Supreme Court
No. 20 1 9

- 438

- C.A. ( P1/1 6

- 3412 A )

State :

v. : Kunwar Chadha

. :

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Report er. Readers are requested to notify th e Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222

- 3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors in o rder that corrections may be made befor e the opinion is published.- 1

- Supreme Court
No. 20 1 9

- 438

- C.A. ( P1/1 6

- 3412 A )

State :

v. : Kunwar Chadha

. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson , L ynch Prata , and L ong , JJ. O P I N I O N Justice Robinson , f

or the Court. The defendant, Kunwar Chadha, appeals from a June 20, 2019 judgment of conviction and commitment entered against him
in Providence County Superior Court on two counts of second

- degree child

m olestation sexual assault . The defendant argues o n appeal that the trial justi ce erred by : (1) “ restricting [defendant’s] right of confrontation and sufficient cross

examination ; ” and (2) denying his motion for a new trial

. For the reasons set forth in this opinion , we affirm the judgment of the Superio r Court.- 2

- I
Facts and Travel The instant case arises as a result of allegations that defendant sexually molested Matthew 1 on four occasions. On November 29, 2016, defendant was indicted by a grand jury on one count of f irst

- degree child molestation sexua l assault in violation of G.L

. 1956 §§ 11

- 37

- 8.1 and 11

- 37

- 8.2 for sexual penetration, to wit, fellatio, with a person fourteen years of age or under between January 1 , 2012 and May 1 , 2012 (Count One) . He was also indicted on four
counts of second

- degree ch ild molestation sexual ass a ult in violation of §§ 11

- 37

- 8.3 and 11

- 37

- 8.4 for alleged: sexual contact, to wit, hand to penis, with a person fourteen years of age or under between January 1 , 2012 and May 1 , 2012 (Count Two); 2 between October 31 , 2011 and December 25 , 2011 (Count Thr e e); between
March 1 , 2012 and June 1 , 2012 (Count Four ); and between June 1 , 2012 and July
31 , 2012 (Count Five ). A trial ensued on various dates in February and March of 2019. We relate below the salient details of what tran sp ired at that trial.

1 Although the complaining witness was eighteen years old at the time of trial, he wa s a minor when the alleged incidents at iss ue occurred. According ly, we sha ll refer to him pseudonymously.

2 F ollowing the close of the state ’ s case, the trial justice granted defendant ’ s motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Two on the grounds that the stat e did not meet its burden of proof as to t h a t count.- 3

- A
The T r ial 1. Matthew’s Testimony Regarding the Alleged Incidents On direct examination, Matthew testified with respect to each of the alleged incidents. Matthew stat ed that he knew defendant because they lived in the same neighborh oo d in Cumberland, Rhod e Isla nd, and that he had been friends with defendant’s older twin sons

. 3 He said that he used to see the twins at school and that they also spen t time together outside of school

. a. The First Alleged Incident Matthew testi fied th at, one evening when he was e leven years old, he was

“ hanging out ” with the twins and a number of other friends at defendant’s house when the first alleged incident took place

. He stated that he and the other children were in the basement watch ing a movie when the f ollowing occ u rred:

“ [T] he kids were wrestling the Defendant, and they were horsing around. And then when they settled down, some of the kids went upstairs to get snacks, and the Defendant put me on his lap and put his hand dow n my pants and sta rted playing with me do w n the re for about two minutes .”

