[Cite as Skaggs v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2022-Ohio-2034.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Jason Skaggs, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 21AP-465

v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2019-00650JD)

Ohio Department of Rehabilitation : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

and Correction, 

:

Defendant-Appellee.

:

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on June 16, 2022

On brief: Jason Skaggs, pro se. 

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Jenna Jacobus, and 

Chelsey M. Capezzuti, for appellee.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio 

McGRATH, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal by plaintiff-appellant, Jason Skaggs, from a judgment of the 

Court of Claims of Ohio overruling his objections to a magistrate's decision and entering 

judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction ("ODRC"), on appellant's action against ODRC. For the reasons that follow, we 

affirm. 

{¶ 2} Appellant, currently an inmate in the custody of ODRC, appears to suffer 

from a seizure disorder. On May 23, 2019, appellant filed a pro se complaint against ODRC 

alleging that he has been an inmate since 2008, housed in three different institutions over 

that period of time. The complaint alleged appellant has suffered seizures from the age of 
No. 21AP-465 2

16, and that he had been treated and prescribed various medications to control his 

condition. 

{¶ 3} According to the complaint, beginning "about 6/25/2016," the London 

Correctional Institution "for no apparent reason has taken the plaintiff off his prescribe[d] 

and mandatory medication * * * to control" his condition, and during this time he has

been placed on "mind [altering] psychotic drugs" of Phelbatol and Depakote "to help keep 

in check the attacks of unmanageable seizures." (Emphasis sic.) (Compl. at 1 & Attachment 

to Compl. at 3.) The complaint also alleged that appellant's wrists had been injured due to 

"excessive force" in being handcuffed. (Attachment to Compl. at 4.) 

{¶ 4} On June 26, 2019, ODRC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 

12(B)(6). In the accompanying memorandum in support, ODRC argued appellant's claim 

that he was wrongly denied medication was barred by the applicable one-year statute of 

limitations "for events dating back to 2016." (Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) By entry filed 

December 19, 2019, the Court of Claims denied ODRC's motion to dismiss. 

{¶ 5} On December 27, 2019, appellant filed a motion to amend his complaint,

pursuant to Civ.R. 15, which the Court of Claims granted by order filed February 4, 2020. 

On February 18, 2020, appellant filed an amended complaint. ODRC filed an answer to the 

amended complaint on March 24, 2020.

{¶ 6} On March 4, 2021, the matter came for trial before a magistrate of the Court 

of Claims. On May 26, 2021, the magistrate filed a decision recommending that judgment 

be entered in favor of ODRC. 

{¶ 7} While the record on appeal does not include a trial transcript, the decision of 

the magistrate sets forth the following factual findings and conclusions of law. At trial, 

appellant testified that, "prior to entering prison in 2008, he was placed on seizure 

medication in 2003 and has continued to take seizure medication since that time." 

Appellant related "he suffers from grand mal seizures, complex partial seizures, and stare 

seizures." According to appellant, "when he has a seizure, he often loses control of his 

bodily movements and * * * he is unable to recall events that occurred while * * * suffering 

from his seizure." Appellant "stated that with the aid of his medications, Topamax and 

Keppra, his seizures have been controlled." (Mag. Decision at 1.)

{¶ 8} Appellant related "he was transferred to the London Correctional Institution

in January 2016 and began to have problems with seizures shortly thereafter." He testified 
No. 21AP-465 3

that "at some point [ODRC's] medical staff discontinued his seizure medication." The 

decision by the institution to remove him from Topamax "occurred on February 5, 2016,"

and the decision to remove him "from Keppra occurred on February 9, 2016." (Mag. 

Decision at 1 citing Pl.'s Ex. 1.) Appellant "was gradually [weaned] off both medications 

over the next couple of months." (Mag. Decision at 1-2.)

{¶ 9} Appellant testified he "began to experience frequent seizures that were 

witnessed by staff and other prison employees." He "believes * * * the medications should 

never have been discontinued and that by removing him from his medications, he began to 

have frequent seizures." According to appellant, "it appeared to him that [ODRC] did not 

believe that his seizures were real." (Mag. Decision at 2.)

{¶ 10} Appellant "described several incidents where he received conduct reports for 

his actions while he was having a seizure," and "emphasized * * * he has no ability to control 

his actions when he is having a seizure." Appellant testified that he suffered a seizure on 

April 27, 2016, "and he was unable to respond to corrections officer's orders, unable to 

control himself, became aggressive, and grabbed the arm of the corrections officer." In a 

second incident occurring on July 3, 2016, a corrections officer "was escorting [appellant] 

when [he] became 'dead weight' and was taken to the floor." In a third incident, occurring 

on July 28, 2016, two corrections officers "found [appellant] lying down and shaking." At 

"some point," appellant attempted to "grab" one of the officers "by the right arm." The 

corrections officers then "grabbed [appellant] by the shoulders, placed him on the wall, 

attempted to place handcuffs on him, and ordered him to comply." When appellant "failed 

to comply, corrections officers deployed pepper spray." Appellant "continued to become 

more aggressive until officers gained control of him." As a result, appellant was "placed in 

the hole (restrictive housing) with handcuffs on that [appellant] says were too tight." 

Appellant "testified that his wrists were damaged by the handcuffs." (Mag. Decision at 2.)

{¶ 11} Appellant testified that "in October 2016, his diagnosis was confirmed and 

[ODRC] prescribed Depakote and Keppra." Appellant "believes he should have been 

prescribed Topamax." Appellant "acknowledged that he was never denied seizure 

medication and was continually provided medications." He "believes," however, "he should 

have never had Topamax and Keppra removed from his prescription plan." Appellant 

further testified that "Disability Rights Ohio became involved in his case and his conduct 

reports were amended to show that he was not breaking prison rules but that he was 
No. 21AP-465 4

suffering from medical issues." Appellant "added that he is currently on Keppra and 

Topamax." (Mag. Decision at 2-3.)

{¶ 12} The other witness at trial, "Landon Khols, the health care administrator at 

the Allen-Oakwood Correctional Institution, testified that [appellant] is on the healthcare 

load for [ODRC]." Khols "examined a list of prescription medi[c]ations that [appellant] has 

been prescribed since 2017 and noted that dating back to March 2017 [appellant] has been 

consistently provided with various combinations of seizure medications, including 

Divalproex (Depakote), Levetiracetam (Keppra) and Carbamazepine." (Mag. Decision at 

3.)

{¶ 13} With respect to appellant's claim for "excessive force," the magistrate noted 

that appellant "claims injuries arising from at least one of the 2016-incidents, in which force 

was used on him while he was suffering from a seizure" and during which, according to

appellant, "his wrists were damaged because the handcuffs were too tight." The magistrate 

determined that, because appellant "did not file this action until May 23, 2019," the twoyear statute of limitations under R.C. 2743.16(A) "bars any recovery arising out of the force 

that was used on him." (Mag. Decision at 3.)

{¶ 14} The magistrate next addressed ODRC's argument that appellant's "medical 

negligence claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations for such claims" under 

R.C. 2305.113(A). The magistrate observed that appellant "challenges the February 2016 

decision of the medical staff to adjust his seizure medication," and noted appellant "believes 

that Topamax and Keppra should have always been his prescription medication and that it 

was a mistake to alter his medications." The magistrate determined, however, appellant 

"filed this action on May 23, 2019, well beyond the time limitation for bringing such 

actions" and that, "[e]ven applying the two-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2743.16(A),

[appellant's] claim would likewise be time-barred." (Mag. Decision at 3, 4.) 

{¶ 15} Finally, the magistrate observed, "even if [appellant] had timely filed his 

claim challenging the decision to adjust his seizure medication, [he] did not present any 

expert testimony to support such a claim. The negligence [appellant] describes arose in the 

course of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment, and is thus a claim for medical 

malpractice." Finding that appellant "failed to present any expert witness testimony to 

establish the standard of care or that a breach of that standard proximately caused him 

harm," the magistrate concluded appellant "cannot prevail on his claim for medical 
No. 21AP-465 5

malpractice." (Mag. Decision at 4-5, 6.) Based on the above determinations, the magistrate 

therefore recommended that judgment be entered in favor of ODRC.

