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HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE:

INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF

U.S. FOREIGN AID

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 10, 2010

Serial No. 111–102

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Thomas Carothers, J.D., Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace ........................................................................................ 10

The Honorable Lorne W. Craner, President, International Republican Institute (Former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights 

and Labor) ............................................................................................................ 19

Ms. Jennifer L. Windsor, Executive Director, Freedom House ............................ 31

Elisa Massimino, J.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, Human Rights 

First ....................................................................................................................... 44

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Thomas Carothers, J.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 13

The Honorable Lorne W. Craner: Prepared statement ........................................ 21

Ms. Jennifer L. Windsor: Prepared statement ...................................................... 34

Elisa Massimino, J.D.: 

Material for the record ........................................................................................ 45

Prepared statement .............................................................................................. 56

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 96

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 97

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 99

The Honorable Jeff Flake, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Arizona: Prepared statement .............................................................................. 101

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and 

the Global Environment: Prepared statement ................................................... 105

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 108

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 110

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Material for the record .............................................. 112

Ms. Jennifer L. Windsor: Material for the record ................................................. 114

Elisa Massimino, J.D.: Material for the record ..................................................... 121

(1)

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS 

OF U.S. FOREIGN AID 

THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

In a moment, I will recognize myself and the ranking member for 

up to 7 minutes each to make opening statements. I will then recognize the chair and ranking member of the Subcommittee on 

International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight for up 

to 3 minutes for any opening remarks they would like to make. All 

other members will then have the opportunity to make 1-minute 

opening statements if they wish to do so; and, without objection, 

members may also place written statements in the record. 

Before we begin the statements, I very enthusiastically want to 

extend a very warm welcome to Ted Deutch, who was appointed to 

the committee as a permanent member last month. That is why we 

have all those seats below him and on either side of him. Ted was 

elected to represent Florida’s 19th District, the seat held by our 

former colleague, Bob Wexler, in a special election on April 13. 

As a member of the Florida State Senate, he wrote and passed 

legislation that made Florida the first State in the Nation to require that public pension funds divest from the companies that do 

business with Iran; and hopefully in legislation we will pass soon 

we will ensure that those kinds of State laws will stand up to potential judicial challenges. 

Without objection, Mr. Deutch will be assigned to the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, the Subcommittee 

on Europe, and the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 

Human Rights and Oversight. 

We are really very pleased to welcome you to the committee. We 

hope you enjoy it as much as we do some of the time, and we look 

forward to working with you. Good to have you. 

Now, on to the hearing. 

This is the latest in a series of hearings on foreign assistance reform, one of the committee’s highest priorities. In past hearings 

and in other fora, we have examined the proper role of the military 

in carrying out humanitarian and security assistance, the efficacy 

2

and structure of our development programs; and, of course, resource levels appropriate to meet our national security, diplomatic, 

and moral commitments around the globe. 

Today, we will focus on our Government’s efforts to promote 

human rights and democracy abroad—a foreign policy imperative 

that enjoys strong bipartisan approach—and what we can do to 

make those programs more effective and efficient. 

A core American principle is that all people should enjoy freedom 

of speech, expression and religion, and freedom from tyranny, oppression, torture, and discrimination. 

U.S. foreign policy should reflect and promote those core values, 

not only because it implicates fundamental human freedoms, but 

also because it serves U.S. national interests. 

Violent extremism that threatens U.S. national security flourishes where democratic governance is weak, justice is uncertain, 

and legal avenues for change are in short supply. 

Efforts to reduce poverty and promote broad-based economic 

growth are more effective and sustainable in a political environment in which fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are respected, government institutions are broadly representative, and 

corruption is held to a minimum. 

Regrettably, our human rights and democracy assistance programs continue to face obstacles that impede their effectiveness. 

With the fragmentation of resources and capabilities, gaps in the 

delivery of certain types of assistance and lack of flexibility—be it 

through Presidential initiatives or congressional funding directives—taxpayers simply aren’t getting an adequate return on their 

investment. 

While those deficiencies are not unique to human rights and democracy, these programs are particularly sensitive and deserve 

special attention. We have seen how ham-handed attempts to insert the United States in the political processes of other countries 

runs the risk of failing to achieve meaningful reform, and even endangering those who would dare to speak out against the policies 

of their own governments. 

To address these problems, we recently released a discussion 

paper on human rights and democracy assistance—which is available on our committee Web site—that proposes a number of common-sense solutions to those problems. These proposed reforms—

such as requiring action plans to broaden civic participation and 

prevent human rights abuses, enhancing the democracy and governance functions at USAID, modernizing and codifying existing 

human rights statutes, and improving training for democracy and 

human rights officers—will allow us to more effectively assist 

human rights defenders, promote participatory forms of government, and strengthen the rule of law. 

Some may argue that these proposed reforms go too far, while 

others may say they don’t go far enough. Even on those points 

where there is agreement on principle, there are likely to be many 

challenges in operationalizing these ideas. We have tried to find 

the right balance among a variety of competing objectives—such as 

increasing flexibility while maintaining consistency, or assisting reformers without compromising their independence. 

3

The purpose of the paper was to generate a robust discussion on 

these important issues, and we welcome any comments from the 

witnesses and—at the appropriate time—other stakeholders and 

members of the public. We will be scheduling meetings and 

roundtables in the near future for that purpose. 

It is worth noting that our democracy assistance does not aim to 

impose a particular form of government on anyone: These funds 

help local partners build representative and accountable institutions in their own countries. They take the lead, while we provide 

the training and resources that will enable them to be more successful. Our programs include activities often carried out by nongovernmental organizations—such as training judges and journalists, monitoring elections, and encouraging the development of political parties and civil society organizations. 

On the human rights front, we have a twofold task: Providing 

support for defenders of internationally-recognized human rights, 

and ensuring that our aid stays out of the hands of violators. 

Finally, I would like to note that additional funding is not the 

only key to advancing human rights and democracy abroad. Yes, 

increased resources such as those proposed by President Obama, 

will certainly enhance our ability to protect human rights and promote democratic governance. But equally important are our efforts 

to reform the current system of providing such funding. In order 

to be responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars, we owe it to 

the American people to make the system we have function in a 

more effective, transparent, and responsive manner. 

We are fortunate today to have a distinguished panel of witnesses with us, and we are interested in hearing your views on how 

we can more effectively assist those who champion the ideals upon 

which our Nation was founded. 

And now I would like to turn to the ranking member, Ileana RosLehtinen of Florida, for her opening remarks. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, as always. It is wonderful to see a packed house and to have all these 

young people present today. 

I also welcome our fellow Floridian, Congressman Deutch, to our 

committee. He will be a valuable member. 

Foreign assistance programs as we utilize them today are a relatively new concept. Most of our assistance programs today did not 

exist before the Second World War 60 years ago. Some of our programs, such as those for the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights, are, in fact, even more recent additions to 

our assistance efforts. 

The relatively new and evolving nature of our democracy promotion programs argues strongly for ensuring that we have objective means of assessing their performance over the long term. 

Today, with an annual budget for democracy promotion that is 

estimated to reach almost $3 billion annually, we must review the 

challenges that have arisen in the course of their implementation 

over the past three or four decades and how best to address those 

in order to increase their efficiency and ensure that they advance 

U.S. interests and our priorities. 

Some of the issues we must look at in order to improve our democracy assistance includes: The need for better coordination of 

4

programs that are administered by a range of U.S. Government 

agencies and nongovernmental organizations; the need for objective, quantifiable means of measuring the effectiveness of democracy assistance programs; and differing points of views on how to 

best implement such programs, whether by targeting political entities, individuals, and events, by embedding them in other development programs, or by a combination of approaches. 

And, finally, what is the proper role of democracy assistance in 

relation to our diplomacy in support of human rights and the expansion of democratic governance? 

With regard to that last and very important point, I am concerned that the United States is shying away from strong diplomacy in this vital area by failing to condemn and hold accountable, 

or, even worse, by actually engaging directly with repressive regimes. 

While the recently released national security strategy includes 

two pages on the promotion of democracy and human rights, what 

matters is what is done, not just what is written. If our foreign aid 

for any objective, including development, is to be effective, we must 

have open and responsive governments and institutions so that we 

can track the use of our funds and ensure that they are not diverted into private bank accounts. 

Second, a lack of diplomatic focus on human rights and democracy will only embolden dictators and corrupt rulers to consolidate 

their power. We need to ramp up our diplomacy in support of democracy, while also targeting our assistance for this key challenge. 

For example, while aggregate funding numbers may have increased, I have concerns about whether certain time-tested organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, are maintaining their proper place in our budget priorities. The administration’s request for NED for Fiscal Year 2011 is nearly a 9 percent 

cut from Fiscal Year 2009 levels and an 11 percent cut for the estimated Fiscal Year 2010 levels. 

Assistance for Iranian civil society and the democratic opposition 

in Iran has to be considered a priority. As the Iranian regime has 

intensified its crackdown on the Iranian people, the United States 

has actually reduced our support for democracy and human rights 

in Iran. While the budget for Fiscal Year 2009 requested $65 million for the State Department Iran Democracy Fund, the fund has 

now been scrapped. Its replacement, the Near East Regional Democracy Fund, has an unclear mission and has received significantly less funding. These programming shifts and funding cuts 

have had a real and negative consequence. 

Funding must be moved from organizations whose commitment 

to the principles of democracy is questionable, such as the farce 

that is called the Organization of American States. We should shift 

those funds to organizations that are consistent in their efforts on 

behalf of democracy. 

The United States provides 60 percent of the entire budget for 

the OAS, while that organization pursues an agenda of appeasement toward repressive governments in our hemisphere. 

The OAS position on Cuba? In spite of hundreds of political prisoners languishing in jail, having committed no crime but speaking 

on behalf of democracy, in spite of there being only one political 

5

party allowed to operate in Cuba, the Communist Party, in spite 

of no labor unions allowed to operate, and no human rights respected, what did the OAS do? It recently passed a resolution lifting the 1962 suspension of Cuba from the OAS. 

Following attacks on a prominent synagogue in Venezuela, which 

highlighted the growing anti-Semitic campaign facilitated and tolerated by the Chavez regime, the then-U.S. Ambassador to the 

OAS rightfully called for a condemnation. What did the OAS do? 

Nothing. And the Secretary General expressed confidence in the 

Chavez system and its investigation of the incident. What a waste 

of taxpayer dollars. 

Again, our diplomacy on behalf of those who are oppressed and 

our commitment to democratic governance and the consolidation of 

democratic institutions must be strong and it must be vigorous. I 

thank our panel of witnesses this morning, and I look forward to 

hearing their testimony on this important issue. 

Thank you as always, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. I thank the ranking member for her statement. 

I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight Subcommittee, Mr. Carnahan of Missouri. 

Mr. CARNAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to start by adding my welcome to Ted Deutch, not only 

for being on the full committee but the Middle East Subcommittee 

and the Subcommittee on International Organizations. We really 

look forward to working with you, and you will be a great voice in 

what we do here. 

Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, thank you 

for holding this hearing regarding human rights and democracy assistance. As chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight, I am pleased we are examining this critical component of foreign assistance. 

I want to look back to 1948. Our famous Missourian, Harry Truman, during his administration helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states,

‘‘Whereas the people of the United Nations have reaffirmed 

their faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity and 

worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and 

women, have determined to promote social progress and better 

standards of life and larger freedom.’’

Much has changed since 1948 when the Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights was signed. We have also witnessed great changes 

since 1961 when our Foreign Assistance Act was adopted by the 

Congress. Whether it is YouTube in Venezuela, twitter in Iran or 

Google in China, we have seen traditional democracy and human 

rights assistance struggle to keep pace with the times. Foreign assistance needs to be modernized to meet current challenges. We 

need to ensure transparency, accountability of our funds; and, at 

the same time, there needs to be much greater efficiency and flexibility. 

We need to make better use of the broad range of all the tools 

in our smart power arsenal and look at some basic commonsense 

6

measures. We should raise the profile of the Office of Democracy 

and Governance within USAID. We should streamline the reporting requirements, reduce the reporting burden on our missions 

abroad, and focus on better leveraging those reports to promote 

fundamental democratic changes within countries. 

Finally, we need to have a serious examination of the deficiencies 

in contract oversight. Way too much taxpayer money is being lost 

to waste, fraud, and abuse, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The reputation of the U.S. as a beacon of freedom and human 

rights has also suffered in recent years. Under the current administration, we have seen efforts to protect basic freedoms at home 

and restore our image overseas. This approach has yielded significant benefits to our economic and our security interests. 

I thank our leadership for having this hearing again today. I look 

forward to hearing from our distinguished panel on this critical and 

timely issue. I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

My colleague from California, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and 

Oversight, Mr. Rohrabacher, 3 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Today, in another part of town, they are marking—there is a 

commemoration of the third anniversary of the Victims of Communism Memorial, and I felt that it was more important for me to 

be here continuing that fight rather than just memorializing that 

fight. 

I remember Tom Lantos played such an important part in making sure that the Victims of Communism Memorial was actually 

built. I was his partner in that endeavor, and it was a struggle 

simply to get it someplace in Washington, and it is over in a corner 

now. Some people who have authority just didn’t like the idea of 

commemorating all those millions of people that were victims of 

communism. They called it being belligerent and warlike to make 

that memorial. 

Let me just note that standing up for freedom is not belligerence. 

It is honorable, and it is a part of our national heritage. 

Today, usually when we do not stand up for freedom and we do 

not meet that traditional element of America’s heritage, we lose. 

Today marks the first anniversary of the uprising in Iran after 

the phony elections that the Mullahs had that kept them in power. 

We all remember that 1 year ago today, the body of Neda, a young 

journalist, lay there in the streets for the world to see. What we 

didn’t see, of course, were the other bodies that were in the streets 

that were destroyed and murdered by the Mullah regime and the 

others that have been murdered by that regime over the years. 

What is happening in Iran is a failure of the United States long 

ago to make human rights a priority and for us to assist in any 

way that we could those people who would fight for democracy and 

human rights in Iran. 

This leads me to my main point, which is policy. American policy 

is much more important than funding. It is America’s standing up 

for its principles, not just how much money we are dishing out that 

makes a difference. Ronald Reagan’s very aggressive assertion that 

7

the Soviet Union was an evil empire was far more important than 

even the increases in military spending during his administration. 

In fact, I was very proud to be part of Reagan’s administration, 

one of his principal speech writers, and I know that his speech at 

the British Parliament in which he established the National Endowment for Democracy was a huge turning point, I believe, in the 

struggle for freedom throughout the world. 

These are things that I think we must——

I overstayed already? Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

We have a challenge in China as well as radical Islam, and we 

must stand up for human rights. That is how we succeed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Does any member of the committee seek to make an opening 

statement? 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing 

today. I would like to welcome the witnesses. 

Promoting human rights and democracy around the world is an 

important, worthwhile and strategic goal of American foreign policy. The United States must remain a global leader in this area. 

And I have long believed that the best way for us to show its leadership is through soft assistance to other countries. This is accomplished through foreign assistance programs involving a team of 

different organizations, each playing different roles. We are here 

today as part of that team, and the role we play is to find ways 

that reform and strengthen the structure of these programs so they 

can be more flexible, accountable, and efficient. 

Promoting human rights and democracy is a bipartisan foreign 

policy objective, and finding ways to make our foreign aid programs 

more effective should be likewise a bipartisan effort. It is important 

to remember that providing soft assistance to countries helps us 

promote American values and interests around the world and avoid 

the need for possible complicated and expensive interventions. 

Mr. Chairman, having been to both Afghan and watched what 

our foreign assistance is trying to do with our military in alternative crops and watching it also in Latin America, I think we 

have realized it is so much cheaper to provide foreign assistance 

than it is to activate the 101st Airborne or 82nd Airborne. 

So, with that, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Smith from New Jersey is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome our very distinguished panel 

of human rights activists and leaders. Thank you, along with Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for calling this hearing. 

With the TIP Report findings coming out on Monday—due to 

come out on Monday, I am very concerned that countries where 

there has been an egregious erosion of human rights relative to a 

whole number of areas but especially in the area of human trafficking, that countries like China, Vietnam, and India, will be looking very carefully to see if they are on the list of Tier 3 countries. 

My hope is, no matter what the remedy or penalties that might be 

8

prescribed after that, we need to speak truth to power to each of 

those countries about what is truly going on in the area of human 

trafficking. 

And, also, Mr. Chairman, I remain very concerned that now, a 

year and a quarter into this administration, that to the best of my 

knowledge we still do not have an Ambassador at Large to run the 

International Religious Freedom Office. That is a revelation of priorities. It is, I think, a serious mistake by this administration; and 

I hope that they soon name that person. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Does anyone else seek recognition? 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to say real briefly that, as a member of the committee 

and like many on this committee who travel, we want to give a 

very good compliment to our foreign aid and Foreign Service workers, many of them in places where their lives are on the line. 

But I must add that we have an efficiency problem of how we 

effectively use our resources, and we have got to address that, and 

I am very hopeful that this hearing will certainly accomplish that 

purpose. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman BERMAN. Are there any further requests for time? 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Royce, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last month, the State Department hosted a Chinese delegation 

in Washington for 2 days of what we call human rights dialogue; 

and according to State’s point man on human rights there, we 

didn’t tell China anything. This was a discussion among two important countries. 

I think for me the comments by the Assistant Secretary of State, 

Michael Posner, he said he brought up the new Arizona immigration law early and often and also noted ‘‘a troubling trend in our 

society and an indication that we have to deal with issues of discrimination.’’

I regret very much that he is not here today, and I think he 

should be before this committee to clarify why he chose to focus on 

these issues, as opposed to China’s abysmal record that includes religious repression, extrajudicial killings, prison camps, no freedom 

of expression, not to mention the forced repatriation of North Korean refugees back across the border to face certain death. 

There are credible reports China has been harvesting the organs 

of religious minorities. The human rights situation in Communist 

China is beyond grim. But to hear State describe it, we have got 

the same issues. This downplay of China’s despicable human rights 

record is deplorable. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome 

our panelists here; and I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

9

having this hearing. And I particularly want to tie it to our pending rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. 

The whole question of democratization, building democratic institutions and human rights have many elements that are similar to 

conditions that prevailed 50 years ago, but a lot has changed. And 

so, in the post Cold War world, is it not time to revisit some of 

these issues and make sure that the institutions we support are 

well structured to promote the values and the institutions we want 

to see succeed? 

So I am looking forward to this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I 

continue to enjoy and look forward to working with you in this ongoing effort to make sure we take cognizance of those changing circumstances in that all-important rewrite. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahon. 

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this very important hearing, and we thank the witnesses for 

coming. 

Mr. Chairman, Alexis de Toqueville once said that the greatness 

of America lies not in being more enlightened than any other nation but rather in her ability to repair her faults. I believe that this 

committee’s efforts to increase the effectiveness of foreign aid are 

embodied in this quote. 

The NGOs that work to promote democracy, protect women’s 

rights and health, and increase opportunities for the poor to direct 

them away from terrorism need fast and effective aid to achieve 

these worthwhile objectives. However, one thing that U.S. agencies 

seem to struggle with is the issue of relative performance. 

No country has a spotless human rights record, and the challenges in developing countries are even greater. Trying to distinguish between countries that are relatively better on human rights 

and whose governments are taking the right steps becomes difficult 

when incidents arise. If the expectation of a perfect record is not 

realistic, how can decision makers decide what is good enough? 

And we must also focus on women’s rights as we go forward and 

make that a very important issue. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The chair is unaware of anyone else seeking recognition for an 

opening statement, so we will now have the pleasure of introducing 

our panel and hearing from them. 

It is 10 o’clock. We started the hearing at 9:30. We get to witnesses by 10. That is good. 

Thomas Carothers is vice president for studies at the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace. He oversees the Endowment’s 

Middle East program, Carnegie Europe, and the Democracy and 

Rule of Law program, which he founded. Mr. Carothers has worked 

on democracy assistance projects for many public and private organizations and carried out extensive field research on democracy 

building programs around the world. He also has significant experience in the fields of development, human rights, comparative politics, international institutions, and foreign aid. 

10

Lorne Craner is president of the International Republican Institute. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. A member of the Council on 

Foreign Relations, Mr. Craner has testified on numerous occasions 

before House and Senate committees; and I have had the pleasure 

of having a chance to meet with him in the past on democracy promotion issues. 

Jennifer Windsor is the executive director of Freedom House. 

Previously, she served as deputy assistant administrator and director of the Center for Democracy and Governance at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Ms. Windsor began her service 

at USAID working on democracy and governance issues in Africa, 

and also served as special assistant deputy chief of staff to thenUSAID Administrator Brian Atwood. 

Elisa Massimino is president and chief executive officer of 

Human Rights First, where she has worked for almost two decades. 

Previously, she was a litigator in private practice at a Washington 

law firm where she was pro bono counsel in many human rights 

cases. Ms. Massimino writes frequently for mainstream publications and specialized journals and has testified before Congress 

dozens of times. 

We are pleased to have all you here. 

Mr. Carothers, why don’t you start? And, of course, everyone’s 

opening statements in their entirety will be included in the record 

and feel free, where appropriate, to summarize. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS CAROTHERS, J.D., VICE PRESIDENT 

FOR STUDIES, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 

Mr. CAROTHERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members 

of the committee. It is my pleasure to be here today. 

Supporting democracy abroad is a vital part of U.S. policy. Democracy assistance programs are a crucial tool in that goal. A wellcrafted rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act can help make democracy assistance more effective. 

I appear before the committee today as someone who studies democracy assistance. I try to understand what works and what 

doesn’t, how we can make it better. I am often known as a critic, 

because I think we often fall short of our ideals and our aspirations. But I am a critic who believes in the overall endeavor, and 

my critical comments both today and in general are aimed at that 

larger goal. 

The committee has before it many questions and issues with regard to democracy and human rights assistance. One of which is 

clearly on the committee’s mind is whether or not there are too 

many sources of democracy aid in the U.S. Government. There 

sometimes appears to be almost a chaotic salad bar of institutions 

involved, and one can wonder is there unnecessary duplication and 

a lack of coordination in this area? I understand the instinct to 

worry about this, but I don’t think that is the central problem. 

Democracy assistance is complicated. There are a lot of different 

parts to it, many different places, many different themes. It is useful having different organizations that develop different strengths 

and weaknesses. 

11

Also, democracy aid has a complex relationship to U.S. foreign 

policy. Sometimes it is good to have democracy aid coming from the 

State Department, where it is directly integrated into policy. Sometimes it is good having it come from a nongovernmental organization like the National Endowment, where it is at arm’s length. 

Having a variety of institutions gives you more flexibility, a greater 

range of tools in democracy assistance. 

Moreover, I don’t really see coordination as a problem, and I do 

a lot of research on the ground asking people what can make this 

assistance better. People working on the ground from the different 

parts of the U.S. Government, the different agencies and organizations talk to each other. They know what they are doing. There 

isn’t a lot of problem with coordination or tripping over each other. 

So where do the problems, then, lie? I think the problems lie 

more in how the assistance is being given out. The key to improve 

it is not to reduce the number of sources, but to make each source 

work as effectively as possible; and I would like to focus my time 

here on USAID, which is the big fish in this pool. 

USAID is by far the largest source of democracy assistance, well 

over $1 billion a year. In fact, USAID has devoted more resources, 

more energy, and more time to democracy assistance than any organization in the world in the last 25 years. USAID has done many 

valuable things in this domain, but time is short, so I will cut to 

the quick. 

USAID’s democracy assistance has serious problems reflecting 

serious problems that have been facing the agency for many years. 

First and foremost, it is extremely bureaucratic. Our assistance, 

unfortunately, is often inflexible. It is cookie cutter. It is slow. It 

is cumbersome. 

Democracy aid needs the opposite. You need innovation, flexibility, the chance to seize opportunities. USAID is weighted down 

by a bureaucratized system that makes it often ineffective on the 

ground. It needs a serious bureaucratic cleaning of the house, a 

debureaucratization. 

I ask the committee and the House not to think of putting more 

and more procedures, regulations, requirements on an agency that 

is already in a sense groaning underneath those that weigh upon 

it. It doesn’t need, obviously, to be let loose from legislation, but it 

needs freedom. It needs air to breathe. It needs the possibility of 

debureaucratizing itself and operating more in the spirit of democracy itself. 

Secondly, USAID does not give enough roles to the people in the 

countries with which it is trying to work. Too often when it does 

a project it hires some Americans to come in and design it, another 

set of Americans to come in and implement it, a third set of Americans to come in and evaluate it. This is not the way you choose 

local institutions. There needs to be a change in spirit and practice 

here. I don’t mean that we should necessarily just give money directly to the local people, but we need to give money in a way, 

sometimes to U.S. organizations, sometimes directly to locals, that 

allows them to have real partnerships with Americans, to have 

long-term relationships, not short-term projects in which Americans come and just tell them what to do. 

12

Third, USAID has been doing democracy work for 25 years but 

still doesn’t get a strong enough place within the agency. If you go 

to USAID and ask who is the most senior person responsible for 

democracy issues, it is not the administrator, it is not the deputy 

administrator, it is not an assistant administrator, it is a deputy 

assistant administrator, of whom there must be dozens at the agency. Yet we claim that this is a central priority of the agency. 

There needs to be an elevation in a number of ways, which I 

could go into in the questions and answers, to elevate the place of 

democracy within USAID. 

What will it take to do these things—to debureaucratize, to 

strengthen local actors, to give the greater place? Above all, leadership from the agency, drive from the top. This is an agency that 

responds to central imperatives from the leadership; and a willingness to focus on these often less glamorous bureaucratic, procedural, procurement issues that really are the thing that makes the 

agency ineffective or effective depending on how they are carried 

out. 

It will also require the support of Congress; and, as I said, it will 

require Congress to have a helping and sort of a thoughtful in itself 

a nimble hand in helping USAID achieve its potential, rather than 

simply trying to impose on it more and more procedures, regulations, rules that are already, to some extent, suffocating the agency. 

I ask that the remainder of my written testimony be entered into 

the record, and I thank you for the opportunity to appear today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carothers follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much, and as I indicated 

your statement will be in the record in its entirety. 

Mr. Craner. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LORNE W. CRANER, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE (FORMER 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEMOCRACY, 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR) 

Mr. CRANER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Ros-Lehtinen, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. I commend you for calling this hearing on ways to better 

help the oppressed abroad. 

When I joined the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor some years ago, a friend of mine named Penn Kemble, who 

was just coming out of the administration, gave me a piece of advice that I didn’t believe at the time. He told me that on advancing 

human rights and democracy in the administration my best friends 

would be here in the halls of Congress. I learned that he was right. 

Congress is the branch of our Government that most closely represents the American people, who are good and decent, and they 

want a foreign policy that reflects those traits. 

For those reasons, three decades ago, Congress created my old 

bureau, DRL. Over administration objection, the Congress mandated the Human Rights Reports. In the last 10 years, Congress, 

each time over administration objection, created State department 

offices to combat anti-Semitism, and to combat trafficking and to 

further religious freedom. Congress also passed the ADVANCE Democracy Act recently, after much back and forth with the Bush administration. 

These actions all greatly enhanced our efforts to promote human 

rights and democracy. 

Today, we face tougher obstacles abroad; and more action is 

needed. As I told Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice after I had 

left the administration but when I headed the State Department’s 

Advisory Committee on Democracy Promotion, our Government bureaucracy is not organized to deliver on Presidential promises on 

democracy and human rights. USAID’s democracy capabilities are 

weak, career officials need to be better trained and incentivized, 

there is an excessive bureaucracy at the State Department on this 

issue, and better coverage is needed across the field. 

The paper being circulated by the majority addresses many of 

these issues. My written statement has a comprehensive rundown 

of my views, including some additional thoughts on the paper’s provisions. But I believe that those upgrading USAID’s democracy office, requiring mission plans, consolidating reporting requirements, 

and requiring diplomat training and assignment to functional bureaus have special merit. 

I would commend my friend Tom Carothers’ paper to you. It describes additional problems and solutions for USAID. I hope, as do 

Tom and I think Jennifer, that USAID can be revitalized. If not, 

in a tough budget climate, an amount of democracy funding should 

be deducted from USAID, with part going to the more efficient 

DRL and NED and the remainder, frankly, going to reduce the 

budget. Other changes I suggest are addressing the creeping buVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:35 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\061010\56888 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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reaucratization of DRL and the much worse, valueless bureaucratization of the ‘‘F’’ process. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe there is another reason to act. As I describe in my written testimony, the Obama administration is facing 

many of the same questions on human rights that were faced early 

in the Reagan administration almost 30 years ago. Both succeeded 

unpopular Presidents whose foreign policy problems were seen to 

have been based on a misplaced concern with human rights, and 

early in both administrations the concern about human rights was 

downgraded. 

In Reagan’s case, congressional reaction, including by a then Republican Senate, helped bring the administration around. Within 

17 months of his inaugural, in fact 28 years ago this week, President Reagan delivered the Westminster speech, which was referred 

to earlier. He had recrafted President Carter’s policy, but he also 

added a strategy and the means—the NED and vital diplomacy—

to accomplish it. 

From the editorial pages of the Post and New York Times to dictators, Democrats, and dissidents abroad, the current administration’s human rights and democracy policies have been found wanting. The President has delivered a good number of speeches on this 

issue, and the recent national security strategy is a good addition. 

But 17 months into his administration, he has not put in place a 

strategy and a means to build on the 33-year bipartisan policy that 

preceded him. 

In the past, whether it was a Republican or Democrat Congress 

or a Republican or Democrat President, Congress, when it has 

found the administration wanting, has taken action and brought 

forth legislation that helped put us back on track. Today, we will 

be reviewing some of those proposals. Whether they are considered 

as part of a larger bill or on their own, I hope Congress will soon 

act. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Craner follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Ms. Windsor. 

STATEMENT OF MS. JENNIFER L. WINDSOR, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Ms. WINDSOR. Chairman Berman, distinguished members of the 

committee, thank you for convening this important hearing. 

I want to start by complimenting your staff on the excellent discussion paper on human rights and democracy. Freedom House 

supports many of the changes proposed in that paper. We believe 

that the U.S. should advance democracy and human rights as an 

end in itself as well as a way to advance other U.S. interests. In 

particular, we welcome the fact that the draft Presidential study 

directive appropriately prioritizes and recognizes the role of democratic governance in U.S. development policy. If there is anything 

that we have learned from good development policy it is that it has 

to take into account the political structures, and democratic governance is a vehicle in which to achieve better development. 

We are in a time, unfortunately, of a global freedom recession, 

as our various studies have shown. Of particular concern is the assault on and erosion of fundamental freedoms of association and 

expression, the very freedoms upon which democratic systems that 

respect human rights are based. 

International human rights defenders have asked for more U.S. 

support and more U.S. leadership in these areas, as you can see 

from the action plan that came out of the Washington Human 

Rights Summit we convened with Elisa and Human Rights First 

earlier this year. 

I want to now turn to current U.S. capacity to handle these challenges. The committee discussion paper notes and several of my copanelists have noted the problem of multiple actors, but we actually agree that, while there might be a need for better coordination, 

that consolidating democracy and human rights programs into any 

one entity either within or outside of the U.S. Government would 

be very counterproductive. Pluralism in this case has supported innovation. 

While Tom Carothers has already mentioned the problems of 

USAID, I want to add my 2 cents since I worked there for almost 

10 years before I came to Freedom House. I believe that USAID 

needs a strong central unit to complement and guide the work done 

by USAID field missions. The current Office of Democracy and 

Governance needs more human, more financial resources, and more 

policy influence. 

I wholeheartedly agree with the paper’s recommendation that the 

Democracy and Human Rights Office staff and programs be removed from the Humanitarian Conflict Bureau and elevated within 

the agency to a bureau that is on par with the other development 

sectors. 

More broadly, though, in talking about all parts of the U.S. Government, we need more discussion on what the proper role for any 

official from the U.S. Government should actually be in managing 

democracy and human rights programs. 

While, of course, we expect our Government officials to ensure 

that taxpayer dollars are used efficiently, excessive government 

control and involvement can be counterproductive. It can stifle inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:35 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\061010\56888 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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novation in programming and prevent programming that is flexible 

and responsive to the needs on the ground. The very lessons that 

we have learned from Tom Carothers and other studies is that we 

need to be more flexible and more able to change in this area; and 

I am worrying that we are seeing too much micromanagement from 

U.S. Government officials that are pushed by a number of pressures, including from the Hill, in this area. 

I now want to turn to the issue of results. 

Many of the members here mentioned the need to make sure 

that there is efficiency and effectiveness of our programs. We have 

problems, a number of problems, with the current system that has 

been put in place with the ‘‘F’’ process. The agency and now the 

State Department have been struggling with the issues of results 

for many, many years. I want to just make a couple of points about 

the area of democracy and human rights which I think provides 

unique challenges in this area. 

First, attributing progress in a country to specific U.S.-Government-funded programs may undermine the very legitimacy of 

groups and individuals that are the intended beneficiaries of those 

resources. If you say that assistance to Ukraine brought about the 

Ukrainian Orange revolution in Ukraine, that delegitimizes the 

very people that brought about that change. U.S. programs absolutely helped, but that doesn’t mean that they have been—they 

themselves are the cause for the change. 

Second, context matters a great deal in what results in democracy and human rights can be achieved. In a relatively open country like Nigeria, a program to support human rights groups can result perhaps in a change of law or change in practice that better 

protects human rights. But in a situation like Ethiopia, the mere 

survival of independent human rights groups represents an important achievement, given the Ethiopian Government’s attempts to 

try to stifle all civil society activity in this area. 

Third, in this time of a downward trend in freedom around the 

world, the system of impact measurement and expectations must 

be adapted to realities. It may be enough that the situation does 

not get worse. 

Fourth, in places like Burma, North Korea, Uzbekistan, Iran, the 

United States should be providing a lifeline of support to human 

rights defenders, regardless of whether there are measurable results. 

I would like to finish by being a bit provocative. The term ‘‘country ownership’’ has come up in a broader context of foreign aid reform. We fear that this term may be misinterpreted to mean that 

governments should be able to veto the kind of assistance that the 

U.S. or others provide in a country. 

The Obama administration has made a series of very bad decisions in this regard. They have recently zeroed out funding for democracy and governance and human rights in Bolivia at the request of the government there. They have limited USAID funding 

in China, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Egypt only to registered organizations when we know that such registration processes are being 

used to control or eliminate ‘‘undesirable activities of human rights 

groups.’’

33

Meanwhile, the State Department is moving ahead with plans to 

set up a $300-million Mubarak-Obama endowment for Egypt. This 

is country ownership in its worst form. 

Let me state for the record that we oppose the U.S. Government 

signing any agreement that gives authoritarian governments veto 

power over U.S. support for democracy and human rights. Similarly, we oppose any attempts that attempt to involve governments 

in determining what is responsible NGO behavior or regulation of 

independent media in the Internet. In these cases, governments always are the problem. 

I want to end by recognizing efforts of this committee to move 

forward the process of U.S. foreign assistance reform. I thank you 

for the opportunity to appear today. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Windsor follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Ms. Massimino—and I apologize for mispronouncing your name. It is not a name I am familiar with. Go 

ahead. 

STATEMENT OF ELISA MASSIMINO, J.D., PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, appreciate the 

opportunity to be here today to share our recommendations on this 

important issue. 

The existing statutory framework for foreign assistance is sorely 

in need of an overhaul after nearly half a century; and we are very 

grateful for your leadership, Mr. Chairman, and that of this entire 

committee in tackling this challenge head on. I want to echo my 

colleagues’ thanks to the committee staff who have consulted widely with stakeholders as part of this process. 

My comments today will focus on the committee’s human rights 

and democracy discussion paper that you referenced. Human 

Rights First, along with a number of other groups, have put forward two sets of recommendations to the committee over the last 

several months, and I have attached those as part of my testimony 

and ask that they be made part of the record. 

Our views on this issue are also shaped by the recommendations 

which came out of the summit that Jennifer mentioned that we cohosted with Freedom House here in Washington in February which 

brought together activists from over two dozen countries to discuss 

the challenges that they are facing and to formulate recommendations to governments for how to strengthen support for those on the 

front lines, including this government and actions by this government. So I ask that those recommendations be made part of the 

record as well. 

Chairman BERMAN. Without objection, they will be included. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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Ms. MASSIMINO. Thank you. 

Let me begin by saying we very much welcome the overall approach in the committee’s discussion paper. It includes a number 

of the recommendations that we have put forward. That said, legislative reform has to be a lot more ambitious in order to meet the 

objectives that the committee has set out. 

I would like to highlight just three principles that we believe 

ought to guide those efforts. The first relates to much of what we 

have heard today, including from members of the committee, is do 

no harm. It is essential that the U.S. assistance, especially security 

assistance, does not undermine respect for human rights or democratic governance or lend legitimacy to governments that violate 

fundamental rights. Where possible, assistance should provide incentives to encourage recipients to improve their human rights performance. 

Second, foreign assistance that is specifically designed to achieve 

human rights outcomes must be based on a clear strategy and operate through multiple channels in order to be effective. 

And, third, a new statutory framework for foreign assistance 

ought to strengthen the infrastructure to advance human rights 

throughout the government, not just at the State Department and 

USAID. A whole of government approach to advancing human 

rights and democracy should result in reinforcing messages and 

consistent political support for human rights from all parts of the 

government. 

Let me elaborate briefly on each of these principles. 

In the area of doing no harm, the committee’s discussion draft 

rightly prioritizes an effective minimum standard of human rights 

compliance before permitting a country to receive USAID and highlights the need to evaluate existing assistance to determine its impact on human rights. We recommend that the legislation build incentives that will help move recipients of assistance away from 

practices that violate human rights. This could be done by establishing an annual process for determining which recipients of U.S. 

security assistance have significant human rights problems, and 

such a finding could result in withholding a certain percentage of 

security assistance, both State and DoD funded, until specified improvements are achieved. 

Congress ought to authorize affirmative assistance to help those 

governments meet improvement benchmarks and avoid having 

their aid permanently reduced. 

The absence of effective conditionality on foreign security assistance fuels the damaging impression that the United States Government condones or even supports human rights violations committed 

by recipient security forces and governments. Such impressions are 

harmful to the broader U.S. national security interests and represent a significant cost that should be taken into consideration 

when objections are raised suggesting that applying human rights 

conditions will complicate or worsen vital strategic relationships. 

Another aspect of this principle of do no harm is that we have 

to ensure that the way in which U.S. foreign assistance is delivered 

doesn’t undermine the basic political freedoms that the assistance 

is designed to promote. For example, as Jennifer pointed out, we 

should not be acceding to the demands of other governments to vet 

54

or restrict U.S. foreign assistance to independent human rights organizations. Those kinds of arrangements create the impression 

that governments hold the veto power over the way that U.S. funds 

are dispersed and restrict access to much-needed support for very 

vulnerable local human rights defenders. 

We very much welcome the discussion papers focused on 

strengthening the Leahy law and incorporating it directly into the 

statutory framework for foreign aid. Restrictions on aid to security 

units who have committed severe violations of human rights with 

impunity are vital in upholding the do no harm principle. We 

strongly endorse the expansion of the Leahy law to units of recipient governance beyond the security forces, which should include police; and we also welcome expansion to aid provided by the Defense 

Department. 

The Defense Department has become, as you know, a huge donor of foreign aid. One estimate has the DoD at $8.9 billion in military 

aid worldwide in Fiscal Year 2009, outstripping all the programs 

administered by the State Department. It is essential that we bring 

transparency and oversight to that process as well as bring DoD 

aid squarely under human rights policy. To do that right, there has 

to be a good process for gathering evidence of human rights violations and including adequate funding to do that oversight. So we 

recommend that this be supported by a fee on security assistance 

to help shore up the infrastructure designed to do that. 

We also welcome the discussion draft’s emphasis on human 

rights and democracy action plans. That is something that we have 

called for for many years. These are essential building blocks, and 

affirmative assistance ought to be funded as part of an overall 

strategy embodied in those plans. USAID human rights assistance 

in particular should be tied directly to multi-agency strategies to 

promote human rights in a specific country, rather than being derivative of an overall USAID country strategy. Those action plans 

should include strategies to support independent human rights 

groups, and they ought to be involved in the development of those 

strategies. 

In our view, it would be a mistake to view assistance designed 

to advance respect for human rights as a subset of democracy assistance, as the discussion draft seems to suggest. Human rights 

and democracy are inextricably connected. Only when human 

rights are respected can democracy be secured. Yet it is also possible and sometimes it is critically important to advance human 

rights objectives through affirmative assistance in nondemocratic 

countries or in countries where the strategy to promote democracy 

is unclear. In those countries, support can be provided to human 

rights defenders to enhance their efforts to document violations, 

advocate for international bodies, and raise public awareness. That 

is critically important if we are going to build a civil society to advance human rights and democracy. 

The discussion draft proposes strengthening the democracy and 

human rights functions at USAID; and while USAID can certainly 

do more to advance human rights objectives, we would caution 

against an overreliance on that approach. I think this is consistent 

with what you have heard from all of the witnesses. Decision making there is heavily concentrated in field missions and for many of 

55

the development objectives the mission works closely with the host 

government in some cases, as it should. But that just underscores 

for us the need for multiplicity of actors in this area and against 

consolidation. 

As part of the mix, the State Department’s lead bureau with 

human rights and democracy promotion, DRL, has to have sufficient capacity to do this. That really underscores the necessity for 

building up all the levers of our power. 

One important recommendation out of the Human Rights Summit that we heard from our human rights colleagues was that the 

United States needs to facilitate, support, and strengthen engagement by independent civil society organizations in regional and 

subregional multilateral bodies; and we would welcome an emphasis on that and specific attention to supporting those efforts. 

Finally, in our view, none of this works unless there is a wholeof-government approach. This goes a bit to what Ms. Ros-Lehtinen 

mentioned about consistency in our diplomacy. 

A lot of the infrastructure of the U.S. Government to advance 

human rights globally is embedded and traced to the Foreign Assistance Act, the country report; and any rewriting of that should 

strengthen the ability of the entire government not only to deliver 

more effective assistance but also to ensure that the rhetorical commitment of the U.S. to universal human rights is backed up with 

committed action as a foreign policy priority. 

For those country plans to work, they need to exist more than 

just on paper. They have to become part of the fabric of the U.S. 

approach to every country across all government agencies. That requires leadership from the top, and it is going to require consistent 

oversight from you all here. And there has to be somebody in 

charge of implementing those plans. That could be the U.S. Ambassador, the Chief of Mission, but there needs to be somebody designated. And, of course, there has to be sufficient resources. That 

has got to be backed up by sufficient resources and attention here 

in Washington; and we think that the regional bureau in the State 

Department, each of them should have a Deputy Assistant Secretary devoted to human rights. 

In conclusion, I want to point out that in the national security 

strategy that President Obama released just recently it was structured around looking at the world as it is and the world as we 

want it to be. We see foreign aid as a critical vehicle in getting us 

from point A to point B. This is a moment when our U.S. interests 

and values are so aligned, to align our foreign aid structure to 

those values, and we look forward to working with the committee 

to seize that opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Massimino follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. I thank all of you very much. 

We will now go to the comments and questions of the panel 

under the 5-minute rule. That means if the question takes 4 minutes and 55 seconds, the panelists have 5 seconds to answer. 

I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

There are many questions to ask, and I won’t be able to raise all 

of the issues I would like to pursue with you, but let me start with 

this. I do this notwithstanding what could be interpreted as Ms. 

Windsor’s admonition, and I take her point not so much as crediting America for something happening, you do have to measure effectiveness of programs, and that requires some discussion of what 

has happened as a result of programs. 

In a recent briefing to committee staff, a senior government official claimed we don’t really know how to do democracy and governance programs and that devoting additional funds to this area—

and presumably continuing to fund at the current levels—would be 

a waste because they have failed to achieve tangible results. 

Do you agree with that assessment? Can you provide meaningful 

examples of where our democracy and governance programs have 

achieved meaningful results? 

Ms. WINDSOR. Well, I will start to say that I absolutely agree 

with you that we should be knowing whether programs are actually 

good programs and are making a difference, whether they get attributed to the U.S. or not. 

I am sorry to hear about the senior government official. There 

are at least 20 or 30 briefing books that are in USAID and the 

State Department on different results measurement, and there is 

actually an outside book prepared on this, and I am sure I could 

recommend some reading. 

So let’s talk about what kind of results one can see. I will use 

Freedom House programs, because it kind of concretizes it. 

When Lorne was the Assistant Secretary of DRL, we received 

funding for an independent—to try to set up an independent printing press in Kyrgyzstan because there was no alternative capacity 

to that of the state and the states in the region to print alternative 

newspapers. It was a way that the government used to try to control the free flow of information. 

The U.S. invested in this. Everyone said technically there is no 

way that it can be helpful, and now there is actually a printing 

press that works. There are opposition newspapers that have been 

printed on it. There are a lot of other things that have been printed 

on it. The state printing press has had to upgrade its capabilities. 

Has this changed democratic development in Kyrgyzstan? No. As 

we can see, during that time, Kyrgyzstan has gone through a number of political changes. It is not responsible for that, but this is 

an example of a good investment. 

We were talking about the issue of women’s rights. In Jordan, a 

program we had working with Jordanian human rights and women’s rights organizations to look at honor crimes, we brought a lot 

more awareness to the issue; and one of the parts of raising awareness was to look at how courts actually treated these issues. So we 

monitored with our local partners hundreds of cases. Out of that, 

the recommendation was that there needed to be a specialized 

67

court chamber to hear cases in a more equitable manner, and that 

was put in place. 

Now again, I think that was a good recommendation. Is there 

still a problem in terms of treatment of women in Jordan? Yes. Do 

we think that this is an effective use of money to be able to advance the process? Yes. 

Chairman BERMAN. Let me ask, does anybody else want to weigh 

in on this? 

Mr. CRANER. I would. I was kind of shocked to hear you say that, 

and it makes me wonder where this diplomat has been for the last 

25 years. I think if you talked to folks in the Philippines or Chile 

or Serbia or Indonesia or Georgia or Moldavia or many other 

places, I know that they say our aid has been effective. 

I will tell you a story. I was in Bratislava, Slovakia, talking to 

Mikulas Dzurinda who defeated Vladimir Meciar in the 1998 election, and I said, ‘‘This place looks a lot different.’’ I had driven in 

from the airport. There was a lot more economic activity. There 

was clearly a lot of investment. There was even an IKEA out by 

the airport. And I said, ‘‘Now you are in the EU and NATO.’’ I said, 

‘‘This is all due to you. This is because of your presidency from 

1998 to 2002.’’

He said, ‘‘No, it is not. It is all due to you. It is all due to the 

assistance that you gave us.’’ He said, ‘‘Without your assistance, we 

could not have done this.’’

Jennifer is right. Measuring this is an art, not a science. This is 

not like how many kids did you immunize or how many miles of 

road did you build, but it is measurable. And I would be happy to 

brief your staff on some of the work we at IRI have been doing. But 

the foreigners are our best evidence that it works. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you very much. 

My time has expired, and I yield to the ranking member, 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have three country specific questions: On Iran, should the Iran 

Democracy Fund be restored? And, if so, what should its specific 

objectives and performance benchmarks be? 

On Cuba, the Cuban regime’s imprisonment of U.S. citizen Alan 

Gross has effectively put U.S. democracy assistance to Cuba on 

hold for months, playing directly into the dictatorship’s hands. Do 

you believe the administration should continue to allow the Cuban 

regime to dictate our assistance to freedom seekers on the island? 

And, finally, on Haiti: Keeping in mind the relatively fragile 

state of Haiti’s Government, what role do you think democracy assistance should play with regard to U.S. immediate and long-term 

assistance funding to Haiti? 

Lorne, let’s start with you. 

Mr. CRANER. Let me talk about Cuba first. I have also found this 

very, very frustrating. 

I understand reluctance to—on the surface a reluctance to continue the programs, but I think with a few minutes of thought we 

ought to be able to get past this. There are many, many programs 

that have been done over the years in a similar fashion. I don’t 

hear any complaining about this kind of program going on in 

Zimbabwe. I don’t hear any complaining about this kind of program 

68

going on in Burma or North Korea or many other places. It seems 

to be focused on Cuba. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

If I can have the others discuss Iran and Haiti. 

Ms. WINDSOR. Let me comment on Iran. I think it is less important where the Iran program is placed. If in fact it provides less 

rhetorical interference by putting it under a regional program, I 

think that is not a problem. The problem is what it is actually focusing on and what the approach is. Some of the decisions have 

been made that we don’t agree with, programs that have been cut 

off and other programs that have been funded, and it is very hard 

to figure out what the strategy is. 

We think that priority for assistance should be given to political 

prisoners, refugees, and Internet and securing digital communications. It seems like if we have a number of very critical areas we 

identify the priorities and let’s strive toward those. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

On Haiti? 

Ms. MASSIMINO. I would like to add a word on Iran, if I could. 

Obviously, assistance to a country like Iran is incredibly complicated. From our perspective, it is very important to take into account the views of the activists inside the society. We have to be 

really careful, as Jennifer pointed out, to focus on what objectives 

we are trying to achieve there. We have to be very careful not to 

conflate regime change with human rights promotion. That is essential. 

I very much agree with what Jennifer said about where we 

should be focusing our assistance on the political prisoners, human 

rights activists who are so much under siege. 

Mr. CRANER. I think you know IRI no longer operates in Haiti. 

I think that the lessening of our democracy assistance there is a 

big mistake. There is a lot of talk about country ownership coming 

out of the administration. I don’t know how a country can own 

some of the programs that we want them to own, absent a functioning government. That seems to be a big problem in Haiti. So 

to now cut off the assistance to try to help build a functioning government, it seems to me that we are going to be giving a lot of aid 

there for a long time because we are the only effective actor. 

Mr. CAROTHERS. I would add a word on Iran. 

I think the impulse of the U.S. Government to try to do everything that it can to support democracy in Iran is commendable, but 

we also have to be realistic in understanding what is possible. The 

kind of efforts that Lorne described in Slovakia that did produce 

positive results and really a wonderful legacy are impossible—or 

difficult, if not impossible, to carry out in Iran because of the lack 

of political space there. So we have to be careful in thinking about 

what kind of opportunities there are there to carry out the sorts 

of training or other kinds of technical assistance that we do in 

other places. So I think with Iran it isn’t the amount of money that 

is important; it is the care and the sensitivity and the thought with 

which we do such programs. 

On Haiti, we have to use this effort of reconstruction. If you just 

pile onto a country lots and lots of reconstruction money and don’t 

try to integrate a new conception in Haiti of when are we ever 

69

going to get past the failed state problem in Haiti and build that 

into the reconstruction effort, then we are simply repeating the 

mistakes of the past. I worked on Haiti in the late 1980s, and we 

haven’t moved much beyond that. So reconstruction does need to 

be combined with democracy assistance to Haiti. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, chairman of the Africa and Global Health Subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Let me say that I am very pleased we are having this very important hearing. I apologize that I did not get an opportunity to 

hear the testimony. However, I am very familiar with the work 

done, especially NED, which I think has been a very important 

agency, so to speak, not quite an agency, but by NED being the 

type of organization that it is, it is able to transcend whatever administration is in, and the work of NED continues to be balanced 

and to move forward with the IRI and NDI and the National 

Chamber of Commerce and AFL–CIO having all of those areas. 

Mr. Craner, we have seen sometimes that the work that we attempt to do in countries promoting democracy in some countries 

seems to, in some instances—and I won’t go into them specifically, 

but I think you know the ones we are talking about—how do we 

keep a balance, though, of us doing democracy building without—

and I know it is kind of a delicate balance—without becoming intrusive or really injecting our own, sometimes subconsciously, individual biases or preferences, however you want to say it? Because, 

as you know, in several instances on different continents we have 

heard the criticism. And, of course, countries don’t want to admit 

that they have a problem, but how do you do that balance? 

Mr. CRANER. I think you do it with a couple of things that I always tell my staff. One is that we assist, we don’t lead. That it is 

our job to walk a couple of steps behind the folks, and when they 

turn to us for advice, give them the advice they are asking for. 

Second, we need to understand that it is their country, not ours. 

Their democracy will turn out looking very, very different from 

ours, just as our democracy looks very, very different from that of 

the British, and we are born from them. 

Maybe most of all we need to understand that third, it is their 

fight, not ours. They have chosen to make this stand, and we are 

not there to cheer them on. We are there to give them the most 

objective advice we can about how to help them accomplish that. 

Finally, I always say we need to have a very un-American virtue 

called patience. We need to understand that we can’t go into a 

country for 2 or 3 years and spend $100 million and then say, gee, 

they don’t look like us. That in a lot of these countries, especially 

the ones that are left, it is going to 10, 15, 20 years to really be 

able to make a difference. And if we are willing to make that commitment, then some better things will come out the other end. 

Ms. MASSIMINO. I think one of the key factors in achieving that 

correct balance is listening to the human rights democracy activists 

on the ground. 

Chairman Berman, you asked when has there been real, concrete, measurable progress. I would say most of the places where 

70

that have happened are examples of where we did a good job of listening to the activists on the grounds. USAID, which helped to establish this innovative new accountability mechanism in Guatemala which now is providing an opportunity for activists who have 

been collecting evidence for decades of war crimes in that country 

now have a place to have those cases heard. That was done by 

USAID, and it was done by listening to the activists on the ground. 

And there are numerous examples of that kind of concrete 

progress. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Before my time expires, I just want to throw out two questions, 

and I don’t have time to get an answer. But we do push democracy. 

Of course, we pushed elections in Gaza, and we ended up with 

something that we didn’t want. That is for sure. 

In Algeria, we had elections. They won. But the NIF, bad government, the army went in and said, ‘‘We can’t have that.’’ So sometimes this democracy has a two-edged sword. 

The final thing, I want to say that on August 4 Kenya is expected to vote on a draft referendum which is going to approve or 

reject, and it is very important because we saw the tragedy that 

happened after the last election when many people died. However, 

let me just say that outsiders are really intruding. There is an antiabortion provision that has no exception for the life of the mother, 

and there is also some 999 year leases that outside people don’t 

want ended. So the danger is we are going to have outside influence killing a bill that the country needs. If they don’t get a referendum going, I predict the same thing is going to happen at the 

end of the next election that happened with the thousands that 

were killed at the end of the last——

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

For those of us who are willing to sit that long, we will have a 

chance to come back for a second round. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a couple of comments, and that is regime change is the goal 

of human rights activists, an activity in dictatorships that murder 

their people and suppress those liberties that we consider to be important and valuable. This idea of we are supposed to be just engaging these ghoulish, monstrous regimes like in North Korea, we 

are going to engage them rather than seek to change that regime 

is at best counterproductive to trying to achieve the goals of a freer 

people and a freer world. What has happened in North Korea 

through this type of logic has been the cementing of their power, 

rather than the replacing of a regime that threatens the peace and 

stability of an entire region of the world. 

I would like to ask a question of the panel. I happen to believe 

that one of the greatest obstacles to achieving the human rights 

goals that we have in mind and that we agree on as Americans, 

one of the greatest obstacles is that we have corporate America on 

the wrong side and that we have people, Americans, going over and 

trying to cut deals with these dictatorships, whether it be in China 

or Ethiopia or elsewhere, in a way that basically we are told by 

that kind of engagement we are going to change the Chinese or 

71

change this dictatorship or that dictatorship when in fact what 

happens is our corporate leaders become mouthpieces for the dictatorship here, rather than promoters of democracy there. 

What role does corporate America play in this whole struggle? 

Just comments. 

Ms. MASSIMINO. I think it is huge. I think you are absolutely 

right, that in some countries corporations have a bigger footprint 

and a bigger influence than the U.S. Government does. And I think 

it is vital that we——

I mean, if you just think about Internet freedom and freedom of 

expression, this was the biggest issue that came up, freedom of expression and association in the virtual space at the summit that we 

held in February. While we raised all of these concerns and the activists who were here raised them with the U.S. Government, the 

people who really needed to be in the room were the heads of 

Google and Microsoft and Yahoo and these other companies. 

I was heartened to see that the State Department has laid down 

a marker, that Secretary Clinton has called these companies in to 

talk about how their actions can be undermining and potentially 

could be supporting our foreign policy. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. People who believe that democracy and freedom should be a major priority for American policy need to be appalled when they hear that people like Assistant Secretary Posner 

has conducted meetings with the Communist Chinese, which happen to be the world’s worst human rights abusers, and the framework of the discussion is based on America has some sort of moral 

equivalency to these type of vicious dictatorships. Well, I am afraid 

when corporate America deals with these dictatorships, whether 

China or elsewhere, it is already based on they are legitimate, 

meaning our corporate leaders are providing legitimacy to any type 

of agreement in deals they make with the cliques that hold power 

in these vicious regimes. 

I think we need to focus on making sure that we don’t succumb 

to this engagement strategy with dictatorships; and, instead, we 

have the strategy of replacing those dictatorships on an official 

level and that we don’t let corporate America undermine our efforts 

by giving legitimacy by making deals with those very same regimes. 

I have 30 seconds left. 

Mr. CAROTHERS. Well, Michael Posner, I am sure, will have a 

chance to respond. 

Let me say that I know a little bit about those talks. Michael 

Posner has worked for human rights for over 20 years. He doesn’t 

believe in a moral equivalence between Chinese human rights practices and American ones. I think his approach to that dialogue was 

one that this is going to be a long-term process with the Chinese; 

and in the first conversation you have with a difficult partner, you 

don’t start screaming at them. I think it was more of a tactical approach, rather than a strategic one; and I think he understands the 

real challenge at issue. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutch, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I will pass at this time, Mr. Chairman. 

72

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Connolly is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the concerns I have had over the years in looking at our 

efforts in trying to foster democratic values and democratic institutions, and particularly I am focused on NDI and the Republican Institute as well, my observation is we have a top-down kind of approach. As somebody who spent 14 years in local government, my 

sense is that democracy is built from the bottom up, rather than 

the top down. I think that is a fundamental problem in the pyramid of our efforts; and I am wondering, Mr. Craner, if you might 

comment on that. 

Mr. CRANER. I know this isn’t the season, but I hope you can 

come out and travel with us so we can allay your fears. 

Both in helping civil society groups and in building political parties, we work from the ground up. The political parties we usually 

run into are top down. They are also usually very, very small because of that. The point we make with them is, if you are only operating in the capital or urban centers and if you don’t have a platform that appeals to people across the country and if you don’t 

have branches across the country and if you don’t have members 

across the country, you are not going anywhere. So our approach 

is to help them build from the ground up. Because they do, usually 

not surprisingly in the countries where we work, have a very centralized mentality. 

But whether it is us or NDI, come out with us; and I think we 

can allay your fears. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If we are looking at fostering elections at the village or local level, you might see incipient democracy that you will 

not see at higher levels of government. 

Mr. CRANER. And that is why both we and NDI have taken on 

this issue of governance; and, as it happens, we are both working 

very much at the local level so that the good examples percolate 

up and they percolate across the country. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do either you or NDI have a local government 

component actually dedicated to local government? 

Mr. CRANER. Absolutely. We are currently operating in many 

countries. Colombia is our oldest program. Jordan. We just started 

a program like that in Moldova. We have a similar program in 

Georgia. We have a similar program I am going to see next week 

in Berbera, Kenya. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you believe USAID, which is really the source 

of funding, adequately funds the local government initiatives we 

are trying to undertake? 

Mr. CRANER. I think perhaps more than adequately. And I think 

there is a missing element in their programs. Their programs are 

very much focused on service delivery. Are the lights working in 

the streets, is the garbage being collected, all of which is important 

to the people in the cities or villages they think, but they don’t 

really know. They assume that those are the things that are important. 

It is kind of like in Afghanistan. When we started, we would pull 

up to a village and say, ‘‘Hey, I bet you need a health clinic,’’ when 

what they really needed was a well. 

73

The missing component is the political issue. It is putting the 

people in the village together with the providers so they can say, 

‘‘We don’t need a health clinic. We need a school or we need a well 

dug.’’ That is what would make a difference to us in this town. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Ms. Windsor, you were nodding your head in affirmation. 

Ms. WINDSOR. Yes. I think in fact the local level—how you define 

the local level is important. Especially, is your objective more democracy than human rights? I think there are plenty of programs 

that are ensuring better citizen involvement in different processes, 

et cetera, building up and training government officials, increasing 

budget transparency. I think that sometimes the local government 

programs, though, are looked at apolitically. And in the end, 

whether it is local government or judicial systems or parliaments 

or other aspects, this is a political system that we are interfacing 

with; and sometimes I think that USAID can be a little cut and 

dried in terms of looking at what local government means and 

takes the politics out of local government. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, it is inherently political because there is a 

contract. That is, if I am collecting your taxes, however well or 

badly, the contract is that I will provide services to you, however 

well or badly. It is a fairly fundamental principle, but it is a real 

essential building block of democratization anywhere. 

Mr. Carothers, in the 19 seconds I have left, do you want to comment? 

Mr. CAROTHERS. I think what Lorne and Jennifer have described 

is really an evolution over the last 20 years. IRI and NDI may have 

started out in the 1980s with a very national focus. They had less 

money and less experience, but there has been a real evolution over 

time. In places like Russia, even though it is a big country, IRI 

went very local for awhile. I don’t think that is any longer a problem. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Smith from New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

To Secretary Craner, first, let me say I appreciate you pointing 

out that human rights laws have been established repeatedly over 

the objections of administrations, be that Democrat or Republican. 

And you cited the Religious Freedom Act. I held all of the hearings 

here. The Clinton administration was against it. He ended up signing it. They were against the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 

He ended up signing it. And the Bush administration was against 

the special envoy and the office on anti-Semitism, we passed it, he 

signed it, and that was the Bush administration. 

So from my point of view, there is a bad habit that has to be broken; and we are seeing it again with the International Megan’s 

Law which we have passed out of this committee. I am very concerned that this administration is going to try to kill it. I am worried about the International Child Abduction and Prevention Act, 

which is not getting any traction at the Department, even though 

there are 2,800 American children who have been kidnapped, and 

1,800 or so American parents left behind. 

And then there is the Global Online Freedom Act, which was opposed by the Bush administration, and I believe will be opposed by 

74

the Obama administration as well. That, too, is very clear and nonambiguous; and at least two of your organizations have been outstanding in helping us write it and now support it. I am afraid that 

legislation is going to die as well. 

Two quick issues with regard to China, which I believe in scope 

and pervasiveness is the most egregious violator of human rights 

on earth. I was very disappointed when Mrs. Clinton said we will 

not allow human rights to interfere with climate change and with 

settling our debt. We know a number of labor activists, more than 

before, are being arrested and incarcerated, beaten even, for asking 

for fundamental ILO protections. It is no coincidence in my view 

that the Cairo speech by the President was made during the anniversary of Tiananmen Square. 

And one issue that absolutely is the worst violation of human 

rights in the world, is the one child per couple policy. We are now 

giving money to at least two organizations, Marie Stopes International and the U.N. Population Fund, even though huge numbers 

of women are being violated as never before. 

I would ask unanimous consent that the op-ed by Chai Ling, the 

leader of the human rights Tiananmen Square student movement 

called, ‘‘China’s One Child Policy as Brutal and Hypocritical as 

Ever,’’ be included in the record. She points out there are 100 million girls missing because of the forced abortion policy. And also 

that there are some 30 to 40 million more boys than girls under 

the age of 20, and she puts that in perspective. That is equal to 

the entire young male population of the United States of the same 

age. Those girls are gone, killed by gendercide. 

Recently, we had a hearing and a woman named Wujian testified, and this gives an indication just how horrific this policy is and 

why so many women are committing suicide in China. Five hundred women per day commit suicide, according to WHO. 

Wujian said:

‘‘Then I was put into a room with several other moms. The 

room was full of moms who had just gone through a forced 

abortion. Some moms were crying, some moms were mourning, 

some moms were screaming, and one mom was rolling on the 

floor in unbearable pain. Then I kept saying to her [the abortionist], ‘. . . how could you become a killer by killing people 

every day?. . .’ ’’

Then she talks about how when they put the big, long needle 

into the head of the baby, the baby died.

‘‘At the moment, it was the end of the world for me and I felt 

even time had stopped. Since it did not come out as expected, 

they decided to cut the baby into pieces in my womb with scissors and then suck it out with a special machine. I did not 

have any time to think as this most horrifying surgery began 

by force. I could hear the sound of the scissors, cutting the 

body of my baby in the womb.’’

She went on to say,

‘‘Eventually the journey in hell, the surgery, was finished; and 

one nurse showed me part of the bloody foot with her tweezers. 

Through my tears, the picture of the bloody foot was engraved 

75

into my eyes and into my heart, and so clearly I could see the 

small five bloody toes.’’

This is the one child per couple policy. I say to President Obama, 

silence in the face of this barbaric Chinese Government behavior 

is not an option. 

Why have we not spoken out on this issue? And I mean in a way 

that is meaningful, not in some passing reference? This is the 

worst violation in my opinion of women ever. 

Finally, my friend and colleague, Mr. Payne, talked about Kenya. 

Kenya is a pro-life country. Virtually every poll shows massive majorities believe in the sanctity and dignity of unborn life, and yet 

the U.S. Government has contributed at least $11 million in the 

constitutional rewrite. We have asked, Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen and I 

and another Member of Congress, that the IG investigate this 

wrongful use, this violation of the Siljander amendment, in promoting this pro-abortion constitution. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The United States provides certain types of assistance to countries with repressive governments like China, Cuba, Vietnam, and 

so forth; and usually the assistance is for nongovernmental organizations that promote democracy and human rights or for activities 

in such areas as environmental protection and disease control, 

which are important to the health and safety of American citizens. 

But do you believe that such assistance programs should be terminated in countries with poor records on human rights and democracy? 

Mr. CRANER. There is a fundamental dilemma here, and I faced 

this in Uzbekistan when I was in government. The Uzbek Government is about as nasty a group of people as you can find, and there 

are many of that description. 

We, by dint of 9/11, were close to being engaged to working with 

the Uzbek Government. There was a time when we thought we 

were making progress from a very, very low base in terms of how 

they treated people. This is a pretty nasty group in terms of how 

they were killing people in prisons, that kind of thing. And then 

Andijan happened, which was the big massacre out in eastern 

Uzbekistan and all U.S. relationships with Uzbekistan essentially 

ended. Does that help the people in Uzbekistan that we ended a 

relationship over something awful that happened? 

I would contend, and I know that Congress has addressed itself 

to this on occasion, that in countries where we have a complete embargo that human rights and democracy work be allowed to continue. I think especially of Serbia in the late 1990s, where Congress faced that dilemma and made that decision. So I would make 

the case that in very, very limited circumstances, very, very narrow 

types of programming should be allowed to continue in those countries. I don’t find it morally satisfying to not have a relationship 

and not be able to help. 

Ms. WINDSOR. However, I just want to reiterate my point that 

signing MOUs with the Government of China to allow them to dicVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:35 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\061010\56888 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tate what kind of assistance we provide, which has recently been 

the case with USAID’s program China, is not the way to go. 

I would also say that it is not the democracy and human rights 

assistance that we should be worried about in many of these countries. That is a very—it is a pittance in terms of overall relationship and message that these governments are getting from the U.S. 

Government in terms of what is really important. That is true in 

Uzbekistan, where we are now apparently relooking at restoring 

military relationships. China, Vietnam, whether we assist democracy and human rights groups under extremely narrow circumstances is not the problem there. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me ask you about Africa. We have a serious 

human rights violation problem, particularly in the heart of Africa, 

in places like Rwanda and especially in the Congo in a place called 

Goma, where I was and went. 

I want to ask you if you could comment on what should be done. 

The number one physical ailment and treatment in the hospitals 

of Goma are not tuberculosis, it is not stroke or heart disease or 

high blood pressure, it is violation of sexual cruelty to women. That 

is the number one treatment, not rape but sexual violence. How 

deeply are you aware of this and what would be your advice as to 

how we can use our resources to get in there and help or what are 

we doing? 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Well, as you know, if you have been there, it is 

rampant and a huge problem. And I think, from our perspective, 

we are not working on this directly right now but have spoken to 

groups on the ground who are struggling to deal with this overwhelming problem. Like many of the problems we are talking 

about today, there are complex causes, and it needs to be tackled 

from a number of different avenues. 

Mr. SCOTT. What would you say are the causes? Can you just expand on the complexity of the causes? 

Ms. MASSIMINO. I can’t put myself out there as an expert, but the 

legacy of the wartime abuses is a serious problem there. It created 

a culture in which this kind of thing is permitted, and so there is 

that aspect of the problem that has to be dealt with in addition to 

dealing with the victims after the fact, prevention. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake. 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Windsor, Freedom House has documented very well the 

human rights abuses in Cuba that have gone on, yet Freedom 

House still advocates the lifting of the travel ban to allow Americans to travel. Do you want to talk about that for a minute? 

Ms. WINDSOR. Yes. We did it. It was our first act, actually, when 

the Obama administration first came into office. We think that the 

lifting on the ban on travel to Cuba makes sense. It will enable the 

free flow of information to Cuban citizens, it will increase ideas of 

liberty, and it will be harder for the Cuban Government to contain 

that information, which they are able to do. 

I also noted that the U.S. ban on Americans to Cuba will reaffirm the rights of Americans to travel wherever they want. We are 

allowed to travel to any of these other countries that have greater 

sanctions. However, we don’t think any policy changes—any addiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:35 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\061010\56888 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tional policy changes—we need to be in consultation with the democracy and human rights groups within Cuba and make sure that 

anything we do is supported by them and think that they will increase freedom and liberty on the island. 

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you for that thoughtful position. 

I am holding here a letter to the House of Representatives from 

members of Cuban civil society signed by 74 individuals, people 

representing civil rights society there, clerics, intellectuals, artists, 

political prisoners. Across the board, they make the argument that 

we share the opinion that the isolation of the people of Cuba benefits the most inflexible interests of its government. It would seem 

across the board—and I know you will find a dissident here or 

there who will say, no, we should continue with the status quo, but 

the status quo of 50 years has gotten us very little. 

Mr. Craner, you mentioned we shouldn’t put a hold on democracy 

programs just because we have a problem with Mr. Gross being 

held and mentioned that we have democracy programs continuing 

in Burma or Zimbabwe, and we also allow Americans to travel to 

those countries. We don’t have that prohibition. Do you feel that 

prohibition is still warranted in this case? 

Mr. CRANER. I have to tell you, I looked at this from a little bit 

of experience, not with Cuba but another country called Vietnam. 

I used to work for Senator McCain, as you may know. I thought 

it was a smart thing in the 1980s and even into the first Bush administration, Bush 41, to lift a lot of sanctions against Vietnam, to 

allow businesses in and establish diplomatic relations, et cetera, 

because I thought it would help on human rights and democracy. 

I am afraid that I was wrong. I don’t think there has been any 

improvement in human rights and democracy in Vietnam. The idea 

that if you let businesses in, that folks from IBM or Exxon are 

going to proselytize for democracy, I think they are too busy making money. 

Mr. FLAKE. Individuals to travel, you certainly wouldn’t advocate 

reimposing a travel ban, or imposing a travel ban on Vietnam? 

Mr. CRANER. I think—I don’t know there ever was a travel ban 

on Vietnam, but in the case of Cuba, this has been an administration very dedicated to engagement. And I think they are coming to 

the—in some countries at least—they are coming to the end of 

their tether on what engagement has produced. So absent some 

willingness on the part of the Cubans to move, I don’t know why 

we would. 

Mr. FLAKE. I have always held the position, most in Congress do, 

I think, this is in our self-interest. We have tried to outguess, second guess the Cuban administration as to what they want. I have 

never been convinced that they really want the travel ban lifted. 

I think we should disregard what we think that they want and do 

what we know is in our interest, and it is simply not in our interest 

to deny Americans the ability to make that choice themselves as 

to whether or not they will travel. 

I commend those in USAID and elsewhere in government who 

have tried to implement programs that will help those Cubans who 

need it badly. I think we ought to allow Americans and have simply greater contact, and things will happen that we simply don’t 

know. Cuba can impose their travel ban. If we lift ours, they will 

78

probably impose some kind of ban. But that should be their province, not ours. 

I thank Freedom House and others, and I encourage all of you 

to encourage travel and trade. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ambassador Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. I want to thank all of the witnesses. 

Having been an Ambassador myself, I have to agree with my colleague over on the other side, Mr. Flake, because I do think that 

the more contact Americans have with the Cuban people on the 

ground—I think under new leadership there, however, it could still 

be convinced by the brother to hold onto policies. But having discussions with Fidel Castro, I feel we could make some headway if 

we relieve the travel ban and let people go into Cuba by their own 

need to whatever, tour, to talk with the Cubans themselves. 

I had an opportunity to be on the campus on the medical school 

there—and I am going to say this real quickly because I want to 

go to my points—but I went up to students getting off buses, and 

I recognized them as being Americans, African Americans, and I 

asked them, what does this experience mean to you? And they said, 

a quality medical education, virtually free, and I am looking forward to devoting 2 years of my professional life, delivering health 

care services in underdeveloped countries. 

If you talk to the people who are there, they are not looking at 

the politics, but they are looking at how they can benefit from this 

program. Some of the best health care—and I have been attacked 

because I have said this—some of the best health care I have seen 

has been in Cuba. 

Now let me get to something that I think I heard Mr. Carothers 

or Mr. Craner say, either one. It was about Haiti. I understand 

from President Clinton, the envoy to Haiti, that he had worked out 

a development plan with President Preval prior to the earthquake 

short term, mid term, and long term; and this was our assistance 

to Haiti to start developing their country. 

Either one of you, if you can respond, I would appreciate it. I 

thought I heard somebody refer to development in Haiti. 

Mr. CAROTHERS. I did refer. My point, Congresswoman, was that 

now that we are in a phase of giving extensive assistance to Haiti 

again—and it kind of waxes and wanes in American policy—we 

should take advantage of that moment to address fundamental 

issues of building the Haitian state and building a democratic 

state. Because Haiti’s calamities will simply occur and reoccur if we 

don’t get to the essential problem that they have never built a genuine relationship between their state and their society. And so we 

want to be as helpful as possible as quickly as possible, but simply 

pouring reconstruction money onto a state that basically doesn’t 

work isn’t going to get to the fundamental roots of the problem. 

Ms. WATSON. And I would like this verified. And maybe, Mr. 

Chairman, we can send a letter to the special envoy, President 

Clinton. Because he then told us that he had the President sign off 

on a development plan which included many points in the following: Developing a strong middle class. And I understand since 

1751 that resources were held at the top and they never went down 

and so the Haitian people have learned to just be survivors at the 

79

lowest level and I understand in an MOU that was signed that 

some of this was included. So maybe we as a committee could get 

some answers as to what was contained in the development plan. 

Chairman BERMAN. On the issue of part of our resources on governance? 

Ms. WATSON. How best to aid the Haitian people in terms of developing their country on a more democratic basis, in terms of developing their infrastructure, and in terms of jobs, and in terms—

I see my time is up, but you get the gist. 

Chairman BERMAN. I do. We will follow up with you to pursue 

that. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretaries Clinton and Gates have both talked about promoting 

the idea of smart security. I actually have legislation that promotes 

a smarter approach to reaching peace around the world with nations we might be having arguments with. Because it is absolutely 

no longer acceptable that our foreign policy would be based on preemptive strikes and military might and that we would think that 

if another country’s approach to democracy or human rights in a 

real effort don’t look like ours, so then it is our job to bully them 

into submission, that has to stop. It is not working. We know that. 

So my question to you—and I guess I am just telling you that—

since we need to prevent discord and we need to build cooperation, 

we absolutely must worldwide, are there states where in your opinion it isn’t possible to start the dialogue and make inroads? 

I don’t know where to start. Mr. Craner. 

Mr. CRANER. You mean start the dialogue and make inroads on 

this issue or in general? 

Ms. WOOLSEY. On this issue. 

Mr. CRANER. I think there are some countries that simply aren’t 

interested, where the leaders are not interested. I think if we tried, 

and I think we do try to talk to the North Koreans on this issue, 

we are not going to get much of a response. I think the people are 

more interested, but it is very difficult for us to get out and talk 

to the people. And it is also in that kind of country such a repressive environment that it is very, very—as soon as somebody lifts 

their head and says something that is coming out of their head and 

not ours, they go to prison. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. What are you thinking about Iran? 

Mr. CRANER. I think we saw it in the demonstrations last year—

there is a tiredness with the regime. If you go back to 1979, people 

clearly thought they had an American-imposed authoritarian government, and to an extent they were right. I think they have gotten tired these 30-some years later of what they brought themselves and how for many of them it did not live up to their expectations in 1979. I think that is why Iran—amongst the citizenry, not 

the government, but amongst the citizenry—may be the most proAmerican and pro-democratic country in the Middle East, because 

they are tired of living under their rulers. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Do any of you have any opinions of the Hamas 

leadership of the Palestinians? Would they be willing to work? 

Mr. CRANER. In terms of these issues? 

80

Ms. WOOLSEY. Yes. 

Mr. CRANER. Again, that is an organization that is willing to 

take advantage of the forms and methods of democracy but not to 

subscribe to the substance of democracy. They are happy to use 

elections to get into power. They are not particularly interested in 

democratic practices thereafter. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Does anybody have an opinion on how we can convince naysayers that there is a way to engage that is smarter than 

military and bombs and guns? 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Absolutely. I think that is in large part what we 

are talking about here today, is how to leverage money and diplomacy, including nonsecurity assistance, and the need for a multiplicity of actors to be involved here. In a lot of the countries that 

we have been talking about, it is vitally important that the U.S. 

be engaged. 

Now engagement could be engagement with our real allies in 

that country, which are not the government. They are people who 

are advancing the ideals of human rights and democracy that we 

share, and we have to understand what it is that they need, how 

to be sophisticated about that kind of engagement so that we are 

not undermining them, but we don’t throw up our hands and say 

we can’t measure achieving any results so we should just butt out 

or it is too complicated. That is why this is such a tough job, but 

it is vital. 

I think the President laid it out in the national security strategy 

how these things have to be so closely aligned. So we have to find 

different ways of doing it, and it is not just one way or a bilateral 

switch. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. 

Welcome. Let me ask a couple of questions that I have been 

dying to ask. 

I wanted to find out, first of all, in promoting democracy abroad, 

do we recognize that democracy may emerge differently from country to country and may not necessarily be an American form of democracy? And, if so, how do we have a standard for democracy assistance if in fact we allow for those differences? If we don’t, then 

why not? 

Secondly, during the last administration, I continually warned 

Secretary of State Rice about pushing for elections as it relates to 

the Palestinian people in terms of what was taking place in the 

Middle East, and I often said be careful what you ask for. We know 

the history. They pushed, pushed, pushed, and Hamas was elected. 

At what point should we make decisions about pushing, pushing, 

pushing for elections, recognizing that those elections may or may 

not be in the United States’ best interests based on administration 

policy? And when do we not push, push, push where it could be 

detrimental to what the United States feels is in their best interests? Because, obviously, people voted for Hamas for a variety of 

reasons; and of course we know what has happened and that has 

not been in Israel’s or the United States’ best interests. But we 

pushed, pushed, pushed; and so it is be careful what you ask for. 

81

How do we balance that off and when do we know not to push, 

push, push? 

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Carothers. 

Mr. CAROTHERS. Thank you for the question. 

There are certain underlying principles in democracy that are 

common to all democracies, but many of the specific forms are different, and so when we go out in the world to promote democracy, 

we have to be consistent and true to these underlying principles 

but willing to accept that it is going to take different forms in different places. 

Recently, for example, the Ukraine had elections. The United 

States has been working to promote democracy in Ukraine for a 

long time. We clearly saw that probably one candidate would have 

been better for U.S. security interests than another because they 

might have been less pro-Russian and maybe pro-American. But 

the United States promoted democracy in the Ukraine, and the 

leader emerged who might not have been our first choice, but we 

stuck to our principle and we promoted a system and not a particular candidate. That gives us credit in the world. 

I was with a group of visiting Russian delegates who were talking about the hypocrisies of American democracy promotion; and I 

said, would Russia be willing to support a process and not an outcome in the Ukraine? And the fact that we were willing to support 

a process and not a particular outcome makes us look good in the 

world. 

But with respect to pushing, pushing, pushing on elections, in 98 

percent of cases countries’ election schedules are set in their Constitution; and it really isn’t up to us. Palestine had had elections 

before. Yassar Arafat was elected before. In almost all cases in the 

world, it really isn’t up to us to decide whether or not a country 

has an election. It is up to us to decide whether or not we can help 

make that a better election. 

And so I think the dilemma about or the idea that we are out 

there causing all these elections in the world is a little bit of a red 

herring and the fact that we focus so much on the case of Hamas 

is because it is so exceptional. There have been surprisingly few 

cases in the last 25 years of elections that have really produced 

damaging results to American security. In 99 of 100 cases, it is better if a country lets the system breathe, has elections, and continues with its constitutional schedule. So what we are really trying to push for is better elections. We are really not in the driver’s 

seat about whether elections. And so the push, push, pushing on 

elections really is or at least should be let’s push on better elections. 

Ms. LEE. Do we accept the outcome then of all elections? 

Mr. CAROTHERS. Yes. 

Mr. CRANER. I think Tom explained it very, very well. Elections 

are occurring. They may not be very good elections. The Soviet 

Union used to have elections. The question is, what is the character of elections going to be? You can make the argument in the 

Palestinian case that there were supposed to have been elections 

sooner. Had those elections been held sooner, I think Hamas might 

not have won. 

82

I think it is also fair to consider in the outcome of elections that 

simply having had a fair election doesn’t necessarily mean we are 

going to agree all the time on everything with the government that 

was elected. And so that needs to be brought into consideration. 

Simply because they were elected, it doesn’t mean we have to like 

them. 

Ms. LEE. President Aristide was welcomed to be the duly elected 

President of Haiti, and our Government helped depose him. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady, on that interesting last question, has expired. 

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Ellison, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Would you like to respond to that Aristide question? 

Mr. CRANER. There is a quote by Colin Powell that I think is 

worth looking up and talking to him about. He basically says that 

President Aristide, because of his misrule, brought this upon himself. So for somebody who was in office at the time who has an understanding of what we did or didn’t view I think Colin Powell 

would be worth talking to. 

If I could go back to your question——

Mr. ELLISON. I don’t have a question before you, sir. 

Could you respond on the way that our country responded to the 

issue in Honduras, when a duly elected President deposed? Would 

you like to respond on that one in terms of how it conforms to our 

policy of supporting elections and holding up the integrity of an 

election? 

Mr. CRANER. I think this goes back to what I talked about before 

with Hamas, that there are governments that are elected on occasion which don’t respect democratic processes after they come into 

office. And I don’t think that we or the OAS or anybody else has 

a good enough policy that deals with this issue of what do you do 

when somebody who is not democratic is elected in a democratic 

process. And I think that the administration came to see that that 

was an issue in Honduras. 

This time last year, or basically when the issue started, they 

were very staunch and very firm in favor of the deposed President; 

and I note that Secretary Clinton yesterday or the day before was 

at the OAS saying that they ought to readmit Honduras, considering the election that they just held on this. 

Mr. ELLISON. Do you all have any thoughts on how the dynamics 

and timing of a process of elections over time—if a government as 

you described, a government is elected that doesn’t subscribe to 

democratic principles that we would want them to, have we ever 

actually tried to let them rule and then seen over the course of a 

few elections whether or not the responsibility of governance pulls 

them into more amenable conduct? 

Ms. Windsor, you want to take a stab at that one? 

Ms. WINDSOR. I think we have let—certainly recently we have let 

a number of countries sort of try that approach. So, in Venezuela, 

it hasn’t actually worked so well, at least for the Venezuelan 

human rights activists and civil society groups that are really being 

squeezed. So we don’t have—we shouldn’t be in the position of trying to remove governments, but we can speak out for any governVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:35 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\061010\56888 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ment’s, whether they were elected or not, misuse of their own populations; and I think we need to do that. 

Mr. ELLISON. But I think they are separate issues, though. The 

fact is that—let me ask you the question this way. Does the responsibility of governance moderate the more pernicious aspects of what 

a particular government may have done if they were not allowed 

to bear the burden of governance? Anybody? 

Mr. CRANER. It may or it may not. It depends whether while they 

are in office they are saying, oh, let’s not have another election; or, 

gee, I think I will extend my term; or let’s get rid of the judiciary; 

or let’s go after civil society. If they are hemmed in by these elements of democracy that you see in democracies from Asia to the 

Middle East to Latin America, then they might say, hmm, I think 

I am going to have to moderate my behavior. Because if I don’t, I 

am not going to be in office any more. But if they don’t have to 

worry about that, they don’t have to moderate their behavior. 

Mr. ELLISON. And, of course, they don’t do it in a vacuum. As Ms. 

Windsor pointed out, people domestically and in the international 

community can raise issues around civil rights and should. 

Ms. Massimino. 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Just very briefly, I think it is important to remember that while democracy can emerge in different contexts and 

it may look different in different countries and all of that, there are 

universal standards of human rights that all governments, almost 

all governments have agreed to, and these commitments, respect 

for those commitments helps set the stage for real democracy and 

for elections that actually represent the will of the people, and then 

they are the standards on which any government, whether it came 

into power through elections or not, should be judged. 

So I think, just getting back to the focus of the hearing, that it 

is really important that we not lose sight of that aspect of our goals 

for foreign aid, that we need to focus on that, too, in addition to 

the democracy part. 

Mr. ELLISON. I think I am out of time. 

Chairman BERMAN. I think the time of the gentleman has expired. 

But if the gentleman wants, I am prepared to have a second 

round, at least for myself and I think, therefore, anybody else who 

wants to. 

Mr. ELLISON. I actually do. 

Chairman BERMAN. We have to go back. The test is how much 

do you want a second round? 

I will yield myself 5 minutes. 

Two of you, I gather, one in State and one USAID, were in the 

government for significant parts of your careers. I am curious if it 

has been long enough since you have been gone that you feel comfortable talking about the tension between what you were supposed 

to be pushing and doing, and your own sense of what you were supposed to be pushing and doing came from those bureaus that were 

focused more on, and people and higher ups, who were focused 

more on the nature of the bilateral relationship, a very specific or 

a range of issues in that bilateral relationship where what you 

might be pushing to do would create tensions that they didn’t want 

to have to see come up, and sort of tests of how some of that should 

84

get resolved, and others on the panel who would want to join in 

as well. 

Egypt is a fascinating example. But other issues raised here, 

Iran, nuclear weapons, the consequences of the election 1 year ago 

and all that has happened, the preexisting limitations on human 

rights. I am less interested in this case in the specifics than sort 

of a construct for maintaining our commitments in this area and 

pushing what we want to push in this area and the struggles people in your roles face. 

Ms. WINDSOR. Well, anybody that knows me knows that I am always comfortable complaining—even when I was within the U.S. 

Government I was interested in complaining about behaviors that 

I thought were not very helpful. And certainly being an NGO gives 

you a lot more freedom and opportunity to criticize those inside. So 

I do want to say that within USAID and State Department there 

are people who are working on democracy and human rights issues, 

and oftentimes they are the ones that are pitted against those that 

are very, very focused on the bilateral relationships, and I completely respect them. 

I just think that the balance is way off in terms of the resources, 

the human resources, so that democracy and human rights can actually get on the table at important discussions and have a chance 

of being heard. And I think that is as true today as it was—in fact, 

I think it is probably more true today that democracy and human 

rights groups are not—voices within the government are not at the 

table as much they should be. 

I will say something sort of provocative. State Department and 

USAID is all focused on the country unit. Whether the Ambassador 

or the USAID mission director, field missions, et cetera, you get 

this kind of everything should be pushed down to that level. Well, 

the nature of being an Ambassador or mission director is that you 

are wanting to improve the relationship with that country, and 

there is not enough——

Chairman BERMAN. Country as defined by government? 

Ms. WINDSOR. Exactly. And I think there is not enough—this is 

what the ADVANCE Democracy Act was about and efforts to try 

to train and give incentives to USAID and State Department officers, that it is in their interest that they see it as part of the larger 

bilateral relationship, that is in their interest to actually care about 

democracy and human rights. And the most recent example is 

Kyrgyzstan. The embassy managed to put itself against democracy 

and human rights. 

So I think that there has to be very strong central pressure from 

inside of both USAID and State on embassies and missions that 

they have to include this in their definition of what makes a good 

bilateral relationship. And that is incomplete. So we have certain 

mission directors and certain Ambassadors that are great on these 

issues, and then we have others who are not. So if you have an 

across-the-board approach, for instance in USAID, that the mission 

always knows best, you are going to get programs that actually undermine democracy and human rights. And I think that that 

should not happen. 

Chairman BERMAN. Anybody else want—I have just used all my 

time. 

85

I yield 5 minutes to the ranking member. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Some may have a revisionist history—a revisionist view of recent 

history about what went on in Honduras. Apparently, some may 

ascribe to the Benjamin Franklin quote that said, ‘‘Never let a gang 

of brutal facts get in the way of a beautiful theory.’’ What is the 

beautiful theory? That what happened in Honduras was a coup 

d’e ́tat. Love to say that. 

The brutal facts are that Manuel Zelaya, the President of Honduras, put on the ballot—printed on the ballots that were about to 

be voted on by the public—a question asking the public what their 

thoughts were on extending the Presidential term. The problem is 

that, according to the Honduran Constitution, putting that question on a ballot is in and of itself a violation of that Constitution. 

So the Supreme Court of Honduras ruled against Manuel Zelaya 

for committing this illegal act. Then the Human Rights Ombudsman of Honduras also ruled against Manuel Zelaya. Then the Congress of Honduras, both parties, the opposition and Zelaya’s party, 

itself, voted that, yes, he had violated the Constitution. Finally, 

civil society organizations also agreed that the actions taken by 

Zelaya were in violation of the Constitution. 

While the United States was involved in doing all the wrong 

things there, the Honduran people and the Honduran institutions 

of government were all in agreement. The Supreme Court decided 

it. The Congress decided it. The civil organizations all signed documents saying that this is wrong. And so he was arrested pursuant 

to a legal warrant. He should not have been taken out of the country, I agree; and all of the parties have said it was wrong to do 

that. He should have been judged. He should have been tried, and 

he would have been found guilty, because the law was clear. He 

violated the Constitution. 

So Zelaya was trying to extend his term illegally by pushing an 

unlawful referendum to change the Honduran Constitution, which 

clearly limits to one term the time in office of the President. Those 

are the facts. And so, after all of these decisions, Zelaya was removed from power, according to the Constitution, according to the 

Congress, according to the rule of law. 

Now, we have got a very active U.S. Ambassador there in Honduras who is going to try to do everything within his power to continue the failed policy of this administration to say that what happened there was an illegal act, never mind what the Supreme 

Court said, never mind what the Honduran Congress said, never 

mind that the Honduran people celebrated a free, fair, transparent, 

uncorrupted election that was hailed by all parties as an example 

of a terrific election process in Honduras. All applauded. Lobo was 

sworn in as President, but the United States administration, the 

Obama administration, and the Secretary of State—and our activist U.S. Ambassador in Honduras who continues to try to pressure 

all of the parties because he is obsessed with this—to try to call 

it a coup d’e ́tat and continue on with this problem. 

The Honduran people have moved on. The Supreme Court has 

moved on. The Honduran Congress has moved on. Some have not 

moved on, and they want to call this a coup d’e ́tat. They want to 

continue, continue, continue, even though we have a new demoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:35 Aug 13, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\061010\56888 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cratic government, applauded by all the international groups that 

say this was a clear and fair election. 

Let’s not change the facts just to fit this beautiful theory. It was 

not a coup d’e ́tat. The Honduran people have moved on. They 

would like recognition by the international community. Slowly, we 

are restoring the visas that we should never have taken away from 

them in the first place. 

We are still punishing those who were with the interim government, including Mr. Micheletti. Those people are still being punished. We withdrew USAID, going against our own interests, including U.S. anti-narcotics efforts. We held that country and its 

people as prisoners. They could not escape. They had no visas. 

And so some of us aren’t being fooled. If, by contrast, our Ambassador in Nicaragua rightfully highlights Ortega’s efforts to trump 

the judiciary and Constitution, let’s look at what Hugo Chavez is 

doing. Let’s look at what Daniel Ortega is doing. Get over Honduras. The Honduran people are very happy with their duly elected 

democratic government. This was not a coup d’e ́tat. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentlelady has expired. 

The gentleman from Minnesota. 

Mr. ELLISON. Just a few more questions about your democracy 

work. 

Now I actually agree with the work you are doing and applaud 

you for doing it. Only problem is I think as a country we have got 

to really build some real resolve to be consistent with it when we 

do it. And I do think people around the world, when we say we are 

for democracy, they take it seriously. They try to take full advantage of what we say we are about; and we need to be ready to deal 

with that, regardless of what the consequences of that are. At the 

same time, never giving up, as Ms. Windsor pointed out, our obligation and responsibility to call people to account when they veer 

from agreed-upon constitutional norms. But I don’t think we should 

ever stop doing democracy promotion. 

Let me just ask this question in that regard. How do we balance 

these two things, of promoting democracy and then, when it doesn’t 

go the way we want, making sure that we don’t undermine the democracy that we helped to promote? 

Mr. CAROTHERS. I think the key is to have a set of democratic 

support policies and programs that really represent a wide range 

of institutions in the country and processes. Democracy promotion, 

despite what comes up again and again, really isn’t mostly about 

elections. Elections can be a capstone or a cornerstone of a democratic process, but it is really about a much, much wider range of 

things, whether it is media systems, local government working 

with parliaments, working with human rights organizations, and so 

forth. So the idea that we are caught in the headlights like a deer 

if somebody gets elected who we are not entirely happy about, we 

have a whole range of things that we might be doing in the country, supporting, as Lorne said, institutions that counterbalance 

power and so forth. So I think if we have a properly broad conception, we will be in better shape. 

And I would like to take advantage of this to say one thing also 

to the chairman. If you try to understand what results can we 

have, I am still—in a sense stuck in my throat is that quote from 

87

the senior State Department official about tangible results. Because maybe the person meant transformative results. But let’s 

just pause for a moment to think about the fact that the United 

States is spending $21⁄2 billion year on democracies. Wow. That is 

a lot of money. What can $21⁄2 billion buy you here in the United 

States? Well, widening the Wilson bridge costs $21⁄2 billion. 

So we sit down and we spend a certain amount of money in 100 

countries around the world. Is it realistic to hope to transform 100 

countries’ political direction with the amount of money it takes to 

widen one bridge between Virginia and the District of Columbia? 

So we need to have a sense of proportion about what we are 

doing and what we expect from it in that this money is valuable. 

And people like Lorne and Jennifer and employees of their organizations, they get up every morning; and I don’t think they do that 

day in, day out, week in, week out, month in, month out, year in, 

year out, for rather modest salaries, I must say, if they weren’t producing something tangible. 

Are we taking this money and transforming the world? No, we 

are not. Would it be realistic to expect the money for one bridge 

to go out and change 100 countries’ political destiny? I don’t think 

so. 

Mr. ELLISON. Let me follow up with you on that one. What do 

we hope to achieve over time? Over time, do we expect—sometimes 

you can’t look at one country during one election cycle and say, 

well, we have done our thing. But if you look at it in a region and 

you look at it over time, what do we hope to see in Central Asia 

if we keep this up? 

Mr. CAROTHERS. You hope to see in a society nucleuses of people 

who are—who believe in something, who are working for positive 

change and feel, first, a sense of moral support. Second, they feel 

the ability to learn things that are coming from abroad from those 

who might have the experience. Third, they might have some actual resources from us to do what they want to do. 

So what you are trying to do is inject and help inject some elements into the society that we are working for positive change. And 

you cannot travel to most countries in the world without meeting 

dozens, hundreds, thousands of people who have been affected by 

these programs and who believe they are better actors, whether 

they are in government or out of government, with those basic 

principles. And it takes a long time. It takes a lot of different people. 

Mr. ELLISON. I only got 40 seconds. Sorry about that. 

Could you talk about what you guys do in a specialized way to 

help women and minorities be a part of the election process? 

Mr. CRANER. We have come to have a great focus on that. We 

used to think it was important to put women in the room with men 

to train them. We now understand that training separately is much 

better. Because, frankly, they are reluctant sometimes to speak up. 

What we have done is, (A) try and persuade party leaders, usually the guys, to bring women into the political parties as candidates, often making a self-interest argument—you are missing 

half the vote here if you don’t do this—to ensure that when they 

bring them in they are not just symbols, and then (B) work with 

88

the women who may get elected to ensure they are the best candidates and officeholders as possible. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentleman from California. The gentleman—he hasn’t done 

the first round. You haven’t done the second round. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Much has been made of the Minerals Management Service having a conflict of interest because it both collects 

the revenue and imposes the rules. There is also an institutional 

conflict of influence at State. On the one hand, it is their job to conduct diplomacy with every country with whom we have relations, 

including those ruled by tyrants. On the other hand, it is their job 

to promote democracy, something rarely appreciated by tyrants. 

And often I see that first objective getting in the way of the second. 

The best example of this was when Congress, over the objections 

of the administration, required that money be spent for democracy 

programs in Libya. The Ambassador to Libya and much of the 

State Department thought that that was at least annoying; and 

they didn’t want to just figure out a way to spend the money in 

an innocuous and ineffective manner, which would be their usual 

response. They decided to go one step further in their efforts to get 

along with Kadafi. Their plan was to give the money to Kadafi. 

And only with pressure from Congress did they decide that that is 

not what Congress had in mind when we thought that democracy 

should be promoted in Libya. 

At this point, I can’t propose any structural change, because I 

think democracy programs benefit from the power they have from 

having a voice inside the State Department. But often it works the 

other way around. 

The first question I have—and I don’t know who to address it 

to—is with regard to our efforts in Iran. There is a huge pro-democracy movement in Iran. As far as I can tell, that has nothing 

to do with anything we have done through our democracy programs. 

And one thing I have been calling on the government to do is to 

take the many radio shows and even TV shows created in Los Angeles and pay the pittance that it would cost to make sure that 

these shows were available on satellite in Iran. The institutional 

response has been pretty ugly. First, that means that money that 

could be spent on bureaucratic jobs is spent somewhere else. But, 

more importantly, it means that we would have 1,000 flowers that 

bloom and we wouldn’t control the message. 

Can someone comment on whether getting these private-sectorproduced shows into Iran would be a good use of our Iran democracy funds? 

Ms. WINDSOR. Well, I can more generally say that the need for 

free flow of information, that is what the Iranians want. And they 

want to hear—they were a very engaged society with the outside 

world, and so they don’t appreciate the current regime’s attempts 

to isolate them. 

And in terms of whether we—Iran—I want to just talk about, if 

I could, some Iranians have absolutely been very clear that they 

don’t want our help. But there are many Iranians that say that 

89

they do. And the help that they want primarily is not only to help 

the people that are in political prison and that have had to leave 

the country because there is such a crackdown, but they want the 

ability to connect with each other and with the outside world. And 

there were a number of efforts that the U.S. provided that helped 

that happen. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I appreciate that, and I want to squeeze in one 

more question for Lorne Craner, who is with the best organization 

in Washington that has the word Republican in its name. 

Mr. Craner, in your testimony, you stated that the role of the 

Foreign Assistance Bureau within the State Department needs to 

be examined. Could you explain how the Bureau came about and 

how it has changed and expand on that for us. 

Mr. CRANER. Yes. I actually had a conversation about this with 

Secretary Rice, and I mentioned to her that I had tried for 3 years 

to get from USAID a list of its democracy projects around the world 

by country and that they have never been able to produce that. She 

said that is really interesting because, she said, I tried for the first 

3 months I was here to get the same, and I couldn’t get it. And we 

both were finally were given three legal-size sheets, single-spaced 

with a grid that showed——

But, in the meantime, it had actually happened that USAID had 

had to go to the NGOs it was giving money to to say, ‘‘What are 

you doing with the money? Because the Secretary wants to know 

what we are doing with the money.’’

So there was a good reason for F to start, which was not only 

did State not know what USAID was doing with its money, USAID 

didn’t know what USAID was doing with its money. So there was 

a good reason for its start. 

Unfortunately, like many good ideas in the bureaucracy, it has 

kind of gone haywire; and you now have F deciding essentially how 

every foreign aid penny from this very, very small centralized 

group—how every foreign aid penny is going to be spent where and 

how it is going to be accounted for and how it is going to be monitored and evaluated; and that simply has added a layer of bureaucracy with no value at the State Department. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has quite expired. 

The gentleman from New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and I were just speaking, and we both agree 

that the travel ban ought to be lifted by Fidel Castro. Because if 

you are a human rights activist or a democracy activist, you don’t 

get out. And if we lift it unilaterally without any kind of linkage 

there will be a very perverse outcome. 

And, you know, Ambassador Watson talked a minute ago about 

the medical students and about the happy doctors that she met. 

Well, Dr. Oscar Bicet remains often in solitary confinement, an 

Afro-Cuban medical doctor, an OB/GYN and an outstanding human 

rights activist who got 25 years for advancing the cause of liberty 

and human rights. 

So lift the travel ban. I offered an amendment that would have 

done that back in the early part of this decade if and only if the 

political prisoners are released. And I think we ought to have that 

linkage, and we ought to be very clear about that. 

90

You might want to comment on that. 

On Belarus, I am meeting with Alexander Lebedko, a good friend 

and human rights activist. I am very concerned that the Belarus 

Democracy Act may be weakened by the administration. I know 

there is some talk of that. Your view on that. 

On Vietnam, thank you, Secretary Craner, for saying the engagement didn’t work. As soon as the bilateral agreement was signed, 

there was an immediate demonstrable deterioration of human 

rights, and those who signed Bloc 8406 found themselves being 

hunted down. Religious freedom gains were immediately reversed. 

And I join the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom in saying we oppose CPC. Your views on that. 

On TIP, we will find out, Ms. Windsor, on Monday whether or 

not the clientitis that you spoke of again manifests inside the 

building and from our U.S. missions abroad. 

India ought to be on Tier 3; Vietnam absolutely for its labor trafficking; and China, one of the worst trafficking meccas in the 

world, ought to be on Tier 3; and I am very fearful politics will 

again rear its ugly head. Your views on that. 

And, finally, last week I was part of a launch by Chai Ling of 

a new initiative called All Girls Allowed. It is an effort to re-enfranchise the girl child in China, who has been targeted for extermination as a result of the one child per couple policy. Why, I would 

ask all of you, has the international community been so grossly indifferent and enabling, even, by groups like UNFPA? Where is 

CEDAW? Where is the Human Rights Council, which bashes Israel 

with predictability, unfortunately? Where is the genocide panel of 

experts at the U.N. and others while women and children, especially the girl child, is being, like I said, exterminated in China? 

Where are they? 

Chairman BERMAN. You have 2 minutes and 16 seconds. 

Mr. CRANER. On Cuba, one might be able to cite reasons—I 

might not necessarily agree with them—to lift the travel bans. 

Human rights and democracy is not one of them. That is the bottom line. It may help businesses, it may help the hotels in Cuba, 

whatever, but human rights and democracy is not a good reason. 

On Belarus, the Democracy Act, it is being weakened. The 

Charge ́ has taken in Minsk—one of five diplomats we still have left 

there—has taken upon himself to say that the character of assistance for the opposition should be changed and reduced. 

On Vietnam, if they are not making improvements, then absolutely CPC should be changed. 

On China, the Chinese are going to have the biggest problem of 

all with this, because it is creating huge social tensions in the 

country. You and I both know there is a lot of trafficking into 

China of women from abroad because there aren’t enough women 

for all the guys to marry. And they have already got huge social 

tensions and economic tensions caused by our recession. This is 

going to be one big problem for them. 

Ms. MASSIMINO. I could reinforce just on China, as you know, it 

took—just to get recognition here, it took an act of Congress to get 

the United States to recognize that victims of forced abortion are 

victims of persecution. Our laws on refugee status were not being 

91

interpreted even to recognize that that constitutes persecution. 

That is absurd. 

I think, obviously, China is a human rights disaster on so many 

levels. It is a complicated place. It is easy to condemn. It is very 

difficult to make progress. 

And I think one of the things, if I can just highlight for us, that 

structurally I was really concerned when—well, today in the Post 

it was announced, but we have known this, that the midterm review of the report of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development 

Review is not going to be made public. 

Many of us have been working on that for a while. What we do 

know is that there are 12 task forces working on this, and none of 

them seems to have anything to do with human rights. We hear 

that it is integrated throughout and all of that, but I think Congress really needs to ask some questions about this, and I think 

there ought to be a hearing on it as quickly as possible. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

The gentlelady from Texas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy; 

and I apologize to the witnesses for being delayed. 

I would be remiss not to say to you that one of the overriding 

crises is that of the BP oil spill which might need some comforting 

concepts of freedom, democracy, and otherwise. I come from the 

Gulf region, so thank you for your indulgence of my questions. 

I do want to say this is a very important hearing, and I think 

I am going to take a different vein. I was not here, so I don’t know 

what the others have done so as well. 

There is a concept called allies, and it raises its head in a very 

large way. China is an ally or one that we built over the years. Afghanistan is an ally. We are working to make the continent of Africa allies, plural. And, of course, Iran has a different posture, but 

we have Iranian Americans. And here is my concern. 

When we talk about human rights and democracy assistance, it 

is what we overlook. For example, the good news is we had a hearing on the rights of women yesterday; and we understand the 

United Nations is in the midst of putting together a task force to 

develop a component or a department that is for women’s rights 

that would have the leadership level of the Secretary General. But 

when we have allies, we tend to not be restrictive, not be demanding, not use the human rights clout; and part of is that some of 

these countries are independent and some of them we need them. 

So, for example, in Afghanistan, that government makes a lot of 

conversation about human rights and women’s rights but continuously allows—because they are in a war, I guess, position—the 

abuses to continue. What do we do there? Because we are giving 

them dollars for governance, but we hear stories that women parliamentarians cannot travel back to their district for fear of loss of 

life. 

In Iran, for example, there is a resistance movement that we 

seem to characterize as terrorists are bad. And I don’t understand 

why we can’t find ways of working or collaborating or finding out 

more facts so that if there is a legitimate resistance movement, not 

by violence but by supporting opportunities for democracy and 

human rights. 

92

And so my confusion is, on how we use this assistance, is that 

we are blocked by way of our friendship and then when there are 

groups that are willing to take a risk, they get labeled. They are 

stigmatized. Maybe there is a basis for it. But I think we have got 

to find a way to really own up to how much we are committed—

without violence, without a war, I don’t want us to be in that posture—but to really be forceful, consistent on this question of promoting human rights and democracy. 

I would like you to go down the line. It looks like I have 1.56 

seconds. Thank you. 

Ms. WINDSOR. Let me just say that, while you can’t get complete 

consistency absolutely, every government, no matter whether they 

are ally or adversaries, should be subject to the same universal 

standards that Elisa mentioned earlier. 

I will add to the list of allies where we ignore democracy and 

human rights concerns, that being Ethiopia. No one actually talks 

about Ethiopia, but it has really been—essentially, democracy and 

human rights has been ignored for the last—since this government 

came in power. And since 9/11, it has been—they just had the 

worst possible elections, and there was really no U.S. statement at 

all or no U.S. effort to try to criticize them, because, of course, they 

play a very important role. 

Similarly, in Egypt, I think that we keep on saying that we are 

going to put democracy and human rights—we need the Egyptians 

to do certain things for us, but it makes us look hypocritical. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Where is our push? Can I yield to Mr. Craner? 

Mr. CRANER. Where is our push? I think the leadership from the 

Department is very, very important. This body does not confirm officials. The Senate does. 

But I can’t tell you how important it is, as somebody who used 

to work in legislative affairs at the State Department and who 

worked again for Secretary Powell doing human rights, how important it is that you bring people up here. 

I once said to Marc Grossman, who was the Under Secretary of 

State—I had been at State a couple of months, my second time; 

and I said, ‘‘I am finding that folks under 40, 45 get human rights, 

because we kind of grew up with it. But I am finding that people 

a little older don’t get it.’’ But I said then, ‘‘Oddly, people who are 

the Assistant Secretaries and the Under Secretaries get it.’’ And he 

looked at me like I was a fool, and he said, ‘‘Lorne, they have to 

get confirmed, and they have to go up and testify at Congress.’’

Don’t underestimate your role and value when witnesses come up 

here and you bother them on these issues. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You just gaveled 

me down, but I must say that we have got to make some use out 

of our power on human rights if we are going to carry our message 

of democracy and freedom forward. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. 

I think, given the time, I will forgo the third round. I did want 

to pursue this notion of the conditioning of security assistance, but 

some other time, some other place. 

Thank you very much. It has been a very valuable contribution 

you have made to our education on the subject, and we are very 

grateful that you took the time to come here. 

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With that, the committee hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MS. JENNIFER L. WINDSOR, EXECUTIVE

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY ELISA MASSIMINO, J.D., PRESIDENT AND

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