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FILED

JUL 31 2014

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-13-1329-KuBlPa

)

701 MARIPOSA PROJECT, LLC, ) Bk. No. SV 12-11486-MT

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

 )

SHERRIE KEYS, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) OPINION

)

701 MARIPOSA PROJECT, LLC, )

)

Appellee. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on June 26, 2014

at Pasadena, California

Filed – July 31, 2014 _____________

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Maureen A. Tighe, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Appellant Sherrie Keys argued pro se; G. Bryan

Brannon argued for appellee 701 Mariposa Project,

LLC.

 

Before: KURTZ, BLUMENSTIEL*, and PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judges.

*

The Honorable Hannah L. Blumenstiel, Bankruptcy Judge for

the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
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KURTZ, Bankruptcy Judge:

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Rule 3004,1

 debtor 701 Mariposa Project, LLC

filed a proof of claim on behalf of Sherrie Keys. 701 Mariposa

then filed an objection to that claim, which the bankruptcy court

sustained based in part on Keys’ failure to respond to the claim

objection. Roughly four months later, Keys filed a motion

seeking to set aside the disallowance of her claim, but the

bankruptcy court denied that motion. Keys appeals from the

denial of her motion.

The bankruptcy court’s order disallowing Keys’ claim is void

because the bankruptcy court did not have personal jurisdiction

over Keys. Keys never filed a proof of claim, nor did she

participate in any way in the bankruptcy case before she filed

her motion to set aside, so she never consented to the bankruptcy

court exercising jurisdiction over her or her claim. 

Furthermore, 701 Mariposa’s service of process by mail on Keys

did not comply with Rule 7004(b)(1).

As a result, the bankruptcy court should have granted Keys’

motion and should have set aside the order disallowing Keys’

claim. Therefore, we REVERSE and REMAND.

FACTS

701 Mariposa is a limited liability company that was formed

1

 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

all Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure. All Civil Rule references are to the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

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for the purpose of taking title to a single asset: a twenty-fourunit apartment building located on Mariposa Avenue in Los

Angeles, California.2

 701 Mariposa purchased the property at a

nonjudicial foreclosure sale that took place in July 2011. 701

Mariposa took title subject to the senior liens of Pacific 701

Mariposa, LLC.

Keys is one of the former occupants of the apartment

building. According to Keys, she duly and timely paid $600

monthly rent to an organization called People in Progress

(“PIP”). In turn, PIP was obligated to pay rent to the prior

owner of the apartment building, 709 South Mariposa, Inc.,

pursuant to a lease agreement. At some point, PIP stopped making

rent payments to 709 South Mariposa. In May 2011, PIP vacated

the apartment building and notified the other building occupants,

including Keys, that it was discontinuing its affordable housing

program and that the occupants would need to leave.

In August 2011, within days of its acquisition of the

apartment building, 701 Mariposa hired a new property manager. 

According to 701 Mariposa, the new property manager, Pearson

Management, immediately was confronted with a number of serious

problems including unpaid utility bills, uncollected garbage,

unrepaired fixtures and plumbing, and nonpaying occupants. 

Pearson Management, 701 Mariposa explains, took immediate steps

2

 To facilitate our review and our recitation of facts, the

Panel has reviewed the papers the parties filed in Keys’ district

court lawsuit and in 701 Mariposa’s bankruptcy cases. While many

of these papers were not included in the parties’ excerpts of

record, we can and do take judicial notice of the filing and

contents of these papers. See O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In

re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957–58 (9th Cir. 1989).

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to rectify these problems.

Apparently, Pearson Management’s initial management efforts

included an attempt to evict Keys. While Pearson’s initial

eviction attempt was not successful, Keys eventually was evicted

in September 2012.

In July 2012, Keys filed a lawsuit in the United States

District Court against Pearson, 701 Mariposa and others seeking

over $4.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. 

