1. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was redesignated the Missile

Defense Agency (MDA) in January 2002. This action elevated BMDO to agency status. Has this redesignation changed your mission in any way?

The change of name reflects a change in responsibilities and authorities of the MDA

Director to manage the development of a single integrated Ballistic Missile Defense

(BMD) System in a single program within the Department of Defense. The new

organization and authorities will impact decision-making, especially with respect to

how we proceed. The redesignation did not change the mission, but rather it

marked the culmination of last year's extensive missile defense review to determine

how to proceed to meet our growing need for protection from ballistic missile attack.

2. What objectives have been established for missile defense?

The objective of the Missile Defense Program is to develop and, in collaboration with

the Military Departments and Joint Staff, deploy incrementally a BMD System that layers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of flight − in boost, midcourse, and terminal.1 The system will evolve to address all ranges of threat ballistic missiles and to

protect the territories and deployed forces of the United States, allies and friends.

Continued on page 2 

Volume 3, Number 2

March 2002

Contents

Interview with

General Kadish 1

Introducing Dr Scannell 6

Anti-Jam GPS Pt II 7

Directors Corner 12

FYI.. 8

New Sensors & Seekers

Course 11

Calendar of Events 15

WSTIAC is a DoD Information

Analysis Center Sponsored by the

Defense Technical Information

Center and Operated by IiT

Research Institute

WST

WEAPON SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION ANALYSIS CENTER

IAC

Interview with

Lt Gen Ronald T. Kadish 

Director, Missile Defense Agency

1 The first opportunity to intercept a missile comes in the boost phase, as it rockets towards space. In this phase of flight,

the hot missile is easy to see. The disadvantage of intercepting in this phase is that the engagement window is very small.

The second opportunity is in the midcourse phase of flight, after the missile payload separates from the boosters and is

coasting through space. In this phase debris and decoys may accompany warheads, which challenges the capabilities

of our discrimination sensors. The advantage of intercepting in this phase is that the engagement window is relatively

long. The third phase is the terminal, when the warhead plunges through the atmosphere towards its target. In this stage,

the warheads move very fast, which means that the opportunity to kill it is very limited. Given atmospheric resistance,

however, the lighter weight decoys are more difficult to employ in this stage. 

General Kadish, thank you for

agreeing to be interviewed by the

Weapon Systems Technology

Information Analysis Center

(WSTIAC). The readers of the

WSTIAC Newsletter are very interested in missile defense because

it is such a critical part of our

homeland defense strategy. We

would like to get your response to

the following questions:
Continued from page 1 

Continued on page 3

Leveraging mature and advanced technologies, and investigating new

basing options unconstrained by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)

Treaty, the president has stated that a U.S. missile defense capability

will be deployed "when ready." At present, with the first deployments

of Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (or PAC-3) missiles begun last year

and the existing PAC-2 forces, we have a limited capability in the field

to defend troops and localized areas against short-range ballistic missiles.

We currently have no defenses against longer-range threats to the

United States or its interests abroad, forward deployed forces, allies

and friends. This past December the president notified Moscow that

the United States is withdrawing from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile

treaty so as to remove the 30-year old restrictions on our ability to

develop, test, and deploy the system we will need to protect ourselves

from missile attacks. In view of this decision, we will develop and recommend deployment of capabilities that make sense within the framework of our mission and that have been tested sufficiently to give us a

high level of confidence in their performance reliability and producibility.

3. We understand that the MDA budget for FY2002 is roughly $7 billion. How is this money being spent?

The restructured Missile Defense Program will focus almost exclusively

on research, development, test and evaluation (or RDT&E) activities.

Much of the funding we received this year has been applied to improving elements that have been under development for some years now,

such as Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Sea-Based

Midcourse Defense (formerly known as Navy Theater Wide). A significant share of our funding will go toward the continued development

of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense element of the system (formerly known as National Missile Defense) and to the expansion of our

Pacific Ocean-based BMD System Test Bed. 

We also plan to do considerable development work in the other

defense segments. Following up on our successful "first light" test, we

are moving towards a lethality demonstration with the Airborne Laser

in the 2004 timeframe against a boosting ballistic missile target. We

are also looking at alternative ways to attack a boosting missile using

kinetic energy interceptors. On the terminal side, we will continue

operational testing of Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) and we

look forward to transitioning PAC-3 to full rate production to build up

missile inventory. We also will continue to support the improvement of

the Israeli Arrow system. 

The bottom line is that, with the FY 2002 funding, we will pursue a

broad range of activities to aggressively develop and test mature and

new technologies for integration into various missile defense elements.

The $7 billion figure is roughly correct for what we need to do in this

RDT&E program, and funding at about this level will be necessary in

the out-years if we are to have the program stability required for sustained developmental progress. 

4. Is MDA making a distinction between Theater Missile Defense and

National Missile Defense or are they now integrated in some way?

From a programmatic standpoint, we are no longer making this distinction. Operationally, "theater" and "national" can take on different

meanings. The distinction between theater and national missile

defense has gone away because we are now looking at this problem

differently. Protection for Japan against ballistic missile attack might be

theater for us, but it is national for the Japanese. Protection for Israel

is theater for us, but it is national for the Israelis, and so on and so

forth. You also have to consider that, at some point, a short-range

missile positioned for launch from the sea could be used to threaten

this country just as effectively as an ICBM. So, as we look at this problem, especially after September 11, when we were reminded that surprise dangers from unexpected sources do arise from time to time, we

want to make sure that we engineer an integrated system that is effective against all ranges of threat missiles.

5. We understand that a robust missile defense system needs to

employ a "layered defense," where threat missiles can be attacked and

destroyed at various points along their flight path. Is the United States

planning to use a layered defense, and if so, what will this consist of?

A defining feature of the BMD System is that it will layer defenses by

leveraging different geographic environments and configuring sensors,

interceptors, and the battle management, command and control component to optimize the performance of the system. This country's experience in the missile defense field tells us that the technical and operational challenges of intercepting ballistic missiles are daunting. So we

must try to leverage key advantages that may be created when setting

up engagement opportunities against a threat missile in each of the

phases of flight − first boost, then midcourse, and finally terminal.

Reliability in the BMD System will be realized, in part, through the

redundancy we build into it. Improved effectiveness, in part, will be a

function of the number of shot opportunities we are able to take

against an in-flight missile and how early in the threat missile's flight we

can take those shots. Improving the odds of interception becomes critical when ballistic missiles carry weapons of mass destruction. 

Also, with boost, midcourse, and terminal defenses, the successful use

of ballistic missiles against us will require the attacker to defeat the

BMD system using countermeasures at different points along the missile's trajectory. This will not be easy to do. The central point here is

that, by not attacking the missile in all phases of flight, we fail to exploit

opportunities that could increase the advantage of the defense. This

is not to say we will be perfect − no system ever is. But rather we

believe that the layered approach to missile defense is the key to evolving an increasingly effective system.

At present, I do not know which elements will make up these layered

defenses. Part of our acquisition approach is to pursue those technologies and system integration concepts that make sense and that are

demonstrated through rigorous testing. Concurrent with these activities we must plan to integrate everything into a single, synergistic

whole. We do not expect we will deploy everything we are developing

today − some activities will show more promise than others, and we

intend to put our money on the winners. This does not mean we are

not making technological progress or that we are lacking for ideas on

what we should deploy. Based on our accomplishments to date we

believe that in the 2004 to 2006 timeframe we will be in a position to

recommend initial deployment of components of the Ground-based

Midcourse Defense element within the BMD Test Bed. In emergency

situations, these same test assets will have an inherent capability to

provide a limited defense of all or parts of the United States against

longer-range missiles. To counter the short-range air and missile

threat, today we are moving the new PAC-3 missile into production

and into the field, so we know that PAC-3 will be available. Progress

on the Airborne Laser (ABL) means that an early, though limited, capability within the next few years is a possibility. Development progress in

the midcourse sea-based interceptor and radars over the next few

years could provide us with opportunities to focus on developing

mobile (or ship-based) missile defense platforms. 

So we have a good idea of our near-term deployment possibilities, and

our testing over the next few years will help clear up the longer-term

picture. Also, the system we are engineering will be able to accept

upgrades and reconfigurations (that is, we can change how we deploy

our sensors and interceptors), depending on the nature of the threat.

What this means is that the composition of our layered defenses will

periodically change. Even in battle our configurations may change, so 
Continued from page 2 WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

Continued on page 4

that the architecture that we take into a war (especially if that architecture includes ships at sea) may not be the same midway into that

war or at war's end.

6. We understand that some of our missile defense systems will use a

"hit-to-kill" strategy, where the warhead's kinetic energy is the kill mechanism and no explosives are involved, while other defensive systems

will employ blast and fragmentation as kill mechanisms. Why are we

using different types of kill mechanisms? 

You are correct to point out we have other kill mechanisms in development, to include interceptors using a blast-fragmentation warhead

(PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill interceptor that uses a blast-fragmentation warhead to help increase the probability of intercept against cruise missiles and aircraft) as well as weapons that use directed energy to kill

the target. The use of blast-fragmentation warheads in the PAC-3 is

part of the Patriot legacy, and the use of explosive warheads continues

to be important for engaging air-breathing targets. Many of the elements under development today will use "hit-to-kill" technologies, that

is, sensor-propulsion packages that rely initially on external sensors

and then execute endgame engagement using internal sensors to collide with the in-flight ballistic missile or warhead. 

We are investigating new technologies in order to identify the best

approach(es) for effectively performing the missile defense mission.

The development of multiple kill mechanisms will allow us to continue

to advance the state of the art for missile defense, choose what works

best in meeting the challenges we face (for example, perhaps we will

learn that directed energy is critical to deploying a highly effective

boost phase intercept capability), and use various kill mechanisms in

optimum combinations to help build up the layered defense architecture.

7. The MDA has had a number of fairly recent successes where you

demonstrated that it's possible to "hit a bullet with a bullet." Can you

please describe the types of tests that have been conducted and what

you were able to demonstrate?

In order to meet the challenges of flight-testing, we use an extensive

test bed. Collectively, ground-test, range, sensor, targets, and instrumentation assets, as well as our modeling and simulation and associated analytical support activities, provide valuable test capability for

demonstrating technologies and integration concepts. Missile defense

test schedules are complex and use a variety of facilities and ranges

spread out across the world. We also use a variety of threat representative targets. 

This past year we successfully conducted a number of intercept flight

tests. We conducted two successful intercept tests involving the

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element, so that we now

have enough confidence in our hit-to-kill interceptor that we can add

additional complexity (that is, countermeasures) into upcoming tests.

This past January we conducted our first successful midcourse intercept

of a medium-range ballistic missile target using a sea-based interceptor. We also conducted with mixed success several intercept tests

involving multiple engagements of the PAC-3 ground-based terminal

defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missile and airbreathing targets. Our tests in this area are becoming increasingly

complex and we have learned that we still have more work do before

we can move into full production. 

8. Some people claim that the hit-to-kill tests conducted to date have

not been realistic enough because an actual threat ballistic missile

would employ countermeasures of one sort or another. What types of

countermeasures are possible and what are MDA's plans for including

realistic countermeasures in future tests?

Many types of countermeasures are possible to design, but not all of

them are practical. Also, countermeasures may be developed for use

in each of the engagement phases (boost, midcourse, and terminal−

critics mostly address midcourse countermeasures), but it is not likely

that there will be a single countermeasure that is effective in all of the

engagement phases. Layered defense introduces significant complexity into an attacker's plans. It also is not easy for many countries, from

a technical standpoint, to integrate a countermeasure into a missile

payload and successfully employ it. Moreover, few states are likely to

test those countermeasures for fear that we will learn about them, and

so they will not have confidence that they will work as intended. 

Yet we also know that the missile defense countermeasures technology is proliferating and that several nations have countermeasures programs. We are taking the countermeasures threat seriously, especially as it may evolve to defeat our midcourse interceptors.

Discrimination, or our ability to find the target in the presence of countermeasures, is a major technical challenge. The ability to discriminate

between decoys and reentry vehicles has always been a part of our

design criteria for the Ground-based Midcourse System. We are

developing advanced sensor and propulsion technologies, exploiting

major leaps in computer processing, and advancing the state of the art

in battle management, command and control to address these challenges. 

There is a great deal of uncertainty as to what states are developing,

and there is every reason to believe that countermeasures technology

will continue to advance. Therefore, we are using a capability-based

approach in the development of the BMD System, so that we will have

capability against many of the known types of countermeasures, and

we will improve that capability over time as we learn more about the

threat and as we demonstrate critical counter-countermeasure technologies. Because we are not designing the system only to defeat a

specific threat, this approach will help us to deal with surprise threats,

or so-called "unknown unknowns." We have an extensive countermeasure activity underway to explore countermeasure possibilities and

devise responses to them. This activity includes "red team/white

team/blue team" analysis and a process whereby we can leverage government and industry experts to vet plausible ideas and identify system

weaknesses. As our testing of the individual elements of the BMD system advances from developmental to more realistic operational testing, we will be incorporating more countermeasures into our testing

regime.

9. Some people have criticized the MDA for not doing enough tests.

Do you think this criticism is warranted and what plans do you have

for testing during the rest of 2002?

Testing has always been an integral part of the Missile Defense

Program, but we have listened to our critics and are taking steps to

conduct more tests and introduce a greater degree of realism into our

test scenarios. Each test provides valuable data, data that goes directly into development of effective missile defenses. We use disciplined,

proven, and scientific methods learned over more than four decades

of missile development, deployment, and operations to conduct these

tests in order to learn as much as we can − we learn from our failures

as well as our successes. 

Our test philosophy is to add step-by-step complexities over time by

using countermeasures and testing in increasingly stressful environments. Early in our intercept tests when we are testing hit-to-kill, in

other words, we will not employ sophisticated countermeasures. We

use a walk-before-you-run, learn-as-you-go approach to testing.

When successes come in increasingly complex tests, we know we are

on track. So, our tests help us to determine performance capabilities

and identify potential design problems. We use what we learn to

improve the elements in preparation for the next test. Over all, our 
tests help demonstrate system element performance under varying and

stressing conditions and identify challenges. In some cases, the tests

we perform help prove out construction, transportation, and logistics

concepts we will need to build and operate deployment facilities. This

past year, we conducted roughly one major test a month, most of

which were intercept flight-tests. For the remainder of FY 2002, we

plan to conduct fifteen element flight tests involving PAC-3, Airborne

Laser, Ground-based Midcourse Defense, Sea-based Midcourse

Defense, the Israeli Arrow program, and our kinetic energy concept

development work. We are projecting sixteen more element ground

tests (to include testing of all the elements listed above as well as

THAAD and Space-based Laser), eleven system-wide tests or exercises,

and four joint interoperability exercises. As you can see, our testing

approach is not limited to flight-testing. Our ground-testing provides

performance assessment in a much broader set of conditions and scenarios than can be addressed in flight tests. We have wind tunnels that

provide aerodynamic, aero-thermal, aero-optic jet interaction and

shroud separation. We have hardware-in-the-loop test facilities that

employ state-of-the-art computers in environmental chambers with target scene projection systems and flight motion simulators. We use a

unique ballistic missile range facility to investigate real gas effects on

aerodynamic shapes above Mach 12 and to test interceptor lethality.

We also use modeling and simulation.

10. Can you please explain how modeling and simulation are being

used in our missile defense programs?

Modeling and simulation is an essential part of our development and

test approach. It is used to perform trade-off analyses, to assist in

design and engineering of the integrated BMD System and its elements, to aid in the development of operating concepts, and to perform as an adjunct to live testing in the characterization and assessment of BMD System capability and military utility. We make extensive

use of modeling and simulation in order to test operational scenarios

and conditions that are impractical, difficult, or costly to replicate in

fight-tests, such as operating in nuclear environments and engaging

multiple ballistic missile attacks against U.S. forces or the United

States. Other constraints − particularly those related to the physical

dimensions of test ranges and the location of fixed test instrumentation

− present limitations on the performance envelope that can be fully

flight-tested. We must rely on computer-based testing in order to

advance understanding in these areas. Importantly, our flight tests

allow us to gather data to anchor and update our models and simulations, so that they are highly representative of real environments.

11. Can you please describe the an airborne laser and the spacebased laser and explain how these two system fit into our overall missile defense plans?