3 Matthew testified that defendant had four children

— two sets of twin boys

— and that he and the older set of twins were friends

.- 4

-

Matthew testified that , although he “kept trying to push away and get away , ” he did not tell defendant to stop because he “didn’t know what was going on” and he was “in complete sh ock .” He added tha t he ultimately “shrugg e d it off

. ” b. The Second Alleged Incident Matthew testified that he did not return to defendant’s h ouse again until the
S pring of 2012 , at which time the second alleged incident took place

. He stated that , when he rang the doorbell to see if his friends w anted to play , defendant answered the door

. Matthew testified that , even though defendant said that his children were not home, he nevertheless told Matthew to come inside the house. Matthew stated that he di d as he was told and e ntered the house and we n t dir ectly
to the spare bedroom ; he added that defendant followed him and , once therein, “gave [ Matthew ] oral sex .” Matthew testified that , shortly thereafter , defendant walked him to the front door and told him that , if he told an yone about what had tak e n pla ce, defendant “would * * * hunt [ his ] father down and hurt him .” c. The Third Alleged Incident Matthew testified that the third alleged incident also occurred in the S pring of 2012 . He stated that he had been in the living ro om of defendant’s house with defendant’s four children and that they had all been playing in the living room and defendant’s bed room . Matthew testified that, at one point that evening , defendant told his children to “get out” of the bedroom, at which poin t he locked Matthew- 5

-

in s i de th e bedroom with him

. Matthew stated that , when he and defendant were alone, defendant touched his genitals. Matthew testified that, when he left defendant’s house after th at incident , he went to the home of his best friend and told his friend that d e fenda nt had touched him inappropriately and had also threatened him

. Matthew added that, although his friend thought that Matthew
should tell someone about what had happened , he chose not to disclose any
inf ormation to anyone else at that time

.

d. The Fo u rth A lleged Incident Matthew testified that the fourth alleged incident occurred in the “early summer” of 2012, when he went to defendant’s house to see if his friends wanted to play

. He stated that , afte r defendant answered the d oor and invited him in , he

we nt upstairs to the living room

. Matthew testified that , when defendant joined
him in the living room, defendant told him to l ie on the floor and forced Matthew
to touch defendant ’ s genitals

. Matthew added that defendant also touched Matthew ’s genit a ls

. He further stated that, when he yelled out in pain as a result of being touched , defendant “got mad and told [ Matthew ] to get out of [ the ] house .” Matthew testified that, whe n he left defendant’s house, he “ran home and * * * started cutting [himsel f

].”
M atthew testified that , for several years subsequent to the alleged acts of molestation , he continued self

- harming behavior, which led to his hospitaliz ation- 6

-

on multiple occas ions . He stated that, following one such hospitaliza tion in 2015 , he began s eeing a counselor , one Jennifer Lawrence. Matthew testified that , because he had a “good connection” with Ms. Lawrence , he felt comfortable discussing with her t he “molestation incidents .” He stated that, after telling her about t he four alleged inciden t s , Ms . Lawrence contacted Matthew ’s family and
the police in Cumberland to report what Matthew had told her . Matthew added that he went to the police station t he following week and “recited all [his] incidents
with the Defendant

. ”

2. The Limitations on t h e Cro ss - Examination of Matthew
While cross

- examining Matthew at trial , defense counsel attempted to question him as to certain instances of past conduct. In particula r, defense counsel stated outside the presence of the jury that he sought to elicit tes t imony from Matthew to the effect that he had once put peanut butter in the “ smoothie ” 4 of a person who had a peanut allergy ( “ the peanut butter incident”) because that person had bullied him . Defense counsel intended to use such te stimony to challenge
Ma t thew’ s credibility

—

namely, to show that Matthew’s statements that he was always the target of bullying and was never a bully himself sh ould not be

4 The American Her itage D ictionary defines “smoothie” as a “drink made of frui t or sometimes vegetables, bl ended wit h juice, mi lk, or yogurt and often ice until smooth.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1 655 ( 5th ed. 2011 ).- 7

-

believed

. 5 The trial justice, in prohibiting this line of questioning, stated as fol lows:

“ I don ’ t think t h at it comes under 608(b), and I don ’ t

think that it goes to the issue of bullying. Frankly, it goes to the issue of something very diff erent than that. So I don ’ t think it ’ s an issue of impeachment on a prior inconsistent statemen t. So unless you have a nothe r rule of evidence, you ’ re not going to get into it