According to Keys, the defendants’ alternate efforts to evict her

or to persuade her to relocate were all part of a pattern and

practice designed to force out of the building the occupants

brought in by PIP, who were predominantly minorities paying 

below-market-rate rent, and to replace them with white tenants

willing and able to pay market-rate rents of double or triple

what the PIP tenants were paying. Keys asserted that this

pattern and practice violated local, state and federal law.

Meanwhile, 701 Mariposa filed its first chapter 11

bankruptcy case in August 2011, which was dismissed in February

2012. 701 Mariposa filed its second chapter 11 case later that

same month. As reflected in 701 Mariposa’s schedules, its only

significant asset was the apartment building.

In April 2012, the bankruptcy court set a claims bar date of

June 10, 2012. 701 Mariposa served notice of the claims bar date

on its scheduled creditors, but Keys did not receive this notice

because she was not a scheduled creditor. 701 Mariposa did not

initially list Keys as creditor in its bankruptcy schedules, nor

did 701 Mariposa amend its schedules either before or after Keys

filed her $4.5 million district court lawsuit.

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However, 701 Mariposa did file a notice of bankruptcy filing

in the district court lawsuit in August 2012, which was served on

Keys. In addition, pursuant to Rule 3004, 701 Mariposa filed

that same month a $4.5 million proof of claim on Keys’ behalf. 

701 Mariposa attached to the proof of claim a copy of Keys’

district court complaint.

701 Mariposa then filed, in October 2012, an objection to

the proof of claim. In that objection, 701 Mariposa asserted

that Keys’ claim should be disallowed not only as untimely but

also because the claim had no merit factually or legally. 701

Mariposa further asserted that the claim should be disallowed

because Keys was suing 701 Mariposa in the district court in

violation of the automatic stay. 

Based on 701 Mariposa’s notice of bankruptcy filing, the

district court entered an order directing Keys to file either a

request for voluntary dismissal of 701 Mariposa from the district

court lawsuit or a motion for relief from stay seeking permission

from the bankruptcy court to proceed with the district court

lawsuit as against 701 Mariposa.

Keys never complied with the district court’s order. 

Instead, on November 5, 2012, she filed a motion seeking an

extension of time to comply with the district court’s order. In

the process of requesting this relief, Keys admitted that she had

received email notice of 701 Mariposa’s claim objection and that

she was aware the claim objection had been set for hearing on

November 29, 2012. Furthermore, she attached to her district

court extension motion a copy of 701 Mariposa’s claim objection.

Keys never filed a response to 701 Mariposa’s claim

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objection. After the November 29, 2012 hearing date, the

bankruptcy court sustained the claim objection and disallowed

Keys’ claim for the reasons stated in the claim objection and

based on Keys’ failure to respond. The court entered its order

disallowing Keys’ claim on December 4, 2012. 

The docket from the district court lawsuit and the documents

filed therein demonstrate that Keys was aware of the bankruptcy

court’s order disallowing her claim by no later than December 12,

2012, when she replied to a December 6, 2012 opposition and a

December 6, 2012 judicial notice request filed by 701 Mariposa in

the district court lawsuit. 701 Mariposa’s December 6, 2012

district court filings specifically refer to and attach a copy of

the bankruptcy court’s December 4, 2012 order disallowing Keys’

claim.

Even so, Keys did not seek relief from the bankruptcy

court’s December 4, 2012 claim disallowance order until over four

months later, when she filed her motion to set aside that order. 

Keys once again admitted in that motion that she had actual

notice of 701 Mariposa’s claim objection and the date set for the

hearing thereon. The only relevant grounds Keys stated in

support of the motion were insufficient service of process and

the violation of her due process rights.

