Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 229 / Friday, November 27, 2020 / Notices 76159 

1These numbers include the approximately 5.9 

million GMT900 vehicles and associated passenger 

inflators addressed by this decision. 

2 Globally, including the United States, the deaths 

of at least 30 people are attributable to these 

rupturing Takata inflators. 

3The May 2015 Consent Order is available at: 

https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/ 

documents/consent-order-takata-05182015_0.pdf. 

4Recall Nos. 15E–040, 15E–041, 15E–042, and 

15E–043. 

5The twelve vehicle manufacturers affected by 

the May 2015 recalls were: BMW of North America, 

LLC; FCA US, LLC (formerly Chrysler); Daimler 

Trucks North America, LLC; Daimler Vans USA, 

LLC; Ford Motor Company; General Motors, LLC; 

American Honda Motor Company; Mazda North 

American Operations; Mitsubishi Motors North 

America, Inc.; Nissan North America, Inc.; Subaru 

of America, Inc.; and Toyota Motor Engineering and 

Manufacturing. 

departing pipelines. Each pipeline will 

depart the fixed offshore platform, 

carrying the crude oil to a Pipeline End 

Manifold (PLEM) in approximately 104 

feet water depth located 1.25 nautical 

miles from the fixed offshore platform. 

Each PLEM is then connected through 

two 24-inch hoses to a Single Point 

Mooring (SPM) Buoy. Two 24-inch 

floating loading hoses will connect the 

SPM Buoy to the VLCC or other crude 

oil carrier. SPM Buoy 1 is in Outer 

Continental Shelf Galveston Area Lease 

Block GA–423 and SPM Buoy 2 is in 

Outer Continental Shelf Galveston Area 

Lease Block GA A 36. 

The GulfLink deepwater port onshore 

storage and supply components would 

consist of the following: 

• An Onshore Storage Terminal: The 

proposed GulfLink Jones Creek 

Terminal would be located in Brazoria 

County, Texas, on approximately 262 

acres of land, consisting of eight above 

ground storage tanks, each with a 

working storage capacity of 708,168 

barrels, for a total onshore storage 

capacity of approximately 6 million 

barrels. The facility can accommodate 

four (4) additional tanks, bringing the 

total to twelve tanks or up to 8.0 million 

barrels of working capacity. 

• The GulfLink Jones Creek Terminal 

also would include: Six electric-driven 

mainline crude oil pumps; three electric 

driven booster crude oil pumps; one 

crude oil pipeline pig launcher; one 

crude oil pipeline pig receiver; two 

measurement skids for measuring 

incoming crude oil—one skid located on 

the Department of Energy’s Bryan 

Mound facility, and one skid installed 

for the outgoing crude oil barrels leaving 

the tank storage to be loaded on the 

VLCC; and ancillary facilities to include 

an operations control center, electrical 

substation, offices, and warehouse 

building. 

• Two crude oil pipelines would be 

constructed onshore to support the 

GulfLink deepwater port and include 

the following items: 

Æ One proposed incoming 9.7 statute 

mile 36-inch outside diameter pipeline 

connected to a leased 40-inch 

ExxonMobil pipeline originating at the 

Department of Energy (DOE) facility in 

Bryan Mound with connectivity to the 

Houston market. 

Æ One proposed outgoing 12.7 statute 

mile 42-inch outside diameter 

connection from the GulfLink Jones 

Creek Terminal to the shore crossing 

where this becomes the pipeline 

supplying the proposed offshore 

GulfLink deepwater port. 

Privacy Act 

Anyone can search the electronic 

form of all comments received into any 

of our dockets by the name of the 

individual submitting the comment (or 

signing the comment, if submitted on 

behalf of an association, business, labor 

union, etc.). You may review DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement in the 

Federal Register published on April 11, 

2000 (65 FR 19477–78), or you may visit 

http://dms.dot.gov. 

(Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1501 et seq., 49 CFR 

1.93(h)). 

* * * * * 

Dated: November 18, 2020. 

By Order of the Maritime Administrator. 

T. Mitchell Hudson, Jr., 

Secretary, Maritime Administration. 

[FR Doc. 2020–25843 Filed 11–25–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–81–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2016–0124; Notice of 

Agency Decision] 

General Motors LLC, Denial of 

Consolidated Petition for Decision of 

Inconsequential Defect 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation. 

ACTION: Denial of consolidated petition. 

SUMMARY: TK Holdings Inc. (‘‘Takata’’) 

has filed defect information reports 

(DIRs), in which it determined that a 

defect exists in certain passenger-side 

frontal air bag inflators that it 

manufactured, including passenger-side 

inflators that it supplied to General 

Motors, LLC (GM) for use in certain 

GMT900 vehicles. GM petitioned 

NHTSA for a decision that, because of 

differences in inflator design and 

vehicle integration, the equipment 

defect determined to exist by Takata is 

inconsequential as it relates to motor 

vehicle safety in GM’s GMT900 

vehicles, and that GM should therefore 

be relieved of its notification and 

remedy obligations under the National 

Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 

1966 and its applicable regulations. 

After reviewing GM’s consolidated 

petition, supporting materials, and 

public comments, NHTSA has 

concluded that GM has not met its 

burden of establishing that the defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety, 

and denies the petition. 

ADDRESSES: For further information on 

this decision contact Stephen Hench, 

Office of Chief Counsel, National 

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, W41–326, 

Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202– 

366–5263). 

For general information regarding 

NHTSA’s investigation into Takata air 

bag inflator ruptures and the related 

recalls: www.nhtsa.gov/takata. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background 

The Takata air bag inflator recalls 

(‘‘Takata recalls’’) are the largest and 

most complex vehicle recalls in U.S. 

history. These recalls currently involve 

19 vehicle manufacturers and over 60 

million Takata air bag inflators in tens 

of millions of vehicles in the United 

States alone.1 The recalls are due to a 

design defect, whereby the propellant 

used in Takata’s air bag inflators 

degrades after long-term exposure to 

high humidity and temperature cycling. 

During air bag deployment, this 

propellant degradation can cause the 

inflator to over-pressurize, causing 

sharp metal fragments (like shrapnel) to 

penetrate the air bag and enter the 

vehicle compartment. To date, these 

rupturing Takata inflators have resulted 

in the deaths of 18 people across the 

United States 2 and hundreds of injuries, 

including lacerations and other serious 

consequences to occupants’ face, neck, 

and chest areas. 

In May 2015, NHTSA issued, and 

Takata agreed to, a Consent Order,3 and 

Takata filed four defect information 

reports (‘‘DIRs’’) 4 for inflators installed 

in vehicles manufactured by twelve 5

vehicle manufacturers. Recognizing that 

these unprecedented recalls would 

involve many challenges for vehicle 

manufacturers and consumers, NHTSA 

began an administrative proceeding in 

June 2015 providing public notice and 

seeking comment (Docket Number 

NHTSA–2015–0055) that culminated in 

NHTSA’s establishment of a 


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6See Notice of Coordinated Remedy Program 

Proceeding for the Replacement of Certain Takata 

Air Bag Inflators, 80 FR 32197 (June 5, 2015). 

The Coordinated Remedy Order, which 

established the Coordinated Remedy, is available at: 

https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/ 

documents/nhtsa-coordinatedremedyordertakata.pdf. The Third Amendment to the 

Coordinated Remedy Order incorporated additional 

vehicle manufacturers, that were not affected by the 

recalls at the time NHTSA issued the CRO into the 

Coordinated Remedy, and is available at: https://

www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/ 

documents/final_public_-_third_amendment_to_

the_coordinated_remedy_order_with_annex_acorrected_12.16.16.pdf. The additional affected 

vehicle manufacturers are: Ferrari North America, 

Inc.; Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC; 

McLaren Automotive, Ltd.; Mercedes-Benz US, 

LCC; Tesla Motors, Inc.; Volkswagen Group of 

America, Inc.; and, per Memorandum of 

Understanding dated September 16, 2016, Karma 

Automotive on behalf of certain Fisker vehicles. 

7See Coordinated Remedy Order at 15–18, Annex 

A; Third Amendment to the Coordinated Remedy 

Order at 14–17. These documents, among other 

documents related to the Takata recalls discussed 

herein, are available on NHTSA’s website at http:// 

www.nhtsa.gov/takata. 

8Zone A comprises the following U.S. states and 

jurisdictions: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, 

Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, 

Texas, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the 

Northern Mariana Islands (Saipan), and the U.S. 

Virgin Islands. Amendment to November 3, 2015 

Consent Order at ¶ 7.a. 

9Zone B comprises the following U.S. states and 

jurisdictions: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, District 

of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 

Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, 

New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, 

Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and West 

Virginia. Amendment to November 3, 2015 Consent 

Order at ¶ 7.b. 

10Zone C comprises the following U.S. states and 

jurisdictions: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, 

Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 

Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North 

Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, 

Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 

Amendment to November 3, 2015 Consent Order at 

¶ 7.c. 

11NHTSA has permitted Takata to file within a 

few days of these deadlines to account for 

weekends and holidays. 

12See Recall Nos. 16E–042, 16E–043, and 16E– 

044. 

13See 49 CFR part 573; ACO at ¶ 16; Third 

Amendment to Coordinated Remedy Order at ¶ 32. 

14First Petition at 18. 

15 81 FR 85681 (Nov. 28, 2016). 

16 49 CFR 556.4(c). 

17OATK was subsequently purchased by 

Northrop Grumman. For simplicity and continuity 

across NHTSA’s documents regarding the Takata 

inflator recalls and Coordinated Remedy, NHTSA 

will continue to refer to the company as OATK. 

18 GM also retained Professor Arnold Barnett, the 

George Eastman Professor of Management Science 

and Professor of Statistics at the Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology, who worked with 

Cornerstone Research, to provide GM’s statistical 

assessment. 

19 Docket no. NHTSA–2016–0124 can be accessed 

at https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=NHTSA2016-0124. Note that limited materials, including 

Coordinated Remedy Program 

(‘‘Coordinated Remedy’’) in November 

2015.6 The Coordinated Remedy 

prioritizes and phases the various 

Takata recalls to not only accelerate the 

repairs, but also—given the large 

number of affected vehicles—to ensure 

that repair parts are available to fix the 

highest-risk vehicles first.7

Under the Coordinated Remedy, 

vehicles are prioritized for repair parts 

based on various factors relevant to the 

safety risk—primarily on vehicle model 

year (MY), as a proxy for inflator age, 

and geographic region. In the early 

stages of the Takata inflator recalls, 

affected vehicles were categorized as 

belonging to one of two regions: The 

High Absolute Humidity (‘‘HAH’’) 

region (largely inclusive of Gulf Coast 

states and tropical island states and 

territories), or the non-HAH region 

(inclusive of the remaining states and 

the District of Columbia). On May 4, 

2016, NHTSA issued, and Takata agreed 

to, an amendment to the November 3, 

2015 Consent Order (‘‘ACO’’), wherein 

these geographic regions were refined 

based on improved understanding of the 

risk, and were then categorized as Zones 

A, B, and C. Zone A encompasses the 

higher risk HAH region as well as 

certain other states,8 Zone B includes 

states with more moderate climates (i.e., 

lower heat and humidity than Zone A),9

and Zone C includes the coolertemperature states largely located in the 

northern part of the country.10

The ACO also required Takata to 

declare on a rolling basis a defect in all 

frontal driver and passenger-side air bag 

inflators that contain a phase-stabilized 

ammonium nitrate (‘‘PSAN’’)-based 

propellant without a moisture-absorbing 

desiccant. The first DIR was due on May 

16, 2016; the second on December 31, 

2016; the third on December 31, 2017; 

the fourth on December 31, 2018; and 

the fifth on December 31, 2019.11

GM’s May 27, 2016 DIRs and First 

Petition 

Takata timely submitted the first 

scheduled equipment DIRs on May 16, 

2016.12 Those DIRs included nondesiccated passenger inflators, 

designated as SPI YP (‘‘YP’’) and PSPI– 

L YD (‘‘YD’’) variants, that were 

installed as original equipment on 

certain GMT900 motor vehicles 

manufactured by GM, as well as other 

non-desiccated passenger inflators 

installed as original equipment on 

motor vehicles manufactured by GM 

that are not at issue here. The Takata 

filing triggered GM’s obligation to file a 

DIR for the affected GM vehicles.13 GM 

submitted two DIRs on May 27, 2016. 

On November 15, 2016, GM submitted 

a Petition for Inconsequentiality and 

Request for Deferral of Determination 

Regarding Certain GMT900 Vehicles 

Equipped with Takata ‘‘SPI YP’’ and 

‘‘PSPI–L YD’’ Passenger Inflators (the 

‘‘First Petition for Inconsequentiality’’ 

or ‘‘First Petition’’), pursuant to 49 

U.S.C. 30118(d), 30120(h) and 49 CFR 

part 556. In the First Petition, GM 

requested that NHTSA defer its decision 

on inconsequentiality until GM was able 

to complete its testing and engineering 

analysis in August 2017.14

On November 28, 2016, the Agency 

published a notice of receipt of the First 

Petition in the Federal Register and 

granted two administrative requests.15

First, as a matter of its enforcement 

discretion, NHTSA accepted the First 

Petition even though it was filed outside 

the regulatory thirty-day filing 

deadline.16 Second, based on unique 

facts and circumstances, NHTSA 

granted GM’s request for additional time 

to conduct research and submit 

information to the Agency, and allowed 

GM until August 31, 2017 to develop 

and present further evidence, data, and 

information before issuing a decision on 

the First Petition. NHTSA opened 

public docket no. NHTSA–2016–0124 as 

a repository for the Petition and 

supporting materials, and to receive 

public comments until September 14, 

2017. 

NHTSA further required that GM 

submit monthly testing updates. GM 

submitted such updates for December 

2016 and January through July 2017, 

and a comprehensive submission in 

August 2017 that included testing, 

statistical analysis, and other 

information. GM also presented 

technical briefings to NHTSA on August 

16, 2017 and August 23, 2017. On 

September 15, 2017, NHTSA sent 

follow-up questions to GM seeking 

clarification of information GM had 

provided, and GM submitted responses 

on September 29, 2017 (‘‘GM’s 

September 2017 Response’’). GM 

continued providing additional updates 

to NHTSA at meetings on February 12, 

April 9, and June 8, 2018. NHTSA sent 

GM additional follow-up questions to 

the June 8 meeting on July 10, 2018, and 

GM submitted responses to those 

questions on July 20, 2018 (‘‘GM’s July 

2018 Response’’). 

GM submitted voluminous materials 

to the Agency over the course of about 

two years, including materials from 

Orbital-ATK (‘‘OATK’’) 17 and 

Cornerstone Research 

(‘‘Cornerstone’’).18 To apprise the public 

of this information—which the Agency 

was considering in rendering the instant 

decision—the Agency regularly posted 

GM’s materials on public docket no. 

NHTSA–2016–0124.19 The Agency 


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materials subject to requests for confidential 

treatment, are included in the docket via 

incorporation by memo. 

20See Recall Nos. 17E–001, 17E–002, and 17E– 

003. 

21See 49 CFR part 573; ACO at ¶ 16; Third 

Amendment to Coordinated Remedy Order at ¶ 32. 

22 82 FR 42718 (Sept. 11, 2017). GM also filed a 

Supplemental Brief in Support of Petitions for 

Inconsequentiality Regarding Certain GMT900 

Vehicles following submission of the Second 

Petition, which is also available in the public 

docket. 

23See Recall Nos. 18E–001, 18E–002, and 18E– 

003. 

24See 49 CFR part 573; ACO at ¶ 16; Third 

Amendment to Coordinated Remedy Order at ¶ 32. 

25 83 FR 15233 (Apr. 9, 2018). 

26Recall Nos. 19E–001, 19E–002, and 19E–003. 

27See 49 CFR part 573; ACO at ¶ 16; Third 

Amendment to Coordinated Remedy Order at ¶ 32. 

28 83 FR 15233 (June 18, 2019). 

29Fourth Petition at 2. Based on information 

provided to NHTSA by GM, the precise number of 

vehicles under petition is 5,888,421. 30See id. at 11–12. 

further offered the opportunity for 

public comment, and comments were 

both received and considered. 

GM’s January 10, 2017 DIRs and Second 

Petition 

On January 3, 2017, Takata timely 

submitted the second scheduled 

equipment DIRs.20 The Takata filing 

triggered GM’s obligation to file a DIR 

for the affected GM vehicles,21 and GM 

submitted DIRs on January 10, 2017 

recalling additional GMT900 vehicles as 

well as other vehicles containing nondesiccated PSAN inflators supplied to 

GM that are not at issue here. GM 

notified NHTSA of its intention to file 

a petition for an exemption from its 

recall notification and remedy 

obligations as to the GMT900 vehicles 

only, and submitted a Petition for 

Inconsequentiality and Request for 

Deferral of Determination Regarding 

Certain GMT900 Vehicles Equipped 

with Takata ‘‘SPI YP’’ and ‘‘PSPI–L YD’’ 

Passenger Inflators Subject to January 

2017 Takata Equipment DIR Filings (the 

‘‘Second Petition for 

Inconsequentiality’’ or ‘‘Second 

Petition’’). On September 11, 2017, the 

Agency published a notice of receipt of 

the Second Petition and consolidated 

the First Petition with the Second 

Petition in Docket No. NHTSA–2016– 

0124.22

GM’s January 9, 2018 DIRs and Third 

Petition 

Takata timely submitted the third 

scheduled equipment DIRs on January 

2, 2018.23 The Takata filing triggered 

GM’s obligation to file a DIR for the 

affected GM vehicles,24 and GM 

submitted DIRs on January 9, 2018 

recalling additional GMT900 vehicles as 

well as other vehicles containing nondesiccated PSAN inflators supplied to 

GM not at issue here. GM notified 

NHTSA of its intention to file a petition 

for an exemption from its recall 

notification and remedy obligations as 

to the GMT900 vehicles only, and 

submitted a Petition for 

Inconsequentiality Regarding Certain 

GMT900 Vehicles Equipped with Takata 

‘‘SPI YP’’ and ‘‘PSPI–L YD’’ Passenger 

Inflators Subject to January 2018 Takata 

Equipment DIR Filings (the ‘‘Third 

Petition for Inconsequentiality’’ or 

‘‘Third Petition’’). On April 9, 2018, the 

Agency published a notice of receipt of 

the Third Petition and consolidated the 

Third Petition with the previously 

consolidated First and Second 

Petitions.25 NHTSA also reopened the 

public docket to take additional 

comment on GM’s Petition and 

supporting materials. The closing date 

for the re-opened comment period was 

May 9, 2018. 

GM’s January 9, 2019 DIRs and Fourth 

Petition 

Takata timely submitted the fourth 

scheduled equipment DIRs on January 

2, 2019.26 The Takata filing triggered 

GM’s obligation to file a DIR for the 

affected GM vehicles,27 and GM 

submitted DIRs on January 9, 2019 

recalling additional GMT900 vehicles as 

well as other vehicles containing nondesiccated PSAN inflators supplied to 

GM that are not at issue here. GM 

notified NHTSA of its intention to file 

a petition for an exemption from its 

recall notification and remedy 

obligations as to the GMT900 vehicles 

only, and submitted a Petition for 

Inconsequentiality Regarding Certain 

GMT900 Vehicles Equipped with Takata 

‘‘SPI YP’’ and ‘‘PSPI–L YD’’ Passenger 

Inflators Subject to January 2019 Takata 

Equipment DIR Filings (the ‘‘Fourth 

Petition for Inconsequentiality’’ or 

‘‘Fourth Petition’’). On June 18, 2019, 

the Agency published notice of the 

Fourth Petition and consolidated it with 

the previously consolidated Petitions 

(collectively referred to as ‘‘the Petition’’ 

or ‘‘GM’s Petition’’).28 NHTSA also 

reopened the public docket to take 

additional comment on GM’s Petition 

and supporting materials. The closing 

date for the re-opened comment period 

was July 18, 2019. 

Public Comments on GM’s Petition 

NHTSA opened public docket number 

NHTSA–2016–0124 to provide the 

public an opportunity to review the data 

and information GM submitted in 

support of the Petition. NHTSA has 

taken into consideration all comments 

posted to the docket as of November 19, 

2020. 

As of that date, 302 comments have 

been posted to the docket. No comments 

were filed in support of granting the 

Petition, and few address technical 

aspects of GM’s Petition or data. Many 

comments referred either to concerns 

with selling unrepaired vehicles, or to 

the economic hardship or disadvantage 

experienced as a result of diminished 

resale or trade-in value for vehicles with 

unrepaired inflators. Many commenters 

also expressed general concern about 

the air bags in their GMT900 vehicles. 

Since NHTSA concludes here that GM’s 

Petition should be denied, those 

comments are not discussed here. 

II. Motor Vehicles Involved 

GM’s Petition involves certain 

‘‘GMT900’’ vehicles that contain ‘‘SPI 

YP’’ and ‘‘PSPI–L YD’’ inflator variants. 

GMT900 is a GM-specific vehicle 

platform that forms the structural 

foundation for a variety of GM light- and 

heavy-duty pickup trucks and sport 

utility vehicles, including: Chevrolet 

Silverado 1500, GMC Sierra 1500, 

Chevrolet Silverado 2500/3500, GMC 

Sierra 2500/3500, Chevrolet Tahoe, 

Chevrolet Suburban, Chevrolet 

Avalanche, GMC Yukon, GMC Yukon 

XL, Cadillac Escalade, Cadillac Escalade 

ESV, and Cadillac Escalade EXT. The 

Petition involves approximately 5.9 

million MY 2007–2014 GMT900 

vehicles in Zones A, B, and C.29

III. Summary of GM’s Petition and 

Supporting Information 

GM has petitioned the Agency for a 

decision that the Takata PSAN defect in 

the GMT900 vehicles is inconsequential 

as it relates to motor vehicle safety, and 

that GM should therefore be relieved of 

its notification and remedy obligations. 

GM asserts two primary arguments for 

why the defect should be deemed 

inconsequential in GMT900 vehicles. 

First, GM asserts that there are multiple 

‘‘unique’’ design differences in the YD 

and YP variant inflators used in 

GMT900 vehicles that result in a 

reduced risk of rupture. Second, GM 

argues that the physical environment in 

GMT900 vehicles ‘‘better protects the 

front-passenger inflator from the 

extreme temperature cycling that can 

cause inflator rupture.’’ 30 GM’s primary 

arguments and supporting information 

are summarized below. 

A. Unique Inflator Design Differences 

and Vehicle Features 

GM claims that the YD and YP variant 

inflators in GMT900 vehicles are not 

used by any other vehicle manufacturers 

and that these inflator variants have a 


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31See id. at 12; Second Petition at 11–12; Third 

Petition at 5–8; Fourth Petition at 5–7. 

32Fourth Petition at 6; see Third Petition at 6. 

GM’s Third Petition asserts that strict adherence to 

the United States Council for Automotive Research 

(‘‘USCAR’’) air bag performance standards ‘‘resulted 

in [GM] inflators with increased inflator-structural 

integrity, better ballistic performance, and greater 

resistance to moisture.’’ Third Petition at 6. NHTSA 

notes that USCAR standards are utilized across the 

industry and adherence to those standards is not 

particular to the GMT900 inflators at issue. 

In all events, for the reasons discussed here, GM 

has failed to meet its burden to show that the defect 

at issue here is inconsequential to motor vehicle 

safety. 

33Fourth Petition at 6–7; see Third Petition at 6. 

34See Third Petition at 6; Fourth Petition at 6– 

7. 

35See Fourth Petition at 7. 

36See id. 

37 Id. 

38See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 126; 

GM’s August 23, 2017 Presentation at 111, 113; 

GM’s April 5, 2017 Presentation at 84. 

39Fourth Petition at 7; Second Petition at 11–12; 

First Petition at 12; Third Petition at 7. 

40See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 4, 32. 

This contention is based on 35 years of artificial 

aging (worst-case field exposure in Miami, Florida) 

of newly manufactured inflators, described infra. 

Id. 

41Fourth Petition at 12–13; Third Petition at 13. 

GM’s Third Petition cites 1,620 YD and 2,235 YP 

inflators and a ‘‘vast majority’’ coming from Zone 

A GMT900 vehicles, while GM’s Fourth Petition 

cites 1,197 YD and 2,249 YP inflators and a 

‘‘majority’’ coming from Zone A GMT900 vehicles. 

42Fourth Petition at 12; Third Petition at 13. 

43 GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 37; GM’s 

April 5, 2017 Presentation at 60–64, 70; see Exhibit 

A, Report of Dr. Harold Blomquist (‘‘2020 

Blomquist Report’’) at paras. 88, 221 & n.120. 

44Second Petition at 15–16; see also First Petition 

at 15–16. 

45Second Petition at 16; First Petition at 16. 

46See Second Petition, Exs. B & C; First Petition, 

Exs. B &C. 

47First Petition at 3; see Second Petition at 15– 

17. 

48Fourth Petition at 12; see GM’s June 8, 2018 

Presentation at 36. The 66,894 figure is referenced 

in GM’s Fourth Petition, while GM’s June 8, 2018 

Presentation references 68,206 deployments. 

49Fourth Petition at 12. 

50See First Petition at 3, 14–15; Fourth Petition 

at 13–16; GM’s August 23, 2017 Presentation at 94– 

97; GM’s April 5, 2017 Presentation at 80–82. 

51See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 11, 14. 

52See GM’s August 23, 2017 Presentation at 171. 

number of unique design features that 

result in a reduced risk of inflator 

rupture.31 GM contends that these 

unique design features are ‘‘crucially’’ 

important factors that required Takata to 

‘‘heavily modify the characteristics’’ of 

their inflators in order to meet GM’s 

standards.32 As noted in GM’s petitions 

and information presented to NHTSA, 

these alleged design differences include 

the following: 

Thinner Propellant Wafers. GM 

claims that the thinner (8mm) 

propellant wafers used in the GMT900 

inflators have more predictable ballistic 

properties than thicker (11mm) wafers 

used in many other Takata PSAN 

inflator variants, which ‘‘create less 

excess surface area as they degrade.’’ 33

As a result, GM contends that the 

thinner propellant wafers used in the 

GMT900 vehicles age more slowly and 

burn more efficiently than thicker 

propellant wafers, resulting in a reduced 

risk of inflator rupture.34

Larger Vent Area. GM claims that a 

greater vent-area-to-propellant-mass 

ratio provides for more efficient burning 

and deployment of the GMT900 

inflators, resulting in a reduced risk of 

inflator rupture.35

Steel Endcap. GM claims that the steel 

endcap used on the GMT900 inflators 

creates an improved hermetic seal 

compared to the aluminum endcaps 

used on other Takata PSAN inflators, 

and therefore better protects the 

propellant from moisture.36 GM also 

claims that the use of steel endcaps 

improves the inflators’ ‘‘resistance to 

high-internal pressures.’’ 37

Other Design Differences. GM 

observed several other design 

differences in its presentations to 

NHTSA, including tablets in a cup (for 

YP variants), the incorporation of a 

ceramic cushion (also for YP variants), 

and the incorporation of a bulkhead 

disk with an anvil (for YD variants).38

While noted and discussed during 

presentations, these design differences 

were not explicitly referenced or 

otherwise significantly expounded upon 

in GM’s Petition documents. 

GM also asserts that the physical 

environment in GMT900 vehicles better 

protects the front-passenger inflators 

from extreme temperature cycling that 

can cause inflator rupture. GM claims 

that the GMT900 vehicles have larger 

cabin volumes than other vehicles 

equipped with Takata PSAN inflators, 

and are all equipped with solarabsorbing glass windshields and side 

glass, which results in lower internal 

vehicle temperatures and thus a reduced 

risk of inflator rupture.39

B. Additional Supporting Data and 

Information 

GM contends that the passenger 

inflators at issue are currently 

performing as designed, and will 

continue to function properly without 

risk of rupture for at least 30 to 35 years 

of service in the field.40 In support of 

this argument, GM cites ballistic testing, 

aging studies, predictive modeling, and 

other analyses that it has conducted 

over the last several years. 

1. Testing & Field Data Analyses 

Testing by Takata. GM retrieved 

inflators from the field by removing 

parts from vehicles (a ‘‘field return’’ part 

or inflator) and sent them to Takata for 

ballistic testing and analysis. In total, 

Takata conducted ballistic tests of more 

than 4,200 field return inflators, with 

the majority (1,620 YD and 2,235 YP 

inflators) coming from Zone A.41 GM 

states that none of the tested GMT900 

inflators have ruptured.42 Takata’s 

testing further included CT scans of 

inflators to measure average and 

maximum wafer diameters of more than 

5,000 YD and YP variant inflators, and 

GM also pointed to micro-CT and highspeed x-ray cinematography, which 

enabled researchers to view pores and 

fissures caused by PSAN propellant 

degradation.43

Stress-Strength Interference Analysis. 

GM conducted a stress-strength 

interference analysis of the GMT900 

vehicle inflators based on CT scans of 

1,578 YD and YP inflators.44 GM 

explains stress-strength interference 

analysis as the plotting of curves on a 

graph related to the diameter of fieldreturned YP and YD inflators and the 

diameter of non-GM inflators that have 

ruptured during ballistic testing; the 

amount of overlap between the two 

curves ‘‘represents the probability of 

rupture in a particular group of 

inflators.’’ 45 GM provides plots of 

curves with no discernable overlap,46

and concludes that ‘‘even the oldest 

(MY 2007) Zone A Takata GMT 900 

inflators are not at risk of rupture.’’ 47

Crash Deployment Estimates. GM 

estimates that its GMT900 vehicles 

equipped with YD and YP inflators have 

been involved in approximately 66,894 

crashes where the passenger air bag has 

deployed, all allegedly without a field 

rupture.48 GM asserts that this data 

demonstrates that the GMT900 inflators 

are ‘‘currently performing as 

designed.’’ 49

2. Aging Studies 

GM conducted a preliminary Aging 

Study (‘‘GM Aging Study’’), and later 

engaged a third party, OATK, to conduct 

a larger ‘‘long-term’’ Aging Study 

(‘‘OATK Aging Study’’) to simulate the 

propellant degradation process that 

occurs in Takata PSAN inflators.50 It is 

the Agency’s understanding that both 

studies were informed by vehicle 

temperature studies conducted by GM 

(the ‘‘GM Temperature Study’’) and 

Atlas Material Testing Solutions (the 

‘‘Atlas Cabin Temperature Study’’).51

For the GM Temperature Study, GM 

studied the Pontiac Vibe and two 

GMT900 vehicle models (Silverado and 

Suburban).52 The Atlas Cabin 


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53See id. 54See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 11, 14. 55See First Petition at 3, 14–15; GM’s August 23, 

2017 presentation at 94–97; GM’s April 5, 2017 

Presentation to NHTSA at 80–82. 56First Petition at 14–15. 57 Id.; see GM’s August 23, 2017 Presentation at 

94–97. 58Fourth Petition at 7–8; Third Petition at 8 & 

Ex.C. 59Fourth Petition at 8; Third Petition at 9 & Ex.C. 60Fourth Petition at 8; Third Petition at 9. 61See GM’s August 23, 2017 Presentation at 12, 

15; GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 4, 81; Fourth 

Petition at 13; Second Petition at 32–33 (Ex.D). 

62Fourth Petition at 3; Third Petition at 3, 11. 

63 Id. at 3; see Fourth Petition at 3–4. 

64Fourth Petition at 16. 

65See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 11, 14, 

48. 

66 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 189. 

67See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 6–14. 68 Id. at 10, 145. 69Fourth Petition at 4; GM’s June 8, 2018 

Presentation at 4, 8 (defining threshold risk level as 

1% chance of failure upon initiation in the 1% 

vehicle (most severe exposure)). 

70 June 8, 2018 Presentation at 4; see Fourth 

Petition at 14. These assessments were presented at 

briefings to the Agency in August 2017, February 

2018, and June 2018. Cornerstone attended all three 

briefings, while Professor Barnett only attended the 

August 2017 and June 2018 meetings. 

71For several years, Takata has inspected, tested, 

and analyzed inflators returned from the field. The 

compiled and summarized test results for more than 

387,000 inflator tests or inspections (as of July 3, 

2018), including GMT900 inflators, are contained in 

the Takata MEAF. Takata’s MEAF file was available 

to the Agency in making its determination, and it 

is from this file that some of the information 

considered by the Agency was derived, and 

discussed herein. 

72See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 17. 

73 Id. at 18. 

74See, e.g., GM’s July 20, 2018 Response, Ex.C. 

GM sometimes refers to this as the ‘‘POF’’ 

(probability of failure), ‘‘probability of ED’’ 

(probability of energetic deployment), or ‘‘IR risk’’ 

(inflator rupture risk). 

GM also asserted that the probability of rupture 

in a given deployment is ‘‘zero’’ for the YD and YP 

inflators in the ‘‘long-term,’’ but did not provide 

supporting information. See GM’s September 29, 

2017 Response at 2. GM referred the Agency to 

GM’s Supplemental Brief, but NHTSA found no 

information that supported this assertion, and 

therefore it is not addressed in NHTSA’s analysis. 

75 GM provided hundreds of per-deployment risk 

estimates based on various combinations of inputs. 

See GM’s July 2018 Response, Ex.C. The estimates 

in this table reflect estimates for inflators exposed 

to the most extreme conditions for which GM/ 

OATK calculated risk. 

Temperature Study studied the Pontiac 

Vibe and 11 non-GM vehicles.53 GM 

asserts these studies demonstrate that 

GMT900 vehicles normally achieve a 

relatively low peak vehicle temperature 

(below 60°C, or what GM refers to as the 

‘‘T1’’ temperature range).54 GM utilized 

these temperature studies in its aging 

studies as described below. 

GM Aging Study. GM conducted a 

preliminary aging study of a small 

number of inflators, including fieldreturn parts (both YP and YD variant 

inflators) to demonstrate the short-term 

safety of its inflators while the Petition 

was pending.55 GM artificially aged the 

inflators by imposing four-hour cycles 

of temperature and humidity cycling per 

day for fifty-eight days, in closed-test 

laboratory chambers.56 Though none of 

the inflators ruptured or demonstrated 

elevated pressure, all showed signs of 

wafer diameter growth.57

OATK Aging Study. GM retained 

OATK to conduct a long-term aging 

study to evaluate the future performance 

of GMT900 inflators through simulated 

laboratory aging.58 Takata specially 

constructed YD, YP, and FD variant 

inflators for use in the OATK Aging 

Study.59 The primary chambers in the 

inflators were loaded with three 

different levels of moisture: (1) No 

moisture added; (2) ‘‘internal moisture 

approximately equal to 90th percentile 

moisture levels in Zone A’’; and (3) 

‘‘moisture levels approximately twotimes higher than the highest level ever 

measured in a GMT900 Inflator 

recovered from Zone A.’’ 60 The OATK 

Aging Study employed four-hour 

temperature cycles; by June 2018, OATK 

had conducted 1,960 cycles of testing, 

which GM asserts simulated 35 years of 

field aging.61 According to GM, ‘‘all of 

the GMT900 Inflators in the study safely 

deployed without any ruptures,’’ 

leading GM to the conclusion that the 

YP and YD inflators are safer and more 

resistant to rupture than other Takata 

PSAN inflators.62 GM asserts that the 

study demonstrates the GMT900 

inflators ‘‘will continue to operate safely 

for decades, even in the highest 

temperature and humidity regions.’’ 63

3. Predictive Modeling 

In 2018, GM presented results of a 

parametric mathematical model created 

by OATK (the ‘‘OATK Model’’ or ‘‘the 

Model’’) that was designed to predict 

the service-life expectancy of GMT900 

inflators.64 It is the Agency’s 

understanding that this Model was 

informed by the GM Temperature Study 

and the Atlas Cabin Temperature Study, 

as well as the GM Aging Study and the 

OATK Aging Study.65 The Model runs 

a Monte Carlo simulation 32,000 times 

simulating air bag deployments. Each 

trial combines variations of several 

different inputs, including usage profile 

(meaning how the vehicle is driven, 

where it is parked, how often and high 

the air conditioning is run, and any 

other factors that affect the moisture and 

temperature environment of the 

inflator),66 peak vehicle temperature, 

the environmental conditions of the city 

in which the inflator resides, and the 

age of the inflator.67 The final output of 

the Model is the ‘‘probability of ED’’ for 

a deployed inflator with these inputs, 

i.e., the probability that an inflator will 

rupture under various circumstances.68

From these Model-predicted outputs, 

GM concludes that the GMT900 

inflators ‘‘will not reach a threshold risk 

level within 30 years of worst case 

environmental field exposure in Miami 

[Florida].’’ 69

4. Risk Assessments 

GM also presented statistical risk 

assessments from third parties 

Cornerstone and Professor Arnold 

Barnett, and OATK, which attempted to 

quantify the future risk of rupture for 

the GMT900 inflator variants.70 These 

risk assessments were based upon data 

and inputs from the OATK Model, the 

OATK Aging Study, Takata’s Master 

Engineering Analysis File (‘‘MEAF’’) 

file,71 and GM’s crash-data estimates.72

Cornerstone concluded that the rupture 

risk for GMT900 inflators is 

‘‘significantly lower’’ than that for 

‘‘typical ‘benchmark’ Takata inflators in 

other vehicles,’’ and that the OATK 

model ‘‘offers strong evidence that a 

GMT900’s absolute risk’’ of a rupture ‘‘is 

extremely small.’’ 73

GM presented several assessments 

regarding the per-deployment risk, or 

the probability that a specific air bag 

will rupture in a given deployment.74

Based upon the outputs of the OATK 

Model, GM predicts the following 

probabilities of future inflator rupture 

for inflators aged 30 years under the 

Model:75

Vehicle temperature band YD YP 

For vehicles with cabin temperature less than 60°C (referred to by GM 

as ‘‘T1’’).

0% (i.e., no risk of rupture) ........... 0% (i.e., no risk of rupture). 

For vehicles with a cabin temperature between 60 and 65°C (referred 

to by GM as ‘‘T2’’).

0.87% (i.e., 1 rupture per 115 deployments).12% (i.e.,1 rupture per 8 deployments). 

For vehicles with a cabin temperature above 65°C (referred to by GM 

as ‘‘T3’’).

66% (i.e., 2 ruptures per 3 deployments).99% (i.e., 99 ruptures per 100 deployments). 


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76See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 14; see 

also GM’s July 20, 2018 Response, Ex.C. 77See GM’s July 20, 2018 Response, Ex. C. 78 GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 26. 79 Id. at 21–23, 39; GM’s July 20, 2018 Response 

at 16. 80Third Petition at 10. 

81 GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 21–22; see 

GM’s July 20, 2018 Response at 16. GM provided 

estimates for crash deployments that have occurred 

in GMT900 vehicles, and based its risk analyses on 

the assumption that there were no ruptures in those 

crash deployments. See infra. 

82More specifically, 8–12-year-old SPI and PSPI– 

L inflators from non-GM vehicles (excluding the 

Vibe). GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 39. 

83More specifically, 8–12-year-old SPI and PSPI– 

L inflators from non-GM vehicles (excluding the 

Vibe) in Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, 

Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas. Id. at 39, 

46. 

84Fourth Petition at 16. 

85Third Petition at 17; see also Fourth Petition at 

16; GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 5. Based on 

information provided to NHTSA by GM, the total 

number of vehicles under petition is 5,888,421. 

86 49 U.S.C. 30102(a)(9). 

87 Id. 30118(c)(1). ‘‘[A] defect in original 

equipment, or noncompliance of original 

equipment with a motor vehicle safety standard 

prescribed under this chapter, is deemed to be a 

defect or noncompliance of the motor vehicle in or 

on which the equipment was installed at the time 

of delivery to the first purchaser.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

30102(b)(1)(F). 

88 Id. 30118–20. 

89 Id. 30118(d), 30120(h); 49 CFR part 556. 

90See, e.g., Food Mktg. Institute v. Argus Leader 

Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (2019) (quoting Perrin 

v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 

91See Pub. L. 93–492, Title I, § 102(a), 88 Stat. 

1475 (Oct. 27, 1974); Webster’s Third New Int’l 

Dictionary (principal copyright 1961) (defining 

‘‘inconsequential’’ as ‘‘inconsequent;’ defining 

‘‘inconsequent’’ as ‘‘of no consequence,’’ ‘‘lacking 

worth, significance, or importance’’). 

The House Conference Report indicates that the 

Department of Transportation planned to define 

‘‘inconsequentiality’’ through a regulation; 

however, it did not do so. See H.R. Rep. 93–1191, 

1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6046, 6066 (July 11, 1974). 

Instead, NHTSA issued a procedural regulation 

governing the filing and disposition of petitions for 

inconsequentiality, but which did not address the 

meaning of the term ‘‘inconsequential.’’ 42 FR 7145 

(Feb. 7, 1977). The procedural regulation, 49 CFR 

part 556, has remained largely unchanged since that 

time, and the changes that have been made have no 

effect on the meaning of inconsequentiality. 

92https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/ 

english/inconsequential. 

93https://ahdictionary.com/word/ 

search.html?q=inconsequential. 

94https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 

inconsequential. 

GM asserts that all GMT900 vehicles 

fall within the lowest ‘‘T1’’ vehicle 

temperature range and therefore have a 

zero percent risk of rupture through age 

30.76 For vehicles that fall within the 

higher ‘‘T2’’ and ‘‘T3’’ vehicle 

temperature ranges, GM provided an 

estimate for the number of years until 

the inflator will have a 1-in-100 chance 

of rupturing if deployed: for the YD 

inflator, between 17.6 and 30-plus years; 

for the YP inflator, between 14.6 and 30- 

plus years.77 GM further provided a 

lifetime risk estimate—namely, the 

probability that an individual inflator 

will experience at least one rupture over 

its lifetime when a person is seated in 

the front passenger seat, of not more 

than 1 in 50 million for the YD inflator 

variant, and not more than 1 in 3.4 

million for the YP inflator variant.78

GM also provided ‘‘comparative risk’’ 

assessments for the GMT900 inflators.79

GM contends that the comparator FD 

inflators—used in the Pontiac Vibe and 

other vehicles—were ‘‘ideal’’ because 

(1) they are from the same inflator 

family as the GMT900 light-duty inflator 

with certain design and construction 

similarities, but ‘‘lack the critical design 

elements that, in GM’s view, distinguish 

the GMT900 inflators from other Takata 

non-desiccated PSAN inflators and 

make the GMT900 Inflators resistant to 

the risk of energetic deployment,’’ and 

(2) the FD inflators ‘‘have consistently 

experienced ruptures during ballistic 

testing’’ and have also experienced field 

ruptures.’’ 80 Based upon the assertion 

that there have been no GMT900 

ruptures in the OATK Aging Study, 

field returned samples (based upon 

MEAF data), or in the field, GM 

concludes that if the GMT900 inflators 

posed the same risk as other inflators, 

the probability of observing zero 

ruptures for GMT900 inflators given the 

sample size and when compared to 

other inflators is as follows: 81

When compared to YD & YP 

(pooled) YD YP 

FD inflators, when each variant is artificially aged (OATK Aging Study) ........... 1 in 499 billion ........ 1 in 767,815 .......... 1 in 649,530. 

Other inflators (excluding the Vibe),82 when weighted according to certain 

conditions (Field Return, MEAF data).

1 in 1.5 million ........ 1 in 1,551 .............. 1 in 347. 

Other 8- to 12-year old inflators in Zone A (excluding the Vibe) 83 (Field Data 

Applying Crash Deployment Estimates).

1 in 10 22 ................. 1 in 41 trillion ........ 1 in 174,267. 

