U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S RESPONSE TO AIR QUALITY ISSUES ARISING

FROM THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: WERE THERE SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 25, 2007

Serial No. 110–54

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S RESPONSE TO AIR QUALITY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE TERRORIST

ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: WERE THERE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS?

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U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S RESPONSE TO AIR QUALITY ISSUES ARISING

FROM THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: WERE THERE SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION,

CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 25, 2007

Serial No. 110–54

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JOSEPH GIBSON, Minority Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

JERROLD NADLER, New York, Chairman 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

DAVID LACHMANN, Chief of Staff 

PAUL B. TAYLOR, Minority Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

JUNE 25, 2007

Page 

OPENING STATEMENT 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 1

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, and Member, 

Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties ............. 9

The Honorable Anthony D. Weiner, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ....................... 11

The Honorable Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil 

Rights, and Civil Liberties .................................................................................. 28

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Christine Todd Whitman, Whitman Strategy Group 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 13

Mr. John L. Henshaw, Henshaw & Associates, Inc. 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 15

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18

Mr. Samuel Thernstrom, American Enterprise Institute 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 64

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 66

Ms. Tina Kreisher, Communications Director, U.S. Department of the Interior 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 85

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 86

Mr. David M. Newman, New York Committee of Occupational Safety and 

Health 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 88

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 90

Ms. Eileen McGinnis, Senior Vice President, Whitman Strategy Group 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 114

Ms. Marianne L. Horinko, Executive Vice President, Global Environment 

& Technology Foundation 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 115

Ms. Suzanne Y. Mattei 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 116

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 118

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties ............................................ 6

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, Chairman, Committee on the 

Judiciary, and Member, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 

and Civil Liberties ............................................................................................... 10

Page

IV

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE PRINTED HEARING RECORD

Material submitted by the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 

the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties ............................................ 150

Supplemental Submission from the Honorable Christine Todd Whitman, 

Whitman Strategy Group .................................................................................... 153

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from the Honorable Christine Todd 

Whitman, Whitman Strategy Group .................................................................. 158

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from John L. Henshaw, Henshaw & 

Associates, Inc. ..................................................................................................... 167

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Samuel Thernstrom, American Enterprise Institute .................................................................................................. 171

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Tina Kreisher, Communications 

Director, U.S. Department of the Interior ......................................................... 174

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Eileen McGinnis, Senior Vice President, Whitman Strategy Group .......................................................................... 175

Response to Post-Hearing Questions from Marianne L. Horinko, Executive 

Vice President, Global Environment & Technology Foundation ...................... 177

Substantive Due Process Violations Arising from the EPA’s Handling of Air 

Quality Issues Following September 11, 2001, June 25, 2007 ......................... 181

OFFICIAL HEARING RECORD 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BUT NOT PRINTED

The information that follows is material that was submitted for the official hearing 

record. The material is not printed in this printed hearing record but is on file with 

the Subcommittee and is also available at the specified links.

EPA’s Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and 

Areas for Improvement, by the Office of the EPA Inspector General at: 

http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2003/WTClreportl20030821.pdf.

This August 21, 2003 report by EPA’s Office of the Inspector General surveys 

EPA’s response to the attacks on 9/11 and the Agency’s failure to comply with its 

established regulations and responsibilities, particularly with regard to indoor air.

Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero, by Suzanne Mattei at:

http://web.archive.org/web/20041106175554/www.sierraclub.org/groundzero/report.pdf.

This report, by the former New York City Executive of the Sierra Club, analyzes 

the response of Federal and local authorities in the wake of 9/11. It provides important insight into falsely reassuring statements that EPA made to the public.

EPA Ombudsman Hearings Transcripts at:

http://www.nyenvirolaw.org/PDF/Transcript-EPA-OmbudsmanHearing-2-23-2002.pdf, and

http://www.nyenvirolaw.org/PDF/Transcript-EPA-OmbudsmanHearing-3-11-2002.pdf.

The EPA Ombudsman held two investigative hearings in 2002 at the request of 

Congressman Nadler to explore the accounts of people who were directly affected 

by the environmental consequences of 9/11. Transcripts of both hearings are provided.

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler’s Actions Regarding World Trade Center Air Quality 

on Testing and Clean-up of WTC Contamination at:

http://www.house.gov/nadler/wtc/cleanup.shtml.

This site provides information on Congressman Jerrold Nadler’s actions on testing 

and clean-up of contamination that resulted from the collapse of the World Trade 

Center. It provides a link to Congressman Nadler’s April 12, 2002 report on Lower 

Manhattan air quality, which documents significant evidence that EPA misled the 

public about the safety of air quality and made virtually no effort to ensure that 

City agencies complied with Federal laws designed to protect the public from hazardous materials. 

(1)

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S RESPONSE TO AIR QUALITY ISSUES 

ARISING FROM THE TERRORIST ATTACKS 

ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001: WERE THERE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS? 

MONDAY, JUNE 25, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m., in Room 

2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Jerrold Nadler (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Nadler, Wasserman Schultz, Ellison, 

Conyers, Scott, Cohen, Franks and King. 

Also present: Representatives Pascrell and Weiner. 

Staff Present: David Lachman, Subcommittee Staff Director; 

Kanya Bennett, Majority Counsel; Perry Apelbaum, Staff Director 

and Chief Counsel; Ted Kalo, General Counsel/Deputy Staff Director; Paul Taylor, Minority Counsel; Crystal Jezierski, Minority 

Counsel; and Susana Gutierrez, Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. NADLER. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Subcommittee 

on Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties will come to order. 

Today’s hearing will examine the question of possible substantive 

due process violations arising from the EPA’s handling of air quality issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

Before we begin, and mindful of the very strong emotions necessarily associated with the issues we will be looking at today, I 

would remind all those in attendance that the Rules of the House 

of Representatives do not permit demonstrations of any kind by the 

spectators. That includes holding up posters of any kind. The work 

we are doing today is very important. We have the opportunity to 

get answers to questions many people have been asking for nearly 

6 years. The Chair is determined to see that the work of the Committee will go forward and not be disrupted. I know that those of 

you have traveled so far to be here will agree with that goal. 

Before we begin, I’d like to extend a special welcome to a number 

of people who are here: to first responders John Sferazo, Marvin 

Bethea, Richard Volpe, Jim McGowan, Deputy Chief Jim Riches, 

and Michael Arcari; to family members, the family of Felicia DunnJones, Rebecca Jones, Joseph Jones, Sharon Alvarez, Rose Foti and 

Diane Horning; and to people who have been very active in the 

2

community surrounding the World Trade Center in the last 51⁄2

years, Kimberly Flynn, Jo Polett, Catherine McVay Hughes, Jonathan Bennett, Rob Spencer, Rachel Lidov, Sally Regenhard, Robert 

Gulack, Nina Lavin; member of the State Assembly from New York 

Linda Rosenthal; and Professor Glen Corbett. 

The Chair recognizes himself for an opening statement. Today 

the Subcommittee begins—let me say since the Ranking Minority 

Member is not here yet, he will be here in about 20 minutes, we 

will give him an opportunity to make his opening statement after 

he arrives between rounds of questioning. 

Before my opening statement, I want to ask unanimous consent, 

we are joined today by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner, 

who is a Member of the full Committee but not a Member of the 

Subcommittee. Without objection, the gentleman will be permitted 

to sit on the Subcommittee and recognized to ask questions of our 

witnesses after the Members of the Subcommittee have had the opportunity do so. Without objection. 

In addition to that, we are joined today by the gentleman from 

New Jersey Mr. Pascrell. Without objection, the gentleman will be 

permitted to sit on the Subcommittee and will be recognized for 5 

minutes to ask questions of our witnesses after the Members of the 

Subcommittee have had the opportunity to do so. Without objection. 

Today the Subcommittee begins its investigation of the possible 

substantive due process violations arising from the Environment 

Protection Agency’s handling of air quality issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

I want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for their willingness to participate. This hearing continues the work begun in 

the hearing chaired last week by New York’s junior Senator, Hillary Clinton, which also looked at the Federal Government’s failures in responding to the environmental crisis that resulted from 

the World Trade Center attacks. 

The hearing will examine whether the Federal Government by 

its actions violated the substantive due process rights of first responders, local residents, students and workers. Specifically, did 

the Federal Government itself, by responding inadequately or improperly to the environmental impact, knowingly do bodily harm to 

its citizens and thereby violate their constitutional rights, and if so, 

which government actors were responsible? We will look into what 

is known about the quality of the air versus what was communicated to the public and whether Federal Government ‘‘risk communications’’ properly communicated necessary and legal precautions. 

So why are we asking these questions about events that happened nearly 6 years ago? 

These hearings represent the first comprehensive congressional 

oversight investigations into these matters since the immediate 

aftermath of the attacks. Indeed, Congress and the American people have heard very little on the record from the key players in this 

controversy. 

Today marks the first time that former EPA Administrator 

Christine Todd Whitman has testified at a congressional hearing 

dedicated solely to the Federal Government’s response to the enviVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
3

ronmental and health dangers caused by the terrorist attacks on 

the World Trade Center. 

The heroes and victims of 9/11, and the families and workers 

who continue to live with the consequences of that environmental 

disaster, deserve to know the truth, to hear from the officials who 

provided the assurances on quality, and to learn why, and on what 

basis those assurances were made. 

Finally we must address the future. What can we learn from the 

government’s response? How will our government respond to future 

environmental disasters? The Administration seems to be headed 

in the wrong direction already. For example, the Administration 

has now mandated that public health communications during a terrorist attack be ‘‘coordinated’’ through the Department of Homeland Security, and it is developing standards for toxic clean-ups 

and national emergencies that may be weaker than current Federal 

standards. 

I represent the site of the World Trade Center and the surrounding communities. The World Trade Center collapse propelled 

hundreds of tons of asbestos, nearly half a million pounds of lead, 

and untold amounts of glass fibers, steel and concrete into a massive cloud of toxic, caustic dust and smoke which blanketed parts 

of New York City and New Jersey, and was blown and dispersed 

into surrounding office buildings, schools and residences. In addition, fires that burned for many months emitted particulate matter, 

various heavy metals, PCBs, VOCs, dioxin, benzene and other 

deadly substances. 

Tens of thousands of my constituents and others from around the 

country who responded to the call have already begun to suffer severe illnesses. I have unfortunately had to spend the better part of 

the last 5-plus years attempting to cajole the Federal Government 

into telling the truth about 9/11 air quality, insisting that there 

must be a full and proper clean-up of the environmental toxins remaining in apartments, workplaces, and schools that to this day, 

I believe, are poisoning people, and demanding that the government provide long-term, comprehensive health care to those already sick, be they first responders or area residents, workers or 

schoolchildren. 

In the 6 years since the attacks, we have accumulated a mountain of evidence that tens of thousands of those exposed, including 

10,000 firefighters, are suffering from chronic respiratory diseases 

and a variety of rare cancers. And the deaths of at least two individuals, James Zadroga and Felicia Dunn-Jones, whose families 

join us today, have been linked unquestionably by government 

medical examiners to World Trade Center dust. Nonetheless, the 

Federal Government still refuses to respond appropriately. 

The Administration continues to conceal and obfuscate its 

misstatements, its failure to follow applicable laws, and its failure 

to take standard protective actions in the days and weeks following 

the attacks. Even worse, the Administration still fails to protect the 

health of the community and our first responders. Whatever may 

have been noted at the time the evidence available today mandates 

action. 

The Administration’s continuing lack of response stems directly, 

I believe, from a desire to cover up its misstatements and misdeeds 

4

in the early days after the attacks. The Administration has continued to make false, misleading and inaccurate statements, and refused to take remedial actions, even in the face of overwhelming 

evidence, so that it would not have to admit it failed to follow applicable laws and to utilize basic precautionary principles in the 

first place. It continues to this day, to endanger the lives of American citizens, so it can deny that other White House concerns 

trumped its legal mandate to protect public health. That is why 

this hearing seeks to reexamine what happened back in the early 

days of September and October 2001. 

Following the attacks Administrator Christine Todd Whitman repeatedly assured New Yorkers that the air was ‘‘safe to breathe.’’ 

On September 14, 2001, the New York Times concluded from Administrator Whitman’s assurances that ‘‘tests of air and the dust 

coating parts of Lower Manhattan appeared to support the official 

view expressed by Federal health and environmental officials that 

health problems from pollution would not be one of the legacies of 

the attacks.’’

The EPA Inspector General found these statements were falsely 

reassuring, lacked a scientific basis, and were politically motivated. 

The IG said, ‘‘When EPA made a[n] announcement that the air was 

‘‘safe’’ to breathe, it did not have sufficient data and analyses to 

make such a blanket statement.’’

The IG called the EPA assurance, quote, ‘‘incomplete in that it 

lacked necessary qualifications and thus was not supported by the 

data available at the time.’’ She concluded that ‘‘EPA’s basic overriding message was that the public did not need to be concerned 

about airborne contaminants caused by the World Trade Center 

collapse. This reassurance appeared to apply to both indoor and 

outdoor air.’’

I believe the Inspector General was quite generous here. In a 

March 2002 White Paper, I detailed how EPA’s statements not only 

lacked sufficient data and qualification, but how they also 

mischaracterized what data they did have, withheld critical information from the public, and ignored a wealth of information available at the time that directly contradicted their assurances. 

The IG’s report described the process by which the White House, 

through the Council on Environmental Quality and the National 

Security Council, ‘‘. . . influenced . . . the information that EPA 

communicated to the public . . . when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones.’’ It concluded that, 

quote, ‘‘competing considerations, such as . . . the desire to open 

Wall Street, also played a role in EPA’s air quality statements,’’ 

close quote. Other observers have surmised that the cost of a proper government-financed clean-up of indoor spaces, given the scope 

of potential contamination, and concern about Manhattan real estate value may have been other ‘‘competing considerations.’’

These EPA statements and a series of subsequent EPA misdeeds 

lulled Americans affected by 9/11 to a false sense of safety, and 

gave other government decision-makers, businesses and employers 

the cover to take extremely perilous shortcuts, which did further 

harm. After making those initial safety claims, EPA continued to 

make materially misleading statements about air quality, longterm health effects and EPA’s alleged lack of jurisdiction for remeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
5

diating indoor contamination. EPA illegally delegated its responsibility to clean indoor environments to New York City, which in 

turn dumped that responsibility onto individual homeowners, tenants and employers who were completely unequipped to discharge 

that responsibility. 

EPA conducted indoor clean-ups in 2002 and later that the IG, 

EPA’s own Scientific Advisory Panel, and now the Government Accountability Office have all found lacked a paper scientific basis 

and failed to ensure the proper decontamination of tens of thousands of residences and work places. 

The response of other Federal agencies was similarly inadequate. 

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for example, 

failed to enforce workplace safety regulations on the ‘‘pile,’’ the 

same regulations that were enforced at the Pentagon where every 

worker was required to wear respirators, and nobody has become 

sick. OSHA allowed indoor workers to reoccupy workplaces that 

had not been properly tested and cleaned. FEMA refused to pay for 

testing and clean-up of indoor spaces, a cost that was much too prohibitive for most residents and small businesses. FEMA also denied 

payments to residents to stay elsewhere even when their homes 

were full of World Trade Center dust. 

New York City and State government officials followed suit by allowing reoccupation of buildings, including schools, that had not 

properly been tested and decontaminated; advising people to clean 

asbestos-containing dust in their homes and workplaces with a 

‘‘wet mop and wet rag,’’ illegal and unsafe advice endorsed by EPA 

and posted on its Website; and failing to enforce local environmental codes for worker protection. 

Based on EPA assurances, insurance companies refused to cover 

individual claims for proper indoor clean-ups, and building owners 

and employers citing the Federal safety standards did not properly 

test and clean the spaces for which they were ostensibly responsible. Hundreds of thousands of people, not wanting to imagine 

that their government could act with such reckless disregard for 

their safety, believed the false assurances and continued to work 

on the pile with inadequate protective equipment and returned to 

their homes, schools and workplaces that had not been properly 

tested and cleaned and have still have not been. 

Six years later we are just beginning to see the enormous consequences of these actions. Our government knowingly exposed 

thousands of American citizens unnecessarily to deadly, hazardous 

materials, and because it has never admitted the truth, Americans 

remain at grave risk to this day. Thousands of first responders, 

residents, area workers and students are sick, and some dead. And 

that toll will continue to grow until we get the truth and take appropriate action. 

Those false statements continue to the present. Administrator 

Whitman has said, ‘‘There has never been a subsequent study that 

disproved what agency scientists told us all along.’’ She omits to 

note that what Agency scientists and others told her was very, very 

different from what the EPA communicated to the public. 

A September 2003 statement of 19 EPA union local heads read: 

‘‘Little did the Civil Service expect their professional work would 

be subverted by political pressure applied by the White 

6

House. . . . These workers reported to senior EPA officials their 

best estimate of the risks, and they expected those estimates and 

the accompanying recommendations for protective measures to be 

released in a timely manner to those who need the information. 

The public was not informed of all the health risks. . . . This information was withheld . . . under orders of the White House. The 

Bush White House had information released, drafted by political 

appointees, that it knew to contradict the scientific facts. It misinformed. And many rescue workers and citizens suffered. Some 

citizens now face the long-term risk of asbestos-related lung cancer 

as well as other debilitating respiratory ailments as a result.’’

I want to conclude with a pronouncement made by then Administrator Whitman in 2001. She declared then, ‘‘The President said, 

’Spare no expense, do everything you need to do to make sure the 

people of this city . . . are safe as far as the environment is concerned.’’

It is my fervent hope that after some of the truth begins to come 

to light through these hearings, we will see that this promise made 

to the victims and heroes of 9/11 is finally kept. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nadler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JERROLD NADLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Today, the Subcommittee begins its investigation into possible substantive due 

process violations arising from the Environmental Protection Agency’s handling of 

air quality issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

I want to welcome our witnesses and thank them for their willingness to participate. 

This hearing continues the work begun in a hearing chaired last week by New 

York’s Junior Senator, Hillary Clinton, which also looked at the federal government’s failures in responding to the environmental crisis that resulted from the 

World Trade Center attacks. 

This hearing will examine whether the federal government, by its actions, violated 

the ‘‘substantive due process’’ rights of first responders, local residents, students and 

workers. Specifically ‘‘[d]id the federal government itself, by responding inadequately or improperly to the environmental impacts—knowingly do bodily harm to 

its citizens, and thereby violate their constitutional rights? And, if so, which government actors were responsible?’’ We will look into what was known about the quality 

of the air versus what was communicated to the public, and whether federal government ‘‘risk communications’’ properly communicated necessary and legal precautions. 

So, why are we asking these questions about events that happened nearly 6 years 

ago? 

These hearings represent the first comprehensive Congressional oversight investigations into these matters since the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Indeed, 

Congress and the American people have heard very little on the record from the key 

players in this controversy. 

Today marks the first time that former EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman has testified at a Congressional hearing dedicated solely to the federal government’s response to the environmental and health dangers caused by the terrorist 

attacks on the World Trade Center. 

The heroes and victims of 9/11, and the families and workers who continue to live 

with the consequences of that environmental disaster, deserve to know the truth; 

to hear from the officials who provided the assurances on air quality, and to learn 

why, and on what basis those assurances were made. 

Finally, we must address the future. What can we learn from the government’s 

response? How will our government respond to future environmental disasters like 

this? The Administration seems to be headed in the wrong direction already. For 

example, they have now mandated that public health communications during a terrorist attack be ‘‘coordinated’’ through the Department of Homeland Security and 

7

they are developing standards for toxic cleanups in national emergencies that may 

be weaker than current federal standards. 

I represent the site of the World Trade Center and the surrounding communities. 

The World Trade Center collapse propelled hundreds of tons of asbestos, nearly half 

a million pounds of lead, and untold amounts of glass fibers, steel and concrete into 

a massive cloud of toxic, caustic dust and smoke which blanketed parts of New York 

City and New Jersey, and was blown or dispersed into surrounding office buildings, 

schools, and residences. In addition, fires that burned for many months emitted particulate matter, various heavy metals, PCBs, VOCs, dioxin, benzene and other deadly substances. 

Tens of thousands of my constituents and others from around the country who 

responded to the call have already begun to suffer severe illnesses as a result of 

this environmental disaster. I have, unfortunately, had to spend the better part of 

the last five plus years attempting to cajole the federal government into telling the 

truth about 9/11 air quality, insisting that there must be a full and proper cleanup 

of the environmental toxins remaining in apartments, workplaces, and schools that, 

to this day, are poisoning people, and demanding that the government provide long 

term, comprehensive health care to those already sick—be they first responders or 

area residents, workers or school children. 

In the six years since the attacks, we have accumulated a mountain of evidence 

that tens of thousands of those exposed are suffering from chronic respiratory disease, and, increasingly, a variety of rare cancers. The sick includes 10,000 firefighters. And, the deaths of at least two individuals—James Zadroga and Felicia 

Dunn-Jones (whose family joins us today) have been linked unquestionably by government medical examiners to World Trade Center dust. Nonetheless, the federal 

government still refuses to respond appropriately. 

The Administration continues to conceal and obfuscate its misstatements, its failure to follow applicable laws, and its failure to take standard protective actions in 

the days and weeks following the attacks. Even worse, the Administration still fails 

to act to protect the health of the community and our first responders. Whatever 

may have been known at the time, the evidence available today mandates action. 

The Administration’s continuing lack of responsiveness stems directly, I believe, 

from a desire to cover up its misstatements and misdeeds in the early days after 

the attacks. The Administration has continued to provide false, misleading and inaccurate statements, and refused to take remedial actions, even in the face of overwhelming evidence, so that it would not have to admit that it failed to follow applicable laws and to utilize basic precautionary principles in the first place. It continues, to this day, to endanger the lives of American citizens, so it can deny that 

other White House concerns trumped its legal mandate to protect public health. 

That is why this hearing seeks to re-examine what happened back in those early 

days of September and October of 2001. 

Following the attacks, Administrator Christine Todd Whitman repeatedly assured 

New Yorkers that the air was ‘‘safe to breathe.’’ On September 14, 2001, the New 

York Times concluded from Administrator Whitman’s assurances that, ‘‘tests of air 

and the dust coating parts of Lower Manhattan appeared to support the official view 

expressed by . . . federal health and environmental officials: that health problems 

from pollution would not be one of the legacies of the attacks.’’

EPA’s Inspector General found that these statements were falsely reassuring, 

lacked a scientific basis, and were politically motivated. The IG said, ‘‘When the 

EPA made a[n] announcement that the air was ‘safe’ to breathe, it did not have sufficient data and analyses to make such a blanket statement.’’ She called this EPA 

assurance, ‘‘incomplete in that it lacked necessary qualifications and thus was not 

supported by the data available at the time.’’ She concluded that ‘‘EPA’s basic overriding message was that the public did not need to be concerned about airborne contaminants caused by the WTC collapse. This reassurance appeared to apply to both 

indoor and outdoor air.’’

I believe that the IG was quite generous here. In a March, 2002 ‘‘White Paper,’’ 

I detailed how Administrator Whitman’s statements not only ‘‘lacked sufficient data’’ 

and ‘‘qualification,’’ but how she also mischaracterized what data she did have, withheld critical data from the public, and ignored a wealth of information available at 

the time that directly contradicted those assurances. 

The IG’s report described a process by which the White House, through the Council on Environmental Quality and the National Security Council, ‘‘. . . influenced 

. . . the information that EPA communicated to the public . . . when it convinced 

EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones.’’ It concluded that, 

‘‘competing considerations, such as . . . the desire to open Wall Street, also played 

a role in EPA’s air quality statements.’’

8

Other observers have surmised that the cost of a proper government-financed 

cleanup of indoor spaces, given the scope of the potential contamination, and concerns about Manhattan real estate values, were other ‘‘competing considerations.’’

These EPA statements, and a series of subsequent EPA misdeeds, lulled Americans affected by 9/11 into a dangerously false sense of safety, and gave other government decision-makers, businesses and employers the cover to take extremely perilous short cuts which did further harm. After making those initial safety claims:

• EPA continued to make materially misleading statements about air quality, 

long-term health effects, and EPA’s alleged lack of jurisdiction for remediating indoor contamination;

• EPA illegally delegated its responsibility to clean indoor environments to New 

York City, which, in turn, dumped that responsibility onto individual home 

owners, tenants, and employers; and

• EPA conducted two so-called ‘‘indoor cleanups’’ that the IG, EPA’s own scientific advisory panel, and, now, the Government Accountability Office, all 

found lacked a proper scientific basis and failed to ensure the proper de-contamination of tens of thousands of residences and workplaces.

The response of other federal agencies was similarly inadequate. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for example, failed to enforce workplace 

safety regulations on the ‘‘pile’’ that it enforced at the Pentagon (where every worker 

was required to wear respirators and nobody has become sick). OSHA also allowed 

indoor workers to re-occupy workplaces that had not been properly tested and 

cleaned. FEMA refused to pay for testing and cleanup of indoor spaces, a cost that 

was much too prohibitive for most residents and small businesses. FEMA also denied payments to residents to stay elsewhere even when their homes were full of 

World Trade Center dust. 

New York City and State government officials followed suit by allowing re-occupation of buildings (including schools) that not been properly tested and decontaminated, advising people to clean asbestos-containing dust in their homes and workplaces with a ‘‘wet mop and a wet rag’’—illegal and unsafe advice endorsed by EPA 

and posted on its website—and failing to enforce local environmental codes for worker protection. 

Based on EPA assurances, insurance companies refused to cover individual claims 

for proper indoor cleanups. And building owners and employers, citing the federal 

safety statements, did not properly test and clean the spaces for which they were 

ostensibly responsible. 

Finally, hundreds of thousand of people, not wanting to imagine that their government could act with such reckless disregard for their welfare, believed the false assurances, and continued to work on the pile with inadequate Personal Protective 

Equipment and returned to their homes, schools and workplaces that had not been 

properly tested and cleaned—and have still not been. 

Six years later, we are just beginning to see the enormous consequences of these 

actions. Our government has knowingly exposed thousands of American citizens unnecessarily to deadly hazardous materials. And because it has never admitted the 

truth, Americans remain at grave risk to this day. Thousands of first-responders, 

residents, area workers and students are sick, and some are dead, and that toll will 

continue to grow until we get the truth and take appropriate action. 

Those false statements continue to the present. Ms. Whitman herself has rationalized the White House’s soft-peddling of risk in EPA statements, proclaiming to 

Newsweek in 2003 that she did not object to the White House changing her press 

releases and that, ‘‘the public wasn’t harmed by the White House’s decision to adopt 

the more reassuring analysis.’’ Even now, they try to rewrite history, arguing, for 

example, that their reassuring statements were ‘‘only talking about air on the ‘pile,’ 

not in the surrounding neighborhoods’’ or that they were ‘‘only talking about outdoor, not indoor air’’ or that they had ‘‘always told residents to get their homes professionally cleaned.’’ The IG reached a different conclusion, and the statements 

speak for themselves. Governor Whitman has even gone so far as to blame the victims themselves for their illnesses. 

Administrator Whitman has said, ‘‘There has never been a subsequent study that 

disproved what agency scientists told us all along.’’ She omits to note that what 

agency scientists and others told her, was very, very different from what she communicated to the public. A September, 2003 statement of 19 EPA union local heads 

reads:

Little did the Civil Service expect that their professional work would be subverted by political pressure applied by the White House. . . . These workers reported to senior EPA officials their best estimate of the risks, and they expected 

9

those estimates and the accompanying recommendations for protective measures to be released in a timely manner to those who need the information. The 

public was not informed of all the health risks. . . . This information was withheld . . . under orders of the White House. The Bush White House had information released, drafted by political appointees, that it knew to contradict the 

scientific facts. It misinformed. And many rescue workers and citizens suffered. 

Some citizens now face the long-term risk of asbestos-related lung cancer as 

well as other debilitating respiratory ailments as a result.

I want to conclude with a pronouncement made by then-Administrator Whitman 

in September 2001. She declared then, ‘‘The President has said, ‘Spare no expense, 

do everything you need to do to make sure the people of this City . . . are safe as 

far as the environment is concerned.’’

It is my fervent hope that after some of the truth begins to come to light through 

these hearings; we will see that this promise, made to the victims and heroes of 9/

11, is finally kept. 

Thank you.

Mr. NADLER. Please, no demonstrations, including applause. 

Since the Ranking Member is not here, as I stated before, we will 

postpone his opening statement. 

Normally in the interest of proceeding to our witnesses—we will 

have apparently two opening statements right now, first from the 

Chairman of the full Committee, the distinguished gentleman from 

Michigan Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Nadler. 

I come here in full recognition of the importance and gravity of 

this hearing, and I begin by welcoming the witnesses of which 

there are quite a few. But to begin with, it is important that we 

extend a welcome, as the Chairman Nadler will, to Governor Christine Todd Whitman, the former Administrator of EPA. 

We thank you very much for your appearance here today and the 

discussion that we are going to have. 

This isn’t a courtroom, although most of the people might be lawyers. We want to try to get at the bottom of a very important historical question, obviously. And the reason I start off by welcoming 

you is that it would not be inappropriate to notice that you, at 

times when you felt it necessary, have been an independent voice 

in discharging your responsibilities not only as the Governor, but 

as the director or Administrator of EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency. And so we thank you for coming. 

This will probably be the most important hearing that we will 

hear, and it is appropriate that you know that there—with Chairman Nadler, he has a very direct and vital connection to this terrible tragedy. His constituents were involved. He’s represented the 

City of New York and the State of New York across a great number 

of years, and so we think that that is extremely important. 

I would also like to thank the former Administrator of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA, Mr. John 

Henshaw, who is sitting at the witness table as well. I want to 

thank you, sir, personally for the cooperation you have extended 

the Committee, which leads us to the best way that we can get at 

what happened. 

Now, September 11, 2001, indelibly imprinted in the history of 

this country by reason of the fact that terrorists flew two hijacked 

commercial jets into the World Trade Center Towers in New York. 

Almost 3,000 people were killed by the terrorists in the collapse of 

the towers, including hundreds of first responders, police officers 

10

and firefighters. Beyond the devastating loss of life, when the towers collapsed, numerous hazardous substances were released into 

the environment. 

It also is appropriate to say that our attitude as a Nation toward 

the enemies of this country were automatically changed at the 

same time in a hugely dramatic way. And so we’re here to reexamine it, and I have to comment on some of the theories that have 

been advanced to me across the years about this, which we need 

not recount now, but this has moved into the psyche of almost all 

of the citizens of this country. 

And so evidence accumulated since the collapse of the World 

Trade Center under this attack indicates that the air exposure to 

these hazards have caused serious physical injury and death. 

That’s probably the first thing we want to examine. Those who relied on statements that the air was safe and the instructions for 

insufficient clean-up of the indoor spaces have created serious results following that. 

There’s been a lot of injuries and deaths and suffering and family 

misery that has been caused as a result of the actual dastardly attack on this country. This oversight hearing of the Constitution 

Subcommittee gives us and the American people the first opportunity to try to establish what really happened, and we are looking 

for an honest revelation of the circumstances and the relationships 

between EPA and the White House, through the Council on Environmental Quality and the National Security Council, and other activities between them that will be inquired into. 

It’s very important to me that all of our witnesses’ testimony be 

as candid as it possibly can be under the circumstances. We’re here 

to learn, we’re here to find out what happened, we’re here to put 

to rest some of the misunderstandings that have occurred. And we 

are counting on our witnesses, beginning with Governor Whitman 

and Mr. Henshaw and those others—I think there are six more on 

panel two—to help us make history right by us proceeding with an 

inquiry that is long overdue. 

But I commend the Chairman and even the Ranking Member in 

his absence, and I am hoping he will appear shortly, for the way 

they have constructed today’s activity, and I thank the Chairman 

and congratulate him for his hard work. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conyers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN CONYERS, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND

CIVIL LIBERTIES

On September 11, 2001, nearly 3,000 Americans lost their lives in a series of terrorist attacks, one of which caused the collapse of the World Trade Center. As a Nation, we collectively shared the pain and suffering of the victims and the survivors 

of these horrific attacks. 