After 701 Mariposa responded to the reconsideration motion,

the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the motion on June 28,

2013, at which the court adopted its tentative ruling as its

final ruling. The court found that Keys’ actual notice of the

claim objection was sufficient to satisfy the minimal

requirements of due process. As for the asserted defective

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service of process, the bankruptcy court found that Keys was

evicted from the apartment building in September 2012. The court

further found that the apartment building no longer was Keys’

“dwelling house or usual place of abode” as specified in Rule

7004(b)(1) and therefore 701 Mariposa’s service of process was

defective. Nonetheless, the court found that 701 Mariposa’s

service of process, in conjunction with Keys’ actual notice, met

the “substantial compliance standard” for service of process and

thus was sufficient to give the bankruptcy court personal

jurisdiction over Keys. Consequently, the bankruptcy court

denied Keys’ motion to set aside, and Keys timely appealed.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(B). We have

appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158. We discuss below

the bankruptcy court’s personal jurisdiction over Keys.

ISSUE

Was the order disallowing Keys’ claim void either because

Keys was denied due process or because the bankruptcy court

lacked personal jurisdiction over Keys?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Whether notice was sufficient for due process purposes is

reviewed de novo. See Frates v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re

Frates), 507 B.R. 298, 301 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). To the extent

the underlying facts are undisputed, the bankruptcy court’s

determination regarding personal jurisdiction also is reviewed de

novo. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Brenneke, 551 F.3d

1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009). To the extent certain facts

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regarding service of process are disputed, those facts are

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See S.E.C. v.

Internet Solutions for Business Inc., 509 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th

Cir. 2007). 

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are

“illogical, implausible, or without support in the record.” Retz

v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010).

DISCUSSION

Keys has argued in relevant part that 701 Mariposa’s service

of the claim objection was defective. Keys presses this argument

on appeal even though she has admitted (a number of times) that

she actually knew of the claim objection well before November 29,

2012 – the date set for the hearing on the claim objection. 

According to Keys’ own declaration testimony, she found out about

the claim objection and the hearing date from an email that she

received from 701 Mariposa’s counsel on October 15, 2012. 

Furthermore, the record establishes that she had received a full

copy of the claim objection by no later than November 8, 2012. 

On that date, she filed papers in the district court lawsuit to

which she attached a copy of the claim objection.

As Keys notes and the bankruptcy court found, 701 Mariposa

served Keys at her address in the apartment building, but Keys no

longer was living in the apartment building at that time because

she had been evicted in September 2012. These factual findings

have not been challenged on appeal, so we accept them as true. 

See Sachan v. Huh (In re Huh), 506 B.R. 257, 272 (9th Cir. BAP

2014) (en banc). Because 701 Mariposa did not serve Keys at her

“dwelling house or usual place of abode,” 701 Mariposa’s

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attempted service of process by mail did not comply with the

requirements of Rule 7004(b)(1).

Based on this defective service of process, Keys in essence

asserts two things: (1) that she was denied due process; and (2)

that, as a result of 701 Mariposa’s defective service of process,

the bankruptcy court did not have personal jurisdiction over

her.3

Both of Keys’ assertions – lack of due process and lack of

personal jurisdiction – implicate Rule 60(b)(4), which applies to

Keys’ motion to set aside. See United Student Funds, Inc. v.

Wylie (In re Wylie), 349 B.R. 204, 209 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (“when

reconsideration under Rule 3008 is sought after the . . . appeal

period has expired, the motion is subject to the constraints of

FRCP 60(b) as incorporated by Rule 9024.”). If either of Keys’

assertions is true, then the December 2012 claim disallowance

order was void, and the bankruptcy court should have granted

Keys’ motion to set aside. See Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v.

Ctr. Wholesale, Inc. (In re Ctr. Wholesale, Inc.), 759 F.2d 1440,

1448 (9th Cir. 1985); see also S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130,

1139 (9th Cir 2007) (“A judgment entered without jurisdiction

over the defendant is void.”). We will address each of Keys’

assertions in turn.

