U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General

A Review of the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation’s Initial Response 

to Representative Mark Foley’s 

E-mails to a Former Page

Office of the Inspector General 

January 2007

DRAFT
I. Introduction 

 This report describes the Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG) 

review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) response when it 

received e-mails sent by Representative Mark Foley to a former page with 

the United States House of Representatives. The e-mails contained 

comments from Foley to the former page, and comments from the page to 

a House employee to whom the page had forwarded Foley’s e-mails. 

Melanie Sloan, the Executive Director of a group called Citizens for 

Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), believed that the e-mails 

warranted investigation and in July 2006 forwarded the e-mails to the 

FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO), Northern Virginia Resident Agency 

(NVRA). An FBI agent in that office who reviewed the e-mails decided that 

the e-mails did not warrant any investigative action. The FBI did not 

inform CREW of its decision or take any additional action with respect to 

the e-mails. 

 In September 2006, these e-mails and other instant messages from 

Foley to other former congressional pages became public. Foley resigned 

from Congress on September 29. 

 On October 1, the FBI announced that it was opening a “preliminary 

investigation” into Foley’s e-mails with House pages.1 The following day, 

Melanie Sloan from CREW informed the OIG of her submission of several 

of Foley’s e-mails to the FBI in July, and she questioned why the FBI had 

not investigated them at the time. 

 Sloan subsequently sent a letter to the OIG complaining about the 

FBI’s public statements in response to public reports about the e-mails 

she had provided to the FBI. Several media reports reported that the FBI 

and the Department of Justice (Department) had said the e-mail messages 

CREW provided were “heavily redacted” and that CREW had refused to 

provide more information when asked by the FBI, factors that the news 

stories suggested contributed to the FBI’s decision not to investigate the 

e-mails in July. 

II. OIG Review 

The OIG conducted this review to examine the FBI’s actions when it 

received the Foley e-mails from CREW in July 2006. As part of this 

review, we interviewed Sloan, the Executive Director of CREW; the FBI 

 1 See, e.g., Charles Babington and Jonathan Weisman, FBI to Examine Foley’s 

E-mails, The Washington Post, Oct. 2, 2006; John Heilprin, FBI Examining Foley’s E-mails 

to Teens, Associated Press, Oct. 2, 2006. 
Special Agent and the Supervisory Special Agents at the NVRA who 

reviewed the e-mails in July 2006 and made the decision not to investigate 

them; a WFO Assistant Special Agent in Charge who reviewed the e-mails 

in October 2006; a supervising Assistant United States Attorney from the 

United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia who reviewed 

the e-mails in October 2006; and three FBI media officials. 

We also reviewed various documents, including the e-mails that 

CREW provided to the FBI in July 2006, a draft chronology created by the 

FBI’s WFO in October 2006 describing its response to the e-mails it 

received from CREW, e-mails between FBI employees regarding Foley’s 

resignation and inquiries from the media, newspaper articles concerning 

the information that CREW provided to the FBI, and documents regarding 

the Department and the FBI’s initiatives against the online sexual 

exploitation of children. 

Our review focused on two issues. First, we examined what the FBI 

did in response to the information it received from CREW in July 2006. 

Second, we reviewed the accuracy of the Department and the FBI’s 

statements to the media in October 2006 regarding these e-mails.2 This 

report describes the results of our review. 

 

III. Factual Chronology 

A. The E-mails from CREW 

Melanie Sloan, the Executive Director of CREW, told the OIG that on 

July 19, 2006, a CREW staff member received a set of e-mails that 

allegedly were sent by Foley to a former House page and then forwarded by 

the former page to an employee of the House of Representatives. Sloan 

said she did not know the age of the former page but understood that all 

pages were minors. 

Sloan said that a third person affiliated with an interest group other 

than CREW had received the e-mails from a congressional staffer and had 

provided the e-mails to CREW. Sloan stated that at the time she received 

the e-mails she did not know the identity of the congressional staffer who 

provided the e-mails to the interest group. 

The material that CREW received consisted of five e-mails from Foley 

to the former page and three e-mails between the page and an employee 

with the House of Representatives. The first of the five e-mails sent by 

 2 Our review does not examine the FBI’s current investigation into the Foley 

e-mails, which the FBI began on October 1, 2006. 

2
Foley indicates in the address header that it was sent on July 29, 2005, at 

11:00 a.m. The remaining four e-mails from Foley do not indicate when 

they were sent. The body of these e-mails from Foley to the former page 

read, in full, as follows: 

 

1) do I have the right email 

 Mark Foley 

2) glad your home safe and sound...we dont go back into 

session until Sept 5,,,,si its a nice long break....I am back in 

Florida now...its nice here..been raining today..it sounds like 

you will have some fun over the next few weeks...how old are 

you now?...

3) I am in North Carolina..and it was 100 in New 

Orleans...wow that’s really hot...well do you miss DC...Its 

raining here but 68 degrees so who can argue..did you have 

fun at your conference...what do you want for your birthday 

coming up...what stuff do you like to do 

4) I just emailed [name of page]...hes such a nice guy....acts 

much older than his age...and hes in really great shape....i am 

just finished riding my bike on a 25 mile journey now heading 

to the gym...whats school like for you this year? 

5) how are you weathering the hurricane..are you safe..send 

me an email pic of you as well 

On the face of the documents that were provided to CREW and 

subsequently forwarded to the FBI, it appears that the five e-mails from 

Foley to the former page were forwarded to another person, other than the 

House employee mentioned above, whose name is redacted. The former 

page’s full name is included in all five e-mails.3 

A second set of three e-mails provided to CREW and subsequently 

forwarded to the FBI are the e-mails between the former page and the 

House employee who had an e-mail address indicating she worked for the 

House of Representatives. 

