### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma rc h 6, 200 7

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. CA RLO S BU SH
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 04-04780 Chris Craft, Judge

No. W2005-02479-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Novem ber 29, 2007

Ap pe lla nt, Carl os B us h, wa s c on vic te d b y a jur y of on e cou nt o f a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry . A s a

re su lt, Appellant wa s sentence d to serve f ifteen y ear s in incarc eration as a Rang e I Imultipl e off ender . After the denial of

a motion for new

trial and a

timely notice of appea l, Appellant presents the following issues for our revie w: (1) whether the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the conviction; (2) whe ther the ph oto g ra

ph ic lin e up wa s und

uly su g g e sti ve ; ( 3) wh e the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in a llo wi nga

wi tne ss to testify reg arding Appellant’s prior incar cer ation; ( 4) whether the trial cour

t improperly

admitted hear say testimony ; (5) whether the trial court imprope rly ref used to g rant a

rec ess to allow Appellant to p re pa re c ur a tiv e me a sure s f

or a lle g e d ev ide nti ary e rr or s; an d ( 6) wh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

imp ro pe rl y enhanc ed Appellant’s sentenc e by applying an enhanc ement fac tor that was not de termined by a jury in violation of Blakely

v. W ashington , 5 4 2 U. S

. 296 (2004). We dete rmine that the e vidence was sufficie nt to support the conviction, that the photog raphic lineup was proper a nd that the trial cour

t did not improperly admit hear say or statements a

bout Appellant’s prior inc arc eration. W ith reg ard to Appellant’s s en t en ce , we determine that re view of the issue is not necessa ry to do substantial justice, and c onsequently , that no plain err or was committed on the part of the trial court. F urther, the application of enh an ce m en t fac tors (1) a nd (16) justified the e nhance ment of Appe llant’s sentenc e fr om twelve y ear s to fifteen y ear s. Acc ording ly , the j udg ment of t he trial court is af firmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H AYES , and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Edwar d P. Bronston, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Carlos B ush.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y G e n e r a l a n d Re po rt e r; Re ne e W. T ur

ne r, As sis tant A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L

. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Robert Carter and Dea n DeCandia , As s i s tant District Attorney s Gene ral,for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

Factual Back

ground

Sometime late in the evening of Fe bruar y 18 or ear ly in the morning of F ebrua ry 19, 2004, the victim, J esus Morale s, was re turning home to hi s ap artment in Memphis . The victim had
wo rk e d a ll d ay , th e n w e nt to play po ol b e fo re re tur

nin g to h is a

pa rtme nt. As the vic timdr ov e int o the pa rk inglot a t hi s a pa rtmen t, he had

to d ri ve aro un d to loo k f

or a pa rk ingsp a c e . T he vic tim
no tic e d a da rk -c olo re d SU V d

ri vin g be hin d h im a

nd a ssume d that th e dr ive r o f t he SUVwa s a lso looking for a place to park. The victim finally found a parkingspace , pulled his car into the spot and tur ne d of f the e ng ine

. At that tim e , he sa w the SUVa

bo ut t we lve fe e t be hin d h is c ar. Th e vic tim saw two Af

rica n-Amer ican men a

pproac h his car throug h the rear- view mi rror

. One of the men had a g un. The man w ith the gun w as “r eal he avy .” The other man w as “skinny , tall.” The gunman c a me to t he dr ive r’ s si de of the c ar, po int e d the g un a t the vic tim and de mand e d mon e y . T he vic tim tol d the man tha t he did no t hav e any mon e y

. Th e g un man ag a in de mand e d mo ne y , a nd the vic tim ag ain insisted that he did not have any money

. The victim was afra id that the two men wer e g oing to kill hi m, so he tried to wre stle the g un awa y from the he avy

man. I n the meantime, the othe r attacke r had opened the passeng er- side door t o the vi ctim’s car and had g otten inside. During the tu s s l e f o r t h e g u n , b o t h t h e g u n m an an d t h e o t h e r a t t a c k e r h i t t h e v i c t i m i nt h e h e a d

. T h e “ s k i n n y, tall” man took the victim’s wallet f rom his pocket. The victim beg g ed the man t o take the mone y but leave his “paper s.” Acc ording to the vi ctim, the m an took the m oney and his paper s; then the g unman threwthe wallet a way . The wa llet contained a pproxi mately

$200 in cash, the vic tim’s immigration card a

nd the victim’s driver’ s license.

After the two men lef

t, the victim called the police

. The police ar rived to proc ess the sce ne, and the victim wa s transporte d to the hospital for treatment for the injuries he sustained during the robber y

. Serg eant Da

vid Ay ers was assig ned to the ca se as the inve stigator. Duringthe cour se of the inv e sti gati on , L a Cur

tis Wal le r w a s arr e ste d a s a su sp e c t in

the ro bb e ry . M r. Wal le r a dmi tte d h is p art i c i p a t i o ni nt h e r o b b e r y an d i mp l i c a t e d

A p p e l l an ta s t h e o t h e r

p e r s o n i n v o l v e d

i nt h e r o b b e r

y. At that time, Ser g eant Ay ers c reated two photog raphic lineups - one c ontaining A ppellant’s picture along with f

ive other individuals a

nd one containing Mr. Waller’s picture along wi t h fi v e o t h er individuals. The photogr aphic lineups we re shown to the victim by Serg eant Rober

t Schogg ins, who is fluent in Spanish, the victim’s prefe rre d lang uag e. The victim identifie d both Appellant and Mr. Waller as the pe rpetrators of the c rime.

