IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Daniel J. Cifelli, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 523 C.D. 2023

 : Submitted: May 7, 2024

City of Philadelphia (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: June 7, 2024

Daniel J. Cifelli (Claimant) petitions for review of the Order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the decision of a Workers’ 

Compensation Judge (WCJ) granting in part Claimant’s Petition to Review

Compensation Benefits (Review Petition) and denying Claimant’s Petition to 

Reinstate Compensation Benefits (Reinstatement Petition) and Petition for Penalties 

(Penalty Petition). The WCJ also terminated Claimant’s workers’ compensation

(WC) benefits based on the City of Philadelphia’s (Employer) credited medical 

evidence that Claimant’s work-related injuries did not result in disability and had

fully resolved by October 19, 2021. On appeal, Claimant argues the Board’s Order 

must be reversed because it applied the wrong standard of review where the WCJ 

capriciously disregarded essential evidence, did not make necessary findings of fact, 

and precluded Claimant from developing his evidentiary case, making the WCJ’s 
2

decision manifestly unreasonable. Claimant further asserts that Employer’s expert 

medical witnesses’ testimony was not legally competent and that the Board applied 

the wrong burden of proof and analysis on Claimant’s mental injury claim. After 

careful review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Petitions

On July 30, 2020, Claimant, a corrections officer for Employer, was involved 

in an altercation with an inmate at work, during which he was injured. Employer 

accepted, via a Notice of Temporary Compensation Payable which converted to a 

Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP) by operation of law, a work-related injury 

in the nature of a laceration under his right eye when he “was assaulted by an inmate 

who struck him in his face . . . .” (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 12a, 15a.) Employer 

paid Claimant wage loss benefits until January 18, 2021, when it notified Claimant

that it was suspending his benefits based on his return to work at no loss of earnings. 

(Id. at 18a.) On March 5, 2021, Claimant filed the Petitions at issue, asserting that

his disability had recurred on February 17, 2021, when, despite his efforts, he could 

not work his time-of-injury position (Reinstatement Petition); he sustained injuries 

beyond the facial laceration accepted in the NCP (Review Petition); and Employer 

violated the Workers’ Compensation Act1(Act) when it failed to pay him disability 

benefits despite there being an open NCP (Penalty Petition). (Id. at 21a-23a.) 

Employer filed answers to each, denying the Petitions’ material allegations. (Id. at 

1 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.1—2501-2710.
3

24a-29a.) The Petitions were assigned to the WCJ,2 who held multiple hearings at 

which the parties presented testimony and documentary evidence.

B. Proceedings Before the WCJ

1. Claimant’s Evidence

Claimant testified by video and by deposition and presented the deposition 

testimonies of Surena Namdari, M.D. and Miriam Franco, Psy.D. Claimant testified 

by deposition on June 25, 2021,3 describing his work duties as a corrections officer 

and the July 30, 2020 incident as follows. Claimant and his partner (Partner) were 

notified that something was wrong in one of the pods, and they went to investigate. 

When they arrived, an inmate (Inmate) told Claimant that he was having problems 

and needed his medications, and Claimant told the inmate he could help. In the 

meantime, another officer initiated a “response,” which resulted in all of the 

telephones in the pod being turned off, including those that were in use by other 

inmates. (R.R. at 57a.) Those other inmates became upset and began throwing

items, like trashcans, at Claimant, Partner, and Inmate. While Claimant attempted 

to secure Inmate, another officer arrived and sprayed pepper spray but instead of 

hitting Inmate, it hit Partner in the face, blinding him, and Claimant. Inmate moved 

to fight with the other inmates, Claimant tried to put himself between the inmates, 

and more officers arrived on scene. Inmate ultimately began to swing blindly and 

struck Claimant in the face, causing a laceration on the eye, and that “pretty much 

picked [Claimant] up off [his] feet.” (Id. at 59a.) Claimant was sent to the hospital

for treatment, where he complained of face, neck, and upper body pain. Claimant 

2 The Petitions were initially assigned to one WCJ but, following several hearings, they 

were reassigned to the WCJ that rendered the ultimate decision in this matter.

3 Claimant’s deposition testimony is found at pages 49a to 137a of the Reproduced Record. 

The WCJ summarized this testimony in Finding of Fact 6.
4

received follow-up treatment with Concentra, where he complained of face, neck, 

shoulder, and right-sided chest pain, as well as dizziness and anxiousness, and later 

from the Rothman Institute.

Claimant attempted to return to work on October 9, 2020, but felt panicked 

being there and experienced chest pain and difficulty focusing. He advised his 

supervisor of this, went home sick, and later went to the emergency room for 

dizziness, chest pain, and anxiety, where he was diagnosed with anxiety. Beginning 

March 2, 2021, Claimant has treated the anxiety with telemedicine sessions, with, 

among others, Collaborative Psychiatric Associates (Collaborative), with whom he 

had treated before. Claimant admitted to having been assaulted by inmates in the 

past, including in December 2020, when he sustained a concussion after an inmate 

struck him multiple times, but did not miss any work. Claimant returned to full-duty 

work on January 18, 2021, after being cleared to do so by Dr. Namdari, who was 

treating Claimant for his injuries to his sternum, and by panel physician, Dr. Ronald 

Wolfe. Claimant said he returned to work notwithstanding that he still had pain

because he wanted to try to see if he could work. He did not feel exactly like himself 

at work, and after a few days, Claimant was forced to quarantine due to COVID-19. 

Claimant again returned to full-duty work on February 17, 2021, but felt anxious and 

had an overwhelming feeling of stress, worry, fear, and nervousness, which affected 

his ability to perform his job. Claimant did not return to work after that day.

Claimant testified before the WCJ via video on May 31, 2022,

4

reiterating the 

details of July 30, 2020, until the WCJ stopped him because the details had already 

been given in the deposition with which the WCJ was familiar. (R.R. at 892a.) 

Claimant repeated his testimony about his prior attempts to return to work, and the 

4 Claimant’s testimony before the WCJ is found at pages 885a to 930a in the Reproduced 

Record. The WCJ summarized this testimony in Finding of Fact 13.
5

medical and psychiatric treatment he sought at those times. Claimant explained he 

had since tried different types of work, but has not found a permanent job, and did 

not believe he could return to his position with Employer due to his anxiety. 

Claimant agreed on cross-examination that the only treatment he sought from the 

emergency room immediately following the work incident was for the laceration. 

He also indicated that it was his emotional wellbeing that was keeping him out of 

work. (Id. at 910a.)

Dr. Namdari, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, testified by deposition5

about Claimant’s description of the July 30, 2020 incident to him, Claimant’s 

treatment since that time, and Dr. Namdari’s examinations and treatment of 

Claimant. Dr. Namdari took over Claimant’s care from Ryan Pfeifer, D.O. He

opined that his examinations of Claimant revealed that Claimant’s sternoclavicular 

joint was tender, and a magnetic resonance image of Claimant’s chest revealed

edema, consistent with that tenderness. Based on his review of Claimant’s medical 

records and tests, and his physical examination of Claimant, Dr. Namdari diagnosed 

Claimant with “[r]ight shoulder sternoclavicular joint sprain in the setting of 

preexisting arthritis” and related that injury to the July 30, 2020 incident. (Id. at 

307a-08a.) Dr. Namdari treated this injury with an ultrasound-guided cortisone 

injection into that joint, which helped to relieve Claimant’s pain and decreased 

Claimant’s symptoms. Dr. Namdari indicated that, at a December 15, 2020 visit,

Claimant stated he felt he could return to work, and given Claimant’s decrease in 

symptoms, Dr. Namdari signed a return-to-work form. 

When Claimant returned to Dr. Namdari’s office in May 2021, the pain had 

recurred due to the injection wearing off. At that time, Dr. Namdari restricted 

5 Dr. Namdari’s deposition is found at pages 297a to 344a in the Reproduced Record. The 

WCJ summarized this testimony in Finding of Fact 7.
6

Claimant to modified duty based on Claimant’s unchanged diagnosis and continued 

symptomology. Dr. Namdari saw Claimant several more times, with the last being 

on November 9, 2021, at which time Dr. Namdari noted that Claimant’s October 12, 

2021 injection had lasted only a week. Dr. Namdari opined that Claimant had 

preexisting arthritis in his sternoclavicular joint, which had been asymptomatic prior 

to the work injury, and was aggravated, and possibly accelerated, by the work injury. 

On cross-examination, Dr. Namdari agreed Claimant’s emergency room records 

from July 2020 reflect that Claimant’s vital signs were negative for neck or chest 

soreness, or chest tenderness, and Claimant denied having chest pain. He also agreed 

that Claimant’s symptoms had improved by the December 15, 2020 examination and 

there were no longer any objective findings. He further acknowledged that Claimant

did not seek treatment between the December 2020 office visit and May 2021 office 

visit. 

Claimant attempted to obtain the records and deposition of panel physician 

Dr. Wolfe, who treated Claimant’s injury, but Dr. Wolfe was not cooperative, 

including by not responding to a subpoena. After Dr. Wolfe would not cooperate, 

Claimant requested that an adverse inference be taken as to that testimony. (Id. at 

874a-75a, 934a-35a.) It is unclear that Claimant took any formal steps to enforce 

the subpoena before asking for the adverse inference.

Dr. Franco, a psychologist, conducted an independent medical examination 

(IME) of Claimant, consisting of four video sessions. Claimant obtained Dr. 

Franco’s opinion in lieu of the licensed social worker at Collaborative with whom 

Claimant had been treating for his anxiety disorder due to a concern that the social 

worker was not competent to provide medical opinions. (Id. at 436a.) In her 

deposition, Dr. Franco described her examinations and the history of the work 
7

incident.

6 Dr. Franco opined that, based on the results of the various tests she

performed and Claimant’s mental status examination, Claimant suffers from PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) due to his direct exposure to traumatic events on 

July 30, 2020. Dr. Franco indicated Claimant’s reaction to attempting to return to 

work in October 2020 was consistent with someone with PTSD. Dr. Franco stated 

that Claimant was not capable of returning to full-duty work from a psychological 

standpoint due to his ongoing nightmares, agitation, and hyperarousal when 

reminded of work. On cross-examination, Dr. Franco acknowledged that the first 

records she reviewed documenting Claimant’s complaints of anxiety were from 

March 2, 2021. Further, Dr. Franco’s history did not reflect, as found in Claimant’s

treating provider’s record of April 29, 2021, Claimant’s testing positive for COVID19, which made his anxiety and physical complaints worse.

2. Employer’s Evidence

Employer presented the deposition testimonies of David Glaser, M.D., and 

Gladys Fenichel, M.D.7 Dr. Glaser, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, performed 

an IME of Claimant on October 19, 2021, and testified about the history Claimant 

provided of both the incident and his treatment, his examination of Claimant, and 

his review of Claimant’s treatment records, as follows.8 Claimant reported pain in 

his right arm and throbbing in his sternoclavicular region, and Dr. Glaser’s physical 

6 Dr. Franco’s deposition is found at pages 448a to 553a of the Reproduced Record. The 

WCJ summarized this testimony in Finding of Fact 8. 

