alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

September 22, 2021

No. 04-21-00382-CR

IN RE Jaime FLORES, Relator

Original Proceeding1

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK 

OF JURISDICTION.

It is so ORDERED on September 22, 2021.

_____________________________

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 22nd day of September, 2021.

_____________________________

Michael A. Cruz, Clerk of Court

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2006-CR-6091, styled The State of Texas v. Jaime Flores.
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS 

Appeal of -- ) 

) 

Head, Inc. ) 

) 

Under Contract No. W912BV-10-C-2001 ) 

APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: 

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: 

ASBCA No. 60483 

Robert G. Ruggieri, Esq. 

Michael H. Payne, Esq. 

Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall 

& Furman PC 

Philadelphia, PA 

Thomas H. Gourlay, Jr., Esq. 

Engineer Chief Trial Attorney 

Keith S. Francis, Esq. 

Bryan M. Harrington, Esq. 

Engineer Trial Attorneys 

U.S_. Army Engineer District, Tulsa 

OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE SWEET 

It is the Board's decision, pursuant to 41 U.S.C. §§ 7105(e), 7108(b), and the parties' 

stipulation and agreement, that the appeal is sustained. In the nature of a consent judgment, 

the Board makes a monetary award to appellant in the amount of $412,804.00. This amount 

is inclusive of interest. No further interest shall be paid. 

Dated: 26 June 2017 

(Signatures continued) 

JAMES R. SWEET 

Administrative Judge 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 
I concur 

RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 

Administrative Judge 

Acting Chairman 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

I concur 

OWEN C. WILSON 

Administrative Judge 

Acting Vice Chairman 

Armed Services Board 

of Contract Appeals 

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 

Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA No. 60483, Appeal of Head, Inc., 

rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. 

Dated: 

2 

JEFFREY D. GARDIN 

Recorder, Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 01-41491

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JUAN GONZABA SALINAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(C-01-CR-142-1)

--------------------

August 14, 2002

Before DAVIS, WIENER, AND EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Juan Gonzaba Salinas (“Salinas”) appeals

from his guilty plea conviction and sentence for possession of

marihuana with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(D).

Salinas argues that the district court erred in its

application of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 by counting two prior burglary

convictions separately, which increased his criminal history score

and resulted in the application of the career offender enhancement.

Salinas cannot make the requisite showing that the prior cases were
2

consolidated. See United States v. Huskey, 137 F.3d 283, 288 (5th

Cir. 1998). Salinas’ reliance on LaPorte v. Texas, 840 S.W.2d 412

(Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc), is misplaced. See United States

v. Fitzhugh, 984 F.2d 143, 147 n.18 (5th Cir. 1993).

Salinas also argues that the district court erred when it

included special conditions of supervised release in its written

judgment that were not orally pronounced at sentencing or,

alternatively, that the district court erred by delegating to the

probation officer the authority to set the timing and amount of

drug/alcohol detection and treatment. Salinas concedes that this

argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Warden,

291 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2002).

Salinas next argues that 21 U.S.C. § 841, the statute under

which he was convicted, is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme

Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Salinas concedes that this argument is foreclosed by our prior

ruling in United States v. Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 582 (5th Cir.

2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1045 (2001). Because we cannot

overrule an earlier panel’s decision, we reject Salinas’ argument

with respect to these issues. See United States v. Short, 181 F.3d

620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1091 (2000);

United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 91 (5th Cir. 1994).

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Salinas’s conviction and

sentence.
3

S:\OPINIONS\UNPUB\01\01-41491.0.wpd

4/29/04 6:10 pm
#### § 203.18c One-time or up-front mortgage insurance premium excluded from limitations on maximum mortgage amounts.

After determining any maximum insurable mortgage amount under the provisions of this subpart, the maximum insurable amount of any mortgage may be increased by the amount of any one-time or up-front mortgage insurance premium that will be financed as part of the mortgage.

[57 FR 15211, Apr. 24, 1992]
**Exhibit      32.2**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO **

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350, **

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO **

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Registrant. |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                            |                                                             |                               |
|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Dated              this 28th day of June, 2006. | By:                                                    | /s/              Jibin Zhang  |
|                                            | Jibin                ZhangChief                Financial Officer |

----
#### Yetta Saldinger, Appellant, v. Morris J. Lascher, Doing Business as Jack and Jill, et al., Respondents.

In an action to recover on a promissory note, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated April 19, 1960, and entered in Orange County on April 25, 1960, which denies her motion for summary judgment under rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. No opinion. Nolan, P. J., Beldock, Kleinfeld, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
§ 203.343 Partial release, addition or substitution of security. ( a ) Except as provided in § 203.389(n), a mortgagee shall not release the security or any part thereof, while the mortgage is insured, without the prior consent of the Commissioner.
( b ) A mortgagee may, with the prior consent of the Commissioner, accept an addition to, or substitution of, security for the purpose of removing the dwelling to a new lot under the following conditions: ( 1 ) The mortgagee obtains a good and valid first lien on the property to which the dwelling is removed.
( 2 ) All damages to the structure are repaired without cost to HUD.
( 3 ) The property to which the dwelling is removed is in an area known to be reasonably free from natural hazards or, if in a flood zone, the mortgagor will insure or reinsure under the National Flood Insurance Program or obtain equivalent private flood insurance coverage as defined in § 203.16a.
( c ) A mortgagee may, without the prior consent of the Commissioner, accept an addition to, or substitution of, security for the purpose of removing the dwelling to a new lot under the following conditions. ( 1 ) The dwelling has survived an earthquake or other disaster with little damage, but continued location on the property might be hazardous.
( 2 ) The conditions stated in paragraph (b) of this section exist.
( 3 ) Immediately following the emergency removal the mortgagee notifies the Commissioner of the reasons for removal.
[41 FR 49735, Nov. 10, 1976, as amended at 87 FR 70743, Nov. 21, 2022]
Exhibit 32.1 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

In connection with the Annual Report of Atlas America Series 25-2004 (B) L.P. (the “Partnership”) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2014 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Freddie M. Kotek, Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of the General Partner, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

|   | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership. |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|                                                                                       |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| /s/ FREDDIE M. KOTEK                                                                  |
| Freddie M. Kotek                                                                      |
| Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of the General Partner |
| September 11, 2015                                                                    |
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

U

For the Northern District of California

NITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

SHI-XIAN REN,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

KONG QIAN YING DAB LILLY’S

RESTAURANT,

Defendant(s).

_____________________________________/

No. C 09-0478 MEJ

ORDER VACATING PRETRIAL

DEADLINES AND TRIAL DATE

This matter is currently scheduled for a jury trial on July 12, 2010. However, as the parties

are participating in a settlement conference on May 18, 2010 before the Honorable James Larson,

and pretrial filings are due the following week, the Court hereby VACATES all upcoming pretrial

and trial dates so that the parties are able to focus their efforts on the settlement conference. The

parties shall file a joint status report within 14 days of completion of the mediation process.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2010 _______________________________

Maria-Elena James 

Chief United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 3:09-cv-00478-MEJ Document 16 Filed 04/30/10 Page 1 of 1
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 10**  **- 1297** 

WILLIAM LUTHER , Plaintiff

– Appellant ,
v. GARY LOCKE , Defendant

– Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virgin ia , at Alexandria
. Leonie M. Brinkema , District Judge. ( 1:09

- cv - 00748

- LMB

- IDD )

Submitted : August 19, 2010 Decided: August 26, 2010

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and AGEE , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
.
William Luther, A ppellant Pro Se. Jonathan Holland Hambrick, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: William Luther appeals the district court ’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss his civil action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons s tated by the district
court. See Luther v. Locke , No. 1:09

- cv - 00748

- LMB

- IDD (E.D. Va. Jan. 11, 2010). We d ispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
§ 221.256 Interest rate increase and payment of mortgage insurance premiums on mortgages under § 221.60 and § 221.65. ( a ) Where a mortgage meets the special requirements of § 221.60 or § 221.65, the following procedures are applicable: ( 1 ) The mortgagee shall determine, at least biennially, whether the mortgagor has continued to occupy the property securing the mortgage. If the mortgagee determines that the mortgagor is not occupying the property or that the mortgagor has sold the property subject to the mortgage to a purchaser not qualifying under the provisions of § 221.60(h) or § 221.65(d)(4) (as appropriate) for the continuation of a below market interest rate, interest on such mortgage shall be computed by the mortgagee at the highest rate permissible under the mortgage. The computation at the higher rate shall be effective from the first day of the month following the month in which the right to collect interest at the increased rate first accrued, as determined by the mortgagee.
( 2 ) The mortgagee shall determine the mortgagor's family income, at least biennially, and shall increase the mortgage interest pursuant to the requirements of §§ 221.60(g) and 221.65(d)(5), as appropriate, to comply with the requirements of such sections. The computation at the higher rate shall be effective from the first day of the month following the month in which the mortgagee determines that the mortgagor's family income was increased.
( b ) The mortgagee shall notify the Commissioner, on a form prescribed by the Commissioner, within 30 days of making the determination of the right to compute interest at the higher rate, as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, of: ( 1 ) The date on which such right first accrued, and
( 2 ) The outstanding principal balance of the mortgage on the first day of the month following the date on which such right first accrued.
( c ) The liability for payment of mortgage insurance premiums shall begin on and be computed from the first day of the month following the date on which the right to compute interest at the higher rate shall have first accrued.
[36 FR 24587, Dec. 22, 1971, as amended at 37 FR 8663, Apr. 29, 1972]
### §1862. Natural gas distribution

#### (a) Expanded participation by local distribution companies in acquisition of leases and development of natural gas resources

The purpose of this section is to encourage expanded participation by local distribution companies in acquisition of leases and development of natural gas resources on the Outer Continental Shelf by facilitating the transportation in interstate commerce of natural gas, which is produced from a lease located on the Outer Continental Shelf and owned, in whole or in part, by a local distribution company, from such lease to the service area of such local distribution company.

#### (b) Application and issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity for transportation of natural gas

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission shall, after opportunity for presentation of written and oral views, promulgate and publish in the Federal Register a statement of Commission policy which carries out the purpose of this section and sets forth the standards under which the Commission will consider applications for, and, as appropriate, issue certificates of public convenience and necessity, pursuant to section 717f of title 15, for the transportation in interstate commerce of natural gas, which is produced from a lease located on the Outer Continental Shelf and owned, in whole or in part, by a local distribution company, from such lease to the service area of such local distribution company. Such statement of policy shall specify the criteria, limitations, or requirements the Commission will apply in determing— 1

(1) whether the application of any local distribution company qualifies for consideration under the statement of policy; and

(2) whether the public convenience and necessity will be served by the issuance of the requested certificate of transportation.

Such statement of policy shall also set forth the terms or limitations on which the Commission may condition, pursuant to section 717f of title 15, the issuance of a certificate of transportation under such statement of policy. To the maximum extent practicable, such statement shall be promulgated and published within one year after September 18, 1978.

#### (c) Definitions

For purposes of this section, the term—

(1) "local distribution company" means any person—

(A) engaged in the distribution of natural gas at retail, including any subsidiary or affiliate thereof engaged in the exploration and production of natural gas; and

(B) regulated, or operated as a public utility, by a State or local government or agency thereof;

(2) "interstate commerce" shall have the same meaning as such term has under section 717a(7) of title 15; and

(3) "Commission" means the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

(Pub. L. 95–372, title VI, §603, Sept. 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 694.)

1 So in original. Probably should be "determining—".
ex10_47.htm









Exhibit 10.47


FIRST AMENDMENT


TO THE


EMPLOYMENT AND NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENT







The Sheridan Group, Inc. (the "Employer") and Patricia A. Stricker (the "Employee") wish to amend the Employee's Employment and Non-Competition Agreement (the "Employment Agreement"), dated April 1, 2007, to bring the Employment Agreement into compliance with the requirements of Internal Revenue Code section 409A and the Treasury Regulations and other authoritative guidance issued under that section.







WHEREAS, pursuant to IRS Notice 2007-86 and the final Treasury Regulations under Code section 409A, the Employment Agreement is being amended to comply with the final Treasury Regulations issued under Code section 409A.







Accordingly, effective April 1, 2007, the Employment Agreement is amended as follows:







1.  The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 6(e)(iv) is amended by deleting the phrase that appears in brackets (i.e., by deleting "[or less than fifty percent (50%), if the Employee becomes an independent contractor]").







2.  Section 10(g) – Arbitration of Disputes – is amended by adding the following sentence to the end of that Section:







"Any reimbursement of reasonable fees and expenses under this Section shall be paid by the Employer to the Employee by the March 15 following the end of the year during which the Employee prevails in the dispute giving rise to such reimbursement."







In all other respects, the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.







IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have caused this Amendment to be duly executed, effective as specified herein.








	
ATTEST/WITNESS:

	  	
THE SHERIDAN GROUP, INC.


	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  
	 	/s/ Dale A. Tepp	 	 	/s/ John A. Saxton
	 	 	 	 	 
	
Print Name:

	
Dale A. Tepp

	  	
Print Name:

	
John A. Saxton


	  	  	  	  	  
	 	 	 	 	 
	  	  	  	  	  
	 	/s/ Dale A. Tepp	 	/s/ Patricia A. Stricker
	  	  	  	
Patricia A. Stricker


	
Print Name:

	
Dale A. Tepp
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STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING HEARING

ERIK G. BABCOCK, Bar No. 172517

LAW OFFICES OF ERIK BABCOCK

1212 Broadway, Suite 726

Oakland, CA 94612-3423

(510) 452-8400 Tel

(510) 452-8405 Fax

Attorneys for the Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. CR 09-0825 WHA

 

 Plaintiff, STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED]

 ORDER CONTINUING SENTENCING

v. 

JOSE BAIRON VARGAS MOLINA, 

 

 Defendant. /

This matter is set for sentencing on January 27, 2010. Counsel for defendant, Erik Babcock,

was sent out to trial in state court and is now unavailable that day. His trial is expected to be finished

in early February. Therefore, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED between the parties, with the

concurrence of the US Probation Office, that the sentencing hearing currently scheduled for January

27, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. may be vacated and continued to February 9, 2010, at 2:00 p.m.

SO STIPULATED.

Dated: January 20, 2010 /S/Brian Lewis 

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: January 20, 2010 /S/Erik Babcock 

 Attorney for Defendant

SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

 HONORABLE WILLIAM ALSUP

 United States District Judge

January 21, 2010.

U

NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge William Alsup

Case 3:09-cr-00825-WHA Document 21 Filed 01/21/10 Page 1 of 1
§ 401.451 PAE Physical Condition Analysis (PCA). ( a ) *Review and certification of owner evaluation.* ( 1 ) The PAE must independently evaluate the physical condition of the project by means of a PCA. If the PAE finds any immediate threats to health and safety, the owner must complete those work items immediately, or the PAE must evaluate the project's eligibility in accordance with § 401.403(b)(2)(iii).
( 2 ) After consultation with the owner and an opportunity for the owner to modify its evaluation performed under § 401.450, the PAE must either certify to the accuracy and completeness of the owner's evaluation performed under § 401.450 for each project covered by the PRA, or state that the evaluation fails to address certain items or does not propose a cost effective approach.
( b ) *Rejection due to inaccurate or incomplete owner evaluation.* If the PAE cannot certify to the accuracy and completeness of the owner's evaluation due to its failure to address specific work items or because it does not propose a cost effective approach, the PAE must notify HUD. If HUD agrees with the PAE's determination, the PAE must notify the owner that the request for a Restructuring Plan is rejected.
( c ) *Rejection due to poor condition of the project.* Based on the completed PCA, the PAE must determine whether proceeding with a Restructuring Plan with necessary rehabilitation is more cost-effective in terms of Federal resources than rejecting the Request for a Restructuring Plan under § 401.403(b)(2)(iii) and providing tenant-based assistance for displaced tenants under § 401.602. HUD will provide guidance to PAEs for making the determination. If the PAE concludes that a request for a Restructuring Plan should be rejected because of lack of cost-effectiveness due to poor condition of the project, it must also consider the effect on tenants and the community and advise HUD of the effect. HUD will make the final decision after considering the PAE's recommendation.
( d ) *Dispute and appeal of rejection.* The dispute and appeal provisions of subpart F of this part apply to rejections under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section.