DECENTRALIZATION: FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT PROJECT 

Associates in Rural Development, Inc. 

in collaboration with 

Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University 

Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University 

ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE SAHEL --


A STUDY OF POLICY ADVOCACY IN MALI
 

Preparedby: 

Henri Josserand 

R. James Bingen 

in collaborationwith 

Cheibane Coulibaly, Ti~moko Di lb!o, and Edmond Dembel6 

Preparedfor: 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Decentralization: Finance and Management Project 

Contract No. DHR 5446-Z-00-7033-00 

February 1995 
Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................ 
 iii 

FO REWORD ...................................................... 	 v
 

I. RESEARCH SETTING AND ORIENTATIONS ........................... 	 .11
 

A. Introduction and Rationale ................................ .... II
 

B. Mali as a Suitable Case for a Pilot Study .......................... 	 11
 

C. Study Approach . ............................. 	 ............... 12
 

D. Research Approach and Instruments ............................. 	 13
 

1. Understanding the Policy Process ........................... 	 13
 

2. Cross-sectional Analysis of Interest Groups ................... 	 14
 

3. Policy Issues and Actors in the Cotton Subsector ................ 14
 

4. Longitudinal Analysis of Interest Groups in the Cotton Subsector .... 15
 

Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................
 

II. THE ECONOMIC POLICY PROCESS -- ACTORS AND DYNAMICS ......... 17
 

A . The Basic Model . ........................................... 
 17 

B. Overview of the Main Actors and Dynamics ........................ 	 18
 

C. The Bureaucracy and the Policy Process ........................... 	 19
 

1. The 	Policy Process and Policies Financed under the BSI ........... 20
 

2. The 	Policy Prcess and Structural Adjustment Policies ............ 21
 

3. 	 The Policy Process in Policy Areas where Donors are Actively
 

Involved ... .... ........ ................ ....... ... 22
 D. Interest Groups and the Policy Process ............................ 	 23
 

E. The National Assembly and the Policy Process ...................... 	 31
 

F. The Media and the Policy Process ............................... 	 34
 

I. The 	Media and the Post-1991 Democratic Process in Mali ......... 34
 

2. The 	Media and the Economic Policy Debate ................... 35
 

III. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POLICY PROCESS ..................... 	 47
 

A . Overview ................................................ 
 47 

B. Descriptive Overview of the Data ............................... 	 51
 

1. Structural Characteristics ................................. 	 51
 

2. Group Strategies and Methods Used ......................... 	 53
 

3. Channels and Points of Entry into the Policy Process ............. 54
 

4. Measures of Succ ,ss: Extent of Effectiveness/Political Power ....... 56
 

C. Relationship Between Group Characteristics and Their Degree of Success ... 57
 

1. "Having adequate resources doesn't hurt..." .................... 	 58
 

2. "It 	pays to know your stuff..." . ........................... 58
 

3. "Strength in numbers..." . ............................... 	 59
 

4. "Hearing you loud and clear..." . .......................... 	 59
 
5. "M eet me in the lobby..." . .............................. 60
 

6. "Best tickets in the house " . ...................... 61
 

D. Comments on Key Determinants of Success ........................ 62
 

IV. POLICY ISSUES AND ACTORS IN THE COTTON SUBSECTOR ........... 65
 

A. Overview of the Cotton Subsector . ............................... 65
 

B . Introduction . ............................................... 65
 

C . O rigins . .................................................. 66
 

D . Background . ............................................... 67
 

E. The Contrat Plan. ........................................... 70
 

1. The Cotton Success Story ................................ 70
 

2. Background to the Contrat Plan Negotiations ................... 72
 

3. ContratPlan Negotiation Issues ............................ 73
 

4. Observations ......................................... 74
 

F. Organizational Dynamics ...................................... 75
 

1. Organizational Structure ................................. 75
 

G. The Farmers' Movement in Mali ................................. 79
 

1. Unions and Parties ..................................... 79
 

2. National Assembly Representatives .......................... 80
 

3. Chamber of Agriculture .................................. 80
 

4. Union Solidarity . ....................................... 80
 

V. RESEARCH AND PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS .................... 81
 

A. Strengthening Governmental Democratic Performance ................. 81
 

B. Strengthening Economic Policy Analysis .......................... 81
 

C. Strengthening the National Assembly's Role in Democratic Development .... 82
 

D. Supporting the Media . ........................................ 82
 

Z. Strengthening Farmers' Organizations ............................. 82
 

F. Promoting More Effective Donor Coordination ...................... 83
 

G . A Final Note . .............................................. 83
 

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 85
 

APPEN-DICES 

A. Chronology of Political and Economic Events 

B. Les Medias et L',nformation Economique au Mali 

C. The Bamako Declaration on Radio Pluralism 

D. List of Persons Contacted 

E. Broadcast Schedules of Selected Radio Stations 

F. Media Survey Questionnaire 

G. Interest Group Survey 

H. Characteristics of Selected Interest Groups 

I. Schematic Illustrations of the Cotton Sub-Sector in Mali 

ii 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 

ABB Association des Banques et Etablissements Bancaires (banks and financial institutions) 

ADEMA Association pour la D~mocracie au Mali/Parti Africain pour ia Solidaritd et ia Justice 

ADIDE Association des Diplomds Initiateurs d'Emplois (unemployed graduates) 

ADO Agricultural Development Office, USAID Mission 

AFE Association des Femmes Entrepreneurs (women entrepreneurs) 

APEP Association pour la Promotion de l'Entreprise Priv6e 

ARD Associates in Rural Development, Inc. 

ASARED Association pour la Sauvegarde et le Renforcement de la D6mocratie 

ASCOMA Association des Consommateurs Maliens (Malian consumers' association) 

ATVR Association des Travailleurs Partants Volontaires h la Retraite (early retirees) 

AV Association Villageoise 

BNDA Banque Nationale pour le Ddveloppement Agricole 

BSI Budget Spdcial d'Investissement 

CAFO Coordination des Associations et ONG fdminines 

CCAM Comitd des Compagnies d'Assurances du Mali (insurance companies) 

CCIM The Malian Chamber of Commerce 

CFAF CFA franc 

CFDT Compagnie Franqaise pour le Ddveloppement des Fibres Textiles 

CH Canal France International 

CMDT Compagnie Malienne pour le Ddveloppement des Fibres Textiles 

CNID Comitd National d'Initiative D6mocratique 

CNN Cable News Network 

CNPF Centre National du Patronnat Franqais 

COFEM Collectif des Femmes du Mali (loose federation of women's associations) 

COPACO the Compagnie Cotonnijre 

CP Contrat Plan 

DFM Decentralization: Finance and Management project 

DNAE Direction National des Affaires Economiques 

EDM Energie du Mali 

EEC European Economic Community 

FNEM F~ddration Nationale des Employeurs du Mali 

GCM Groupement des Commerqants Maliens 

iii 
GDO USAID's General Development Office 

GMM Grands Moulins du Mali 

GPP Groupement des Professionnels du Pdtrole 

HUICOMA Mali's cottonseed oil company 

IMF International Monetary Fund 

IMRAD Institut Malien de Recherches Appliqudes pour le D6veloppement 

MSU Michigan State University 

MTV Music Television channel 

OHVN Office de la Haute Vallde du Niger 

OPAM Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali 

OPIM The council of industrial manufacturers 

ORTM Office de [a Radio/Tdl6vision du Mali 

PRMC Programme de Restructuration du Marchd C~rdalier 

PVO private voluntary organization 

RFI Radio France Internationale (retransmitted French TV) 

SAP Structural Adjustment Program 

SMPC Societd Malienne de Produits Chimiques 

SONATAM Societd Nationale de Transports du Mali 

SYCOV Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton et Vivriers 

SYNABAT Syndicat National des Entreprises du Bftiment et des Travaux Publics 

SYNAPPO Syndicat National des Pharmaciens d'Officines Priv6es (private pharmacies) 

SYNAPRO Syndicat National de ]a Production (oldest and largest farmers' association) 

SYNTRUI Syndicat des Transporteurs Urbains et Interurbains 

UDD Union pour ia D6mocratie et le D6veloppement 

UMOA Union Mondtaire Ouest Africaine 

UNAJOM Union Nationale des Journalistes du Mali 

UNCTRM Union Nationale des Chargeurs et Transporteurs Routiers du Mali 

UNTM Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali 

URTL Union des Radios et T616visions Libres 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USIA U.S. Information Agency 

VOA Voice of America 

iv 
FOREWORD 

In 1988 Associates in Rural Development, Inc. (ARD), in collaboration with Indiana 

University's Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and the Maxwell School of 

Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, began a research and development effort focused on decentralized public service provision. The Decentralization: Finance and 

Management Project (DFM), sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), was designed to study problems associated with the failure of many development projects to achieve sustainable impacts--particularly those in rural areas managed by central 

government agencies. The project's research agenda has analyzed a variety of institutional 

arrangements and resource mobilization strategies to determine their effects on the sustainable 

provision of rural roads, irrigation infrastructure, health and education services, and the 

management of renewable natural resources. Field investigations and desk studies have also 

analyzed broader decentralization policies and issues relating to local government operations 

and finance. 

In the initial years of the project, a series of state-of-the-art papers were prepared on 

the principal sectors of inquiry. These reports ipcluded a thorough review of the relevant 

literature and established a framework for field-level analysis. These early studies were the 

basis for two published books, several journal articles, and numerous conference papers dealing with the problems of rural infrastructure and irrigation management. In addition to 

these core research produ.ts, numerous policy studies, field research initiatives, and project designs and evaluations were conducted at the request of USAID missions in Asia and Africa 

and the central bureaus of USAIDlWashington. These efforts provided project research staff 

the opportunity to test and refine analytic methods and to demonstrate the utility of 

institutional analysis to a variety of development problems. 

At the conclusion of this major effort covering seven years and 15 different countries, 

a series of final papers has been prepared that synthesize the cumulative research findings and 

lessons learned from the project. These include a report summarizing four years of research 

and analysis on governance and management of irrigation systems in Nepal; a synthesis of 

several years of research on economic and institutional policy reform in Cameroon; an 

analysis of DFM research on decentralized public service provision in Africa; a research 

synthesis on local governance and management of renewable natural resources; a paper on the 

concept of social capital and its implications for development; and a synthesis of research on 

rural road maintenance. In addition, the DFM legacy includes two papers providing practical project desigr guidelines in the areas of rural infrastructure and natural resources and a final 

report summarizing the project's principal research and development accomplishments. 

The DFM project staff from ARD, the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 

Analysis, and the Maxwell School extend their sincere appreciation for the sponsorship of this 

project by USAID. The Agency's research programs aimej at improving our underst-inding 

V 
of the development process and thereby the effectiveness of financial and technical assistance 

represent a significant contribution to the dower community and its partners in the developing 

world. We would also like to acknowledge and thank the dozens of colleagues from the 

academic and development assistance communities as well as the citizens ind representatives 

of host countries who have participated in our enterprise. Our group has learned a great deal 

from this project, much of which is reflected in this final series of documents. We hope that 

this learning experience has also benefitted our collaborators in the U.S. and abroad. 

vi 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 

A. Purpose of the Study and Approach 

The purpose of this one-year, pilot phase study was to examine the relationship 

between political liberalization and economic policy reforms in the Sahel. More specifically, 

the study was designed to examine how USAID, a host country government and other actors 

in civil society could collaborate to improve the transparency, political support, feasibility and 

effectiveness of far-reaching economic policy changes. Specific objectives of this pilot study 

were to: 

Develop a methodology to better understand the role of urban and rural interest 

groups in economic policy reform; 

Identify methods enabling such groups to become more effective participants in 

the policy process; and 

Suggest means to promote further openness and transparency in the ways 

Sahelian Governments design, negotiate, and implement economic policies. 

Mali was chosen for this research because its government has made considerable 

progress in assuring sustained political and economic liberalization since 1991. Moreover, a 

wide range of political parties and interest groups participate actively in the country's political 

and economic life. The cotton subsector, in particular, was selected because of its significant 

place in the national economy. It also provides, through the union of cotton producers 

(Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton et Vivriers, SYCOV), an uncommon example of a 

farmers' union in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

This research activity applied a multi-disciplinary approach to several related fronts: 

the economic policy process, the role of the bureaucracy, the structure and dynamics of 

interest groups in urban and rural areas, and the functions of the media and of the National 

Assembly. All aspects of this work, including urban and rural interviews, were carried out in 

close collaboration with the Institut Malien de Recherches Appliquies pour le Ddveloppenent 

(IMRAD) and a number of Malian individuals. 

B. Overview of the Policy Process and of its Main Actors 

An understanding of Mali's economic policy process requires an assessment of 

complex interactions between the bureaucracy, interest groups, the National Assembly, the 

media, and political parties. None of these actors can be analyzed separately from the others, 

but some important characteristics, and their respective rc'zs in the policy process may be 

summarized as follows: 

1 
The bureaucracy, itself composed of a diverse set of interests, resists, tolerates 

or welcomes interaction on policy issues with various actors, including donor 

agencies; 

Interest groups interact at various levels and in different ways, depending on 

the nature of the group, the policy issue, and other factors. Different interest 

groups choose a variety of strategies, from independent to collaborative 

relationships. In addition, some groups may take direct policy action, while 

others may use one or several channels, including the media. 

The media are an integral part of the policy process. First, they measure its 

degree of openness and transparency. Secondly, they provide an information 

channel from the bureaucracy towards interest groups, or vice-versa. They also 

constitute an identifiable interest group. 

The National Assembly also appears to play several roles in the policy 

process. It has some oversight over policy making and implementation and, to 

a limited extent, holds ministerial agencies accountable. In addition, some 

Dputds act as channels or intermediaries for specific interest groups. Finally, 

through its open and public debates on policy issues, the National Assembly 

does contribute, with the help of the media, to improved transparency in the 

policy process and to public information. 

Finally, political parties intervene indirectly, and in multiple ways, in the 

economic policy process. A principal channel is the National Assembly, where 

all parties are organized into six groupements parlementaires. Political parties 

also speak through the media. Interest groups, however, rarely mobilize 

political parties to help settle policy issues. A major reason is that in the past, 

parties have tried to divide, infiltrate or control various interest groups. 

Conversely, some political parties are as eager to stay away from "radical" 

interest groups as the latter are to keep their distances from political parties. 

C. Main Findings 

1. The Bureaucracy 

Foreign interests continue to exert a very strong influence on most aspects of Mali's 

economic policy process. In spite of this common feature, there are significant differences in 

the openness toward, and type of relationship with, interest groups in Malian society, 

depending on the economic policy area concerned. More specifically, relations on policy 

issues 	between the bureaucracy and interest groups depend on two major factors: 

i) 	 the extent to which the national bureaucracy has ownership of, and control over 

certain policy areas, and; 

2 
ii) 	 the extent to which policies in these areas are coherent with each other, and 

effective. 

The first factor reflects the fact that the Government cannot really engage interest 

groups into a substantial policy dialogue and negotiation unless the bureaucracy itself has 

some degree of control over policy choices. The second one is linked to the fact that the type of policy dialogue with interest groups, and the level at which it takes place, partly depend on 

the coherence and effectiveness of policies. 

With respect to the above factors, there are important differences between: 

Development policies and programs financed under the national investment 

budget 	(Budget Sp&ial d'Investissements, BSI); 

Policies and programs directly related to the implementation of the Structural 

Adjustment Program (SAP), and; 

Other 	policy areas where donors are directly and actively involved (in the 

Malian 	case, national cereal policy and the cotton subsector are good 

examples). 

The results can be summarized as follows: 

Control Coherence/Effectiv. Openness/Style 

B.S.I Potentially 

high, but low 

Low Average (very broad or 

Implementation) 

S.A.P. Average Average/High Good, at higher policy level 

Donor- Low High Good, but selective 

"Intensive" 

One implication from this analysis is that the approach used by USAID to strengthen the Malian bureaucracy's ability to manage economic policy, and to engage interest groups in 

a constructive dialogue over policy issues is not necessarily the same for each type of policy 

area, as described above. 

2. The NationalAssembly 

The National Assembly fulfills several functions: 

i) 	 Diputds participate in the legislative aspects of the policy process by reviewing and amending key legislation, such as the budget bill or the Prime Minister's 

statement of development strategy3 
ii) 	 they provide urban and rural interest groups with a voice and channel for 

action on various macroeconomic or subsectoral issues; 

iii) 	 they contribute to a more open policy debate by requesting testimony on policy 

issues from various interested parties, and through public access and media 

coverage of plenary sessions. 

The National Assembly, however, shows severe limitations, and labors under 

considerable constraints. It remains critically under-equipped, and has very little technical 

support and parliamentary staff. Draft bills submitted by the Government are often 

incomplete or unclear. Representatives themselves admit that parliamentary commissions tend 

to request testimony on a rather selective basis. Many diputes are unprepared to deal with 

complex technical issues and resent their lack of understanding of, or control over, economic 

policy. However, providing representatives with technical information or training has proved 

to be a delicate issue. 

The National Assembly does play a role i. the areas of policy oversight, rural and 

urban interest group representation, and public policy debate, but this role is very imperfect. 

The Government of Mali may not be eager to have a policy watchdog acquire keener senses. 

It may 	also feel that there are already too many channels for the expression of popular 

discontent. However, a dysfunctional or strongly biased parliament may be worse than 

nothing, as it might heighten social tensions and popular frustrations. In other words, if Mali 

is to have a parliament it can live with and keep in the long run, it has to become more 

functional. A number of specific suggestions on further support to the National Assembly are 

presented in the last chapter. 

3. The Media 

Since 1991, the Malian media, a unique phenomenon in West Africa, have played a 

critical role, both in the new democratic process, and in opening up the economic policy 

debate. Several newspapers or magazines cover policy issues on a regular basis. The best 

coverage comes from "Les Cauris," an independent bi-monthly which specializes in political 

economy and policy issues. Others include "L'Aurore," the ADEMA-supported "Mali 

Entreprise," and the Government-controlled "L'Essor." 

Overall, coverage of economic policy and issues in the printed media remains limited. 

Few journalists have more than a basic understanding of economic issues; well-argued feature 

articles and investigative reports are scarce. The number of interviews with high-ranking 

administration officials on economic matters is similarly low, and so is the sum of articles 

contributed by local specialists and academics. The need for better economic journalism is, 

however, getting increasing attention; several economic journalism seminars on structural 

adjustment and on the CFAF devaluation have been organized in the past two years. 

4
 
Mali's unique radio network includes Government-controlled network, private Malian 

broadcasters, and foreign radio stations. Most are operating in Bamako, although a good number of them are now established in small towns throughout the country. Because of the 

dominance of oral communication, and of their reliance on vernacular languages, radio 

stations have reached unprecedented numbers of people with many kinds of information. 

Independent radio stations have been at least as active as the written press in their
 

coverage of economic issues and have reached larger and more diverse audiences.
 

Broadcasters play a basic information role by providing daily price information, and
 

announcements of specific activities and events. 
 All stations have also organized and
 

broadcast round-table discussions and conferences on such issues as structural adjustment,


trade policy, and other economic policy reforms.
 

Most interest groups use the media in some way to further their objectives. The radio 

have been very useful to groups eager to publicize their claims and use popular opinion to 

force the Government to enter into a real dialogue and negotiation process. For the vast 

majority of rural groups, radio stations constitute the only source of information and the sole 

opportunity for popular expression and communication. Most Bamako broadcasters are
 

actually very eager to establish transmitters in small towns, and to develop rural programs,
 

but very few have the financial means to do so. 

4. Urban Interest Groups 

Since 1991, many interest groups have emerged, representing a great variety of 

interests, along multiple organizational and operational modes. Some reflect corporatist interests and practices, while others gather a more disparate membership around specific policy issues. Certain groups clearly focus on economic issues while others deal with 

different types of social questions, such as the place and role of religion in society, human 

rights, and gender issues (there are over 60 women's associations). 

To explore the links between the characteristics of interest groups and their degree of 

success in the policy process, the team carried out a cross-sectional study of about twenty 

groups, all of which are functional and, as it turns out, rather influent. "Structural" 

characteristics were first examined: urban vs. rural-orientation, size, extent of association 

with other groups, relative endowment in resources, access to relevant information andJ 

capacity to carry out pertinent economic analysis. The team then summarized the groups' strategies and methods of operations. Their most common "points of entry" into the policy 

process were also identified. Finally, their degree of success in terms of effectiveness and 

political power was assessed. 

This analysis revealed that five interest group characteristics are most closely associated with successful participation in the policy process. In decreasing order of 

significance, they are: resource endowment, association with parliamentary groups, access to 

high levels of the policy process, access to information, and capacity to analyze it. 

5
 
Corporatist groups, usually better endowed with resources, have tended to do better 

than single-issue oriented ones. Not surprisingly, having resources is also positively 

correlated with another important characteristic: access to information and capacity to carry 

out policy analysis. The actual size of groups, however, does not necessarily determine their 

degree of success. Confrontational strategies and a capacity to mobilize large numbers of 

people do go together, but a confrontational approach does not seem to guarantee influence in 

the long run. 

In addition to this analysis on about twenty interest groups, four mini-case studies, or 

vignettes, illustrate various aspects of intra- and inter-group dynamics, and of the overall 

economic policy process. These vignettes first underscore the importance of a historical 

perspective on the dynamics of interest groups. They also illustrate the crucial role of 

external actors: business partners abroad, donors acting as mediators or as active participants 

in the policy process. 

The vignettes further emphasize important differences between groups in their nature 

and orientation, in their leadership, strategies and degree of effectiveness in policy activism. 

Finally, they reveal the ebb-and-flow of alliances and conflicts among groups, and differences 

in the degree of publicity given to various policy-related controversies. 

5. The Cotton Subsector 

Cotton represents over 50 percent of Mali's export earnings. Faced with falling 

international prices, and as part of a broader structural adjustment program, the Government 

and parastatal agencies active in the subsector have taken measures to reduce management 

and operational costs. These measures have included the retrenchment of Malian parastatal 

enterprises from various input supply, credit, transport and extension activities, and the 

establishment of a multi-year program agreement (Contrat-Plan)between the Government, the 

Malian Company for Textile Development (Compagnie Malienne pour le Diveloppement des 

Textiles, CMDT), donors, and more recently the SYCOV. 

The cotton producers' union, SYCOV, has its origins in a barely averted 1991 strike 

by cotton farmers, mostly from the Koutiala area. Producers had to apply unusual pressure to 

have the Government and the CMDT consider a list of twelve grievances concerning longstanding pricing and marketing issues. Nine out of twelve were rapidly worked out; the 

remainder ushered in a long process of negotiation between the CMDT and cotton producers, 

which resulted, among other things, in the formal establishment of SYCOV as a producer 

organization. 

However, because of the strategic nature of the subsector, several donor agencies 

supported both the emergence of SYCOV as an interlocutor to CMDT, and the pursuit of 

negotiations between the two parties. Consequently, in the eyes of many producers and the 

minds of many who follow Malian agricultural policy, SYCOV has appeared beholden to, if 

not captured by, some international donors and the CMDT. The situation is made more 

6 
complex by the fact that the CMDT fulfills two important roles. It is first a private sector actor managing various aspects of the 'fili~re:" production, collection, processing and marketing. Secondly, it acts as a public agent of the Ministry of Rural Development with responsibility for a wide variety of rural development activities in the cotton zones. Although some policy makers welcome the emergence of SYCOV as a "corporatist" partner to the
 CMDT in the cotton subsector, most are doubtful about the union's capacity to assume the
 management (at lower cost) for the provision of inputs, and for village-level extension 

responsibilities. 

In negotiations with the Government and the CMDT, SYCOV has, with support from donors and the Malian Assembly of Chambers of Agriculture, reached several of its major goals: it has become a full-fledged signatory party to the Contrat-Plan,and has secured, in
 the fall of 1994, a higher producer price for cotton than 
was proposed by the Government. On the other hand, it has failed to obtain satisfaction on the removal of production quotas determined by Compagnie Fran aise pour le Ddveloppement des Fibres Textiles (CFDT), and 

on village-based cotton classification. 

SYCOV leaders as well as outside supporters agree that the union's main challenge is to strengthen its base by increasing the number of members and solidifying the grounds of membership. SYCOV is less than five years old, but it remains more an organization of its leaders rather than of its members. The union also faces a series of deep problems linked to the history of village-level organization and rural political mobilization in Mali. While many public and nongovernmental programs stiW, consider the Associations Villageoises (AVs) as their main points of entry for the implementation of their programs, the AV system appears to 

have reached its limits. 

Whether as a union defending its members' interests, or as a "loyal" corporatist partner to the CMDT and the Government, SYCOV's continued success and viability may hinge on 

an often overlooked factor: literacy. Most of its leaders have had some schooling, and quite a few are retired civil servants. Many of SYCOV's village-level leaders emerged from the once powerful CMDT literacy program. This program now receives much less attention than it used to, and to the extent that this narrow educated base further erodes, it undercuts the 

chances of renewal of village leadership. 

This chapter of the report concludes by examining what, if any, opportunities could be available for the emergence of wider farmer solidarity in Mali. In particular, the team examined SYCOV's relations with political parties, the National Assembly, the Chamber of Agriculture and other farmers' unions to shed some light on prospects for continued political and economic liberalization in rural Mali. 

7
 
D. Research and Programmatic Implications 

Research and programmatic implications include, but are not limited tD, the following: 

L. Strengthening Governmental Democratic Performance 

As Mali continues to move along the path toward political and economic liberalization, 

the findings of this report suggest a number r; ways for the Government to move from its 

'control orientation' in policy making to a f.cilitating and public service role. 

2. StrengtheningEconomic Policy Analysis 

A broader and more constructive dialogue between the Government and a variety of 

interest groups will depend in part upon the capacity of public agencies to carry out more 

informed policy assessments and evaluations. There is,however, no reason why a capacity 

for economic analysis should be a Government monopoly. This report highlights 

opportunities to support independent institutes or associations doing political and economic 

analysis of their own. 

3. Strengthening the NationalAssembly's Role in DemocraticDevelopment 

Based on a fuller understanding of the National Assembly's role, one could consider 

effective ways for 'training' diputis to serve as representatives. Providing some 

parliamentary staff, communications and other logistical support required to improve the 

effetLiveness of the National Assembly should also be considered a priority. 

4. Supporting the Media 

The media have probably contributed more to opening up the policy debate, and to 

promoting the democratic process in Mali than any other single group. Logistical support to 

both the written press and the radio (newsprint, printing equipment, communications and 

broadcasting equipment) would provide extremely high democracy and development "returns", 

both in urban and rural areas. This could be accomplished by supporting station 

programming, providing transportation and recording equipment to journalists, and helping 

private voluntary organizations (PVOs) operating in rural areas bring their "clients" into the 

media channels. 

5. Strengthening Farmers' Organizations 

The various issues raised by SYCOV are illustrative of the problems confronting most 

farmers' organizations in Mali. Emerging farm leaders need to acquire basic skills to 

strengthen the structure of their organizations, establish a more solid financial base and 

improve (or create) an independent policy analysis capacity. Representatives from US farmer 

groups may contribilte to this process. 

8 
The Government's program for administrative decentralization will shift the locus of development policy and political action to the regions. If implemented as planned, however, this program will have profound implications for the organization of farmer groups. For 

example, the commune rurale will replace the village as the basic organizational unit. This
 raises questions about the type of organizational structu,- to replace the association
 

villageoise, as the current unit for development program implementation, and as the basic
 

constituent unit for most farmer organizations.
 

6. PromotingMore Effective Donor Coordination 

It is difficult for a national bureaucracy, beset by a lack of human and other resources, to assert effective control over economic policies largely financed and oriented by donors. This study confirms that, in addition to the sheer "weight" of donor influence, Malian civil 

servants have to reckon with complex patterns of donor infl-ience, not only upon the 

government or the bureaucracy, but on many interest groups as well. Greater coherence in donor policies will not, in itself, guarantee a higher level of national control and "ownership" of economic policies, but it will very likely be a prerequisite. As a major donor, USAID can 

take a lead in both areas. 

7. The Rule of Law 

In many ways, this research and the Mali democracy and governance assessment are complementary. The two exercises indepcidently concluded that one should ensure that the rule of law continues to prevail. Under a dictatorial regime, the rules of the game, however biased, are well understood and enforced. If unconstrained by acceptable and enforceable 

rules, however, rapid gains in political and economic liberalization can bring about new kinds of excesses ctk,,tributing to renewed social tensions in several areas. One should not take it for granted that Mali's imperfect judicial and court system, al'eady strained, will always provide adequate safeguards under the new order. 

9
 
I. RESEARCH SETTING AND ORIENTATIONS 

A. Introduction and Rationale 

In late 1993, the Sahel/West Africa Office of USAID's Africa Bureau asked 

Associates in Rural Development, Inc. and Michigan State University to carry out a one-year, pilot phase study to examine the relationship between political liberalization and economic 

policy 	reforms in the Sahel. The rationale for this request owed much to previous inquiries into the process of economic policy reform in sub-saharan Africa. These suggested that, since the early 1980's, the lack of transparency and popular participation in the policy reform 

process, especially among rural and marginalized groups, had weighed heavily in the generally pooi performance of structural adjustment and other macroeconomic and sectoral 

reforms. 

With the increasing likelihood of a CFA franc devaluation, USAID felt that a better
 understanding of the links between political liberalization and economic policy reform in the
 Sahel, would help increase the transparency, political backing and feasibility of far-reaching
 economic policies. More specifically, the objectives of this pilot study 
were to: 

0 	 Develop a methodology to better understand the role of rural communities and 

interest groups in economic policy reform; 

* Identify methods enabling communities and groups to become more effective 

participants in the policy process; 

* Streigthen the capacity of Sahelian governments in the design, negotiation, and 

implementation of policy reforms, and; 

* Improve the openness of these governments to a greater role for the civil 

society 	in economic policy reform process. 

The work carried out in Mali during 1994 by ARD, Inc., Michigan State University (MSU), and their Malian associates provides an understanding of theses issues, presents methodological approaches and tools, draws general conclusions, and suggests specific operational steps. While this researh was done under the DFM project, an African

Democracy and Governance assessment of the socio-political situation in Mali was being carried out. The two research teams were thus able to exchange information and to coordinate activities. Several Malian participants worked under both research projects, which 

further facilitated the synergy between the two. 

B. Mali as a Suitable Case for a Pilot Study 

After consultations with several USAID missions, the team elected to carry out this research in Mali, using the cotton subsector as an illustration. Mali was selected because, 

11
 
since 1991, its Government appeared to be making considerable progress in assuring sustained 

political and economic liberalization. Under a civilian, executive-parliamentary form of 

government, a wide range of political parties and interest groups seemed to be actively 

participating in the country's political life. This was confirmed both by the team's work, and 

by the findings of the USAID-funded Democracy and Governance Assessment. The cotton 

subsector was chosen because of its significant place in the national economy, raising and 

diversifying the incomes of many thousands of rural families, and adding up to over half of 

the nation's export earnings. The subsector also had high political visibility, and its union of 

cotton producers SYCOV, provided an uncommon example of organized and powerful rural 

labor association in sub-saharan Africa. Finally, this area offered much empirical material for 

the study of rural-urban interactions. 

C. Study Approach 

This prototype study was designed by an economist and a political scientist to be fully 

multidisciplinary, collaborative, and based on multiple visits. Working links were established 

with a Malian research and policy activism organization, the Institut Malien de Recherches 

Appliquies au Diveloppement, IMRAD. The study also established working relationships 

with key researchers, former Government officials, business and labor personalities. Thus, 

Malian team members included two widely respected experts on national economic and 

political affairs, a former high-ranking official of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and a 

rural sociologist, knowledgeable in the issues confronting various rural interest groups in the 

cotton subsector. Collaborative links were maintained through several visits to Mali, joint 

interviews, commissioned work and organization or participation in several workshops held in 

Bamako. Commissioned work included a number of interviews and short case studies, two of 

which are appended to this report as working papers' . 

The full team carried out the research during three separate, short phases in January, 

March and June-July 1994, Malian team members continuing with various components of the 

research program throughout the period. This approach had several advantages: time to 

reconsider and redirect lines of enquiry, time for the main researchers to reflect on issues, 

building a stronger sense of involvement and "ownership" over time among Malian 

researchers and other associates. Finally, this allowed the team to track the evolution of 

policies, policy positions and interests among various actors, especially in light of the January 

12, 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc. 

To further publicize this research within Mali, the final workshop has been taped and 

to produce a two-hour radio broadcast on Radio Kl6du, a Bamako station specializing in 

economic policy debates and conferences. On the U.S. side, the team has made every effort 

to inform, and collaborate with interest parties: the GDO and ADO offices at USAID, the 

Embassy, and at the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). Finally, the main research team 

"The 1990-1994 Chronology of Economic and Political Events", and "The Media and Economic Information in 

Mali." 

12 
organized a small donors' roundtable consultation on the extent to which donors support specific interest groups and promote a more open and participatory economic policy process. 

D. Research Approach and Instruments 

The conceptual approach used in designing the field research combined two types of 

studies: those dealing with policy reform and those dealing with the organization and 

influence of interest groups in the development process. More specifically, the field team 

carried out simultaneous research activities in four areas: 

0 	 the economic policy process; 

• 	 the structure and dynamics of a sample of interest groups; 

a policy 	issues and actors in the cotton sub-sector; and 

a the structure and dynamics of groups in the cotton sub-sector. 

1. Understandingthe Policy Process 

The team's goal here was to gain an understanding of how the economic policy 

process actually "works"; to identify the mechanisms, main actors, and issues. The team 

wanted to explore certain specific questions; for instance: 

* 	 To what extent does the bureaucracy feel it has adequate control over major 

aspects of economic policy in Mali? 

a 	 Are the necessary mechanisms and dynamics in place to ensure that reasonably cohesive policy orientations and choices emerge from the central bureaucracy? 

0 	 Is the bureaucracy willing to work with various interest groups on policy 

analysis and implementation? If so, which areas and issues are "open for 

negotiation" and which ones are not? 

0 	 On which mechanisms does the bureaucracy rely to send this message to 

interest groups; how does negotiation take place, and at which levels of the 

policy process? 

* What is the role of "linkage" or intermediary institutions such as the media, 

parliamentary groups, political parties, in the interaction between the 

bureaucracy and interest groups? 

0 Regarding the above points, is there a willingness to make the process more 

efficient; what are some reasonable options? 

13 
The team tried to answer these questions on the basis of documentary evidence, 

structured interviews with current and past members of the bureaucracy, group discussions 

with Malian colleagues, and in two workshops. Results are round in Chapter II of the paper. 

2. Cross-sectionalAnalysis of Interest Groups 

In terms of policy issues and interactions between the policy process and interest 

groups, this paper emphasizes the cotton subsector. However, the team felt that it would be 

useful to draw on a broader sample of groups to complement sub-sectoral analysis with a 

study of interest groups characteristics and determinants of success in policy activism. 

Typical questions included: 

Intra-group dynamics -- Can one draw up a typology of interest groups 

according to structure, strategies, and mode of operation? How do these factors 

relate to success, in terms of the ability to inflect policy choices or 

implementation? 

"Point of Entry" -- What is the range of points of entry used by interest groups 

in their interaction with the policy process; and is there a relationship with their 

degree of success? 

Inter-group dynamics -- What are the kinds of relationships between groups, 

and how do they affect the groups' degree of success? 

Other actors -- What role do the media, parliamentary groups, political parties, 

donors, play in the policy process, and in the interaction between groups and 

the policy process? 

Regarding the above points, what measures might be taken to promote a more 

open, balanced and constructive interaction between groups and the policy 

process?
 

The team tried to answer such questions through single and repeat interviews with 

constituents from a varied sample of interest groups, members of the bureaucracy, of the 

media, of the National Assembly, of political parties, and representatives from donor agencies. 

Results are illustrated through "mini-case studies", or vignettes, in Chapter II of the report. 

3. Policy Issues and Actors in the Cotton Subsector 

This aspect of the research was designed to provide a more detailed description of 

policies, actors in interactions in the cotton subsector. The questions addressed included: 

What is the linkage between macroeconomic policy areas, and policies more 

specific to the cotton subsector? 

14 
Who are the main stakeholders and actors in the cotton subsector; which policy 

area is of concern to them, or the object of interaction (collaboration, 

interdependence, conflict) with other groups or the bureaucracy'? 

In this case, the research instrument consisted of several overlaid "mappings" of the 

cotton subsector. On the basis of documentary research and interviews with a wide range of 

actors from the central bureaucracy, parastatal enterprise, transporters, textile manufacturers, 

cotton producers, and donor agencies, the team derived a series of schematic illustrations. 

These showed: i) relevnt areas of macroeconomic policy, ii) the mapping of functional 

relationships betvcen major actors in the cotton subsector, and iii) policy issues specific to 

the subsector. The overlaid mapping showed which set of actors was affected by main 

subsectoral or macroeconomic policy areas. The rationale for this mapping was that it helped visualize which actors are likely to intervene on each major policy area. It also helped understand the political calculus of subsectoral policy choices, since affected stakeholders 

were identified by main policy area. 

4. LongitudinalAnalysis of Interest Groups in the Cotton Subsector 

Here the team tried to answer similar questions as in the second research area, above, but with a narrower policy focus, in greater detail, and with a much expanded historical 

perspective. This required an examination of the following questions: 

There is no doubt that the SYCOV cotton farmers' union has gained influence, 

to the point where they now participate in Contrat-Plannegotiations with the 

central bureaucracy, the CMDT and donors. However, the viability and 

representativeness of SYCOV remain debatable. For example, many observers 

question the real extent of SYCOV's base in the rural areas. The union's 

legitimacy and influence have also benefitted from financial and technical 

support by donors or NGOs. The question is, therefore, at what point does 

external support begin to create a "dependency relationship" and a handicap to 

creating a viable farmers' union? 

Do parastatal experience and training among SYCOV leaders influence the 

union's effectiveness? In other words, could an interest group whose leaders 

have no previous government experience become an accepted and viable 

interlocutor in policy discussions? 

At the village level, what would SYCOV need to do in order to convince 

farmers that it represents an attractive and profitable option to the current role 

played bye the CMDT and its village-level agents? 

What developmental role can political parties play, especially in the 

countryside? 

15 
How will the Government's program for administrative decentralization 

influence the effectiveness of SYCOV? 

Are there any opportunities for the emergence of wider, or nation-wide, farmer 

solidarity movements in Mali? 

Findings in this area of research were obtained mostly through individual and group 

interviews with members of the central bureaucracy, of the CMDT parastatal, the SYCOV 

leadership and members, and a set of field surveys in Mali's cotton areas (CMDT as well as 

the Office de la Haute Vallie du Niger, OHVN). Results are presented in Chapter IV. 

16
 
II. THE ECONOMIC POLICY PROCESS -- ACTORS AND DYNAMICS 

This chapter presents a general description of the economic policy process, and of the 

major actors taking part in it. Subsequent chapters provide a more detailed analysis of 

interest groups and of dynamics within the cotton subsector. 

Most African and foreign experts recognize that many of the economic policy reform 

programs of the 1980's have failed, not only economically, but also politically and socially. 

Some observers invoke the over-eagerness of donors, the lack of host country commitment, or 

limited institutional resources as likely reasons. Others point to failures in communications 

between aid agencies and African governments, or between these governments and their own 

people, as the real cause. Indeed, partly out of customary arbitrariness, and partly because 

they were largely unconvinced themselves, many African governments failed to build broad 

popular support behind the reforms they agreed to undertake. This had two major 

consequences. First, their counter-arguments to planned measures were less convincing2 than 

if such opposition had been aired through wider public debate. Secondly, by the time the 

reforms had to be carried out, popular reaction was often uncontrollable. Governments, 

caught between the "rock" of donor pressure, and the "hard place" of popular discontent, 

either retreated into brutal oppression, or fell. 

For the purposes of this study, the economic policy process refers to the results from 

the interaction between the policy domain proper, and various societal actors. The policy domain includes high-level members of the polity and the state bureaucracy in charge of 

policy orientations, policy making (policy design or analysis, choice of policy instruments)

and policy implementation. Relevant societal actors include popular masses, specific interest 

groups or associations, the media, the National Assembly, and political parties. 

A. The Basic Model 

In this study, the policy process has been analyzed by main component stage. The 

first stage applies to the level where policy orientations are chosen in order to reach overall 

societal goals. Broad orientations are then translated into specific sectoral and other policies, 

to be applied by various government agencies (usually ministries). In the next stage, instruments are chosen for each main policy to reach intended results, subject to a number of 

constraints on financial and institutional resources, and with respect to the impact of available 

policy instruments on various social or interest groups. The last stage applies to policy 

implementation. 

In its analysis of Malian interest groups, the team paid particular attention to the 

degree of transparency of the policy process, especially through the availability of relevant 

information, and to the capacity of groups to gather and analyze policy related information. 

2At least until the first bread or rice price riots erupted. 

17 
The groups' strategies and resources were also examined, as potential determinants of the 

level, or stage, at which groups interact with the policy process. In addition, channels of 

action, direct and indirect, were investigated. 

B. Overview of the Main Actors and Dynamics 

The discussion below presents groups considered to be major actors. They are: the 

state bureaucracy, interest groups, the media, the national assembly, and political parties. One 

should be mindful that the lines between main actors are not always clearly drawn: the state 

bureaucracy is itself akin to a set of institutional interest groups; political parties are influent 

both in parliament and in the media. In addition, each major actor can play a variety of roles. 