7 Employer also presented a fact witness, but the WCJ found that witness’s testimony on 

the relevant issues to be equivocal due to a lack of personal knowledge of the events and rejected 

that witness’s testimony that Claimant abandoned his job because Employer was aware of the work 

injury “and could presume that Claimant was absent from work due to his ongoing limitations, 

perceived or otherwise.” (WCJ Decision, Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶¶ 12, 18.)

8 Dr. Glaser’s deposition is found at pages 603a to 665a of the Reproduced Record. The 

WCJ summarized Dr. Glaser’s testimony in Finding of Fact 9.
8

examination of Claimant’s neck, rotator cuff, labrum, and scapula was normal, with 

no weakness in his cervical spine. Dr. Glaser reviewed the diagnostic testing of 

Claimant’s chest and cervical spine, which, he opined, showed an active process in 

the chest, rather than a change based on a single episode, due to the presence of 

degenerative arthritis, and the test of the cervical spine showed degenerative 

changes. Based upon his examination of Claimant and his review of Claimant’s 

medical records, including those from the emergency room, Dr. Pfeifer, Dr. 

Namdari, and physical therapy, and the diagnostic tests, Dr. Glaser opined that 

Claimant sustained the laceration as a result of the work incident, that Claimant’s 

right-sided sternoclavicular and cervical spine degenerative arthritis were not caused 

or aggravated by that incident, and that cervical pain is not an injury. Dr. Glaser 

disagreed that the nature of the incident could cause the sternoclavicular injury and, 

had it done so, he would have expected complaints of pain in that region to have 

appeared in the emergency room records or in Claimant’s follow-up visits with 

Concentra, and they did not. Dr. Glaser opined that the laceration was the only workrelated injury Claimant sustained and that Claimant required no restrictions on his 

return to full-duty work. Dr. Glaser further opined that if any injury beyond the 

laceration did occur, it had resolved by the time of the IME and that any injury to 

the sternoclavicular joint would not be disabling. (Id. at 627a-28a.)

Dr. Fenichel, a board-certified psychiatrist, performed an IME of Claimant on 

September 21, 2021, and testified by deposition regarding her examination of 

Claimant, review of Claimant’s records, and conclusion that Claimant did not sustain 

any psychological injury as a result of the work incident.9 Dr. Fenichel set forth the 

history of the incident as provided by Claimant, but noted that Claimant was difficult 

9 Dr. Fenichel’s deposition is found at pages 723a to 783a of the Reproduced Record. The 

WCJ summarized this testimony in Finding of Fact 10.
9

to talk to as he did not answer direct questions or give full, direct answers to 

questions she asked. Claimant discussed his personal life, and the stress he 

experienced growing up before he would discuss the work incident. (Id. at 738a39a.) She discussed the aftermath of the work incident and Claimant’s feelings about 

the incident, including expressing concern about being with inmates, that he did not 

feel like himself, and that he had always believed he was mentally strong. 

Claimant’s medical records revealed the first reference of anxiety was in October 

2020, at which time Concentra told Claimant to reach out to Employer,

Collaborative’s record of December 22, 2020, revealed improvement in Claimant’s 

anxiety, and Concentra’s record of January 12, 2021, likewise showed improvement 

in his anxiety, which was followed by Concentra’s release of Claimant to full-duty 

work. Dr. Fenichel noted that neither Dr. Pfeifer’s nor Dr. Namdari’s records 

reflected any complaints of anxiety or other emotional issues. After learning that 

Claimant had been assaulted at work multiple times in the seven months before the 

July 30, 2020 incident, Dr. Fenichel concluded that this last incident was not an 

extreme traumatic incident that would give rise to PTSD. Instead, Dr. Fenichel 

related Claimant’s anxiety to “a lifetime of abuse he experienced and was able to 

surmount,” (WCJ Decision, Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶ 10f). Dr. Fenichel additionally 

testified that Claimant did not explain how what occurred on July 30, 2020, 

prevented him from proceeding with his normal life. Dr. Fenichel concluded that

Claimant did not have anything, from a psychiatric perspective, that prevented him 

from performing his full-duty work, and did not need any psychological treatment 

for any injury that may have occurred as a result of the work incident, and a return 

to work would likely be good for Claimant.
10

3. The WCJ’s Decision

Upon her review of the evidence, the WCJ credited Claimant’s testimony in 

part, finding Claimant sustained work-related injuries beyond the laceration under 

his right eye, but rejecting Claimant’s testimony that he was incapable of performing 

his pre-injury work due to any work-related injury. (Id. ¶ 14.) The WCJ accepted 

Dr. Namdari’s opinion as to the nature of Claimant’s physical injuries over Dr. 

Glaser’s contrary opinion, finding that Claimant had preexisting arthritis in the 

sternoclavicular joint, which had been asymptomatic prior to the work incident that 

was aggravated by the work injury. (Id. ¶ 15.) The WCJ did not find Claimant’s 

preexisting arthritis was accelerated by the work injury, noting Dr. Namdari 

indicated that this was only a possibility. (Id.) As to whether that aggravation was 

ongoing, the WCJ found Dr. Glaser’s opinion that Claimant had fully recovered from 

all of his physical injuries credible, stating that Claimant’s failure to treat or follow 

up on those injuries with Dr. Namdari for six months, despite alleged ongoing 

symptomology, was significant. (Id. ¶ 16.)

As for Claimant’s alleged work-related psychological injuries, the WCJ found 

Dr. Fenichel’s opinions that Claimant sustained no such injuries as a result of the 

July 30, 2020 incident more credible than Dr. Franco’s contrary opinions and that 

where the two differed, Dr. Fenichel’s opinions prevailed. (Id. ¶ 17.) The WCJ cited 

Dr. Fenichel’s more comprehensive psychological examination of Claimant as the 

basis for the credibility determination. (Id.) The WCJ found that Dr. Fenichel 

“credibly analyzed whether PTSD was an appropriate diagnosis and found it was not 

based in large part on the fact that Claimant had been assaulted at work three times 

over a period of seven months, and thus, the events were not out of the ordinary.” 

