 Nuclear Warhead Storage 

Sites and Provided 

Assistance to Improve 

Security of Warheads in 

Transit 

Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $374 million to 

improve security at 50 Russian nuclear warhead sites and plans to install 

security upgrades at 23 additional sites by the end of 2008. Additionally, 

DOD spent approximately $546 million to help Russia secure 12 warhead 

sites and to provide security for nuclear warheads in transit.14 DOD plans to 

complete security upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of 2008. Figure 

3 shows a breakdown of U.S. funding to improve security of Russian 

nuclear warheads through the end of fiscal year 2006. 

14DOE and DOD differ somewhat in their definition of what constitutes a “site.” For 

example, some temporary nuclear warhead storage sites controlled by the Russian Navy, 

where DOE installed upgrades, consist of one or more piers where submarines are berthed, 

which are generally smaller than permanent warhead storage sites.
Page 18 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 3: U.S. Spending on Nuclear Warhead Security in Russia through the End of 

Fiscal Year 2006

Note: DOD spending for nuclear warhead site security efforts includes spending on related DOD 

efforts, such as the development of an Automated Inventory Control and Management System for 

Russia’s nuclear warhead stockpile, a personnel reliability program and training equipment for guard 

forces at nuclear warhead sites, an emergency response capability, and a variety of training for site 

personnel. DOE's program also includes training for site personnel and the development of a 

personnel reliability program for those Russian nuclear commands not supported by DOD. 

Percentages do not total 100 due to rounding.

DOE plans to provide security upgrades at 23 additional sites, and DOD 

plans to provide upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of 2008. DOE 

and DOD gained authorization and access to work at 15 of these sites as a 

result of an agreement reached at the summit between President Bush and 

Russian President Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, in February 2005. After this 

summit, Russia offered access to 15 additional nuclear warhead sites of 

which DOE has agreed to install upgrades at 7 sites, and DOD will help 

secure the remaining 8 sites. Table 2 provides an overview of DOE and 

DOD’s progress in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites.

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and DOD data.

DOE, $373.6

DOD, nuclear warhead transportation

security, $125.6

DOD, nuclear warhead site

security, $420.4

14%

41%

46%

Dollars in millions
Page 19 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 2: DOE and DOD Progress in Helping Russia Secure Nuclear Warhead Sites

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE and DOD information.

Despite the agencies’ optimism that all sites within this scope will be 

secured by the end of 2008, they face challenges in meeting this goal. For 

example, DOE and DOD officials stated that work in Russia involves 

extensive bureaucracy, changing requirements to meet Russian demands 

and, at times, difficult relationships and coordination with Russian 

subcontractors. DOD officials told us that there have been performance 

issues with a certain Russian subcontractor, but finding alternatives is 

difficult because there are only a limited number of Russian subcontractors 

qualified for this type of work and cleared by the Russian MOD to work at 

nuclear weapons sites. Additionally, the harsh environmental conditions at 

some remote sites have caused delays in the installation of security 

upgrades. Specifically, DOD officials stated that adverse weather 

conditions delayed the installation of security upgrades at four Russian 

warhead sites by about 1 month. 

In addition, DOD spent over $125 million through the end of fiscal year 

2006 to improve the security of nuclear warheads during transportation by 

rail to consolidation and dismantlement sites. According to DOD officials, 

security experts consider nuclear warheads to be highly vulnerable to theft 

during transport. DOD has attempted to address this threat by providing 

the Russian MOD with security enhancements for railcars, hardened 

shipping containers for nuclear warheads to protect against small arms fire 

and other threats, and payment of railway tariffs associated with 

transporting nuclear warheads to consolidation and dismantlement sites. 

Since 1995, DOD has supported maintenance on 200 specialized, secure 

railcars for transporting nuclear weapons and provided 15 armored railcars 

for guard forces protecting shipments of nuclear weapons. DOD is in the 

process of procuring up to 100 additional nuclear warhead transport 

railcars for use by the Russian MOD.

Site type 

DOE sites 

complete

DOD sites 

complete

Total sites 

completed

DOE sites 

remaining

DOD sites 

remaining

Total sites 

remaining

Permanent 

warhead 

sites 8 9 17 14 10 24

Temporary 

warhead 

sites 42 3 45 9 2 11

Total 50 12 62 23 12 35
Page 20 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Coordination between DOE 

and DOD’s Nuclear Warhead 

Security Efforts in Russia 

Has Improved

DOE and DOD have mechanisms for sharing information and avoiding 

duplication of effort. Coordination between the agencies has improved 

since 2003, when we reported that the agencies did not have consistent 

policies toward providing security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead 

sites. We recommended in 2003 that the departments work together to 

develop a standardized approach to improving security at Russian nuclear 

warhead sites. Since our 2003 report, DOD and DOE have expanded their 

efforts to share information about their work at Russian nuclear warhead 

sites.

Specifically, the departments coordinate their efforts through an 

interagency working group, which reports to the National Security 

Council.15 According to DOE and DOD officials, this group was 

instrumental in coordinating the U.S. response to proposals for security 

upgrades at additional Russian nuclear warhead sites stemming from the 

summit between Presidents Bush and Putin at Bratislava, Slovakia, in 2005. 

In addition, DOE and DOD participate in joint coordinating groups that 

include key representatives from DOE, DOD, and the various branches of 

the Russian MOD. All of these groups meet regularly to discuss ongoing 

work at Russian nuclear warhead sites and resolve problems or issues that 

arise in this effort. Furthermore, DOE and DOD have jointly developed 

common designs for security upgrades at similar Russian warhead sites to 

ensure a level of consistency in the assistance provided to these sites. DOD 

officials stated that having a standardized design between the two agencies 

allows DOE and DOD leverage with the Russian MOD, to deny requests if 

they are made for items not in the site design plan of either agency. Further, 

DOE and DOD seek to present a united image to Russian officials by 

writing letters jointly on common issues and answering Russian site 

proposals together. 

15We reported in 2003 that DOE and DOD did not have consistent plans to balance nuclear 

warhead security improvements against the possibility of enhancing the operational 

capability of Russia’s nuclear forces. In January 2003, the National Security Council issued 

guidelines that generally prohibited assistance to operational sites due to concerns that U.S. 

assistance might enhance Russia’s military capability. As a result of these guidelines and 

other internal policy decisions, DOE plans no further assistance to 21 nuclear warhead sites 

where the department had installed rapid upgrades and one additional site where DOE had 

installed both rapid and comprehensive upgrades. 
Page 21 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE and DOD Use Similar 

Systems to Manage Large 

Contracts to Improve 

Security at Russian Nuclear 

Warhead Sites

In their efforts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead 

sites, DOE and DOD are taking similar approaches to managing large 

contracts. Generally, OMB requires federal agencies to use EVM16 or an 

alternative performance management system on major acquisition 

contracts to identify cost and schedule variances at early stages so they can 

be addressed in a timely manner.17 DOD has used EVM to evaluate its 

contracts to install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOE does 

not require its contractors to implement EVM to evaluate its contracts to 

install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites, but, during the course of 

our review, augmented its contract performance management system to 

include additional reporting mechanisms for identifying and addressing 

schedule variances, which DOE officials believe represent a comparable 

alternative to an EVM system.

DOD officials stated that EVM is one of many tools that provide empirical 

data to validate testimonial information about the status of security 

upgrades provided in its contractors’ monthly and quarterly reports. 

Additionally, EVM enhances program management capabilities by 

providing an early warning system for deviations from plans and quantifies 

technical and schedule problems in terms of cost. This provides DOD with 

an objective basis for considering corrective action. DOD officials told us 

that their use of EVM allowed them to identify schedule variances due to 

poor contractor performance at one Russian nuclear warhead site where 

the department is installing security upgrades. DOD officials stated that 

this early detection allowed them to reassign the work to a different 

Russian subcontractor and formulate a plan to make up for the lost time 

and work in order to meet their scheduled completion date and critical 

path milestones. 

16An EVM system compares the value of the work accomplished during a given period with 

the value of the work scheduled to be accomplished during that period. Differences from 

the scheduled work plan are measured in both cost and schedule variances. For example, 

program activities that are completed ahead of schedule would be reported as positive 

variances, while activities that are completed behind schedule would be reported as 

negative variances. Similarly, the EVM system tracks whether completed activities are 

costing more or less than expected. A negative cost variance would indicate that activities 

are costing more than expected, while a positive cost variance would mean activities are 

costing less than expected.

17Office of Management and Budget, Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-11, 

Part 7, Planning, Budgeting, Acquisition, and Management of Capital Assets (June 30, 

2006).
Page 22 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Similarly, DOE recently proposed requirements that its large contracts for 

security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites be managed with a system 

similar to EVM. In September 2006, DOE initiated security upgrades at four 

large nuclear warhead storage sites in Russia.18 Until January 2007, DOE 

managed these fixed-price contracts according to the NNSA Programmatic 

Guidelines, which do not require the use of EVM or an alternative system to 

assess contract performance for cost and schedule variances. In part, as a 

result of our inquiry into its contracting practices, DOE altered its oversight 

mechanisms for these contracts in January 2007 and will now require 

monthly reports and other measures to more accurately ascertain the 

progress of contracted items, including the identification of schedule 

variances due to inclement weather and other unforeseen events and, 

subsequently, the development of recovery plans. According to DOE 

officials, these new reporting mechanisms represent a comparable 

alternative to an EVM system and will give DOE project managers 

additional opportunities to identify potential schedule slippages and enable 

appropriate management intervention to take place in a timely manner.19

Long-term 

Sustainability of U.S.-

Funded Security 

Upgrades Is Uncertain 

because Access 

Problems and Other 

Issues May Hamper 

DOE and DOD 

Sustainability Efforts

DOE has developed sustainability guidelines to help Russia prepare to take 

financial responsibility for maintaining U.S.-funded security upgrades at 

nuclear material and warhead sites without DOE assistance by 2013 as the 

Congress mandated. DOE and Rosatom are developing a joint 

sustainability plan that will provide an agreed-upon framework to guide 

DOE’s sustainability efforts at nuclear material sites in Russia. However, 

DOE’s ability to ensure that U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear 

material sites are being sustained may be hampered by access difficulties, 

funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, access difficulties at some 

Russian nuclear warhead sites may also prohibit DOE and DOD from 

ensuring that U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained.

18Two of these fixed-price contracts are managed by Sandia National Laboratories, and two 

are managed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

19Since DOE negotiates fixed-price contracts for its work to improve security at Russian 

nuclear warhead sites, an EVM system would only track schedule variances, rather than 

cost and schedule variances. As a result, DOE has elected to monitor schedules with 

comparable, but less expensive alternatives to EVM.
Page 23 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE Issued Guidelines to 

Direct Its Efforts to Help 

Russia Prepare to Maintain 

U.S.-Funded Security 

Upgrades without DOE 

Assistance

In May 2004, DOE issued interim guidelines (referred to as Sustainability 

Guidelines) to direct its efforts to assist Russia in developing sustainable 

MPC&A systems at Russian nuclear material and warhead sites by 2013 as 

the Congress mandated. In December 2006, DOE issued a final version of 

its Sustainability Guidelines for the MPC&A program. These guidelines 

require DOE program managers to develop assessments of each site’s 

existing capabilities to sustain MPC&A systems and to identify 

requirements that should be met before a site transitions from DOE 

support to full Russian responsibility. According to DOE, these 

assessments will be used to develop site-specific sustainability plans that 

detail the remaining cooperative activities required to address each of the 

seven elements of sustainability. The guidelines also require DOE project 

teams to develop site-specific transition plans, which would detail how 

sustainability activities will be funded as the sites move toward transition 

to full Russian responsibility by 2013.

DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines set forth seven key elements of a 

sustainable MPC&A program at sites receiving MPC&A upgrades, such as 

the development of site operating procedures, which form the foundation 

for all of DOE’s sustainability activities at nuclear material and warhead 

sites in Russia and other countries where DOE has provided security 

upgrades. DOE uses a variety of sustainability indicators for each of the 

seven elements to determine the degree to which the individual elements 

are being addressed at Russian sites. Table 2 shows the seven elements of 

sustainability outlined in DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines and some of the 

indicators DOE uses to assess the degree to which each element of 

sustainability is being met at a given Russian site.
Page 24 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Table 3: Seven Elements of Sustainability in DOE’s Guidelines

Source: DOE.

According to DOE, the Sustainability Guidelines provide general criteria 

for DOE project teams to follow when working with their Russian 

counterparts in developing sustainability programs for sites where DOE 

Element Definition Select sustainability indicators

Site MPC&A organization Site MPC&A operations plans establish 

management structures, assign staff 

responsibilities that support MPC&A operations, 

identify how site actions reduce risk, and identify 

how the site will allocate human and financial 

resources to effectively operate the MPC&A 

systems.

• Site has an established and documented 

MPC&A organization with clear roles and 

responsibilities.

• Site has conducted MPC&A sustainability 

planning.

• Site has a budget for MPC&A operations 

and personnel.

Site operating procedures MPC&A systems require a set of procedures to 

direct site personnel in the proper operation of 

equipment. Site operating procedures help staff 

operate systems consistently and effectively in 

conformance with Russian national regulations.

• Site has written procedures covering all key 

MPC&A operations.

• Site procedures are consistent with 

regulations.

• Site has a mechanism for modifying 

procedures.

Human resource 

management and site training

A human resource management system is 

designed to provide qualified and well-trained 

MPC&A professionals to perform assigned 

MPC&A duties.

• Training requirements for each MPC&A 

position have been identified.

• The site has a mechanism to track corrective 

actions from inspections and offers 

retraining to staff.

Operational cost analysis Operational cost analysis helps sites to plan and 

allocate resources for MPC&A operations 

throughout the system’s life cycle by estimating the 

costs associated with long- and short-term 

maintenance of MPC&A systems.

• Site has identified life cycle costs, capital 

equipment replacement costs, etc.

• Site has established a budget for MPC&A 

operation, which covers the site’s system 

requirements.

Equipment maintenance, 

repair, and calibration

Preventative maintenance, repair, and equipment 

calibration should be governed by a formal 

maintenance and repair process to ensure that 

malfunctioning equipment is promptly repaired, 

spare parts are available, and equipment is 

properly calibrated.

• Site has documented maintenance 

requirements, strategy, and schedule, 

prioritized based on relative importance of 

the components.

• Site has adequate resources to maintain or 

repair MPC&A systems. 

• Site has a documented calibration plan.

Performance testing and 

operational monitoring

Performance testing and operational monitoring 

allows site MPC&A organizations to assess the 

effectiveness of MPC&A components and systems 

and to take corrective actions when deficiencies 

are identified.

• Site has an internal or external review 

system to evaluate MPC&A system 

performance.

• Site has evidence of identifying and 

correcting MPC&A deficiencies.

MPC&A system configuration 

management 

MPC&A systems operate as part of the overall 

nuclear operations at a site. Configuration 

management systems are designed to ensure that 

changes in site operations do not compromise the 

effectiveness of the site’s MPC&A systems.

• Site has a configuration control plan or 

similar document.

• Changes to configuration are reviewed by 

appropriate staff to verify that system 

effectiveness is not degraded.
Page 25 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

has installed MPC&A systems. DOE officials noted that some sites may not 

require assistance to address issues in each of the seven categories. For 

example, many sites that store naval nuclear fuel are administered by the 

Russian Navy, which has its own human resource management system and 

would not require DOE assistance to address the human resource 

management and site training sustainability element.

In addition, DOE and Rosatom are currently developing a joint 

sustainability plan that is intended to govern sustainability activities at the 

sites under Rosatom’s control where DOE has installed MPC&A systems. 

DOE officials told us that this joint sustainability plan may be completed in 

March 2007. DOE officials believe that this plan will be an important step in 

gaining Rosatom’s buy-in to the concepts of sustainability and will lead to a 

specific path forward and detailed plan for funding sustainability activities 

for DOE, while transitioning to full Russian responsibility in 2013. 

According to DOE officials, the plan will be based largely on DOE’s 

Sustainability Guidelines and will include the seven key elements of 

sustainability outlined in those guidelines. DOE anticipates spending about 

$437.8 million to provide sustainability support to sites in Russia and other 

countries between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2013.

While DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines provide a framework for the 

department’s approach to sustainability implementation, the guidelines do 

not call for a tracking system to assist MPC&A management in assessing 

the progress being made toward DOE’s goal of providing Russia a 

sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. Currently, DOE’s Metrics Information 

Management System (MIMS) contains data detailing the department’s 

progress in implementing the MPC&A program by tracking the number of 

buildings and sites where DOE has installed security upgrades, among 

other things. DOE also uses MIMS to track some measures of progress in 

their sustainability efforts, such as the development of site-specific plans 

that document how MPC&A site management will plan, budget, direct, 

monitor, and evaluate all MPC&A systems. DOE managers use MIMS as a 

tool in their oversight of the MPC&A program. However, DOE officials 

acknowledged that the current MIMS data do not provide an accurate 

picture of the department’s progress toward its goal of preparing Russia to 

take full responsibility for funding the maintenance and sustainability of 

U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013. Expanding MIMS to include tracking for all 

sustainability elements could give DOE managers an improved tool for 

monitoring the MPC&A program’s progress toward the goal of preparing 

Russia to take full responsibility for funding the maintenance and 

sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013. Further, DOE officials told 
Page 26 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

us that improved tracking of sustainability implementation would be useful 

to allow the department to provide more accurate information to the 

Congress on DOE’s progress in its sustainability efforts. 

DOE’s Ability to Ensure 

That U.S.-Funded Security 

Upgrades at Nuclear 

Material Sites Are Being 

Sustained May Be 

Hampered by Access 

Difficulties, Funding 

Concerns, and Other Issues

Several challenges could impact DOE’s ability to prepare Russia to sustain 

security upgrades on its own at sites that house weapons-usable nuclear 

material, including: (1) access difficulties at some sites, (2) the limited 

financial ability of some Russian sites to maintain DOE-funded MPC&A 

equipment, (3) the lack of certification of some DOE-funded MPC&A 

equipment, and (4) delays in installing the MPC&A Operations Monitoring 

(MOM) system at Rosatom facilities. 

• According to DOE officials, Russia has denied DOE access at some sites 

after the completion of security upgrades, making it difficult for the 

department to ensure that funds intended for sustainability of U.S.-

funded upgrades are being properly spent. For example, at one facility 

where DOE completed upgrades in 1998, DOE officials were denied 

access from 1999 through 2002. DOE officials told us that after 

commissioning the MPC&A system at this facility, the department had 

not developed specific plans for sustaining the U.S.-funded security 

equipment. Upon returning to the facility in September 2002, DOE 

officials found that the U.S.-funded security upgrades were in a severe 

state of disrepair. As a result, DOE has had to spend about $800,000 to 

correct problems resulting from the site’s inability to properly maintain 

the U.S.-funded security upgrades. According to DOE officials, these 

security upgrade replacement efforts are scheduled to be completed in 

fiscal year 2007. 

• Despite improvements in the Russian economy, some sites may not be 

financially able to maintain DOE-funded security upgrades. The Russian 

economy has improved since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 

and the financial troubles of the late 1990s.20 In September 2006, the 

Deputy Head of Rosatom stated that Russia is no longer in need of U.S. 

assistance and that it is easier and more convenient for Russia to pay for 

its own domestic nuclear security projects. However, during our visit to 

Russia, officials at three of the four civilian nuclear research institutes 

20For example, in 1999, Russia's foreign debt amounted to about 96 percent of its gross 

domestic product, but in 2006, it fell to about 9 percent. Russia’s economy was expected to 

grow about 6 percent in 2006.
Page 27 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

we visited told us that they are concerned about their sites’ financial 

ability to maintain U.S.-funded security upgrades after U.S. assistance 

ends. Some of these sites do not receive regular funds from the Russian 

government to support the operation and maintenance of their MPC&A 

systems. As a result, Russian site officials told us that, after DOE 

financial support ends in 2013, they will likely face difficult choices 

about how to pay for maintenance of the security upgrades DOE has 

provided.

• Some U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment is not certified for use at Russian 

facilities, which means that the Russian government may not pay for its 

maintenance. Certification is a mandatory Russian regulatory 

requirement designed to ensure the functionality, safety, and security of 

specific equipment, products, and technology used in Russian nuclear 

sites. Certification of U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment must be obtained 

before it can be legally used at Russian nuclear sites. DOE has 

historically maintained that certification is a Russian responsibility, and 

current DOE policy generally precludes funding for certification of 

equipment. Despite repeated attempts to persuade Russia to fund 

equipment certification, DOE is paying for some equipment to be 

certified on a case-by-case basis. According to DOE officials, some sites 

have equipment or MPC&A systems that are not fully certified for use. 

For example, at eight sites that house weapons-usable nuclear material, 

DOE-funded equipment used to make accurate measurements of the 

type and quantity of nuclear material stored at these sites has not been 

certified for use. Unless this equipment receives certification in the near 

future, DOE may be forced to pay for maintenance longer than it 

intends. Rosatom and DOE also have established a Joint Certification 

Working Group that is developing a joint plan to certify key equipment 

items. DOE developed the Equipment Certification and Vendor Support 

project in 1998 to provide DOE project managers with accurate 

information on the Russian certification process. DOE spent $23.6 

million on this project through the end of fiscal year 2006.

• There have been delays installing the MOM system at some Rosatom 

facilities. In February 2001, we recommended that DOE develop a 

system, in cooperation with Russia, to monitor, on a long-term basis, the 

security systems installed at the Russian sites to ensure that they 

continue to detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear
Page 28 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

material.21 In response to this recommendation, DOE developed the 

MOM system, consisting of off-the-shelf video cameras and other 

equipment designed to allow Russian officials to ensure that MPC&A 

systems are properly staffed, personnel are vigilant, and key security 

procedures are enforced. DOE officials told us in 2002 they anticipated 

that the MOM system would be an integral part of DOE’s sustainability 

assistance to Russian sites. However, through the end of fiscal year 

2006, only five sites with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE 

installed security upgrades had the MOM system.22 While DOE also 

plans to install equipment at two additional sites in fiscal year 2007, 

none of the seven sites where DOE has installed or plans to install 

MOM systems is controlled by Rosatom. Rosatom has been unwilling to 

allow DOE to install MOM systems at sites under its control.23

Unfortunately, DOE was unable to anticipate Rosatom’s resistance to 

the MOM system and, in 2002, the department pre-purchased MOM 

equipment for use at Rosatom facilities. As a result, DOE has had to pay 

for storage and upkeep of 367 MOM cameras and other equipment since 

2002. DOE officials told us that if Rosatom decides not to allow MOM 

equipment at its sites, the excess equipment may be used by other DOE 

programs, such as the Second Line of Defense program, which works 

with Russia to combat nuclear smuggling by installing radiation 

detection equipment at key border crossings. Through fiscal year 2006, 

DOE had spent a total of $20.5 million on the MOM project, including 

about $270,000 to pay for storage and upkeep of unused MOM 

equipment that has been in storage since 2002.

21GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; 

Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2001).

22In addition, two other sites that do not contain nuclear material had been provided with 

MOM systems—the Interdepartmental Special Training Center, where Russian officials are 

trained on MPC&A systems, and the Information Security Center, which performs 

certification activities for MOM equipment.

23DOE and Rosatom have agreed to install a pilot MOM system in Rosatom’s Situation and 

Crisis Center in Moscow. Although this facility does not have nuclear material, it functions 

as a technical center authorized by Rosatom to evaluate the feasibility of using the MOM 

system at Rosatom sites. DOE officials are hopeful that Rosatom will allow the installation 

of MOM equipment at its facilities in the near future.
Page 29 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Access Difficulties at Some 

Russian Nuclear Warhead 

Sites May Prohibit DOE and 

DOD from Ensuring That 

Security Upgrades Are 

Being Sustained

DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security 

upgrades at nuclear warhead sites, but access difficulties may prevent the 

agencies from carrying out their plans. Specifically, neither department has 

reached an agreement with the Russian MOD on access procedures for 

sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage sites where the 

agencies are installing security upgrades. Site access is needed to ensure 

that U.S. funds are being used to help Russia maintain security upgrades at 

these sites. If DOE and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the Russian 

MOD on access procedures for sustainability activities at these 44 sites, or 

develop acceptable alternatives to physical access, the agencies will be 

unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly 

sustained and may not be able to spend funds allotted for these efforts. 

DOE and DOD have formed an informal working group to more effectively 

coordinate their efforts on sustainability of security upgrades at Russian 

nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD have agreed in principle that the 

seven elements of sustainability outlined in DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines 

will be applied to the agencies’ efforts to help the Russian MOD sustain 

security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD’s joint plan to 

address sustainability at Russian nuclear warhead sites uses a three-phased 

approach, (1) addressing processes and procedural issues, (2) establishing 

regional training and maintenance centers, and (3) providing site-level 

assistance, such as warrantees and spare parts. 

• First, DOE is assisting the Russian MOD with the development of 

regulations, operating procedures, and an independent inspections 

process to help ensure that security systems continue to operate as 

intended. Similarly, DOD has supported the development of a personnel 

reliability program for the 12th Main Directorate of the MOD and DOE is 

planning to support a similar program for the Russian Navy and 

Strategic Rocket Forces. 

• Second, DOE and DOD have funded the construction of regional 

training and maintenance centers. For example, DOE recently 

completed construction of the Kola Technical Center, near Murmansk, 

Russia, which serves as the centralized training and maintenance facility 

for all Russian MOD sites in the Murmansk region, both naval nuclear 

From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2004, 

DOD spent about $335 million to design and build a

Fissile Material Storage Facility in Russia to house 

nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons

and spent an additional $69.2 million to provide 

fissile material containers for use in the facility. 

Although it was completed in December 2003, the 

facility sat empty and unused for nearly 3 years. 

Russia began loading material into the facility in 

July 2006, but DOD has yet to secure a

transparency agreement to allow the United States

to verify the type, quality, and quantity of material 

stored at the facility. Consequently, DOD does not 

currently have access to the facility and, as a result, 

cannot ensure that it is being used as intended. 

DOD and Department of State officials told us that 

negotiations are ongoing to resolve outstanding 

issues related to transparency at the facility. DOD 

officials noted that there currently is no budget for 

transparency activities. If an agreement is secured, 

DOD officials told us that funding for transparency 

and verification activities would have to be shifted 

from other programs.

Transparency Issues at DOD-Built Fissile 

Material Storage Facility Not Resolved
Page 30 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

fuel sites and nuclear warhead storage sites.24 The Kola Technical Center 

was commissioned in fall 2005, and Russian MOD officials told us that 

the facility will help them prepare to assume full financial responsibility 

for maintenance and sustainability when U.S. assistance ends. 

• Finally, at the site level, once DOE and DOD come to agreement with the 

Russian MOD on verification of sustainability assistance, they will assist 

in sustaining the upgraded security systems with a focus on training and 

developing the Russian MOD’s capability to maintain the modernized 

systems. Initially, DOE and DOD will rely on contractor support for 

repair of failed security systems while the Russian MOD’s capability is 

being developed, gradually transitioning to full Russian system support.

Although DOE and DOD are working closely to provide sustainability 

assistance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites, differences exist in 

the length of time DOE and DOD intend to fund sustainability activities at 

these sites. Specifically, DOE intends to fund sustainability until 2013, while 

DOD plans to halt funding in 2011. This has the potential to cause 

difficulties for the Russian MOD when it comes to funding sustainability 

earlier at sites where DOD installed security upgrades. In addition, DOD 

plans no further support with respect to sustainability for warhead 

transportation upgrades it has provided to the Russian MOD, because, 

according to DOD officials, the Russian MOD has not requested assistance 

for this activity.

Conclusions DOE and DOD have made significant progress in helping Russia and other 

countries improve security at vulnerable sites housing weapons-usable 

nuclear material and nuclear warheads. Since our 2003 report, DOE has 

worked with Russia to resolve many of the access difficulties that we 

reported, especially at sites within the Rosatom weapons complex. 

However, in our view, DOE’s current metric for reporting progress on the 

number of buildings secured by its MPC&A program provides the Congress 

with a potentially misleading assessment of the security at these facilities. 

24DOD’s Security Assessment and Training Center, which was completed in fiscal year 2003 

at a cost of $25.9 million and is located near Moscow, serves a similar purpose for sites 

located in the Moscow region. DOD is also funding the construction of a third facility, the 

Far East Training Center, to support sites in the Russian Far East, including the Russian 

Navy’s Pacific Fleet. DOD expects the facility to be completed in 2009 at a cost of $16.9 

million.
Page 31 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Specifically, DOE should not report to the Congress that buildings with 

weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries are “secure” 

until all DOE risk reduction goals have been achieved, and all planned 

upgrades at those buildings are completed. Currently, DOE considers 

buildings to be “secured” after only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid 

upgrades) are installed, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are 

planned. Rapid upgrades do not include the majority of measures DOE uses 

to address the threat of insider theft at Russian nuclear sites, which DOE 

considers to be one of its most pressing concerns. DOE provides most 

upgrades designed to address the insider threat during the comprehensive 

upgrades phase. Further, DOE officials told us that comprehensive 

upgrades are necessary to achieve all risk reduction goals at buildings with 

nuclear material, calling into question DOE’s decision to report buildings 

without such upgrades completed as “secure.” 

As DOE nears the completion of its security upgrade work in its MPC&A 

program, the sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in 

Russia and other countries has become increasingly important for ensuring 

that the substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15 years is not 

wasted. DOE and Rosatom have been cooperating to develop a joint 

sustainability plan for the majority of sites where DOE has installed 

MPC&A upgrades. We believe this is a critical step in gaining agreement on 

what remains to be done before DOE transfers full responsibility for 

sustainability of MPC&A upgrades to Russia in 2013. While DOE uses its 

Metrics Information Management System to track some measures of 

progress in its sustainability efforts, DOE officials acknowledged that the 

current MIMS data do not provide an accurate picture of the department’s 

progress toward its goal of preparing Russia to take full responsibility for 

funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by 

2013. Creating a new management information system for sustainability or 

expanding MIMS to include tracking for all sustainability elements could 

give DOE managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A program’s 

progress on sustainability and would aid the department in providing the 

Congress with a more accurate assessment of the progress made toward 

DOE’s goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material and 

warheads in Russia and other countries, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Energy, working with the Administrator of NNSA, take the following two 

actions:
Page 32 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

• revise the metrics used to measure progress in the MPC&A program to 

better reflect the level of completion of security upgrades at buildings 

reported as “secure;” and 

• develop a sustainability management system or modify the Metrics 

Information Management System to more clearly track DOE’s progress 

in developing a sustainable MPC&A system across all sites where it has 

installed MPC&A upgrades, including evaluations of progress for each of 

the seven key elements of sustainability outlined in DOE’s Sustainability 

Guidelines.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOE generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had 

no written comments on our report. DOE and DOD also provided technical 

comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

In its comments, DOE provided additional information about the metric it 

uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its reasons for not using 

EVM on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts to work with Rosatom on 

sustainability issues. DOE agreed that the current metric it uses to track 

progress in the MPC&A program may be confusing. DOE wrote that it is 

changing the metric to one that more accurately identifies the level of 

completion for upgrades. Similarly, DOE officials told us in January 2007 

that they were taking steps to modify the progress metric. However, in 

February 2007, DOE issued its Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request, which did 

not include modifications to clarify the confusions DOE agrees are present 

in its progress metric. As a result, DOE’s most recent budget justification 

continues to present the Congress with an unclear picture of the progress 

made in improving security at buildings with weapons-useable nuclear 

material in Russia and other countries because DOE’s progress metric does 

not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some 

buildings that the department lists as being “secure.” 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretaries of Energy and Defense; the Administrator, National Nuclear 

Security Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; 

and interested congressional committees. We also will make copies 
Page 33 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be made 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in 

appendix VI.

Gene Aloise

Director, Natural Resources and Environment
Page 34 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

We performed our review of U.S. efforts to assist Russia and other 

countries in securing nuclear materials and warheads at the Departments 

of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD) and State (State); the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) in Washington, D.C.; the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency in Fort Belvior, Virginia; Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, 

New Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico. We visited Russia to discuss the implementation of U.S. nuclear 

material and warhead security assistance programs with Russian officials. 

We also spoke with officials from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, DOE’s 

Moscow office, and the DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Office in Moscow.

While in Russia we met with officials from the Federal Agency for Atomic 

Energy of the Russian Federation (Rosatom), Rostekhnadzor (the Russian 

nuclear regulatory authority), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD)—

including representatives from the 12th Main Directorate, Navy, and 

Strategic Rocket Forces. We requested visits to the Institute of Nuclear 

Materials, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Interdepartmental 

Special Training Center, Russian Methodological Training Center, and AllRussian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (also known as 

Chelyabinsk-70 and Snezhinsk), but Rosatom denied us access to all 

facilities under its control, including these. In fact, we were denied access 

to some Russian sites GAO officials had visited during past reviews of U.S. 

nonproliferation programs. Rosatom officials told us that because our 

names were not on the list of 185 individuals provided by DOE for access 

under the terms of a 2001 access arrangement, we would not be allowed to 

visit any Rosatom facilities. Rosatom officials did not deny our request for 

access until we had already arrived in Russia to begin our fieldwork for this 

review. In addition, the Russian MOD denied our request to visit a naval 

nuclear fuel facility, Site 49, and a naval nuclear warhead facility near 

Murmansk, Russia, due to military exercises scheduled near these sites 

during the time of our visit. 

We were able meet our audit objectives by visiting four sites—civilian, 

educational, and research institutes that are not under Rosatom’s control—

where DOE had provided security upgrades through NNSA’s Materials 

Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program: Karpov Institute 

for Physical Chemistry, Kurchatov Institute, Joint Institute for Nuclear 

Research, and Moscow State Engineering and Physics Institute. During our 

visits to these sites, we discussed the implementation of the MPC&A 

program, sustainability of U.S.-funded MPC&A upgrades, and the future of 

DOE cooperation with Russian officials. In addition, we visited a training 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

facility near Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to provide training to 

Russian MOD personnel in the Murmansk region. 

To assess the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other countries 

secure nuclear material, we had discussions with officials from NNSA’s 

MPC&A program, DOE’s contractors at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia 

National Laboratories, and experts from nongovernmental organizations 

that specialize in nuclear nonproliferation. We reviewed various program 

documents, including the MPC&A Programmatic Guidelines, MPC&A 

Program Management Document, project work plans, and the DOERosatom Joint Action Plan. We also analyzed financial information 

detailing program expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates, 

and contract data for expenditures of the MPC&A program through the end 

of fiscal year 2006. To assess the reliability of these data, we questioned key 

database officials about data entry access, internal control procedures, and 

the accuracy and completeness of the data, following up with further 

questions, as necessary. Although any caveats and limitations to the data 

were noted in the documentation of our work, we determined that the data 

we received were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

To assess the progress DOE and DOD have made in assisting Russia with 

securing nuclear warheads, we reviewed documents and had discussions 

with officials from NNSA’s MPC&A program, DOE’s contractors at Oak 

Ridge and Sandia National Laboratories, DOD’s Office of the 

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. We spoke with officials from the Russian MOD and visited a 

training facility near Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to provide 

training to Russian MOD personnel. We analyzed financial information 

detailing program expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates, 

and contract data from both DOE and DOD through the end of fiscal year 

2006. To assess the reliability of these data, we questioned key database 

officials about on data entry access, internal control procedures, and the 

accuracy and completeness of the data, following up with further 

questions, as necessary. Although any caveats and limitations to the data 

were noted in the documentation of our work, we determined that these 

data were also sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

In addition, we reviewed guidance on government contracting, including 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-11, DOD 

Earned Value Management (EVM) Implementation Guide, and DOE Order 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

413.3A.1 After reviewing this guidance, we requested copies of DOE and 

DOD’s ongoing contracts valued over $20 million for work to help Russia 

and other countries secure nuclear material and warheads. To determine 

how DOE’s large contracts were being managed, we reviewed contract 

documents and identified a requirement for quarterly reporting in the 

contracts. We contacted the Contracting Officers identified in the contracts 

to request information on how the contracts are managed in respect to 

applicable criteria required by OMB and DOE directives. Additionally, we 

reviewed DOD’s large contracts for installing security upgrades at Russian 

nuclear warhead sites and reviewed documentation from DOD’s 

contractors, Bechtel National, Inc., and Raytheon Technical Services. After 

analyzing these contracts and other related documentation, we determined 

that both of DOD’s contracts reflected an EVM system. DOD provided us 

with certification documentation for Bechtel and Raytheon’s EVM systems, 

a requirement called for by federal guidance for all EVM systems. Since the 

scope of work within the Bechtel contract was at or near completion, we 

evaluated only the contract performance management for Raytheon, in 

order to determine how DOD was executing and managing its large 

contracts for security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOD provided 

Raytheon’s cost performance reports which GAO contracting experts 

assessed for cost and schedule variances in contracted work. After review 

of Raytheon’s cost performance reports, we determined that shortfalls in 

scheduled work were resulting in a schedule variance equivalent to around 

$13 million.2

To assess the efforts undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the 

sustainability and continued use of U.S.-funded security upgrades, we had 

discussions with officials from NNSA’s MPC&A program; DOE’s 

contractors at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories; 

DOD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; and the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency. We analyzed program documents, including 

DOE’s May 2004 interim Sustainability Guidelines, DOE’s December 2006 

final Sustainability Guidelines, DOE-DOD Joint Sustainability Task Force 

1

DOD and DOE’s guidance in these directives requires the use of EVM on contracts valued 

over $20 million.

2

We followed up with DOD program managers who stated that they had identified this same 

variance through use of their EVM system. DOD officials stated that this schedule variance 

had been addressed with a plan to recoup lost work and, in any case, the variance did not 

affect the critical path forward. They remained confident that they would complete 

upgrades within their scope by the 2008 deadline.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

documents, DOE-Rosatom Joint Sustainability Working Group documents, 

and project work plans. We interviewed program officials responsible for 

the development of DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines and program managers 

responsible for implementing them. We also discussed the sustainability of 

U.S.-funded upgrades with Russian officials at sites we visited.

We performed our review from April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 38 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix II

Time Line of Major Events in the History of 

U.S. Efforts to Secure Nuclear Material and 

Warheads in Russia and Other Countries ApendxiI

Prior GAO reviews

The Congress passes the Soviet Threat Reduction Act of 1991, 1991

(Pub. L. No. 102-228), popularly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar 

Act.

Source: GAO.

1992

2013

1993

1998

2003

2001

2005

2004

2001

2003

2000

1993

1996

1999

2006

2008

1995

DOD begins its Cooperative Threat Reduction program to assist Russia

and other former Soviet republics in securing and dismantling weapons of 

mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The Soviet Union dissolves.

DOE begins working with Russian nuclear facilities to 

improve security of nuclear material.

DOE begins its MPC&A program.

DOD begins to work with the Russian Ministry of Defense to enhance 

transportation security for nuclear warheads and security at nuclear 

warhead storage sites.

DOD and Rosatom sign an agreement to build a Fissile Material Storage 

Facility to store nuclear material from dismantled Russian nuclear 

warheads.

September-DOE revises its MPC&A Programmatic 

Guidelines.

December-DOE issues the first MPC&A Programmatic 

Guidelines.

December-DOD completes construction of the Fissile Material Storage 

Facility.

December-DOE revises its MPC&A Programmatic 

Guidelines.

December-DOE issues final Sustainability Guidelines.

July 17-Presidents Bush and Putin reaffirmed their 

commitment to completing security upgrades at nuclear 

material and warhead sites in Russia by the end of 2008.

March 8-Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs 

Associated with U.S. Dismantlement Assistance,

GAO/NSIAD-93-154.

March 8-Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to 

Improve Nuclear Materials Controls in Newly Independent 

States, GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89.

March 24-Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian 

Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at 

Russian Sites, GAO-03-482.

July-Rosatom informs DOD that it has begun loading the 

Fissile Material Storage Facility.

June-DOE and the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of 

Russia sign a Joint Action Plan.

DOE expands the scope of its efforts with the Russian Navy from 

protecting naval reactor fuel to helping secure nuclear warheads.

May-DOE issues interim Sustainability Guidelines (Guidelines for 

Sustaining Effective Operations of Material Protection, Control, and 

Accounting Systems in the Russian Federation).

February 24-At their summit meeting in Bratislava, U.S. President Bush 

and Russian President Putin issued a joint statement on continued 

cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. 

October-DOE begins MPC&A cooperation with the China Atomic Energy 

Authority by engaging in a Joint Technology Demonstration on integrated 

nuclear material management at a facility in Beijing.

October 24-DOE announces completion of security enhancements at all 

50 Russian Navy nuclear sites (both nuclear material and warhead sites) 

where upgrades were planned. 

December 31-DOE and DOD plan to complete all security upgrades at 

nuclear material and warhead sites in Russia by this date.

January 1-Date that the Congress requires DOE to have developed a

“fully sustainable” MPC&A system with Russia.

March 6-Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear 

Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States, 

GAO/RCED/NSIAD-00-82.

April 13-Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian 

Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, 

GAO/NSIAD-99-76.

February 28-Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s 

Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed,

GAO-01-312.
Page 39 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia ApendxiI

From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent a total of $131.5 

million on efforts to help countries outside of Russia secure facilities with 

nuclear material (see fig. 4). Responsibility for managing DOE’s MPC&A 

efforts in countries outside of Russia has shifted among a number of offices 

within DOE and NNSA.1

 Responsibility for sustainability of upgrades at 

sites in the former Soviet Union now rests with the Office of Weapons 

Material Protection within the Office of International Materials Protection 

and Cooperation in NNSA. The Office of Materials Consolidation and 

Civilian Sites within the Office of International Materials Protection and 

Cooperation in NNSA is responsible for implementing MPC&A efforts 

outside of the former Soviet Union, such as DOE’s efforts in China and 

India.

1

From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE’s MPC&A projects in Belarus, Georgia, 

Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan were managed by four separate 

offices within NNSA and one task force. Program activities in these countries included work 

on physical protection, material control and accounting, International Atomic Energy 

Agency safeguards requirements, and other nuclear security issues. Funding noted here 

reflects the total level of effort in this region, though the majority of funds cited relate to the 

MPC&A activities on which this report focuses.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia

Page 40 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Figure 4: Map Showing DOE Spending by Country through the End of Fiscal Year 2006 for MPC&A Assistance Outside of Russia

Note: In addition to the spending illustrated in the above figure, DOE also spent $33.7 million on 

miscellaneous MPC&A efforts outside of Russia through the end of fiscal year 2006. Also, all dollar 

amounts are rounded, and dollars are in millions.

 DOE spending by country

Sources: GAO analysis of DOE data and Map Resources (map).

Lithuania

$0.9

Belarus

$3.6

Ukraine

 $37.7

China

 $4.7

India

 $0.1

Georgia

 $0.2

Kazakhstan

 $45.3

Uzbekistan

$4.4

Latvia

$0.9
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia

Page 41 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Belarus DOE provided security upgrades to two buildings at one facility—the Sosny 

Scientific and Technical Center (now known as the Joint Institute of Power 

and Nuclear Research-Sosny)—in Belarus. DOE began work at this site in 

April 1994, and the initial phase of MPC&A upgrades was completed in 

December 1997. After this, DOE was unable to conduct additional work in 

the country due to sanctions the United States had placed on Belarus.2

However, in May 2003, the Department of State modified its position and 

allowed a team from DOE to visit Sosny solely to review the status of the 

MPC&A systems provided with U.S. funds. The DOE team visited the site in 

June 2003 and noted several security deficiencies that required immediate 

improvement. Shortly thereafter, DOE received approval from the 

Department of State to return to Belarus to perform a comprehensive 

vulnerability assessment at the Sosny site. According to DOE officials, the 

Department of State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund allocated 

$250,000 for design work and $1.6 million for further upgrades in 2003 and 

2005, respectively. Since there is currently no government-to-government 

agreement between the United States and Belarus, the project is being 

administered via the International Scientific and Technical Center’s 

Partners Program. However, no funding has been spent yet because the 

Belarusian government suspended the project due to concerns over sharing 

information with a foreign entity. In the fall of 2006, Belarus indicated that 

it was again ready to move forward with the project. DOE sent a team to 

Sosny in December 2006 and was able to re-establish relations, as well as, 

develop a statement of work for the design of a communications system for 

the site and a project work plan for material control and accounting. 

Additional trips are planned for February and April 2007. DOE hopes to 

complete a second phase of MPC&A upgrades at the site in fiscal year 2008. 

In total, DOE spent about $3.6 million through the end of fiscal year 2006 to 

provide MPC&A assistance to Belarus.

China DOE has a cooperative engagement program with China on issues related 

to nuclear material security. The purpose of the engagement is to increase 

awareness of our respective approaches to nuclear security issues, as well 

as MPC&A methodologies and applicable technologies, and to work 

cooperatively to improve security in these areas when and where 

appropriate. DOE is pursuing this objective through dialogue and technical 

2

The Department of State’s Selective Engagement Policy prohibits a variety of U.S. 

assistance to Belarus and was applied to that country beginning in 1997.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia

Page 42 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

collaboration with the China Atomic Energy Authority in China’s civilian 

nuclear sector and is attempting initial engagements with the China 

Academy of Engineering Physics in China’s defense nuclear sector. 

DOE is pursuing bilateral cooperation with the Chinese civilian nuclear 

sector under the Statement of Intent signed with the China Atomic Energy 

Authority in January 2004 and the DOE-China Atomic Energy Authority 

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement. In February 2004, DOE 

and the China Atomic Energy Authority agreed to conduct a Joint 

Technology Demonstration on integrated nuclear material management in 

Beijing. The purpose of this demonstration project was to promote the 

adoption of modern security practices and technologies at civilian nuclear 

facilities by demonstrating established physical protection, nuclear 

material control and accounting, and international safeguards technologies 

that provide a first line of defense against nuclear material theft, diversion, 

and sabotage. The Joint Technology Demonstration took place in Beijing in 

October 2005. Following the completion of the technology demonstration 

project, DOE is currently discussing ideas for future bilateral work with the 

China Atomic Energy Authority and the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy. 

Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $4.7 million on MPC&A 

cooperation with China.

Georgia DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Georgia, the 

Andronikashvili Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tbilisi. Work began at this 

site in January 1996 and was completed in May 1996, at a cost of about $0.2 

million. All fresh and spent nuclear fuel was transferred from the facility to 

a secure nuclear site in Scotland in April 1998 under a multinational effort 

known as Operation Auburn Endeavor. DOE’s MPC&A program currently 

has no ongoing work in Georgia.

India DOE’s cooperative security engagement program with India is in its initial 

stages. DOE is investigating near-term opportunities to engage India on 

issues related to nuclear material security with the intent of initiating a 

cooperative program with India on nuclear security best practices. 

Potential issues for discussion include the theoretical framework for 

developing and implementing a design basis threat; the methodology for 

designing effective physical protection systems; a vulnerability assessment 

methodology; regulatory infrastructure for material control and 

accounting, and physical protection; and general nuclear security culture. 
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia

Page 43 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE spent about $100,000 on MPC&A cooperation with India through the 

end of fiscal year 2006.

Latvia DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Latvia, the Latvian 

Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center (also known as the Latvian

Institute of Nuclear Physics at Salaspils). Work began at this site in July 

1994 and was completed in February 1996. Since fiscal year 1994, DOE has 

spent about $900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this 

facility. In May 2005, 2.5 kilograms of fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) 

fuel were removed from the Salaspils reactor and returned to Russia. 

According to the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian 

Federation (Rosatom), the HEU fuel will be downblended into lowenriched uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear power plants. 

DOE’s MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Latvia.

Lithuania DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Lithuania, the Ignalina 

Nuclear Power Plant. Work began at this site in October 1995 and was 

completed in August 1996. Since fiscal year 1996, DOE has spent about 

$900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this facility. DOE 

counted one building at this facility as secure in its progress metric for the 

MPC&A program that tracks the number of buildings with weapons-usable 

nuclear material secured, even though the facility never possessed such 

material.3

 During the course of our review, we brought this to the attention 

of DOE management, and they agreed to remove the facility from the 

progress report in DOE’s fiscal year 2008 budget justification document. 

DOE’s MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Lithuania.

Kazakhstan DOE provided security upgrades to four sites in Kazakhstan: the Institute 

of Atomic Energy–Kurchatov, the Institute of Nuclear Physics at Alatau, the 

BN-350 breeder reactor at Aktau, and the Ulba Metallurgical Plant. In total, 

3

We reported in 2000 that DOE improved the security at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant 

because the nuclear security systems would assist the site in implementing the International 

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Safeguards are systems designed to limit the risk of 

proliferation through the diversion of nuclear materials and assist efforts to reduce global 

nuclear weapons stockpiles. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in 

Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States, 

GAO/RCED/NSIAD-00-82 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2000).
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia

Page 44 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

DOE spent about $45.3 million from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 

2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Kazakhstan. 

Institute of Atomic EnergyKurchatov

The Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov, formerly called Semipalatinsk21, is a branch of the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center. Two nuclear 

research reactors are located at the site. DOE began providing both 

physical security and material control and accounting upgrades to the site 

in October 1994, and the site was commissioned in September 1997. The 

perimeter security system at the site was commissioned in July 1998. DOE 

plans to continue to assist the Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov with 

spare parts, extended warranties, and training to sustain its MPC&A 

systems in fiscal year 2007.

Institute of Nuclear Physics The Institute of Nuclear Physics is a branch of the Kazakhstan National 

Nuclear Center located in the town of Alatau. The site operates a 10-

megawatt research reactor used to manufacture radioisotopes as a 

radiation source for industrial and medical use, among other activities. 

DOE began work at the site in September 1995 and completed upgrades in 

October 1998. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute of Nuclear 

Physics at Alatau with extended warranties and training to sustain its 

MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

BN-350 Reactor at Aktau DOE provided upgrades to two buildings at the BN-350 reactor site at 

Aktau. MPC&A upgrade work began in September 1994 and was completed 

in December 1998. In May 2002, HEU fuel was transferred from the BN-350 

breeder reactor in Aktau to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant with the assistance 

of a nongovernmental organization involved in nonproliferation efforts—

the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The HEU fuel will be downblended into lowenriched uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear reactors. 

Ulba Metallurgical Plant The Ulba Metallurgical Plant contains a low-enriched uranium fuel 

fabrication facility, among other resources. The fuel fabrication facility 

produces nuclear fuel pellets with a capacity of 1,000 metric tons per year. 

Security upgrades work began in September 1994 and was completed in 

September 1997. DOE plans to continue to assist the Ulba Metallurgical 

Plant with extended warranties and spare parts to sustain its MPC&A 

systems in fiscal year 2007.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia

Page 45 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

In addition, on November 21, 1994, 581 kilograms of HEU was transferred 

from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the United States in a highly secret 

project code-named “Sapphire.” The project was carried out with 

cooperation from the Kazakhstani government and DOE and DOD.4 The 

large stockpile of HEU, reportedly left over from the Soviet Union's secret 

Alfa submarine program, had been stored at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in 

unsecured and unsafeguarded facilities without electronic means of 

accounting. Experts estimate the nuclear material was sufficient to make 

20-25 nuclear bombs. The HEU was downblended into low-enriched 

uranium for use in civilian nuclear power plants in the late 1990s. 

Ukraine DOE provided MPC&A assistance to four sites in Ukraine: Kharkiv Institute 

of Physics and Technology, Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research, Sevastopol 

National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, and South Ukraine 

Nuclear Power Plant. In total, DOE spent about $37.7 million from fiscal 

year 1993 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to 

Ukraine, including installation of security upgrades, maintenance of 

installed MPC&A systems, and training for site personnel.

Kharkiv Institute of Physics 

and Technology

The Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology conducts nuclear fuel 

cycle research and has important experimental physics facilities including 

a number of electron and ion accelerators. DOE provided upgrades to one 

building at this site. Security upgrades work began in May 1995 and was 

completed in January 1999. DOE plans to continue to assist the Kharkiv 

Institute of Physics and Technology with extended warranties and training 

to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

Kiev Institute of Nuclear 

Research

The Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research was established in 1970 and is 

operated by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The institute’s primary 

function is to perform research in low- and medium-energy nuclear 

physics. Security upgrades work began at one building at this site in 

December 1993 and was completed in October 1997. DOE plans to continue 

to assist the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research with extended warranties 

and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

4

The costs of this project are not readily available and, as a result, are not included in our 

total of DOE spending on MPC&A assistance in Kazakhstan.
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia

Page 46 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Sevastopol National 

Institute of Nuclear Energy 

and Industry

The Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry’s mission 

is to support Ukraine’s nuclear power industry by training nuclear power 

plant personnel. The facility operates a 200-kilowatt, light-water cooled, 

research reactor. Security upgrades work began at one building at this 

facility in May 1996 and was completed in January 1999. DOE plans to 

continue to assist the Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and 

Industry with extended warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A 

systems in fiscal year 2007.

South Ukraine Nuclear 

Power Plant

In addition to these facilities, DOE provided MPC&A upgrades to a fourth 

site that does not possess weapons-usable nuclear material, the South 

Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. DOE began security upgrades work at this 

site in August 1994 and completed its upgrades work in January 1999. DOE 

counted this facility as secured in its progress metric for the MPC&A 

program, even though the facility never possessed such material. During 

the course of our review, we brought this to the attention of DOE 

management, and they agreed to remove the facility from their progress 

report in DOE’s fiscal year 2008 budget justification document. According 

to DOE officials, no further MPC&A assistance is planned at this site.

Uzbekistan In Uzbekistan, DOE’s project goal is to continue to enhance capabilities 

and commitment to operating and maintaining security improvements at 

two institutes: the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent and the Foton 

facility. In total, DOE spent about $4.4 million from fiscal year 1995 through 

fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Uzbekistan. 

Institute of Nuclear Physics Founded in 1956 as part of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, the 

Institute of Nuclear Physics operates a 10-megawatt research reactor. 

Often described as the largest facility of its kind in central Asia, the site has 

an ambitious program to become the primary nuclear research and isotope 

production facility for the region. The facility maintains fresh and 

irradiated nuclear fuel storage facilities to support continued reactor 

operations. Security upgrades at the site began in June 1995 and were 

provided by a joint team from the United States, Australia, Sweden, and the 

United Kingdom. Australia and Sweden agreed to provide assistance in the 

area of material control and accounting, while the United States and United 

Kingdom agreed to provide physical protection upgrades. Upgrades were 
Appendix III

Additional Information on DOE Efforts to 

Secure Sites with Weapons-Usable Nuclear 

Material in Countries Other Than Russia

Page 47 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

provided in two phases. Phase I upgrades were completed in August 1996. 

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE began to work with the 

facility to develop a plan to further improve its security system. Additional 

upgrades focused on the facility perimeter and included the installation of 

new fencing and exterior intrusion detection sensors. In addition, the 

Department of State provided about $0.6 million in fiscal year 2002 through 

its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to supply cameras and lighting 

for the facility’s perimeter. All Phase II upgrades were completed in 

September 2002. A commissioning ceremony was held in October 2002. In 

2006, DOE announced the removal of 63 kilograms of HEU in the form of 

spent nuclear fuel from the facility. The HEU spent fuel was returned to 

Russia through DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. DOE plans to 

continue to assist the Institute of Nuclear Physics with extended 

warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.

Foton Facility The Foton facility has a small research reactor containing less than 5 

kilograms of HEU. MPC&A upgrades at the site began in January 2005 and 

were completed in May 2005. Physical security upgrades at the Foton 

facility focused on the research reactor building and included such things 

as intrusion detection sensors, improved access controls, and a central 

alarm station. DOE plans to continue to assist the Foton facility with 

extended warranties to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007.
Page 48 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix IV

Additional Information on DOE’s National 

Infrastructure and Related Programs ApendxiIV

In addition to DOE’s efforts to provide security upgrades at sites with 

weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other 

countries, the department implements other crosscutting efforts to support 

the efforts of its MPC&A program, such as assistance for transportation 

security, equipment for protective forces at nuclear facilities, and efforts to 

consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and sites. According to 

DOE officials, these efforts support DOE’s goal of improving security of 

vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material by contributing 

to the overall security systems at nuclear materials sites in Russia and 

other countries. As table 4 shows, through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE 

spent about $493.9 million on these efforts.

Table 4: DOE Spending on Crosscutting MPC&A Assistance Efforts through the End 

of Fiscal Year 2006 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE data.

a

The certification, MPC&A operations monitoring, and MPC&A operations/sustainability projects are 

discussed in the body of this report. Dollar amounts are rounded.

Dollars in millions

Project Spending

Material consolidation and conversion $128.8

Secure transportation 88.1

Training and technical support infrastructure 63.6

Russian Federation inspection implementation 43.1

Protective forces assistance 30.2

Federal Information System 29.1

Regulatory development 27.0 

Certificationa 23.6

MPC&A operations monitoringa 20.5

MPC&A operations/sustainabilitya 13.9

MPC&A education 13.4

Material control and accounting measurements 10.8

MPC&A security culture 1.3

Taxation and customs 0.5

Total $493.9
Appendix IV

Additional Information on DOE’s National 

Infrastructure and Related Programs

Page 49 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Material Consolidation 

and Conversion

DOE’s Material Consolidation and Conversion project supports the transfer 

of HEU from Russian sites where it is no longer needed in order to secure 

locations within Russia for eventual conversion to low-enriched uranium. 

According to DOE, consolidation and conversion efforts significantly 

reduce the requirements and costs of securing material. For example, in 

2006, DOE announced the completion of a 2-year cooperative effort to 

remove HEU from the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute, a Russian 

research facility located near St. Petersburg. DOE teams worked with their 

Russian counterparts to validate the inventory of nuclear material and 

confirm that it was securely packaged for transport. DOE paid for the HEU 

to be shipped to another facility in Russia where it will be converted 

(downblended) to low-enriched uranium, which will eliminate it as a 

proliferation concern. Through the Material Consolidation and Conversion 

project, DOE has also supported the secure storage and conversion of 

Russian-origin HEU that has been returned to Russia from countries such 

as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. DOE 

reported in July 2006 that more than 8,000 kilograms of HEU had been 

downblended into low-enriched uranium under the project. Through the 

end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $128.8 million on the project.

Secure Transportation In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE 

increased funding for its efforts to secure nuclear material during transit. 

By providing upgraded security for transport and guard railcars, 

specialized secure trucks and escort vehicles, and secure containers—

called overpacks—DOE seeks to reduce the risks of theft and sabotage of 

nuclear material transported within and between nuclear facilities in 

Russia. The goal of the Secure Transportation project is to reduce the risk 

of theft or diversion of material or warheads during transportation 

operations in Russia by improving security for railcars and trucks, Russian 

nuclear material and warhead transport infrastructure, and 

communications interface with response forces. Through fiscal year 2006, 

DOE had spent about $88.1 million to improve the transportation security 

of nuclear material in Russia, by providing 76 cargo trucks, 86 escort 

vehicles, as well as 66 cargo railcars, 25 guard railcars, and 283 security 

overpacks. This included 54 refurbished cargo railcars, 25 new 

manufactured guard railcars, 12 new manufactured cargo railcars, and 

approximately 78 cargo trucks and 89 escort trucks to support both on-site 

and off-site nuclear material shipments.
Appendix IV

Additional Information on DOE’s National 

Infrastructure and Related Programs

Page 50 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Training and Technical 

Support Infrastructure

DOE provides a variety of training and technical support to both the 

Russian Navy and Rosatom to help these entities operate and maintain 

U.S.-funded security upgrades and MPC&A systems. One of the primary 

accomplishments of the project was the construction of the Kola Technical 

Center near Murmansk. The facility was designed and constructed by DOE 

to be a central training and maintenance center to support naval nuclear 

fuel and warhead sites in the Murmansk region. DOE completed 

construction of the Kola Technical Center in June 2005 at a cost of $24 

million.1

 We visited the facility during our trip to Russia. Russian officials 

told us that the Kola Technical Center is critical to help the Russian MOD 

transition to full financial responsibility for sustainability after U.S. funding 

ends.

In addition, DOE provides support to Rosatom’s regional training facilities 

through the Rosatom Training and Technical Support Infrastructure 

project. These facilities, such as the Interdepartmental Special Training 

Center and the Russian Methodological and Training Center, seek to train 

specialists and guard forces to safeguard materials at Russian nuclear sites. 

Additionally, these centers seek to assist Rosatom by providing effective 

and sustainable training and technical support infrastructures. To date, 

DOE has spent $42.5 million on the establishment of these training and 

technological support centers.

Russian Federation 

Inspection 

Implementation

The Russian Federation Inspection Implementation project seeks to 

enhance nuclear material inspections by establishing a sustainable 

infrastructure with sufficient resources to enforce MPC&A regulations 

through federal and industry oversight. Under this project, DOE provides 

inspection support to Rostekhnadzor, Rosatom, and other Russian 

ministries and agencies. The project enhances MPC&A nuclear material 

inspections at the ministerial, agency, and site-level by providing 

comprehensive training, inspection, and technical assistance, as well as 

sufficient information technology to aid inspectors in conducting 

systematic inspections. For example, DOE assists Russian organizations in 

developing a systematic inspection approach that assures the MPC&A 

1

Prior to fiscal year 2003, funding for this project derived from DOE’s Office of Nuclear 

Warhead Protection. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2006, funding for the project 

came from the budget of DOE’s Office of National Infrastructure and Sustainability, which 

spent $21.2 million on its construction.
Appendix IV

Additional Information on DOE’s National 

Infrastructure and Related Programs

Page 51 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

objectives are met and assists organizations in defining the inspection 

program by benchmarking proposed inspection methodologies against U.S. 

and other inspection approaches. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE has 

sponsored 83 inspections by Rosatom and Rostekhnadzor, and 980 Russian 

personnel have attended inspection courses. DOE’s goal for the project is 

to maintain a cadre of about 125 trained inspectors. DOE had spent about 

$43.1 million on this project through the end of fiscal year 2006.

Protective Forces 

Assistance

The objective of the Protective Force Assistance project is to ensure that a 

sufficient number of organized, equipped, and trained response forces are 

present and able to protect against threats to highly-desirable nuclear 

material at Russian and Ukrainian sites and during transit. The project 

includes efforts in Russia and Ukraine, although the bulk of the efforts and 

money are spent in Russia. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $26.7 

million to purchase a variety of equipment, such as bulletproof vests, 

helmets, response vehicles, and cold-weather uniforms for use by the 

forces that protect sites that store weapons-usable nuclear material in 

Russia. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $3.4 million to purchase the 

same type of equipment for Ukrainian sites.

Federal Information 

System 

The Federal Information System (FIS) is a computerized management 

information system designed to track the location and movement of 

nuclear material between organizations throughout Russia. The FIS 

provides information on the quantity of nuclear material located at 

facilities that report to Rosatom. The system is centralized and automated 

to ensure that information can be received, tracked, and monitored by 

Rosatom. The development of the FIS is important to the MPC&A program 

because, prior to its development, Russian nuclear facilities generally used 

paper-based systems to track nuclear material inventories. The FIS will 

allow the Russian government to maintain an accurate and complete 

inventory of its weapons-usable nuclear material. As of fiscal year 2006, 

DOE reported that 21 organizations and facilities throughout Russia report 

to the FIS. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $29.1 

million to develop the FIS.

Regulatory 

Development

The purpose of the Regulatory Development project is to assist Russian 

regulatory and operating agencies and services in developing a sustainable 

MPC&A regulatory system for civilian nuclear materials site security and to 
Appendix IV

Additional Information on DOE’s National 

Infrastructure and Related Programs

Page 52 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

also provide assistance to regulatory agencies in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. 

The regulatory framework establishes legal requirements for MPC&A 

activities for relevant ministries, agencies, services, operating 

organizations, and facilities. DOE works with Rosatom, Rostekhnadzor—

Russia’s civilian nuclear regulatory authority, and other agencies to develop 

consistent MPC&A requirements across ministries, operating 

organizations, and facilities. In doing so, DOE aims to create incentives for 

effective MPC&A procedures and sanctions for noncompliance with 

regulations in order to foster a strong MPC&A culture and help sustain 

U.S.-funded security upgrades. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, the 

project has achieved enactment of 67 regulations, which is 35 percent of 

the total planned. In addition, DOE has worked with the Russian MOD to 

develop a comprehensive regulatory base that ensures MPC&A practices 

are implemented consistently throughout all branches and services of the 

Russian MOD. DOE spent about $27 million through fiscal year 2006 on its 

regulatory development projects. 

MPC&A Education The MPC&A Education project supports efforts in Russia to train existing 

and future MPC&A experts. The project consists of two educational degree 

programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute and one degree 

program at Tomsk Polytechnic University. The first educational degree 

program is the MPC&A Graduate Program available only at the Moscow 

Engineering Physics Institute. DOE worked with both the Moscow 

Engineering Physics Institute and Tomsk Polytechnic University to develop 

an undergraduate engineering program, focusing on more technical, handson aspects of nuclear security. For each of these degree programs, DOE 

works with the two universities to develop curriculum; identify and acquire 

training aids; develop and publish textbooks; and strengthen instructor 

skills. In addition, DOE works with the Monterey Institute of International 

Studies2

 to support the instruction of nontechnical nonproliferation 

courses at universities and high schools located outside of Moscow. 

Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $13.4 million on 

the project.

2

Founded in 1955, the Monterey Institute of International Studies is located in Monterey, 

California, with a mission of improving international understanding through education in 

languages, cross-cultural communications, and a detailed study of the complex relations 

between nations and peoples.
Appendix IV

Additional Information on DOE’s National 

Infrastructure and Related Programs

Page 53 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Material Control and 

Accounting 

Measurements

The Material Control and Accounting Measurements project provides 

support to Russia for developing a national system of reference materials 

(standards), nuclear material measurement methods, instruments, and 

infrastructure to support the accurate measurement and accounting of 

weapons-usable nuclear material at Russian facilities. Reference materials, 

measurement methods, and instruments are needed to accurately measure 

the quantity and isotopic composition of nuclear material during 

inventories and transfers for input into accountability databases. Accurate 

material control and accounting measurements are key components to any 

MPC&A system. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $10.8 

million under this project and has purchased and distributed transportable 

equipment that allows for the testing of uranium and plutonium.

MPC&A Security 

Culture

The MPC&A Security Culture project supports the overall MPC&A goal of 

assisting Russia with enhancing its capabilities and strengthening its 

commitment to operating and maintaining improved nuclear security by 

fostering the development of training centers and developing an outreach 

strategy to enhance partner countries’ awareness and understanding of 

MPC&A benefits, e.g., an MPC&A security “culture.” The main objective of 

this project is to establish an infrastructure that emphasizes the importance 

of MPC&A and increase the commitment throughout Russia to operate and 

maintain MPC&A systems with minimal U.S. support by reinforcing the 

necessary attitudes and beliefs required to instill a strong MPC&A culture. 

Accomplishments under this project include training 1,800 staff in security 

culture and initiating a pilot security culture coordinator project at nine 

sites. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $1.3 million 

on the MPC&A Security Culture project.

In addition to its efforts to improve the security culture at Russian nuclear 

sites, DOE recently conducted a series of workshops for Russian officials 

on MPC&A best practices at U.S. nuclear sites. The workshops included 

presentations by U.S. MPC&A experts. In conducting this workshop series, 

DOE intends to further enhance the security culture at Russian sites by 

working to educate Russian site officials on the methods used at U.S. 

facilities, so that these best practices can be applied at Russian sites.

Taxation and Customs The MPC&A Taxation and Customs project began in 1999 to meet a 

congressional mandate that U.S. nuclear safety and security programs not 

pay taxes in Russia. The MPC&A program must obtain a certified tax 
Appendix IV

Additional Information on DOE’s National 

Infrastructure and Related Programs

Page 54 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

exemption when providing technical equipment and services. The Taxation 

and Customs project assists DOE project teams’ understanding of taxation 

and customs issues and ensures compliance with Russian laws. The project 

stays abreast of Russian taxation and customs legislation, as well as 

guidance on bureaucracy and requirements for tax exemption, by holding 

workshops for Russian sites; tracking the tax-exemption process; and 

maintaining a taxation Web site for DOE project teams. Through the end of 

fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $0.5 million on the project.
Page 55 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Energy ApendxiV
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 56 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Appendix V

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 57 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation
Page 58 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Appendix VI

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841, or aloisee@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, R. Stockton Butler, Jeffery 

Hartnett, Lisa Henson, and Jim Shafer made significant contributions to 

this report. Other assistance was provided by John Delicath, Jennifer 

Echard, Brandon Haller, Gregory Marchand, Keith Rhodes, and Karen 

Richey.
Page 59 GAO-07-404 Nuclear Nonproliferation

Related GAO Products

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some 

DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries. GAO-05-828. Washington, 

D.C.: August 29, 2005.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and 

Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-329. Washington, D.C.: 

June 30, 2005.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better 

Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to 

Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03-482. 

Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material 

Improving; Further Enhancements Needed. GAO-01-312. Washington, 

D.C.: February 28, 2001.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear 

Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States. 

RCED/NSIAD-00-82. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May 

Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: 

April 13, 1999.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear 

Materials Controls in Newly Independent States. NSIAD/RCED-96-89. 

Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.

Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. 

Dismantlement Assistance. NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 

1993.

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