Transportation of Federal Prisoners to State Courts

Pursuant to Writs of Habeas Corpus

T h e A tto rn ey G eneral needs no specific sta tu to ry authorization in o rd er to surren d er 

custody o f a federal prisoner to state authorities for transportation to a state co u rt 

pursuant to a w rit o f habeas corpus, and no federal statute prohibits it.

S urrendering a federal prisoner to the tem porary physical custody and co n tro l o f state 

officers does not result in a loss o f federal jurisdiction o v e r the prisoner.

E scape o f a federal prisoner tem porarily in the custody o f state authorities pursuant to the 

direction o f the A tto rn ey G eneral w ould violate the federal escape statute, 18 U .S.C. 

§ 7 5 1 .

July 25, 1980

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR 

TH E DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS

This responds to your request for our opinion whether federal prisoners may be released to the physical custody of state law enforcement 

officers for transportation to a state court pursuant to the issuance of a 

writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum or ad prosequendum. 1 You also 

have requested our opinion whether escape by a prisoner thus released 

could be prosecuted as escape from federal custody under 18 U.S.C. 

§751 (Supp. I 1977).

The United States Marshals Service (USMS) concludes that the 

Bureau of Prisons (BOP) may relinquish custody temporarily to state 

officials on state court writs without waiving federal jurisdiction or 

violating federal law. The USMS further concludes that a federal prisoner who escapes from such temporary state custody has violated 18 

U.S.C. § 751. In your view, a federal prisoner may not be released from 

the physical custody of federal agents without specific statutory authorization, because federal custody must remain unbroken. You also 

suggest that if a federal prisoner who is released to state officials 

escapes, he could not be prosecuted under the federal escape statute.

For reasons stated more fully below, we conclude that federal jurisdiction over a prisoner committed to the custody of the Attorney 

General is not waived or otherwise lost if physical custody is surren1 Your question, and accordingly, this response, are limited to situations to which the Interstate 

Agreem ent on Detainers, 18 U.S.C. Appendix, does not apply either because the requesting state is not 

a party to the A greem ent or because the request for production is pursuant to a w rit of habeas corpus 

ad testificandum, and thus not within the scope of the Agreement.

719
dered temporarily to state officials for the purpose of producing the 

prisoner in a state court pursuant to the issuance of a writ of habeas 

corpus ad testificandum or ad prosequendum. We conclude that specific 

statutory authorization is not required for such a temporary transfer of 

custody, and we have found no statute which expressly or impliedly 

prohibits it. We further conclude that escape by a federal prisoner 

while in the temporary custody of state officials would violate the 

federal escape statute.

I.

In 1922, the Supreme Court settled the question whether a federal 

prisoner could be taken on a writ of habeas corpus to a state court and 

there prosecuted on state charges. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 

(1922). Ponzi argued, inter alia, that the state court could not try him 

without jurisdiction over his person and that, as a prisoner of the 

United States, he was “within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction” 

of the United States. Id. at 258. The Court rejected this argument, 

describing it as “a refinement which if entertained would merely obstruct justice,” and stated:

The trial court is given all the jurisdiction needed to try 

and hear him by the consent of the United States, which 

only insists on his being kept safely from escape or from 

danger under the eye and control of its officer. This 

arrangement of comity between the two governments 

works in no way to the prejudice of the prisoner or of 

either sovereignty.

Id. at 265-66. The Court emphasized that our scheme of government, 

with the federal government and the governments of the several states 

each having their own system of courts, requires “not only definite 

rules fixing the powers of the courts in cases of jurisdiction over the 

same persons and things . . . but also a spirit of reciprocal comity and 

mutual assistance to promote due and orderly procedure.” Id. at 259. 

Physical custody of the federal prisoner was not an issue in Ponzi,

however. A federal agent at all times had custody, and the Court, while 

not expressly relying on this fact as essential to the holding, did note it.

Following the lead of Ponzi, federal courts consistently have ruled 

that the federal government does not lose jurisdiction over a federal 

prisoner if it, as a matter of comity, arranges to produce a prisoner for 

prosecution in state court or for service of a state sentence. See, e.g.,

Chunn v. Clark, 451 F.2d 1005, 1006 (5th Cir. 1971); Truesdell v. United

States, 400 F.2d 859, 860 (8th Cir. 1968); Murray v. United States, 334 

F.2d 616, 617 (9th Cir. 1964); Lovell v. Arnold, 391 F. Supp. 1047, 1048 

(M.D. Pa. 1975); United States ex rel. Williams v. Fitzpatrick, 299 F. 

Supp. 260, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

720
As noted in both your opinion request and the USMS memorandum, 

the past practice consistently has been to transport federal prisoners to 

state courts in the custody of a federal marshal and to require the states 

to reimburse the USMS for this expense. Accordingly, the question 

presented here, which is one of physical custody, has not been addressed directly by the courts. The cases, such as those cited above, 

which have considered related questions, however, have inferred that 

temporary transfers of physical custody also are matters of comity to be 

worked out between federal and state authorities.

In Allen v. Hunter, 65 F. Supp. 365 (D. Kan. 1946), for example, the 

court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the federal government lost all 

jurisdiction over him when, after convicting and sentencing him, it 

permitted him to be returned to the Indiana State Prison. Quoting from 

the Tenth Circuit in Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F.2d 865, 866 (10th Cir. 

1940), the court held:

When the court of one sovereign takes a person into its 

custody on a criminal charge he remains in the jurisdiction of that sovereign until it has been exhausted, to the 

exclusion of the courts of the other sovereign. That rule 

rests upon principles of comity, and it exists between 

federal and state courts. [Cites omitted.] But either the 

federal or a state government may voluntarily surrender 

its prisoner to the other without the consent of the prisoner, and in such circumstances the question of jurisdiction and custody is purely one of comity between the two 

sovereigns, not a personal right of the prisoner which he 

can assert in a proceeding of this kind.

Allen v. Hunter, 65 F. Supp. at 367-68 (emphasis added). See also Young

v. Harris, 229 F. Supp. 922, 924 (W.D. Mo. 1964). The Fifth Circuit in 

Chunn v. Clark, supra, believed it “well-established” that a prisoner has 

no standing to contest an agreement between two sovereigns, and thus 

ruled that federal authorities did not lose jurisdiction over Chunn by 

complying with an Alabama writ. 451 F.2d at 1006.2 Similarly, in Potter

v. Ciccone, 316 F. Supp. 703, 705 (W.D. Mo. 1970), the court stated the 

“well-established” rule that the federal government does not lose jurisdiction of a prisoner because it permits a state “to take the prisoner into

its custody . . .” (Emphasis added.) The court continued: “Thus, while 

the temporary custody of the other sovereign may postpone the rights

* Many o f these cases have arisen on writs o f habeas corpus filed by prisoners seeking either a 

release from custody or freedom from prosecution. T he courts have held that such prisoners have no 

standing to contest an agreem ent between tw o sovereigns concerning the tem porary exchange of 

custody of the prisoners on writs o f habeas corpus ad prosequendum or their agreem ent as to the order 

o f prosecution or execution o f sentence. See, e.g., Chunn v. Clark, 451 F.2d 1005 (Sth Cir. 1971); 

Derengowski v. U.S. Marshal, 377 F.2d 223 (Sth Cir. 1967); Lovell v. Arnold, 391 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. 

Pa. 1975).

721
of the first sovereign, it cannot defeat them and jurisdiction is not lost.” 

Id. at 705-06.3

These issues also have arisen when state authorities have released 

state prisoners to the custody of federal authorities. Although in many 

of these cases, actual physical custody was transferred to federal authorities, the courts refused to find a loss of state jurisdiction. In 

Bullock v. Mississippi, 404 F.2d 75 (Sth Cir. 1968), the prisoner-appellant 

sought release from a state detainer on the ground that by earlier 

transferring him to federal custody, the state had waived its right to 

jurisdiction over him. The court ruled that “[t]he State, by giving 

temporary custody to the federal authorities does so without a complete surrender of its prior jurisdiction over him.” Id. at 76. See also

Derengowski v. U.S. Marshal, 377 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1967).

These same rules apply when a prisoner is produced pursuant to a 

writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. In In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 

89 (2d Cir. 1978), the court held that: “any ‘loan’ to the second sovereignty in compliance with such a writ or any other temporary transfer 

of custody from the sovereignty having the prior jurisdiction cannot 

affect in any way whatever any final judgment of conviction already 

entered against the prisoner there or affect the running of the sentence 

imposed pursuant to that judgment.” And, recently, the Ninth Circuit 

implemented this rule by declaring that a district judge’s attempt to 

transfer a prisoner (who was serving concurrent federal and state sentences in state prison) from state to federal custody violated fundamental principles of comity and separation of powers. United States v. 

Warren, 610 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1980). The court wrote:

Determination of priority o f custody and service of sentence between state and federal sovereigns is a matter of

comity to be resolved by the executive branches of the 

two sovereigns . . . [T]he sovereign with priority of jurisdiction, here, the United States, may elect under the doctrine of comity to relinquish it to another sovereign. This 

discretionary election is an executive, and not a judicial 

function. [Cites omitted.]

In the federal system, the “power and discretion” to 

practice comity is vested in the Attorney General.

Id. at 684-85 (emphasis added).

The cases cited above establish that surrendering a prisoner to another jurisdiction for purposes of prosecution, testimony, or service of 

sentence does not affect a loss of jurisdiction by the surrendering

3 Loss o f jurisdiction also has been asserted w here a state took into custody a federal defendant 

w ho was released from federal custody pending appeal. In Jones v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 493, 493-94 (10th 

Cir. 1964), the court rejected this contention because “ [w]hen a person is convicted o f independent 

crimes in state and federal courts, the question o f jurisdiction and custody is one o f com ity between the 

tw o governm ents and not a personal right o f the prisoner" (emphasis added).

722
authority. Although most of these cases did not address directly the 

question you raise other than in dicta, we believe that the policies 

underlying these cases yield the same result here. In our opinion, 

therefore, Federal jurisdiction is not lost if physical custody and control 

of Federal prisoners is transferred temporarily to State officers.4

II.

In addition to raising jurisdictional questions, you have suggested that 

custody of a federal prisoner may not be surrendered to state authorities absent congressional authorization. Again relying on Ponzi v. 

Fessenden, supra, we believe that, as a general rule, specific statutory 

authorization is not required. In Ponzi, the Court wrote: “There is no 

express authority authorizing the transfer of a federal prisoner to a state 

court for [trial]. Yet we have no doubt that it exists and is to be 

exercised with the consent of the Attorney General.” 258 U.S. at 261 — 

62. The Court recited the many duties of the Attorney General with 

respect to prisons and prisoners, and concluded:

This recital of the duties of the Attorney General leaves 

no doubt that one of the interests of the United States 

which he has authority and discretion to attend to, 

through one of his subordinates, in a state court, under 

§367, Rev. Stats., is that which relates to the safety and 

custody of United States prisoners in confinement under 

sentence of federal courts. In such matters he represents the

United States and may on its part practice the comity which

the harmonious and effective operation of both systems of

courts requires, provided it does not prevent enforcement of

the sentence of the federal courts or endanger the prisoner.

Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263.

Id. at 263 (emphasis added).5

Although we believe that specific statutory authorization is not required, it is necessary to review relevant statutes to determine whether

4 In one sense, federal jurisdiction may be lost if physical custody is relinquished to state authorities. 

If a state violates doctrines of com ity and refuses to return the prisoner to federal authorities, the 

federal governm ent has no immediate jurisdiction over the prisoner w ithout actual physical custody of 

the body. Its jurisdiction over the prisoner is limited to its pow er to enforce the federal sentence once 

the prisoner is released from slate custody.

Unless an enforceable agreem ent is struck between federal and state authorities, the federal government would be w ithout an adequate immediate remedy if the state refuses to return the prisoner. In 

that event, absent a violation of the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States (28 U.S.C. 

§2254), the federal governm ent would have to await the release o f the prisoner by the state. See

Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590, 604-06 (9th Cir. 1957). The Associate D eputy A ttorney General 

has indicated that this is not a serious practical problem because, if it happened once, no additional 

prisoners would be released to that state.

5 See also United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1980). T he legislation creating the 

Departm ent of Justice authorized the A ttorney General to send the Solicitor G eneral or any officer o f 

the Departm ent of Justice “to any State or district in the United States to attend to the interests of the 

United States in any suit pending . . . or to attend to any other interest o f the United States." A ct of 

June 22, 1870, §5, 16 Stat. 162, 163. The current version o f this section is 28 U.S.C. §517.

723
Congress has prohibited, either expressly or impliedly, exercise of 

comity in this area by the Attorney General. We find no express 

statutory prohibition on temporary transfers of custody for the purpose 

of transporting federal prisoners to state court. The only statute we find 

which might be read to prohibit impliedly such a transfer is 18 U.S.C. 

§4008.6

Section 4008 provides: “Prisoners shall be transported by agents 

designated by the Attorney General or his authorized representative” 

(emphasis added). The question raised by this section is whether it 

requires that in all cases a federal prisoner must be transported by a 

federal agent. We believe it should not be interpreted so restrictively. 

In our opinion, this statute was not intended to cover transportation 

solely for a state’s convenience and upon a state’s request.

Section 4008 was designed primarily to authorize payment of transportation expenses.7 After stating that prisoners shall be transported by 

designated agents, the section provides: “The reasonable expense of 

transportation, necessary subsistence, and hire and transportation of 

guards and agents shall be paid by the Attorney General from such 

appropriation for the Department of Justice as he shall direct.” 8 Similar language first appeared in an 1864 Act, which provided:

Be it enacted . . . [t]hat all persons who have been, or 

who may hereafter be, convicted of crime by any court of 

the United States—not military—the punishment whereof 

shall be imprisonment, in a district or territory where, at 

the time of such conviction, there may be no penitentiary 

or other prison suitable for the confinement of convicts of

6 Ac first glance, 18 U.S.C. § 4085(a) seems to relate to this question. This section provides:

W henever any federal prisoner has been indicted, informed against, or convicted of a 

felony in a court of record of any State or the District of Columbia, the A ttorney 

G eneral shall, if he finds it in the public interest to do so, upon the request of the 

G overnor or the executive authority thereof, and upon the presentation of a certified 

copy of such indictment, information or judgm ent of conviction, cause such person, 

prior to his release, to be transferred to a penal or correctional institution within such 

State or District.

• * • • *

T he expense o f personnel and transportation incurred shall be chargeable to the 

appropriation for the “Support of United States prisoners."

This section, however, does not address the issue o f tem porary transfer o f custody. It is distinguishable 

from the situations under review because it contem plates transfer immediately prior to expiration of 

the federal sentence so that upon release the prisoner is subject to the state authority. See S. Rep. No. 

1410, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1940); H.R. Rep. No. 1885, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1940).

7 If a section heading is enacted as part o f an act or as part o f a code, one may look to the heading 

as an aid to the legislative intent. Know/ton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41.77 (1849); Clawans v. Sheetz, 92 F.2d 

517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction §47.14 (1973 & Supp. 

1978). Section 4008 is headed “Transportation expenses,” suggesting that the prim ary purpose of the 

statute was to authorize payment for such expenses.

8 The rem ainder o f the section provides:

Upon conviction by a consular court or court martial the prisoner shall be transported 

from the court to the place o f confinement by agents of the D epartm ent of State, the 

Arm y, Navy, or Air Force, as the case may be, the expense to be paid out of the 

Treasury of the United States in the manner provided by law.

724
the United States, and available therefor, shall be confined 

. . . in some suitable prison in a convenient state or territory to be designated by the Secretary of Interior, and

shall be transported and delivered to the warden or keeper of

the prison by the m arshal. . . the reasonable actual expense

o f transportation, necessary subsistence and hire, and transportation o f guards and the marshal. . . to be paid by the

Secretary o f the Interior, out of the judiciary fund. . . .

Act of May 12, 1864, § 1, 13 Stat. .74, 74-75 (emphasis added).9 This 

section further provided that if, in the opinion of the Secretary, the 

expense of transportation would exceed the cost of maintaining a prisoner in a jail in the state of his conviction, then it would be lawful so to 

confine him. This measure passed the Congress with no recorded floor 

debate on its provisions. 64 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1684 

(1864); 65 Cong. Globe 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2207 (1864). The text of 

the Act suggests that its purpose was to resolve the question where 

federal prisoners should be incarcerated if there was no suitable penitentiary in the state or territory of conviction. The transportation provision, authorizing transportation and delivery to a suitable prison, was 

part of the resolution of this question.10

In 1876, responsibility for designating places of confinement was 

transferred to the Attorney General. Act of July 12, 1876, 19 Stat. 88- 

89. This Act also amended the Act of May 12, 1864, supra, by allowing 

the Attorney General to change the place of imprisonment as necessary. The transportation provisions in the Act were not substantively 

altered, however. They provided that prisoners “shall be transported 

and delivered to the warden . . . by the marshal . . . the reasonable 

actual expense of transportation, necessary subsistence, and hire and 

transportation of guards and the marshal . . . to be paid by the Attorney General, out of the judiciary fund.” Id. An 1891 statute authorizing 

the establishment of three United States prisons also contained a section 

providing that transportation of all United States prisoners and their 

delivery to United States prisons shall be by the marshal and allowed 

the same expenses as did the previous statutes.11 The language was

9 Prior to that time, statutes allowed costs to United States Marshals for “transporting criminals." 

See Act o f Feb. 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 165.

10 A similar statute, providing for the confinement o f juvenile offenders, and their transportation to 

the place o f confinement by the marshal, was passed in 1865. A ct o f M arch 3, 1865, § 1, 13 Stat. 538. 

This Act provided:

Be it enacted . . . [t]hat juvenile offenders . . . shall be confined . . . in some house of 

refuge to be designated by the Secretary o f the Interior, and shall be transported and 

delivered to the warden or keeper o f such house of refuge by the marshal . . . and the 

reasonable actual expense of the transportation, necessary subsistence, and hire, and 

transportation o f assistants and the marshal or warden, only shall be paid by the 

Secretary of the Interior, out of the judiciary fund.

11 A ct o f M arch 3, 1891, § 5, 26 Stat. 839, 839-40. Section 5 provided:

That the transportation o f all United States prisoners convicted o f crimes against the 

laws of the United States in any State, District or T erritory, and sentenced to terms of

Continued

725
again amended in 1901, but, again, the substance of the transportation 

provisions was not changed. Act of March 3, 1901, 31 Stat. 1450-51. 

The legislative history of these acts is brief and the transportation 

provisions are not specifically addressed. 4 Cong. Rec. 2339, 4268 

(1876); 22 Cong. Rec. 2925, 3563-64 (1891).

In 1930, Congress created the Bureau of Prisons and revised the laws 

relating to federal prisoners. The law regarding transportation of prisoners was amended to read substantially as it does today. As enacted at 

that time, it provided:

All transportation of prisoners shall be by such agent or 

agents of the Department of Justice as the Attorney General or his authorized representative shall from time to 

time nominate, the reasonable expense of transportation, 

necessary subsistence, and hire and transportation of 

guards and agent or agents to be paid by the Attorney 

General from any appropriation to the Department of 

Justice as he may direct. . . .

Act of May 14, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-218, §8, 46 Stat. 325, 328. The 

major change was that “all transportation” shall be by “an agent or 

agents of the Department of Justice,” rather than that transportation 

and delivery of prisoners to the place of confinement shall be by the 

marshal. The legislative history of this 1930 modification does not 

explain why these changes were made. The committee reports do 

indicate that the act resulted from concern about the lack of proper 

care and supervision of the increasing number of federal prisoners. H.R. 

Rep. No. 106, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1930). The few federal penitentiaries were congested and “great masses” of federal prisoners were held 

in local jails and workhouses, some of which were considered “unsanitary and generally deplorable.” S. Rep. No. 533, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 

2 (1930). Accordingly, these reports and the floor debates concentrate 

on a program to provide adequate prison facilities and a proper organization to administer the federal penal system. 72 Cong. Rec. 2157-58 

(1930). The only reference to the bill’s transportation section in either 

report is a reference found in an attached Attorney General’s analysis 

of the bill. That analysis stated: “Section 8 of the proposed bill clarifies 

how prisoners may be transported and the fund which is chargeable.”

H.R. Rep. No. 106, supra, at 3; S. Rep. No. 533, supra, at 3. There is no 

indication, however, that Congress intended that section to extend 

beyond its prior coverage of transportation and delivery to a place of

imprisonment in a penitentiary, and their delivery to the superintendent, warden, or 

keeper o f such United States prisons, shall be by the marshal of the District or 

T erritory w here such conviction may occur, after the erection and com pletion o f said 

prisons. That the actual expenses of such marshal, including transportation and subsistence, hire, transportation and subsistence o f guards, and the transportation and subsistence o f the convict or convicts, be paid, on the approval o f the A ttorney G enera) out 

o f the judiciary fund.

726
confinement or that it intended to restrict the Attorney General’s broad 

discretionary authority as to the care and custody of federal prisoners.

In light of this legislative history, it is not necessary to assume that 

by providing that the expenses of all transportation were to be paid by 

the Attorney General, the Congress intended that transportation requested by a state for purposes unrelated to the federal conviction or 

incarceration be paid by the federal government. Nor is it necessary to 

interpret the statement that prisoners “shall be transported” by agents 

designated by the Attorney General as precluding the Attorney General from promoting comity among sovereigns by exercising his authority to approve temporary transfers of custody. Rather, we believe it is 

more reasonable to conclude that Congress intended § 4008 to provide 

for transportation for federal purposes, such as transportation from the 

court of conviction to the place of confinement as did the previous 

statutes on which that section is based. The “clarification” mentioned in 

the committee reports most likely referred to the authorization for any 

agent designated by the Attorney General to transport prisoners rather 

than the marshal exclusively.

In the 1948 codification of the United States Criminal Code, the 

section was revised to its present form.12 Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. 

No. 80-772, § 4008, 62 Stat. 683, 849. It was explained in a committee 

report that the revisions were “[m]inor changes in phraseology,” not 

substantive changes. H.R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A179 

(1947). See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 468-70 (1975). We conclude, therefore, that § 4008 does not prohibit the Attorney General 

from making arrangements for state law enforcement officers to assume 

temporary custody of federal prisoners for the purpose of production in 

a state court, pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. Nor have we found 

any other federal statute which prohibits such action.

We emphasize that this memorandum addresses only those circumstances in which the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is not 

applicable.13 If the state is a party to the IAD, the procedures established under it may be exclusive. See United States ex rel. Escola v. 

Groomes, 520 F.2d 830, 837-38 (3d Cir. 1975). Even if the state involved is not a party to the IAD, that agreement should be used as a 

guide for all temporary transfers of custody, for state prosecution or 

testimony. The party states of the IAD, which now include the federal 

government and approximately 42 states, find that proper proceedings 

on charges emanating from other jurisdictions cannot be had in the 

absence of cooperative procedures, and declare that the purpose of the

12 In 1949, the third paragraph of the section, dealing with prisoners convicted by a consular court 

or court martial, was amended. A ct of M ay 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, § 4121, 63 Stat. 89, 98. These 

amendments do not affect the first and second paragraphs of the section with w hich we are concerned 

here.

13 See note 1, supra.

in
IAD is to provide such procedures.14 The Department of Justice initiated and supported congressional adoption of the IAD because existing 

procedures were inadequate. See H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d 

Sess. 3 (1970).

To avoid the damaging effects of detainers on prisoners, the IAD 

guarantees certain procedural rights to prisoners. For example, prison 

authorities are required to inform prisoners of all charges on the basis 

of which detainers have been lodged. Prisoners may then request a trial 

on the charges and if such trial does not commence within 180 days, 

the charges must be dismissed with prejudice. A non-IAD agreement to 

transfer custody to a state for purposes of prosecution should include 

all legally available safeguards of both the prisoner’s and the government’s interests. A state, by refusing to become party to the IAD, 

should not be able to avoid entirely the procedural requirements of it 

while securing its benefits.15

III.

As you suggested in your request, additional legal questions may 

arise from such temporary transfers of custody. You requested that we 

address one such problem—escape from custody. The federal escape 

statute, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (Supp. I 1977) provides:

Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he is 

confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from 

any custody under or by virtue of any process issued 

under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, 

or commissioner, or from the custody of an officer or 

employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, 

shall [be fined or imprisoned, or both].

The question raised here is whether escape from the temporary custody 

of the state law enforcement officers would violate this statute.

This section was first enacted in 1930, when the Bureau of Prisons 

was established. It read:

14 IA D , A rt. I, 18 U.S.C. Appendix. W hen (he IA D was enacted by Congress, 28 states w ere 

parties to it. Congress expected that the remaining 22 states would becom e partners as soon as their 

legislatures next met. 116 Cong. Rec. 38,841 (1970) (rem arks o f Sen. Hruska).

13 W e do not believe that Congress intended the IA D to be the exclusive means o f transfer of 

custody in all cases, thereby precluding transfer if the requesting state is not a party to it. Such an 

interpretation is not supported by the language o f the A greem ent or its legislative history and would 

exacerbate, for non-party states, the problems the A greem ent is directed tow ard ameliorating. It would 

preclude any transfers to non-party states for purposes o f prosecution, for example, thus leaving 

prisoners with no way o f clearing detainers filed against them and precluding prosecutors from 

bringing defendants to trial w ithin a reasonable time after charges are filed. This would result in 

dismissal of charges not timely prosecuted. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970).

728
Any person properly committed to the custody of the 

Attorney General or his authorized representative or who 

is confined in any penal or correctional institution, pursuant to the direction of the Attorney General, who escapes 

or attempts to escape therefrom shall be guilty of an 

offense. . . .

Act of May 14, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-218, §9, 46 Stat. 327. In the 

Attorney General’s analysis of this Act prior to its enactment, he 

explained that there was “no statutory penalty for escaping from the 

custody of a Federal prison or Federal officers.” H.R. Rep. No. 106, 

supra at 3; S. Rep. No. 533, supra at 3. Since 1930, the section has been 

modified to clarify ambiguities and to broaden its scope. For example, 

in 1935, Congress added the phrase “[any person] who is in custody by 

virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any 

court, judge, or commissioner.” Act of Aug. 3, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74- 

233, 49 Stat. 513, 513-14. In 1948, several amendments were made to 

remove ambiguities and to improve phraseology. Act of June 25, 1948, 

Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 751, 62 Stat. 683, 734. See H.R. Rep. No. 304, 

80th Cong., 1st Sess. A67 (1947).

The term “custody,” as it is used in this statute, has been defined 

very broadly. Although none of the cases deal with the specific situation presented here, they are sufficiently analogous to support the 

conclusion that such escape would violate §751. For example, in 

United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1977), the court concluded that a prisoner serving concurrent state and federal sentences in 

a state penitentiary who failed to return after he was released on a 

“social” pass violated §751. The court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4082(b) provides that a federal sentence may be served in an institution not maintained by the federal government and that “an escape 

from a State institution is an escape from the custody of the Attorney 

General if the prisoner has been confined there under the authority of 

the Attorney General.” Id. at 1073. The Ninth Circuit in an earlier case 

identified the three elements which must be proved to sustain a conviction under § 751: “(a) that there was a prior federal conviction; (b) that 

there was an escape; and (c) that such escape was from a confinement 

arising by virtue of the conviction.” Hardwick v. United States, 296 

F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1961). The court found no basis to the defendant’s 

argument that the prisoner be in the actual physical custody of a federal 

official. Similarly, in McCullough v. United States, 369 F.2d 548, 550 

(8th Cir. 1966), the court held that § 751 punishes “escape from custody 

or from any facility in which the prisoner is confined by direction of 

the Attorney General.” If the Attorney General, through the BOP, 

enters into an agreement with state officials in which the state officials 

agree to keep the prisoner safely confined, the prisoner would be

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confined by virtue of the federal conviction and by direction of the 

Attorney General.

In United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court 

upheld a conviction under § 751 of a federal prisoner who escaped from 

custody after being transferred to a local jail pursuant to a writ of 

habeas corpus ad testificandum. The court ruled:

[We decide] that a prisoner who has been committed to 

the custody of the Attorney General by virtue of a conviction is still in the custody of the Attorney General by 

virtue of that conviction for the purposes of Section 

751(a) when he is transferred pursuant to a writ of habeas

corpus ad testificandum and confined in an institution designated by the Attorney General for the custody of federal prisoners. Policy considerations support at least this 

broad an interpretation of Section 751. The jurisdiction 

from which a prisoner is brought pursuant to a writ of 

habeas corpus has a significant interest in preventing the 

prisoner’s escape from custody. This interest has been 

recognized in an analogous situation by the drafters of the 

Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), who provided 

that when a prisoner serving a sentence in one jurisdiction 

is brought to another jurisdiction for trial on another 

offense and escapes while in the receiving jurisdiction, he 

may be prosecuted under the escape statute of the sending 

jurisdiction.

585 F.2d at 1104 (footnote omitted). We conclude, therefore, that 

escape from state law enforcement officers by a prisoner who is in 

custody pursuant to a federal conviction and is confined under the 

direction of the Attorney General violates § 751.

L a r r y L. Sim m s 

Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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