. ”
Defense counsel also attempted to cross - examine Matthew on a topic which

w e shall refer to as “ the Cagno allegation .” During voir dire outside the presence of the jury wi th respect to this prop o sed l ine of questioning, Matthew testified that, when he worked as a volunteer at a venue known as “ the Stadium Theatre ” in
2015 , he met a man named John Cagno

. Matthew stated that Mr. Cagno was an employee of the theat re , under w hose direction Matthew s erved as a volunteer

. Matthew testified that, although he had auditioned for the leading role in a play and had expressed to Mr. Cagno his interest in that role , he was not selected to play that part

. Matthew further testified tha t, several weeks after h e lea rned that he had not been selected for the role in the play , he went to the Woonsocket P olice
D epart ment and reported that Mr. Cagno “had promised [him] the lead role in return for sexual favors [

. ] ”

5 It should be noted tha t those statements regarding always being the target of bull ying and never being a bully himself w e re recorde d in Matthew’s counseling records, but were not alluded to in the presence of the jury

.- 8

-

When defense counsel infor med the trial justice t h at Mr . Cagno was prepared to testify that nothing of a physical nature ever happened between him
and Matth ew , the trial justice responded as follows:

“That’s not going to happen. That’s going to be a 403 issue. It would be differe nt if in this [police] r eport [ Matthew ] recanted, you know, and said, Cagno never tied our relationship to a part. I made that u p because I was upset for one reason or another. I don’t see it anywhere in this report, and I don’t believe he has recanted h ere today. “* * * “Ri g ht. We’re bringing in issues of sexual conduct with someone else, and now we’re talking about somebody a bout four years older, homosexual contact with someone about four years older than he was at the age of 15, not 11. And he say s that it was tied to a n offe r of a part. We’re not going to try that case .” Although the trial justice prohibited defense cou nsel both from further questioning Matthew with respect to Mr. Cagno and from calling Mr. Cagno as a witness, she did permit cou nsel to make an offer o f proo f as to what Mr. Cagno would say if permitted to testify

. Follow ing defense counsel’s offer of pr oof, the trial justice affirmed her earlier ruling

.

3. The Jury Deliberations and the Jury Verdict
After the close of evidence a nd during the jury inst r uctio ns , the trial justice provided the jury with a verdict form , which included a “questionnaire” that set
forth five “ questions

. ” The first three questions referenced conduct related to the- 9

-

first three alleged incidents . However , questions four and fi v e bot h dealt with Count Five and related to the fourth alleged incident. 6 Shortly after deliberations

co mmenced , the trial justice was informed that the jurors were unable to reach a unanimous decision as to any of the questions o n the verdict form . Acc o rding ly, the trial justice opted to deliver a n Allen charge. See Allen v. United States , 164 U.S. 492 , 501

- 02 (1 896) ; State v. Rodriguez , 822 A.2d 894, 899

- 904 (R.I. 2003) ; see also State v. Arciliares , 108 A.3d 1040 , 1047 (R.I. 20 1 5 )

. Then, after furth e r del iberations , the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on Count One and guilty on Count Three. It indicated that it was unable to reach a verdict as to Count Four and as to the first question under Count Five. However, it did find defendant guilty o n the second question under Count Five. 7
B

The Motion for a New Trial and the Sentencing
Thereafter , defendant mo ved for a new trial as to Counts Three and Five

. The trial justice denied the motion for a new trial, finding that the evidence supported the j ury’s verdict

.

6 More specifically, question four asked whether defendant had made Matthew touch defendant ’ s genitals, whereas quest ion five asked whe ther defend ant had t o uched Matt hew ’ s genitals.

