### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00138- CR
Larry De wayn e G arre tt, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 2 O F B ELL COUNTY NO. 2C13- 0717 6, H ONO RAB LE JO HN MI CHAEL M ISCH TIAN, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
L arr y Dewa y ne Gar rett appea ls from a conviction for violation of a protec tive order

. See Tex. Penal Code § 25.07. I n his sole point of err or, Gar rett contends that the evidenc e prese nted at trial was leg ally insufficient to support his conviction. Gar rett maintains that by fa i l i n g to introduce evidenc e specify ing under which statute, of those enumer ated in section 25.07 of the Texas Penal Code, the protec tive order was issued, the State did not prove all ele m en t s o f the offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt. We will affirm.
BACK GR OUND Gar rett was arr ested an d ch ar g ed by information with the Class A misdemeanor offe nse of violation of a protec tive order

. At trial, Marina Gar rett, L arr y ’s ex-wife, testified that on J u n e 26, 2013, following a hear ing, a Be ll County district court issued a protec tive order ag ain s t Gar rett for her pr otection.I n th e protec tive order , the trial court found that family violence had occur red and wa s likely to occur in the future

. Am ong its terms, the protec tive order provided that Gar rett was prohibited from g oing within 1,000 fee t of Marina Gar rett’s residenc e. Marina Gar rett testified that both she and Ga

rre tt had been pr esent a t the hear ing and t hat t he judg e had e x plained the ter ms of the order to them. Fur

ther, Marina Gar

rett testified that on September 13, she was awa kened in her residenc e by her dog barking

. Hea ring knocking at the front door, she looked throug h the peephole and saw Gar

rett standing on the porc h. Gar rett was c onvicted and sentenc ed to 180 day s’ incar cer ation in c ounty jail a nd a fine of $500. This appea l followed. I n one point of err or, Gar rett challeng es the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e in support of his conviction for violation of the protec tive order

. STANDARD OF REVIEW When assessing the leg al sufficie ncy of t h e evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court must view the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the verdic t and deter mine whether , based on that evidenc e and rea sonable infere nces there from, any rational trier of fac t could have found the defe ndant g uil t y o f al l o f t he elements of the offe nse bey ond a rea sonable doubt. Jack son v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Temple v. State , 390 S.W .3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Finley v. S t a t e , 4 4 9 S.W .3d 145, 147 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. g rante d). An infere nce is “a conclusion rea ched by considering other facts and d ed u cing a logic al consequence from them.” Hooper v . State , 214 S.W .3d 9, 16-17 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007).

2DISCUSSIO N I n his only point of err or, Gar rett contends that the evidenc e was insufficient to support his conviction beca use the State failed to prese nt any evidenc e demonstrating under which statute the protec tive order was issued. Sec tion 25.07 reads in re levant par t:
A person commits an offe nse if, in violation of

. . . an o rder issued under Chapter 7A, Code of Criminal Procedur e, an order issued under Article 17.292, Code of Criminal Procedur e, an order is s ued under S ec t i o n 6.504, Family Code, Chapter 83, Fa mily Code, if the temporar y ex parte order has been serve d on t h e p er s on, or C hapter 8 5 , Fa m ily Code, or an order issued by another jurisdiction as provided by Chapter 88, Family Code, the person knowing ly or intentionally

. . . .
Tex. P enal Code § 25.07. To obta in a conviction under section 25.07, t he S tate mus t prove, a s an element of the offe nse, that the violated order was issued under one of the statutes listed in section 25.07. Villarreal v. State , 286 S.W .3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ga r d n er v. State , No. 05-05-00750- CR, 2006 WL 1413098, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 24, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). Where the evidentiar y rec ord does not contain direc t evidenc e of the authority under which the violated protec tive order was issued, the protec tive order itself, when introduced into evidenc e, will support the conviction if a rational jury can “re ad the order as a whole [and] consider it in the context of” a statute’s provisions to find bey ond a rea sonable doubt that it was issued under the authority of that statute. Villarreal , 286 S.W .3d at 328; see also Hoopes v

. State , 438 S.W .3d 93, 95-96 (Te x . App.—Amar illo 2014, pet. ref ’d); Gaw v. State , No. 05-08-00463- CR, 2009 WL 5193931, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Dallas De c. 17, 2009, no pet.) (not desig nated f or publication).

3Her e, the protec tive order admitted into evidenc e at Gar rett’s trial trac ks the lang uag e and require ments of chapte r 85 of the Texas Family Code. The protec tive order specific ally states t h at fa m i l y v iolence had occur red and was likely to occur in the future as require d by section 85.001(a) of the Te x as F amily Code. See Tex. F am. Code § 85.001(a)

. I n its orde r, the trial c ourt mandated that Gar

rett enroll in a battering intervention and preve ntion prog ram, under the discretion g rante d it by section 85.022(a)(1)

. See id

. § 85.022(a) (1). The trial court did so afte r finding t hat “the protec tive order was nece ssary for t h e preve ntion of family violence,” a provision found in section 85.022(a)

. Moreove r, the order prohibited Ga rr et t , non-exhaustively , from “committing family violence” ; “communica ting direc tly with any Protected Person in a threa tening or hara ssing
manner ”; “communica ting a threa t throug h any person t o an y P rot ecte d Person”; “on the basis of g ood cause shown, from communicating in any manner with any Protected Person”; and from “g oing to or near [wit hin 1,000 fee t of Marina Gar rett’s residenc e],” all require ments under section 85.022 of a protec tive order

apply ing to a person who committed family violence. See id. § 85.022. The protec tive order ag ainst Gar rett was to run for two y ear s, the statutory duration established by section 85.025. See id

. § 85.026. Most sig nificantly , the protec tive order contained the verba tim wa rning lang uag e presc ribed in section 85.026. See id. § 85.026 (providing , inter alia, that person, other than peac e off icer , subject t o protec tive order may not possess firea

rm; no person may

g ive per mission to any one to violate or ignor e provision of protec tive order ; and commission of act p ro h i b i t ed by order may be punishable by

fine of up to $4,000, c onfinement in jail for up to y ear , or both). A jury could have rea sonably inferr ed fr o m t h e extensive share d lang uag e and simil arities between the protec tive order violated by Gar rett and the s tatutory lang uag e o f chapter

485 that chapte r 85 serve d as t he authority under wh i ch t he protective order was issued. See Gaw ,

2009 WL 5193931, at *5-6 (conc luding that protec tive order ’s inclusion of lang uag e simil ar to that of chapte r 85 was sufficie nt to establish that the protec tive order was issued under chapte r 85). We there fore overr

ule Gar rett’s only

point of err or.
CONCLUSION Having overr

uled Gar rett’s sole point of err or, we aff irm the trial court’s judgme nt.

______________________________ Scott K. Field, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice Rose, Jus tices Pemberton a nd Field Affir med Filed: Nove mber 10, 2015 Do Not Publish

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