 3 These e-mails, with names and e-mail addresses of the page and the House 

employee, and other information that is irrelevant, redacted by the OIG, are attached to 

this report. 

3
The first e-mail in this set is dated August 30, 2005, and is from the 

former page to the House employee. The e-mail starts as follows: 

Yeah. I have his personal e-mail. 

What happened was I gave certain people Thank-you cards, 

you know? I gave Foley one because he was a really nice guy 

to me and all. Then, he asked me to write my e-mail on the 

back of his. So I was like, “sure!” because of course I had no 

suspicions. 

In the same e-mail, the former page gives the full name of the person 

that Foley describes in his e-mail as acting “much older than his age” and 

being “in really great shape.” The former page describes this person as 

“just another page he [Foley] liked.” The former page goes on to describe 

some of the e-mails from Foley and his reaction, including the following: 

And this is the one about send him a pic: 

“how are you weathering the hurricane...are you safe....send 

me an email pic of you as well...” 

Sick sick sick sick sick sick sick sick sick sick sick sick sick. . 

The former page also mentions that another former House page, who 

he identifies by her first name, had previously told him “that there was a 

congressman that did hit on pages. She didn’t know his name. . .” 

In this e-mail, the former page also requests that the House 

employee “mention this to Rodney [Representative Rodney Alexander] so 

he is aware. I wonder what he would do about it. And if he wants to 

e-mail me or call me, you can give him my info if he doesn’t already have 

it.” 

The former page next comments in the e-mail that it is late and “I 

have freaked out enough tonight, lol.” The former page adds, “I still 

haven’t emailed him back, and I don’t think I will for a while, if ever. What 

do you think about it all?” 

In the second e-mail, dated August 31, 2005, the House employee 

sent the following one-sentence reply to the former page: “If you can, 

forward me the emails.” 

4
In the third e-mail, also dated August 31, 2005, the former page 

replies to the House employee: 

Ok. I am forwarding them now. 

Maybe it is just me being paranoid, but seriously. This 

freaked me out. 

But do tell me what you think about it all. I have one friend 

thinking I am being paranoid and the other saying that she 

thinks it is weird that he even asked for my e-mail, much 

more what he said. 

B. CREW Provides the E-mails to the FBI 

Sloan told the OIG that based on her prior experience as an 

Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Columbia who had 

prosecuted some sex crimes, she concluded that the e-mails contained 

information that warranted investigation by the FBI. Sloan noted to the 

OIG that the former page who received Foley’s e-mails was clearly upset 

and distressed about the messages. 

On July 21, 2006, the same day that Sloan received the e-mails from 

a member of her staff, and two days after Sloan said her staff member first 

received the e-mails, Sloan contacted an FBI special agent assigned to the 

Public Corruption Squad at the FBI’s Washington Field Office (WFO), who 

was stationed in WFO’s Northern Virginia Resident Agency (NVRA). Part of 

the Special Agent’s responsibilities was to serve as a liaison with federal 

watchdog groups and to encourage these groups to report to the FBI any 

information about potential criminal activity that they received. In 2003 

or 2004, the Special Agent had called Sloan and encouraged her to report 

to the Special Agent any suspicious activity that CREW might learn about. 

The Special Agent and Sloan had not spoken again until the call from 

Sloan in July 2006 to pass along the Foley e-mails. 

According to the Special Agent, when Sloan called she said she had 

“disturbing e-mails concerning a Congressman soliciting pages.” Sloan 

told the Special Agent that she thought the e-mails might involve criminal 

activity because all pages are minors, and Sloan wanted to “get the e-mails 

to law enforcement.” The Special Agent said she requested that Sloan 

send her the e-mails. 

Sloan sent the e-mails to the Special Agent, first by facsimile and 

then in a PDF document sent to the Special Agent’s e-mail account. After 

receiving the e-mails, the Special Agent said she called Sloan back to

5
confirm that the e-mails were from Congressman Foley. The Special Agent 

told the OIG that she questioned Sloan regarding the portions of the 

e-mails that had been redacted or underlined, and Sloan told her that the 

redactions and underlines were present when Sloan had received the 

e-mails, and that the FBI was receiving the e-mails in the same condition 

that CREW received them.4 

The Special Agent told the OIG that she believes, but is not certain, 

that she also asked Sloan to reveal who had forwarded the e-mails to 

CREW, and that Sloan declined to do so. However, the Special Agent said 

that she cannot be certain that her recollection was accurate regarding 

this point, because she may be confusing her recollection with an 

unrelated case.5

The Special Agent said she also asked Sloan for information about 

the House employee whose name was on the documents because the 

former page had forwarded the Foley e-mails to that employee. The 

Special Agent said that Sloan explained that the House employee was 

another page who was a friend of the former page who received the Foley 

e-mails. 

In contrast, Sloan told the OIG that she recalled that the Special 

Agent called her after receiving the e-mails and the only question that the 

Special Agent asked was whether the e-mails were between Congressman 

Foley and a page. Sloan said the Special Agent did not ask her to reveal 

who had provided the e-mails to CREW, did not ask any follow-up 

questions about the House employee whose name was in the e-mails, and 

did not ask any questions about the redactions. Sloan said that she did 

not decline to answer any questions that the Special Agent asked her. 