7 We would note that Count Five related to two separate acts, both of which allegedly occurred during the fourth incident. See Part II. B .2, infra

.- 10

-

The trial justice thereafter sentenced defendant as follows: thirty years imprisonment with twenty

- two years to serve and eight years suspended, with probation , on Count Three; and eighteen years suspended , with proba tion , on Count Five (co n secut ive to Count Three ). The defendant filed a notice of appeal to this Court. 8
I I Analysis On appeal, d efendant argues that the trial justice erred by “ restricting [defendant’s] right of confrontation and sufficient cross

- examin ation

. ” He also
conten d s tha t the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a new trial. W e are not persuaded by defendant’s arguments. A

The Limitations on Cross
- Examination
The defendant contends that the trial justice erred by “ restricting [defen dant’s] right of confro ntatio n and sufficient cross

- examination

. ” The
defendant specifically argues that he should have been permitted to cross

- examine

8 We would note that defendant ’ s notic e of appeal was prematurely f iled prio r to the en try of the judgment of conviction and commit ment. However, that fact has no bearing on the validity of the appeal. See State v. Chase , 9 A.3d 1248, 1252 n.2 (R.I . 2010) ( “ Although defendant ’ s notice of app eal was premature, it was nev ertheless valid. ” ).- 11

-

Matthew with re spect to the peanut butter incident as well as with respect to the Cagno allegation

. 1. “ The Peanut Butter Incident ” On appeal, defen dant ar gues that, pursuant to Rule 6 08(b) of the Rhode Island Rule s of Evidence , 9 defense counsel should have been al lowed to question Matthew regarding the peanut butter incident in order to attack Mat t hew ’ s

cr edibility

—

by showing that he was untruthful i n his “ repeated self

characterization that he was a victim and not a perpetrator of vengeful acts .” The defendant argues that cross

- examination on this subject would have undermined Matthew ’s credibility in thr ee important ways. First, de fendant alleges, it wou ld have show n that, despite his repeated contention that he was always a victim , Matthew was actually “capable of egregious spite and intentional infliction of
harm .” Second, it would have demonstrate d t hat Matthew was “certainly ca pable of disclo s ing pai nful or personally uncomfortable truths with his doctors, as evidence d by his disclosure of this ‘peanut butter incident’” during counseling

9 Rule 608(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence st a t es in per tinent part: “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provi ded in Rule 609, or, in the discretion of the trial judge, evidence of prio r similar f alse accusations, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross

- examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ charac t e r for tru thfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross

examined has testified.”- 12

-

sessions. Third, it would have show n that, despite Matthew ’s t estimony that he was receivin g treatment as a result of his self

- harming behaviors, he was actually receiving treatment “in part due to the threat of criminal charges related to the [peanut butter] incident .” “Both the Sixth Amendment to the United State s Constitution * * * and
arti cle 1, section 1 0, of t he Rhode Island Constitution guarantee individuals accused of criminal charges the right to confront and cross

- examine any adverse witnesses who testify against them.” State v. Manning , 973 A.2d 524 , 530 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v . Dorsey , 783 A. 2d 947, 950 (R.I. 2001)). That right, however, “is not unbounded.” State v. Rivera , 987 A.2d 887, 906 (R.I. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, it “is tempered by the dictates of practicality an d judicial economy; trial jus tices are auth or ized to exercise sound discretion in limiting the scope of cross

- examination.” State v. Danis , 182 A.3d
36 , 40 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Manning , 973 A.2d at 53 0 ). The exercise of this discretion, however, “must n ot unduly restrict a
defendan t ’ s right to cro s s - exam ine .” State v. Anthony , 422 A.2d 921 , 924 (R.I. 1980) . We have stated that it is “ the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross

- examiner. ” Id. Nonetheless , it is the duty of the court to protect witnesse s from questions th at “ go beyond the proper bounds of cross

examination,” including those that “are irrelevant or offer no probative value.” Id.- 13

-

This Court will “ review [a] trial justice ’ s decision to limit the scope of cross

examination * * * for cle ar abuse of discret i on; th e decision will be overruled only if such abuse constitutes prejudicial error .” Rivera , 987 A.2d at 906 (internal quotation marks omitted). We are satisfied that it was within the trial justice’s discret ion to exclude the
line of qu estioning pertai n ing to the peanut butter incident. During the sidebar conference concerning this proposed testimony, defense counsel indicated that he wanted to question Matthew as to this incident because it would go to Matt hew ’s credibility

