SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4699-15T3

MATTHEW CALAFIORE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v. 

BOARD OF REVIEW,

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and

COMPACT AUTO BODY, INC.,

Respondents-Respondents.

_________________________________

Submitted October 3, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Fuentes, Vernoia and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of 

Labor, Docket No. 023, 459.

Leslie A. Farber, attorney for appellant.

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa,

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alan C. 

Stephens, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Respondent Compact Auto Body, Inc., has not filed a 

brief.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 27, 2018
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PER CURIAM

Claimant Matthew Calafiore challenges Board of Review decisions 

disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits as of March 17, 2013,

and directing that he refund unemployment benefits he received. We affirm.

I.

Claimant commenced his employment with Compact Auto Body, Inc. 

(Compact) in December 2011. One year later, in December 2012, he filed a 

claim for unemployment compensation benefits but did not initially take any 

action to collect the benefits.1 On March 18, 2013, claimant resigned from 

Compact to accept employment with Monmouth Auto Body (Monmouth). 

Monmouth laid off claimant in April 2013, two weeks after his employment 

began. Claimant thereafter collected unemployment compensation benefits 

totaling $17,020 for the weeks ending May 11, 2013, through November 16,

2013.

 

1

 During a July 23, 2014 Appeal Tribunal hearing, claimant explained that he 

filed the December 2012 claim to obtain temporary unemployment 

compensation benefits following a two-and-a-half week closure of Compact 

following Superstorm Sandy. Claimant did not, however, take any action to 

collect benefits until he resigned from his employment at Compact in March 

2013, and was later laid off by his subsequent employer, Monmouth Auto Body. 
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Claimant filed a new claim for unemployment benefits in December 2013. 

During a January 23, 2014 fact-finding conference before a claims examiner,

claimant explained that he quit his job at Compact in March 2013, and 

subsequently worked at Monmouth for two weeks before being laid off. The 

claims examiner advised claimant Compact had not been notified about his May 

2013 benefits claim, but that Compact was informed about his December 2013 

claim and, in response, stated claimant resigned his employment to accept a job 

with a new employer. The claims examiner informed claimant he was 

disqualified from the benefits he collected during 2013 because he voluntarily 

resigned his employment with Compact, and that he was liable for a refund of 

the benefits he received.

The Board Decides Claimant Is Disqualified

In a subsequent written determination, a Division of Unemployment and 

Disability Insurance (Division) Deputy Director disqualified claimant from 

benefits after March 17, 2013, because he voluntarily left his job at Compact on 

March 18, 2013, by resigning to accept the Monmouth job. The Deputy Director 

also found claimant liable for a refund of the $17,020 in benefits he received in 

2013 during the disqualification period.
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Claimant appealed and testified during a July 23, 2014 Appeal Tribunal 

hearing that he resigned from his position as an estimator at Compact due to the 

stress of an increasing workload, and after he found a higher paying position 

with Monmouth. The Appeal Tribunal determined claimant's reasons for 

leaving Compact "[did] not rise to the level of good cause attributable to the 

work," and concluded claimant was "disqualified for benefits from [March 17,

2013,] under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)" and that his subsequent employment at 

Monmouth was "insufficient to end [his] disqualification." The Appeal 

Tribunal further determined claimant is liable under N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d) to 

refund the benefits he received during the period following March 17, 2013, but 

noted claimant could request a refund waiver. In a January 9, 2015 decision,

the Board of Review adopted the Appeal Tribunal's findings of fact and affirmed 

its decision. Claimant appealed.

Remand To Consider May 4, 2015 Amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)

On February 1, 2016, we granted the Board's motion to remand this matter 

to determine whether a May 4, 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) should 

be applied retroactively. The amendment authorized unemployment 

compensation benefits for individuals under certain circumstances who leave 

work to accept employment with a new employer. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), amended 
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by L. 2015, c. 41. On remand, the Board found the amendment did not apply 

retroactively to claimant's unemployment compensation claim, see Ardan v. Bd. 

of Review, 231 N.J. 589, 608-13 (2018) (finding the May 4, 2015 amendment 

to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) is not retroactive), and that claimant is disqualified from 

March 17, 2013, and liable for the refund. 

The Board Reissues Its Final Decision 

The Board moved for a second temporary remand to determine whether

claimant was denied due process because Compact did not timely appeal

claimant's receipt of benefits. On December 8, 2016, we granted the motion and 

directed the Board "to determine if [Compact] was informed [claimant] had been 

found eligible for benefits and whether [Compact] filed a timely appeal from 

that determination."

On remand, the Board "set aside its prior decision," adopted the Appeal 

Tribunal's fact-findings and determined claimant initially filed for benefits on 

December 2, 2012, but did not claim benefits because he continued to work at 

Compact. Claimant resigned from Compact effective March 18, 2013, to accept 

employment at Monmouth; he was laid off two weeks later on April 3, 2013.

The Board further found claimant "reopened" his unemployment claim on 

May 5, 2013, and the Division provided only his most recent employer,
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Monmouth, with information concerning the claim. The Division did not 

request information from Compact concerning claimant's separation of 

employment or notify Compact regarding claimant's eligibility for the $17,020 

in benefits paid during 2013. 

The Board determined that when defendant filed his December 2013 

transitional benefits claim, he indicated he resigned from his employment with 

Compact in March 2013. The Division conducted the January 23, 2014 factfinding conference, and the Deputy Director found claimant disqualified for 

benefits as of March 17, 2013. Claimant appealed and had a hearing before the 

Appeal Tribunal, which found claimant resigned from Compact to accept the 

Monmouth position and was therefore disqualified from benefits and liable for 

a refund. 

The Board concluded the Division was unaware claimant resigned from 

his employment with Compact until he filed his claim for transitional benefits 

in December 2013. Compact was first notified about the claim in June 2014 

when the Division determined claimant was disqualified. The Board observed 

that the Division did not have a procedure "to request prior separation 

information on the paperwork to reopen an existing claim after two separate 

periods of unemployment," and the information provided by claimant in support 
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of his December 2013 transitional benefits claim first prompted the inquiry that 

resulted in the disqualification determination. 

The Board decided claimant was disqualified from March 17, 2013,

because he voluntarily resigned from Compact to accept employment with 

Monmouth, and his subsequent employment was insufficient to remove the 

disqualification. Claimant was thus liable to refund the Division $17,020 he 

received during 2013.

Refund Waiver Remand 

In October 2017, claimant moved for a remand for the Board to consider 

his eligibility for a refund waiver based on alleged hardship. We granted the 

motion, directed that the remand proceedings be completed by January 31, 2018,

and retained jurisdiction.

In a February 28, 2018 decision, the Board explained claimant failed to 

respond to two requests for the financial and medical information necessary for 

a refund waiver determination. The Board concluded it was therefore 

"constrained to hold . . . claimant is not eligible for a refund" and "does not 

qualify for a refund waiver pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2." 
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II.

Our review of decisions by administrative agencies is limited, In re 

Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011), with claimants carrying a substantial 

burden of persuasion, Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997). An 

agency's determination "must be sustained unless there is a clear showing . . . it 

[wa]s arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lack[ed] fair support in 

the record." Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 

(2011) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)). "[I]f substantial 

evidence supports the agency's decision, 'a court may not substitute its own 

judgment for the agency's even though the court might have reached a different 

result.'" In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007) (citation omitted). The burden 

of proof rests with the employee to establish a right to collect unemployment 

benefits. Brady, 152 N.J. at 218. 

Claimant presents a singular argument in support of his appeal.2 He 

claims there is insufficient evidence supporting the Board's determination he is 

 

2

 We do not address the following arguments that were asserted in claimant's 

brief: his due process rights were violated because Compact did not appeal the 

initial determination he was qualified for benefits and his receipt of benefits was 

the result of the Division's alleged errors; and he is entitled to a refund waiver 

because his receipt of benefits was due to the Division's errors. In a June 14,

2018 letter to the clerk, claimant's counsel advised those arguments were 

"abandoned."
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disqualified from benefits because he left his employment with Compact without 

good cause attributable to the work. We are not persuaded. 

An individual is disqualified for benefits if he or she "left work voluntarily 

without good cause attributable to such work." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). "'[G]ood 

cause attributable to such work' means a reason related directly to the 

individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no 

choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). "An individual 

shall not be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work if he or she 

can establish that working conditions are so unsafe, unhealthful, or dangerous 

as to constitute good cause attributable to such work." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.4. 

However, a claimant who leaves employment "for personal reasons, however 

compelling, . . . is disqualified under the statute." Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 

N.J. 534, 544 (2008). 

Here, there is substantial evidence supporting the Board's determination 

claimant is disqualified from benefits following his voluntary resignation from 

Compact. See Carter, 191 N.J. at 483. Claimant testified he was motivated to 

leave his position as an estimator with Compact due to an increasing and, what 

he considered to be, onerous workload, but "[m]ere dissatisfaction with working 

conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not 
10 A-4699-15T3

constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily." Domenico v. Bd. of 

Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Medwick v. Bd. of 

Review, 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). Claimant did not present 

any competent evidence establishing his workload was "unsafe, unhealthful, or 

dangerous," N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.4, and never told his superior at Compact that he 

would resign unless his working conditions changed. To the contrary, claimant 

testified "the reason" he resigned from Compact "was for a better position with 

more money." We therefore discern no basis to conclude the Board's decision 

is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable" or "lacks fair support in the record." 

See Russo, 206 N.J. at 27. 

We also note that during the pendency of this appeal, we granted 

claimant's motion for a temporary remand for consideration of his claimed 

entitlement to a refund waiver, but he failed to provide requested medical and 

financial information relevant to his assertion the ordered refund was patently 

inequitable due to claimed health and financial issues. Based on claimant's

repeated failure to provide the information necessary to determine his claimed 

entitlement to a refund waiver, the Board issued a final decision finding he did 

not qualify for a waiver.
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Although claimant amended his notice of appeal to challenge the Board's 

decision denying the refund waiver, we do not address the issue because 

claimant does not offer any argument challenging the decision. See Jefferson 

Loan Co. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 525 n.4 (App. Div. 2008) (finding that 

an issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived).

Affirmed.