At tr ia l, M r. Wal le r t e sti fi e d th a t he ple d guil ty to the ro bb e ry of the vic tim . A c c or din g to Mr. Waller, Appe llant came to his house a nd asked if he wante d to “make a littl e sting .” Mr. Waller stated that a “ sting” was a

slang term for a robbery

. Mr. W aller told Appellant he was not intere sted,-3-

but Appellant per sisted. Mr. Waller finally ag ree d to go w ith Appellant. Mr. Waller testified a bout his participation in the robbe ry . Mr. Waller stated that he : [J ]um ped o u t o f t h e p as seng er’ s side of the truc k and we nt up to the car and I had tol d [th e vic tim ] to g ive me his mon e y and e ve ry thi ng

. Yo u k

no w, he wo uld

n’ t c ome out, he wouldn’t g ive it to m e. So I g uess he wa s taking too long, [Appellant] had g ot out too, came to the driver’s si de. And the guy g rabbe d the g un when he g rabbe d my - - he g ra bb e d my g un , y ou kn ow , he c a me aro un d a

nd g ot t he - - [Ap pe lla

nt] h it the dude and went in his pockets to g et his stuff out be cause he wasn’t coming out of it, he wa sn’t g oing to g ive up his wallet. He had bee n drinking , Ig uess. He w as drunk. He wasn’t g oing to c ome - - he wasn’t c oming out of his pocke t.
So [App e lla

nt] c a me aro un d a

nd re a c he d, lik e re a c he d o ve r and was g oin g in h is po c ke t and

Iha d s natc he d th e g un . Se e , I ra n a nd g ot i n th e tr

uc k. Iwa s te lli nghim , like, come on, let’s forge t it, man, y ou know what I ’m saying, he wasn’t c oming on down, I wasn’t f ix ing to - - l ike i t was going to esca late int o something more than a robber y , so Ijust ran and g ot in the truck, told him to come on.

Mr . Wa lle r s ta te d th a t App e lla nt:
[J ]um ped out of the truc k when [the victim] g rabbe d the gu n - - whe n he see n the dude wa sn’t coming out, he had g rabbe d my g un, he jumped out of the truc k, he
came to assist me. Came around, like jumped in the path - - like in betwee n us. Ihad the door ope n. Ihad pulled the door open. [Appellant] [k] ind of squeezed in. L ike in b e tw e e n us , sn a tc he d th e g un , h e hit the du de , s tart e d g oin g in h is p oc ke ts b e c a us e he wasn’t c oming, he wasn’t c oming out, he w asn’t g oing to g ive his wallet up. He went in his pocket and I went to the - - ran to the truck, told him to c o m e o n , l et’s roll, man.

Mr . Wa lle r s aw A

pp e lla nt t a ke a wa lle t, a sw itc hb la de and

a li tt le go ld n e c kla c e fr om t he vic tim

. Ap pe lla nt d id n ot o ff

e r a ny pr oo f at tr ia l.

At the conclusion of the proof, the jury found Appellant g uilty of ag g ravated robber y . After

a se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt se nte nc e d App e lla

nt t o f if te e n y e ars a s a

Rang e I Imul tip le offe nder. Appellant filed a mot ion for new t rial. After a hearing , the t rial cour t denied the motion for ne w trial. Appe llant filed a timely notice of ap p ea l. On appea l, Appellant ar g ues: (1) the evidenc e is insufficient to support th e c o nv ic ti o n; (2) the photog raphic lineup was unduly sug g estive; (3) the tr ial court e rre d in a llowing a witness to te stify reg arding Appellant’s prior inca rce ration; (4) the trial cour

t improperly

admitted hear say

testimony ; (5) the tria l court improper ly ref used to g rant
a re cess to allow Appe llant to prepar e cur ative mea sures for evidentiar y err ors; and (6) the trial court improperly

en h an ce d Appellant’s se ntence by applying a

n enhanc ement fa ctor that wa s not deter mined by a jury in violation of Blakely

v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004).-4- An aly sis
Suppression of Photographic Li ne-up

On a pp eal , App e lla

nt c on te nd s th a t th e “ pr e -t ri a l ph oto g ra

ph ic lin e -u

p w a s im pe rm iss ibl y sug g estive.” Spec ifically , Appellant ar g ues that t he poli ce showed the victim a “ single picture” and that the use of a

“sing le picture violated h i s d u e p ro ce ss rig hts and the identification testim ony sh ou ld h a ve be e n e xclu de d. ” I n th e a lte rn a tiv e , App e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e ide nti fi cat io n p ro c e ss violated his due proc ess rig hts beca use there wer e dis cr ep an ci es in the testimony reg ardingthe pr oc e ss b y

wh ic h th e vic timide nti fi e d App e lla nt. I n th a t r e g ard , App e lla nt a rgue s th a t th e vic tim te sti fi e d h e vie we d th e ph oto g ra ph ic lin e -u

ps a t th e Cr imi na l Just ic e Ce nte r wh e n the fo rm s in dic a te that the vi ctim viewed the photog raphic line-ups at a dif fer ent location. F urther, A ppellant ar g ues that th e po lic e of

fi c e r te sti fi e d tha t the vic timvie we d b oth of the ph oto g ra

ph ic lin e -u

ps on the same day , but that notations on the photogra phic line-ups themselve s indic ate they wer e viewe d on separ ate da

y s. The State ar g ues that Appe llant has waive d his rig ht to raise this issue on appe al for fa ilure to f

ile a mot ion to s up pr e ss t

he ph oto g ra

ph ic lin e -u

p p ri or to t ri a l and by fa ili ngto o bje c t to the int ro du c tio n o f t

he te sti mony a t tr ia l. Mo re ov e r, the State argue s, the iss ue ha s n o me ri t be c a us e the testimony

indicates that the vic tim was shown a photog raphic lineup, not one photog raph.

The re cord doe s not contain a motion to suppress the photogr aphic line-up. F urthermor e, the transcr ipt of the trial does not indicate that counsel for Appe llant objected to the introduc tion of the identification testimony

or ph o t o graphic line-up at trial. Te nnessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 (b )( 2) (C ) s ta te s th a t mo tio ns to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e “ mus t” be ra ise d p ri or to t ri a l. A c c or din g to Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 12 (f

), “ [u]nl e ss the c ourt

g ra nts re lie f f

or g oo d c a us e , a pa rt y waives a ny defe nse, objection, or reque st by failing to comply

with: (1) rules r equiring such matters to be ra ised pretr ial . . . .” More over, Te nnessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a ) states that “[n] othing in this rule shall be c onstrued as requiring relief be g rante d to a par ty responsible for

an err or or who failed to take whateve r ac tion was rea sonably available to preve nt or nullify the har mful
e ff e c t of an e rr or .” Th e fa ilure to o bje c t, r e qu e st a cu rat iv e in stru c tio n o r m ov e fo r a mis tr ia l is ty pically g rou n d s fo r wa iver of a

n issue on appea l. State v. W alker , 910 S.W .2d 381, 386 (Tenn. 1995). “When a

party does not object to the a dmiss ibilit y of evide nce, the evidenc e bec omes admissible notwithstanding any other Rule of Evidence to the contra ry , and the jury

may consider that evidenc e for

its ‘natural probative eff ects a s if it were in law admi s s i b l e.’” Sta te v . S mi th , 24 S

. W

. 3 d 2 7 4 , 2 8 0 (T en n

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( qu o t i n g State v. Harrington , 627 S.W .2d 345, 348 (Tenn. 1981) ). Consequently , beca

use Appe llant failed to file a motion to s uppress the photog raphic line-up prior to trial and fa iled to object to the introduction of the testimony at trial, this issue is waived.
Evidentiary I

ssues During Mr. W

aller’s Testimony
Next, Appe llant c ontends that this Court should ove rturn Appellant’s conviction bec ause the trial c o u rt i mp r o p e r ly

a ll o w e d a w it n e s s to te s ti f

y r e g ar d in g A p p e ll an t’ s p r io r in c ar c e r a ti o n. Specifica lly , Appellant challeng es testimony by Mr. Waller that Appellant “ha d just got out of the penitentiary” and te stimony by Mr. Waller that Appe llant told Mr. W aller to te ll the police that heT h e r ec or d doe s n ot c on t ai n a mot i on i n l i mi n e f i l ed by Appel l an t t o e x cl u de s u ch e v i den ce or a t r an s cr i pt of 1
a h ear i ng i n w hi ch t he t r i al cour t r ul ed on t he mat t er

. O ur rev i ew of t he r ecor d r eve al s t hat dur i ng a ben ch conf er enc e at t r i al , t h e par t i es a l l u ded t o a pr e- t r i al h ea r i n g on t h e mat t er i n w h i ch t h e t r i al cou r t pr oh i bi t ed t h e St at e’ s w i t n es s es f r om t est i f y i ng ab o ut A p p el l ant ’ s p ast cri m es, p end i ng c ri m es o r gang m em b ers hi p unl ess A p p el l ant op ened t he d o o r t o t he te stim o n y.
-5- was not with him when he c ommitt ed the r obbery

. Ap pellant ar g ues that such testimony was hear say . Appellant also a

rg ues that the testimony

violated the trial c ourt’s pre-trial ruling prohibiting testimony about Appellant’s pr ior bad a cts. Fur ther, Appe llant argues that the trial c ourt should have g rante d him a rece ss to prepa re proper curative measure s once the improper testimony was a dmitted. As a re sult of the trial court’ s actions, Appellant state s that he was prejudice d despite t he trial c ourt’s
curative instruction to t he jury . The State, on the othe r hand, submits that the admission of the testimon y wa s proper

beca use Appe llant “opene d the door to such que stioning” a nd that the trial court g ave a

proper curative instruction to the jury

. Appar ently , prior to tr ial, there was a hear ing in w hich the trial cour t prohibited the parties from introducingevidenc e or te stimony about any pending or prior c rimes committed by Appellant or Appe llant’s potential g angmembership. On direc t examination, M r. Waller testified that whe n 1 he wa s ar re ste d, he “ a dv ise d poli c e ” that App e lla nt w a s in vo lve d in

the ro bb e ry . D ur ingthe c ro ssexamination of Mr. Waller by Appellant’s c ounsel, Mr. Waller admitted that he pled g uilty to severa l counts of agg ravated robbery for concurr ent t en-y ear sentenc es. Then, Mr . Waller admitted that he attempted to re cant his orig inal story to inve stigators about Appellant’s involvment in the cr ime. At that time, Counsel for Appe llant introduced into evidenc e a le tter written by Mr. Waller that stated, “I do not k now [Appellant]. The detectives a sked me how did I g et to the apa

rtments Isaid he dropped me off f

rom my cousin’s house. They made me include him

. I don’t know hi m.” Counsel for the State did not objec t to the introduction of the letter.

On re direc t examination, M r. Waller testified that he wrote the letter whe n he wa s incar cer ated r ight be fore he ente red a g uilty plea. M r. W al l er acknow ledg ed that the letter was inconsistent with the statement implicating Appellant that Mr. Waller g ave to de tectives on the nig ht that he wa s arr ested. I n order to expl ain the inconsistency , Mr. Waller testified that at the time he g ave t h e s tatement to detec tives, he fe lt “safe ,” but at the time he w rote the le tter he did not fe el

“ s a f e

. ” M r

. Wa ll e r

c la im e d h e d id n o t f e e l s a f e b e c a u s e A p p e ll an t ur g e d h im

to “ te ll [th e p o li c e ] I
wer en’t [sic] wit h y a’ll,” w hen the robber y was commit ted. Counsel for Appe llant objected to Mr. Waller’s testimony

on the basis of hearsa

y . At that time, Mr. Waller clar ified that Appe llant made the statement, urg ing Mr . Waller to “cut [ him] loose” because Mr. W aller had “a lrea dy signe d for [hi s] t ime.” The trial court r uled as follows, “All rig ht, I ’m g oing to r ule that the stateme nts he made to the defe ndant about I ’ll say I wasn’t with y ou are not g oing to - t hey are not being offe red to show the truth of the matter

asser ted but only

to show [M r. Waller’s] state of mind.”
At that point, Counsel for the State soug ht to introduce the written statement made by Mr. Waller to de tectives in w hich he implicated Appellant in the robber y