Sadly, there continues to be further casualties of this national tragedy. The collapse of the World Trade Center spewed numerous toxic chemicals into the air, 

which was then inhaled by the brave rescuers and clean-up personnel as well as 

the men, women and children living in the surrounding area. Already, many of 

these individuals have developed life-threatening illnesses as a result of their exposure to these chemicals. 

Our Nation’s air quality watchdog, the Environmental Protection Agency, however, may not have accurately assessed the extent of the hazard these airborne toxVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
11

ins presented to the public. Indeed, the allegations go beyond that the EPA acted 

negligently. 

While the EPA assured members of the public that the air was safe and that they 

could return to their homes, jobs, and schools, there is accumulating evidence that 

the available science did not support those statements and may have actually contradicted them. 

The EPA’s Inspector General found that the Agency’s press releases and reports 

were altered to downplay or conceal the breadth of the environmental hazard and 

health consequences. In addition, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 

of New York recently held that the EPA’s actions violated the public’s due process 

rights. Noting that the EPA’s actions were ‘‘conscience-shocking,’’ the court found 

that the Agency ‘‘affirmatively took actions that increased or created dangers’’ to the 

public. 

Although the terrorists bear the ultimate responsibility for the September 11th 

attacks, it is the duty of our government to protect the public and to assist those 

whose lives have been affected by a catastrophe. Unfortunately, the government’s 

failures here have compounded, rather than lessened the impact of the September 

11th attacks. 

Today, we have the opportunity to assess the EPA’s response to the lingering 

health hazards presented by these attacks. It is my hope that the witnesses will 

shed light on the facts and circumstances of the Agency’s actions and respond to 

these very serious allegations. Understandably, there has been much speculation as 

to why the EPA acted as it did, but the American public, particularly those who 

work and live in New York City deserve the truth.

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I am told that Mr. Weiner wanted to have an opening statement. 

Without objection—do any of the other Members of the Subcommittee want an opening statement first? 

Fine. Without objection, Mr. Weiner will be recognized for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. WEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won’t take much time. 

I first want to begin by offering my thanks and the thanks of our 

whole city to you, Mr. Chairman. Shortly after the events of September 11, there began to be many people who sought to gloss over 

the challenges our city in Lower Manhattan faced. You were not 

one of them. You confronted the danger that was quite literally in 

the air and have not given up your quest to get to the bottom of 

it. 

Today I also want to welcome Governor Whitman, the EPA Administrator, here today. We will get to hear two voices, and maybe 

even more, from the EPA Administrator. We heard the public assurances in the days after September 11; the assurances, for example, on September 13, in the EPA press release that the air quality 

is ‘‘unlikely to cause significant health effects, and the EPA is 

greatly relieved to have learned there appears to be no significant 

levels of asbestos dust in the air in New York City.’’ We heard the 

EPA say on the 16th, air asbestos levels ‘‘cause us no concern.’’ 

September 18: ‘‘I, the EPA administer, am glad to reassure the people of New York and Washington, D.C., that the air is safe to 

breathe.’’ Those quotes were unambiguous, they were reassuring, 

and they were dead wrong. They were literally dead wrong. We 

know they were deadly because many of my constituents and some 

people in this audience are dying because they believed those assurances. 

We also know they were wrong because the IG has said they 

were wrong. A Federal district court went so far as to say Whitman’s deliberate and misleading statements made to the press 

where she reassured the public that the air was safe to breathe 

12

around Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn and that there would be no 

health risk presented to those returning to the areas shocked the 

conscience. 

We also know they were wrong because the EPA knew they were 

wrong at the time you, Madam Governor, stated them. At the point 

that those decisions were made, those statements were made, 25 

percent of all the dust samples taken by the EPA had already 

shown to have unsafe levels of asbestos. 

But now there is a second voice emerging from the former Administrator, after shouting from rooftops in the days after September 11 that the air was safe, now there are statements that, 

well, in fact, I, the EPA Administrator, was quietly whispering into 

the ear of city officials, saying, don’t believe what I say publicly, 

only believe that it is unsafe; go out and make sure your workers 

protect themselves. 

It looks very honestly like what it is, an unseemly attempt to rewrite the public record, to rewrite it in a way that effectively covers 

one person’s responsibility and moves it to someone else. Make no 

mistake, this is a national responsibility. This was an attack on us, 

the United States, not one neighborhood, not two buildings. It was 

an attack on the United States. 

It is the responsibility of the Federal Government to act now, 

and it is not too late. It is too late for some that stood on that pile 

and believed what they heard their highest government officials 

say, but it is not too late for the Federal Government to finally step 

up and say, we did wrong then, there were pressures on us that 

were unimaginable, but now is the time for us to start taking care 

of the health of the people who believed what we said. 

There was an environment in the period after September 11 

where many things that were told to us by our government turned 

out to be wrong. Slowly but surely, like an onion peeling away, we 

are learning more and more of them. Perhaps none were so damaging to the health and lives of the people in New York City than 

the ones made by our witness here today. We cannot continue this 

effort to say I said, he said, she said. Now is the time to accept responsibility, so finally the people who are harmed by those statements, harmed by those misjudgments, harmed by that mismanagement can finally reach some closure on the facts and get 

some opening on true health care for their families. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit opening statements for inclusion in the record. 

Without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare a recess of the hearing if necessary at any time. 

We will now turn to our first panel of witnesses. As we ask questions of our witnesses, the Chair will recognize Members in the 

order of their seniority on the Subcommittee, alternating between 

Majority and Minority, provided that the Member is present when 

his or her turn arrives. Members who are not present when their 

turn begins will be recognized after the other Members have had 

the opportunity to ask their questions. The Chair reserves the right 

to accommodate a Member who is unavoidably late or is only able 

to be with us for a short time. 

13

Our first witness is the Honorable Christine Todd Whitman. 

Christine Todd Whitman served as Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under President George W. Bush 

from 2001 to 2003. Before that she served for 7 years as Governor 

of New Jersey. Governor Whitman is now the president of the William—I’m sorry, Whitman Strategy Group, a consulting firm that 

specializes in government relations and environmental and energy 

issues. 

Our next witness is John Henshaw. Mr. Henshaw was nominated 

by President Bush and was confirmed by the Senate in 2001 to 

head the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Prior to 

becoming the OSHA Administrator, he served as director, environment safety and health for Astaris, LLC. He was also the director 

of environment safety and health for Solutia, Inc.; corporate director, quality and compliance assurance, from Monsanto Company. 

He is now president of Henshaw & Associates, Inc., a safety and 

health professional services firm of Florida. 

Your written statements will be made part of the record in its 

entirety. I would ask that you now summarize your testimony in 

5 minutes, if you can. To help you stay within that time there is 

a timing light at your table. When 1 minute remains, the light will 

switch from green to yellow, and red when the 5 minutes are up. 

I will be a little lenient on the timing. 

It is our custom in this Committee to swear the witness, so will 

the two witnesses please stand? I ask you to raise your right hand 

to take the oath. 

[witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. NADLER. Let the record reflect the witnesses responded in 

the affirmative. 

You may be seated. 

Governor, you may proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, 

WHITMAN STRATEGY GROUP 

Ms. WHITMAN. I appreciate this opportunity to respond, to discuss the Environmental Protection Agency’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It’s been nearly 6 years since 

two planes flew into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, 

yet not a day goes by that I don’t think of friends that we all lost 

and the grief, despair and helplessness we felt as a Nation. 

It is important to remember that many of the EPA personnel saw 

the planes hit knowing they had friends and relatives in those 

buildings. Yet within hours of those attacks, EPA officials were on 

the site collecting test data on potential environmental contaminants in order to assist New York City and the public. 

In the early days EPA officials were monitoring for contaminants 

around Ground Zero without the benefits of electricity, surrounded 

by firefighting crews in the midst of desperate rescue operations. 

They deserve our respect and our appreciation. 

On September 11, the President issued the declaration of emergency triggering the Federal response plan, which assigned lead 

Federal authority to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 

FEMA then charged EPA with the responsibility of supporting the 

14

city’s response to any discharge of hazardous materials as a result 

of the attacks. 

EPA immediately began collecting air, water and bulk dust samples for testing. By 2003, EPA had taken over 25,000 test samples, 

consisting of nearly 227,000 individual measurements of almost 

700 contaminants. The EPA also performed other emergency response functions, such as the removal of hazardous waste, monitoring environmental conditions at landfills receiving debris from 

the World Trade Center, assisting the FBI in the recovery of evidence and remains, as well as constructing and operating wash stations near Ground Zero for both vehicles and personnel. 

Within days of the attack, EPA took the initiative to secure critical protective gear for rescue and recovery personnel and in all 

provided them with 22,000 respirators, 13,000 safety glasses, 1,000 

hard hats. 

After I left the Agency in 2003, the Inspector General confirmed 

that the EPA fulfilled its mandate to support New York City. While 

understandably finding areas for improvement, she publicly stated, 

and I quote, ‘‘EPA did a really good job.’’

Mr. Chairman, I fully appreciate that the events of 9/11 touch 

raw emotions, but I am disappointed in the misinformation, innuendo and outright falsehoods that have characterized public discussion about EPA in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. EPA’s extreme critics have alleged that I knowingly misled New Yorkers 

and the workers of Ground Zero about the safety risks associated 

with environmental contamination. This destructive and incendiary 

charge was investigated by EPA’s Inspector General, who confirmed in her 2003 report that we did not conceal any of our test 

data from the public. 

In fact, within days of the 9/11 report, I authorized EPA to post 

all the test data, all of it, on a public Website. I did so precisely 

because I wanted to be as transparent to the public as possible. 

Statements that EPA officials made after 9/11 were based on the 

judgment of experienced environmental and health professionals at 

EPA, OSHA and the CDC who had analyzed the test data that 13 

different organizations and agencies were collecting in Lower Manhattan. 

I do not recall any EPA scientist or experts responsible for reviewing this data ever advising me that the test data from Lower 

Manhattan showed that the air or water posed long-term health 

risks for the general public. 

With respect to the immediate area where the towers fell, however, the data revealed, and we publicly reported, that the air was 

different than in the rest of Manhattan. As these charts over here 

show, in the weeks following the attacks, EPA officials repeatedly 

warned of the risk to workers at Ground Zero and noticed the difference between air quality at the site and the air in the rest of 

New York. I and other EPA officials publicly urged rescue and recovery workers to wear protective gear that EPA had secured for 

their use at Ground Zero. 

The EPA also advised workers at Ground Zero of the proper 

washing procedures for their clothes and equipment. In fact, on 

September 11, only hours after the attack, EPA officials prepared 

this flier that I would direct your attention to for distribution by 

15

FEMA to rescue and recovery workers at the site. As you can see, 

Mr. Chairman, the flier informed workers of the risk of asbestos 

exposure caused by the collapse and cautioned workers to use protective equipment, including appropriate eyeglasses, respirators 

and protective clothing. It also urged proper cleaning procedures 

for clothing and equipment. It is utterly false, then, for EPA critics 

to assert that I or others in the agency set about to mislead New 

Yorkers or the rescue workers. 

Mr. Chairman, the grief of 9/11 remains with us. Like many others, I lost personal friends that day. I suspect there will be a lot 

of talk in this hearing about blame and responsibility for what happened on September 11 and its aftermath. Let’s be clear: There are 

people to blame. They are the terrorists who attacked the United 

States, not the men and women at all levels of government who 

worked heroically to protect this country. 

Of course, there are lessons to be learned from the extraordinary 

challenges of 9/11. I welcome a constructive dialogue on those lessons that is undertaken in good faith. I came here today in that 

spirit, Mr. Chairman, and I trust the Subcommittee has as well. 

I thank you and will be pleased to answer any questions that you 

might have. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

I now recognize Mr. Henshaw for an opening statement for 5 

minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN L. HENSHAW,

HENSHAW & ASSOCIATES, INC. 

Mr. HENSHAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You stated earlier I 

am an occupational safety and health professional and a certified 

industrial hygienist providing safety and health consultation services to clients around the world. 

In June 2001, I was nominated by President Bush and then later 

confirmed by the U.S. Senate in August of 2001 as Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or OSHA. 

I wish to take this opportunity today to discuss OSHA’s role in 

protecting workers after the tragic events of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. My testimony represents my views and 

reflects my experiences as the OSHA Administrator. 

OSHA’s mission is to ensure to the extent possible safe and 

healthful working conditions for employees around this Nation. 

Under the OSH Act of 1970, OSHA has jurisdiction over privatesector employees and does not have jurisdiction over the public-sector employees such as the local fire and local police. 

In addition, and under the Federal Response and National Contingency Plans established to deal with emergencies, OSHA operates under the incident command system which is invoked during 

significant emergency situations. 

Our first action after the attack was to evacuate all 21 members 

of our Manhattan area office from building number 6 of the World 

Trade Center, which was destroyed with the collapse of the North 

Tower. It is because of their training and commitment to protecting 

workers, all of our employees, including an employee confined to a 

wheelchair, got out safely. They, too, were traumatized and exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
16

posed to all the same conditions as others who were in Lower Manhattan that tragic day. 

After all were accounted for, our staff joined the Federal, State 

and local agencies, as well as safety and health professionals from 

contractors, trade unions on site, all in an effort to protect the 

workers involved in the rescue, recovery, demolition and clean-up 

operations. In line with OSHA’s internal directive, we determined 

we could be most protective in protecting worker safety and health 

by providing immediate assistance, oversight and consultation in 

an effort to ensure OSHA’s standards and good safety and health 

practices were followed at a minimum. 

It was apparent the site was not a typical construction or demolition project. Workers needed immediate protection from hazards 

whose scope and severity could be assessed only as the work progressed. In an effort to achieve quick and maximum effectiveness 

in saving lives and assuring worker protections, OSHA embarked 

on five specific activities: Number one, conducted personnel and 

area monitoring to characterize potential workplace exposures and 

the resulting hazards; number two, recommended appropriate personal protective equipment, including respiratory protection; number three, distributed and fit respirators, along with distributing 

other kinds of personal protective equipment; number four, conducted safety and health inspections 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 

in an effort to ensure standards were followed and workers were 

properly protected; and number five, provided site leadership and 

coordination of workplace safety and health. 

OSHA committed nearly 1,100 staff, many times as many as 75 

personnel on the site on any day. OSHA’s staff worked on the site 

24 hours a day, 7 days a week for the entire 10-month period. 

OSHA collected more than 6,500 air and bulk samples and performed over 24,000 analyses, looking at 81 different potentially 

hazardous materials such as asbestos, lead, silica and many other 

organic and inorganic compounds. 

Personal air samples were collected around the clock each day, 

and we coordinated our efforts in monitoring with our safety and 

health compatriots, our professionals, and unions, and contractors 

and other agencies. OSHA’s sampling effort focused on workers on 

and near the pile, as well as workplaces that were impacted by the 

attack, which is like the financial district. OSHA’s breathing zone 

samples showed well below the Agency’s permissible exposure levels for the majority of compounds and substances. The few that 

were above were on the pile. 

OSHA distributed sampling summaries to trade unions, site contractors and agencies during our daily safety and health meetings 

and posted them on our Web. OSHA consistently instructed employers on the site to wear appropriate respiratory protection. Due 

primarily to the unpredictable nature of the hazards on the pile, 

a high level of protection was selected jointly with all safety and 

health professionals. These requirements were communicated 

through orders and notices posted throughout the sites, as well as 

during inspections, daily meetings and other communications. 

During the first 3 weeks following the attack, OSHA gave out 

respirators at a rate of 4,000 a day. Over the 10-month period 

OSHA distributed more than 131,000 respirators to personnel 

17

working at the World Trade Center. Initially handing out respirators on foot, OSHA quickly opened multiple distribution locations throughout the 16-acre site, including the ones at the Queens 

Marina, which was the Fire Department of New York’s staging 

area. 

Over 7,500 quantitative fit tests were conducted for negative 

pressure respirators, including nearly 3,000 fit tests specifically for 

the firefighters. In addition, 45,000 pieces of other kinds of protective equipment were distributed, including hard hats, safety glasses, gloves. 

Mr. Chairman, I am very proud of how OSHA responded after 

the attack of September 11, 2001. Despite the highly intense, highly emotional and highly dangerous rescue, recovery and clean-up 

mission, this Nation did not lose another life at that site during 

that 10-month period. In fact, the lost day injury rate during that 

10-month period was significantly less than what you would expect 

on a typical construction project. 

Mr. Chairman, this was not a typical construction project. The 

absolute key to this success was working in partnership with 

unions, contractors, city employees, management, all in an effort to 

achieve compliance with OSHA’s standards and our recommendations. The normal enforcement strategy was unacceptable to me, 

unacceptable approach, to enforce within the green line the pile, 

given the fact that enforcement may take days or weeks to develop 

the necessary evidence to support citations as this Committee 

knows. As you know, if citations are contested, it could take years 

before the administrative law judge’s review and corrective action 

is required. 

Mr. Chairman, if our purpose is to save lives and reduce injuries 

and illnesses, we did not have years, we did not have months, we 

did not have weeks, we did not have hours to wait for corrective 

action. We had to deploy a strategy to achieve compliance as soon 

as the hazard was recognized. The number of near misses that 

were reported indicated to me that the strategy that achieved immediate corrective action was the absolute right choice. OSHA did, 

however, execute normal enforcement strategy outside the pile, outside of Ground Zero, and we issued many citations as a result. 

Mr. Chairman, I, like many people in OSHA, can say with confidence and a high degree of pride that OSHA’s staff did everything 

they believed humanly possible to assure worker protection during 

those 10 months after the attack. OSHA did, however, learn a 

great deal at the World Trade Center site, lessons that can help 

the Agency and the Nation improve emergency preparedness and 

emergency response. 

Following the World Trade Center experience, OSHA is pursuing 

a leadership role in coordinating worker health and safety during 

significant emergencies and is getting more involved in emergency 

preparedness. We now train with firefighters, law enforcement 

agencies and others responders across the Nation as a valued member of the response team. 

Our Nation’s responders deserve the very best protection, and 

the best way to assure that is for OSHA, supported by NIOSH, to 

be an integral part of our Nation’s emergency planning, training 

and response efforts. 

18

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad to take any questions. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Henshaw follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN L. HENSHAW


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Mr. NADLER. The Chair will recognize himself for the first questions. 

A September 12, 2001, e-mail circulated to top EPA officials stated, quote, ‘‘All statements to the media should be cleared through 

the National Security Council before they were released,’’ close 

quote. So as early as September 12, the National Security Council 

and the White House were approving public statements. Let’s take 

a look at some of those statements. There will be a video for about 

30 seconds. 

[Videotape played.] 

Mr. NADLER. Ms. Whitman, an EPA press release from September 18th also quotes you as saying, ‘‘I am glad to reassure the 

people of New York and Washington, D.C., that their air is safe to 

breathe.’’

Mr. Henshaw, in a September 16th press release, you were 

quoted as saying, ‘‘Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers 

to go back to work in New York’s financial district.’’

In a series of EPA press releases beginning on September 13, the 

following words were used to describe the air conditions: Good 

news, causes no concern, not detectable, no significant health risk 

and safe to breathe. 

Ms. Whitman, do these words and phrases convey a sense of danger or even of caution, or do they, in fact, convey a sense of safety 

and security? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Mr. Chairman, those words, to the best of my 

recollection and every effort that I made at the time, were also 

added with the phrase, ‘‘However, on the pile it is different.’’

Mr. NADLER. Well, we will get to that. 

Ms. WHITMAN. There is a significant difference, the readings we 

were getting at the time. 

Mr. NADLER. At the time—would you answer my question—do 

they convey a sense of safety and security or a sense of caution? 

Ms. WHITMAN. They convey exactly what they were meant to convey. Those were the readings we were getting from the scientists. 

Mr. NADLER. Do you regret your repeating the sentence that the 

air was safe to breathe? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I do not regret repeating what the scientists said 

was appropriate. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Henshaw, do these words and phrases convey 

a sense of danger or even of caution? Or do they convey a sense 

of safety and security in your opinion? 

Mr. HENSHAW. Again, not counting the pile, the pile was a separate issue. 

Mr. NADLER. We will get to the pile. 

Mr. HENSHAW. All right. We took 240 samples———

Mr. NADLER. Please answer the question. 

Mr. HENSHAW. All of our samples were below our—significantly 

below our significant exposure limits. 

Mr. NADLER. You said that already. It is on the record. I just 

asked you to convey the sense of———

Mr. HENSHAW. That conveys that the environment is safe. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Thank you. Do you now regret saying it was 

safe for New Yorkers to go back to work 6 days after the terrorist 

attack? Was that a mistake? 

24

Mr. HENSHAW. Not within the Financial District. On the pile was 

a different circumstance. Sir, I do not regret it. 

Mr. NADLER. The area around it was okay? 

Mr. HENSHAW. All of our data indicated it was okay. 

Mr. NADLER. Ms. Whitman, during 2001 did any government official or outside scientist tell you that EPA statements were not adequately communicating health risk warnings based on the data 

available at the time? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Mr. Chairman, to the best of my knowledge, not 

one of the scientists who were responsible for analyzing the data 

on the pile ever indicated———

Mr. NADLER. Did any scientist? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Not that I can recall. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Now, Ms. Whitman, I would like to talk 

about the information you had or did not have at the time and 

compare it to what EPA said publicly. Much of this organization 

is—I am sorry—much of this information is contained on that chart 

to your left, although not all of it. It is Document 16 in the binder 

that was supplied to you. Since I know it’s a little difficult to read 

that, because I can’t read it from here, that chart summarizes overwhelming evidence that when the EPA was assuring everyone 

was—that the air was safe, in fact, it either didn’t have supporting 

data or it had data showing the opposite. 

Ms. Whitman, on September 13 you said in an interview, everything we are getting back from the sampling that we are doing is 

below background levels. There’s not a reason for the general public to be concerned, closed quote. And yet on September 12, the day 

before that statement, in response to an urgent White House inquiry, Dr. Ed Kilbourne of the Centers for Disease Control warned 

that EPA sampling data was, quote, scanty, unquote, that he was, 

quote, aware of other toxic hazards in the area about which EPA 

hasn’t asked, and that of the first five EPA bulk samples from the 

World Trade Center site, one contained a, quote, substantial concentration of asbestos, closed quote. That is 20 percent of the available samples. 

Doesn’t this information make your September 13 statement a 

flat out falsehood? 

Ms. WHITMAN. No, it does not, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. Why doesn’t it? 

Ms. WHITMAN. The fact that dust contained high levels of lead 

and asbestos, or asbestos I should say, is absolutely accurate and 

true. But that was different from what we were finding in the air. 

In fact, that was why we were working with the city to put HEPA 

trucks on the street that could get in and suck up the dust and to 

wash down the outsides of the buildings. 

Mr. NADLER. Were you aware that Dr. Kilbourne had warned 

that EPA wasn’t asking about lots of toxic hazards and that he said 

that the EPA sampling data was scanty and should not be relied 

upon for safety at that———

Ms. WHITMAN. I was not aware of any scientist—what happened—let me describe for you the process. Perhaps it will help 

things. The first week, or 2 weeks actually, we had three phone 

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gion 2 scientists at Region 2, on-scene coordinators as well as headquarters staff, who was involved with emergency response and in 

communications. We would go over what the dust—what the samples they were getting in those days. And we were constantly adding to the samples. There’s no doubt about that. We were getting 

results on a lot of those samples. We would go over. I would ask 

what was accurate to say to the public, what they could hear, what 

I could say accurately. And I was told we were—went over that, we 

decided what it was and we went out and conveyed that to the public. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, EPA did not begin regular outdoor air monitoring in Lower Manhattan until September 14. The only air monitoring results, we are told, that you had for September 12 and 13 

were from the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. Those air samples, of the 10 air samples the city took during those days, seven showed asbestos levels above the EPA’s 1 

percent trigger mark, including one from as far away as six blocks 

away in front of the Municipal Building. Yet the September 13 

press release states that EPA, quote, found either no asbestos or 

very low levels of asbestos and further states that monitoring the 

sampling has been very reassuring about potential exposure. The 

general public should be very reassured. This despite the New York 

City findings of 70 percent of its samples showing asbestos levels 

above the EPA’s 1 percent trigger level. 

Isn’t this a little contradictory. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to try to go back 

almost 6 years now to second-guess the scientists at the time. 

Mr. NADLER. Excuse me. It’s not second guessing the scientists 

at this time. 

Ms. WHITMAN. It would be second guessing the scientists. 

Mr. NADLER. No. My question has nothing to do with the scientists. My question is to do with the fact that you are putting out 

very reassuring statements saying nobody’s finding any asbestos 

levels above—any high asbestos levels when in fact the only test 

they had at that time, the New York City test, showed high asbestos levels above the 1 percent mark in 70 percent of the tests. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Two things here, Mr. Chairman, and I cannot determine based on the question what is in play either, whether all 

of the samples that you are talking about from New York City were 

relative—related to the dust or related to the air. Those are two 

different things. 

Mr. NADLER. Excuse me. Those were air samples. 

Ms. WHITMAN. All right. Fine. Thank you. I will also tell you that 

it was my understanding—we had people back on the site. We did 

use New York City samples. We used New York State samples. We 

used samples, as I had mentioned, from over 17 different organizations and we were taking our own samples, which we were taking 

at which time? I can’t tell you. I can’t go back and tell you. 

Mr. NADLER. Let’s go into your own samples. The EPA dust samples, dust samples of September 14 show asbestos levels of 2.1 to 

3.3 percent, which is 210 percent and 330 percent above the EPA’s 

1 percent trigger level. Yet the EPA September 16 press release describes this as slightly above the 1 percent trigger. Don’t you believe that characterizing dust samples that are 210 to 330 percent 

26

above your own standard as only slightly above the trigger is falsely reassuring and misleading? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect I can’t imagine that we would have released a statement 3 days later that 

wasn’t based on new testing data and results because we were getting new information every single day. When I was on the 

phone———

Mr. NADLER. The fact is, is that you did release that statement, 

and these were the test results that were there at the time. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, if we are talking about dust or air, again 

there was a difference with dust and air. 

Mr. NADLER. These were dust samples. 

Ms. WHITMAN. You are saying that the second statement related 

to dust samples, too, or air samples? 

Mr. NADLER. The second statement simply said that um—yes, 

they referred to these specific tests, and they characterized the results of these specific tests of 2.1 and 3.3 as slightly above the 1 

percent trigger. So we are referring to these specific tests. 

Mr. WHITMAN. I will have to take your word for that. I haven’t 

seen that. Recently I haven’t had a chance to go back over all that. 

But I will tell you again that every statement that we made, that 

I made, was based on what the experts who had a great deal of 

experience in this kind of response were conveying to me. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you very much. I will now recognize the distinguished—I will come to Mr. Henshaw in the next round. I will 

now recognize the distinguished Chairman of the full Committee, 

the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for their testimony. Mr. Henshaw, the September 16 EPA 

press release quotes you in the following way: 

Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers to go back to work 

in New York’s Financial District. 

Now this release implied that you said this on the basis of the 

fact that some indoor tests in the Financial District buildings were, 

according to the EPA, negative for asbestos. But again, outdoor test 

results showed the 2.1 to 3.3 levels. 

Do you believe it is practical in a dust-saturated environment for 

workers to walk through debris with unsafe levels of asbestos without somehow breathing it in or getting it on their clothes or tracking it into the buildings? 

Mr. HENSHAW. Mr. Congressman, tracking materials, you will 

see in that press release we talk about and caution about tracking 

it back into the buildings. That was a big concern of ours, and 

that’s why the HEPA vacuum, as the Governor mentioned, and the 

cleaning of the streets of the Wall Street area was a significant 

event, to make sure that we maintain safe work environments. 

Now, our results—the results you are talking about are referring 

to percent in a bulk sample. And true, we found as high as 1.9 percent in bulk. This was a chunk on top of a patrol car. That was 

the highest percentage we found of asbestos. What we found in the 

workplace in the air, which is the critical piece, if it’s in a bulk, 

it’s not going to be hazardous unless it gets in the air and people 

breathe it. We spent—starting on the 13th, our data began to 

measure and monitor exposures throughout the entire Wall Street 

27

area; in fact, from Canal Street down, and collected over the period 

of time 204 samples. All of those samples showed we were well 

below—we barely detected any asbestos or any fibers in the air. 

And let me clarify this, we did find fibers in the air using our 

base contrast microscopy. When we used TEM, we found out those 

were not asbestos. Keep in mind, there’s two towers loaded with 

carbon material, with fabric from wall covers, from the cubicles, 

from the ceiling tiles to the curtains. There were a lot of fibers. 

And when you see results as you saw in the NYCOSH data that 

talks about fibers, not speciating as to whether it is asbestos or 

not. And that’s the confusion, Mr. Chairman. And that’s why somebody needs to coordinate this whole effort, to make sure that we 

have a constant message. Because showing samples that is using 

the PCM method that we have a lot of fibers doesn’t mean it’s asbestos. 

And so, Congressman, the answer to your question directly, we 

did find some fibers in tests but they were not asbestos. And therefore, we believed it was appropriate to open up Wall Street, as long 

as we put in the right precautions, that we do what we can to minimize the tracking and reentrainment when you kick on ventilation 

systems, reentrainment of whatever dust may be in those systems. 

It was safe for people to go back to work. 

Chairman CONYERS. Well, it was safe to go back to work if you 

could get through the pollution to get to work. I mean, what we are 

talking about here, sir, are the outdoor tests as compared to the 

safety that you claim was on the inside. The outdoor tests showed 

there was great danger of very potent———

Mr. HENSHAW. And while our issues are workplace environments, we knew workers were going to walk to and from their 

workplace. We monitored, and we had OSHA inspectors walking 

the streets of New York City on the 14th, 15th and 16th, and we 

did that following the 17th when we opened up Wall Street, to see 

what exposures the people who are walking to and from work 

might be exposed to. And sir, we did not find them being exposed 

above any kind of acceptable standard, or unacceptable standard in 

respect to workplace standards. 

Mr. CONYERS. You didn’t find—you didn’t know that the outdoor 

test results showed that there were 2.1 to 3.3 levels existing in the 

outside atmosphere? 

Mr. HENSHAW. When you say levels, I am not sure what you are 

talking about. But I did not know of any result. We did not find 

any result of fibrous per cc of air, is the units we use, to estimate 

or judge whether in fact a workplace is an issue. We did not find 

those concentrations. If you are talking about a bulk sample, which 

represents the percent of asbestos in that by weight of that substance or that chunk, that’s a different story, and we did find percentages. At the highest we had was 1.9 percent. 

But again, Congressman, if I may interrupt, the key really is 

what’s in the air. That’s———

Mr. CONYERS. That’s what I am saying. What is in the air. In 

the air, let me just read———

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. You can ask just 

this question. 

28

Mr. CONYERS. All right. Let me just follow this out. And I thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. Here is EPA, Environmental Protection Agency 

response to September 11. And this is dated September 16. In the 

fifth paragraph, air samples taken on September 13 inside buildings in New York’s Financial District were negative for asbestos. 

Debris samples collected outside buildings on cars and other surfaces contained small percentages of asbestos, ranging from 2.1 to 

3.3. That’s where I get that—that’s where I get it. 

Mr. HENSHAW. That, sir, is———

Mr. CONYERS. That is what was outside. So all I am raising is 

that to get inside where you claim it was safe, you had to work—

you had to walk through an environment that was highly, highly 

infested with the kinds of materials that are harmful to human 

beings, right? 

Mr. HENSHAW. Not—no, sir. 

Mr. CONYERS. I am not right. Well, is this statement incorrect in 

the EPA release of September 16, 2001? Would you like to take a 

look at it? 

Mr. HENSHAW. You are saying the EPA release? 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HENSHAW. Well, I will be glad—but all I can—you are referring to bulk samples, which is sediment, dust on a surface, and one 

of the reasons why we recommended on Friday that we clean Wall 

Street, and that’s with the HEPA vacuums and that’s with the 

washing down of the streets where a lot of that debris was removed. 

Mr. CONYERS. So you are suggesting we shouldn’t pay any attention to this asbestos ranging from 2.1 to 3.3 in the release, that 

wasn’t relative to any———

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The witness may 

answer the question. 

Mr. HENSHAW. Certainly bulk concentrations of an asbestos 

above 1 percent is something that we need to pay attention to. No 

doubt about it. And what’s important is, we want to make sure 

that doesn’t get reentrained in the air where people are exposed to 

it. And so that’s why we continue to monitor. We monitored before 

Wall Street was open, and we monitored after to make sure that 

nothing was getting in the air. And Congressman, we didn’t find 

anything getting in the air. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Thank you. We’ve now been joined by 

the Ranking Republican Member of the Committee, of the Subcommittee rather, Mr. Franks, and I will now recognize him for an 

opening statement because I promised I would before. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank Governor 

Whitman and Mr. Henshaw for being here. I apologize, and no one 

tried to get here sooner. With that in mind, Mr. Chairman, this 

oversight hearing is ostensibly to explore the legal issues that are 

currently being examined in ongoing litigation specific to the case 

of Lombardi v. Whitman. Initially this case was unanimously decided by a three-judge appellate panel, including Robert D. Sack, 

a Clinton appointee, but the decision by that panel is not the final 

step in the litigation process, as there will be appeals to the full 

Second Circuit for an en banc decision by all of its judges and a 

possible appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court after that. And while I 

29

look forward to an exploration of some of the legal issues raised in 

this case, I am concerned that our hearing today will be seen as 

a constitutionally questionable or inappropriate congressional attempt to second-guess the judiciary decision before the appeals 

process has made the final determination on the merits. 

The claims involve whether the EPA’s public statements regarding the quality of the air at the World Trade Center cleanup site 

were entirely accurate with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. The 

court determined that the EPA took substantial measures to warn 

the public of environmental dangers. The court resolved the claims 

as follows, stating: 

Government action resulting in bodily harm is not a substantive 

due process violation unless the government action was so egregious, so outrageous that it may be fairly said to shock the contemporary conscience. In order to shock the conscience and trigger a 

violation of substantive due process, official conduct must be outrageous and egregious under the circumstances. It must be, quote, 

truly brutal and offensive to human dignity, closed quote. The OIG 

report shows that the defendants were required to make decisions 

using rapidly changing information about the ramifications of unprecedented events in coordination with multiple Federal agencies 

and local agencies and governments. If anything, the importance of 

the EPA’s mission counsels against broad constitutional liability in 

this situation. The risk of such liability will tend to inhibit EPA officials in making difficult decisions about how to disseminate information to the public in an environmental emergency. Knowing that 

lawsuits alleging intentional misconduct could result from the disclosure of incomplete, confusingly comprehensive or mistakenly inaccurate information, officials might default in silence or default to 

silence in the face of the public’s urgent need for information. 

In essence, the Second Circuit held that it would not be lawful 

to hold the Federal Government responsible for harm suffered by 

rescue workers who may have relied upon information issued by 

the Federal Government in circumstances in which the Federal 

Government was, quote, required to make decisions using rapidly 

changing information about the ramifications of, once again, unprecedented events in coordination with multiple Federal agencies 

and local agencies and governments, closed quote. As the OIG report stated, responding to this crisis required organizations from 

all levels of government to coordinate their response efforts and to 

make critical public health and safety decisions quickly and without all of the data that the decision makers themselves would normally desire. To impose liability in such circumstances would actually risk even greater harm in the future because fear of liability 

might deter the government from saying anything about an emergency situation. And I hope we can all agree that nothing should 

be done to force the Federal Government to remain silent in the 

midst of a crisis. 

I understand that Chairman Nadler held a press conference to 

criticize State and local official efforts to provide for injured 911 

rescue workers in which he said, quote, the villains are no longer 

the terrorists. The villains live in the White House and in the 

Gracie mansion and in the Governor’s office, closed quote. 

30

Let us be clear, Mr. Chairman, the villains are the terrorists, the 

villains remain the terrorists. The terrorists caused the harm on 9/

11. We must be very careful not to equate even unintentionally the 

good-faith efforts of government officials to dutifully respond to an 

emergency in strange circumstances with the vicious premeditated 

violence perpetrated by blood thirsty murderers who express desire 

to kill as many innocent people as possible. 

Mr. CONYERS. Would the distinguished———

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the witness. 

Mr. CONYERS. Would the distinguished gentleman yield to me? 

Mr. FRANKS. Certainly. 

Mr. CONYERS. I thank you, Mr. Franks. As the Ranking Member, 

we appreciate your presence very much. What I wanted to just 

make sure that we all agree on, that we’re in no way attempting 

to intervene with the court procedures or what’s going on in the 

court, and that we’re not trying to obfuscate or in any way discredit 

anything that is going on at this present time in the Federal courts 

under the legal procedure. I think we’re all in agreement that that 

is not our goal here, to interfere or even to instruct the courts. 

We’re holding the hearing pursuant to our responsibilities as Members of the one Committee in the Congress that can inquire into 

these matters, and I just wanted to seek your assurance that that’s 

why we’re all here. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I understand, Mr. Chairman. And I accept 

that at face value. I guess I would just suggest that given the sensibilities of the issue here that it might be better for the courts to 

come to their conclusion before we begin to second-guess them. And 

with that, I will yield back. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Let me just say that I don’t think that 

the Congress in the exercise of its legislative responsibilities can or 

should wait for courts to decide limit questions that are before the 

courts. 

Mr. CONYERS. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. There are at least three cases before the courts. 

Our purpose today is not to influence those cases in any way, but 

neither should we wait for them because we have responsibilities 

to undertake, and I must comment I did say what I was quoted as 

saying. And I think the terrorists—with the terrorists, they were 

the villains who did what they did. But insofar, insofar as government, as government officials in bad faith, if they were in bad 

faith, acted in such a way as to inflict bodily harm or to subject 

people to bodily harm in the United States, then they also are 

guilty if that is the case that happened. 

I’m not saying that now. That happens to be my personal opinion. But that’s not before the Committee now. But that was the—

what I was saying there, I was not equating them with the terrorists. The terrorists did what they did, which was obviously heinous. 

But that doesn’t eliminate the logical possibility that other people 

compounded the damage, which I believed to be the case. And 

that—and that it may be incumbent on us as Congress to take remedial action, which is what we have to examine. 

Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. NADLER. Yes. 

31

Mr. CONYERS. I just wanted to get the assurances and the continued cooperation of the distinguished Ranking Member of this Committee that I hope that he has no objection to us moving forward 

with the inquiry. No one has mentioned the courts until now. And 

we don’t intend to invade their jurisdiction, nor do we intend to describe or limit or instruct them as to how they should proceed. And 

so we would like to continue the comity that we’ve enjoyed in this 

Committee so far and get your assent to the continuation of these 

hearings as we’re proceeding. We’ve got distinguished witnesses 

here, and we would like this to be a bipartisan inquiry. 

Does that meet with the objections of the gentleman. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I would just say I look forward to 

the hearing and what the witnesses have to say and do so with an 

open heart. 

Mr. CONYERS. Wonderful. Now one point though. Could you call 

for me our distinguished friends, Mr. Pence and Mr. Issa and Steve 

King and Jim Jordan, to invite them if they are here, to please join 

these proceedings because this isn’t a party, a partisan inquiry. 

And I don’t want anybody to think that it is. It’s a bipartisan point 

of view in which they are entitled to express any opinions that they 

hold about this proceeding. And I don’t think that the Committee 

serves its fullest purpose without all of our colleagues here. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond to that just 

extremely briefly. 

Mr. NADLER. Briefly, yes. 

Mr. FRANKS. The meeting being held—in all due deference to the 

Chairman—at 1 on a Monday has been difficult for some of our 

Members. As you know, I had to make great effort to be here personally and I know all of you are here, so that leaves us without 

excuse. But I do suggest to you that the particular timing of the 

hearing made it———

Mr. CONYERS. And I’m sorry that you were inconvenienced, your 

Members, not you, but those that may not have been able to be 

here. 

Mr. NADLER. Let me just say, the meeting was scheduled for 1 

on a Monday because that was the only time that some of the witnesses could make it. With that, I will yield for 5 minutes of questioning to the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. 

Ellison. 

Mr. ELLISON. Ms. Whitman, on September 14, the EPA had its 

own workplace tested in Manhattan and found asbestos. Without 

even waiting for the results, the EPA had its building professionally cleaned. How could you say that there were, quote, no significant levels of asbestos, unquote, in your September 16 press release when significant amounts of taxpayer dollars were spent to 

clean your own building at 290 Broadway? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, we advised everyone who was going 

to reoccupy buildings that they should be appropriately cleaned. 

There was no extraordinary cleaning undertaken at our buildings, 

but clearly every building in that area where people were going to 

be occupying should have been cleaned. And what we said at the 

time was, while we recommended professional cleaners, if individuals couldn’t afford that or didn’t have access to them, that HEPA 

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take. But we absolutely recommended that everybody clean the 

buildings. And I would repeat that nothing extraordinary occurred 

with our building, but surely it was important to get the men and 

women back within who were responding in a very direct way and 

were responsible for a lot of the analysis of the information and the 

data on which the public so depended back into their building, 

which was literally four blocks away. 

Mr. ELLISON. Governor Whitman, did the EPA issue a press release and also state on its Website that residents should clean their 

residences and workplace with a wet rag or a wet mop? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I don’t recall EPA ever saying wet rag or wet 

mop. EPA said professional cleaners if possible and HEPA vac and 

wet wipes together. Vacuum cleaner with a special HEPA filter and 

wet wipes. It is my understanding that in subsequent retesting 

that those who followed those procedures, they were found to have 

very low, if any, incident of remaining asbestos. We also recommended that if people had shag carpets———

Mr. ELLISON. I’m sorry, Ms. Whitman. I have limited time. 

Thank you, Governor Whitman. On September 16 the EPA told 

New York Newsday that its highest recorded asbestos rating for 

contamination was about 4.5 percent. New York Newsday quoted 

you, Ms. Whitman, as saying, quote, there is no reason for concern. 

Why did say there’s no reason for concern when EPA’s official own 

position since 1986 has been that there’s no safe level of asbestos? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, as Mr. Henshaw indicated, the concern that 

we had for the general public was in asbestos getting into the air 

into their lungs. What we found in dust—in bulk samples was different. Nobody wants asbestos anywhere. There’s no———

Mr. ELLISON. Excuse me. Could I just say that you’d agree with 

me that in the aftermath, the immediate aftermath of this tragedy, 

people were scared? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Of course people were scared. 

Mr. ELLISON. People were panicked, right? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Of course. 

Mr. ELLISON. People wanted to know what should they do and 

they wanted to know from you, that is right? 

Ms. WHITMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. ELLISON. You gave them reassurances about the quality of 

the water and the quality of the air being okay. Today you come 

and say okay, we’re talking about bulk or this or that. But the fact 

is that on the September 18 press release, you said that we’re very 

encouraged by the results of the———

Ms. WHITMAN. We were. 

Mr. ELLISON. You gave the assurances to people. Let me ask you 

this, do you agree that after those planes collided with the towers 

that it caused immediately dangerous toxic levels for people of air 

quality, dust and water? 

Ms. WHITMAN. We were enormously concerned when those towers came down. 

Mr. ELLISON. Right. And do you also agree today even looking 

back in hindsight that the language that you used gave people a 

false sense of safety? 

Ms. WHITMAN. No, I do not agree it gave them a false sense of 

safety. We were talking about air quality, the general ambient air 

33

quality in Lower Manhattan and the impact on long-term health. 

And I’m sorry if that was not what people now looking back on see, 

but that was what the scientists———

Mr. ELLISON. I’m sorry, Governor. I only have 5 minutes. I would 

never interrupt you under normal circumstances, but I only have 

5 minutes. This is a quote from the September 18 EPA response: 

Given the scope of tragedy from last week I am glad to reassure 

the people of New York and Washington, D.C. that their air is safe 

to breathe and the water’s safe to drink. Now that is a fairly 

sweeping statement about reassurance. 

Do you now feel that you spoke a little bit too broadly and a little 

bit too soon about the actual quality of the air and the water? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Every test that we have———

Mr. ELLISON. Excuse me, Governor. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, you know, it’s fine to go through 

the yes and noes. But I think it’s important for people to understand that these were not whims, these were not decisions by a politician. Everything I said was based on what I was hearing from 

professionals. My son was in Building 7 on that day, Congressman. 

And I almost lost him. This is as personal to me as it is to anyone. 

Mr. ELLISON. Governor, excuse me. I’m not going to allow you to 

turn this into a personal thing. It’s personal for the people out here 

too, Governor. 

Ms. WHITMAN. It’s personal to everyone. 

Mr. ELLISON. I’m not going to stand here and allow you to try 

to obfuscate the questions that I am asking. 

Ms. WHITMAN. I’m not obfuscating, Congressman. I am asking. I 

have been called a liar. I have been called a liar even in this room 

today. My actions were not criminal. With all due respect, you are 

sitting on a panel with people———

Mr. NADLER. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. ELLISON. With permission 

Mr. NADLER. Without objection, the gentleman has 1 minute. 

Mr. ELLISON. On September 27, the USDA gave the EPA test results that found WTC dust to be highly toxic. The WSGS—excuse 

me, the USGS concluded that the ph level of the WTC dust was 

as toxic as drain cleaner. Why didn’t the EPA issue a single press 

release about the USGS findings? 

Ms. WHITMAN. The reference in, as I understand it again, looking—to the best of my recollection looking back 6 years, that statement was relative to the dust, the contaminants found on the pile 

of Ground Zero, and that is where EPA was constantly reminding 

all those involved that Ground Zero, the air quality on Ground Zero 

on the pile was different than in Lower Manhattan, and that those 

responders should wear respirators, should wear HAZMAT suits, 

should take—wear eye protective and that’s—eye protection and 

that’s why we even set up wash stations. 

Mr. ELLISON. My time has expired. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Arizona, Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you again, 

Mr. Henshaw and Governor Whitman, for being here. Governor 

Whitman, I read in the IG report that the IG, quote, found no evidence that EPA attempted to conceal data results from the public, 

34

closed quote. That’s pretty straightforward. Is that your understanding? How do you answer critics who claim that the EPA misled the public about the data results? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, again in that instance I would absolutely 

agree with the IG’s finding there because we were providing—we 

had a Website up within 10 days. We had data that was being collected by 13 different entities to synthesize. We tried to ensure that 

those in the public who—and the scientists and the public and in 

other parts of government at all levels had the opportunity to look 

at the data that we were looking at to be able to compare apples 

to apples and make their own decisions, were we telling them the 

truth, was it safe or not. So they could see what was happening 

in that area. 

Mr. FRANKS. Governor, you know that the same report states 

again, quote, that EPA provided public access to its monitoring 

data through its public Website. I am assuming this is the one you 

just mentioned. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Which included interactive maps that could be used 

to identify monitoring results. Am I reading this correctly, that the 

EPA provided public access to all of its data? 

Ms. WHITMAN. We put everything up on the Website as fast as 

we could get that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Why did you do that? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Because I thought transparency was of the utmost 

importance. People needed to see what we were seeing, how we 

were coming to the conclusions that we were, to make the statements that we were. It was important because in science you are 

always going to get second-guessed and we need people to be able 

to see all the data. 

Mr. FRANKS. Sometimes you get 10 scientists in the room and 

you get 20 opinions. Up here you get 10 of us and you get 150 opinions. These scientists could have come to a different conclusion 

looking at the same data about whether the air was safe in your 

mind? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Scientists certainly could. It’s a little bit like climate change. There are a number of scientists who don’t feel that 

that is occurring, yet the bulk of the scientists believe that it is. 

It is sort of the same kind of situation. 

Mr. FRANKS. I’m confused, as some of us, that Mars is also increasing there, and we wonder how that’s greenhouse gases. 

Governor, I keep reporting, keep referencing this IG report. But 

let me just reference one more. The conclusions from the EPA draft 

risk evaluation completed over a year after the 9/11 attacks have 

tended to support EPA’s statement about long-term health effects 

when all the necessary qualifications are considered. 

Do you think this means that the EPA has found no evidence of 

a long-term health effect from the air in New York beyond the 

Ground Zero sites? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, there are ongoing studies on which 

EPA is—in which EPA is participating to monitor the health of the 

responders and those who live at Ground Zero. And I would have 

to respect whatever those—those studies find. But as yet, I have 

not seen any final peer review scientific conclusion from any of 

35

those studies, those long-term studies. But the agency I gather is 

part of those. I know they are continuing to go along with those 

and I would bow to whatever those studies ultimately conclude. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, the IG report also noted that the IG consulted 

with environmental and medical expert—or medical external experts who confirmed that such exposure to the general public was 

not likely to present a risk of long-term health risks. 

Were you aware of the external experts that they had reached 

these kind of conclusions? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I was aware of what I was getting every day on 

the calls, sometimes three times a day early on, from the scientists 

who were analyzing the data. And sometimes it may not seem intuitive to those of us standing around that what they were finding 

was real. But I will believe the scientists. When they tell me that 

they examined the data and what is safe for humans to breathe, 

I will believe them. And in this instance, I did. And I think they 

have been proven to be correct in large measure, to the best of my 

knowledge. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, we’ve heard a lot about the White House and 

its involvement in this hearing. Why was the White House involved 

in crafting the press release? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, my experience as a Governor, I always found that in the time of a crisis you need to speak with one 

voice. You need to have someone who is collating the information 

and is communicating it in a reasoned way that the public can understand, especially when you have a number of different agencies 

under your purview that have responsibility for that kind of response. In this instance, obviously you had EPA, you had OSHA, 

you had CDC, you had the FBI, you had CIA. ATSDR, you had a 

number of different organizations looking at a variety of data. And 

it was important that that be synthesized and communicated in a 

way that was coherent and that the public could use, and I thought 

it was entirely appropriate to have the White House perform that 

function. 

Mr. FRANKS. If I can get under the line here, I would like to ask, 

there’s a letter from Mr. Bruce Sprigg, which is EPA’s chief of Response and Prevention Branch, to Mr. Kelly R. McKinney. And 

that’s Associate Commissioner of the Bureau of Regulatory and Environmental Health Services of the City of New York. It’s dated October 5, 2001, which states, quote, the EPA has recommended and 

continues to recommend that workers at the site wear respiratory 

protection, closed quote. 

Were you aware that the EPA made these recommendations to 

New York City shortly after the 9/11 attacks? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, I was. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, my time has expired, but thank you, Governor. Mr. Henshaw, I’m sorry I left you out. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I now recognize for the purpose of asking questions for 5 minutes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our witnesses for 

being with us today. Mr. Henshaw, you mentioned the fact that asbestos was detected and was over a certain level. Are there safe 

levels of asbestos? 

36

Mr. HENSHAW. Yes, sir, there are safe levels of asbestos. We have 

an Occupational Safety and Health—what we call permissible exposure limit, which is 0.5 fibers per cc for an 8-hour average. That 

is our current standard with respect to asbestos. 

Mr. SCOTT. And you consider that safe? 

Mr. HENSHAW. Yes, sir, I do. 

Mr. SCOTT. I understand that the EPA office was professionally 

cleaned. Was there a recommendation that people cleaning their 

own apartments use professional cleaning?

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, there was. 

Mr. SCOTT. There was? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, there was, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Was that in your press release? 

Ms. WHITMAN. It was in a number of our press releases, in statements, and I believe that the City of New York had assumed the 

responsibility for indoor air cleaning. They had asked us not to participate in that but we worked together collegially to help them 

with it, but they were doing it. And we referred them, anyone who 

had questions, to New York City, as well to their health office and 

they had a series of recommendations. I also believe I included the 

recommendation to use professional cleaners wherever they could. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. And there was one press release that was a 

legal exchange. One of the reports we have, it’s Document 15, paragraph 35. It says that the OIG representative read a statement 

that the Wall Street Journal attributed to EPA’s Region 2 administrator. We have said from the very beginning, the departments 

need to be professionally cleaned. The OIG representative asked, 

did your office consider advising the public through a press release 

that they need to obtain professional cleaning for their indoor 

spaces? Ms. Kreisher replied that, quote, it was in a press release. 

It was removed by Sam. 

Ms. WHITMAN. That was one press release, and that’s absolutely 

correct. It was the only time in fact when the press releases—that 

I was ever made aware of a substantive difference between the 

White House and EPA on what should be communicated to the 

public. We had been saying prior to that time professional cleaners. 

We said after that time professional cleaners. When it was brought 

to my attention that, in fact, it was recommended that this sentence be removed, the phrase be removed, at that point in time 

there had been apparently quite a bit of discussion back and forth 

on the use of this sentence. It was in the afternoon, and I don’t remember, Congressman, what else was in that press release, but I 

do remember thinking—there was information there that needed to 

be communicated to the public. So I made the determination rather 

than continue the fight, battle over that particular phrase, to let 

the press release go out as it was because I knew I was going to 

be appearing on, I believe it was CNBC, but again going back in 

time, I don’t remember which particular media outlet I was going 

to be on. And I said I will use that phrase. It appeared in every 

subsequent press release. But in that one press release, that was 

the only time that I remember anything of substance being taken 

out. The information may not have been the exact order wording 

that the EPA sent over, but it conveyed all the relevant information that the public needed. 

37

Mr. SCOTT. Do you believe there are safe levels of asbestos exposure? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, in general the EPA doesn’t like to see asbestos anywhere. But yes, there are standards that represent safe levels of exposure. 

Mr. SCOTT. And do you know what that safe level is? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I bow to Mr. Henshaw’s analysis of that. He’s the 

expert. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now you mentioned Ground Zero and people were 

going back—Mr. Henshaw, Ground Zero people were going back to 

Ground Zero. Were they wearing the appropriate respirators? 

Mr. HENSHAW. Were all the folks wearing appropriate respirators? Obviously, sir, no. That was our dilemma. How do you get 

people to wear proper personal———

Mr. SCOTT. Do you communicate to them in such a way that they 

were risking their lives by not using the respirators? 

Mr. HENSHAW. Constantly. That’s why that is why we did 24/7 

inspections. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you have any enforcement powers when people 

are violating OSHA regulations? 

Mr. HENSHAW. As you know, we do not have jurisdiction over the 

firefighters and police. So we couldn’t tell them that they should 

do that. 

Mr. SCOTT. But you were aware that they were endangering 

their lives. 

Mr. HENSHAW. That’s precisely, sir, why we put together on October 15 the partnership, which included the firefighters and police, 

we put down in writing, they will follow our OSHA standards. I 

can’t guarantee they follow them always. This was something that 

we had not done before. And we did it because these circumstances 

required extraordinary efforts. 

Mr. CONYERS. And do you have any evidence to contradict what 

I’ve heard that 70 percent of the first responders are already having symptoms of asbestos and other problems? 

Mr. HENSHAW. Sir, as the Governor had mentioned earlier, clearly the exposures right after the collapse of the tower were immense. No doubt about it. Unfortunately we did not measure, but 

that was, in my mind, an extraordinary amount of exposure. When 

it clouded out the sky, when you couldn’t see the sun, that was—

I’ve been an industrial hygienist almost all my life. I keep saying, 

I’m not done yet. But that was an immense concentration. And 

clearly those folks were exposed to all sorts of things, even the 

caustic environment that was mentioned earlier. And clearly—we 

just don’t—we can’t quantify what that was but that clearly was 

an extreme exposure. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time———

Mr. HENSHAW. That was the effect of the terrorist attacks, not 

because of the response. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Governor Whitman, according to the Inspector General, your 

Chief of Staff, Ms. McGinnis, I understood that Sam Thernstrom 

provided press releases to other government officials but she didn’t 

38

know who those officials were. Do you know who in the White 

House these other government officials were that the crafted press 

releases were given to? 

Ms. WHITMAN. No, sir, I don’t. 

Mr. COHEN. You don’t know who the ultimate White House decision-maker was on press releases? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I assumed it was the Council on Environmental 

Quality. 

Mr. COHEN. The Council on Environmental Quality changed 

quite a few of the releases from what your office had suggested. 

And I think it’s summarizing them, your office acted as a scientist 

health-based group, I guess, and had precautionary press releases. 

The changes were uniformly made by the White House or the environmental quality group to less precautionary and more reassuring. 

More political, so to speak. 

Was that appropriate, do you believe from your perspective? I 

know as a Governor you see a common—it should be a common 

voice. We saw in Jaws that the sheriff told everybody it’s safe to 

go back in the sea, you know, we know it wasn’t. Was that appropriate for the White House to take that pro-environment, economic, 

everybody come and have a nice time at the beach and don’t worry 

about the sharks approach? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, with all due respect I don’t think 

that was ever even implied in any of the press releases. No kind 

of levity, no kind of———

Mr. COHEN. I know they weren’t. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Dismissive of the threats and the concerns that 

everybody had. To the best of my knowledge, as I indicated in a 

previous response, the only time that there was anything substantive that I felt was important that the public know was in the 

one press release where the phrase ‘‘use professional cleaners when 

possible’’ was omitted. Beyond that, as I indicated earlier, press—

what happened—we’d sit down, we’d talk to those on-scene, we had 

talked to those who were analyzing the data, we being a group at 

headquarters, myself, the deputy chief of staff, the head of emergency response, the head of the press office, we would determine 

what was the appropriate message. After that, it was left to—it became a process that was coordinated by the White House to bring 

some kind of agreement of all the various agencies responding so 

that how it was—how the ultimate—my concern was that the information get out. 

Mr. COHEN. Let me ask you this, Governor, the White House’s 

first concern was to see that the markets were open the next day. 

Their first concern was that everybody could go shopping. Don’t 

you think that you as the EPA Administrator should have taken 

a higher—you were held to a higher duty and a higher standard 

and should have implored somebody in the White House that having the market open, having MSNBC active, having everybody feel 

reassured was not as important as a precautionary note, which we 

now know that the precautionary note was correct? Don’t you think 

you had a higher responsibility than commerce? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I couldn’t disagree with you more 

with what you just said about what the White House wanted. 

Yeah, did I get a call? I reported it before. I got a call from the 

39

White House a day after from the Office of the Economic Advisers, 

which is not surprising, they’re concerned about the economy of the 

country saying, reminding me of the importance of Wall Street, of 

opening the stock market. I indicated that until that building was 

cleaned, until it was safe it would be inappropriate, and that’s the 

last I heard of that. It was cleaned, it was safe, as you have heard 

from Mr. Henshaw, for them to go back in, and they were allowed 

back in. Was it wrong to try to get the city back on its feet as 

quickly as possible in the safest way possible? Absolutely not. Safety was first and foremost, but we wouldn’t let the terrorists win. 

Mr. COHEN. Please. I’ll take care of that. I appreciate your help. 

I mean, the terrorists, you talk about a uniform voice. I have heard 

the terrorists twice. We have got a uniform voice here. The original 

EPA language stated that dust samples showed levels of asbestos 

ranging from 2.1 percent to 3.3 percent. EPA views 1 percent of asbestos as containing material to be dangerous. This language was 

deleted and the White House added, our tests show it’s safe for 

New Yorkers to go back to work in New York’s Financial District. 

Isn’t that a big change from 200 to 300 percent higher than what 

EPA recommends to ‘‘it’s safe to go back to work’’? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I can’t tell you, again, I’m not looking at the press release, I don’t know what it said. I know that 

when contacted by the White House and asked if it wouldn’t be 

safe for reoccupation of the building by the Friday after the Tuesday after the attacks, we indicated that until the buildings were 

safe and had been cleaned and were safe that it wouldn’t be appropriate, and as Mr. Henshaw has indicated, cleaning took place, 

testing was done, and it was safe. It would have been inappropriate 

to say you can’t go back if it is in fact safe. Safety is first and foremost. 

Mr. COHEN. Are you submitting, with all you know today, that 

it was safe to be back in that area other than on the pile? 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The witness may 

answer the question. 

Ms. WHITMAN. I said yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 

Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you. Governor, there’s no one in this room 

that believes—I don’t believe—knowing what I know about you, 

that you feel any less or are any less sensitive to the workers and 

the folks that came from New Jersey, many of them, and the first 

responders. That’s not the issue. The issue is this, that you said 

there was no conspiracy, you said there was no White House interference. Yet let me simply repeat what your own IG stated, your 

own. Quote, the White House Council on Environmental Quality influenced the information that EPA communicated to the public 

through its early press releases when it convinced EPA to add reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones. Tables II-4 and tables II-5 in the IG’s report is very clear about that. And a letter 

that we sent in 2003, and another letter we sent in 2006 to the Attorney General, we never got really a response on. I don’t remember a response. Do you? 

Mr. NADLER. None. 

40

Mr. PASCRELL. The Associate Administrator Kreisher, K-R-E-I-SH-E-R, told the IG there was a conscious effort, quote, to reassure 

people, and that came from the Administrator and the White 

House, unquote. She told the IG that, quote, felt extreme pressure 

from the White House. You are stating today again that there was 

no extreme pressure from the White House, Governor Whitman. Is 

that correct? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I’m saying that I felt no extreme 

pressure from the White House. And I think if you’ll go further———

Mr. PASCRELL. Why does the Associate Administrator feel that 

way? Why does Kreisher feel differently than you? 

Ms. WHITMAN. You will have an opportunity to ask her that in 

a minute. She is on the next panel. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I certainly will. We’re talking here about credibility and accountability. Let me ask you this question, do you 

think the City of New York acted responsibly? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I think the City of New York did absolutely everything in its power to do what was right by the citizens of New 

York. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So now we’re in a different stage since———

Mr. NADLER. I would remind people. The gentleman will suspend. I would remind people again no demonstrations. Continue. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, I don’t lose time, do I? 

Mr. NADLER. No, no, no. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I had the honor to serve on the Homeland Security Committee for 4 years. We went into this certainly not in the 

depth that this Committee’s going to go into it. And Chairman at 

that time it was Peter King. It just didn’t seem right, what was 

going on and what we were hearing. If you’ve read the reports from 

Mount Sinai, two, a couple of reports—by the way, did you read the 

reports from Mount Sinai about those people who worked———

Ms. WHITMAN. I have not read the reports. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Let me recommend them to you. I say that in all 

sincerity. Because I conclude after reading the two reports that I 

read, it might have been more, that the people are not making 

these stories up. The people are not claiming that their illnesses 

or sicknesses are coming from something other than they felt their 

work in the area. That’s very dangerous, and I think you’d agree 

with that, very serious, and we have a responsibility in the government to protect and to prevent things from happening. If these people are correct that they suffered these things, then I don’t care 

what reports you tell us about. I don’t care what evidence you 

present. The evidence is that people I’m convinced are not lying, 

that they are sick, that they have had very difficult situations in 

breathing, pulmonary problems. I’ve talked to these people myself, 

Governor. They’re not making this stuff up. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I would never say they were making it up. And I have talked to them as well. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, good. Now that we agree———

Ms. WHITMAN. That’s one of the reasons why we continue to say 

that those working on the pile should wear respirators. 

Mr. PASCRELL. But they all didn’t. And the judge who handled 

the case—and in conclusion, I want to make this point very clear. 

41

The judge who handled the case that was brought against you and 

against the EPA was very clear. He said this: 

‘‘Whitman’s deliberate and misleading statements made to the 

press, where she reassured the public that the air was safe to 

breathe around Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn, that there would 

be no health risk presented to those returning to those areas 

shocked the conscience.’’ That’s what he said. I didn’t say that. 

Nadler didn’t say that. King didn’t say that. That’s what he said. 

He also said, ‘‘no reasonable person would have thought that telling thousands of people that it was safe to return to Lower Manhattan while knowing such return could pose long-term risks and 

other dire consequences was conduct sanctioned by our laws.’’

And let me tell you, something, Governor, very clearly. There is 

a reason, there is a reason for this happening. And there’s a reason 

for why this judge said what he did. And let me tell you also, you 

know that this Administration that you worked for has very little 

credibility and accountability. So you wonder, you don’t wonder 

why we ask questions about what they were—what was coming 

out. We wanted one voice. Give me a break. We’re talking about 

people here. We’re talking about families. We’re talking about 

human faces. And you know that just as well as I do. I ask you, 

come clear, clear the air so that we can all go forward. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The witness may 

answer the question. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Thank you. First of all, I would just like to correct, it was a she, that particular judge, and there was another 

judge in the Southern District Court on the same day———

Mr. PASCRELL. I apologize for that, Governor. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, there was a judge in the Southern 

District Court on the same day looking at the basic same fact pattern came to a very different conclusion. She did not look at fact. 

I think you are a lawyer, Congressman? 

Mr. PASCRELL. No, I’m not. No, I’m not. 

Ms. WHITMAN. I’m not either. That’s one of the few things we 

share, Congressman. Neither one of us are. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I have two sons who are lawyers. I don’t hold it 

against them. 

Ms. WHITMAN. One of the things that a judge must take as fact 

in that kind of the proceeding are the allegations by the plaintiffs. 

They don’t look at fact. They don’t hear testimony on it. They have 

to take that as fact and she was adjudicating whether or not———

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, I’m glad someone from the Administration, 

past and present, believes that we should rely on science. That’s 

what we will do. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentlelady 

from Florida’s recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 

Henshaw and Governor Whitman, I in my other role serve as the 

Chair of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Subcommittee and 

I say that because we have just been through a process by which 

we are having to make sure that we can now take care of tunnel 

workers who were exposed to very high levels of asbestos in our 

tunnels while working on the Capitol Visitor Center site as well as 

the site leading to the Capitol power plant. And for years we batVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
42

tled the Architect of the Capitol, who refused to do anything about 

it or acknowledge that there’s a problem, and now we know that 

we have tunnel workers who were exposed. And we’re going to 

have to deal with that to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars, both to clean up the site and make sure we can take care of 

those workers. So I have spent a little bit of time on this and I 

wanted to lay that out in that context. 

Mr. Henshaw, at the Pentagon my understanding is that OSHA 

enforced regulations requiring the use of respirators and then no 

one became sick. But at the World Trade Center site OSHA regulations were not enforced and 70 percent of the first responders are 

now sick. So why did OSHA not enforce the law in New York with 

respect to the non-city or State employees on the site despite repeated requests from, what I understand from the city to do so? 

And given the fact that thousands of people are now sick, do you 

now believe that OSHA’s nonenforcement of the respiratory protection standard at Ground Zero was the correct course of action? 

Mr. HENSHAW. Congresswoman, you probably missed my opening 

statement. But Virginia has a State program, and the State program also has authority to enforce with firefighters and police. We 

in the Federal system do not have the authority to enforce with 

firefighters and police. The municipal employees, public sector are 

now covered under the OSHA Act, as you know. 

Number two———

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. The EPA did have the ability to take 

over the site at the point that they felt that—and that is under 

Presidential Decision Directive 62, Emergency Support Function 

10, and the National Contingency Plan under CERCLA, EPA could 

have taken over control of the site from the city as the lead agency 

if they felt that the city was not properly protecting their workers. 

So they certainly had the ability to do it, and you chose not to. So 

if you are saying that the law wasn’t structured in New York to 

allow you to do that, then why didn’t EPA step in and take over? 

Mr. HENSHAW. First, I can’t speak to why EPA didn’t step in. 

And if you want———

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. I will have Governor Whitman answer 

then. 

Mr. HENSHAW. If I can complete the other part of your question, 

previous question, in respect to enforcing, even with the nongovernment employees or nonpublic sector employees, which were the contractors, the four primary contractors, that were at the site. We 

met with them the day after. They produced safety and health 

plans. We coordinated those safety and health plans. We got an 

agreement up front that we were going to follow one safety and 

health plan which has required the use of respiratory protection. 

That plan was put in place and signed by all parties eventually 

on October 15. Yes, Congressman, it was signed by the 15th. That 

plan, the contractors were the ones that were putting that together. 

We did not enforce—and that’s why we had 70 people on the 

ground for 24/7 for that 10-month period when we saw—when we 

did inspection and found they weren’t wearing respiratory protection, we told them to put it on and we also got a few of them removed from the site because they weren’t wearing respiratory protection. 

43

Again this was the contractors. We had an agreement up front. 

Now, sir, I’m not a lawyer either and I don’t want to employ any 

more lawyers. And as you know if we go through enforcement, we 

have to develop the evidence, we have to present it, issue the citations, they have 15 days to contest the citations. And then it goes 

through the administrative law judge and ultimately possibly to 

the review commission. That could take years. And we did not have 

seconds. I was there, and I agree 150 percent, this was the best approach to make sure we had immediate compliance. And that’s why 

we put 1,100 people on the ground to make sure that they were 

complying. 

Now, in the earlier days it was very, very difficult because there 

were a lot of issues. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Henshaw, when you are talking 

about exposure to that type of environment, you don’t have the luxury of letting that type of time pass. The more time passes, the 

more people are exposed, and the more likely they are to get sick 

down the road. So even a lapse of a few weeks made a significant 

difference in people’s health. And Governor, I would like to ask 

you, because I don’t think it has been covered before I got here, 

why is it that EPA didn’t take in and step over and use your legal 

authority to make sure these things were taken care of? Because 

that is a great concern to me. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congresswoman, under—as you know, the EPA 

would have under certain circumstances had the authority to take 

over the site. What had to be proven in order to invoke the 

CERCLA, the Superfund Act, substantive—substantial and imminent danger, and the readings that we were getting relative—and 

this was relative to the overall air, I’m talking more about outside 

of the pile, were not indicating that. And we were working in a collegial fashion with the City of New York. 

Again, as far as the workers on the pile, what our—we were 

tasked by OSHA to do the—I mean, excuse me, by FEMA to do the 

health and safety monitoring, to monitor the air. And we did that, 

and then we provided respirators. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. When it comes to imminent—substantial and imminent danger, are you talking about immediate death, 

horrible sickness within weeks? Because mesothelioma, the cancer 

that is the result of exposure to asbestos, does not manifest itself 

substantially or immediately. It could be years, but it’s almost certain. So how is it that you didn’t step in and exercise your authority given that knowledge, which has been known for years? 

Mr. NADLER. The gentlelady’s time has expired. The witness may 

answer the question. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congresswoman, that was based on what the interpretation of what our legal ability was to act by—in consultation 

with counsel at the time. We did have conversations about invoking 

Superfund and determined that frankly, the other part of it was, 

even if we had it, given the fact that we were trying to work in 

a collegial way with New York, I’m not sure the public would have 

stood with my taking New York to court to take Federal control of 

the site. But I can’t speak to that because that would be supposition on my part. 

44

We did look at it and didn’t feel the legal basis for exerting that 

existed. That’s what I was told. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Thank you. We will start the second round of questions and I 

yield myself—well, we won’t start the second round of questions. I 

recognize the distinguished gentleman from Iowa. 

Mr. KING. I thank the Chairman, the distinguished gentleman 

from New York. I want to make my short confession here in that 

and I just arrived on the scene and there are many pieces, details, 

of this that I haven’t had an opportunity to accumulate and sort 

in as rational an approach that I would like to. I didn’t want to 

pass up this opportunity, Mr. Chairman. What I’d like to do is, if 

I could just direct a question to Governor Whitman. 

The narrowness of the questions that have been asked at this 

point: Is there something you would like to address that you 

haven’t had an opportunity to speak to? 

Ms. WHITMAN. What has always been frustrating is that I believe 

that the men and women of the Environmental Protection Agency 

were heroes as much as everyone in the way they acted after that 

and the kind of work they did, going down. They were on the pile, 

as far as I can recollect, on an almost daily basis. We had people 

on the site wearing monitors, trying to convey the best information. 

We tend to forget, looking back almost 6 years, the chaotic and 

emotional nature of this event. It was unprecedented. We were 

doing the very best we could, putting out information as fast as we 

could get it to the public, with the best interpretation of scientists 

who were not neophytes at this. 

While we had never faced something of the magnitude of the 

Twin Towers coming down, the professional men and women of the 

Environmental Protection Agency have responded to crises all 

around the world, and they were in Oklahoma City when the buildings came down. They know the kinds of things to look for, they 

make appropriate scientific-based assumptions based on what they 

know and the readings they are getting. To me, it is really sad that 

their reputation is being so undermined and so questioned when I 

believe they did an extraordinary job. 

Mr. KING. Governor, I thank you for those comments and I reflect upon a number of other incidents across the country where in 

the aftermath firemen charged the fire. And we know how many 

of them lost their lives because of their selfless dedication to their 

duty, without question about measuring the risk. 

I’ve seen it happen on a smaller scale in the district that I represent and this is the aftermath I understand, but also there have 

been many Monday mornings since then that have passed to get 

to this point. It is my view that we should measure the circumstances in the time that it took place and also measure the 

dedication of the people who made those decisions and question 

what they had to work with at the time and the political climate 

that we were in, well as the emergency situation that was there. 

How could anyone—I pose this question to you, Governor: How 

could anyone argue that we shouldn’t have engaged in the recovery 

operations until we had a definitive response, definitive understanding of all of the implications that might have unfolded? 

45

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I don’t think anybody would. Obviously nobody did. The men and women who went in to respond to 

that—and many of them were people who were there because they 

worked for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and 

I have had the opportunity to work with them and they didn’t come 

back out of those buildings. They were true heroes and we owe 

them a debt of gratitude. And for those who did come out, but 

spent then months on that pile, this was a response where I believe 

every level of government did their very best. 

To say that anyone is perfect, that’s not within the purview of 

mankind. But to then say that because there might not—to say 

that no one, not everyone is perfect in every instance, although I 

think we did an outstanding job, to say therefore it was malicious 

and with forethought and intent to mislead is an extreme—well, I 

think it is dangerous and it is going to be hard for people, if we 

should ever suffer another attack, for people to trust their government. 

Mr. KING. I leave with you that conclusion, Governor. I appreciate your testimony; yours also, Mr. Henshaw, and I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

I’ll now begin the second round of questioning. I yield myself 5 

minutes. 

First of all, let me make a couple of comments on what was said 

before I get into my questions. Mr. Henshaw, you talked about 70 

percent of the victims and you talked about people caught in the 

plume and it was the terrorists’ fault. But the 70 percent was not 

of people caught in the plume, the 70 percent of people who are 

sick are 70 percent of the first responders who were not caught in 

the plume. They are sick because they worked in the pile for 40 

and 50 days without proper protection, so that is not the same 

thing. The people who were caught in the plume lots of them are 

sick, but the 70 percent of the first responders who were not caught 

in the plume, who did not inhale anything toxic on 9/11, but who 

worked there 40 and 50 days later, they are now sick because they 

worked without proper protection from OSHA or EPA or other 

agencies of government. 

Second of all, I must comment on Ms. Whitman’s claims that 

EPA constantly told people to get a professional cleaning of their 

homes. There were no such recommendations in any EPA press release or on the 24-hour hot line or in any statements that we could 

identify before November 26th of ’01. 

EPA region II Acting Administrator Kathleen Callahan testified 

at a New York City council hearing on November 1, ’01, only about 

the New York City instructions to clean up, that people should 

clean up their apartments and their places of business with a wet 

rag and a wet mop, and made no distinctions in her testimony 

about levels of dust. 

In response to January 2002 Freedom of Information Act request, 

EPA could not produce any publicly disseminated document that either assumed the dust to contain asbestos or told people that they 

should use professional contractors if there is more than minimal 

dust. So unless you can provide to this Committee something dating before November 26th, 2001, I would hope you would not reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
46

peat the untruth that EPA was constantly telling people to get professional help. They were certainly not doing so in anything that 

we have been able to identify before November 26th. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I will attempt to get you the tape 

of October 26, an MSNBC interview that I gave that talks about 

that. I’ll get it to you. 

Mr. NADLER. And October 26, if you said that on October 26, 

that’s a month and a half after you’d given the wrong information. 

Now, EPA press releases at its Website referred residents and 

employers returning to their homes and workplaces to New York 

City Department of Health guidelines that advised people to remove dust from their homes and workplaces using a wet mop or 

a wet rag. 

Now, Mr. Henshaw, on January 31, 2002 you wrote a letter to 

President Peterson of Local 78 of the Asbestos Workers Union and 

you said the following: In that the materials’ referral to dust—he 

had asked whether dust found in people’s homes should be considered asbestos containing material. You wrote the following: In that 

the materials containing asbestos were used in the construction of 

the Twin Towers, the settled dust from their collapse must be presumed to contain asbestos. Therefore, you concluded, the dust contained asbestos must be removed by a competent person and be 

disposed of properly. 

Now, Mrs. Whitman, the IG report, as was noted before, said 

that a recommendation to obtain professional cleaning was deleted 

from an EPA press release by a White House official. We will get 

into that in Panel II. The EPA Website was constantly referring 

people to the New York City Department of Health recommendation to clean up their apartments with a wet mop and wet rag. 

Now, Mrs. Whitman, isn’t it a fact that EPA prosecutes people 

all the time for illegal removal and disposal of asbestos? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, yes. 

Mr. NADLER. If the EPA saw removal crews dumping asbestoscontaining material in the trash, wouldn’t the EPA prosecute 

them? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I would presume they would. 

Mr. NADLER. Then given that Mr. Henshaw’s letter properly stated that all World Trade Center dust must be presumed to be asbestos-containing material, and that therefore all asbestos regulations 

apply, and since EPA’s own 1986 regulations state that there is no 

safe levels of asbestos, how could EPA urge people, how could they 

permit the City Department of Health to urge people to illegally 

dump asbestos-containing material in the trash and to illegally 

clean it up without being licensed to do so or without being properly protected? 

Isn’t that illegal advice for which you would prosecute people in 

the normal course of events? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, no, I am not a lawyer so I can’t tell 

you whether counsel would have advised under those circumstances to bring charges against anyone who was trying to dispose of the dust. 

Mr. NADLER. Let’s rephrase the question. Isn’t it clearly illegal 

for people who are not licensed to do so, and are not properly proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
47

tected, to remove asbestos-containing material and throw it in the 

garbage? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I actually cannot answer that question. I am not a lawyer. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Henshaw, can you answer that question? 

Mr. HENSHAW. I don’t know if I can answer that exact question, 

except that letter was in response to invoking what the standards 

are required for hazardous waste. And that wasn’t the case under 

these circumstances. 

Mr. NADLER. What wasn’t the case? 

Mr. HENSHAW. That this was a hazardous waste site. 

Mr. NADLER. It certainly was. 

Mr. HENSHAW. It was hazardous, but it wasn’t declared to be a 

hazardous waste site. 

Mr. NADLER. It wasn’t declared to be hazardous site, but nonetheless your letter stated that since there was asbestos in the 

World Trade Center, you must presume that the dust from it contained asbestos. And the law would simply operate to say if it is 

asbestos-containing material, you must dispose of it according to 

the law. 

We will get to that in Panel II, though. But my conclusion is this: 

That was illegal advice, not to mention unsafe. My time is expired, 

but I permit you to answer the question. 

Mr. HENSHAW. Thank you very much. We were operating under 

1926, which is construction standard for asbestos, those are—that’s 

the standard which we were operating under during the World 

Trade Center events. 

I would also like———

Mr. NADLER. And, therefore, what———

Mr. HENSHAW. And that required based on the assessment, based 

on exposure assessment, and our assessment was we did not find 

asbestos concentrations in those workplaces. And therefore the appropriate—we had in the cleanup operation scope A and scope B. 

If you read further in the discussions, you will hear scope A and 

scope B. If there was scope A, what was visible dust, then we 

would recommend respiratory protection. If it was scope B, which 

is nonvisible dust, then we didn’t require it. 

I’d like to go back———

Mr. NADLER. My time is expired. 

Mr. HENSHAW. But during your time you raised the issue about 

70 percent. 

Mr. NADLER. I’ll have to get to that later. My time is well overexpired. 

Mr. Franks? Mr. Franks is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just start the second round here by saying that I know 

that anyone who’s gotten sick as a result of this tragedy is an ancillary part of it. I don’t want it ever to be thought or assumed that 

there’s not a great concern on my part and, I am convinced, as well 

as those members of the panel here today. But I think what is disturbing me is that somehow, Governor, as you put it earlier, that 

there is being attached to this tragedy some malicious part, malicious motivation on the part of the EPA to somehow either not care 

48

or just deliberately do things that would harm people in the aftermath of this tragedy. 

I’ve heard things as outrageously ridiculous as that 9/11 was orchestrated by the American Federal Government. You hear things 

that are stupid beyond degree, and yet it seems that there are 

those in certain quarters willing to say them with great conviction. 

So I just—I want to register my disgust with people that would 

deliberately attach a malicious attitude on the part of government 

officials that were trying, trying to respond to a tragedy that beggars the description of all of us. 

With that said, I am particularly concerned about some of the 

things related to the White House involvement and press releases. 

The 9/11 Commission Report at note 13 on page 555 already examined this issue and they concluded as follows: All the White Housereviewed process resulted in some editorial changes to the press releases. These changes were consistent with what the EPA had already been saying about the White House clearance. There were 

disputes between EPA’s communication person and the White 

House coordinator regarding those press releases. But the White 

House coordinator, however, told us—this is the 9/11 Commission—

that these disputes were solely concerned with process, not the actual substance of the press releases. Former EPA Administrator, 

Christine Whitman, agreed that the White House coordinator—

agreed with the White House coordinator, the document supports 

this claim. We found no evidence of pressure on the EPA to say the 

air was safe in order to permit the markets to reopen. 

So I guess, Governor Whitman, I would ask you, hasn’t the 9/11 

Commission already looked into this and concluded that there was 

no wrongdoing? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, the 9/11 Commission did a very 

thorough investigation of the entire tragedy. I have read that word 

for word, been through the entire 9/11 report, and I think they 

were very accurate in their portrayal of the response of the Environmental Protection Agency and the other levels of government to 

this unprecedented attack and tragedy. 

Mr. FRANKS. Did anyone within the EPA ever complain to you 

that they believed that EPA’s public statements about the test data 

were false and misleading. 

Ms. WHITMAN. To the best of my recollection, I don’t remember 

anyone ever coming to me within the Agency and saying that. To 

the best of my recollection. 

Mr. FRANKS. Related to the lawsuits, isn’t it true that two of the 

lawsuits filed against the EPA and you personally, one of them has 

been thrown out of court and the other one is on appeal with the 

same court that threw out the first one? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, it is. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me just conclude here with a quote from the 

IG’s statement and New York Times: ‘‘We looked at a lot of things 

and we only came up with those very few things that we talked 

about, and what that says is that the EPA did a really good job. 

I don’t think you can read five pages in that report without us talking about the fact that it was an unprecedented thing. 

Also an official from the New York City Department of Design 

and Construction said about the EPA’s response to 9/11 that it was 

49

‘‘phenomenal’’ and that the EPA’s response crews were on top of 

every issue under EPA’s mandate. And you, Governor, led this 

agency through those tough times and, for whatever it is worth to 

you, I would like to try to applaud your conduct. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Thank you, Congressman. Could I do one followup response to the Chairman? 

Mr. FRANKS. Certainly. 

Ms. WHITMAN. When you indicated that we were misleading and 

not providing the information to the public on the cleanup, I would 

refer you to a 9/16/01 statement where we did refer people to the 

New York City Department of Health, they were the ones who 

were leading for New York City, where they specifically called for 

a professional cleaning of the buildings. New York City did do that. 

They had that on their Website. We were deferring to them. I just 

want to make sure that you understood the full picture there, that 

New York City was doing this as early as 9/16. 

Mr. NADLER. Time for the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, Chairman of the full 

Committee is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We are trying as best we can as a congressional Committee, to 

recreate as accurately as we can recall, the circumstances—and in 

some ways they are complicated—about what happened following 

this disastrous tragic attack upon our country in New York. 

Governor Whitman, you said that New York City was not properly protecting its workers; is that accurate? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I don’t recall ever making a quote to that effect, 

no. Not using those words. New York was the primary responder; 

I did say that, yes, because that was how the emergency response 

works out, that’s how it happens, that they are the primary responder. But I don’t think I ever blamed—and Congressman, I can 

understand how you might be misinformed on that, because the 

press is dying for a fight here. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I am dying to get Katie Couric and your conversation on 60 Minutes———

Ms. WHITMAN. Certainly. 

Mr. CONYERS.—on September 2006 accurately interpreted. Let 

me review that with you. 

Couric: The Environmental Protection Agency is to protect people 

from the environment. 

Ms. Whitman: Right. 

Couric: Did you really do it? 

Ms. Whitman: We did everything we could to protect people from 

that environment and we did it in the best way that we could, 

which was to communicate with those people who had the responsibility for enforcing what we were telling, saying should be done. 

We didn’t have the authority to do that enforcement, but we communicated that to the people who did. 

Couric: But who had the ultimate authority over the site? 

Ms. Whitman: Really it was the city; it was the primary responder. 

Do you recall that? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, I do. 

Mr. CONYERS. Okay. 

50

Couric: Did your people do enough to call the people who were 

overseeing the site, i.e. Mayor Guliani and city officials, and say, 

damn it, we have got to protect these people? 

Ms. Whitman: Oh, EPA was very firm in what it communicated, 

and it did communicate up and down the line. 

Couric: In no uncertain terms? 

Ms. Whitman, no uncertain terms. 

So if this were the case, does it not appear that it was the city 

that was not properly protecting its workers? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, my response is, those are all accurate, to the best of my knowledge; that the city was the primary 

responder, and as I indicated, that’s—we conveyed the information 

about the importance of wearing protective gear on a regular basis 

to those who had the most direct oversight of the responders on the 

pile. There were mornings it’s my understanding up in Region II 

with everyone. 

Again, this was a highly emotional time and I fully appreciate 

your sentiment of wanting to see how we do better, and I hope that 

one of the things that will come out of a Committee like this is 

whether they want to call it a line item or whatever, but a real 

focus on how do we make respirators that don’t clog, that aren’t 

cumbersome, so responders will wear them without worrying about 

it. 

These were people who were trying to save their brothers and 

sisters. These respirators inhibited communications. They did clog. 

They were hot. Those were warm days in the September, early October days. There were reasons. 

Nobody—again, we all seem to want to always find blame, somebody to blame—that’s the terrorists over and over again—but there 

are some very good things we can do: Get HAZMAT suits that are 

not cumbersome, that allow them to do their job and that are safe. 

Those are the kinds of things that we ought to be looking at. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, did you———

Mr. NADLER. The time for the gentleman is expired. 

Mr. CONYERS. Could I get an additional minute? 

Mr. NADLER. By unanimous consent, without objection, the gentleman is yielded 1 additional minute. 

Mr. CONYERS. I have got a number of minutes, but here is what 

Mayor Guliani said on September 12, 2006. And I am not trying 

to be provocative, but if we don’t straighten it out with you, I don’t 

know who to go to except for Katie Couric herself. But Guliani also 

lashed out at the former Environmental Protection Agency Administrator for trying to blame him. That’s what he said. 

‘‘What I remember from Cristine Whitman is her saying that the 

air was fine,’’ he said, ‘‘and her saying that quite prominently over 

and over again, and insisting on it.’’

Now, that’s why I raised the question in the way that I did. I 

wasn’t trying to put words in your mouth. 

Can you help me with that response before—the Chairman is 

raising his gavel again. 

Ms. WHITMAN. I would be happy to. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time is expired, but the witness 

may answer the question. 

51

Ms. WHITMAN. I would be happy to, Congressman, once again. 

There are two different things we are talking about, the pile and 

ambient air quality in Manhattan in general. One of the things 

that I learned, as I am sure you have, is not to respond to purported allegations given to me by reporters and the press, because 

usually we find that those are taken somewhat out of context, and 

we find that people weren’t really blaming other people in the way 

that is implicated or implied by the way the question might be 

asked. So I don’t think the mayor is blaming me. I am certainly 

not blaming the mayor. I don’t think that that is a fruitful thing 

in which to engage. 

Mr. CONYERS. In other words, you don’t think he said it. 

Ms. WHITMAN. I don’t think he said it relative to the pile, certainly relative to the ambient air quality in Lower Manhattan in 

general, because that’s what I said. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time is expired. The gentleman 

from Iowa is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think most of us on this 

Committee have looked upon that tragic smoking pile of rubble 

and, later, into that smoking hole of rubble. I can’t imagine anyone 

not thinking it was a war zone, that it was a war zone. I can’t 

imagine anyone not thinking that did not put us at war right then, 

at that moment of impact, on that day. 

As I look down into that smoking hole, I think back across our 

history and what did it mean? The first word when I found out 

about the first plane—actually the second plane that hit the Twin 

Towers, the first one was, ‘‘oh my God, what’s happened to a passenger plane?’’ The second one was my passenger who was with me 

said ‘‘Pearl Harbor.’’ The scope of the whole thing rolled into his 

head instantaneously. 

I spent my Father’s Day weekend down to the Civil War battlefields at Manassas. And the first Battle of Manassas as it is known 

up on the south side of the Mason-Dixon line and, as I learned, the 

Battle of Bull Run, there was a momentous time in history and a 

lot of people think that the Civil War might have been over within 

months instead of years, at the cost of thousands of lives rather 

than hundreds of thousands of lives, if the battery that protected 

the right flank of the Union had simply received the order to fire 

on the charging regimen of, I believe, the 32nd Virginia. That order 

was apparently never issued, but no one really knows because 

every one who defended that battery was killed within a 10-minute 

period of time. The Union line was overrun and the first Battle of 

Bull Run was won by the Confederates and we launched ourselves 

on a tragic path of American history. 

What’s interesting about that is Congress held hearings on that 

battle and they held hearings on why the order wasn’t given. If it 

was given for that battery of cannon-to-fire-rate-shot, how it might 

have turned history if it had just done something different. 

I read that history down there, and I think how could Congress 

go back and be a Monday morning quarterback and even put themselves into the circumstances of the troops who lost their lives that 

day or those who survived the battle. And it is different when you 

are at war, it is different when decisions have to be made on the 

52

spot, and it is different in the aftermath. And this Nation had 

needs. 

And I am trying to imagine what it would be like, with a city 

that covered with ash, to file charges against someone for not doing 

a proper EPA cleanup when they maybe lost their wife or husband 

in the Twin Towers? How could you bring that kind of enforcement 

from the EPA? And I guess that’s really where my question is. I 

ask you that question, Governor Whitman, because I’d ask you 

again: Can you set the scene, how would that have been, if you 

would have followed the path that seems to be recommended here 

by some of the members of the panel, what do you think would 

have been the reaction of the public, of the President, of the Congress? Do you think you would have been called before hearings before this Congress if you had punished people who maybe didn’t follow all of the letters of the regulations of the EPA and the cleanup 

in the aftermath, especially in the first couple of months afterwards? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Again, Congressman, it is so hard to speculate 

about what might have happened or might not have happened. But 

given today’s atmosphere I would have to say, yes, I would have 

been probably brought to Congress long before this. 

Mr. KING. Governor, that’s my speculation too. It strikes me that 

the circumstances that you found yourself in, that history called 

you to, were a no-win situation. Whichever side of the argument 

that might have come down, there were going to be a lot of questions, a lot of recriminations. 

And what is different about this era than the Civil War era, is 

we’re a litigious society. Nobody was going to file a lawsuit at the 

beginning of the Civil War or in the aftermath, but today we have 

a lot of litigation that goes on. We have people that are looking for 

these kind of opportunities, people that advertise for these kind of 

opportunities. And the financial incentive that’s there is part of the 

equation. 

And I am not impugning anyone’s integrity here, we know, it is 

part of the equation. We deal with that debate in this Committee. 

We have every year since I have been here. So I think we need to 

put this in a proper perspective, being that we were at war, we still 

are at war, and decisions had to be made on the spot. And to go 

back and, by the way, engage ourselves in a hearing here that may 

well affect the results of litigation, I think is something that we 

have refrained from in this Committee, but it is happening here 

today. 

I would ask Mr. Henshaw if he’d comment on that. 

Mr. HENSHAW. Congressman, I agree 100 percent. I came to New 

York on Thursday after driving all night from Wisconsin, and I had 

a really deep appreciation of what some of those folks were going 

through. Incidentally, Congressman, Mr. Chairman, your people in 

New York were outstanding individuals. I went to some of the candlelight vigils. I have the utmost respect from New Yorkers. I grew 

up in Delaware and on the east cost, but I have the utmost respect 

for New Yorkers. When I arrived, we’re trying to get a sense of how 

we can add value and save lives and reduce injuries and illnesses. 

Quite frankly, one of the purposes behind this ought to be how can 

we move forward. 

53

We had firefighters tell us, we don’t need civilians to tell us how 

to do our job. And it’s not because—I went through fire 

school———

Mr. NADLER. Could the witness please———

Mr. HENSHAW. I am wrapping up. 

My point is I have the utmost respect for those individuals. We 

did not train them on wearing negative pressure respirators, and 

during an emergency you are not going to add a new element to 

their training. You just don’t do that. And so the fallacy here is we 

did not prepare them adequately to deal with those kinds of conditions. 

And so the future ought to be how can we train them to put on 

the negative pressure respirators because we did not train them 

prior to that, and that’s where we need to focus on. I yield back. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman, I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Governor Whitman, you indicated that the 9/11 Commission had 

exonerated the EPA. 

Ms. WHITMAN. No, I don’t believe I used the word ‘‘exonerated,’’ 

Congressman. I think I said they had done a very thorough report 

on what happened. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. There is one statement in a footnote that said 

we did not have the expertise to examine the scientific accuracy of 

the EPA pronouncements in the press releases. Is that in their report? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, that’s in the footnotes as you allude to, as I 

recall. I don’t recall every footnote. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Henshaw, just to get a couple of things on the 

record for clarification. I understand you say that you knew when 

the workers were at Ground Zero, working without respirators, 

that you were aware that they were in eminent danger for health 

problems; is that right? 

Mr. HENSHAW. No, sir, I did not say that. In fact, what our requirements were to wear respiratory protection. And to answer the 

question of the Congresswoman about citation, we did not find 

many samples above our standard able to cite. 

Mr. SCOTT. You knew they were working at Ground Zero without 

respirators. 

Mr. HENSHAW. Our requirement was to wear respirators and 

when we saw one not wearing it, we in fact told them put it on, 

and they did. And we also had a few people dismissed because they 

weren’t. 

Mr. SCOTT. So you were not aware of anyone working without a 

respirator that you didn’t take immediate action to correct? 

Mr. HENSHAW. I am not aware of any that we did not take immediate action to correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. And in response to the gentleman from New York, 

the Chairman’s comment, you indicated that one of the problems 

with exposure was exposure was immediate, and so a lot of the illness could not have possibly been prevented because the exposure 

was right there at the explosion. 

Is it your testimony that people were not exposed after the initial 

9/11 and subjected to significant health problems? 

54

Mr. HENSHAW. Congressman, certainly during the collapse of the 

building there was an immense exposure, no doubt about it. There 

is a picture right here to see the kind of environment that individuals were in. 

During the cleanup and recovery and as soon as we began to 

take samples, we began to characterize what those exposures were. 

And we found very few above our permissible exposure levels. But 

regardless, the requirement was to wear respiratory protection 

when you are on the pile. 

Mr. SCOTT. While you are talking about acceptable levels, can 

you remind me what you said the acceptable level for asbestos exposure was? 

Mr. HENSHAW. On an 8-hour time-weighted average, it is 0.15 fibers per cc. 

Mr. SCOTT. There are some that think that any exposure to asbestos is hazardous; you would disagree with them? 

Mr. HENSHAW. I disagree with them. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for a second? 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield. 

Mr. NADLER. I would point out that the Federal Register of April 

25th, 1986, the official EPA regulations state available evidence 

support the conclusion there is no safe level of exposure to asbestos. I yield back to the gentleman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Reclaiming my time. I am aware of that, I just wanted to make sure I didn’t misunderstand the gentleman’s testimony. 

Mr. HENSHAW. That’s based on a 1980’s risk assessment that was 

based on some old information. We have new information today. 

Mr. SCOTT. Governor Whitman, you indicated in response to the 

Chairman’s inquiries on the question of whether the places ought 

to be professionally cleaned, you have knowledge that the White 

House changed the press release, that was a substantive change, 

but that was the only time that you failed to mention the places 

ought to be professionally cleaned? 

Ms. WHITMAN. To the best of my—no, what I said, to the best 

of my knowledge, that was the only time that something substantive had been changed in a press release, that did not convey 

all of the information that we felt should be conveyed. Again, I am 

surprised to hear the Congressman say there weren’t other press 

releases that indicated the need for professional cleaning. I know 

that I have said it on numerous occasions, and I am surely happy 

to go back and find tapes, although we———

Mr. SCOTT. We know now that evidence was there that we should 

have known better than to send people back into some of those situations. If we don’t know whether it is safe or not, should we say 

that it’s safe or should we say that it’s not safe if we don’t have 

firm evidence one way or the other? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, we were basing everything—there 

were tests that were done on air quality. Again, it is not the usual 

prerogative or responsibility of the Agency to do indoor air. However, this was clearly a need, and we were working with the city 

of New York that took the lead on indoor air, and we were following their lead. They were the primary responders———

55

Mr. SCOTT. We know now that it was not safe, so obviously we 

didn’t———

Ms. WHITMAN. No, it was a question of the readings as to whether they were high enough where they exceeded levels, and to the 

best of my knowledge in going back and talking to people about 5-

1/2 years ago and what we were finding, that they were not finding 

levels in the air that were—when they did go into apartments—

that were problematic. But that’s my recollection looking back. 

That was run out of Region II and again it was New York City who 

was the primary responder. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time is expired. The gentleman 

from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen. I’m sorry, did I skip Mr. Ellison? I am 

sorry. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Governor, I just want to tell you I appreciate you being here. I 

know we had an exchange last time. Nothing here is intended to 

be personally offensive to you. I’m just trying to get some information. 

Do you agree that people were made sick because of the exposure 

to toxins that were in the environment in the aftermath of 9/11? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I can’t make that kind of finding. 

That has to be based on the scientific data and the studies. 

Mr. ELLISON. Okay. Based on the scientific data and the studies, 

do you believe people were made sick by toxins that were in the 

environment after 9/11? 

Ms. WHITMAN. If they come to those conclusions I would have to 

agree. But waiting for those conclusions———

Mr. ELLISON. But, Governor———

Ms. WHITMAN. No. Clearly we were concerned, Congressman. Obviously we were concerned or we wouldn’t have recommended time 

and again that those working on the pile wear appropriate safety 

protections. 

Mr. ELLISON. So can we safely say that you do agree that the illnesses that people have suffered as a result of their work of recovery, post 9/11, are related to their illnesses? You———

Ms. WHITMAN. That’s something that will be proven by all those 

studies, including the Mount Sinai one. 

Mr. ELLISON. So are you saying yes, no, or you just don’t know? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I don’t know. I am not a scientist. I am not a doctor. 

Mr. ELLISON. I know, I’ve read your bio. What does your common 

sense tell you? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Excuse me? 

Mr. ELLISON. What does your common sense tell you? 

Ms. WHITMAN. My common sense tells me that we were concerned about possible health ramifications from workers who were 

not adequately protected; otherwise we would not have repeated 

over and over again that they should wear protection. 

Mr. ELLISON. So you have testified already today about how the 

toxins that you tested for were within limits in terms of the studies 

that you relied on. 

If you—do you doubt the testing—do you doubt any of those tests 

that you found that were within the acceptable limits for exposure 

for people? 

56

Ms. WHITMAN. Do I doubt the quality of the tests? 

Mr. ELLISON. Yeah. 

Ms. WHITMAN. I have no reason to doubt the quality of the tests. 

Again, the men and women at the Environmental Protection Agency, the scientists—and they weren’t just the Environmental Protection Agency scientists who were looking at this data, it was OSHA, 

CDC, ATSDR, a number—as well as hospitals, the city and the 

State. There was a lot of instantaneous peer review, if you will, 

going on. So it as not just EPA. 

Mr. ELLISON. Well, here’s the thing, Governor. We have a lot of 

people who are sick, many of them are here today. And yet we have 

you saying, hey, we tested it and it was within acceptable; levels, 

that’s why we told the public that—we reassured the public that 

it was safe. 

How do you account for what looks to me like a discrepancy? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, again, I think we are talking about 

two different things. On the pile there were concerns, and clearly, 

as Mr. Henshaw has indicated, when those towers came down, anybody that was engulfed in that dust you have to believe there was 

enormous amount of contamination that took place then, but that 

as it was happening nobody was out there taking readings; everybody was trying to figure out what to do. Our offices in fact were 

very near that site and had to be evacuated and people had to go 

immediately to the Emergency Response Center. But in the ambient air quality in Lower Manhattan in general, after setting aside 

the moment when those buildings came down, after that, when we 

started taking tests and data—the scientists were telling me that 

they didn’t see anything that indicated long-term health problems 

for the general public. 

And, of course, remember that Lower Manhattan was closed to 

the general public, to most of the general public for quite some 

time afterwards as well. It wasn’t a complete kind of a closeout, but 

there were pretty strict police patrols. But that’s aside—we were 

just dealing with what we were hearing from the scientists, to the 

best of my knowledge. 

Mr. ELLISON. Well, let me—are you saying that the people who 

have contracted illnesses—well, who I believe contracted illnesses 

as a result of the exposure were people who were only—who were 

exposed later and not as a result of the on-the-scene—at the time 

of the attack that were engulfed in that big pile? You are saying 

that the illnesses are folks who—the people who are sick are people 

who got exposed outside of the initial attack? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I couldn’t even begin to speculate on that, which 

is why the Environmental Protection Agency is part of the ongoing 

health registry and examinations that are being conducted to follow 

people to find out exactly what kind of exposure, whether these 

are—whether they can make that kind of correlation. I couldn’t 

speculate on that, sir. 

Mr. ELLISON. One last question, Mr. Chair. 

Earlier on, a member of our panel sort of raised a question about 

why would we go through an exercise of asking questions post hoc 

about what happened here. My question—my point would be because we want to do better next time. 

57

My question to you is in that light, going forward, do you think 

that you would give reassurances about safety of the air and the 

water and the toxic exposure after a catastrophe the way you did 

this time, if we were to, heaven forbid, to have another kind of catastrophe like this? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Going forward, I think it is the absolute responsibility of the Agency to communicate to the public the information 

and conclusions being drawn by the scientists who are looking at 

the data and making that analysis, not to inject any kind of a personal presumption into it, but to communicate what they are getting, based on what the scientists and professionals who are 

trained in this are finding. 

Mr. NADLER. Gentleman’s time is expired. The gentleman—now 

we’ll get to the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cohen. 

Mr. COHEN. Governor Whitman, were the scientists involved in 

the issuing of the—given the information that were used in the 

press releases at the EPA issued? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Were there scientists involved? As I explained at 

the beginning, Congressman, when we would have the meetings in 

the morning, our scientists, the head scientist was generally 

present at headquarters, but also on the other end at Region II, 

their Acting Administrator who was overseeing things was there, 

he had scientists there. Scientists were very much a part of the discussions; yes, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. And when the press releases were changed, were the 

folks in the White House—do you know if scientists were involved 

in that office? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I don’t know that, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. Well, being that you don’t know if there were scientists involved on that end and there were on your end, and you 

state, which is accurate and correct, that the scientists are the people who should be making these decisions, why did you never object 

once, with the changing of the press releases to an ‘‘all is safe and 

clear’’ from a precautionary note? The scientists were precautionary, the politicians weren’t. Why did you never once be precautionary? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, as I indicated earlier, the thing of 

concern was to ensure that all of the information that the public 

needed to make intelligent choices was it contained in these press 

releases and there was—as far as the actual wordsmithing went, 

I left that to people who were trying to get consensus from the various agencies. And I have to presume that scientists were involved 

from other agencies as well. 

Mr. COHEN. You presume, but you don’t know. 

Ms. WHITMAN. No, I don’t know. 

Mr. COHEN. And you never questioned one time, you didn’t think 

your position was to speak truth to power, even if they refused and 

overruled you, that at least you would have rested—your conscience would have felt good about raising an issue. 

Ms. WHITMAN. All the relevant data was communicated in those 

press releases to the best of my remembrance and looking at them. 

I know, I feel assured, because in one instance where we felt that 

all the data wasn’t getting out, it was brought to my attention. So 

again we talked in the morning about what information we knew, 

58

what the scientists and professionals felt was acceptable to communicate to the public. That was communicated to the communications office that went through this process———

Mr. COHEN. But you looked at the differences. The differences 

are very dramatic from, you know—there’s a problem, and asbestos 

is never a safe substance and it is 200 to 300 percent higher 

to———

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, I would disagree with your characterization 

of the changes and I think you could go through and argue back 

and forth. But also remember, 

Congressman, that press releases were not the only way we were 

communicating information and data. In fact, I find that they were 

probably the least effective way because most of the people that 

needed the information, particularly those on the pile, didn’t have 

time to sit and read press releases, which is why we communicated, 

too, verbally and a whole lot of different levels as well. 

Mr. COHEN. How do you define ‘‘the pile?’’ What’s the dimensions 

of the pile, the parameters? 

Ms. WHITMAN. I can get it for you, I don’t have it here, but there 

was actually a blue line drawn around it—or green line I guess it 

was—a green line that indicated the parameters of the highest exposure where people were working on. It was basically those areas 

where the buildings collapsed. 

Mr. COHEN. And so was it out to the fence? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Which fence? 

Mr. COHEN. When I was there, this is what I was given about 

3 weeks afterwards. I was out around the fence. Was that the pile? 

Or was the pile—did the pile stop? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Actually our area, you’d probably get a better answer with the next panel, Congressman. Off the top of my head, 

I can’t tell you what the parameters were, but again, that’s a matter of record. 

Mr. COHEN. There were differences in how the folks who worked 

at the Pentagon were allowed to work and the ones at the Twin 

Towers. You waived some standards, did you not, at the Twin Towers that weren’t waived as far as using respirators or conditions? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Are you addressing me or Mr. Henshaw? 

Mr. COHEN. Either one that can give me a proper answer. 

Mr. HENSHAW. No standards were waived. 

Mr. COHEN. But everybody at the Pentagon wore the respirators, 

did they not? 

Mr. HENSHAW. I don’t know that for sure. 

Mr. COHEN. The information I have says they were and that 

there were different standards. You don’t know anything about 

that. 

Mr. HENSHAW. They were not different standards. We enforced 

the same standard, but just in a different way. 

Mr. COHEN. In a different way. 

Mr. HENSHAW. Well, I know there was a snicker behind me. This 

is as serious to me as it is to them. 

We applied a different enforcement policy or strategy on the pile 

because we did not have enforcement authority. And circumstances 

require a little different standard in respect to enforcement, as I 

said earlier, than happened at the Pentagon. Under the cirVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
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cumstances, we had to deploy a partnership requiring people to follow those standards because we did not have authority for the firefighters and the police. 

Now, was every one of them wearing a respirator? Obviously, I 

see photographs of people not wearing respirators, or they are 

hanging around their chin. I’m an industrial hygienist, and I know 

the only way it is going to work is if it is on your face properly and 

you are fitted properly. So you are asking me, did everybody wear 

it the same way? No. You’re asking me, did people wear it always 

at the Pentagon? I don’t know for sure. In workplaces all around 

this country people are supposed to wear it, and sometimes they 

are not, so I don’t know. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. The time of the gentleman is expired. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. No one is suggesting that the EPA or OSHA 

doesn’t care about human life. The bottom line is we have to find 

out whether you did your job or not, and we are going to do that, 

believe me. 

Governor Whitman, I have a question for you. I want to know 

who was the highest-ranking White House official you ever spoke 

to about air quality at the site we are discussing today? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, they were regular Cabinet meetings that we have, and in the course of those Cabinet meetings, I 

reported to the President. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So you spoke to the President about the air quality at the site. 

Ms. WHITMAN. At least one Cabinet meeting it was mentioned 

what was happening. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Was any official at the White House involved in 

the decision not to use your authority to take over the site cleanup 

to protect workers? 

Ms. WHITMAN. No. 

Mr. PASCRELL. You don’t remember anything like that? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Never had a conversation with anyone at the 

White House on that issue. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What about your authority at the site? 

Ms. WHITMAN. No, we were operating within the authority as invoked when the President issued the emergency declaration required under the law. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I can only conclude from what you are saying, 

Governor, that you wouldn’t have changed one darn thing if, God 

forbid, this heinous act happened again. I listened very carefully to 

your answers from both sides of the aisle, and I don’t think you 

would have responded much differently. That disturbs me because 

a lot of people are hurting. I know you don’t want to hurt people—

but the results of your actions. 

I have another question to ask you. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Could I respond to that? I would refer you to the 

lessons learned plan here. The Environmental Protection Agency 

was the first Agency of the Federal Government to take a look at 

what happened after 9/11 and to come up with a number of ways 

that we could have improved our performance, and those things I 

endorse. 

60

Mr. PASCRELL. Governor Whitman, you have a habit of quoting 

what you want from the documents. If you go back to 9/11, since 

you brought it up, the quoting from 9/11 that totally exonerates 

you—do you want me to read what else they said in this report? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Excuse me, but I don’t believe I ever said it totally exonerates. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Then we should open up and clear the air. I have 

a question to ask you, because if I repeat on the record for the first 

time what else the 9/11 report said, it isn’t as clear as you pretend 

it to be. And you know what I am talking about. 

Ms. WHITMAN. No, Congressman, I honestly don’t. 

Mr. PASCRELL. If you want me to read it to you? 

Ms. WHITMAN. If you want to read, Congressman, I have learned 

in dealing with you in the past, if you want to read it, you will read 

it. That’s up to you. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Before I read it, I want to ask you a question. 

Why did you shut down the EPA Ombudsman Office when they 

were———

Ms. WHITMAN. The EPA—certainly. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I didn’t finish the question. 

—when they were investigating two major areas, plus how 9/11. 

What did the 9/11 response encounter? Why did you shut the office 

down? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, the office wasn’t shut down. The 

functions of the office were moved to the Inspector General’s offices, a more appropriate place to place it, frankly, because we were 

concerned. There had been numerous times where the ombudsman 

office had conducted hearings at Superfund sites, raised very serious questions about EPA’s response in those Superfund sites, and 

yet not issued a report on them. In order for EPA to change its behavior and to make a difference we needed to have those reports. 

It started under Carol Browner. 

Mr. NADLER. Would you yield for a moment? 

Mr. PASCRELL. Sure. 

Mr. NADLER. I would like to ask Governor Whitman, in February 

and March of ’02 the EPA Ombudsman’s Office held hearings in 

New York on this whole question. And you refused to attend those 

hearings. You sent a memo saying to other government agencies, 

saying they should refuse to attend those hearings, and you put out 

a press release in advance of the hearings saying it would be a 

Broadway production and a farce and that no one should attend 

the hearings. My information is that you had never done this for 

any previous ombudsman hearings. Why did you do that? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, I have to tell you, I have no recollection of doing that. 

Mr. NADLER. I was cochairing those hearings. I remember you 

doing it. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, okay. Well, fine. 

Mr. NADLER. There will be no comment from the audience, 

please. Governor? 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, obviously I am taking your word 

for it. I am just saying I have no recollection of that. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, I yield back. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Okay. 

61

Mr. PASCRELL. It says in the 9/11 report a lot of things, ‘‘Former 

EPA administrator, Cristie Whitman, Christine Whitman, agreed 

with the White House coordinator. Christine Whitman interviewed 

June 28th, 2004. The documentary evidence supports this claim, although Whitman told us she spoke with White House senior economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay regarding the need to get the financial markets open quickly. She denied you pressured her to declare the air was safe due to economic expediency. We found no evidence of pressure on the EPA to say the air was safe in order to 

permit the markets to reopen. 

The most controversial release that specifically declared the air 

safe to breathe was released after the markets had already reopened. The EPA did not have the health-based benchmarks needed to assess the extraordinary air-quality conditions in Lower Manhattan after 9/11. The EPA and the White House therefore improvised and applied standards developed for other circumstances in 

order to make pronouncements regarding air safety, advising workers at Ground Zero to use protective gear and advising the general 

population that the air was safe. 

The first questions that I asked you my first time around: Those 

standards—different standards when you respond to first responders at the site and compared to different standards when you talk 

about school kids and other workers in the area. Let’s not confuse 

those two, because there were two judges involved here. One was 

a male and one was a female. I just want to make that clear. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time is expired. The witness may 

answer the question. 

Ms. WHITMAN. Congressman, there were no new standards applied. Frankly, I thought it would be a huge mistake to suddenly 

start imposing new standards in the middle of a crisis. We went 

by the standards that EPA has traditionally used when it has responded to emergencies. We did not change any of the criteria on 

the testing data, we didn’t change any of the markers, we stayed 

with what EPA has used in the past. And I will go back again to 

say it is an extraordinarily professional Agency, with very smart 

scientists, who are a lot smarter than I am. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, if I may conclude with this one 

point. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman is granted an additional 30 seconds. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I’m reading in the 9/11 report that everybody 

seems anxious to quote from. 

‘‘The White House efforts during the crisis were coordinated by 

the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets.’’

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

That concludes the first panel of witnesses. The witnesses are excused, with our thanks. And we will go on to the second panel of 

witnesses. We will give a moment or two to change over. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. NADLER. The hearing will resume. I hope everyone can take 

their seats. Let me remind everybody of what I said prior to the 

first panel, that the rules of the House of Representatives do not 

permit demonstrations of any kind by the spectators. Given the 

emotions, I think everybody’s pretty good about that, but please 

62

continue. We have the opportunity to get answers to questions, 

that many of us have been asking for 6 years, today and we must 

proceed in an orderly manner. I know that those of you who have 

traveled so far to be here today agree with that. 

I would now like to introduce our second panel of witnesses. Our 

first witness, who I don’t see there but who I saw earlier—our first 

witness is Samuel Thernstrom. He is managing editor of the AEI 

Press, which is a publisher of the American Enterprise Institute, 

and director of the AEI’s W.H. Grady Program on Culture and 

Freedom. He was the associate director for communications for the 

White House Council for Environmental Equality from 2001 to 

2003. He was also chief speechwriter for the U.S. Department of 

Labor, speechwriter for former Governor George Pataki of New 

York, and spokesman for the New York Department of Environmental Conservation. Previously he was an environmental studies 

fellow at the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, a research 

assistant to Aaron Rudofsky at the University of California at 

Berkeley, and a research fellow of the Political Economy Research 

Center. 

Our second witness is Tina Kreisher. Ms. Kreisher became director of communications of the U.S. Department of the Interior in 

2004 where she had been a speechwriter and acting deputy communications director since 2002. She was associate administrator, Office of Communications, Education and Media Relations for the Environmental Protection Agency from 2001 to 2002. Previously she 

was communications director for the U.S. Senate, Energy and Natural Resources Committee; deputy director of Governor Christine 

Todd Whitman’s Washington Office, and special assistant to the 

Public Liaison Director for the Information Agency. 

Next, Witness David Newman who has served as a nongovernmental expert on the EPA World Trade Center Expert Technical 

Review Panel. He is an industrial hygienist with the New York 

Committee for Occupational Safety and Health and coordinates its 

World Trade Center Health and Safety Project. Mr. Newman 

serves on the Community Advisory Committee of the World Trade 

Center Environmental Health Center at Bellevue Hospital and on 

the Labor Advisory Committee of the New York City Department 

of Health and Mental Hygiene World Trade Center Registry. He 

served on the advisory board of Columbia University Mailman’s 

School of Public Health World Trade Center Evacuation Study and 

on the Exposure Assessment Working Group of the World Trade 

Center Worker and volunteer medical screening program. Mr. Newman is a member of the American Industrial Hygiene Association, 

the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, 

and the American Public Health Association. 

Our next witness is Ms. Eileen McGinnis. Ms. McGinnis served 

as chief of staff to the Administrator of the U.S. EPA. Ms. 

McGinnis also served in Governor Whitman’s cabinet as chief of 

policy, where she was responsible for the government operations of 

16 State departments. She also served in the administration of 

Governor Thomas Caine as director of the Office of Policy in the 

Department of Human Services. 

The next witness is Marianne Horinko who was named Acting 

Administrator of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by PresiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
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dent Bush on July 10th, 2003. She served in this position from July 

14th, 2003 until November 5th, 2003. She then returned to her position as system administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response. Ms. Horinko has served as a system administrator since being confirmed by the Senate on October 1, 2001. Following the events of September 11, Ms. Horinko spent her first few 

months at EPA involved in environmental cleanup activities in 

Lower Manhattan, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. And the U.S. 

Capitol during the crisis over anthrax contamination. During the 

first Bush administration, Ms. Horinko was attorney advisor to 

Don Clay, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response. In that capacity she was responsible for 

RCRA regulatory issues and Superfund reauthorization. 

Our final witness is Suzanne Mattei. Suzanne Mattei has worked 

in environmental policy analysis and advocacy for 25 years. After 

graduating from Yale Law School in 1981, she became staff attorney and then director for the Connecticut Fund for the Environment, and environmental advisor to the New York City Comptroller from 1990 to 1993. In 1994, she became assistant deputy advocate to the Public Advocate. She then served as public policy director for the Access to Justice Campaign for the New York State 

Trial Lawyers. From 2003 to early 2007, she served as New York 

City executive for the National Sierra Club where she produced 

three in-depth reports on the health impacts of human exposure to 

pollution from the September 11 attacks and response at the World 

Trade Center, and failed environmental response at the World 

Trade Center and the Katrina Hurricane. She now serves as regional director for the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Region II. She is testifying not in her State 

capacity, but in her capacity as the former New York City Executive for the Sierra Club and author of its ‘‘Pollution and Deception 

at Ground Zero’’ series of reports. Her comments are her own and 

do not necessarily reflect the views of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. I am pleased to welcome all 

of you. 

As a reminder, each of your written statements will be made part 

of the record in its entirety. I would ask that you now summarize 

your testimony in 5 minutes or less. 

To help you stay within that time, there’s a timing light at your 

table. When 1 minute remains, the light will switch from green to 

yellow and then red when the 5 minutes are up. As is customary, 

I ask the witnesses now to please stand and raise your right hand 

to take the oath. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr NADLER. Let the record reflect all of the witnesses responded 

in the affirmative. 

You may be seated. 

Mr NADLER. The first witness we’ll invite to testify is Mr. 

Thernstrom. 

Mr. Thernstrom, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

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TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL THERNSTROM,

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Good afternoon. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to testify. This is an important opportunity 

to correct some widespread misconceptions about the environmental issues related to September 11. Prior investigations, including the bipartisan September 11 Commission investigation, debunked those misconceptions and I hope the Committee will do so 

as well. 

As you know, the EPA Inspector General’s report made a number 

of inflammatory claims regarding CEQ’s interactions with EPA. As 

a White House employee, I was not at liberty to respond to the IG’s 

questions, although I would have liked to. As a result, the IG’s report was based on an incomplete and faulty assessment of the 

facts. 

Let me be clear. The White House had a legitimate role to play 

in reviewing EPA’s public statement at this time of grave national 

emergency, and I am proud of my work. My goal was to ensure 

that EPA’s statements were as clear and accurate as possible, providing the public with both the environmental testing data and 

EPA’s best assessment of its significance. 

Every EPA staffer working on this issue shared that goal, and 

we worked together to achieve it. There was no disagreement between the White House and EPA about the degree of danger to the 

public. On that question, I deferred to the experts at EPA and 

OSHA, who had assessed the data, and I relied upon my counterparts at those agencies to consult with their colleagues to ensure 

that the press releases that they issued were accurate. This was a 

collaborative process involving dozens of agency staffers, and the 

actions we took reflected the broad consensus within the agencies 

about the data. 

It is true that I made many suggestions to EPA about ways to 

improve their press releases, and when EPA agreed with those suggestions, they accepted them. In instances where we revised EPA’s 

drafts in ways that made them more reassuring, it was my belief 

that those changes accurately reflected EPA’s assessment of those 

risks as repeatedly articulated in daily conference calls with and 

prior public statements by EPA officials. There was no meaningful 

dispute between EPA and the White House about how to characterize those risks. 

The IG’s claim that the White House improperly influenced the 

substance of these press releases is simply false, as the documentary evidence clearly shows. 

Fortunately, a far more thorough and objective investigation of 

these claims was conducted by the bipartisan September 11 Commission. The Commission’s findings were unambiguous. There was 

no improper White House influence. EPA’s statements accurately 

reflected its assessment of the risks. The Commission was appropriately agnostic as to whether EPA’s risk analysis was infallible, 

as indeed am I; but they were quite clear that my role in this process was not improper and indeed did not influence Administrator 

Whitman’s decision to declare that the air in lower Manhattan was 

safe. 

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As the Commission noted in its report, quote, ‘‘We did examine 

whether the White House improperly influenced the content of the 

press releases so that they would intentionally mislead the public. 

The EPA press releases were coordinated with Samuel Thernstrom, 

Associate Director for Communications at the White House Council 

on Environmental Quality. Oral reports, interviews with EPA officials and materials on EPA’s Website were not coordinated through 

the White House. Although the White House review process resulted in some editorial changes to the press releases, these 

changes were consistent with what the EPA had already been saying without White House clearance,’’ closed quote. 

The Commission report then cites several examples of news stories published on September 14 and 16 in which Administrator 

Whitman reassured the public that there was no reason to be concerned about air quality in New York. The Commission report continues, quote, ‘‘There were disputes between the EPA’s communications person and the White House coordinator regarding the press 

releases. The White House coordinator, however, told us that these 

disputes were solely concerned with process, not the actual substance of the releases. Former EPA Administrator Christine Whitman agreed with the White House coordinator. The documentary 

evidence supports this claim. We found no evidence of pressure on 

EPA to say the air was safe in order to permit the financial markets to reopen. Moreover, the most controversial release that specifically declared the air safe to breathe was released after the 

markets had already reopened,’’ closed quote. 

The Commission’s findings are very clear, and I hope this Committee will give them proper consideration. 

In closing, I want to simply make clear that my statements here 

today have been and will be accurate to the best of my recollection. 

But almost 6 years have elapsed since September 11, and I have 

not had access to my White House records while preparing for this 

testimony. A lot has happened in the intervening years, but I will 

do my best to answer your questions as completely and accurately 

as I can. 

Given the time limitations on my oral testimony, I will have to 

stop here. But my written testimony adds considerable additional 

detail to these points, and I encourage all of you to read it. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thernstron follows:]

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ATTACHMENT


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Mr NADLER. I will now recognize Ms. Kreisher for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF TINA KREISHER, COMMUNICATIONS 

DIRECTOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Ms. KREISHER. Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Franks and 

Members, my name is Tina Kreisher. I serve as Director of Communications at the Department of the Interior. I’ve been at Interior 

since February 2002 and have served two secretaries, Gale Norton 

and now Dirk Kempthorne. 

In September it will be a full 6 years since the events of 9/11 and 

the time I worked at the Environmental Protection Agency. More 

than 3 months after that catastrophic event, I left EPA for extensive foot surgery and then moved to a new position at Interior. I 

left behind all of my files and have had only the August 2000 report—2003, excuse me—report by the EPA’s Inspector General to 

refresh my memory. Excuse me. 

Much has been said about the adequacy of the processes being 

used by EPA to test for air quality after the monumental destruction of the terrorist attack. Yet the tests are the same as those 

used by the Clinton administration and for a few months by the 

Bush administration to test for daily air quality in the City of New 

York and elsewhere. It was the standard being used by EPA. 

As a political appointee, I was not and others were not scientists. 

We relied on the professionals to guide us through the testing procedures and processes. When we were told the test showed air 

quality within normal range, we accepted those findings. My 

memories are of our New York office located just blocks from 

Ground Zero and the stories of our staff members literally scooping 

up dust samples as they ran away from the maelstrom on that day, 

and of their returning to work there just a few short weeks after 

the attack. 

There seems to be a perception by some that we accepted these 

test results because we had a disregard for the people living in the 

city. There is no basis to that perception. 

I remember being in the office as Administrator Christine Todd 

Whitman heard from her son, who was in one of the buildings at 

the World Trade Center. He called, and she told him to get out of 

the building, which he did; but then it was agonizing hours before 

he called to tell her he was safe. 

My oldest daughter was an attorney in New York at the Cravath 

law firm, and she lived near the theater district. She was there on 

9/11 and breathed the air for 2 years before she moved from the 

city. 

There was no disregard for the people who had suffered and were 

suffering either on a personal or on a professional level. Administrator Whitman wanted complete transparency for the test monitoring, and it was at her suggestion that we put the testing results 

online for the press and the public and other scientists to see and 

evaluate. 

She also wanted more press releases, which brings me to the section of the IG report that is critical of the press releases. I’ve been 

writing press releases in this town for more than 18 years, and it 

has always been a cumbersome process. In my experience, when 

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ally he or she has edited it. At Interior, we have an approval process that can sometimes take minutes if I can get to the Secretary, 

or hours and days for a detailed review process involving many 

people. 

The press release approval process that was set up after 9/11 

was taking days and sometimes a week. There were many considerations and many questions being asked, and debates swirled on 

conference calls set up, at least in part, by the Council on Environmental Quality under the auspices of the National Security Council. 

Questions were: Could EPA speak to health risks? Who was the 

lead for getting the information out? What was our statutory obligation? The IG’s report, in fact, said, and I quote, ‘‘These statutes 

and regulations do not obligate EPA to respond to a given emergency, allowing for local agencies to lead a response; and New York 

City, in fact, exercised a lead role regarding indoor air,’’ unquote. 

We were told on conference calls that EPA should continue testing and let the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, the 

City and State of New York, the Department of Health and Human 

Services discuss human health. I understand that OSHA did provide guidance at Ground Zero. 

The point has been made many times that there are more effective ways to get information to the press than by press release. In 

fact, I rarely see the content of press releases in actual press reports. Reporters prefer to do their own reporting and not copy what 

is being given to everyone. 

Because of the cumbersome approval process, I opted to do fewer 

releases and, instead, spoke personally to almost every reporter 

who called during those days. This meant 20 to 30 interviews a day 

just for information from me and then a number of requests for live 

interviews with Administrator Whitman. I think reporters would 

confirm that we were forthcoming with information during that period if we had the information to give them. 

I will add one other thing. In all of the years I’ve been writing 

press releases, I’ve never knowingly put false information into a release. While editing changes were made, based on recommendations by the Council on Environmental Quality, I believe those 

changes to be upsetting in some cases but not false. 

I still believe that to be true. The IG’s report, in fact, had this 

to say, and I quote, ‘‘We spoke to a number of experts in the field 

of environmental monitoring, including physicians, industrial hygienists and researchers. These experts generally agreed that the 

levels of airborne asbestos detected in the air outside the perimeter 

of Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan did not present a significant 

increase in the long-term health risks imposed on the public,’’ end 

quote. 

I will be happy to take your questions. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the witness. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kreisher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TINA KREISHER

Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Franks, members of the subcommittee, my 

name is Tina Kreisher and I serve as Director of Communications at the Department of the Interior. I have been at Interior since February, 2002 and have served 

two Secretaries, Gale Norton and now Dirk Kempthorne. 

87

In September, it will be a full six years since the events of 9/11 and the time I 

worked at the Environmental Protection Agency. More than three months after the 

catastrophic event, I left EPA for extensive foot surgery and then moved to a new 

position at Interior. I left behind all of my files and have had only the August 2003 

report by the EPA’s inspector general to refresh my memory. 

Much has been said about the adequacy of the processes being used by EPA to 

test for air quality after the monumental destruction of the terrorist attack. Yet the 

tests are the same as those used by the Clinton administration and for a few 

months by the Bush administration to test for air quality in the city of New York 

and elsewhere. It was the standard being used by EPA. As a political appointee, I 

was not, and others were not, scientists. We relied on the professionals to guide us 

through the testing procedures and processes. When we were told the tests showed 

air quality within normal range, we accepted those findings. 

My memory is of our New York office, located just blocks from ground zero and 

the stories of staff members scooping up dust samples as they ran from the maelstrom on that day. And of their returning to work there just a few short weeks after 

the attack. 

There seems to be a perception by some that we accepted these test results because we had a disregard for the people living in the city. There is no basis to that 

perception. I remember being in the office as Administrator Christie Todd Whitman 

heard from her son, who was in one of the buildings at the World Trade Center. 

He called and she told him to get out of the building, which he did. But then it 

was agonizing hours before he called to tell her he was safe. 

My oldest daughter was an attorney in New York at the Cravath law firm and 

she lived near the theater district. She was there on 9/11 and breathed the air for 

two years before she moved from the city. 

There was no disregard for the people who had suffered and were suffering either 

on a personal or professional level. 

Administrator Whitman wanted complete transparency for the test monitoring, 

and it was at her suggestion that we put the testing results on line for the press 

and the public and other scientists to see and evaluate. 

She also wanted more press releases. That brings me to a section of the IG report 

that is critical of the press releases. I have been writing press releases in this town 

for more than 18 years and it has always been a cumbersome process. In my experience, when the release has a Congressman’s or Senator’s name at the top, usually 

he or she has edited it. At Interior, we have an approval process that sometimes 

takes minutes from the Secretary or hours from a detailed review process involving 

many people. 

The press release approval process that was set up after 9/11 was taking days and 

sometimes a week. There were many considerations and many questions being 

asked, and debate swirled on conference calls set up, at least in part, by the Council 

on Environmental Quality under the auspices of the National Security Council. 

Could EPA speak to health risks? Who was the lead for getting information out? 

What was our statutory obligation? 

The IG’s report, in fact, said, ‘‘These statutes and regulations do not obligate EPA 

to respond to a given emergency, allowing for local agencies to lead a response, and 

New York City in fact exercised a lead role regarding indoor air.’’

We were told on conference calls that EPA should continue testing and let the 

Occupational Health and Safety Administration, the city and state of New York, and 

the Department of Health and Human Services discuss human health. I understand 

that OSHA did provide guidance at ground zero. 

The point has been made many times that there are more effective ways to get 

information to the press than by press release. In fact, I rarely see the content of 

press releases in actual press reports. Reporters prefer to do their own reporting 

and not copy what is being given to everyone. Because of the cumbersome approval 

process, I opted to do fewer releases and instead spoke personally to almost every 

reporter who called. This meant 20 to 30 interviews a day for just information from 

me and then a number of requests for live interviews with Administrator Whitman. 

I think reporters would confirm that we were forthcoming with information during the period—if we had the information to give them. 

I will add one other thing. In all the years I have been writing press releases, 

I have never knowingly put false information into a release. While editing changes 

were made based on recommendations by the Council on Environmental Quality, I 

believed those changes to be upsetting in some cases, but not false. I still believe 

that to be true. 

The IG’s report, in fact, had this to say: ‘‘We spoke to a number of experts in the 

field of environmental monitoring, including physicians, industrial hygienists, and 

researchers. These experts generally agreed that the levels of airborne asbestos deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
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tected in the air outside the perimeter of Ground Zero in Lower Manhattan did not 

present a significant increase in long-term health risk to the public.’’

I will be happy to take your questions.

Mr NADLER. We’ll now recognize Mr. Newman for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID M. NEWMAN, NEW YORK COMMITTEE 

OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH 

Mr. NEWMAN. Good afternoon, Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Franks and other Subcommittee Members. 

The attacks of September 11, 2001, produced not only an initial 

catastrophic loss of life, but also a lingering environmental disaster 

with adverse health consequences for responders as well as for area 

workers and residents. Toxic contaminants were dispersed at 

Ground Zero, throughout Manhattan, parts of Brooklyn and possibly beyond. 

Prior to and on 9/11 EPA and OSHA had credible data that indicated the presence at the World Trade Center site of an extensive 

list of toxic materials which, if released, could pose a risk to human 

health. Government databases documented reportable quantities of 

stored hazardous materials at the WTC site, including barium, 

lead, chloroform, chlordane, carbon tetrachloride, cadmium, chromium, mercury, hydrogen sulfide, arsenic, tetrachloroethylene, 

PCBs and ethane. The agencies were most assuredly also aware of 

the danger posed by the presence of several hundred thousand 

pounds of asbestos in World Trade Center fireproofing. 

EPA’s and OSHA’s public statements mischaracterized the available data. Sampling results obtained by EPA and OSHA after 9/11 

indicated the presence of toxic substances at levels of concern at 

Ground Zero and at other locations in Lower Manhattan, both outdoors and indoors. 

Asbestos was detected by EPA in 76 percent of 143 bulk samples 

collected outside the 16-acre collapsed site; 26 percent of these 

samples contained 1.1 to 4.49 percent asbestos, that is, levels 110 

to 449 percent of the level at which legal requirements for asbestos 

are triggered. 

At least 25 12-hour air samples obtained at 10 separate locations 

exceeded the clearance standard of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, the benchmark EPA was using. Fifty-seven 

percent of personal air samples obtained in September 2001 by the 

U.S. Public Health Service exceeded the OSHA permissible exposure limit for asbestos. Sixty percent of asbestos air samples collected at Ground Zero by the operating engineers exceeded the EPA 

clearance standard. Twenty-seven percent of 177 bulk samples initially collected by EPA and OSHA at Ground Zero were greater 

than 1 percent asbestos. 

Independent air monitoring in two Lower Manhattan apartments 

found significantly elevated levels of asbestos, including results up 

to 151 times the EPA clearance level. The U.S. Geological Survey 

reported as early as September 18 that asbestos could be present 

in concentrations of 20 percent or more at distances greater than 

one-half mile from Ground Zero. 

EPA detected benzene at Ground Zero in 57 of 96 air samples at 

levels from 5 to 86 times the OSHA PEL. Benzene results as late 

as January were five times the PEL. 

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EPA test results through November for dioxin several blocks 

from Ground Zero indicated that workers and residents who returned to areas reopened as safe were potentially exposed to concentrations of dioxin nearly six times the highest dioxin level ever 

recorded. Workers at Ground Zero were potentially exposed to 

dioxin levels 100 to 1,500 times higher than is typical in urban air. 

EPA did not release this information for more than a year. 

EPA’s unsupported reassurances of lack of risk had the unfortunate effect of giving a green light to employers and workers not to 

use respiratory protection, and to landlords, employers and government agencies that cleanup was not necessary. Because EPA contended for 8 months that it had no legal responsibility for addressing indoor contaminants, sampling and remediation efforts occurred only on a limited, haphazard and ineffectual basis. EPA’s indoor cleanup efforts, to date, exclude all 1,500 commercial and government buildings in Lower Manhattan and are of questionable scientific merit and technical effectiveness. 

Within days of the attacks, EPA declared Lower Manhattan’s air 

safe to breathe. OSHA announced that it is safe for New Yorkers 

to go back to work. EPA maintained until fairly recently that, 

quote, ‘‘There is little concern about any long-term health effects,’’ 

unquote. Unfortunately, there’s considerable evidence to the contrary. 

It is now well established that a large and increasing number of 

people who were exposed to 9/11 contaminants, primarily rescue 

and recovery workers, but also area workers and area residents, 

are suffering serious and persistent adverse health outcomes. We 

now know that those caught in the dust cloud and/or those responding at the WTC site in the first hours and days have higher 

incidences and greater severities of health impacts. Presumably, 

the intensity and duration of exposure and the lack of respiratory 

protection were significant factors. These early exposures were unavoidable; however, the failure of OSHA to ensure the use of respiratory protection and the failure of OSHA to enforce legal standards subjected workers to unnecessary and avoidable exposures 

with the result that many are now experiencing persistent disabling respiratory illnesses, and some are dying. 

Similarly, the failure of EPA to provide, require or even encourage indoor environmental assessments and cleanup, where warranted in commercial and government buildings, coupled with 

EPA’s inadequate sampling and cleanup in residences is likely to 

have subjected area workers and residents to additional unnecessary and avoidable exposures. 

Thank you very much for your concern on these issues. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Newman follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID M. NEWMAN


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Mr NADLER. Ms. McGinnis is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF EILEEN McGINNIS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

WHITMAN STRATEGY GROUP 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

this afternoon to share my thoughts and perspectives on the response of the USEPA to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001. By way of introduction, I served as Chief of Staff to EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman from January 2001 to June of 

2002. Prior to that, I served as Chief of the Governor’s Office of 

Policy and Planning for 6 years. I have served most of my career 

in government service. 

Hours after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, I received a phone call 

from EPA’s Regional Administrator in New York City, informing 

me that EPA employees were out in the field installing air monitors. I was proud, although they had just witnessed the horrors of 

the attacks a few blocks from their office, these very brave and courageous employees quickly put aside their personal and emotional 

reactions to the tragedy and were already on the job in pursuit of 

the Agency’s mission to protect the environment and human 

health. 

On September 11, a dedicated team of EPA employees collected 

air samples for the presence of lead, asbestos and VOCs which 

were the contaminants of initial concern. Samples for other contaminants were added in the days and the weeks after the attack. 

In truly EPA fashion, experts from all over the country came together to help form a monitor network to assess the ambient air 

conditions in Lower Manhattan. EPA employees worked around the 

clock in makeshift offices since their offices in Lower Manhattan 

were closed as a result of the tragedy. 

The emphasis in those early days after the attack was to provide 

as much information as possible to the public and to make sure 

that information was as transparent as possible. Data from the air 

and water monitoring was put up on the EPA’s Website for everyone to see and track. 

It is important to note today that the Inspector General’s report 

being discussed at today’s hearing verified the accuracy of the information posted and found no evidence the EPA attempted to conceal data from the public. In all, EPA took nearly 25,000 samples 

and conducted a quarter of a million measurements. 

Mr. Chairman, your press advisory about today’s hearing states, 

quote, ‘‘Now is the time for the truth,’’ end quote. I believe the ultimate truth is that the leadership and staff of the EPA did the very 

best they could under very difficult circumstances to meet the 

Agency’s obligation to help protect the lives and health of all those 

affected by the attacks. EPA, along with other agencies with whom 

we worked, acted to provide the best possible information based on 

available data and using our collective professional judgment under 

extraordinary circumstances. 

Looking back, one can always find things that could have been 

done better. That’s why, within weeks of the terrorist attacks, we 

launched a comprehensive review of the actions we took in response. As a result, we developed clear recommendations as to how 

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the agencies could better respond to any future attacks, should 

they occur. 

On the whole, however, I remain confident that we’ve discharged 

our duties with integrity, professionalism and commitment to our 

mission; and those EPA employees who were in the field in the 

hours, days and weeks following the tragedy, with courage and 

bravery. 

Thank you, and I would be glad to answer any questions. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentlelady. 

Ms. Horinko is recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF MARIANNE L. HORINKO, EXECUTIVE VICE 

PRESIDENT, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT & TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION 

Ms. HORINKO. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, distinguished 

Members of the Committee. I appreciate your invitation to be here 

this afternoon, because I am convinced the more the public understands about EPA’s actions after September 11, 2001, the more everyone will understand what I know, that the women and men of 

EPA were then and are now an amazing group of professionals 

dedicated to protecting the health of every person in this country. 

In New York, in the weeks following September 11, it was not 

business as usual. EPA employees from all over the country rushed 

to New York to provide their assistance in cleaning up the aftermath of the terrorist attack and to gather and analyze the data required to answer questions that everyone who lived and worked in 

Manhattan were asking. 

We had to find creative ways to place monitors and to gather the 

data, since there was little monitoring infrastructure and, for quite 

some time, no electricity. EPA employees had difficulty getting permission to get near Ground Zero in the areas where monitoring 

was most critical. But somehow the monitors went up. 

Once we started gathering data and consistent with our overall 

mission as an agency, we were determined to share information 

with the public as quickly as we could and in a manner that was 

easily accessible. Public officials and citizens were clamoring for information. We felt we owed them a duty to get the data out as fast 

as we could. We posted the data from our monitors on the Internet, 

accessible to anyone. Anyone who wanted to look at the same data 

we were reviewing could. 

We gathered the experts of the Agency and in other agencies to 

review this data to help determine potential impacts to residents 

and workers in New York. We provided our best information as frequently as we could to the public. 

We also worried a lot about the first responders and all the people who worked at Ground Zero. We told the workers in every way 

we could imagine to do it that they needed to protect themselves 

even while they were trying to save others. We gave them equipment and taught them how to use it. We even set up tents with 

food to encourage the workers to come in and decontaminate their 

clothing and ensure that their protective equipment was functioning properly. 

Did we learn some lessons from this experience? Of course we 

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sons so that our next response to any significant disaster would be 

better. 

I find it very affirming to know that the Inspector General, looking dispassionately at our actions with the benefit of hindsight, 

concluded that we acted responsibly and that our statements to the 

public reflected the facts as we knew them then and as we still 

know them today. 

To suggest that anyone at EPA was ever motivated by anything 

less than a complete focus on protecting the public does those individuals a terrible disservice. Governor Whitman, whom I admire 

greatly, sought out the opinions of experts and listened to what 

they had to say. She kept the Agency on course when it would have 

been easy to lose direction. 

EPA has an important mission in responding to any disaster like 

the collapse of the World Trade Center. But EPA was never intended to do everything for everyone. In this case, we worked effectively with all the other agencies that also had expertise and an 

important role to play, including OSHA, the Centers for Disease 

Control, ATSDR and the City of New York. That is the way the 

system is designed, and I feel comfortable that it worked as 

planned. As I said at the beginning, I thank you for inviting me 

here and I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentlelady. 

Ms. Mattei is recognized for 5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF SUZANNE Y. MATTEI 

Ms. MATTEI. Good afternoon. My name is Suzanne Mattei. I am 

the former Sierra Club, New York City, executive and author of its 

Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero report on our Federal Government’s failure to provide a proper response to the 9/11 pollution. 

The report also warns that our Federal Government’s new disaster 

policies perpetuate its failures at Ground Zero. 

Most Americans know more about Paris Hilton than about what 

happened in New York City after September 11. They don’t realize 

that the community district that included the Towers was home to 

over 2,700 children under age 10 at the time of the attack. Most 

Americans also don’t realize how long Ground Zero burned. The 

fires were not declared out until 3 months after the attack, and 

even after that as debris removal opened up new areas the site 

emitted smoke for at least 6 months after the attack. The exposures were much more extensive and prolonged than most Americans know. 

In the aftermath of the attack, our government should have 

warned people against exposure and reduced exposure through 

proper cleanup. Instead, it did the opposite. It encouraged people 

to ignore their own common sense. 

The air looked bad and smelled bad. Many people would have 

guessed that the air was unsafe for themselves and their children, 

but EPA’s broad, unsupported assurances of safety interfered with 

that commonsense reaction. I recall people saying, It smells awful, 

but EPA says it’s not really that bad. The sad irony is that if EPA 

had said nothing at all, the public probably would have been better 

off because more people probably would have used their own common sense. 

117

While the September 11 attack was unprecedented, there was no 

excuse for failure to warn about known hazards. The event’s physical effects on the environment were not completely without precedent. Planes have crashed and burned before. Buildings have 

caught fire before. Buildings have even collapsed before. We actually know quite a bit about what happens when uncontrolled fires 

burn mixed materials and when buildings collapse. 

EPA’s been studying the products of uncontrolled incineration for 

decades, and is knowledgeable about demolition as well. It did not 

have to take a single test to know that the 9/11 cloud of dust was 

harmful. It should have issued a health warning right away. 

Even if dust contains no toxic chemicals, it’s a respiratory hazard. EPA had the expertise to know that people with asthma and 

respiratory conditions needed to avoid exposure. EPA knew the 

Towers contained not only asbestos but also thousands of computers, plastics and electrical equipment, all of which would emit 

toxic chemicals when burned. 

Think of your own computer on your desk. If that caught fire, 

would you want to breathe in those fumes? Our Federal experts 

knew all these things before taking a single test. 

There can be no excuse for issuing broad assurances of safety 

when two 110-story office towers burn and collapse. So the concern 

is not just the EPA lacked the test results to justify its early assurances of safety, it’s worse. Our government issued those safety assurances even though EPA’s own vast body of knowledge built up 

over three decades of research indicated that the pollution would 

be harmful. 

EPA also should have changed its assurances when new information on health risk emerged. It didn’t do so when tests showed the 

presence of toxic hazards. It didn’t do so when it became apparent 

that people were getting sick. The Federal administration failed to 

issue a press release, for example, when the U.S. Geological Survey 

shared with other agencies on September 27 its proof that the 9/

11 dust was highly caustic. The public didn’t hear about this until 

over 4 months later from a St. Louis Post Dispatch article. That’s 

not how we should find things out. 

Among those expressing surprise were some of the leading doctors treating the already ailing Ground Zero workers. 

EPA’s responses to the disclosure of hazards tended to be defensive, not corrective. When environmental attorney Joel 

Kupferman’s research published by Daily News journalist Juan 

Gonzalez revealed that an air sample at the pile surface showed a 

high level of benzene, a cancer-causing chemical, EPA argued there 

were lower levels in what it called the breathing zone, 5 to 7 feet 

above the debris pile. The Ground Zero workers were reaching in 

and pulling out debris and human remains by hand. Their breathing zone was not 5 or 7 feet above the pile. 

Our Federal Government’s stonewalling continued as study after 

study documented health impacts not only among workers from the 

pit but also area cleanup workers, building cleanup workers and 

residents. I want to recognize Alex Sanchez and Manuel Checo, 

who are here today, building cleanup workers suffering severe 

health effects from their exposures. 

118

Six years later, denial is still the order of the day. The assurances of safety have never been retracted, and this has had consequences. 

Consider the government’s weak response to 9/11 health impacts 

which Jonathan Sferazo, a Ground Zero iron worker and founder 

of the Unsung Heroes Helping Heroes, calls an ‘‘epidemic.’’ The 

Government Accountability Office’s report on the government’s slipshod work to assess those impacts reveals that the Federal Government didn’t really bother to find out how many people were sick. 

They don’t know, perhaps because these people are not supposed 

to exist. 

They do exist. 

Five years later, only limited Federal money for treatment; it’s 

inadequate, it doesn’t begin to touch the devastating economic impacts that many of these hard-working people and their families 

now face. 

This hearing is a historic step to investigate what happened after 

the attack. We need action to right at least some of the wrongs that 

occurred and to ensure that these missed steps don’t ever happen 

again. 

Unfortunately, our Federal Government hasn’t learned from this 

debacle. Under its national response plan, OSHA will not enforce 

worker health and safety standards in national disasters. The plan 

centralizes press statements, as occurred after 9/11, without a 

strong precautionary policy to err on the side of protecting human 

health when full data is missing. 

Finally, the Department of Homeland Security’s new guidance 

document on cleanup after a dirty bomb or other terrorist nuclear 

attack encourages consideration of economic factors, even impacts 

on tourism in managing the public health risks. 

Some people may be suffering from media fatigue, tired of hearing about Ground Zero. They may wonder why New York City residents don’t just get closure and move on. The answer is, we can’t. 

We still live with the toxic aftermath of the attack. We still haven’t 

had a proper cleanup. Until our government does the right thing, 

we will never be able to have closure. 

And until our government takes action to make sure that the 

failed response at Ground Zero never happens again in any future 

disaster, no American can truly have closure. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Mattei follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUZANNE Y. MATTEI

Good afternoon. My name is Suzanne Mattei. I am the former Sierra Club New 

York City Executive and author of its Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero series 

of reports on the harmful impacts of the 9/11 pollution and our federal government’s 

failure to warn the public and provide a proper response. The reports also urge that 

our federal government’s new disaster response policies perpetuate its failures at 

Ground Zero. 

Most Americans know more about Paris Hilton than about what happened in New 

York City after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. They do not understand 

that it happened in a residential area. Lower Manhattan looks like a commercial 

zone, but people live there. The community district that includes the World Trade 

Center was home to over 2,700 children under age 10 at the time of the attack. Most 

Americans also do not understand how long Ground Zero burned. The fires were not 

officially declared out until three months after the attack. And even after that, as 

debris removal opened up new areas, the site emitted smoke. One resident living 

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nearby recalls the weekend of St. Patrick’s Day, in 2002, when she looked out the 

window and saw smoke from the pit—half a year after the attack. 

So the exposures were much more extensive and prolonged than most Americans 

realize. 

The deaths on September 11th were devastating, but our government could have 

and should have done much more to control the lingering harm. It should have 

warned people against exposure and reduced the duration of exposure through proper cleanup. 

Instead, it did the opposite. It encouraged people to ignore their own common 

sense. The air looked bad and smelled bad. Using common sense, many people 

would have guessed that the air was unsafe for themselves and their children. But 

EPA’s broad, unsupported assurances of safety interfered with that common sense 

reaction. I recall people saying, ‘‘It smells awful, but EPA says it’s not really that 

bad.’’ The sad irony is that if EPA had said nothing at all, the public probably would 

have been better off, because more people probably would have heeded their own 

common sense. Calling the September 11th attack ‘‘unprecedented’’ can be misleading. There was 

no excuse for failure to warn about known hazards. Yes, the terrorist attack itself, 

causing widespread destruction on American soil, was unprecedented. But the 

event’s physical results on the environment were not truly without precedent. 

Planes have crashed and burned before. Buildings have caught fire before. Buildings 

have even collapsed before. We actually know quite a bit about what happens when 

uncontrolled fires burn mixed materials, and when buildings collapse. 

EPA has been studying the products of uncontrolled incineration for decades and 

is very knowledgeable about demolition as well. It did not have to take a single test 

to know that the massive amount of dust released by the towers was harmful. It 

should have issued a health warning right away.

• Even if dust contains no toxic chemicals at all, it irritates the human respiratory system. EPA should have immediately warned the public—especially 

people with asthma and respiratory conditions—to avoid exposure, before any 

test results for toxic chemicals came back.

• EPA knew that the towers contained asbestos—this had become widely 

known after the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.

• EPA knew that the towers contained thousands of computers, plastics and 

electrical equipment, all of which would emit toxic chemicals when burned. 

It did not have to consult any existing database on storage hazardous materials at the site to take cognizance of this.

Our federal experts knew all these things before taking a single test. There can 

be no excuse for issuing broad assurances of safety when two massive office towers 

burn and collapse. 

So the concern is not just that EPA lacked the test results to justify its early assurances of safety—as noted in the Inspector General’s 2003 report. It is worse than 

that. Our government issued those safety assurances even though EPA’s own vast 

body of knowledge, built up over three decades of research, indicated that the pollution would be harmful. 

Also, EPA should have changed its safety assurances when new information on 

health risks emerged. It did not do so. It did not do so when tests showed the presence of toxic hazards, and it did not do so even when it became apparent that people 

were getting sick. 

The first Pollution and Deception at Ground Zero report contains a table entitled, 

‘‘What Was Known, What Was Said.’’ The table documents at least a dozen instances in which EPA had information indicating health risks yet failed to correct 

its assurances of safety. Despite early dust tests indicating the presence of asbestos, 

for example, a sentence stating concern for workers who might be returning to their 

offices on or near an area with asbestos-containing dust was deleted from EPA’s 

September 14 draft press release. Also, the federal administration failed to issue a 

press release when the U.S. Geological Survey sent test results to its sister agencies 

on September 27, 2001, documenting that the 9/11 dust was highly caustic. The public did not hear anything about this until over four months later, when the St. Louis 

Post Dispatch released an article about the data. Among those expressing surprise 

at the time was one of the leading medical doctors who had been screening the already ailing Ground Zero workers. 

EPA’s responses to the revelation of hazards tended to be defensive rather than 

corrective. Perhaps the worst example is its response to a disclosure of benzene pollution on the pile. Research by environmental attorney Joel Kupferman, published 

in the Daily News by journalist Juan Gonzalez, revealed tests showing elevated levels of certain pollutants from Ground Zero. One of them was benzene, a known 

120

human carcinogen that can cause leukemia. EPA argued that while a benzene sample at the surface of the pile had a high reading, EPA had found lower levels in 

what it called the ‘‘breathing zone,’’ five to seven feet above the debris pile. The rescue and recovery workers were reaching in and pulling out debris and human remains by hand. Their breathing zone was not between five and seven feet above the 

debris pile. 

Our federal government’s inaction in the face of new information continued as 

study after study documented health impacts not only among workers from the pile 

but also area clean-up workers and even residents. Today, over five and a half years 

later, denial is still the order of the day. The assurances of safety have never been 

retracted, and this has had consequences. 

Consider the federal government’s weak response to the health impacts from 9/

11 pollution, which Jonathan Sferazo, a Ground Zero ironworker and President of 

the Unsung Heroes Helping Heroes, calls an ‘‘epidemic.’’ The General Accounting 

Office issued a report on the government’s slipshod approach to assessing those 

health impacts. In plain language, the conclusion is this: The federal government 

has not even bothered to find out how many people are sick. Why? Perhaps because 

these people are not supposed to exist. But they do exist, and they are suffering. 

Only now, five years later, are we beginning to see some federal money for medical 

treatment, but it is terribly inadequate and does not begin to touch the demoralizing 

economic impacts that many of these hard-working people and their families now 

face. 

This hearing is a historic step to investigate what really happened after the September 11th attack. We cannot control everything, but our federal government certainly could have controlled this attack’s toxic consequences far better than it did. 

We need action, to right at least some of the wrongs that have occurred. Also, we 

must prevent such harms from happening in future disasters. 

Unfortunately, our federal government has not learned from its Ground Zero debacle. Under its National Response Plan, worker health and safety standards will 

not be enforced in national disasters. Also, the Plan centralizes and controls the release of information, which can facilitate politicization of health warnings, as occurred after 9/11, without a strong precautionary policy to err on the side of protecting human health in the absence of full information. Finally, the Department 

of Homeland Security’s new guidance document on radiological cleanup would encourage consideration of economic factors, even impacts on tourism, in determining 

public health risks from a dirty bomb or other terrorist-wielded nuclear device. 

Some people may be suffering from media fatigue. They may be tired of hearing 

about Ground Zero. They may wonder why New York City residents don’t just ‘‘get 

closure’’ and ‘‘move on.’’ The answer is, we cannot. We are still living with the toxic 

aftermath of the attack. Until our government does the right thing, we will never 

be able to have ‘‘closure.’’ And until our government takes the proper steps to make 

sure that the failed response at Ground Zero never happens again, in any future 

national disaster, no American can truly have ‘‘closure.’’

Mr. NADLER. I thank the witnesses. I will begin the—please, 

we’re not supposed to have any demonstrations. It’s against the 

rules of the House, even approval. It may not seem political, but 

that’s the rules of the House. 

I will begin the question period—oh, I should say. I will begin 

the questioning by yielding myself 5 minutes. 

Mr. Thernstrom, who designated you to be the conduit or communications liaison between the EPA and NSC? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Honestly, I believe that system was set up by 

Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Bolten, but I couldn’t say for sure. I was 

told to assume that responsibility by my boss, Chairman———

Mr. NADLER. Who at the NSC did you report to on EPA communications clearance activities? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I don’t frankly remember the NSC press person who———

Mr. NADLER. You don’t remember who you reported to? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I reported to Chairman Connaughton. I sent 

the press releases over to the NSC and received approval for them. 

121

But, no, I don’t actually remember the name of the person I was 

dealing with there. 

Mr. NADLER. Who at the NSC did you send those papers to? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I sent them to a fax number that was assigned. I don’t know who was reviewing them at the NSC. It was 

6 years ago. 

Mr. NADLER. I understand that. 

Who made the decision to have the NSC approve all the EPA 

statements? Do you know that? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I don’t know. 

Mr. NADLER. Who at the White House did you speak to about 

EPA’s public statements? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Chairman Connaughton in my office was my 

primary contact. I also consulted occasionally with perhaps another 

staffer on the CEQ staff. 

Mr. NADLER. No one above Chairman Connaughton in the organization? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. No, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Did you ever speak with Ms. Whitman about EPA’s 

public statements? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I don’t believe that I had any direct personal 

conversation with Ms. Whitman. I participated in daily conference 

calls with Ms. Whitman. But I don’t think we had any one-on-one 

conversations about these things. 

Mr. NADLER. Now, Ms. Kreisher told the Inspector General that 

you worked directly with the NSC Press Secretary on clearance for 

EPA communications. That is Condoleezza Rice’s Press Secretary. 

She was head of NSC at the time; is that correct? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Like I said, I sent them to the NSC and I assumed that, yes, it was the Press Secretary. I don’t actually recall. 

Mr. NADLER. You didn’t work with that person? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I do remember speaking to that person at one 

point. Like I said, I don’t even recall her name. This was a———

Mr. NADLER. Now, EPA Chief of Staff McGinnis, who is sitting 

here, was asked by the EPA IG whether she could claim ownership 

of EPA’s early WTC, World Trade Center, press releases. She replied that she was not able to do so, quote, ‘‘because the ownership 

was joint between the EPA and the White House,’’ unquote, and 

that, quote, ‘‘final approval came from the White House,’’ unquote. 

She also told the IG, quote, ‘‘If Sam’’—that is you, sir—‘‘If Sam 

okayed it, then it was issued.’’ The IG also noted that Ms. 

McGinnis, quote, ‘‘understood that Sam Thernstrom provided draft 

press releases to other government officials, but she does not know 

who these other government officials were.’’

Were you, sir, the final decision maker for the public statements? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. No. I wouldn’t put it that way. 

Mr. NADLER. If not, who had the final approval in the NSC for 

EPA public statements? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Like I said, I sent them to the NSC and I received approval from the NSC. 

Mr. NADLER. Someone you were dealing with in the NSC had 

final approval, but you don’t know who it was? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Six years after the fact, I honestly do not remember the name of the person I dealt with. 

122

Mr. NADLER. Okay. 

Ms. McGinnis, Ms. Kreisher told the IG that all press releases 

pertaining to the World Trade Center disaster were always approved by the Administrator’s Chief of Staff, Eileen McGinnis. Now 

you have said that you never approved the press releases either 

verbally or in writing. 

Did you have the final okay on EPA 9/11-related communications 

within EPA? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Tina would keep me informed throughout the day 

on the interagency process that was going on and the types of discussions that were going on. But as I said in my testimony, the 

CEQ, as our conduit to NSC, had the final sign-off on———

Mr. NADLER. They had the final sign-off. But within EPA you 

were the final sign-off? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Thank you. 

Now, you received an e-mail on 9/12, that is, on September 12, 

from EPA Deputy Administrator’s Chief of Staff Claudia 

McMurray, stating that all statements to the media should be 

cleared through the NSC before they were released. 

You stated you cleared all statements through the NSC. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I did not, sir. CEQ was our conduit to the NSC. 

I had no contact———

Mr. NADLER. They were all sent to the CEQ and then the NSC? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Correct. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Did you tell Ms. Whitman to clear all statements with the NSC. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I recall a memo coming over to all agency heads. 

Mr. NADLER. That would have been the Claudia McMurray 

memo? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. No. I think it was from Andy Card. 

Mr. NADLER. From whom? Andrew Card? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Andrew Card. I recall them saying that all communication needed to be reviewed by NSC, and then that was followed by the e-mail that was in the IG’s report by the Deputy Administrator. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. What expertise does the National Security 

Council have that the EPA doesn’t have with respect to the risks 

from environmental contamination on public health? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I can’t answer that question about what excuse 

they have. I have never been in contact with NSC. I stated in my 

testimony to the IG that I thought the White House played an appropriate coordinating role, given the national emergency. 

Mr. NADLER. And do you know who made the decision to have 

the NSC approve all EPA statements? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I do not. 

Mr. NADLER. Do you know who would know that? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I do not. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. 

Well, final question, when you were asked by the EPA IG whether you could claim ownership of EPA’s early World Trade Center 

press releases, you replied you couldn’t do so ‘‘because the ownership was joint between EPA and the White House’’ and then ‘‘final 

123

approval came from the White House.’’ You also told the IG, ‘‘If 

Sam okayed it, it was issued.’’

The IG also noted that you understand that Sam Thernstrom 

provided draft press releases to other government officials, but she 

doesn’t know who those other government officials were, as you 

just said. 