However, the main actors and dynamics in the policy process may be described as follows: 

- As a set of sometimes allied, sometimes competing interest groups, the bureaucracy 

avoids, tolerates, or welcomes interaction on policy issues with various parties, 

including donor agencies; 

* Interest groups interact with the policy domain at various stages, and in different 

ways, depending various factors, including the nature of the group and the policy 

issue. Interest groups act singly, or in alliance with, or against other groups. In some 

instances interest groups interact directly with the policy domain, while in others they 

use one or several channels: the media, the National Assembly, or political parties; 

• The media play several roles in the policy process. They contribute to transparency 

in the interactions between the bureaucracy and interest groups, and provide a measure 

of openness in the policy process. They supply a channel for information flowing 

from the bureaucracy towards interest groups, or vice-versa, and give a voice to all 

parties. They also constitute a corporatist interest group in their own right; 

* Likewise, the National Assembly fulfills various functions. It has some oversight 

over policy making and implementation and, to a limited extent, can call on the 

bureaucracy to account for its actions. It can act as a channel or intermediary in 

representing specific interest groups. By holding widely open debates on policy 

issues, it contributes, with the help of the media, to transparency and public 

information. 

* Political parties intervene indirectly, and in multiple ways, into the economic 

policy process. One common channel is the National Assembly, where all parties are 

organized into six groupements parlementaires. As mentioned above, all parties are 

represented in each parliamentary commission, and its members vote or introduce 

motions in the National Assembly's general sessions. Political parties or, rather, 

political figures, also intervene through the media: several newspapers or radio stations 

are owned or controlled by powerful individuals. Although people directly contact 

political parties to help settle personal problems, interest groups rarely do so. A chief 

18 
reason is that political parties, especially the Association pour la Dimocracieau 

Mali/PartiAfricain pour la Solidaritiet la Justice (ADEMA), have a history of trying 

to divide, infiltrate or control various associations and interest groups. Conversely, 

some political parties are as eager to stay away from "radical" interest groups as the 

latter are to keep their distances from political parties. 

With respect to the rural sector, discussions with representatives from several political 

parties suggeor that the extent to which they embrace a rural strategy, or have taken a 

position vis-a-vis the interests of rural producers, is questionable. Most parties have 

relatively localized sources of support, either in Bamako or in certain regions. There 

is some evidence, however, that some parties, like the Union pour la Ddmocratie et le 

Diveloppement (UDD) are gradually broadening their political base with a network of 

regional and local offices. Various rural groups frequently present grievances or 

requests through the representatives of parliamentary parties. At the same time, 

however, SYCOV and the OHV Comiti de Coordinationpublicly dissociate their 

organizations from any partisan affiliations. Both groups feel strongly that they have 

more to lose than to gain from clear partisan connections. Moreover, this 'antipartisanism' seems to reflect a widespread cynicism of party politics in the 

countryside. Shortly after the presidential elections, for example, farmers interviewed 

in the CMDT zone reported that party activity was basically divisive, and possibly 

anti-developmental, in most villages. 

C. The Bureaucracy and the Policy Process 

The Malian state bureaucracy represents a varied set of institutional interest groups and factions. Strdctural adjustment pressures have drawn more clearly yet the lines between 

the Finance Ministry, for instance, and other institutions. The restructuring or privatization of 

parastatal enterprises have also been very divisive issues. Interaction between the 

bureaucracy and the political 61ite on the one hand, and with other interest groups has been 

all the more laborious. In addition, many interest groups include early-retired former 

members of the bureaucracy. 

In their relations with civil society interest groups, members of the bureaucracy also 

have to manage "political interference," whereby a policy outcome is often presented to them 

as afait accoinpli. In some instances, the Government yields to popular pressure, while in 

other cases, interest groups directly lobby a Minister, who may elect not to rely on his staff 

for policy analysis. 

Finally, the bureaucracy is quite ambivalent on "donor interference" into the policy 

process. On the one hand, donors can provide the means by which interest groups collaborate 

with the bureaucracy on policy analysis, as has been the case in the transport sector. Donors 

have also helped interest groups reach a consensus position on important policy issues as a 

preamble to negotiations with the Government. On the other hand, when donors assume a 

19
 
predominant role, there can be important implications for the participatory quality of the 

policy process. 

The study results also suggest a relationship between i) the extent of control by the 

Malian bureaucracy over certain types of policies, ii) the intra-sectoral coherence and 

effectiveness of these policies, and iii) the degree of openness toward, and type of relationship 

with, interest groups in Malian society. Three broad types of economic policies may be 

analyzed to illustrate the point: 

I. The Policy Processand Policies Financedunder the BSI 

These are the investment-oriented policies whereby national orientations and the 

sundry interests of donors are reconciled through the BSI and its rolling three-year investment 

plan. The process involves the Ministry of Plan, the Ministry of Finance's national budget 

directorate, and the statistical and planning units of the various ministries. As in other Sahel 

countries, however, the proportion of donor funds in the BSI is around 80-85 percent, and 

these funds come from a large number of donors who have different --and sometimes 

changing-- development approaches and emphases. A national bureaucracy thus finds it hard 

to relate programs to a national mandate, and to maintain policy consistency over time. The 

temptation is also great to rely on a strategy designed to maximize the overall size of the BSI 

and the number of individual projects, and to minimize the national contribution. This 

invariably drives down the rate of spending on budgeted funds; in Mali it is currently on the 

order of 50 to 55 percent. Although the efficiency of such spending is expected to be quite 

low, it's difficult to make an overall assessment since the Ministry of Plan does not have the 

resources to verify the physical implementation of budgeted activities; it only works on the 

basis of reimbursed project expenditures. This is the reason why the summary table below 

indicates that while control over the BSI by the Malian bureaucracy can be high in principle, 

the coherence among policies, and their overall effectiveness, are low. 

The policy process, however, is not merely driven by a combination of donors' 

orientations and institutional interests. Over the last few years, the translation of broad 

national orientations into specific policies and programs has increasingly relied on the 

conclusions of rather popular fora, and on technical input from the ranks of the administration 

(as in the forestry subsector, for instance). Non-institutional stakeholders do not intervene at 

the intermediate stages of the policy process. The interests of specific groups are expressed 

through parliamentary action at a higher policy level through the review of the lettre de 

politique de ddveloppement, loi de finances, and at a lower level through questions orales in 

plenary sessions. Consequently, the degree of openness is thought to be average, and the 

popular participation takes place on very broad policy orientations, or at the implementation 

level. 

Also, these types of policies lend themselves best to the Government's proposed 

decentralization policy, which may significantly alter the relationships and dynamics within 

government agencies, between levels of government, and between government and rural 

20
 
interest groups. The Ministry of Rural Development's Plan d'Action provides an example of 

a government document specifically addressing the issue of a more decentralized organization 

that would respond more effectively and appropriately to rural needs and interests. This 

approach would involve more privatization of activities as well as specific measures so that 

it ional offices would be less hierarchically dependent on Bamako, and more demandt cn by local constituencies. As the Plan states: "The point is no longer to control or 

rt iment producers, but to establish a relation of true partnership within which their 

individual interests, as well as the public good, can be both safeguarded and allowed to 

interact harmoniously 3

." It is, however, only fair to point out that decentralization remains 

very much a top-down process, and that there are many in the national bureaucracy who 

actively resist it. 

2. The Policy PrGcess and StructuralAdjustment Policies 

This process is driven by a much smaller number of donors, working closely with each 

other and the Government. Many Malians still consider that such policy reforms are imposed 

by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but in reality things are less 

clear-cut. For one thing, part of the bureaucracy has gradually taken ownership of and 

responsibility for many of the adjustment policies. The framework document is now prepared 

by the Malian bureaucracy in a fairly open and participatory process. The Structural 

Adjustment Committee gathers eight national analysts and representatives from each ministry. 

It has a design as well as a monitoring function, and meets once a month on the average. 

The committee discusses program implementation, and sends its conclusions to the World 

Bank and to the IMF. Still, most civil servants complain that the process of communication 

and consultation within the administration remains far from perfect 4

. 

Consultations with corporate interest groups on technical issues in structural 

adjustment policy areas (e.g., energy, transport, health) have been numerous. In some cases, 

the bureaucracy has sought the collaboration of trade groups, in others, the latter have taken 

the initiative. In the transport sector, for instance, donors have facilitated the participation of 

trade associations in the analysis of policy reforms. The national labor union federation, 

UNTM, has also been kept regularly informed of planned structural adjustment measures. 

The bureaucracy increasingly relies on the press to gauge the interpretation and 

reaction of various groups to policy decisions, especially in the area of structural adjustment. 

The Ministry of Finance plans to carry out a systematic monthly polling of public opinion, to 

see how people perceive government decisions, in terms of efficiency or equity. This activity 

will cover rural as well as urban areas, and will not be donor-supported. The polling is to be 

3 II ne s'agit plus d'encadrer, voire enrdgimenter ... mais d'entretenir... des relations de partenariat vrai 

pour une forme de d6veloppement dans laquelle ses intdr~ts particuliers, aussi bien que ceux de la collectivit6 

nationale seraient pr6servds et s'articuleraient harmonieusement." 

4See for instance, Deme, M. et al, "Ajustement Structurel et Communication", 1994. 

21 
carried out by a private consulting firm, with results to be presented in the Council of 

Ministers. 

In spite of such efforts, the quality of communication, and the nature of collaboration 

between the bureaucracy and important interest groups on specific issues leave much to be 

desired. Both sides are aware of this and readily recognize it. Even donors intervening in 

critical areas have had to allow for this. In some cases, a donor designing policy reforms has 

consulted certain interest groups, in addition to the bureaucracy. In other ir .ances, the 

bureaucracy itself has turned to donors to facilitated collaboration or mediation among interest 

groups to ensure a more productive dialogue between them and the public agencies. In 

conclusion, on structural adjustment-related policies, the degree of control by the national 

institutions is average, policies tend to be relatively coherent and effective, and participation 

by various interest groups is rather good, and improving. 

3. The Policy Process in Policy Areas where Donors are Actively Involved 

The third type of policy area is strongly influenced by a smaller group of donors, who 

not only provide financing, but also take an active part in policy design and implementation. 

Examples include cereal policy, with the long-standing multi-donor Programmede 

Restructuration du March Cer~alier(PRMC) project, and the cotton subsector. In such 

cases, the degree of control over the policy area by the bureaucracy is low, while intrasectoral coherence and effectiveness tend to be high. It is also in this type of policy area that 

donor involvement with corporatist interest groups has been the greatest, through technical or 

financial support to producers' or traders' associations, or intermediation between producers 

and policy makers. 

The results can be summarized in the table below: 

Control by the Coherence/Effectiv. Openness/Style 

Bureaucracy 

B.S.I Potentially Low Average (very broad 

high, but low or Implementation) 

S.A.P. Average Average/High Good, at higher policy 

level 

Donor- Low High Good, but selective 

"Intensive" 

To summarize, overall control of policies by the Malian bureaucracy remains partial. 

In the BSI case, policy coherence and effectiveness suffer, while in the case of "donormanagement intensive" policy areas, outside influence provides greater policy coherence and 

effectiveness. The extent of openness in the policy process, and the type of relations with 

22
 
interest groups seem to be determined by the combined effects of policy control and 

coherence. In the case of BSI-financed policies, the process is open, but opportunities for 

significant policy influence by interest groups are few. In the policy areas where donors take 

a very active role, the high coherence and effectiveness of policies should facilitate policy dialogue. However, the involvement of the national bureaucracy in such areas is relatively 

limited. Consequently, interest groups either gain accc.ss to the policy process through

donors, or find their interlocutors in the national administration rather passive. It is, rather, in 

the structural adjustment-related policy areas that the combination is most favorable to a 

relatively wide and constructive policy dialogue: a satisfactory degree of control by the 

national bureaucracy, and of coherence and effectiveness in policies. 

D. Interest Groups and the Policy Process 

This study has examined Malian interest groups from various viewpoints. The 

following four mini-case studies or "vignettes" provide some insights into the interactions 

among interest groups, and between groups and other actors in the economic policy process. 

Chapter IV presents a more complete analysis of the structure and dynamics of Malian 

interest groups, of their effectiveness in policy activism, and of the relationships between 

group characteristics and the.. degree of success. Finally, Chapter V looks in detail at interest 

groups in the cotton subsector. 

Vignette I - The Malian Chamber of Commerce (CCIM) 

As in most countries, the Chamber of Commerce tries to represent two kinds of business interests: the manufacturing and industrial interests, and trading interests. As usual, the interests of such business groups are quite different, and often opposed. For instance, the traders are in favor of lower custom duties, whereas manufacturers are aiming for the opposite. Relations 

between traders and manufacturers within the CCIM thus take various turns; they are sometimes opposed, sometimes allied. The CCIM occasionally relies on mediation by outsiders, it isalso closely tied to foreign business interests. 

The CCIM regroups large and small manufacturers, wholesale traders operating both on 

domestic and international markets, and a large number of small retailers. Even though such 

groups are often at odds with each other, the CCIM could play a useful role in at least two 

areas. First, it could be looking after the general interests of constituent groups, for instance, making sure that regulations apply fairly to all, helping monitor the application of business law, promoting Mali's export products, etc. Secondly, it could provide a forum for discussions or negotiations between various interest groups. In fact, the CCM does not assume these tasks 

very well, unless there isa serious crisis, such as the 1991 aftermath of the overthrow of the Traor6 regime, when rioters had torched or looted many businesses. Another recent example isthe January 12, 1994 CFA franc devaluation, where all parties worked closely for about three weeks to reach agreements acceptable to the business community (fiscal measures, compensation on unpaid orders from foreign suppliers) to the government (interms of anticipated revenues) and to consumers (limits on price increases). The CCIM did help provide, for this period, one of the forums or mechanisms for the exchange of Ideas and decision-making, but this role should not be overemphasized; discussions and negotiations would have taken place anyway. 

23
 
In certain cases, trade and Industry interests have accepted mediation because they 

perceived that a mutually beneficial consensus was reachable in a specific policy area. At 

the conclusion of the Etats-G 6nraux on Commerce and Industry, for instance, all parties had 

agreed on the principle of reviewing custom duties. However, neither import/export 

wholesalers, who wanted lower duties, nor manufacturers, who requested higher ones, could 

reach an agreement. The Ministry of Finance, not wanting to "take sides", nor able to 

convince either group to reach an agreement, relied on an independent mediator to work 

with the two sides to reach a solution, in this case, a foreign consultant, provided under World 

Bank financing. 

On balance, then, deep discontent with the Chamber of Commerce is widespread. Many 

Malian observers, including some members of the bureaucracy, feel that "industrial 

development in Mali cannot move forward as long as the CCIM maintains the status-quo." 

They would like, with help from the World Bank, to privatize the CCIM, and have a number of 

more independent trade associations emerge, somewhat in the F6d6rafion Nationale des 

Employeurs du Mali (FNEM) style. In fact, the principle of CCIM/FNEM separation had been 

agreed on by all parties during the Etats-G6nraux on Trade and Industry, and was to be 

announced In a presidential speech. However, the Chamber of Commerce has so far 

managed to foil such measures. 

There are several related reasons why the CCIM has been able to remain a powerful 

institution. The first stems from continued (although sometimes reluctant) support by the 

government, which still appoints the Chamber's Secretary.General. The second reason has to 

do with the political power of its elected president. Although many member groups have 

been trying to get rid of this well known, visible and controversial figure, and to restructure the 

Chamber of Commerce, its president manages to hang on. He owes part of his support to a 

small group of powerful traders, but also, and mostly, to a particular constituency: the small, 

informal or petty treaders. Along with students and employees of state enterprises, petty 

traders are one of the most feared groups by the government. They can organize economic 

strikes, and take to the streets in riotous ways. 

The "fraude",or smuggling issue isvery symptomatic of relations between groups within the 

CCIM. During the transition period, the government had decided, under manufacturers' 

pressure, to crack down on smuggled imports. Various groups had worked on special 

measures to reduce this phenomenon, including the Etats-Generaux mandated Cellule de 

R6pression contre la Fraude, whose hands were tied for socio-political reasons. In 1992 some 

manufacturers and traders organized and raised funds to address the problem. They created 

joint brigades including army or police officers and representatives from the business 

community. Fuel and vehicles were provided by concerned businesses. They had some 

successes, but the movement died down after a time. In 1993, a Bamako neighborhood 

where many small retailers specializing in smuggled goods was searched. The traders response 

turned into serious riots, and the government backed off. Although the Malian administration 

has succeded in increasing revenues, there isno doubt that most commodities still come Into 

Mali with no custom duties being collected5 . 

The Chamber of Commerce leadership has played another card to retain influence: support 

from foreign, mostly French, business groups, such as the Chambers of Commerce of Bordeaux 

AA 1993 study estimated the malian government's losses to smuggling and other types of tax evasion to 130-165 

billion FCFA/year (official development assistance to Mali is on the order of 65 billion FCFA per annum). 

24
 
or Paris. The CCIM strategy appears tied to the post-devaluation wave of re-investment in 

west Africa. Since the late 1980s, many firms had been taking mitigating measures, or leaving the region. Individual members of the local elites had placed their funds Into shelter 

currencies. Now that the devaluation has taken place, a fair amount of money is coming back. Sheltered savings are buying back twice their old value in CFA. Some of this money
 finds its way to productive investments, while most goes into residential housing. However,
 foreign capital tends to go into export-oriented or import-substituting manufacturing. In several 

countries, French firms are reinvested in such sub-sectors as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc. West African Chambers of Commerce are involved in this process, and the Mali CCIM 

undoubtedly finds it opportune to be part of it. 

Vignette 2 - The Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Mali (UNTM) 

The UNTM is Mall's largest and oldest federation of labor unions, having been very active in the 

independence-related labor struggles of the 1950s. Today, it appears as an old-fashioned 

socialist-style labor group, concerned primarily with working conditions and salaries, but its 

political clout remains considerable. 

The UNTM has become increasingly involved In the policy process, but with very limited 

effectiveness. Since the early days of the structural adjustment program, UNIM has been part of the process, being the first group the Malian government consulted outside of the 

bureaucracy. Some of its officers even went to Washington to negotiate a program with the 

World Bank, but ihe experience turned short, and has not been repeated. 

As a representative of interest groups, the UNTM issystematically consulted by the government when important policy changes are being considered. 1,is the only Malian non-governmental 

group to systematically receive a copy of the complete agreements between the World Bank and the government of Mali, but of their own admission, no one there really understands the 

agreements, just as very few people in the Malian administration fully comprehend it. 

However, UNTM's social and political importance are acknowledged, in the sense that donors 

undertaking major policy reforms, especially the World Bank, hold discussions with them. The 

UNTM isthus a pcrty to such agreements both through discussions with the government, and through consultations with foreign sponsors of policy change. The problem isthat the UNTM, as 

a federation ot labor unions, and as an institution, 1-extremely poorly equiped to deal with 

structural adjustement Issues. Its leadership isconcerned with classic labor union matters: 

salaries, working conditions, benefits and job security. They are much less interested in policy analysis. They sometimes rely on outside expertise for advice, but have none of their own, although they have received offers from international labor federations. There issome 

computer equipment at UNTM, for instance, but no one uses it. Neither did the federation 

take up offers of technical asssistance in economic policy analysis. In conclusion, although the 

UNTM has been Included in policy discussions, their style of operations does not make full­ fledged or effective partners of them. A possible reason is that the classic, old-style UNTM 

leadership may feel threatened by a modus operandi granting younger and more policy­ oriented staff additional influence. 

Vignette 3 - Trade Associations in the Transport Sector 

There are only two trade associations in the transport sector, Union Nationale des Chargeurs et 

Transporteurs Routiers du Mali (UNCTRM) and Syndicat des Tronsporteurs Urbains et Interurbains 

(SYNTRUI). UNCTRM Isthe older, more traditional organization, which was, in fact, the only one 

25
 
allowed under the Moussa Traor6 r6glme. SYNTRUI was created shortly before the 1991 

6vdnements, It Istoday the largest (by far), most modern, dynamic, and best-endowed of the 

two trade associctions. Both operate under increasingly competitive conditions: freight rates 

have fallen by at least one-third since 1991, and Mali Isone of the handful of countries in all of 

Africa where fuel prices have been fully liberalized. This, by the way, issaid to result from 

strong and effective pressure from import-export trade groups in Mali. The two unions tend to 

operate in different areas of the transport sector, and on very different scales; UNCTRM, for 

example, includes most of the small Intra and pei-urban mass transit transporters, while SYNTRUI 

puts the emphasis on inter-urban and long distance (to Abidjan and Dakar) transport. They 

are definitely strong rivals, but do collaborate on the African transporters main and universal 

problems: ransoming at road blocks. They also join in yearly negotiations with the CMDT on the 

cost of transporting cotton fiber for export (mostly through Abidjan). 

The experience of the SYNTRUI union illustrates several Interesting features of organized groups 

dynamics. Its creation isa direct result of in extremis political liberalization steps taken in the 

very last days of the Traore administration. The laws enabling the creation of such trade unions 

had been passed since the late 1950's and early 1960's6 but were not applied until early 1991. 

Even then, political liberalization 6 /a Traor6 did not extend to all, or apply randomly: the 

president of SYNTRUI isa well-known, popular personality, and a close relative of the former 

head of state. In fact, this close association with the mali's former ruling family nearly cost the 

new union dearly during the 1991 uprisings. Trucks and staff had to be quickly removed from 

Bamako until things quieted down. 

Partly for this reason, the union has adopted a particularly conciliatory and conservative 

approach in its relations with the transition and Third Republic governments. It has refused to 

join two important strikes, the 1992 grave gen6rale des oi6rateurs6conomiques, and the 

February/March 1994 ville morte action. Shortly after the CFAF devaluation, the SYNTRUI 

proposed a 30 percent increase in freight charges, which was extremely well received by an 

administration expecting to have to put up with an increase of over 50 percent. 

This does not, however, mean that the SYNTRUI fails to look after its members' Interests. It has 

considerable resources (as shown below) and isone of the very best organized and managed 

trade associations in Mali. Representatives from the union have frequent meetings with the 

administration on a number of technical issues, and are routinely consulted by National 

Assembly representatives on transportation matters. SYNTRUI has also actively participated in, 

and contributed to a World Bank sectoral review of the transport sector. The organization also 

maintains an office in Abidjan, which works closely with the Ivoirian administration, and with 

transporters from C6te d'lvoire and Burkina Faso. It has been able to Influence the agenda 

setting and negotiations during the regularly scheduled meetings of transport ministers from 

Mall, Burkina Faso and C6te d'lvoire. Through collaboration with other transporters' 

associations and applying pressure on the Ivoirian administration, they have succeeded in 

reducing freight taxes in C6te d'lvoihe from 35,000 to 14,000 FCFA/truck, and hope to have this 

tax removed entirely. They hove also obtained the removal of the carte de s6jour requirement 

for truckers operating in C6te d'lvoire. 

In Mali Itself, they have obtained the removal of a tax on road freight, and have been 

organizing joint missions with members of the bureaucracy to substantiate the biggest and 

most common transporters' problem in Africa: ransoming at road blocks. This Isa very difficult 

Executive order No. 41, art. 293, and law 62167 ANIRM. 

26 
area. Everyone knows that road transporters pay more in Illegal taxes and bribes than in fuel 

or any other cost category. Road blocks disappear briefly after occasional crackdowns, but 

never fall to reappear. In Mall, toll taxes are supposed to be levied from transporters to pay for 

a variety of municipal and state public services. Both the government, through revenue 

agents, and the transporters' unions, through vouchers or receipts collected from transporters, try to keep track of amounts paid, and to reconcile their numbers. Proceeds are then divided 

according to the following proportions: 

60 percent goes to the Government (some of it for redistribution to decentralized
 

authorities);
 

25 percent goes to the transporters' union, to be used for the Improvement of
 

efficiency and safety in the profession (a lot of it isapplied to training programs for
 

drivers and operators);
 

15 percent goes to the uniformed services In charge of collecting the taxes.
 

Another interesting aspect of the transporters' union isthe nature of their relationship with 

interest groups in the energy sector, particularly the Groupement des Professionnels du P6trole 

(GPP). The GPP ismade up of representatives from Total/Texaco, Elf, Shell and Mobil. In the 

early 1990s, transporters and fuel companies joined forces to lean on the government to 

reduce the inflows of fuel from Nigeria. At that time, illegal but widespread Nigerian exports of 

fuel were in full swing. The very low price of fuel in Nigeria, rapidly falling exchange rate of the 

Naira, and proximity of potential buyers paying in convertible currency (the CFAF) combined 

to drive so much fuel out of Nigeria that major shortages resulted in the Federation. Of course, 

the same principle applied to fertilizer, cars, spare parts, textiles and a multitude of 

manufactured goods made in Nigeria or imported from Asia. Benin, Niger and Cameroon 

were hit especially hard, but even Mali felt some of the effects of this strategy, Malian 

transporters could not go to Nigeria to join this kind of trade, and fuel companies, legally bringing gasoline with the help of Malian transporters, from C6te d'lvoire refineries, found they had a common interest. After some time, fuel flows from Nigeria dried up. 

The smuggling problem has not entirely been solved, however. Taxes on gasoline imported from Ivoirian refineries amount to about 165 FCFA/liter, out of a retail price of just under 300 

FCFA/liter. There isa strong incentive for many operators to smuggle gasoline into Mall and set 

up roadside barrel-and-pump retail operations. Tax paying fuel companies and transporters have reached agreements on long-term rates allowing them to weather lean times, but they would like the government to crack down more actively on the illegal fuel trade. The 

administration, however, Istrying to balance the cost of lost fuel tax revenues against and the 

price it would have to pay, in terms of business and consumer reaction, if smuggled fuel flows 

dried up. 

Vignette 4 - The Malian Miller's Tale: Grands Moulins vs. Bakers 

This final case on the flour import tax law illustrates several Important aspects of the policy debate In Mali. It has pitted various protagonists against each other: the milling company, bakers, the Ministry of Finance, the Customs Service, and foreign interests. Uncharacteristically, the dispute has been carried over into relatively open fora: National Assembly commissions, 

and the media. 

The main protagonists have been the milling company and the Bamako bakers. The milling 

company, Grands Moulins du Mall (GMM), was established in 1982 by the government with 

Mallan and French credits. The mill has been operated under license by a member of a 

27
 
leading Lebanese business dynasty, Mr. Achcar. Although wheat milling capacity isabout 

60,000 tons/year, production reaches 23,000 tons of flour, out of approximately 35,000 tons 

consumed annually In the country. The mill employs about 80 regular staff and 70 daily 

laborers. It generates about FCFA 3C0 million/year in taxes for the government of Mali. 

On the other side of the fence are about 35 "industrial" and over 100 "artisanal" bakeries in 

Bamako. They buy flour either from the GMM, from wholesale importers, or from resellers. 

Wheat and wheat flour are relatively inexpensive on the world market, due to production and 

export subsidies. Strictly speaking, the "protection" argument In Mali isspecious since Mall 

produces no wheat to speak of, and other cereals are hardly ever milled as wheat flour 

substitute. The real question is"who isto capture the world market subsidies: bread consumers, 

bakers, millers, or the treasury?". The answers to seemingly straightforward policy questions are 

often complicated; this case isno exception. For instance, varying rates of import taxation 

have been applied over time. As a result, smuggled flour has found its way to Malian 

bakeries7 . Thus "protection" in the GMM sense really means protection from smuggling. As a 

compensation for its inability to control flour imports, the government has made low-cost 

Canadian food aid available to the GMM (in either wheat or wheat flour). 

In early 1991 the Minister of Finance sponsored a law raising the import tax rate on flour to 99.1 

percent. Even with rising EEC export subsidies this would have resulted in a large retail price 

increase in Bamako. In response, bakers organized a 3-day strike, which became part of the 

long chain of events leading to the fall of Moussa Traor6. Under the transition government, the 

law remained on the books, but from 1991 through 1993 less stringent fiscal controls led to 

sharp increases in untaxed flour imports; the market price of flour went from 11,000 to 8,000 

FCFA/bag. 

InJanuary 1993 the government, acting on recommendations from the 1992 Etats-G6n6raux 

for Trade and Industry, decided to redraft overall tax legislation. As the draft bills were sent to 

the Chamber of Commerce for review, the bakers introduced a request" to reclassify wheat 

flour as an intermediate good or input, rather than as a product directly competing with 

national production (thereby halving the import tax rate). 

This request was first rejected by the government, which sent the draft bill to the National 

Assembly. Undaunted, the bakers' union took its case directly to the parliamentary 

commission in charge of reviewing the draft bill (finance, industry and plan), and submitted 

several economic and legal arguments to limit the tax rate. 

In addition to the GMM, several parties opposed the bakers' viewpoint. For instance, the 

Ministry of Finance argued that strong compensatory taxation was justified, given the large 

export subsidies granted by the EEC. More generally, the government tried to balance the 

need for flour import tax receipts against the risk of damage to a debtor state enterprise which 

provided employment, paid taxes, and Involved some of Mali's partners (France and 

Canada). 

7 Mauritanian traders have gladly acted as intermediaries, any profit on such operations being earned in hard 

(overvalued) currency. 

8 The leader of the bakers' trade union (Svndicat des Boulangers) is also vice-president of the Chamber of 

Commerce... 

28 
Yet, the parliamentary commission sided with the bakers' arguments. Its members, invoking economic liberalization principles, argued that the post-1991 competition and lower flour 

prices had not unduly jeopardized the GMM, and that Mall's industries had to do their share to 

remain competitive. 

On January 21, 1993, the National Assembly voted not on the specific issue of imported flour 

taxation, but on the overall fiscal legislation (code des impots). Against objections from the 

GMM and from the Government, d6put6s sided with the commission's conclusions, which 

implied that the tax rate fell from 99.1 to 46 percent. 

Two reasons are often given to explain the majority agreement with the commission's opinion: (i) d6put6s were more sensitive to the interests of bakers and urban bread consumers than to 

budgetary or industrial arguments, and (ii) the GMM has been operated by a prominent Lebanese family, with extensive ties to the Moussa Traor6 rdgime... 

Once the National Assembly votes on a bill, it has to be signed by the president to become 

law (promulgation). According to the Mallan constitution, the president may veto it, and send 

it back to the Assembly for review (deuxirme lecture). In this case, there appears to have 

been a rather long Interval between the vote on the bill and its promulgation into law, during which various groups applied pressure on the president's office: 

* The French national council of business owners (Centre National du Patronnat Frangais, CNPF) pointed out in a letter to the Malian president the potential consequences on the 

Malian economy of lower import taxes on flour; 

- The Malian directorate for economic affairs, Direction Nationale des Affaires Economiques (DNAE), followed suit, emphasilng the impact of a GMM failure, in terms of employment; 

" The Customs Service argued that such a law would contradict current customs legislation; 

* The council of industrial manufacturers, OPIM, complained that they had not been called to 

testify before the parliamentary commission. 

Facing a very real risk that this pressure would lead to a rejection or major amendment of the 

bill, the bakers' union took their case to the public. They held a press conference at the 

Chamber of Commerce to publicize the potential benefits of the law on bread consumers. 

Although the law was signed and published on February 15, the debate raged on; a week 

later, a direct confrontation (the word Isapt) between The president of the bakers' union, and 

the GMM operator was broadcast on television and radio stations. 

The GMM further counter-attacked on several fronts. The mill operator first arranged for 

participation in a prime time call-in radio program. One of the Bamako weekly papers, Le R6publicain, then published a first-page editorial on the impact of Canada's flour food aid 

and of lower import taxes on the financial viability of the GMM. At the National Assembly, 

pressure was maintained on the commission responsible for the original decision. The GMM's 

lobbying led to the establishment of a special commission to monitor the implementation and 

impact of the law. Meanwhile, the Malian Government had reduced the price at which 

Canadian flour was being sold to the mill,. 

29
 
The January 12, 1994 FCFA devaluation put a damper on things. Import tax rates on flour and 

most other Intermediate goods fell from 46 to 33.4 percent. Further negotiations with Canada 

led to an agreement that food aid would more likely involve wheat than wheat flour, providing 

low-cost grist to the GMM mill. 

Several features are common to the above vignettes, including: 

The importance of a historical perspective in the analysis of the dynamics of 

interest groups; 

Reliance on external actors by interest groups. This was the case for the CCIM 

leadership as well as that of the UNTM, and for the Malian transporters' 

valuable links with similar west African trade associations, and with foreign oil 

companies operating in Mali. Another example is the role of French business 

interests in the dispute opposing the Bamako mill operator and bakers, while 

Canada, as a donor, has been mobilized to help reach a settlement. 

Another common feature was the divergent position of Government agencies, 

as illustrated by the differences among competing state institutions (Custom 

Service, DNAE, Ministry of Finance, etc.) in the search for negotiated 

settlements with interest groups. 

On the other hand, the vignettes underline important differences in the nature and 

orientation of interest groups, in their strategies and degree of effectiveness in policy activism. 

Some were differences in the kind of leadership. In some groups, such as the CCIM, the 

leadership pursued its own political and institutional objectives, even when these were not 

consistent with those of constituent member groups. Leadership among most other groups 

was more in step with a consensus among the membership. There were also differences in 

the extent of influence and effectiveness in policy activism. The UNTM is a good example 

of a federation of interest groups brought into the policy process because of its historical 

socio-political standing, rather than because of its policy-oriented activism. SYNTRUI's 

effectiveness, one the other hand has been achieved through financial and human resources, 

political connections, leadership and management techniques, and through links with similar 

professional groups in the region. 

Relations among gfoups were also varied. Given the high stakes involved, opposition 

among groups tended to be more common that the kind of collaboration which took place 

among manufacturers against smuggled imports, or between transporters and oil companies. 

Finally, there were differences in the degree of openness of the policy process. Most 

lobbying takes place behind the scenes. When a policy choice implies gains and losses for 

various interest groups, the natural tendency of most governments is to devise specific 

measures mitigating the negative impact of the policy upon influential groups. While such a 

strategy may be economically questionatle, it is favored for political reasons because it 

30 
allows the government to retain as much control over policy choice as possible, and to 

nurture important alliances. 

The last vignette, however, illustrates an exception to this rule. The Etats-Gengraux 

process provided an opportunity to bring the debate into the open since legislative change was 

being considered. However, the degree to which various interest groups could participate in 

this legislative review was obviously very uneven. In addition, the media provided very little 

unbiased background information. Only two newspapers provided a useful analysis of the 

issues. 

E. The National Assembly and the Policy Process 

As pointed out earlier in this Chapter, the National Assembly fulfills several functions: 

oversight of the policy process, providing a channel for interest groups9

, and helping open up

the policy debate. The following discussion provides a closer look at its relative 

effectiveness, limitations and constraints. 

In Mali's presidential-parliamentary system, the National Assembly plays a very 

different role from that of a congress in a system built around a clear separation of executive 

and legislative powers. Thus, one would not expect to find a "strong" committee system in 

the National Assembly. Still, with respect to overall or macroeconomic policy orientations, 

the National Assembly reviews the Prime Minister's lettre d'orientationde politique 

conomique, and the loi de finances. The National Assembly requested and obtained 

reductions in defense and parastatal radio/television agency appropriations in the 1994 

national budget. The Prime Minister also outlines every major agreement with the World 

Bank or IMF before the Assembly. Oversight on specific economic issues, on the other hand, 

takes place through the reviewing of and voting on legislation, and hearing testimony from 

institutions, groups or individuals on policy implementation. An important tool available to 

National Assembly representatives and parliamentary groups is the "questionsorales" process (these are actually written, and submitted ahead of time to the president of the National 

Assembly). Such questions"0 can address very specific policy issues and be rather pointed, 

as seen below from questions directed to the Minister of Rural Development: 

"Mr. Minister, cotton is Mali's main export product. During your interviews 

with the media you have emphasized the advantages of the CFA devaluation 

for the rural areas. We would, therefore, expect that these advantages would 

be felt especially strongly by cotton producers. However, Mr. Minister, as you well know, cotton producers are constantly frustrated by the issue of cotton 

classification.., could you tell us whether there are objective criteria for cotton 

From our analysis of a sample of interest groups, we saw that over haf have systematically relied on 

parliamentary groups at some point. 

" Excerpts from questions raised by the ADEMA/PASJ Parliamentary Group (ref. 94/10 GPA). 

31 
classification? If so, what can you say about plans to have the producers truly 

participate in cotton classification?... 

...We know that compared to a 35 percent increase in the price of first choice 

cotton, the price of inputs went up 100 percent. Given this situation, is the 

government ready to consider subsidizing cotton inputs? If so, how is the 

government to proceed, and when will it do so?" 

There are seven parliamentary commissions, including finance, rural development, 

public works, defense, social affairs. When a draft bill is sent to the National Assembly, the 

"conference of commission presidents" assigns the bill to one or several of the commissions. 

The commission then has up to 15 days to review the draft legislation, hear expert testimony, 

and prepare an opinion for the general assembly. The commission president then names a 

rapporteurwho is put in charge of the draft bill review. In most parliamentary systems, the 

rapporteurworks with several members of his commission, and legislative aides to review the 

draft bill, organize and hear testimony, review previous legislation relevant to the case, and 

prepare an opinion. In some cases, the Malian rapporteurworks closely with his commission 

colleagues, in others, he is left pretty much to his own devices. 

Each commission can call on the civil service to provide expert testimony, or a written 

explanation or analysis on specific points. They can also call on business or trade union 

representatives, or other individuals. Individuals or interest group representatives may 

themselves i'equest a meeting with a commission to present their views. Fishermen or farmer 

groups have sent delegations to the rural development commission. The same commission 

has also heard SYCOV representatives on the cotton subsector". Another commission has 

received a labor union delegation from one of the state enterprise being privatized; the 

personnel were opposed to a buy-out offer from a French business concern. 

In certain cases, commission members feel that a 15-day period is insufficient to 

review a draft bill; they can ask for a postponement to the next parliamentary session. This 

has been the case for legislation on decentralization. Otherwise, the rapporteurand 

commission members present their report in plenary session. At that time, any representative 

may introduce a motion to postpone the vote on the draft bill. A majority parliamentary 

group can thus prevent vote on, and passage of a bill, while a minority group may hope to 

delay it, or at least to generate a wider public debate on its content. Plenary sessions are 

wide open, the Government and independent media always cover the sessions. Some 

background documents are available to journalists; businessmen, students, attend the sessions. 

The National Assembly, however, labors under considerable constraints. 

Representatives fail to settle many issues; after six months' deliberations, for example, the 

ddputds had not been able to agree on a legislation regarding the requirements for and status 

11We found, during our own interview with the president and vice-president of the rural development 

commission, that they were very well informed of cotton subsector issues. 

32 
of attorneys. Representatives also readily admit that in many cases, testimony presented 

before commissions is partial, biased, and should be much more diversified. In the case 

opposing the GrandsMoulins du Mali and Bamako bakers, the vote on the tax bill involved 

all ddputds and parliamentary groups, so that there was opportunity for a number of voices to 

be heard, but the fact remains that the relevant parliamentary commission only heard a select 

number of arguments before making its recommendations. Interestingly, political parties were 

neither openly enlisted by the bakers or the GMM, nor particularly eager to take sides on the 

issue. 

Many representatives, unprepared to deal with complex technical issues, resent their 

lack of understanding of or control over economic policy. They feel entitled to ask for 

clarifications, and may be able to modify budget items "at the margin," but consider that all 

major decisions are already made. Yet, providing representatives with technical information 

or training can be a delicate issue. The Association pour la Promotion de l'EntreprisePrivie 

(APEP) organized a seminar on public finances for deputds with the help of a Malian 

businessmen's network, including a well-connected local accounting firm. A public finance 

expert from France was also to participate. However, this initiative faced strong resistance 

from some National Assembly officers. 

As an organization, the National Assembly is critically under-equipped. Although there are about 100 parliamentary staff members, many positions are unfilled and quite a few 

staffers are working on a voluntary basis, hoping for a salaried opening. Certain resources or 

services mandated by law are not available: transcripts of session records do not appear in the 

JournalOfficiel, which makes it almost impossible to track proceedings and record votes. 

The National Assembly has received books on law, economics and politics, and some 

computer equipment. The books are adequately archived and the equipment is running, but 

their usefulness remains limited; few ddputis are likely to refer to books on local 

administration or public finance. Such resources are usually meant for research staff, who 

have the skills required to find, analyze and present information in a form usable by individual representatives or commissions. The National Assembly has no such staff. 

Parliamentary officers have suggested that each commission should be able to rely on a 

parliamentary administrator well versed in the commission's area of responsibility. Another 

option would be to form a "studies and analysis" group accessible to the various commissions. 

In conclusion, the National Assembly does play a role in the areas of policy oversight, interest group representation, and public policy debate, but this role, especially in oversight and representation, remains very imperfect. The Government may not be eager to have a 

policy watchdog acquire keener senses. It may also feel that there are already too many channels for the expression of popular discontent. However, a dysfunctional or strongly

biased parliament may be worse than nothing, as it might heighten social tensions and popular 

frustrations. 

33 
F. The Media and the Policy Process 

The downfall of the Traor6 regime opened wide the gates of free speech and freedom 

of the press in Mali. There are now over 80 daily or weekly newspapers and magazines in 

Bamako and a few other cities. Several are published in vernacular languages, such as 

Jekabaara, Kibaru and Kabaru, with a circulation of about 16,000 each. Shortly after the 

1991 tvknements, a relatively large number of independent radio stations sprang up in 

Bamako and in several provincial towns. This section looks at the role of the media in the 

post-1991 democratic process, and as part of the national economic policy debate. Two short 

vignettes provide additional insights. 

1. The Media and the Post-1991 Democratic Process in Mali 

It is quite clear that the Malian media are a unique phenomenon in West Africa, and 

that they have played critical roles in the new democratic process and in opening up the 

economic policy debate. According to the president of the national union of independent 

radio stations (Union des Radios et T9l9visions Libres, URTL): 

"The radio phenomenon in Mali is not an outgrowth of the national media, it is 

a direct result of the democratic dynamics set in motion on March 26, 1991... 

We are a young democracy, many associations were created, including 

cooperative radios, in Mali to facilitate relations between population groups and 

the government and state institutions". 

A few months after their creation, two radio stations (Radio Libert6 and Bamakan) had 

to deal with a new phenomenon: the 1992 presidential, legislative and municipal elections. 

Presidential candidates were given equal air-time to present their programs. The radio 

stations also took the initiative to educate the population on the electoral process. It is 

because of this progressive attitude on the part of broadcasters that the 1993 Colloquium on 

Radio Pluralism in West Africa was held in Bamako by the West African Journalists 

Association and the Panos Institute rather than in Nigeria, as originally planned. Some of the 

principles from the ensuing Bamako Declaration on Radio Pluralism' 2 are worth mentioning: 

1. Radio is a priority means of social communication, in Africa in particular; 

2. Radio pluralism is an essential component in the deepening of the democratic 

process now under way: it gives people access to more diverse sources of information, 

and guarantees increased popular participation in sustainable human development; 

'2The complete text isprovided inthe Appendix. 

34
 
3. Information pluralism requires the complete elimination of radio monopolies, and 

the existence of a range of radio stations able to express the diverse viewpoints and 

aspirations of different segments of society. 

After 1991, freedom of association and political liberalization allowed for the creation 

of a large number of latent or new interest groups, associations, and political parties. By then, most could rapidly identify their potential membership and make their purpose known. 

However, many smaller special interest groups or public service associations had to find 

efficient and inexpensive means to reach a large number of people to present their association 

and its objectives. Since 1992 Transition Government, the role of radio stations has been 

essential; in the beginning, 20 to 30 different associations were created everyday, none of 

them able to publicize their creation and objectives. Radio Libertd, therefore, produced a 

special program for new associations and political parties; demand for the weekly program 

was such that it became daily one. Most other independent radio stations made periods of air 

time available at no (or minimal) charge to interest groups and associations, as a public 

service, and to widen the stations' circles of listeners. 

Most groups and associations use the media in some way to further their objectives. 

The radio has been one of the most useful media for groups wanting to publicize their 

demands, and to rely on popular pressure to force the Government to enter into a real 

negotiation process. Examples include the Association of Early Retirees, and the Association 

of Civil Servants. 

Currently, many interest groups, such as ASCOMA, FNEM, OPIM, CCIM, use radio 

stations to broadcast announcements. However, most radio stations are disappointed in the 

limited extent to which small and medium-size enterprises, virtually all in the informal sector, 

avail themselves of their services. Small businesses do listen to the news and economic 

bulletins, but rarely react by calling the stations to ask for more information or to comment 

on various issues. Still, several debate programs in Bamanan have been organized with small 

traders on topics of interest to the small business community, such as smuggling. On the 

contrary, larger firms, private or formerly state enterprises (Societj Nationale de Transports du Mali (SONATAM), Sada Diallo Enterprises), do not hesitate to call the radio stations to 

comment on ongoing broadcasts or current issues. 

2. The Media and the Economic Policy Debate 

a. Newspapers 

Few publications offer policy-oriented articles on a regular basis. The best coverage 

of economic issues is provided by "Les Cauris," an independent bi-monthly which specializes

in political economy and policy issues, by "L'Aurore", and by the ADEMA-sponsored "Mali 

Entreprise."The Government-controlled "L'Essor"also publishes articles on cereal policy, which are nostly rewrites of special studies from the Office des ProduitsAgricoles du Mali 

(OPAM)-based Market Information System. 

35 
The January 1994 CFA Franc devaluation revitalized the media coverage of economic 

issues; all newspapers and radio stations carried the news, emphasizing its impact in various 

areas: retail prices, wages, macroeconomic policy, international relations. The number of 

articles on economic issues in Malian newspapers has sharply increased after the devaluation. 

The list of newspapers surveyed during the first six months of 1994 is as follows: 

Newspapers Included in the 

Survey of Economic Articles 

L'Aurore Le Messager 

L'Employeur Le Rdpublicain 

L'Essor Le Scorpion 

L'Observateur Le Tambour 

La Cigale Muselde Le Temps 

La Gazette Les Cauris 

La Griffe Les Echos 

La Roue Nouvel Horizon 

Le D6mocrate Malien Yeko 

Le Malien Zanke 

Over 300 articles were reviewed; they fell into the following categories: economic 

policy, business economics, monetary policy, international economics, etc. Most articles deal 

with topics of immediate and local interest rather than with in-depth analyses or investigative 

reporting. Among daily papers, the official "L'Essor"ranked first in number of articles (72) 

directly related to economic issues, followed by the independent "Nouvel Horizon" (47). Of 

weekly papers "Le Rdpublicain" published 45; various other publications reached 25-30 

economic articles each during the same period ("L'Aurore". "L'Observateur"). Finally, the bimonthly "Le Malien" and "Les Cauris"have each published about 30 articles over the same 

period. Most of these papers (this is a recent phenomenon) are beginning to reprint items on 

economic issues from various wire or press services 3 . If one were to award a prize for best 

all-around coverage of economic news, analysis and investigative reporting, it would clearly 

go to "Les Cauris", which provides the steadiest and highest quality fare in each category. 

A sample of Cauris articles over a six-month period is included in the Appendix. Of 

45 articles surveyed, the categories of topics were as follows: 

General economic policy issues 18 

Monetary policy 12 

International economics 6 

Agricultural economics/rural 

Development 5 

Business economics 4 

'3 Especially from MFI (Media France Intercontinent) and SYFIA (Syst6me Frangais d'Informations Agricoles). 

36
 
The main reason why "Les Cauris" provides broader, and higher quality coverage is 

that this newspaper is the only one where the editorial staff has received university training in 

economics and rural sociology, respectively. Another reason is that it relies extensively on 

carefully selected reprints from other sources: newspapers, but also books, reports, and 

contributed analyses" . 

The overall performance of the printed media, however, is rather poor. Very few 

journalists have more than a basic understanding of economic issues, the number of 

interviews with high-ranking administration officials on economic matters is very small, and 

so is the number of articles contributed by local specialists and academics. This is clearly

due to a lack of professional training 5 and of resources. All the newspapers (including 

"L'Essor") operate on incredibly thin budgets, with poorly trained, low-paid, and underequipped staff. None of the newspapers, including "Les Cauris", has the means to carry out 

any but the simplest analysis on economic data. "Les Cauris" does have computer equipment,

but it is used only for word processing. Aside from the central bureaucracy, the only groups who have detailed, processed information are certain trade associations, (SYNTRUI, GPP, 

CCAM, FNEM) which do keep detailed information on their own subsectors. However, since 

this information is used by these groups to argue their cases within the policy process,

sometimes against competing groups in the same sector, they are not eager to share it for 

other uses. 

The need for better economic journalism has begun to get some attention. Two 

economic journalism seminars on structural adjustment have been organized by the World 

Bank in 1993, one in Dakar, and one in Yaound6, with some participation by Malian 

journalists. In February 1994, USIA organized a workshop in Bamako, in collaboration with 

the National Union of Malian Journalists, (Union Nationale des Journalistesdu Mali, 

UNAJOM). The topic "economic journalism" had been requested by UNAJOM. 

Unfortunately, radio station reporters were not included. In April 1994, France also financed 

a workshop in Dakar, on the devaluation of the CFA Franc. 

b. Radio stations 

Mali's radio network includes both national (Government-controlled and private) and 

foreign radio stations. Most are operating in Bamako, although a sizeable and increasing 

number of them are now established in small towns throughout the country. Tndependent 

radio stations themselves fall into two categories: there are private commerciai, radio stations, 

such as Radio KI6du, and private cooperative stations ("radiosassociatives") such as 

Bamakan, Kayira, Libert6, etc. In addition, the government plans to provide commercial 

access to various international television networks such as Canal France International (CFI), 

WorldNet, and Cable News Network (CNN) in Bamako. 

" A list of authors of "Les Cauris" articles, by category of economic issue, is in the Appendix. 

15 There are two schools of journalism in west Africa, one in Dakar, and one in Yaoundd. 

37
 
BAMAKO STATIONS PROVINCIAL STATIONS 

ORTM (Nationwide) Radio Douentza 

Radio Amifi Kayes: Radio rurale de Kayes 

Radio Bamakan Koutiala: Radio Jamana, Radio Kayira 

Radio Kayira S6gou: Radio Jamana (Foko) , Radio 

Radio Kl6du Kayira (Sido) 

Radio Libert6 Sikasso: Radio Kn6, Radio Badegnan 

Radio Tabal6 

Fr6quence 3 

RFI (Radio France Internationale) 

Independent radio stations belong to a professional association, URTL, Union des 

Radios et Tildvisions Libres. They have --and use-- complete freedom of expression. They 

are, however, bound to respect Malian laws, and are fairly tightly regulated. Some radio 

stations are definite thorns in the Government's side, and there have been several instances of 

temporary closures of Radio Kayira, in Bamako, and in secondary towns. "Accidental" power 

and telephone disconnections are not uncommon. 

All stations are limited to 1 Kilowatt transmitters and pay a 100,000 FCFA annual 

license fee to the government. All but one operate on incredibly thin budgets: station 

operating expenses ranging from $200 - $2,000 per month 6 . Bamanan, Libertd, and Kayira 

keep only technicians on their regular payroll, other staff are paid on a part-time basis, work 

as volunteers, or earn a commission on advertising contracts with firms, Government 

agencies, donors, or PVOs. Various stations have also explored the option of paying part of 

the annual fee in-kind, through public service announcemen's and civic education programs. 

Since the emphasis in Malian culture is on oral communication, and because of their ability to 

use vernacular languages, radio stations have reached unprecedented numbers of people with 

new kinds of information. Popular reaction has ranged from strong to riotous. Although 

most Bamako stations are very eager to establish transmitters in small towns, and to develop 

rural programs, their shaky financial status is a major obstacle. Sponsored programs and 

advertising are scant, and will not suffice to develop a national network of independent 

stations. In fact, URTL officials expect some stations to disappear in 1995. Although some 

"natural selection" is bound to occur, a complete loss of radio pluralism in Mali would be 

tragic. For many people, especially rural groups, they constitute the only source of 

information and the sole opportunity for popular expression and communication. By relying 

on a combination of news from the government-controlled Office de la Radio/Tdhlvision du 

Mali (ORTM) and independent stations, people can have access to a considerable range of 

news, analysis and public debates on economic issues. The table below presents ORTM 

economy-related programs during 1994. Coverage of economic issues by various other 

stations is provided below. 

16 In 1993, URTL member stations received a $23,000 grant from USIA for civic education. 

38 
NATIONAL RADIO (ORTM) BROADCASTS
 

Date Program Name 

2/5/94 Magazine d'Actualitd 

2/12/94 Point de Rencontre 

3/28i-'! Questions d'Afrique 

7/9/94 Point de Rencontre 

7/23/94 Questions d'Afrique 

7/27/94 Vulgarisation Rurale 

8/28/94 Questions d'Afrique 

8/29/94 M6moire d'un 

Continent 

9/26/94 Vulgarisation Rurale 

10/23/9 Vulgarisation Rurale 

4 

11/20/9 Femmes et 

4 D6veloppement 

11/22/9 Le Magazine 

4 Economique 

11/26/9 Questions d'Afriq'te 

4 

(Economic Topics, by date) 

Title 

The impact of devaluation on tbhrural 

sector (impacts de la ddvaluaton sur le 

monde rural) 

Livestock and devaluation (l'dlevageface a 

la ddvaluation) 

What are NGOs for? (A quoi servent les 

ONG?) 

Business Management (La gestion dans 

l'entreprise) 

Political conditions for development (les 

conditions politiques du diveloppement) 

Problemes in the fishing sector(les 

probl'mes relatifs 6 la p&he au Mali) 

Development agents (les acteurs du 

ddveloppement) 

An economist's research on informal 

savings associations in Africa (recherches 

d'un dconomiste sur les tontines en 

Afrique) 

Cotton harvesting and storage (la ricolte 

du coton et son stockage) 

Resource management in the inner delta (la 

gestion 'es ressources du delta intdrieur) 

Kita women's soap factory (la savonnerie 


des fenmmes de Kita) 


Problems in Mali's industrial sector (les 

problbines d'industrialistes au Mali) 

Jacques Diouf (FAO) answers the 

questions of African journalists (Jacques 

Diouf ripond aux questions des 

journalistes africains) 

Duration 

33 min 

Journalist's 

Name 

Seydou 

Guindo 

60 min 

52 min 

Asmara 

Condd 

RE 

Production 

60 min 

45 min 

Moussa 

Hary Maiga 

RFI 

Production 

Rural 

extension 

45 min RFI 

15 min Butia Kantd 

16 min 

25 min 

30 min 

Samba 

Sid6bd 

Fanta 

Saugar6 

Cheickna 

Cissd 

RFI 

39
 
Independent radio stations have been at least as active as the written press in their 

coverage of economic issues and, unconstrained by literacy and language requirements, have 

reached larger and more diverse audiences. Broadcasters play a basic information role by 

providing daily price information, and announcements of specific activities and events. 

However, most stations have also organized and broadcast roulld-table discussions and 

conferences on key economic issues: structural adjustment, trade policy, various economic 

reforms. Other popular programs deal with such issues as AIDS, taxi fares, corruption in 

government17, etc. 

All stations have also organized public debates with officials from some of the 

government agencies in touch with the public: the Energie du Mali power utility, the 

Directiondes Inpots, and Direction des Douanes. According to station managers, the general 

(Bamako) public and the administration have appreciated this type of programming '. Radio 

Kayira, the "enfant terrible"of Malian radio in the capital and smaller towns) has produced 

many economy-related programs, including roundtables gathering business leaders, members 

of the Chamber of Commerce, representatives from the association of retailers, the association 

of women entrepreneurs, the national tax directorate (Inpots), and from the UNTM. 

This study included a survey of economic policy debate programs from various radio 

stations. Such programs are archived on cassetuc tapes and are readily available. In this case, 

about fifteen hours of programs on economic and political issues broadcast in 1993 and 1994 

were listened to; some of which being fully transcribed. Programs produced in French are 

listed below, many more are available in Bamanan. 

Samples of weekly programming grids are included in the Appendix. 

t In one case, a call-in show scheduled from 8:30 pm to 10:30 (regular end of day's programs) went on till 

'7 

12:30 am. 

40 
RADIO 	 DATE TITLE 

Radio Libertd Sept. 93 	 Emission co-r~alis~e par l'Institut Panos et la Confederation 

Nationale des Radios Libres 

Guests: Belco Tamboura, Editor-in-Chief 

"L'Observateur" 

Iyes Zouman, Repr~sentant de ia 

Recherche de RSF 

Moustapha LEYE, Messagerjournalist 

11-30-92 Guests: Boubacar Kass6 (RAT) 

Madoni Diallo (ADEMA)
 

Ibr6him Diakit6 (National Fund)
 

Denis Baudouin (Canadian Consulate in
 

Mali) 

Jean Guillemette (Club Sahel) 

Radio Kayira April 93 Nouveau Visage du Pouvoir Malien : Changement ou Statut Quo 

(the new look of Malian power: change or status quo?) 

07-08-93 Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)--Volume I 

SAP--Volume 2 

SAP--Volume 3 

09-06-93 	 Point de Vue du Comit National d'Initiative 

dressement 

Dimocratique

des 

(CNID) 

Finances

sur 

Publiques 

les Mesures 

Proposies

de Repar 

le Gouvernement (CNID's opinion on the 

government's proposed financial measures) 

Guests: Konimba Sidib6, N'Diaye Bah 

11-11-93 	 La Coordinationdes Victimes du Programme 

d'Ajustement Structurel (coordination of Strucutral 

Adjustment's Program's victims) 

03-02-94 	 Emission avec la Commission de Dicentralisation 

(Broadcast with the decentralization task force). 

41 
This review of radio programs led the team to the following conclusions: 

* Most radio stations perceive an interest on the part of the public in basic economic 

issues, and try to respond by organizing programs; 

- They use various program formats to do so: group discussion, coverage of roundtable or 

workshop, expert or man-in-the-street interviews, and call-in programs; 

* The range of economic topics is appropriately broad, while still relevant to the concerns 

of most listeners (the response to call-in programs is very good). 

* Participation by members of the bureaucracy is limited and rather timid. In Mali as 

elsewhere, civil servants are often accused of providing information on policy choices 

after the fact, and of shunning an open debate on key issues. However, much progress is 

still politically feasible in the areas of information on policy options and choices and, 

especially, on procedures for more efficient interaction between the public and government 

agencies. 

- Depending on the radio station, type of program, intended audience, and participants, the 

technical level and quality of programs varies greatly. As in the case of the written press, 

however, the quality and clarity of debates are rather poor. Most speakers have limited 

information and understanding of economic issues. Among the few experts speaking on 

radio, few have a capacity to make economic concepts and problems easily understandable 

to listeners. Those individuals, and there are quite a few, who combine a good grasp of 

issues and an ability to explain them clearly to non-specialists are very much sought after 

by local consulting firms, the government, interest groups, or donors. Speaking on radio 

stations provides few rewards and is low on their list of priorities. In this respect, the 

team's own experience is illustrative. In addition to very close collaborators, the team 

worked with a number of resource persons who are ideal candidates for a radio program. 

In fact quite a few of them have been on the radio or on television before. Several radio 

stations were very eager to organize a program on the links between political and 

economic liberalization. However, the team could never rw..et with all five persons 

together in Bamako at any one time. The team had to resort to mixing a two-hour 

program on this topic at Radio Kledu from individual inter\ iews, and from a journalist's 

recording of a day-long workshop held to discuss the findings and implications of the 

study. 

42
 
Vignette 1 - Radio Kledu, a special case 

This station, which belongs to a Mallan businessman, specializes In economic issues. 

Unlike all other independent stations, it has state-of-the-art equipment, and well trained and 

paid staff. The station, which re-broadcasts of Voice of America programs, ison the air from 

06:00 through midnight every day, with a daily program on economic issues "Magazine Economie" from 4:00-4:30 p.m. Topics include the World Bank and the IMF, monetary issues, 

conditionality in donor financing, the resettlement of displaced populations. The radio station 

also produces a weekly program on economic conferences, seminars or debates. 

Radio Kledu has produced programs for political parties, public enterprises (Mali-Lalt) and for the government and interest groups. In addition, the station has offered to broadcast 

on behalf of SONATAM, OPAM, and the Revenue Service (Direction des Impots). Large PVOs 

(Care, Africare, Oxfam, etc.) are also among its clients. Fees are on the order of 100,000 

CFA/hour of air time, and 200,000 for a 15-minute publicity spot. 

In December 1993, Radio Kledu broadcast most of the proceedings of a three-day 

public debate on '"The Economic Crisis in Mali". In 1994, Kledu's programs on economic issues 

included: 

* 	 The compensation of businesses which suffered losses as a result of the 1991 

riots; 

0 	 The prices of medicines and the role of the informal sector In the health sector 

(a debate with Government representatives); 

0 	 The social impact of structural adjustment (an interview with Mall's Minister of 

Finance); 

* 	 The effects of smuggling on economic activity in Mall, the cases of SOMAPILE 

and SONATAM (dry cell batteries, cigarettes); 

° 	 Land tenure rights and problems in the Mopti region; 

0 	 The state of the economy 9 months after the devaluation (with VOA journalists 

and a Mallan reporter). 

More recently, Radio Kledu has taken a hard look at its programs and audience. Its 

managers are preparing a wide urban and rural survey to better understand the public's 

Interest for the media in general, and radio in particular. The questionnaire (included In the 

Appendix) will also try to elicit responses on listeners' preferences among current stations and 

programs, language of broadcast and programming. There isa definite sense at Kledu that 

their programs should become closer to Mallan traditional and popular culture. However, 

Radio Kledu still intends to break the government monopoly on television broadcasting by installing a satellite receiver/retransmitter for local distribution of CFI, CNN, MTV, TV5, Worldnet 

channels. The government has approved the project, although frequencies have not yet 

been assigned. 

43
 
By all accounts, rural listeners appreciate diversity in radio stations and programming at 

least as much as urban dwellers. The following vignette, on Radio Sido (Radio Kayira branch in 

S6gou) is typical of comments on independent rural radios'9. 

Vignette 2, Radio Sido -- "Country-Style Kayira" 

'The radio station was created in August 1993 following the request from Segou 

residents to belong to the Kayira radio network. We set up the station with 

equipment retired from the Bamako broadcasting studio. Radio Sido 

broadcasts daily from 7a.m. through 11 p.m. or 3a.m. 80 percent of programs 

are vernacular languages (10 languages). The station currently has technical 

problems, but normally, we should be reaching 500,000 listeners. On Segou's 

weekly market day, the station opens its doors to all visitors, and many rural 

dwellers in town for the day come in and suggest topics for information or 

debate radio programs (e.g. the CFAF devalution, the Ganda Khoy movement, 

etc.)." 

"Radio Sido's resources are limited to paid announcements and advertisements: 

we don't raise enough resources to pay for the repairs of their amplifier 

equipment." 

On the impact of independent radio stations: 

"Compared to the previous silence, there isa major impact; people are now 

Informed of everything happening, in Mall and elsewhere, even when the 

government keeps silent on certain subjects. On our daily 5p.m. newscast, we 

broadcast more news about more topics than does the government-controlled 

radio station. We can spend 30 minutes or more on whatever isgoing on in 

Europe, America, Asia and Africa, news being broadcast Indifferent vernacular 

languages. Radio stations are essential to give a country a democratic culture. 

Previously, people could not speak, whereas now, even ifthere are obstacles 

or pressures, we can now speak of things which used to be off-limits. 

Widespread free speech isnot yet a reality, but at least, people are more 

informed. We know what problems people have in the rural areas, and we 

can speak to these, but it's a very different story when a farmer or herder takes 

the microphone and speaks for himself." 

19 Based on an interview with attorney Sekou Aliou Diallo, president of the board of directors of Radio 

Kayira/Segou (Radio Sido). 

44 
In conclusion, the media have probably made a greater contribution to the democratic 

process than any other single group. They are important actors in information dissemination, and 

in the opening up of the economic policy debate. Both the written press and the radio have tried 

to reach rural groups, with some limited success. However, the radio, free of literacy and 

language constraints has a huge potential advantage. 

The quality of coverage of, and debate on, economic policy issues is poor by professional 

standards, but is far superior to what is available in other West African countries. As far as the 

written press is concerned, a number of rather obvious measures can be taken to improve its 

performance, although they will not be easy, and will take time to produce significant change. 

For the radio, the best prospects for further improvements seem to be in the areas of: 

information on policy choices, public announcements on the services provided by the 

Government, radio as a communication device for interest groups, and, especially in the rural 

areas, as a means to participate more fully in the political and economic policy processes. 

45
 
III. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE POLICY PROCESS
 

A. Overview 

The team carried out this research on Malian interest groups on several simultaneous 

fronts. Chapter VI looks at the evolution of the SYCOV over time, to see what transformations 

in its structure and operations have enabled it to acquire an increasing capacity to participate 

more actively in the policy process. One might call this a focussed, or "longitudinal", approach. 

At the same time, the team identified and studied a number of other, mostly urban-oriented, 

interest groups. The purpose was to better understand the relationships between the degree of 

success of an interest group and certain structural or strategic characteristics, such as the group's 

relative endowment in resources, its capacity to obtain and analyze relevant economic data, the 

group's point of entry into the policy process, etc. Another goal was to analyze inter-group 

dynamics. 

Since 1991, many common interest associations have emerged. They represent a great 

variety of interests, and follow many different types of organizational and operational modes. 

Some reflect corporatist interests and practices (in the banking or construction subsectors, for 

instance) while others gather a more disparate membership around specific policy issues. The 

majority are urban based and oriented, with a few representing rural interests. Some clearly 

focus on economic issues while others deal with other types of social questions, such as the place 

and role of religion in society, human rights, and gender issues (there are over 60 women's 

associations). Many, perhaps most, of these interest groups are not really functional. Some, on 

the other hand, are quite powerful. 

This profusion and diversity of interest groups should not, however, eclipse an important 

fact: few truly "new" groups acceded to legal status in 1991. During the Traord years, the few 

formal associations allowed were completely controlled by the president or by his wife. A few 

groups circumvented this constraint by creating informal and quasi clandestine associations, 

especially in the last years of the Traord administration. From the spring of 1990, however, some 

of these associations became instrumental in the political process leading to the fall of the 

regime 2 . The tumultuous demonstrations by retail traders in November 1990, and the strikes 

organized by the UNTM (National federation of labor unions) and the UNCTRM (a transporters' 

union) in January 1991 are good examples. Some of the more politically oriented "associations 

dikmocratiques" (thinly disguised political parties pressing for pluralism) also played a significant 

role (e.g., the ADEMA and CNID), and emerged as bona fide political parties after the fall of 

Moussa Traor6. The determinant factor in the political struggle was the AEEM student union 

which, with support from the ADEMA, CNID, UNTM and others, organized demonstrations and 

confronted all symbols of the state (parastatal enterprises, police and army). The ensuing chaos 

precipitated the removal, inanu militari,of Moussa Traord. 

" Important events included the UDPM-sponsored national conference on the democratization of the party, which 

turned into a widely publicized debate on multiparty politics (March 1990), the May 1990 national seminar on 

decentralization, etc. 

47 

2
Malian interest groups of the post-1991 era should thus be viewed from a historical 

perspective as well as from their current strength and stance on today's issues. Although this 

study could by no means do full justice to such an approach, the team tried to interpret group 

dynamics in the light of past experience. In the transport sector, for instance, there are two 

professional associations. The UNCTRM (the only one allowed until 1991) is very different, in 

terms of membership, resources, strategy, methods, and effectiveness from the SYNTRUI, 

established in February 1991. Today, the SYNTRUI is clearly the most effective and powerful of 

the two professional associations. Yet, relations between SYNTRUI and the government (and 

with the UNCTRM) must be gauged in view of the close kinship and business ties between the 

former dictator and today's SYNTRUI leader. 

Table 3.1: The Sample of'Interest Groups 

Single- and repeat-interviews allowed us to analyze a sample of 19 groups: 

ABB - Association des Banques Small, well endowed urban interest group. Has good access to
 

et Etablissements Bancaires information and excellent analytical capacity. Quite effective and
 

(banks and financial powerful.
 

institutions).
 

ADIDE - Association des Large group created in 1988 in opposition to official employment
 

Diplom6s Initiateurs d'Emplois policy and practices. Has accomplished a great deal and could do
 

(unemployed graduates). much more, but has not been able to maintain an effective
 

dialogue with the government. 

AFE - Association des Femmes Very small urban group; has very few resources and is not 

Entrepreneurs (women effective in its own right. Must rely on its membership into larger 

entrepreneurs). groups (FNEM, COFEM) to have any influence. Broke away from 

fenmmes commerqantes. 

ASCOMA - Association des Large issue3-oriented group created in 1991 for Bamako and major
 

Consommateurs Maliens towns. Not well endowed with resources but has been active and
 

(Malian consumers' effective (receives occasional support from Canada).
 

asscciation).
 

ATVR - Assoc. des 	 This is one of several relatively large urban groups. In their case,
 

Travailleurs Partants the policy dialogue consists of claims for financial compensation.
 

Volontaires Ala Retraite (early Has been somewhat effective and powerful by resorting to mass
 

retirees) pressure and sharp, open confrontation with the government.
 

CAFO - Coordination des 	 Since 1991, this quasi-institutional group gathers about 50 women's
 

Associations et ONG f6minines. 	 organizations. Replaces the Traor6-controlled and monopolistic 

UNFM. CAFO member organizations have been reluctant to 

establish close links with the government or political parties. Has 

sought and received support from donors on behalf of member 

associations. 

48
 
CCAM - Comit6 des 

Compagnies d'Assurances du 

Mali (insurance companies). 

CCIM - Chambre de Commerce 

et d'Industrie du Mali 

(Chamber of commerce and 

industry). 

COFEM - Collectif des Femmes 

du Mali (loose federation of 

women's associations). 

FNEM - Fdration Nationale 

des Employeurs du Mali ("big 

business" group). 

GCM - Groupement des 

Commerqants Maliens 

(association of retailers and 

wholesalers). 

GPP - Groupement des 

Professionnels Pdtroliers (oil 

companies). 

SYCOV - Syndicat des 

Producteurs Cotonniers et 

Vivriers (producers of cotton 

and other agricultural goods). 

SYNAPPO - Syndicat National 

des Pharmaciens d'Officines 

Privdes (private pharmacies). 

SYNAPRO - Syndicat National 

de la Production (oldest and 

largest farmers' association). 

Small urban group created in 1981. Well endowed and highly 

effective. Includes several foreign-owned insurance companies. 

This is probably the oldest quasi-private interest group in Mali. 

This complex institution is described further in the section on 

inter-group dynamics. 

Also created in 1991 on the basis of a semi-clandestine association, 

this is a major "competitor" to the more institutional CAFO 

women's organization. Orientations are similar, but styles and 

philosophies are quite different. COFEM is effective in many 

different areas. 

Created in 1980, FNEM furthers the interests of 18 professional 

business associations. FNEM has adequate access to resources, 

information and analytical capacity, and is highly effective. It is 

actively seeking ways to be more powerful. 

Created in 1960, this large group is member of both FNEM and 

CCIM, and has been directly embroiled in the controversy 

surrounding the CC'IM/FNEM opposition. On its own, or through 

CCIM, this group has several times demonstrated its effectiveness 

and power. 

Created in the early 1980s, this is a very unusual group in the 

sense that its members (Mali's "four sisters") are all foreign oil 

companies. This effective and powerful group has a complex 

history of relations with the government, and with other interest 

groups (transporters, national fuel distributors). 

Mali's rural labor union par excellence, the SYCOV has become 

effective. Chapter III provides a detailed description of this group 

and its policy activism. 

This recent (late 1992) trade association meets all criteria to be 

effective and powerful. It maintains close links with the 

government, the national assembly, and donors (including the 

World Bank). 

Created as a branch of UNTM in 1963, and still very much part of 

this centralized federation of labor unions. Through UNTM 

representation, SYNAPRO is effective but not powerful. 

Interestingly, SYNAPRO includes CMDT workers, which implies 

direct conflicts of interest with the more producer-oriented and 

independent SYCOV (not UNTM affiliated). 

49
 
SYNABAT - Syndicat National This older (197C) trade association has been operating in a 

des Entreprises du Batiment et subsector dominated by large and powerful foreign companies. 

des Travaux Publics Has been successful in relations with the government and the 

(construction and public national assembly, but the "younger" and more dynamic Malian 

works). member companies are pressing for an increasing share of the local 

market. 

SYNTRUI - Syndicat des Created in February 1991, this is the most effective and powerful 

Transporteurs Urbains et of the two transporters' unions. SYNTRUI's links to the previous 

Interurbains (transporters' r~gime being a definite liability, the union has tried to balance the 

union). pursuit of its objectives with socio-political rehabilitation through "responsible practices". 

UNCTRM - Union Nationale This is the oldest (previously only) transporters' union. It is less 

des Chargeurs et Transporteurs effective than SYNTRUI, and relations between the two 

Routiers du Mali (transporters' organizations are rather difficult. UNCTRM tends to gather the 

union). smaller, more "traditional" transporters, and most of the organized 

providers of low-cost mass transit services. Their large and vocal 

membership has openly confronted successive governments. 

UNTM - Union Nationale des This cent rale syndicale is the most centralized federation of labor 

Travailleurs du Mali (Mali's unions (12 affiliated member unions, and 4 associated ones). 

oldest federation of labor UNTM has a long histor" of strong political involvement (either 

unions). for or against Malian governments through time). In spite of its 

rather "old-fashioned" style of operation, it remains a major 

interlocutor on social and political issues for the government, and 

even donor agencies. UNTM is also associated with similar unions 

in west Africa, and with the international labor movement. 

In order to test hypotheses on the relationship between interest groups characteristics and 

degree of success, the information was organized on each of these groups as follows: 

First, the team identified "structural" characteristics: urban vs. rural-orientation, size, 

extent of association with other groups, relative endowment in resources, access to relevant 

information, and capacity to carry out pertinent economic analysis. 

The groups' strategies and methods of operations were then summarized through a number 

of indicators, including the dominant "style" of - ?eration (i.e., confrontational vs. collaborative), 

methods used, e.g., working through the media, or parliamentary groups. The team also looked 

at the groups' most common "point of entry" in their interaction with the policy process, i.e., 

whether they intervene at the overall policy analysis level or in more specific discussions on the 

choice of policy instruments. 

Finally, the team assessed the degree of success in terms of two indicators, effectiveness 

and political power. For the purposes of this analysis, "effectiveness" is the capacity of a group 

to inflect the course of the policy process, i.e., having an impact on policy orientations, 

legislation, the choice of policy instruments or actual implementation. Examples of specific 

instances of effectiveness are provided in the results. A group is considered to be particularly 

50
 
effective, or "powerful", when its effectiveness in policy advocacy has given it a role or place 

significantly greater than its relative place in society and the economy would normally warrant, 

(e.g., a single-family business dynasty directly influencing import tax legislation). 

Before proceeding to the overview of the data (16 characteristics pertaining to 19 interest 

groups; complete data tables are in the Appendix), and to the relationships between certain 

characteristics and the degree of success, a few remarks are in order. 

First, the proportion of groups found to be "effective" is high. This may be due to a selfselection phenomenon: relatively successful groups are more likely to survive and be visible and 

available for study than ineffective ones. It would have taken a much more systematic search to 

come up with a more "balanced" set of groups. 

Second, most groups interact with the policy process either directly, or through one or 

several channels: the media, parliamentary groups, and political parties. Although the team was 

able to elicit enough information on the first two channels, information about the role of political 

parties was either lacking or so inconclusive that it could not be used in the analysis. Perhaps a 

more focussed and detailed study could have clarified the issue. One should keep in mind, 

however, that as interest groups mobilize the media (especially newspapers) or parliamentary 

groups, political party involvement is already sizeable 1 . 

Finally, the presentation of data on group characteristics and degree of success implies 

that they tend to act alone, or independently of others. Such is not the case. This report devotes 

a special section to alliances and rivalries among interest groups with respect to certain policy 

issues. 

B. Descriptive Overview of the Data 

1. StructuralCharacteristics 

a. Urban vs. rural 

The report sample includes only two groups with predominantly rural bases and 

orientations (SYCOV22 and SYNAPRO). Although most other groups have sizeable and active 

branches in various regions of Mali, they are mostly urban-oriented. 

21Political parties intervene through the National Assembly's groupes parlementaires. Parties (or political 

personalities) are also said to control certain newspapers or radio stations. 

22 See Chapter VI. 

51 
b. Single vs. federated 

The majority of groups (12/19) are independent rather than affiliated or federated with 

other groupings, such as FNEM or UNTM. The team tested the significance of this characteristic 

in terms of a group's access to resources, relevant information and analytic capacity. UNTM for 

instance, federates twelve national iabor unions, md maintains ties with another four independent 

ones. As members of one group commented: "le pluralisme associatifest une bonne chose, mais 

la solidarit6est essentielle pourfaireface au gouvernement''23 . 

c. Corporatistvs. issue-oriented 

Another structural characteristic hinges on the type of organization and objectives; the 

majority (12/19) act along corporatist lines (transport, energy, banking) on a variety of relevant 

policy issues, while the rest gather more disparate memberships around wages, working 

conditions, prices and retirement conditions (UNTM, ASCOMA, ADIDE, ATVR) or women's 

issues (COFEM, CAFO, AFE). 

d. Relative endowment in resources 

The sample is divided among groups relatively well endowed with resources (10) and 

groups with few resources. This report defines "adequate resource endowment" as significant 

dues collected from a relatively large membership, the ability to acquire or rely on some business 

infrastructure (office space, telephone, fax, secretary, etc.). Groups with low levels of resource 

endowment typically have no permanent headquarters or office, no telephone, and have an 

uncertain ability to stay in touch with their membership by mail or other direct means of 

communication. Every group characterized as relatively well endowed (except the UNTM) is 

business-related and corporatist in nature. 

Most interest groups raise their own resources, but there are important exceptions. The 

Chamber of Commerce has always had an "in-kind contribution" from the government, its 

Secretaire-Gineralbeing a civil servant appointed upon approval in conseil des ininistres. In 

addition to its own sizeable funds, the Chamber of Commerce has received aid (e.g., from 

Germany for business publications) and considerable financial support from the French network 

of Chambers of Commerce. The UNTM labor union federation has maintained collaborative 

links with similar bodies in Africa, and has received support from the International labor 

movement. Finally, the SYCOV leadership have received technical assistance and financial 

backing for seminars and workshops from various donors. 

23 "freedom of association isa good thing, but one may have to join forces to take on the government". 

52 
e. Group size 

Given the Malian context, this report ascribes the values of large to groups (14) having
 

over 150 active members, and small for the other ones (5).
 

f Access to information relevant to the group's objectives 

From interviews with various groups and a review of some of their products (open letters, 

position papers, statements in the media), a value was assigned to measure their access to general and policy specific information on relevant economic issues. It was found that slightly over half 

(11) of the groups had reasonably good access to information. 

Some typical sources of information included the national media as well as foreign 

newspapers, magazines and radio stations, and contacts in the bureaucracy. Other sources 

included Malians residing abroad and contacts in donor agencies. With the notable exception of 

the UNTM, interest groups stated that very little economic information is provided directly by the 

government. 

g. Capacity to carry out some degree of policy analysis 

Using the same type of information as for (d) above, this report identifies groups 

demonstrating a capacity to carry out some degree of policy analysis (14/19). It is worth noting that more groups show a capacity for analysis than claim, or show, to have adequate access to 

relevant policy information. At the analytical stage, the team tested for relationships between 

group resources, access to information, policy analysis capacity, methods chosen, and degree of 

success. 

In the case of federated groups (UNTM, FNEM), results from this type of analysis must 

be interpreted cautiously. For instance, the relatively powerful UNTM has no real analytical capacity of its own. In some cases, it can muster some through one of its constituent unions, in 

others, depending on the policy issue and the respective positions of constituent groups, it needs 

to turn to independent advisers. FNEM, on the contrary, demonstrates a solid analytical capacity, 

reinforced by most of its constituent members. 

2. Group Strategies and Methods Used 

Over the past four years, Malian interest groups have used a wide range of methods to 

express their positions and exert influence. They have also chosen among several possible "channels" and "entry points." The analysis is made somewhat more difficult by the fact that a 

group may use several methods in combination, over time, or according to the "entry point" chosen. In a cross-sectional approach such as this, the team had to ascribe characteristics to 

groups on the basis of a dominant, rather than single strategy, method, or point of entry into the 

policy process. 

53 
First, the range of policy advocacy methods was divided into the following categories: 

* 	 open confrontation or threat (ranging from violent demonstrations to "economic 

strike") vs. more collaborative and dialogue-oriented strategies; 

* 	 mass mobilization (marches, demonstrations) vs. acting through the group's 

leadership; or 

* 	 use of a consultative/participative mode, as when a group is actively involved in 

policy design/review exercises with part of the government bureaucracy, vs. a less 

interactive representation of group objectives, e.g., submitting letters or position 

papers. 

a. Strategy: confrontationalor collaborative? 

None of the nineteen groups surveyed rely on open confrontation or credible threat as the 

sole or main policy advocacy strategy. However, six of them have demonstrated a capacity to 

resort to confrontation or credible threat as a last (and successful) recourse, including the two 

rural-based groups. 

b. Style of intervention 

A relatively large number (11/19) of the interest groups rely partly on broad popular 

mobilization to be heard and convey their messages. Not surprisingly, all such groups have large 

memberships. Mass mobilization, however, is usually a measure of last resort, Mali's recent 

history of mass demonstrations showing that they easily turn into confrontations with opposing 

groups, government forces, or both. 

c. Type of interaction with the policy process 

The majority of groups surveyed (15/19) were able to establish such an interaction with 

the policy process that they felt they were somewhat consulted on, or participated in some policy 

decisions. 

3. Channels and Points of Entry into the Policy Process 

Once overall policy orientations have been chosen and announced at the highest political 

level, they are first translated into operational guidelines at the ministerial level. Single interest 

groups are rarely able to intervene at this level, although the central bureaucracy, as a major 

stakeholder group, begins to exert influence. Interest groups are more likely to intervene at the 

stages where policies are designed or redesigned, when policy impact analysis is carried out, and 

when the choice of specific policy instruments is considered. 

54 
The policy process is generally assumed to be rather iterative; popular reaction to a policy 

reaches the bureaucracy, then percolates horizontally and vertically through it until a decision is 

reached to react (not always explicitly). There are obvious limitations to this way of modelling 

political interactions; this report uses several examples in the discussion of central bureaucracy to 

refine it somewhat, as it pertains to Mali. However, the team tests the hypothesis that the point 

of entry used by a group to interact with the policy process depends partly on the group's 4 characteristics . To the extent that some groups are also using channels other than the central 

bureaucracy to exert influence, this report investigates the relationship between group types and 

methods on one hand, and entry points and channels on the other. 

a. Interaction at the policy analysis level 

Over half of the groups (10/19) were considered to have access, at least occasionally, to 

levels of the policy process where overall policy analysis takes place, usually on the anticipated 

impact of various policy options. 

