## United States Court of Appeals **For the Eighth Circuit**

___________________________
No. 20

- 3561

___________________________
United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Devin L. Ashford

Defendant - Appellant

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Nebraska

____________
Submitted: October 18, 2021

Filed: February 25, 2022 [Unpublished]

____________ Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judg es.

____________

PER CURI AM.

A jury convicted Devin Ashford of sex trafficking of a minor , 18 U.S.C

. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c) ; production of child pornography , 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) ; sex trafficking by means of force, threat s of force , fraud, or coercio n , 18 U.S.C § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1)

– (2) ; and interstate travel for prostitution , 18 U.S.C. § 242 1(a).-2- The district court 1 sentenced Ashford to three consecutive terms (and one concurrent term) of imprisonment totaling 47 years. Ashford appeals, arguing there was
insufficient evidence for his conviction on each count and that the district court’s
sentence was unreasonable. We affirm.

We review sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v.
Paul , 885 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 2018). We will overturn a conviction “ only where no reasonable jury could find all the [crime ’ s] elements beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 1102 ( alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cole , 721 F.3d 1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013) ). We address sufficiency of the evidence for each count
in turn.

First, Ashford argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction
for sex trafficking of a minor because there was no evidence E.F. , the minor victim, ever actually engaged in commercial sex acts or was enticed by Ashford to engage
in such acts. T he sex trafficking of a minor statute , however, does not require a
commercial sex act

— Ashford is guilty if he knowingly enticed a person know ing, or recklessly disregard ing, the fact “that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act .” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (emphasis added) ; see also United States v. Collier , 932 F.3d 1067, 1079 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[T] he fact the victim never actually engaged in commercial sex is irrelevant ”
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). ).

Ashford does not dispute he knew E.F. was not yet 18 years old

. And E.F.’s phone revealed social media communications with Ashford indicating E.F. was “trapping,” a term often associated with illicit activity according to witness testimony

, and going on “dates” to make money for Ashford

. While A shford argues
there is no direct evidence he sent these messages, the jury reasonabl y infer red he

1 The Honorable John M. Gerrard, then Chief Judge, now United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.-3- did because the messages came from his phone and Ashford presented no evidence indicating someone else sent them

. Moreover, a witness who lived with E.F.

tes tified Ashford instructed her to find “ dates ” for E.F. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude Ashford knowingly enticed E.F. to meet with men knowing she would be caused to engage in commercial sex act s

.

Next, Ashford argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for production of child pornography. Ashford argues that while the minor victim testified Ashford requested and she sent sexually explicit pictures of herself to his
Facebook M essenger accou nt, no direct evidence showed he actually sent and
received those communications

. Again

, there was sufficient circumstantial
evidence

, including the lack of evidence as to any alternative, for a reasonable jury
to conclude it was Ashford who requested and received the child pornography through his account

.

Third, Ashford argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for sex trafficking by fraud, force, or coercion . He contends there was

no direct evidence that the victim engaged in a commercial sex act

. But again , direct evidence of a commercial sex act is not required under § 1591(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); Collier , 932 F.3d at 1079

. Ashford is guilty of sex trafficking by fraud, force, or coerci on if he knowingly en ticed or advertised a person knowing or recklessly disregard ing that fraud, force, threats of force, or coercion “will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The victim’s testimony that Ashford advertised her to men, expected her to have sex with men for money

, and would beat her if she refused to go on “ dates ” was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude Ashford knowingly advertised and enticed the victim

to meet with men kn ow ing the threat of force would cause her to engage in
commercial sex act s

. See United States v. Reed , 972 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2020) ( “The jury is the final arbiter of the witnesses ’ credibility, and we will not disturb
that assessment .”) (quoting United States v. Li stman , 636 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 2011) ); United States v. DeCoteau , 630 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir. 2011) ( noting “a victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to prove aggravated sexual abuse”).-4- Ashford offers the same no

- evidence

- of -a- commercial

- sex

- act argument for the final count, interstate travel for prostitution

. However, victims testified Ashford
traveled with them and intimidated them into having sex for money in several
different states

. This is sufficient evi dence for a reasonable jury to conclude Ashford knowingly transported victims across state lines intending they engag e in prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 1 (a).

Finally, Ashford claims the district court imposed unreasonable consecutive

sentences of imprisonment totaling 47 years when, according to Ashford, a 30

- year
concurrent sentence , the minimum sentence advised by the United States Sentencing
Guidelines Manua l, would have satisfied the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553. We review whether the district court’s sentence was substantively reasonable “under
a ‘deferential abuse

- of

- discretion standard .’” United States v. Stephen , 984 F.3d 625, 632 (8th Cir. 2021 ) (quoting United States v. Cole , 657 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 2011) ). Here , the district court thoroughly considered the sentencing factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

. The district court emphasized the nature of the offense s and
the need for the sentence imposed

, noting Ashford ’s disregard and cruelty towards
his victims and that he had no other career outside of his crimes

. The district court was well within its broad discretion in determining the § 3553(a) factors required a

sentence more severe than Ashford wanted

. See United States v. Donahue , 959 F.3d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[S]entencing courts

. . . have wide discretion to weigh the § 3553(a) factors.”) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Wilder , 597 F.3d 936, 946 (8 th Cir. 2010) ).

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.

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