UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-5139

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DIANGELLO DARNELLE STRONG,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00095-WO-1)

Submitted: July 14, 2011 Decided: August 11, 2011

Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James E. Quander, Jr., QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, 

North Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Diangello Darnelle Strong pleaded guilty, pursuant to 

a plea agreement, to one count of possession of ammunition by a 

convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) 

(2006). The district court sentenced Strong to 188 months in 

prison followed by five years of supervised release, and imposed 

a $100 special assessment. We affirm.

On appeal, Strong’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he states 

that he could find no meritorious issues for appeal. Counsel 

seeks our review of the reasonableness of Strong’s sentence. 

Strong filed a pro se supplemental brief raising several 

additional grounds for appeal. Strong also moved for 

appointment of additional appellate counsel.

We review Strong’s sentence for reasonableness under a 

deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this review 

requires us to inspect for procedural reasonableness by ensuring 

that the district court committed no significant procedural 

errors, such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating 

the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the 

sentence. United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837-38 (4th 

Cir. 2010). We then consider the substantive reasonableness of 
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the sentence imposed, taking into account the totality of the 

circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

Strong’s sentence fell within the Sentencing 

Guidelines advisory range. We presume a sentence within a 

properly-calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. United 

States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007). Our review 

of the record reveals nothing indicative of an abuse of 

discretion by the district court in imposing Strong’s sentence.

We have assessed the further grounds for appeal set 

forth by Strong in his pro se brief and find them wholly lacking 

in merit. We lend only abbreviated comment to each. Strong has 

no cognizable speedy trial claim because he pleaded guilty 

within seventy days of his initial court appearance. Strong has 

no cognizable double jeopardy claim because the use of criminal 

activity that is not part of the current conviction to determine 

the appropriate punishment for the current conviction is not 

punishment that implicates double jeopardy. United States v. 

McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1039 (4th Cir. 1996). Strong has no 

meritorious disparate sentencing claim because his sentence was 

only eight months longer than the fifteen-year statutory 

mandatory minimum sentence. Strong has no cognizable cruel and 

unusual punishment claim because proportionality review under 

the cruel and unusual punishment clause is not available for any 

sentence less than life imprisonment without the possibility of 
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parole. United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166, 180 (4th Cir. 

2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm Strong’s conviction and sentence. We deny 

Strong’s motion for appointment of additional appellate counsel.

This court requires that counsel inform Strong, in 

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If Strong requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Strong.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED