United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

POLAR-ORBITING 

OPERATIONAL 

ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITES 

Restructuring Is 

Under Way, but 

Technical Challenges 

and Risks Remain 

April 2007 

 

GAO-07-498 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2007

POLAR-ORBITING OPERATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITES 

Restructuring Is Under Way, but 

Technical Challenges and Risks Remain

Highlights of GAO-07-498, a report to 

congressional requesters 

The National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental

Satellite System (NPOESS) is a triagency acquisition—managed by 

the Departments of Commerce and

Defense and the National

Aeronautics and Space

Administration—which 

experienced escalating costs, 

schedule delays, and technical 

difficulties. These factors led to a

June 2006 decision to restructure 

the program thereby decreasing the

program’s complexity, increasing

its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, 

and delaying the first two satellites

by 3 to 5 years. GAO was asked to 

(1) assess progress in restructuring

the acquisition, (2) evaluate

progress in establishing an

effective management structure, 

(3) assess the reliability of the cost 

and schedule estimate, and 

(4) identify the status and key risks 

facing the program’s major

segments. To do so, GAO analyzed

program and contractor data,

attended program reviews, and

interviewed program officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

appropriate executives approve

key acquisition documents, the 

Secretary of Defense delay

reassigning the Program Executive,

and the Secretary of Commerce

ensure that program authorities 

identify and address staffing needs. 

Agency officials agreed with all of

the recommendations except 

delaying the Program Executive’s 

reassignment. GAO believes that

proceeding with this reassignment

would increase program risks. 

The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the 

acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans guiding 

the contractors’ work activities in 2006 and 2007; however, important tasks 

leading up to finalizing contract changes remain to be completed. Executive

approvals of key acquisition documents are about 6 months late—due in part 

to the complexity of navigating three agencies’ approval processes. Delays in

finalizing these documents could hinder plans to complete contract 

negotiations by July 2007 and could keep the program from moving forward 

in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline. 

The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective 

management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with 

increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more 

frequent and rigorous program reviews; however, plans to reassign the 

recently appointed Program Executive Officer will likely increase the 

program’s risks. Additionally, the program lacks a process and plan for 

identifying and filling staffing shortages, which has led to delays in key 

activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. Until this process is

in place the NPOESS program faces increased risk of further delays. 

The methodology supporting a June 2006 independent cost estimate with the 

expectation of initial satellite launch in January 2013 was reliable, but recent

events could increase program costs and delay schedules. Specifically, the 

program continues to experience technical problems on key sensors and 

program costs will likely be adjusted during upcoming negotiations on 

contract changes. A new baseline cost and schedule reflecting these factors 

is expected by July 2007. 

Development and testing of major NPOESS segments—including key 

sensors and ground systems—are under way, but significant risks remain. 

For example, while work continues on key sensors, two of them experienced 

significant problems and are considered high risk (see table). Additionally, 

while progress has been made in reducing delays in the data processing 

system, work remains in refining the algorithms needed to translate sensor 

observations into useable weather products. Given the tight time frames for 

completing this work, it will be important for program officials and 

executives to continue to provide close oversight of milestones and risks. 

 Key NPOESS Components and Corresponding Risk Levels 

NPOESS component Risk level 

Visible/infrared imager radiometer suite High 

Cross-track infrared sounder High 

Ozone mapper/profiler suite Moderate 

Advanced technology microwave sounder Low 

Command, control, and communications system Low 

Interface data processing system Moderate 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-498.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David A. 

Powner, (202) 512-9286, and 

pownerd@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key 

Steps Remain To Be Completed 21 

Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS 

Management Structure, but Executive Turnover Will Increase 

Risks, and Staffing Problems Remain 26 

Methodology Supporting the June 2006 Cost and Schedule 

Estimate Was Reliable, but Recent Events Could Increase 

Program Costs 31 

Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant 

Risks Remain 34 

Conclusions 42

Recommendations for Executive Action 43 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 46 

Appendix II Overview of Satellite Data Processing Algorithms and 

the Calibration and Validation Process 48 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Commerce 51 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Defense 54 

Appendix V Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 56 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 57 

Page i GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Tables 

Table 1: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004

(critical sensors are in bold) 13 

Table 2: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program 17 

Table 3: Key Program Milestones 18 

Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in 

bold) 19 

Table 5: Planned Configuration of Sensors on NPP and NPOESS 

Satellites 20

Table 6: Elements of a Sound Cost Estimating Methodology 32 

Table 7: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as 

of April 2007 35 

Table 8: Status of Ground Segment Components 39 

Figures 

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites 6 

Figure 2: A Generic Data Relay Pattern for Polar Meteorological 

Satellite Systems 7 

Figure 3: Satellite Data Processing Steps 8 

Figure 4: Analysis of Ozone Concentration from POES Satellite 

Data 9

Figure 5: POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 10 

Figure 6: Organizations Coordinated by the NPOESS Integrated 

Program Office 12 

Figure 7: Progress on Planned Milestones in Fiscal Year 2006, as of 

October 1, 2006 23 

Figure 8: Progress on Planned Milestones in Fiscal Year 2007, as of 

January 20, 2007 24 

Figure 9: Overview of New Management Structure 27 

Figure 10: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS 

Space Segment over a 13-Month Period 37 

Figure 11: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS 

IDPS Development over a 13-Month Period 40 

Figure 12: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS 

Command, Control, and Communications Segment over a 

13-Month Period 41 

Figure 13: Satellite Data Processing Algorithms 49 

Figure 14: Describes the High-Level Calibration and Validation 

Process 50

Page ii GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Abbreviations 

ATMS advanced technology microwave sounder 

CMIS conical-scanned microwave imager/sounder 

CrIS cross-track infrared sounder 

DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

DOD Department of Defense 

EDR environmental data record

IDPS interface data processing system 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NESDIS National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental 

 Satellite System 

NPP NPOESS Preparatory Project 

POES Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites 

OMPS ozone mapper/profiler suite 

VIIRS visible/infrared imager radiometer suite 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 27, 2007

The Honorable Nick Lampson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Bob Inglis

Ranking Republican Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Environment 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Nick Lampson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Bob Inglis

Ranking Republican Member 

Subcommittee on Energy and Environment 

Committee on Science and Technology 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable David Wu 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Vernon J. Ehlers 

House of Representatives 

The planned National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System (NPOESS) program is expected to be a state-of-the-art, 

environment-monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing 

polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites 

provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, 

climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather, 

climate, the oceans, and the environment. The NPOESS program is 

considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity

of data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events 

such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the year 2026.

The planned National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

System (NPOESS) program is expected to be a state-of-the-art, 

environment-monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing 

polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. Polar-orbiting satellites 

provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, 

climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather, 

climate, the oceans, and the environment. The NPOESS program is 

considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity

of data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events 

such as hurricanes) and global climate monitoring through the year 2026.

Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition: the 

Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States 

Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA). To manage the NPOESS program, these agencies established a triagency integrated program office. In recent years, this program has 

experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties, 

leading to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program. This decision 

decreased the complexity of the program by reducing the number of 

satellites and sensors, increased the estimated cost of the program to $12.5 

billion, and delayed the launches of the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years.

Three agencies share responsibility for the NPOESS acquisition: the 

Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD)/United States 

Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA). To manage the NPOESS program, these agencies established a triagency integrated program office. In recent years, this program has 

experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties, 

leading to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program. This decision 

decreased the complexity of the program by reducing the number of 

satellites and sensors, increased the estimated cost of the program to $12.5 

billion, and delayed the launches of the first two satellites by 3 to 5 years.

This report responds to your request that we (1) evaluate the NPOESS 

program office’s progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluate the

This report responds to your request that we (1) evaluate the NPOESS 

program office’s progress in restructuring the acquisition, (2) evaluate the

Page 1 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
program office’s progress in establishing an effective management 

structure, (3) assess the reliability of the life cycle cost estimate and 

proposed schedule, and (4) identify the status and key risks facing the 

program’s major segments and evaluate the adequacy of the program’s 

efforts to mitigate these risks. 

To evaluate the program office’s progress in restructuring the acquisition, 

we assessed program documentation, attended management status 

briefings, and interviewed program officials. To determine progress in 

establishing a new management structure, we assessed the status of 

efforts to implement past recommendations regarding the management 

structure and staffing, attended senior-level management review meetings, 

reviewed program documents, and interviewed program officials. To 

assess the cost estimate, we evaluated the methodology and assumptions 

used to develop the estimate and interviewed program officials to identify

any assumptions that may have changed. To determine the status, risk, and 

risk mitigation efforts for the program, we analyzed monthly program 

management documents and interviewed NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials 

to determine concerns with these mitigation efforts. In addition, this 

report builds on other work we have done on environmental satellite 

programs over the last several years.1

We conducted our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program Office 

headquarters and at DOD, NOAA, and NASA facilities in the Washington, 

D.C., metropolitan area. We performed our work from July 2006 to April 

2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Appendix I contains additional details on our objectives, scope,

and methodology. 

Results in Brief The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the 

acquisition by establishing and implementing interim program plans 

 1

GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger

Review and Place Program’s Direction on Hold, GAO-06-573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 

2006); GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, 

Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, 

GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental

Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule Changes, GAO-04-1054 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project 

Risks Could Affect Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO-03-987T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003); and GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: 

Status, Plans, and Future Data Management Challenges, GAO-02-684T (Washington, D.C.: 

July 24, 2002). 

Page 2 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
guiding the contractors’ work activities in 2006 and 2007; however, 

important tasks leading up to finalizing contract changes remain to be 

completed. While the program office developed key acquisition 

documents, including a memorandum of agreement on the roles and 

responsibilities of the three agencies, a revised acquisition strategy, and a 

system engineering plan, the responsible executives in the three agencies

have not yet approved these documents—even though they were due by

September 1, 2006. Finalizing these documents is essential to ensure 

interagency agreement and will allow the program office to move forward 

in completing other activities related to restructuring the program. These 

activities include conducting an integrated baseline review with the 

contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work activities and 

finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and production contract—

thereby allowing the program office to lock down a new acquisition 

baseline cost and schedule. Until the key acquisition documents are 

approved by the appropriate executives in each agency, the program faces 

increased risk that restructuring activities will not be completed in time to 

allow it to move forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program baseline 

in place. This places the NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and 

future cost increases. 

The program office has also made progress in establishing an effective 

management structure by adopting a new organizational framework with 

increased oversight from program executives and by instituting more 

frequent and rigorous program management reviews; however, planned

changes in executive management will likely increase program risk, and 

the program lacks a process and plan for identifying and filling staffing 

shortages. As a result, the program experienced delays in beginning key 

activities such as cost estimating and contract revisions. Until this process 

is in place and working, the NPOESS program faces increased risk of 

further delays. 

The methodology supporting a June 2006 cost and schedule estimate was 

reliable, but recent events could lead to increased program costs and delay 

schedules. DOD’s independent cost estimating group used an acceptable 

methodology in developing a June 2006 cost estimate of $11.5 billion for 

the acquisition portion of the restructured program with the expectation 

of initial satellite launch in January 2013. Consistent with DOD direction, 

this estimate did not include roughly $1 billion in operations and support 

costs—bringing the total life cycle cost estimate to $12.5 billion. However, 

the program continues to experience technical problems on key sensors, 

and program costs will likely be adjusted during upcoming negotiations on 

contract changes. The NPOESS program office is developing its own cost 

Page 3 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
estimate to further refine the one developed in June 2006 to help it 

negotiate contract changes. A new baseline cost and schedule will be 

established once the contract is finalized—an event that the Program 

Director expects to occur by July 2007. 

Development and testing of major program segments—including key

sensors and the ground systems—are under way, but significant risks 

remain. For example, work continues on key sensors, but two sensors—

the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite and the Cross-track Infrared

Sounder—continue to experience significant difficulties. Specifically, the 

former encountered three significant problems with image quality and 

reliability during environmental testing of the engineering unit, and the 

latter suffered a major structural failure during vibration testing. 

Additionally, while significant progress has been made in reducing delays

in the NPOESS data processing system, much work remains in refining the 

algorithms needed to translate sensor observations into usable weather 

products. Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors, 

integrating them with the demonstration spacecraft (called the NPOESS 

Preparatory Project or NPP) and getting the ground-based data processing 

systems developed, tested, and deployed, it will be important for the 

Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the 

Executive Committee to continue to provide close oversight of milestones 

and risks. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and

Defense and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that the appropriate 

executives finalize key acquisition documents by the end of April 2007 in

order to allow the restructuring of the program to proceed. We are also 

making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct the Air 

Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive 

Officer until key program risks are resolved. We are also making

recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to ensure that NPOESS 

program authorities develop and implement a written process for 

identifying and addressing human capital needs and that they establish a 

plan to immediately fill needed positions. 

The Department of Commerce, DOD, and NASA provided written 

comments on our draft report (see apps. III, IV, and V). All three agencies

agreed that it was important to finalize key acquisition documents in a 

timely manner, and DOD proposed extending the due dates for the 

documents to July 2, 2007. In addition, the Department of Commerce 

concurred with our recommendation to identify and address human 

capital needs and immediately fill open positions in the NPOESS program 

Page 4 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
office. Commerce noted that NOAA was taking actions in both areas. 

However, DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay 

reassigning the Program Executive Officer, noting that the Program 

Director responsible for the acquisition program would remain in place for 

4 years. While it is important that the System Program Director remain in 

place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this position does 

not ensure continuity in the important oversight and coordination 

functions provided by the current Program Executive Officer. We remain 

concerned that reassigning the Program Executive at a time when 

NPOESS is still facing critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will

place the program at further risk. 

All three agencies also provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated in this report as appropriate. 

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate operational 

polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series—managed by NOAA, 

and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP)—managed by 

the Air Force. These satellites obtain environmental data that are 

processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather 

products. These satellite data are also the predominant input to numerical 

weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting 

weather 3 or more days in advance—including forecasting the path and 

intensity of hurricanes. The weather products and models are used to 

predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and 

emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar 

satellites also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, 

such as ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that 

are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate monitoring. 

Background 

Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position relative to

the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in an almost 

north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the 

weather and climate. Each satellite makes about 14 orbits a day. As the 

earth rotates beneath it, each satellite views the entire earth’s surface 

twice a day. Currently, there are two operational POES satellites and two 

operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that they can observe 

the earth in early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon polar orbits. 

Together, they ensure that, for any region of the earth, the data provided 

to users are generally no more than 6 hours old. Figure 1 illustrates the 

current operational polar satellite configuration. Besides the four 

Page 5 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
operational satellites, six older satellites are in orbit that still collect some 

data and are available to provide limited backup to the operational 

satellites should they degrade or fail. In the future, both NOAA and the Air 

Force plan to continue to launch additional POES and DMSP satellites 

every few years, with final launches scheduled for 2009 and 2012, 

respectively.

2

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites 

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.

POES

DMSP

POES

DMSP

Notional local equatorial crossing times

0530 

hrs

0730 

hrs

1330 

hrs

0830 

hrs

Each of the polar satellites carries a suite of sensors designed to detect

environmental data that are either reflected or emitted from the earth, the 

atmosphere, and space. The satellites broadcast a subset of these data in 

real time to properly equipped field terminals that are within a direct line 

of sight; these field terminals are located at universities, on battlefields, or 

on ships. Additionally, the polar satellites store the observed 

environmental data and then transmit them to NOAA and Air Force ground 

stations when the satellites pass overhead. The ground stations then relay 

the data via communications satellites to the appropriate meteorological 

centers for processing. 

 2

Three DMSP satellites and one POES satellite remain to be launched.

Page 6 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Under a shared processing agreement among four satellite data processing 

centers—NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and Information 

Service (NESDIS), the Air Force Weather Agency, the Navy’s Fleet 

Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center, and the Naval 

Oceanographic Office—different centers are responsible for producing 

and distributing, via a shared network, different environmental data sets, 

specialized weather and oceanographic products, and weather prediction 

model outputs. 

Each of the four processing centers is also responsible for distributing the 

data to its respective users. For the DOD centers, the users include 

regional meteorology and oceanography centers, as well as meteorology 

and oceanography staff on military bases, the Naval Fleet, and mobile field 

sites. NESDIS forwards the data to NOAA’s National Weather Service for 

distribution and use by government and commercial forecasters. The 

processing centers also use the Internet to distribute data to the general 

public. NESDIS is responsible for the long-term archiving of data and

derived products from POES and DMSP. Figure 2 depicts a generic data

relay pattern from the polar-orbiting satellites to the data processing 

centers and field terminals. 

Figure 2: A Generic Data Relay Pattern for Polar Meteorological Satellite Systems 

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.

Polar-orbiting meteorological satellite

Field terminal

Communications satellite

Ground station

Data processing center

Stored

Real-time

Page 7 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into a 

variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of radiation 

wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely determining 

information about the earth’s atmosphere, land surface, oceans, and the 

space environment. When first received, satellite data are considered raw 

data. To make them usable, the processing centers format the data so that 

they are time-sequenced and include earth location and calibration 

information. After formatting, these data are called raw data records. The

centers further process these raw data records into channel-specific data 

sets, called sensor data records and temperature data records. These data

records are then used to derive weather and climate products called 

environmental data records (EDR). EDRs include a wide range of 

atmospheric products detailing cloud coverage, temperature, humidity, 

and ozone distribution; land surface products showing snow cover, 

vegetation, and land use; ocean products depicting sea surface 

temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and characterizations of the space 

environment. Combinations of these data records (raw, sensor, 

temperature, and environmental data records) are also used to derive 

more sophisticated products, including outputs from numerical weather 

models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 3 is a simplified 

depiction of the various stages of satellite data processing, and figures 4 

and 5 depict examples of EDR weather products. 

Polar Satellite Data and 

Products

Figure 3: Satellite Data Processing Steps 

Raw data Raw data

records

Sensor data

records and 

temperature data

records

Environmental 

data records

Derived products

and output from 

numerical weather 

prediction models 0011110101101101010

1011010101010101010

1010100101110101000

1010101111110101010

1001011010110100110

1010100110110101010

1010101101010101010

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA information.

Page 8 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 4: Analysis of Ozone Concentration from POES Satellite Data 

Source: NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service.

Page 9 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 5: POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 

Source: NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service.

Page 10 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
NPOESS Overview With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would 

reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 

Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the 

two satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of satisfying 

both civilian and military requirements.3

 The converged program, 

NPOESS, is considered critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the 

continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global climate 

monitoring through the year 2026. To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, 

and NASA formed the tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located within 

NOAA. 

Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities: 

NOAA has overall program management responsibility for the converged 

system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the acquisition; 

and NASA has primary responsibility for facilitating the development and 

incorporation of new technologies into the converged system. NOAA and 

DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA funds specific 

technology projects and studies. Figure 6 depicts the organizations that 

make up the NPOESS program office and lists their responsibilities. 

 3

Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994. 

Page 11 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 6: Organizations Coordinated by the NPOESS Integrated Program Office 

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.

Overall program 

management and 

satellite operations

National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration

United States

Air Force

National Aeronautics and 

Space Admininstration

Acquisition

Agency

Responsibility

Funding

Technologies

Shared funding 

for NPOESS

Specific technology 

projects and studies

NPOESS Integrated Program Office

The NPOESS program office is overseen by an Executive Committee, 

which is made up of the Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the 

Undersecretary of the Air Force. 

NPOESS Acquisition 

Strategy 

NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to 

cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its 

inception in 1995 through 2018. The program is to provide satellite 

development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite 

data processing. These deliverables are grouped into four main categories: 

(1) the space segment, which includes the satellites and sensors; (2) the 

integrated data processing segment, which is the system for transforming 

raw data into EDRs and is to be located at the four processing centers; (3) 

the command, control, and communications segment, which includes the 

equipment and services needed to support satellite operations; and (4) the 

launch segment, which includes the launch vehicle services. 

When the NPOESS engineering, manufacturing, and development contract 

was awarded in August 2002, the cost estimate was adjusted to $7 billion. 

Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch of six satellites 

over the life of the program, as well as the integration of 13 instruments—

consisting of 10 environmental sensors and three subsystems. Together, 

Page 12 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
the sensors were to receive and transmit data on atmospheric, cloud 

cover, environmental, climatic, oceanographic, and solar-geophysical 

observations. The subsystems were to support nonenvironmental search 

and rescue efforts, sensor survivability, and environmental data collection 

activities. The program office considered 4 of the sensors to be critical

because they provide data for key weather products; these sensors are in 

bold in table 1, which describes each of the expected NPOESS 

instruments.

Table 1: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical sensors are in bold)

Instrument Description

Advanced technology

microwave sounder (ATMS)

Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the atmosphere and is to be used with 

infrared sounding data from NPOESS’s cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily global 

atmospheric temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles. 

Aerosol polarimetry sensor Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols (liquid droplets or solid particles 

suspended in the atmosphere, such as sea spray, smog, and smoke). 

Conical-scanned microwave 

imager/sounder (CMIS) 

Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain rate, ocean surface wind speed and 

direction, amount of water in the clouds, and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at 

different atmospheric levels. 

Cross-track infrared sounder 

(CrIS) 

Collects measurements of the earth’s radiation to determine the vertical distribution of temperature, 

moisture, and pressure in the atmosphere. 

Data collection system Collects environmental data from platforms around the world and delivers them to users worldwide. 

Earth radiation budget sensor Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave radiation released by the earth back into space

on a worldwide scale to enhance long-term climate studies. 

Ozone mapper/profiler suite 

(OMPS) 

Collects data needed to measure the amount and distribution of ozone in the earth’s atmosphere. 

Radar altimeter Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and ocean surface roughness, which are 

used to determine sea surface height, significant wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to 

provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction models. 

Search and rescue satellite 

aided tracking system 

Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based users in distress. 

Space environmental sensor 

suite 

Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects of space weather on technological systems, 

including satellites and radio links. 

Survivability sensor Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other instruments in case of an attack. 

Total solar irradiance sensor Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance data. 

Visible/infrared imager 

radiometer suite (VIIRS) 

Collects images and radiometric data used to provide information on the earth’s clouds, 

atmosphere, ocean, and land surfaces. 

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

In addition, NPP was planned as a demonstration satellite to be launched 

several years before the first NPOESS satellite in order to reduce the risk 

associated with launching new sensor technologies and to ensure 

continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites. 

Page 13 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
NPP is to host three of the four critical NPOESS sensors (VIIRS, CrIS, and 

ATMS), as well as one other noncritical sensor (OMPS). NPP is to provide 

the program office and the processing centers an early opportunity to 

work with the sensors, ground control, and data processing systems. 

When the NPOESS development contract was awarded, the schedule for 

launching the satellites was driven by a requirement that the satellites be 

available to back up the final POES and DMSP satellites should anything 

go wrong during the planned launches of these satellites. In general, 

satellite experts anticipate that roughly 1 out of every 10 satellites will fail 

either during launch or during early operations after launch.

Early program milestones included (1) launching NPP by May 2006, (2) 

having the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES 

satellite launch in March 2008, and (3) having the second NPOESS satellite 

available to back up the final DMSP satellite launch in October 2009. If the 

NPOESS satellites were not needed to back up the final predecessor 

satellites, their anticipated launch dates would have been April 2009 and 

June 2011, respectively.

NPOESS Experienced Cost 

Increases, Schedule 

Delays, and Technical 

Problems over Several 

Years 

Over the last few years, NPOESS has experienced continued cost 

increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made 

about the program’s direction and capabilities. In 2003, we reported that 

changes in the NPOESS funding stream caused a delay in the program’s 

schedule.4

 Specifically, in late 2002, DOD shifted the expected launch date 

for its final DMSP satellite from 2009 to 2010. As a result, the department 

reduced funding for NPOESS by about $65 million between fiscal years 

2004 and 2007. According to program officials, because NOAA was 

required to provide the same level of funding that DOD provides, this 

change triggered a corresponding reduction in funding by NOAA for those 

years. As a result of the reduced funding, program officials were forced to 

make difficult decisions about what to focus on first. The program office 

decided to keep NPP as close to its original schedule as possible because

of its importance to the eventual NPOESS development and to shift some 

of the program’s deliverables to later years. This shift affected the 

NPOESS deployment schedule. To plan for this shift, the program office 

developed a new program cost and schedule baseline. 

 4

GAO-03-987T. 

Page 14 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
After this new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the 

program office increased the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion 

to $8.1 billion; delayed key milestones, including the planned launch of the 

first NPOESS satellite—which was delayed by 7 months; and extended the 

life of the program from 2018 to 2020.

5

 The cost increases reflected 

changes to the NPOESS contract, as well as increased program 

management funds. According to the program office, contract changes 

included extension of the development schedule, increased sensor costs, 

and additional funds needed for mitigating risks. Increased program 

management funds were added for noncontract costs and management 

reserves. 

At that time, we also noted that other factors could further affect the 

revised cost and schedule estimates. Specifically, the contractor was not 

meeting expected cost and schedule targets on the new baseline because 

of technical issues in the development of key sensors, including the 

critical VIIRS sensor. Based on its performance through May 2004, we 

estimated that the contractor would most likely overrun its contract at 

completion in September 2011 by $500 million—thereby increasing the 

projected life cycle cost to $8.6 billion. In addition, we reported that risks 

associated with the development of the critical sensors, integrated data 

processing system, and algorithms, among other things, could contribute 

to further cost increases and schedule slips—and we noted that continued

oversight was critical. The program office’s baseline cost estimate was 

subsequently adjusted to $8.4 billion. 

In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to experience

problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting in schedule delays

and anticipated cost increases.6

 At that time, we projected that the 

program’s cost estimate had grown to about $10 billion based on 

contractor cost and schedule data. We reported that the program’s issues 

were due, in part, to problems at multiple levels of management—

including subcontractor, contractor, program office, and executive 

leadership. Recognizing that the budget for the program was no longer 

executable, the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a decision

in December 2005 on the future direction of the program—what would be 

delivered, at what cost, and by when. This involved deciding among 

options involving increased costs, delayed schedules, and reduced 

 5

GAO-04-1054. 

6

GAO-06-249T. 

Page 15 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
functionality. We noted that continued oversight, strong leadership, and 

timely decision making were more critical than ever and we urged the 

committee to make a decision quickly so that the program could proceed.

However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, NPOESS 

cost growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires 

DOD to certify the program to Congress.7

 This placed any decision about 

the future direction of the program on hold until the certification took 

place in June 2006. In the meantime, the program office implemented an 

interim program plan for fiscal year 2006 to continue work on key sensors 

and other program elements using fiscal year 2006 funding. 

Nunn-McCurdy Process 

Led to a Decision to 

Restructure the NPOESS 

Program 

The Nunn-McCurdy law8

 requires DOD to take specific actions when a 

major defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost thresholds. In 

November 2005, key provisions of the act required the Secretary of 

Defense to notify Congress when a major defense acquisition was 

expected to overrun its project baseline by 15 percent or more and to 

certify the program to Congress when it was expected to overrun its 

baseline by 25 percent or more.9

 At that time, NPOESS exceeded the 25

percent threshold, and DOD was required to certify the program. 

Certifying a program entailed providing a determination that (1) the 

program is essential to national security, (2) there are no alternatives to 

the program that will provide equal or greater military capability at less 

cost, (3) the new estimates of the program’s cost are reasonable, and (4) 

the management structure for the program is adequate to manage and 

control costs. DOD established tri-agency teams—made up of DOD, 

NOAA, and NASA experts—to work on each of the four elements of the 

certification process. 

In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies) 

certified a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 billion 

through 2026. This decision approved a cost increase of $4 billion over the 

prior approved baseline cost and delayed the launch of NPP and the first 

two satellites by roughly 3 to 5 years. The new program also entailed 

 7

GAO-06-573T. 

8

10 U.S.C. § 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy. 

9

10 U.S.C. § 2433 (e)(2) has recently been amended by Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 802 (Jan. 6, 

2006) and Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 213 (a) (Oct. 17, 2006). 

Page 16 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
establishing a stronger program management structure, reducing the 

number of satellites to be produced and launched from 6 to 4, and 

reducing the number of instruments on the satellites from 13 to 9—

consisting of 7 environmental sensors and 2 subsystems. It also entailed 

using NPOESS satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits and 

relying on European satellites for midmorning orbit data.10 Table 2 

summarizes the major program changes made under the Nunn-McCurdy 

certification decision. 

Table 2: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program 

Key area Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision 

Life cycle range 1995-2020 1995-2026 

Estimated life cycle 

cost 

$8.4 billion $12.5 billion 

Launch schedule NPP by October 2006 

First NPOESS by November 2009 

Second NPOESS by June 2011 

NPP by January 2010 

First NPOESS by January 2013

Second NPOESS by January 2016 

Management 

structure 

System Program Director reports to a tri-agency 

steering committee and the tri-agency Executive 

Committee 

Independent program reviews noted insufficient 

system engineering and cost analysis staff 

System Program Director is responsible for day-to-day 

program management and reports to the Program 

Executive Officer 

Program Executive Officer oversees program and 

reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee 

Number of satellites 6 (in addition to NPP) 4 (in addition to NPP) 

Number of orbits 3 (early morning, midmorning, and afternoon) 2 (early morning and afternoon; will rely on European 

satellites for midmorning orbit data) 

Number and 

complement of

instruments 

13 instruments (10 sensors and 3 subsystems) 9 instruments (7 sensors and 2 subsystems); 4 of the 

sensors are to provide fewer capabilities 

Number of EDRs 55 39 (6 are to be degraded products) 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for 

the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by January 

2010,

11 launching the first NPOESS satellite (called C1) by January 2013, 

 10The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellite’s MetOp 

program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology.

MetOp satellites are planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. 

11According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision 

specifies NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA plans to launch it by September 2009 to

reduce the possibility of a climate data continuity gap. 

Page 17 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called C2) by January 2016. 

These revised milestones deviated from prior plans to have the first 

NPOESS satellite available to back up the final POES satellite should 

anything go wrong during that launch. 

Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the final 

POES satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need to rely on 

the existing constellation of environmental satellites until NPP data 

becomes available—almost 2 years later. Although NPP was not intended

to be an operational asset, NASA agreed to move NPP to a different orbit 

so that its data would be available in the event of a premature failure of 

the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not provide all of the 

operational capability planned for the NPOESS spacecraft. If the health of

the existing constellation of satellites diminishes—or if NPP data is not 

available, timely, and reliable—then there could be a gap in environmental 

satellite data. Table 3 summarizes changes in key program milestones over 

time. 

Table 3: Key Program Milestones 

Milestones 

As of the August 

2002 contract award

As of the February 

2004 rebaselined

program 

As of the June 2006 

certification decision

Change from 2004 

rebaselined program 

Final POES launchaMarch 2008 March 2008 February 2009 Not applicable

NPP launch May 2006 October 2006 January 2010b44-month delay

First NPOESS satellite 

planned for launch (C1) 

April 2009 November 2009 January 2013 38-month delay

Final DMSP launchaOctober 2009 May 2010 April 2012 Not applicable

Second NPOESS satellite 

planned for launch (C2) 

June 2011 June 2011 January 2016 55-month delay

Source: GAO analysis, based on NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

a

POES and DMSP are not part of the NPOESS program. Their launch dates are provided to indicate 

the increased risk of satellite data gaps between when these systems launch and when the NPOESS

satellites launch.

b

Although the certification decision specified NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA plans to 

launch it by September 2009 to reduce the possibility of a gap in climate data continuity. 

In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification

decision decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and 

reduced the functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, of the 13 original 

sensors, 5 sensors remain unchanged, 3 were replaced with less capable 

sensors, 1 was modified to provide less functionality, and 4 were 

Page 18 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
cancelled. Table 4 shows the changes to NPOESS sensors, including the 4 

identified in bold as critical sensors. 

Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in bold)

Instrument

Status of 

instrument after 

the NunnMcCurdy 

decision Change description

ATMS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites 

Aerosol polarimetry sensor Cancelled Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites 

should another party choose to fund ita

CMIS Replaced CMIS sensor was cancelled, and the program office is to procure a less complex 

Microwave imager/sounder for inclusion on the second, third, and fourth NPOESS 

satellites 

CrIS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites 

Data collection system Unchanged Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS satellites 

Earth radiation budget sensor Replaced Sensor was cancelled, and is to be replaced on the first NPOESS satellite (and no

others) by an existing sensor with fewer capabilities called the Cloud’s and Earth’s 

Radiant Energy System

OMPS Modified One part of the sensor, called OMPS (nadir), is to be included on NPP and on the 

first and third NPOESS satellites; the remaining part, called OMPS (limb), was 

cancelled on the NPOESS satellites, but will be included on NPPa

Radar altimeter Cancelled Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites 

should another party choose to fund it 

Search and rescue satellite 

aided tracking system 

Unchanged Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS satellites 

Space environmental sensor 

suite 

Replaced Sensor is to be replaced by a less capable, less expensive, legacy sensor called 

the Space Environment Monitor on the first and third NPOESS satellites 

Survivability sensor Cancelled Subsystem contract was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS 

satellites should another party choose to fund it 

Total solar irradiance sensor Cancelled Sensor contract was cancelled but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS 

satellites should another party choose to fund it 

VIIRS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on all four NPOESS satellites 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

a

While direct program funding for these instruments was eliminated, the instruments could be 

reintegrated on NPOESS satellites should other parties choose to fund them. The Nunn-McCurdy

decision requires the program office to allow sufficient space on the spacecraft for these instruments 

and to provide the funding needed to integrate them. 

The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the

resulting weather and environmental products, called EDRs. In selecting 

sensors for the restructured program, the Nunn-McCurdy process placed 

the highest priority on continuing current operational weather capabilities 

Page 19 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
and a lower priority on obtaining selected environmental and climate 

measuring capabilities. As a result, the revised NPOESS system has 

significantly less capability for providing global climate measures than was 

originally planned. Specifically, the number of EDRs was decreased from

55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced quality. The 39 EDRs that remain 

include cloud base height, land surface temperature, precipitation type 

and rate, and sea surface winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include 

cloud particle size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation

at the top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in 

the space environment. The 6 EDRs that are of a reduced quality include

ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple products depicting energy in the 

space environment. 

Given the changes in planned sensors, program officials established a 

planned configuration for NPP and the four satellites of the NPOESS 

program, called C1, C2, C3, and C4 (see table 5). Program officials 

acknowledged that this configuration could change if other parties 

decided to develop the sensors that were cancelled. However, they noted 

that the planned configuration of the first satellite cannot change without 

increasing the risk that the launch will be delayed. 

Table 5: Planned Configuration of Sensors on NPP and NPOESS Satellites 

Sensor NPP

NPOESS 

C1 

NPOESS 

C2 

NPOESS 

C3 

NPOESS 

C4 

VIIRS X X X X X

Microwave imager/sounder 

(replacing CMIS) 

X X X

CrIS X X X

ATMS X X X

Space environment monitor 

(replacing the space 

environmental sensor suite) 

X X

OMPS X X X

Data collection system X X X X 

Search and rescue satellite 

aided tracking system 

X X X X

Cloud’s and earth’s radiant 

energy system (replacing the 

earth radiation budget sensor) 

X

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

Page 20 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
To be effective, project managers need current information on a 

contractor’s progress in meeting contract deliverables. One method that 

can help project managers track this progress is earned value

management. This method, used by DOD for several decades, compares 

the value of work accomplished during a given period with that of the 

work expected in that period. 

Differences from expectations are measured in both cost and schedule 

variances. Cost variances compare the earned value of the completed 

work with the actual cost of the work performed. For example, if a 

contractor completed $5 million worth of work and the work actually cost

$6.7 million, there would be a –$1.7 million cost variance. Schedule 

variances are also measured in dollars, but they compare the earned value

of the work completed with the value of work that was expected to be

completed. For example, if a contractor completed $5 million worth of 

work at the end of the month but was budgeted to complete $10 million 

worth of work, there would be a –$5 million schedule variance. Positive 

variances indicate that activities are costing less or are completed ahead 

of schedule. Negative variances indicate activities are costing more or are 

falling behind schedule. These cost and schedule variances can then be 

used in estimating the cost and time needed to complete the program. 

Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of the 

NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in restructuring 

the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks leading up to revising 

and finalizing contract changes remain to be completed. Restructuring a 

major acquisition program like NPOESS is a process that involves 

identifying time critical and high priority work and keeping this work 

moving forward, while reassessing development priorities, 

interdependencies, deliverables, risks, and costs. It also involves revising 

important acquisition documents including the memorandum of 

agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the three agencies, the 

acquisition strategy, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation

master plan, the integrated master schedule defining what needs to 

happen by when, and the acquisition program baseline. The NunnMcCurdy certification decision required the Secretaries of Defense and 

Commerce and the Administrator of NASA to sign a revised memorandum 

of agreement by August 6, 2006. It also required that the program office, 

Program Executive Officer, and the Executive Committee revise and 

approve key acquisition documents including the acquisition strategy and

system engineering plan by September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with 

the restructuring. Once these are completed, the program office can 

Earned Value Management 

Techniques Provide Insight 

on Program Cost and 

Schedule 

NPOESS Acquisition 

Restructuring Is Well 

Under Way, but Key 

Steps Remain To Be 

Completed 

Page 21 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
proceed to negotiate with its prime contractor on a new program baseline 

defining what will be delivered, by when, and at what cost. 

The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the 

acquisition. Specifically, the program office has established interim 

program plans guiding the contractor’s work activities in 2006 and 2007

and has made progress in implementing these plans. Specifically, the 

program office reported that it had completed 156 of 166 key milestones12

during fiscal year 2006—including completing ambient and thermal 

vacuum testing of the VIIRS engineering unit. Of the 10 remaining 

milestones resulting from unanticipated problems in the development of

VIIRS and CrIS, 5 have since been completed, and 5 are still pending. The 

program office plans to complete 222 milestones in fiscal year 2007—

including completing performance tests on the OMPS (nadir) sensor—and 

notes that they are slightly ahead of plans in that they have completed 62 

milestones through January 20, 2007, which is 2 more than had been

planned. Figures 7 and 8 depict the program office’s progress against key 

milestones in fiscal year 2006 and to date in fiscal year 2007. 

 12The NPOESS program office selected key milestones from a much larger set of ongoing 

and planned milestones in order to track progress. 

Page 22 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 7: Progress on Planned Milestones in Fiscal Year 2006, as of October 1, 2006

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.

Number of milestones completed

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Actual

Planned

Jan. 2006

Feb. 2006

Mar. 2006

Apr. 2006

May 2006

June 2006

July 2006

Aug. 2006

Oct. 2006

Sept. 2006

Page 23 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 8: Progress on Planned Milestones in Fiscal Year 2007, as of January 20, 

2007 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data.

Number of milestones completed

0

50

100

150

200

250

Actual

Planned

Oct. 2006

Jan. 2007

Feb. 2007

Nov. 2006

Dec. 2006

Mar. 2007

Apr. 2007

May 2007

June 2007

July 2007

Aug. 2007

Sept. 2007

The program office has also made progress in revising key acquisition 

documents. It revised the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation

master plan, and the acquisition strategy plan, and obtained approval of 

these documents by the Program Executive Officer. The program office

and contractor also developed an integrated master schedule for the 

remainder of the program—beyond fiscal year 2007. This integrated 

master schedule details the steps leading up to launching NPP by 

September 2009, launching the first NPOESS satellite in January 2013, and 

launching the second NPOESS satellite in January 2016. Near-term steps 

include completing and testing the VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors; 

integrating these sensors with the NPP spacecraft and completing 

integration testing; completing the data processing system and integrating

it with the command, control, and communications segment; and 

performing advanced acceptance testing of the overall system of systems 

for NPP. 

Page 24 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be 

completed. These steps include obtaining the approval of the Secretaries 

of Commerce and Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the 

memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, and obtaining the

approval of the NPOESS Executive Committee on key acquisition 

documents, including the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation

master plan, and the acquisition strategy. These approvals are currently 

over 6 months past due. Agency officials noted that the September 1, 2006,

due date for the key acquisition documents was not realistic given the 

complexity of coordinating documents among three different agencies, but 

did not provide a new estimate for when these documents would be 

approved. 

Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency agreements 

and will allow the program office to move forward in completing other 

activities related to restructuring the program. These activities include 

conducting an integrated baseline review with the contractor to reach 

agreement on the schedule and work activities, and finalizing changes to 

the NPOESS development and production contract—thereby allowing the 

program office to lock down a new acquisition baseline cost and schedule. 

The program office expects to conduct an integrated baseline review by 

May 2007 and to finalize the contract changes by July 2007. Until key 

acquisition documents are finalized and approved, the program faces 

increased risk that it will not be able to complete important restructuring 

activities in time to move forward in fiscal year 2008 with a new program 

baseline in place. This places the NPOESS program at risk of continued 

delays and future cost increases. 

Page 25 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective 

management structure, but—almost a year after this structure was 

endorsed during the Nunn-McCurdy certification process—the Integrated 

Program Office still faces staffing problems. Over the past few years, we 

and others have raised concerns about management problems at all levels

of the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor 

management, program office management, and executive-level 

management.13 Two independent review teams also noted a shortage of 

skilled program staff, including budget analysts and system engineers. 

Since that time, the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing 

an effective management structure—including establishing a new 

organizational framework with increased oversight by program 

executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and 

program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance. 

However, DOD’s plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in 

Summer 2007 increase the program’s risks. Additionally, the program lacks 

a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing needs, gaps, and plans for 

filling those gaps. As a result, the program office has experienced delays in 

getting core management activities under way and lacks the staff it needs 

to execute day-to-day management activities. 

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective 

management structure and increasing the frequency and intensity of its 

oversight activities. Over the past few years, we and others have raised 

concerns about management problems at all levels of management on the 

NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor management, 

program office management, and executive-level management. In response 

to recommendations made by two different independent review teams, the 

program office began exploring options in late 2005 and early 2006 for 

revising its management structure. 

Progress Has Been 

Made in Establishing 

an Effective NPOESS 

Management 

Structure, but 

Executive Turnover 

Will Increase Risks, 

and Staffing Problems 

Remain 

NPOESS Program Has 

Made Progress in 

Establishing an Effective 

Management Structure and 

Increasing Oversight 

Activities, but Executive 

Turnover Will Increase 

Program Risks 

In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a 

Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program 

 13GAO-06-249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector General, Poor 

Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over

Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG-17794-6-0001/2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In 

addition, two independent teams reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led 

Independent Review Team investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on

NPP, and a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader

NPOESS program. The teams briefed the NPOESS Executive Committee on their findings

in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively. 

Page 26 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Director, to streamline decision making and to provide oversight to the 

program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the Executive

Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and the Program 

Director proposed a revised organizational framework that realigned 

division managers within the Integrated Program Office responsible for 

overseeing key elements of the acquisition and increased staffing in key 

areas. In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision approved 

this new management structure and the Integrated Program Office 

implemented it. Figure 9 provides an overview of the relationships among 

the Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and the 

Executive Committee, as well as key divisions within the program office.

Figure 9: Overview of New Management Structure 

Source: NOAA.

Budget

and Planning

Management 

Operations

Mission 

Assurance

Systems

Engineering 

Division

Spacecraft 

Division

Payloads

Division

(sensors) 

Algorithms

Division

Ground 

Systems

Division

Contracts

Program Executive Officer

Program Executive Office

NPOESS Program Director

Integrated Program Office

Executive Committee

Oversees program

Executes acquisition program

Overall responsibility

Operating under this new management structure, the program office 

implemented more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and 

program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and mitigation 

Page 27 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value management 

techniques to monitor contractor performance. Specifically, program 

officials and the prime contractor now review the subcontractors’ cost and 

schedule performance on a weekly basis. The information from these 

meetings feeds into monthly government meetings with the prime 

contractor to review progress against milestones, issues, and risks. 

Further, the Program Director conducts monthly reviews with each 

technical division lead to review the divisions’ achievements, risks, and 

plans. Program officials note that these frequent reviews allow information 

on risks to be quickly escalated from subcontractors to contractors, to the 

program component level, and to the Program Director—and they allow 

program officials to better manage efforts to reduce risks. The program 

office also reported that all division leads were trained in earned value

management techniques and were effectively using these techniques both 

to monitor subcontractor and contractor performance on a weekly basis 

and to identify potential problems as soon as possible. 

In addition to these program office activities, the Program Executive 

Officer implemented monthly program reviews and increased the 

frequency of contacts with the Executive Committee. Specifically, the

Program Executive Officer holds monthly program management reviews 

where the Program Director and program division leads (for example, 

those in charge of systems engineering or ground systems) provide 

briefings on the program’s earned value, progress, risks, and concerns. We 

observed that these briefings allow the Program Executive Officer to have

direct insight into the challenges and workings of the Integrated Program 

Office and allow risks to be appropriately escalated and addressed. These

meetings also provide an open forum for managers to raise concerns and 

ask questions about operational challenges. For example, when NASA 

officials expressed concerns that vibration levels used during testing were 

higher than necessary and were causing damage to key sensor 

components, the Program Director and Program Executive Officer 

immediately established a forum to discuss and mitigate this issue. The 

Program Executive Officer briefs the Executive Committee in monthly 

letters, apprising committee members of the program’s status, progress, 

risks, and earned value and the Executive Committee now meets on a 

quarterly basis—whereas in the recent past, we reported that the 

Executive Committee had met only five times in 2 years.14

 14GAO-06-249T. 

Page 28 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
While the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective 

management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We recently

reported that DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due in part to 

frequent turnover in leadership positions, and we suggested that 

addressing this will require DOD to consider matching officials’ tenure 

with the development or delivery of a product.15 In March 2007, NPOESS 

program officials stated that DOD is planning to reassign the recently 

appointed Program Executive Officer in Summer 2007 as part of this 

executive’s natural career progression. As of March 2007, the Program 

Executive Officer has held this position for 16 months. Given that the 

program is currently still being restructured, and that there are significant 

challenges in being able to meet critical deadlines to ensure satellite data 

continuity, such a move adds unnecessary risk to an already risky 

program. 

NPOESS Program Has 

Filled Key Vacancies but 

Lacks A Programwide 

Staffing Process 

The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies in recent months but 

lacks a staffing process that identifies programwide staffing requirements 

and plans for filling those needed positions. Sound human capital 

management calls for establishing a process or plan for determining 

staffing requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning to fill

critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially important for 

NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple independent review 

teams that staffing shortfalls contributed to past problems. Specifically, 

these review teams noted shortages in the number of system engineers 

needed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor and contractor 

engineering activities and in the number of budget and cost analysts 

needed to assess contractor cost and earned value reports. To rectify this

situation, the June 2006 certification decision directed the Program 

Director to take immediate actions to fill vacant positions at the program 

office with the approval of the Program Executive Officer. 

Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure, the 

program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a budget

officer, a chief system engineer, an algorithm division chief, and a 

contracts director. In addition, on an ad hoc basis, individual division 

managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire individuals 

for key positions. However, almost a year after the certification, the 

 15GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions and Keys to 

Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006). 

Page 29 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
program office still lacks a programwide process for identifying and filling 

all needed positions. As a result, division managers often wait months for 

critical positions to be filled. For example, in February 2006, the NPOESS 

program estimated that it needed to hire up to 10 new budget analysts. As 

of September 2006, none of these positions had been filled. Today, 

program officials estimate that they only needed to fill 7 budget analyst 

positions, of which 2 positions have been filled, and 5 remain vacant.

Additionally, even though the certification decision directed immediate 

action to fill critical vacancies, the program still has vacancies in 5 systems 

engineering positions and 10 technical manager positions. The majority of 

the vacancies—4 of the 5 budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems engineering 

positions, and 8 of the 10 technical manager positions—are to be provided

by NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of these positions is in some 

stage of being filled—that is, recruitment packages are being developed or 

reviewed, vacancies are being advertised, or candidates are being 

interviewed, selected, and approved.

The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the right 

personnel in place to facilitate this process—and did not even begin to 

develop a staffing process—until November 2006. Program officials noted

that the tri-agency nature of the program adds unusual layers of 

complexity to the hiring and administrative functions because each agency 

has its own hiring and performance management rules. In November 2006, 

the program office brought in an administrative officer who took the lead 

in pulling together the division managers’ individual assessments of 

needed staff—currently estimated to be 25 vacant positions—and has been 

working with the division managers to refine this list. This new 

administrative officer plans to train division managers in how to assess 

their needs and to hire needed staff and to develop a process by which 

evolving needs are identified and positions are filled. However, there is as 

yet no date set for establishing this basic programwide staffing process. 

As a result of the lack of a programwide staffing process, there has been

an extended delay in determining what staff are needed and in bringing 

those staff on board—which has resulted in delays in performing core 

management activities such as establishing the program office’s cost 

estimate and bringing in needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a 

programwide staffing process is in place, the program office risks not 

having the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management activities. 

Page 30 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
In June 2006, DOD certified a restructured NPOESS program that was 

estimated to cost $11.5 billion for the acquisition portion of the program16

and scheduled to launch the first satellite in 2013. The Office of the 

Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (cost analysis 

group)—the independent cost estimators charged with developing the 

estimate for the acquisition portion of the program—used an acceptable 

methodology to develop this estimate. When combined with an estimated 

$1 billion for operations and support after launch, this brings the program 

life cycle cost to $12.5 billion. Recent events, however, could further 

increase program costs or delay schedules. Specifically, the program 

continues to experience technical problems on key sensors, and costs and

schedules will be adjusted during negotiations on contract changes. The 

NPOESS program office is developing its own cost estimate to refine the 

one developed in June 2006 that it will use to negotiate contract changes.

A new baseline cost will be established once the contract is finalized. 

The cost and schedule estimate for the restructured NPOESS program was 

developed by DOD’s cost analysis group using an acceptable methodology. 

Cost-estimating organizations throughout the federal government and 

industry use certain key practices—related to planning, conducting, and 

reporting the estimate—to ensure a sound estimate. Table 6 lists the 

elements of a sound cost estimating methodology. In addition, to ensure 

the validity of the data assumptions that go into the estimate, leading 

organizations use actual historical costs and seek an independent 

validation of critical cost drivers. 

Methodology 

Supporting the June 

2006 Cost and 

Schedule Estimate 

Was Reliable, but 

Recent Events Could 

Increase Program 

Costs 

Certified Program 

Estimates Were Developed 

Using an Acceptable 

Methodology 

 16The acquisition portion of the program includes satellite development, production, and 

launch. It does not include operations and support costs after launch.

Page 31 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Table 6: Elements of a Sound Cost Estimating Methodology

Activity area Key practices

Define the estimate’s purpose 

Define the program or system characteristics 

Identify ground rules and assumptions 

Determine the estimating approach 

Planning the 

estimate 

Develop the estimating plan 

Obtain the data 

Perform the estimate 

Conduct a risk and uncertainty analysis 

Conducting the

estimate 

Conduct a sensitivity analysis

Document the estimate 

Review and provide results 

Reporting the 

estimate 

Update the estimate with actual cost data and document lessons 

learned 

Source: GAO analysis of leading practices. 

DOD’s cost analysis group used an acceptable methodology in developing 

the NPOESS cost estimate in that they planned, conducted, and reported 

the estimate consistent with leading practices. The cost analysis group’s 

cost estimating approach was largely driven by the program’s principal 

“ground rule” to maintain the continuity of weather data without a gap. 

Specifically, the cost analysis group assessed two risks: (1) the uncertainty 

of the health of the current polar-satellite constellation and (2) the 

uncertainty of when the new satellite system could be delivered (including 

the time needed to evaluate new satellites once in orbit). The resulting 

analysis showed that the restructured NPOESS system could be delivered

and the first satellite launched by 2013 with a high level of confidence in

maintaining satellite data continuity.17

To determine specific costs, the group used the existing work breakdown 

structure employed by the program office as the basis for performing its 

work. This work breakdown structure consists of seven major elements, 

including ground systems; spacecraft; sensors; assembly, integration and 

test; system engineering/contractor program management; government 

program management; and launch. 

 17The cost analysis group determined that there was a 90 percent confidence level that 

there would be no weather coverage gap. 

Page 32 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
The cost analysis group also took steps to ensure the validity of the data 

that went into the estimate. For each element, the cost analysis group 

visited all major contractor sites to collect program data including 

• schedule (including the original, rebaselined, and current schedules, and

risks affecting the current schedule); 

• current staffing profile by month; 

• the history of staffing used; 

• the qualifications of people charging the program; 

• the program’s technical approaches;

• system diagrams; 

• bills of materials; 

• funding profile; and 

• the contractor’s program legacy (a justification that the contractor has 

worked on similar projects in the past and that the contractor should be 

able to adapt that knowledge to the current work). 

The cost analysis group also compared this data with contractor labor 

rates from the Defense Contract Management Agency and obtained 

NASA’s validation of the costs associated with the most significant cost 

driver, the VIIRS sensor. 

Since schedule was the primary uncertainty factor in the cost analysis, it 

also was the driver of overall costs. Specifically, the cost analysis group 

took its risk-adjusted schedule durations for the major cost elements and 

adjusted the contractor-submitted manning profiles accordingly. They

then used NPOESS historical data on labor rates and materials to calculate

the cost of these elements. 

Consistent with DOD practice, the cost analysis group established its cost 

estimate at a 50 percent confidence level.18 However, cost analysts could 

 18A 50 percent level of confidence indicates that NPOESS has a 50 percent chance that the

restructured program (as defined in the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision) will be 

delivered as planned at the acquisition cost of $11.5 billion.

Page 33 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
not provide an upper limit for potential cost growth, explaining that the 

program contains “failsafe” measures to use alternative technologies (such 

as using legacy systems) if schedules are delayed and costs increase. As a 

result, cost analysts reported that they have a high level of confidence that

acquisition costs will not exceed $11.5 billion—but a lower level of 

confidence that the configuration of sensors will remain unchanged. 

While the June 2006 cost estimate for the acquisition portion of the 

program was reasonable at the time it was made, several recent events 

could cause program life cycle costs to grow or schedules to be delayed. 

Specifically, the program continues to experience technical problems on 

key sensors. The CrIS sensor being developed for the NPP satellite 

suffered a major structural failure in October 2006. A failure review board

is currently working to resolve the root causes of the failure. While 

program officials note that they should be able to cover costs related to 

investigating the problem, the full cost and schedule to fix the sensor is 

not yet known. Also, VIIRS development, which has been the program’s 

primary cost driver, is not yet complete and continues to be a high-risk 

development. This too, could lead to higher final program costs or delayed 

schedules. 

Program costs are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming negotiations 

on contract changes. The NPOESS program office is developing its own 

cost estimate to refine the one developed in June 2006. Program officials 

plan to use this revised cost estimate to negotiate contract changes. A new 

baseline cost will be established once the contract is finalized—an event 

that the Program Director expects to occur by July 2007. 

Major segments of the NPOESS program—the space segment, the ground 

systems segment, and the launch segment—are under development; 

however, significant problems have occurred and risks remain. The 

program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate them, but 

continued problems could affect the program’s overall cost and schedule.

Given the tight time frames for completing key sensors, integrating them 

on the NPP spacecraft, and getting the ground-based data processing 

systems developed, tested, and deployed, it will be important for the 

NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the Program Executive Office, and 

the Executive Committee to continue to provide close oversight of 

milestones and risks. 

Recent Events Could Lead 

to Increased Program 

Costs or Delayed 

Schedules 

Major Program 

Segments Are Under 

Development, but 

Significant Risks 

Remain 

Page 34 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four sensors 

are of critical importance—VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS—because they

are to be launched on the NPP satellite. Initiating work on another sensor, 

the Microwave imager/sounder, is also important because this new 

sensor—replacing the cancelled CMIS sensor—will need to be developed 

in time for the second NPOESS satellite launch. Over the past year, the 

program made progress on each of the sensors and the spacecraft. 

However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have experienced major problems. 

The status of each of the components of the space segment is described in

table 7. 

Space Segment—Progress 

Made, but Key Sensors 

Continue to Face Major 

Risks 

Table 7: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of April 2007 

Space segment

component Risk level Status

VIIRS High VIIRS development has continued in 2006 and in early 2007. In December 2006, the 

contractor completed environmental tests of VIIRS’ engineering design unit (a prototype) 

and identified three problems.a While these problems were being studied, the program 

office approved the delivery of the engineering unit to the subcontractor responsible for 

integration and testing on NPP. In late February 2007, program officials determined that 

the contractor was able to mitigate all but one of the problems, and they approved the 

flight unit to proceed to system level integration with a goal of resolving the final problem 

before a technical readiness review milestone in May 2007. VIIRS flight unit is scheduled 

to be delivered to NPP by July 2008. 

CrIS High Development of CrIS was put on hold in October 2006 when the flight unit designated to 

go on NPP experienced a major structural failure during its vibration testing. As of March 

2007, a failure review board established by the contractors and the NPOESS program 

office identified causes for failure and has planned an approach to completing flight unit 

development and delivery for NPP. The review board has also initiated inspections of all 

sensor modules and subsystems for damage. The program office expects to restart 

acceptance testing in July 2007, and the CrIS flight unit is expected to be delivered to 

NPP by February 2008. 

OMPS Moderate As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification in June 2006, one element of the OMPS 

sensor, called OMPS (limb), was removed from the program. In February 2007, program 

officials agreed to reintegrate OMPS (limb) on NPP if NOAA and NASA would fund it. 

This funding was approved in early April 2007. OMPS is currently on schedule for 

delivery to NPP by May 2008; however, there are concerns that the OMPS flight unit 

delivery will be so late in the integration testing process that there could be an insufficient 

schedule margin, should a problem arise. 

ATMS Low The ATMS flight unit for NPP was developed by a NASA contractor and delivered to the 

program in October 2005. NASA integrated the flight unit on the spacecraft and is 

awaiting delivery of the other sensors in order to complete integration testing. 

Microwave imager/ 

sounder 

Not yet rated A new microwave imager/sounder sensor is being planned to replace the cancelled CMIS 

sensor. It is planned to be ready for launch on the second NPOESS satellite. In October 

2006, the program office issued a request for information seeking industry ideas for the 

design of the new sensor, and responses were due by the end of December 2006. The 

program office anticipates awarding a contract to develop the sensor by October 2008. 

Page 35 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Space segment

component Risk level Status

Spacecraft Low The development of the spacecrafts for NPP and NPOESS are on track. The NPP 

spacecraft was completed in June 2005. Integration testing will be conducted once the 

NPP sensors are delivered. 

Early issues with the NPOESS spacecraft (including issues with antennas and a data 

storage unit) have been resolved; however, risks remain that could delay the completion 

of the spacecraft. A key risk involves delays in the delivery of the solar array, which may 

arrive too late to be included in some key testing. Other risks associated with the 

electrical power subsystem are taking longer than anticipated to resolve. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

a

The three problems are (1) band-to-band co-registration, an issue in which band registration shifts 

with different temperatures; (2) cross-talk, which involves information from sensor cells leaking into 

other cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which the instrument’s focus changes with changes 

in temperature. 

Earned value management tools are used to compare the value of work 

accomplished with the work expected during a given time period, and any 

differences are measured in cost and schedule variances. The NPOESS 

space segment experienced negative cost and schedule variances between

January 2006 and January 2007 (see fig. 10). 

Earned Value Data Show 

Problems on the Space 

Segment 

Page 36 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 10: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS Space Segment

over a 13-Month Period

Source: GAO analysis based on contractor data.

Dollars in millions

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

Cost variance

Schedule variance

Jan. 2006

Feb. 2006

Mar. 2006

Apr. 2006

May 2006

Jan. 2007

June 2006

July 2006

Aug. 2006

Sept. 2006

Oct. 2006

Nov. 2006

Dec. 2006

From January 2006 to January 2007, the contractor exceeded cost targets 

for the space segment by $17 million—which is 4 percent of the space 

segment budget for that time period. Similarly, the contractor was unable 

to complete $14.6 million worth of work in the space segment. The main 

factors in the cost and schedule variances were due to underestimation of 

the scope of work, pulling resources from lower priority tasks to higher 

priority items, and unforeseen design issues on key sensors. For example, 

VIIRS continued to experience negative cost variance trends due to 

unplanned efforts, which included refurbishing and recertifying the VIIRS 

calibration chamber, completing the testing of the engineering design unit,

and resolving a problem with the testing equipment needed to adjust 

VIIRS’ temperature during a key test. 

Unplanned efforts for CrIS that attributed to the negative cost and 

schedule variances included additional time required for testing and 

material management. The schedule variances for VIIRS and CrIS were 

mainly due to resources being pulled from other areas to support higher 

priority tasks, extended testing and testing delays, management changes,

Page 37 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
and improper material handling. Further, there is a high likelihood that 

CrIS will continue to experience cost and schedule variances against the 

fiscal year 2007 interim program plan until the issues that caused its 

structural failure are addressed. 