A demonstrated capacity to carry out policy analysis and make valid policy suggestions 

does not automatically make a group influential. Although some groups seem to have had an 

impact at the policy analysis level, the central bureaucracy has often been reluctant to recognize 

or acknowledge their contribution. ADIDE is a good example of such a group, which initiated or 

assisted with major ideas and initiatives (establishment of an AGETYPE agency in Mali, the third 

Republic's employment policies, anti-smuggling measures). 

b. Working on policy instruments 

A greater proportion of groups (14/19) accedes to a slightly lower level of the policy 

process, where policy instruments are being considered and debated on the basis of a policy 

already chosen. The data are consistent in the sense that all groups able to gain access to the 

policy analysis level are also involved in discussions on instruments, whereas the reverse does 

not necessarily hold true. In certain areas (e.g., health, transport, energy) the government may 

not be eager to see interest groups play an active role at the policy orientation, or policy analysis 

stages, but welcomes the groups' involvement to discuss policy instruments and specific issues. 

Institutional mechanisms have been established over time to facilitate regular interaction. 

In addition to direct interaction with the government and its bureaucracy, Malian interest 

groups have relied on two channels of action, sometimes simultaneously: the media and the 

National Assembly. 

24 We hypothesize that it also depends on the nature of the policy issue addressed. 

55 
c. The media 

Tie vast majority (14/19) of groups regularly use the media as a means to argue their case 

or rally support for their cause. This phenomenon really "took off' when the number of radio 

stations sharply increased25 : whereas the printed press reaches only the literate and francophone 

population, news, information, and programs of general interest are broadcast in national 

languages. It's fair to say that no other phenomenon has come close to this "democratization" of 

information and public debate. The section of this report on the role of the media describes this 

in greater detail. 

d. The NationalAssembly 

Issues affecting interest groups are often discussed at the National Assembly. It is 

difficult to establish a link between such discussions and an interest group's systematic 

"lobbying" efforts. Nevertheless, it seems that 9/19 groups have systematically relied on 

parliamentary groups at some point. There are only two groups which clearly did not want to do 

so. GPP, given its other powerful means of action, does not believe that additional public 

exposure would serve a useful purpose, while the CAFO has not been eager to strengthen real or 

perceived ties with any kind of political institution. 

4. Measures of Success: Extent of Effectiveness/PoliticalPower 

The non-parametric dependent variable is the extent to which an interest group has been 

able to inflect or t, jointly determine the course of the policy process. This includes instances 

where a group has: 

influenced agenda setting, whereby the government has opened a public debate 

about specific policy issues to be considered and acted on; 

influenced policy analysis or tl choice of policy instruments, typically by pointing 

out the anticipated impact on certain groups, or on the budget; or 

influenced policy implementation; either by pointing out how policy 

implementation departs from plan, or how a fully implemented policy has a 

negative impact to be mitigated through policy change or compensation. 

a. Effectiveness 

The assessment this report makes of a group's policy advocacy effictiveness is relative, in 

the sense that the team compares what the group has accomplished with the group's stated 

25 There are about a dozen independent local FM radio stations in Bamako. Most secondary towns (Kayes, Koutiala, 

Mopti, Nioro, Sikasso, Sdgou) also have one or several local independent stations. 

56 
objectives. This has the drawback of ascribing a greater degree of success to a group fulfilling
 

very modest objectives, than to another which has made significant absolute gains, while falling
 

short of its set mandate. 

Probably because of the self-selection phenomenon mentioned above, a majority of 

interest groups surveyed (16/19) appears to have been effective 26 . As described in Chapter III, 

the SYCOV has been effective in bringing the government (and the CMDT) around to entering into a real dialogue with cotton producers, and in gaining a seat at the Contrat-Plan bargaining 

table. The COFEM, after a complete review of the Malian civil code, identified discriminatory laws and practices; some of these have then been changed through a formal legislative process.

For instance, women no longer need an authorization from their husbands to run a business, 

consult a family planning clinic, or to travel abroad. The ASCOMA has been able to push through a number of important changes in the energy sector, following a widely publicized ASCOMA/Energie du Mali (EDM) conference. In addition, ASCOMA attends meetings of all 

hospital management boards. More detailed descriptions of interest group accomplishments are 

presented below. 

The groups judged "ineffective", on the other hand, share several characteristics: they have 

relatively low resources, tend to act singly rather than within a federation of groups, and 

demons'rate no capacity to have access to the policy process, either at the level of policy 

analysis, or regarding discussions on policy instruments. 

b. Power 

By definition, an organized and active interest group occupies a greater place in the public 

arena, and is likely to secure more advantages than unorganized or ineffective stakeholders. So, 

all effective groups are successful in some absolute sensi. Quite a few groups (10/19), however, 

have managed to play a role and gain advanta.,es which, ypear greater than their relative places in society and the economy might warrant. This report 'iassifies them as being especially 

successful, or relatively powerful. 

C. Relationship Between Group Characteristics and Their Degree of Success 

In the next few pages, data is presented on the overall sample, and on effective and 

powerful groups. A value of 1 indicates the group meets the criteria in the appropriate column, 

while a 2 and a 0 indicate "no" or "undetermined", respectively. Summary results are then 

provided on the hypothesized relationships between the degree of success of interest groups and 

several factors seen as key determinants. The reader is reminded that a correlative approach 

cannot fully take inter-group dynamics into account. 

26 Some groups, unable to achieve some type of change through interaction with the government policy process, have 

decided to act more directly (COFEM: list of projects to be financed by donors. ADIDE: supporting employment creation) --neither of which is well endowed with resources... 

57 
1. "Having adequate resources doesn't hurt... " 

Ten groups are relatively well endowed with resources, every one of them is effective, 

and all but one (SYNABAT) are powerful as well. A hypothesis for the reason why SYNABAT 

is not powerful is that they intervene in a subsector still dominated by powerful foreign 

construction and public works firms. 

Well endowed groups are not necessarily large (6/10). However, all but one had 

relatively adequate analytical capacity and interacted with the policy process at the policy 

analysis level. Most (8/10) relied on some form of media. 

TABLE 3.2: GROUPS WITH ADEQUATE RESOURCES 

Group Corp. Resourc Large Capa. Media Polic Eff Power 

ABB 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 

CCAM 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 

CCIM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

FNEM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

GCM 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 

GPP 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 

SYNABAT 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 

SYNAPPO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

SYNTRUI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

UNTM 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 

2. "It pays to know your stuff..." 

Eleven groups had relatively good access to information, and although they were not all 

well endowed with resources (low resources=3), all but one were found to be effective. The 

correlation between capacity to do policy analysis and access to information is good: all ten 

groups with analytical capacity also had good accefs to information. Only one group had good 

information but no endogenous analytical capacity (UNTM). Being well informed and able to do 

policy analysis does not, however, necessarily translate into power (see ADIDE, for instance); the 

proportion of powerful groups was 8/11. Finally, it's important to note that all groups, including 

the ones which have relatively good information and analytical capacity, would like more, or are . actively seeking ways to improve their standing in both areas'7 

27 This issue is more fully addressed in the section on the media, and in Tiemoko Diallo's working paper on the 

media and economic information in Mali (Annex). 

58 
TABLE 3.3: GROUPS WITH ADEQUATE ACCESS TO INFORMATION 

Group Resourc Large Info Analyt PolAn Effect Power 

ABB 1 2 1 1 1 1 1

ADIDE 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 

ASCOMA 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 

CCAM 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 

CCIM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

COFEM 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 

FNEM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

GPP 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 

SYNAPPO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

SYNTRUI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

UNTM 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 

3. "Strength in numbers..." 

Six groups had relied on open confrontation or credible threat, backed up by the fact that 

all six are able to mobilize large numbers of people (all are large). The strategy was rather 

successful since 5/6 are considered effective, even though half of them are relatively well 

endowed with resources. However, only 3/6 could be called powerful. Not surprisingly, only half of these groups put much emphasis on the media. Finally, compared to the overall sample 

average, these groups score very low on access to information and analytical capacity. 

TABLE 3.4: GROUPS RELYING PARTLY ON CONFRONTATION 

Group Urban Resourc Info Confr Mass Media Eff Power 

CCIM 1 1" 1 1 1 1 1 1 

GCM 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 

SYCOV 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 

SYNAPRO 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 

UNCTRM 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 

UNTM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

4. "Hearingyou loud and clear..." 

The vast majority of groups (14/19) used some form of media. Particularly noteworthy is 

the fact that the two rural groups (both effective, but not powerful) could not mobilize this 

59 
channel to further their interests. Large groups tended to use the media more than small ones (11 

vs. 3) although this may not be a matter of resources, some small groups being well endowed. 

Media use is closely associated with effectiveness (12/14 were effective), but not so closely with 

power. This is because regular use of the media appears worthwhile mostly to groups with low 

or "average" power. Really powerful groups tend to rely on the media as a last resort. There are 

several reasons for this. First, past experience showed them that the media are not equipped to 

convincingly present technically complex policy arguments-.

2 Secondly, powerful groups feel 

they have adequate access to decision makers and need no intermediary. Finally, they don't wish 

to publicize their policy objectives through the media: no point in stirring up potentially 

competing interest groups... 

TABLE 3.5: GROUPS RELYING ON THE MEDIA AS AN INSTRUMENT 

Groups Urb. Res. Large Capa Med PolA Eff Power 

ABB 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 

ADIDE 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 

AFE 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 

ASCOMA 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 

ATVR 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 

CAFO 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 

CCIM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

COFEM 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 

FNEM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

GCM 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 

SYNABAT 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 

SYNAPPO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

SYNTRUI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

UNTM 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 

5. "Meet me in the lobby..." 

Interaction with parliamentary groups seems to be part of the strategy for 9/19 interest 

groups. It does not seem to hurt, since all 9 of them appear effective, and 7/9 powerful. Most of 

the same groups (7/9) rely on the media as well. The extent to which action through the 

National Assembly is determinant is hard to gauge, however, since 8/9 of these groups turn out to 

be relatively well endowed with resources. As discussed below, causality is unclear. 

28 Typical comment "We've been very disappointed in the ability of local reporters to put together a valid and 

convincing article from information we supplied to them." 

60 
TABLE 3.6: GROUPS RELYING PARTLY ON THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 

Groups Urban Corpo Resourc Anly Media NAssm Eff Power 

CCAM 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 

CCIM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

FNEM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

GCM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

SYCOV 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 

SYNABAT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 

SYNAPPO 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 

SYNTRUI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

UNTM 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 

6. "Best tickets in the house..." 

Interacting with the policy process at the higher levels (policy analysis AND policy 

instruments) is the way to effectiveness, a proof of it, or both. Out of 10 interest groups 

intervening at this level, all were effective, and 8/10 were deemed powerful. There are 

significant preconditions: 9/10 had to muster adequate access to information, analytical capacity, 

and good resource endowment... Provided the group had these, however, size was not a factor 

(4/10 being small). 

It is worth noting that most of the trade associations intervening at the policy level are 

members of CCIM and/or FNEM, also active at this level. Interviews with interest groups 

suggest that each plays a complex combination of independent actions, alliances, and oppositions, 

according to circumstances. For instance, a group may act singly on a given policy issue, and in 

alliance with others (e.g., through FNEM) on others. Conversely, there are cases where the 

CCIM (or, less often, FNEM) stand before a very divided membership as they wage a policy 

battle with the bureaucracy. This point is also addressed in the section on inter-group dynamics. 

61
 
TABLE 3.7: GROUPS INTERVENING AT THE POLICY ANALYSIS LEVEL 

Groups Resou Info Anly PolAn Inst Eff Power 

ABB 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

CCAM 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 

CCIM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

COFEM 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 

FNEM I 1 1 1 1 1 1 

GPP 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 

SYNABAT 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 

SYNAPPO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

SYNTRUI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

UNTM 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 

D. Comments on Key Determinants of Success 

As noted above, the number of unsuccessful interest groups --in an overall small sample-­

does not allow for a definitive analysis of what makes a group effective rather than powerless. 

However, enough information was collected to comment on determinants of degree of success, 

there being 16/19 effective groups, and 10/19 powerful ones. Among the various group 

characteristics identified, five emerge as most likely related to the degree of success; in 

decreasing order of significance: resource endowment, association with parliamentary groups, 

interaction with the policy process at the higher levels, access to information, and capacity to 

analyze it. 

As the summary tables (pp. **-**) indicate, the proportion of groups with adequate 

resources increases from 56 percent in the overall sample to 90 percent among powerful groups. 

Whereas 47 percent of all groups have some interaction with parliamentary groups, the 

percentage rises to 70 percent among powerful ones. 80 percent of powerful groups intervene at 

the higher level of the policy process, compared to 53 percent of all groups. Adequate access to 

information is typical among 58 percent of all groups, and a characteristic for 80 percent of 

powerful ones. Finally, at a lower level of significance, adequate analytical capacity goes from 

74 percent among all groups to 90 percent for the powerful ones. 

The data suggest a few additional comments. First, the direction of causality is most 

often ambiguous. It's rather safe to hypothesize causal links between resource endowment and 

access to information, and assume that adequate information is a prerequisite for carrying out 

policy analysis. However, there is no telling whether groups are in general effective because they 

have access to a high entry point into the policy process, or whether their own success and 

62 
influence makes it possible for them to reach this point. It's also impossible to say whether, in 

general, groups gain influence by way of parliamentary interaction, or whether the National 

Assembly becomes a factor only beyond a certain level of success. Information from the various 

groups surveyed suggests, in fact, that the causality can run either or both ways. 

This sample neither confirms nor refutes the hypothesis that the media play a key role in 

policy activism, since three-quarters of the groups in the overall sample reportedly use the media 

anyway. Secondly, corporatist groups tend to do better than single-issue oriented ones. Given 

the suggested importance of resource endowment, this is not surprising. Three-quarters of 

corporatist groups are adequately endowed, versus 1/6 of issue-oriented ones... The actual size of 

groups, however, does not seem to contribute to their degree of success. Related to size, the data 

show that a confronttional strategy and a capacity to mobilize large numbers of people go 

together (in 14/19 cases). However, reliance on this strategy does not seem to have lasting 

positive effects: the percentage of powerful groups fall as one goes from the whole sample to 

confrontational ones. 

The relationship between resource endowment and access to information is also rather 

clear; resources/information and no-resources/no-information are correlated in 14/19 cases. 

Looking at the relationship between access to information and capacity to carry out policy 

analysis, in the overall sample, 50 percent of groups with access to information complement it 

with analysis, whereas 40 percent fail to do so. On the other hand, among powerful groups, 

nearly 90 percent of groups with access to information are also characterized by a capacity to 

analyze it. 

63
 
IV. POLICY ISSUES AND ACTORS IN THE COTTON SUBSECTOR 

A. Overview of the Cotton Subsector 

While cotton represents over 50 percent of Mali's export earnings, and is similarly significant in several other countries in the subregion, West Africa ranks only third in world 

cotton exports. Moreover, according to the CFDT, the perceived quality of West African cotton 

has declined on the world market - a new and disturbing trend (Estur, 1992). 

Cotton production in Mali, and throughout West and Central Africa, is based on rainfall 

rather than irrigated production technology. Given the uncertainties and economic risk associated 

with rainfall agriculture, each cotton producing country like Mali can find clear economic
 

advaiitages in associating with some type of regional production and marketing system. 
 The 

CFDT-led cotton family offers such an integrated arrangement. At the same time, each country 

must balance this advantage with the fact that the CFDT places its relationship with any one 

country in the larger context of its West and Central African operations. 

Its 'protection' as a member of the CFDT cotton family has not, however, shielded Mali 

from the effects of low world market cotton prices that fell precipitously from 1983 to 1986 and 

again in 1992. From 1985 through 1992, net losses amounted to approximately 241 billion CFA 

francs and net income on cotton production was positive in only two out of eight years. Throughout the 1980s, Mali, in particular, confronted a series of additional crises related to its reentry into the West African Monetary Union (UMOA) and the associated currency devaluation. 

In response, and as part of a broader structural adjustment program, the government began to take several institutional steps designed to improve the efficiency of the subsector: reducing the number of parastatal enterprises in the subsector and reducing the management and 

operational costs of the CMDT. In addition to these changes, many of which are still in 

progress, the recer:.t upswing on the world cotton market and the CFA franc devaluation may

provide additional relief, at least in the short-term. 

B. Introduction 

In June 1994, less than three years after its explosive emergence into the Malian political 

arena, the National Union of Cotton Producers (Syndicat des Producteursle Coton et Vivriers, 

SYCOV) sat at the bargaining table as a full partner with the Government and with the Malian 

Company for Textile Development (Compagnie Malienne pour le Dgveloppement des Textiles, CMDT) to negotiate a new four-year Contrat Plan governing the production and marketing of 

cotton through 1998. With SYCOV's participation in these negotiations, Malian cotton 

producers, for the first time in Malian history, had a direct voice in influencing agricultural policy. A renegotiated ContratPlan, with SYCOV as a signatory, had been the major item on 

the SYCOV agenda for almost two years, and it appears that most cotton producers are pleased 

with the outcome of the negotiations. 

65 
SYCOV's policy success came just after representatives from about 10 Malian farmers' 

organizations met in Kati for two days to examine how to assure and expand their role in the 

country's democratic political proccss (see Coulibaly, 1994). Based on this meeting and series 

of regional discussions that started in late 1994, the Association pour la Sauvegarde et le 

Renforcenent de la Ddmocratie (ASARED) and the Institut Malien de Recherches Appliquies au 

Dgveloppement farmer unionism and democracy in Mali (IMRAD) will host a national seminar on 

during the early part of 1995. 

Hopefully, the following observations about SYCOV can contribute to the discussions in 

this national seminar and to the deliberations of others concerned about a greater role for 

farmers' organizations in economic policy-making in Mali. More broadly, it is hoped this case 

study will improve the understanding of multiple relationships between democratization and 

economic policy-making, and the kinds of governmental and political reforms that might be 

designed to complement economic reform policies and programs. Finally, this case study offers 

information to advance the understanding of how a more open political situation and 

of political and opportunities for a more open policy debate might lead to greater measures 

economic development. 

Following a brief review of the origins of SYCOV, this case study examines the major 

issues surrounding the negotiations of the new, four-year Contrat Plan, including a description of 

the key features of the cotton subsector. Second, it assesses the political and economic 

conditions related to SYCOV's role and its legitimacy vis-a-vis Malian cotton producers. Third, 

this case study identifies the organizational conditions in SYCOV that affect its viability as a 

significant actor in the process of political and economic liberalization in Mali. Finally, it 

identifies the opportunities for, and constraints on, the emergence of greater nation-wide farmer 

In conclusion, several suggestions or lessons are offered for consideration by solidarity in Mali. 

those interested in promoting a greater role for farmer organizations in democracy and 

governance in Mali. 

C. Origins 

If the Director of the Regional CMDT Office in Koutiala had initially received the small 

delegation of cotton producers who came to present their 12 grievances (doliances) in May 1991 

with even a small measure of courtesy and consideration, it is highly likely that the story of 

SYCOV's role in Malian agricultural development policy would have taken another path. 

Despite the CMDT's efforts to deal with some of these demands, the producers felt deeply 

insulted and they declared a cotton strike, just as planting was to begin. What started as a 

discussion quickly erupted into a public confrontation that was finally defused only with the 

personal intervention and assurances of the Minister of Rural Development. 

The cotton producers, who came together largely from the Koutiala region, were neither 

extremists nor revolutionaries. Most had produced and marketed their cotton with the CMDT for 

over 20 years. Several practiced large-scale, mechanized production, and many had completed at 

least eight or nine years of formal schooling in French and/or had participated in the CMDT 

66 
Bambara literacy program. While the farmers were angry (Bingen, 1994), they saw themselves 

primarily as unfairly treated partners rather than an agrarian revolutionary vanguard. Moreover, 

their decision to 'strike' was not taken suddenly. Their concerns about their role vis- -vis the 

CMDT had been growing for several years. 

D. Background 

As the Malian economy worsened in the late 1980s, cotton producers found themselves 

increasingly squeezed. The prices received for their cotton were not keeping up with the 

increased costs for equipment and supplies. For many producers, cotton production, their 

principal source of income, was becoming less and less profitable. Consequently, when the 

CMDT decided in late 1989 to transfer its responsibility for agricultural credit to the National 

Agricultural Development Bank, BNDA, and its more restrictive repayment policies, a small 

group of producer-leaders from the Koutiala region came together as the Coordinationdes AV et 

Tons to lobby against this decision, which they saw as imposing a further financial hardship on 

their already stressed production operations. The group's initial, short-term successes with the 

CMDT encouraged it to broaden its lobbying effort to deal, among other issues, with the apparent 

shortages of, and high prices for animal (cotton cake) feed on the open market, as well as with 

the CMDT's decision to classify and price cotton at the central processing plant instead of with 

the producers at the village-level collection points. The producers were less successful in these 

broader discussions, but with the overthrow of the Traord regime, they found political room to go 

public with their growing frustrations. 

The producers' 12 demands or grievances dealt with specific and some long-standing 

pricing and marketing issues. They neither challenged the authority of the CMDT nor at the 

time, considered the establishment of a producers'union. But the political conditions during the 

first months of thz transition that allowed the producers a measure of previously unavailable 

political freedom were also the source of considerable political apprehension and uncertainty. It 

wasn't altogether clear to regional CMDT and government officials, for example, that the 

producers' strike did not represent a grassroots effort by Traor6 sympathizers to reinstall the 

previous regime. The international attention given to the confrontation also heightened tensions 

between producers and the CMDT (Marchant, 1991; Barrot and Ouattara, 1992). 

With the intervention of the Minister of Rural Development, the CMDT and the producers 

were able to reach agreement on nine of the 12 grievances. On the remaining three points - the 

availability of animal feed, fertilizer prices and cotton prices - the CMDT and the producers 

agreed to continue their negotiations. Based on these initial steps toward reconciliation, and as 

the political air cleared, in July the CMDT proposed a two phase program to restore a spirit of 

trust between the CMDT and producers 

In the short term, the CMDT pr-,posed to carry-out a broad-based training and information 

program on the cotton subsector (filik re) for the producers' representatives as well as a regionby-region identification of the producers' cotton marketing problems and concerns. In addition, 

the CMDT agreed to host a public roundtable discussion of subsector issues between 

67 
representatives from the Ministry of Rural Development, the producers and the CMDT. In the 

medium term, the CMDT proposed two major activities: to host a 'study trip' of the la filire 

coton from Bamako to Paris and Havres; and, to support information-discussion sessions in 

Bambara for producers of the Contrat-Planand the CMDT's rural development program. 

The roundtable discussion, with 84 attendees, including representatives from the French 

Ministry of Coopdration, the Caisse Francaisede Diveloppement, the European Development 

Fund and the World Bank, was held in S6gou in September 1991. The participants reached five 

major recommendations concerning the organization of producers, cotton production practices and 

marketing, the supply of animal feed and the integration of the OHVN cotton producers into the 

'CMDT system.' 

First, the participants approved the establishment of a producer organization that would 

represent producers from the village to the national level. While it was agreed that this 

organization would be allowed to identify and define the grounds upon which it would establish 

its own legal identity, it was also agreed that the organization would collaborate closely with the 

CMDT, the Chamber of Agriculture, the government administration and other technical services 

to guarantee the widest possible diffusion of information to all cotton producers. In addition, the 

participants recommended that the producers' organization should be represented in all the 

decision-making units, such as the CMDT Management Board (Conseil d'Administration)and 

the Stabilization Fund Management Committee, and that the CMDT would study a proposal to 

allow such an organization to become a CMDT shareholder. 

Second, the roundtable participants approved efforts to establish cotton production quotas 

in order to achieve two separate objectives: to control land degradation and to keep within the 

CMDT processing capacity. Third, it was agreed that producer prices would be announced 

before planting and that producer representatives would be allowed to participate at the village 

level in the classification of cotton harvested. Fourth, producers were advised to diversify their 

sources of animal feed, while the national commission for the distribution of feed was advised to 

earmark at least 50 percent of the annual stock of feed to cotton producers. 

Finally, the participants recommended that the ContratPlan effectively include cotton 

producers in the OHVN zone. In addition, the CMDT was invited to examine the possibility of 

extending its advantages in input supply and cotton purchasing to OHVN producers. 

With the roundtable's endorsement of the legitimacy of a producers' organization, 

several international agencies, notably the French Ministry of Coop6ration through the 

Agriculteurs Franaispour le Dgveloppenent Internationaland the Fondationpour le Progrsde 

l'Homme, began to provide financial and technical support to help establish a professional 

national cotton producers' organization. At the same time, many of those involved in the 

Koutiala events sought legal assistance through the Chamber of Agriculture to establish an 

officially recognized union of cotton producers. With this level of both national and international 

backing, the outspoken leadership of the still-nascent SYCOV held off offers at the national rural 

68
 
development estates-general in December to affiliate with the National Union of Malian Labor 

(UNTM) or to adopt a partisan association with any of the country's new political parties. 

Its political autonomy thus asserted, the newly invested Congress of the Syndicat des 

Producteursde Coton et Vivriers in September 1992 agreed that SYCOV needed to focus on 

three types of activities: 1) those that would improve the technical production and marketing 

capacity of its constitutive village-level units; 2) participation in the regular meetings of the 

CMDT services d'encadrement; and, 3) the establishment of a partnership relationship with the 

principal development actors throughout the CMDT and OHVN cotton producing zones. Even

t.)ugh the CMDT had made very little, if any progress in taking action on most of the 

September 1991 roundtable recommendations (see Traor6, 1992), as the nuwly elected President 

of SYCOV, Antoine Baba Berthd, a year later would assure the members and the Managing 

Director of the CMDT, 

"i partir de ce Jour SYCOV sera aux cbtis de la CMDT dans un rapportde 

partenariatque nous souhaitonsfecond. .. SYCOV marque avant tout la 

reconnaissancepour tout ce que la CMDT, et avant elle la CFDT ont fait pour 

que nous arrivionsa ce niveau. .. Ainsi la main dans la main, sans complexe 

aucun, souhaitons I'aveniravec confiance malgrj les difficultis conjoncturelles 

que connait la fili~re coton." 

This brief overview of the origins of SYCOV highlights several significant, policyrelevant observations for interested government and donor agencies and for SYCOV leaders and 

members. In the eyes of many producers, as well as the minds of many who follow Malian 

agricultural development policy, SYCOV appears beholden, if not captured, by some international 

donors and/or the CMDT. The CMDT initiative following the May 1991 confrontation in 

Koutiala and the subsequent financial support from the international community are perceived by 

many 'from the outside' as compromising SYCOV's policy independence. In some CMDT 

areas, especially where it is reported that CMDT village agents 'chose' the SYCOV 

representatives or where union representatives (mistakenly) tell farmers that SYCOV membership 

is required to receive production credit and market cotton, producers express ambivalent feelings about SYCOV's relationship witii the CMDT. At the same time, SYCOV's multiple links with 

the international community and its international profile did considerably enhance its bargaining 

position vis-h-vis the Government and the CMDT. 

Second, while the CMDT has been described as "overbureaucratized' (Flott6, et al., 

1993), it did respond quickly to the producers' challenges in mid-1991. For the lessons it might 

provide to other governmental agencies during a period of political liberalization, it would be 

useful to identify how those organizational and/or political factors enabled this adaptive response. 

Third, SYCOV's history clearly indicates the significance of understanding both tle 

origins of a farmers' organization and the various relationships among its members. It is clear 

that successful farmers' movements do not emerge overnight. It is also clear that such 

organizations are built around a complex set of both customary and more 'contractual' relations 

69
 
among members. Relations of trust and confidence, built on family and village-level relations, 

are as important, and sometimes more important, than solidary relations forged from an 

expression of shared grievances as cotton producers. 

E. The Contrat Plan 

Despite the long history of cotton production throughout West Africa, it was not until 

1952, and close to the end of the cconial period that the parastatal (societi mixte) French 

Company for Textile Development, CFDT, extended its improved production, processing and 

marketing operations from Central Africa into Mali (the Soudan). At independence, the new 

government permitted continued CFDT investments through an agreement that gave monopoly 

control over cotton production and processing. Based on the success of the 'CFDT model,' and 

as a means for attracting additional external financial support to achieve broader rural 

development objectives, in 1974 Mali created the Malian Company for Textile Development, 

CMDT, with 60 percent Malian government capital and 40 percent CFDT capital. 

With continued support from the World Bank, and other donors, since the mid-1970s, the 

CMDT has established itself as a key actor in what might be one the most successful agricultural 

and rural development programs in West Africa. Following a brief discussion of the institutional 

structure of the cotton subsector, this section reviews some of the background to the Contrat 

Plan, including the CMDT and SYCOV positions going into the June negotiations. The section 

concludes with a preliminary assessment of the results of the negotiations, N\ith an emphasis on 

the political implications for SYCOV, including its political viability and organizational 

dynamics. 

1. The Cotton Success Story. 

Since 1960, cotton production in Mali has increased by a flCtor of 50 and thereby has 

made southern Mali among the richest areas in the country. The estimated average annual 

income throughout the CMDT zone prior to the January 1994 devaluation was 100,000 CFA, or 5 

times the national average. It is widely accepted as well that cotton production technology has 

helped to increase production of cereal crops, turning the cotton zone into "le grenier ai c6r6ales 

d Mali." 

The CMDT zone may also be the most technologically advanced in terms of agricultural 

production technology. It is estimated that 75 percent of the almost 100,000 cotton producing 

households have plows, seeders and oxen. This is also the one area in Mali with tractor farming. 

In the Koutiala area, tractors are used on 142 farms. The CMDT contribution to this level of 

technological development is clear. In 1974/75 only 58 percent of the cotton fields plowed. By 

1990/91, this figure had jumped over 90 percent. Similarly, while seeders were not at all used in 

1974/75, by 1990/91, and estimated 70 percent of the fields were mechanically seeded. The total 

area under production has tripled from 68,059 ha to 194,423 ha and productivity has almost 

doubled from 883 kg/ha to 1,359 kg/ha. 

70 
This Malian success story of agricultural and rural development is due in no small 

measure to the multinational integration of all components of cotton production, processing and 

marketing (fili~re) operating through a series of private and parastatal actors. Within a welldefined policy and regulatcry framework, this CFDT-led famille cotonniere, includes several 

French governmental actors, the international donor community and the Malian government. The 

following overview of the principal actors in the fili~re helps improve understanding of some 

current issues in agricultural development policy-making, and especially the role of SYCOV in 

this process. 

The CMDT is responsible for 98 percent of the country's cotton production, with the
 

OHVN responsible for the remaining 2 percent. In its role as the country's largest generator of
 

export earnings, the CMDT benefits from several types of special arrangements and agreements. 

First, the CMDT technical package is based on over 50 years of French investment in cotton 

research throughout West and Central Africa. In recent years, varietal breeding priorities have 

switched from production per hectare to improved fiber quality and ginning productivity. 

Second, in its role as an input supplier, the CMDT profits from being able to order large quantities, from tax and duty advantages on imported agricultural equipment, and from donor 

grants that have helped with the purchase of inputs on concessional terms. Finally, the CMDT 

has agreed to purchase pesticides from the government monopoly, (Societi Malienne de Produits 

Clzimiques, SMPC). 

In addition to its role incotton production, the CMDT holds a monopoly on cotton 

processing and, since 1988, on cotton export marketing. With the direct participation of the 

CFDT, the CMDT operates 12 cotton processing facilities located throughout the southern region of the country. The processing capacities of these gins range from 5,000 MT per processing

cycle (151 days) for the oldest, to more than 40,000 MT per cycle for the newest facilities. This 

available processing capacity, plus an interest in controlling transportation costs, is the primary 

reason why the CMDT is interested in setting and controlling cotton production quotas 

throughout the region. 

Finally, with its almost 7 percent interest, CMDT joins CFDT and other West and Central 

African cotton producing companies as shareholders in COPACO, the Compagnie Cotonnidre. 

COPACO is the exclusive buying agent of the CFDT and for a .05 percent commission on total 

sales, receives over 90 percent of Mali's cotton production. While COPACO handles less than 

10 percent of the world market, it specializes in marketing West African cotton and it offers an 

assured market for Malian cotton. 

As the majority shareholder in HUICOMA, CMDT also seeks to protect the country's 

monopoly on commercial cotton seed oil processing for oil, soap and animal feed. The company has started testing the use of (glandless) cotton seed flour for both food and chicken feed and 

expects that, if successful, these new uses for cotton will quickly diminish the availability of 

animal feed. 

71 
Clearly, the level of institutional integration or structure of the cotton subsector is 

unrmatched in other commodity subsectors in Mali. Nevertheless, this 'model' highlights pivotal 

and common features that are relevant to policymaking that affects other agricultural subsectors. 

Moreover, if Contrat Plan is seen as a document that is illustrative of subsector policy 

management, then an examination of the discussions leading to June 1994 renegotiations of the 

CornratPlan offers an excellent opportunity to examine several dimensions of the roles of 

various groups in the economic policy process. 

2. Backgroundto the Contrat Plan Negotiations. 

In the wake of a period of crisis in the world cotton markets, and as part of a series of 

structural adjustment measures being negotiated between the World Bank and the Government of 

Mali, the Selingu6 Seminar on the Future of Cotton in Mali was held in May 1988 to identify 

and approve several legal and economic reforms designed to assure and improve the competitive 

position of Malian cotton. 

The key agreements at Selingu6 included the following principal recommendations: 

change the statute of the CMDT from that of a government agency to an essentially privatized 

societ9 t caractkreindustriel et commercial in which the Malian government is part owner with 

the CFDT; examine how producers might join as shareholders; the establishment of a floor price 

for cotton and of a price stabilization fund; examine how producers would be represented in its 

managem'.nt; and, invite the OHVN to become part of the CMDT dominated subsector. 

These important recommendations, which became part of the first ContratPlan between 

the Government and the CMDT, are based on the assumption that the CMDT plays two 

complementary, but significantly separate roles as both a private and a public actor in economic 

development. The first role identifies the CMDT as a commercial, private sector actor in which 

the CMDT is responsible for the management of all aspects of the cotton subsector - production, 

collection, processing and marketing. In its second role, the CMDT acts as a public agent of the 

Ministry of Rural Development with responsibility for a wide variety of rural development 

activities throughout its zone of cotton production operations. This distinction between a public 

and private role for the same agency is not uniformly accepted by Malian policy-makers, but it 

presumably does represent one way for the Government to be more fully responsive to its 

structural adjustment agreement with the World Bank. At the same time, however, it represents 

an important source of the ambivalence which many policymakers feel in response to at least two 

of SYCOV's principal concerns: lowering the costs of, and/or assuming management for the 

pwovision of inputs; and, taking over village-level extension responsibilities. 

Input supply, for example, is defined as a "rural development" activity. While input 

supply is as much a private sector economic activity as transport or processing, its designation as 

a rural development function, and thereby governmental, activity, enables the CMDT to receive 

foreign assistance in support of its input supply program (e.g., the Dutch fertilizer program). 

This type of assistance, in turn, is one way for the CMDT to ease its cashflow problems over the 

long (15-18 month) period in which it has to carry the high financial charges related to ordering 

72
 
and distributing agricultural inputs. In reality, however, one of CMDT's great strengths derives 

from its successful record as a significant commercial actor in assuring the timely provision of 

equipment and supplies for the production season. Consequently, given the economic and 

financial complexity of input supply, many government and donor agency policymakers, who 

might otherwise support SYCOV, find that it's demand to take over input supply quite 

implausible. 

On the other hand, most of the costs for CMDT encadrement, or its extension system, are 

allocated to its role as a private sector actor. As Macrae (1992) indicated, "La solution du 

contrat-plan est une solution opdrationnelle Aun probl~me concret qui s'est posd Acourt terme: 

par qui et comment financer la fonction d'encadrement? C'est la meme question qui est posde 

dans le cadre du d6bat sur le r6le de l'Etat dans l'dconomie:...". For SYCOV, this raises a 

significant and immediate problem that is directly related to their demands to increase the 

producer price of cotton. According to SYCOV, the estimated 13-15 CFA francs per kilo (before

devaluation) that supported the encadrementcould more profitably serve two purposes: increase 

the producer price of cotton and replace many of the village-level agents by SYCOV members. 

3. ContratPlan Negotiation Issues 

Just prior to negotiations, the membership and leadership of SYCOV reported that there 

were five principal issues on their negotiation agenda. With devaluation, producerpricing has 

become more of an issue than it was in 1991. Most producers felt that prices were declining before devaluation, especially in comparison with other West Africa countries. There was a 

strong feeling by many that the CMDT had not adjusted its price upward sufficiently to 

compensate for the increased costs of production due to inflation. Some even expressed interest 

in raising the price for 1st choice cotton to 170 CFA per kilo. 

Neither the membership nor the leadership of SYCOV were willing to accept production 

quotas. From the farmers' perspective, if CMDT doesn't purchase all of the cotton, then the 

government should permit another agency to purchase the rest. Such an option would decouple 

the producers' income from CMDT's ginning capacity. 

Third, farmers asked for village-level classificationof their cotton harvest, or for 

representatives at the factory. Like farmers throughout history, Malian cotton producers feel 

quite strongly that they are not being treated honestly and openly when the CMDT is allowed to 

classify the quality of cotton harvested when the producers are not present. 

Fourth, farmers still do not understand the rebate policy or concept. Even though CMDT 

agreed to a 33 1/3 percent rebate, an increase of over 8 percent from its proposal of 25 percent, it 

remains an area that has not been successfully explained to producers. Specifically, producers do 

not understand how payment of rebate for year one tied to price and sales of cotton in year two. 

And finally, SYCOV expressed concern over the cost of agriculturalinputs. In 

discussions prior to the Contrat Plan negotiations, the CMDT had not honored the producers 

73
 
request to be to be associated in the negotiations of input prices. In particular, SYCOV has 

asked government to remove or decrease some of the taxes and tariffs that appear to be largely 

responsible for the significant increase in the costs of insecticides. But the union has also asked 

that CMDT examine how input distribution organized and managed so that cost savings could be 

turned into lower costs for input costs for farmers; 

SYCOV also sought to place several other issues on the negotiating table, including the 

use of a percentage of the rebate to finance its activities, ways to reduce processing costs and 

thereby generate savings that could be turned into higher farmgate prices, more frequent reporting 

on cotton marketing and sale. By June 1994, the cotton producers, CMDT and HUICOMA had 

reached at least a temporarily satisfactory agreement. One-half of HUICOMA's production is 

allocated to CMDT and OHVN cotton producers. Joint CMDT-SYCOV local-level committees 

establish quotas of animal feed based on estimates of pasture availability and numbers of work 

animals per household and CMDT distributes the animal feed allocation to its cotton pick-up 

points. Consequently, some villagers must arrange their own transportation to pick up their 

allocation from the drop-off point. 

4. Observations 

Following the June negotiations, SYCOV distributed several thousand copies of a Contrat 

Plan summary, translated into Bambara, and held review and discussion meetings with its 

regional leadership. Based on these discussions, SYCOV's leaders and members feel extremely 

satisfied with the outcome of the June Contrat Plan negotiations, largely because they agreed 

upon a cotton price higher than that proposed by government. On two other issues that were 

critical for SYCOV, namely the removal of production quotas and the establishment of villagebased cotton classification, SYCOV's positions were not accepted. 

With respect to production quotas, the Plan stipulates that the CMDT will establish an 

overall production quota "en fonction de la capacit6 d'dgrenage de ses usines et de la situation 

des prix du coton fibre sur les march6s internationaux." Moreover, "la CMDT se r6serve le droit 

de refuser l'achat de la production excddentaire de coton graine." Similarly, the Plan specifically 

indicates that "le paiement du coton graine .. se fera sur la base du classement industriel." In 

response to SYCOV's concerns, the CMDT offers to assure "une meilleure circulation de 

l'information et une transparence au tour du classement industriel entre les differents partenaires 

de la filire coton." In addition, and in partial response to several of SYCOV's other related 

concerns, the CMDT agrees to undertake several organizational cost-saving measures, including a 

reduction-in-force of extension personnel. 

The producers agree to the following: to accept the production quotas established as a 

function of CMDT's processing capacity; to follow the CMDT recommended technical practices, 

including the exclusive use of CMDT seed and CMDT's suggested insecticide applications; to 

accept the factory-based cotton classification system; and, to assure a regular supply of cotton to 

the processing facilities. 

74 
Given the importance that SYCOV attached to a 'no-quota' policy and to village-level 

classification, these specific stipulations would appear to present a serious threat to SYCOV's 

credibility. Member satisfaction with the immediate and concrete price gains, however, appears 

to have offset their concerns with production quotas and classification. Moreover, SYCOV can 

emphasize and draw the attention of cotton producers to several more fundamental agreements 

that could have significa- long-term implications for the structure of thefilire in Mali. 

First, CMDT has agreed to study the ways in which cotton producers might become 

CMDT shareholders. The results of this study are to be presented to the CMDT Management 

Committee (Conseil d'Administration)no later than June 1996. Second, SYCOV, as the 

representative of cotton producers, now fully participates in policy-making with the CMDT and 

the Government. As one of four permanent members of the Oversight Committee (Conit, de 

suivi et de gestion) of th- ContratPlan, SYCOV will be able to participate in the annual audit of 

the filire,in decisions to review the producers' costs of production, and in the review of 

CMDT's annual performance report. SYCOV also sits on the management committee for the 

Stabilization Fund. Finally, the ContratPlan stipulates that SYCOV ("les producteurs") and the 

CMDT will meet regularly "dans le cadre d'un partenariat actif" in order to: review each year's 

production and marketing; plan for the coming year and agree upon the producers' price; and, 

establish the production quotas. The outstanding challenge for SYCOV now is whether it can 

develop the organizational capacity to participate as an equal partner at these different policymaking levels. 

F. Organizational Dynamics 

This section focuses on the organizational conditions related to SYCOV's capacity and 

continued legitimacy to act as a significant representative of cotton producers in economic policymaking. Following a brief review of SYCOV's organizational structure, this section examines 

several membership and leadership issues, including questions related to the role of the 

Associations Villageoises and to SYCOV's operational, village-level relations with the CMDT. 

1. OrganizationalStructure 

SYCOV's organizational structure and membership requirements are defined in its statutes 

that were approved by the first SYCOV Corigr(,-ss held in September 1992. These statutes state 

that membership in SYCOV is open to any producers whose production activities are in some 

way related to cotton production and who agree with the organization's goals to support "la 

formation syndicale indispensable" and to intervene "aupr~s de l'Etat, des organismes nationaux, 

extra-nationaux et des services d'encadrement pour la d6fense des int6r~ts professionnels, 

6conomiques, sociaux et moraux des exploitants membres." Salaried cmpioyees in public or 

private sector are specifically excluded from membership in the union. 

The organizational structure of SYCOV and its constituent units parallel that of the 

CMDT. Assemblde Gingralesat the village and secteur de base levels serve as the primary 

organizational units; representatives from these levels are elected to successively higher levels of 

75
 
decision-making, from confdrences at the inter-village level, depending upon the area (ZER, 

ZAER or Sous-Secteur), or coordinationsdcondaire,to the Secteur, Regional and to the Conseil 

Central and Congres at the national level. Meetings at the village and inter-village levels appear 

to be quite variable. The ConseilNational is a consultative body, while the Congrs, with 10-15 

delegates from each regional bureau, meets every 5 years as the instance supreme of the union. 

A Central Bureau meets formally every 2 months on a rotating basis in each region and is 

responsible for the operational and day-to-day responsibilities tasks of the union. SYCOV has no 

paid or professional staff. Members of the Central Bureau are reimbursed only for their 

expenses. 

Membership dues have been set at 1000 FCFA per year (prior to devaluation) and the 

Union records indicate about 9,000 on the membership list. SYCOV membership varies widely 

across the CMDT and OHVN zones: Sikasso reports 3,000 and Koutiala shows 2,300 members. 

Membership in the other CMDT regions is significantly lower with 1,100 in Fana 910 in 

Bougouni There are an estimated 1,800 SYCOV members throughout the and 420 in San. 

OHVN zone. 

There i3 iairly widespread agreement among SYCOV's leaders and its outside supporters, 

that one of SYCOV's major challenges involves strengthening its membership base by both 

increasing number of members and solidifying grounds of membership. SYCOV is less than five 

years old, but it is still more an organization of its leaders rather than its members. This 

challenge is not unlike that faced historically by other farmer organizations throughiout the world, 

but in this early period of political liberalization in Mali this challenge raises a broader concern 

with the longer term viability of rural-based organizations and their role in economic policymaking. 

As a rural (or farmers') organization, SYCOV confronts a universal set of problems in 

attracting and strengthening its membership. Its (potential) members are dispersed throughout 

often inaccessible villages. Furthermore, other communication difficulties that are linked to both 

the lack of road and communication infrastructure and continued high levels of illiteracy, make it 

extremely difficult to 'sell the SYCOV message' to new members and to assure the 'fence 

mending' required to maintain a strong rural-based organization. These difficulties are, in turn, 

exacerbated by the lack of financial and technical (transportation) resources required to maintain 

contact with a rural constituency. Given these constraints, membership mobilization depends 

more than ever on SYCOV's ability to offset the classic 'freerider' problem by showing 

evidence of concrete results and benefits to joining and maintaining membership in the union. 

From this perspective, SYCOV's participation in itself in the CP negotiations and its 'win' with 

cotton prices represent very useful and concrete illustrations of SYCOV's ability defend its 

members' interests. Moreover, as long as SYCOV is accepted as the 'representative of the 

producers,' its membership on several policymaking bodies, and thereby its ability to seek 

specific advantages for its members, should help strengthen its case in attracting new members. 

While SYCOV may be able to use some of its initial 'successes' in the ContratPlan 

negotiations to deal in the short-run with some of the classic organizational problems that arise in 

76
 
trying to mobilize farmers, it also faces a series of deeper problems that are linked to the history 

of village-level organizations and rural political mobilization in Mali. Cotton producers who 

know about SYCOV, or who are members, tend to feel positively about its possible contribution 

to improving Eiieir livelihoods. Nevertheless, Mali's long history of rural mobilization since 

independence creates a high level of skepticism, if not cynicism, among the country's producers. 

In the last 40-plus years, they have seen a lot of promises with various types of socitds, 

groupements, cooperativescome and go in the countryside. For many, there is no reason to 

believe that this experience with SYCOV will be significantly different from the other, largely 

failed, experiments in rural organization. 

Second, many of SYCOV's village-level membership and leadership issues are 

inextricably tied to a wide range of problems related to the specific history and role of the 

Associations Villageoises which are the village-ievel base for SYCOV's leaders and members. 

Since the mid-1970s, these village-based groups have been indispensable to the successes of 

agricultural development efforts throughout the CMDT and OHVN zones. For example, the AVs 

are an integral part of the CMDT "dispositif d'encadrement." For several years, a selected 

number of AVs have had the responsibility to carry-out several critical data collection tasks, 

including field measurements (used to calculate estimated production and thereby set 

quotas) management of equipment, supplies and credit, cotton marketing, the collection of various 

statistics, and ',.rving as the base for i'ulgarisationdemonstrations. In the OHVN zone, the AVs 

have been eqially indispensable, especially in the successful privatization of rural credit and 

input distribution. Furthermore, many governmental and nongovernmental programs still look to 

AVs as their principal point of entry into villages for implementation of their programs. 

Nevertheless, problems, such as embezzlement and inter-village conflicts within the AVs 

are now so widespread and well-known that the AV is recognized as "un modble bloqu6" for 

development programs. In part, many of the AV problems stem from continued high illiteracy 

levels and the perception that oral tradition does not offer a solid basis for overcoming the 

fundamental ambiguities between the AV as an economic actor in development and the continued 

use of customary principles as basis for defining roles of villagers as members and leaders. 

These ambiguities are manifested in at least two ways. First, in most of the AVs, customary 

village leaders tend to accumulate responsibilities or positions within the AV, thereby 

reproducing the village power structure. Second, membership in the AVs is largely restricted to 

founding families of village, even though 'stranger' families may have been resident for several 

generations. At same time some village notables may not be members or do not pay dues when 

they are members. As a result of these two factors, many AVs reflect a high degree of 

immobilization. 

Given these problems, the CMDT for several years has been trying to establish a more 

appropriate village-level structure that might help carry-out its development activities more 

effectively. The problematic nature of the AVs also poses profound problems for viability of 

SYCOV as an open, representative and democratic organization. As long as SYCOV's leaders 

and members continue to be drawn from the AVs and as long as the CMDT continues to rely on 

these village organizations for its produjction and development program, the whole range of AV 

77
 
problems risk being carried into SYCOV. In full recognition of such problems, SYCOV has 

publically taken a stand of 'non-involvement' or 'disengagement' from any village-level problems 

related to the AVs. In fact, the SYCOV feels strongly that the organization has much to gain by 

staying 'above the fray.' 

In addition to this structural issue, SYCOV's leaders also confront the hard work of 

building a farmers' union without having the training or expertise required to undertake this task. 

While their previous experience, often governmental, and training, has been indispensable in 

gaining a legitimate policy voice, it does not help in the tough work of union organizing. At the 

same time, the union's leaders recognize that they face a real dilemma in trying to resolve two, 

absolutely critical, but quite separate issues: attracting outside financial and technical resourues 

and building the union's membership base. As (potential) members perceive the leadership as 

spending more time seeking financial support, especially when this (necessarily) involves trips to 

Europe, etc., they remain skeptical of the leaders' motives, despite the organization's successes. 

Moreover, many feel that such 'foreign aid' also may compel them to be beholden to foreign 

interests. Similarly, while SYCOV may be successful in soliciting outside support, the case can 

be made that this success also keeps the leadership from dealing with hard issues of how to 

resolve its financial issues internally. 

The relationship between SYCOV and the CMDT frames a second set of issues 

confronted by SYCOV's leaders. Throughout most of the CMDT zone, SYCOV representatives 

depend upon CMDT agents for transportation and for communications. Even at the national 

level, most of SYCOV's information about the cotton subsector comes through various CMDT 

offices. The efficacy of this relationship varies widely, ranging from SYCOV charging CMDT 

agents with deliberate sabotage to apparently very cooperative working relationships at the village 

level. The extreme variability in the CMDT-SYCOV relationships at the local level suggests 

some degree of personalized conflict. At the same time, some village-level CMDT agents may 

feel genuinely threatened by SYCOV's stated objective to assume local-level extension 

responsibilities. Many may even see SYCOV's hand behind the ContratPlan agreement to seek 

a reduction-in-force. Similarly, other village-level agents may be challenged by SYCOV's 

objective to take over input supply, since :his would impinge directly on their often profitable 

relationships with AVs in the equipment and supply distribution. In response, many CMDT 

village agents play to the farmers' knowledge and long history with CMDT and contrast it with 

the 'unknown' nature and risks as c;ciated with SYCOV. 

Given the extent to which Mali's agricultural success with cotton is directly related to the 

highly integrated nature of the subsector, it is difficult at this early stage in the evolution of 

SYCOV to assess the longer term implications of its emergence. While SYCOV initially was 

perceived as a threat to the success of the subsector, in the long run its demands for a greater 

role in input and extension may be consistent with the CMDT (and CFDT) plans for the 

organizational division of responsibilities within the subsector. Consequently, the recently 

negotiated tripartite ContratPlan may represent the beginning of new corporatist structure in the 

cotton subsector. 

78 
Whether as a union defending its members' interests or as a loyal corporatist partner with 

the CMDT and the Government, SYCOV's continued success and viability may hinge on one 

commonly overlooked factor: literacy. Most of SYCOV's key leaders have some schooling, and 

many are retired government employees. As government services continue to downsize under 

structural adjustment, it is possible that this pool of leaders may continue to grow. On the other 

hand, many of SYCOV's villhge-level leaders emerged from the once powerful CMDT functional 

literacy program. This program receives no where near the investment and attention that it once 

received and to the extent that this educational base erodes, it undercuts the foundation for a 

renewal of village leadership. 

G. The Farmers' Movement in Mali 

This section examines what, if any, opportunities might be available for the emergence of 

greater, nation-wide, farmer solidarity in Mali. In particular, the report explores how some of 

SYCOV's relations with political parties, the National Assembly, the Chamber of Agriculture and 

other farmers' unions might improve our understanding of the prospects for continued political 

and economic liberalization in Mali. 

1. Unions and Parties 

SYCOV's statutes specifically state that the union is nonpartisan, a position also held by 

the membership. While SYCOV's members may hold varying views of SYCOV's goals, they 

are unified in their opposition to an affiliation with any political party. Similarly, most political 

parties indicate that would not be appropriate to establish a formal political relationship with 

SYCOV. Government regulations prohibit formal relationships between unions and political 

parties, but the intensity of the nonpartisanship opinion may also be reflective of this period of 

political action in Mali. In other words, the intensity and consistency with which this view is 

expressed may represent an effort to make a clean break with the past 35 years of Malian politics 

that have been characterized by various top-down efforts to impose links among all associational 

activities. The opinion also reflects a certain cynicism that partisan affiliations, per se, are 

inherently and unnecessarily conflictual. Shortly after the elections, for example, many villagers 

reported that efforts by parties to solicit electoral support were seen to disrupt relations among 

villagers. That is, for villagers, Mrlian political parties are a long way from serving as 

mechanisms for aggregating and articulating political interests. 

It is widely recognized that the parties did not have time to establish strong organizational 

bases in the countryside for the last elections. Thus, it should be instructive to try to track the 

rural organizational initiatives of several parties as they prepare for the next series of elections, 

and to see if rural perceptions of the parties change accordingly. SYCOV's statutes are clear 

about formally defined relationships, but they do allow for support and relations with parties 

when such relations are consistent with "l'am6lioration des conditions d'existance et de travail 

du Monde Rural en g6n6ral et des producteurs de coton et vivriers en particulier." Consequently, 

SYCOV has room for some partisan maneuver and it may be useful to watch how this is used. 

79
 
2. National Assembly Representatives 

Some of SYCOV's members have already take the first steps in this direction in 

contacting their National Assembly diputis. SYCOV members do not hesitate to contact their 

deputies on an individual basis to deal with issues that SYCOV is also trying to address. As 

indicated earlier, however, both the organization of the National Assembly and the meager 

resources available to deputies weigh against the possibility of having deputies bring these 

individualized demands together in a broader policy context. 

3. Chamber of Agriculture 

[ -ie Chamber of Agriculture continues to be SYCOV's closest organizational ally in the 

economic policy process. As noted earlier, local level Chamber representatives played key roles 

during the confrontation at Koutiala, and the Bamako office (now the assemble permanente) was 

instrumental in helping to establish SYCOV as a union. The President of SYCOV is an elected 

member of the Chamber's national Assemblee Pennanente and the Bamako office continues to 

be a point of contact logistically and for political and policy support. For example, SYCOV 

leaders discussed and reviewed their concerns related to the ContratPlan negotiations with the 

paid staff in this office 

SYCOV will need to confront some of the ambiguities in its relationship with the 

Chamber. First, despite the recent reorganization and decentralization of the Chamber, it is still 

widely perceived as a semi-governmental organization. In part, this perception is linked to the 

history of the Chamber and in part, it is linked to the fact that the Chamber's paid, permanent 

professional staff are seconded civil servants. Consequently, a close relationship with the 

Chamber raises questions about SYCOV's independence as a political actor. 

4. Union Solidarity 

The Kati meeting of representatives from several farmers' organizations is illustrative of a 

relatively new phenomena during the early years of this new era of political liberalization. 

Namely, many types of farmers' groups are taking advantage of the opportunities for open 

contact and discussion among themselves. Such contacts should be helpful for SYCOV in 

defining its role and as a basis for broadening the farmers' movement in Mali. It is interesting, 

nevertheless, that an emerging and vibrant farmers' movement is still not part of debate either on 

decentralization or more specifically, within the Ministry of Rural Development as it considers 

the implementation of the Schna Directeurthrough its Plan d'Action. Despite Mali's important 

steps toward political liberalization, the state and civil society are still disconnected. 

80
 
V. RESEARCH AND PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS 

The following suggested research and program implications are consistent with the 

Agency's strategy for "Building Democracy"'29 and its focus on: continued strengthening of the 

national bureaucracy's capacity to carry out and publicize economic policy analysis; 

improvements in the material, technical, and decision-making capability of the National 

Assembly; strengthening trade unions, professional associations, and women's groups; improving 

media outlets; and support for institutions and organizations, such as the Chamber of Agriculture, 

that increase Government responsiveness and accountability at the national, state, and local levels. 

Consistent with this overall strategy, the team feels that the type of participatory and 

semi-longitudinal research approach followed in this project recommends itself highly as a means 

for USAID (and USAID/Bamako) to assess the results of individual democracy programs that 

might be supported in Mali or elsewhere in West Africa. Specifically, the insights into the 

process of democratization in Mali gained through the collaboration among Malian social 

scientists, journalists, consultants, and American Africanist social scientists offers an effective and 

accurate way to evaluate the performance of democracy programs. This approach could also be 

seen as a modest contribution to the policy debate process, since several workshops were covered 

by the press ("Les Cauris") and radio (Radio Kledu). 

Research and programmatic implications arising from this work include, but are not 

limited to, the following: 

A. Strengthening Governmental Democratic Performance 

As Mali continues to move along the path toward political and economic liberalization, 

the Government bureaucracy must find ways to move from its 'control orientation' in policy 

making to a facilitative and service role. In order to support this type of evo'ution it might be 

useful to consider 1)a selective, but more in-depth assessment of current 'bureaucratic' views of 

the civil society by current civil servants at different Governmental levels, including current 

approaches to working with interest groups; and 2) an examination of the ways in which the 

curriculum at the National Administration School (Ecole Nationaled'Adninistration),and other 

major training institutions for civil servants, could be modified to deal with issues of Government 

administration in a democratic society. 

B. Strengthening Economic Policy Analysis 

A broader and more constructive dialogue between the Government and a variety of 

interest groups will depend in part upon the capacity of Government agency staff to carry out 

more informed policy assessment and evaluation. Thus, continued support to the administration's 

29 USAID/Washington: "Strategies for Sustainable Development". January 1994. 

81 
policy analysis and management capacity, in addition to the type of activities now undertaken 

under the PRED30 project, could be considered. 

Our contacts with various groups, however, show that most people feel that a capacity for 

economic analysis should not be a Government monopoly. In fact, there are ample opportunities 

to support independent institutes or associations doing political and economic analysis of their 

own. Such groups as the Malian branch of the West African Business Association, the Club des 

JournalistesEconomiques, and the Association des Econonistesdu Mali, for example, appear to 

offer new opportunities for informing the public policy debate and educating policymakers via 

their informal communication networks, and through the media. 

C. Strengthening the National Assembly's Role in Democratic Development 

Based on a more in-depth understanding of the role assigned to the National Assembly in 

Mali's presidential-parliamentary system, future programs could consider the most effective ways 

for 'tr: ining' dtputis to serve as representatives. Providing some parliamentary staff, 

communications and other logistical support required to improve the effectiveness of the National 

Assembly should also be considered a priority. 

D. Supporting the Media 

The media have probably contribuied more to opening up the policy debate, and to 

promoting the democratic process than any other single group in Mali. Logistical support to both 

the written press and the radio (newsprint, printing equipment, communications and broadcasting 

equipment) would provide extremely high democracy and development "returns". The 

professional level of journalists needs to be raised, including through the kinds of workshops 

organized in 1994 and referred to in this report. 

In addition, access by both urban and rural populations to the media should also be 

facilitated. This could be accomplished through support to urban and rural station programming, 

providing transportation and recording equipment to journalists, and helping PVOs operating in 

rural areas develop a capacity to bring their clients into the media streams. 

E. Strengthening Farmers' Organizations 

The organizational issues raised by SYCOV are illustrative of the more common problems 

confronted by most farmers' organizations in Mali. Simply put, the emerging farmer leaders 

need to acquire basic skills for building and managing their organizations. Representatives from 

US farmer groups have something to contribute to this process. 

30 USAID/Mali's Poliky Reform for Economic Development project. 

82 
More specifically, if Mali's farmers' organizations are to continue to exercise a voice in 

the economic policy process, then ways must be found to help them strengthen their 

organizational structure, establish a more solid financial base and improve (create) an independent 

policy analysis capacity. 

Based on the Government's program for administrative decentralization, it seems clear 

that the locus of development policy and political action will be shifting to the regions. Through 

the Plan d'Action, the Ministry of Rural Development appears to be taking the leadership in the 

implementation of a decentralization program. For example, the Rural Economy Institute has 

already established regional users' commissions to help reorient and regionalize its research 

programming. In a related move, the recent reorganization of the Chamber of Agriculture 

included the renewal and establishment of elected regional chambers. The effort by several 

farmer groups to organize a national farmers' seminar based on a series of preparatory regional 

seminars is also indicative of the changing face of development policy making and politics. 

If implemented as planned, however, the Government's decentralization program will have 

profound implications for the organization of farmer groups. For example, the commune rurale 

will replace the village as the basic organizational unit. At a very minimum tilis raises questions 

about the type of organizational structure to replace the association villageoise, as the current unit 

for development program implementation, and as the basic constituent unit for most farmer 

organizations. More generally, what is the future of village-based organizational units that 

currently play such a crtcal role in a wide variety of Malian development programs? 

F. Promoting More Effective Donor Coordination 

As noted above, it is difficult for a national bureaucracy--beset by a lack of human and 

other resources--to manage economic policies that are largely financed and oriented by donors. 

This study confirms that, in addition to the sheer "weight" of donor influence, Malian civil 

servants have to reckon with complex patterns of donor influence, not only upon the Government 

or the bureaucracy, but on many interest groups as well. Greater coherence in donor policies will 

not, in itself, guarantee a higher level of national control and "ownership" of economic policies, 

but it will very likely be a prerequisite. As a nmi:Jor donor, AID can take a lead in both 

processes.
 

G. A Final Note 

In many ways, the work done in Mali throughout 1994 has paralleled the concerns and 

research undertaken under the Mali Democracy and Governance assessment. These two exercises 

seem to converge on a number of conclusions. Perhaps the most important is that in cases where 

there are significant and rapid gains in both political and economic liberalization, it is important 

to ensure that the rule of law continues to prevail. Under an authoritariani regime, the rules of the 

game, however biased, are well understood and usually enforced, even if the people only 

reluctantly accept them. After so many years of 'sitting on the sidelines,' the average Malian 

citizen, and especially the vast majority in the rural villages are deeply cynical of the rhetoric of 

83
 
democracy. For most Malians, 'democracy' is just another slogan. Some use it to rationalize a 

disregard for the rule of law. But for most, the 'proof is in the pudding.' Thus, the enduring 

dilemma of development and democratization. This study begins to indicate that Mali has found 

a way to address this dilemma - a free and open press, a policy role for various interest groups, 

etc. Nevertheless, it is also clear that much more needs to be done. At a minimum, the 

Government must begin to Malian citizens to introduce them to their political, not to 'reach out' 

necessarily partisan role, in the country's development. Mali now serves as a model of the 

process of democratization and development in West Africa, but clearly, much remains to be 

done. 

84
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
 

Berthin, Gerardo, et al. Civil Society and DemocraticDevelopment. A CDIE Evaluation Design
 

Paper. Development Associates, 1994.
 

Bingen, Jim, African Rural and Urban Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 57-72, 1994.
 

Blair, Harry, A.1.D. Evaluation News. Vol. 5, No. 1, 1993.
 

Brinkerhoff, Derick and Kulibaba, Nicolas. 1994. Participationin Economic Policy Reform in
 

Africa: A Review of the Literature. U.S. Agency for International Development, 1993.
 

ACDI. La gestion budgitairedes dipenses publiques au Mali, Ottawa, April 1994. 

Charlick, Robert The Concept of Governance and its Implicationsfor A.J.D. 's Development 

Assistance Programin Africa. Africa Bureau Democracy and Governance. Burlington, VT:
 

Associates in Rural Development, 1992.
 

Compagnie Malienne pour le D6veloppement des Textiles Contrat-PlanEtat-CMDT-Producteurs,
 

1994.
 

Coton et Ddveloppement, No. 11. Septembre 1994.
 

Coulibaly, Ch6ibane, Mali: les ruraux et la gouvernance ddmocratique. Institut Malien de
 

Recherches Appliqudes au D6veloppement, 1994.
 

Courrier Afrique. Les filibres du coton dans le rouge, 1993.
 

Deme, Moustapl:a, et al. Ajustement structurel et communication. Bamako, Mali: Socidt6
 

d'Etudes et d'Applications Techniques, 1994
 

Demr, Moustapha, Kone, N'Fagnanama, and Dembele, Vincent. 1993. Lafilibre Coton au Mal 

Situation, Structures, Fonctionnement,et Perspectives. Bamako, Mali: World Bank. 

Eisa, Hamdy M., et al. Cotton ProductionProspectsfor the Decade to 2005. World Bank 

Technical Paper No. 231. Washington, DC. 1994.
 

Fdd6ration Nationale des Employeurs du Mali, Rdflexions sur la divaluatiotl du 12 janvier 1994.
 

Note itI'attention de Monsieur le PremierMinistre sur le train de mesures proposdes par le
 

gouvernement en vue de restaurerlI'quilibredes finances publiques. 1994
 

Global Coalition for Africa, MeasuringProgressTowards Improved Governance in Africa. 

Washington, DC. 1993. 

85 
Gordon, David, SustainingEconomic Reform in Sub-SaharanAfrica: Issues and Implicationsfor 

USAID. Abt Associates, 1992. 

IDRC Reports. "Active Listeningfor African Farmers" 1994.
 

Kantd, Mamadou, et al. Governance in Democratic Mali: An Assessment of Transitionand
 

Consolidationand Guidelinesfor Near-Term Action, 1994.
 

CCIM, 9 April Livre blanc sur la situation des entreprises maliennes apr~s les ivdnements de
 

janvieret mars 1991.
 

Macrae, John, et al. Evaluation macro-iconomique de la .filirecoton et des effets du contrat
 

plan sur la periode 1989/90-1993-94, 1992.
 

OECD Development Centre. Enhancing Policy Effectiveness and Choice. Paris, France, 1991.
 

Ouddraogo, Ismael and Carol Adoum Improving the Effectiveness of Policy Reform in Africa:
 

Cereals Market Policy Reform in Mali. Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II (APAP II).
 

Abt Associates, 1993
 

R6publique du Mali, Recommandations sur l'tatde la nation. circa 1991.
 

Rjunion Preparatoiredu siminairesous-rdgionalsur les transportsroutiers inter-dtats.
 

Abidjan: 18-19 Mai 1993. 

S~n6 Conseils. Siminairesur la fili~re coton et le contrat-planEtat-CMDT-Producteursen Zone
 

Cotonnikre du Mali, Rapport de synthzse. Bamako, Mali, 1994
 

Syndicat Autonome des Pharmaciens d'Officine Priv6e, Statuts et Rdglement Ihtgrieurs.
 

Syst~me d'Information du March6. Apergu sur le marchg du riz 6 la suite de la ddvaluation.
 

Feb. 1994. 

U.S. Agency for International Development. Economic Reform in Africa's New Era of Political 

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86
 
APPENDICES
 

sl
 
Appendix A. Chronology of Political and Economic Events
 
CHRONOLOGY OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EVENTS
 

Ti6moko Diallo
 

Economic Journalist
 

June 1994
 

Document prepared as part of the ARD/IMRAD/MSU study
 

of economy policy and civil society in Mali
 

AID Contract No. DFM 625-0975-3613506
 
Chronoloay of Eventc in 1990
 

January 18: The Minister of Agriculture published 1989-90
 

agricultural production statistics. According to these figures, a
 

grain surplus of nearly 600,000 tons was recorded, to which public
 

and private stocks, estimated to be 300,000 tons, must be added.
 

This surplus occurred after three consecutive years of shortfall
 

resulting from inadequate rainfall. To manage this surplus, the
 

ministry decided on a series of measures, in particular the
 

suspension of rice imports for the entire 1990 marketing year, the
 

elimination of export taxes on millet and sorghum, the reduction of
 

transport prices, especially for public transportation, etc.
 

January 24: One week after these statistics were published,
 

the opposition newspapers (Les Echos, etc.), basing their
 

contentions on the damage caused by migratory locusts, dispute the
 

600,000 ton figure. This marked the start of a wide-ranging
 

controversy about economic statistics, which prompted the Minister
 

of Agriculture, Mr. Moulaye HaLdara, to meet with the statisticians
 

from the Planning Ministry for a final revision. Ultimately, the
 

grain surplus was lowered to 200,000 tons. For the first time,
 

economic statistics had given rise to controversy.
 

February 8-9: Ninth Conference of the CILSS Heads of State in
 

Guinea-Bissau. During the summit, the Malian experience in rural
 

organization (village association system) was treated in great 

detail. Accordingly, the recommendations emanating from the Sdgou
 

seminar on the management of village lands, held in Sdgou in May
 

1989, were approved. This seminar was intended to assign to the
 

farmers and decision-makers their specific responsibilities, so as
 

to institute a movement in the Sahel supporting the fight against
 

drought and desertification. To this end, major recommendations
 

advocating decentralization in general were proposed to the
 

participating countries.
 

February 28: The President of the Republic opened the Donors'
 

Employment Round Table in Bamako, Mali. The basic objective of this
 

discussion group was to initiate a medium-term strategy for
 

employment promotion. A number of countries and institutions were
 

represented, including, most notably, the African Development Bank,
 

the Production Development Fund Association (APDF), BID, World
 

Bank, BIT, BOAD, CDI, the EEC, the Council of Negro Women (CNW) of
 

Washington, DC, ENDA-Third World, FOSSIDEC, OPEP, PMA, UNDP, USAID,
 

and others. Following the deliberations, the donors approved a
 

financial package including investments worth nearly 50 billion
 

over 15 years.
 

February 28: One year after its founding, SOMISY (the Mining
 

Company of Syama, an American firm) presented the first ingots to
 

the President of the Republic at Koulouba Palace. Gold production
 

was estimated at 2 tons per year for a 15-year period. We should
 

note that BHP-UTA Mineral is one of the first American companies to
 

/0
 
become established in Mali; SOMISY (second plant to be established,
 

following SOGEMORK), the largest gold-production firm in the
 

country.
 

March 6: A national seminar on the integration of Malian women
 

into business and commerce was opened at CRES. Organized by the
 

association of businesswomen and entrepreneurs, with the financial
 

assistance of USAID, this seminar sought for ways and means to
 

achieve the massive integration of women into the various business
 

sectors. The seminar recommendations included revision of the
 

marriage code, which, in the articles sanctioning male oversight of
 

women's activities, does not encourage free enterprise among women.
 

March 19: Signing of a four-billion financing agreement
 

between Mali and the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Francaise on
 

behalf of the Mali Textile Company (CMDT), as part of the execution
 

of the Government-CMDT performance contract, which stipulated
 

greater CMDT managerial autonomy from the government (as would be
 

the case.with many other state-owned enterprises). This agreement
 

allowed the CMDT to purchase its buildings, infrastructure and
 

equipment, which were assessed at more than 9.5 billion francs.
 

March 21: Opening of a national seminar on stock accounting.
 

Organized by the National Budget Authority with the technical
 

assistance of the Sahel Regional Financial Management Project
 

(PRGFS) and USAID, this seminar (intended for Malian accountants)
 

was designed to introduce participants to stock accounting as part
 

of the effort to systematize the accounting of governmental
 

tangible assets and real property which, according to the Finance
 

Ministry, had for years been subject to waste.
 

March 31: During the period devoted to celebrating the
 

anniversary of the single political party, the UDPM, its political
 

secretary, Mr. Djibril Diallo, led a conference-debate on democracy
 

within the party. Participants included government managers
 

gathered at the all-sports stadium in Bamako. The conference became
 

a forum for demands for a multiparty system. 14 of the 27 speeches
 

focused on the establishment of a multi-party system. The meeting
 

represented the start of a national debate on a multiparty system,
 

a debate to which the press devoted significant coverage.
 

May 4: Opening of a national seminar on decentralization,
 

presided over by the President of the Republic. Participants
 

included 400 delegates from Mali's seven regions. The meeting
 

studied the possibilities for extending the system of
 

administration, within which non-central elected officials would be
 

given decision-making authority within the framework of their
 

relations with the central government.
 

May 21: National seminar on the topic: journalism and the
 

fight against fraud and unfair competition, held at the Grand Hotel
 

in Bamako (a first?). The purpose of the seminar was to promote
 

J9
 
media dissemination of high-quality economic information, in order
 

to educate journalists in the techniques specific to the collection
 

and processing of economic information. The journalists would then
 

to the harmful
 be responsible for sensitizing the people 


consequences of fraud for the economy.
 

May 15: A significant first-time occurrence: Since the advent
 

of an independent press in Mali in 1989, a private newspaper (the
 

Aurore) was legally attacked for defamation by the Malian Battery
 

article asserting
 Company \SOMAPIL). The paper had published an 


that SOMAPIL was not adhering to collective labor agreements in
 

Mali, and was paying employees below the legal minim:. wage. The
 

information proved tolse, and the Bamako District Court sentenced
 

francs in fines and 5 million in
 the paper to pay 25,000 CFA 


damages to SOMAPIL.
 

June 20: La Baule (France) Summit bringing together 22 heads
 

of state, including the President of the Mali. France decided to
 

and democratization in the
 tie its economic aid to freedom 


developing countries. A number of heads of state, including those
 

of Mali and Chad, revolted against this policy, which they
 

characterized as meddling in the internal affairs of the countries.
 

June 25: Ninth Session of the National Counzil of the UDPM
 

(the single party in Mali). Multipartyism was brought up for the
 

first time, but was termed a cause of disunity, a matter of concern
 

for intellectuals, and the expression of external pressure.
 

July 12: Opening of the facilities of the General Surveillance
 

Company (SGS) in Bamako. The founding of this company met a
 

set down by PAS for an import-inspection program
 requirement 
 advantageous prices
 intended to select imports based on the most 


charged on the world market. Participants at the founding
 

ceremonies included the Minister of the Economy and Finance, the
 

vice-president of SGS-Geneva, Mr. Muller, the director of SGS-Mali,
 

Mr. Raymond, the national directors of Customs and Economic
 

Affairs, and tt.e SGS representatives from Togo, Senegal, and Ivory
 

Coast.
 

August 15: Swearing in of the new governing boards of the
 

Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Mr. Drahamane Hamidou Tourd, aka
 

Darhat, elected following the August 12 vote with more than 94% of
 

the votes, was officially installed. A 12-member board, including
 

a vice-president and one delegate per region, began i.s tenure.
 

August 21: Following increasingly murderous attacks on several
 

communities in the north by "armed bandits," the Minister of
 

Defense broke the silence and called a press conference in Bamako
 

on the northern disturbances. He emphasized that. these attacks had
 

been perpetrated by groups of our fellow citizens who had served in
 

the armed forces of Libya, Chad, and other countries, and who, upon
 

their return, had engaged in acts of looting in the Sixth and


/
 
Seventh regions. He added that the army would take all necessary
 

steps to guarantee the peace and tranquility of the people.
 

August 23: Opening of an extraordinary session of the National
 

Council of the UDPM, the supreme authority of the party. Major
 

decisions were expected regarding the establishment of a multiparty system, but this issue was postponed to the March 1990 Party
 

Congress.
 

September 10: Meeting of JANET (?) (Algeria) bringing together
 

the heads of state of Mali, Algeria, Niger, Libya, and other
 

countries to discuss border-security problems. On his return,
 

President Moussa Traord made a stop-over in Gao. During the
 

conference of managerial personnel he led on that occasion, he
 

affirmed that there was no Tuareg problem, and that the attacks on
 

the communities had been launched by misguided fellow Malians.
 

September 18: The French secretary of state charged with
 

humanitarian activities, Mr. Bernard Kouchner, paid a visit to
 

Mali, during which he met with various Tuareg groups in the Sixth
 

and Seventh Regions.
 

September 29-30: President Moussa Traor6 was co-president of
 

the World Children's Summit in New York, which brought together 77
 

heads of state and government.
 

October 1: President Moussa Traor6 made a trip to the United
 

States (San Francisco and Washington), basically for economic
 

purposes. In San Francisco, he led a conference on investment
 

opportunities in Mali attended by representatives of the business
 

world. In Washington, he also met with the Secretary of State for
 

Trade and representatives of development institutions and Mali's
 

partners, including the IMF, the World Bank, USAID, etc. The
 

purpose of the visit was to inform and educate American businessmen
 

about investment opportunities in Mali. The president was
 

accompanied by the presidents of the Chambers of Commerce and
 

Agriculture.
 

October 15: France canceled 65 billion of its outstanding
 

credit extended to Mali. This cancellation meant a reduction of
 

about 2.5 billion of the debt burden, and allowed national
 

enterprises, including the Railway Company (RCFM), SOTELMA, EDM,
 

the Niger Bureau, and National Bank for Agricultural Development
 

(BNDA) to continue to honor their commitments.
 

October 5: Beginning of a national seminar on implementation
 

of the VAT and TPS. 150 tax agents, accountants, auditors, and tax
 

advisers took part in this seminar. This event was in anticipation
 

of the implementation of the VAT scheduled for January 1991. The
 

seminar was organized by the National Tax Authority and the
 

Administration and Management Improvement Entity (CEPAG).
 
November 2: Visit by an IMF-World Bank mission, which
 

expressed its satisfaction at the good economic results obtained by
 

Mali under its economic reform program. The mission underscored the
 

need for energetic support for the private sector, so that it could
 

by
 November 4: Following 


become the driving force for recovery in accordance with PAS 

principles. 

the violent march led retail 

merchants, which produced the destruction of a number of public
 

buildings in the downtown area as the result of a decision of the
 

governorship of the Bamako District to clear way retail merchants
 

from the sidewalks, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, the
 

[...], it Malian Businessmen's Group, and the Governor of Bamako 


was decided to postpone these measures until January 31.
 

November 27: Opening of the CEDEAO Summit in Bamako on the
 

Liberian crisis, attended by eight heads of state and
 

representatives of the groups involved in the conflict, including
 

Charles Taylor, Colonel R. Diggs representing the Liberian armed
 

forces, and Mr. Nohh A. Bordilo representing the provisional
 

government of Liberia. The parties signed a crease-fire agreement
 

and agreed to a peace plan calling for free and democratic
 

elections.
 

December 25: The President of the Republic opened the budget
 

session at the Hall of the People. The main issues for this session
 

were tax reform (expansion of the tax base through establishment of
 

the VAT), payroll streamlining, incorporation of special funds into
 

the budget, and improved programming of public investments.
 

December 29: ADEMA and CbjiD organized a peaceful march to
 

demand the establishment of a multiparty system 
and democracy.


However, en route the procession formed by the two associations met
 

UDPM militants from Commune II, who had spontaneously organized a
 

counter-march. The latter were dispersed by stones thrown by the
 

former.
 

December 30: UDPM militants from the six communes composing
 

the Bamako District organized a march to show their unconditional
 

support for the Party. The President of the Republic (and General
 

Secretary of the Party) welcomed the group at the Hall of the
 

People. During the meeting which then took place, the president
 

denounced what he termed imitative behavior and outside pressures.
 
1991 Chronology
 

January 6: Ministerial reorganization, which saw the
 

appointment of Sekou Ly (formerly Minister of Education) to the
 

Ministry of the Interior, and Mr. Sambou Soumard to Justice. Both
 

were considered government hard-liners. Hardly had he been
 

appointed when the Minister of the Interior sent a letter to the
 

depocratic associations, i.e., CNID, ADEMA, AEEM, and JLD, asking
 

that they end their political activities. The private newspapers
 

also received letters advising that they comply with press laws, in
 

particular legal filing two days prior to publication. The
 

newspapers in question met several days thereafter and decided not
 

to comply with these measures.
 

January 8-9: The National Union of Malian Workers began a
 

general 48-hour strike in support of the claims submitted to the
 

government in August for a 50% increase in salaries, elimination of
 

organic higher-level staff in state service, payment of salaries at
 

their updated rate for 1987, 1988, and 1989, payment of advancement
 

arrears, and consultation with the trade union leadership before
 

any decision to sell off or privatize state companies or
 

enterprises.
 

January 16: Crisis at the National Union of Cooperatives and
 

Highways Carriers of Mali (UNCTRM). Taxis and "Douroudourouni"
 

(covered Peugeot 404s) invaded the courtyard of the Bamako
 

District's Governor's Office. They were protesting the decision
 

affecting them which, with the support of the UNCTRM, called for
 

the payment of rebates to the UNCTRM, along with a 9,000 franc fine
 

for refusal to pay these obligatory sums. It should be noted that
 

these rebates were collected from transport orders for departures
 

from Bamako. The refusal to pay by the carriers resulted from the
 

fact that the latter were protesting the management of the
 

cooperative, which, it was rumored, had recorded a deficit of
 

nearly 100 million CFA francs.
 

January 18-19: ADEMA and CNID decided to organize a peaceful
 

march to demand the establishment of a multiparty system.
 

Authorization for the march was refused by the Governor of the
 

Bamako District, on the grounds that it would constitute a public
 

nuisance. Despite this decision, a number of militants from the two
 

associations marched together in the downtown area. The march was
 

dispersed by police and followed by a number of arrests, including
 

two students from the National School of Administration and Mrs. B&
 

Konard, currently the wife of the President of the Republic, who
 

was released several hours later.
 

January 21: To protest the arrests of two of their comrades
 

during the January 19 march, students led violent demonstrations
 

leading to the pillaging of public buildings in the Bamako
 

District.
 
January 22: Judges launched a general strike to protest the
 

The latter, a relative of
 handling of the "Ismall Kall affair." 


Great Imam of the Bamako Mosque and a confidant of Moussa
 the 


Traor6, had been accused of swindling in connection with a land
 

deal in Kati. He was arrested but released immediately, and the
 

judge charged with the case replaced and punished.
 

January 23: The students returned to the attack by staging a
 

strike that was more violent than the one on January 22. They broke
 

vehicles, public buildings, and state-owned
 and damaged 


enterprises, including the Tobacco and Matches Company (SONATAM)
 

and the People's Pharmacy, of which a number of dispensaries were
 

looted in Bamako and a number of cities in the interior. Following
 

this strike, the government decided to close all educational
 

institutions throughout the country. We should note that this
 

strike produce two deaths, one in Sikasso and one in Bamako, and
 

more than 35 wounded. The People's Pharmacy suffered losses of more
 

than 500 million francs. For the first time, armored vehicles
 

(BRDM) were used to maintain order. After these events, a mediation
 

commission was fonned under the auspices of the Chamber of
 

Commerce; it was composed of religious figures, businessmen, and
 

the Malian Human Rights Association (AMDH). A 16-member commission
 

presided over by Mr. Sidy Konatd of the Malian Association for the
 

Unity and Progress of Islam (AMUPI) was formed.
 

February 2: End of the budget session in the National
 

Assembly. The budget bill calling for revenues of 224.9 million
 

francs and expenditures of 230.7 million francs, or a forecasted
 

deficit of 5.8 billion francs, was approved. The increased figures
 

resulted from the incorporation of special accounts into the
 

overall budget; previously, they had been covered by special
 

accounting procedures. Accordingly, the figures increased from 100
 

(previous budget) to more than 200 billion francs. During this
 

session, the legislators offered recommendations, in particular as
 

regards the elimination of the minimum tax (per capita tax) and the
 

creation of other resources to cover its counter-value. They
 

encouraged the government to organize information campaigns and
 

efforts to educate the population about the VAT and TPS.
 

February 8: The National Federation of Malian Employers
 

organized a general meeting at the Caisse Autonoume d'Amortissement,
 

in order to study measures intended to prevent any possible
 

destruction in the event of political disorders.
 

February 15: The government decided to reopen classes
 

throughout the country.
 

February 19: After signing the Tamanrasset agreement--	 on 

to January 6, the President travelled to the northern regions 

inform the population about the content of these accords. Economic
 

and social problems, as well as those relating to decentralization
 

and the accountability of the people with respect to the management
 

/,?/ qo 
of the decentralized communities, gave rise to extensive
 

deliberations.
 

March 1: A four billion franc financing agreement was signed
 

between the government and the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation
 

Economique under the heading of reorganization of postal checks and
 

the savings bank, restructuring measures that had the support of
 

the IMF and the World Bank. A new structure, the Postal Check and
 

Savings Bank Company (SCPCE) was established to operate as a bank,
 

since it was empowered to issue checks. Was this the first step of
 

its kind in the subregion?
 

March 22-26: Following the break-off of negotiations between
 

the Mali Student Association (AEEM) and the government concerning
 

demands for a 50% increase in scholarships, the opening of boarding
 

schools, and dining halls in educational institutions, AEEM
 

launched a general strike using barricades and causing destruction
 

throughout the country. Police opened fire, resulting in 27 deaths
 

and an incalculable number of wounded in Bamako during the day of
 

March 22. It was Black Friday. On the evening of March 22,
 

President Moussa Traor6 addressed the nation to express his
 

condolences to the victims' families, but remain adamant with
 

regard to the demands. The next day, March 23, the democratic
 

associations (ADEMA, CNID, JLD) coordinated their efforts to
 

support AEEM. Confrontations continued and officials stopped
 

counting the dead. In the light of killings of children, a group of
 

women joined AEEM and decided to march on the president's office,
 

but the group was dispersed. AEEM formed a crisis committee at
 

Gabriel Tour6 Hospital to evacuate the dead and wounded. On Sunday,
 

March 24, the National Union of Malian Workers (UNTM), the tradeunion leadership, called a general meeting at the Trade Union
 

Center, following which it decreed an open-ended general strike,
 

which was to continue until the resignation of Moussa Traord and
 

his government, the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the
 

formation of a government of national welfare. The president
 

rejected these demands, but agreed to all of the AEEM demands.
 

However, the latter henceforth refused to negotiate with
 

"murderers." Chaos reigned. Finally, in the night of March 25 to
 

26, a group of officers led by Amadou Toumani Tour6 and Oumar
 

Diallo, the formeL aide-de-camp of the president, seized power and
 

proposed the creation of an integral multiparty system, free and
 

democratic elections, and the army's withdrawal from the political
 

arena.
 

April 2: Creation of the CTSP (Transition Committee for the
 

Popular Welfare). This entity replaced the CRN (National
 

Reconciliation Committee) composed of the officers who had carried
 

out the putsch. The CTSP was made up of 25 members representing all
 

of the democratic associations that had taken part in the fall of
 

the dictatorship.
 

April 4: Appointment of Soumana Sacko to the post of prime
 

-/
 
minister and head of government. He had formerly been a fiery
 

Finance who had resigned in 1987 following a gold-
 Minister of 


trafficking scheme that he had broken up at the Bamako Airport.
 

Formation of a 23-member government (composed mainly
 April 7: 


with instituting confidence, state
 of technocrats) charged 


authority, and the resumption of economic activity, which had been
 

a major
 significantly damaged by the looting and destruction of 


part of the productive fabric as a result of events.
 

April 23: In the presence of the accredited diplomats in
 

a
 Bamako, the Minister of International Cooperation gave first
 

account of the events of March 26. Damage of more than 22 billion
 

CFA francs was ascertained.
 

Peaceful march by the police, the Gendarmerie, and
 April 27: 


the Republican Guard, in order to make a public account of their
 

Students at Askia High School attempted to
 living conditions. 


throwing stones. In reaction,
 disperse the demonstrators by 
 High School,
 demonstrators in uniform stormed. into the Askia 


the students. AEEM
 burning motorbikes and vehicles belonging to 


reacted by pillaging all of the police stations in Bamako.
 

May 18: A law modified the operation of the EPICs (public
 

industrial and commercial establishments). The law was designed to
 

lower the operating costs of the EPICs by reducing the number of
 

meetings of the boards of directors, eliminating the position of
 

government commissioner, reducing salaries for CEOs, etc.
 

by notice of calls for
 Henceforth, CEOs were to be recruited 


competing bids, according to the new law.
 

Congress of the CNID Party (the association remained
 May 26: 


was elected party chairman.
 intact). Mr. Mountaga Tall, Esq., 


May 25-26: Congress of the ADEMA Party. Mr. Alpha Omar Konard
 

was elected party chairman.
 

June 9: From their high positions, the Ministers of Finance
 

and Budget explained the situation regarding the union demands.
 

Responding to the specific demand for a 50% salary increase (which
 

had been within his competence since the Moussa Traord regime), the
 

Budget Minister stated that "in order to hand out the pie, there
 

must be a pie to begin with." This statement gave gray hairs to the
 

ranks of the UNTM, which responded by a speech broadcast over radio
 

and television, wondering "where were these two men during the wild
 

days of March 1991." This was the first engagement between the UNTM
 

and the government since the political change.
 

Peaceful march by ADIDE. The demonstrators invaded
 June 16: 


government headquarters and presented a list of complaints to the
 

prime minister, which included an unemployment allowance equal to
 

base salary depending on category, a government
 80% of the 


d~d",9q6 
statement regarding all of the complaints, and the approval of a
 

program of short- and medium-term employment. Among the slogans it
 

was possible to read "our share of the pie."
 

June 24: Arrest of Oumar Diallo, aka Birus (former aide-decamp of Moussa Traor6 and one of the instigators of the March 1991
 

coup d'etat). He was placed at the disposal of the commission of
 

inquiry charged with shedding light on the crimes and
 

misappropriation of funds committed by the Traor6 regime. This
 

arrest was greeted favorably by the entire democratic movement.
 

July 2: Extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the
 

UNTM. The union leadership demanded an immediate 50% salary
 

increase for civil servants.
 

July 9: Visit of the chairman of the CTSP (Amadou T. Tour6) to
 

the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This visit took place
 

following the grumblings of businessmen concerning the arrests of
 

some of their number, as a result of a hydrocrabon-trafficking
 

affair. At the time of this visit, the issue was holding general
 

meetings of the business and industry entities. The chairman of the
 

CTSP encouraged the businessmen to invest in the housing,
 

transport, industrial, and trade sectors.
 

July 15: Failed coup d'etat. According to a statement by the
 

CTSP chairman, the Minister of Internal Security, Mr. Diabira, and
 

other officers allegedly attempted a coup d'etat. Believing that an
 

ATT arrest had taken place, some soldiers arrested and dismissed a
 

number of senior officers. This mutiny ceased only after a visit of
 

the CTSP chairman to the military garrisons in Bamako. During the
 

evening of July 15, the prime minister and head of state, Mr.
 

Soumana Sacko, in a televised address announced social relief
 

measures, i.e., regular payment of salaries at their updated 1988­

89-90 index, a 5% increase in lower salaries, etc.
 

July 16: The coordinating group of democratic associations
 

organized a solidarity march at the CTSP following the failed coup.
 

July 26: Start of the national conference. Several hundred
 

delegates representing various societal viewpoints examined the
 

proposed constitution, the party charter, etc. The Prime Minister
 

spoke about the state of the nation. The proposed constitution
 

called for a power-sharing arrangement mid-way between a
 

parliamentary and a presidential system. A number of political
 

institutions were created: the Office of the President, the
 

Government, the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the
 

Constitutional Court, the High Court of Justice, the Council of
 

Territorial Communities, the High Council of Malians Abroad, and
 

the Economic and Social Council.
 

September 5: The Association of Workers Dismissed from State-


Owned Companies and Enterprises organized a peaceful march on
 
government headquarters and the CTSP, to demanid that the banks 

finance their projects for reintegration into professional life. 

However, the group encountered the opposition of the police forces. 

September 14: Opening of a national debate on education. More
 

than 700 participants tcok part: parents of students, political
 

parties, democratic associations, teachers, students, etc. 

Recommendations were based on the need to reverse the school 

pyramid by giving increased importance to basic education. 

October 24: Opening at the trade union center of a seminar on
 

trade union democracy, organized by the International Confederation
 

of Free Unions (CISL). This seminar was designed to inculcate the
 

principles of democratization into the Malian trade union movement
 

following the political changes of March 1991.
 

November 1: The chairman of the 
CTSP opened the meeting of


commerce, industry, and small-scale business entities in Bamako.
 

The purpose of these meetings was to eliminate the legal and
 

institutional obstacles thwarting the effective 
 progress of


economic life, burdened by administrative inertia, insufficient
 

financing, an unsuitable tax system, and the lack of basic
 

infrastructure. Following the seminar, a so-called joint commission
 

(government and businessmen) was formed to follow up on the
 

resolutions of the meeting. The recommendations were based mainly
 

on the need to alleviate tax pressure.
 

November 25: Opening in Segou of a so-called preparatory


conference on the northern disturbances (rebellion). This meeting 

of the rebel side and the government was intended to inaugurate a 

negotiation strategy leading to a national conference on the north. 

November 25: Opening of a seminar on the land problem and
 

decentralization. organized by the CILSS and the Sahel Club, this
 

seminar studied the problem of the participation and accountability 

of the rural population in the decentralization process, access to 

natural and renewable resources, the management of village lands,
 

etc. As regards this last point, recommendations included a
 

contractual approach, a rereading of the various codes, 
the


adaptation of the laws to the political-social context, the
 

drafting of simple charters appropriate for each locality, and the
 

creation of data-banks to facilitate the implementation and followup of the measures taken.
 

December 9: Opening in Bamako of the Meeting of Rural
 

Entities, More than 400 farmer-delegates met in Bamako to redefine
 

rural development objectives in a concrete manner in the context of 

a strengthened macroeconomic policy, by separating short-, medium-, 

and long-term objectives. The problem posed by the withdrawal of
 

development firms, decentralization, and the management of natural
 

resources were exhaustively debated.
 

iO1)
 
December 10: Joint AEEM-ADVR march (association composed of
 

victims of the March 1991 repressioh) to demand justice for the
 

victims of March 1991. The march was a prelude to the "blood
 

crimes" trial (formcr officials).
 

December 14: In Bamako, the coordinating group of democratic
 

associations and organizations staged a large, peaceful march for
 

peace in the north. This event was in response to the many rebel
 

attacks in the northern regions of Mali.
 

December 16: Opening in Mopti of a meeting to consider the
 

problems in the north (following the S~gou meeting). This meeting,
 

which the political authorities and rebel leaders attended in the
 

presence of the ambassadors of Algeria, Burkina Faso, and
 

Mauritania, was intended to approve a number of documents bearing
 

on proposals for settlement of the Northern question. The rebels
 

were to make a decision about these proposals. The parties agreed
 

on the principle of a negotiated settlement, a halt to violence
 

(thefts, looting, etc.), and the establishment of a commission of
 

inquiry to investigate acts of vandalism.
 

December 19: Inauguration in Bamako of the national days of
 

communication. This seminar was organized by the PANOS Institute
 

and the Research Center for International Development (CRDI)
 

(Canada) to increase deliberations on media and information systems
 

and to outline draft texts on legislation, ethics, and the
 

professional organization of the information and communication
 

professions.
 

/ iol
 
1992 Chronology
 

January 2: The Union of Private Carriers, bringing together
 

taxis and the "Douroudourouni" (covered Peugeot 404s), began a
 

strike with a peaceful march to CTSP headquarters to protest police
 

harassment (inappropriate inspections). The demonstrators were met
 

by the vice-chairman of the CTSP and General Secretary of the UNTM,
 

Mi. Bakary Karambd. Following the talks, the parties agreed on the
 

principle of monthly meetings between the carriers and authorities,
 

in order to solve problems as they arise.
 

January 4: Closing of the AEEM Congress, presided over by the
 

chairman of the CTSP, Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Tourd. A
 

new board was formed, headed by Issa Mariko (student at the ENA who
 

succeeded Oumar Mariko). His task was to achieve as rapidly as
 

possible the demands specified in the memorandum signed in
 

conjunction with the government. The chairman encouraged the
 

students to find the proper equation between their demands and the
 

government's financial resources.
 

January 11: Send-off for the work of AGETIPE (Agency for
 

Execution of Public Interest Activities for Employment) under the
 

chairmanship of Prime Minister Soumana Sacko. This was a
 

subregional project intended to combat the social effects of
 

structural adjustment. The purpose was to fight unemployment and
 

under-employment by means of major employment-generating urban
 

development projects. The first three-year program for the city of
 

Bamako called for a financial package of 6.5 billion francs, of
 

which 4.5 billion was funded by the World Bank. Nearly 2,000 jobs
 

were expected.
 

January 12: Constitutional referendum. More than 2.3 voters
 

were asked to give their judgment on the new constitution, which
 

enshrined integral multipartyism. Official results: 43% voting rate
 

and 98.35% of the votes were in favor. No incidents occurred.
 

January 12: Submission of the 1992 budget. This budget had to
 

include rebuilding expenses following the destruction perpetrated
 

in March 1991. To make up for the lowered revenues resulting from
 

this destruction, it was decided to initiate a fee on private
 

television sets and a tax on parabolic antennas. The overall budget
 

showed revenues in the amount of 214 billion francs and
 

expenditures of 215.4 billion for 1991. The decrease resulted
 

mainly from a reduction of the special investment budget.
 

January 19: Municipal elections. ADEMA won in various
 

districts with 214 council members, followed by the US-RDA with
 

130, and the CHID, with 96 city council members.
 

January 23: AEEM staged a peaceful march to government
 

headquarters to demand that its memorandum be implemented, that the
 

blood crimes trial of former officials be held before the end of
 
the transition period, the granting of scholarships on the basis of
 

an average of 11.50 (instead of 12, as contemplated by the
 

government), the construction of its headquarters, the extension of
 

the academic cycles in certain institutions, including the Center
 

for Professional Training, the National School of Posts and
 

Telecommunications, EHEP, etc.
 

January 22-24: Meeting in Algiers between the northern rebel
 

movements and the government, during which a truce was signed, to
 

take effect on February 8. The principle of a negotiated settlement
 

to the conflict was agreed to. However, the Popular Front for the
 

Liberation of the AZAWAD did not take part in the meeting, because,
 

it was said, the new constitution did not give voice to the Tuareg
 

demands, in particular the autonomy of the northern areas.
 

January 30: Altercation between customs officers and
 

traffickers in Yanfolila (Bougouni), as a result of which a
 

trafficker was killed by customs officer Diego Kelta. Some of the
 

people rose up against the killer and organized a violent march to
 

the customs office. Kelta was burned alive. A commission of inquiry
 

named by the authorities led to the arrest of twenty demonstrators.
 

The chairman of the CTSP went to the site to denounce this popular
 

practice.
 

February 11: End of an IMF-World Bank mission, which had come
 

to assess the economic reform program and to draft a new economic
 

policy framework paper for 1992-1994 and a memorandum in order to
 

establish the activity-implementation schedule. During this
 

mission, the 1992 budget was much discussed, in particular the
 

academic scholarships, which required expenditures of 4.8 billion
 

francs, or nearly 80% of the health-care budget. The mission judged
 

this figure to be abnormal. Other subjects discussed: the slowness
 

with which the program for privatization of state-owned enterprises
 

was being implemented, revision of the business code (to
 

definitively deregulate domestic and foreign trade), and potential
 

liberalization of the price of hydrocarbons.
 

February 20: Joint ADIDE, AJDP, and JLD march on the seat of
 

government to denounce the anti-social measures decreed by the
 

government, in particular the competition for entry into state
 

service (limited to 35 years), the low level of the recruitment
 

quota (250/year), etc. The prime minister refused to receive the
 

demonstrators. Arrests took place, most notably that of the General
 

Secretary of ADIDE, who was released sev-ral hours later.
 

February 23: Legislative elections: 55 electoral districts, 22
 

competing parties. ADEMA gained an absolute majority with 82
 

deputies, followed by CNID with nine deputies and USRDA with 8. The
 

Supreme Court rejected 36 appeals for invalidation.
 

February 28: Verdict in the Diogo Keita case (Yanfolila) by
 

the Bamako Court of Assizes: 14 death sentences, four sentenced to
 

/LX
 
forced labor in perpetuity, 10 persons sentenced to five years
 

forced labor, and one person sentenced to three years in prison.
 

March 9: In Bamako, the Prime Minister opened the meeting of
 

transport groups. Several hundred delegates from various
 

the problems of the transport sector and
 communities studied 


delineated the short- and medium-term strategic orientations. The
 

statutory or administrative problems (associated with competition,
 

international in particular) and those relating to rate and safety
 

that the transport
 were intensively debated. We should note 


to the price of hydrocarbons and from
 industry adds more than 38% 


30 to 38% to the price of construction materials.
 

The Prime Minister closed a seminar on government
 March 14: 


neutrality, which was called into question by a number of political
 

parties during the recent elections. The seminar recommended the
 

recognition of, and respect for, the independence and specific
 

character of the government with respect to the political parties,
 

and the need to protect the government and its representat.ves from
 

the intercessions and pressures of the political parties.
 

March 26: Celebration honoring the anniversary of the
 

Revolution of March 1991. The chairman of the CTSP pardoned those
 

affair. 14 persons
 sentenced to death in the Yanfolila The 


sentenced had their punishment commuted to forced labor in
 

perpetuity.
 

April 11: In Bamako, signing of a national pact between the
 

northern rebels and the government, with the mediation of Algeria.
 

Employing the decentralization mechanism, this agreement, which
 

sealed a final peace, called for mors regional autonomy, the
 

dismantling of rebel and military bases, the integration of the
 

combatants into the national army, the return of more than 140,000
 

measures
 refugees, and economic investment programs. All of the 


were to cost nearly 75 billion CFA francs.
 

April 12: First round of tne presidential elections. The ADEMA
 

candidate, Alpha Omar Konard, led with 44.9% of the votes. Tidould
 

Konatd received 14.51%; Mountaga Tall (CNID), 11.4%; Almamy Sylla,
 

9%; Baba H. Haidara, 7.33%; Idrissa Traor6, 4.10%; Niangado, 4.01%;
 

Maribatrou Diaby, 2.67%, and Demba Diallo, 2.04%.
 

April 22: Signing of the protocol stipulating membership of
 

Mali in Air Afrique. Air Mali had been sold off in 1986.
 

April 26: Second round of the presidential elections. Alpha 0.
 

Konar6 was elected with 69.01% of the vote, as against 30.99% for
 

Ti~ould Konat6.
 

May 6: Judges' strike to protest the new Ministry of Justice
 

provisions giving the head of state the ability to sanction judges.
 

After several days of negotiation, a compromise was achieved
 

10 
calling for a rereading of these provisions within the shortest
 

possible time-frame.
 

May 4: National seminar on economic journalism. Organized by


the World Bank, this seminar was intended to sensitize journalists
 

to economic issues (PAS), in order to deal with the increasingly
 

pronounced communications gap between the Bank and the Fund, on the
 

one hand, and the African peoples, on the other. Both institutions
 

were still being presented by the media as managing partners.
 

May 6: Signing of a social pact between the National Workers
 

Union of Mali (UNTM: member of CTSP) and the government. This pact
 

was signed following a three-day advance strike notice (May 6 to 8)
 

filed by the union leadership in support of its demands. This pact


stipulated a multi-year program to increase salaries by 50% and the
 

payment of salaries at their 1990 rate beginning as of September 1,
 

1992.
 

May 13: The Minister of Communication opened a national
 

seminar on the rural press. The purpose of this gathering was to
 

combat the communications gap between state institutions and the
 

countryside (i.e., over 80% of the population) through the
 

sensitization and advanced training of journalists in the
 

techniques of writing, photographic reporting, and interviews in
 

rural areas.
 

May 14: Governmental crisis leading to the departure of the
 

Minister of Social Action and the Promotion of Women, Dr. J. Brien
 

de Lisle. For weeks, a dispute pitted the latter against the Prime
 

Minister; thereafter, Dr. de Lisle filed a complaint with the
 

Supreme Court. It was reported that Dr. de Lisle had agreed to
 

become minister on the condition that, at the end of the transition
 

period, he would occupy his former post as national health
 

director. He was upset to learn that the Prime Minister had
 

appointed Mrs. Bocum Suzane to this position during the transition
 

period. In his capacity as arbiter, the chairman of the CTSP 

intervened and dismissed both the Minister and the National 

Director. 

May 19: The Minister of the Economy and Finance published the
 

1991 economic accounts. The GDP had risen to 702 billion francs, as
 

compared with 666.2 billion, or an increase of 5.5%. Private
 

consumption had increased from 534 to 587.5 billion francs, or an
 

increase of about 10%, and public consumption had fallen from 100.1
 

billion to 96 billion, or a 4.2% decrease. Gross capital asset
 

formation (investments) had decreased by 20% from 139.4 to 110.9
 

billion. Exports had increased slightly from 114.8 to 120 billion,
 

and imports, from 218.3 to 215.9 billion. A deterioration of the
 

economic accounts was thus recorded. The political happenings
 

during 1991 contributed to these figures.
 

May 30: Opening of the general meetings on for youth and
 
employment. More than 300 participants from various associations
 

and youth groups studied the problems of the employment of young
 

persons. During this forum, much attention was devoted to the 

training-employment equation, the revival of productive investments 

through the creation of a climate favorable to investment, and 

incentive measures for the hiring of young persons, such as tax
 

exemption for firms employing young people, etc.
 

June 4: Start of the trial of former officials. The former
 

president, Moussa Traor6, his government, and the members of his
 

political council (UDPM) had to answer accusation of blood crimes,
 

blows and purposeful injury leading to the deaths of more than 106
 

persons. However, the trial was very quickly postponed following an
 

incident that occurred when former president Traord and his
 

Minister of the Interior, S~kou Ly, embraced each other, thus
 

causing an outcry among the audience composed of students and
 

victims. This upheaval nearly degenerated into confrontations. The
 

trial was postponed to a later date.
 

June 8: The Supreme Court swore in the first president of the
 

Third Republic, Alpha 0. Konar6, who listed his property in
 

accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
 

June 9: Appointment of a new prime minister, Younousso Tourd, 

director of the Central Bank, who formed a government of 19 persons 

(as compared with 23 during the transition) representing diverse 

political leanings, and in particular the parties who had signed 

the PSPR Republican Pact (the coalition which had supported 

candidate Konard), i.e., the US-RDA, the RDP, the UFDP, etc. 

June 23: Break-off of relations between Mali and the IMF
 

following acknowledged lags in the implementation of the economic
 

reform programs, including a financial gap of about 18 billion
 

francs resulting from 6 billion less in tax receipts, non-payment
 

of debt amounting to a little more than 5.5 billion, and budget
 

overexpenditures of more than 6 billion.
 

July 1: Liberalization of hydrocarbon prices. This measure
 

signified the complete liberalization of all prices in Mali.
 

July 5: A financial scandal exploded in the Treasury following
 

the visit of the IMF-World Bank visit in June. This scandal
 

involved abuses of in the system of tax credits "extended to some
 

traders in order to allow them to retrieve their goods from
 

customs." The abuse stemmed from the fact that not only were the
 

quotas stipulated for that purpose in the budget exceeded, but also
 

a number of traders enjoying these advantages disappeared, some of
 

whom had given false identities. The sums involved amounted to more
 

than 6 billion francs.
 

July 30: The Prime Minister made a statement of general policy
 

before the legislators at the National Assembly. The outlines of
 
this statement dealt with freedom of the press, the reestablishment
 

of government authority, the prompt, effective resolution of the
 

northern problem, administrative decentralization, the
 

reorganization of the army, the independence of the legal system,
 

and the indemnification of the victims of the 1991 repression.
 

August 27: Conflict between the National Assembly and the
 

National Workers' Union regarding the new labor code. The union
 

leadership maintained it had not been consulted prior to the vote
 

on the law, adding that it had offered amendments to the Supreme
 

Labor Council (composed of government and union representatives)
 

advocating that the check-off system (withholding of union dues) be
 

retained. The Assembly responded by stating that it had been
 

consulted during the bill-drafting phase, and that the check-off
 

system was not appropriate in a system of union pluralism.
 

September 8: The Ministry of the Economy published the New
 

Code of Commerce. The emergence of the single-person limitedliability company having minimum capital of 1 million CFA francs
 

should be pointed out. The limited-liability company was reduced
 

from three to two partners, and its minimum capital declined from
 

3.5 to 1.5 million francs. The joint-stock company was reduced from
 

seven to five partners, and minimum capital, from 12.5 to 5 million
 

francs. The approval time-frame was set at 15 days.
 

September 23: Meeting of the head of state and the NGOs. The
 

president reaffirmed his support for decentralized cooperation,
 

then underscored the role played by the NGOs in the economic
 

development of Mali: investments totalling 27.5 billion francs and
 

5,000 jobs created by 346 NGOs. He added, however, that it was
 

incumbent upon these organizations to obey the law regarding, in
 

particular, the submission of their annual activities reports, a
 

document which a number of NGOs do not submit to authorities.
 

September 26: Violent march organized by the victims of the
 

ABC tontine. The latter, which had offered to pay 45,000 CFA francs
 

to its members in return for a beginning deposit of 3,000 francs,
 

had been able to attract thousands of savers. Once this system
 

turned sour, the depositors joined together in associations (e.g.,
 

associations of the victims of the ABC tontine) to demand
 

compensation. The September 26 march was intended to force
 

political authorities to break the silence they had previously
 

maintained regarding this affair.
 

November 13: The National Assembly approved the press law. The
 

journalists' associations, including UNAJOM and ASSIPRP
 

(Interprofessional Association for the Private Press) denounced
 

this law, focusing on the punishments provided for certain
 

infractions (e.g., flagrantly insulting the President of the
 

Republic and his family, the punishment for which increased from
 

three to five years in prison), and the procedure used to appoint
 

members of the High Council on Communications. The journalists
 

/01
 
advocated the independence of this institution from the government;
 

but the legally-stipulated procedure for nomination to this board
 

gave the majority of appointments to the political institutions.
 

trial of
 November 26: Reopening of the "crimes of blood" 


former officials, following its postponement from June 5.
 

strike to protest the
 December 
28: General businessmen's


demands of the meetings of business,
 refusal to deal with the 


industry, and small-scale commerce groups. A compromise was reached
 

of the day, entailing the implementation of certain
 at the end 


short-term measures regarding tax relief and outstanding bank debt.
 
1993 Chronology
 

February 12: End of the crimes of blood trial. Moussa Traord,
 

Sdkou Ly, and Mamadou Coulibaly (former Minister of the Interior
 

and Defense) were sentenced to death. The members of the BEC and
 

the government were acquitted. The defense counsels decided to
 

appeal to the Court of Appeals.
 

February 16: Strike, followed by a march staged by students
 

from the Katibougou IPR, in order to protest the decision of school
 

administrators to reduce scholarships by 2,500 francs to permit
 

operation of the institute's health services. Major damage


occurred, including the burning of the Koulikoro governor's office
 

and the governor's residence and the ransacking of the institute's
 

administrative offices and some central departments. Following this
 

march, institute administrators raised disciplinary sanctions
 

(expulsions and suspensions) against some of the striking students.
 

February 24: To protest these sanctions, AEEM launched a
 

general strike and a march with barricades. All activity in Bamako
 

was brought to a halt. Police intervened, and one death and a
 

number of injuries resulted.
 

March 26: Second anniversary of the fall of the dictatorship.


RFI and Africa 1 inaugurated frequency-modulated antennae in
 

Bamako.
 

April 5: Black Monday. Strike and violent march by AEEM. The
 

National Assembly was set on fire, as were the Jamana Cultural 

Center and the residences of a number of senior ADEMA officials and
 

other signatories to the Republican Pact.
 

April 9: Prime Minister Younoussi Tourd resigned following
 

these events.
 

April 12: Abdoulaye Sekou Sow, Minister of the Defense, was
 

named prime minister.
 

April 16: Formation of a new 22-member government (as compared
 with 19 members of the previous administration). The RDP and CNID
 

(considered to be the hard-line wing of the opposition) became part
 

of the government.
 

April 26: In Bamako, the President of the Republic opened an
 

international conference on the socia. aspects of adjustment.


Organized by UNTM, the International Confederation of Free Unions,
 

and the World Bank, this seminar sensitized the social partners to
 

structural adjustment and deliberated on its adverse social
 

repercussions, as part of the search for a national consensus on
 

economic policy.
 
May 13-16: Visit of the President of the Republic to the
 

Koulikoro region. During this visit, President Alpha Omar Konard
 

lashed out at the non-payment of taxes by the people, who, he said,
 

quickly by confusing elimination of the
 had acted somewhat too 


minimum tax with the elimination of any form of tax.
 

The National Education Federation (FEN) decided on a
 June 7: 


in schools and
 one-week strike to protest the lack of safety 


on teachers in some establishments. It also
 threats and attacks 


demanded the institution of a hierarchical system for the different
 

teachers' groups. A compromise to the crisis was reached after the
 

government agreed to institute a hierarchical system by the year
 

1994.
 

leadership
 June 14: Meeting of the UNTM Board. The union 


demanded that the government make late worker-promotion payments,
 

frozen since 1987. It also sought concrete on-the-job worker-safety
 

measures. With respect to the increased salaries, the union stated
 

"that it didn't care where the government looked for the money.'"
 

The Prime Minister opeined deliberating sessions on
 June 21: 


of the government financial departments.
 nodernization 


Computerization was much discussed during these deliberations.
 

July 8-11: ADEMA National Conference. The militants insisted
 

that the party take new positions regarding the exercise of
 

authority and more precise specification of the relationships
 

party, the President of the Republic, and the
 between the 


this situation was the end
 government. It should be noted tnat 


result cf altercations between the party's Steering Committee and
 

the various Prime Ministers. The Steering Committee had
 

continuously demanded periodic meetings with the different Prime
 

Ministers, who refused to do so, stating that, in accordance with
 

the terms of the Constitution, they were accountable only to the
 

President of the Republic.
 

End of June - Beginning of July: Visit by an IMF-World Bank
 

a schedule of periodic evaluations of the
 mission, as part of 


noted a gap of 30
 structural adjustment program. The mission 

for
 billion francs, including a 16-billion reduction in revenues 


1993 and overexpenditures of 14 billion francs. Because of these
 

gaps, the IMF decided to suspend its aid to Mali. The government's
 

laxity with respect to tax collection was emphasized, as was its
 

lack of rigor in managing public expenditures.
 

August 2: The ministers of the different UMOA (West African
 

Monetary Union) countries decided that, beginning in August, the
 

BCEAO would no longer repurchase CFA banknotes held by the rest of
 

outside of the Franc Zone. According to sourcos,
 the world, i.e., 


the purpose was to-stop increasingly persistent outflows of notes
 

because of devaluation rumors.
 

/0 
August 17: Strike with 24-hour advance warning decreed by UNTM
 

to demand salary increases and to support other demands contained
 

in the social agreement signed by the government and union
 

leadership. SYNCAB, which asserted its independence through UNTM
 

and which included the banks, insurance companies, and trade,
 

withdrew its support of the strike. Nevertheless, BMCD did take
 

part.
 

August 20: Extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers
 

concerning the deficiencies which had emerged in the management of
 

PAS. These deficiencies had, at the end of July, produced a break
 

in relations between Mali and the IMF. A recovery plan containing
 

37 measures was drawn up and proposed to the various social
 

partners. This plan stipulated a drastic reduction in the
 

government's lifestyle: reduction or simple elimination of certain
 

allowances, mission and housing expenses, and carry-over of some
 

expenditures already committed under the 1994 budget, including the
 

institution of a hierarchical system for teachers (1.5 billion),
 

certain tax breaks granted to firms, the institution of scholarship
 

criteria, and even the elimination of vacation scholarships for
 

students, etc. The plan submitted for the approval of Mali's social
 

partners caused some concern, in particular in the UNTM which,
 

while it agreed to exchange late worker-promotion payments for
 

housing plots, stated that it was not persuaded that reduced
 

compensation "source of motivation) could contribute to economic
 

recovery. The same skepticism was shown by AEE1I, which rejected all
 

of the measures pertaining to scholarship criteria.
 

August 28: Burning of the Great Market of Bamako. An
 

electrical short-circuit was reportedly the cause of this disaster.
 

Damage was estimated at several billions of CFA francs. This was a
 

severe blow to businessmen, who were already suffering from the
 

disastrous consequences of the destruction of March 1991.
 

September 14-18: Subregional conference on radio pluralism in
 

West Africa. More than 70 press representatives and donors spoke of
 

the legislative and financial obstacles to the development of radio
 

in West Africa. Following the seminar, the so-called Bamako
 

Declaration, which stressed the need to liberalize the air waves,
 

was promulgated.
 

September 15: Televised speech by the Prime Minister, who
 

presented the plan for recovery from the economic crisis. The plan
 

included 37 recovery measures decided upon at the end of the 

extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting of August 20. 

September 30: Three senior officers belonging to the 

Paratrooper Company were declared to have disappeared during a
 

parachuting operation over the Niger River in Bamako. After a fourday search, the drowned officers were found. This incident caused
 

consternation among the public, especially since the three officers
 

were from the commando unit that had arrested Moussa Traord at his
 
palace in Koulouba during the night of March 25 to 26, 1991.
 

October 6: Under pressure from the AMUPI (Malian Association
 

for the Unity and Progress of Islam), the government refused the
 

projected visit to Mali of the German preacher-pastor Mr. Bonke.
 

The government was criticized by a portion of public opinion, which
 

saw in its refusal an infringement on the secularism of the country
 

and threats of strict religious conservatism.
 

October 8: Six former officials of the Moussa Traord regime
 

charged with economic crimes (misappropriation of public monies)
 

were provisionally released by the Bamako Supreme Court. They were:
 

Amara Danfaga, M'Bouill6 Siby, Monzon Kelta, Sidiki Diarra (former
 

president of the Assembly), Amadou B. Diarra, and Bayes AG Mohamed.
 

October 10: In Bamako, opening of a national seminar on
 

development-communications policy. Organized by the Minister of
 

Communications, FAO, and UNDP, this seminar made major
 

recommendations at the end of its deliberations: among others,
 

assigning a priority to the development-communications policy
 

within the government's program of activities; the establishment of
 

a training center for the written media, and the incorporation of
 

traditional communications media into communications strategies, to
 

be given their full importance by professionals.
 

October 15: Beginning of a meeting of the Inter-Sectoral
 

Technical Committee on Rural Radio. This meeting was intended to
 

describe the current circumstances governing rural access to
 

information within the framework of the farmer self-development
 

policy. It established a plan of action, which was intended to lead
 

to a limited committee for the establishment of a unit for
 

monitoring and evaluating radio broadcasts.
 

October 27: AEEM (Association of Malian Students) celebrated
 

its third anniversary. During a press conference called to mark the
 

occasion, the General Secretary of the association, Mr. Zarawana,
 

asserted the need to draft the memorandum listing academic demands.
 

He rejected in their entirety the scholarship selection criteria
 

proposed by the government.
 

November 7: Ministerial reorganization. The major event was
 

the departure of the Minister of the Economy and Finance, Mr. Oumar
 

Malga. The major deficiencies found in the management of PAS, which
 

caused the IMF agreements to be broken, played a role in this
 

shuffling.
 

November 9: ADIDE (Association of Job-Creating Graduates)
 

denounced the temporary/free-lance worker system. In fact, asserted
 

the association, this system allows the government to over-employ
 

and underpay young graduates, without giving them a status in
 

conformity with the Labor Code. The association demanded revision
 

of the Labor Code.
 
November 14: The President of the Republic opened Feback 1993,
 

the first international trade show. Thirty African, European,
 

American, and Asian nations took part. According to the president
 

of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the purpose was to
 

reinvigorate national production by showing off the value of these
 

products abroad.
 

November 15: Lifting of the parliamentary immunity of the PMD
 

deputy from Sikasso, Mr. N'Golo Sanogo, who had been accused of
 

embezzlement of 30 million francs belonging to the CMDT.
 

November 16: As part of the war on tax evasion, nearly 600
 

security forces agents, guided by forty customs/economic affairs
 

agents, launched a vast inspection operation at the "Dabanani"
 

market in Bamako. Tons of cigarettes and batteries which had
 

entered Mali illegally were seized. The situation took a bad turn
 

when the merchants whose merchandise had been seized joined in a
 

group and tried to stone the police forces, who quickly left the
 

scene.
 

December 9: The government spokesman confirmed rumors of a
 

coup d'etat planned by Oumar Diallo, aka Birus, the former aide-decamp of Moussa Traore. The spokesmen said that arrests were made
 

within the army. Public opinion cast doubt on the accuracy of this
 

information, especially since the former aide-de-camp was no longer 

a soldier, but had resigned from the army much earlier.
 

December 12: Rebellion of highway carriers in Sikasso. Drivers
 

and apprentices of more than 100 trucks coming from Ivory Coast
 

refused to comply with customs inspections in Sikasso. The
 

outnumbered customs officers withdrew to avoid a bloody
 

confrontation.
 

"/3
 
1994 Chronology
 

January 3: The Hospital Workers' union called for a 48-hour
 

strike to protest the new status given to hospitals, i.e., their
 

status as EPAs (public administrative establishments), which, it is
 

claimed, in Articles 11 and 21 does not specify that salaries will
 

be provided for under the national budget.
 

January 6: Bamako had no telephone or fax services from 4:00
 

am to 2:00 pm. A failure in the SOTELMA converters reportedly
 

caused this crisis.
 

January 11: The UMOA heads of state gathered at an
 

extraordinary summit in Dakar. The devaluation of the CFA franc was
 

on the agenda.
 

January 11: The Minister of Health met with the health unions
 

following the January 3 strike. The parties agreed to a revision of
 

Articles 11 and 12.
 

January 12: The heads of state of the Franc Zone decided on a
 

50% devaluation of the CFA franc, after nearly 48 years of fixed
 

parity. According to the official communique which made the
 

announcement, the basic objective was to revive imports in order to
 

stabilize the foreign balances of payments.
 

January 14: The government announced a series of protective
 

measures (prior to the end of negotiations on the attendant
 

measures) in order to limit the explosion of prices following
 

devaluation. These measures included a tax exemption on sugar and
 

rice, freezing of the prices hydrocarbons, flour, oil, soap, rice,
 

sugar, tea, and medicines made in Mali, and freezing of
 

electricity, water, and telephone prices.
 

January 24: Following the devaluation of the CFA franc, UNTM
 

became more recalcitrant and demanded immediate 50% salary
 

increases and the payment of all outstanding promotion payments in
 

cash (contrary to a previous agreement stipulating the exchange of
 

these outstanding payments for housing plots). Moreover, in the
 

absence of a CFA franc unpegged to the French franc, the UNTM
 

encouraged the government to create a national currency.
 

February 3: Michel Roussin, the French Minister of
 

Cooperation, visited Mali. He confirmed that French commitments
 

would be honored as part of the measures accompanying devaluation.
 

February 4: Following the devaluation of the CFA franc, AEEM
 

again took action, staging a violent march accompanied by the 

pillaging of public and private buildings to demand a 50% 

adjustment of academic scholarships. 

February 5: Immediately after the AEEM strike, the Prime 
Minister, Abdoulaye Sdkou Sow, Esq., resigned. In his letter of
 

resignation submitted to the President of the Republic, he accused
 

the Steering Committee of ADEMA (the party in power) of being the
 

instigator of the plot organized against him and his government.
 

February 7: Mr. Ibrahim Kelta, Mi.nister of Foreign Affairs,
 

was named prime minister. Following this appointment, the CNID and
 

the other parties making up the governing coalition left the
 

government, denouncing ADEMA's management methods.
 

February 7: Formation of a new government composed, one could
 

say, completely of ADEMA members. One noted appointment: Mrs. Sy,


the former governor of the Bamako District, became Minister of
 

Foreign Affairs.
 

February 8: The president of the Chamber of Commerce, Dr.
 

Darahamane Tourd, aka Darhat, proposed to mediate in the academic
 

crisis.
 

February 10: The Council of Minister studied the 1984 budget
 

in the light of the devaluation. A deficit of more than 80 billion
 

francs had to be made up.
 

February 10: After agreement concerning the measures
 

accompanying devaluation, the IMF signed the letter of intent.
 

