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96–461 PDF 2007

S. HRG. 108–918

A REVIEW OF THE TOOLS TO FIGHT TERRORISM

ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 13, 2004

Serial No. J–108–94

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

BRUCE ARTIM, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY

JON KYL, Arizona, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

STEPHEN HIGGINS, Majority Chief Counsel 

DAVID HANTMAN, Democratic Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas ............................... 5

Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 57

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................. 4

prepared statement and attachments ............................................................. 59

Hatch, Hon. Orrin G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 67

Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .................................... 1

prepared statement and attachments ............................................................. 71

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 88

WITNESSES 

Bryant, Daniel J., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., and Barry Sabin, Chief, 

Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. ........................................................................................................... 6

Turley, Jonathan, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C. ............................................. 12

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Daniel Bryant and Barry Sabin to questions submitted by Senator Leahy ............................................................................................................. 36

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Bryant, Daniel J., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., and Barry Sabin, Chief, 

Counterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., joint statement ............................................................................... 45

Turley, Jonathan, Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law, George Washington University Law School, Washington, D.C., prepared statement .......... 91

(1)

A REVIEW OF THE TOOLS TO FIGHT 

TERRORISM ACT 

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2004 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Kyl, Chairman 

of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Kyl, Sessions, Feinstein, and Cornyn [ex officio.] 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA 

Chairman KYL. This hearing will come to order of the Committee 

on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and 

Homeland Security. 

Good morning, everyone, and welcome to today’s hearing. It is 

going to focus on Senate bill 2679, the Tools to Fight Terrorism 

Act, which is a bill that I recently introduced with several other 

members of this Committee and of the Senate leadership. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, Congressional committees and executive agencies have conducted extensive reviews of 

our Nation’s anti-terrorism safety net. We have had numerous 

hearings in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the Joint 

Intelligence Committee inquiry, the 9/11 Commission hearings and 

report, and the Justice Department has conducted extensive evaluations of its own anti-terrorism capabilities. 

These hearings have uncovered numerous flaws and gaps in our 

anti-terrorism system. We have found, for example, that in many 

cases anti-terror investigators still have less authority to access information than do investigators of other crimes that, while serious, 

pale in comparison to the threat posted by international terrorism. 

We also have seen that some of the Federal Code’s criminal offenses and penalties are far too light or too narrow in their scope, 

in light of the contemporary terrorist threat. 

Yes, despite all of these hearings and inquiries, Congress has enacted no major anti-terrorism legislation since the passage of the 

USA PATRIOT Act almost 3 years ago. To give just a brief description of the nature of the TFTA—again, the Tools for Fighting Terrorism Act—and the legislative process behind it, here are just a 

few examples of some of the most important provisions. 

2

Section 102 is identical to a bill introduced in 2002 by Senator 

Schumer and me which allows FBI agents to seek warrants for the 

surveillance of suspected lone wolf terrorists, such as alleged 20th 

hijacker Zacarias Moussaoui. We have acted on that bill in the Senate and it is pending in the House. 

Sections 112 and 113, which are the same as a bill introduced 

by Senator Chambliss, will improve information-sharing among 

Federal agencies and with State and local authorities, avoiding the 

types of barriers between criminal and intelligence investigators 

that impeded pre-September 11 searches in the United States for 

hijackers Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. 

Section 106 is identical to a bill introduced by Senator Hatch 

which punishes hoaxes about terrorist crimes or a death of a U.S. 

soldier, imposing penalties commensurate with the disruptions and 

trauma inflicted by such hoaxes. 

Title II is identical to a bill introduced by Senator Cornyn, who 

is with us here this morning. It imposes stiff 30-year mandatory 

minimum penalties for possession of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft 

missiles, atomic and radiological bombs, and variola virus, which is 

smallpox—penalties which are sufficient to deter middlemen who 

might help terrorists acquire these weapons. 

Title IV is identical to a bill introduced by Senators Biden and 

Feinstein which creates a set of criminal offenses tailored to the 

challenges of guaranteeing the security of our Nation’s seaports. 

TFTA is divided into five titles which consist of all or part of 11 

bills that I said are currently pending either in the House or in the 

Senate. Every provision has previously either been introduced and 

is pending as a bill in Congress or addresses a matter that has 

been explored in a Congressional Committee hearing. 

Collectively, the provisions of TFTA have been the subject of nine 

separate hearings before House and Senate committees, and have 

the subject of four separate Committee reports. If you add up, by 

the way, all of the time that the various bills included in TFTA 

have been awaiting enactment since first introduced, as of today 

the components of the bill have been pending for 14 years, 7 

months and 9 days. But who is counting? 

In any event, with today’s hearing, I hope to give this legislation 

a final opportunity for review so we can get it to the Senate floor 

and get it adopted before Congress recesses for the year. 

I am pleased to introduce the witnesses and, with Senator Feinstein’s concurrence, would invite Mr. Turley to join this panel. The 

protocol is we have our Government witnesses on the first panel 

and other witnesses second. With only three witnesses today, all 

being erudite in the law, I am going to ask that they all three join 

us, and then we can get our questions answered at one time. 

Dan Bryant will be our first witness. He is the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Policy in the Department of 

Justice. He began his legal career at Justice in 1987. In 1995, he 

became counsel to the House of Representatives’ Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, and promoted to majority chief counsel of that 

Subcommittee in 1999. He was appointed Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Office of Legislative Affairs in 

2001 and has served in his current position since 2003. 

3

Barry Sabin is the Chief of the Counterterrorism Section of the 

Justice Department’s Criminal Division. Mr. Sabin previously 

served nearly a dozen years in the U.S. Attorney’s office in Miami, 

Florida, where he held the positions of Chief of the Criminal Division, Chief of the Major Prosecutions and Violent Crime Section, 

and Deputy Chief of the Economic Crime Section. His most recent 

position in that office was First Assistant U.S. Attorney and he 

held that position since 2002. 

I would like to note that Mr. Sabin’s office recently received some 

very praise in the report of the September 11th Commission, and 

I want to quote it because I think it sets the stage nicely for what 

we want to do here today. So this is a quotation from the September 11th Commission report. 

‘‘The Department of Justice also has dramatically increased its 

focused efforts to investigate and disrupt terrorist financing in the 

United States. The Terrorism and Violent Crime Section formed a 

unit to implement an aggressive program of prosecuting terrorist 

financing cases. The Terrorist Financing Unit coordinates and pursues terrorist financing criminal investigations around the country 

and provides support and guidance to U.S. Attorneys’ office in terrorist financing issues. In stark contrast to the dysfunctional relationship between the FBI and DOJ that plagued them before 9/11, 

the two entities now seem to be working cooperatively. The leadership of the FBI’s Terrorism Finance Operation Section praises the 

CTS Terrorist Financing Unit’’—which is Mr. Sabin’s unit—‘‘for its 

unwavering support.’’ 

Finally, I am pleased to also introduce Professor Jonathan 

Turley, the Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law at George 

Washington University Law School. Professor Turley is a nationally-recognized expert on constitutional law and national security 

policy. In addition to a large number of academic works in these 

areas, Professor Turley has served as counsel in a variety of highprofile national security cases in both criminal and civil courts, including espionage cases in both Federal and military courts. 

Professor Turley is a frequent witness on constitutional and national security issues in Congress and has served as a consultant 

for such issues for State legislatures. His academic writings and 

public appearances have made him, according to a recent study, 

one of the top 100 most cited public intellectuals in the Nation and 

one of the top two most cited law professors—a distinction. 

As I told Professor Turley this morning, we are really interested 

in him grading our bill here, not giving any kind of a whitewash, 

but to tell us if there are parts of it he thinks could stand improvement because, as I said, we do want to move this bill to the Senate 

floor as quickly as we can and get it adopted before we leave here. 

As always, I am joined by the ranking Democrat member of the 

Subcommittee, Senator Feinstein, from California, who has been an 

ardent supporter of anti-terrorism legislation. She and I had introduced legislation before September 11 that we pushed hard, and it 

wasn’t until after September 11 that our colleagues began to notice 

what we had been trying to do on this Subcommittee. 

I couldn’t have a better partner on this Subcommittee in trying 

to improve the way that this country deals with the whole specVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:46 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 096461 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\96461.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
4

trum of terrorism issues than Senator Feinstein and I am happy 

to turn the time over to her now. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kyl appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you, too, for those comments. I think you know how much 

I have enjoyed working with you. 

I want to take this opportunity to welcome our witnesses. I certainly look forward to your remarks. 

I would like to use my time very briefly to discuss two points and 

kind of put Mr. Bryant a little bit on the hot seat in my comments, 

if I might. I have two concerns. The first is that the Department 

of Justice may not effectively be using the tools it already has. I 

have noticed the tendency of the Department to rather trumpet arrests and indictments in terrorism cases, but those announcements 

don’t seem to be matched by prosecutions. Let me give you a few 

examples—in Detroit, with the Detroit cell, defendants Koubriti 

and Elmardoudi, who had been convicted on terrorism and fraud 

charges, and Ahmed Hannan, who had been convicted of fraud. A 

fourth defendant, Farouk Ali-Haimoud, was acquitted. A jury verdict was overturned, with a finding of prosecutorial misconduct and 

failure to provide required discovery to the defendants. 

In Portland, Oregon, Brandon Mayfield—the FBI mistakenly said 

his fingerprints matched one found on a plastic bag connected to 

the Madrid, Spain, bombing. Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, 

New York, were released on bail after a Federal judge concluded 

the men were not as dangerous as prosecutors alleged. 

A Saudi student in Boise, Idaho, was acquitted in June on 

charges of giving terrorist material support by creating an Internet 

network. There was no clear-cut evidence that said he was a terrorist. 

Mr. Moussaoui has continued to tie up the court system in knots. 

Mr. Padilla, was arrested in Chicago, then transferred to southern 

New York and finally to a military court, arrested with great fanfare, but it is no longer clear whether any real plot did exist. So 

I think it is important that we not always look to increasing the 

legislative authorities provided, but also that we use what we have 

both properly and appropriately. 

My second concern is one of oversight. Since September 11, I 

think the Congress has acted expeditiously. Senator Kyl outlined 

some of the issues that this Subcommittee has handled—bioterrorism, the Visa Reform and Border Security Act, and, of course, 

the PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act perhaps is the greatest aid 

to prosecution that has come up, and I have been trying to follow 

it and have had great trouble in doing it, and I want to express 

that for the first time publicly. 

We know that 16 provisions of the PATRIOT Act sunset in 2005. 

They are the controversial provisions. Those provisions require participation by the executive branch—the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence. I have repeatedly requested that the 

Department of Justice undertake a task that they should have 

5

begun without prompting, and that is carrying out an objective, 

comprehensive review of the effect and efficacy of the 16 provisions 

set to expire next year. 

I received a report earlier this year, but it was not at all responsive to what I had asked. It was more or less a compendium of success stories. Let me give you one example. 