Both the Special Agent and Sloan said that this conversation was 

their last communication with each other about the e-mails. Sloan said 

she did not speak with anyone else at the FBI regarding the e-mails and 

Congressman Foley. 

 4 The e-mails appeared to have been forwarded to another person or persons in 

addition to the House employee. While the full name of the House employee was in the 

e-mails, the name and e-mail address of the additional persons to whom the e-mails had 

been forwarded were redacted. The e-mails also contained some handwritten underlines 

and brackets. 

5 In a written draft chronology of events prepared in October 2006 by another

FBI employee but which the Special Agent reviewed and approved, the Special Agent’s 

recollection is described as follows: “[The Special Agent] has a vague recollection of 

asking Ms. Sloan who she got the emails from and Ms. Sloan did not want to reveal her 

source.” 

6
 Sloan said that she reported the e-mails to the FBI because she 

wanted to “get the e-mails to law enforcement” and she believed that the 

FBI was best situated to investigate the matter. Sloan told the OIG that 

she thought the FBI would interview the former page to determine if any 

follow-up was needed. She said she did not believe it was appropriate for 

her to follow up on the matter by trying to talk to the former page herself. 

C. Review by the FBI’s Public Corruption Squad 

 

The FBI Special Agent who received the e-mails from Sloan said that 

she read the e-mails and concluded that the former page appeared “to be 

wierded out by it.” That same day, the Special Agent showed the e-mails 

to her supervisor, the supervisory special agent (SSA) in charge of the 

Public Corruption Squad at the NVRA. The Public Corruption SSA told the 

OIG he read the e-mails and thought “What a freak” about the 

Congressman. However, he concluded they did not fall within the 

jurisdiction of the Public Corruption Squad because they did not involve 

any allegations of public corruption, such as bribery or gratuities. 

The Public Corruption SSA directed the Special Agent to give the 

e-mails to the supervisor of the NVRA Crimes Against Children and Adult 

Obscenity Squad (Crimes Against Children Squad). The Special Agent said 

that because it was already around 6 p.m. on a Friday, she waited until 

the following Monday, July 24, 2006, to leave a voicemail for the SSA of 

the Crimes Against Children Squad. 

D. Review by the Crimes Against Children and Adult Obscenity 

Squad 

 

The NVRA Crimes Against Children Squad investigates adult 

obscenity crimes and non-Internet crimes against children, including child 

prostitution, child pornography, child sexual exploitation cases that are 

not Internet based, and international parental kidnappings. The Crimes 

Against Children Squad SSA has been the supervisor of this squad since 

September 18, 2005. She said that prior to this assignment, she had no 

previous assignments that related to sex crimes, other than her work as a 

police officer before joining the FBI. 

The Crimes Against Children Squad SSA was on annual leave on 

Monday, July 24, 2006. She received a copy of the Foley e-mails from the 

Special Agent when she returned to the office the next day. The SSA said 

she understood from her communications with the Special Agent that this 

matter involved a House page receiving e-mail messages from a 

Congressman and that the page was probably a juvenile. The SSA told the 

OIG that after reading the e-mail messages, it “was clear to me that there 

was no criminal violation” on the face of the e-mails. She acknowledged 

7
that the e-mails were “inappropriate” if they were sent from an adult to a 

child. 

The Crimes Against Children Squad SSA concluded that, because 

the e-mail messages were sent via computer, the appropriate squad to 

review the messages was the Cyber Crimes Squad in NVRA. 

E. Review by the Cyber Crimes Squad 

 1. Background of Cyber Crimes Squad 

The Cyber Crimes Squad investigates Internet fraud, theft of 

intellectual property, and online sexual exploitation of children. 

The Cyber Crimes Squad is supervised by an SSA. That SSA said 

that, generally, the online sexual exploitation of children matters her 

squad investigates are cases involving the distribution, production and 

receipt of online child pornography or “traveler cases” in which suspects 

entice children through the Internet to cross state lines to engage in sexual 

activity. The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA said that her squad’s cases 

generally do not come from referrals, either from the public or from public 

interest groups. The cases generally are referred by local law enforcement 

agencies or are generated by FBI agents working undercover in an online 

capacity. She said that the squad’s traveler cases are almost exclusively 

self-initiated by agents posing as children on the Internet. 

The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA said that she has ten agents assigned 

to her squad, but only two agents work full time and one agent works part 

time on investigations involving the online sexual exploitation of children. 

The remaining agents work on Internet fraud and theft of intellectual 

property cases. 

When the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA first joined the squad, the 

squad’s highest priority was intellectual property rights. She said that 

after the announcement of the Project Safe Childhood Initiative in March 

or April of 2006, sexual exploitation of children over the Internet became 

her squad’s number one priority. However, because of the emotionally 

difficult nature of sexual exploitation cases, agents on the Cyber Crimes 

Squad must volunteer to work on these types of cases and can only be 

assigned the cases after undergoing psychological testing. Thus, the 

Cyber Crimes Squad SSA said she does not have any other agents 

available to work on these cases. However, as explained in the following 

section, the amount of available resources did not influence the Cyber 

Crimes SSA’s decision on whether or not to conduct additional follow-up 

on the e-mails that the FBI received from CREW. 

8
The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA said that her squad has an 

approximate backlog of 30 unaddressed sexual exploitation complaints, 

which may or may not merit investigation but are not yet being pursued 

because she does not have the resources to address them. According to 

the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA, the majority of the unaddressed complaints 

involve allegations of possession of child pornography. 