. In so arg uing, defense co u nsel s tated that “ [ Matthew i s ] going to say he never bullied anyone [,] yet, he ’ s putting peanut butter in a milk shake to someone who could potentially die

. ” In response, the trial ju stice ruled as follows :

“ I don ’ t think that it comes un der 608(b), and I don ’ t think that it goes to the issue of bullying. Frankly, it goes to the issue of something very different than that. So I don ’ t think it ’ s an issue of impeachment on a prior inco nsistent statement. So un less you have another rule of evidence, you ’ r e not g oing to get into it

. ” We agree with the trial justice’s conclusion that , although Matthew ’s act of putting peanut butter in the smoothie of a supposed bully may arguably relate to some other aspect of hi s character , it is not probat ive of his chara c ter fo r truthfulness and does not fall within the bounds of Rule 608(b)

. In our judgment, said evidence could also have been excluded pursuant to Rule 403. Accordingly, the trial justice did not abuse her dis cretion in prohibiting cross

- examination on t h is sub ject.- 14

- 2. “ The Cagno Allegation ”
The d efendant further argues that the trial justice erred by excluding cross

examination with respect to the Cagno allegation . The defendant contends t hat such testimony relates to Matthew’s credibil ity because it w o uld de monstrate : (1) “ whether he was trustworthy in his accusations against [defendant] despite his demonstrably misleading accusations against Mr. Cagno;” (2) his “ knowledge about sexual act s ” despite his youn g age; and (3) the truthfulne ss of his claim t hat “h e never disclosed to anyone what [defendant] had allegedly done because he was ‘ashamed’ and ‘uncomfortable,’ ” despite having made a similar disclosure five months prior

. (Emphasis in original.) We have noted that our rules of evide nce “generally t r eat wi th disfavor the use of evidence of a witness ’ s prior conduct for the purpose of proving that he or she acted in conformity therewith.” Manning , 973 A.2d at 531 ( q uoting R.I. R. Evid. 404(a) ). However, p ursuant to Rule 608(b) of the Rhode Island Ru l es of Evidence, subject to a trial justice’s discretion, a witness may be questioned during

cross - examination on the witness’s “ prior similar false accusations, if probative of truthfuln ess or untruthfulness. ” Id. We have also previously held that “ evid e nce of a complaining witness ’ [s] prior allegations of sexual assault may be admitted to challenge effectively the complaining witness ’ s credibility, even if the allegations were not prov en false or withdrawn. ” State v. Oliveira , 576 A.2d 111 , 113 (R.I.- 15

-

1 9 90) (i nternal quotation marks omitted). But, we have noted that, where such accusations are “fundamentally different” from th os e in the case at bar , they may
not be used. Dors ey , 783 A.2d at 951 (internal quo tation marks omitted ) ; see St ate v. Botelho , 7 53 A.2 d 343 , 347 (R.I. 2000). We are of the opinion that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion by prohibiting cross

- examination of Matthew concerning his prior allegations against Mr. Cagno . We would first note that the trial jus tice acknowledge d that Matthew neither admitted the falsity of the allegation s nor recanted the allegation s , either to the police or while testifying at trial. Cf. State v. Dennis , 893 A.2d 250, 266 (R.I. 2006) (complai ning wi tness admitted prior false cl aim of rape)

. We would next point out that , in prohibiting cross

- examination on this subject, the trial justice relied on Rule 403 and distinguished the facts of the Cagno allegation from the
facts in the instant case . She sta ted as follows:

“We’re bringi ng in issues of s exual conduct with someone else, and now we’re talking about somebody about four years older, homosexual contact with someone about four years older than he was at the age of 15, not 11. And he says that it wa s tied to an offer of a part. We’re not goi n g to tr y that case .” After careful reflection concerning this not insubstantial question , we are in the end convinced that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in excluding cross examination on the Ca gno allegation on the basis o f her observat io n relat ive to the- 16

-

“ fundamental [] differen [ ce ]” between those allegations and the allegations against defendant

. Dorsey , 783 A.2d at 951 (internal quotation marks omitted )

. B The Trial Justice’s Denial of the Mo tion for a New Trial
The de fendant also contends t hat the trial justice erred in denying his motion for a new trial for two reasons: (1) “[t]he trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence in the case;” and (2) “[w]hen the jury returned a verdict as to Count 5, separa ted into two questions, they returned a legal ly inconsistent verdict of guilty as to one question and hung as to the other,” which offended defendant’s right to due process of law

. (Emphasis i n original.) 1. The Alleged Overlo ok ing and Misconceiv ing of Ma terial Evide n ce With re spect to his first argument, defendant avers that the trial justice overlooked three important facts when she “ dismissed the possibility that [Matthew] had fabricated the allegations” against defendant on the basis of her understandi ng that “[t] h ere was ju st not evidence that he felt revengeful

. ” H e
argue s first that , because “the jury itself wrestled with [Matthew ’s ] credibility, finding [defendant] not guilty of committing the acts [ sic ] alleged in Coun t 1, failing to reach a verdi ct as to par t of Count 5, and failing to reach a verdict as to
Coun t 4 , ” the “verdicts [therefore] signal that such a blanket statement was not a fair takeaway from his trial testimony .” (Emphasis in original.) The defendant- 17

-

next argues that “the trial j ustice overl o oked the f act that [Matthew] was an aspiring actor an d his entire trial presentation read like a play; a play where he forgot many of his lines .” His third contention is that the trial justice “overlooked
the fact that [Matthew] had a long hi story of tro u bling beha viors,” which “ predate any of the allegati ons against [defendant] and include manipulative conduct such as misleading medical professionals .” (Emphasis in original.) When ruling on a motion for a new tri al, the trial justice must pe rform at lea s t three an alyses:

“First, he or she must consider t he evidence in light of the charge to the jury, a charge that presumably is correct and fair to the defendant. Second, he or she must determine his or her own opi nion of the evidence, and the n weigh the c redibility of the witnesses and other evidence and choose which conflicting testimony and evidence to accept and which to reject. Finally, the trial justice must determine whether he or she would have reached a di fferent result from that of t he jury base d on an ind ividual assessment and in light of the ch arge to the jury.” State v. DeOliveira , 972 A.2d 653, 665 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. Rivera , 839 A.2d 497, 502

- 03 (R.I. 2003)).
If , at this point in the analy sis, the trial justice agrees with the ju r y’s verdic t, the verdict should be affirmed. Rivera , 839 A.2d at 503. H owever, “ [f] urther analysis must be conducted * * * when the trial justice does not agree with the jury verdict or does not agree that reason able minds could differ as to the proper d isposition of the case.” DeOliveira , 972 A.2d at 665. “ In that event, the trial justice must- 18

-

determine whether the verdict is against the fair preponderance of the evidence and fails to do substantial justice.” Id. “ If the trial justice so determines, * * * a ne w trial should be ordered. ” Id. In carrying out t he just

- summarized analysis, the trial justice “need not specifically refer to each speck of trial evidence that might support his or her decision, but need only relate to that evi dence, which is suffici ent to allow this Court to determine whether the tria l justice has undertaken to comply with the applicable standards for his or her decision.” State v. Ramirez , 786 A.2d 368, 373 (R.I. 2001) (internal q uotation marks omitted) ; see Rivera , 839 A .2d at 503 . “This Court will not disturb the decision of a trial justice who has employed the abo ve described analytical approach unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherw ise clearly wrong.” DeOlivei ra , 972 A.2d at 665.
I t is our view that, i n ruling on the motion for a new trial in th e instant case, the tri al justice conducted the required analysis, by weighing the evidence adduced at trial and the credibility of the wit nesses and choosing which evi dence to cre d it and whi ch to reject. See id. T he trial justice found that Matthew was “a credible
witness ” a nd that , although “[t]here may have been some discrepancies between his trial testimony and details he provided at ea rlier hearings[,] * * * those discrepanci e s were not material to the issues set forth in the indictment.” She added that, in any event, he adequately explained at least on e of those- 19