(Id.)
11

The WCJ did

not find that Claimant suffered from any physical or psychological 

work injury after February 17, 2021[,] that disabled him from returning 

to work in his pre-injury job. In fact, Claimant’s own testimony 

supports the conclusion that the only reason he did not return to work 

was his mindset, and not any physical injury. Dr. Namdari’s testimony

also supports this conclusion as []he had released him to return to his 

pre-injury job in December 2020.

(Id. ¶ 19.) Based on the credited evidence, the WCJ found “that all disability 

referable to the work injury ceased on October 19, 2021, thereby entitling Employer 

to a termination of benefits.” (Id. ¶ 21.) Additionally, the WCJ found that Employer 

did not violate the Act in not paying wage loss benefits to Claimant after January 18, 

2021, when Employer filed its notice of suspension, which Claimant did not 

challenge.10 (Id. ¶ 20.) 

The WCJ concluded that Claimant did not meet his burdens of proof on the 

Reinstatement and Penalty Petitions and, therefore, denied those Petitions. (WCJ 

Decision, Conclusions of Law ¶¶ 2, 5.) In contrast, the WCJ held that Claimant did 

meet his burden of proving that he suffered an additional work injury, the 

aggravation of his sternoclavicular arthritis, but that this injury did not disable him 

from his job and had fully resolved by October 19, 2021. Thus, the WCJ granted 

the Review Petition in part to add the sternoclavicular injury but terminated benefits 

as of October 19, 2021. (Id. ¶ 3, Order.) The WCJ found Employer’s contest 

10 The WCJ also found that Claimant had a disfiguring scar from the laceration and awarded 

12 weeks of wage loss benefits to compensate for the scar, which, on appeal, the Board modified 

to award 25 weeks of wage loss benefits based on its in-person view of Claimant. (FOF ¶ 22; WCJ 

Decision, Conclusion of Law ¶ 4; Board Opinion (Op.) at 20-21.) This part of the Board’s decision 

was not appealed.
12

reasonable and, as Claimant prevailed on the Review Petition, directed Employer to 

pay Claimant’s litigation costs. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) 

C. The Board’s Opinion

Claimant appealed to the Board, making substantially the same arguments as 

he does to this Court. (See R.R. at 995a-1002a.) In his appeal, Claimant focused on 

evidence he claims the WCJ “omitted” from numerous Findings of Fact, making 

them inaccurate and reflecting a capricious disregard of the evidence, and how the 

WCJ prevented him from making his case. Claimant also asserted the WCJ did not

provide an adequate explanation for the credibility determinations and argues that 

the testimony of Dr. Glaser and Dr. Fenichel, who did not “understand the 

physicality of the work incident,” was not legally competent, rendering Employer’s 

challenge unreasonable and requiring an award of attorney’s fees. (Id. at 1000a02a.) The Board disagreed on all points and affirmed the WCJ’s decision, 

concluding that the WCJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that 

the WCJ committed no error of law. As part of this determination, the Board held 

Claimant’s alleged PTSD had to be evaluated under the mental-mental standard, 

which required him to show that the PTSD was the result of an abnormal working 

condition. (Board Opinion (Op.) at 3-4, 17 (citing, e.g., Payes v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Pa. State Police), 79 A.3d 543 (Pa. 2013)).) Claimant now petitions 

this Court for review.11

11 This Court’s review “is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether 

constitutional rights were violated.” Elberson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Elwyn, Inc.), 936 

A.2d 1195, 1198 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
13

II. DISCUSSION

Claimant asserts multiple bases for why the Board and the WCJ allegedly 

erred or abused their discretion in this matter and the denial of his Petitions should 

be reversed. 

A. The Standards Used by the Board

Claimant first argues the Board failed to perform proper appellate review of 

the WCJ’s decision by focusing only on whether the Findings of Fact were supported 

by substantial evidence, which Claimant appears to concede.

12

 (Claimant’s Brief 

(Br.) at 25 (“[B]y performing only a ‘substantial evidence test’, the Board did

identify excerpts of testimony sufficient to support the outcome reached.”)

(emphasis omitted).) The error, Claimant asserts, was in the Board’s not reviewing 

the record as a whole in order to address Claimant’s arguments that the WCJ 

capriciously disregarded overwhelming and unrefuted evidence. 

Reviewing the Board’s Opinion, we discern no error in the standard the Board

applied. The Board’s appellate review, like ours, specifically requires it to determine 

whether the WCJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial, competent 

evidence. Bethenergy Mines v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Skirpan), 612 A.2d 

434, 437 (Pa. 1992). It is well settled that the Board, like this Court, is bound by a 

WCJ’s findings if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id. When 

performing a substantial evidence analysis, the evidence and every reasonable 

inference deducible from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party. Wawa v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Seltzer), 951 A.2d 405, 

408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 407 n.4.

12 We have rearranged and combined Claimant’s arguments for ease of discussion.
14

In cases where both parties present evidence, the critical inquiry is whether there is 

evidence to support the findings actually made, and it is irrelevant whether the record 

contains evidence to support findings other than those made by a WCJ. Hoffmaster 

v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Senco Prods., Inc.), 721 A.2d 1152, 1155 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1998). A WCJ, as the factfinder, has the sole authority to assess credibility, 

to resolve conflicting evidence, and to determine the weight given to the evidence. 

Id. at 1155-56. Accordingly, a WCJ may reject, in whole or in part, the testimony 

of any witness, even if that testimony is uncontradicted. Id. at 1156.