. Counsel for Appe llant did not object to the introduction of the statement into e vidence

. Be cause this stateme nt was inconsistent with Mr. Waller’s pr i o r s t at em ent to investigators in which he c laimed that he did not know-6-

Appellant, the tria l court instructed the jury that they

sho u l d co n s i der a

ny prior inconsistent statements only

for the pur

poses of testing the wit ness’s credibility and not as substantive evide nce of the tr uth of the ma tte r a sse rt e d in

su c h s ta te me nts

.
Th e State the n a ssume d th e re dir e c t e xami natio n o f M r. Wal le r. Du ri ngthat te sti mony , w hil e explaining why

he fe lt “threatened” when he penned the handwr itten note in which he c laimed that he did not know Appellant, Mr. Waller mentioned th at Ap p ell ant “ha d just got [sic] out of the penitentiary .” Counsel for A ppellant objecte d to the statement, arguing that it violated the pretria l order prohibiting testim ony of Appe llant’s prior bad a cts. After a leng thy discussion on the matter, the tr ia l c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t he wo uld g ive the jur

y a “ c ur a tiv e ins tr

uc tio n th a t . . . th e y

c an o nly consider [the fa ct that Mr. Waller lied to investig ators bec ause he was sca red of Appellant] for the
c re dib ili ty

of [Mr . Wa lle r]” and

that c ouns e l f

or Ap pe lla nt c ou ld v oir di re the wi tne ss a bo ut h is persona l knowledg e as to Appe llant’s incar cer ation.
Counsel for Appellant asked for a rec ess at that time to “pre pare a brie f” r eg ardingcurative
measure s. The trial c ourt denied the reque st a nd offe red to g ive the jury a cur ative instruction. The tr ia l c ourt g a ve the fo llo wi ng ins tr

uc tio n be fo re the c on c lus ion of Mr . Wa lle r’ s te sti mony

and a g a in

a t th e c on c lus ion

of the tr ia l:

I f fr om the p ro o f y ou find the def endant ha s been pr eviously incar cer ated, you can consider suc h only

for the pur

pose of it’ s effect, if a

ny , on this witness’[ s] s tate of min d in makin g a state me nt. I t c ann ot b e c on sid e re d by y ou a s e vid e nc e of

his g uil t of the of fe ns e fo r w hic h h e is n owon tr ia l.

I n our view, this matter is g overne d by Tenne ssee Rule of Evidence 613, which sets out t he pr oc e dure fo r uti lizin g the pr ior state me nt o f a

wi tne ss f or imp e a c hme nt p ur

po se s. I n a

n atte mpt to impeach the testimony of Mr. Waller, counsel for Appellant introduce d a handw ritten statement as

a pr ior inc on sis te nt state me nt. I n that state me nt, Mr

. Wal le r c la ime d that he did no t kn owAp pe lla

nt. As he wa s expl aining the orig in of the statement a nd why it wa s inconsistent with the one i m p l i ca t i n g Appellant, Mr. Waller ma de the two c omments that Appellant complains about on

a pp e a l. M r. Wal le r t e sti fi e d th a t App e lla nt tol d him to “ te ll [the po lic e ] I we re n’ t [sic ] wit

h y a ’l l” and that he f

elt threatened to do so bec ause A ppellant h ad “j u s t got [ sic] out of the penitentiary .” I mpeac hment evidenc e, like any evidenc e, mus t be relevant in orde r to be a dmitted into evidence. S ta te v. Leach , 14 8 S. W.3 d 4 2, 56 (T e nn . 2 00 4) . E vid e nc e is r e le va nt i f i t ha s “ any

te nd e nc y to make th e ex i stence of any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more probable or less proba

ble than it would be without the evidenc e.” T enn. R. Evid. 401. The deter mination of rele vancy is le ft to the discretion of the trial c ourt, and this Court will not overturn a trial court’s determination i n this reg ard in the abse nce of an abuse of discre tion. State v. Forbes , 918 S.W .2d 431, 449 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

.
The rule s of evidenc e limit the introduction int o evidenc e of prior inconsistent statements of wi tne sse s. Te nn e sse e Rul e of Ev ide nc e 61 3( b) pr ov ide s:-7-

Extr ins ic e vid e nc e of

a pr ior inc on sis te nt s ta te ment by a wi tne ss i s n ot a dmi ssi ble unless the wi t n es s is affor ded an oppor tunity to expl ain or de ny

the same a

nd the opposite party

is affor ded an oppor

tunity to interrog ate the w itnes s thereon, or the interests of just i ce re quire other wise. This provision does not apply to admissions of a pa rty opponent as de fined in Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 803(1.2).

See also State v . Ree ce , 637 S.W .2d 858, 861 (Tenn. 1 9 8 2 ). Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 613(b) allows the introduction of other wi s e i nadmissible ext rinsic evidenc e for impeachme nt. State v. Ma rti n , 9 64 S.W. 2d

56 4, 56 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; se e als o S tat e v . S mi th , 24 S.W .3d 274, 280-81 (Te nn. 2000). A prior inconsistent statement introduce d for pur poses of impea chment may be conside red only on the i ssue of cre dibilit y and not as substantive evide nce. Ree ce , 637 S.W .2d at 861. When pr e se nte d w itha

pr ior inc on sis te nt s ta te me nt a

“ wi tne ss h a s se ve ra l po ssi ble re sp on se s: the wi tne ss can a dmit, deny , or not re m em b er m ak ing a ll or part of the statements.” Ne il P. C ohen, Sara h Y. She pp e ard

& Do na ld F . Pa ine , T e nn e sse e L aw of Ev ide nc e § 61 3[5][a ] ( 5th e d. 20 05 ). I f t he wi tne ss admits making the prior inconsistent statement, a ny extrinsi c pro o f of the statement would be cumulative and the ref

ore ina dmissibl e. Id . Howeve r, if the witness une quivocally admits making the prior inconsistent statement, extrinsic proof of the statement is not admissibl e. Sta te v . M ar tin , 964 S.W .2d 564, 567 (Tenn. 1998)

. Analy zing the situation he rein in the context of Rule 613, we note that in the ca se her ein, Mr. Waller fre ely admitted on cross-e x amination that he made the prior inconsistent stateme nt to police. Thus, extrins i c ev i d en ce of the prior inconsistent stateme nt would ordinarily be inadmissible. Ma rti n , 964 S.W .2d at 567. Counsel for the State cou l d h av e o b j ected to the introduction of the letter. F rom the re cord, w e have deter mined that no objection was made to the introduction of the statement. On re direc t, Mr. Waller was “ aff orded the opportunity

to expl ain” why

he made the statement. Tenn. Rule Evid. 613. Mr. Waller made the a lleg edly

offe nding c omments about which Appellant complains, “tell t hem I wer en’t [ sic] with y a’ll” and Appellant “ha d just got [sic] out of the penitentiar

y ” duringhis ex planation of the or igin of the inconsist en t statement. Counsel for Appellant, in his eff

ort to introduce e x trinsic evidenc e of a prior inconsistent statement, ope ned the door making it permissible under Te nn. R. Evid. 613 for the witness to explain why the prior inconsistent statement was made

. Thus, the witness’s complained of statements did not violate the motion in l imine.

A p p e l l an tf

u rt h e r c l a i m s t h a tt h e s t a t e m e n t , “ t e l l t h e m I w e r e n ’ t[ s i c ] w i t h y’ a l l ” w a s h e a r s a y. “‘H ear say ’ is a stateme nt, other than one made by the dec lara

nt while testify ing at the trial or hear ing, of

fer ed in evidenc e to prove the truth of the matter asser ted.” Te nn. R

. E v i d

. 8 0 1(c) . A statement ca

n be an or al or wr itten assertion. Tenn. R. Evid. 801(a) (1). A hearsay statement is not admissible unless it is shown to be admissible via an e x ception contained in the rules of e vidence or otherw ise by

law. See Tenn. R. Evid. 802.

We conclude that the statement wa s not hearsa y as it wa s n o t o ffe red f

or the truth of the mat te r a s s e rte d

. T h e tr ia l c o u rt p r o p e r ly d e te r mi n e d th a t th e s tate me n t w a s ma d e to s h ow Mr. Waller’s state of

mind at the time he wrote the letter in whic h he claimed he did not know Appellant-8-

and to e xpla in h is i nc on sis te nt s ta te me nt t o inve sti g a tor s. Th e tr ia l judg e ins tr uc te d the jur

y to t his eff ect. The statement wa s not offer ed to prove that App el l an t wa s i n v olved in the robbe ry of the vi ctim. Ev e n if

the state me nt c ou ld s ome ho w b e c on sid e re d h e ars ay , it wo uld be a dmi ssi ble pursuant to Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 803(1.2)( A), whic h provides a he arsa y exceptio n fo r a statement off

ere d ag ai n s t a p ar t y that is “the par ty ’s own stateme nt in either an individual or a repr esentative capa city .” Appe llant is not entit led to relief on this iss ue.

Curative Instruction
Appellant complains that the tria l court improper ly denied a rec ess t o allow Counsel for Appellant to pre pare curative measure s after Mr. Waller t est ified re g ardingAppellant’s pr ior incar cer ation.

After a lengthy discussion among counsel for both parties a nd the trial cour

t, the trial court g a v e t h e j u r

y a c u r a t i v e i n s t r

u c t i o n , i n f

o r m i n g t h e m o nt h e p r o p e r

u s e o f M r

. W a l l e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y. The trial c ourt’s cur ative instruction was suf ficient to counte r the potential for prejudice , and the law pr e su me s th a t ju ri e s f

oll owthe ins tr

uc tio ns that th e y

re c e ive a bs e nt c le ar a

nd c on vin c ingpr oo f t o the contrary

. Se e Sta te v . H all , 9 76 S.W. 2d

12 1, 14 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; State v. Vanzant , 659 S.W .2d 816, 819 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) . This issue is without merit.
Sufficiency of the E

videnc e Next, Appellant contends that the e vidence was insuffic ient to sustain his conviction for ag g ravated robbery

. Specifica lly , Appellant submits that the “State has fa iled to car ry its burden of proving bey ond a rea sonable doubt that he is guilty of ag g ravated robbe ry ” bec ause the “police f ound nothing a ssociated with the robber y - no g un or money

afte r the robbe ry . No prints wer e found. N o one witnessed the alleg ed ag g ravated robbe ry .” The State counter s that the victim a nd Mr. Waller both identified Appellant as being involved in the robbery and that the victim pi cked A ppellant out
o f a p h o t o g r a

p h i c l i n e
- u

p

. T h e r e f o r e , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e S t a t e , t h e r e w a s a mp l e e v i d e n c e t o su sta in the conviction.

