alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Vincent Salmeri, Respondent, v Beth Israel Medical Center-Kings Highway Division, et al., Appellants. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[834 NYS2d 314]—

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendants separately appeal, as limited by their briefs, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Steinhardt, J.), dated April 20, 2006, as, upon a jury verdict on the issues of liability and damages finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff sustained damages in the principal sums of $320,000 for past pain and suffering and $1,500,000 for future pain and suffering, and upon the denial of their motions pursuant to CPLR 4401 and 4404 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint or, alternatively, pursuant to CPLR 4404 to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence and for a new trial, is in favor of the plaintiff and against them in the principal sum of $1,820,000.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

To establish a prima facie case of liability in a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant deviated from accepted practice and that such deviation proximately caused his injuries *(see Thompson v Orner,*36 AD3d 791 [2007]; *Anderson v Lamaute,*306 AD2d 232, 233 [2003]; *Prete v Rafla-Demetrious,*224 AD2d 674, 675 [1996]). To meet this burden, a plaintiff ordinarily presents expert testimony showing that the defendant’s conduct deviated from the requisite standard of care *(see Texter v Middletown Dialysis Ctr., Inc.,*22 AD3d 831 [2005]). Here, there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict finding that the defendant physicians deviated from accepted practice in their assessment, treatment, and care of the plaintiffs acute perforated diverticulum, and that such deviation proximately caused his injuries *(see Cohen v Hallmark*
      *842
      *Cards,*45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]; *Nicastro v Park,*113 AD 2d 129, 132 [1985]; *see also Fellin v Sahgal,*35 AD3d 800 [2006]; *Szczerbiak v Pilat,*90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]).

Moreover, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Where both the plaintiff and the defendants presented expert testimony in support of their respective positions, it was the province of the jury to determine the experts’ credibility *(see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, Inc., supra*at 498-499; *Fellin v Sahgal, supra; Texter v Middletown Dialysis Ctr., Inc., supra*at 832; *Wong v Tang,*2 AD3d 840 [2003]; *Velez v Policastro,*1 AD3d 429, 431 [2003]; *Nicastro v Park, supra*at 133-134).

The award of damages for the plaintiffs future pain and suffering did not deviate materially from what would be considered reasonable compensation *(see*CPLR 5501 [c]; *Wisholek v Douglas,*280 AD2d 220, 224 [2001], *revd on other grounds*97 NY2d 740 [2002]; *Krueger v Frisenda,*218 AD2d 685 [1995]).

The defendants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Schmidt, J.E, Mastro, Garni and Dickerson, JJ., concur.
### SUBCHAPTER III—ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION
### §390dd. Limitation on ownership

Except as provided in section 390ii of this title, irrigation water may not be delivered to—

(1) a qualified recipient for use in the irrigation of lands owned by such qualified recipient in excess of nine hundred and sixty acres of class I lands or the equivalent thereof; or

(2) a limited recipient for the use in the irrigation of lands owned by such limited recipient in excess of six hundred and forty acres of class I lands or the equivalent thereof;

whether situated in one or more districts.

(Pub. L. 97–293, title II, §204, Oct. 12, 1982, 96 Stat. 1265.)
#### In the Matter of Angelo Lorenzo, Respondent, v Michael J. Codd, as Police Commissioner of the City of New York, et al., Appellants.

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County, entered June 8, 1977, granting the petition in this article 78 proceeding to the extent of reducing the *919penalty to a 15-day suspension, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, vacated, and the determination of respondent police commissioner dated October 30, 1975 confirmed in its entirety. The punishment imposed was not so disproportionate to the offense to shock one’s sense of fairness so as to warrant adjustment by the court of the agency’s sanction. (See *Matter of Pell v Board of Educ.,*34 NY2d 222; *Matter of Marksamer v*Guggenheimer; 43 NY2d 857.) Concur—Murphy, P. J., Lupiano, Silverman, Markewich and Sandler, JJ.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NOS. WR-91,806-01; WR-91,806-02

EX PARTE JAMES ALLEN JACKSON, Applicant

ON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NOS. CR1607300 & CR1607301 IN THE 273 DISTRICT COURT

RD

FROM SABINE COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Applicant was convicted of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child and sentenced to life

imprisonment for both cause numbers. The SixthCourt of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Jackson v.

State, 06-18-00054-CR & 06-18-00055-CR)(Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 27, 2018)(not designated

for publication). Applicantfiled these applications for writs of habeas corpus in the county of conviction,

and the district clerk forwarded them this Court. See TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.

Applicant contends, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to raise

insufficient evidence, failing to object to evidence and prosecutor’s comments, failing to request extra
2

peremptorychallenges, makinganobjectionable comment, and openingthe doorto inadmissible evidence. 

Applicant also alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of insufficient

evidence on appeal. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v .

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court is the

appropriate forum for findings of fact. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall

order both trialand appellate counselto respond to Applicant’s claims. In developing the record, the trial

court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). It appears that Applicant is represented by

counsel. If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, itshalldetermine ifApplicant isrepresented bycounsel,

and if not, whether Applicant is indigent. IfApplicant isindigent and wishesto be represented by counsel,

the trialcourtshallappoint an attorney to represent Applicant at the hearing. TEX.CODECRIM.PROC. art.

26.04.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether trial counsel’s or

appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and Applicant was prejudiced. The trial court may make

any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant’s claims.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date

of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court’s findings and

conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions,

objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcriptsfromhearings and depositions. See

TEX.R.APP.P.73.4(b)(4). Anyextensions oftime must be requested by the trialcourt and obtained from

this Court.
3

Filed:October 21, 2020

Do not publish
#### (A) Government of the Argentine Republic et al. v. Gaylen Machinery Corporation. (B) Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v. Marshall Goldman et al. (C) In the Matter of B. Cole Estate, Inc. v. Robert E. Herman, as State Rent Administrator.

[In each action] Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with $10 costs, unless the appellant procures the record on appeal and appellant’s points to be served and filed on or before February 28, 1961, *897with notice of argument for the April 1961 Term of this court, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, McNally, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

PrimePay, Inc. 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

First Tax Service, Inc. 

 Defendant. 

Case No. C 09 02775-JF/HRL 

CONSENT JUDGMENT

 WHEREAS PrimePay Inc., has brought this action against First Tax Service, Inc. for 

copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, trademark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 

1114; unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); and unfair business practice arising 

under California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; and 

 WHEREAS Defendant First Tax Service, Inc., having executed a related Settlement 

Agreement, now wishes to resolve and settle this action. 

 It is hereby ordered and decreed that: 

First Tax Service, Inc. and its associates, affiliates, subsidiaries, and all those entities 

or individuals acting in concert with it, including its directors and officers, are herby enjoined 

from any use of PrimePay, Inc.'s name, any of its trademarks including any trademark that is 

RS

AS MODIFIED BY THE 

COURT

*E-Filed 

04/02/2010*

Case 3:09-cv-02775-RS Document 25 Filed 04/02/10 Page 1 of 2
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Young & Thompson 209 Madison St., Suite 500 

Alexandria, AV 22314 

(703) 521-2297 

likely to cause confusion with its trademarks, its designs, and its copyrighted literature and/or 

marketing materials and texts, whether or not registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. 

SO ORDERED 

Dated: 

 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: April 1, 2010 

 By: ___/s/ Jeffrey M. Goehring _______________ 

Jeffrey M. Goehring (CA SBN: 233002) 

 YOUNG & THOMPSON 

 

 Attorney for Plaintiff PrimePay, Inc. 

Dated: April 2, 2010 

 

 

 By: /s/ James J. Steinle 

 James J. Steinle (CA SBN: 237291) 

 Law Offices of Teresa T.H. Nguyen 

 

 Attorney for Defendant First Tax Service, Inc. 

*

* On or before June 27, 2010, the parties shall submit a status update as to the stipulated 

deferred payment.

04/02/2010

Case 3:09-cv-02775-RS Document 25 Filed 04/02/10 Page 2 of 2
(February 3, 1961)

#### In the Matter of Arthur M. Cromarty, Individually and as a Member of the Board of Supervisors of Suffolk County, Respondent, v. William Leonard, as Presiding Officer of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Suffolk, et al., Appellants, and David Zaron, as Secretary of the Civil Service Commission of the County of Suffolk, et al., Respondents.

Motion to add appeal to the February Term Calendar, denied. The appeal is ordered on the calendar for the March Term, commencing February 27, 1961. Appellants are directed to file and serve their brief and the record on or before February 15, 1961. Nolan, P. J., Kleinfeld, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3219 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3219

              To reduce temporarily the duty on Cyhalofop.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 12, 2005

  Mr. Buyer introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
              To reduce temporarily the duty on Cyhalofop.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CYHALOFOP.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.02.86 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to propanoic acid) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``Free'' and inserting ``1.5%''; and
            (2) by striking ``12/31/2006'' and inserting ``12/31/
        2008''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
### §1002. Definitions

As used in this chapter, the term—

(1) "bankruptcy court" means the court having jurisdiction over the reorganization of the Rock Island Railroad;

(2) "Board" means the Railroad Retirement Board;

(3) "Commission" means the Interstate Commerce Commission;

(4) "employee" includes any employee of the Rock Island Railroad as of August 1, 1979, but does not include any individual serving as president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, comptroller, counsel, member of the board of directors, or any other person performing such functions;

(5) the term "Rock Island Railroad" means the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company, the estate of such Company in its reorganization proceeding, or the trustee appointed in such proceeding; and

(6) the term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Transportation.

(Pub. L. 96–254, title I, §103, May 30, 1980, 94 Stat. 399; Pub. L. 96–448, title VII, §701(b)(3), Oct. 14, 1980, 94 Stat. 1960.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this title", meaning title I (§101 et seq.) of Pub. L. 96–254, May 30, 1980, 94 Stat. 399, known as the Rock Island Railroad Transition and Employee Assistance Act, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of title I to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1001 of this title and Tables.

#### Amendments

1980—Par. (5). Pub. L. 96–448 inserted ", the estate of such Company in its reorganization proceeding, or the trustee appointed in such proceeding" after "Railroad Company". The amendment was executed by inserting amendatory text preceding the semicolon instead of the period at end of par. (5) as directed to reflect the probable intent of Congress, in view of par. (5) being enacted without a closing period.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1980 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 96–448 effective Oct. 14, 1980, see section 710(d) of Pub. L. 96–448, set out as a note under section 1170 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.

#### Abolition of Interstate Commerce Commission and Transfer of Functions

Interstate Commerce Commission abolished and functions of Commission transferred, except as otherwise provided in Pub. L. 104–88, to Surface Transportation Board effective Jan. 1, 1996, by section 1302 of Title 49, Transportation, and section 101 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of Title 49. References to Interstate Commerce Commission deemed to refer to Surface Transportation Board, a member or employee of the Board, or Secretary of Transportation, as appropriate, see section 205 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as a note under section 1301 of Title 49.
### §703a. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, Pub. L. 90–132, title II, Nov. 8, 1967, 81 Stat. 404, which provided for approval by Secretary of any State plan which provided standards for professional obstetrical services in accordance with the laws of the State, was not repeated in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1969. Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:

Nov. 7, 1966, Pub. L. 87–787, title II, 80 Stat. 1397.

Aug. 31, 1965, Pub. L. 89–156, title II, 79 Stat. 605.

Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. 88–605, title II, 78 Stat. 976.

Oct. 11, 1963, Pub. L. 88–136, title II, 77 Stat. 240.

Aug. 14, 1962, Pub. L. 87–582, title II, 76 Stat. 376.

Sept. 22, 1961, Pub. L. 87–290, title II, 75 Stat. 605.

Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. 86–703, title II, 74 Stat. 770.

Aug. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86–158, title II, 73 Stat. 353.

Aug. 1, 1958, Pub. L. 85–580, title II, 72 Stat. 472.

June 29, 1957, Pub. L. 85–67, title II, 71 Stat. 222.

June 29, 1956, ch. 477, title II, 70 Stat. 434.

Aug. 1, 1955, ch. 437, title II, 69 Stat. 408.

July 2, 1954, ch. 457, title II, 68 Stat. 444.

July 31, 1953, ch. 296, title II, 67 Stat. 255.

July 5, 1952, ch. 575, title II, 66 Stat. 368.

Aug. 31, 1951, ch. 373, title II, 65 Stat. 219.

Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, ch. V, title II, 64 Stat. 653.

June 29, 1949, ch. 275, title II, 63 Stat. 284.

June 16, 1948, ch. 472, title I, 62 Stat. 447.

July 8, 1947, ch. 210, title II, 61 Stat. 273.

July 26, 1946, title I, 60 Stat. 681.

July 3, 1945, ch. 263, title I, 59 Stat. 363.
Case 3:09-cv-01952-SI Document 24 Filed 02/16/10 Page 1 of 3
March 26, 2010

3 p.m.

Case 3:09-cv-01952-SI Document 24 Filed 02/16/10 Page 2 of 3
Case 3:09-cv-01952-SI Document 24 Filed 02/16/10 Page 3 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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G:\JLALL\CASES\CIVIL\09-1225\90daydismissal.wpd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Blessing U. Ahuruonye,

Plaintiff,

v.

Patelco Credit Union, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 09 -1225 JL

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The parties hereto, by their counsel, having advised the court that they have agreed

to a settlement of this cause, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this cause of action be

dismissed with prejudice; provided, however that if any party hereto shall certify to this

court, within ninety days, with proof of service thereof, that the agreed consideration for

said settlement has not been delivered over, the foregoing order shall stand vacated and

this cause shall forthwith be restored to the calendar to be set for trial.

DATED: July 28, 2010

__________________________________

 James Larson

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01225-JL Document 44 Filed 07/28/10 Page 1 of 1
### §1161. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 1161 was editorially reclassified as section 2501 of this title.
### §6805. Grants for State consumer protection offices by Secretary

#### (a) Establishment, operation, and purpose; qualifications for funds

The Secretary may make grants to States, or otherwise as provided in subsection (c), under this section to provide for the establishment and operation of offices of consumer services to assist consumers in their presentations before utility regulatory commissions. Any assistance provided under this section shall be provided only for an office of consumer services which is operated independently of any such utility regulatory commission and which is empowered to—

(1) make general factual assessments of the impact of proposed rate changes and other proposed regulatory actions upon all affected consumers;

(2) assist consumers in the presentation of their positions before utility regulatory commissions; and

(3) advocate, on its own behalf, a position which it determines represents the position most advantageous to consumers, taking into account developments in rate design reform.

#### (b) Grants subject to State assurances on funds

Grants pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be made only to States which furnish such assurances as the Secretary may require that funds made available under such section will be in addition to, and not in substitution for, funds made available to offices of consumer services from other sources.

#### (c) Offices established by Tennessee Valley Authority

Assistance may be provided under this section to an office of consumer services established by the Tennessee Valley Authority, if such office is operated independently of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

(Pub. L. 94–385, title II, §205, Aug. 14, 1976, 90 Stat. 1144; Pub. L. 95–617, title I, §143, Nov. 9, 1978, 92 Stat. 3134.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1978—Subsecs. (a), (b). Pub. L. 95–617 substituted "Secretary" for "Administrator", meaning Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration.
§ 570.426 Program income. ( a ) The provisions of § 570.504(b) apply to all program income generated by a specific grant and received prior to grant closeout.
( b ) If the unit of general local government has another ongoing CDBG grant at the time of closeout, the program income will be considered to be program income of the ongoing grant. The grantee can choose which grant to credit the program income to if it has multiple open CDBG grants.
( c ) If the unit of general local government has no open ongoing CDBG grant at the time of closeout, program income of the unit of general local government or its subrecipients which amounts to less than $25,000 per year will not be considered to be program income unless needed to repay a Section 108 guaranteed loan. When more than $25,000 of program income is generated from one or more closed out grants in a year after closeout, the entire amount of the program income is subject to the requirements of this part. This will be a subject of the closeout agreement described in § 570.509(c).
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

July 6 , 2018 

# Order

Clerk July 6 , 2018

156161(66)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellant/

Cross

- Appellee,

SC: 156161

v COA: 331594

Wayne CC: 12

- 007733

- FH

WILBERT JOSEPH McKEEVER,

Defendant

- Appellee/

Cross

- Appellant.

____________________________________ _ _/

On order of the C hief Justice , the motion of defendant

- appellee/cross

- appellant to

extend the time for filing his supplemental brief is GRANTED. The supplemental brief

will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before August 9, 2018.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VALERIE ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KAISER PERMANENTE

INTERNATIONAL, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-01270 JSW

ORDER REMANDING ACTION

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint stating only state law claims. A district court may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in a case arising from a common nucleus of

operative fact where, inter alia, it has dismissed the federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In

order to make this determination, courts should consider factors such as “economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.

1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When “federal-law claims are eliminated

before trial, the balance of factors to be considered ... will point toward declining to exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 n.7 (1988), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 

In this case, it would be equally convenient for the parties to try the remaining claims in

state court, where this case originated. The Court concludes that principles of comity,

convenience, and judicial economy weigh against retaining supplemental jurisdiction in this

Case 3:09-cv-01270-JSW Document 94 Filed 07/13/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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case and, therefore, it shall remand this case to the Alameda County Superior Court.

Accordingly, this matter is HEREBY REMANDED to Alameda County Superior Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-01270-JSW Document 94 Filed 07/13/10 Page 2 of 2