2. Review of the E-mails by the Cyber Crimes Squad 

Supervisor 

On July 25, 2006, the Crimes Against Children Squad SSA 

hand-delivered the e-mails to the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA and told the 

Cyber Crimes Squad SSA that it was her understanding that the e-mail 

messages were between a Congressman and a juvenile. After reviewing the 

e-mails, they briefly discussed their belief that there was no criminal 

activity in the e-mails. They said they also discussed the possibility of 

assuming the former page’s identity on the computer and engaging the 

Congressman in a conversation. However, they both concluded that 

pursuing an assumed identity investigation was not viable because the 

e-mails had been written in 2005. 

The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA told the OIG that while she found the 

messages “odd,” she did not see any evidence of criminal wrongdoing. She 

said that she concluded, after reading the e-mails, that no further 

investigation was warranted. She said that in determining that no 

investigation was warranted, she relied in part on the fact that the age of 

consent in the District of Columbia is 16. She said that she was uncertain 

how old the former page was, but said she had a recollection that the 

Crimes Against Children Squad SSA had stated that the former page was 

16 or 17 years old.6 The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA stated that although 

the former page appeared to be bothered by the e-mails, as evidenced by 

his repeated use of the word “sick,” she believed that fact did not provide a 

basis for any further investigation. 

 

The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA also told the OIG that, “We only open 

a case if there is a reasonable indication that criminal activity has 

occurred or will occur.” She said that “There was nothing in this [e-mails] 

that warranted taking any action.” 

The OIG asked her whether the language in the e-mails could have 

been interpreted as “grooming” behavior that is employed by sexual 

predators. Typically, in this scenario, predatory behavior begins with the 

 6

 The Crimes Against Children SSA told the OIG that she did not know how old 

the former page was, although it was her understanding at the time that the former page

was a juvenile.

9
suspect using inappropriate language and then later builds up to 

inappropriate sexual communications and conduct. The Cyber Crimes 

Squad SSA responded that she did not view the content of the e-mails 

alone as constituting grooming behavior. She also told the OIG that she 

could not go forward with an investigation unless the e-mails contained 

explicitly sexual language. When asked to give an example of the type of 

language that would be sufficient to justify opening an investigation, she 

suggested language such as, “How big is your penis?” The SSA also said 

an enticement case had to be at a “substantial stage” before prosecutors 

would take the case for prosecution, such as evidence that plane or bus 

tickets had been purchased to enable the child to travel. 

 

The OIG asked the SSA if she would have viewed the matter any 

differently if the e-mail exchange had been between another authority 

figure and a juvenile, such as between a coach and a student. The SSA 

said no. 

When asked if there was anything in the e-mails that warranted 

notifying anyone outside the FBI of the e-mails, including anyone in a 

position of authority over the page program, the SSA also replied, “No.” 

She said she did not consider referring the e-mails to the local police 

because the local police are overburdened and there is only one person in 

the District of Columbia who handles these types of cases. 

The SSA also stated that these e-mails were “not the job of the FBI. 

This is a parental job.” The SSA stated that the FBI does not have the 

authority to investigate absent an indication that a crime has or may be 

occurring. The SSA said that for this reason, the FBI engages in outreach 

to raise parental awareness. She said that the FBI has to have a 

reasonable basis to believe a crime has been committed or will be 

committed before investigating because “we’re the big bad government.” 

The SSA stated that to do otherwise would be a misuse of FBI authority. 

She said, “In hindsight, I wouldn’t have changed my decision.” She added, 

“We are not the ethics police.” 

The OIG asked the SSA if her decision to not open the investigation 

was influenced in any way by the fact that the suspect was a 

Congressman. She replied, “No.” She also said that her decision was not 

influenced by the lack of any information about the former page’s identity. 

She said that she believed that the FBI had enough information from the 

e-mails provided by CREW to find the former page if the FBI had wanted to 

locate him. 

 

The SSA said that other than a brief discussion with the Crimes 

Against Children Squad SSA, she did not discuss her decision to decline to 

open an investigation with anyone else at the FBI at the time. 

10
 

After deciding no further investigation was warranted, the Cyber 

Crimes Squad SSA placed the e-mail messages in her in-box around July 

25, 2006. She said it was her intention to place the e-mails in a “zero” file, 

which is the name of an FBI file that is created to store information 

received by the FBI that it believes does not warrant further action. 

However, the e-mail messages remained in the SSA’s in-box and no further 

action was taken until she was contacted by her supervisor, a WFO 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge (the ASAC), on September 29, 2006, 

after Foley announced his resignation. 

F. Review of the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA's Decision 

 

 1. SAC Review 

The first information the ASAC received concerning any allegations 

of inappropriate communications between Congressman Foley and House 

pages was on Friday, September 29, 2006, the day Foley resigned. The

ASAC received a telephone call that day from the FBI WFO media 

representative asking the ASAC if he knew anything about an FBI 

investigation of Congressman Foley. The ASAC called the Crimes Against 

Children Squad SSA to find out if the FBI had received anything regarding 

Foley, and that SSA directed the ASAC to the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA. 

The ASAC spoke to the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA, who told him that in 

July 2006 the FBI had received e-mails sent by Foley to a former page. 

She reported to the ASAC that she had determined that there was nothing 

sexually explicit in the e-mails and that the matter did not warrant a 

criminal investigation. She also told the ASAC that she had put the 

e-mails in her in-box with the intention to place them in a zero file, but 

that the e-mails were still in her in-box. 