In applying the above standard, the Board did not ignore the allegations of 

capricious disregard, rather it recognized that

[w]here there is substantial evidence to support the WCJ’s findings of 

fact and the findings support the conclusions, only in rare instances

should the adjudication be disturbed on the basis of capricious 

disregard of material, competent evidence. Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. 

v. W[orkers’] C[omp.] A[ppeal] B[d.] (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478[, 487

n.14] (Pa. 2002). A WCJ’s express consideration and rejection of 

evidence is not capricious disregard. Williams v. W[orkers’] C[omp.] 

A[ppeal] B[d.] (USX Corp[.]-Fairless Works), 862 A.2d 137[, 145] (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2004).

(Board Op. at 4-5 (emphasis added).) The Board then summarized the testimony of 

the witnesses, reviewed the WCJ’s credibility determinations, and expressly 

concluded there was no capricious disregard by the WCJ in this matter. Accordingly,

we cannot say that the Board failed to perform the proper review, and this is not a 

basis to reverse.

Claimant also argues the Board erred in applying the wrong standard in 

reviewing his mental injury claim when it evaluated whether he satisfied the 

mental/mental standard of proof, rather than the physical/mental standard. Employer 

asserts the Board’s reference to the mental/mental standard was harmless error 
15

because that was not the standard applied by the WCJ. According to Employer, the 

WCJ did not examine whether the July 30, 2020 incident was “abnormal” but 

whether it supported, in the first instance, the diagnosis of PTSD.

To succeed on a review petition, a claimant must, as they do on a claim 

petition, establish all the elements required to support an award of WC benefits, 

including that an injury occurred, the injury was caused by their work duties, and 

they suffered disability (a loss of earnings) from that injury. Inglis House 

v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 1993). Mental 

injuries are categorized three ways: mental/physical injuries, where a psychological 

stimulus results in a physical injury; mental/mental injuries, where psychological 

stimulus results in a psychological injury; and physical/mental, where a physical 

stimulus results in a psychological injury. Ryan v. Workman’s [sic] Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Cmty. Health Servs.), 707 A.2d 1130, 1135 (Pa. 1998). In the situation where 

the claimed work injury is a mental/mental injury, which the Board reasoned was 

the case here, “a claimant must prove by objective evidence that he has suffered a 

psychic injury and that such injury is other than a subjective reaction to normal 

working conditions.” Davis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Swarthmore Borough), 

751 A.2d 168, 174 (Pa. 2000). Claimant contends his PTSD would fall under the 

physical/mental standard, which does not require a showing of an abnormal working 

condition.

Thus, to establish an entitlement to WC benefits, Claimant first had to prove 

that he suffered the alleged PTSD, and, if he did so, then the issue of which standard 

– the physical/mental or the mental/mental standard–applies would become relevant. 

Id. Here, though, because the WCJ credited Dr. Fenichel’s opinion that Claimant 

did not suffer PTSD over Dr. Franco’s contrary opinion, the questions of the work-
16

relatedness of that alleged injury, and which category of mental injury it falls into, 

were not at issue. Accordingly, if the Board erred in invoking the mental/mental 

standard, any such error was harmless because Claimant did not establish that he 

sustained PTSD in the first instance.

 

B. Capricious Disregard/Preclusion of Evidence

Claimant argues that the WCJ’s capricious disregard of evidence and 

preclusion of relevant evidence renders the WCJ’s findings incomplete. Claimant’s 

arguments are predicated on his belief that the WCJ’s failure to identify and 

reference the admitted exhibits, or his request for an adverse inference due to Dr. 

Wolfe’s refusal to cooperate, in the decision’s list of exhibits meant they were not 

considered. Claimant also contends that the WCJ’s factual findings present a 

distorted summary of the facts and testimony, particularly as to the nature of the July 

30, 2020 incident. Relatedly, Claimant argues the WCJ capriciously disregarded

essential evidence needed to make the findings of fact “necessary” for a correct 

understanding of the incident and the lack of these detailed findings affected the 

WCJ’s credibility determinations.

Employer argues there is no capricious disregard here, and the WCJ’s decision 

allows for effective judicial review by summarizing the relevant evidence and

identifying the credible witnesses, and offers the grounds for the credibility 

determinations. See Supervalu, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bowser), 755 

A.2d 715, 721-22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). No line-by-line analysis of the evidence and 

its effect on the ultimate conclusion is needed, Employer asserts; instead, all that is 

needed is for the WCJ to make the findings necessary for her determination. 

Minicozzi v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Indus. Metal Plating, Inc.), 873 A.2d 25,

29-30 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Employer argues that Claimant’s capricious disregard 
17

arguments are really challenges to the WCJ’s credibility and evidentiary weight 

determinations, which are not subject to review on appeal. 

Review for capricious disregard of competent evidence is an appropriate 

component of appellate consideration in every case in which such question is 

properly brought before the court. Wintermyer, 812 A.2d at 487. Capricious 

disregard has been described as a deliberate disregard of competent evidence which 

one of ordinary intelligence could not possibly have avoided in reaching a result. 

Arena v. Packaging Sys. Corp., 507 A.2d 18, 20 (Pa. 1986). This limited aspect of 

appellate review should not be applied in a way that would intrude upon the factfinding role and discretionary decision-making authority of the agency. Wintermyer, 

812 A.2d at 487-88. “To be capricious, the [WCJ’s] decision must not be merely an 

error in judgment course, but []the adjudication must be so flagrant as to be 

repugnant to a man of reasonable intelligence.[]” Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Workmen’s 

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Bensy), 651 A.2d 212, 217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

We begin with Claimant’s argument that a capricious disregard occurred 

because the WCJ did not include the exhibits admitted in the decision’s list of 

exhibits or reference his request for an adverse inference from Dr. Wolfe’s refusal 

to cooperate in the decision or summarize those exhibits and that request in the 

findings of fact. We find that argument unpersuasive. The exhibits Claimant cites 

are included in the certified record, reflecting their admission, and many were either

referenced in witness testimony or discussed by counsel during the proceedings. 

Claimant’s request for an adverse inference is likewise in the certified record.13 That 

13 Notably, Claimant does not appear to argue, as he did to the Board, that the denial of the 

adverse inference was erroneous. Rather, he just points to the lack of reference to his request 

reflects the WCJ’s capricious disregard in this matter.
18

they were not included in the decision’s exhibit list appears to be an oversight, 

particularly where none were identified in that list. As for the WCJ’s failure to 

specifically reference that evidence in the findings, some of the evidence was 

referenced, as they were medical records discussed and relied upon by the various 

experts whose testimony was summarized by the WCJ. (See, e.g., FOF ¶¶ 7a, 8c, 

9b, 9d, 10c.) Moreover, a WCJ is not required to provide a line-by-line explanation 

of the evidence presented and how that evidence may have affected the ultimate 

decision. Acme Mkts., Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Brown), 890 A.2d 21, 26

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Accordingly, this potential oversight does not meet the high 

standard necessary for reversing based on a capricious disregard of overwhelming 

evidence.

Turning to Claimant’s arguments that the findings relating to the nature of the 

incident were distorted thereby resulting in an incorrect understanding of the 

incident, we disagree. These assertions, at their essence, challenge the WCJ’s 

description of the incident in Findings of Fact 6a and 13a. Finding of Fact 6a states: 

“On July 30, 2020, [Claimant] and his partner responded to a call involving a

combative [I]nmate. [Claimant] became entangled in an altercation involving more 

than one individual and was struck in his face.” (FOF ¶ 6a.) Finding of Fact 13a 

provides: “Claimant recounted the July 30, 2020 event at work, when he was struck

by [I]nmate. Altercations with prisoners happened with some regularity.” (Id.

¶ 13a.) Claimant maintains that his testimony was far more detailed, and reflected 

the gravity of the incident, and the WCJ, having not rejected that testimony, should 

have made similarly detailed findings. Had the WCJ done so, Claimant posits that 

different credibility determinations would likely have been made.
19

Claimant does not, nor can he, assert that the WCJ’s findings are not supported 

by substantial evidence because Claimant’s testimony supports this general 

description of the July 30, 2020 incident and that altercations with inmates occur 

with regularity, as Claimant had been involved in multiple altercations, some of 

which resulted in injuries. (R.R. at 65a-67a, 70a-71a.) Claimant’s argument that 

different findings should have been made essentially seeksto have the Court reweigh 

the evidence. The WCJ, as the factfinder, has the sole authority to assess credibility, 

to resolve conflicting evidence, and to determine the weight given to the evidence. 

Hoffmaster, 721 A.2d at 1155-56. Here, the WCJ reviewed the record and 

summarized the evidence in findings of fact that she believed necessary to make her 

decision and was not required to perform a line-by-line analysis of the evidence 

presented. Id. To the extent Claimant believes this would have changed the 

credibility determinations, the capricious disregard standard should not be applied 

in a way that would intrude upon the fact-finding role and discretionary decisionmaking authority of the agency, which is what Claimant requests we do. 

Wintermyer, 812 A.2d at 487-88. We discern no deliberate “disregard” of the 

evidence, id., or a WCJ’s decision that is so “repugnant” that it must be reversed, 

Giant Eagle, Inc., 651 A.2d at 217. 

Finally, Claimant argues the WCJ precluded him from presenting his case by 

refusing to allow him “to more graphically describe the incident” at the final hearing.

(Claimant’s Br. at 29.) Claimant’s initial deposition testimony described the July 

30, 2020 incident in great detail, some of which he began to repeat during the last 

hearing. (R.R. at 55a-61a, 890a-91a.) That testimony was also reiterated, at least in 

part, during the questioning of Dr. Fenichel. (Id. at 760a-64a.) We discern no abuse 

of discretion or capricious disregard in the WCJ’s decision not to allow what she 
20

viewed would be cumulative testimony. See Marincov v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (City of Washington), 454 A.2d 670, 673-74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983) (finding no 

abuse of discretion in denying a rehearing because there was nothing to indicate that 

the proposed testimony to be offered “would be anything other than cumulative with 

respect to that already adduced”). 

C. Employer’s Witnesses

Claimant asserts the WCJ erred in relying on Employer’s witnesses’

testimony and in explaining why she credited those witnesses over Claimant’s 

experts. Related to Claimant’s capricious disregard arguments is his position that 

Dr. Fenichel’s and Dr. Glaser’s testimonies were not legally competent. Key to that 

argument is his contention that neither Dr. Fenichel nor Dr. Glaser had a correct 

understanding of the July 30, 2020 incident or of Claimant’s medical records. 

Claimant further asserts that Dr. Glaser’s testimony is not competent because he did 

not accept that Claimant sustained any injury to his sternoclavicular joint, which the 

WCJ ultimately accepted.

Employer asserts generally that Claimant’s competency arguments are really 

challenges to the weight the WCJ gave to the witnesses’ testimony, which is for the 

WCJ to determine. As for Dr. Glaser’s opinion related to the existence of a 

sternoclavicular joint condition, Employer argues Dr. Glaser did not dispute the 

existence of a condition of that joint, only that this condition was acute, as Dr. 

Namdari concluded, rather than chronic, as Dr. Glaser opined. It maintains that Dr. 

Glaser’s testimony that he found no evidence of impairment attributable to 

Claimant’s sternoclavicular condition during his examination of Claimant on 

October 19, 2021, which the WCJ credited, supported termination based on full 

recovery by that date.
21

The Board’s Opinion accurately sets forth the legal principles related to these

arguments. 