Our acquisition approach is to explore different kill mechanisms and

geographic basing modes in order to develop the most effective layered BMD System possible. With the decision to withdraw from the

1972 ABM Treaty, it will now be possible to objectively consider cost,

operational, and performance trade-offs that different approaches to

missile defense present, to include approaches involving other physical principles, such as directed energy. While hit-to-kill shows great

promise and will characterize our early 21st century missile defense

capabilities, directed energy has significant military promise over the

long-term. A laser, like that under development for ABL, can offer key

advantages. High-energy lasers are capable of serving as long-range

weapons, especially when they can be operated above the atmosphere. Since we are talking about a speed-of-light weapon, directed

energy also can help overcome the timeline problem faced by all kinetic energy interceptors, which rely on boosters and can take several 

minutes to reach the point of intercept. Lasers, in other words, can

improve our response time. Ballistic missiles can be attacked within or

outside the atmosphere. All boosting missiles are vulnerable to attack

in the early stages of flight from platforms based in the air, at sea, or

on the ground. Similarly, a missile or its payload can be attacked in

the midcourse phase from any of the other geographic environments,

including from space. The ability to create a layered defense architecture that uses all geographic environments would allow us to

improve the overall effectiveness of the BMD System. 

Should we overcome the technical challenges that face us in the development of an ABL or a Space-based Laser (SBL), these elements could

offer a significant enhancement of system performance. The ABL is

intended to target a boosting missile above cloud level by focusing a

high-energy beam of light on the missile body. The energy of the

beam would heat the skin and weaken the missile structure or cause a

fuel tank to rupture. This capability, which could be flown to the region

of conflict and positioned to attack missiles as they boost, would add

an important additional layer of defense to the architecture. By terminating powered flight early, ABL confronts an adversary with the

prospect of having missile payloads fall short of their targets, perhaps

even on the adversary's own territory. 

We have known for quite some time that, given adequate deployment

of spacecraft, orbiting platforms could give us a capability to destroy

in a timely manner ballistic missiles launched from almost anywhere on

the globe. The long-stand-off distances involved mean that significant

energy and operational demands will be placed on orbiting platforms.

With space-based lasers, it would be possible to lase a missile target

as it ascended or in the midcourse part of its trajectory. Space-based

lasers could provide the upper layer of a defense against theater-range

and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Exoatmospheric weapons

could help thin out an attacking force before it released multiple reentry vehicles or countermeasures. There are still a number of challenges

to be met, including developing a light-weight system to withstand the

rigors of launch. The spacecraft would also have to be designed for

refueling in orbit. So there are plenty of technical and operational difficulties to address.

12. We understand that the Russians have deployed a missile

defense system to defend Moscow against ballistic missiles and that

this system may use interceptors armed with nuclear warheads. Does

the United States plan to use nuclear warheads as part of our missile

defense system? 

No, the United States has no plan to develop nuclear-tipped missile

defense interceptors. The first U.S. missile defense systems relied on

nuclear warheads to increase the probability of killing the warhead

and its penetration aids. In 1976 the United States deployed a

nuclear missile defense system called Safeguard to defend an intercontinental ballistic missile base in Grand Forks, North Dakota.

Concerns about the earth environment and political consequences of

nuclear explosions in space and the atmosphere led to Safeguard's

dismantling just a few months after it was declared operational.

Today, precision has replaced our earlier reliance on the massed and

wide-area effects that only a nuclear weapon can deliver. We now

have the technology to find an in-flight warhead and to collide with

it. Perhaps one day we will also have the capability to destroy that

warhead with pinpoint accuracy using directed energy. 

13. What are some of the key technologies that the United States will

need to develop in order to achieve a robust missile defense system

and what progress is being made to develop these technologies?

The legacy of technologies employed in our missile defense systems

currently under development can be traced back at least to the 1980s. 

Continued from page 3

Continued on page 5
This means that we have been able to build on the investments and

hard work of the previous decades. The development of groundbased sensor elements, such as the X-Band Radar (XBR) and the

Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs), may be traced back to the

days of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) that was

fielded in the 1960s. Since that time, we have made significant

advances in relevant technologies, including the development of solidstate Transmit/Receive Modules for X-Band Radars, and in electronics

for signal and data processing in our sensors and missiles.

Over the years, we have had great success in miniaturizing technologies relevant to the BMD mission and making them more reliable.

Our sensors are becoming smaller and more sensitive. Space-based

sensors for early warning trace their lineage as far back as the development of the Defense Support Program begun in the early 1970s.

We also have capitalized on subsequent space-based sensor development programs, so that today we look forward to the deployment of a

very capable Space-Based Infrared System (Low) to improve our tracking and acquisition capabilities. Major advances in focal plane array

technology and computer processing will allow us to deploy extremely

sensitive "eyes" in space and on the ground, on our sensors and interceptors. We have also had advances in development of longer-life

cryocoolers needed for infrared sensor operations in space. 

Similarly, our battle management and advanced information processing and handling capabilities have a legacy going back to early computerized command and control systems like SAGE (Semi-Automatic

Ground Environment), which was developed and deployed in the

1950s. Computers are critical to all aspects of the missile defense

mission, but especially for the battle management function and our

highly sensitive radars. Using increasingly fast, small, and powerful

computers, the battle-management system we have been developing

processes large volumes of data in order to integrate operations, sort

through and prioritize tracking and cueing information, and control

multiple intercepts.

Non-nuclear ground-based interceptor technologies owe a great deal

to the successes we have had since the 1984 Homing Overlay

Experiment (HOE), when we had the first exoatmospheric intercept with

the relatively large and heavy HOE kill vehicle, to include the

Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor System (ERIS) program, and the

current Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) and Theater High

Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Ground-based Midcourse

Defense (GMD) activities. We are now able to develop exoatmospheric kill vehicles and endoatmospheric interceptors today that are

smaller and more agile. The advances in on-board computer processing capability; larger and more sensitive infrared focal plane arrays;

lightweight cryogenic cooling; lighter inertial measurement instruments; lighter, higher capacity batteries; lighter-weight structures; and

miniaturized propulsion all synergistically combine to provide dramatic advances in hit-to-kill capability.

Today's exoatmospheric kill vehicles leverage all these advances. The

HOE kill stage weighed roughly 2,500 pounds. This contrasts sharply

with the roughly 120-pound Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) that has

been developed for the legacy NMD program. This much smaller and

lighter EKV can help us to keep the costs of production down, while

increasing lethality potential, range, and speed. Even at this lighter

weight, the high speed of the intercepts helps ensure lethality. Larger,

more sensitive focal plane arrays can detect warheads farther away

and track them more accurately, allowing earlier corrections of the kill

vehicle trajectory toward the intercept point. The dramatic increase in

on-board processing capability is essential for processing the flood of

data from complex target signatures gathered by these larger focal

plane arrays. The enhanced on-board processing combined with the

advanced inertial measurement instruments and miniature propulsion 

thrusters enables rapid, precise adjustments of the kill vehicle trajectory toward the selected aimpoint. We have been able to exploit

advanced proportional navigation techniques and smaller, more efficient divert propulsion nozzles for our hit-to-kill interceptors.

Furthermore, new capabilities for measuring several different colors or

wavelengths in a kill vehicle's optical sensor combined with enhanced

on-board processing can dramatically enhance our capability to discriminate between debris or decoys and an actual warhead.

We have made significant technology advances. However, we still

have a ways to go in areas such as improved target discrimination

algorithms, high speed parallel computer processors for multi-color

seekers, and automated battle management decision algorithm development. Of course, as we integrate technology into the BMD System,

we will need increased technical fidelity in our testing infrastructure to

verify increases in system performance.

14. What has MDA accomplished in the last few years that you are

most proud of?

I am proud to be in the forefront of a development activity that is making steady and consistent progress towards our goal of providing this

nation with an effective, reliable BMD System and, in doing so, working with some of the most talented, skilled, and knowledgeable people in a very challenging area of engineering. In both government and

industry, the people make a difference. So my focus over these next

few years will be to convince the best and the brightest in this country

and in allied countries to come to work on this program, to become

valued contributing members of our missile defense national team. 

Because we are trying to build effective missile defenses on a priority

basis, and the technical challenges facing us are significant, a rigorous testing program is required if we are to advance towards construction and deployment. So I am proud of the progress we have

made in our tests and in advancing the processes (from test preparation to post-test analyses) required to make certain that we spend the

taxpayer's money wisely and get the most out of each test. Testing is

also one of the most significant ways we, and others, can grade our

progress. We have succeeded in introducing significant rigor in our

test regimes, which we must do if we are to have any confidence that

what we deploy will work reliably. It all comes back to the quality of

the people we employ − and there are literally hundreds who are

involved in the tests we conduct. We are meeting the technical challenges head on and, I am pleased to state, making steady strides.

15. What areas currently give you the most concern?

In a program as complex and unprecedented as the Missile Defense

Program, I am always concerned about encountering surprises, especially in the engineering, cost, and schedule areas. Unwelcome surprises in any of those areas can delay our achievement by years. We

currently have no defenses in place that can protect the nation, or our

forces and interests abroad, against a ballistic missile attack. There is

a certain urgency, not only to deploy a system, but also to ensure that

that system is both effective and affordable.

As a program manager, needless to add, I am always on the lookout

for better ways to manage this program. Our program is now entering a new phase, moving from technology development to system

engineering, and we face a very significant challenge of integrating

many diverse elements into one system. We employ thousands of individuals throughout the United States. We also are collaborating extensively with all of the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, and the

warfighting CINCs as we investigate different basing modes and deal

with associated operational and planning challenges. The manageContinued from page 4

Continued on page 6

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002
ment challenges we face pose at least as many difficulties as the technical challenges. 

16. Is there anything else you would like to share with our readers?

There have been four presidents and nine congresses since 1983 that

have been pressing us along in the area of missile defense. While the

national guidance and priorities relating to missile defense have

changed a number of times over the years, I think we have been good

stewards of the resources that have been entrusted to us. The national support we have received in this area has gotten us to the point

where we are today. The efforts of the past have not been wasted; they

feed directly into the successes we have had this past year. 

But I believe missile defense today is at a crossroads, both from the

decision-making and technological points of view. We will be making

some fundamental decisions over these next few years that will give

shape to our defenses for the next decades. How we make those decisions, and what we base those decisions on, are highly important in

this process. This is why I have focused so heavily on the management

of the program − not only so that we can be good stewards of the taxpayer's money, but also so that we are structured adequately to make

decisions that this country will have to live with for many years to come.

The threats we face and the timelines for developing such a complex

system are such that we must proceed with all due haste, but not without proper deliberation concerning the direction we must take and

adequate validation of our choices regarding the functional elements

of the BMD System. That crossroads, in other words, represents the

decisions we have to make, and the testing performances that must

take place, to either get us into a very effective system or to push

deployment somewhere out into the future (a result that will mean that

this country will have to abide certain dangers for an undefined period of time). I am confident, however, in our direction and in the

progress that is yet to come.

General Kadish, thank you very much for updating us on the Missile

Defense Agency's program and future plans. The Weapon Systems

Technology Information Analysis Center and our more than 6,000 users

extend our best wishes to you and your staff for future success. ♦

Introducing....

Dr. Edward Scannell 

W

STIAC is pleased to introduce the new Division

Manager of the Tactical Systems Division, Dr Edward P.

Scannell. Dr Scannell, an internationally renowned

specialist in directed energy weapons, joined IITRI in January

2002. He is an experimental physicist with over 30 years of

experience in a broad range of technical areas, in both conducting and managing research and development (R&D) programs. His areas of technical expertise include: plasma

physics; alternative energy sources, such as controlled fusion,

magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generators, nuclear isomers,

and fuel cells for both large scale industrial and compact military applications; electromagnetic (EM) accelerators for EM

guns, space propulsion and nuclear weapons simulation; and

high power microwave (HPM), particle beam, laser and pulse

power physics for directed energy (DE) applications. Prior to

joining IITRI, Dr. Scannell was the chief of the Directed Energy

and Power Generation Division including the Electrochemical

Branch, now in the Sensors and Electron Devices Directorate of

Army Research Lab at Adelphi MD. ♦

Continued from page 5

In the NEWS...

DARPA, ARMY ANNOUNCE FUTURE COMBAT

SYSTEMS LEAD SYSTEM INTEGRATOR

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the

Army today announced the selection of the team of the Boeing Co.

(Anaheim, Calif., and Seattle, Wash.) and Science Applications

International Corp. (SAIC), (McLean, Va., and San Diego, Calif.) as the

Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) for the concept and technology development phase of the Future Combat Systems program. Subject to negotiation, the Boeing-SAIC team will receive a $154 million award for

this 16-month effort.

The Boeing-SAIC LSI will support the Army's development of the concept design, organization and operational structure, and performance

specifications for the FCS program. The LSI Team will develop the

architecture for the system of systems envisioned for the FCS, and will

identify and evaluate potential concepts and technologies, conduct

demonstrations and select the most promising efforts for further definition. The work accomplished by the LSI will ensure the FCS program is

ready to transition from the concept and technology development

phase into the system development and demonstration phase during8

NEWS(cont.)

the third quarter of fiscal 2003. The LSI approach affords opportunities to insert "leap ahead" technology upgrades when they are mature,

to incorporate best business practices and to ensure an integrated

effort from all concerned.

The FCS program is a joint DARPA/Army program that is identifying the

promising systems and technologies for achieving the Army's vision of

fielding an "Objective Force" beginning this decade. "Future Combat

Systems is a major step in the transformation of the Army," stated

Claude M. Bolton, Jr., assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition,

Logistics and Technology. "The LSI is critical to making the Objective

Force a reality in this decade." 

"FCS is an Army networked system of systems that serves as the core

building block within all Objective Force maneuver units of action to

enhance advanced joint and coalition warfighting capabilities to provide options for decisive victory to our Nation," said Lt. Gen. John

Riggs, director, Objective Force Task Force. The FCS is envisioned as

a networked system of systems including manned and unmanned platforms that will be capable of conducting missions for assault, indirect

fires, air defense, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition,

and battle command and communications. 

The Objective Force is the Army's future full spectrum force; organized,

manned, equipped and trained to be more strategically responsive,

deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable across

the entire spectrum of military operations from major theater wars

through counter terrorism to homeland security. FCS tactical formations enable the Objective Force to see first, understand first, act first

and finish decisively as the means to tactical success.

"The DARPA/Army Future Combat Systems effort has been and continues to be a close and effective partnership. (Continued on page 10)
is required to deliver a minimum of 21.88 W = 10 log 10 (21.88) =

13.4 dBW of input power to the transmit antenna for the L1 C/A-code

signal. The entire set of specified parameter values for minimum guaranteed GPS received signal power is as follows:

20

15

5

10

30

5 1 0 1 5 2 0 2 5

25

y (Mm)

x (Mm)

Weapon Location

GPS Satellite Orbit

Reo

Rsato

Earth

Horizon

25,785 km

25,150 km

5o

Re = radius of earth = 6,370 km

Rsato = radius of GPS satellite orbit = 26,560 km

Figure 1: Geometry for max range encounter between GPS receiver 

and satellite.

Anti-Jam (AJ) GPS Part II

Jamming Weapon Receivers

by Mark Scott

IIT Research Institute

Background

In the September issue of the WSTIAC newsletter, Part I of this series

described the proliferating employment of Global Positioning System

(GPS) navigation receivers in precision guided munitions (PGMs). Also

described were the fundamentals of GPS navigation from the perspective of a weapon guidance function. This discussion explained how a

GPS receiver's acquisition and tracking of signals transmitted from the

GPS satellites, enables computation of accurate position fixes for

application to weapon precision guidance functions.

If simple jamming techniques are effective in blocking reception of

GPS signals, then the precision guidance that we are beginning to

depend on GPS providing, could be denied to current/future generations of weapons. Accordingly, in this newsletter, Part II in this series

will describe the characteristics of GPS navigation signals and

receivers that relate to the potential for a weapon-grade receiver to be

jammed by tactically feasible electronic countermeasure (ECM)

devices.

GPS Satellite Signals

Each GPS satellite transmits navigation signals at two different carrier

frequencies. The primary frequency is called L1 = 1.57542 GHz and

the secondary frequency is called L2 = 1.22760 GHz. The reason for

employing two different carrier frequencies is to enable the GPS receiver to correct for variations in the speed of light through the ionospheric portion of the earth's atmosphere (ionospheric delay in electromagnetic wave propagation is frequency dependent, and can thus be virtually eliminated via dual-frequency ranging measurements).