The ASAC also asked the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA to create a 

chronology of events outlining what information the FBI received from 

CREW and what the FBI did with this information. The SSA prepared a 

draft chronology and incorporated the comments of the Special Agent who 

had received the e-mails from CREW, the Public Corruption Squad SSA, 

and the Crimes Against Children SSA. In this draft chronology, the Cyber 

Crimes Squad SSA provided the following rationale for declining to open 

an investigation: 

[The Cyber Crimes SSA] reviewed the emails and discussed 

the content with [the Crimes Against Children SSA]. Based on 

the emails, [the Cyber Crimes SSA] and [the Crimes Against 

Children SSA] agreed there was no evidence of criminal 

wrongdoing. [The Cyber Crimes SSA] made this determination 

based on the content of the emails, her experience in IINI 

11
[Innocent Images National Initiative] matters, and her legal 

background.7 Specifically, for the following reasons: 

1. The emails were not sexually explicit. 

2. The emails did not discuss illegal or legal sexual activity. 

3. The emails did not contain language inducing or enticing 

an individual, regardless of age, to engage in sexual activity. 

In fact, the emails contained no language of persuasion or 

enticement to engage in any type of activity, criminal or 

otherwise. 

4. The emails contained no discussion of any past crime or 

potential future crime. No criminal acts were discussed. 

5. Emailing a minor is not a crime. 

6. Based on the facts provided, there was no reasonable 

suspicion any criminal activity had taken place. Thus, the 

FBI was not warranted in conducting further investigation and 

there was no basis to conduct an investigation, especially in 

light of the fact Ms. Sloan, CREW, refused to provide the 

identity of her source. 

7. The age of consent in the District of Columbia is 16. 

 

[Emphasis in original]. 

The ASAC told the OIG that upon his review of the e-mails and this 

draft chronology, he agreed with the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA’s decision to 

not open a criminal investigation. However, he said that, in accordance 

with FBI policy, the SSA should have promptly indexed the relevant 

information from the e-mails into the FBI’s Automated Case Support (ACS) 

computer data system when the e-mails were received in July. 

 

The ASAC said he told the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA that even 

though she had declined to open an investigation when she received the 

e-mails in July, she should have promptly had the relevant information 

from the e-mails indexed so that it would be entered into ACS. 

 

The ASAC said that he does not have any personal experience in 

investigating cases involving sexual exploitation of children, other than 

what he has learned by supervising the squad that conducts these cases. 

He said that he relies on the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA’s expertise in these 

matters. 

The ASAC told the OIG that he believed the FBI would have a moral 

obligation to notify someone if that person was at risk of being a victim, 

 7 Before joining the FBI, the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA was a lawyer in private

practice, primarily handling civil litigation. 

12
even if the FBI was not going to conduct an investigation. However, he 

said that it is not the FBI’s policy to make such a notification without 

proof. He said that the FBI did not have anything in the e-mails it received 

from CREW that provided adequate grounds to provide notification to 

anyone involved with the page program. 

The ASAC said that several officials from the FBI, the District of 

Columbia United States Attorney’s Office (D.C. USAO), and the Criminal 

Division of the Department of Justice met during the week following 

Foley’s resignation and decided to open an investigation into Foley’s 

conduct in light of the sexually explicit instant messages that had been 

revealed by ABC News in September 2006. The ASAC noted that no one at 

that meeting expressed any disagreement with the Cyber Crimes Squad 

SSA's previous decision not to open a criminal investigation based on the 

e-mails received from CREW, but he added this meeting was focused on 

the instant messages and not on the e-mails. 

2. Assessment of Decision by Assistant United States 

Attorney 

Patricia Stewart is the Deputy Chief of the Major Crimes Section of 

the Criminal Division of the D.C. USAO, the section that investigates and 

prosecutes federal crimes involving the online sexual exploitation of 

children. Stewart did not formally review or supervise the FBI’s decision 

on whether to pursue an investigation into the e-mails provided by CREW. 

However, D.C. USAO can be called upon to provide advice to the WFO 

Cyber Crimes Squad about whether an investigative lead is worth 

pursuing. The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA stated that if she had had “an 

ounce of question” in July 2006 about her decision to place the e-mails in 

a zero file without any further follow-up, she would have run her decision 

through the D.C. USAO for guidance. The SSA also said that after Foley 

resigned, she discussed the e-mails with Stewart, who endorsed the SSA’s 

July 2006 decision that no further follow-up by the FBI was necessary at 

that time. 

Stewart said that the majority of the federal Internet exploitation 

cases handled by the D.C. USAO Major Crimes Section are brought to her 

office by the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department Youth 

Division. She said that most of the online child sexual exploitation cases 

her office prosecutes are initiated by undercover police officers posing as 

children in Internet communications. 

Stewart said that prior to the resignation of Congressman Foley, she 

did not have any knowledge of the e-mails between Foley and the former 

page that the FBI had received in July 2006. Stewart said that had the 

FBI brought the e-mails to her in July 2006, she would have reviewed the 

13
e-mails in light of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which makes it a crime to entice or 

attempt to entice a minor to engage in illicit sexual conduct. She noted 

that illicit sexual conduct is defined by state law, and that if someone was 

trying to entice anyone age 16 or older in the District of Columbia, it would 

not be illegal. Stewart said she could not speak to the laws in other states 

where some of the e-mails may have been sent or received. 

Stewart said that the e-mails sent to the FBI by CREW indicated 

that someone was being made uncomfortable but, in her opinion, the 

Cyber Crimes Squad SSA appropriately decided that a follow-up call to the 

former page was not warranted. However, Stewart noted that the FBI 

could have conducted an investigation without the D.C. USAO’s 

involvement, although her office would not have assisted at that point 

without more evidence. Stewart also said that in her opinion the e-mails 

the FBI received in July did not rise to a level where notification to some 

other authority would be warranted. Stewart said that the instant 

messages revealed by ABC in September 2006 were sexually explicit 

communications and provided enough justification for both the FBI and 

the D.C. USAO to open an investigation, which they have since done. 

IV. OIG Assessment of the FBI’s Actions 

In this section, we examine the FBI’s decision not to conduct any 

follow-up regarding the e-mails it received from CREW in July 2006. 

Because this decision must be viewed in the framework of the law that 

criminalizes sexual solicitations of minors via the Internet, we first provide 

an overview of the relevant provision of the federal criminal code governing 

that conduct. 

A. Overview of Relevant Provision of the Federal Criminal Code 

Federal law governing the sexual solicitation of a minor via the 

Internet provides: 

Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate 

or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and 

territorial jurisdiction of the United States knowingly 

persuades, induces, entices or coerces any individual who has 

not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or 

any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with 

14
a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under 

this title and imprisoned not less than ten years or for life. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).8

The criminal code in the state or states where the conduct occurred 

would determine whether the sexual activity is one for which a subject 

could be charged with a criminal offense. Many states set the age at 

which a minor can consent to engage in sexual activity with an adult at 

less than 18 years old. Thus, it would not be illegal to solicit a person 

under 18 to engage in consensual sexual activity if that person were above 

the age of consent in the state where the conduct was occurring. 

From the information on the face of the e-mails provided to the FBI 

by CREW, it appears that they may have been sent either to or from 

Florida, North Carolina, Washington, D.C., Maryland, Virginia, Louisiana, 

Mississippi, or Alabama. First, Foley mentions in one e-mail that he is 

“back in Florida now” and in another e-mail that “I am in North Carolina.” 

Second, it is possible that Foley may have sent some of the e-mails either 

from Washington, D.C., where he had an office, or from his residence in 

the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, which includes the states of 

Maryland and Virginia. Third, Foley tells the former page in one e-mail 

that he is “glad your home safe and sound” and in a later e-mail asks “how 

are you weathering the hurricane.” The first e-mail Foley sent was dated 

July 29, 2005, and the former page forwarded the e-mails to the House 

employee on August 31, 2005. Because Hurricane Katrina occurred 

during that time period, it appears possible that the former page resided in 

Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama, the states most affected by Hurricane 

Katrina. The age of consent in those states ranges from 16 to 18 years 

old.9 

 8 On July 27, 2006, the penalties were increased from “not less than 5 years and 

not more than 30 years” to “not less than 10 years or for life”. See The Adam Walsh Child 

Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248 (2006). 

9 In fact, the former page was 16 years old at the time of the e-mail exchange with 

Foley. Three of the eight states from which the communications potentially were sent or 

received would have criminalized sexual contact between a 16 year old and Foley. See Fl. 

Stat. § 794.06 (providing that it is a second degree felony for a person 24 years of age or 

older to engage in sexual activity with a person 16 or 17 years of age); La. R.S. Ann. 

§ 14.80 (felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile is committed when a person who is 19

years of age or older engages in consensual sex with a person older than 13 and younger 

than 17 when the victim is not the spouse of the offender); Va. Stat. § 18.2-371 (providing 

that it is a misdemeanor offense for an adult to engage in consensual sexual intercourse 

with a child aged 15 to 17 to whom the adult is not married). The remaining states

established the age at which a person can legally consent to sexual activity with an adult 

at age 16 or lower. See Code of Ala. § 13A-6-70 (age of consent is 16 years old); 22 D.C.

Code §§ 3008, 3009 (age of consent is 16 years old); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-65 (age of

consent is 16 years old); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.7A (age of consent is 16 years old). 

15
B. OIG Assessment of the FBI’s Actions 

Upon receipt of the e-mails, the FBI Special Agent and the Public 

Corruption SSA with whom she spoke acted quickly and appropriately in 

forwarding the information to the FBI’s Crimes Against Children Squad. 

In turn, the SSA on that squad quickly forwarded the information to the 

Cyber Crimes Squad SSA, who she believed was the appropriate person to 

evaluate the information contained in the e-mails. 

The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA made the decision not to open a 

criminal investigation. She said that she did not find anything in the 

e-mails that provided “a reasonable indication that criminal activity has 

occurred or will occur.” The SSA also told the OIG she would not 

investigate any e-mail conversations between adults and minors unless 

the e-mails contained sexually explicit language. 

While the SSA’s squad has a large backlog of work, she said this did 

not influence her decision not to investigate the e-mails. Rather, she 

stated that she believed there was nothing criminal in the e-mails to 

investigate. 

After Foley resigned and the issue of his behavior became public, the 

WFO ASAC who supervised the Cyber Crimes Squad told the OIG that he 

agreed with the SSA’s decision not to investigate the e-mails or not to 

make any referral of the e-mails to the House authorities with 

responsibility for the page program. AUSA Stewart also agreed after the 

fact that no further investigation of the e-mails had been warranted. 

It is important to note that we found no indication that the Cyber 

Crimes Squad SSA’s decision to decline to investigate was influenced in 

any way by the fact that Foley was a member of Congress. Rather, the 

SSA said she relied on the fact that the e-mails lacked evidence of criminal 

activity. 

Based on our review, we believe that the SSA’s decision not to 

investigate the matter further did not constitute misconduct, and fell 

within the range of discretion that she was afforded in her position as an 

FBI supervisor. 

However, notwithstanding the FBI supervisor and AUSA’s opinions 

about actions they would have advised at the time, we believe that the 

e-mails provided enough troubling indications on their face, particularly 

given the position of trust and authority that Foley held with respect to 

House pages, that a better practice for the FBI would have been to take at 

least some follow-up steps with regard to the e-mails. Such action could 

have easily included a brief preliminary inquiry, with an interview of the 

16
former page. Alternatively, if the FBI did not think that such an interview 

was warranted, the FBI should have considered notifying the House 

authorities in charge of the page program about the concerns expressed by 

the former page. At the least, we believe the FBI should have notified 

CREW, the complainant in this case, that the FBI had declined to open an 

investigation. At the time, CREW was relying on the FBI to pursue the 

matter and as a result had not notified anyone else about the e-mails. 

We recognize that our assessment is made after-the-fact, when 

explicit instant messages and information about Foley’s behavior have 

surfaced. However, given Foley’s position of trust and authority in relation 

to the pages, the concern expressed by the page, and the troubling nature 

of the e-mails, we believe taking some action would have been the better 

course of action. 

In making this assessment, we note that Foley’s language in the 

e-mails fell within the type of behavior that the FBI warns against in its 

Parent’s Guide to Internet Safety.10 Foley engaged in conversations that, 

at a minimum, could be described as unusual between an adult in a 

position of authority and a juvenile. The former page clearly was troubled 

by the e-mails, describing them as “sick,” and stating that the e-mails 

“freaked him out.” It also was apparent from the e-mails that Foley was 

engaging in a similar pattern of communication with another House page. 

 Had the FBI taken the initiative, it could have easily pursued some 

limited investigative steps. The e-mails contained the full name and e-mail 

addresses of the former page who received the e-mails and the House 

employee to whom he sent the e-mails. In addition, the FBI had the full 

name of another page that Foley said he was e-mailing and that Foley 

 10 As part of the FBI’s Innocent Images National Initiative (IINI), which the FBI

launched in 1995 to target child pornography and online child enticement, the FBI

published A Parent’s Guide to Internet Safety (Parent’s Guide), which is available on the

FBI’s website. The Guide warns parents that while some offenders may use sexually

explicit solicitations, other individuals who attempt to sexually exploit children through 

the use of the Internet begin by using more subtle tactics. As the Parent’s Guide 

describes: 

Some of these individuals gradually seduce their targets through the use of

attention, affection, kindness, and even gifts. These individuals are often 

willing to devote considerable amounts of time, money, and energy in this 

process. They listen to and empathize with the problems of children. They

will be aware of the latest music, hobbies, and interests of children. These

individuals attempt to gradually lower children’s inhibitions by slowly 

introducing sexual context and content into their conversations. 

The Guide also warns that “[a]s part of the seduction process, it is common for offenders 

to send letters, photographs, and all manner of gifts to their potential victims.” 

 

17
allegedly “liked.” The Cyber Crimes Squad SSA acknowledged to the OIG 

that there was enough information in the original material she received to 

allow her to locate the former page who received the e-mails. 

However, the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA stated in her draft 

chronology of events that her decision to decline to investigate was 

justified “especially in light of the fact the source of the e-mails was not 

identified.” Yet, Sloan told the OIG that she was never asked to identify 

the source who forwarded the e-mails to CREW. Moreover, that 

information was not critical, because the former page who originally 

received the e-mails was identified. 

 In addition, even if the FBI did not believe any interviews were 

warranted based upon the e-mails alone, we believe the FBI should have 

considered taking some steps to ensure that any minors in the 

Congressional page program were not at risk of predatory behavior by 

Foley. The FBI could have notified the House authorities who ran the page 

program about the e-mails as well as the FBI’s decision not to investigate 

the matter. At the least, it could have informed CREW that the FBI did not 

intend to investigate the matter, so that CREW could take whatever steps 

it deemed appropriate.11 

Finally, as the WFO ASAC noted, once the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA 

declined to investigate the e-mails, she should have entered the 

information into ACS. This type of data entry is particularly important 

regarding potential allegations of sexual activity with minors because 

patterns of inappropriate contact with minors may be indicative of illegal 

conduct. 

In sum, we believe that the FBI’s decision to decline to investigate 

this matter was not misconduct. Yet, we believe that the e-mails should 

have raised enough concerns to warrant some action. At the least, the FBI 

should have ensured that supervisors of the House page program were 

aware of these e-mails, or informed the complainant that it was not going 

to investigate the e-mails and the complainant could therefore make such 

a notification. Finally, the FBI should have uploaded the information into 

its ACS computer system. 

 11 We also note that, in May 2006, the Department initiated Project Safe

Childhood, a program designed to protect children from sexual abuse and exploitation on 

the Internet. The project is led by the 94 United States Attorneys and includes the FBI. 

In addressing a Project Safe Childhood conference in December 2006, the Attorney

General noted the critical role that citizens play in this initiative by notifying law 

enforcement of any suspicious behavior. He stated that “[w]e must therefore train 

ourselves so that no lead will ever cross the threshold of a U.S. Attorney’s Office, local 

police precinct or advocacy center without some kind of follow-up and action.” 

18
V. Statements to the Media Regarding the Information CREW 

 Provided to the FBI 

In addition to reviewing the actions taken by the FBI in response to 

the e-mails it received from CREW in July, we reviewed the FBI’s 

statements to the media regarding its interactions with CREW. Because of 

information that appeared in several media articles, CREW complained 

that the FBI or the Department provided the media with false information 

about CREW’s referral of the Foley e-mails. According to some media 

reports, FBI or Department officials had stated to the media that CREW 

had provided the FBI with “heavily redacted” e-mails. According to those 

reports, the FBI asked CREW to go back to its source and ask for more 

information so it could follow up but CREW refused, which is why the FBI 

did nothing further at the time. Sloan alleged that these suggestions were 

false. 

 

To examine this issue, we interviewed three public affairs specialists 

for the FBI who had spoken to the media regarding the Foley e-mails after 

they became public in September 2006. We also reviewed the media 

reports regarding this issue. For example, an October 4, 2006, article on 

the CBS News website stated: 

The Justice Department told CBS News that in July, when 

Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) 

provided the “innocuous” e-mails to the FBI, they were heavily 

redacted. . .The Justice Department also said the FBI asked 

CREW to go back to its source and ask for more information 

so it could follow up, but CREW refused. That’s why the FBI, 

Justice said, did nothing further at the time.12 

Other news organizations carried similar statements attributed to 

either Justice or FBI or law enforcement officials, such as an article in the 

Washington Post on October 6, which stated: 

In subsequent days, unidentified Justice and FBI officials told 

reporters that the e-mails provided by CREW were heavily 

redacted and that the group refused to provide unedited 

versions to the FBI. One law enforcement official – speaking 

on the condition of anonymity to discuss an ongoing 

investigation – also told the Washington Post the FBI believed 

that CREW may have received the e-mails as early as April 

 12 See Beverly Lumpkin, Foley Probe Not a Jefferson Replay, CBS News, 

Oct. 4, 2006.

19
and that the group refused to tell the FBI how they were 

obtained.13 

We found that the statements attributed to the FBI and the 

Department about CREW and the Foley e-mails were not accurate. First, 

we found that the redactions in the e-mails, which the FBI learned soon 

after receiving the e-mails from CREW were in place when CREW had 

received copies of the e-mails, were not significant redactions. The only

redactions on the e-mails appeared to be the name or e-mail address of the 

person or persons to whom someone had forwarded the e-mails. However, 

no language in the body of the e-mails was redacted. Significantly, the 

e-mails still contained the full names of the pages and the House employee 

to whom the e-mails were sent. Moreover, as we described above, the 

redactions in the e-mail did not factor into the FBI’s decision to decline to 

investigate the matter. 

Second, we found that the FBI did not seek any additional 

information from CREW, other than the one follow-up phone call the 

Public Corruption Squad Special Agent made to Sloan after initially 

receiving the e-mails. The Special Agent told the OIG that, although she is 

not sure, she may have asked Sloan during that call to reveal who 

provided the e-mails to Sloan and that Sloan declined. The Special Agent 

remembered that she asked Sloan other questions which Sloan answered, 

including whether the e-mails were from Foley, whether Sloan knew 

anything about the redactions, and whether Sloan knew anything about 

the House employee whose name was in the e-mails. 

However, Sloan said the Special Agent never asked her at any time 

to reveal the source of the e-mails. Sloan told the OIG that the only 

question the Special Agent asked during this phone call was whether the 

e-mails were from Congressman Foley, to which Sloan said yes. 

 

Third, the e-mails were provided to CREW in July 2006, not April, 

and CREW sent them to the FBI within days of receiving them. 

The OIG was unable to determine from the interviews it conducted 

who was responsible for making these inaccurate statements to the media. 

The three FBI media representatives we interviewed said they do not recall 

making any of these statements to any reporter. However, we determined 

that two of the three media representatives mistakenly believed, probably 

based on incorrect information from the Public Corruption Special Agent, 

that the FBI had sought additional information from CREW and that 

CREW refused to provide it. This mistaken belief also was likely passed to 

 13 See Dan Eggen, Watchdog Group Disputes FBI’s Claims on E-Mails, The

Washington Post, Oct. 6, 2006.

20
other FBI spokespersons and Department spokespersons who discussed 

the Foley e-mails with the media. Thus, we believe these 

misunderstandings may have contributed to inaccurate information being 

provided to the media.

In addition, it appears that a misreading of the draft chronology of 

events prepared by WFO contributed to the inaccurate perception that the 

FBI requested additional information from CREW and CREW refused to 

provide it. The draft chronology stated that the Special Agent who spoke 

with Sloan had a “vague recollection of asking Ms. Sloan who she got the 

emails from and Ms. Sloan did not want to reveal her source.” The draft 

chronology also stated that the Cyber Crimes Squad SSA decided the 

investigation was not warranted “especially in light of the fact Ms. Sloan, 

CREW, refused to provide the identity of her source.” Whether or not 

Sloan declined to reveal the source who gave her the e-mails, the e-mails 

CREW provided contained the identity both of the former page who 

received the e-mails and two other potential witnesses. Further, we 

determined that this issue was not a factor in the FBI’s decision to decline 

to investigate the matter, notwithstanding the suggestion in the draft 

chronology. 

Finally, several news stories reported the inaccurate statement that 

CREW had the e-mails since April. We do not know who may have 

supplied the media with this inaccurate information. 

In sum, the OIG concluded that the information provided by the FBI 

and the Department inaccurately portrayed the information that CREW 

provided to the FBI, and inaccurately suggested that CREW’s actions were 

the cause of the FBI’s decision not to investigate the e-mails. We believe 

that the inaccuracies were caused by a misinterpretation of the description 

of events that was disseminated within the FBI and the Department, both 

verbally and through the written draft chronology of events, regarding the 

FBI’s actions in response to the e-mails it received in July. 

21
 APPENDIX