{¶ 16} On June 10, 2021, appellant filed a "motion to deny this Magistrate decision 

to deny the plaintiff complaint," which the Court of Claims construed as objections to the 

magistrate's decision. In his motion, appellant asserted he "never * * * submitted a Claim 

for 'Medical Malpractice,' " and that "if the Court would read the Complaint actually as 

written it will determine this was [a] negl[i]gent tort action." (June 10, 2021 Mot. at 1.) 

{¶ 17} On August 18, 2021, the Court of Claims filed a judgment entry adopting the 

magistrate's decision as its own and entering judgment in favor of ODRC. The Court of 

Claims, noting that appellant did not provide a transcript of the trial evidence to support 

his objections (nor an affidavit of evidence), restricted its consideration of the objections to 

"a review of the magistrate's legal conclusions." (Aug. 18, 2021 Jgmt. Entry at 2.) In its 

entry, the Court of Claims held in relevant part:

A review of the magistrate's legal conclusions reveals that he 

neither erred in construing Plaintiff's claim as one for medical 

malpractice nor finding that Plaintiff's claim was barred by the 

statute of limitations. Indeed, if ODRC's alleged negligent acts 

or omissions arise in the course of medical diagnosis, care, or 

treatment of an inmate, then it is a claim for medical 

malpractice. * * * The negligence Plaintiff alleges involves 

Defendant's medical staff altering Plaintiff's seizure 

medications, Topamax and Keppra, in February 2016. Indeed, 

such actions arise out of Defendant's medical diagnosis, care, 

or treatment of Plaintiff. Thus, the Court finds no error with 

the magistrate construing Plaintiff's allegations as a claim for 

medical malpractice.

Additionally, Plaintiff was aware Defendant's medical staff

altered his seizure medication in February 2016 and Plaintiff 

believes he should have always been prescribed Topamax and 

Keppra. Indeed, this is a cognizable event that should 

reasonably alert Plaintiff to pursue his remedies regarding an 

error in his medical care. * * * Despite Plaintiff's contention 

that Defendant's negligence was ongoing until 2020, it is clear 

that Plaintiff believes Defendant began mishandling his 

medical treatment in 2016. Thus, the Court finds no error with 

the magistrate's legal finding that Plaintiff's medical 

malpractice claim is time-barred. 

Assuming arguendo that the Court were to construe Plaintiff's 

claim as ordinary negligence, his claim would likewise be 
No. 21AP-465 6

barred by the two-year statute of limitations. * * * As stated 

above, Plaintiff claims Defendant's discontinuation of 

Plaintiff's seizure medication, which led to several use-of-force 

incidents, occurred in 2016. Consequently, Plaintiff's May 

2019 complaint cannot survive the statute of limitations. 

(Jgmt. Entry at 5-6.) 

{¶ 18} While appellant's pro se brief contains a section titled "ASSIGNMENT OF 

ERROR[]," his brief does not set forth a statement of assignments of error as required by 

App.R. 16(A)(3). However, appellant asserts in his brief that the Court of Claims erred "by 

accepting that [ODRC] produce the expert witness called at the trial." According to 

appellant, "the State through [its] agents at trial * * * called Landon Khols," and the Court 

of Claims "then * * * construed that [appellant] called this witness." Appellant argues that 

he "never raised a malpractice claim," and that the Court of Claims "abused [its] discretion 

by not accepting [his] claim * * * [as] other than a Tort/Negligence claim." (Appellant's 

Brief at 4.) 

{¶ 19} Appellant further argues that, upon entering the custody of ODRC, he was 

taking "the correct medication that was prescribed to him," and that ODRC had a 

"mandatory duty * * * not to experiment with other medications." Appellant maintains

ODRC and its agents "prescribed various combination[s]" of medications that only 

increased his seizures and failed to "control his seizure activity." According to appellant, 

his seizure activity only decreased once he was "given back * * * his original prescribed 

medication of Topamax and Keppra." (Emphasis sic.) (Appellant's Brief at 4, 7.)

{¶ 20} As noted by the Court of Claims in its decision addressing appellant's 

objections, appellant "did not provide a transcript of the evidence to support his objections 

or an affidavit of evidence." (Jgmt. Entry at 2.) Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) states in part that "[a]

party may file written objections to a magistrate's decision within fourteen days of the filing 

of the decision." Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) states in part: "An objection to a factual finding, 

whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), shall 

be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that 

finding or an affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available." 