5. Dealer Replacements as Risk Creation 

Finally, GM contends that because the 

GMT900 inflators are ‘‘not at risk of 

rupture,’’ dealers conducting repairs for 

the inflators under petition could 

‘‘unnecessarily expose’’ occupants ‘‘to 

the risk of an improper repair’’ 84 by 

‘‘disrupting critical, sensitive, fully 

operational safety systems in millions of 

customer vehicles.’’ 85

IV. NHTSA’s Analysis 

A. Background 

The National Traffic and Motor 

Vehicle Safety Act (the ‘‘Safety Act’’), 49 

U.S.C. Chapter 301, defines ‘‘motor 

vehicle safety’’ as ‘‘the performance of a 

motor vehicle or motor vehicle 

equipment in a way that protects the 

public against unreasonable risk of 

accidents occurring because of the 

design, construction, or performance of 

a motor vehicle, and against 

unreasonable risk of death or injury in 

an accident, and includes 

nonoperational safety of a motor 

vehicle.’’ 86 Under the Safety Act, a 

manufacturer must notify NHTSA when 

it ‘‘learns the vehicle or equipment 

contains a defect and decides in good 

faith that the defect is related to motor 

vehicle safety,’’ or ‘‘decides in good 

faith that the vehicle or equipment does 

not comply with an applicable motor 

vehicle safety standard.’’ 87 The act of 

filing a notification with NHTSA is the 

first step in a manufacturer’s statutory 

recall obligations of notification and 

remedy.88 However, Congress has 

recognized that, under some limited 

circumstances, a manufacturer may 

petition NHTSA for an exemption from 

the requirements to notify owners, 

purchasers, and dealers and to remedy 

the vehicles or equipment on the basis 

that the defect or noncompliance is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle 

safety.89

‘‘Inconsequential’’ is not defined 

either in the statute or in NHTSA’s 

regulations, and so must be interpreted 

based on its ‘‘ordinary, contemporary, 

common meaning.’’ 90 The 

inconsequentiality provision was added 

to the statute in 1974, and there is no 

indication that the plain meaning of the 

term has changed since 1961—meaning 

definitions used today are substantially 

the same as those used in 1974.91 The 

Cambridge Dictionary defines 

‘‘inconsequential’’ to mean ‘‘not 

important’’ or ‘‘able to be ignored.’’ 92

Other dictionaries similarly define the 

term as ‘‘lacking importance’’ 93 and 

‘‘unimportant.’’ 94


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95See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 

566 U.S. 560, 569–72 (2012) (considering ordinary 

and technical meanings, as well as statutory 

context, in determining meaning of a ‘‘interpreter’’ 

under 28 U.S.C. 1920(6)). 

96 49 U.S.C. 30118(d), 30120(h). 

97 Id. 30102(a)(9) (emphasis added). 

98 Id. 30101. 

99 Id. 30118(d), 30120(h). 

100 Id. 30118(c)(1). 

101NHTSA notes that the current petition is 

different in that the inflators were declared 

defective by the supplier of the airbag, and that 

GM’s defect notice was filed in response to the 

supplier’s notice. 

102Letter from J. Glassman, NHTSA, to V. Kroll, 

Adaptive Driving Alliance (Sept. 23, 2002), https:// 

www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/ada3. 

103See id. 

104Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.; Grant of Petition for 

Inconsequential Defect, 47 FR 41458, 41459 (Sept. 

20,1982) and 48 FR 27635, 27635 (June 16, 1983). 

105 Id. 

106Nat’l Coach Corp.; Denial of Petition for 

Inconsequential [Defect], 47 FR 49517, 49517 (Nov. 

1, 1982). NHTSA’s denial was erroneously titled 

‘‘Denial of Petition for Inconsequential 

Noncompliance;’’ the discussion actually addressed 

the issue as a defect. See id.; see also Nat’l Coach 

Corp.; Receipt of Petition for Inconsequential 

Defect, 47 FR 4190 (Jan. 28, 1982). 

107 Id. at 49517–18. 

108 Id. at 49518. 

109 Final Determination & Order Regarding Safety 

Related Defects in the 1971 Fiat Model 850 and the 

1970–74 Fiat Model 124 Automobiles Imported and 

Distributed by Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc.; Ruling 

on Petition of Inconsequentiality, 45 FR 2134, 2137, 

41 (Jan. 10, 1980). 

The statutory context is also relevant 

to the meaning of ‘‘inconsequential.’’ 95

The full text of the inconsequentiality 

provision is: 

On application of a manufacturer, the 

Secretary shall exempt the manufacturer 

from this section if the Secretary decides a 

defect or noncompliance is inconsequential 

to motor vehicle safety. The Secretary may 

take action under this subsection only after 

notice in the Federal Register and an 

opportunity for any interested person to 

present information, views, and arguments.96

As described above, the statute 

defines ‘‘motor vehicle safety’’ to mean 

‘‘the performance of a motor vehicle or 

motor vehicle equipment in a way that 

protects the public against unreasonable 

risk of accidents . . . and against 

unreasonable risk of death or injury in 

an accident . . . .’’ 97 This is also 

consistent with the overall statutory 

purpose: ‘‘to reduce traffic accidents 

and deaths and injuries resulting from 

traffic accidents.’’ 98

The statute explicitly allows a 

manufacturer to seek an exemption from 

carrying out a recall on the basis that 

either a defect or a noncompliance is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle 

safety.99 However, in practice, 

substantially all inconsequentiality 

petitions have related to 

noncompliances, and it has been 

extremely rare for a manufacturer to 

seek an exemption in the case of a 

defect. This is because a manufacturer 

does not have a statutory obligation to 

conduct a recall for a defect unless and 

until it ‘‘learns the vehicle or equipment 

contains a defect and decides in good 

faith that the defect is related to motor 

vehicle safety,’’ or NHTSA orders a 

recall by making a ‘‘final decision that 

a motor vehicle or replacement 

equipment contains a defect related to 

motor vehicle safety.’’ 100 Until that 

threshold determination has been made 

by either the manufacturer or the 

Agency, there is no need for a statutory 

exception on the basis that a defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. 

And since a defect determination 

involves a finding that the defect poses 

an unreasonable risk to safety, asking 

the agency to make a determination that 

a defect posing an unreasonable risk to 

safety is inconsequential has heretofore 

been almost unexplored.101

Given this statutory context, a 

manufacturer bears a heavy burden in 

petitioning NHTSA to determine that a 

defect related to motor vehicle safety 

(which necessarily involves an 

unreasonable risk of an accident, or 

death or injury in an accident) is 

nevertheless inconsequential to motor 

vehicle safety. In accordance with the 

plain meaning of ‘‘inconsequential,’’ the 

manufacturer must show that a risk 

posed by a defect is not important or 

capable of being ignored. This 

appropriately describes the actual 

consequence of granting a petition as 

well. The manufacturer would be 

relieved of its statutory obligations to 

notify vehicle owners and remedy the 

defect, and effectively ignore the defect 

as unimportant from a safety 

perspective. Accordingly, the threshold 

of evidence necessary for a 

manufacturer to carry its burden of 

persuasion that a defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety 

is difficult to satisfy. This is particularly 

true where the defect involves a 

potential failure of safety-critical 

equipment, as is the case here. 

The Agency necessarily determines 

whether a defect or noncompliance is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety 

based on the specific facts before it. The 

scarcity of defect-related 

inconsequentiality petitions over the 

course of the Agency’s history reflects 

the heavy burden of persuasion as well 

as the general understanding among 

regulated entities that the grant of such 

relief would be quite rare. The Agency 

has recognized this explicitly in the 

past. For example, in 2002, NHTSA 

stated that ‘‘[a]lthough NHTSA’s 

empowering statute alludes to the 

possibility of an inconsequentiality 

determination with regard to a defect, 

the granting of such a petition would be 

highly unusual.’’ 102

Of the three known occasions in 

which the Agency has previously 

considered petitions contending that a 

defect is inconsequential to motor 

vehicle safety, the Agency has granted 

only one of the petitions, nearly three 

decades ago, in a vastly different set of 

circumstances.103 In that case, the defect 

was a typographical error in the 

vehicle’s gross vehicle weight rating 

(GVWR) that had no impact on the 

actual ability of the vehicle to carry an 

appropriate load. NHTSA granted a 

motorcycle manufacturer’s petition, 

finding that a defect was 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety 

where the GVWR was erroneously 

described as only 60 lbs., which error 

was readily apparent to the motorcycle 

operator based upon both common 

sense and the fact that the 330 lbs. front 

axle rating and 540 lbs. rear axle rating 

were listed directly below the GVWR on 

the same label.104 Moreover, the error 

did not actually impact the ability of the 

motorcycle to carry the weight for 

which it was designed.105

On the other hand, NHTSA denied 

another petition concerning a vehicle’s 

weight label where there was a potential 

safety impact. NHTSA denied that 

petition from National Coach 

Corporation on the basis that the rear 

gross axle weight rating (RGAWR) for its 

buses was too low and could lead to 

overloading of the rear axle if the buses 

were fully loaded with passengers.106

NHTSA rejected arguments that most of 

the buses were not used in situations 

where they were fully loaded with 

passengers and that there were no 

complaints.107 NHTSA noted that its 

Office of Defects Investigation had 

conducted numerous investigations 

concerning overloading of suspensions 

that resulted in recalls, that other 

manufacturers had conducted recalls for 

similar issues in the past, and that, even 

if current owners were aware of the 

issue, subsequent owners were unlikely 

to be aware absent a recall.108

NHTSA also denied a petition 

asserting that a defect was 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety 

where the defect involved premature 

corrosion of critical structure 

components (the vehicle’s 

undercarriage), which could result in a 

crash or loss of vehicle control.109 Fiat 

filed the petition preemptively, 

following NHTSA’s initial decision that 


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110 Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc.; Receipt of Petition 

for Determination of Inconsequential Defect, 44 FR 

60193, 60193 (Oct. 18, 1979); Fiat Motors Corp. of 

N. Am.; Receipt of Petition for Determination of 

Inconsequential Defect, 44 FR 12793, 12793 (Mar. 

8, 1979). 

111See, e.g., 45 FR 2134, 2141 (Jan. 10, 1980). 

112 Final Determination & Order Regarding Safety 

Related Defects in the 1971 Fiat Model 850 and the 

1970–74 Fiat Model 124 Automobiles Imported and 

Distributed by Fiat Motors of N. Am., Inc.; Ruling 

on Petition of Inconsequentiality, 45 FR 2137–41 

(Jan. 10, 1980). Fiat also agreed to a recall of certain 

of the vehicles, and NHTSA found that Fiat did not 

reasonably meet the statutory recall remedy 

requirements. Id. at 2134–37. 

113 Id. at 2139. 

114 Id. 

115 Id. at 2140. 

116 49 U.S.C. 30118(d), 30120(h). 

117See, e.g., Gen. Motors, LLC.; cf. Grant of 

Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 81 FR 92963 (Dec. 20, 2016). By 

contrast, in Michelin, we reached the opposite 

conclusion under different facts. There, the defect 

was a failure to mark the maximum load and 

corresponding inflation pressure in both Metric and 

English units on the sidewall of the tires. Michelin 

N. America, Inc.; Denial of Petition for Decision of 

Inconsequential Noncompliance, 82 FR 41678 

(Sept. 1, 2017). 

118Cf. Gen. Motors Corporation; Ruling on 

Petition for Determination of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 69 FR 19897, 19899 (Apr. 14, 

2004) (citing prior cases where noncompliance was 

expected to be imperceptible, or nearly so, to 

vehicle occupants or approaching drivers). 

119See Gen. Motors, LLC; Grant of Petition for 

Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 

35355 (June 12, 2013) (finding noncompliance had 

no effect on occupant safety because it had no effect 

on the proper operation of the occupant 

classification system and the correct deployment of 

an air bag); Osram Sylvania Prods. Inc.; Grant of 

Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 78 FR 46000 (July 30, 2013) 

(finding occupant using noncompliant light source 

would not be exposed to significantly greater risk 

than occupant using similar compliant light 

source). 

120See Combi USA Inc., Denial of Petition for 

Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 

71028, 71030 (Nov. 27, 2013). 

121 Morgan 3 Wheeler Ltd.; Denial of Petition for 

Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 81 FR 

21663, 21666 (Apr. 12, 2016). 

122United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 

754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding defect poses an 

unreasonable risk when it ‘‘results in hazards as 

potentially dangerous as sudden engine fire, and 

where there is no dispute that at least some such 

hazards, in this case fires, can definitely be 

expected to occur in the future’’). 

123See Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., L.L.C.; Denial of 

Application for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 66 FR 38342 (July 23, 2001) 

(rejecting argument that noncompliance was 

inconsequential because of the small number of 

vehicles affected); Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd.; 

Denial of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 81 FR 41370 (June 24, 2016) 

(noting that situations involving individuals 

trapped in motor vehicles—while infrequent—are 

consequential to safety); Morgan 3 Wheeler Ltd.; 

Denial of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential 

Noncompliance, 81 FR 21663, 21664 (Apr. 12, 

2016) (rejecting argument that petition should be 

granted because the vehicle was produced in very 

low numbers and likely to be operated on a limited 

basis). 

124See Gen. Motors Corp.; Ruling on Petition for 

Determination of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 

69 FR 19897, 19900 (Apr. 14, 2004); Cosco Inc.; 

Denial of Application for Decision of 

Inconsequential Noncompliance, 64 FR 29408, 

29409 (June 1, 1999). 

certain Fiat vehicles contained a safetyrelated defect.110 In support of its 

petition, Fiat argued that no crashes or 

injuries resulted from components that 

failed due to corrosion, and that owners 

exercising due diligence had adequate 

warning of the existence of the 

defect.111 NHTSA rejected those 

arguments and both finalized its 

determination that certain vehicles 

contained a safety-related defect (i.e., 

ordered a recall) and found that the 

defect was not inconsequential to motor 

vehicle safety.112 NHTSA explained that 

the absence of crashes or injuries was 

not dispositive: ‘‘the possibility of an 

injury or accident can reasonably be 

inferred from the nature of the 

component involved.’’ 113 NHTSA also 

noted that the failure mode was 

identical to another population of 

vehicles for which Fiat was carrying out 

a recall.114 The Agency rejected the 

argument that there was adequate 

warning to vehicle owners, explaining 

that the average owner does not inspect 

the underbody of a car and interior 

corrosion may not be visible.115

Agency practice over several decades 

therefore shows that inconsequentiality 

petitions are rarely filed in the defect 

context, and virtually never granted. 

Nonetheless, in light of the importance 

of the issues here, and the fact that GM’s 

defect notification was filed in response 

to the notification provided by their 

supplier, the Agency also considered 

the potential usefulness of the Agency’s 

precedent on noncompliance. The same 

legal standard—‘‘inconsequential to 

motor vehicle safety’’—applies to both 

defects and noncompliances.116

In the noncompliance context, in 

some instances, NHTSA has determined 

that a manufacturer met its burden of 

demonstrating that a noncompliance 

was inconsequential to safety. For 

example, labels intended to provide 

safety advice to an occupant that may 

have a misspelled word, or may be 

printed in the wrong format or the 

wrong type size, have been deemed 

inconsequential where they should not 

cause any misunderstanding, especially 

where other sources of correct 

information are available.117 These 

decisions are similar in nature to the 

lone instance where NHTSA granted a 

petition for an inconsequential defect, 

as discussed above. 

However, the burden of establishing 

the inconsequentiality of a failure to 

comply with a performance requirement 

in a standard—as opposed to a labeling 

requirement—is more substantial and 

difficult to meet. Accordingly, the 

Agency has not found many such 

noncompliances inconsequential.118

Potential performance failures of safetycritical equipment, like seat belts or air 

bags, are rarely deemed inconsequential. 

An important issue to consider in 

determining inconsequentiality based 

upon NHTSA’s prior decisions on 

noncompliance issues was the safety 

risk to individuals who experience the 

type of event against which the recall 

would otherwise protect.119 NHTSA 

also does not consider the absence of 

complaints or injuries to show that the 

issue is inconsequential to safety.120

‘‘Most importantly, the absence of a 

complaint does not mean there have not 

been any safety issues, nor does it mean 

that there will not be safety issues in the 

future.’’ 121 ‘‘[T]he fact that in past 

reported cases good luck and swift 

reaction have prevented many serious 

injuries does not mean that good luck 

will continue to work.’’ 122

Arguments that only a small number 

of vehicles or items of motor vehicle 

equipment are affected have also not 

justified granting an inconsequentiality 

petition.123 Similarly, NHTSA has 

rejected petitions based on the assertion 

that only a small percentage of vehicles 

or items of equipment are likely to 

actually exhibit a noncompliance. The 

percentage of potential occupants that 

could be adversely affected by a 

noncompliance does not determine the 

question of inconsequentiality. Rather, 

the issue to consider is the consequence 

to an occupant who is exposed to the 

consequence of that noncompliance.124

These considerations are also relevant 

when considering whether a defect is 

inconsequential to motor vehicle safety. 

B. Information Before the Agency 

In support of its Petition, GM 

submitted thousands of pages of 

information and data, including work by 

OATK and Cornerstone on GM’s behalf, 

which is summarized above and further 

discussed below. In addition, the 

Agency retained Harold R. Blomquist, 

Ph.D. to consult on scientific issues 

related to NHTSA’s ongoing 

investigation into Takata PSAN air bag 

inflators. As part of the Agency’s review 

of GM’s Petition, Dr. Blomquist attended 

presentations by GM made to the 

Agency and provided a technical 

assessment of the information provided 

by GM. 

Dr. Blomquist is a highly-regarded 

and well-qualified expert in the 

automotive engineering field, who has 

spent most of his career focused on 


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125 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 8. 126 Id. at para. 9. 127 Id. 128 Id. at paras. 13–15. 129 Id. at para. 10. 130 Id. at para. 20. 131Some information reviewed by Dr. 

Blomquist—including certain information 

submitted by GM—is subject to a request for 

confidential treatment, and is not publicly 

available. 132 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 253–56; see 

generally id. at 253–74 (Conclusions). 

133See id. at paras. 259, 263. 

134 Id. at paras. 262, 263a. 

135 Id. at paras. 262, 269. 

136 Id. at para. 271. 

137 Id. at para. 272. 

138 Id. at paras. 273. 

139 In fact, as GM has never observed or induced 

a rupture of a GMT900 inflator, GM affirmatively 

stated it could not determine the safety 

consequence of an inflator rupture in a GMT900 

vehicle. See GM’s September 2017 Response at 7. 

140See, e.g., Fourth Petition at 16; GM’s August 

23, 2017 Presentation at 33. 

141 GM’s assertion that strict adherence to the 

USCAR air bag performance standards ‘‘resulted in 

[GM] inflators with increased inflator-structural 

integrity, better ballistic performance, and greater 

resistance to moisture’’ does not change this 

conclusion. See Third Petition at 6. As noted above, 

USCAR standards are utilized across the industry, 

and adherence to those standards is not particular 

to the GMT900 inflators at issue. Moreover, gradual 

density reduction in both the YD and YP inflator 

variants demonstrate the GMT900 inflators are 

drafting out of conformance to SAE/USCAR 24–2 

safety requirements. 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 

265. 

142See id. at para. 233. 

issues related to ‘‘the design of energetic 

solid materials such as propellants, 

pyrotechnics, explosives and gas 

generants (propellants) for missile 

systems and automotive air bag 

applications.’’ 125 After earning his 

Ph.D. from Duke University in 1980, Dr. 

Blomquist began working in the rocket 

industry for Aerojet Strategic Propulsion 

Corporation and Olin Rocket Research 

Corporation, where he led propulsion 

research and development (‘‘R&D’’) 

activities.126

After ten years in the rocket industry, 

Dr. Blomquist transitioned to TRW 

Automotive in 1990, where the focus of 

his work was automotive air bag 

technologies.127 For the next twenty 

years, Dr. Blomquist’s work at TRW 

included inflator design research and 

energetic materials (propellant, booster, 

and autoignitiation) formulation R&D. 

Notably, during the 1990s, Dr. 

Blomquist worked on replacing TRW’s 

azide-based propellant technology, 

through which he worked with inflators 

with PSAN oxidizers, like the Takata 

inflators at issue with this petition.128

Because of his work at TRW, Dr. 

Blomquist holds twenty-five air-bag 

related patents and was honored twice 

with product innovation awards related 

to airbag systems.129 Further, Dr. 

Blomquist has published on the subject 

of airbags and propellants, including ‘‘a 

technical paper describing PSAN-based 

propellant and corresponding inflator 

[which was] presented at the national 

meeting of the American Institute of 

Chemical Engineers.’’ 130 Dr. 

Blomquist’s experience is more fully set 

forth in his Report, along with his 

assessments and findings concerning 

GM’s petition. Dr. Blomquist’s report is 

available in docket no. NHTSA–2016– 

0124. 

Dr. Blomquist reviewed the technical 

data provided by GM in support of its 

Petition, as well as information 

available to the Agency through its 

ongoing investigation in EA15–001, 

including presentations and information 

submitted by TK Global.131 Ultimately, 

Dr. Blomquist concluded that GM’s 

claim that design and environmental 

features render the GMT900 inflators 

less likely to rupture is unfounded.132

Many of GM’s enumerated features that 

allegedly make the GMT900 inflators 

uniquely resilient to rupture are, in fact, 

not unique to the GMT900 inflators, and 

other inflators that possess those 

characteristics have experienced field 

and testing ruptures, as well as 

abnormally high-pressure events 

indicative of propellant degradation.133

Further, ballistic testing results for the 

GMT900 inflators that are subject to this 

petition include abnormally highpressure events indicative of potential 

future rupture risk.134 These findings 

illustrate that GM’s inflators have a 

similar, if not identical, degradation 

continuum to that of the other Takata 

non-desiccated PSAN inflators, and test 

results from field-aged inflators are 

consistent with gradual propellant 

degradation and expected increasing 

high-pressure deployments.135

In addition, Dr. Blomquist found that 

the OATK Aging Study—which forms 

the basis for most of GM’s supporting 

arguments—did not replicate real-world 

conditions.136 ‘‘Similarly, OATK’s 

predictive model is anchored in key 

ways to the data derived from OATK’s 

Aging Study, so any weaknesses 

observed in the Aging Study may 

explain the Model’s inability to predict 

observed high pressure events and 

ruptures of field aged inflators.’’ 137 Dr. 

Blomquist concluded, inter alia, that the 

inflators used in GM’s vehicles under 

Petition here—like other Takata nondesiccated PSAN inflators—are 

susceptible to propellant degradation as 

built, and to risk of rupture.138

The Agency has independently 

reviewed all of the information 

submitted by GM and TK Global on this 

matter, as well as Dr. Blomquist’s 

Report. Based upon this information, 

and applying its expert judgment as the 

Agency charged with overseeing motor 

vehicle safety, NHTSA has determined 

that GM has not demonstrated that the 

defect is inconsequential to safety in the 

GMT900 vehicles. The Petition is 

therefore denied, for the reasons set 

forth in more detail below. 

C. Response to GM’s Supporting 

Information & Analyses 

Rather than focusing on the 

consequence to an occupant in the event 

of an inflator rupture,139 GM instead 

seeks to show that the GMT900 inflators 

are not at risk of rupture, contending 

that GMT900 inflators are ‘‘more 

resilient’’ to rupture than other Takata 

PSAN inflators.140 As discussed above, 

in support of this argument, GM points 

to unique inflator design differences and 

unique vehicle features, as well as 

testing and field data, aging studies, 

predictive modeling, risk assessments, 

and the notion that dealer repairs create 

a potential risk. GM does not discuss the 

consequence to an occupant in the event 

of an inflator rupture, and the 

information provided by GM does not 

persuasively demonstrate any specific 

or unique resiliency to propellant 

degradation or inflator rupture in 

GMT900 inflators. And, as discussed 

previously, field-return testing of 

GMT900 inflators show elevated 

deployment pressures indicative of 

propellant degradation and future 

rupture risk. 

1. Unique Inflator Design Differences 

and Vehicle Features 

GM has not demonstrated that any of 

the features described above—either 

alone or in conjunction with other 

features or factors—prevents propellant 

degradation or renders the defect in 

GMT900 inflators inconsequential to 

safety.141 In fact, as outlined below, 

other Takata inflators with similar 

design features have experienced 

ruptures and high-pressure 

deployments. Similarly, vehicles with 

lower or similar peak temperatures have 

also experienced ruptures and highpressure deployments. Thus, there is no 

persuasive evidence that GM’s claimed 

‘‘unique’’ design advantages lead to a 

reduced risk of inflator rupture.142

Thinner Propellant Wafers. GM 

claims that the thinner (8mm) 

propellant wafers used in the GMT900 

inflators have more predictable ballistic 

properties than thicker (11mm) wafers 

used in many other Takata PSAN 

inflator variants, which ‘‘create less 


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143Fourth Petition at 6–7; see Third Petition at 6. 

144See Third Petition at 6; Fourth Petition at 6– 

7. 

145See GM’s August 23, 2017 Presentation at 44– 

45. 

146 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 60–63, 196. 

147 Id. at para. 212. 

148See id. at paras. 195, 209–13. 

149See id. at para. 263a. 

150See id. at paras. 194, 263a, 273; GM’s August 

23, 2017 Presentation at 43–45, 171–178. 

151 GM’s February 12, 2018 Presentation at 5–18; 

GM’s April 9, 2018 Presentation at 14–15; GM’s 

June 8, 2018 Presentation at 115; 2020 Blomquist 

Report at paras. 96–99, 173, 246–49, 263a. 

152Fourth Petition at 7. While mass (density) is 

relevant to propellant degradation, it is the ventarea-to-burning-surface-area ratio that is most 

relevant to GM’s claims here. See 2020 Blomquist 

Report at para. 65. 

153See 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 65. 

154See id. at paras. 65, 215–22. 

155See id. at paras. 218–20, 263c. 

156See id. at para. 218, 263c. 

157Fourth Petition at 7. 

158 Id. 

159See 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 213–214, 

263b. 

160 Id. at paras. 70, 223, 263d. 

161See id. at paras. 71, 224, 263e. 

162 Id. at paras. 225–26, 263f. 

163See id. 

164First Petition at 12; Second Petition at 11–12; 

Third Petition at 7–8; Fourth Petition at 7. 

165See 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 73–74, 

228, 230. 

166See id. at para. 74. 

excess surface area as they degrade.’’ 143

As a result, GM contends that the 

thinner propellant wafers used in the 

GMT900 vehicles age more slowly and 

burn more efficiently than thicker 

propellant wafers, resulting in a reduced 

risk of inflator rupture.144 In support of 

its argument, GM relies on two 

comparison inflator variants—the SPI AJ 

and the PSPI–L FD.145 Both variants use 

primarily 11mm wafers, are commonly 

installed in vehicle platforms with 

higher peak temperatures, and have 

been shown in Takata test and field data 

to age faster and/or show ruptures and 

abnormal pressures more often than 

many other variants.146

GM’s claim that 8 mm wafers age 

more slowly than 11 mm wafers is not 

supported by the results of the OATK 

Aging Study or by testing data obtained 

on field aged inflators. There was no 

significant difference in wafer growth 

between 8 mm wafers and 11 mm 

wafers for the inflators in the OATK 

Aging Study with as-built moisture 

levels; accordingly, at comparable 

moisture and temperature conditions, 

the growth rates of the two sized wafers 

are essentially the same.147 At most, the 

evidence tends to show that the 

GMT900 inflators age more slowly than 

the worst performing inflator 

variants.148

Moreover, the use of thinner wafers is 

not unique to the GMT900 inflator 

variants, as 8 mm wafers are used in at 

least twenty-one other Takata PSPI 

inflator variants.149 Those non-GM 

variants using 8 mm wafers—including 

certain variants that share many of the 

attributes of the GMT900 inflators—are 

also susceptible to propellant 

degradation, and have experienced 

ruptures and abnormally high pressures 

during ballistic testing.150 Furthermore, 

GM’s contention is undermined by 

ballistic testing conducted on the YP 

and YD inflator variants used in the 

GMT900 vehicles. Thus far, four YD and 

YP inflators have experienced 

abnormally high peak pressures 

consistent with propellant degradation, 

including one field-returned YP inflator 

that recorded a 91 MPa peak internal 

pressure—a near rupture.151 As more 

time passes, it is reasonable to 

anticipate that this trend will 

continue—as has been seen with nondesiccated PSAN inflators generally. 

Larger Vent Area. GM claims that a 

greater vent-area-to-propellant-mass 

ratio provides for more efficient burning 

and deployment of the GMT900 

inflators, resulting in a reduced risk of 

inflator rupture.152 The vent area is not 

variable in any Takata inflator; that is, 

the vent area does not change during air 

bag deployment.153 While the larger 

vent size of a GMT900 inflator might 

provide for more efficient burning 

during normal air bag deployment, the 

same cannot be said during an abnormal 

deployment of a defective PSAN 

inflator.154 Given the sudden increase in 

burning surface-area that may occur 

during an abnormal deployment of a 

defective PSAN inflator, the vent area 

may still be overwhelmed causing steep 

internal pressure increases.155 Because 

the vent area of the GMT900 inflators 

does not, and cannot, change to address 

the steep internal pressure increases 

that occur when a defective PSAN 

inflator abnormally deploys, it does not 

render the inflators resistant to 

rupture.156

Steel Endcaps. GM claims that use of 

a steel endcap on the GMT900 inflators 

better protects the PSAN propellant 

from moisture by creating an improved 

hermetic seal compared to the 

aluminum endcaps used on other 

Takata PSAN inflators.157 However, GM 

provided no evidence to support this 

argument or its statement that steel 

endcaps improved the inflators 

‘‘resistance to high-internal 

pressures’’ 158 beyond an OATK 

investigation that pre-dated the 

petition—which, in any event, only 

illustrated that steel endcaps provide no 

measurable advantage over other 

variants with respect to moisture 

intrusion.159

Other Design Differences. As noted 

above, GM observed several other 

design differences in its presentations to 

NHTSA, but did not reference or 

elaborate on these differences in their 

Petition documents. In any event, the 

mere mention of these differences— 

tablets in a cup (for YP variants), the 

incorporation of a ceramic cushion (also 

for YP variants), and the incorporation 

of a bulkhead disk with an anvil (for YD 

variants)—are unpersuasive. 