Both carrier waves are binary phase shift key (BPSK) modulated with

wide band, spread spectrum, pseudo-random noise (PRN) codes -

unique codes being employed by each satellite (code division multiple

access or CDMA). These codes are used to accomplish the measurement of range from the receiver to the GPS satellite, as described in

Part I of this series. The L1 signal carries two codes: the C/A-code

(coarse/acquisition-code) and the P-code (precision-code). The C/Acode has a period of 1 msec, a bandwidth of 1.023 MHz, and was

designed to be the navigation modulation for general purpose, unrestricted use in the Standard Positioning Service (SPS). The P-code is a

higher rate, wider bandwidth (10.23 MHz), longer code, with a period

of 1 week. The P-code was designed to be the navigation modulation

for the Precise Positioning Service (PPS) of the GPS system. Intended

primarily for use by DoD and US Government agencies, the P-code

can be denied to civilian and other SPS users by encryption, to form a

secure version of the code known as the Y-code or P(Y)-code. While

the L1 signal carries both C/A and P(Y)-codes, L2 usually only carries

the P(Y)-code.

From the perspective of signal power budget, all three of the GPS

satellite signals (L1 C/A-code, L1 P(Y)-code, and L2 P(Y)-code) are

quite similar. We will initially focus on the L1 C/A-code signal for purposes of illustration in this article. The transmitter in the GPS satellites 

1 0 dBi (minimum)

G receiveantenna gain

c f L m

L1 carrierwavelength

1.58 2 dB (maximum)

L atmospheric losses

21.88 13.4 dBi (minimum)

G transmitantenna gain

5 deg elevation- see Figure1.)

25,150 km(max rangefor satelliteat

R rangefrom satelliteto weapon receiver

21.88 W 13.4 dBW (minimum)

P input power to satellitetransmitantenna

ra

atmos

ta

t

= =

=

= = × × =

=

= =

=

= =

=

=

=

= =

=

( 1) 3 10 1.575 10 0.19 8 9

l1

Continued on page 8

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002
Continued on page 9

These transmitter parameters result in a minimum signal power density incident on the receiver antenna of 

Note: Power in dBW = 10 log10 (Power in Watts)

This is an incredibly low RF signal! A Christmas tree light bulb suspended from a balloon over the California coastline would supply an

approximately equivalent intensity of optical illumination on the face of

an observer looking west from the top of the Empire State Building

(assuming no atmospheric attenuation)!

There are several reasons for the faintness of the GPS signal. The

satellite's transmitter power is modest, viz., ~10 W order of magnitude, since the satellite is dependant on autonomous power generation via batteries and solar cells. Neither satellites nor receivers have

the luxury of very high antenna gain since both entities have significant

field-of-view requirements (about 45 deg beamwidth for the satellites,

to cover all of the earth, all the way out to lower satellite orbits (see

Figure 2); and almost hemispheric coverage for receivers, to simultaneously observe all satellites above the horizon). Finally, the satellites

are pretty far away, ranging from 20,190 km overhead to 25,150 km

down near the horizon (see Figure 1 again). Together, these factors

result in a whispy power density incident on an earthbound receiver's

antenna ~10-14 W/m2 = 0.01 pW/m2, i.e., one-hundredth of a picoWatt (10-12 W) per square meter!

By comparison, the thermal noise resident in the receiver's spread

spectrum bandwidth that accommodates the 1 + MHz wide C/Acoded signal is given by 

20

15

5

10

5 10 15 20

25

y (Mm)

x (Mm)

Earth

~45o

Figure 2: Satellite transmit antenna main beam width and orientation

minimum gain = 13.4 dBi

14 2

3 2

, 2

3.81 10

1.58

21.88

4 (25150 10 )

21.88

4

W m

L

G

R

P

P

atmos

t ta

density r

−

= ×

×

=

=

p

p

3 2

2

2

1

2.87 10

4

(0.19) (1)

4

m

G

A

ra

er

−

= ×

=

=

p

p

l

(1)

The receiver antenna parameters above result in a minimum effective

receive aperture area of 

(2)

The resulting guaranteed minimum received signal power for the L1

C/A-code GPS signal (for worst case receiver performance analysis) is:

dBW

W

W m m

Pr Pdensity r Aer

160

1.09 10

(3.81 10 ) (2.87 10 )

16

14 2 3 2

,

= −

= ×

= × ×

= ⋅

−

− −

(3)

Using a representative value of 4 dB for the noise figure (numerical

factor of 2.51), yields the following thermal noise level at the C/Acoded spread spectrum signal stage in a GPS receiver:

F receiver's noisefigure

1.023 MHz

B spreadspectrumbandwidthof C/A - coded signal

T standardambient temperature 290K (17Cor 63F)

k Boltzmann's constant 1.38 10 J K

where

N kT B F

SS

-23

SS SS

=

=

=

= =

= = ×

=

0

0 (4)

dBW

W

NSS W

140

1.03 10

(1.38 10 )(290)(1.023 10 )(2.51)

14

23 6

= −

= ×

= × ×

−

−

(5)

This noise level, small though it may be, is 20 dB above the received

GPS signal power, as calculated in equation (3)! The corresponding

signal-to-noise power ratio (SNR) is therefore, -20 dB.

RF Needle in a Thermal Noise Haystack

How then, can a GPS receiver accomplish acquisition and tracking of

weak coded navigation signals that are buried so deeply in internal

receiver noise? Two features of the GPS signal/receiver interaction

process answer this question. These two features are correlation

reception and low rate ephemeris data. First, as described in Part I of

this series, the receiver has to measure the delay in the received signal

associated with its propagation from the satellite transmitter (it can

then convert this time delay into an estimated range, or pseudo-range,

from the satellite to the receiver, for use in the navigation solution).

The receiver attempts to measure the time delay in the received signal

by comparing (correlating) the PRN spread spectrum code on the

received signal (buried in noise) with a locally generated replica code.

The correlation process multiplies the received and local codes together and integrates the product, sequentially varying the phase of the

local code until the two codes line up.

When the two codes do line up, the correlation process strips the code

off the received signal, despreading the spectrum of the resulting signal down to the bandwidth of the satellite ephemeris data. Since this

data is of low volume, it can easily be conveyed to the receiver at a

low data rate (50 bits/sec) in a narrow bandwidth (50Hz). Accordingly, 

Continued from page 7
Continued from page 8

the code correlation process, first and foremost, accomplishes a bandwidth compression function, squeezing the 1 MHz spread spectrum

signal power into a 50 Hz baseband signal. At baseband, the received

signal competes with only 50 Hz of noise spectral density, instead of 1

MHz +, thereby realizing a signal processing gain in the ratio of the

spread-to-despread bandwidths:

Continued on page 10

( )

( )

dB

Hz

Hz

BaseBW BBW

Spread SpectrumBW SSBW GSS

43

2.05 10

50

1.023 10

4

6

=

= ×

×

=

=

(6)

This spread spectrum signal processing gain yields an amplification in

the baseband signal-to-noise power ratio at the receiver output (less

receiver implementation losses, Lr, such as cable, insertion, correlation, A/D losses, etc., say Lr ≈ 2 dB):

dB

dB

SNRBB SNRSS GSS LrdB

21

20 43 2

=

= − + −

= + −

(7)

Hence at the baseband output of a GPS receiver, the weak satellite signals come booming out over the narrow band noise, enabling detection/tracking of the signals, measurement of the propagation time

delays from the satellite to the receiver, and demodulation of the satellite ephemeris data.

RF Monkey Wrenches

So what seemed to be a hopelessly weak signal in the receiver's spread

spectrum intermediate frequency (IF) section, arrives at the receiver

output with apparently ample signal-to-noise margin. This would

seem to say that GPS receivers should have some natural tolerance to

jamming, due to spread spectrum processing gain. A significant jammer-to-signal power ratio (JSR) is required to overcome this signal

margin and inhibit signal acquisition/tracking. On the surface, it

appears that it may, in fact, be nontrivial to throw an RF monkey

wrench into the signal processing works, and jam a GPS receiver.

Such, however, is unfortunately not the case. While it is true, that a

large JSR is required to suppress the baseband GPS signal, large values of JSR turn out to be relatively easy to come by. This is a result of

the fact that, although spread spectrum processing gain yields ample

signal relative to the noise floor, the absolute signal level remains very

small, due to the low intensity of the incident GPS signal. Even relatively weak jamming transmitters compare favorably with the modest

GPS satellite transmitters (~ 10 W). And earth-based jammers enjoy

a tremendous range advantage over the space based satellite transmitters - tens of kilometers for the jammers compared to tens of thousands of kilometers for the satellites. 

As a numerical example, consider a very small, simple jammer, with an

effective transmitter power (Pj) of only 10 W (10 dBW), applied to a

unit gain (Gja = 0 dBi), omnidirectional antenna. The gain of the

weapon receiver's antenna in the direction of the earthbound jammer

(at or below the horizon) is likely to be less than unity, say Graj ≈ 0.5

= -3 dBi. Then an expression for jamming power at the GPS receiver's output, as a function of slant range to the jammer (Rj

) in km, is

given by:

SSBW

BBW

L

G

G

R

P

J R

r

raj

ja

j

j

j

× ⋅

=

2

1

4 ( 10 ) 4

( )

2

1

3 2

p

l

p

(8)

The wavelength, λ1, is again equal to 0.19 m if the jammer centers its

transmission on the victim GPS RF signal - L1 in this case. The jamming signal suffers the same circuit losses as the satellite signal traversing the receiver, hence the loss, Lr = 1.58 (2 dB), appears in the

denominator.

The correlation process in the receiver multiplies the incoming jamming waveform with the local replica of the C/A-code for the satellite

being tracked. Rather than compressing the jamming into the receiver's base bandwidth (BBW = 50 Hz in our example), the correlation

process spreads the jamming signal out in the frequency domain,

thereby diluting its power spectral density (multiplication of waveforms

in the time domain results in the mathematical process of convolution

of their frequency spectra). If the jamming waveform is initially

matched to the spread spectrum bandwidth of the GPS signal, its output spectrum will be doubled in width at the output of the correlation

process, hence the factor of 2 x SSBW in the denominator of equation

(8). Finally, this diluted jamming spectrum is filtered by the base bandwidth at the receiver's output, hence the factor of BBW in the numerator of equation (8).

The jamming power expression from the equation (8) is plotted as a

function of receiver-to-jammer range (Rj) in Figure 3. Also plotted in

Figure 3, for comparison purposes, are the minimum GPS signal output power and the noise floor in the GPS receiver output base band.

Notice that the jamming power exceeds the signal power whenever the

weapon gets closer than about 16 km to the jammer. This represents

the jammer's "keep-out" zone. When the weapon gets within this

"keep-out" zone, its receiver can't track GPS signals - the jamming

power grows over the signal level causing the receiver's tracking loops

to loose lock. The receiver can then no longer acquire/track the

received signals, measure satellite ranges, or demodulate satellite

ephemeris data, i.e., the GPS receiver can no longer navigate.

-135

-140

-145

-150

-155

-160

-165

-170

-175

-180

-185

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Rj

Range to Jammer (km)

Power Levels (dBW)

Jammer

Location

Range at which

jamming level

exceeds signal

Weapon approaching

jammer

S

N

J(Rj)

Figure 3. Signal, noise, and jamming power levels in GPS receiver's

output base bandwidth.

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002
Actually, the situation for our jamming example is a little worse than

described above. The signal level actually needs to be somewhat

greater than the interference (jamming plus internal receiver noise) for

reliable receiver operation: signal acquisition with low false alarm

probability; signal tracking and accurate propagation delay measurement; and data demodulation with acceptable error rates. Actual

keepout ranges for the jammer in this example with respect to the L1

C/A-code signal, are 20 km for signal tracking and 70 km for signal

acquisition and data demodulation (see Figure 4).

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

-15

-20

-25

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Range to Jammer (km)

SIR (dB)

Jammer

Location

For Rj < 20 km GPS

receiver looses lock,

cannot track signals, is

completely

inoperative.

Weapon

approaching

jammer

For 20 < Rj < 70 km

GPS receiver can:

track signals,

measure ranges.

For Rj > 70 km GPS

receiver can:

acquire signals,

track signals,

measure ranges,

demodulate data.

~ 12 dB

~ 1.5 dB

Acquisition

Threshold

Threshold

Tracking

Figure 4. Signal-to-Interference Ratio (SIR) vs. range and receiver per

formance thresholds.

Conclusion

So the claims you may have heard, that relatively small, low power,

unsophisticated noise jammers hold the potential to significantly disrupt/deny GPS navigation, are indeed true - at least for C/A-code

receivers. Furthermore, since these jammers are based on relatively

simple technology, they may represent an electronic countermeasure

(ECM) that is tactically feasible to field in large numbers. A large

matrix of such jammers could create a GPS denial zone with dimensions of hundreds of kms (areas of tens of thousands of square kms).

In the next newsletter, the third and final installment in this series of articles will present the fundamental antijam (AJ) electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) available to GPS receivers in weapon applications. These ECCM techniques are designed to mitigate the effects of

the tactically feasible noise jammers described in this article. For a

more comprehensive description of ECM/ECCM aspects of GPS in

weapon applications (including P(Y)-code receiver performance in

jamming environments), WSTIAC will be publishing a state-of-the-art

review on this subject this coming summer (4th quarter FY02). Details

will be included in the next newsletter article.

References

Open literature references employed in writing Parts I and II of this

series, that you may find useful for background and depth on GPS topics include:

· Herring, "The Global Positioning System," Scientific American, Vol

274, No 2, February 1996.

· Hurn, GPS - A Guide to the Next Utility, Trimble Navigation,

1989.

· Kaplan, Understanding GPS - Principles and Applications, Artech

House, 1996.

· Logsdon, The Navstar Global Positioning System, Van Nostrand

Reinhold, 1992.

· Parkinson & Spilker, Global Positioning System:Theory and

Applications, Volume I, AIAA, 1996.♦

About the Author Mark Scott received B.S. and M.S. degrees in

Electrical Engineering from Michigan State University in 1974 and

1976 respectively. From 1977 to 1982 he was employed by the

Instrument Division of Lear Siegler, Inc., working on tactical avionics

systems. From 1982 to 1984 he was employed by IIT Research

Institute, performing countermeasure/counter-countermeasure

(CM/CCM) analyses on air defense radars. From 1984 to 1987 he

was with Harris Corporation working on airborne data links, after which

he rejoined IITRI. His current research interests include sensor/ countermeasure performance analysis, signal processing, and sensor fusion

for smart weapons, multisensor seekers, survivability suites, and C3I

applications. Mr. Scott is a member of IEEE, the IEEE Aerospace and

Electronic Systems Society, and the Association of Old Crows. 

Continued from page 9

NEWS(continued from page 6)

We look forward to moving ahead in this transformational endeavor

with the Army and the Lead Systems Integrator," said Anthony J. Tether,

director of DARPA. Army Col. William Johnson, DARPA's program

manager for the FCS program, added, "the selection of the LSI begins

the physical transformation of the U.S. Army to the Objective Force."

Today's LSI selection follows a 21-month concept design phase during

which four contractor teams (Boeing, Science Applications

International Corp., Team FoCuS Vision Consortium, and Team

Gladiator) developed innovative concepts for Future Combat Systems.

DARPA and the Army analyzed the concepts and used them to refine

the draft FCS requirements.

For more information please contact Jan Walker of DARPA at 703-

696-2404, jwalker@darpa.mil or Army Capt. Amy Hannah, 703-

697-4314, amy.hannah@hqda.army.mil. ♦

Planning 

a Conference or Seminar?

WSTIAC can assist with technical support:

· Call for papers

· Announcements

· Local arrangements

· Author kits/paper selection

· Registration

· Security, meals, transport

· Exhibits, receptions

· Proceedings
WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002

is pleased to announce the availability of its

Introduction to Sensors and Seekers for

Smart Munitions and Weapons Course

Primary instructor: Mr Paul Kisatsky, IIT Research Institute

Course Objective: 

The Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC) developed this 2-1⁄2 day Introduction to Sensors and Seekers for

Smart Munitions and Weapons Course to provide an introduction to

the most commonly used sensors and seekers employed in smart

weapons (projectiles, missiles, and wide area mines). It is oriented to

managers, engineers, and scientists who are engaged in smart

weapon program development and who desire to obtain a deeper

understanding of the sensors they must deal with, but who do not need

to personally design or analyze them in depth. An undergraduate technical degree is recommended. Mathematics is kept to a minimum, but

important formulas are introduced. This course also serves as an excellent foundation for those scientists and engineers who desire to pursue

this discipline to intermediate and advanced levels. 

Course Outline:

The course covers:

♦ Classification of Seekers and Sensors; 

♦ Fundamentals of Waves and Propagation; 

♦ Fundamentals of Noise and Clutter; 

♦ Fundamentals of Search Footprints; 

♦ Introduction to Infrared; 

♦ Introduction to Radar; 

♦ Introduction to LADAR; 

♦ Introduction to Visionics; 

♦ Introduction to Acoustics; 

♦ Future Projections and Interactive Brainstorming.