Was it your understanding that Mr. Thernstrom was the final 

decision maker for EPA public statements within the White House? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I really did not know what happened—who Sam 

communicated with at the White House. 

Mr. NADLER. So you don’t know who the final decision-making 

authority———

Ms. MCGINNIS. I do not. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Thank you very much. 

My time has expired, and I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman 

from Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the main question that is 

being asked here today is if, indeed, there was a deliberate attempt 

on the part of the EPA to conspire with the White House to send 

people, to convince people to go into an unsafe environment. And, 

you know, the motivations to that end elude me completely. 

But, Ms. McGinnis, I would like to ask you, do you think that 

there was a deliberate conspiracy within the White House and the 

EPA to convince people to go into an unsafe environment? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I do not, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. What was the main—the Agency’s goal as far as the 

press releases that you sent? What was your main goal? What was 

your desire? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. The public was very hungry for information, and 

our desire was to produce information as soon as possible with—

emphasizing quality and timeliness. 

Mr. FRANKS. Was it appropriate in your mind for the NSC and 

CEQ to have the final sign-off on these press releases? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Yes, given the national emergency that had just 

occurred. 

Mr. FRANKS. Were press releases your only form of communication? Was it your main form of communication? What———

Ms. MCGINNIS. As Governor Whitman and Ms. Kreisher have 

testified, I have supervised over the years many press offices, both 

on the State and in the Federal level. Press releases, I think, have 

become increasingly less important, and other forms of communication have become more important. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. Thank you, Ms. McGinnis. Mr. 

Thernstrom, the Office of the Inspector General report stated, 

quote, ‘‘Responding to this crisis required organizations from all 

levels of government to coordinate their responses and their efforts, 

and to make critical public health and safety decision quickly and 

without all the data the decision makers would normally desire,’’ 

unquote. 

Do you agree that in this case the EPA had to make statements 

regarding its judgment in emergency circumstances in which it 

could not possibly have had perfect information? 

124

Mr. THERNSTROM. Absolutely, Congressman. In fact, I was quite 

struck by the fact that when the EPA Inspector General was interviewed by, I believe it was MSNBC, after her report was issued 

and she was asked whether she believed that the air after 9/11 was 

safe, she said that even 2 years after the fact, she wasn’t certain 

what the answer to that was. 

Now, I don’t think it’s the appropriate response for the Federal 

Government to tell the people of New York, Gee, we’re taking all 

the tests, but we don’t really know. Hold your breath and just—

you know, we’ll get back to you in a couple of years if we have an 

answer then. 

I think the best response of the Federal Government, who employs the Nation’s best experts on these questions, was to assess 

the data as best it could, make its best judgment about the significance of that data and speak to the public in this time of terrible 

national emergency. And I think EPA did that very responsibly. 

Mr. FRANKS. You don’t think there was any hint of conspiracy between EPA and the White House to convince people to go into an 

unsafe area? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I think nothing could be further from the 

truth, Congressman. 

We were very concerned about the potential environmental hazards related to September 11, and we were very reassured by the 

information that we saw. And as Governor Whitman said, we 

spoke—we had a thrice daily conference call originally, later twice 

daily, speaking with all of the staffers who were working on this 

issue. They were looking at the data. 

The things that Governor Whitman said, the things that Ms. 

Kreisher and I put in the press releases that were issued were 

based strictly upon what we were told by all of the scientists, who 

reviewed the data, was the correct way to characterize those risks. 

I can’t say that their assessment was infallible, but I am quite 

confident they were doing the best job they could under the circumstances, and we were listening to them very carefully. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I guess I can only add that, you 

know, there is no way to overstate the tragedy that this 9/11 incident caused America and so many people both on that day and in 

subsequent days and some of the ancillary areas that have occurred since. And I don’t know that anyone in this room would ever 

want to minimize that tragedy, anyone. 

And I guess I just would suggest that this Committee’s energies 

might be better spent trying to make things better for those victims 

that were in 9/11, and doing what we can to have policies that 

would prevent such a tragedy from occurring again. 

And deliberately trying to somehow insinuate that there was a 

conspiracy between the EPA and the White House to convince people to go into unsafe areas, that’s a preposterous notion; and I 

think the Committee’s energy is ill spent in this regard, and I 

think we have to work toward making this never happen again. I 

thank the panel members. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott———

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER.—is recognized for 5 minutes. 

125

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, we’re inquiring whether or not there are any failures in government processes that might have unnecessarily exposed people to health risks. Just because we’re doing that, that 

doesn’t suggest necessarily that we are trying to find a conspiracy 

to intentionally endanger people. We’re trying to see if government 

worked or it didn’t work. And I think there’s plenty of evidence 

here that people have been exposed to toxic materials unnecessarily. Now, let me ask a couple of questions. 

Mr. Thernstrom, you were doing press releases? You were doing 

press releases in the White House at the time? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I was the Associate Director of Communications for the CEQ, yes, and I worked closely with Ms. Kreisher and 

other EPA staffers on these press issues. 

Mr. SCOTT. Did you make any changes in these press releases 

that were presented to you that made a substantive difference in 

the science? One that was suggested is, you took professional cleaning—it’s been suggested that you took quote, ‘‘professional cleaning,’’ as a recommendation out. Is that true? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. That is correct, Congressman. That was not 

based upon a difference in the science, though—however. That was 

a jurisdictional question involving which agency had responsibility 

for providing New Yorkers with guidance on that issue. That was 

not based upon my reading of the science so—whatsoever. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, the EPA Director suggested that that was a 

substantive difference. Were there any other changes that were 

made that constituted a substantive difference? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I can say—you know, ‘‘substantive difference’’ 

is in the eye of the beholder, Congressman. But I can say every 

change I made was a matter of consensus between me and the EPA 

staffers who I worked with. There was no disagreement about the 

substance of them and that, in fact, the changes I made were based 

upon my daily conversations with all of the EPA staffers. 

So we all worked together in this very fast-moving, very chaotic, 

dynamic environment to try to understand all of the information 

that was coming in, to listen to the staff that we were talking to 

and to correctly reflect what they were telling us. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Ms. Kreisher, did you feel any political pressure in the way press 

releases should be written? 

Ms. KREISHER. I didn’t feel political pressure. Mr. Thernstrom 

and I sometimes disagreed, and that’s reflected in some of the edits 

we see in the press releases. I would agree with Governor Whitman 

that the only substantive change had to do with the cleaning. And 

as Sam just said, that press release referred you to the City of New 

York. 

Mr. SCOTT. The question was, did you feel any political question 

to write press releases in a certain way? 

Ms. KREISHER. No. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Newman, I’ve got two versions of an answer to 

a question I asked Mr. Henshaw, about what was going on at 

Ground Zero. The first go-around was that people were there not 

wearing respiratory equipment and there was nothing he could do 

about it because it was New York City’s problem. 

126

The second time he answered the same question, he said that 

any time they notice someone not wearing the equipment, they 

were down there on the spot and corrected it right then and there. 

Can you tell me what you thought was going on in terms of 

OSHA enforcement? People are obviously in a dangerous situation 

involving the equipment they should be wearing. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Thank you for that question. There was no OSHA 

enforcement at Ground Zero. That was a deliberate, conscious policy. That policy was done on—was implemented at that point in 

time on a discretionary basis. 

It has since then been incorporated into OSHA policy officially, 

and OSHA’s official policy as of 2003, going forward, is automatic 

nonenforcement in disaster response situations, which of course I 

disagree with that policy. I think it’s an incorrect policy. 

The contention that OSHA had no authority to enforce, I think 

is also fallacious. There is absolutely nothing, at least insofar as 

I’m aware, in either the National Contingency Plan or Presidential 

Decision Directive 62 which addresses the issue of OSHA enforcement; and OSHA not only is free to enforce, but is obligated to enforce in my opinion. 

Mr. SCOTT. What was going on at Ground Zero? Were the people 

wearing the equipment or not? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Well, the answer to that is ‘‘no.’’ There was no enforcement, and people were not wearing their equipment. Whatever 

policy OSHA adopted, whether it was enforcement or nonenforcement, that policy was ineffectual. 

Mr. SCOTT. Was there any question that the people not wearing 

the appropriate equipment were in danger? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Well, I don’t think there was any question among 

the regulatory agencies or among the people in the industrial hygiene or public health communities. 

There was certainly some question among responders themselves, given the lack of clarity and reassurances from EPA and 

OSHA that the air was safe to breathe. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank you. I now recognize for 5 minutes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the 9/11 report, 

since, Mr. Thernstrom, you are such an expert on 9/11, there’s a 

statement by the Committee that says, we do not have the expertise to examine the scientific accuracy of the pronouncements in 

the press releases. The issue is the subject of pending civil litigation. 

How do you interpret that? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I’m not quite sure how to answer the question, 

Congressman. It seems it’s a self-evident statement———

Mr. PASCRELL. What does it mean to you? 

Mr. THERNSTROM.—in its entirety. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What does it mean to you, Mr. Thernstrom? What 

does it mean to you? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Simply that there are complex scientific questions involved which are hotly disputed and that that was not an 

issue that the 9/11 Commission had the expertise to examine, nor 

was it an issue that I feel I have any expertise to comment upon. 

127

Mr. PASCRELL. So, therefore, we can’t make a conclusion or a 

judgment that the 9/11 Commission cleared anybody, because they 

didn’t have the scientific evidence, because they weren’t tuned to 

that. Is that an accurate statement? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Congressman, the 9/11 Commission looked at 

one question specifically, which was whether or not———

Mr. PASCRELL. It is only a short period within that report; is that 

correct? It is about 12 footnotes. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. The question the 9/11 Commission was looking 

at was whether or not the White House influence upon EPA’s press 

releases was improper. And on that question, their answer was unambiguous; its answer was ‘‘no.’’

Mr. PASCRELL. It’s not a conclusion. It’s not a conclusion if you 

read this report. 

But I want to ask another question. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. But I don’t understand that. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I would like to ask another question. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Sure. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What you call ‘‘preposterous,’’ you said that would 

be so preposterous in your answer to the question. Why would it 

be so preposterous? 

This is an Administration that paid journalists to clear the air. 

They also had the chief procurement officer out of the White House 

so he couldn’t be arrested in there, first time an employee—why 

would it be so preposterous to change—excuse me, sir. I’m not finished. 

Why would it be so preposterous to change the words within a 

press release so that people’s fears could be assuaged? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Congressman, I don’t believe I used the word 

‘‘preposterous.’’

Mr. PASCRELL. You used the word ‘‘preposterous.’’

Mr. THERNSTROM. I believe Congressman Franks———

Mr. FRANKS. Actually I, did, sir. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Well, you used it then. There’s no difference. 

There’s no difference because this is—you know, how did Andy 

Card show up in the middle of this thing? How did Andy Card 

show up in the middle of this thing? 

Ms. Mattei, I want to ask you a question. 

Ms. MATTEI. Yes. 

Mr. PASCRELL. What are the shortcomings of the various indoor 

cleanup plans that the EPA has conducted so far? What should 

they have done? What should be done now? 

And my final question to you is this: Has the EPA ever called 

for an examination, a physical examination, of those people who 

were in the zone long beyond which they shouldn’t have been in 

that zone? Had they ever asked you or anybody else, first responders, to definitely get a physical examination to see what might affect you and you personally? Have they ever done that? 

Ms. MATTEI. I certainly did not experience that. And I’m not 

aware of them ever having done that. I didn’t see anybody monitoring the air on the street where I worked. And I can tell you that 

I smelled Ground Zero for months, and I was about seven blocks 

away. This ‘‘on-the-pile’’ versus ‘‘off-the-pile’’ thing is a little bit of 

128

nonsense. There was no glass bubble over Ground Zero. The air 

blew that stuff into the———

Mr. PASCRELL. All over the place. 

Ms. MATTEI.—into the surrounding community. It definitely did. 

And while there may have been some dissolution, there were a lot 

of toxic chemicals for which there is no safe level of exposure. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Speak the truth. 

Ms. MATTEI. And the nonsense about—well, the high levels were 

in the dust, not in the air, that’s just out of touch with reality. People coming back to their homes, people coming back to their work 

sites, there was dust. And what did people do? They cleaned up the 

dust. Small business people cleaned up their own businesses. People cleaned up their own offices. 

Have you ever dusted a book shelf? 

Mr. PASCRELL. That’s a good idea. 

Ms. MATTEI. Where was your nose? Where was your nose when 

you dusted that book shelf? 

Thank you. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I just have one more question. I want to ask that 

question to Ms. Kreisher. 

Ms. Kreisher, you told the Inspector General that you felt extreme pressure when the White House was changing your drafts of 

the EPA press releases. And you said in your testimony today that 

those changes were upsetting in some cases. Who upset you? 

Ms. KREISHER. As I said, Sam and I didn’t always agree. The 

pressure was from Sam. A lot of times tempers flew. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Was he applying pressure to you? 

Ms. KREISHER. I wouldn’t call it ‘‘pressure.’’ Any point, Sam 

would always say, this is your press release. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So your statement to the Inspector General wasn’t 

really what you felt? 

Ms. KREISHER. Well———

Mr. PASCRELL. You used the term—correct me if I’m wrong—‘‘extreme pressure.’’

Ms. KREISHER. I was referring words—to the wordsmithing, not 

some big policy somewhere. 

You’ve got to put this back in context. The IG inspector came to 

see me. I was at Interior. I was being asked about what my press 

releases looked like and whether the words in the press release 

were all mine. 

Mr. PASCRELL. So the pressure—the pressure was basically 

whether we should use a comma or colon—I’m exaggerating right 

now; I’m using hyperbole right now—and not really whether or not 

we were communicating to the folks out there what was really 

going on? That wasn’t ever a question in your mind, right? 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Ms. KREISHER. Of course it was a question. 

Mr. PASCRELL. It was a question in your mind? 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The witness may answer the question. 

Ms. KREISHER. We always cared what the content was. And as 

I said, we had a lot of conference calls. We had a lot of discussion 

before these press releases were ever issued. And we usually came 

to consensus before that happened. 

129

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. I don’t mean any harm, but I thought I asked the 

same witness if she was receiving any political pressure, and she 

told me ‘‘no.’’

Mr. NADLER. I will yield the gentleman, with unanimous consent, 

1 minute; and the witness may answer the question. 

Ms. KREISHER. Okay. To me, political pressure is, here is the 

message. You will make sure that this is the message that goes 

out, crafted accordingly. It was not done like that. The scientists 

gave us the message. We always listened to the scientists. 

Mr. NADLER. If the gentleman would yield, so what pressure 

were you referring to? 

Ms. KREISHER. Sam and I didn’t always agree. And there was 

pressure between us on, you know, was this the right wording? 

Was this the right wording? 

I got a lot of pressure from———

Mr. NADLER. So it was interpersonal pressure, not political pressure? 

Ms. KREISHER. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Tennessee is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, I was with some 

folks in the back, and I hate to go over———

First thing, all politics is personal. My protection on Octobersomething in 2001. The EPA document labeled Attachment 4 and 

produced by Ms. Whitman says that paper filament masks would 

provide sufficient protection under minimal exposure conditions. 

Mr. Newman, this mask—is this a paper filament mask? 

Mr. NEWMAN. I’m sorry. I can’t see it from here. Does it say 

NIOSH on the front? 

Mr. COHEN. It sure does. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Does it say N95? 

Mr. COHEN. It says N95. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Well, that’s not the paper mask that is being referred to in this case. 

Mr. COHEN. What would this one be? Is this better or worse? 

Mr. NEWMAN. That is not—despite the fact that that’s not the 

paper dust mask to which you were referring, that mask is not acceptable under OSHA legal standards for exposure to asbestos. 

Mr. COHEN. This one isn’t. 

Mr. NEWMAN. You need a halfface air purifying respirator with 

screw-in HEPA particulate filters, which that is not. 

Mr. COHEN. So when I was on that location, right down there 

somewhere around this fence, or right down inside the—just outside the pile, this was show business? 

Mr. NEWMAN. That would be a fashion accessory, yes. 

Mr. COHEN. You do know I was wearing—how about the paper 

filament masks; they were not sufficient either? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Paper dust masks provide zero protection under 

any circumstances, zero health protection, that is. 

Mr. COHEN. Was there any reason why the people at the Twin 

Towers should have been allowed to—should the EPA have enVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:45 Jan 29, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CONST\062507\36342.000 HJUD1 PsN: 36342
130

forced their regulations that those folks use their respirators, as 

apparently they did at the Department of Defense? 

Mr. NEWMAN. That’s directed to me? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Neither EPA or OSHA enforced their regulations, 

as we know, at Ground Zero. I think that was absolutely inappropriate and possibly criminal. 

I’m shocked to hear here that we’re talking about an extraordinary—we’re talking about extraordinary circumstances as though 

EPA did not have, frankly, quite a stellar—in general, stellar track 

record, the expertise, the staffing, the funding and the track record 

to respond to incidents like this. 

Yes, the scope of this was somewhat unusual. However, there 

was nothing unusual here. I mean, what’s unusual is the lack of 

enforcement of applicable standards. That’s the most unusual thing 

in this case. 

What’s unusual is not the hazards to which people were potentially exposed. The issue was that we didn’t protect people against 

those hazards. That was the unusual part here. 

Mr. COHEN. Is there anybody on the panel that would like to respond to that? Nobody wants to respond to that? Do you all agree 

with that? Everybody agrees? 

Ah, a volunteer. 

Ms. HORINKO. I will, because I feel that the agencies, working 

collectively, used their best judgment to get the responders to wear 

their gear as quickly as we could. There was discussion with the 

city and OSHA of how, daily, to get the responders to wear their 

gear. 

EPA, the first weekend, at OSHA and FEMA’s behest, provided, 

I believe, thousands of respirators and cartridges and set up washing stations, and eventually set up the food stations to get the—

a condition of which was to decontaminate and make sure your 

gear was working properly. 

There was discussion about whether the city or OSHA should 

step in and start fining the responders and take them to court. It 

seemed inconceivable that we would do so while they were trying 

to still save fallen comrades. So given the situation at the 

time———

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield for a moment on that 

point? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Everybody who was going to be saved was saved by 

the third day. After that it was simply a recovery operation. So 

why was it inconceivable in the next 50 or 60 days? 

Ms. HORINKO. In the next 50 or 60 days we didn’t have to because by then people were wearing their gear. 

Mr. NADLER. It’s your testimony everybody, almost everybody, 

wore their protective gear after the first 3 three or 4 days? 

Ms. HORINKO. Not after the first 4 or 4 days but certainly 50 or 

60 days. 

Mr. NADLER. I yield back. 

Mr. COHEN. Ms. Kreisher, if you have answered this, let me 

know, but Mr. Thernstrom said your work quality wasn’t good, or 

something to that effect. 

131

Ms. KREISHER. I don’t recall him saying that. We had our differences but we did respect one another. 

Mr. COHEN. In Mr. Thernstrom’s written testimony he stated 

that his job was to make it clear and to the point, and stated because—in his words—the complete conflict between you and he was 

only about your work quality. 

Ms. KREISHER. Well, the wordsmithing that went on, we disagreed on some of the———

Mr. COHEN. Work quality is wordsmithing? 

Ms. KREISHER. In a press release, sir. 

Mr. COHEN. I guess it is. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Since you’re characterizing my words here, I 

did not say the conflict with Ms. Kreisher was about our work 

quality, I did say that we sometimes—I worked to try to improve 

the press releases because I had concerns about the quality of 

them. I thought they were sometimes vague and incomplete. Where 

I said that they conflict with Ms. Kreisher was in fact about process questions involving the clearance procedures with the NFC. I 

thought it was important that the NFC have an opportunity to sign 

off on everything that went out the door before it went out the 

door, and Ms. Kreisher understandably was frustrated with the 

clearance process. It wasn’t something she was accustomed to. 

That, to the best of my recollection, was the source of conflict between us. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Chairman, can I have 1 minute? 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman from New Jersey is recognized for 

1 minute. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Let’s look at exactly what was changed in the 

September 14th draft release. The original statement was this. 

This is the sentence before it gets to our friends. ‘‘the concern 

raised by these samples would be for the workers at the cleanup 

site and for those workers who might be returning to their offices 

on or near Water Street on Monday, September 17th 2001.’’

The samples that were taken they are talking about here. That 

sentence was deleted. It goes away. Instead the release quotes 

OSHA saying this: Our tests show that it is safe for New Yorkers 

to go back to work in New York’s financial district. 

Let me tell you something, Ms. Kreisher, I don’t see a technical 

change in the sentences, I see—I can only tell you what I see and 

you tell me what you see, although you change your mind but 

that’s okay, you can change your mind around here—you trying to 

convince me and the panel that the sentence that was replacing the 

original sentence, the former sentence that I read, there is some 

technical changes? That is night and day. 

Ms. KREISHER. Congressman, Sam has gotten kind of a heavy 

rap here as being the only editor of these press releases. As we explained we were on conference calls with OSHA, CEQ, with sometimes the State of New York, with a lot of different people who had 

input into this. The thought was that OSHA had better and more 

complete data at that point than the———

Mr. PASCRELL. So you let it go through your hands that the air 

is really clear and forget about the original statement that would 

have gone in there. 

132

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. PASCRELL. Give us a break. 

Mr. NADLER. We will now begin the second round of questions. 

I will pick up where Mr. Pascrell was leaving off. 

Mr. Thernstrom, you have stated in your testimony that your 

basic job is to make—or one of your jobs is to make EPA’s written 

statements clear and to the point. Now the IG details in its report, 

tables 2.4 and 2.5 over there, changes you made to several press 

releases. On September 13 you took out the statement: ‘‘even at 

low levels EPA considers asbestos hazardous.’’ You substituted for 

that warning a quote from Mrs. Whitman: ‘‘EPA is greatly relieved 

to have learned that there appears to be no significant levels of asbestos dust in the air in New York City.’’ Do you consider that simply making something clear and to the point or isn’t that clearly 

changing the meaning from a warning to a reassurance? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Congressman, as Ms. Kreisher just explained, 

we had———

Mr. NADLER. Is this changing only stylistic or changing a warning to reassurance? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Congressman, that change reflected our conversations. 

Mr. NADLER. I’m not asking that. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. It accurately reflected it. 

Mr. NADLER. It accurately reflected what you thought, but does 

it change EPA’S original suggestion of a warning to a reassurance; 

yes or no? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I don’t believe that EPA was originally trying 

to warn the public. 

Mr. NADLER. Even at low levels EPA considers asbestos hazardous is not a warning? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. You opened this hearing by showing a video 

clip on the monitors of Governor Whitman telling the people of 

New York that she believed the air was safe. I think that the revisions that we made to the press releases were in light of that, Governor Whitman’s assessment. 

Mr. NADLER. Going to the next one, you change the original EPA 

language stating dust samples showed levels of asbestos ranging 

from 2.1 to 3.3 percent. EPA views 1 percent levels of asbestos as 

a definition of asbestos- containing material, to final language deleting reference to 1 percent level being dangerous and characterizing sample results 200 to 300 percent over the 1 percent level as, 

quote, ‘‘slightly above the 1 percent level.’’

I have the same question. Don’t you think that is slightly misleading, to characterize something 200 to 300 percent above a level 

as slightly above? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Congressman, all I can tell you, the language 

in those press releases was considered accurate by the scientists 

who reviewed them. 

Mr. NADLER. Ms. Kreisher told the IG that there was a conscious 

effort to reassure the public and that it came from the White House 

and the Administration; do you agree? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. We all, including EPA and at the White 

House, found that the data we were looking at was reassuring; and 

so we felt it was appropriate to reassure the public. That was what 

133

the scientists who reviewed the data told us and we were greatly 

relieved to hear that. 

Mr. NADLER. Finally, Mr. Thernstrom—Ms. Kreisher, rather—

Mr. Thernstrom e-mailed you on the 25th of September ’01 about 

your desire to put raw monitoring results on the EPA Website. He 

wrote that raw, quote, ‘‘raw data alone is easily misunderstood and 

mischaracterized by political candidates in a city who have an ax 

to grind. I think you will leave yourself more open to their attacks 

by giving them more ammunition,’’ close quote. 

Do you agree that denying the public the right to see raw testing 

data is an appropriate approach to communicating risk, Ms. 

Kreisher? 

Ms. KREISHER. I agreed with Governor Whitman that that data 

needed to be out there as quickly as possible. The discussion came 

in, if you have no context for the data, does it make sense to the 

public, and at that point the raw data was just that, raw data. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Newman, was there—did this seem to be a pattern of EPA not posting relevant data on its Website for months 

at a time? 

Mr. NEWMAN. There was certainly delays and omissions in what 

we saw posted on the EPA Website. Additionally, there was information of the sort that I believe Ms. Kreisher is referring to, that 

is characterization of the data as distinguished from the raw data, 

and it is my opinion that the characterization of the data was used 

at times to obfuscate or to hide the raw data. Specifically, as an 

example, are the dioxin data. 

Mr. NADLER. Ms. McGinnis, earlier in your testimony you mentioned Andrew Card’s name. I think you mentioned Andrew Card, 

Josh Bolton. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Andrew Card. 

Mr. NADLER. Is there anyone else at this level, and did you say 

that he was involved in issuing or approving statements about the 

World Trade Center? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I didn’t say that. I raised his name in the context 

of I believe on September 12 a memo came over from Andy Card 

to all agency heads, the whole Cabinet, mentioning the need to coordinate communications. I think it was like a two- or three-sentence memo. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Mr. Thernstrom, did you ever speak to Andy 

Card about any of these statements? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. No, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Or anybody in his office? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. No, sir. Not to the best of my recollection. 

Mr. NADLER. Very good. Okay. The time of the Chairman has expired. I now recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Franks for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you 

again for being here. 

Ms. Horinko, I know that many times we are asking questions 

on subjective statements here today. When you say ‘‘safe,’’ I’m not 

sure this hearing room is entirely safe. There’s a lot of subjective 

statements. 

134

But let me just ask you, has there been any scientific showing 

that any long-term health risks have been presented by contamination to the residents of lower Manhattan? 

Ms. HORINKO. No, Congressman, I’m not aware of any peer-reviewed studies where scientific experts have found any long-term 

risks to the public. 

Mr. FRANKS. So essentially we’re dealing with kind of the individual reports and things of that nature and not able—when we 

talk about science here, that has been mentioned several times—

we don’t really at this point have any science that indicates even 

specifically, much less incontrovertibly; correct? 

Ms. HORINKO. Not that I am aware of, Congressman. 

Mr. FRANKS. There has also been some criticism regarding uneven enforcements of procedures used in the debris removal. Didn’t 

the IG report find it was New York City that was responsible for 

the debris removal as well as the demolition of that debris? 

Ms. HORINKO. That I am not specifically aware of, Congressman. 

Mr. FRANKS. Do you know if the IG found that FEMA agreed to 

fund indoor cleanup programs, something that FEMA normally 

does not do, because the EPA provided FEMA with justification for 

such a program, and could you elaborate if you know anything 

about that? 

Ms. HORINKO. Yes, indeed, Congressman, I know a bit, although 

I was not involved a whole lot. But I do recall the region II folks 

coming to me saying that they needed some help with FEMA Headquarters securing funding. In fact, I believe they went over to the 

White House and met with some staff who were very helpful with 

FEMA. 

Mr. FRANKS. Isn’t it also true that the IG has found contemporaneous documents showing that New York City told EPA it did not 

want EPA’s assistance with the indoor cleanup program? 

Ms. HORINKO. I believe that was the case in the beginning, but 

they came to agree that that would be a good way. 

Mr. FRANKS. So why didn’t EPA simply push New York City 

aside and take charge of the indoor cleanup program themselves? 

Ms. HORINKO. We enjoyed a very collaborative relationship with 

the city. Within the national response plan EPA works under 

FEMA’s direction, under the city’s leadership, and so we wanted to 

make sure that we followed the established procedures in any disaster. 

Mr. FRANKS. So I might ask you, Ms. Horinko, before my time 

is up here, a question that I have asked a couple of other panel 

members. Do you know or believe that there was ever any conspiracy between EPA and the White House to deliberately convince 

people to go into unsafe areas? 

Ms. HORINKO. No. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I guess I’ll yield back what time I 

have. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Ms. Mattei, if you had gotten better information, what could the public have done different? 

Ms. MATTEI. I think people could have done a lot to avoid exposure, people could have had professional cleanings of their home, 

135

they might not have had to fight with their insurance companies 

over that. I work in my office, but if I had to work at home for a 

while, I could. We’re living in the 21st century and there are many 

alternative ways to get things done. So people could have protected 

themselves quite a bit. 

If I could just take a moment, I’d also like to point out that there 

have been peer-reviewed scientific studies on health impacts from 

the Ground Zero contamination, both a survey that was published 

in the American Journal of Epidemiology about residents, 43.7 percent of 2,362 surveyed residents had new onset upper respiratory 

systems that persisted a year after the attack. There have been 

studies on newborns of women who were exposed to the dust cloud, 

smaller birth weight than normal. And also a very disturbing study 

about genetic mutations, procarcinogenic DNA level at a higher 

level in women who were exposed to the dust cloud and also in 

their newborns. 

So I think there is some peer-reviewed information out there now 

about health risks from the 9/11 contamination to the residents in 

the area. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do any of those studies speak to the allowable exposure risk of asbestos? 

Ms. MATTEI. I have been hearing today that there are safe levels 

of exposure to asbestos. I have to say that’s kind of news to me. 

If you float around on EPA’s Website you’ll find statements that 

there’s no safe level of exposure to asbestos, and there is new information that’s come out that asbestos not only causes cancer but 

also can wreak havoc to the immune system. 

So I’m finding those statements very questionable today. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Newman, you served on the EPA World Trade Center Expert 

Technical Review Panel. Can you give us information about what 

you did on that panel and what the conclusions were? 

Mr. NEWMAN. The panel was charged with assessing the extent, 

if any, of residual indoor contamination from 9/11, with identifying 

and proposing methods for addressing unmet public health needs 

stemming from 9/11. We engaged in extensive discussion on some 

of these issues, particularly an attempt to devise a sampling and 

cleanup plan for Lower Manhattan residences and workplaces over 

the course of a year and a half or so. Ultimately with regard to that 

issue, EPA chose to ignore or reject all of the panel’s proposals, recommendations, and concerns and disbanded the panel. 

In regard to our attempt to address issues of broader—issues of 

public health, as we were mandated to do at the implementation 

of the panel, those attempts to engage in those broader discussions 

were largely thwarted by EPA. 

Mr. SCOTT. Who were the members of the panel and how did 

they get appointed? 

Mr. NEWMAN. It was a rather unique construction for the panel. 

At least initially there was equal representation from government 

agencies such as OSHA, EPA, FEMA and New York City Department of Health, New York City Department of Environmental Protection, Coast Guard Strike Force, et cetera, along with academics 

and technical experts, including nongovernment technical experts, 

including myself. 

136

Mr. SCOTT. Were the conclusions a consensus? I mean were there 

differences of opinion? 

Mr. NEWMAN. There were continual differences of opinion. There 

was no mechanism in the panel process for votes or consensus 

reaching. Nevertheless, there was on certain issues and at certain 

times fairly robust discussions, at which points of agreement were 

readily apparent and those points of agreement ultimately were ignored in the sampling plan that EPA———

Mr. SCOTT. Did you issue a report with this consensus? 

Mr. NEWMAN. There was no mechanism in the panel process for 

the panel or panel members to issue reports. There were a 

large———

Mr. SCOTT. How did you communicate a consensus? 

Mr. NEWMAN. Through discussion at panel meetings. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I will now yield myself 5 minutes. 

Ms. McGinnis, you were asked—before I get to that, the Inspector General reported that the so-called EPA cleanup of 2002 to 

which I think you referred to a few minutes ago, was against scientific standards, totally inadequate, and essentially useless. The 

Inspector General reported that the site, namely the whole downtown Manhattan, Brooklyn, maybe Jersey City, had not been properly characterized as normal procedures say it should be, and that 

what should be done in order to assess indoor contamination is 

that you should take several hundred inspections of indoor spaces 

and concentric circles out from the World Trade Center, find out 

where in fact the contamination indoor is, maybe three blocks in 

one direction, maybe three miles in another direction and wherever 

that was found, whatever geographic area, every building in that 

area must be cleaned. 

That was the IG’s recommendation. I think most scientists who 

have looked at that have concurred with that. Nothing like this 

was done, obviously. Given that fact, Ms. Horinko, can you say 

with assurance that thousands of indoor spaces today are not contaminated? 

Ms. HORINKO. Obviously, I don’t have data on every house or 

every apartment. 

Mr. NADLER. I didn’t ask about every—talking about large numbers. 

Ms. HORINKO. I believe that large numbers of the homes in lower 

Manhattan are safe. 

Mr. NADLER. On what basis do you say that? 

Ms. HORINKO. I relied upon the experts in EPA region II who designed the program. 

Mr. NADLER. But everyone, the IG, et cetera, says that program 

was nonsense, it wasn’t based on scientific standards. 

Ms. HORINKO. I can tell you the program was design———

Mr. NADLER. Do you believe there was a 30,000-high-foot wall at 

Canal Street and therefore they didn’t have to look north of Canal 

Street all along the East River; therefore they didn’t have to look 

at Brooklyn? 

Ms. HORINKO. I relied on the professionals’ expertise. 

Mr. NADLER. Well, using common sense, could any professional 

in his right mind say that you have to inspect below Canal Street 

but not above Canal Street? 

137

Ms. HORINKO. All I can say, Congressman, is you have to draw 

a line somewhere. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Newman, would you comment on that, please? 

Mr. NEWMAN. In our discussions at the EPA World Trade Center 

Technical Review Panel, EPA presented as a basis for its determination of geographic boundaries for the sampling plan aerial 

photographs from the EPA EPIC study. Those aerial photographs 

showed deposition of visible dust and debris in areas of Lower 

Manhattan and some areas in Brooklyn. However, I believe and the 

panel believed strongly that geographic boundaries needed to be expanded beyond what EPA proposed, and we believed there is no 

scientific basis for utilizing visible dust and debris as the basis for 

the extent of the geographic dispersion of particulates, in particular, because the particulates of most concern to health are not 

visible, they are invisible. Those asbestos fibers and other particulates will not show up on those photographs. 

Mr. NADLER. Are you aware of any respected scientific authority 

who will be willing to testify that the EPA so-called cleanup plan 

in 2002 was scientifically valid? 

Mr. NEWMAN. EPA certainly has some. 

Mr. NADLER. Outside EPA? 

Mr. NEWMAN. No, I’m not. 

Mr. NADLER. You’re not. Okay. 

Ms. McGinnis, you were asked by the IG whether the EPA had 

considered putting qualifications in the press releases and whether 

there was resistance to putting in such qualifications. You replied 

that you would not call it resistance but would call it competing 

priorities. You stated that opening Wall Street was one of the 

major competing priorities. 

Is it your testimony today that considerations than public health 

were considered when preparing EPA’s early press releases? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Economic security, national security, were certainly considerations but health concerns were never sacrificed because of those considerations. 

Mr. NADLER. Do you believe that economic factors ought to be 

considered in a health-based determination? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. No, sir. 

Mr. NADLER. Who discussed these competing priorities with you? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I don’t recall any specific conversations about it. 

I do recall general conversations about whether the Wall Street 

area was cleaned sufficiently for its 

reopening. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. 

Ms. Horinko. Two more questions, one for Ms. Horinko. Ms. 

Horinko, were White House officials involved in the decisions on 

funding or cleaning up indoor spaces? 

Ms. HORINKO. I have no direct knowledge. 

Mr. NADLER. You have no direct knowledge. Thank you. 

I see my time has expired. I will recognize the gentleman from 

Virginia—I am sorry, the gentleman from Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Kreisher, thank you very much, again, for being here. I 

wanted to ask you, the indications were that maybe somehow the 

pressure that people speak of, that you had complained to Ms. 

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Whitman that—about the changes that the White House requested. 

Is that true that you ever complained to her about specific changes 

that the White House had requested? 

Ms. KREISHER. I don’t believe I ever went directly to the Governor with anything like that. Eileen and I had discussions. Again, 

you get your ego and all kinds of things involved when you are 

having a dispute with someone, and I would go in and say, Eileen, 

you have got to change this or call them or something, and those 

things happened; but, no, I never went directly to Governor Whitman. 

Mr. FRANKS. I think every Member of Congress identifies so 

much with that when we have discussions with our press secretaries and there is always—of course, Members of Congress are superior in every way in terms of what words to use. But it’s an ongoing situation. I have hit on a central theme here throughout this 

entire Committee and that is simply: Was there any conspiracy between the White House and the EPA to deliberately convince people to go into unsafe areas? Was there any effort like that, Ms. 

Kreisher? 

Ms. KREISHER. No. In fact, this is very interesting to me from my 

existing job at Interior, because we are being often criticized that 

we did not listen to the scientists; that in some way policymakers 

are changing what the scientists are telling us—and that is the 

subject of other congressional hearings—yet I seem to be getting 

overtones here that we shouldn’t have been listening to our scientists and should have come up with another policy. It’s just an 

observation that I’ll make. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me just ask the question a little broader. Do 

you know of any instance in which the leadership of the EPA or 

the White House deliberately acted in a way to subordinate people’s health to political considerations? 

Ms. KREISHER. No, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. Even carelessly? 

Mr. KREISHER. Not that I’m aware of. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Ms. Kreisher. 

Mr. Thernstrom, let me just ask you a kind of open-ended question. Is there anything here that you think hasn’t been covered 

that you think that you would like to specifically bring out? Again, 

along the lines that I talked about with Ms. Kreisher, do you think 

there is any conspiracy here or any deliberate effort or even any 

just blatantly careless effort on the part of the White House or the 

EPA to subordinate the lives and health of people for political reasons? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. No, sir; to the contrary. I think we made great 

efforts under very difficult circumstances, as I mentioned, constantly changing information, many different Federal agencies 

working together. We made great efforts to try to make sense of 

that information, to listen to the scientists and to most accurately 

characterize the information that was being given to us. So I don’t 

think anything of the sort was going on. 

If you don’t mind, I wouldn’t mind taking this opportunity just 

very briefly—I’m sorry that Congressman Pascrell from New Jersey 

has left. He was quite exorcised about one particular point in the 

September 14th press release, and if you don’t mind———

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Mr. FRANKS. He was also exorcised about me calling some of his 

ideas preposterous. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I would like to correct this point for the record. 

He said that in the draft press release from September 14th, that 

I struck the sentence that said the concern raised by these samples 

would be for workers at the cleanup site and for those workers who 

might be returning to their offices on or near Water Street on Monday, September 17th. And he’s correct that I did strike that sentence. 

But I think everyone in this room should listen to the sentence 

that immediately followed that in the original draft press release 

which was: OSHA Director John Henshaw emphasized that the 

level found, even if resuspended in the air, does not violate OSHA 

standards. 

And so the context in the original press release that is very clear, 

is that the press release spoke of a concern and then it spoke of 

the fact that that was not a concern. And so the appropriate editorial process was to clarify that, in fact, the overall message from 

this press release was that there was not a concern. 

The original language was confusing and the language was revised in a way that more clearly communicated the correct language. 

That’s exactly the sort of type of thinking through these draft 

press releases when we’re working very quickly under a great deal 

of pressure. That is the editing process we went through collaboratively to try to best express to the people of New York the information that they needed to know. And I have, in all of the time 

that has elapsed, I have never heard that any EPA scientist object 

to anything that we said to any way of characterizing their reports 

to us. We had daily conversations with them and to the best of my 

knowledge we accurately characterized what they told us. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Virginia. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. NADLER. Is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Thernstrom, in your testimony you stated that you were not 

at liberty to talk to the Inspector General when you were at the 

White House. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. Who told you not to talk to the Inspector General? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. White House counsel’s office. I asked them to 

try to make arrangements to have that interview happen and those 

arrangements were not made, ultimately. I was never given the goahead. 

Mr. SCOTT. The White House counsel’s office. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Correct. 

Mr. SCOTT. Who was the White House counsel at the time? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. That would be Mr. Gonzales. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Newman, we’ve heard suggestions that we needed to listen to the scientists. What were the scientists saying this 

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gesting—as the public statements were being made that things 

were safe. 

Mr. NEWMAN. I think as a number of witnesses have already 

pointed out, scientists look to the data for their answers. And so 

the question is the quality of the data and what data are available. 

I think what many folks were confronted with were the fact that—

many scientists were confronted with was the fact that, number 

one, we had inconsistent data. We had a large body of data that 

indicated low or no exceedances. We had a much smaller body that 

indicated fairly high exceedances under certain conditions and certain circumstances. 

The question then becomes which—and that’s not unexpected. In 

a circumstance like this where conditions change daily or hourly in 

terms of fires and in terms of emissions, we would expect to find 

inconsistent data. The question then becomes politically and from 

a public health perspective how do you interpret that data. 

One approach would be to take the most reassuring data and emphasize that. And another approach would be to take the worstcase scenario and emphasize precautionary measures until such 

time as we’re comfortable and confident that hazards don’t exist. 

Mr. SCOTT. With the dangers, with the potential dangers, if 

you’re not sure what to do, which way should you lean? 

Mr. NEWMAN. That also goes to the issue of enforcement. We had 

applicable standards such as the OSHA hazardous waste operations and emergency response standard, which basically is the 

most effective, proactive, and protective—or standard for workers 

engaged in hazardous waste operations, and we had OSHA’s decision not to enforce that standard or any other standard. 

Those standards essentially call for precautionary approaches; 

that is, assume the worst and as the data become available and become more credible, if appropriate, we can scale down our levels of 

respiratory protection, our levels of safe work practices, our levels 

of personal protective equipment. But start off with the worst data, 

assume workers are going to be exposed at that level, and assess 

the situation in an ongoing fashion. 

Instead, we had the opposite. We assumed the best and not the 

worst and the consequences—the bottom line here is not the data 

either way; the bottom line is that people are ill, regardless of what 

the data show or don’t show and regardless of what our interpretation of the data is. I have to strongly disagree with my esteemed 

colleagues from EPA. There is a considerable body of data in the 

peer-reviewed literature, in fact. It’s unambiguous and noncontroversial and I’m amazed people haven’t read it. There is a 

considerable body of evidence that indicates both Ground Zero responders as well as area workers and residents are ill at alarming 

rates with clinically diagnosed persistent respiratory illness and 

other medical conditions, and the bottom line is if the data don’t 

show that, there’s something wrong with either how we’re interpreting the data or with how we obtained the data—because the 

bottom line is that if people are sick, we have a problem. 

Mr. SCOTT. Ms. Mattei, if people are sick, as they are, how can 

that possibly be consistent with the message that was being given 

out? 

141

Ms. MATTEI. Well, it certainly was not. And that’s why I wrote 

the reports that I did, because you can’t have it both ways. You 

can’t have it’s safe, and thousands of people are sick. We’re talking 

about thousands of people, not 50 or 100. Thousands of people are 

sick. Children of people exposed are at risk. That’s what 

procarcinogenic damage is. It makes a person more vulnerable to 

cancer. That’s what’s happened to some of these newborns. So it’s 

a really serious situation. 

I would also point out that, repeatedly, when private tests were 

conducted, when elected officials paid for private tests, when other 

people conducted private tests, they were finding much higher levels of asbestos than EPA was. And I also want to point out that 

the constant emphasis on asbestos was very disingenuous. 

I never heard EPA talking about the polycyclic aeromatic hydrocarbons carbons. Thousands and thousands of pounds of that went 

into the air. It was discovered on window films within a kilometer 

of the site at high levels. Polycyclic aeromatic hydrocarbons are a 

very toxic group of chemicals. And they never talked about it, they 

never talked about a number of the other pollutants from Ground 

Zero that we should have been concerned about and watching for. 

It was easier to just focus on one chemical, and that’s what they 

did. But that was wrong. It was definitely a wrong thing to do. 

Mr. SCOTT. If you could just respond———

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman is granted an additional 30 seconds, 

without objection. 

Mr. SCOTT. Was that message coming from the scientific community? 

Ms. MATTEI. David, do you want to respond to that, because I’m 

trying to remember who said what, when. I knew there was a fairly 

significant amount of research from data sources other than EPA 

or other government resources that indicated the possibility, the 

likelihood, and in some cases the reality of a variety of a robust 

range of contaminants. However, that data was not large in quantity, so there were a number of scientists who have expressed concern through their research as the possibility of the presence or exposure to other contaminants. However, the data upon which most 

scientists relied, either because they were in the Agency, such as 

EPA, or because they were—or the only data they had available to 

them if they were outside EPA, was the EPA and OSHA data that 

was publicly shared. That data, by and large, at least the data that 

was publicly shared was, as EPA correctly said, reassuring. The 

data that was not necessarily shared was less reassuring. 

Ms. MATTEI. I just want to add to that, that we’re not just talking about what science would indicate but the regulations on dealing with hazardous releases calls for that kind of a comprehensive 

assessment. You’re not just supposed to look at one chemical when 

you have a release, a hazardous release; you’re supposed to find out 

what’s in it, where did it go and who was exposed? That didn’t happen here. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired 

and I’ll grant myself 5 minutes. I recognize myself, I should say, 

for 5 minutes. 

142

First of all, let me ask Mr. Thernstrom, an EPA press release 

from September 13 says that the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings is unlikely to cause significant health effects. 

From September 2002 to September 2003, the CDC, Centers for 

Disease Control, New England Journal of Medicine, Mount Sinai 

School of Medicine, all issued reports demonstrating that rescuers, 

cleanup workers and office workers, were sick as a result of their 

exposure to WTC dust. And yet the White House Council of Environmental Quality asserted in October of 2003 that quote, ‘‘We continue to stand by the information distributed in press releases regarding the potential long-term health risks,’’ close quote. 

There have been a myriad of subsequent peer-reviewed studies 

documenting chronic health effects, as has been mentioned. 

Do you still stand by the information distributed in the press releases regarding lack of potential long-term health risks in spite of 

all what we know today? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Congressman, I don’t actually recognize the 

October quote that you are reading to me. That certainly was not 

something I wrote. I’m sorry if———

Mr. NADLER. First of all, it’s a September quote. But forget that 

quote. There are a whole bunch of quotes we’ve been talking about 

all afternoon here saying in effect that things are safe, things are 

good, things are reassuring, we’re not going to have health problems from the World Trade Center. 

We now know that that wasn’t—I think we know from all the 

studies and from the reality, that that wasn’t correct; and yet the 

White House in its latest pronouncement, which was 3 years ago, 

said they stood by it. Do you still think they ought to stand by 

those? 

Mr. THERNSTROM. I wasn’t working for the White House 3 years 

ago so I can’t speak to what they said then. Honestly, I really don’t 

feel like I have the expertise to speak to the health effects of the 

World Trade Center. 

Mr. NADLER. You’re still not willing to say that all these people 

who are sick, a lot of them are sick because of the World Trade 

Center. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Congressman, I simply don’t have an expertise 

on that subject. All I can say, what we———

Mr. NADLER. Let me ask Ms. Mattei and Mr. Newman. You mentioned, Ms. Mattei, I think, that there was—I think you said a paucity of data with respect to asbestos and so forth. There is one 

thing I wanted to get in the record here. The EPA was using PLM 

test methodology all over New York City except in its own building. 

Now, in 1994 the EPA said the PLM test methodology was oldfashioned, not accurate, not up to date, and they ought to use the 

TEM methods. We know that the TEM methods will detect small 

asbestos fibers that are produced by the pulverization such as occurred at the World Trade Center, that the PLM method will not. 

Do you think that most of the, or many—much of the EPA asbestos readings taken with PLM methodology was simply not reliable 

for that reason? 

Ms. MATTEI. Certainly the TEM tests revealed higher levels. Joel 

Cutherman worked with both BEP and EPA staff at one point to 

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ings of asbestos fibers using the TEM method than the PLM. It is 

not only better at identifying short fibers, but also the very thin fibers because it tends to produce thin fibers. 

I would point out it wasn’t EPA that tested. It was actually the 

General Services Administration. Pretty much everybody else was 

using—everybody was using TEM except the EPA. Kind of baffling. 

Mr. NADLER. Why was that not done? 

Ms. HORINKO. We relied upon the folks from region II and 

thought we should use———

Mr. NADLER. Ms. McGinnis, your September 13 press release 

said—well, and also Governor Whitman earlier today kept talking 

about the distinction between the quality air on the pile and off the 

pile; on the pile you kept saying it was bad and all the assurances 

that we were hearing that everything was fine didn’t relate to the 

pile, it related to off-the-pile. That’s the testimony we heard earlier 

today. 

Now, September 13 EPA put out a press release that said quote: 

Sampling of ambient air quality found no asbestos or very low levels; tests have been reassuring of rescue crews and the public to 

environmental contaminants. Obviously if it’s talking about rescue 

crews, you’re talking about on the pile, not off the pile. 

So it is not true that at least some of the very reassuring statements were dealing with off-the-pile only, and in fact you’re talking 

here giving reassuring statements about on the pile. Is there any 

other way of reading this? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. Could you say that again? I didn’t follow. 

Mr. NADLER. I will give myself another minute to repeat that. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I understood everything except the sentence 

itself. 

Mr. NADLER. The question is: Is there any way of reading that 

press release, or the part of it that says the tests have been very 

reassuring about potential exposure of rescue crews and the public, 

as meaning anything other than that that press release refers to 

the wonderful air quality on the pile, not just off the pile, and that 

everything we’ve heard today about the reassurances not referring 

to conditions on the pile are not quite true, or at least not completely true? 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I’m reluctant to say yes or no on that without 

looking at the context, and I don’t have—haven’t looked———

Mr. NADLER. You will agree you have to be talking about rescue 

crews, you have to be talking about on the pile. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. I have no recollection. 

Mr. NADLER. It’s in tab 3 of your binder is the entire quote. 

Ms. MCGINNIS. What paragraph are you referring to? 

Mr. NADLER. The sentence: Sampling of ambient air quality 

found asbestos. Tests have been very reassuring about potential exposure of rescue crews and the public to environmental contaminants. This would imply rescue crews should not even be concerned 

about air quality. 

Do you want to comment, Ms. Kreisher? 

Ms. KREISHER. I think it would be an error that I probably made. 

At the time we were only 2 days out from the blast, and I could 

have added that without thinking in terms of the distinction between the———

144

Mr. NADLER. You’re saying that all the reassurances were not 

still on the pile, and that including that reference was probably a 

mistake. 

Ms. KREISHER. The same day, September 13, I can quote from 

ABC News.com quoting me saying, ‘‘It’s one of those cases of don’t 

be stupid. If there’s a chance, why not put on the mask?’’ We’re 

talking to rescue workers at that point. Governor Whitman was 

much more strident than I was about making sure that there was 

a distinction. 

Mr. NADLER. My time has expired. The gentleman from Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Ms. Horinko, did you have anything that you wanted to add as 

far as being able to answer any of the questions prior? 

Ms. HORINKO. I just wanted to add that I think all the agencies 

involved worked as hard as they could to get the information out 

in the hands of people who needed it, to make sure that responders 

were able to develop standards under an unprecedented situation, 

using their best professional judgment. We will continue to monitor 

the studies that are taking place in New York. People that are becoming ill, if the study shows that it is the fault of the World Trade 

Center exposures that they received, I think should get the best 

possible access to health care and treatment they possibly should. 

But at the end of the day, I think everyone involved did their very 

best to get the information out as quickly as we could. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Thernstrom, you have testified that you tried the best you 

could to disseminate information based on what you thought the 

science showed and that was reported to you, and that’s still your 

testimony essentially. 

Mr. THERNSTROM. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. FRANKS. I think the reason I mention that is the Bush administration has been criticized sometimes for their, quote, ‘‘lack of 

using scientific bases,’’ and yet when they do so then they are criticized for that as well. 

I happen to be the grandson of a man who died of black lung 

from exposure to a toxic substance and I know that that’s a heartbreak for families that begs my ability to describe or articulate 

today. So I want to make sure that any people in this room or 

under the sound of my voice know that I identify and care very 

much about any illness that they have faced. 

But the reality remains that when we talk about safe levels of 

asbestos, there is asbestos in this room; it might be measured in 

parts per quadrillion instead of parts per million, and yet 6 years 

from now there may be people in this room will come down with 

some type of sickness that would be impossible to relate to that. 

I don’t know what the ultimate effect—cause and effect has been 

in these illnesses, I really don’t know. But my point is this: The 

overwhelming testimony that I have heard today indicates to me 

that there was no deliberate effort on the part of the EPA or the 

Administration to do anything but the best they could to try to 

serve the country in a horrifying tragedy, and I believe that they 

tried to serve both the future and the people that were being—not 

only the ones that were victims at the moment, but potentially victims in the future. 

145

It again seems astonishing to me that we spend the time of this 

Committee trying to punish those who are doing the best they 

could. 

Mr. NADLER. If the gentleman will suspend, please, we have 

come almost to the end with proper decorum. Let’s continue that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Just for the record, I understand the comment. But 

for the record, I believe with all my heart that you were trying to 

protect the American people, from what I have heard today. So for 

that I commend you and hope that somehow we can all work together to make sure this never happens again, and we can help the 

people who are sick try to get better and prevent this tragic situation. 

But we need to remember—my last word—that it was not you, 

the EPA or the Administration, that did this to the American people; it was jihadist terrorists that continue to plot against America. 

Mr. NADLER. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I hope we 

wouldn’t set as our standard that there is nothing at all if you can’t 

find a potential conspiracy between the EPA and the White House 

to intentionally victimize people. I mean the evidence is clear that 

people are sick. There is something we could have done to have 

prevented it. You don’t have to find a potential conspiracy to improve things so that it doesn’t happen again. 

I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. They have 

been here a long time, and I appreciate their patience, and just ask 

any of them if they have any final comments, particularly on indoor 

cleanup. If anyone wants to make a final comment. 

Ms. MATTEI. Well, I was—just on the issue of the kind of information that has been put out about indoor pollution. There was 

something that I think was significantly misleading, and that was 

a letter from the White House Council on Environmental Quality 

to Senators Hillary Clinton and Joseph Lieberman, stating that of 

the 4,100 residential units examined as part of EPA’s indoor program, only about 1 percent were found to have asbestos at levels 

exceeding the health-based standard. 

What that letter didn’t say was that they didn’t test most of 

those apartments before cleaning them. They tested most of them 

after cleaning them. So the data was significantly misused. And it 

is hard for me to understand how anybody could have misused the 

data in that way, because it was obvious what the data was. And 

the way that it was presented in the letter was so obviously misleading. So that is of great concern. 

I am concerned about Ground Zero dust remaining in buildings 

in Lower Manhattan. And until we have a proper testing and 

cleanup program in Lower Manhattan, I consider the Lower Manhattan residents—and I am also concerned about Brooklyn, as is 

Jenna Orkin, who is here today, I consider people to be at risk. And 

in particular toddlers who roll around on carpets and bounce on 

soft furniture, where the dust is likely to be trapped and can’t get 

picked up by an ordinary vacuum cleaner. That is my primary 

health concern for Lower Manhattan and the parts of Brooklyn affected by the dust cloud. It is not over for us. 

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1See report entitled EPA’s Response to the World Trade Center Collapse: Challenges, Successes, and Areas for Improvement, by the Office of the EPA Inspector General at http://

www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2003/WTClreportl20030821.pdf. 

Mr. NEWMAN. Let’s be very clear here that when we talk about 

indoor cleanup, there fundamentally has been none. The single 

EPA program from 2002 to 2003 was limited in scope. Anything 

that was not a residence was excluded, or businesses, workplaces, 

schools, firehouses, City Hall, hospitals, were excluded and are excluded again in the current program. 

The participation rate in 2002-2003 was only approximately 

4,000 apartments. The efficacy of environmental cleanup in those 

apartments was inadequate. Fundamentally, the same methodology 

will be used in the current program, only I believe the number is 

295 apartments are enrolled in the current program. So what we 

have, approaching the sixth anniversary of the events of 9/11, is 

virtually zero testing and cleanup of indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank all 

of our witnesses for their patience. This has been a long hearing. 

Mr. NADLER. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. SCOTT. I yield the balance of my time to the Chairman. 

Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman. Let me simply say, before 

I go through the rigamarole for closing the hearing, and before I 

thank the witnesses, let me just say that I hope that we have 

learned something at this hearing. I think we have learned some 

things. But I think it is very clear that much of the discussion that 

we were having about those press releases, et cetera, was what was 

known then, and whether people should have put out those reassurances then. 

Looking backward—and my opinion is obvious. Looking backwards now, it is very clear that whatever their intentions, whatever their reliances, they were wrong; 70,000 first responders are 

sick—10,000 first responders; 70,000 people are getting sick. Of the 

10,000 first responders tested, 70 percent. So 70 percent of the first 

responders are sick, probably more of the people in the plume, and 

others. That didn’t happen because everything was safe and because the air was safe. And Lower Manhattan and Brooklyn, and 

maybe Jersey City, hasn’t been cleaned up, as Ms. Mattei said. 

And I hope that this hearing, which may be followed by others, 

will begin the process of getting more of this out into public view 

so that we can set the case for changing our policies, which are still 

based on the same policies that got us into this mess. 

And by the way, the terrorists caused a terrible mess, but an additional mess—I don’t want to confuse that—an unnecessary mess, 

with people unnecessarily sick, that we are in. 

With that I yield back my time. And I want to thank the witnesses. I want to—with unanimous consent, I ask unanimous consent to place the EPA Inspector General’s report in the record.1

Without objection. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses. I want to also thank the 

many people who came here today from New York. I want to thank 

the Members for their participation. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit to the Chair additional questions for the witnesses, which 

147

we will forward and ask the witnesses to respond as promptly as 

you can so that your answers may be made part of the record. 

Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days to 

submit any additional materials for inclusion in the record. With 

that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE PRINTED HEARING RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE HONORABLE JERROLD NADLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES


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SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSION FROM THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, 

WHITMAN STRATEGY GROUP


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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE TODD

WHITMAN, WHITMAN STRATEGY GROUP


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ATTACHMENT


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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM JOHN L. HENSHAW,

HENSHAW & ASSOCIATES, INC.


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RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM SAMUEL THERNSTROM,

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE


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172


E-2.eps
173


E-3.eps
174

RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM TINA KREISHER,

COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR


F.eps
175

RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM EILEEN MCGINNIS,

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, WHITMAN STRATEGY GROUP


G-1.eps
176


G-2.eps
177

RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS FROM MARIANNE L. HORINKO, EXECUTIVE

VICE PRESIDENT, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT & TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION


H-1.eps
178


H-2.eps
179


H-3.eps
180


H-4.eps
181

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS ARISING FROM THE EPA’S HANDLING OF

AIR QUALITY ISSUES FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

JUNE 25, 2007

TABLE OF CONTENTS


EPATOC-1.eps
182


EPATOC-2.eps
183

TAB 1


EPAA-2.eps
184


EPAA-3.eps
185

TAB 2


EPAA-5.eps
186


EPAA-6.eps
187


EPAA-7.eps
188

TAB 3


EPAA-9.eps
189


EPAA-10.eps
190


EPAA-11.eps
191


EPAA-12.eps
192


EPAA-13.eps
193


EPAA-14.eps
194


EPAA-15.eps
195


EPAA-16.eps
196


EPAA-17.eps
197


EPAA-18.eps
198


EPAA-19.eps
199


EPAA-20.eps
200


EPAA-21.eps
201


EPAA-22.eps
202

TAB 4


EPAA-24.eps
203


EPAA-25.eps
204

TAB 5


EPAA-27.eps
205

TAB 6


EPAA-29.eps
206


EPAA-30.eps
207


EPAA-31.eps
208


EPAA-32.eps
209


EPAA-33.eps
210


EPAA-34.eps
211

TAB 7


EPAA-36.eps
212


EPAA-37.eps
213


EPAA-38.eps
214


EPAA-39.eps
215

TAB 8


EPAA-41.eps
216


EPAA-42.eps
217

TAB 9


EPAA-44.eps
218


EPAA-45.eps
219

TAB 10


EPAA-47.eps
220


EPAA-48.eps
221

TAB 11


EPAA-50.eps
222


EPAA-51.eps
223

TAB 12


EPAA-53.eps
224


EPAA-54.eps
225

TAB 13


EPAA-56.eps
226

TAB 14


EPAA-58.eps
227


EPAA-59.eps
228

TAB 15


EPAA-61.eps
229


EPAA-62.eps
230

TAB 16


EPAA-64.eps
231


EPAA-65.eps
232


EPAA-66.eps
233


EPAA-67.eps
234


EPAA-68.eps
235


EPAA-69.eps
236


EPAA-70.eps
237

TAB 17


EPAA-72.eps
238


EPAA-73.eps
239

TAB 18


EPAA-75.eps
240


EPAA-76.eps
241


EPAA-77.eps
242


EPAA-78.eps
243


EPAA-79.eps
244

TAB 19


EPAA-81.eps
245


EPAA-82.eps
246


EPAA-83.eps
247


EPAA-84.eps
248


EPAA-85.eps
249


EPAA-86.eps
250


EPAA-87.eps
251


EPAA-88.eps
252


EPAA-89.eps
253

TAB 20


EPAA-91.eps
254


EPAA-92.eps
255


EPAA-93.eps
256


EPAA-94.eps
257


EPAA-95.eps
258


EPAA-96.eps
259

TAB 21


EPAA-98.eps
260

TAB 22


EPAA-100.eps
261


EPAA-101.eps
262

TAB 23


EPAA-103.eps
263


EPAA-104.eps
264

TAB 24


EPAA-106.eps
265


EPAA-107.eps
266

TAB 25


EPAA-109.eps
267


EPAA-110.eps
268

TAB 26


EPAB-1.eps
269


EPAB-2.eps
270


EPAB-3.eps
271


EPAB-4.eps
272


EPAB-5.eps
273


EPAB-6.eps
274


EPAB-7.eps
275


EPAB-8.eps
276


EPAB-9.eps
277


EPAB-10.eps
278


EPAB-11.eps
279


EPAB-12.eps
280

TAB 27


EPAB-13.eps
281

TAB 28


EPAB-14.eps
282


EPAB-15.eps
283

TAB 29


EPAB-16.eps
284


EPAB-17.eps
285


EPAB-18.eps
286

TAB 30


EPAB-19.eps
287


EPAB-20.eps
288

TAB 31


EPAB-21.eps
289


EPAB-22.eps
290


EPAB-23.eps
291

TAB 32


EPAB-24.eps
292


EPAB-25.eps
293


EPAB-26.eps
294


EPAB-27.eps
295


EPAB-28.eps
296


EPAB-29.eps
297


EPAB-30.eps
298


EPAB-31.eps
299


EPAB-32.eps
300

TAB 33


EPAB-33.eps
301


EPAB-34.eps
302


EPABX.eps
303


EPAB-35.eps
304

TAB 34


EPAB-36.eps
305


EPAB-37.eps
306

TAB 35


EPAC-2.eps
307


EPAC-3.eps
308


EPAC-4.eps
309


EPAC-5.eps
310


EPAC-6.eps
311

TAB 36


EPAC-8.eps
312


EPAC-9.eps
313

TAB 37


EPAC-11.eps
314


EPAC-12.eps
315

TAB 38


EPAC-13.eps
316


EPAC-14.eps
317


EPAC-15.eps
318


EPAC-16.eps
319


EPAC-17.eps
320


EPAC-18.eps
321


EPAC-19.eps
322


EPAC-20.eps
323

TAB 39


EPAC-21.eps
324


EPAC-22.eps
325

TAB 40


EPAC-23.eps
326


EPAC-24.eps
327


EPAC-25.eps
328


EPAC-26.eps
329


EPAC-27.eps
330

TAB 41


EPAC-28.eps
331


EPAC-29.eps
332

TAB 42


EPAC-30.eps
333

TAB 43


EPAC-32.eps
334


EPAC-33.eps
335

TAB 44


EPAC-35.eps
336

Æ


EPAC-36.eps