1. Lack of Due Process

The due process requirements for notice are relatively

3

 We have construed Keys’ pro se appeal briefs liberally,

in accordance with Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d

696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990), partially overruled on other grounds

by, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562–63 (2007).

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minimal; they merely require notice “reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present

their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

We understand that Keys may not have received all of the

notices regarding the commencement of the bankruptcy case and the

claims bar date contemplated under the Bankruptcy Code and the

Rules, but Keys simply cannot parlay these procedural defects

into a due process violation concerning 701 Mariposa’s claim

objection. Keys has admitted that she had actual notice of the

claim objection and the hearing thereon. Furthermore, she had a

full copy of the claim objection papers at least three weeks

before the date set for the claim objection hearing. These facts

are more than sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements

with respect to the claim objection proceedings. See generally

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272

(2010). Thus, Keys’ due process argument lacks merit.

2. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Effective service of process, made in compliance with Rule

7004 and Civil Rule 4, is a prerequisite to the bankruptcy court

exercising personal jurisdiction over a litigant. Marciano v.

Fahs (In re Marciano), 459 B.R. 27, 37 (9th Cir. BAP 2011); 

Morris Motors v. Peralta (In re Peralta), 317 B.R. 381, 386 (9th

Cir. BAP 2004). As the Ninth Circuit has put it, “[b]efore a

federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a

defendant, the procedural requirement of service of [process]

must be satisfied.” Rubin v. Pringle (In re Focus Media Inc.),

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387 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Omni Capital Int’l,

Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987)).

Generally speaking, the service of process prerequisite to

personal jurisdiction applies in contested matters the same as 

it does in adversary proceedings. See Rule 9014(b)(requiring

service of contested matter motions in the same manner that a

summons and complaint must be served under Rule 7004); see also

In re Frates, 507 B.R. at 302 (stating that, “when a particular

creditor’s rights are at issue,” the bankruptcy rules require

more than the minimal notice required to satisfy due process

concerns). Accord, Beneficial Cal., Inc. v. Villar (In re

Villar), 317 B.R. 88, 93-94 (9th Cir. BAP 2004).

Claims objections undoubtedly are contested matters subject

to the requirements of Rule 9014. See Advisory Committee Notes

accompanying Rules 3007 and 9014. However, unlike most contested

matters, claims objections are subject to a specific Rule stating

in part as follows: “A copy of the objection [to claim] with

notice of the hearing thereon shall be mailed or otherwise

delivered to the claimant . . . at least 30 days prior to the

hearing.” Rule 3007(a).

In the past, the Panel has offered conflicting views

regarding whether Rule 3007(a)’s mailing/delivery requirements

are in addition to or in lieu of Rule 7004’s service

requirements. Compare United States v. Levoy (In re Levoy), 182

B.R. 827, 834 (9th Cir. BAP 1995), with Jorgenson v. State Line

Hotel, Inc. (In re State Line Hotel, Inc.), 323 B.R. 703, 711-12

(9th Cir. BAP 2005), vacated as moot, 242 Fed.Appx. 460, 462 (9th

Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, regardless of whether Rule 7004’s

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service requirements ordinarily apply when a creditor files a

proof of claim and an interested party objects thereto, we hold

that they do apply when, as here, the creditor has not filed a

proof of claim, has not otherwise participated in the bankruptcy

case, and has not otherwise engaged in any conduct that could be

construed as consent to the bankruptcy court’s personal

jurisdiction. We further hold that when, as here, Rule 7004’s

service requirements have been contravened, the bankruptcy court

lacks personal jurisdiction over the creditor.

In the vast majority of cases, it is beyond dispute that the

bankruptcy court has personal jurisdiction over any creditor

whose proof of claim has been objected to because the creditor

consents to the bankruptcy court’s personal jurisdiction by

filing a proof of claim, thereby enabling the bankruptcy court to

allow or disallow the claim and to determine the creditor’s

entitlement (if any) to share in distributions from the

bankruptcy estate. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 334-35

(1966) (stating that “[b]y presenting their claims respondents

subjected themselves to all the consequences that attach to an

appearance” and that “a creditor who offers a proof of claim and

demands its allowance is bound by what is judicially

determined”); Tucker Plastics, Inc. v. Pay’N Pak Stores, Inc. (In

re PNP Holdings Corp.), 99 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding

that creditor consented to bankruptcy’s personal jurisdiction by

filing proof of claim). 

But when, as here, the creditor has not filed a proof of

claim, has not otherwise participated in the bankruptcy case, and

has not otherwise engaged in any conduct that could be construed

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as consent to the bankruptcy court’s personal jurisdiction, 

personal jurisdiction principles dictate that federal courts

cannot exercise jurisdiction over a litigant in the absence of

proper service of process. See Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd., 484

U.S. at 104.

For this reason, “[a] person is not bound by a judgment in a

litigation to which he or she has not been made a party by

service of process.” Mason v. Genisco Technology Corp., 960 F.2d

849, 851 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S.

880, 884 (2008). Similarly, when a federal court lacks personal

jurisdiction over a litigant, that litigant “is always free to

ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and

then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a

collateral proceeding.” Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des

Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982). 

Even though claims objections do not ordinarily generate

personal jurisdiction issues, the bankruptcy court here

apparently realized that, because Keys had not filed a proof of

claim or otherwise participated in the bankruptcy case, the issue

Keys raised in her motion about the sufficiency of service of the

claims objection implicated the personal jurisdiction of the

court. That is why the bankruptcy court felt compelled to

discuss the substantial compliance doctrine, which under certain

circumstances excuses minor technical defects in service of

process. See Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 446–48 (9th Cir.

1984). Under the substantial compliance doctrine, a federal

court need not dismiss a complaint for insufficient service of

process based on technical defects in service of process when:

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(a) the party that had to be served personally received

actual notice, (b) the defendant would suffer no

prejudice from the defect in service, (c) there is a

justifiable excuse for the failure to serve properly,

and (d) the plaintiff would be severely prejudiced if

his complaint were dismissed.

Whale v. United States, 792 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1986)

(quoting Borzeka, 739 F.2d at 447).

The bankruptcy court concluded that 701 Mariposa had met the

requirements of the substantial compliance doctrine. The court

found, based on Keys’ own admissions, that she had actual notice

of both the bankruptcy filing and the claim objection

proceedings. In addition, the bankruptcy court found that 701

Mariposa had a justifiable excuse for its defective service. As

the court pointed out, well after her eviction in September 2012, 

Keys continued to state in papers filed in the district court

litigation that she lived in the apartment building. We have no

issue with these findings.

However, the bankruptcy court’s findings regarding prejudice 

are problematic. The court in essence found that each party

potentially would be subject to prejudice depending on how it

ruled on the reconsideration motion but that the equities tipped

in favor of 701 Mariposa because Keys did not take any steps to

remedy her automatic stay violation (her continuing prosecution

of the district court lawsuit) after she learned of 701

Mariposa’s second bankruptcy filing. This is not the type of

assessment the substantial compliance standard calls for. On its

face, the standard requires “no prejudice” to the party subjected

to the defective service of process (in this instance, Keys) and

“severe prejudice” to the party whose request for relief is

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subject to dismissal for insufficient service of process (in this

instance, 701 Mariposa). The bankruptcy court did not find that

these specific criteria had been met, and that by itself should

have prevented the court from applying the substantial compliance

doctrine.

Furthermore, we disagree with the bankruptcy court’s finding

regarding the prejudice to 701 Mariposa that would arise if the

court did not excuse the defective service of process. The only

prejudice the court found was the obligation 701 Mariposa would

have to “administer” Keys’ $4.5 million claim in the absence of

the court’s order disallowing Keys’ claim. In this instance, by

“administer” the court in essence meant that 701 Mariposa would

be forced to address Keys’ claim on the merits if Keys were

allowed to proceed with her challenge to the merits of 701

Mariposa’s claim objection. The Ninth Circuit has held that

being denied a “quick victory” and instead having to defend the

merits of a claim typically constitutes little or no prejudice. 

See Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1224–25 (9th

Cir. 2000). In short, we hold that the bankruptcy court’s

finding regarding the prejudice to 701 Mariposa was clearly

erroneous.

The biggest problem with the bankruptcy court’s substantial

compliance determination concerns whether the bankruptcy court

should have applied the doctrine in this context at all. From

our review of the cases applying the doctrine, it appears that

the Ninth Circuit only has permitted the doctrine to be used as a

shield to protect plaintiffs from the dismissal of their

complaints based on technical defects in service of process. 

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See, e.g., Whale, 792 F.2d at 953; Borzeka, 739 F.2d at 446–48. 

The Ninth Circuit has not, based upon our research, permitted

plaintiffs to use the doctrine as a sword against defaulting

defendants who seek to set aside a default judgment based on

defective service of process.

We acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit in other decisions has

stated that, when the defendant receives sufficient notice, the

service of process rules generally should be liberally construed

to uphold service. See Brenneke, 551 F.3d at 1135 (citing Chan

v. Soc’y Expeditions, Inc., 39 F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994));

United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736

F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit

also has stated that “neither actual notice nor simply naming the

defendant in the complaint will provide personal jurisdiction

without substantial compliance with [Civil] Rule 4.” Brenneke,

551 F.3d at 1135 (emphasis added) (quoting Benny v. Pipes, 799

F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986)).

As a matter of law, we do not consider 701 Mariposa’s

service by mail of its claim objection at the apartment building

from which Keys had been evicted, combined with service by email,

sufficient to qualify as substantial compliance with the service

by mail requirements set forth in Rule 7004(b)(1), which require

service by mail at the “individual’s dwelling house or usual

place of abode or to the place where the individual regularly

conducts a business or profession.” In In re Villar, we

explained that service of process by mail for the purpose of

establishing personal jurisdiction over a litigant is a “rare

privilege which should not be abused or taken lightly.” In re

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Villar, 317 B.R. at 93. We further explained that “[w]here the

alternative to service by mail is hiring a process server to

serve the papers in person, it seems like a small burden to

require literal compliance with the rule.” Id. (quoting In re

Schoon, 153 B.R. 48, 49 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993)).

Under these circumstances, service by mail of Keys at an

address where she used to live simply is not substantial

compliance with Rule 7004(b)(1).

Finally, the Supreme Court has indicated that, when the

bankruptcy court has an “arguable basis” for exercising 

jurisdiction, a defect in that jurisdiction does not render the

trial court’s judgment void for purposes of a subsequent motion

under Civil Rule 60(b)(4). Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 271. But the

decisions Espinosa cited in support of the arguable basis

doctrine indicate that the doctrine arises in the context of

subject matter jurisdiction and not in the context of personal

jurisdiction. We decline to extend the arguable basis doctrine

to the bankruptcy court’s determination here that it had personal

jurisdiction over Keys. To do so would bring our decision into

conflict with other Supreme Court precedent stating that 

litigants always may collaterally raise personal jurisdiction

defects. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. at 706

(“A defendant is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings,

risk a default judgment, and then challenge that judgment on

jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE and REMAND. On

remand, the bankruptcy court should enter an order granting Keys’

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motion to set aside the court’s claim disallowance order.4

4

 In its appeal briefs, 701 Mariposa requested that

sanctions be imposed against Keys for filing a frivolous appeal. 

701 Mariposa’s sanctions request did not comply with Rule 8020,

which contemplates a separately filed motion. In any event,

because Keys has prevailed in this appeal, we would have denied

701 Mariposa’s sanctions request even if it had been properly

brought before us.

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