GM provided no data demonstrating 

that the behavior of tablets during 

deployment is a major or secondary 

factor in the root cause of ruptures 

arising from degradation, and density 

data in the OATK aging study ‘‘is nearly 

flat for all three variants at as-built and 

flat at mid-level moisture levels at all 

peak temperatures.’’ 160 GM also did not 

provide any information supporting the 

relevance of a ceramic cushion to 

mitigating inflator rupture or 

abnormally high-pressure 

deployments.161 And data provided by 

GM showed that, for inflator variants 

with a bulkhead anvil, the moisture gain 

in the booster propellant did not 

significantly change the main propellant 

moisture levels in inflators, which 

varied in the same small range across all 

inflator variants tested in the OATK 

Aging Study.162 Since the bulkheadanvil feature had no effect on the main 

propellant moisture levels—which 

would be relevant to propellant 

degradation, the cause of inflator 

rupture—GM has not demonstrated that 

this design characteristic results in a 

reduced risk of rupture.163

Larger Cabin Volume & Solar 

Absorbing Glass. GM claims that the 

GMT900 vehicles have larger cabin 

volumes than other vehicles equipped 

with Takata PSAN inflators, and are all 

equipped with solar-absorbing glass 

windshields and side glass, which 

results in lower internal vehicle 

temperatures and thus a reduced risk of 

inflator rupture.164 However, GM did 

not provide any data demonstrating the 

influence of larger cabin volume on 

peak temperatures independent of 

temperature band, or any data specific 

to how solar absorbing glass affects 

interior vehicle temperatures.165 In fact, 

at least one non-GM vehicle has a much 

smaller cabin, yet has a temperature 

profile lower than that claimed for the 

GMT900 vehicles; nonetheless, that 

vehicle—a mid-sized pick-up truck— 

experienced an inflator rupture.166

Further, GM did not demonstrate that 

these alleged lower internal vehicle 

temperatures rendered the GMT900 


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167See id. at paras. 74, 200, 263g; GM’s August 

23, 2017 Presentation at 45. 

168Third Petition at 13. 

169Fourth Petition at 12. 

170See 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 246–49. 

171See id. at paras. 246–49, 267–69, 250–52, 273– 

74. 

172See GM Presentation to NHTSA February 12, 

2018, 5–18; 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 97, 

247. 

173See also 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 97, 

247, 267. 

174See id. at paras. 247–48. 

175See id. at paras. 200, 248–49. 

176See Fourth Petition at 4. 

177 Id. at 12. 

178First Petition at 15–17; Second Petition at 15– 

17. 

179Second Petition at 16. 

180See 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 42, 44– 

45, 53. 

inflators more resilient to rupture. 

Vehicles with similar, if not lower, peak 

vehicle temperatures have experienced 

inflator rupture and abnormally highpressure deployments—including that 

of an inflator variant that is nearly 

identical to the GMT900 YP inflator 

variant.167 Additionally, as explained 

below, at least four inflators from 

GMT900 vehicles have experienced 

abnormally high internal pressure 

deployments indicative of propellant 

degradation and increased risk of 

rupture. Given the evidence of 

degradation in GMT900 inflators and 

inflator variants that possess the same 

design features, the evidence does not 

demonstrate that the GMT900 vehicle 

environment characteristics appreciably 

reduce the risk of inflator rupture for 

defective Takata non-desiccated PSAN 

inflators. 

GM further provided data from 

ballistic testing, field data, and 

temperature and aging studies, as well 

as outputs from a predictive model 

purporting to show that the GMT900 

inflators pose a lower risk of rupture. As 

outlined below there are a number of 

compounding concerns with the 

information and analyses presented that 

render GM’s arguments unpersuasive. 

2. Testing & Field Inflator Analyses 

Testing by Takata. In its Third 

Petition, GM claims that none of the 

GMT900 field return inflators collected 

and sent to Takata for ballistic testing 

and analysis ruptured or demonstrated 

elevated deployment pressure or other 

signs of abnormal deployment.168 In its 

Fourth Petition, GM amended this claim 

to only assert that none of the field 

return inflators had ruptured.169 This 

change may be in response to MEAF 

data indicating that at least four 

inflators recovered from GMT900 

vehicles in Zone A experienced 

abnormally high pressure during 

ballistic testing: Three YP variant 

inflators and one YD inflator returned 

from MY 2007 GMT900 vehicles 

experienced high-pressure deployments. 

One of these even reached a pressure of 

91 MPa: A near rupture.170 It is true 

that, at present, there is no known 

incident of a rupture of a GMT900 

inflator during ballistic testing having 

occurred during the pendency of GM’s 

petition. However, this does not show 

that the defect here is inconsequential to 

safety. Instead, the testing results 

indicate that these inflators—even 

encompassing all of the design 

‘‘advantages’’ claimed by GM—have and 

will continue to suffer propellant 

degradation in a manner similar to the 

other non-desiccated PSAN inflators.171

GM sought to distinguish the YP 

inflator that experienced the nearrupture ballistic result by categorizing it 

as a ‘‘Gen1’’ YP inflator that differs from 

‘‘Gen2’’ YP inflators based on a shift 

from propellant tablets to granules, a 

minor decrease in the amount of tablet 

propellant weight, the use of a cup 

instead of a sleeve to hold the 

propellant tablets, and the addition of 

the ceramic cushions.172 As discussed 

above, GM has not shown that these 

particular features prevent propellant 

degradation or provide special 

resiliency against inflator rupture.173

Both Gen1 and Gen2 use the same 

number of 8 mm wafers, have the same 

vent area, and experience the same invehicle environmental conditions; yet, 

the 91 MPa deployment is clear 

evidence that the YP variant is 

experiencing propellant degradation 

that leads to ruptures and/or abnormally 

high internal inflator pressures.174 In 

addition, the nearly identical SPI DH/ 

MG inflator variant—which shares most 

design attributes, the same diameter 

growth rate, and the same peak vehicle 

temperature band—exhibited a rupture 

rate of 1 per 6,771 during ballistic 

testing.175 GM has not explained how 

these ballistic test results can be 

reconciled with its position that the 

GMT900 inflators will not rupture 

‘‘within even unrealistically 

conservative vehicle-service life 

estimates.’’ 176 Given the severity of a 

rupture outcome, the observed 

propellant degradation in the GMT900 

inflators and inflator variants with 

similar (if not identical) characteristics 

cannot be ignored; these test results are 

consistent with the notion that the 

GMT900 inflators have and will 

continue to suffer propellant 

degradation in a manner similar to other 

non-desiccated PSAN inflators. 

Further, NHTSA has concerns about 

the size of the ballistic-testing 

population. GM asserts that in 

deploying over 4,200 inflators taken 

from GMT900 vehicles, none have 

ruptured.177 By comparison, the total 

GMT900 population under 

consideration is nearly 5.9 million 

vehicles. Thus, the number of ballistic 

tests conducted is approximately 0.07% 

of the total GMT900 population. Even 

when only comparing the number of 

inflators tested to the approximately 2 

million 2007 and 2008 MY GMT900 

vehicles under Petition (the oldest 

GMT900 vehicles covered by the 

Petition), the number of ballistic tests 

conducted is approximately 0.21% of 

that total population. By comparison, 

for example, that percentage of the 

GMT900 population tested is smaller 

than the percentage of inflators tested, 

as of November 2019, in a population of 

a non-GM mid-sized pick-up vehicle— 

1.81%—with one observed test rupture. 

Rupture risk in non-desiccated PSAN 

inflators increases with age/exposure; 

although testing may not yet have 

resulted in a rupture, that does not 

mean that ruptures will not occur in the 

future. 

Stress-Strength Interference Analysis. 

In the First and Second Petitions, GM 

includes a ‘‘stress-strength interference 

analysis’’ that, it contended, suggests 

that propellant in MY 2007 and 2008 

GMT900 inflators had not degraded to a 

sufficient degree to create a rupture 

risk.178 GM explains stress-strength 

interference analysis as the plotting of 

curves on a graph related to the 

diameter of field-returned YP and YD 

inflators and the diameter of non-GM 

inflators that have ruptured during 

ballistic testing; the amount of overlap 

between the two curves ‘‘represents the 

probability of rupture in a particular 

group of inflators.’’ 179 GM did not 

discuss this assessment in its Third or 

Fourth Petitions, appearing to have 

largely abandoned it in favor of the 

OATK Aging Study and OATK Model 

discussed below. In any event, NHTSA 

does not find it persuasive or 

determinative on the question of 

inconsequentiality. 

First, this analysis only measures the 

outside diameter of propellant wafers. 

While wafer growth and diameter are an 

indicator of propellant degradation, they 

are not the only indicator that 

degradation has occurred. As seen in 

inflators returned from the field, 

degradation is evidenced by the 

formation of pores or fissures in the 

propellant wafers, as well as changes in 

the propellant wafer density and 

diameter.180 Therefore, reliance on 

wafer growth alone is of limited utility. 


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181See id. at paras. 234, 266 (noting also the 

‘‘wide variation of vehicle utilization by 

consumers’’ that ‘‘makes the analysis difficult to use 

with confidence’’). Indeed, GM’s analysis did not 

address the rupture of an inflator variant with a 

wafer-growth rate similar to the YP variant, which 

ruptured at a field age of 11.6 years in Florida. Id. 

at para. 235. 

182Fourth Petition at 12. 

183See GM’s June 18, 2018 Presentation at 36. 

Had GM used either the NHTSA 1995 or NHTSA– 

EPA 2016 attrition models when the estimating the 

number of GMT900 air bag deployments that have 

occurred in the past, GM would have estimated 

there to have been fewer rupture-free deployments 

of its inflators in the field. See NHTSA 1995 

attrition model: Updated Vehicle Survivability and 

Travel Mileage Schedules, NHTSA (Report Number: 

DOT HS 808 339) (Nov. 1995); NHTSA–EPA 2016 

attrition model: EPA, CARB, & NHTSA, Draft 

Technical Assessment Report: Midterm Evaluation 

of Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 

Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 

Standards for Model Years 2022–2025, EPA–420– 

D–16–900 July 2016, available at https://

www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/cafe/ 

Draft-TAR-Final.pdf. 

184As noted above, the GM Aging Study was 

intended to demonstrate the short-term safety of 

GM’s inflators while the longer-term OATK Aging 

Study was conducted. In previously granting GM 

additional time to provide evidence in support of 

its Petition, the Agency found GM’s reliance on, 

inter alia, GM’s Aging Study, as ‘‘probative 

evidence’’ to support its claim of 

inconsequentiality. 81 FR 85681, 85684 (Nov. 28, 

2016). The Agency only found this information 

tended to support GM’s petition ‘‘at least with 

respect to the short-term safety’’ of the GMT900 

inflators—it was not sufficient to prove 

inconsequentiality. It does not appear that GM 

directly relies on the results of the GM Aging Study 

in reaching its conclusions, and therefore we do not 

analyze it here. 

185 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 112. 

186See GM’s August 23, 2017 Presentation at 171. 

187See id.; supra note 51 and accompanying text; 

2020 Blomquist Report at para. 108. 

188See 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 106. 

189See First Petition, Ex.D (reflecting 891 

inflators in Statement of Work); GM’s August 23, 

2017 Presentation at 24 (‘‘700+ Inflators’’). 

190See 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 236–45, 

271. 

191See id. 

192 GM August 23, 2017 Presentation at 17–18. 

193 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 239. 

And second, this analysis focused on 

propellant with an average age of eight 

to nine years. As the vast majority of 

inflators take longer than that time 

period to experience propellant 

degradation sufficient for rupture, 

looking at inflators of this age is also of 

limited value.181

Crash Deployment Estimates. In the 

Fourth Petition, GM estimates that 

66,894 Takata passenger air bag inflators 

have deployed in GMT900 vehicles 

without a reported rupture.182 It is true 

that during the pendency of GM’s 

petition, there is no known incident of 

a rupture of a GMT900 inflator in the 

field. However, that a rupture has not 

yet occurred or been reported does not 

mean that a rupture will not occur in 

the future. This is particularly relevant 

in the case of Takata non-desiccated 

PSAN inflators, where the risk of 

rupture increases as inflators age and 

have more exposure to heat and 

humidity, and in the HAH and Zone A 

geographic areas described above, first 

becomes manifest after more than ten 

years in service. 

Moreover, GM’s assertions based on 

‘‘rupture-free’’ crash deployment 

estimates provide no support for the 

notion that, in the event of a GMT900 

inflator rupture, the result will be 

inconsequential to safety. As noted 

above, when taking into consideration 

the Agency’s noncompliance precedent, 

the likelihood of a rupture is not the 

only relevant factor here. Indeed, an 

important factor is also the severity of 

the consequence of the defect were it to 

occur—i.e., the safety risk to an 

occupant who is exposed to an inflator 

rupture. The known consequence of a 

rupturing Takata non-desiccated PSAN 

air bag inflators is quite severe: The 

spraying of metal shrapnel toward 

vehicle occupants. GM does not provide 

any information to suggest that result 

would be any different were such an 

inflator to rupture in a GMT900 vehicle. 

Even if GM’s crash deployment 

estimates were informative, GM’s 

estimate does not prove a helpful 

comparison, as it includes both air bag 

deployments in vehicles when they 

were new and unlikely to have 

experienced propellant degradation, as 

well as deployments in vehicles that 

were older and exposed to more 

temperature fluctuation and 

environmental moisture (i.e., 

degradation). This estimate therefore 

fails to account for the differences in the 

risk of rupture for new vehicles and 

older vehicles. Additionally, in 

estimating the number of past GMT900 

air bag deployments GM utilized its 

own attrition model, which resulted in 

a higher estimated number of 

deployments when compared to 

estimates based on NHTSA’s attrition 

models.183

GM’s estimate also is based only on 

reported ruptures, and passenger air bag 

ruptures in the field may not always be 

reported (and as such)—particularly if 

no passenger was present in the seat at 

the time of rupture. 

3. Aging Studies 184

The parameters of the OATK Aging 

Study are discussed above, and while 

the Agency appreciates the work that 

went into the Study, the Agency does 

not find the results of the Study 

persuasive for making an 

inconsequentiality determination, for 

several reasons. As an initial matter, 

certain inputs into the OATK Study are 

not sufficiently reliable. Temperature 

data from the GM Temperature Study 

and the Atlas Cabin Temperature Study 

informed the OATK Study’s 

temperature cycles and temperature 

bands.185 However, the GM 

Temperature Study included only two 

of the twelve vehicle models covered by 

the Petition, and was limited to only a 

handful of vehicles.186 The Atlas Cabin 

Temperature Study also only utilized 

eleven non-GM vehicles and the Pontiac 

Vibe—no GMT900 vehicles.187 In 

addition, for the GM Temperature 

Study, GM reported on one, two, or 

three vehicles subjected to testing for 

lengths of time that, at most, were only 

vaguely described—information that is 

critical to determining the reliability of 

the study.188 Furthermore, the OATK 

Aging Study was based on analysis of 

fewer than 1,000 artificially aged 

inflators.189 As outlined above, such 

low sample sizes (both in input from the 

temperature studies, and in the number 

of inflators tested) limits confidence in 

the Aging Study results, as well as any 

further study or model that relies on the 

results of that Aging Study. 