Whether medical opinion evidence is competent or equivocal is a 

question of law based upon a review of the opinion or testimony as a 

whole. Lewis v. W[orkmen’s] C[omp.] A[ppeal] B[d.] (Pittsburgh Bd. 

of Educ.), 498 A.2d 800[, 803] (Pa. 1985). In conducting such a review, 

a final decision should not rest upon a few words taken out of context.

Id. A medical expert’s opinion is not incompetent unless it is based 

solely on inaccurate or false information. The opinion must be 

viewed as a whole, and even inaccurate information will not render the 

opinion incompetent unless it is dependent on the inaccuracies. Casne 

v. W[orkers’] C[omp.] A[ppeal] B[d.] (Stat Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 

14[, 16] (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (citations omitted).

(Board Op. at 4 (emphasis added).) The question of competency is one of law, fully 

reviewable on appeal. Cerro Metal Prods. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. 

(Plewa), 855 A.2d 932, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Applying these standards, the 

Board disagreed “that the testimony of Dr. Glaser and Dr. Fenichel was not 

competent because they did not have a correct history and did not fully appreciate 

the magnitude of the incident.” (Board Op. at 16.) We agree with the Board’s 

assessment.

Contrary to Claimant’s contention, the history Dr. Glaser and Dr. Fenichel

had of the incident was that which Claimant himself provided. Both experts testified 

similarly to Claimant regarding the incident, albeit more briefly, and their reports 

reflect that they both reviewed Claimant’s June 25, 2021 deposition describing the 

incident. (R.R. at 610a-12a, 708a, 729a-30a, 740a-43a, 760a-64a, 807a.) Notably, 

Dr. Fenichel testified that Claimant was very difficult to talk to about the incident, 

refusing to answer direct questions and preferring to discuss his personal history 

rather than the incident. (Id. at 742a-43a.) Thus, it cannot be said that their opinions, 

when taken as a whole, were “solely based on inaccurate or false information” and 
22

not legally competent for that reason. Casne, 962 A.2d at 16. That Claimant 

believes Employer’s experts did not fully appreciate the incident’s magnitude 

relates, in our view, more to the weight given to that testimony, than its competence. 

Issues of evidentiary weight are for the WCJ to decide, not this Court. IA Constr. 

Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Rhodes), 139 A.3d 154, 161 (Pa. 2016) 

(“Pennsylvania appellate tribunals accord broader deference to fact-based 

determinations of [WCJs,]” which includes issues of credibility and evidentiary 

weight.).

As for Claimant’s assertion that Dr. Glaser’s testimony was incompetent 

because he did not accept that Claimant had a sternoclavicular joint injury, a close 

review of Dr. Glaser’s testimony belies Claimant’s argument. The testimony of a 

medical expert who refuses to accept the existence of an accepted or adjudicated 

injury is not legally competent to support a termination, O’Neill v. Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board (News Corp. Ltd.), 29 A.3d 50, 57 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011);

Hall v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (America Service Group), 3 A.3d 

734, 740 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), but we are not convinced that this is what happened 

here. Notably, at the time Dr. Glaser testified, no injury beyond a facial laceration 

had been accepted and no injury had been adjudicated. Dr. Glaser did not state that 

Claimant was not suffering a sternoclavicular joint condition; rather, he opined that 

the condition was not related to the work incident and that, based on his examination,

the condition was not disabling nor precluded Claimant from returning to full-duty 

work. (R.R. at 625a-29a.) This conclusion was supported by Dr. Namdari’s findings 

that, as of Claimant’s December 15, 2020 examination, no objective findings of the 

issue were present and Claimant could return to full-duty work, testimony to which

the WCJ pointed in finding that Claimant was no longer entitled to WC benefits. 
23

(Id. at 335a-36a; FOF ¶¶ 7d, 19.) The WCJ, as factfinder, could, and did, reject that 

part of Dr. Glaser’s testimony as to the work incident’s effect on Claimant’s 

sternoclavicular joint in favor of Dr. Namdari’s testimony. However, the WCJ, as 

factfinder, was also free to accept Dr. Glaser’s testimony that Claimant had no 

orthopedic findings at the time of his examination, was fully recovered from any 

injury sustained in the July 30, 2020 incident, was not disabled by that condition,

and could return to work, over Dr. Namdari’s contrary testimony. The WCJ is 

authorized to accept or reject the testimony of any witness, including medical expert 

witnesses, in whole or in part. Minicozzi, 873 A.2d at 28.

The termination of benefits may be granted where a medical expert 

unequivocally and credibly testifies that the claimant is fully recovered from the 

work injury, that there are no objective findings to support any ongoing complaints, 

and that the claimant can return to work without restrictions. Inservco Ins. Servs. v. 

Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Purefoey), 902 A.2d 574, 579 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). 

Termination may also be granted if a medical expert testifies that any remaining 

restrictions or disability experienced by a claimant are not related to the work injury.

Campbell v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Antietam Valley Animal Hosp.), 705 A.2d 

503, 507 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Dr. Glaser’s credited opinion recognized the existence 

of a sternoclavicular joint issue, but he opined that by October 19, 2021, there was 

no objective evidence of that condition, which was adjudicated as an aggravation of 

the sternoclavicular joint arthritis, Claimant had no orthopedic impairments related 

to the work incident, and Claimant could return to his full-duty position without 

restrictions related to his musculoskeletal system. (R.R. at 626a-29a, 638a.) This is 

sufficient to support the termination of benefits. Shepherd v. Workmen’s Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Shepherd), 443 A.2d 862, 863-64 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982). 
24

Claimant also argues that the WCJ did not adequately explain why Drs. Glaser 

and Fenichel were more credible than Drs. Namdari and Franco. This argument 

relates to Section 422(a) of the Act’s requirement that a WCJ issue a reasoned 

decision, 77 P.S. § 834,

14 and the part of that requirement that a WCJ adequately 

explain the resolution of conflicting evidence. Where a witness testifies before the 

factfinder, allowing the WCJ to assess the witness’s demeanor, the “mere conclusion 

as to which witness was deemed credible . . . could be sufficient to render the 

decision adequately reasoned.” Minicozzi, 873 A.2d at 30. But, where the 

conflicting testimony of the witnesses occurs in depositions, the WCJ must articulate 

some objective basis for the credibility determination. Daniels v. Workers’ Comp. 

Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transp.), 828 A.2d 1043, 1053 (Pa. 2003). “[T]here are 

countless objective factors which may support the decision to accept certain 

evidence while []rejecting or discrediting competent [conflicting] evidence.[]” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). A “case-specific, if brief, explanation for [a] 

credibility determination” may meet the requirements of Section 422(a) if “they [are] 

sufficient to allow for adequate review under the applicable review standards . . . .” 

Id. at 1050. 

14 Section 422(a) states, in pertinent part:

All parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are entitled to a reasoned decision 

containing findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a 

whole which clearly and concisely states and explains the rationale for the decisions 

so that all can determine why and how a particular result was reached. The [WCJ] 

shall specify the evidence upon which the [WCJ] relies and state the reasons for 

accepting it in conformity with this section. When faced with conflicting evidence, 

the [WCJ] must adequately explain the reasons for rejecting or discrediting 

competent evidence. . . . The adjudication shall provide the basis for meaningful 

review.

77 P.S. § 834. 
25

Here, the WCJ’s relevant credibility determinations are found in Findings of 

Fact 14 through 17. The WCJ found Dr. Namdari and Dr. Glaser credible in part 

and not credible in part, based in part on her partial acceptance and rejection of 

Claimant’s testimony. In rejecting Dr. Namdari’s testimony regarding an 

acceleration of Claimant’s sternoclavicular joint arthritis, the WCJ cited Dr. 

Namdari’s testimony that such acceleration was merely a possibility and, therefore, 

legally insufficient to support that injury. (FOF ¶ 15.) The WCJ credited Dr. 

Glaser’s testimony rejecting, based on his examination, Claimant’s alleged ongoing 

inability to perform his work duties due to his physical injuries, and concluding that 

Claimant had fully recovered from any physical injuries relating to the work 

incident, pointing to Claimant’s failure to treat or follow up with Dr. Namdari for 

six months, even though Claimant maintained he had ongoing symptomology. (Id.

¶ 16.) In crediting Dr. Fenichel’s opinions over those of Dr. Franco, the WCJ 

reasoned that “Dr. Fenichel’s psychiatric exam of Claimant was more 

comprehensive that Dr. Franco’s.” (Id. ¶ 17.)

In addition to the reasons provided in these findings, the WCJ described in the 

summaries of witnesses’ testimony bases that support the credibility determinations. 

For example, the objective reason proffered by the WCJ in crediting Dr. Glaser’s 

testimony is based on Dr. Namdari’s admissions that no treatment occurred between 

December 15, 2020, and May 21, 2021, seemingly contradicting the allegations of 

an ongoing injury. (See id. ¶¶ 7d, 16.) As for crediting Dr. Fenichel’s testimony 

over Dr. Franco’s testimony, the WCJ observed in the summaries for those 

witnesses’ differences in their review of Claimant’s records and/or their examination 

of Claimant, pointing to the lack of history taken by Dr. Franco about Claimant’s 

COVID-19 infection, that appeared to worsen Claimant’s anxiety. (See id. ¶¶ 8b-c, 
26

10c.) A review of Dr. Fenichel’s deposition testimony and report reveals that she 

appears to have engaged in a more thorough examination of Claimant and his 

medical records, including those of Dr. Wolfe, Dr. Pfeifer, Dr. Namdari, and 

Collaborative, than Dr. Franco, whose report did not reflect any specific review of 

the records related to Claimant’s physical injury to determine if they could establish 

PTSD. (Compare R.R. at 570a-80a with id. at 802a-13a.) The failure of a medical 

expert to review all of a claimant’s medical records is something that can go to the 

weight of that testimony. Pryor v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Colin Serv. Sys.), 

923 A.2d 1197, 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Accordingly, the reasons provided by the 

WCJ for the credibility determinations are “case-specific” and objective, not based 

on a subjective view of the witnesses (except where allowed, such as for Claimant), 

and allow for adequate appellate review. Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1050. Therefore, we 

are not persuaded that the WCJ failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in Section 

422(a) and Daniels for a reasoned decision.

D. Whether the WCJ’s Decision was Manifestly Unreasonable

The above errors, Claimant argues, taken together render the WCJ’s decision 

manifestly unreasonable because that decision is without a rational basis or scheme

and, therefore, reflects an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. Giant Eagle, 

Inc., 651 A.2d at 217-18. However, finding no errors or abuses of discretion by the 

WCJ, we cannot say that the WCJ’s decision was manifestly unreasonable.15

15 Claimant also asserts that, if he prevails in his appeal, the matter should be remanded for 

the award of counsel fees. However, having not prevailed on his arguments, no remand is 

warranted.
27

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Claimant has not established that either the WCJ 

or the Board erred or abused their discretion in this matter. Accordingly, the Board’s 

Order is affirmed.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Daniel J. Cifelli, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 523 C.D. 2023 

 : 

City of Philadelphia (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, June 7, 2024, the Order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, 

entered in the above-captioned matter, is hereby AFFIRMED.

__________________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge