IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MICHELLE ALTIERI,

Plaintiff,

v.

KIMBERLY ALEXY, SARA 

ANDREWS, RONALD E. F. CODD, 

ARTHUR W. COVIELLO, JR.,

KEVIN MANDIA, ADRIAN 

MCDERMOTT, VIRAL PATEL, 

ENRIQUE SALEM, ROBERT E. 

SWITZ, and MANDIANT, INC.,

Defendants.

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C.A. No. 2021-0946-KSJM

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Defendant Kevin Mandia formed Defendant Mandiant, Inc. (the 

“Company”) in 2004 to provide incident response services to companies that experience 

data security breaches. The Company embarked on a merger and acquisition strategy to 

grow the original business. This Order refers to the Company’s original business line as 

“Old Mandiant.”

2. The Company combined with FireEye, Inc. on December 30, 2013. The 

combined entity initially took the FireEye name but later changed it back to Mandiant. 

This Order refers to the FireEye line of business, including goodwill and associated 

intangible assets, as the “FireEye Business.” Whereas Old Mandiant focused on incident 

response and consulting services, the FireEye Business created products designed to detect 
2

and prevent cyberattacks. Combining with FireEye allowed the Company to both “detect[] 

attacks” and also “respond[] to attacks[.]”

1

3. The Company acquired other businesses in 2016—iSight Partners, which 

was in the business of gathering information “about hacker groups and other cybersecurity 

risks,”

2

and Invotas International Corp., which provided “security automation and 

orchestration technology.”3 Also in 2016, Mandia joined the Company’s Board of 

Directors (the “Board”) and replaced David DeWalt as CEO. 

4. The Company’s revenue increased between 2016 and 2020. During this 

period of growth, the FireEye Business was significant to overall business. In 2019 and 

2020, the FireEye Business accounted for 62% and 57% of the Company’s overall revenue, 

respectively.4 Further, the Company’s Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended June 30, 

2021, listed $1 billion in goodwill, approximately $500 million of which is alleged to be 

attributable to the FireEye Business.5 The FireEye Business also had a strong social media 

presence relative to Mandiant’s other offerings. In 2021, however, the Board projected that 

the FireEye Business would decline as a percentage of overall revenue—forecasted down

to 48% in 2022 and 42% in 2023.6 

1 C.A. No. 2021-0946-KSJM, Docket (“Dkt.”) 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 19. 

2

Id. ¶ 20. 

3

Id. ¶ 21. 

4

Id. ¶ 32. 

5

Id. ¶ 31; see also FireEye, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (August 9, 2021) (“Aug. 

9 Form 10-Q”). The Complaint incorporates the contents of the August 9 Form 10-Q by 

reference. See Compl. ¶ 31 n.11. 

6 Compl. ¶ 32.
3

5. On May 10, 2021, Mandia sold 150,000 shares in the Company, pursuant to 

a trading plan, for $20.06 per share—a total of about $3 million. Mandia had sold no shares 

in 2020 and sold only 15,781 shares in 2019. 

6. On June 2, 2021, the Company sold the FireEye Business to Symphony 

Technology Group (“STG”) for $1.2 billion (the “Sale”). Mandia described the Sale as an 

opportunity to let Mandiant “concentrate exclusively on scaling our intelligence and 

frontline expertise[.]”7 He stated that the FireEye Business would fare better with STG, as 

STG was focused on “fueling innovative market leaders in software and cybersecurity[.]”8 

The Company did not seek stockholder approval of the Sale. 

7. In reaction to the announcement of the Sale, the Company’s stock dropped 

by 17.62%.

9 Financial analysts who covered the Company expressed concern about the 

Company’s “lower gross margin and stability” absent the FireEye Business, noting that 

“the realized price for [the Company’s] product portfolio is less than we would have 

expected.”10 

8. Plaintiff Michelle Altieri (“Plaintiff”) is a stockholder of the Company. On 

November 3, 2021, Plaintiff brought this action challenging the Sale, asserting claims 

against the Company and its Board members, Defendants Mandia, Kimberly Alexy, Sara 

7

Id. ¶ 25. 

8

Id. 

9

Id. ¶ 26. 

10 Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 
4

Andrews, Ronald E. F. Codd, Arthur W. Coviello, Jr., Adrian McDermott, Viral Patel, 

Enrique Salem, and Robert E. Switz (together, the “Director Defendants”). 

9. The Complaint asserts three causes of action. In Count I, Plaintiff seeks to 

void the Sale under 8 Del. C. § 271, arguing that the Sale was a “sale of all or substantially 

all” of Mandiant’s assets but that the Board failed to put it to a stockholder vote as required 

by Section 271.

11

 In Count II, Plaintiff claims that the Director Defendants breached their 

fiduciary duties by knowingly failing to obtain a stockholder vote as required by Section 

271. In Count III, Plaintiff claims that Mandia breached his fiduciary duties to the 

Company by trading on material, non-public information ahead of the Sale and by 

approving the Sale. On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff withdrew the portion of Count III alleging 

a breach of fiduciary duty through stock trading.

12

 As relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory 

judgment in her favor, an injunction compelling a stockholder vote on the Sale, and 

attorneys’ fees.13 

10. Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Court of 

Chancery Rules 12(b)(6) and 23.1.

14 The parties briefed the motion and the court heard 

oral argument on February 24, 2023.

15

 Because Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) arguments are 

dispositive, this Order does not reach the Rule 23.1 arguments.

11 Id. ¶¶ 39–48. 

12 See Dkt. 42 (“Pl.’s Answering Br.”) at 28 n.18. 

13 See Compl. at 16. 

14 See Dkt. 18. 

15 Dkts. 54, 55 (Feb. 25, 2023 Hr’g Tr.). 
5

11. Under Delaware law, the governing pleading standard to survive a motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is reasonable conceivability.16 When considering such a 

motion, the court must “accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the [c]omplaint as 

true . . . , draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and deny the motion unless 

the plaintiff could not recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances 

susceptible of proof.”17 The court need not, however, “accept conclusory allegations 

unsupported by specific facts or . . . draw unreasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”18

12. In Count I, Plaintiff claims that the Company breached Section 271, which 

requires a stockholder vote on any “[sale], lease or exchange all or substantially all of its 

property and assets, including its goodwill and its corporate franchises.”

19

 Defendants

argue that Count I fails to state a claim because the Sale did not constitute a sale of 

“substantially all” the Company’s assets under Section 271.

20

 

13. Under Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc.,

21 the court must evaluate “the 

quantitative and qualitative importance of the transaction at issue” to determine what 

16 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 537 (Del. 

2011).

17 Id. at 536 (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896–97 (Del. 2002)).

18 Price v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 26 A.3d 162, 166 (Del. 2011), overruled on 

other grounds by Ramsey v. Georgia S. Univ. Advanced Dev. Ctr., 189 A.3d 1255, 1277 

(Del. 2018) (citing Clinton v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009)).

19 8 Del. C. § 271(a). 

20 See Dkt. 18 (“Defs.’ Opening Br.”) at 16. 

21 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974); see also Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d 

342, 379 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citing Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 606); Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 
6

constitutes “substantially all” of a company’s assets for purposes of Section 271.22 The 

purpose of the Gimbel analysis is to determine whether the transaction “struck ‘at the heart 

of the corporate existence and purpose,’ in the sense that it involved the ‘destruction of the 

means to accomplish the purpose or objects for which the corporation was incorporated 

and actually performs.’”23

14. When evaluating quantitative metrics, no one factor is necessarily 

dispositive. Courts consider data points such as the revenue generated by the assets sold 

as a percentage of total company revenue, the percentage of book value of the sale, the 

contribution of the assets sold to the company’s overall EBITDA, and future earnings 

potential.24 “[T]he transaction must be viewed in terms of its overall effect on the 

corporation, and there is no necessary quantifying percentage.”25 

15. When evaluating qualitative metrics, the court focuses on “economic quality 

and, at most, on whether the transaction leaves the stockholders with an investment that in 

economic terms is qualitatively different than the one that they now possess.”26 For Section 

835, 843 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“The Supreme Court has long held that determination of whether 

there is a sale of substantially all assets so as to trigger [S]ection 271 depends upon the 

particular qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the transaction at issue.”). 

22 Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 379. 

23 Id. (quoting Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 606) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

24 See Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 379–82. 

25 Winston, 710 A.2d at 843. 

26 Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 384 (citing Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 606). 
7

271 to apply, the sale must be “out of the ordinary and substantially affect[] the existence 

and purpose of the corporation[.]”27

16. When considered quantitatively, the Sale does not satisfy the substantiallyall test. The Company’s public filings indicate total assets of approximately $3.245 billion 

as of December 2020 and $3.14 billion as of June 30, 2021.

28 The Sale, which was for 

$1.2 billion, is 37.5% and 38.2% of each figure, respectively.

29 These percentages fall short 

of the substantially-all threshold from a quantitative perspective.

30

 

17. When considered qualitatively, the Sale does not satisfy the substantially-all 

test. Although the FireEye Business was an important aspect of Mandiant, Plaintiff has not 

pled that it affects the “existence and purpose” of the Company.31 Mandiant was a

cybersecurity company before the Sale. It is a cybersecurity company after the Sale.

Although selling the FireEye Business may alter course in how the Company operates, the 

change is not qualitatively so significant as to “strike a blow” to Mandiant’s “heart.”32

27 Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 606. 

28 See Dkt. 18, Defs.’ Ex. 1 at 54 (December 20, 2020 Form 10-K reflecting approximately 

$3.245 billion at Year End 2020); see also Aug. 9 Form 10-Q at 4 (reflecting total asset 

value of approximately $3.14 billion). 

29 In briefing, Defendants cite web sources purporting to show a market capitalization of 

over $5.3 billion on June 1, 2021. See Defs.’ Opening Br. at 18, 18 n.8. On this basis, 

Defendants measure the $1.2 billion Sale as 23% of the Company’s overall value. The link

that Defendants cite, however, is no longer operational. For this and other reasons, the 

court does not rely upon this data for its decision. See id.

30 See Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 377 (“A fair and succinct equivalent to the term ‘substantially 

all’ would [] be ‘essentially everything.’”). 

31 See id. 

32 Id. at 385. 
8

Although the Sale was out of the ordinary, it does not satisfy the “substantially all” test 

from a qualitative perspective. 

18. Plaintiff’s position is that the Sale satisfies the substantially-all test because 

the FireEye Business accounted for 62% of Company revenue in 2019 and 57% in 2020.33 

Plaintiff cites four cases to support her position that these figures, when paired with

qualitative factors, are sufficient.34 All four cases are distinguishable. 

19. In the first case, Katz, the court determined that the transaction satisfied the 

substantially-all test based primarily on qualitative factors. Quantitatively, the business 

line at issue, steel drums, represented only 51% of its remaining assets, 44.9% of its sales 

revenue, and 52.4% of its pre-tax net operating income.

35 Qualitatively, however, the 

challenged transaction constituted an effort by the company to shift its overall business 

strategy by “embark[ing] on the manufacture of plastic drums” that “represent[ed] a radical 

departure from [the company’s] historically successful line of business, namely steel 

drums.”36

20. Katz is distinguishable because the transaction at issue in this case did not 

represent a stark departure from the Company’s historic line of business. The Company

was born from the fusion of FireEye with Old Mandiant, which focused on cybersecurity 

33 See Pl.’s Answering Br. at 24. 

34 See id. at 23 (citing Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1275–76 (Del. Ch. 1981); Thorpe

v. CERBCO, Inc., 1995 WL 478954, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1995); B.S.F. Co. v. Phila. 

Nat’l Bank, 204 A.2d 746, 750 (Del. 1964); Winston, 710 A.2d at 843). 

35 Katz, 431 A.2d at 1275. 

36 See id. at 1276. 
9

services. Mandiant had several businesses prior to the Sale, only one of which was the 

FireEye Business. The Sale was not qualitatively transformative for Mandiant.

21. In the next two cases, Thorpe and B.S.F., the court determined that the 

challenged transactions satisfied the substantially-all standard based on quantitative 

factors. In Thorpe, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this court’s holding that a 

pipeline services provider’s sale of a subsidiary pipeline services business satisfied the 

substantially-all test. The high court reasoned that the subsidiary accounted for 68% of the 

company’s overall assets and was the holding company’s “primary income generating 

asset[.]”37 The Court of Chancery had held that, if the assets at issue were removed, the 

holding company “would have been left with a substantial amount of cash, a small 

subsidiary that was about to be liquidated, and a single operating company . . . that was 

minimally profitable.”

38 In B.S.F., the asset sale falling under Section 271 constituted 75% 

of the company’s assets that were its “only substantial income [] producing asset[.]”39

22. Thorpe and B.S.F. are distinguishable because the quantitative metrics on 

which Plaintiff relies are much less compelling. Plaintiff rightly notes that the revenue 

metrics for the FireEye Business are close to the revenue metrics in Thorpe and B.S.F., but 

Plaintiff ignores that the percentage of overall assets attributable to the FireEye Business 

is far smaller. The FireEye Business constituted approximately 38% of the Company’s 

overall assets compared to 68% and 75% in Thorpe and B.S.F., respectively. Also, by 

37 676 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 1996). 

38 Thorpe, 1995 WL 478954, at *9. 

39 See B.S.F., 204 A.2d at 112. 
10

contrast to both Thorpe and B.S.F., Plaintiff has not pled facts indicating that Mandiant is 

unable to generate income in FireEye’s absence; indeed, the Company generated total 

revenues of approximately $121.97 million in the fiscal quarter following the Sale.

40

 

23. In the last case, Winston, the court held that it was reasonably conceivable 

that a sale satisfied the substantially-all standard based on qualitative and quantitative 

factors. There, the court interpreted a corporate certificate of designations entitling holders 

of preferred stock to convert their shares into a new security in the event the company 

disposed of substantially all of the company’s assets. The court looked to case law 

interpreting Section 271 for guidance concerning the substantially-all standard. The 

plaintiff alleged that, qualitatively, the sale shifted the company’s primary business from 

holding real property to holding real estate-related securities.41 The plaintiff alleged that, 

quantitatively, the assets sold were 60% of the company’s net assets.

42

 Based on these 

allegations, the court held that it was reasonably conceivable that the sale was for 

substantially all of the company’s assets.

43

24. Winston is distinguishable in two ways. For one, the company had shifted 

its “primary business” from “the ownership and management of real property” to “the 

40 See Defs.’ Opening Br., Ex. 25 at 37 (Form 10-Q for quarter ended September 30, 2021, 

describing Company revenues). The court may take judicial notice of this revenue figure. 

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312, 320 n.28 (Del. 2004). 

41 Winston, 710 A.2d at 843.

42 Id.

43 Id. 
11

holding of real estate[-]related securities and mortgages[.]”44 By contrast, as discussed 

above, the Company has not fundamentally changed its core practice in the cybersecurity 

space. Moreover, the plaintiff in Winston alleged that the assets at issue constituted 60% 

of the company’s net assets.45 Here, the FireEye Business indisputably constituted far less

(approximately 38%) of the Company’s net assets. 

25. Another decision of this court, Hollinger, supports dismissal. There, thenVice Chancellor Strine held that media company Hollinger International, Inc.’s sale of a 

major asset, the “Telegraph Group,” did not satisfy the substantially-all test of Section 

271.

46 The Telegraph Group was the “single most valuable asset” that the company 

possessed, accounting for approximately 56–57% of the company’s overall asset value.

47

 

Qualitatively, the court reasoned that even after the sale of the Telegraph Group, 

“stockholders will remain investors in a publication company with profitable operating 

assets, a well-regarded tabloid newspaper of good reputation and large circulation, a 

prestigious newspaper in Israel, and other valuable assets. While important, the sale of the 

Telegraph does not strike a blow to [the company’s] heart.”

48 The Vice Chancellor reached 

this conclusion even assuming “that the Telegraph Group is the single most valuable asset 

that [the company] possesses[.]”49 

44 Id. 

45 Id.

46 See Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 379. 

47 Id. at 379–80. 

48 Id. at 385. 

49 Id. at 379. 
12

26. Here, the court’s analysis is unchanged even crediting Plaintiff’s description 

of the FireEye Business as the crown jewel of the Company, much as the Hollinger court 

credited the plaintiff’s allegations concerning the Telegraph Group. Post-Sale, Company

investors are still left with an investment in a cybersecurity company, much as investors in 

Hollinger International, Inc. retained their investment in a global media company even after 

the sale of the Telegraph Group. The elimination of the FireEye Business is similarly 

“important,” but “does not strike a blow” to the Company’s heart.50

27. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Hollinger in several ways. First, Plaintiff

observes that Hollinger was decided not on the pleadings, but rather, on a preliminary 

injunction record and thus with the benefit of fact discovery.51 But the factual record did 

not drive the outcome of Hollinger, which was resolved as a matter of law. Second, 

Plaintiff views Hollinger as an outlier relative to the four cases on which Plaintiff relies.

52

 

But for reasons already discussed, those cases are distinguishable. Third, Plaintiff argues 

that the presence of strong qualitative factors weighing in her favor distinguishes Hollinger, 

which—unlike here—was not a close call on the qualitative dimension of the Gimbel test.53

But the qualitative analysis does not weigh in Plaintiff’s favor, as discussed above. The

FireEye Business was one part of the Company’s corporate identity, but the Complaint does 

50 Id. at 385. 

51 See Pl.’s Answering Br. at 24–25. 

52 See id. at 25. 

53 See id.
13

not support a reasonable inference that the FireEye Business was the “heart” of the 

Company’s existence and purpose.54 

28. Under the circumstances, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the Sale 

triggered the voting requirement of Section 271. Count I is dismissed. 

29. In Count II, Plaintiff claims that the Director Defendants breached their 

fiduciary duties by approving the Sale without obtaining stockholder approval as required 

by Section 271. Invoking the Company’s exculpatory charter provision adopted pursuant 

to 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) and In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litigation,

55

the Director Defendants argue for dismissal of Count II on the basis that Plaintiff was 

required, but failed, to plead that they acted in bad faith when approving the Sale.

56

 

30. Because the Sale did not violate Section 271, Plaintiff’s voting rights were 

not breached. Therefore, it is not reasonably conceivable that the Director Defendants

acted in bad faith by failing to submit the Sale to a vote. Furthermore, Plaintiff has alleged 

no defect in the Sale process itself that would suggest bad faith. Accordingly, Count II is 

dismissed. 

31. In Count III, Plaintiff seems to assert a claim for breach of the duty or loyalty 

or waste against Mandia in connection with the Sale, although Count III is not clearly pled

as such.57 Plaintiff argues that Mandia used the Sale to transform the Company into a 

54 Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 606. 

55 115 A.3d 1173 (Del. 2015). 

56 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 30–39. 

57 See Compl. ¶¶ 54–60. 
14

vanity project. By pruning out the influence of the FireEye Business, Plaintiff alleges that 

Mandia turned the Company into something approximating what he originally founded.

58

 

Plaintiff argues that Mandia did so for his own ego rather than for the benefit of the 

Company. 

32. This decision need not dilate extensively on the standard for pleading the 

claims at issue in Count III, because Plaintiff’s vanity-project theory is wholly conclusory. 

It would take a lot of work to list all the allegations relevant to such a claim that are missing

from the Complaint. Suffice it to say, Count III falls way short. It is therefore dismissed. 

33. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in its 

entirety. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants. 

/s/ Kathaleen St. J. McCormick 

Chancellor Kathaleen St. J. McCormick

Dated: May 22, 2023

58 See Pl.’s Answering Br. at 6 (describing the Sale as a way for Mandia to “return the 

Company to his original vision for Old Mandiant”).