Second, importantly, the OATK Aging 

Study did not appear to accurately 

replicate the real-world degradation 

process observed to occur in field-aged 

inflators.190 The underlying defect in 

the GMT900 inflators is a consequence 

of inflator propellant degradation. As 

seen in inflators returned from the field, 

degradation is evidenced by the 

formation of pores or fissures in the 

propellant wafers, as well as changes in 

the propellant wafer density and 

diameter. While the Aging Study did 

show changes in inflator wafer density 

and diameter, the density changes 

observed during the Study did not 

replicate field aging in inflators of veryhigh moisture content, nor did it 

replicate the formation of pores or 

fissures seen in field-aged inflators.191

Additionally, the lab-aged inflators in 

the OATK Aging Study showed no 

tendency to increase in pressure when 

wafers were above the diameter were 

accelerated burning is expected,192

despite this result being welldocumented in most Takata inflator 

variants.193

A third concern is the Aging Study’s 

presumption that fifty-six four hour 

cycles of laboratory accelerated aging is 

equivalent to one year of aging in the 

field. It is the Agency’s understanding 

that this ‘‘equivalent year’’ is derived 

from the number of days in Miami, FL 

that GM presented as reaching 


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194 Id. at para. 241; see generally GM’s August 23, 

2017 Presentation at 12. 

195 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 241. 

196 Id. at para. 242; see id. at para.270. 

197See id. at paras. 196–205. 

198 Id. at para. 196. 

199 GM’s August 23, 2017 presentation at 45; 2020 

Blomquist Report at para. 199 & n.13. 

200See Fourth Petition at 4. 

201See 2020 Blomquist Report at paras. 201–05. 

202 Id.; information received by NHTSA pursuant 

to Standing General Order 2015–01A. 

203 2020 Blomquist Report at para. 204. 

204 Id. at para. 205. 

205See also id. at paras. 250, 272. 

206See id. at para. 252 (observing high-pressure 

and rupture events in the Takata non-desiccated 

PSAN population ‘‘are relatively rare . . . for all 

vehicle platforms, with rupture rates for most 

variants well under 1%. Modeling at sufficient 

fidelity to predict low frequency events is 

challenging’’). The Model’s reliability for the 

purpose of advancing GM’s arguments here is 

further called into question by its inability to 

produce similar probabilities for GM’s YP inflators 

and the non-GM DH/MG inflators, which are nearly 

identical. See id. 

207See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 10–14. 

temperatures above 90° F.194 However, 

this presumes that propellant 

degradation only occurs on days or 

times that reach peak temperatures of 

90° F, which is not correct as 

demonstrated by the many inflators— 

both in the field and in testing—that 

have been exposed to lower 

temperatures and still experienced 

propellant degradation and inflator 

rupture.195 This test scheme also 

presumes that the temperature cycle can 

be condensed from a twenty-four hour 

day to four hours without compromising 

or altering the type of degradation 

caused to the propellant.196 Based upon 

the information presented to NHTSA, it 

does not appear that this was the case. 

It is also appropriate to note here that 

GM’s reliance on the use of 

‘‘comparison inflators’’ throughout its 

research (the SPI AJ and PSPI–L FD— 

the latter of which was, for example, 

included in the OATK Aging Study) to 

demonstrate the safety of the GMT900 

inflators is misplaced. First, arguing that 

the GMT900 inflators are ‘‘safer’’ than 

other inflators with the same defect does 

not answer the question of whether that 

defect is inconsequential to safety. 

Second, the selected comparison 

inflators have been shown in Takata test 

and field data to age faster and show 

ruptures and abnormal pressures more 

often than many other variants.197

Additionally, unlike the GMT900 

inflator variants, the comparison 

variants use primarily 11mm wafers (as 

opposed to 8mm wafers) and are 

installed on vehicles with higher peak 

temperatures than what GM claims as 

the GMT900 peak temperature.198

Comparing GMT900 inflators to such 

disparate non-GM inflators does little to 

quantify the risk posed by GM’s 

inflators, and does not demonstrate that 

the defect is inconsequential to safety. 

And finally, analysis of other inflator 

variants that possess the same attributes 

as the GMT900 inflators also weakens 

GM’s claim that the unique inflator 

design differences and vehicle 

environment of the GMT900 vehicles 

render the GMT900 inflators more 

resilient to rupture. The non-GM SPI 

DH/MG inflator variant is nearly 

identical to GM’s YP inflator in that it 

also uses 8mm wafers and enjoys a low 

peak inflator surface temperature. Data 

showed that diameter measurements for 

the (GM) YP inflators and (non-GM) DH/ 

MG inflators were essentially the same 

after field aging, reinforcing the 

similarity of the two variants.199

Notably, the DH/MG inflator variant has 

exhibited a rupture rate of 1 per of 6,771 

ballistic tests. GM has not provided any 

further, persuasive information that 

would explain how these ballistic 

results can be reconciled with GM’s 

position that its YP inflators will not 

rupture ‘‘within even unrealistically 

conservative vehicle-service life 

estimates.’’ 200

Similarly, the non-GM PSPI–6 YB and 

PSPI–6 XG inflator variants, which both 

use primarily 8mm wafers, can provide 

insight into GM’s YD inflators.201 The 

YB variant is used on two non-GM 

vehicle platforms, one of which 

provides peak vehicle temperatures 

slightly lower than the GMT900, and 

one of which provides peak vehicle 

temperatures slightly higher than the 

GMT900. The non-GM platform using 

the YB variant that experiences higher 

peak vehicle temperature conditions has 

experienced at least one field rupture, 

three inflator ruptures during fieldreturn ballistic testing, and one 

abnormally high-pressure result during 

ballistic testing.202 ‘‘These results 

indicate that an 8mm wafer inflator 

variant experiencing high peak inflator 

temperature in Zone A can rupture at a 

similar age to the Vibe PSPI–L FD (with 

an 11mm wafer) that GM used for 

comparison.’’ 203 Another non-GM 

vehicle platform using 8mm wafers in 

the PSPI–6 XG variant has demonstrated 

ruptures or abnormally high pressures 

during ballistic testing at a rate of 1.06% 

of inflators tested, with all ruptures 

occurring in inflators field aged 9.4 to 

10.3 years.204 Even assuming this 

vehicle platform had a higher peak 

vehicle temperature than that alleged for 

the GMT900 vehicles, analysis of these 

similar inflator variants contradicts 

GM’s claims that thinner propellant 

wafers render the GMT900 inflators less 

susceptible to rupture and degradation. 

Given the severity of a rupture 

outcome, the observed propellant 

degradation in the GMT900 inflators 

and inflator variants with similar (if not 

identical) characteristics cannot be 

ignored; these test results are consistent 

with the notion that the GMT900 

inflators have and will continue to 

suffer propellant degradation in a 

manner similar to other non-desiccated 

PSAN inflators—and, in all events, that 

the risk is not inconsequential to safety. 

4. Predictive Modeling 

As noted above, it is the Agency’s 

understanding that this Model was 

informed by the GM Temperature Study 

and the Atlas Cabin Temperature Study, 

as well as the GM Aging Study and the 

OATK Aging Study.205 Accordingly, the 

concerns the Agency has with those 

inputs (also described above) also 

adversely affect the reliability of the 

Model as it applies to GM’s arguments 

here. The implications of this are even 

more pronounced when the number of 

trials in the underlying simulation are 

too small to detect certain rupture rates: 

If the risk of rupture is 1 in 100,000, 

then based on a Monte Carlo simulation 

with 32,000 trials, the OATK Model 

output would likely predict a zero risk 

of rupture, clearly understating the 

potential risk. Even setting aside 

concerns regarding the inputs, given the 

relative rarity of high pressure and 

rupture events across the nondesiccated PSAN inflator population, it 

is difficult to place much reliability on 

the OATK Model outputs when 

evaluating the likelihood of a rupture of 

a YP or YD inflator variant.206

Additionally, the OATK Model 

outputs underestimate the risk for 

consumers with YP or YD inflators 

exposed to the most extreme conditions. 

The OATK Model selects 32,000 

random scenarios that combine different 

inputs of density and pressure; some of 

the 32,000 selected scenarios will pose 

a higher risk (i.e., have a combination of 

density and pressure that is more 

rupture-prone) and some will pose a 

lower risk (i.e., be less ruptureprone).207 As a result, the output will 

tend to reflect the risk posed by an 

average inflator, thereby 

underestimating the risk posed by 

inflators subjected to the most extreme 

conditions. These shortcomings also 

reflect an underestimation of how 

quickly an inflator degrades— 

undermining GM’s claim that GMT900 

inflators will not reach a ‘‘threshold risk 


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208See Third Petition at 15; GM’s August 23, 2017 

Presentation at 22, 24–30; GM’s June 8, 2018 

Presentation at 11–17, 24–26. 

209See generally NIST/SEMATECH e-Handbook 

of Statistical Methods at 6.2.3.2, available at http:// 

www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook (choosing a 

sampling plan with a given Operating Characteristic 

(‘‘OC’’) Curve; id. at 7.2.2.2 (providing example 

calculation of sample-size estimate for limiting 

error); id. at 3.1.3.4 (Populations and Sampling). 

210See generally supra. 

211While GM’s upper bounds on the lifetime risk 

could be construed as a type of margin of error, it 

does not take into account important sources of 

variation, such as the Monte Carlo simulation. 

212See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 20–22. 

213See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 21–22, 

39. 

214 GM’s July 2018 Response (Ex.A) did provide 

estimates specific to Zone A; however, the response 

pooled the risk for the two inflator variants (YD and 

YP). 

215There were also significant inconsistencies 

between the production numbers GM relied upon 

in arriving at these estimates and comparative 

registration data. See GM’s July 2018 Response at 

6–8. Additionally, GM’s future deployment risk 

estimates assume that a passenger will be present 

in 25% of future GMT900 crashes, which is not 

consistent with National Automotive Sampling 

System General Estimates System (NASS GES) 

estimates. 

216 Id. Ex.C (providing, inter alia, temperature 

bands and probability). 

217See GM’s August 23, 2017 Presentation 8 

(reflecting average peak and maximum peak 

temperatures in Michigan, Florida, and Arizona). 

218See GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 26 

(utilizing an average probability of failure for T1 

and T2 as an upper bound). 

219See id. at 36 (reflecting 25% passenger air bag 

activation rate for YD, and 100% activation rate for 

YP in front deployment level crashes). 

220 Information received by NHTSA pursuant to 

Standing General Order 2015–01A. 

221Third Petition at 17; see also Fourth Petition 

at 16; GM’s June 8, 2018 Presentation at 5. 

level’’ within 30 years of worst case 

environmental field exposure in Miami. 

5. Risk Assessments 

GM also presented statistical risk 

assessments from third parties 

Cornerstone and Professor Barnett, and 

OATK, which attempted to quantify the 

future risk of rupture for the GMT900 

inflator variants, as described above. 

NHTSA does not find GM’s statistical 

analysis persuasive, as there are 

multiple foundational concerns with 

GM’s risk estimates. 

First, GM’s risk assessments depend 

upon the inputs and outputs from the 

OATK Model, the OATK Aging Study, 

and GM’s crash data estimates, as well 

as information from the MEAF file.208

Given the extent to which GM’s various 

analyses and assessments inform one 

another, it is critical that the studies that 

fall earlier in the chain and the 

associated results and conclusions are 

sound. As described above, GM has not 

demonstrated the reliability and 

persuasiveness of those studies or the 

associated results and conclusions. 

Second, it is a basic principle of 

statistics that to demonstrate an 

outcome with higher confidence, all 

other things being equal, larger sample 

sizes are necessary.209 Given the low 

number of inflators tested and utilized 

in the earlier studies 210—particularly 

when combined with the challenge 

posed by using models to predict lowfrequency events—it is difficult to have 

confidence in GM’s risk estimates, 

especially in the context of a decision 

on inconsequentiality. Moreover, GM 

did not provide any margins of error on 

their risk estimates—particularly 

important when evaluating the risk of a 

catastrophic event like an inflator 

rupture.211

Third, GM’s comparative risk 

assessments (comparing the rupture rate 

of GMT900 inflators to those of other 

inflators through the OATK Aging 

Study, Takata MEAF data, and GM’s 

crash estimates) 212 simply assert that 

GMT900 inflators are safer than other 

inflators—not that the defect is 

inconsequential. 

And fourth, even to the extent GM’s 

per-deployment or lifetime risk 

estimates inform the question of 

inconsequentiality, they do not reflect 

the compounding risk that arises from 

having millions of affected vehicles. The 

per-deployment risk is the risk that one 

specific air bag will rupture; the fleetlevel risk is the probability that at least 

one air bag will rupture among the 

thousands of air bag deployments 

expected to occur in the nearly 5.9 

million affected GMT900 vehicles over 

the coming years. GM did not provide 

any risk assessments that acknowledge 

the risk presented by the GMT900 

inflator population as a whole, even 

though the fleet-level risk would be 

much larger than the per-deployment 

risk. 

NHTSA also has additional, specific 

concerns about GM’s various risk 

estimates. GM’s comparative risk 

assessments—to the extent they inform 

the question of inconsequentiality—are 

undercut by the ballistic results 

showing elevated pressures discussed 

above. That a rupture has not yet been 

observed does not mean that ruptures 

will never occur—nor that the risk to 

safety is inconsequential—and estimates 

that ignore evidence that GM’s inflators 

are experiencing a similar manner of 

degradation do not provide meaningful 

comparison. 

In addition, GM’s comparative risk 

estimates pool the risk posed by 

inflators across ages and/or Zones, even 

though the risk of rupture varies greatly 

between Zones A, B, and C and as the 

inflators age.213 This pooling typically 

dilutes the risk that exists in the higher 

risk Zone A by combining it with the 

lower risk Zones.214 Similarly, pooling 

younger inflators with older inflators 

dilutes the estimated risk of rupture for 

those older inflators, particularly as 

inflator age plays a vital role in the 

underlying defect. GM’s comparative 

assessment of estimated field crash 

rupture rates also assumes both that 

GM’s crash deployment estimates are 

accurate and that passenger air bag 

ruptures are reported (as such). As 

discussed above, these assumptions are 

not supported.215

Similarly concerning is that GM’s perdeployment risk estimate of zero 

percent for the GMT900 vehicles relies 

on the assumption that GM’s vehicles 

have a low vehicle cabin 

temperature,216 but data provided by 

GM suggested that at least one GMT900 

variant fell within a higher temperature 

range during testing—undermining both 

its risk estimates and GM’s argument 

that all GMT900 vehicles have a lower 

cabin temperature due to a unique 

vehicle environment.217 GM’s ‘‘lifetime 

risk’’ estimate similarly suffers from 

questionable temperature range 

assumptions.218 Moreover, the YP 

inflators will deploy any time sensors 

determine a crash of sufficient force is 

in progress—whether a passenger is 

present or not.219 It is therefore not 

accurate to assume that occupants 

would not be harmed by the rupture of 

a passenger air bag when no passenger 

is present; indeed, occupants have 

suffered injuries from Takata inflator 

ruptures that did not occur directly in 

front of them.220 And just like the 

assessments comparing GMT900 inflator 

rupture rates to the OATK Aging Study 

and MEAF data, GM’s prediction of 

future rupture rates implies that because 

ruptures have (reportedly) not yet 

occurred they are unlikely to occur in 

the future. As this assumption is not 

accurate, these estimates are not 

persuasive in supporting GM’s position 

that the Takata PSAN defect in the 

GMT900 vehicles is inconsequential to 

safety. 

6. Dealer Replacements as Risk Creation 

Finally, GM’s claim that dealers 

conducting repairs for these vehicles 

could ‘‘create risk’’ to consumers 221 has 

no bearing on the question of whether 

the defect is inconsequential to safety. 

Even if the Agency were to consider any 

potential risk posed by potential 

improper repair in analyzing the 

consequentiality of a rupturing inflator, 

GM provided no information to 

corroborate or support this broad, 


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222See Nat’l Coach Corp.; Denial of Petition for 

Inconsequential [Defect], 47 FR 49517 (Nov. 1, 

1982); Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd.; Grant of Petition for 

Inconsequential Defect, 48 FR 27635 (June 16, 

1983). 

223See Final Determination & Order Regarding 

Safety Related Defects in the 1971 Fiat Model 850 

and the 1970–74 Fiat Model 124 Automobiles 

Imported and Distributed by Fiat Motors of N. Am., 

Inc.; Ruling on Petition of Inconsequentiality, 45 FR 

2134 (Jan. 10, 1980). 

224Cf. Gen. Motors, LLC; Grant of Petition for 

Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance, 78 FR 

35355–01, 2013 WL 2489784 (June 12, 2013) 

(finding noncompliance inconsequential where 

‘‘occupant classification system will continue to 

operate as designed and will enable or disable the 

air bag as intended’’). 

225See Final Determination & Order Regarding 

Safety Related Defects in the 1971 Fiat Model 850 

and the 1970–74 Fiat Model 124 Automobiles 

Imported and Distributed by Fiat Motors of N. Am., 

Inc.; Ruling on Petition of Inconsequentiality, 45 FR 

2134 (Jan. 10, 1980) (rejecting argument there was 

adequate warning to vehicle owners of underbody 

corrosion, as the average owner does not undertake 

an inspection of the underbody of a vehicle, and 

interior corrosion of the underbody may not be 

visible). 

226See Nat’l Coach Corp.; Denial of Petition for 

Inconsequential [Defect], 47 FR 49517 (Nov. 1, 

1982) (observing, inter alia, that other 

manufacturers had conducted recalls for similar 

issues in the past, and that, even if current owners 

were aware of the issue, subsequent owners were 

unlikely to be aware absent a recall). 

speculative statement. GM can and does 

ensure quality recall repairs by 

specifying technician qualifications and 

repair techniques for its franchised 

dealer network. 

V. Decision 

The relief sought here is 

extraordinary, and GM’s Petition goes 

far beyond the scope and complexity of 

any inconsequentiality petition that the 

Agency has considered, let alone 

granted. This is with respect not only to 

the volume of information and analyses 

bearing on the issue, but also the nature 

of the defect and associated safety risk. 

Indeed, the Petition concerning 

GMT900 inflators is quite distinct from 

the previous petitions discussed above, 

for example, relating to defective labels 

that may (or may not) mislead the user 

of the vehicle to create an unsafe 

condition.222 Nor is the risk here 

comparable to a deteriorating exterior 

component of vehicle that—even if an 

average owner is unlikely to inspect the 

component—might (or might not) be 

visibly discerned.223

Rather, the defect here poses an 

unsafe condition caused by the 

degradation of an important component 

of a safety device that is designed to 

protect vehicle occupants in crashes. 

Instead of protecting occupants, this 

propellant degradation can lead to an 

uncontrolled explosion of the inflator 

and propel sharp metal fragments 

toward occupants in a manner that can 

cause serious injury, including 

lacerations to the face, neck and chest, 

and even death.224 This unsafe 

condition—hidden in an air bag 

module—is not discernible even by a 

diligent vehicle owner, let alone an 

average owner.225

Moreover, nineteen manufacturers 

(including GM for other populations of 

their vehicles) have conducted similar 

recalls of other non-desiccated PSAN 

inflators. NHTSA has been offered no 

persuasive reason to think that without 

a recall, even if current owners are 

aware of the defect and instant petition, 

subsequent owners of vehicles equipped 

with GMT900 air bag inflators would be 

made aware of the issue.226 This is not 

the type of defect for which notice alone 

enables an owner to avoid the safety 

risk. A remedy is required. 

The threshold of evidence necessary 

to prove the inconsequentiality of a 

defect such as this one—involving the 

potential performance failure of safetycritical equipment—is very difficult to 

overcome. GM bears a heavy burden, 

and the evidence and argument GM 

provides suffers from numerous, 

significant deficiencies, as previously 

described in detail. 

The ‘‘unique’’ inflator design 

differences and vehicle features to 

which GM points are unpersuasive. The 

use of thinner wafers is not unique to 

GMT900 inflators—other Takata inflator 

variants with 8mm wafers have 

experienced ruptures and abnormally 

high pressures during ballistic testing— 

and the results of the OATK Aging 

Study and testing data obtained on field 

aged inflators, at most, show that 

GMT900 inflators age more slowly than 

the worst performing inflator variants. 

Moreover, four GMT900 inflators have 

experienced abnormally high peak 

pressures consistent with propellant 

degradation. Larger vent areas in 

GMT900 inflators do not render those 

inflators more resistant to rupture, as 

the vent area does not change to address 

steep internal pressure increases that 

occur when a defective PSAN inflator 

abnormally deploys. GM did not 

demonstrate that steel endcaps provide 

any measurable advantage over other 

variants with respect to moisture 

intrusion. GM did not provide data 

demonstrating a correlation between 

lower peak temperatures and either 

solar absorbing glass or larger cabin 

volume, or demonstrate that alleged 

internal vehicle temperatures rendered 

the GMT900 inflators more resilient to 

rupture. And other design differences to 

which GM points—tablets in a cup, the 

incorporation of a ceramic cushion, and 

the incorporation of a bulkhead disk 

with an anvil—were not discussed in 

detail in its Petition, and in any event, 

either lack supporting data, or the data 

that GM did provide does not 

demonstrate that the design difference 

results in a reduced risk of rupture. 

GM’s stress-strength interference 

analysis ignores other indicators of 

propellant degradation, and relies 

heavily on relatively young inflators. 

And GM’s crash deployment estimates 

also raise concerns for the Agency. That 

a rupture has not yet occurred or been 

reported does not mean that a rupture 

will not occur in the future, and it 

provides no support for the notion that 

in the event of a rupture, the result will 

be inconsequential to safety. Moreover, 

GM’s estimates incorrectly imply that 

older vehicles have the same risk of 

rupture as newer vehicles, use GM’s 

own attrition model instead of 

NHTSA’s, and assume consistent 

reporting of ruptures and injuries 

despite GM having done no testing or 

analysis to determine the impact of a 

rupture. 

The aging studies on which GM relies 

are similarly deficient and 

unpersuasive. These studies are 

adversely affected by inputs from two 

other studies that were not specific to 

GMT900 vehicles (in one of which 

certain information was vaguely 

described) and were limited in sample 

size. The OATK Aging Study also does 

not appear to replicate real-world 

propellant degradation, including 

degradation that might occur on days or 

times that do not reach peak 

temperatures of 90 °F, even though 

degraded and ruptured inflators in the 

field and in testing show that 

degradation occurs at lower 

temperatures. In addition, in its 

research, GM used certain comparison 

inflators despite key differences 

between the GMT900 inflators in wafer 

diameter and peak-temperature 

exposure. The comparison inflators 

have also been shown in testing and 

field data to age faster and show 

ruptures and abnormal pressures more 

often than many other variants, and 

there are other comparator candidates 

that have ruptured in ballistic testing— 

and one such inflator ruptured at least 

once in the field. And in any event, 

contending that the GMT900 inflators 

are ‘‘safer’’ does not answer the question 

of whether the defect is inconsequential 

to safety. 

GM’s predictive modeling and risk 

assessments are also adversely affected 

by unreliable inputs, with the former 

also understating the potential risk and 

the latter further limited by sample size, 

the pooling of risk across inflator age 


jbell on DSKJLSW7X2PROD with NOTICES
76174 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 229 / Friday, November 27, 2020 / Notices 

1Public Law 115–141, div. L, tit. I, H.R. 1625 at 

646 (as enrolled Mar. 23, 2018). 

2Public Law 114–113, div. L, tit. I, § 152, 129 

Stat. 2242, 2856. 

3Public Law 115–141, div. L, tit. I, H.R. 1625 at 

646 (as enrolled Mar. 23, 2018). 

and zone in comparative risk 

assessments (which only assert that 

GMT900 inflators are safer than other 

inflators, not that the risk to safety is 

inconsequential), a failure to address 

fleet-level risk, and assumptions about 

vehicle cabin temperature, potential 

harm to occupants, and the future 

occurrence and reporting of ruptures in 

the field. GM also did not provide any 

margins of error on their estimates. 

GM’s speculative claim that dealers 

conducting repairs could ‘‘create risk’’ 

to consumers is also unsupported—even 

if the Agency were to consider such a 

risk in analyzing the consequentiality of 

a rupturing inflator—and GM has the 

ability to ensure quality repairs. 

Perhaps most importantly, the testing 

done by Takata, even with a small 

sample size, reflects abnormally high 

pressure during ballistic testing— 

indicative of the type of propellant 

degradation that leads to ruptures. 

Given the severity of the consequence of 

propellant degradation in these air bag 

inflators—the rupture of the inflator and 

metal shrapnel sprayed at vehicle 

occupants—a finding of 

inconsequentiality to safety demands 

extraordinarily robust and persuasive 

evidence. What GM presents here, while 

valuable and informative in certain 

respects, suffers from far too many 

shortcomings, both when the evidence 

is assessed individually and in its 

totality, to demonstrate that the defect 

in GMT900 inflators is not important or 

can otherwise be ignored as a matter of 

safety. 

GM has not demonstrated that the 

defect is inconsequential to motor 

vehicle safety. Accordingly, GM’s 

Petition is hereby denied and GM is 

obligated to provide notification of, and 

a remedy for, the defect pursuant to 49 

U.S.C. 30118 and 30120. Within 30 days 

of the date of this decision, GM shall 

submit to NHTSA a proposed schedule 

for the notification of GMT900 vehicle 

owners and the launch of a remedy 

required to fulfill those obligations. 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30101, et seq., 30118, 

30120; delegations of authority at 49 CFR 

1.95 and 501.8. 

Jeffrey M. Giuseppe, 

Associate Administrator, Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2020–26148 Filed 11–25–20; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE: 4910–59–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Notice of Funding Opportunity for 

Letters of Interest for the RRIF Express 

Pilot Program Under the Railroad 

Rehabilitation & Improvement 

Financing Program 

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of funding opportunity. 

SUMMARY: This Notice of Funding 

Opportunity (NOFO) for the RRIF 

Express Pilot Program expands 

eligibility criteria and extends the 

deadline for submission of Letters of 

Interest. The eligibility criteria in 

section IV. are revised to: Increase the 

total project size limit to $150 million, 

broaden project scope consistent with 

the RRIF statute, and expand the 

proportion of refinancing allowed to 

75%. Prospective RRIF borrowers who 

have been accepted into the RRIF 

Express program may amend their 

Letters of Interest to reflect the changed 

criteria. Prospective RRIF borrowers 

who received advice from DOT on 

issues to address in revising and 

resubmitting Letters of Interest may also 

take advantage of the expanded criteria 

while also following the advice 

provided. All projects that were 

previously eligible for RRIF Express 

financing remain eligible under this 

NOFO. 

DATES: Letters of Interest from 

prospective RRIF borrowers for the RRIF 

Express Program will be accepted on 

rolling basis until available funding is 

expended or this notice is superseded 

by another notice. 

Prospective RRIF borrowers that have 

previously submitted a Letter of Interest 

but that also seek acceptance into the 

RRIF Express Program should resubmit 

a Letter of Interest following the 

instructions below. Prospective RRIF 

borrowers who previously submitted 

Letters of Interest under a previous RRIF 

Express Notice of Funding Opportunity 

(published on December 13, 2019, 

March 16, 2020, or June 19, 2020), and 

whose Letters of Interest have not been 

returned as ineligible, do not have to reapply, and may amend their Letter of 

Interest to take advantage of the revised 

eligibility criteria. Prospective RRIF 

borrowers whose Letter of Interest for 

RRIF Express was returned by the 

Bureau with advice on issues to address 

in resubmitting a Letter of Interest may 

also take advantage of the revised 

eligibility criteria while also following 

the advice provided. 

Irrespective of the above, the Bureau 

continues to accept Letters of Interest on 

a rolling basis from any prospective 

RRIF borrower interested in receiving 

RRIF credit assistance only (i.e., without 

participation in the RRIF Express 

Program). 

ADDRESSES: Applicants to the RRIF 

Express Program must use the latest 

version of the Letter of Interest form 

available on the Build America Bureau 

website: https:// 

www.transportation.gov/content/buildamerica-bureau (including applicants 

who have previously submitted Letters 

of Interest and who are now seeking 

participation in the RRIF Express 

Program). Letters of Interest must be 

submitted to the Build America Bureau 

via email at: RRIFexpress@dot.gov using 

the following subject line: ‘‘Letter of 

Interest for RRIF Express Program.’’ 

Submitters should receive a 

confirmation email, but are advised to 

request a return receipt to confirm 

transmission. Only Letters of Interest 

received via email at the above email 

address with the subject line listed 

above shall be deemed properly filed. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

further information regarding this notice 

please contact William Resch via email 

at william.resch@dot.gov or via 

telephone at 202–366–2300. A TDD is 

available at 202–366–3993. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

original NOFO with modifications 

follows. 

The RRIF Express Program is 

administered by the DOT’s National 

Surface Transportation and Innovative 

Finance Bureau (the ‘‘Build America 

Bureau’’ or ‘‘Bureau’’). The overall RRIF 

program finances development of 

railroad infrastructure, and is 

authorized to have up to $35 billion in 

outstanding principal amounts from 

direct loans and loan guarantees at any 

one time. 

The 2018 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act 1 appropriated $25 

million in budget authority to the DOT 

to cover the cost to the Federal 

Government (‘‘the Government’’) of 

RRIF credit assistance (Credit Risk 

Premium (‘‘CRP’’) Assistance or ‘‘CRP 

Assistance’’). Additionally, the 2016 

Consolidated Appropriations Act 2 and 

the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations 

Act 3 provided $1.96 million and 

$350,000, respectively (of which 

approximately $1 million remains 

available), to the DOT to fund certain 

expenses incurred by prospective RRIF 

borrowers in preparation of their 


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