J-S33036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHARLES DALLAS D GREEN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2069 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0002204-2019

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2022

Charles Dallas D Green (“Green”) appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to third-degree murder, robbery, 

and possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”).

1

 We affirm.

On the morning of March 7, 2019, Green and Michael Warren (“Warren”) 

got into a fight at a subway station. During the altercation, Green chased and

fatally stabbed Warren. Police arrested Green shortly after the stabbing, and 

he later gave statements admitting that he and Warren had fought over 

money that Warren owed him. Green entered open guilty pleas to the abovementioned offenses, and on September 8, 2021, the trial court sentenced him 

to eighteen and one-half to thirty-seven years of incarceration for third-degree 

murder, a consecutive nine and one-half to nineteen years of incarceration for 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 3701(a)(1)(i), 907(a). 
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robbery, and no further penalty for PIC.2 Green did not file a post-sentence 

motion,

3 but timely appealed. Both he and the trial court complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Green raises the following issue on appeal:

Whether the court’s sentencing was inconsistent with the 

Sentencing Code[,] 42 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 9721(b) and/or contrary to 

the fundamental norms which buttress the sentencing process? 

Green’s Brief at 5. 

Green’s issue presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence does not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. See Commonwealth v. Moury, 

992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Rather, such a challenge must be 

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2 Green’s prior record score was “RFEL” and the sentences for robbery and 

third-degree murder were on the low-end of the standard range minimum 

sentences called for by the deadly weapon used matrix. See Commonwealth’s 

Sentencing Memorandum, 9/1/21, at 3. 

3 Green apparently filed a document five days after sentencing, and the trial 

court regarded that document as a post-sentence motion. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/24/22, at 3. However, the document appears to be a copy of a

pre-sentencing memorandum because it was dated September 7, 2021, one 

day before sentencing, and contained a recommended sentence without 

stating the sentence imposed by the trial court. See Memorandum of Law, 

filed 9/13/21, at 1-2. Green’s counsel, who had signed the memorandum of 

law and filed the appeal, did not reference a post-sentence motion. Rather, 

Green’s counsel suggests that after sentencing, Green filed the document of 

law pro se, see Green’s Brief at 7, which would render the filing a legal nullity. 

See Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(noting that we “will not accept a pro se motion while an appellant is 

represented by counsel; indeed, pro se motions have no legal effect and, 

therefore, are legal nullities”) (internal citation omitted). Under these 

circumstances, we conclude that Green did not timely file a post-sentence 

motion. 
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considered a petition for permission to appeal. See Commonwealth v. 

Christman, 225 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2019). Before reaching the 

merits of a discretionary sentencing issue,

[w]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question 

that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (internal citation and brackets omitted). The failure 

to object to a sentence at the hearing or in a post-sentence motion waives a 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth 

v. Padilla-Vargas, 204 A.3d 971, 975-76 (Pa. Super. 2019). Further, if the 

appellant fails to include a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief, and the 

Commonwealth objects, this Court cannot review the issue. See 

Commonwealth v. Dawson, 132 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Following our review, we conclude that Green waived his issue 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Green did not file a 

proper post-sentence motion preserving his claims. See Padilla-Vargas, 204 

A.3d at 975-76; see also footnote 2, supra. Moreover, Green’s brief does not 

contain a separate Rule 2119(f) statement, and the Commonwealth has 

objected to this omission. See Dawson, 132 A.3d at 1005; see also

Commonwealth’s Brief at 5. Accordingly, as we are precluded from reviewing 
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the merits of Green’s sole issue in this appeal, we affirm the judgment of 

sentence. See Dawson, 132 A.3d at 1005.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/2022