Course Sponsors: 

♦ DUSD(S&T) Weapon Systems Directorate 

♦ Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) 

About the Instructor:

Mr Paul Kisatsky is a Senior Physical Scientist with the IIT Research

Institute. He is a nationally recognized expert on sensors and seekers

for smart munitions and weapons and has more than 30 years of

hands-on experience developing sensors and seekers fielded in modern smart munitions and weapons.

Training at Your Location:

WSTIAC can conduct this Sensors and Seekers for Smart Munitions

andWeapons Course at your location to reduce your travel time and

cost. This is a very cost effective way to provide training on sensors and

seekers to up to 25 people on-site. Please call Ms. Kelly Hopkins at

(256) 382-4747 to discuss such training opportunities and/or schedule a course.

Course Description:

The course stresses the basic principles and underlying physics of how

sensors work, what they can do, and how they are limited. Both airborne (projectiles and missiles) as well as ground based (smart mines

and wide area denial) weapon platforms are covered. The course provides both managers and non-sensor-specific engineers with the

framework they need to manage the development of sensor based

smart munitions and weapons. This course assists program engineers

to define the boundaries of their "trade space" and to make them

aware of the capabilities, potentials and limitations of modern

autonomous sensor technology. An overview of the different types and

classes of sensors is presented. Fundamental wave propagation phenomena, which governs the behavior of most sensors, is reviewed.

How search footprints in time and space must both define and limit the

sensor properties is discussed. Noise and clutter, the predominant

obstacles to success in autonomous seekers, are given emphasis. The

major sensor types are classified and each is discussed. In particular,

Infrared, Radar, Optical Laser Radar (LADAR), Imaging and Non-imaging, and Acoustic sensors are individually covered. Of special interest

is the discussion on human visionics versus machine recognition, since

this concept is of central importance to understanding automomous

versus man-in-the-loop sensing systems. The implications of "artificial

intelligence", "data fusion", and "multi-mode" sensors are also briefly

dicussed. System constraints, which force tradeoffs in sensor design

and in ultimate performance, are also covered. Time permitting, a projection of future trends in the role of sensors for smart munitions will be

presented, followed by a "brain-storming" session to solicit student

views. 

Handout Material:

Each student will receive a comprehensive set of course notes covering the material presented.

Fee:

The registration fee for this 2-1⁄2 day course is $950 for US government

personnel and $1150 for government contractors. Contractor teams

of 3 or more, registered at the same time, are charged $950 per person.

Notice: WSTIAC reserves the right to substitute speakers and cancel

and/or change the course schedule for any reason. In the event of a

schedule change or cancellation, registered participants will be individually informed. 

For additional information, contact: 

Ms. Kelly Hopkins, 

Seminar Administrator, 

at (256) 382-4747, fax: (256) 382-4702 

or by e-mail: khopkins@iitri.org
T

he fiscal 2003 Department of Defense Budget request of $369 billion (B), plus another $10B if needed to fight the

war on terrorism, will accelerate the changes needed to transform the U.S. military and provide for homeland

defense. This request represents a $48B increase over fiscal 2002. According to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul

Wolfowitz's testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, the budget request "...

addresses our country's need to fight the war on terror, to support our men and women in uniform and modernize the

forces we have, and to prepare for the challenges of the 21st Century." The 2003 budget will start to implement the DoD

transformation planned as a result of the Quadrennial Defense Review examination of defense priorities. The budget

reflects several changes in DoD policy. The budget focuses on capabilities needed to counter different types of threats,

rather than trying to anticipate where those threats may come from. It also expands the definition of the traditional sea,

air and land-based nuclear triad to include a new type of "triad" that emphasizes offensive nuclear and non-nuclear

weapons, missile defense, and responsive infrastructure. Since the U.S. is likely to face unconventional enemies that will

need to be defeated by precision weapons, agile forces and intelligence, the budget includes a substantial investment in

intelligence gathering and $9.9B for science and technology. It also includes $1B for unmanned ground, sea and air

vehicles, $9.4B to strengthen our fight against terrorism and $7.8B for missile defense. President Bush has called on

Congress to quickly pass his fiscal 2003 defense budget request and not wait until September or October to pass the legislation as it has done in years past. "That's bad budgeting practices in times of peace," President Bush said, and "it's really bad budgeting practices in times of war." Although hearings have already started, only time will tell if Congress will be

willing to act quickly on the DoD fiscal 2003 budget request. 

This issue of the WSTIAC Newsletter features an interview with Air Force Lt Gen Ronald T. Kadish, Director of the DoD

Missile Defense Agency (previously called Ballistic Missile Defense Organization) and a technical article on Anti-Jam GPS

Technology by Mr. Mark Scott, a Senior Science Advisor at the IIT Research Institute. The interview with Lt Gen Kadish

comes at a time when the Bush administration is putting increased emphasis on missile defense and the Missile Defense

Agency has just recently experienced its fourth successful intercept in six attempts during testing of the Ground-based

Midcourse Defense (GMD) Segment, formerly known as National Missile Defense. Mr. Scott's article is the second in a

multi-part series that first appeared in the WSTIAC Newsletter, Volume 2, Number 4, September 2001. This article is

important because almost all precision-guided weapons currently rely on the global positioning system (GPS). In certain

situations GPS can be jammed and rendered unusable and the implementation of robust anti-jam GPS technology is critical to the success of future precision weapons that rely on GPS as their primary or secondary guidance system. 

We welcome your feedback about the WSTIAC Newsletter and solicit your suggestions for future topics you would like to

see included. You can reach me by Email at wkitchens@iitri.org or by phone at (703) 933-3317. ♦

Director/Chief Scientist’s Corner

A view from Washington

by Dr. Wes Kitchens
The WSTIAC Newsletter is the current awareness publication of the Weapon Systems Technology

Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC). WSTIAC, a

Department of Defense (DoD) Information Analysis

Center (IAC), is administratively managed by the

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense

Technical Information Center (DTIC) under the DoD

IAC Program. The Contracting Officer's Technical

Representative (COTR) for WSTIAC is Mr. H. Jack

Taylor, ODUSD (S&T), Defense Pentagon,

Washington, D.C. 20301-3080, (703) 588-7405. IIT

Research Institute operates WSTIAC, which services

Government, industry, and academia as a Center of

Excellence in Weapon Systems Technology.

WSTIAC Director: Dr. Wes Kitchens

703.933.3317, Email: wkitchens@iitri.org

Database Inquiries: Vakare Valaitis

703.933.3362 Email: vvalaitis@iitri.org

Internet: http://iac.dtic.mil/wstiac/

All data and information herein reported are believed

to be reliable; however, no warrant, expressed or

implied, is to be construed as to the accuracy or the

completeness of the information presented. The

views, opinions, and findings contained in this publication are those of the author(s) and should not be

construed as an official Agency position, policy, or

decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONTRATION LIST

FOR 2002 ANNOUNCED

Edward C. "Pete" Aldridge, under secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology

and Logistics, announced today the selection of new Advanced Concept Technology

Demonstration (ACTD) projects for fiscal year 2002. The ACTD program aids in

rapidly transitioning advanced technology into the hands of the unified commanders. Of the funded ACTDs for fiscal year 2002, 11 will directly support the war on

terrorism. The military services, theater commanders and Defense agencies submitted nearly 80 proposed fiscal year 2002 ACTD projects. Representatives of the military services and unified commanders reviewed the list of proposals and provided

their priorities to the Joint Staff's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

Marrying new operational concepts with new technologies, ACTDs reduce the time

required to field new systems and increase end-user involvement in system refinement and integration. Initiated in 1995, the ACTD program focuses on rapidly placing maturing technologies in the hands of warfighters. In partnership with operational commanders, the services and the Joint Staff, the program delivers prototypes

as tailored solutions for validated mission needs. Our products demonstrate the military utility of new technologies while giving warfighters hands-on experience to

develop concepts for operational employment. ACTD projects span a broad spectrum of operational requirements with an emphasis on joint capabilities. In many

cases, ACTDs yield transformational changes. Products such as unmanned aerial

vehicles (UAVs) and unattended ground sensors (UGS) change the paradigms for

military operations. Approximately 30 ACTD products support our nation's counterterrorism efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle. 