Program officials regularly track risks associated with various NPOESS 

components and work to mitigate them. Having identified both VIIRS and 

CrIS as high risk, OMPS as a moderate risk, and the other components as 

low risk, the program office is working closely with the contractors and 

subcontractors to resolve sensor problems. 

Program Office Is Monitoring 

Sensor Risks and Evaluating 

Options 

Program officials have identified work-arounds that will allow them to 

move forward in testing the VIIRS engineering unit and have approved the 

flight unit to proceed to a technical readiness review milestone in May 

2007. Regarding CrIS, as of March 2007, a failure review board identified 

root causes of its structural failure, identified plans for resolving them, and 

initiated inspections of sensor modules and subsystems for damage. An 

agency official reported that there is sufficient funding in the fiscal year 

2007 program office’s and contractor’s management reserve funds to allow 

for troubleshooting both VIIRS and CrIS problems. However, until the CrIS 

failure review board fully determines the amount of rework that is 

necessary to fix the problems, it is unknown if additional funds will be 

needed or if the time frame for CrIS’ delivery will be delayed. According to

agency officials, CrIS is not on the program schedule’s critical path, and 

there is sufficient schedule margin to absorb the time it will take to 

conduct a thorough failure review process. 

Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and CrIS are 

of particular importance because these are to be demonstrated on the NPP 

satellite currently scheduled for launch in September 2009. Additionally, 

any delay in the NPP launch date could affect the overall NPOESS 

program because the success of the program depends on the lessons 

learned in data processing and system integration from the NPP satellite. 

Ground Segment—

Progress Has Been Made, 

but Work Remains 

Development of the ground segment—which includes the interface data 

processing system, the ground stations that are to receive satellite data, 

and the ground-based command, control, and communications system—is 

under way and on track. However, important work pertaining to 

developing the algorithms that translate satellite data into weather 

products within the integrated data processing segment remains to be 

completed. Table 8 describes each of the components of the ground 

Page 38 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
segment and identifies the status of each. Additionally, appendix II 

provides an overview of satellite data processing algorithms. 

Table 8: Status of Ground Segment Components

Ground segment 

component/description Risk level Status 

Interface Data Processing

System (IDPS) 

A ground-based system that 

is to process the sensors’

data so that they are usable 

by the data processing 

centers and the broader 

community of environmental

data users. IDPS will be 

deployed at the four weather 

data processing centers. 

Moderate IDPS is being developed in a series of builds. Currently, IDPS build 1.4 has been 

delivered for testing and recently passed two key data transfer tests. Contractors are 

currently working to develop IDPS build 1.5, which is expected to be the build that will be 

used with NPP. However, work remains in three areas: system latency, algorithm 

performance, and calibration and validation planning. 

• Latency—IDPS must process volumes of data within 65 minutes to meet NPP 

requirements. The contractor has made progress in reducing the latency of the 

system’s data handling from 93 minutes to 73 minutes and is working to reduce it by 8

minutes more by resolving data management issues, increasing the number of 

processors, and increasing algorithm efficiency. 

• Algorithm performance—IDPS algorithms are the mathematical functions coded into 

the system software that transform raw data into data products including sensor data 

records and environmental data records. IDPS build 1.4 contains provisional 

algorithms, which are being refined as the sensors complete various stages of testing. 

Because some sensors are delayed, full characterization of those sensors in order to 

refine the algorithms has also been delayed and may not be completed in time for the 

delivery of IDPS build 1.5 in early 2009. If this occurs, agency officials plan to improve 

the algorithms in build 1.5 during a planned maintenance upgrade prior to NPP launch. 

• Calibration/validation—Calibration/validation is the process for tweaking algorithms to 

provide more accurate observations. The contractor has documented a detailed 

schedule for calibration and validation during IDPS development and is developing a 

postlaunch task list to drive prelaunch preparation efforts. However, much work and 

uncertainty continue to exist in the calibration and validation area. A program official 

noted that, while teams can do a lot of preparation work, including building the 

infrastructure to allow sensor testing and having a good understanding of the satellite, 

sensors, and available data for calibration, many issues need to take place after 

launch. 

Ground stations for receiving 

satellite data 

15 unmanned ground 

stations around the world 

(called SafetyNetTM) are to 

receive satellite data and 

send it to the four data 

processing centers. 

Low NOAA is working with domestic and foreign authorities to gain approval to operate ground

stations to receive satellite data. According to agency officials, the full complement of 

ground stations will not be in place in time for the C1 launch: however, the ground stations 

will be phased in by the launch of C2. To date, the program office has reached agreement

with 4 of 15 ground station sites. 

Command, control, and 

communications segment 

Performs the day-to-day 

monitoring and command of 

the spacecraft and sensors. 

Low NOAA recently completed moving its satellite command, control, and communications 

capabilities to a new office building. In addition, the command, control, and 

communications segment acceptance testing for NPP has been completed. The segment 

is expected to begin operation in 2008. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

Page 39 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Ground Segment Cost and 

Schedule Are on Track; 

Work and Risks Remain 

Using contractor-provided data, our analysis indicates cost and schedule 

performance on key elements of the NPOESS ground segment were 

generally on track or positive against the fiscal year 2006 and 2007 interim 

program plans. For the IDPS component, the contractor completed slightly 

less work than planned and finished slightly under budget. This caused 

cost and schedule variances of less than 1 percent off of expectations. (see 

fig. 11). For the command, control, and communications component, the 

contractor was able to outperform its planned targets by finishing under

budget by $3 million (6.2 percent of the budget for this time period) and by 

completing $31,000 (less than 1 percent) worth of work beyond what was 

planned (see fig. 12). 

Figure 11: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS IDPS 

Development over a 13-Month Period

Source: GAO analysis based on contractor data.

Dollars in millions

-3.0

-1.5

0.0

1.5

3.0

Cost variance

Schedule variance

Jan. 2006

Feb. 2006

Mar. 2006

Apr. 2006

May 2006

June 2006

July 2006

Aug. 2006

Sept. 2006

Oct. 2006

Nov. 2006

Dec. 2006

Jan. 2007

Page 40 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Figure 12: Cumulative Cost and Schedule Variance for the NPOESS Command, 

Control, and Communications Segment over a 13-Month Period

Source: GAO analysis based on contractor data.

Dollars in millions

-3.0

-1.5

0.0

1.5

3.0

Cost variance

Schedule variance

Jan. 2006

Feb. 2006

Mar. 2006

Apr. 2006

May 2006

June 2006

July 2006

Aug. 2006

Sept. 2006

Oct. 2006

Nov. 2006

Dec. 2006

Jan. 2007

The NPOESS program office plans to continue to address risks facing 

IDPS development. Specifically, the IDPS team is working to reduce data 

processing delays by seeking to limit the number of data calls, improve the 

efficiency of the data management system, increase the efficiency of the

algorithms, and increase the number of processors. The program office 

also developed a resource center consisting of a logical technical library, a 

data archive, and a set of analytical tools to coordinate, communicate, and 

facilitate the work of algorithm subject matter experts on algorithm 

development and calibration/validation preparations. Managing the risks 

associated with the development of the IDPS system is of particular 

importance because this system will be needed to process NPP data. 

Program Office Has Plans to 

Address IDPS Risks 

Page 41 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Different agencies are responsible for launching NPP and NPOESS. NASA

is responsible for the NPP launch and began procuring the launch vehicle 

for NPP in August 2006. Program officials expect to have it delivered by

July 2009, less than 2 months before the scheduled NPP launch in 

September 2009. 

The NPOESS Integrated Program Office is responsible for launching the

NPOESS satellites. According to program officials, the Air Force is to 

procure launch services for the program through DOD’s Evolved 

Expendable Launch Vehicle contract. These services are to be procured by

January 2011, 2 years before the first scheduled launch. 

NPOESS restructuring is well under way, and the program has made 

progress in establishing an effective management structure. However, key 

steps remain in restructuring the acquisition, including completing 

important acquisition documents such as the system engineering plan, the 

acquisition program baseline, and the memorandum of agreement 

documenting the three agencies’ roles and responsibilities. Until these key 

documents are finalized, the program is unable to finalize plans for 

restructuring the program. Additionally, the program office continues to

have difficulty filling key positions and lacks a programwide staffing 

process. Until the program establishes an effective and repeatable staffing

process, it will have difficulties in identifying and filling its staffing needs 

in a timely manner. Having insufficient staff in key positions impedes the 

program office’s ability to conduct important management and oversight

activities, including revising cost and schedule estimates, monitoring 

progress, and managing technical risks. The program faces even further 

challenges if DOD proceeds with plans to reassign the Program Executive 

Officer this summer. Such a move would add unnecessary risk to an 

already risky program. 

Launch Segment—NPP 

Launch Preparation Has 

Begun, while NPOESS 

Launch Planning Remains 

a Future Event 

Conclusions 

In addition, the likelihood exists that there will be further cost increases 

and schedule delays because of technical problems on key sensors and 

pending contract negotiations. Major program segments—including the 

space and ground segments—are making progress in their development 

and testing. However, two critical sensors have experienced problems and 

are considered high risk, and risks remain in developing and implementing 

the ground-based data processing system. Given the tight time frames for 

completing key sensors, integrating them, and getting the ground-based 

data processing systems developed, tested, and deployed, continued close 

oversight of milestones and risks is essential to minimize potential cost 

increases and schedule delays. 

Page 42 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program 

to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather and

environmental observations, we are making recommendations to the 

Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and to the Administrator of NASA 

to ensure that the responsible executives within their respective 

organizations approve key acquisition documents, including the 

memorandum of agreement among the three agencies, the system 

engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition 

strategy, as quickly as possible but no later than April 30, 2007. 

We are also recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air 

Force to delay reassigning the recently appointed Program Executive 

Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the NPOESS Preparatory 

Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled to occur by July 2008. 

We are also making two additional recommendations to the Secretary of 

Commerce. We recommend that the Secretary direct the Undersecretary 

of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere to ensure that NPOESS program 

authorities develop and implement a written process for identifying and

addressing human capital needs and for streamlining how the program 

handles the three different agencies’ administrative procedures, and 

establish a plan for immediately filling needed positions. 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Deputy 

Secretary of the Department of Commerce (see app. III), the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Networks and Information Integration of the 

Department of Defense (see app. IV), and the Deputy Administrator of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (see app. V). All three 

agencies agreed that it was important to finalize key acquisition 

documents in a timely manner, and DOD proposed extending the due 

dates for the documents to July 2, 2007. Because the NPOESS program 

office intends to complete contract negotiations by July 4, 2007, we remain

concerned that any further delays in approving the documents could delay 

contract negotiations and thus increase the risk to the program. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our 

recommendation to develop and implement a written process for 

identifying and addressing human capital needs and to streamline how the

program handles the three different agencies’ administrative procedures. 

The department also agreed with our recommendation to plan to 

immediately fill open positions at the NPOESS program office. Commerce 

noted that NOAA identified the skill sets needed for the program and has 

Page 43 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
implemented an accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA 

positions in the NPOESS program. The department also stated that the 

Program Director will begin presenting the detailed staffing information at 

monthly program management reviews, including identifying any barriers

and recommended corrective actions. Commerce also noted that NOAA 

has made NPOESS hiring a high priority and has documented a strategy—

including milestones—to ensure that all 20 needed positions are filled by 

June 2007. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the 

Program Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program 

Director responsible for executing the acquisition program would remain 

in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the 

Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between the Air 

Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that a selection would be made 

prior to the departure of the current Program Executive Officer to provide 

an overlap period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure continuity. 

However, over the last few years, we and others (including an independent

review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have reported that 

ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the NPOESS program’s 

cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that reassigning the

Program Executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing critical cost, 

schedule, and technical challenges will place the program at further risk. 

While it is important that the System Program Director remain in place to 

ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this position does not 

ensure continuity in the functions of the Program Executive Officer. The 

current Program Executive Officer is experienced in providing oversight 

of the progress, issues, and challenges facing NPOESS and coordinating 

with Executive Committee members, as well as DOD authorities 

responsible for executing Nunn-McCurdy requirements. Additionally, 

while the Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between 

agencies, the memorandum of agreement documenting this arrangement is 

still in draft and should be flexible enough to allow the current Program 

Executive Officer to remain until critical risks have been addressed. 

Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between the 

selection of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of the 

current one, time is running out. The current Program Executive Officer is 

expected to depart in early July 2007 and, as of mid-April 2007, a successor 

has not yet been named. NPOESS is an extremely complex acquisition, 

involving three agencies, multiple contractors, and advanced technologies. 

Page 44 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
There is not sufficient time to transfer knowledge and develop the sound 

professional working relationships that the new Program Executive 

Officer will need to succeed in that role. Thus, we remain convinced that

given NPOESS’s current challenges, reassigning the current Program 

Executive Officer at this time would not be appropriate. 

All three agencies also provided technical comments, which we have 

incorporated in this report as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 

Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this 

report will be available at no charge on our Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-9286 or by e-mail at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. 

David A. Powner 

Director, Information Technology 

 Management Issues 

Page 45 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program office’s progress in 

restructuring the acquisition; (2) evaluate the program office’s progress in 

establishing an effective management structure; (3) assess the reliability of

the new life cycle cost estimate and proposed schedule; and (4) identify 

the status and key risks facing the program’s major segments (the launch, 

space, data processing, and ground control segments) and evaluate the 

adequacy of the program’s efforts to mitigate these risks. 

To evaluate the NPOESS program office’s progress in restructuring the 

acquisition program, we reviewed the program’s Nunn-McCurdy 

certification decision memo and program documentation including status 

briefings and milestone progress reports. We also interviewed program 

office officials and attended conferences and senior-level management 

program review meetings to obtain information on the program’s 

acquisition restructuring. 

To evaluate the program office’s progress in establishing an effective 

management structure, we reviewed the Nunn-McCurdy decision memo 

for the program, as well as program documentation and briefings. We 

assessed the status of efforts to implement recommendations regarding 

the program’s management structure, including the work of the team 

responsible for reviewing the management structure under the NunnMcCurdy review. We also analyzed the program office’s organizational 

charts and position vacancies. Finally, we interviewed officials responsible 

for reviewing the management structure of the program under NunnMcCurdy, attended senior-level management review meetings to obtain 

information related to the program’s progress in establishing and staffing 

the new management structure, and interviewed program office officials 

responsible for human capital issues to obtain clarification on plans and 

goals for the new management structure. 

To assess the reliability of the new life cycle cost estimate and proposed 

schedule, we analyzed the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group’s (cost analysis group) cost estimating 

methodology and the assumptions used to develop its independent cost 

estimate. Specifically, we assessed the cost estimating group’s 

methodology against 12 best practices recognized by cost-estimating 

organizations within the federal government and industry for the 

development of reliable cost estimates. These best practices are also 

contained in a draft version of our cost guide, which is currently being 

developed by GAO cost experts. We also assessed cost- and schedulerelated data, including the work breakdown structure and detailed 

Page 46 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

schedule risk analyses to determine the reasonableness of the cost 

analysis group’s assumptions. We also interviewed cost analysis group 

officials to obtain clarification on cost and schedule estimates and their 

underlying assumptions. Further, we interviewed program officials to 

identify any assumptions that may have changed.

To identify the status and key risks facing the program’s major segments 

(the launch, space, data processing, and ground control segments) and to 

evaluate the adequacy of the program’s efforts to mitigate these risks, we 

reviewed the program’s Nunn-McCurdy certification decision memo and 

other program documentation. We analyzed briefings and monthly 

program management documents to determine the status and risks of the 

key program segments. We also analyzed earned value management data 

obtained from the contractor to assess the contractor’s performance to 

cost and schedule. We reviewed cost reports and program risk 

management documents and interviewed program officials to determine 

the program segments’ risks that could negatively affect the program’s 

ability to maintain the current schedule and cost estimates. We also 

interviewed agency officials from the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration (NASA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the 

NPOESS program office to determine the status and risks of the key 

program segments. Finally, we observed senior-level management review 

meetings and attended conferences to obtain information on the status of 

the NPOESS program. 

We performed our work at the NPOESS Integrated Program Office and at 

DOD, NASA, and NOAA offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area 

between July 2006 and April 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Page 47 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix II: Overview of Satellite Data 

Processing Algorithms and the Calibration Appendix II: Overview of Satellite Data and Validation Process 

Processing Algorithms and the Calibration 

and Validation Process 

Algorithms are sets of instructions, expressed mathematically, that 

translate satellite sensor measurements into usable information. In the 

NPOESS program, government contractors are responsible for algorithm 

development; the program office is responsible for independently 

validating the algorithms. Scientists develop these algorithms, which are 

then written as computer code to be incorporated into the interface data 

processing system (IDPS) operational system. The NPOESS ground 

system uses three primary types of algorithms: 

• Algorithms to develop raw data records “unpack” the digital packets 

received by the antennas/IDPS (the ones and zeros) and sent from the 

satellite, associate the data with the information about the satellite’s 

location and, finally, translate it back into the data it was when it started at 

the sensor. 

• Algorithms used to develop sensor and temperature data records allow the 

on-ground users to understand what the sensor saw. It translates the 

information from the sensor into a measure of the various forms of energy 

(e.g., brightness, temperature, radiance). 

• Algorithms used to produce the weather products called environmental 

data records (EDR) are crosscutting. They combine various data records, 

as well as other data, in order to produce measures useful to scientists. 

Additionally, EDRs can be “chained”—that is, the output of one EDR 

algorithm will become an input into the next EDR algorithm. To illustrate, 

cloud detection/mask is an important “base” EDR because many EDRs, 

like sea surface temperature, are only calculated when clouds are not 

present. Figure 13 shows the flow of the data and algorithms. 

Page 48 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix II: Overview of Satellite Data 

Processing Algorithms and the Calibration

and Validation Process 

Figure 13: Satellite Data Processing Algorithms 

A corollary to algorithm development is the calibration and validation 

process. According to a senior algorithm scientist, in this process, once the 

satellite has been launched, scientists verify that the sensors accurately

report what ground conditions are. For example, one EDR from the 

visible/infrared imager radiometer suite (VIIRS) is “ocean color.” Once the 

sensor is in orbit, scientists can compare the results that the VIIRS sensor 

reports on ocean color with the known results from sensors on ocean

buoys that also measure ocean color in select locations. Then, if the 

sensors do not accurately report the ground conditions, scientists can 

calibrate, or “tweak,” the algorithms used to develop sensor, temperature, 

and environmental data records to report on ground conditions more 

accurately. 

According to an agency official, fully calibrating a simple sensor once it 

has been launched can take approximately a year. A more complicated 

sensor can take 18 months to 2 years (see fig. 14).

Sources: GAO (analysis), NASA (images).

NPOESS End users

Algorithm 

step 1

Algorithm 

step 2

Algorithm 

step 3

Satellite observes earth 

and transmits raw data to 

ground receiver. Data is

time-sequenced and 

includes earth location.

Data records are compiled 

into environmental data 

records. 

Raw data records processed 

through second set of 

algorithms into sensor and 

temperature data records.

Raw data processed 

through first set of 

algorithms into raw 

data records. 

End users at the data

processing centers use data

records to develop derived 

products and as input for 

numerical weather 

prediction models.

Page 49 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix II: Overview of Satellite Data 

Processing Algorithms and the Calibration

and Validation Process 

Figure 14: Describes the High-Level Calibration and Validation Process 

Sources: GAO and Map Resources.

4. After the large level “gate” 

has been passed, the validation 

teams work down to figure out 

incrementally smaller errors in 

the sensors and algorithms. 

1. Scientists look at large– 

scale imagery and make 

sure things match up on a

large scale (e.g., ocean 

coast lines match up).

2. Scientists do an automated matchup 

of sensor output with globally available 

data sets (e.g., buoy readings, other 

space-born assets with known 

calibration and geo-location like 

NASA’s earth observing satellites).

3. There is “gate” criteria with various

key performance parameters while 

problems are traced back to their root 

causes. Fundamental problems with 

things that would impact the next Flight 

Unit design are passed back to 

contractors.

Page 50 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Commerce 

Department of Commerce 

 Page 51 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

 Page 52 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

 Page 53 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV of Defense : Comments from the 

Department of Defense 

 Page 54 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

 Page 55 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix V: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Appendix VSpace Administration : Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 

 Page 56 GAO-07-498 Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites
Appendix VI: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 57 GAO-07-498

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286, or pownerd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips, Assistant 

Director; Carol Cha; Neil Doherty; Nancy Glover; Kathleen S. Lovett; Karen 

Richey; and Teresa Smith made key contributions to this report. 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(310821) 
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