{¶ 21} In the absence of a transcript or affidavit, a trial court is "required to accept 

the magistrate's findings of fact" and can "only examine the legal conclusions drawn from 

those facts." Sanders v. Wamco, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-548, 2011-Ohio-1336, ¶ 9, citing 
No. 21AP-465 7

Harris v. Mapp, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1347, 2006-Ohio-5515, ¶ 7. See also Compton v. 

Bontrager, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1169, 2004-Ohio-3695, ¶ 6 ("Where the required support 

for a party's objections is not provided, a trial court is required to accept the magistrate's 

findings of facts, and can examine only the legal conclusions based on those facts."). In 

such circumstances, this court's "review of appellant's assignments of error is limited to 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the law to the magistrate's findings 

of facts." Id., citing H.L.S. Bonding Co. v. Fox, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-150, 2004-Ohio-547.

{¶ 22} At the outset, we note the focus of appellant's argument on appeal involves 

his contention that he suffered "injuries * * * from the wrong combination of medications 

that the State and through its agent [ODRC] prescribed over many years." (Emphasis sic.)

(Appellant's Brief at 5.) Related to this argument is appellant's contention that the Court 

of Claims erred in treating such claim (i.e., arising from the decision by ODRC to make 

changes to his prescription medications) as sounding in medical malpractice as opposed to 

ordinary negligence. 

{¶ 23} We first address, however, appellant's claim of injury arising from alleged use

of "excessive force." The Court of Claims, in addressing appellant's objections to the 

magistrate's decision, held in part that, even construing appellant's claim as ordinary 

negligence, the evidence as to use-of-force incidents "occurred in 2016," and therefore 

could not survive the statute of limitations. (Jgmt. Entry at 6.)

{¶ 24} In addressing the evidence presented regarding appellant's excessive force

claim, the decision of the magistrate cites testimony by appellant describing "several 

incidents" in 2016 (i.e., incidents occurring on April 27, July 3, and July 28, 2016) in which 

he "received conduct reports for his actions while he was having a seizure." The magistrate 

noted appellant asserted "injuries arising from at least one of the 2016-incidents" (i.e., the 

third incident on July 28, 2016), "in which force was used on him while he was suffering 

from a seizure" and during which, according to appellant, "his wrists were damaged because 

the handcuffs were too tight." (Mag. Decision at 2, 3.)

{¶ 25} Accepting that appellant's claim of excessive force sounds in ordinary 

negligence, R.C. 2743.16 sets forth the applicable statute of limitations and states in part: 

"[C]ivil actions against the state permitted by sections 2743.01 to 2743.20 of the Revised 

Code shall be commenced no later than two years after the date of accrual of the cause of 

action or within any shorter period that is applicable to similar suits between private 
No. 21AP-465 8

parties." In general, " ' "a cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful action is 

committed." ' " McDougald v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-218,

2020-Ohio-6697, ¶ 8, quoting Union Sav. Bank v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 191 Ohio App.3d 

540, 2010-Ohio-6396, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.), quoting Harris v. Liston, 86 Ohio St.3d 203, 205 

(1999). 

{¶ 26} In the present case, the magistrate, who heard testimony by appellant 

asserting injury arising from an incident occurring in 2016, accordingly found the general 

time period of 2016 as the accrual date for the cause of action. We find no error in the 

magistrate's determination (as adopted by the Court of Claims) that the cause of action for 

such claim accrued at the time of the incident. Thus, under R.C. 2743.16, appellant "had 

two years after the accrual of the cause of action to file a civil action against the state." 

Rankin v. Ohio Reformatory for Women, 1oth Dist. No. 09AP-524, 2009-Ohio-6575, ¶ 17. 

Because appellant filed his pro se complaint on May 23, 2019, his claim for excessive force

based on an alleged 2016 incident cannot survive the applicable statute of limitations. 

Accordingly, the Court of Claims did not err in applying the law to the facts and determining 

the claim was time-barred. 

{¶ 27} We now turn to appellant's primary argument on appeal in which, as 

indicated above, he contends the Court of Claims erred in granting judgment in favor of 

ODRC regarding his claim of injury arising from "the wrong combination of medications"

that ODRC "prescribed over many years." (Emphasis sic.) On this issue, we initially 

address appellant's contention that he "never raised" or "mention[ed]" a "malpractice 

claim," and that his action was a "[t]ort/[n]egligence" claim. (Appellant's Brief at 5, 4.) 

{¶ 28} As set forth under the facts, the magistrate construed the negligence 

described by appellant as a claim for medical malpractice, and the Court of Claims found 

no error with that determination. Pursuant to R.C. 2305.113(A), "an action upon a medical 

* * * claim shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued." In 

general, in the context of a medical malpractice claim, the statute of limitations begins to 

run when "a cognizable event puts the patient on notice that malpractice may have caused 

him or her to suffer injury." Garcia v. Parenteau, 3d Dist. No. 5-17-13, 2017-Ohio-8519, 

¶ 9. See also George v. Univ. of Toledo Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-599, 2018-Ohio-719, 

¶ 13 ("In determining when a patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and 

diligence should have discovered, the resulting injury, courts look to the occurrence of a 
No. 21AP-465 9

'cognizable event' as the trigger for the commencement of the statute of limitations."). "A 

'cognizable event' is defined as 'some noteworthy event * * * which does or should alert a 

reasonable person-patient that an improper medical procedure, treatment or diagnosis has 

taken place.' " Hans v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-10, 2007-Ohio3294, ¶ 10, quoting Allenius v. Thomas, 42 Ohio St.3d 131, 134 (1989). Accordingly, "if a 

patient believes, because of harm she has suffered, that her treating medical professional 

has done something wrong, such a fact is sufficient to alert a plaintiff to the necessity for 

investigation and pursuit of her remedies." Id.

{¶ 29} Under Ohio statutory law, a "medical claim" is defined in part as " 'any claim 

that is asserted in any civil action against a physician, * * * hospital, * * * or residential 

facility, * * * and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.' "

Foy v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 16AP-723, 2017-Ohio-1065, ¶ 15, 

quoting R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). In considering the term "medical claim," courts have 

determined that R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) requires two components which must be read 

together: "(1) the claim is asserted against one or more of the specifically enumerated 

medical providers and (2) the claim arises out of medical diagnosis, care, or treatment." 

Id., quoting Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical Application of Ohio, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 488, 

2009-Ohio-1525, ¶ 18. 

{¶ 30} In considering the applicable limitations period, " ' "courts must look to the 

actual nature or subject matter of the case, rather than to the form in which the action is 

pleaded. The grounds for bringing the action are the determinative factors, the form is 

immaterial." ' " Montgomery v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1024, 2012-Ohio5489, ¶ 13, quoting Love v. Port Clinton, 37 Ohio St.3d 98, 99 (1988), quoting Hambleton 

v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183 (1984).

{¶ 31} Based on the testimony and evidence presented by appellant at trial, the 

magistrate determined that the decision to wean appellant off his then current seizure 

medication occurred on February 5, 2016 (Topamax) and February 9, 2016 (Keppra). (Mag.

Decision at 1.) In the absence of a transcript, we accept the factual findings of the magistrate 

that the decision to change appellant's medications occurred in February 2016.

{¶ 32} In addressing appellant's objections to the magistrate's decision, the Court of 

Claims held that the negligence alleged by appellant "involves [ODRC's] medical staff 

altering [appellant's] seizure medications, Topamax and Keppra, in February 2016," and 
No. 21AP-465 10

that "such actions arise out of [ODRC's] medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of 

[appellant]." (Jgmt. Entry at 5.) We agree.

{¶ 33} Here, based on the record presented, the alleged negligent acts involve 

ODRC's medical staff changing appellant's seizure medications (involving the 

corresponding issues of whether he suffered from a seizure disorder and the proper course 

of medication to treat such a condition). Such actions, which implicate the standard of care 

for treating a seizure disorder, arise out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of 

appellant. Accordingly, the Court of Claims did not err in finding appellant presented a 

claim for medical malpractice. See Evans v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 

16AP-767, 2018-Ohio-1035, ¶ 2, 35 (action by inmate claiming ODRC "negligently 

prescribed" medication, and "negligently changed his medication," presented a claim for 

medical malpractice); Gibson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-379, 

2019-Ohio-4955, ¶ 18 (holding that appellant's claims "sound in medical negligence rather 

than ordinary negligence" as "[m]edical skill and judgment was necessary to determine the 

proper course of treatment * * * and [to] determine whether any medication should have 

been prescribed to him"). 

{¶ 34} Having found the claim at issue involved medical malpractice, the magistrate 

and Court of Claims further determined the action was barred under the applicable statute 

of limitations. Again, we find no error with that determination. 

{¶ 35} As noted, the magistrate found, based on evidence presented by appellant, 

that the decision by ODRC to remove him from Topamax occurred on February 5, 2016, 

and the decision to remove him from Keppra occurred on February 9, 2016. Further,

appellant testified "the medications should never have been discontinued and that by 

removing him from his medications, he began to have frequent seizures" (including three 

incidents in 2016, occurring on April 27, July 3, and July 28, 2016). (Mag. Decision at 2.) 

In addressing appellant's objection to the magistrate's decision, the Court of Claims noted 

appellant was "aware" that ODRC's medical staff "altered his seizure medication in 

February 2016," and that appellant "believes he should have always been prescribed 

Topamax and Keppra." (Jgmt. Entry at 5.) Here, as recognized by the Court of Claims, the 

"cognizable event" that should have alerted appellantto pursue remedies regarding an error 

in his medical care occurred in February 2016 when ODRC's medical staff began adjusting 

his seizure medication. See Hans at ¶ 10. Because the claim accrued in 2016, and appellant 
No. 21AP-465 11

did not file his complaint until May 23, 2019, the Court of Claims did not err in determining 

the medical malpractice claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (i.e., the 

one-year statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.113(A)). 

{¶ 36} We note the Court of Claims alternatively concluded, even construing 

appellant's claim "as ordinary negligence," that such claim "would likewise be barred by the 

two-year statute of limitations." (Jgmt. Entry at 6.) Based on the record presented, we 

would also find no error with that determination.

{¶ 37} Finally, we briefly address appellant's contention that the Court of Claims 

erred "by accepting that [ODRC] produce the expert witness called at the trial," and his 

further assertion that "the State through [its] agents at trial * * * called Landon Khols, [and] 

then the court construed that [appellant] called this witness." (Appellant's Brief at 4.) 

{¶ 38} A review of the limited record on appeal does not support any contention the 

magistrate "construed" that appellant called ODRC witness (i.e., Khols) as his own expert 

witness. Further, in context, while the magistrate found appellant's claim as barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations, the magistrate alternatively observed that, "even if plaintiff 

had timely filed his claim challenging the decision to adjust his seizure medication, plaintiff 

did not present any expert testimony to support such a claim." (Mag. Decision at 4-5.) In 

this respect, the magistrate cited Ohio case law for the proposition that, "in order to prove 

a claim for medical malpractice, '[e]xpert testimony is required to establish the standard of 

care and to demonstrate the defendant's alleged failure to conform to that standard.' " 

(Mag. Decision at 5, quoting Reeves v. Healy, 192 Ohio App.3d 769, 2011-Ohio-1487, ¶ 38

(1oth Dist.), citing Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 130-31 (1976).)

{¶ 39} To the extent the magistrate recognized that expert testimony was required 

to prove a medical negligence claim based on the allegations and testimony presented, 

appellant cannot show error. See, e.g., Monroe v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 10th Dist. 

No. 89AP-842 (Feb. 27, 1990) (noting expert medical testimony was "essential to a finding 

of medical malpractice" in case in which plaintiff sought to establish that "defendant's 

treatment of plaintiff's seizure disorder fell below the accepted standard of care"). Thus,

while the magistrate's discussion of the requirement of expert testimony in a medical 

malpractice action was not dispositive of the statute of limitations issue, appellant has not 

demonstrated error with respect to the magistrate's analysis regarding that issue.
No. 21AP-465 12

{¶ 40} For the reasons stated above, we conclude the Court of Claims properly 

applied the law to the facts in overruling appellant's objections and in finding that his claims 

were barred under the applicable statutes of limitations.

{¶ 41} Based on the foregoing, appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled, and 

the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio is hereby affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

LUPER SCHUSTER, P.J., and DORRIAN, J., concur.

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