The ACTDs selected for initiation in fiscal year 2002 include: 

Active Denial System: A system mounted on stationary and mobile platforms to provide long-range, anti-personnel, non-lethal force options to commanders. 

Agile Transportation: A system providing visibility of transportation requirements

and assets to improve scheduling decision support tools for mode determination

and optimization of inter- and intra-theater lift assets. 

Coalition Information Assurance Common Operational Picture: Provides a detailed

information assurance and situational awareness picture of the information system

security status of all mission critical systems on a near-or-real-time basis in support

of CINC and coalition missions. 

Contamination Avoidance at Seaports of Debarkation: Provides a deployable package for a chemical and biological defense capability at seaports of debarkation to

minimize impact on seaport operations. 

Expendable Unmanned Air Vehicle and Air-Launched Extended Range Transporter:

Air vehicles providing covert delivery of off-board sensors, tactical surveillance, battle damage assessment and weapons of mass destruction monitoring at low cost. 

Homeland Security: A homeland security capability for assured, secure, survivable

interagency network connectivity to assess and track threats across multiple

domains with a coordinated response capability to neutralize threats and recover

from damage. 

HYCAS: A hyperspectral collection and analysis system with sensors integrated onto

operational platforms and into the existing tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TPED) architectures supporting a counter-concealment, camouflage

and deception intelligence capability. 

Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal-Knowledge and Technology Operational

Demonstration: A system providing a new integrated capability for joint and coalition explosive ordnance disposal forces. 

Language and Speech Exploitation Resources: Systems automating translation of

spoken or written foreign languages for quickly translating captured documents,

debriefing witnesses and supporting communication in coalition operations. 

Micro Air Vehicle: A fully autonomous 6-9 inch micro aerial vehicle providing small

ground combat units with situational awareness of enemy activity using a low-cost,

disposal air vehicle. 

Pathfinder: An integration of unattended ground vehicles, unmanned air vehicles

and smart sensors in a mobile, self-forming network providing enhanced situational awareness, command, control and communications to commanders and assault

forces for urban reconnaissance. 

Thermobaric: A penetrator payload to defeat enemy tunnel facilities and weapons.

Three additional ACTD projects will be initiated during this fiscal year if funding

permits. These include: 

FYI . . .

FYI Cont.

Agent Defeat Warhead: A weapon providing a high

temperature incendiary kinetic energy penetrator warhead to destroy biological and chemical manufacturing and storage facilities. 

Joint Distance Support and Response: A system providing near-real-time, reliable, accurate telemaintenance for forward deployed forces and weapon systems using a collaborative knowledge center and tool

suite, with reach-back capability. 

SPARTAN: An unmanned surface watercraft providing

a low-cost force multiplier with integrated expeditionary sensor and weapon systems for use against

asymmetric threats. 

Information on ACTDs can be found at

http://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/descript.htm. ♦

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002
Smart/Precision Weapons Training Seminar

LOCATION: Huntsville, Alabama, 2002

23-25 April 18-20 June 20-22 August

(Seminar starts at 8:00 AM Tuesday and ends at 12:00 PM Thursday)

Seminar Scope:

The Weapon Systems Technology Information

Analysis Center (WSTIAC) developed this 2-1⁄2 day

Smart Weapons Training Seminar to provide a comprehensive understanding of smart weapons and

related technologies. This seminar is aimed at providing general knowledge about smart weapons

technology and a source of current information on

selected U.S. and foreign smart weapons, to include

system description, concept of employment, performance characteristics, effectiveness and program

status. 

Seminar Objectives:

The seminar's objective is to inform materiel and

combat developers, systems analysts, scientists,

engineers, managers and business developers about

smart weapons to include: State of the art of representative U.S. and foreign smart weapon systems;

Employment concepts; Smart weapons related systems, subsystems, and technologies; and

Technology trends.

Seminar Sponsors:

hDUSD(S&T) Weapons

hDefense Technical Information Center(DTIC)

hJoint Technical Coordinating Group Munitions

Effectiveness(Smart Munitions Working Group) 

About the Seminar:

This seminar was originally developed for the U.S.

Army Command and General Staff College in Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas. It has proven to be enormously popular with attendees from both government and industry. The seminar is updated annually to include current information about the latest

technology and capability upgrades being made to

representative US and foreign smart weapon systems. Instructors include: Dr. Wes Kitchens, WSTIAC Director and former DDR&E Director for

Weapons Technologies; Mr. Mark Scott and Mr.

Hunter Chockley, IITRI Science Advisors; and Mr.

Mike Holthus, foreign weapons expert at the

National Ground Intelligence Center. 

Security Classification:

The security classification of this seminar is SECRET

(U.S. Citizens Only).

Fee:

The registration fee for this 2-1⁄2 seminar is $950 for

US government personnel and $1150 for government contractors. Contractor teams of 3 or more,

registered at the same time, are charged $950 per

person.

Registration:

Attendance is limited to 35 people and the seminars

generally fill up fast. All registrations will be

acknowledged, and each attendee will be sent an

agenda, maps, and directions to the seminar site.

Please call Ms. Kelly Hopkins 

at (256) 382-4747 or 

email khopkins@iitri.org 

for more information and a brochure with seminar details.

Smart Weapons Training Seminar Offered at Your Location

WSTIAC can conduct its 2-1⁄2 day Smart Weapons Training Seminar at your location during 2001 to reduce your travel time and cost. This seminar has been presented to hundreds of students over the past decade. This is a very cost effective way to provide smart

weapons training to up to 35 people at your site. 
Upcoming Conferences and Courses

29 April-1 May 2002

Fuze Conference

Marriott River Walk

San Antonio TX

For additional information:

Email: rmohrmann@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2560 

5-8 May 5-8 2002

AOC International EW Conference and Exposition

Stockholm, Sweden 

For additional information: AOC, 888-OLD-CROW 

E-mail: bnelms@crows.org

http://www.crows.org 

6-9 May 2002

47th Annual Joint EW Conference

Lackland AFB, TX

Secret/US Government-Only

For additional information contact: John Geise 937.255.2960

E-mail: john.geise@wpafb.af.mil

https://jewc.mugu.navy.mil 

6-10 May 2002

Live Fire Test and Evaluation

Monterey CA

For additional information:

Email: pedmonson@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2190 

11-15 May 2002

IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation

Crystal Gateway Marriott Hotel

Washington DC

For additional information:

http://www.icra-iros.com/icra2002/index.html 

13-16 May 2002

21st Century Military Operations and Technology

Sheraton Atlantic City Convention Center

Atlantic City, NJ

For additional information

Email: djenks@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID

=_0MF0QZX7J&MID=2610

21-22 May 2002

Network Centric Warfare 2002 Conference

Crystal City, Arlington, VA

For additional information contact: IQPC, 800.882.8684 

E-mail info@iqpc.com

http://www.iqpc.com/NA-1763-01 

27-29 May 2002

9th Saint Petersburg International Conference on Integrated

Navigation Systems

St Petersburg Russia

For additional information:

Contact: Dr. John Niemela 732 427 4635

Email: john.niemela@maill.monmouth.army.mil

http://www.elektropribor.spb.ru/confs/icins02/index.html

3-5 June 2002

2002 Mines, Demolition and Non-Lethal Conference

Saddlebrook Resort, Tampa FL

For additional information

Email: djenks@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID

=_0MF0QZX7J&MID=2500

3-5 June 2002

2nd Annual Intelligent Vehicle Systems Symposium 

Grand Traverse Resort & Spa

Traverse City, MI 

For additional information

Email: djenks@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure&SID

=_0MF0QZX7J&MID=257

4-5 June 2002

UAV Payloads Conference

Army Research Lab, Adelphi, MD

Secret/US-Only

For additional information contact: AOC, 888-OLD-CROW 

Email: bnelms@crows.org

http://www.crows.org 

21-25 July 2002

Joint Advanced Weapon Systems Sensors, Simulation and

Support Symposium (JAWS S3)

Air Force Academy

Colorado Springs, CO

For additional information:

Email: CGriffith@anteon.com 

23-27 September 2002

20th International Symposium On Ballistics

The Rosen Centre Hotel

Orlando, FL

For additional information:

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~2210 

WSTIAC Newsletter 2nd Quarter 2002
Inside this issue. . .

Interview with LtGen Kadish

AntiJam GPS 

Introducing Dr Scannell

Director’s Corner

F Y I 

New Sensors and Seekers Course

Calendar of Events 

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