When a def

endant c halleng es the suff iciency of t he evidence, this Court is obli g ed to re view that claim ac cording t o ce rt ain well-se ttled principles. A ver dict of g uilty , rende red by a jury and

“ a pp rov ed by th e tr ia l ju dg e , a c c re dit s th e te sti mony of the ” State ’s wi tne sse s and re so lve s a ll conflicts in the testimony in favor of

the State. State v. Cazes , 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ; Sta te v . H arris , 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992). Thus, althoug h the acc used is or igina lly cloake d with a pre sumption of innocence , the jury verdic t of guilty remove s this presumption “and r eplac es it with one of g uilt.” Sta te v . Tu gg le , 639 S.W .2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982) . Henc e, on appe al, the burden of proof r ests with the defe ndant to demonstrate the insufficienc y of the c onvicting e vidence

. Id. Th e re le va

nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ngc ourt

mus t ans we r i s w he the r a ny ratio na l tr ie r of fa c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused guilty of every element of the offense bey ond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. A pp . P. 13 (e ); Ha rri

s , 839 S.W .2d at 75. I n making this decision, we ar e to ac cord the State “the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence as we ll as all rea sonable and leg itimate infere nces that mayE f f ec t i ve J un e 7 , 2 0 0 5 , t he T en ne ssee G en era l A ssem b l y, i n re sp o nse t o t he U nit ed S t ates S up rem e C o urt case 2

o f Bl ake l y v. Was hi ngt on , 542 U

. S. 296 ( 2004) , a men ded T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 35- 102, - 210, a n d - 401 to r e flec t th e a d v iso ry n a tur e o f en h a n c e m e n t f a c to rs

. See 2 0 0 5 T e n n

. P u b

. A c ts c h

. 3 5 3 , § § 1 , 6 , 8

. T h e a m e n d m e n t,

am o ng o t her t hi ngs, rem o ved the p res um p t i ve sent ence l anguage f rom o ur S ent enci ng A ct and m and at ed only t hat t he t r i al “ cour t s hal l i mp ose a s ent enc e wi t hi n t he r ang e of puni s hment

. . . . ” C o m p a re T

. C. A. § 40- 35- 210( c) ( Su pp. 2005) wi t h T

. C

. A

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 (c) (20 0 3 ). T he l egi sl at ure als o p rovided that thi s am end m ent w o ul d a p p l y to d ef end ant s who

co m m i t t ed a cri m i nal off ense on o r af

t er June 7, 20 0 5

. 20 0 5 T enn. P ub

. A ct c h. 3 5 3 , § 1 8

. I n ad d i t i o n, i f a de f end ant

com mi t t ed a c r i mi nal of f ens e on or af

t er Ju l y 1, 198 2 a nd was s ent enc ed af t er Ju ne 7, 200 5, s uch def endan t ca n e l ect to b e se n te n c e d un d e r th e se p ro v isio n s b y e x e c u ting a w a ive r o f t h e ir e x p o st fac to p ro te c tio n s. I d. A p p e llan t he re in

com mi t t ed t he of

f ens es on Febr uar y 18 o r 19 of 20 04 and was s ent enc ed on A ug us t 9, 20 05

. T her e i s no wai ver ex ecu t ed b y A p p e llan t i n the re c o rd he re in. T h u s, the a m e n d m e n ts to the S e n te n c ing A c t d o no t ap p ly t o A p p e llan t.

-9- be draw n there from.” See Tug gle , 6 39 S.W .2d at 914. As such, this Court is preclude d from
rew eig hing or rec onsidering the evidence when evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morgan , 92 9 S. W.2 d 3 80 , 3 83 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Sta te v . M att he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Moreove r, we may not substit ute o u r own “ infere nces f or those dra

wn by the tr ie r o f f a c t f r o m c ir c u ms ta

n ti a l e v id ence .” Matt

he ws , 805 S.W .2d at 779. Fur ther, que stions of witness cre dibilit y , the weig ht and value of evidence, and resolution of conf licts in the evidence are entrusted to the trie r of f

act. State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)

. Appellant wa s convicted of ag g ravated robbe ry . Pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-13-401, robbe ry is defined a s “the intentional or knowingtheft of property from the pe rson of a nother by violence or pu tting th e per so n in

fe ar. ” Ag g ra

vate d r ob be ry

is r ob be ry

that is “ a c c omp lis he d w itha de a dly
we a po n or by dis pla

y of any art ic le us e d o r f

a sh ion e d to le a d th e vic timto r e a so na bly be lie ve it t o be a de adly

wea pon.” T.C.A. § 39-13- 402.
At the outset, we a cknowledg e that it is w ell-settled that the identification of a def endant a s the per petrator of the c rime is a question of f act f or the jury

to determine. State v. Strickland , 885 S.W .2d 85, 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . Viewingthe evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the State, when the police interviewe d Mr. Waller, he implicated Appellant as a participa nt in the robbery . The vic timma de a

po sit ive ide nti fi c a tio n o f A pp e lla nt f ro m a ph oto g ra ph ic lin e up . T he vic tima g a in p o s it iv e ly id e n ti f ie d A p p e ll an t at t

r ia l a n d te s ti f ie d th a t A p p e ll an t r o b b e d

h im with a gun

. We deter mine that the proof offe red at trial was more than suffic ient to support Appellant’s convic tion for a g g ravated robbe ry . Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Sentenc ing

L a s t l y, A p p e l l an tc o m p l a i n s t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rte r r e d i ns e n t e n c i n g h i m

. S p e c i f i c a l l y, Appellant ar g ues that the trial c ourt improperly enhanc ed his sentenc e bec ause it dete rmined that he
was a leade r in the commission of the offe nse. I n that reg ard, Appellant argues t hat t he trial c ourt 2

err ed bec ause it “imposed a sentenc e enha

n ce m en t fo r facts that wer e not deter mined by a jury bey ond a re asonable doubt.” Fur ther, Appellant argues that the trial c ourt “e rre d as a matter of law-10-

by sentenc ing A

ppellant in excess of the maximum authorized by the fa cts which we re e stablished be y on d a re a so na

ble do ub t.” Th e State , on the oth e r ha nd , a rgue s that the tr ia l c ou rt pro pe rl y sentenc ed Appe llant.