-

discrepancies. The trial justice further stated that she found Matthew ’s testimony to be “detailed an d compelling , ” noting t hat “[h]e came across as a troubled child from a broken home, one who might well have found the Defenda nt’s home life and the Defendant, as the head of a beautiful nuclear family, quite attractive to a ch ild who might have been vulne rable to adv a nces from a child predator .” Upon concluding her analysis, the trial justice stated that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict, and she thereby proceeded to deny defendant’s motion
for a new trial

. Accordingl y, we perceive no indication in the recor d that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly
wrong. 2. The “I nconsistent Verdicts” Argument The defendant next argues that it was clear that , because “the jury foun d that [Matthew] was not full y credible a s to his re citation of this alleged incident as they failed to reach a unanimous conclusion as to Count 5 [,] * * * the entry of conviction as to Count 5 is legally improper .” (Emphasis in original.) It should be

r ecalled that , although Count Five of the i ndictment referenced only one incident

— the so

- called fourth incident

— the jury was asked on the verdict form t o separately determine whether, during that incident : (1) defendant had forced Matthew to touch defendant ’s genitals (question four) ; and/or (2) d e fendant ha d touched Matthew ’s genitals (question five)

. The d efendant argues on appeal that, because- 20

-

the ju ry found defendant guilty of having touched Matthew ’s genitals, but could not reach unanimity as to whethe r Matthew had been forced to touch defend a nt’s genit als, the verdict s w ere “legally inconsistent , ” thereby offending defendant’s right to due process. We are not convinced by defendant’s argument.
In support of his argument that the verdicts were legally inconsistent , defendant cites State v. Ar r oyo , 844 A .2d 163 (R.I. 2004)

. Arroyo defines “ legally inconsistent verdicts ” as those in which “the essentia l elements of the count [] of which the defendant is acquitted are identical and necessary to prove the c ount of which the defendant i s convicted * * *. ” Ar royo , 844 A.2d at 171 (emphasis added) (internal quotation ma rks omitted) . The Arroyo opinion further states that, when both crimes ar ise out of the same set of facts, the verdicts are “legally
inconsist ent when they necessarily inv olve the con c lusion tha t the same essential element or elements of each crime were found both to exist and not to exist.” Id. (internal quotation ma rks omitted). We would point out that, in th e present case, the “legally inco nsistent” verdicts with which defendant t a kes issue deal with only

one count from the indictment. We would also note that the jury need only have found one of the acts to have occurred

— either the act referenced in question four

or the act referenced in qu estion five

— in order to have found defend a nt guilty of Count Five in violation of § 11

- 37

- 8.3. We would add that a failure to find that Matthew was forced to touch defendant’s genitals does not negate a finding t hat- 21

-

defendant touched M atthew ’s genitals

— in other words, a finding of on e but not th e other doe s not “ necessarily involve the conclusion that the same essential element or elements of each crime were found both to exist and not to exist.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) . We are of the opin ion that the verdicts relatin g to Count
F i ve are not legally inconsistent and, therefore, do not offend defendant’s right to due process. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in this section, we affirm the trial justice’s denial of the mot ion for a new t rial.
I II Conclusion
For the reasons set f

orth in th is opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record may be returned to that tribunal.SU

- CMS

- 02 A (revised J une 20 20 ) STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT

– CLERK’S OFFICE L icht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case State v. Kunwar Chadha.

Case Number No. 2019

- 438

- C.A. (P1/16

- 3412A) Date Opinion Filed June 25, 2021

Justic es Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ. Written By Associate Justice William P. Rob inson III
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel

Attorney(s) on Appeal For State: Brianne M. Chevalier Department of Atto rney General For Defendant: Kara Hoopis Manosh, Esq.