One of the most controversial tools is Section 215, and last year 

the Attorney General announced that he had not been used. In 

April, my staff received a briefing on that provision and was promised by representatives from Mr. Moschella’s office that an update 

of the status would be provided. On Friday, June 18, the Washington Post reported that the FBI had, in fact, sought to use that 

very controversial provision. 

On my behalf, my staff asked for a classified account of the 

issues raised in that story. No response was forthcoming, and two 

weeks ago we were notified that no response would be provided, except that contained within the general quarterly report. 

I voted for the bill. That approach is simply not acceptable. It 

doesn’t serve the needs of our counterterrorism efforts and I think 

it fosters a climate of cynicism and suspicion. The Attorney General 

has appropriately been given new and more powerful authorities to 

respond to the threats facing us. These authorities are best used 

within the context of appropriate oversight. I have found that very 

difficult to achieve. If someone who has supported the Act finds 

that difficult to achieve, what are those that didn’t support or really want to see those provisions expire or not be renewed going to 

think? 

So as time goes on, I have growing concerns because I have tried 

to get answers, I have tried to get the kinds of evaluations of those 

sections that we need to do our oversight duties, and they have not 

up to this point been forthcoming. 

Fortunately, we do have time, because I wouldn’t estimate that 

any hearings here are going to begin before next year. But I just 

want to serve notice that I am really very serious about taking a 

good, hard look at those 16 sections. Once again, I would like to 

say that I am not receiving the material that we need to provide 

our legally mandated oversight authority. 

Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator Cornyn, would you like to make any statement? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Senator CORNYN. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing, and it is good to be here with you and Senator 

Feinstein. Even though I am not on the Subcommittee, I am very 

much interested in this legislation and in the subject matter. 

As a cosponsor of this bill, the Tools to Fight Terrorism Act of 

2004, of course, I am very interested in what each of the witnesses 

has to say about this proposal. But I would note that I believe I 

saw this morning, or maybe it was yesterday, that while basically 

crime levels are at a 30-year low in this country, and much of this 

6

legislation is directed at punishing terrorist activities and possession of WMD and other dangerous potential weapons, we are not 

obviously when we are talking about terrorism just concerned 

about punishing crime or punishing it after the fact. We are interested in prevention and preemption. 

That is, of course, what bringing down the wall was all about in 

the PATRIOT Act, sharing that information. Perhaps the best evidence that the PATRIOT Act has been successful, as well as the 

other efforts that have been undertaken during the last 3 years, is 

that we have so far been able to disrupt or prevent any other terrorist acts on our own soil. 

Two areas that I am particularly interested in have to do with 

the increased penalties for possession and use of MANPADS—that 

is surface-to-air shoulder-fired missiles—which are a potential 

threat to civil aviation. Obviously, the consequences of the use and 

trafficking of those is obvious. 

In the same vein, this bill provides increased penalties for possession of various weapons of mass destruction, including chemical 

and biological weapons, things like the smallpox virus which could 

be devastating, if used, and dirty bombs, radiological materials and 

nuclear materials. 

So I appreciate your convening this hearing today and letting me 

sit in with you and Senator Feinstein, and look forward to the testimony. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. 

Perhaps, Dan Bryant, when we are done talking about the Tools 

to Fight Terrorism Act, you might, if you are inclined and you can 

at this point, address some of the concerns that Senator Feinstein 

raised in her opening statement. 

Why don’t we begin with Hon. Dan Bryant and Barry Sabin, and 

then Professor Turley. Ordinarily, we have a five-minute clock up 

here. I am not going to use that today. I will assume that you can 

keep your remarks roughly within that point of time. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL J. BRYANT, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY 

GENERAL, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND BARRY SABIN, CHIEF, 

COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. BRYANT. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Feinstein and Senator Cornyn. I thank you for the opportunity to 

appear before you this morning to discuss S. 2679, the Tools to 

Fight Terrorism Act of 2004. Mr. Chairman, I will take your lead 

and I will refer to it as the TFTA. 

Congress and the administration already have done much to improve the Government’s ability to fight the war on terrorism. The 

most notable of these efforts was the enactment of the PATRIOT 

Act, which has proven invaluable in our counterterrorism efforts. 

There is, however, more to be done. 

The TFTA proposes numerous improvements to current law. It 

contains significant, effective, constitutionally-sound tools that 

would help us prevent, disrupt and prosecute terrorism. For purposes of today’s hearing, my colleague, Barry Sabin, and I will comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:46 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 096461 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\96461.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
7

ment on a handful of the key provisions in the bill, and I would 

like to focus now on two of those. 

The TFTA contains a number of provisions that fill gaps in existing law. Some of the most important of these are in Title II which 

addresses the private use and possession of four weapons that 

could be catastrophic in the hands of terrorists—Man-Portable Air 

Defense Systems, or MANPADS; atomic weapons; radiological disbursal devices, sometimes referred to as dirty bombs; and, finally, 

the variola virus which causes smallpox. 

MANPADS are portable, lightweight, surface-to-air missile systems designed to take down an aircraft. Typically, they are able to 

be carried and fired by a single individual. They are small, and 

thus relatively easy to conceal and smuggle. A single attack could 

kill hundreds of persons in the air and many more on the ground. 

A MANPADS attack could also cripple commercial air travel. As 

such, MANPADS present a serious threat to civil aviation. 

The threats posed by other prohibited items—atomic weapons, 

radiological disbursal devices and smallpox—are obvious. Atomic 

weapons and dirty bombs could be used by terrorists to inflict enormous loss of life and damage to property and the environment. The 

variola virus is classified by the Centers for Disease Control as one 

of the biological agents posing the greatest potential threat to public health. 

There are no legitimate private uses for any of these weapons. 

They have the capability to cause widespread harm to the American people and to disrupt on a large scale the United States economy. Current penalties for the unlawful possession of these weapons, however, do not adequately reflect the serious threat to public 

safety and national security posed by their enormous destructive 

power. A maximum penalty of only 10 years in prison applies to 

the unlawful possession of MANPADS and atomic weapons. 

Although the use, threatened use or attempted use of radiological 

disbursal devices are covered by the weapons of mass destruction 

statute, there is no statute that criminalizes the mere possession 

of such devices. Similarly, although there are penalties for prohibited transactions involving nuclear materials, all of them require 

proof of certain intent. There is no statute criminalizing mere possession. 

The knowing, unregistered possession of the variola virus has a 

maximum penalty of only 5 years in prison and up to a $250,000 

fine. Although the possession of the virus for use as a weapon is 

punishable under the biological weapons statute for any term of 

years up to life, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide for a sentence of only 6.5 to 8 years for an offender who has no prior criminal record. 

To provide a much greater deterrent for the possession or use of 

these weapons, the TFTA would establish a zero-tolerance policy 

toward the unlawful importation, possession or transfer of these 

weapons by imposing very tough criminal penalties. Under the bill, 

possession of any of these weapons would result in mandatory imprisonment for 30 years to life. Use, attempts or conspiracy to use, 

or possession and threats to use these weapons would result in 

mandatory life in prison. Capital punishment could be imposed if 

the possession or use of such a weapon resulted in death. 

8

These penalties are justified by the catastrophic destruction that 

could be caused by the use of these weapons. Although harsh penalties may not deter suicidal terrorists determined to attack the 

United States, they may well deter those middlemen and 

facilitators, as the Chairman has referred to, who are essential to 

the transfer of such weapons. They also would assist prosecutors 

and investigators in obtaining cooperation from those individuals 

and moving swiftly up the chain to identify the most dangerous terrorists. 

Section 102 of the TFTA would fill another gap in existing law 

by amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to permit 

surveillance of so-called lone wolf terrorists. FISA currently does 

not cover unaffiliated individuals or individuals whose affiliation 

with a foreign terrorist group is not known who engage in or are 

preparing to engage in international terrorism. 

Imagine a situation in which a single person comes to the United 

States to make preparations for or even initiate a terrorist attack. 

While in the United States, he engages in suspicious activity, such 

as purchasing large quantities of dangerous chemicals, signing up 

for commercial airplane flight school with no prior flight experience 

and no interest in becoming a commercial pilot, or scouting the security perimeter of several nuclear power plants. 

If FBI authorities became aware of such behavior, they may wish 

to conduct an international terrorism investigation by obtaining a 

FISA order permitting electronic surveillance of the suspect. Under 

current law, FISA would prevent the FBI from obtaining the order 

unless they could show that the individual was affiliated with an 

international terrorist organization. 

But the reality today is that a terrorist who seeks to attack the 

United States may be a lone wolf who is not connected to a foreign 

terrorist group or someone whose connection to a foreign terrorist 

group is unknown or unknowable. The quarter-century-old FISA 

law prevents law enforcement and intelligence authorities from exerting maximum effort to intercept and obstruct such terrorists. 

The TFTA would fix this anomaly. Section 102 would update 

FISA by permitting the FBI to apply to the FISA court for a surveillance or search order if they have probable cause to suspect 

that a foreign national in the United States is engaged or may be 

preparing to engage in international terrorist activity, even if they 

cannot immediately link that person to a particular foreign state 

or terrorist group. 

Chairman Kyl and Senator Schumer introduced legislation to fix 

this problem almost 2 years ago and the Senate passed it overwhelmingly in May of 2003 by, I think, a 90–8 vote. Given all we 

have learned about the terrorist threats we face, it is critical to 

enact this common-sense reform. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the chance to be with you 

and I look forward to responding, and I would be pleased to address now or after statements made by my other colleagues to Senator Feinstein’s concerns. 

Chairman KYL. Let’s move through the comments about this bill 

and then we can come back to that, if that is all right. Thank you 

very much. 

Barry Sabin. 

9

Mr. SABIN. Good morning, Chairman Kyl, Ranking Member Feinstein, Senator Cornyn. Thank you for the opportunity to testify at 

this important hearing. 

I wholeheartedly agree with my colleague, Mr. Bryant, that the 

Tools to Fight Terrorism Act of 2004, if passed, would fill a number 

of holes in our homeland security blanket. For my opening remarks, I will focus my testimony in the area of material support 

for terrorism and terrorist financing because I believe they are so 

critical to our daily counterterrorism efforts. 

As the Department’s leadership has indicated, a critical element 

in our battle against terrorism is to prevent the flow of money and 

other material resources to terrorists and terrorist organizations. 

From the perspective of a career Federal prosecutor, I fully endorse 

this approach. 

But as the anniversary on Saturday reminded us all, we must 

continue to be vigilant. In recent months, we have seen the seizures of large quantities of chemicals used to make bombs near 

London’s Heathrow Airport, the bombings in Madrid, a car bombing in Riyadh that killed 5 and wounded 147 others, the raising of 

the threat level pursuant to credible threats on some of our financial institutions, and just last week, and for the third year in a row 

preceding the anniversary of 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s second in 

command Imam Al Zawahiri was seen in a video trying to rally al 

Qaeda supporters. These developments separately and collectively 

indicate that the United States and its allies remain a target of 

deadly worldwide attacks by al Qaeda and others whose view of the 

world involves the indiscriminate killing of innocent people. 

While terrorists continue to plot, we continue to work harder to 

thwart them. By working together, the various components of the 

U.S. Government, in concert with our international allies, continue 

to aggressively pursue terrorists. The Congress and the American 

people expect nothing less. 

Our concerted efforts and reliance on the rule of law and adherence to constitutionally-protected civil liberties have led to the disruption or demise of terrorist cells in locations across the country. 

We continue to dismantle the terrorists’ financial networks, including those that prey on charities, through, in part, an application of 

standard white-collar investigative techniques. 

To be sure, criminal prosecution remains a vital component of 

the war on terrorism, and we at Justice have used our law enforcement powers, when appropriate, to prevent terrorist acts. Much of 

our success is due to the wide array of legislative tools provided by 

the Congress, particularly the material support statutes. 

The watershed legislative development of terrorist financing enforcement occurred in 1996, when Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This statute created the 

Section 2339B offense and the concept of foreign terrorist organizations, or FTOs. The crime of providing material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations, including Title 18 United States 

Code Section 2339A and B, criminalized conduct several steps removed from actual terrorist attacks. 

These crimes permit us to redress the problem of the terrorist 

financier, someone whose role in violent plots is not obviously lethal, but involves the act of logistical and financial facilitation. 

10

These offenses, along with the criminal penalty provisions of the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, which 

we frequently use in material support prosecutions, contain the offenses of attempt and conspiracy, which adds to our ability to take 

down terrorist plots at a very early stage of planning. 

The material support statutes and the improvements provided 

for by the USA PATRIOT Act, including increased penalties, have 

allowed the U.S. Government to successfully prosecute numerous 

terrorists and their cohorts. Prosecutions generate more leads and 

intelligence. Aggressive law enforcement begets more enforcement 

and further disruption of terrorist support mechanisms. 

For example, we can credit the material support statutes as the 

basis for a grand jury in Dallas indicting the Holy Land Foundation and its officers for conspiring to provide material support to 

Hamas over the last decade, and as a key basis for a grand jury 

in Chicago indicting three Hamas operatives this past month; with 

enabling the pending trial of accused U.S.-based terrorist financier 

Sami Al-Arian, who allegedly used his University of South Florida 

office and several non-profit entities he established to support the 

Palestinian Islamic jihad; with providing for the guilty plea and cooperation of al Qaeda associate and military procurer Mohammed 

Junaid Babar in New York City; with the plea and cooperation of 

James Ujaama, who participated in setting up a violent training 

camp in rural Oregon; with the pending extradition requests of Abu 

Hamza El-Masri and Babar Ahmed, who have been charged with 

terrorist support offenses in New York and Connecticut, respectively, and are currently in British custody; and the successful 

prosecutions of individuals in Lackawanna and Portland and right 

here in Northern Virginia of several persons training in the United 

States to engage in violent jihad activities abroad. 

But the TFTA improves this critical tool by clarifying several aspects of the material support statutes. As this Committee well 

knows, there have been a few court decisions finding key terms in 

the definitions of material support or resources to be unconstitutionally vague. TFTA amends the definition of ‘‘personnel,’’ 

‘‘training’’ and ‘‘expert advice or assistance,’’ the terms deemed 

vague by these courts, in a way that addresses the concerns about 

vagueness, and at the same time maintains the statute’s effectiveness. There is a fuller discussion of this in our written statement, 

but let me just cite one quick improvement. 

Section 114 would clarify the meaning of the term ‘‘personnel’’ to 

address a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit finding the term unconstitutionally vague. The court 

opined that the ambit of the term was vague because ‘‘personnel’’ 

could be construed to include unequivocally pure speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment. 

Section 114 of TFTA would address the court’s concern by providing that a person may be prosecuted under Section 2339B for 

providing personnel to a designated foreign terrorist organization 

only if that person provided one, including oneself, or more individuals to work under the organization’s direction or control, or to organize, manage, supervise or otherwise direct the operation of that 

organization. 

11

It is critical that the United States stem the flow of recruits to 

terrorist training camps. A danger is posed to the vital foreign policy interests and national security of the United States whenever 

a person knowingly receives military-type training from a designated terrorist organization or persons acting on its behalf. 

But the current prohibition on providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations under Section 2339B does not explicitly 

prohibit receiving training from, as opposed to providing training 

to a foreign terrorist organization, such as by attending an al 

Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. 

In many cases, it is clear that persons who attend training camps 

violate the existing material support statutes by providing training 

to other trainees serving under the direction of the organization 

and performing guard duty or other tasks, providing money to the 

organization for the training, or for uniforms and provisions and 

the like. 

Proof of these specific activities, however, may be difficult to obtain, especially when the training occurred in a remote location. 

Section 115 of TFTA is designed to fill this gap. Section 115 of 

TFTA would create a new criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 

2339E, which would make it an offense to receive military-type 

training from a designated foreign terrorist organization, subject to 

a penalty of fines or imprisonment for 10 years, or both. 

That concludes my prepared remarks, Mr. Chairman. I again 

thank this Committee for its continued leadership and support. Together, we will continue to make great strides in the long-term efforts to defeat those who seek to terrorize America. I am happy to 

respond to any questions you may have, as well as address Senator 

Feinstein’s earlier remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Messrs. Bryant and Sabin appears as 

a submission for the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much. Again, I appreciate your 

willingness to share the podium with a non-government witness 

here, but he is such a frequent commentator on proposals to change 

our laws and on provisions of law dealing with terrorism that his 

views are certainly sought by many, and certainly by this Subcommittee. 

I would just note that I am just struck by the context of this. As 

we have a problem, and September 11th was the crystallization of 

that problem, and we begin to use the tools that we have, we naturally find out which ones work well, which ones don’t work so well, 

and where there are real holes or gaps. 

This Act is deliberately designed simply to fill some of the holes 

that have been identified by various intelligence and law enforcement people who have had to be on the front line working on this. 

It is striking—and I want to get into this a little bit later—how 

working with the law enables you to find out those things that 

need to be modified in the law and getting advice from the court 

about those areas in which we as Congress have not been as careful as we should have been perhaps in making sure that the balance between the protection of civil liberties and aggressiveness at 

going after terrorists is achieved. 

Professor Turley, thank you very much for being here. 

12

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN TURLEY, SHAPIRO PROFESSOR OF 

PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

LAW SCHOOL, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Mr. TURLEY. Thank you, Chairman Kyl, Senator Feinstein, Senator Cornyn. Thank you very much for the honor of appearing before you today, and to join the panel with the Government witnesses. Dan Bryant and Barry Sabin and I were acknowledging the 

fact that we have more often been on different sides of this debate 

over the last 2 years, and for some the appearance of this panel 

will look like the Visigoths and the Romans sitting down together. 

But I think that it does show that the things that divide us are 

far less than those which we have in common in terms of the fight 

against terror. 

As you know, it is physically impossible for a law professor to 

speak on any subject in less than 50-minute increments, and so I 

have submitted a written statement which is too long for any real 

purpose, but it is available to the Committee. 

I was asked to look at this bill, which is composed obviously of 

many different provisions, which is something of a daunting task, 

and to look at it in terms of its constitutional status and also its 

implications in terms of civil liberties in this fight against terror. 

I appreciate the Chairman and the members of the Committee 

inviting me and indicating that they are interested in the views 

from both sides and not just similar views on these subjects. I am 

happy to say that I view this as an important advance. I think that 

civil liberties advocates and national security advocates can find 

common ground here. It is not that I don’t have concerns in this 

bill, and I am going to mention a few, but the vast majority of this 

bill serves a real purpose. There are some great advances here. 

I think that there is a mistake that many people have when they 

look at this country from abroad and they assume that when we 

face these types of dangers, we don’t have the ability to react, and 

react forcefully, but also to react within the first principles that define us as a Nation. This is a good example of one of those bills 

that respects civil liberties and I think advances national security. 

Obviously, bad times take the measure of any people and their 

government. This bill, particularly Title I, obviously raises issues 

in terms of civil liberties because it readjusts the relationship between the Government and citizens in the investigation and prosecution of terror cases. 

For the most part, what is in Title I is, in my view, not problematic and is beneficial. Six of those sections I have put at the end 

of my testimony because they have raised constitutional concerns 

with various groups. I don’t actually share some of those concerns, 

but I think that they are good-faith concerns and I think that the 

Subcommittee should look very seriously at those concerns. Some 

of them I do feel warrant assessment and possible changes in the 

language. But let me quickly go through the titles and then I will 

address those six sections. 

Section 104 in terms of lifetime post-release supervision is a good 

example of, I think, one of the advantages in this Act. It, to me, 

makes abundant sense to have eligibility for lifetime post-release 

supervision in these cases. It is hard to argue against that, and the 

same can be said of imposing criminal penalties for those that give 

13

false and misleading statements in terms of terrorist crimes or 

about the death or injury of a U.S. soldier. This is Section 106 

which deals with hoaxes. 

I previously have advocated the criminalization of these types of 

hoaxes. While I believe that as a federalism principle, this should 

primarily remain with the States, there is obviously a Federal interest here. I, as I have written before, find precious little distinction between a hoaxster and a terrorist, since both of them are trying to shut down buildings or communities. They are both achieving the same level of terror. 

For a terrorist, the actual body count is sometimes irrelevant, as 

opposed to the dysfunctional effect of the threat, and hoaxsters 

achieve the identical result. What is particularly curious is that 

with some of these hoaxes—and they have come from bizarre corners, from journalists to prosecutors, to normal citizens. The problem is that they often involve millions and millions of dollars of 

costs that are not recouped. 

The effect of this type of law will be to call this conduct what it 

is—criminal. We will return to this theme a couple of times here 

that this bill does achieve a very important thing in some cases in 

establishing that conduct is criminal. That is one of the functions 

of criminal law, is to correctly identify conduct that as a society we 

believe is beyond the pale and must be considered criminal. 

We also have, for example, other sections which I doubt seriously 

anyone could argue with, including Section 111, which denies Federal benefits to convicted terrorists. I doubt you will find much disagreement there. 

I also agree with the Government witnesses that Section 115 

achieves an important purpose in making it a crime to receive military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization. We have 

seen in cases in recent years, particularly cases like Jose Padilla, 

that these training camps are used to recruit and indoctrinate individuals. The problem from what I can see is that prosecutors are 

often left with a very sudden cliff. They either have to charge a direct terrorism crime, which is sometimes difficult to fit, or they 

have to use a more ambiguous theory. It makes for a difficult prosecution. 

What this would do is correctly identify the specific crime of receiving this type of military training from a terrorist organization. 

And, frankly, it would go directly at one of the great recruiting 

techniques used on people like Padilla and John Walker Lindh. It 

also will be of advantage to prosecutors, since they will have a tailored crime to present in front of a jury instead of requiring the 

jury to adopt a more general or fluid theory. 

I am not going to go through each of these sections. I will note, 

however, that sections like Title IV, which is the Seaports Act, is 

enormously important. That is an example of an entire area in 

which we have had significant gaps in terms of the criminalization 

of misconduct. Congress has repeatedly identified seaports as one 

of our great vulnerabilities, and these criminal provisions, I think, 

will present a significant deterrent particularly for people like 

transporters who are bringing terrorist material or terrorists into 

the country. I believe that this will have a significant effect on deterrence and will benefit us all. 

14

Turning to those six sections that have drawn the most significant criticism, the first would be Section 102, the lone wolf provision involving FISA. This is the only section that I have significant 

personal difficulties with, but I need to preface my remarks with 

a personal caveat. I have been an opponent of the FISA law for 

many years. I tend to adopt a fairly textualist view of the U.S. Constitution. I believe that the FISA court does not comply with the 

Fourth Amendment. So my objections to this provision really go 

more generally to the entire FISA process. 

Having said that, I want to be honest that I doubt that the Supreme Court would share my view. The Supreme Court has not 

fully tested FISA, but I believe that they would uphold FISA, and 

I also believe they would uphold this provision. So if the question 

of the Subcommittee is whether this provision will pass constitutional muster, I expect it would, and my objections go more generally to FISA, as I have explained in my written testimony. 

Section 103 deals with bail for terrorists. This is a presumption 

against bail for accused terrorists, and this has drawn some criticism from various quarters. I have no question in my mind that 

this would pass constitutional review, and I also don’t object to it. 

It seems to me a reasonable request from the Department of Justice to have such a presumption that is indeed rebuttable. We already have this type of provision in 18 U.S.C. 3142E, and it seems 

to me rather obvious that accused terrorists should be treated in 

the same fashion. 

In Section 104, we have the JETS provision. This is the Judicially Enforceable Terrorism Subpoenas provision. On this issue, 

once again there have been concerns, and I share those concerns, 

in terms of the ability of the FBI to issue its own subpoenas. 

It is ironic that the civil liberties community and the Department 

of Justice agree on one thing. The Department of Justice wants 

this provision because of the ease with which they can issue subpoenas, and that is exactly why civil libertarians are uncomfortable 

with it. They are concerned that this is making it too easy and that 

there is some benefit of having an AUSA there to serve as some 

type of intermediary. 

My view on this, quite frankly, is that this change is not going 

to result in a significant difference. I have never personally heard 

of an AUSA turning down one of these things. It tends to be a very 

perfunctory process. But what I would encourage the Subcommittee 

to do is that if they decide to move the JETS provision to the floor 

that they commit themselves to close oversight supervision on this 

point. 

This is one area where the closest possible oversight is needed. 

The Subcommittee must have some type of guarantee that it will 

receive information on an annual basis as to the number and scope 

of these subpoenas. To not have that guarantee, I think, frankly, 

would be dangerous. 

Section 108 involves confidential CIPA provisions, and once 

again I have to confess a personal bias. As the Chairman has 

noted, I litigate national security cases and I tend to be on the 

other side of CIPA proceedings. This provision would allow the 

Government to submit in camera ex parte requests for CIPA protection. 

15

Quite frankly, this is a request that is almost uniformly accepted 

by courts. There are a few courts where courts have rejected these 

requests and said you put the request on the public record. But 

quite frankly, I don’t see many cases where the Department of Justice has been put into a compromised position that is indicated in 

this amendment. But it will probably not materially change most 

cases or the rights of defendants. Very little is actually disclosed 

in these public requests, and so the difference is likely to be marginal. 

109 is the FISA information issue regarding immigration proceedings. This provision has been called by the American Immigration Lawyers Association as constitutionally dubious. The AILA believes that allowing FISA information to be used, but not allow notice of the use would raise constitutional problems. 

As much as I respect that organization and the work that it does, 

I do not see the constitutional problem. The fact is that you can 

use secret evidence in immigration proceedings, and the mere fact 

that you will not get specific notice that it is FISA-derived, in my 

view, is a practical and not a constitutional problem for the defense. 

Finally, in Section 114, we have the material support provision. 

This provision, as was noted, corrects gaps in the original language 

identified by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In that sense, it 

moves this statute out of one constitutional area of concern; that 

is, void for vagueness. I would think that that would be embraced 

by civil liberties advocates. 

However, I want to note that there remain First Amendment and 

due process concerns with regard to material support prosecutions. 

I happen to share those concerns, but the material support issue 

is a difficult one for civil libertarians because we are frankly divided. There are some who believe that any prosecution for material support raises facial constitutional problems, that it gets into 

speech and association. 

I share those concerns, but I also believe that the Government 

does have a legitimate interest in prosecuting people giving material support to terrorist organizations. We have throughout our history prosecuted aiders and abettors, and to me there is precious little difference in the type of misconduct identified in this provision. 

Having said that, I have enormous concerns over the prosecutions under this provision and I have significant concerns over the 

administrative aspects of designating terrorist organizations. I 

would encourage the Subcommittee to look at that. 

However, I believe that this is an advance. It makes this statute 

better and brings it closer to conformity with the Constitution. 

Quite frankly, I believe this entire law would be upheld under even 

First Amendment and due process challenges as it stands. It 

doesn’t mean it can’t be improved, but I believe that most courts 

would accept this language as fully complying with the Constitution. 

Let me end by saying that I believe that this law really represents the best of us in the sense that it involves a number of 

changes that were made in conformity to objections made earlier in 

2003. There have been sections that have been removed, and I believe that this has been improved dramatically. I do think that civil 

16

libertarians should reflect that and show that we support a fight 

against terrorism and that we recognize the changes that have 

been made. 

In the same way, I hope that the Department of Justice recognizes that Congress has once again shown in this bill that it is willing to deal with matters in the Federal courts to make them an acceptable forum for the prosecution of terrorism cases and enemy 

combatant cases. 

One of my criticisms of the current Attorney General is that he 

has often expressed a certain distrust of the judicial system and its 

ability to handle terrorism cases. I don’t agree with that. I don’t 

understand why the Attorney General has worked to circumvent 

the courts in some respects. 

But I believe this bill shows that Congress and many civil liberties advocates are willing to make adjustments to compromise 

and to accommodate, and I hope that that will carry over to the 

Department of Justice because I think that ultimately we have a 

certain crisis of faith when you start to circumvent the Federal judiciary. 

This constitutional system has existed through every possible 

stress challenge. We have faced challenges that would have left 

most systems in a fine pumice and we have survived. That is what 

the Framers built. They built a constitutional system to survive, 

not to inspire, to survive, and we have survived. 

For those that say that the Federal courts cannot be used to try 

these cases, it borders on constitutional defamation. We deserve 

better, and this Act will strengthen the ability of the Government 

to use the Federal courts and I hope that it will renew their commitment to use them consistently in these cases. 

That ends my statement. Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turley appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman KYL. Thank you very much, Professor Turley. I would 

note that a lot of the ideas here that are embodied in this legislation have come from the Justice Department. 

Mr. TURLEY. Yes. 

Chairman KYL. So it presumably does indicate a desire on their 

part to continue to use the system and to improve it so that they 

can be successful. Obviously, if you have the Ninth Circuit initially 

at least ruling that the material support statute doesn’t work, that 

doesn’t help the Justice Department. So they have helped us come 

up with some ways that they think that it would. I very much appreciate your candidate assessment of this. 

What I would like to do, I think, is to begin with at least three 

of the areas in which you indicated that the sections probably 

would be upheld as constitutional, but either bear close watching 

or you really question the need for in the sense of what improvement would they really make, would it really change anything; specifically, the CIPA protection, the material support statute. Do we 

really—well, excuse me. I guess that isn’t the point that you made 

there, but that we have to provide significant oversight there, as 

well as in the administrative subpoena section. 

Let me just ask our other two witnesses to address the question 

of why some of these provisions would be needed, specifically the 

17

ones that you referred to—administrative subpoena, CIPA protection, material support, and then I will make the case for the lone 

wolf. 

Dan Bryant. 

Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, with respect to administrative subpoenas, and then I will turn to my colleague, Mr. Sabin, and have 

him respond to a couple of the other provisions, as you know, current law currently provides dozens of agencies with 335 distinct authorities to use administrative subpoenas in a wide variety of investigations. 

The question that you all are facing, that Congress is taking up, 

is whether or not in terrorism investigations—and the text of this 

bill would only provide for administrative subpoenas in terrorism 

investigations—whether or not that same widely employed investigative authority should be available in terrorism investigations. 

We think the answer is absolutely yes, given the imperative of preventing terrorist incidents. 

The key to prevention is often speed. Administrative subpoenas, 

as Professor Turley has noted, do provide an opportunity to move 

more swiftly to obtain key information from a third party in connection with a terrorism investigation. Professor Turley indicated 

that AUSAs routinely will sign a grand jury subpoena, but what 

of the circumstance when no AUSA can be found? What of the circumstance when a grand jury isn’t sitting, and under Federal law 

the return date to comply with a grand jury subpoena requires that 

the grand jury be sitting? 

What if it is a Friday evening and these resources aren’t available over the weekend? The administrative subpoena provides another way for our terrorism investigators to not be slowed down by 

those occurrences and to move with great speed to obtain relevant 

information from third parties. So we think that administrative 

subpoenas, which are used routinely in all of these other areas of 

Federal investigations, certainly are appropriate to be used in terrorism investigations. 

Chairman KYL. On that point, do you think that whether it be 

classified or not in all cases that the Department would be willing 

to share information with the Congress on a routine or timely basis 

as to the situations in which that subpoena authority is used if, in 

fact, it is granted so that we could on a real-time basis perform our 

oversight function as Professor Turley has suggested we should? 

Mr. BRYANT. Yes, I think that would be important and entirely 

appropriate. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you. 

Mr. SABIN. With respect to two of Professor Turley’s points, one 

on the Classified Information Procedures Act, Section 108, that is 

a very limited change. All the legislation provides is rather than 

a prosecutor standing up in open court dealing with critical national security evidence or information and making the request 

which currently exists under Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act, it permits that to proceed ex parte and in camera with the judge, which is already embedded in the present law. 

But rather than making it discretionary, it makes it mandatory. 

So the same procedures and substantive rights that a defendant 

would have would not be undermined, would not be changed. The 

18

same constitutional protections are assured. It just provides the 

court to review that national security information without exercising discretion and forcing the prosecutor to stand up in open 

court and trigger that mechanism. 

With respect to the material support statutes, as I mentioned in 

my opening remarks, that has been the backbone and the life blood 

of our Article III judicial prosecutions in the post-9/11 realm. I 

would refer this Committee to the decision last week of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where, en banc, they 

determined that Section 2339B survived constitutional scrutiny 

emanating out of a terrorist case from Charlotte, North Carolina, 

involving a Hezbollah racketeering enterprise. 

The court addressed the constitutionality on vagueness and overbreadth grounds, and found that it was appropriate. 

What Section 114 would provide is specific terms—‘‘personnel,’’ 

‘‘training,’’ ‘‘expert advice or assistance.’’ With respect to the first 

constitutional scrutiny that would involve vagueness, we believe 

that those terms are precise and defined already within the current 

ambit of the law—precise meaning for personnel, an employment 

or employment-like relationship; on training, instruction or teaching in part a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge of a 

subject matter. And on expert advice or assistance, Federal Rule of 

Evidence 702 acts as a spring board for providing that kind of specific scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. 

So we believe that while already the language is precisely defined, this would merely act as sort of a belt-and-suspenders so 

that we can ensure that the critical statute that has been the backbone of our efforts—so that there is no ambiguity in its effectiveness and use. We believe that the material support statutes are 

constitutionally sound presently. This would just further address 

any civil libertarian concerns or any remaining concerns that exist 

out there. 

Chairman KYL. Professor Turley, particularly on that last point, 

because of the circumstances under which it would be necessary for 

prosecutors to look to the material support statute, lacking anything more concrete with regard to an individual that they want 

to charge, can you be any more explicit with regard to due process 

or First Amendment concerns which you expressed in a general 

way? And I realize we are talking about hypotheticals, but law professors are good at those, as I recall. 

Mr. TURLEY. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman. There have 

been a number of objections made to the material support prosecutions. Some of those can be divided into the designation of organizations by the U.S. Government. There has been a great deal of objection on the administrative level that organizations are not given 

a full opportunity to oppose the designation. That came up in the 

Holy Land Foundation case. 

I am not questioning the outcome of that case or whether they 

should have been designated, but I do think that that case raised 

some very significant due process questions, including the evidence 

that was introduced against the organization which proved to be 

somewhat dubious ultimately. 

Now, that doesn’t mean that it would change the outcome. It 

probably wouldn’t have changed the outcome, but I believe that the 

19

attorneys for the Holy Land Foundation did raise some significant 

due process questions about that organization’s ability to contest 

some of these issues. 

The First Amendment issues go to a broader question. When you 

prosecute someone for material support, you are prosecuting them 

even though they have taken no active, violent measure. And you 

get into the type of Brandenburg issue of what is really required. 

When is something speech and when is something a crime? Inevitably, when you prosecute material support, you will raise speech 

and association questions. 

I happen to disagree with some of my close friends, in that I 

think the Government has a legitimate reason to do so; that we 

have to find a way to do this and to protect those interests. We 

have to have the ability of citizens to support unpopular groups 

and to have a chilling effect, not an uncertainty in some of these 

cases as to whether they could get into trouble in engaging in political speech. 

I think the current law allows for too low of a threshold on material support; that you could take a look, frankly, at what triggers 

material support and what has to be shown to deal with those 

questions, to give further protection for First Amendment interests. 

I would be more than willing to submit to the Subcommittee suggestions along that line. 

But I do want to emphasize with regard to what Mr. Sabin said 

I agree with his testimony that some of these cases have performed 

a vital function. I think this is a crime for our times and we cannot 

continue to fight against terrorism unless we direct our attention 

to those people among us who are funding those who are trying to 

kill us, and we have to find some way to do that. I think the material support provision is a bit too general and should be more specific as to First Amendment activities, and I think that this Committee could do that. 

Chairman KYL. As I understand it, your support for the clarification so that we eliminate the void for vagueness problem is consistent with Mr. Bryant’s testimony. 

Mr. TURLEY. Absolutely, and I want to also build on what you 

said, Mr. Chairman. I think it is commendable what the Department of Justice has submitted and contributed to this legislation. 

I think that it is commendable that they are responding to the 

Ninth Circuit decision and filling this gap. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I have real concerns giving the FBI the administrative subpoena. We purposefully left it out of the PATRIOT 

Act. We did 156 sections, of which 16 sunset. 

Dr. Turley, my experience is that carrying out the oversight role 

over this Justice Department is very difficult. To that end, I would 

like to ask that my letters of March 23, April 28 and June 14 asking for information just to be able to carry out the oversight role 

be entered into the record, if I may. 

Chairman KYL. Without objection. 

Maybe this is a good time to respond to the concerns of the opening statement. I would ask if the witnesses have the letters or are 

aware of them so they might be able to respond. 

20

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me just finish on the administrative subpoena, if I might. 

Chairman KYL. Sure. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I have received no information that Assistant 

U.S. Attorneys are not available 24 hours a day to sign off on a 

subpoena, and I would like to ask if there is that information that 

I receive it or if you could answer that question that you do so now. 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, I would be pleased to make sure that we 

have a fulsome response after this hearing. As an initial response, 

I am aware of circumstances where administrative subpoenas have 

been utilized in circumstances where it is unclear whether or not 

a grand jury subpoena would have been as readily available because of either the unavailability of an AUSA at that moment or 

the lack of a sitting grand jury. I would be pleased to have the discussion of that fact in more full provided to you. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I would really like to know whether that is 

fact or fiction because generally the subpoena is issued by the prosecutor. So I would like to know if this really is a case where there 

is a necessity. 

Mr. BRYANT. Right. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I am very disappointed. I mean, I don’t understand how we can carry out our oversight responsibility. The 

Ranking Member of this Committee is told that they will not share 

on a classified basis information with us as to problems. That is a 

real problem, and yet they turn around and ask to add new sections, all of which do have some implications. 

Now, let me ask this question. Section 2, 50 U.S.C. 851, says, 

‘‘Except as provided in Section 3 of this Act, every person who has 

knowledge of, or who has received instruction or assignment in the 

espionage, counter-espionage or sabotage service or tactics of a government of a foreign country or of a foreign political party, shall 

register with the Attorney General by filing with the Attorney General a registration statement, in duplicate, under oath, prepared 

and filed in such manner and form and containing such statements, information or documents pertinent to the purposes and objectives of this Act, as the Attorney General, having due regard for 

the national security and the public interest, by regulations prescribes.’’ 

Has this section been utilized? 

Mr. SABIN. What was the statutory cite again, Senator? 

Senator FEINSTEIN. 50 U.S.C. 851, Section 2. 

Mr. SABIN. If memory serves, that is relating not to 

counterterrorism efforts, but counter-espionage efforts, and that is 

a different component of the Justice Department. I can make inquiries of the Counter-Espionage Section. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. The question was has it been used? 

Mr. SABIN. I know Section 851 has been used, but I am not 

aware of 851 as I sit here today, that registration requirement 

being triggered. But rather than speak incorrectly, let me try and 

get some more information and we can get back to the Committee 

in that regard. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I would appreciate that. 

Now, if you would like to respond to my—first of all, Dr. Turley, 

thank you very much for your letter. Unfortunately, I just got it 

21

this morning and I would really like to study it a little bit more. 

But I think your views are balanced and I wanted to say I very 

much appreciate them. 

The bottom line for me, and I suspect for this side, is before we 

add to the 156 provisions we have passed, I think we need to do 

our due diligence on those provisions and see that they are being 

properly carried out. That is where I have got the problem. 

So if you would like to take this opportunity, either Mr. Bryant 

or Mr. Sabin, to respond, I would appreciate it. 

Mr. BRYANT. Yes, Senator. I think we will both try to respond. 

I appreciated Professor Turley’s observation that bad times take 

the measure of a people and it is imperative that we respect our 

first principles. One of those first principles is that everything that 

we do by way of providing new tools strengthens ordered liberty; 

that is, that we not promote order at the expense of liberty, but 

rather that we promote the genius of our tradition, and that is ordered liberty. 

Oversight is an important element of that tradition. That is one 

of those first principles and we need to make sure that we are 

being responsive and useful in terms of our responsibility as it relates to your oversight. We do think that we need to do both; that 

is, we need to both be responsive to Congress as it performs its necessary oversight function and we need to be evaluating additional 

needs as we assess gaps in current law. So we think we need to 

be proceeding simultaneously with both of those important imperatives. 

In terms of some of the specifics, Senator, that you raise, it is 

clearly the case that the Moussaoui and Padilla cases—and I think 

Mr. Sabin will respond perhaps in more detail—do implicate new 

challenges. It is a new challenge that we face. Questions of which 

resources to use in a criminal justice arena or in the military arena 

have presented themselves in ways that haven’t occurred in the 

past, and we are proceeding ahead as we sort through those unprecedented questions. 

With respect to the Section 215 inquiry, as you know, Senator, 

we are required under the terms of the PATRIOT Act to provide 

to the intelligence committees of the Congress twice-yearly reports 

regarding the use of Section 215, which is a section authorizing 

FISA orders to be used to obtain tangible things—records, for example—from third parties. 

It is the FISA analog, as you know, to a grand jury subpoena. 

It is used only in connection with terrorism and spy cases. We are 

required to report to the Congress twice yearly on usage of that authority provided in PATRIOT. It is my understanding that in addition to the twice-annual reports that we have already been providing to Congress, the next report due to Congress is being finalized and will be on its way. That would, of course, be available to 

the Senator and all Senators for review through the auspices of the 

Intelligence Committee. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me just stop you there. 215 is one of the 

16 sections that sunset. What I asked for is an analysis, or the beginning of an analysis of all of the 16 sections. How can we vote 

to either let them sunset or to continue them if we don’t know how 

they have been used and really have an opportunity to go into that 

22

use? That is oversight, and I have got to say this is what your Department appears to resist. 

Now, I have never before been told I could not have a classified 

briefing on something that is written in the Washington Post. I 

have never been told I could not have a classified briefing. I serve 

on Intelligence, I am Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and 

yet I was told I won’t be given that information. 

So how could I vote to extend sections that are highly controversial and which I have defended up to this point if I can’t adequately carry out my constitutional responsibility? The bottom line 

is I won’t if I can’t. 

Mr. BRYANT. We owe you that information, Senator. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Yes, you do. 

Mr. SABIN. With respect to some of the specific matters you referred to, Senator, post-9/11 the mission has been to prevent terrorist activities before they occur. As part and parcel of that, and 

consistent with Professor Turley’s remarks that we seek to address 

that in Article III constitutional Federal district courts, we have 

sought to combine the fact that we are sharing that information, 

pursuant to PATRIOT Act Section 218 which would sunset and 

504, to enable the prosecutor and the agent, to enable the criminal 

law enforcement person and the intelligence investigator to sit 

down, share that information, figure out which is the best tool in 

the tool box to use in order to address that particular threat. 

That means that prosecutors and agents are getting involved earlier on in the continuum of that terrorist incident or terrorist 

threat so as not to react, but to prevent, so that cases are taken 

down earlier and you will have the less playing out of the investigating realm before take-down as opposed to after you seek to do 

the disruption. 

We are also addressing the facilitators and the entire spectrum 

of activity and not just the bomb-thrower or the operator, but the 

financial facilitator. So your reference to Sami Al-Hussein out in 

Idaho—I believe the system worked in that regard. An individual 

was charged with specific offenses, including material support offenses. It was a difficult case, but the Government brought its evidence, put its evidence before the court, which was tested, and the 

jury acquitted on certain counts and hung on other counts. 

That individual agreed to be deported from the United States 

after the matter resulted in the hanging on certain counts and the 

acquittal on others. But to address the activity that Mr. Al-Hussein 

was alleged to have committed was acting as a platform or a communications provider for violent jihad activities around the world, 

and the Government produced the evidence. 

We disagreed with the court’s jury instruction that was provided 

to the jury, which we believe was problematic in how the jury 

reached its determination on the material support charges. But 

that is what you have to do when you bring cases to court and try 

to have it played out in a full due process arena. We respect that 

process and do not feel that that was in any way a setback. Indeed, 

we are going to continue to bring those kinds of cases thoughtfully, 

judiciously and aggressively to address that kind of use of the modern technology in the 21st century that is being used by those who 

would seek to facilitate and act as a platform over the Internet. 

23

Your reference to the Albany matter—while it is pending, the 

judge determined that the two defendants should be released on 

bond. That is an example of undercover activities by the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation. We applaud the use of those undercover 

activities in order to try and ferret out criminal activity consistent 

with the actions and conduct of individuals violating material support statutes. 

We have undercover recordings that we submit will be delivered 

in discovery and provided at a jury trial to establish the defendants’ guilt, we believe, beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the specific provision in TFTA, the presumptive pre-trial detention, would 

have triggered the application under TFTA Section 103, the rebuttable presumption, in the Albany matter. 

The reference to a couple of the other cases are subject to ongoing Justice Department review, but let me make a point about the 

matter out of the West Coast that you referred to which addresses 

the material witness warrants. We believe that the use of Title 18 

United States Code Section 3144 has been an extremely effective 

mechanism in the post-9/11 world for law enforcement to obtain information from those that we have not charged with a criminal offense. 

So we go to an Article III judge, provide probable cause that an 

individual is a material witness in a proceeding that is subject to 

judicial review and effective assistance of counsel, and then pursuant to a grand jury proceeding. So we believe that that system can 

work, and that is an effective mechanism that the Government has 

used and will continue to use, we respectfully submit, in order to 

make sure that we are ensuring respect for the material witness’ 

constitutional rights, but also eliciting information that may enable 

the Government to pursue others or to have that individual released. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I appreciate your spirited defense. I am back 

on the reports to Congress that are due, and some are due to Intelligence. My staff has just checked with Intelligence staff and they 

can find none of the reports that were due to go to Intelligence. 

I am still trying to understand checks and on this what means 

what, but I would be happy to share it with you. I think it indicates that the reports to Congress, as required, have not been 

forthcoming, and certainly have not been forthcoming on a timely 

basis. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. We will pursue 

that with the Justice Department and make sure for the record 

that we have the information that is required. 

Senator Sessions has joined us, too. But, Senator Sessions, even 

though Senator Cornyn is not a member of the Subcommittee, he 

has got some pieces of this bill and let me call on him first and 

then call on you, if that would be all right. 

Senator SESSIONS. That is wonderful. 

Chairman KYL. All right. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate particularly Professor Turley’s comments about the goal of trying to 

balance civil liberty concerns with the necessary tools that need to 

24

be provided for law enforcement and intelligence-gathering abilities 

to provide for our National security. Certainly, this is a debate that 

is as old as our country and even older. 

I think all of on the Committee, and indeed all of us in Congress 

feel like it is our responsibility to see that that balance is struck 

as well as we are able to do so. But ultimately we can’t know all 

the given sets of circumstances and facts that may be presented in 

any given case, and in this instance context is important. 

That is why I believe it is important that there ought to be recourse to judicial review, no matter what the circumstance, whether it relates to the so-called sneak-and-peek provisions of the PATRIOT Act which cannot be invoked without the oversight of a 

judge. I feel the same way about the judicially enforceable terrorism subpoenas, and let me just explain. 

My experience with investigations has been that frequently third 

parties who receive a request from an investigator are uncertain 

about what their liability may be, let’s say, or whether their compliance with a lawful request—let’s say an informal request—might 

perhaps invoke some third party rights that are involved in the request. 

So a couple of things happen. Either they will say, well, I will 

be glad to give you the documents that you are requesting, or they 

say I need a subpoena for my file just to show that they are responding—not volunteering, but responding to a lawful request. 

Indeed, under the administrative subpoena provisions here, ultimately if the repository or the custodian of the documents that are 

subpoenaed says I am not going to give these up without a court 

order, there is an opportunity to go to a court to get that approval. 

I would just like to ask first Mr. Bryant and then Professor 

Turley to comment on that. If I have got that wrong, tell me, but 

if you think I have got it roughly right, I would like to know that 

as well. 

Mr. Bryant. 

Mr. BRYANT. Yes, Senator, that is correct. In the case of the judicially enforceable administrative subpoenas for terrorism investigations provided in the bill, recipients can refuse to comply. The FBI 

can’t then enforce that on its own. It would have to go to court to 

seek to enforce that subpoena. A recipient could petition the court 

to modify the terms of the request or to quash the subpoena entirely. 

It is the case that there is also a provision indicating that compliance with the subpoena request by a third party does not create 

civil liability on the part of the compliant party. So we think these 

are important protections that are explicitly part of the provision. 

Senator CORNYN. Professor Turley, I note from one report I saw 

that Congress has already granted administrative subpoena authority in lot of other contexts. That number is kind of staggering—

335, according to one report, including postal inspectors, Small 

Business Administration inspectors. And they are used widely by 

Federal investigators in health care fraud investigations and in 

connection with child exploitation investigations. 

So is there something specific about this context or the general 

issue of administrative subpoenas that causes you concerns? 

25

Mr. TURLEY. Well, first of all, I think that is a valid point that 

you can make too much of the issue. I think there are legitimate 

concerns here and I will address those in a second, but it is also, 

I think, confusing when we refer to grand jury subpoenas. It makes 

it sound like a grand jury issued them, when, in reality, it is simply being signed by an AUSA. 

So the removal of the AUSA is not going to be a significant 

change in terms of civil liberties protections on a practical or a 

legal basis, and I think that you have to start with the analysis 

and accept that proposition from my standpoint. 

Also, parts of this provision, I think, do make abundant sense, 

although some of my friends strongly disagree with me. One, for 

example, is that it prevents people from revealing a national security subpoena. It requires them to only disclose it to their attorney. 

They can then go to a court to seek the court’s intervention if they 

disagree with the subpoena. 

I think that the Department of Justice has a perfectly valid reason for imposing that limitation. The fact is that Federal investigators face this problem all the time outside the terrorist area of 

issuing a subpoena and then triggering knowledge by potential targets. In the terrorism area, I can think of no greater danger than 

that type of release of information. 

So putting those aside, the issue involving administrative subpoenas can be distinguished in one respect. Those often deal with 

civil matters; they deal with administrative matters where the potential for the defendant is not as significant as in a terrorist case. 

So you can make a distinction between the two. 

Once again, this is not, in my view, a significant threat to civil 

liberties, and I think there is a good reason that the Department 

of Justice is asking for this. To be quite frank, civil libertarians feel 

wounded in the last few years, and to support some of these provisions is really an exercise of hope over experience for some civil libertarians. 

So there is a certain degree of resistance to anything that would 

make it easier or faster to issue these types of requests, and that 

is the reason I think Congressional oversight is so essential if you 

go forward with it. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, I appreciate your response because I 

think it is a very balanced point of view. Unfortunately, in this 

area some view it as a zero-sum game. Either law enforcement gets 

what it wants and needs, and if it does, then all of our civil liberties are in jeopardy. I mean, it just seems to be based on TV advertising. Mail solicitations that I receive at my home asking me 

for money because the U.S. Attorney or the Justice Department or 

the U.S. Government or the Congress is taking away your civil liberties by provisions like this or like the sneak-and-peek provision 

which do provide for judicial oversight seem to be so hysterical and 

off base. But I appreciate your response. 

Two other quick questions. One has to do with port security, and 

again I appreciate, Professor, your comments that you think this 

is an important and significant reform because of the potential vulnerability of our ports. 

Let me first ask, Mr. Bryant, the port of Houston, in Texas—we 

have talked to them about this provision and they had some conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:46 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 096461 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\96461.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
26

cerns, for example, in Section 402, the entry by false pretenses; 

409, manifest requirements; 410, stowaways; and 411, bribery. 

They wondered whether these provisions create or add to the liability of a public port authority. do you have an opinion on that, sir? 

Mr. BRYANT. If I might, Senator, in the division of labor Mr. 

Sabin and I arranged, I think he is in a better position to respond. 

Senator CORNYN. Excellent. 

Mr. Sabin. 

Mr. SABIN. I can’t speak to whether it increases the liability in 

a civil context of a particular port officer or the employees in that 

regard. We can get you specific information in that regard. 

I mean, certainly Title IV addresses, we believe, very necessary 

legislation gaps that exist relating to transporting terrorists and 

transporting weapons of mass destruction on vessels, the destruction of certain vessels at maritime facilities, conveying false information to particular individuals. 

It does address in one of the provisions the link between corruption or bribery and port security, so that law enforcement can address a potential vulnerability where there is a gap between the 

border where someone can bribe a particular individual and therefore more easily facilitate terrorist entry into the country. But as 

to your specific question, I can get further information as to the potential civil liability for an employee at the port. 

Senator CORNYN. I would like to know what the Department’s official position is on that because if it is unclear, we may need to 

look at that because I don’t want any port, whether it is the port 

of Houston or others, by invoking the provisions of this statute to 

incur any additional liability and to create liability that is not already present for civil purposes, obviously. 

Mr. SABIN. One thing that we can do is, post-9/11, we have set 

up a mechanism known as the anti-terrorism advisory councils, 

which bring together the prosecutorial entities, as well as individuals at the seaports—first responders and the like—to gather and 

share information. So as part of that system, we can go back to our 

offices, reach out to the anti-terrorism advisory council coordinator 

in Houston or other specific port districts and have them, since 

they now have the networks and shared information that is occurring post-9/11, obtain that information and get you an expeditious 

response in that regard. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, so I don’t wear out my welcome too much, 

since I am not a member of the Subcommittee, let me just ask one 

more question and this has to do with MANPADS. I think, Mr. 

Bryant or Mr. Sabin, whoever has this issue in your division of 

labor, I appreciate the support of the Department for this provision 

to increase the penalties, and indeed to create penalties for possession of MANPADS. 

All you need to do is to drive out close to Reagan National Airport where they have the soccer fields and the bike trails where the 

planes take off for that concern to be brought home. I am aware 

of the fact that, of course, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were an awful lot of Stinger missiles and other 

MANPADS provided to the Mujahadeen to knock down Soviet helicopters. Unfortunately, there are a lot of them still circulating in 

places like the Middle East and places like Central America, where 

27

I recently traveled and was told that there was a buy-back program 

designed to get these out of circulation. 

Do you have any figures or do you have any information that you 

can share with the Subcommittee on the availability of these via 

arms merchants and how realistic the threat of access to 

MANPADS by someone who wishes to do us harm—how readily 

they can be obtained? 

Mr. BRYANT. We would have to get back to you, Senator, with 

specifics. As a general matter, though, it can be noted that the bad 

news is MANPADS are available in the global marketplace. The 

good news is many of them, including some of those that you have 

referred to from past conflict in parts of the world, are very old, 

raising questions of reliability. 

I do know that there is a briefing available by individuals within 

our intelligence community and they can speak with great specificity to the question of how many and what type are currently 

available. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much. Whether they are old or 

not, I am reminded of the saying that we keep repeating around 

here that the bad guys only have to be lucky once and we have to 

be lucky all the time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. You are welcome 

anytime. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership 

on this issue. No one in the Senate has been more aggressive and 

alert to the important issues than you, and Senator Feinstein also 

has been supportive and shown leadership on these questions. 

I would like to go back to the administrative subpoena, the FBI 

subpoena. This is something that is a mountain out of a mole hill 

if there ever was one. 

Is it not true, Mr. Sabin, that the DEA on a regular basis can 

issue administrative subpoenas for bank records, telephone records 

and motel records, and does that everyday in drug cases? 

Mr. SABIN. It is my understanding that, yes, the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as a host of other Federal agencies, 

use the administrative subpoena authority on health care fraud 

prosecutions and others. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, what used to happen in the 

days of ‘‘Dragnet’’ and Jack Webb is the police officers would call 

the motel or the telephone company and say I need the records on 

John Doe, and they would give them to them. And then somewhere 

lawyers got involved and said, well, maybe motel records are confidential to the customer and maybe we can’t give them. And the 

banks said these are our customers; we don’t want to help the DEA 

or the FBI prosecute our customers, so we are not giving the 

records anymore. 

So you have to get a subpoena, and the way that works is that 

to get a subpoena for drug cases, the DEA issues a subpoena. In 

addition to that, Small Business Administration investigators can 

issue them. The Internal Revenue Service can issue them on tax 

charges. We can’t issue these subpoenas on terrorists who want to 

kill us, but we can issue administrative subpoenas to get records 

28

to prosecute a citizen on a tax charge, and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, the Department of Labor, the Bureau of Immigration 

and Customs and Enforcement. 

So first of all, this is not a big deal, to my mind. There is a bureaucratic matter that Mr. Sabin and Mr. Bryant probably understand, and that is the Assistant United States Attorneys like to be 

in charge of everything. So they like to have a grand jury subpoena 

and they don’t care if an FBI agent needs it on Friday afternoon 

and Monday is a holiday and the FBI has to wait until Tuesday 

to find an AUSA to get the thing approved. Or maybe the AUSA 

is out and nobody else will approve it and he has to wait two weeks 

and the whole investigation is delayed. I have always been sympathetic, frankly, with the FBI’s concern. The DEA can get these 

records; everybody else can get them. They are just about the only 

agency that can’t. 

Is that a fair summary of the history of some of this stuff, Mr. 

Sabin? You are a prosecutor. Have you tried cases? 

Mr. SABIN. I have, sir; I have tried many. Prosecutors are diligent, but there are circumstances on weekends or where they can 

be delays. I don’t want to say that it occurs frequently, but it is 

a necessary means for an agent to have in the most expeditious 

fashion the ability in a terrorist investigation not to be delayed. So 

if we can get those records, we can exploit the information and we 

can act to prevent a terrorist attack. So anything that we can do 

to get that information quicker and shared more expeditiously we 

support. 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, can I just add it is important to note, I 

think, that current law already provides for the same kind of nondisclosure that is contemplated in this provision in other types of 

investigations. Health care fraud, child crimes, investigations involving educational records—in all of these areas, current law provides for the opportunity for a non-disclosure requirement to be attached. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now, that is interesting. So you have got a 

non-disclosure provision in education investigations, which don’t 

threaten the lives of thousands of American citizens, and potentially millions. So we have that kind of freedom in those cases, but 

we don’t in terrorism cases. 

I think our friends in the civil rights and civil liberties community are really overboard on this and just haven’t thought this 

through and haven’t understood the history and the ways policies 

occur, Mr. Chairman. I think they just react immediately to anything that looks like an expansion of investigative powers, when 

really this is just bringing terrorism cases up to some of the abilities we have now in other cases. 

Let’s talk about this non-disclosure. This is really, really, really 

important. If you are doing a high-level terrorist investigation and 

you have identified an organization that there is reasonable cause 

to believe may be involved in serious attacks against the people of 

the United States, subjecting thousands of people’s lives to danger, 

maybe you need a bank record to see where money has been moved 

to corroborate these charges, Mr. Sabin, and you subpoena that 

bank record. 

29

What could it do to the investigation if the bank’s lawyer says, 

well, it is our policy to advise our customer whenever their records 

have been subpoenaed? How could that impact the investigation? 

Mr. SABIN. Time is of the essence. You want to make sure that 

you can get that information as quickly as possible. So if you are 

going to be subjected to negotiation and legal back-and-forth between counsel for the financial institution or a court proceeding or 

any kind of other endeavor that would subject that information to 

not being provided as timely and as quickly as possible, you can 

play out the parade of horribles. 

Senator SESSIONS. I guess I was moving on to the next subject, 

which is the immediate non-disclosure limitation. A lot of banks 

take it as policy. I have investigated frauds involving banks, or 

needing records from them. A lot of banks take it as a policy that 

they should notify their customer as soon as that customer’s 

records have been subpoenaed. 

Now, if you are trying to conduct a surreptitious investigation of 

a group of terrorists, you don’t want them to know you are on to 

them and that you are investigating them. Can’t this blow up the 

whole investigation if they called up the terrorists to tell them 

their bank records have been subpoenaed by the FBI? 

Mr. SABIN. Certainly, it can impact not only that individual, but 

that individual’s actions and relationship to other individuals in 

the organization. So monies can be moved, evidence can be destroyed, people can flee legitimate targets. So you will lose the ability to control the investigation. You lose the power to be able to 

strategize and use all the tools that Congress has provided us, 

whether that is the continuing electronic interceptions or other authorities in connection with that financial subpoena. So non-disclosure is very critical. 

Senator SESSIONS. This only applies to the FBI in terrorist cases. 

It doesn’t apply to the IRS or drugs or fraud or corruption or bribery, only in terrorist investigations. That would be a small number 

overall of the investigative work of the FBI, would it not? 

Mr. SABIN. Correct, Senator. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I understand the Supreme Court by a 9–

0 ruling approved administrative subpoenas and approved the nondisclosure rule. I think Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that opinion. So this is not a deal that threatens our liberties. That is all 

I am saying. 

I am delighted that our civil liberties groups are watching everything we do, and I think it is fine that they challenge and raise 

issues when we may be threatening American liberties. But if we 

had to have one example in America, one kind of case in which you 

would have administrative subpoenas and non-disclosure by the recipient, wouldn’t it be terrorism, if that was the only case we allowed it to happen? But now we are doing it in all these other 

cases of lower importance and denying it in terrorism cases, and 

I think that is really bizarre. 

Mr. Bryant, did you want to comment? 

Mr. BRYANT. Senator, your analysis might lead one to conclude 

that the non-disclosure requirement should attack automatically in 

all terrorism investigations. The text of this bill is more judicious, 

if you will, even than that, in that it provides for non-disclosure in 

30

terrorism investigations only when the Attorney General certifies 

that disclosure could endanger the national security of the United 

States. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that is a very significant point, I think, 

to make and I am glad you clarified that. I do note that FBI Director Mueller has said this authority would be, quote, ‘‘tremendously 

helpful,’’ close quote, to terrorism investigations, and I really believe it would. Based on my experience, you don’t want the bad 

guys to know you are on to them. You don’t want them to know 

that you are getting records. 

A lot of times, steps are not taken in an investigation that investigators would like to take simply because they know it will tip off 

the criminals to what is going on. In a terrorism investigation, that 

could cost lives. I think you are right. 

Mr. Turley, you have thought about this a lot. Are we way off 

base on this? 

Mr. TURLEY. No, you are not, Senator. The fact is I think that 

the non-disclosure provision is important. It is a valid request by 

the Department of Justice. I think that this section is written, as 

was noted, in a highly judicious manner. I think it is something 

that does not raise civil liberties concerns, but it does raise national security issues that are valid. 

In terms of the use of these subpoenas, I also agree that we 

shouldn’t make this bigger than it is. The civil liberties community—I can’t speak for them, but as one person who has advocated 

civil liberties views in the past, I can say that there is obviously 

a great sensitivity when we are in a fight like this against terror. 

There is a great concern. 

The fact is that some of our greatest wounds historically have 

been self-inflicted. We have done a great amount of harm to ourselves in the past when we have faced great threats. But it is also 

important, as you have noted, for the civil liberties community to 

recognize when there are valid requests and needs by the executive 

branch. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I think that if the Subcommittee goes forward with the JETS provision, it is simply important for the Subcommittee to clearly lay out an oversight function and a reporting schedule so that you can keep track of the 

scope and number of the subpoenas. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, briefly, Mr. Sabin or Mr. Bryant, could 

the Department of Justice require that the FBI give notice to the 

U.S. Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys for these subpoenas? 

You don’t need the statutory authority for that. I mean, the little 

bureaucratic deal is that the Department of Justice attorneys like 

to know everything. I have been there, been one of them. So it is 

a power deal, and it always has been, between the FBI—the FBI 

says the DEA can do this, why can’t we? 

Mr. BRYANT. It could both be required as a matter of DOJ practice, and even if there were no such requirement imposed internally within the Department, FBI investigators utilizing administrative subpoenas would have reason to nevertheless work closely 

with AUSAs in connection with those investigations underway. 

Senator SESSIONS. I agree with that. 

31

Chairman KYL. Senator Sessions, let me just interrupt you for 

one second. If we were to impose a reporting requirement of the 

circumstances in which it was used, obviously they would have to 

report it to somebody and the Department of Justice is the obvious 

entity to provide the report. So it could happen as a matter of 

course. 

Senator SESSIONS. Right. But, fundamentally, the principle is 

this: If you go into a motel and you sign a motel document saying 

you are there and put your tag number on it, there is no expectation of privacy in that. If you make a telephone call and you contact someone on the phone, you have an expectation of privacy in 

the contents of the conversation. But to make a telephone call, everyone knows the computer systems account for the numbers that 

you utilize and there is no expectation of privacy of the telephone 

numbers you call in that, and historically phone companies have 

given them over without subpoenas. 

I mean, this is the fundamental constitutional principle involved 

here: Is there an expectation of privacy in your bank records or 

telephone records? Since a bank is not like a priest-penitent relationship, the banker does not have the ability to refuse to answer 

questions about a person’s bank account. They don’t volunteer, but 

if they are asked, they have to testify to what the person told them 

about did they lie about the loan, what did they tell them, what 

addresses did they give them and all these things. So there is not 

an expectation of privacy in the paperwork in the bank because everybody in the bank has access to it. That is why bank records can 

be subpoenaed in the fashion that they have been without the high 

degree of proof required for a wiretap of a person’s private conversations. 

I think, Mr. Chairman, you are on the right track with this. I 

really believe that this particular thing is important for our investigators. Other agencies have these powers and have had them for 

years, and we really need the FBI to have them in terrorism cases. 

One more thing. Thank you for adding into your legislation the 

legislation I offered earlier to close a number of the gaps in the enforcement of attacks on trains. We had a lot better laws on airplanes and some real gaps in mass transportation by train, and 

thank you for making that legislation a part of it. I think it is a 

good step forward. 

Chairman KYL. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Let me just reiterate before I make a couple of closing comments for any of you to 

respond to if you like that the purpose of putting this bill together 

was to take things that were relatively non-controversial that we 

could pass quickly. In the event that we could not bring the reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act back up, which the Department 

would like to see done, are there other things that have been recommended over time or that members have introduced as bills? 

And in my opening statement, I made the point that all of the 

legislation in this bill has either been introduced or been the subject of hearings. It has gotten quite a bit of vetting, but we wanted 

to have it all put together in one place, one time, for this hearing. 

Senator SESSIONS. We had a full hearing on the train legislation 

that I offered. 

32

Chairman KYL. Right, and each of the components has had some 

attention paid to it. So the idea here was to do something that was 

not particularly controversial. The administrative subpoena section 

is the only one that has really, I think, received criticism, and I 

hope that after today’s hearing and the other information that has 

been produced on that, our colleagues would see that that is not 

an extension of law, but simply conforming to existing law with respect to a lot of other different types of investigations our Government performs. 

The two areas that we really haven’t focused on here—one is not 

very controversial, but I just want to make the point because it is 

so doggone important. The 9/11 Commission and everybody else 

has talked about the failure of the FBI and the CIA to talk to each 

other, and INS and FBI and one group of FBI within the FBI, and 

so on. 

To some extent, the PATRIOT Act and other changes have made 

that possible, but there are a couple of provisions of this bill that 

also improve on that capability of sharing information, both with 

regard to Federal agencies and with regard to State and local governments. I just wanted, even though they are not controversial, to 

just illustrate why it is so important. 

One of the cases I mentioned was Khalid Al-Midhar, who was 

one of the eventual hijackers who flew the plane into the Pentagon. 

We had obtained some information about him. The CIA primarily 

had done some surveillance in Malaysia and provided some information to the FBI. The agent in charge grasped the significance of 

a visa application that Al-Midhar had applied for and was able to 

talk to and confirm with INS that he had actually entered the 

United States both in January of 2000 and again on July 4, 2001. 

At that point, the FBI decided that since Al-Midhar was in the 

United States, if he was, that he had better be found. That is the 

point at which the wall became a problem because when the CIA, 

FBI and INS people, all of whom had shared information—when 

that information was put together with the FBI request to headquarters from the New York field office that a criminal investigation be opened which could allow greater access to resources dedicated to search for this guy, the FBI attorneys took the position 

that criminal investigators cannot—and that word was emphasized 

in the original writing—cannot be involved, and that criminal information discovered in the intelligence case would be passed over 

the wall according to proper procedures in due time. 

But the agent in the New York office responded by e-mail and 

here is what he said, quote, ‘‘Whatever has happened to this, someday someone will die. And wall or not, the public will not understand why we were not more effective in throwing every resource 

we had at certain problems,’’ end of quote. 

The 9/11 Commission then made the point that if he had been 

found and if he had been held on immigration violations or as a 

material witness, for example, investigation or interrogation into 

their activities might have yielded evidence of other connections. In 

any event, we will never know for sure, but at least it could have 

been one of the elements that might have been able to stop 9/11 

from happening. 

33

Well, these two sections of this legislation, first of all, provide a 

uniform standard under which the FBI would disseminate information. Interestingly enough, one of the existing statutes anonymously placed restrictions on information-sharing with other agencies that are greater than the restrictions applied to non-Federal 

agencies. This statute tries to make all of that uniform, make it 

easier and conform basically all of the different provisions of law 

to each other so that there is one standard both within the agencies and across agencies, and then secondly to allow that information to be shared with State and local government officials as well. 

So, again, nobody has particularly talked about this. Everybody 

is for it, but I just want to make the point that these are important 

changes in the law and one of the reasons why we need to get this 

done. 

I just want to close with this, and particularly, Professor Turley, 

if you want to respond to it. This is the so-called Moussaoui fix. 

This was my bill and I have been so frustrated that we haven’t 

been able to get it passed because this is the case where Agent 

Rowley in Minneapolis says this guy is planning something and 

you have got to get after him, and asked FBI headquarters. 

You know, FBI headquarters has been criticized, I think, in this 

case unfairly because the law is pretty clear. When you think somebody is engaged in terrorism activities or planning terrorism activities, you either have to show that they are an agent of a foreign 

power or affiliated with an international terrorist organization. 

Those are the two ways that you can get jurisdiction to issue the 

subpoena, in this case for the guy’s computers. This is Zacarias 

Moussaoui. 

Frankly, the evidence didn’t exist that tied him either to a foreign government or an international terrorist organization. There 

was some information about Chechens, but it was too loose for the 

FBI to go with. So I think probably rightly, they said we can’t let 

you look in his computer. 

What the so-called Moussaoui fix does is to say that if you have 

this information about someone and it is not a United States citizen, but you have reason to believe that he is involved in terrorism 

activities or planning to commit a terrorist act, then you would be 

able to secure a subpoena under FISA. 

That subpoena may give you information that shows that he actually is affiliated with a terrorist organization—he was just acting 

on his own up to now—or that he is not affiliated with a terrorist 

organization, but he is acting on his own and he intends to do bad 

things. Or it may exonerate him. But in any event, it does fill that 

particular gap. As I say, we passed it through the Senate handily 

and it is still hung up in the House. 

Professor Turley, you didn’t comment on the information-sharing. 

I gather there is no particular controversy there, but is there anything else that you think we ought to be doing in this Moussaoui 

fix that we haven’t done to make it better? 

Mr. TURLEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be more 

than willing to look further at the Moussaoui issue. Of course, as 

I mentioned in my written testimony, I think the fact that this 

Committee is moving again to reduce those barriers between agenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:46 Nov 14, 2007 Jkt 096461 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\96461.TXT SJUD1 PsN: CMORC
34

cies is an important thing. It is probably the greatest lesson we 

learned in 9/11, is the vulnerability associated with those barriers. 

In terms of FISA, as I mentioned in my opening statement, this 

is part of a larger context and we could have good-faith disagreements on it. I tend to be something of a textualist on the Fourth 

Amendment. Also, I do think it would be surprising to the people 

that wrote FISA that there are more FISA surveillance orders than 

conventional interceptions today under Title III. 

That is something that I think was not anticipated, and what we 

have seen with FISA is a gradual change. And I am not trying to 

put an evil motive on this. I mean, the fact is the Department of 

Justice is facing some serious threats. Prosecutors by their nature 

try to be opportunistic in trying to use every tool that they have. 

But we have seen FISA begin with the view that it was going 

to be the exception rather than the rule. It was focused on foreign 

powers as the critical definition and it was focused on foreign intelligence-gathering as the important definition. We have seen the 

last 3 years the move toward the use in conventional criminal investigation of FISA, and now we see a move away from the foreign 

powers. 

So for the civil liberties community, I think there is a very significant concern that FISA is becoming a circumvention of the 

Fourth Amendment for all practical purposes. But as I mentioned 

in my opening statement, all of that is based on a threshold view 

from some of us that this entire process is constitutionally suspect. 

But I also want to be frank. Although it will shock the Chairman, the Supreme Court has disagreed in the past and probably 

would not share my view, and I think that FISA would probably 

be upheld, if it was a full review, on all of its provisions, including 

this one if it is added. So this is not going to make the law unconstitutional. The issue of whether it is constitutional or not goes to 

a far more basic question and it depends upon your approach in interpreting the Constitution, how textualist you are, how much 

flexibility you think there is in the language. 

Chairman KYL. I really appreciate it, and I share Senator Feinstein’s view that you have presented very balanced testimony, very 

credible, because of that. Your advice, therefore, we all consider 

very valuable. 

Unless Senator Sessions has anything further or unless either of 

you would like to comment further, I just want to make the point 

that, as legislators, we do our best to take information and act on 

it. I remember when Agent Rowley came and testified, and it was 

almost as if who could possibly disagree with this proposition that 

that warrant should have been issued. 

When you checked it out and you realized probably that would 

have gone beyond what the law really permitted, if everybody felt 

this was important to do, then we needed to make the fix. But it 

is important that we get wise counsel from everybody who has an 

interest in this to ensure that we don’t go too far in responding to 

the public outcry and the law enforcement outcry and that we don’t 

cross over the line and abuse somebody’s rights. I appreciate your 

assessment that in this case, in this very limited situation, we 

probably wouldn’t be doing that, whatever your views of the underlying FISA. 

35

By the way, this also illustrates something else. We have a lot 

of laws that are now used for purposes that they might not have 

been originally intended for, but they do work in certain situations. 

Professor Turley, you are absolutely right. When FISA was originally written, it did not have terrorism in mind. It was dealing 

with spies who were working against our country. But it also works 

in the terrorism context, and with a few little tweaks it can be 

made to work better. Since that is one of the major threats against 

us right now, I think it is up to us to at least try to make it work 

to the best advantage of protecting our people, again, consistent 

with constitutional principles. 

So if there are no other comments, let me note that Senator 

Hatch’s statement is going to be placed in the record. Anybody else 

can put statements in the record or submit questions until 5:00 

p.m., Monday, September 20. And, of course, we would hope to get 

a response from any of you to those questions. And based upon 

what has been said here today, if you have anything you would like 

to supplement, you are certainly welcome to do that. 

Again, I want to thank all three of you. Your testimony has been 

very, very helpful, and I think perhaps historic in enabling us to 

move forward and doing our best to add some additional tools to 

fight terrorism, close some loopholes and ensure that we have done 

everything that we possibly can up to this point in time to not only 

provide our military with everything it needs, but the other half of 

the folks that are fighting this war on terror in the intelligence 

community, the law enforcement agencies, Department of Justice, 

and so on; that we give them the tools to fight the mission that we 

expect them to fight as well. So, hopefully, we can move this legislation forward and get it done before we finish up our session here. 

Senator Sessions, thank you very much. 

If there is nothing further, then this Subcommittee hearing will 

be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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