alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1
                                 CERTIFICATIONS


I, David D. Wesselink, certify that:

1)   I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Metris Companies Inc.
     "Registrant";

2)   Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of
     a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
     statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
     were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
     report;

3)   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this report, fairly present in all material
     respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of
     the Registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4)   The Registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
     establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
     in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:

     (a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
          disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
          supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the
          Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to
          us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
          which this report is being prepared;

     (b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrant's disclosure controls
          and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
          of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     (c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant's
          most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
          reasonably likely to materially affect, the Registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting; and

5)   The Registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
     our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
     the Registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the Registrant's board
     of:

     (a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
          operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
          reasonably likely to adversely affect the Registrant's ability to
          record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

     (b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the Registrant's internal
          control over financial reporting.

Date: August 14, 2003

/s/ David D. Wesselink David D. Wesselink
-----------------------------------------
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
#### Charles Budd Corporation, Respondent, v. Calnail, Inc., Appellant.

Order, entered March 25, 1960, denying defendant’s motion to vacate the warrant of attachment dated December 9, 1959, unanimously reversed, on the law, with $20 costs and disbursements to the appellant, and the motion granted, with $10 costs, upon the ground that the summons was not served within the time prescribed by the statute. Although this ground is not set forth in the notice of motion, it does appear in the papers on appeal by virtue of having been asserted in the reply affidavit. Order, entered May 31, 1960, denying defendant’s motion to vacate the warrant of attachment dated April 5, 1960, unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to the respondent. Concur — Botein, P. J., Rabin, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
§ 207.251 Definitions. As used in this subpart: ( a ) The term *Commissioner* means the Federal Housing Commissioner.
( b ) The term *act* means the National Housing Act, as amended.
( c ) The term *mortgage* means such a first lien upon real estate and other property as is commonly given to secure advances on, or the unpaid purchase price of, real estate under the laws of the State, district or territory in which the real estate is located, together with the credit instrument or instruments, if any, secured thereby. In any instance where an operating loss loan is involved, the term shall include both the original mortgage and the instrument securing the operating loss loan.
( d ) The term *insured mortgage* means a mortgage which has been insured by the endorsement of the credit instrument by the Commissioner, or his duly authorized representative.
( e ) The term *contract of insurance* means the agreement evidenced by such endorsement and includes the terms, conditions and provisions of this part and of the National Housing Act.
( f ) The term *mortgagor* means the original borrower under a mortgage and its successors and such of its assigns as are approved by the Commissioner.
( g ) The term *mortgagee* means the original lender under a mortgage its successors and such of its assigns as are approved by the Commissioner, and includes the holders of the credit instruments issued under a trust indenture, mortgage or deed of trust pursuant to which such holders act by and through a trustee therein named.
§ 2004.28 Procedure in the event of an adverse ruling. ( a ) *Opportunity to review adverse ruling.* Any person aggrieved by a decision made by the Counsel under this part denying a request for documents or testimony, or restricting the release of documents or testimony, may seek review of that decision pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section.
( b ) *Procedure in the event of conflicting court order.* If the Inspector General or Counsel declines to approve a demand for records or testimony and a court or other authority rules that the demand must be complied with irrespective of the instructions from the OIG not to produce the material or disclose the information sought, the employee or former employee upon whom the demand has been made shall respectfully decline to comply with the demand, citing *United States ex rel. Touhy* v. *Ragen,* 340 U.S. 462 (1951).
( c ) *Procedure* — ( 1 ) *Notice of intention to petition for review.* A party or any person aggrieved by the decision made pursuant to this part denying or restricting the release of documents or testimony may seek review of the decision by filing a written Notice of Intention to Petition for Review (Notice) within five business days of the date of this decision. The Notice shall identify the petitioner, the adverse decision, and any dates (such as deposition, hearing, or court dates) that are significant to the party. The Notice shall be served in accordance with § 2004.23.
( 2 ) *Petition for review.* Within five business days of the filing of a Notice, the person or party seeking review shall file a Petition for Review (Petition) containing a clear and concise statement of the issues to be reviewed and the reasons why the review is appropriate. The petition shall include exceptions to any findings of fact or conclusions of law made, together with supporting reasons and arguments for such exceptions based on appropriate citations to such record or law as may exist. These reasons may be stated in summary form. Decisions on the Petition may be made by either the Inspector General or the Counsel and shall become the final decisions of the OIG. The Petition will be served in accordance with § 2004.23.
( d ) *Prerequisite to judicial review.* Pursuant to Section 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 704, a petition to the agency for review of a decision made under the authority of this part is a prerequisite to the seeking of judicial review of the final decision.
[70 FR 36791, June 24, 2005]
### §390h–7. Tucson area water reclamation study

#### (a) General authority

The Secretary, in cooperation with the State of Arizona and appropriate local and regional entities, shall conduct a feasibility study of comprehensive water reclamation and reuse system for Southern Arizona. For the purpose of this section, the term "Southern Arizona" means those portions of the counties of Pima, Santa Cruz, and Pinal within the Tucson Active Management Hydrologic Area as defined by the Arizona Department of Water Resources.

#### (b) Federal share

The Federal share of the costs of the study authorized by this section shall not exceed 50 per centum of the total.

#### (c) Report

The Secretary shall submit the report authorized by this section to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Natural Resources of the House of Representatives not later than four years after appropriation of funds authorized by sections 390h to 390h–39 of this title.

(Pub. L. 102–575, title XVI, §1609, Oct. 30, 1992, 106 Stat. 4666; Pub. L. 103–437, §16(a)(2), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat. 4594.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1994—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 103–437 substituted "Natural Resources" for "Interior and Insular Affairs" before "of the House".
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION








In connection with the quarterly report
of Roomlinx, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September
30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof 9the “Report”), I, Michael S. Wasik, the Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, to the best of my knowledge,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of the Company.





Date:
11/12/08





By:
            /s/ Michael S.
      WasikMichael
      S. WasikChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
  Officer
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KRISTIN M PERRY, SANDRA B STIER,

PAUL T KATAMI and JEFFREY J

ZARRILLO,

Plaintiffs,

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

v

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, in his

official capacity as governor of

California; EDMUND G BROWN JR, in

his official capacity as attorney

general of California; MARK B

HORTON, in his official capacity

as director of the California

Department of Public Health and

state registrar of vital

statistics; LINETTE SCOTT, in her

official capacity as deputy

director of health information &

strategic planning for the

California Department of Public

Health; PATRICK O’CONNELL, in his

official capacity as clerkrecorder of the County of

Alameda; and DEAN C LOGAN, in his

official capacity as registrarrecorder/county clerk for the

County of Los Angeles, 

Defendants,

DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, GAIL J

KNIGHT, MARTIN F GUTIERREZ,

HAKSHING WILLIAM TAM, MARK A

JANSSON and PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM –

YES ON 8, A PROJECT OF

CALIOFORNIA RENEWAL, as official

proponents of Proposition 8,

Defendant-Intervenors. /

No C 09-2292 VRW

NOTICE TO PARTIES

Case 3:09-cv-02292-JW Document 463 Filed 01/15/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In compliance with the Supreme Court’s order in

Hollingsworth v Perry, 558 US --, No 09A648 (January 13, 2010), as

noted on the record at trial this date, the undersigned has

formally requested Chief Judge Kozinski to withdraw this case from

the pilot project on transmitting trial court proceedings to remote

federal courthouse locations or for broadcast or webcast approved

by the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council on December 17, 2009. 

Transmission of the proceedings to other locations solely within

the San Francisco courthouse will continue along with recording for

use in chambers, as permitted in Civ LR 77-3.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:09-cv-02292-JW Document 463 Filed 01/15/10 Page 2 of 2
#### Sims *v.*The State.

June 12, 1912.

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Worrill. Early superior court. March 6, 1912.

*R. E. Sheffield*and *Byron R. Collins,*for plaintiff in error.

*T. S. Felder, attorney-general, J. A. Laing, solicitor-general,*and *R. R. Arnold,*contra.

Lumpkin, J.

The ground of the motion for a new trial raised only the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. No complaint was made as to any ruling of the presiding judge pending the trial. The evidence authorized the verdict; and the presiding judge having approved it, this court will not interfere.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
§ 35.19 Prehearing conferences. ( a ) The ALJ may schedule prehearing conferences as appropriate.
( b ) Upon the motion of any party, the ALJ shall schedule at least one prehearing conference at a reasonable time in advance of the hearing.
( c ) The ALJ may use prehearing conferences to discuss the following: ( 1 ) Simplification of the issues;
( 2 ) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings, including the need for a more definite statement;
( 3 ) Stipulations and admissions of fact or as to the contents and authenticity of documents;
( 4 ) Whether the parties can agree to submission of the case on a stipulated record;
( 5 ) Whether a party chooses to waive appearance at an oral hearing and to submit only documentary evidence (subject to the objection of other parties) and written argument;
( 6 ) Limitation of the number of witnesses;
( 7 ) Scheduling dates for the exchange of witness lists and of proposed exhibits;
( 8 ) Discovery;
( 9 ) The time and place for the hearing; and
( 10 ) Such other matters as may tend to expedite the fair and just disposition of the proceedings.
( d ) The ALJ may issue an order containing all matters agreed upon by the parties or ordered by the ALJ at a prehearing conference.
#### Martina Lai, Appellant, v. Miguel Vargas, Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of defendant, entered December 28, 1961 in New York County, upon a decision of the court at a Trial Term without a jury.

Judgment in favor of defendant affirmed, with costs.

McNally, J. (dissenting).

I dissent and vote to reverse and grant a new trial. Plaintiff, a passenger in defendant’s automobile, alleges injuries consequent on an automobile accident in New Jersey on August 10, 1957. Plaintiff by pleading and proof presented her ease on the theory of liability for ordinary negligence. Defendant, however, at the time of trial, established that the then decisional law of New Jersey precluded the recovery by a passenger such as the plaintiff unless it was established that the operator of the automobile had been guilty of wanton, willful and gross negligence. *(Lutvin*v. *Dopkus,*94 N. J. L. 64.) The trial court found the evidence did not establish gross negligence.

After the entry of judgment below the Supreme Court of New Jersey overruled the holding of *Lutvin*v. *Dopkus (supra,)*and held that a guest who asked for a ride in an automobile although not expressly invited by the host could recover for injuries upon allegation and proof of the failure to exercise reasonable care in the operation thereof. *(Cohen*v. *Kaminetsky,*36 N. J. 276.)

The entire court agrees that *Cohen*v. *Kaminetsky (supra)*is determinative although decided after the trial and judgment herein. An intervening change of decisional law pending appeal controls the determination of the appeal. *(Johnson*v. *State,*18 N. J. 422.) The rule in New York is to the same effect. Also we may take judicial notice of the New Jersey law. *(Graybar Elec. Co.*v. *New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,*292 N. Y. 246, 250; Civ. Prac. Act, § 344-a.)

However, the majority is of the opinion that the record fails to disclose proof of ordinary negligence. I am not in accord with this view. Plaintiff and her witness testified that the parties left Brooklyn, New York, at 4:45 a.ii. and (after at least one so-called rest stop) the accident occurred at 6:45 a.m., about two hours thereafter, at Maple Shade, New Jersey, approximately 85 miles distant from Brooklyn. The record amply demonstrates the defendant driver approached a circular traffic divider at Maple Shade, New Jersey, while traveling at an excessive rate of speed; sensing that he might overturn if he followed the curve, defendant directed the ear into and over the curbing and crashed into a stone monument.

Plaintiff made out a ease. Since the case was tried and determined on an erroneous theory of law, as a matter of law and in the interest of justice, the judgment should be reversed on the law and, in the exercise of discretion, a new trial granted.

Botein, P. J., Valente and Stevens, JJ., concur in decision; McNally, J., dissents in opinion in which Breitel, J., concurs.

Judgment in favor of defendant affirmed, with costs. The record fails to disclose proof of ordinary negligence.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 20, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-40225

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAVIER MARTINEZ-DIAZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:04-CR-809-ALL

--------------------

Before STEWART, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Javier Martinez-Diaz (Martinez) appeals his guilty plea

conviction and sentence for illegally reentering the United

States after having been deported previously following an

aggravated felony conviction. The Government argues that

Martinez’s appeal is barred by the appellate-waiver provision in

his plea agreement. We assume, arguendo only, that the waiver

does not bar the instant appeal.

Martinez argues that the district court erred by ordering

him to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample as a condition
No. 05-40225

-2-

of supervised release. This claim is not ripe for review on

direct appeal. See United States v. Riascos-Cuenu, 428 F.3d

1100, 1101-02 (5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed (Jan. 9,

2006) (No. 05-8662). The claim is dismissed. See id. at 1102.

Martinez also challenges the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(b). However, Martinez’s constitutional challenge is

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,

235 (1998). Although Martinez contends that Almendarez-Torres

was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court

would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such

arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. 

See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Martinez properly concedes

that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and

circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for

further review.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.
#### § 266.217 Environmental review requirements.

The responsible entity, as defined in 24 CFR part 58 (Environmental Review Procedures for Entities Assuming HUD Environmental Responsibilities), assumes legal responsibility for compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and related laws and authorities. The responsible entity will visit each project site proposed for insurance under this part and prepare the applicable environmental reviews as set forth in 24 CFR part 58. HUD may make a finding in accordance with 24 CFR 58.11, Legal Capacity and Performance, and may perform the environmental review itself under 24 CFR part 50 (Protection and Enhancement of Environmental Quality). In all cases the environmental review must be completed before HUD may issue the firm approval letter.

[85 FR 83442, Dec. 22, 2020]
§ 266.600 Mortgage insurance premium: Insurance upon completion. ( a ) *Initial premium.* For projects insured upon completion, on the date of the final closing, the HFA shall pay to the Commissioner an initial premium in an amount established by the Commissioner under § 266.604.
( b ) *Premium payable with first payment of principal.* On the date of the first payment of principal the HFA shall pay a second premium (calculated on a per annum basis) in an amount established by the Commissioner under § 266.604.
( c ) *Subsequent premiums.* Until one of the conditions is met under § 266.606(a), the HFA on each anniversary of the date of the first principal payment shall pay to the Commissioner an annual mortgage insurance premium in an amount established by the Commissioner under § 266.604, without taking into account delinquent payments, or partial claim payment under § 266.630, or prepayments, for the year following the date on which the premium becomes payable.
[85 FR 83444, Dec. 22, 2020]