February 15: AEEM returned to the attack with a violent march
 

with barricades and pillaging of public and private buildings,
 

including the residence of an ORTM journalist, Daouda Tdkdtd, who
 

had become technical adviser to the Ministry of Basic Education,
 

and his wife's clinic).
 

February 16: The government decided to close all public and
 

private academic establishments throughout the country.
 

February 18: Radio Kayira, a free opposition radio station
 

accused of inciting to violence, was closed by decision of the
 

Minister of the Interior.
 

February 19-20: Arrests of three officials of the AEEM board
 

by the police departments. These persons were to respond to
 

accusations of attacks on the security of public and private
 

property, violence, public disorder, etc.
 

February 24: Reopening of Radio Kayira.
 

February 28: The Prime Minister appealed to the national press
 

to stop, as he said, giving legitimacy to the violence. He was
 

addressing the newspapers which tended to support AEEM's actions.
 

February 29: Colonel Bilal Saloum, one of the leaders of the
 

rebel movement, was killed in Gao. Bilal was one of the rare black
 

115
 
men to hold such a high rank in the Tuareg rebel movement. He had
 

rejoined the regular army following the re-entry of the Tuareg
 

fighters into the army. This assassination was badly received by
 

the MFUA, which suspected other rebel factions. An inquiry was
 

opened by the Northern Commissioner's Office.
 

March 3: Arrest of the General Secretary of AEEM, Ould
 

Zarawana. He was to reply to the same accusations as those made
 

against his comrades arrested on February 19.
 

March 11: The Constitutional Court was sworn in by the
 

President of the Republic.
 

March 17: Extraordinary UMOA Summit Meeting in Ouagadougou.
 

The head of state gave vent to their concerns about the delays with
 

which the partners were fulfilling their commitments. The Summit
 

would sign the instrument terminating the CEAO, whose assets were
 

to be transferred to CEDEAO.
 

March 21: Seminar bringing together in Bamako the Chambers of
 

Commerce of the subregion in order to analyze the devaluation and
 

to set forth the current situation regarding the effects of
 

devaluation on the private sectors. Recommendations were made
 

tending toward the strengthening of the productive sectors and
 

subregional integration, in order to reinvigorate trade within
 

Africa.
 

April 1: Young persons pillaged the residence of the French
 

Consul General in Bamako. A number of persons were questioned.
 

Robbery was suspected.
 

April 11: Partial reopening of the schools, affecting primary
 

and basic education establishments.
 

April 18: The Prime Minister opened a gcvernmental seminar on
 

harmonizing the policies of the different ministries and on
 

selecting the priorities for governmental action in 1994-1995.
 

Organizational and communications issues were discussed at length
 

during this seminar.
 

April. 26: Six former officials of the Moussa Traord regime
 

were released on bail: Driss Traord, Diango Sissoko, Morifing Kon6,
 

Cheikna 0. Doumbia, Amadou Deme, and Amadou Sy.
 

April 29: At the National Assembly, opening of the debate on
 

the Prime Minister's statement of general policy.
 

May 12: Confrontation between police and guards in
 

N'Tomikorobougou. This was an incredible affair. Two camps were set
 

up adjoining each other. Each side, concerned to find a short cut,
 

got into the habit of climbing the high wall separating the two
 

camps. On that day, a guard got into trouble. After jumping from
 

2 
the wall, he was pushed around by young police officers. The other
 

guards reacted, and a confrontation ensued. Result: several wounded
 

and significant physical damage on each side.
 

May 12: Oumar Mariko, former General Secretary of AEEM, which
 

had instigated the events ending in the fall of Moussa Traord, was
 

expelled form Abidjan. He flew from Ouagadougou in the company of
 

Laurent Gbagbo, chairman of the main opposition party in Ivory
 Coast, the Front Populaire Ivoirien, or FPI. He was reportedly seen
 

at his hotel in Abidjan in the company of the leaders of the
 

Federation of Ivory Coast Students.
 

June 2: Dismissal of nearly 61 agents at the Meridien BIAO-


Mali. These dismissals were reportedly the result of severe
 

financial problems assailing that institution.
 

June 6: The Social and Cultural Economic Council of Mali was
 

sworn in by the President of the Republic.
 

June 6: The Workers' Union of the Mali Development Bank (BDM)
 launched an indefinite strike to protest the nomination of an
 

outside executive to the post of DGA. The appointee was Dr. Dafd,


the director of the Operating Division of the BMCD, who was
 

suspected of having close ties to the government.
 

June 9: The government decided to send 150 men to Rwanda in
 

answer to an appeal from the United Nations Security Council. This
 

contingent raised the number of United Nations troops in Rwanda to
 

5,500.
 

June 10: Rumors of the existence of a self-defense movement in
 

opposition to the rebels in the northern part of Mali were made
 

explicit in the press. This was the 
Gandha Koye (Landowners')
 

movement, which planned to organize itself against the Tuareg
 

rebels.
 

June 12: A communique from the Ministry of Defense cited
 

several rebel attacks in the north, including Tombouctcu Amdera
 

boucane, Rharous. These attacks led to 22 deaths and a number of
 

severely-injured persons.
 

June 26: Tamanrasset III. The rebels movements and the
 

government met in Algiers to elucidate the situation 
regarding
 implementation of the national agreement signed in April 1992
 

between the two parties, and to analyze the causes of the renewed
 

outbreak of the northern violence.
 

June 29: Four former officials of the Moussa Traord regime
 

were provisionally released: Abdoulaye Diallo, Moulaye Ha~dara,
 

Tidna Coulibally, and Dianka K. Diakitd.
 

gi11
 
Appendix B. Les Medias et L'Information Economique au Mali
 

/) I
 
LES MEDIAS ET
 

L'INFORMATION ECONOMIQUE AU MALI
 

Ti moko Diallo
 

Journaliste Economique et Consultant
 

Juillet 1994
 

Etude ARD/IMRAD/MSU sur l'ouverture du 

processus de politique 6conomique au Mali, 

financement USAID 
1) INTRODUCTION: 

A la lunire du programme d'ajustement structurel initid par le gouvernement et les 

partenaires tels que le FMI et la Banque Mondiale, on assiste de plus en plus A une 

ouverture de l'activit6 6conomique au Mali, ouverture marqu6e par la lib6ralisation de 

l'6conomie et le d6sengagement de l'6tat au profit de la soci6t civile dans divers 

secteurs. 

La ddmocratisation de la vie politique amorcde Apartir de Mars 1991 a initi6 une 

nouvelle dynamique d'expression et de revendication socio-politiques issue du 

pluralisme politique, syndical, et de la libert6 d'association et de presse. 

Ces nouvelles donndes induisent une nouvelle relation sociale caract~ristique d'une 

soci6t6 ouverte dont le point focal est l'instauration d'un processus permanent de 

concertation, de dialogue ou de n~gociation entre les institutions publiques et les 

groupes organis6s de la soci6t6 civile. 

Or, il apparait que les partenaires 6conomiques de ce dialogue ne disposent pas 

d'616ments d'informations pour analyser ou appr6hender efficacement le fonctionnement 

et les orientations 6conomiques, alors que tout le processus en d6pend d6sormais. 

La situation peut paraitre paradoxale dans la mesure off les sources d'information 

6conomique, qu'elles soient officielles ou priv6es, se densifient de plus en plus, ainsi il 

existe pr~sentement une pl6thore de m6dias tant dans le domaine de l'6crit que de 

l'audio-visuel. 

Le probl~me c'est que l'information 6conomique n'est pas diffus6e, ou si elle l'est, 

les supports sont mal adapt6s, les donn6es sont le plus souvent prdsent6es Al'6tat brut, 

sans aucune dimension analytique, critique ou contradictoire pour cerner la valeur des 

diff~rentes options. 

Cette situation pose le d6fi du transfert, du traitement ou de la diffusion de 

l'information 6conomique, et interpelle les m6dias dans leur mission qui consiste A 

entretenir ou stimuler l'analyse ou le d~bat d'id~es n6cessaires non seulement A la 

d6finition et formulation des choix et options politiques mais aussi Aleur ex6cution et 

contr6le. 

Le but de la pr6sente r6flexion est d'analyser les contraintes et obstacles lids au 

traitement et Ala diffusion de l'information 6conomique par les m6dias et de proposer 

des choix et strategies m6diatiques permettant une meilleur circulation de l'information 

dans le cadre d'une bonne gouvernance 6conomique. Cette r~flexion est bas6e sur une 

recherche documentaire appuy6e d'interviews aupr~s d'un 6chantillon d'organes de 

presse dans le district de Bamako: Les Cauris, Mali-Entreprise, l'Observateur, Aurore, 

L'Essor, Radio K16du, Radio Bamakan, l'ORTM. 
2) LES MEDIAS ET L'EVOLUTION DU DIALOGUE ECONOMIQUE 

Le r6le des m6dias dans le dialogue 6conomique au Mali a longtemps souffert de l'approche monolithique, unidirectionnelle ou verticale de l'information dans le 

pr )cessus 6conomique. 

.2 approche a consist6 Aconsacrer d'6normes efforts aux institutions publiques d'au. nt plus que la soci6t6 civile constitute A pros de 85% d'analphab6tes 6tait consiu6re A tort ou Araisor. comme incapable d'initiatives et d'analyses pour proposer des choix raisonn~s. 

L'inexistence de structures d'analyse en dehors des institutions du parti unique et 

de l'excutif a donc port6 ombrage au dialogue 6conomique et au r6le d'interface des m6dias. Ainsi durant les deux premieres Rdpubliques (1960-68: r6gime socialiste Aparti 6tat, et 1968-1991: parti unique Ar6gime militaire direct) le dialogue 6conomique au Mali 

a ressembl6 A un monologue. 

L'analyse et la formulation des choix ou d6cisions 6conomiques relevaient de la 

competence des institutions du parti unique A travers sa commission 6conomique et sociale. Cette commission se saisissait de toutes les questions 6conomiques n6cessitant l'attention du parti. Elle en faisait l'analyse qu'elle soumettait Al'instance supreme, le

BEC (Bureau Exdcutif Central) qui A son tour transmettait aux structures techniques de 

l'exdcutif pour la traduction en actes administratifs (d6crAts, lois) Asoumettre au vote de 

l'assembl6e nationale. 

Cependant, des dispositions statutaires pr6voyaient au niveau des d6partements charg6s de l'6conomie, des concertations avec la soci6td civile Atravers des commissions 

au demeurant largement court-circuit6es. Ils'agissait le plus souvent de commissions 

interminist6rielles 6largies dans le meilleur des cas Ades groupes constitu~s de la soci6t6 

civile entretenant des liens organiques avec l'6tat: la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie dont le secr~taire-g~n6ral 6tait nomm6 en conseil des ministres, et 'UNTM (union nationale des travailleurs du Mali) dont le secr6taire-g6n6ral 6tait membre de 

droit du bureau ex6cutif central. La mission des m6dias pour peu qu'elle s'exergat A 

travers les deux organes de presse nationaux (La RTM et l'Essor) se limitait Adiffuser les mots d'ordre du parti, Atravers communiqu6s de presse, compte-rendus de conseils 

d'administration de soci6t6s et entreprise d'6tat, avec leur cortege de censure, d'autocensure et de langue de bois. Dans le meilleur des cas, des campagnes d'information ou de sensibilisation des populations avaient lieu autour d'une d6cision dconomique. 

I1faut attendre le changement politique de Mars 1991 pour voir se dessiner une 

6volution satisfaisante dans le dialogue 6conomique et le r6le de la presse. L'av~nement 

de la d~mocratie initie une nouvelle dynamique de concertation A travers deux grands fora: la Conf6rence Nationale (largement 6largie Ala soci6t6 civile) et les Etats G~n6raux 

du commerce, de l'industrie et de l'artisanat, du monde rural, du transport, etc. Une 

,ee
 
structure permanente de concertation et de n~gociation est aussi mise en place entre les 

instituts publics et la soci~t6 civile Atravers la commisa.ion de suivi des 6tats g6n6raux 

du commerce et de l'industrie. 

Le monolithisme c~dant AI'expression plurielle des opinions, le r6le d'interface des 

m~dias dans le processus est sollicit6 et consacr6 par la mise en place des conseillers A 

la communication dans les d~partements minist~riels sur circulaire du Premier Ministre 

de la transition mandant les services administratifs de lever toute r6tention d'information 

sur la gestion des affaires publiques. La tenue de ce qu'on a appel6 "briefing" 

hebdomadaire de la presse par le porte-parole du gouvernement sur les dcisions prises 

en Conseil des Ministres est 6galement A souligner. 

Le virage vers la participation d~mocratique est donc amorc6 mais des probl~mes 

demeurent. Parmis ceux-ci, les attentes de la soci~t6 civile au travers de revendications 

socio-6conomiques jug6es excessives par rapport aux possibilit~s 6conomiques de l'6tat, 

et contradictoires par rapport Ala politique 6conomique du pays. Quoi que les conflits 

soient assumes de part et d'autre (le pouvoir en place ayant cautionn6 ces revendications 

pendant qu'il 6tait encore dans l'opposition) il n'est gu~re besoin de s'interroger sur ces 

conflits pour se rendre compte qu'ils sont la consequence d'un d6ficit d'informations sur 

la situation 6conomique du pays. 

C'est la grande fausse note du processus, un processus dont l'harmonie suppose que 

des gens biens inform~s et form6s puissent discuter des orientations 6conomiques de la 

nation. La n6cessit6 de promouvoir la collecte, l'analyse et la diffusion des donn6es 

dconomiques requises par l'instauration d'un d6bat public bien inform6 pour aider les 

uns et les autres Ajouer pleinement dans le processus avec plus de responsabilit6 est 

donc Al'ordre du jour. 

3) LE PAYSAGE MEDIATIQUE MALIEN 

La position c16 des m6dias dans leur mission de sensibilisation ou de 

conscientisation des masses conduisant Ala chute du regime dictatorial A parti unique 

de Moussa Traor6, leur a octroy6 une place royale dans le processus d6mocratique au 

point que la nouvelle constitution du 12 Janvier 1992 en son article 5 consacre la libert6 

de la presse au Mali. Plus qu'une simple consecration cette constitution en son article 

9 ira jusqu'A poser le devoir d'assistance de l'6tat Ala libert6 de la presse. 

De la loi de F6vrier 1988 (qui consacre la cr6ation de journaux priv6s) Afin 1993 on 

d6nombrait pros de 82 titres de journaux agr6s pour la presse 6crite toute tendances 

confondues. On y trouve de tout: des journaux ind6pendants d'inforrmnations aux 

journaux d'opinions, satiriques, de faits divers, etc. A cet ensemble de journaux il faut 

ajouter pros de 14 stations de radio libre 6mettant pour la plupart en modulation de 

fr~quence (FM) dans les centres urbains: Radio Bamakan, Libert6, Kayira, Kldu, Tabal6, 

3-,
 
Fr~quence 3 et la chaine 2 de I'ORTM pour Bamako. A Mopti: radio Douentza; AKayes: radio Rurale de Kayes; A Sikasso: Radio K6n6 pour la ville de Sikasso, et A Koutiala: 

Radio Jamana et Radio Kayira; AS6gou: Radio Jamana et Radio Kayira. 

A c6t6 de ces radios libres, la station nationale de I'ORTM 6met en ondes courtes sur 

toute l'dtendue du territoire. La T616vision nationale couvre quatre capitales r6gionales (Bamako, Sikasso, S~gou, Kayes). Quatre demandes d'agr6ment de t~l~visions privies sont en gestation aupr~s du rninist~re de la communication. 

La presse parl6e 6trang~re n'est pas en reste, notamment avec RFI et Africa No. I qui 6mettent depuis 1993 en modulation de fr6quence sur Bamako. TV5, une t6l vision 

Franco-canadienne, n6gocie 6galement une antenne ABamako. 

Mais ce dynamisme et cette diversit6 ne doivent pas occulter les caract6ristiques n6gatives de cette presse, notamment son extreme concentration dans la capitale (70% des titres) si bien qu'elle a du mal A se faire l'6cho de la socidt6, civile dans son 

ensemble. Cette extreme concentration se double d'une autre caract6ristique tout aussi 

negative, l'homog~ndisation, selon laquelle la plupart des journaux se r~p~tent, les 

contenus changeant peu d'un journal Al'autre. On note aussi le manque d'enqu~tes et 

de grands reportages. 

Enfin la presse est confront6e Aun probl6me de mutation: une presse combative ne
 

et consodd~e 
 dans le combat pour la d6mocratie et qui apr6s instauration de cette 

d~mocratie a du mal Ase d6faire de cette combativit6 et s'adapter Al'6volution nouvelle.

Toutes choses qui eypliquent les multiples proc~s aupr~s des tribunaux. Ce qu'il faut 

retenir c'est que les supports m~diatiques sont assez importants et diversifids pour atteindre les publics cibl6s. Ce qui manque surtout c'est une strat~gie de communication 

permettant de pousser les m6dias vers des actions sp6cifiques, l'analyse et le d~bat 

6conomiques, par example. 

4) LA PRESSE ECONOMIQUE 

On ne peut pas parler v6ritablement d'une presse 6conomique sp6cialisde au Mali, soit parce que cette presse est disparate, soit parce que l'information 6conomique est 

trait6e de faqon irr~gulire et dans le cadre g6n6ral de l'actualit6. Cependant, depuis quelques ann~es on assiste Ala publication d'un certain nonibre de titres dont le journal "Les Cauris", la revue Mali-Entreprise, l'Observateur (qui Ases d6buts se donnait une 

vocation essentiellement 6conomique mais qui s'est r6tract6 faute d'animateur) et, si l'on 

ose dire, le Bulletin d'information de la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie. On citera 

6galement le journal Jekabaara, sp~cialis6 dans l'6conomie agricole et 6dit6 en largue 

nationale bambara. 

Ces quelques exp6riences r6centes ont succ6d6 Ala revue trimestrielle du Minist~re 
de l'Economie et des Finances, publide au milieu des ann~es 1980. 11 s'agissait pour le 

d6partement de 1'6conomie de l'6poque, de parer Aun d6ficit en communication par la 

publication d'un certain nombre d'articles d'informations et d'analyses de sp6cialistes 

du d6partement sur la politique 6conomique de l'6tat. Quoique l'exp~rience n'ait dur6 

que le temps d'une legislature, cette revue avait servi de support aux d6cisions, avis et 

propositions du d~partement aupr~s des partenaires de l'Etat. Malheureusement, le 

manque de motivation des responsables et les difficult6s de diffusion et d'impression ont 

eu raison de cette revue. Sa reprise est aujourd'hui salutaire car Ala lumi6re du d~fi 

6conomique actuel, le pire des choix pour un d6partement 6conomique serait le silence. 

Renouer avec la parution de cette revue permettra de briser le mutisme et la gestion 

frileuse du Minist~re de l'Economie. 

LES TITRES REGULIERS DANS L'INFORMATION ECONOMIQUE 

Les Cauris: (5.000 exemplaires) 

Cr66 en Juin 1990 sous l'impulsion d'un bureau d'dtude sp6cialis6 en socio-6conomie, 

l'IMRAD( institut malien de recherches appliqu6es au d6veloppement) ce journal est le 

principal titre 6conomique malien. Originellement publi6 sous forme de revue-magazine 

mensuel d'une trentaine de pages dont pr6s de 70% sur l'6conomie, le journal connaitra 

une exp6rience hebdomadaire avant de devenir un bimensuel de 8 pages, avec 5 pages 

sur l'6conomie. Une rubrique centrale "chronique 6conomique" analyse les questions 

6conomiques d'actualit6. Elle est suivie d'une rubxique "entreprise- entrepreneurs", de 

deux pages d'6conomie agricole, et d'une page sur la coopdration et l'int6gration 

6conomiques. Le journal est le seul A publier des articles d'analyse de fond sur des 

questions 6conomiques majeures telles que l'ajustement structurel, et des dossiers de 

fond sur les fili~res 6conomique (filires c6r6alires ou coton, par exemple) l'industrie, 

le commerce et les banques. Le journal est confront6 A des probl6mes d'animation 

(personnel r6duit), de diffusion (distribution difficile), et d'6troitesse de son lectorat. 

Mali-Entreprise 

Cr6e en 1992, cette revue mensuelle d'une trentaine de pages publi6e principalement 

ABamako s'est hiss6e au centre de l'information d'entreprise. On y trouve des articles 

d'analyse de fond sur les probl~mes g6n6raux d'entreprises dont les probl~mes fiscaux, 

bancaires, commerciaux (dont le partenariat commercial et industriel). Le tout est 

6maill6 de commentaires et t6moignages de sp6cialistes de terrain. 

La revue a largement couvert les Etats-G6ndraux du commerce, de l'industrie, du 

monde rural des transports par une s6rie de commentaires et d'analyses contradictoires 

sur les diff6rentes r6solutions et recomn-_ :'.ations. Tout comme le journal Cauris, la 

revue Mali-Entreprise est confront6e A l'6troitesse du lectorat et A la r6tention 

d'informations, d'autant plus qu'un nombre important d'op6rateurs 6conomiques 
dvoluent dans le secteur informel et n'entendent pas paraitre Ala une des journaux. 

Le Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce 

Vu l'appui financier dont ilb6n~ficie de la part d'autres chambres consulaires, ce 

bulletin devrait surmonter les difficult6s auxquelles sont confront6s les journaux mentionn~s ci-dessus et de devenir un veritable journal d'information et d'analyse des 

questions 6conorniques et comnerciales. Malheureusement les articles du bulletin ne 

vont gu~re au delA des avis d'appel d'offre Ala concurrence. Le bulletin souffre surtout 

d'une p~riodicit6 quotidienne difficile Ag~rer, et d'un personnel r~duit et peu motive. 

Jekabaara (16.000 exemplaires) 

Cr66 en 1986 sous l'impulsion des ODR (Office de d6veloppement rural) CMDT, OHVN avec le soutien de bailleurs de fonds, le journal Jekabaara publi6 en langue nationale bambara, est une r6f6rence dans le donaine de la presse 6conomique rurale; ilest largement diffus6 dans les zones CMDT, OHVN, ODIMO etc. 

On y trouve en plus de l'actualit6, des articles sur les techniques culturales sur 

l'analyse des avantages comparatifs des productions ou sur les filires d'activit6s. Tout 

conme le journal Kibaru (cet autre mensuel de la presse rurale tir6 A16.000 exemplaires) Jekabaara est confront6 A un probl~me d'animation et de distribution. Les difficult6s 

d'aiimation proviennent du fait qu'on a grand peine Astabiliser les rubriques du journal 

par les articles cibles. 

Les retards dans la distribution sont 6galement pr6occupants du fait que certains 

abonn6s des villages et hameaux de culture le reqoivent avec pros de trois semaines de 

retard, perdant ainsi tout int6r&t aupr~s des lecteurs. 

Radio Kledu 

Cr6e en 1993 par un op6rateur economique de Bamako, cette radio libre 6mettant 

en FM s'est donn6e une vocation 6conomique. En cons6quence, die anime r6gulirement des 6missions sur l'activit6 6conomique et commerciale et jouit d'une grande exp6rience dans les d6bats publics en direct, avec reportages de rue. 

Elle a Ason palmar~s deux grandes enqu~tes suivies de d6bats, notamment celle sur 

le secteur informel des produits pharmaceutiques, qui s'est 6tal6e sur plusieurs 6missions, et sur les origines de la crise 6concmique au Mali organis6e en collaboration 

avec la fondation Fredrich Hibbert et mettant aux prises des invit6s du gouvernements, des partis politiques, syndicats et associations, notamment l'association des victimes de 

l'ajustement structurel. 
En outre elle anime des campagnes de commercialisation sous forme de 

publi-reportage avec les entreprises locales dont Mali-Lait. Des actions sont en cours 

avec la SONATAM, I'OPAM, pour le march6 cdr6alier. Un contrat est en cours de 

n6gociation avec le Ministate de 1'6conomie portant sur les declarations d'impots. 

L'exp~rience de cette radio est Asaluer d'autant plus que dans un pays Agrande 

tradition orale comme le Mali, le d~bat public l'emporte sur les habitudes de lecture. 

La radio souffre cependant de la r6tention d'informations qui porte ombrage A 

l'animation des d~bats, notamment Acause des refus de participation. IIarrive aussi que 

des invit6s veuillent monnayer leur participation. 

Les Titres Irrguliers 

A c6t6 de ces quelque organes qui ont fait de l'6conomie leur terrain de predilection 

et qui ne d~tiennent qu'une petite partie du lectorat, l'information 6conomique est 

diffus6e de fagon irr6guli~re par la presse d'information g6nrale. Parmi les titres les 

plus courants on peut citer: 

Aurore 

Bien que n'6tant pas sp6cialis6 dans l'dconomie, le journal Aurore (tir6 A 10.000 

exemplaires) s'est distingu6 par la pertinence de ses u-talyses en mati~re 6conomique. 

Notamment sur le dossier des privatisations et restructurations des entreprises publiques 

dont celle d'EDM (Energie du Mali) Apropos de laquelle il a publi6 beaucoup d'enqu6tes 

sur la filire 6lectricit6. Ceci lui permettra de d~crocher un contrat avec le projet 

Procelos du CILSS, en collaboration avec un bureau d'6tudes 6conomiques malien. I1 

s'agit d'un suppl6ment mensuel de deux pages (pour une p6riode de 18 mois) sur 

l'analyse de la filire agro-alimentaire dans le domaine des PME/PMI. Cette experience 

est Aconsolider, d'autant plus que l'analyse des filires qui, prcis~ment est A l'6picentre 

des besoins d'information du public, cofite cher A la presse. Cependant, le journal 

souffre d'un probl~me d'animation en mati~re 6conomique, qu'il a essayd de surmonter 

en faisant appel A un jeune diplom6 en 6conomie, et un sp6cialiste consultant en 

promotion 6conornique. 

L'Observateur : 

Cr6 en 1992 par de jeunes journalistes d6missionnaires de l'Aurore (une r~f~rence 

pour la presse ind~pendante au Mali), l'exp6rience de ce journal est assez r6v~latrice des 

contraintes de la presse 6conomique. Se donnant ds le depart une vocation 6conomique 

(sans pour autant perdre de vue l'analyse politique) le journal va dchanter tr~s t6t A 

cause de la r6tention d'information. L'un des objectifs fondamentaux 6tait de publier 

des dossiers d'enqu~tes sur les grandes unit6s 6conomiques, surtout priv6es. Ceci dans 
le cadre de l'dchange ou du partage d'exp6riences en vue d'une promotion du secteur 

priv6. Mais rien ne fut et le journal a du changer son fusil d'6paule. 

L'ORTM :la station nationale, apr~s avoir abandonn6 ses magazines 6conomiques A la radio anime, en fonction de l'actualit6, des d6bats 6conomiques A travers ses 

6missions grand public dont "devoir d'informer" et "point de rencontre". La fausse note 

ici, c'est que la plupart de ces d6bats sont post6rieurs Aune d6cision d6ja prise, ou font 

suite Aun avis de gr6ve. I1s'agit donc de d~bats d'arri~re-garde. Finalement, le choix 

des participants (g6nralement des politiques) et le devoir de r6serve dont ils font 

preuve, impriment une certaine partialit6 Aces d6bats. 

Des publications sporadiques ont lieu dans la presse d'information g6nrale. Parmi 

celles-ci on peut citer "Le R6publicain" qui se distingue par des dossiers d'enqu~tes sur 

l'industrie, la fraude et la concurrence d6loyale, "l'Observateur", "Nouvel Horizon", "les 

Echos", "le Messager" etc. Mais ils'agit pour la plupart d'informations ponctuelles A 

caract~re sensationnel ayant trait aux scandales 6conomiques et financiers, ou d'analyses des aspects n6gatifs de la politique 6conomique, qui ne rendent pas compte de la 

dimension contradictoire des sujets. 

Ce qui ressort surtout de l'opinion des organes contacts, ce n'est pas que la 

presse ne soit pas dispos~e A faire de l'analyse 6conomique. Au contraire, nombre 

d'organes reconnaissent que s'il y a un d~fi A relever aujourd'hui, c'est celui de 

l'information 6conomique. D'abord parce que les probl6mes 6conomiques sont 

aujourd'hui A l'6picentre de la crise de confiance g~n~ralis6e entre les institutions 

publiques et la soci~t6 civile, crise caract~ris~e par des gr~ves ou des manifestations de 

rue accompagn~es de violence. Ensuite parce que l'analyse et le debat politiques ont 

largement monopolis6 la sc~ne m~diatique ces dernires annes. Ceci a cr66 un 

d~s~quilibre au niveau de la communication. Les conflits engendr6s par la politique 6conomique proviennent du fait --de l'avis des uns et des autres-- que l'information a 

t6 vici~e ou manipul6e. Celle-ci a consist,, par exemple, Amobiliser les couches les plus combattantes dans une lutte politique o les revendications dont elles se pr6valaient 

6taient hors des possibilit6s de l'6tat. 

Ainsi a-t-on soutenu qu'une augmentation de 100% des bourses scolaires 6tait 

possible (50% dans le m6morandum des 6tudiants), qu'une augmentation de 50% des 

salaires des fonctionnaires 6tait pessible de l'avis dit-on d'un expert commis en la 

circonstance par la centrale syndicale (UNTM), que des possibilit~s d'embauche des 

jeunes diplomas sans emplois suivraient une relance d'investissements productifs, etc. 

Soutenir de telles revendications dans une 6conomie ou le paiement r6gulier des salaires 

des fonctionnaires se n6gocie comme du papier A musique, une 6conomie en plein ajustement structurel bas6 sur la rigueur et la compression des d~penses, relive de la 

fantaisie ou du sabotage d6libr6. 
Si cette ignorance persiste encore aujourd'hui c'est parce l'information 6conomique 

ne circule toujours pas assez. C'est aussi parce que les grands forums organis~s par le 

pass6 n'ont pas permis de recentrer le d~bat. Le contexte socio-6conomique est celui 

d'un 6tat dcartelM entre un deficit 6conomique devenu structurel, et des revendications 

6conomiques maximalistes de la part de partenaires sociaux pr~ts Atout pour rendre la 

vie impossible Aleur alli d'antan, aujourd'hui au pouvoir. 

Ainsi l'idde d'un d6bat national faisant table rase des possibilit6s financires de l'6tat 

et des strat6gies A mettre en place est au centre de l'analyse de la plupart des 

observateurs. Ce d6bat pour 6tre efficace ne doit pas faire l'objet d'un forum de plus (les pr6cedents ayant cem6 leurs limites du fait qu'ils se soient transform6s en tribure 

de revendications plut6t qu'en confrontation d'id6es). La crise de confiance 6tant bien 

rdelle, les m~dias, Ala lumire de leur mission d'6ducation, de neutralit6 et d'impartialit6 

peuvent repr6senter une perche Asaisir. En outre, l'opportunit6 des m~dias refl~te un 

souci de mutation, du fait que les probl~mes sociaux prennent de plus en plus la forme 

de d~bats entre institutions publiques et m6dias. 

La sociWt civile semble donc s'en remettre de plus en plus aux m~dias, en gardant 

certes sa participation au d6bat, mais davantage comme figurant dans un spectacle plus 

vaste 61largi aux journalistes. Mais pour parvenir A cette fin encore faudrait-il relaxer 

certaines des contraintes auxquelles sont confront~es les m~dias dans le cadre du 

traitement de l'information 6conomique. Parmi celles-ci le probl~me de la rationalisation 

des sources d'une information 6conomique parfois contradictoires selon qu'on se situe 

du c6t6 des statistiques officielles (Minist6res du Plan ou de l'Economie) ou du c6t6 des 

organismes internationaux (FMI, Banque mondiale), des bureaux d'6tudes et autres 

institutions. De plus, les donn~es dconomiques sont le plus souvent pr6sent6es Al'tat 

brut, ce qui ne facilite pas leur traitement par la presse. C'est le cas par example de 

I'OPAM (Office des produits agricoles du Mali) qui publie les variations des prix des 

crales sans indication sur les causes de ces variations. L'incurie des informations 

statistiques sur les secteurs d'activit~s autres que l'agriculture est aussi un 6lment de 

prdoccupation. Nombre d'organes de presse disent donc avoir du mal Ascuriser leur 

analyse aupr~s des sources d'informations. La difficult6 de s~curisation de l'information 

se double d'une autre: celle de l'absence de programmes 6conomiques au niveau de la 

plupart des partis politiques. Ou alors si ces programmes existent, ce sont g~n~ralement 

les m~mes options et strategies, les differences ne tenant pour l'essentiel qu'A des 

affinit~s d'ordre procedural. On assiste donc A une sorte de monolithisme qui ne 

favorise pas l'closion chez les organes de presse d'une dynamique d'analyses ou de 

critiques contradictoires, d'autant plus que les journalistes 6conomiques dignes de ce 

nom soient assez rares au Mali. Or la critique r~fl~chie, c'est Adire, celle qui consiste 

en un jugement de valeur raisonn6, suppose d'avoir quelques rudiments d'6conomie et 

de disposer du discernement n6cessaire pour parvenir Aune opinion 6quilibr~e sur un 

sujet 6conomique, ce qui est liM au probl~me de la formation des joumalistes. 
La rMtention d'information qui s'est beaucoup d~velopp6e au niveau de la soci6t6 

civile dconomique avec l'expansion du secteur informel (60% des activitO.s 6conomiques) 

est 6galement un sujet majeur de preoccupation. Une triste r6alit6 intensifi6e par les 

6v~nements du 26 mars qui ont entrain6 la casse ou destruction d'unit~s 6conomiques privies. Ceci ne miihte pas en faveur d'une collaboration entre les op6rateurs 

6conomiques et les m6dias. 

Tous ces anachronismes ont amen6 bien des organes de presse A se d6marquer du 

champ d'analyse 6conomique au profit des faits divers, en la mati6re engendr~s par la 

recherche de la "petite bMte", les scandales, la critique n6gative (ou l'analyse se resume 

en une 6num~ration de d6fauts), le n6gativisme cynique, parfois apocalyptique tel que celui Atravers duquel nombre d'organes ont trait6 de la devaluation du FCFA, dont 

l'aspect solution de sortie de la crise n'a gu~re t6 abord6. 

6) VERS UN PLAN D'ACTION MEDIATIOUE 

A la lun-iir des preoccupations soulign6es ci-dessus, la n6cessit6 d'une plus grande implication des m6dias dans le d~bat 6conomique milite pour un plan d'action 

s'inscrivant dans le cadre d'une dynamique globale de promotion de l'information 

dconomique. 

Celle-ci doit partir de l'id~e que l'heure est au partage, au transfert de l'information, 

et A la correction des facteurs de r6tention par une plus grande harmonisation des 

sources mais aussi par une augmentation de la production d'informations 6conomiques, notamment sur les fili~res. Ceci est d'autant plus vrai que les besoins d'information du 

public se posent davantage en ces termes car l'analyse des fili~res touche au vcu 

quotidien de l'6conomie et favorise davantage une perception concrete des questions 6conomiques, alors qu'une analyse macro6conomique se transforme bien souvent en un d~bat d'initi6s. 

On se souvient que le dossier d'enqu~te sur le BTP publi6 par un journal ind~pendant de la place et soulignant bien des incoh~rences de la politique 6conomique de l'tatdans ce secteur a eu tellement d'6chos aupr~s de l'opinion qu'un d6bat informel 

sur la question a eu lieu entre parlementaires Ai'Assembl6e Nationale. 

Mais si ces enquites sont un instrument d'approche privil6gi6, il faut aussi noter 

qu'elles cofitent cher. Des actions d'appui ou de soutien sont donc Asolliciter dans ce 

domaine, comme le contrat "Procelos-Aurore" sur la filire agro-industrielle, comme celui 

sign6 entre la CMDT et "Radio Ken" de Sikasso sur une analyse des enjeux de la filire 

coton, ou celui entre Radio Kl~du et Mali-Lait sur la fili~re lait. 

La lenteur de la production d'information li~e a un 6talement dans le temps des 

6valuations 6conomiques est aussi un obstacle majeur, car il faut bien souvent attendre 
la visite des missions FMI-Banque Mondiale (g~n6ralement annuelles) pour que la presse entre en possession des donn~es 6conomiques. Ceci tend Adensifier l'analyse autour de 

cette p6riode de l'ann~e. Or, des 6valuations d'une dur6e plus courte (qui existent dans 

les d~partements charg6s de l'6conomie, mais ne sont pas communiqu~es Ala presse) pourraient favoriser des analyses p6riodiques et une animation permanente du d6bat 

6conomique. 

La diffusion permanente des rsultats permettrait dgalement d'6viter bien des effets 

de surprise (constat~s ces derniers temps avec les drapages dans le programme) et 

favoriser des d6bats pr6alables sur les mesures d'accompagnement. Ceci r6duirait les 

pr6cipitations telles que les 37 mesures dciddes dans le feu de la crise en Aofit dernier. 

Dans ce contexte, la commission nationale de suivi du programme d'ajustement structurel mise en place en Octobre dernier pour rendre compte en permanence au 

gouvernement, devrait collaborer avec les m6dias. 

L'initiative engag6e par le r6seau d'op6rateurs 6conomiques de l'Afrique de l'Ouest, qui a consist6 Aanimer un s6minaire d'initiation des parlementaires aux techniques et 

choix budg~taires pour permettre Aces derniers de s'investir dans le d6bat 6conomique,. m6rite d'6tre soulign~e et consolid~e, d'autant plus que le Conseil Economique et Social, l'organe consultatif d'6tude et d'analyse 6conomique aupr~s des institutions publiques, 

a du mal Aprendre le large. Enfin, la participation des journalistes ne doit plus se 

limiter A de simples "briefings". Elle doit s'int6grer dans une strat6gie plus vaste 

incluant leur formation Ala politique 6conomique. L'occasion est bonne pour souligner les experiences engag~es ces derni~res ann6es par la Banque Mondiale qui fait d6sormais 

de la circulation de l'information 6conomique une priorit6 dans ses programmes. On 

citera en exemple deux s~minaires de formation sur le journalisme 6conomique, en 

d6cembre 1992 AYaoundd, et en Mai 1993 ADakar (regroupant 8 journalistes maliens). Ils ont 6t suivis en F6vrier 1994 par celui organis6 par le centre culturel Am~ricain A 

Bamako; ce sont des experiences Aconsolider. 

D'une manire g6n6rale le constat est que les choses peuvent aller de mieux en 

mieux, si l'on se convainc de part et d'autre que, dans le cadre de l'ouverture ou du 

transfert des comp~tences 6conomiques, la circulation de l'information adequate et A 

temps est une donn~e endog~ne du processus. Plus les gens seront inform6s sur les 

enjeux, avantages et contraintes de la politique 6conomique, mieux on les aidera A 

acqu~rir une maturit6 d'analyse, de jugement ou de choix raisonn6, point de depart de 

la responsabilit6 dans le partenariat. En ces p6riodes de mutations 6conomiques doubl~es de d6mocratisation, l'harmonie politique suppose d'emprunter les voies de la 

comprehension mutuelle. Nul doute que les m~dias, de par leur role d'6ducation sur 

la base de l'analyse et de la critique r6fl6chies, sont un instrument privil6gi6 de 

facilitation de cette compr6hension mutuelle. L'importance et la diversit6 du capital m~diatique Malien (une r~f~rence dans la sous-rdgion) est une opportunit6 royale A 

saisir. I1faut rompre avec la r6tention d'information et la discr6tion handicapante, et 

faire vibrer ce capital m6diatique vers la cvlture 6conomique. 
Appendix C. The Bamako Declaration on Radio Pluralism
 
THE
 

BAMAKO
 

DECLARATION
 

ONRADIO
 

PLURALISM
 

(14-18 september 1993) 
Recalling the International Declaration on Human Rights 

(Article 19),
 

Recalling the African Charter on Human and People's
 

Rights (Chapter 1,Articles 8,9),
 

Recalling the declaration of political principles and the
 

information measures contained in the new ECOWAS treaty
 

(Article 65),
 

Considering the Montreal action plan for education on the
 

rights of man and on democraty,
 

Noting with appreciation the statements made at the
 

opening ceremony of this colloquium by His Excellency
 

Alpha Oumar Konar6, President of the Republic of Mali, on
 

the need to liberalise the air waves and to encourage rural
 

radio,
 

Considering the decisive role played by radio in human
 

development, in the process of democratisation and in mass
 

participation (especially by vulnerable groups such 
as 

women and children), 

We, the participants in the Colloquium on Radio Pluralism 

in West Africa, co-organised in Bamako on 14-18 

September by the West African Journalists Association 

and the Panos Institute, together welcoming the beginnings of the liberalisation under way in many African countries, 

135
 
]Declare the following: 

1 Radio is a priority means of social 

communication, in Africa in particular; 

2 Radio pluralism is an essential component in the 

deepening of the democratic process now under way : it 

allows people greater access to a diversity of information, 

and guarantees increased popular participation in 

sustainable human development; 

3 Information pluralism requires the complete elimination of radio monopolies, and the existence of a 

range of radio stations able to express the diverse 

viewpoints and aspirations of different segments of 

society; 

4 The possibility of being informed by and 

expressing oneself on radio remains unequal between 

urban and rural areas, and between different social groups 

(especially between men and women); 

5 Initiatives aimed at creating private and 

community radio stations must be encouraged, so as to 

foster the multiplication, diversification and 

decentralisation of such stations, whether they be 

commercial or community-based. In particular, village radio initiatives must be supported by easier 

arrangements for their official authorisation; 

6 African states must speed up the ending of 

monopoly over the air waves, and give priority to national 

proponents of independent radio when allocating broadcasting frequencies. They must also take urgent 

measures to draw up and effectively implement new legal frameworks, to create genuinely independent regulatory agencies, and to identifiy and implement effective 

measures (eg through tax and customs) to encourage a 
flowering of independent radio stations; 

7 State controlled radio must be transformed into guenine public service radio, with all the legal, administrative, editorial and management changes that this 

implies; 

8 African organisations with responsabilities in communications must make more effort to involve professionals from the independent media in their 

activities; 

9 International aid agencies must develop the institutional and financial means to respond effectively to 

the liberalisation of radio in West Africa, especially through effective support (finance, management, human 

ressources...) to the viability of independent radio 

stations; 

10 Professional organisations must strengthen and 

mobilise themselves to address the challenges of radio pluralism : it is important that they should be represented 

on regulatory bodies and that they should participate in the reform of legal and administrative frameworks for 

radio; 

11 Radio pluralism cannot be effectively guaranteed without the active vilance of all citizens, and of 

pressure groups specially created for this purpose; 

12 Radio stations will benefit from forming professional organisations, from organising themselves 

into networks, and from collaborating at the national, subregional and international levels; 

13 International radio stations, in their relationships with public and independent radio in Africa, 

must work within a context of plurality for the listener, 

and of complementarity, 

14 While remaining open to the free international 

flow of information, West Africa must acquire the means to 
become a growth centre for production, creativity and 

innovation in radio. 

We, the participants of the Bamako colloquium, make 

the following recommandations: 

To independent radio proprietors, and to the 

participants of the colloquium: 

1 The creation of national associations of radiobroadcasters, able to defend the interests of radio 

proprietors and radio professionals, and to act as an 

interface between their members and international 

development agencies. In order to create a regional union, a 

constituent meeting should be called fairly soon; 

2 The official transmission ot the Declaration of 

Bamako to the President of Mali, so that he may play an 

advocacy role for the declaration among his fellow heads of 

state, and within the ECOWAS, the OAU and the United 

Nations; 

3 National and regional lobbying to promote radio 

pluralism, the distribution of the documents produced at 

this colloquium, and the implementation of their 

recommendations; 

4 The establishment of an information and 

networking bulletin aimed at West African radio 

broadcasters and their partners; 

5 The organisation of study and exchange visits 

among the actors in radio p!uralism; 

6 South-South and North-South twinning 

arrangements among radio stations and their federations; 

7 The adoption of codes of conduct by radio 

professionals and their organisations; 
8 The establishment of purchasing centres, and of a 

data bank on available equipment; 

9 The creation of maintenance and repair units for 

radio equipment, 

10 The establishment of sound banks, responsible for the regional distribution of radio programmes, 

especially in the languages most commonly used in the 

region. These sound banks should be established within 

institutions which are capable of ensuring the monitoring and management of distribution. 

To the states of West Africa: 

11 The drafting, adoption and effective 

implementation of the legislative and administrative 

frameworks for information pluralism, and especially for 

radio pluralism; 

12 The establishment of independent regulatory authorities to oversee the implementation of the legal framework and to organise the allocation of radio 

frequencies. 

To the appropriate national and regional 

authorities : 

13 The strengthening of existing training centres, and changes in their structures to reflect the new situation 

in radio; 

14 The creation of new arrangements in these 

training centres to strengthen the skills of radio 

broadcasters in management, motivation, radio research, and better journalistic specialisation in socially-useful 

themes. 

To donor agencies: 

15 The creation of a fund to support the production 
of programmes by various types of radio station, especially 

local radio, aimed at promoting information on 

substainable development themes; 

16 The search for institutional and financial 

mechanisms by which donors may respond effectively to 

the liberalisation of the air waves in West Africa, and 

especially by which they may support the 

recommendations of the Bamako colloquium. 

To the organisers of the colloquium : 

17 The establishment of a coordination commitee to 

ensure the national and regional follow-up of the Bamako 

colloquium's proposals. This coordination commitee shall 

also be responsible for examining how to implement, in the 

medium term, a radio pluralism monitoring centre as 

proposed by the President of Mali during the colloquium's 

opening session. 

To all the Malian actors in radio pluralism: 

18 The organisation of a biennial regional event 

(festival, forum ?) to promote radio pluralism at the 

African level, as also suggested by the President of Mali 

during the opening session of the Bamako colloquium. 
PANOS INSTITUTE: 53 Rue de Turbigo - 75003 Paris - Tel: 

(331) 42 71 20 21 Fax: (331) 42 71 21 55
 

WAIA: National Secretariat - Area II - Garki -Abuja- Tel:
 

(234) 9 234 30 16 Fax: (234) 9 234 30 155 

\Qc 
Appendix D. List of Persons Contacted
 

jl,
 
PERSONS CONTACTED
 

ALARID, David A.
 

US Embassy, Political Officer B.P. 34 Bamako
 

BEAUDOIN, Denis G.
 

ACDI, Chef ACDI/Mali B.P. 198, Bamako
 

BEN-BARKA, Leila
 

ROCARE, Directrice B.P. 1060
 

BERTHE, Baba Antoine
 

SYCOV, Pr6sident BP 3299 BKO/BP 123 Koutiala
 

BERTHE, Siaka
 

CMDT/ Bamako
 

CISSE, Augustin
 

ASCOMA, Secr6taire Permanent B.P. 8061
 

COULIBALY, Adama
 

SYNTRUI, Sec. Administratif B.P. 791 Bamako
 

COULIBALY, Adama
 

MDR/Cellule Planification & Strat6gie
 

COULIBALY, Bakary
 

Assemble Nationale, D6put6 B.P. 284
 

COULIBALY, Cheibane
 

IMRAD, Publisher BP 3049 Bamako
 

COULIBALY, Moussa M.B.
 

FNEM, Pr6sident B.P. 2445
 

COULIBALY, Sidi
 

Consultant
 

DEMBELE, Edmond 

CCA/ONG - Projet Pivot GRN, Chef d'Equipe BP 1721 Bamako 

DEMBELE, Vincent 

CMDT, Conseiller Special 

DEME, Moustapha
 

SOCETEC, Consultant
 

DEME, Oumou
 

COFEM/ Secr~taire ' la Communication
 

DIALLO, Abd'El Kader
 

Radio Kledu, Directeur des Programmes B.P. 2322
 

1
 
DIALLO, Daniel
 

Jamana - Coop. Culturelle, Diffusion
 

DIALLO, Deidia
 

Pharmacie Les Hirondelles, Dr. en pharmacie, Bamako
 

DIALLO, Fousseyni
 

Chambre d'Agriculture, Secr~taire G~n6ral BP 3299 Bamako
 

DIALLO, Moussa Alassane
 

BNDA, Chef Svc Exploitat B.P. 2424 Bamako
 

DIALLO, Sekou Alliou
 

Radio Kayira/Segou, Pdt Comit6 gestion Radio Kayira, Segou
 

DIALLO, Tidjani Djime


Mali Entreprise, R6dacteur-en-Chef BP 2430 Bamako
 

DIALLO, Tiemoko
 

IMRAD, R~dacteur-en-chef BP 3041 Bamako
 

DIARRA, Salif
 

Chambre de Commerce, S/G B.P. 931
 

DIARRA, Siaka
 

Radio Kayira, Administrateur D616gu4 B.P. 3140 Bamako
 

DIONE, Josue
 

INSAH, Researcher
 

DOUMBIA, Konimba
 

Assembl6e Nationale, Documentaliste B.P. 284
 

DRABO, Souleymane
 

L'Essor, Redacteur-en-chef B.P. 141 Bamako
 

FELTEN, Jeff
 

CLUSA/OHV, Advisor BP 34 Bamako
 

GAGNY, Timbo
 

Chambre d'Agriculture, Consultant (FAO)
 

GUEYE, Lat
 

UNCTRM, Pr6sident Bamako
 

GUEYMARD, Yves
 

MIFRAC, Technician
 

GUINDO, Hammadoun Amion
 

UNTM, SEC-GEN B.P. 169
 
HAIDARA, Dramane
 

CERDES, Secr6taire Gen4ral Immeuble SOGEFIH Bamako
 

KELLY, Aboubacrine
 

Assembl~e Nationale, D6put6 de Kadiolo 
 BP 284 Bamako
 

KEITA, Sekou
 

SYNAPPO, Pr6sident SYNAPPO March6 Medina Coura
 

KINTZ, Daniele
 

Consultant, Consultant 
 s/c CFD BP 32 Bamako
 

KONAKE, Salif
 

UNCTRM, Dir. Admin. Bamako
 

MAKANGUILE, Ibrahima
 

Cabinet fiscal priv6, Consultant
 

MARIKO, Fadima Siby
 

U.CO.DAL, Directrice UCODAL 
 B.P. 1580, Bamako
 

MARIKO, Fousseyni
 

MDR, C.T. BP 61 Bamako
 

MAY, Charles A.
 

USAID, Project officer
 

MOINEAU, Jacques
 

AFDI, Conseiller Regiona BKO BP84 - DKR: BP 5001
 

MOUSSA, Alassane Ag
 

DNAE, Directeur s/c Min. Fin. B.P. 234
 

NIAKATE, Alassane
 

L'Essor, Journaliste B.P. 141 Bamako
 

PAPAZIAN, Vatche
 

CFD BP 32 Bamako
 

PARE, Michel
 

ACDI, Chef Svce Cooper. B.P. 198
 

RACHED, Mounir
 

IMF/MIN.FIN, Resident Advisor
 

RALEIGH, John
 

PRED, Chief of Party B.P. 34 Bamako 

PELLETIER, Michael 

USIA, P.A.O. B.P. 34 Bamako 

II:
 
SACKO, Saloum
 

US Embassy, Assistant Politique B.P. 34 Bamako
 

SACKO, Bafotigui
 

Minist~re des Finances, Conseiller Technique B.P. 234 Bamako
 

SANAGARE, Alhousseini
 

CERDES, Secr6taire G6n~ral nimeuble SOGEFIH Bamako
 

SANGARE, Modibo
 

OMBEVI, Directeur General
 

SANOGHO, Nampaa
 

MDR/CPS, Chef Suivi/Eval BP 275 Bamako
 

SOUMARE, Samba
 

Observatoire du Foncier, Directeur
 

SANGARE, Urbain
 

SYNTRUI, Secr~taire G6n~ral BP 771 Bamako
 

SCHLESINGER, Joel
 

USAID, Mission Director
 

SIDIBE, Konimba
 

CNID, Dir. Financier s/c Hotel de l'Amitie
 

SOW, Abdoul Kader
 

Assembl6e Nationale, Secr. L6gislatif B.P. 284
 

SY, Maimouna Ba
 

UNDP
 

SY, Ousmane
 

Mission D6centralisation/MAT
 

TALL, Sekou Oumar
 

Chambre d'Agriculture, ex-president BP 3299 Bamako
 

TAMBOURA, Belco
 

L'Observateur R6dacteur-en-Chef
 

TEFFT, Jim
 

SIM, Ag. Economist B.P. 34 Bamako 

THIAM, Cheikh Oumar 

ITEMA, Ingenieur B.P. 299 

THIAM, Soumaila 

SYNTRUI, Secr~taire Economique B.P. 1894 
THIOLON, Dominique

Total/Texaco Mali, Directeur General B.P. 26 

TOE, Richard 

MDR, Conseiller Tech. B.P. 61 

TOGOLA, Baba 

Assembl6e Nationale, D4put6 de Dioila BP 284 Bamako 

TOURE, Aboubacar Alhassane 

Minist~re des Finances, Conseiller Tech. 

TOURE, Ousmane 

FNEM, Secr6taire Permanent B.P. 2445 Bamako
 

TOURE, Aboubakar
 

Ministere des Finances, Conseiller Technique B.P. 234
 

TOURE, Almamy Samory
 

Radio Liberte, Directeur de Station
 

TOURE, ROKIA BA
 

COFEM/INST. PANOS, Sec-Gen COFEM 
 B.P. 2037 Bamako
 

TRAORE, Afoussatou T.
 

Magistrat Tribunal de l6re instance, Bamako
 

TRAORE, Bakary
 

BNDA, Directeur General
 

TRAORE, Cheikna "Kolo"
 

SYNTRUI, President BP 771 Bamako
 

TRAORE, Djiriba
 

MDR/Cellule Planification & Strat6gie B.P. 61
 

TRAORE, Madani
 

Ministere des Finances, Inspecteur des Finances B.P. 234
 

TRAORE, Ousmane
 

Cour Supreme, Conseiller Bamako
 

TRAORE, Yacouba Diadie
 

Conseil N'al des Pharmaciens, President du Conseil B.P. 1897
 

VITAL, Irene
 

Minist~re des Finances, Directrice-Adjointe du Budget B.P. 234
 
Appendix E. Broadcast Schedules of Selected Radio Stations
 
rnV~ahAMVf_ L- RADIO JAMANA / ,J/I,41/ /7,/../ 

* S -ONE-' 5*3' Rp 

S BONNESOE 30RIGTT 30:BIG-RO BRIOIE BIGITTE _BRT B LTTEBI 'E L DOUMBA KONIBA rMTTRTIH MICRO TROTTOIR MiCOTTOIR 

LBSFEMMES KENEYA CIRCULATION DABA KAS DES HUICOMA srBP.AEUN amLE PLATEAU . B IDU U

6. OUATT ,. SOGOBA B. SOGOBA L. DOUMBIA GDANIELL h M3... MERES NINKUNKA FEMMES E SUGU K 0 L ON VARIETES MARIAM .r M ANTS PIVA CAMPAGNE BADA MUSICALES AMARIAM MaT OUATr MARIAM-DOANIEL 2~iibauri ii:i:OUATTARA .. AMADOU OUATT 

MUSIQUES UALENNES SELECTONNEES MUSIQUES MAUENNE$ SELECT1ONNES PrV=DELA 

.ONNE BONNE BONNE BONNE 0tNE BONNE 

.SIE SIESTE SIESTE SEUT SESTE 8E81E 

DJIM DJ9J OJIM OJIM JIM OJIM 

'D 
 7 

S RESSE B. ADRESSES B. ADRESSES B. ADRESSES B. ADRESSES . ADRESSES B ADRESSE AVIS 

; N : IQ!: UE!i!!!:;.A AVIS AVIS AVIG ADR :: M VIS AVIS A COMMUNIQUES U LONE PUI COMMUNIQUES COMMUNIQUES COMMUNIQUeS COMMUNIQUES N I~ii!!iu-ES(OM COMMUNIQUES PUBUCITES PUBUCITES PUBLCTS PUBUCIES PUBUCIES PuBLcnES *6wis AADUOA1AMDUO~rAMADOU OUATT OUATT AAUOA AMADOU AADU OUAT ADOU4A1T 

SPECIAL CMDT EMISSION JEUX EMISSION TRIBUNE DES JEUX 

REGGAE' SENOUFO CONCOURS RIEUGIEUSE ENFANTS CONCOURS .. lt6 ::..::>:. ... 
 X,: BRUNO 

A- ___A. SANOGO BAMANAN ISLAM MaTAASSINE FrI8bl JA MA Aq

W ES KUNA COTONNIER 

BULO FICHESTRE I DANIEL/ FOL re BRUNO S K.TRAORE OUATr o. 

f MAI DJIM__-___ ,_ .OMUSIQUES 

METEI.e 

DOON DUNDUN.BA SCIENCES ET NIPALAN PROTESTANT AnHOUQUES .; . .c 'ri . CULn~E Ma~h c& 2. m IJSIOUE 

tiut"LASSINE DAEL DANIEL DAVID DIARRA, Ilir MaOua M-AANkpim 

..:..... ". . . : :. .... •AMA... IR EMISSION HISTOIRE Rencontrssv HISTOIRE Rovudeposms Su 1burn' BAR0 SPORTIVE lWs AtSs BRUNO MadafmOua 

MUSIQUE MufquS obb 'I HEURES' DANIEL D. BRUNO DAVID Marlam Ouatt DAVID PEUL BRIGIrE SURAFANA SURAFANA SURAFANA SURAFANA SURAFANA SURAFANA 6Ua!:MA . DAMU DAMU DAMU DAMU DAMU DAMU .4EURES A.SANOGO A.SANOGO A.SANOGO A.SANOGO A.SANOGO A.SMOGO A.&S 

!ae REVES YEE MEMOIRE MINIANKALA RIonsim POU CONTES 

K.BAGAYOGO, K.BAGAYOGO LEN D'UN DAMBE SALSA MIXTES 2C~teui PAYS K TRAORE LDOUM1 A MUSIQUEJAZZ RAISON DE R -V DROITS ET KOUTIALA 

22ti"u 

COEUR DANIELU KONIBA S DEVOIRS PRORL .:s BRUNO DJIM BAGAYOGO A.DJIM DJIM BRUNO 

GALABU 

O3-h SHOW 

D u n ._DA NEL 

RF~~T~#~/%01~ r (70PY 
GRILLE ASSOCIATION RADIO LIBRE KAYIRA 

TO 22 87 82 Fax (223) 22 87 82 BP 3140 BAMAKO 

HEURE LUNDI MARDI MERCREDI JEUDI VENDREDI SAMEDI DIMANCHE 

05 H 55-06 H Indicatif Indicatif Indicatif Indicatif Indicatif Indicatif 6H55-7H: 

Indicatif 

06 H 10 - 6 H 30 Rdveil sportif Rdveil sportif Rdveil sportif Rdveil sportif R6veil sportif R6veil sportif 7H10-7H30 

Rdveil sportif 

6 H 30 ­7 H 00 Musique Musique Musique Musique Musique Musique 

7 H - 7 H 30 Circulation Circulation Circulation Circulation Circulation Circulation 

7 H 30 - 8 H 00 Musique Musique Musique Musique Musique Musique Musique 

8 H - 8 H 45 Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. 

r * 8 H 45 -9 H 00 Avis et Comm. Avis et Comm. Avis etComm. Avis et Comm. Avis et Comm. Avis et Comm. Avis et Comm. 

9 H 00 - 10 H 00 Assainissement Assainissemcnt Assainissement Histoire Assainissement Rencontre avc 

LAWALE artistes " 10 H - I!H DUBAS;KI KAYIRA GRIN KOLOSEKOROLA SEKO-NI DUKO Environnement 

Q 

n 

FI H - 12 H Santd en gdndral Sant6/Femme Revue de Presse Tribune de la 

Femme 

12 H - 12 H 30 Musique-Flash Musique-Flash Musiquc-Flash Musique-Flash Musique-Flash Musique-Flash Musique-Flash 

12 H 30 - 12H40 Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. Spots publicit. 

12 H 40 ­ 13 H Avis et Comm. Avis et Comm. Avis ct Comm. Avis et Comm. Avis et Comm. Avis et Comm. Avis et Comm. 

13 H - 14 H Musique Musique Musique Musique Musique Musique Musique 

14 H - 15 H Soninkd Songhoi Soninkd Songhoi Sonink6 30 mn JAZZ _ _ _ _Songhoi 30 mn 

_COULOIR DES JEUNES 

_5 H ­ 16 H Musique Musique Musique Musique Arabe Musiqje Echange de 

16 H - 17 H Musique Musique Musiquc Musique Musique Les enfants Programmes 
HEURE LUNDI MARDI MERCREDI JEUDI VENDREDI SAMEDI DIMANCHE 

17 H ­18 H Peulh Musique Peulh Musique 17H00 

Peulh 

- 17H30 Reggae 17 H - 17 H 30 

Musique classic 

18 H - 18 H 30 Avis et comm. Avis et comm. Avis et comm. Avis et comm. Avis et comm. Avis el comm. Avis et comm. 

18 H 30 - 19 H Musique Sariya bulon Musique Musique Sariya bulon Musique Musique 

19 H - 19 H 30 Musique Sariya bulon Musique Musique Sariya bulon Musique Musique 

19 H 30- 20 H Journal Journal Journal Journal Journal Journal Journal 

20 H - 20 H 30 Retrobal contes et Retrobal contes- Retrobal contes- Retrobal contes- Retrobal contes- Musique Musique 

devinettes d'enf. devinettes d'enf. devinettes d'enf. devinettes d'enf. devinettes d'enf. 

20 H 30 -21 H -- Sport _" -.,_ Sport 

21 H - 22 H ba fo pian Musique avec 

mn dc 

lecture/roman 

15 Musique avec 15 

de lecture/roman 

mn Musique avec 

mn de 

lecture/roman 

15 Musique avec 

mn lecture de 

roman 

15 Musique Le Mali un 

Marchd pour les 

cadres 

22 H - 23 H Mana Fen]re sur Ia Afrique en Radio trottoir m littdrature question 

-GINGIN GRIN (G.G.G.) 

23 H - 23 H 30 Musique indicat. Musique indicat. Musique indicat. 23 H I5 - OOH15 Musique indicat. Musique indicat. Musique 

>! cnr--] 23 H 30 - 00 H Avis et comm. Avis et comm. Avis et comm. 

Santd au bout de 

la nuiti Fermeture 

rni 00 H -00 H 30 G.G.G. G.G.G. G.G.0. OOH15: Avis- G.G.G. G.G.G. 

_ _ Com. 

00H 30-01H -- __ 

I H 00 -2 H 00 " _ __" 

2 H 00 - 3 H 00 _". - .. 

3 H Fermeture Fermeture Fermeture Fermeture Fermeture -"_ 

_ _ 

-f.-___ 4 H 0 0 

Fermeture 
PROGRAMME BAMAKAN FM 100 MHZ 

--Sep-tembre-1993 

SAMEDI 

LUNDI MARDI MERCREDI 08HO0 Sam'mat' 08h0

11h10 Connais-tu IWO JEUDI VENDhEDI 08h30
 Conn2is-tu 10h0 Connals-tu lhG Connals-tu ' Siraba thadya

mon beau ? l0h00 Pdle-mdle varlti 09h00 Mus adu terroir l1hOO

12hOO -on beau oa? mon beau ay? mon beau pays? 10h0D Kafo flash Kato School

12h05 AwniGwa 

12h0 Kato flash 12h00 Kafo flash 12h00 Kafo flash 12h00 Kafo flash 12h00 Kafo flash - 12h00
 12h05 AwniGwa 12h05 Aw niGwa 112h05 Aw niGwa 12h05 Aw niGwa 12h05 Aw niGwa 12h05
 

14h00 

1IW3O Lebeau 

AdroD1hifle 

ani Labelle 

14h00 Pile-Mile varitis'14h00 Airophille 141100 Airophills 14hO0 AiropMlle 14hCO L'invtti de la semalne 14h00

15 0 14h3 _ Kafo blon 14h3O Kafo blon Emission soninkd 16h00 Emisslon bobo lSh0 Emission sonraT 15h00 Kafo blon 15h00 Ploe-mile 15h00

16h0i 

15h30 Kafo blon IWO Kafo blon 15h30 Kafo blon -­ _15h00_
 Kafo flash 161h00 Kao flash IO Kafo flash 16h00 Kafo flash 16h00 Kafo flash 16h00 Kafoflash.., 16h05 Mini ambiance 1h05 Miodle du monde 16h05 Milodle du monde 18h05 Mdiodle du monde 16130 Kunnafoni mpalan 1Bh05 Mdlodle du monde 

16h0 

17hOO Kafo sport 17h00 Vos drolts at devo 17h0 Communlc. & D6v. 17h00 Bamakan Show 1 IShO1 

I9hO0 

Anirnat.brelcquds 

Dinnez 

18h00 ninat. Obrelc ifsIWO Anmat. librecqus 18h00 Animat. Iibre/cquis 1$h00 Plateau des assoclat. 18h00 Animat. librekcj!s 18h00
 en douceur I9h00 Dinnez en douceur I9h00 Dinnez en douceur 19h00 Dinnez en douceur IhO Dinnez en douceur 19h00 Dinnez en douceur 19h00 20h00 Orchestres du Mail 2Gh00 Pile-Mile 2h0 21h00Sokorakoro Le Grin 20hOO Klbaru Isnouvelle 20hOO Podium musical 20hO9 Voyage sur les ondes 20h001 

21h30
 ,22h00 Fin __--22h001 "Fin 22h000 Fin I22M FIn 22h00 Fin 22h00 La f6te de rArchange 22h00 

wm 

EMISSIONS CONTENUS 
 O0hOO Fin EMISSIONS CONTENUS 

Adrophille Animation bre (fr. ;bam) Kibara la nouvelie Infos pile-mile (bam; ft) F Afo Top > Aw ni Gwa Actualltd Magazine de Femme lamuslque africalne (fr) Kafo astrofash Horoscope (fr)

Bamakan 

ISant6 (barn) Kunnafoni mpalan Revue de Ia semalne (barn)

m C

show Musique RAPP (fr) Lebeau ani Labelle Radloscople du couple :sketch (bam) 6srijala InIntlatlves femnilnes M61odle du monde Vaditds musicales C Classic laser Musique classique(fr) 0 Communication & d6veloprnt Communication soclale (fr) Mini ambiance Musique Zouk Musique du terroir Musique traditlonnelle
 

Dinner 

Connais-tu 

en douceur 

mon beau pays? Histolre 

Musique 

du Mail (bam; fr) 
 Orcestresdu Mali Promotion des orchestres (bam; fr) de d6tente PJie-md/e Animation fibre (bam; fr) Fdte 

Grin 

de rArchange (ia) Animation musicale (barn; fr) Plateau des associations Tribune pour ass. & ONG (barn; t) (/e) Dibat avec t6lphone (bam; fr) Podium iusieal Rock, Soul, Jazz, Country music Invlt6 do la semaine Interview (fr) Sam' mat'gym Gymnastlque (fr) Kafo astroflash Horoscope (fr) Siraba shariya Circulation routldre (barn) Kafo blon Tribune (barn; fr) Soko n'a k~r3 Interprdtation des rives (barn) Kafo flash Flash d'lnformation (fr) Sounds of martyrs Musique Reggae

-

Kafo school Encyclopidle radlophon. (fr) Top g6nratlon Succis des anndes 80 et 70 Kafo 

Kafo 

sport Sport (lun. :I dim. :barn) Vos drofts &devoirs Information & dducation jurldiques (ft)

IL& 


telekun Asimatlon lbre (barn) Voyage surles ondes Muslque/Jeuxlconcours ( barn; fr) r t, i" L " -k _ VV. qj Langues : barn a bambara; *r- frangals" -OLCo O (e .() Y dr6n Connaissance de lacult. mallenne (bam) 
GRILLE DESPROGRAMMES LUNDI / VENDREDI 

6:00 & 09:00 KLEDU MATIN avec Mahamoud Camara et Sdkou Kone 

09:00 & 
09:30 CHRONIQUE FAITS-ET HISTOIRES avec Diadj Kinta 

09:30 A io:oo04AGAZINE SCIENTIFIQUE avec Tdophile Sangare
 

10:00 & 12:30 EMISSION BAMBARA avec Sokona Diallo
 

12:30 A 14:30 GRAFFITI COULEUR-avec Mahamoud Camara
 

14:30, 16:00 POINT FOCAL avec Saaba Sissoko et Jacky 

m 

-t 16:00 & 16:30 MAGAZINE.ECONOMIE avec Sekou Kone

16:30 & 17:3o MAGAZINE CULTURE avec Joseph Konat
 

S17:30 & 18:30 AFFAIRES PUBLIQUES avec T~ophile Sangar6
 

-18:30 & 19:30 ANTENNE USA avec la VOA
 

19:30 & 20:00 INFORMATION avec la VOA
 

20:00 
 20:30 LE DISQE DES AUDITEURS.avec Roger-Guv Folly
 

20:30 
 21:00 INFOPMATION avec l'quipe info et FARAFINA DAMBE.** avec Doss4 Traor4 

21:00 & 21:30 INFORMATION avec la VOA
 

21:30 & 00:00 KLEDU'S NIGHT avec l'4guipe de nuit ** dmission bi-hebdomadaire 
Appendix F. Media Survey Questionnaire
 
--

3 

M F 

I 

01 

110-15 

- SEXE 7- E3 15-30 3045 , 451 

IDENTITE 02-AGE 15.30 -47 

C m
 

03- SITUATION FAMILLE [-1 m-1
 

1 2 3 4 +4 

04- NOMBRE D'ENFANTS 7. L ED D El 

1 2 

11 - MOBILITE "- ED 

Eleve SE 

ACTIVITE 12 - OCCUPATION ED -' 
 MI

13- REVENU 

1 2 3

I Ei I 1 2 3 4 +4 

14-SECTEUR 
 liEi- E-i 

INTERET POUR LES MEDIAS 

Preferences mddias 2
 

leg~rement Moyen Fort
 

1011 RadioEl 


1 10111 -combien de postes r-l
 I

* 1012 T16 D- E •10121 -(.. ) l'­ * 1013 Presse ecrite -" -- El •10131 - Frequent achat r910 De fagon generale les programmes ou articles 

sont-ils interessants ? oui non sans avis 

•9101 Radio -' El ­

* 9102 T61e IJ I-l r-­

9103 Presse ecrite El r-M-

* 9104 Causes du manque d'int6ret: 

* 91041 Diversite i'
 

* 91043 Qualite Li 

91042 Liberte L7
 

' 910431 Sonorite -1
 

910432 Emission ri
 
1 2 3 4 

102 Vos preferences programmes : politique social Autre 

scientifiques varietes culturel 

* 1021- Radio -- E:1 El []-r-l r-­

*1022-Tee r-1 0 El F--1 l 

* 1023 - Presse ecrite E-"El El ED El ED 

20 INTERET POUR L'ECOUTE RADIO 

oui non SA 

* 201 - Aimez-vous la Radio ? [M r- Ml 

* 202 Avez-vous une Radio ? El ID El 

* 203 - Ecoutez-vous la Radio ? EEl ­

204 - Disponibilite d'6coute ? F2 3 wEn ] 51 ED I!]M FE 

* 205 - Ecoute week-end Matin 12-19 Soirde 

* 205, - Radio El El El 

* 2052 - T6l6 E F 

•206 - Intdret pour les emissions: Vif Moyen Nul 

* 2061 - Th6atre-radio El l -l 

* 2062 - Jeux concours ED- El 

* 2063 - Emission Jeunes -- El 

* 2064 - Morale et traditions (voix des sages) rI El rI 

Fr B Autre - angue [1 El [1 :1-F •220 -Quelles sont les contributions de la radio sur la Total Moyen Negatif 

soci6t6 : 

. 2201 - Securite ED El El 

* 2202 - Education El -l El 

* 2203- Affaires El. r El 

- 2204 - Loisirs El E El 

2205 - Culture E D 154 
• 207 -Heures d'ecoute souhaitees: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 . 

*2071-Infos E D EE E- DEl ED I- 0 D- -

* 2072 - Varietes (musique, d6tente) '13l l - E - lE El Ml El 

*2073-Culture -1 r -1 0 ED 0 - E 1 D-I r-1 

*2074 -Spor -- l- E E-l E-i Dr-1 

*2075 - Langues locales r-l - l l l El El l -l 

*2076-Sciences l - 1- D El E E--D El 

e208 - Lieu d'ecoute : uniquement souvent temps Aautre 

* 2081 - Domicile El El El 

*2082 - Grin E- El El 

*2083 - Travail El El El 

* 2084 -Ailleurs El El El 

• 2085 - Condition groupe El seul 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 

•209 -Vos stations pr6f6r6es []E ElF]E l-IEl l - El -- I l ElE r] 

varietes infos science culture sport bambara 

*2091-Programme E Dr-I ED El E-I F-1 

*2092 - Pourquoi ? Bon Passable Excellent 

*20921 - Qualit6 emission E- El El 

*20922 - Valeur emission E-I El El 

*20923 - Heure emission El El El 

*20924 - Langue E El El 

*930 - Qu pensez-vous du nombre de 

st',tions au Mali ', 

* 9301 -Excessif -l 1 

*9302 - Normal M" 2 

* 9303 - Insuffisant --I 3 
COCHEZ LES STATIONS QUE VOUS CONNAISSEZ
 

FR3 RFI BAMAKAN KLEDU TABALE KAYIRA CHAINE 2 LIBERTE AFRICA 

N".1 

Qualite 

generole 

Heure de 

Langue 

valeur 

Animation 

Confiance 

Le serieux 

10 Bon 

20 Moyen 

30 Nul 

40 Sons avis 
Appendix G. Interest Group Survey
 
ETUDE ARD/MSU/IMRAD 
-- GUIDE D'INTERVIEW AVEC
 DES GROUPES ORGANISES DE LA SOCIETE CIVILE AU MALI
 

A. INFORMATIONS Date: _/ /1994 STRUCTURELLES
 

Nom du Groupe ou Association:
 

Type de Groupe ou Association 
 _ 

Le Groupe est-il ind6pendant ou 
fait-il partie d'un regroupement
 plus large (coordination, union, etc.)?
 

Personnes Rencontr~es, 
et Position:
 

Objectif ou raison sociale:
 

Les objectifs du groupe sont-ils largement 
connus et partag6s par
 

les membres?
 

Que la r6ponse soit positive ou n6gative, expliquer pourquoi:
 

Quelles 


hi6rarchie, 

sont la structure et l'organisation internes (type de
 distribution g6ographique, mode de mise 
en place des
 responsables, etc.):
 

Nombre d'adherents/membres:
 

les 

Quelles 

moyens 

sont la taille, l'organisation, la structure interne, et


groupe? 

financiers et humains (y compris niveau de formation) du


compris 

De quelles ressources internes et externes dispose-t-il? (y
 d'un appui 6ventuel de l'exterieur):
 
Le groupe passe-t-il plut6t par 
des moyens 16gaux, ou par une
 strat6gie conflictuelle? (grave, "casse", pression 
sur l'opinion
 publique par les m~dias, protestations, etc):
 

Le groupe fonctionne-t-il de fa;on ind6pendante, ou a-t-il 6tabli
 des relations --et de quel type-- avec le Gouvernement, les partis,
 la classe politique, et 
les autres groupes constitu6s?
 

B. CRITERES D'EVALUATION DE LA CAPACITE DU GROUPE
 

Le groupe a-t-il acces 
 aux informations sur la situation
 economique, sur 
les politiques en cours ou envisag~es? Par quel
 mecanisme?
 

Le groupe dispose-t-il de m~canisme, et de ressources n6cessaires
 

pour proc6der & une analyse des informations obtenues, A travers
 

son bureau, un ensemble de sp6cialistes du groupe, en ou en faisant
 appel a des comp6tences externes?
 

Le groupe s'organise-t-il pour examiner l'analyse et d6cider de sa position par rapport ' cette analyse et aux objectifs du groupe
 (ne rien faire, appuyer ou opposer une politique, proposer d'autres
 options, etc) ?
 

Le groupe a-t-i! la capacit6 d'exercer une influence par rapport au
 choix qui a 6t6 fait?
 

Dans l'experience passee du Groupe, citer les cas o' il a pu
 proc6der ' des delib6rations, faire des choix, exercer une
 influence: participation A un processus de d6cision
 gouvernementale, consultation par les 
autorit6s, r~le jou6 dans
 certaines crises pass6es:
 
Appendix 1T. Characteristics of Selected Interest Groups
 
ANALYSIS OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED INTEREST GROUPS-MALI 

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 

IntGroup Urban Single Corpor Resource Large info Analyt Confr Massmob 

ABB 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 

ADIDE 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 

AFE 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 

ASCOMA 1 1 2 2 1 1 I 2 1 

ATVR I 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 

CAFO 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 

CCIM 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

FNEM 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 

GPP I 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 

SYCOV 2 i 1 2 1 2 2 i 1 

SYNTRUI I I I 1 1 1 1 2 2 

UNCTRM I 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 

UNTM 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 I 1 

SYNABAT I 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 

SYNAPRO 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 

GCM j I I 1 I 2 1 I I 

CCAM 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 

COFEM 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 

SYNAPPO I I I I 1 1 1 2 2 

YES (1) 17 12 12 10 14 11 14 6 11 

NO (2) 2 7 7 9 5 8 5 13 8 

% YES 63% 63% 53% 74% 58% 74% 32% 58% 

I/
 
IntGroup Consult Media NatAssm PolAn Pollnst Effect Power 

ABB 1 1 0 1 1 1 i 

ADIDE 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 

AFE 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 

ASCOMA 1 I 0 2 1 i 0 

ATVR 2 i 0 2 1 1 1 

CAFO2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 

CCIM I I I I I I I 

FNEM I I I I I 1 I 

GPP 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 

SYCOV 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 

SYNTRUI 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 

UNCTRM 1 2 0 2 2 2 2 

UNTM I I 1 1 I I I 

SYNABAT I I I 1 1 1 2 

SYNAPRO 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 

GCM 1 .1 1 2 1 I I 

CCAM 1 0 1 1 1 1 I 

COFEM I 1 0 1 I I 2 

SYNAPPO I 1 1 1 I I I 

YES (1) 15 19 9 10 14 16 10 

NO (2) 4 4 2 9 5 3 8 

% YES 79% 74% 47% 53% 74% 84% 53% 
GROUPS DEMONSTRATING EFFECTIVENESS 

IntGroup Urban Single Corpor Resource Large info Analyt Confr 04assmob 

ABB 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 

ASCOMA 1 I 2 2 1 I 2 1 

ATVR 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 

CAFO 1 2 2 2 i 2 2 2 1 

CCAM I I 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 

CCIM I 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 

COFEM 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 

FNEM 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 

GCM 1 1 I 1 1 2 1 1 1 

GPP 1 1 1 1 2 I 1 2 2 

SYCOV 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 

SYNABAT I I 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 

SYNAPPO I I I 1 1 1 1 2 2 

SYNAPRO 2 2 1 2 I 2 1 1 1 

SYNTRUI I I I I I 1 I 2 2 

UNTM 1 2 2 1 1 I 2 1 I 

POWERFUL GROUPS 

ABB 1 2 1 1 2 1 I 2 2 

ATVR 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 

CCAM I I 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 

CCIM 1 2 I 1 I I I I I 

FNEM 1 2 I 1 1 I 1 2 2 

GCM I I I 1 1 2 I 1 1 

GPP I I 1 I 2 1 1 2 2 

SYNAPPO I I I I I I 1 2 2 

SYNTRUI 1 I I I I 1 1 2 2 

UNTM 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 
IntGIoup Consult Media NatAssm PolAn PolInst Effect Power 

ABB I I 0 1 1 1 1 

ASCOMA I 1 0 2 i 1 0 

ATVR 2 i 0 2 1 1 1 

CAFO 2 I 2 2 2 1 2 

CCAM 1 0 1 1 1 I 1 

CCIM 1 1 I 1 I 1 

COFEM 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 

FNEM I I I I I I 

GCM I I I 2 1 i 

GPP 1 2 2 1 1 1 

SYCOV 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 

SYNABAT I 1 I 1 1 1 2 

SYNAPPO I I I I I I I 

SYNAPRO 1 2 0 2 2 I 2 

SYNTRUI 1 2 0 2 2 1 2 

UNTM I I I I I 1 

ABB I 1 0 1 I I 1 

ATVR 2 1 0 2 I 1 1 

CCAM 1 0 1 I 1 I 

CCIM I I I I 1 I I 

FNEM I I I I 1 I I 

GCM I I 1 2 I I I 

GPP 1 2 2 1 I 

SYNAPPO I I I I 1 I I 

SYNTRUI I I I I I I 1 

UNTM I I 1 i I i 1 
Appendix I. Schematic Illustrations of the Cotton Sub-Sector in Mali
 
Schematic Illustration of the Cotton Sub-Sector in Mali 

Imported Inputs 

PDha Ferilizer Insecticides Chemicals Parts 

Dt.c ............... ~ r
 ...... 


CMDT e4 Seed farm SPC Farm equip- Seed farm Cment suppliers 

OHV 

$for purchase 

V V OHV 

farmers 

Eval., in uts delive F CMDT Extension 

.men CMDT zn 

GOMT --

ruraer
 __-__CO_ farmers

development O1N
 

$ appropriation fartOUTPUTS 

13 Gnning Plants 1a 

0HUICOMA 8o 

STBEEX EX 

.... 

L 
Schematic Illustration of Cotton Sub-Sector Policy Areas 

Inputs 

Chemicals Insecticides Fertilizer Proramh 

SMPC 

OHV 

OHV 

farmers 

CMDT 

$ from Dutch grant (1/3) CMDT zone 

_________________ farmers GO M ............................. $ app l*iatron lfor0rurN


develoMent 

OUTPUTS 

(13 Ginning Plants) 

[TEMA Fiber 

COMATEX Exports E 

Proceed frome 

Staiiztion ........... . Fiber Sales
 

fund1 
Fiscal Fiscal/Budge 

Budget 

Rural Development 

-I Fiscal 

PIndustry 

Industry/Trade 

Fiscal BE 
Schematic Illustration of Cotton Sub-Sector Policy Areas 

Dutch
 

Program Fertilizer InsecticidesChmcl
 

Fiscal * Fiscal/Budget 

Budget SP 

.....
 w w- w om 

OHV 

Rural Development OHV 

farmers 

...-.......... CMDT
 

$from Dutch grant (11/3) CMDT zone 

GO M ii h!7ra ;m farm ers 

development 

Fiscal 

OUTPUTS
 

(13 Ginning Plants) 

!! Industry 

v i St.;HUICOMA 

ITEMA Fiber m 

COMATEX Ex
 

Livestock 

. .......... Industry/Trade
 

~~Stabilizationfud 1.....