Rece ntly , in response to Cun nin gh am v . Ca lif or nia , 549 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct . 856 (2007), the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court iss ue d a n o pin ion on re mand fr om t he Un ited State s Su pr e me Court

in State v. Gome

z , N o. M2 00 2- 01 20 9- SC- R11 -C D,

__ _ S.W.3 d ___ , 200 7 WL 29 17 72 6 ( Te nn . O c t. 9 , 2 007) (“ Go mez II

”) that affe cts our re view of the application of e nhance ment fac tors to a defe ndant’s sente nce. O n initial review of the issues in State v. Gome z , 163 S.W .3d 632, 650 (Tenn. 2005) (“ Go me

z I ”), w hich was filed on April 15, 2005, the cour t concluded that the defe ndants wer e lim ite d to pla in e rr or

re vie w o f t

he ir se nte nc ing c la ims re g ard ing the Sixth Ame ndme nt due to t he ir failure to pr eser

ve the issues for ple nary

revie w. I n Gomez I

I , the cour t adher ed to their de cision that the def endants ha d waived ple nary appellate revie w of their sentenc ing claims, but determined that in light of the C u n ningham decision, a tria l court’s e nhance ment of a de fenda nt’s sentenc e on the basis of judicially

deter mined facts other than the de fenda nt’s prior convic tions viol ates the defe ndant’s constitutional rig hts under the Six th Amendment t o the United States Constitut ion. Gomez , ___ S.W .3d ___, 2007 WL 2917726, at *6.

I n th e c a se he re in, Ap pe lla nt’ s se nte nc inghe ari ngwa s h e ld o n A ugus t 8, 2005 , a nd his motion for new tria l was filed on September 6, 2005, both after the filing of the Go me

z I opinion. Ap pe lla nt r a ise d th e c ha lle ng e to h is s e nte nc e ba se d o n th e Sixth A me ndme nt f or the fi rs t ti me in his moti on for ne w trial. In Go me z I , the cour t determined that the issue was wa ived because the de fe nd ants “ did

no t r a ise thi s c on sti tut ion a l c ha lle nge at th eir

. . . se nte nc inghe ari ngor in t he ir motions for new trial, nor did they raise it in the C ourt of Criminal Appea ls.” Gomez , 163 S.W .3d at 648. After

the re lease of the c ourt’s opinion in Gomez I
, thi s Cour

t det e rm ine d tha t a fa ilure to raise the Six th Amendment cha lleng e to a sentenc e at the se ntencinghear ing r esults in a waiver of the issue for ple nary

revie w. See, e .g. , State v. Mic key Lee W illiams , No. E2004-01617- CCA-R3- CD, 2005 WL 2240736, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Sept. 15, 2005), perm. app. de nied , (T e nn . F e b. 21 , 2 00 6) ; State v. Karl Blake , No. M 2004-02731-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL2205877, at *5 (T e nn . Crim . App ., a t Na sh vil le , Sep t. 8 , 2 00 5) ; State v. Billy R. Shelley , No. E2004-00145- CCAR3-CD, 2005 WL 1798637, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvil le, J ul. 29, 2005), perm. app. de nied , (Tenn. D ec. 19, 2005)

. This Court may , in an exercise of its discretion, consider a n issue which has be en wa ived. Howe v er , in order f

or this Court to find plain error, the err or must affe ct a substantial rig ht of the
acc used. Tenn. R. Crim. P

. 5 2 (b ). In order to reviewan issue under the plain er

ror doc trine, five fac tors must be prese nt: (1) the re cord must clea rly establish what occ urre d in the trial court; (2) a clea r and une quivocal rule of l aw must have been breac hed; (3) a subst antial rig ht of the def endant must have bee n adver sely aff ecte d; ( 4) the acc used did not waive the issue for tac tical re asons; and (5) c onsideration of the err or is nece ssary to do substantial justice. State v. Adk isson , 899 S.W .2d 62 6, 64 1 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b).A p pel l an t h er ei n wa s s en t en ce d i n Aug u s t of 2005. T

. C. A. § 40- 35- 114 wa s ame n ded i n 2005 and t he 3

en h an ce men t f

ac t or s w er e r en u mber ed. At t h e s en t en ci n g h ea r i n g , t h e t r i al cou r t re f er r ed t o t h e e n h an ce men t f ac t or s by the ir o ld d e sig n a tio n s, ( 2 ), (3 ), a n d ( 2 1 ). See T

. C

. A

. § 40- 35

- 11 4 ( 20 03 )

. I n or der t o m ai nt ai n c l ar i t y an d cons i s t enc y i n our o p i ni o ns, we wi l l ref er t o t he enhancem ent f act o rs by t he d esi gnat i o ns t hat ap p ear i n t he 2 0 0 5 am end m ent s, t he des i g n at i on s t h at w er e i n e f f ec t a t t h e t i me t h at Appel l an t w as s en t en ce d.

-11- Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proc edure makes it c lear that the plain err or rule is not a re medy to be used in ma ny situations. The intention of the rule is to serve the ends of justice. Ther efor e, it is invoked “only in exceptional circum s t an ce s [ where nec essar y ] t o avoid a miscarr iag e of jus t ice.” Adkisson , 8 9 9 S

. W

. 2 d at 6 3 9 (q u o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . G e ra ld , 624 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980)). Appe llate courts are advised to use it sparing ly in rec og nizi ng err ors that have not be en ra ised by the parties or have been waived due to a pr ocedur al def ault. Id. ; se e als o State v. Bledsoe , 226 S.W .3d 349, 354 (Tenn. 2007)

.
“B eca use the Adkisson test provides a clea r and me aning ful standar d for c onsidering whether

a tr ia l e rr or ri se s to the le ve l of pla in er ro r in the a

bs e nc e of an obje c tio n, ” the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court formally

adopted this test when reviewing a record for plain er ror. Sta te v . S

mi th , 24 S.W .3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000) . In doing so, it re emphasized that the pre sence of all five f actor s must be
e sta bl i s h e d b y t h e r e c o r d

b e f o r e t h e e xi s t e n c e o f

p l a i ne r r o r c anb e r e c o g n i z e d

an d t h a tc o mpl e te consideration of all the fac tors is not necessa ry when it is clea

r fr om the rec ord that at least one of the fa ctors ca

nnot be established. Id. The “ ‘plain er ror’ must [have bee n] of such a g reat mag nitude that it probably

chang ed the outcome of the trial.” Id. (c i t i n g Adkisson , 899 S.W .2d at 642).

T ak i n g p l ai nerro r r ev i ew i n t o ac co u n t , we n o t e t h at o n ap p ea l Ap p el l an td o es n o tch al l en ge the trial court’s application of enhanc ement fac tors (1) and (16)

. See T.C.A. § 40-35-114 ( 2006). 3 I nstead, Appellant challeng es the application of enhanc ement fac tor (3) be cause “the tria l court er red
as a matter of law

when it imposed a sente nce en hance ment for f acts that we re not de termined by a jury bey ond a re asonable doubt” in violation of Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

Turn ingto t

he fa c tor s nec e ssa

ry fo r pla in er

ro r re vie w, we no te that the re c or d is c le ar a s to wh a t oc c ur

red in th e tr ia l c ourt . App e lla nt h e re in w a s c on vic te d o f a g g ra vate d r ob be ry , a

c la ss B felony . As a Rang e I Ioffe nder, A ppellant was subject to a sentenc e of not less than twe lve nor more than twenty

y ear s. T.C.A. § 40-35-112(b) (2). In deter mining the leng th of Appe llant’s sentenc e, the trial court r elied on the f

ollowing e nhance ment fac tors: (1) the defe ndant has a previous history

of
c ri min a l c on vic tio ns or

c ri min a l be havio r, in a dd iti on to t ho se ne c e ssa

ry to e sta bli shthe a pp ro pr ia te rang e; (2) the defe ndant was a leade r in the commission of an offe nse involv i n g t wo o r m ore c ri min a l a c tor s; a

nd (1 6) the de fe nd ant w a s a dju dic a te d to have c omm itt e d a de lin qu e nt a c t or

a c ts
as a juvenile that would constitute a fe lony if committed by

an adult. T.C.A. § 40-35- 114(1), ( 2), & (1 6) (2 00 6) . A ft e r c on sid e ri ngAp pe lla nt’ s p oo r u

pb ri ng inga s a

mit ig a tin g fa c tor , b ut g ivi ngit very littl e we ight, the tr ial court sente nced A ppellant to fiftee n y ear s.
Next, it is clea

r, as a result of t he decision in Gomez I I , that the trial cour

t brea ched a

clea r and unequivocal rule of l aw by applying an enha nceme nt fac tor on the basis of judicially deter mined fac ts that related to items other tha n Appellant’s pr ior convi ct i o n s

. Specifica lly , the trial cour t-12-

conclude d that Appellant wa s a lea der in the c ommissi on of the off ense. The application of enhanc ement factor (2) breache d a cle ar a nd unequivoca l rule of law

. Gomez , ___ S.W .3d ___, 2007 WL 2917726, at *6. The se cond pre requisite for plain err or re view is there fore satisfied.

Fur ther, we deter

mine that a s ubstantial rig ht of Appellant ha s been a dverse ly aff ecte d be c a us e the tr ia l c ourt ’s a

pp lic a tio n o f e nh anc e me nt f a c tor (2 ) d e pr ive d App e lla

nt o f h is Si xth Amendment rig ht to have a jury deter mine whether

those enha

nceme nt fac tors applied. Id. at *6 (c i t i n g Cunningham , 127 S. Ct . at 860)).

Ho we ve r, we de te rm ine that con sid e ra tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt ’s e rr or

via pla in e rr or

re vie w, in this case, is not nec essar

y to do substantial justi ce. A s set forth above , the trial cour t relied on the following enhanc ement fa ctors t o enhance Appe llant’s convictions: “pre vious history of cr iminal convictions or cr iminal behavior in addition to those nece ssary to establish the appropr iate ra ng e” and “the defe ndant was a djudicated to have com m i t ted a de linquent act or a cts as a juve nile that would constitute a fe lony if committed by

an adult.” T .C.A. § 40-35-114(1) & (16) (2006). A trial court c an “pr operly

consider w ithout jury

finding s a defenda

nt’s prior convictions, as well as prior criminal beha

vior admitted to by a defe ndant, when imposing sentenc e.” Gomez , ___ S.W .3d ___, 2 0 0 7 W L 2 9 1 7 7 2 6 , at * 7 (c i t i n g Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000)) . Fur ther, the trial cour

t’s application of the enhanc ement fa ctor that Appe llant was adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act or acts as a juvenile that would constitute a felony if committed by

an adult does not offe nd the S ix th Amendment. Se e id . This enhanc ement fa ctor, like the e nhance ment fac tor for pr ior criminal convic tions, is proven on the basis of fa cts g leane d from Appe llant’s criminal history , not from judicially deter mined fac ts. Whil e the prese ntence repor t does not appe ar in t he r e c o r d o n a

p p e a l , t h e t r an s c r i p t o f t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e ar i n g r e v e a l s t h at A p p e l l an twa s, a t a minimum , pr e v io u s ly

c o nv ic ted of a g g ravated robbe ry and possession of a

controlled substanc e. The
rec ord also indicate s that Appellant committed at lea st four cr imes as a ju v en i l e t h at would have been f elonies if committed by

an adult. The se included two burg laries, a theft, and a possession of

mari jua na . A s a re su lt o f t

he e xten siv e natur e of

Ap pe lla nt’ s p ri or c ri min a l c on vic tio ns , b oth a s a juvenile and a

n adult, we c onclude that the application of these e nhance ment fac tors alone justifies the trial cour

t’s decision to enhanc e Appellant’s sentenc e from the t welve y ear minimum to fifteen y ear s, for a g g ravated robbe ry . Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE