alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §36b. Acquisition of lands or interests therein for use in gaging streams or underground water resources

The Secretary of the Interior may, on behalf of the United States and for use by the United States Geological Survey in gaging streams and underground water resources, acquire lands by donation or when funds have been appropriated by Congress by purchase or condemnation, but not in excess of ten acres for any one stream gaging station or observation well site. For the same purpose the Secretary of the Interior may obtain easements, licenses, rights-of-way, and leases limited to run for such a period of time or term of years as may be required for the effective performance of the function of gaging streams and underground water resources: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this section, shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing in this section shall in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water, in, to, or from any interstate stream or the waters thereof.

(Dec. 24, 1942, ch. 822, 56 Stat. 1086; Pub. L. 86–406, Apr. 4, 1960, 74 Stat. 14; Pub. L. 102–154, title I, Nov. 13, 1991, 105 Stat. 1000.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1960—Pub. L. 86–406 authorized Secretary of the Interior to acquire lands and interests in lands for observation well sites to gage underground water resources.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Change of Name

"United States Geological Survey" substituted in text for "Geological Survey" pursuant to provision of title I of Pub. L. 102–154, set out as a note under section 31 of this title.
• • 

UNITED STATES EN' IRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

REGION III 

1650 Arch Street 

Philadelpt' a, Pennsylvania 19103-2029 

Honorable John Hanger, Secretary 

Pennsylvania Department ofEnvironmntal Protection 

Rachel Carson State Office Building 

P.O. Box 2063 

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105-2063 

Dear Secretary Hanger: 

On April 22, 2009, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency received a revision to the 

Pennsylvania State Implementation PIa, (SIP) submitted by the Pennsylvania Department of 

Environmental Protection on April 14, '009. This SIP revision consists of amendments to the 

plan approval provisions codified in 2S 'A Code Chapter 127, Subchapter B. EPA has 

determined that the submittal is admini ratively and technically complete, and is reviewing it to 

prepare a Notice of Proposed Rulemak' g (NPR). 

Ifmembers of your staff have any questions, they may direct them to Mr. Paul T. 

Wentworth, Permits and Technical Asse,sment Branch, at (215) 814-2183. He is the principal 

contact for this rulemaking. 

cc: Ms. Joyce E. Epps, PA DEP 

Sincerely 

Diana Esher, Acting Director. 

Air Protection Division (3APOO) 

Customer .'. -rvice Hotline: 1-800-438-2474
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT ROBERTSON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO.,

Defendant. /

No. C 09-01056 SI

SECOND

PRETRIAL PREPARATION ORDER

It is hereby ORDERED pursuant to F.R.C.P. and the Local Rules of this Court:

FURTHER CASE MANAGEMENT: August 13, 2010 at 3:00 p.m.

Counsel must file a joint case management statement seven days in advance of the conference.

DISCOVERY PLAN: Per F.R.Civ.P and Local Rules, subject to any provisions below.

NON-EXPERT DISCOVERY CUTOFF is May 28, 2010

DESIGNATION OF EXPERTS: 3/5/10; REBUTTAL: 3/22/10. Parties SHALL conform to Rule 26(a)(2).

EXPERT DISCOVERY CUTOFF is April 23, 2010.

DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS SHALL be filed by July 9, 2010; 

Opp. Due July 23, 2010; Reply Due July 30, 2010;

 and set for hearing no later than August 13, 2010 at 9:00 AM.

PRETRIAL CONFERENCE DATE: December 21, 2010 at 3:30 PM.

JURY TRIAL DATE: January 10, 2011 at 8:30 AM., Courtroom 10, 19th floor.

TRIAL LENGTH is estimated to be days.

SPECIAL DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL PROVISIONS:

The Court adjusted the litigation schedule as indicated above.

The parties shall participate in a follow up mediation session. 

The pretrial conference SHALL be attended by trial counsel prepared to discuss all aspects of the case,

including settlement. Parties SHALL conform to the attached instructions. Plaintiff is ORDERED to

serve a copy of this order on any party subsequently joined in this action.

Dated: 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01056-SC Document 34 Filed 03/25/10 Page 1 of 1
-       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2023-09-01T18:57:11-0400
      - Government Publishing Office, Washington, DC 20401
      - Government Publishing Office
      - Government Publishing Office attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by Government Publishing Office
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-2206

BERHANU GUGGSA GEMEDA,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN ASHCROFT, 

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A76-496-000)

Submitted: April 19, 2004 Decided: July 27, 2004

Before WIDENER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas Hailu, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Peter D.

Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Robert M. Loeb, Stephanie R.

Marcus, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:

Berhanu Guggsa Gemeda petitions for review of an order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) finding that he failed

to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the immigration

judge to reopen the removal proceedings. Gemeda contends:

(1) mere tardiness is not a failure to appear; (2) he established

his failure to appear was due to exceptional circumstances; and

(3) he was denied the right to due process. Finding no reversible

error, we affirm.

This Court’s review of the Board’s denial of a motion to

reopen is extremely deferential, and the decision will not be

reversed absent abuse of discretion. Stewart v. INS, 181 F.3d 587,

595 (4th Cir. 1999). Motions to reopen are disfavored. INS v.

Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2003). We

find the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that Gemeda

failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting granting

a motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), (e)(1)

(2000). In addition, Gemeda was not denied the right to due

process. Sharma v. INS, 89 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir. 1996).

Moreover, we find Gemeda’s argument that the Board failed to follow

its own precedent is without merit. 

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 
- 3 -

PETITION DENIED
#### § 242.44 Construction standards.

Work designed and performed under this section shall conform to the standards adopted by HUD, which, at a minimum, shall include the “Guidelines for Construction and Equipment of Hospital and Medical Facilities,” which is regularly updated and published by the American Institute of Architects.
### §5846. Compliance with safety regulations

#### (a) Notification to Commission of noncompliance

Any individual director, or responsible officer of a firm constructing, owning, operating, or supplying the components of any facility or activity which is licensed or otherwise regulated pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], or pursuant to this chapter, who obtains information reasonably indicating that such facility or activity or basic components supplied to such facility or activity—

(1) fails to comply with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or any applicable rule, regulation, order, or license of the Commission relating to substantial safety hazards, or

(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial safety hazard, as defined by regulations which the Commission shall promulgate,

shall immediately notify the Commission of such failure to comply, or of such defect, unless such person has actual knowledge that the Commission has been adequately informed of such defect or failure to comply.

#### (b) Penalty for failure to notify

Any person who knowingly and consciously fails to provide the notice required by subsection (a) of this section shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount equal to the amount provided by section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C. 2282].

#### (c) Posting of requirements

The requirements of this section shall be prominently posted on the premises of any facility licensed or otherwise regulated pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.].

#### (d) Inspection and enforcement

The Commission is authorized to conduct such reasonable inspections and other enforcement activities as needed to insure compliance with the provisions of this section.

(Pub. L. 93–438, title II, §206, Oct. 11, 1974, 88 Stat. 1246.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (c), is act Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, as added by act Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, §1, 68 Stat. 919, which is classified principally to chapter 23 (§2011 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2011 of this title and Tables.

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 93–438, Oct. 11, 1974, 88 Stat. 1233, known as the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 5801 of this title and Tables.

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Transfer of Functions

For transfer of certain functions from Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Chairman thereof, see Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1980, 45 F.R. 40561, 94 Stat. 3585, set out as a note under section 5841 of this title.
#### City of Chicago, appellee, v. M. H. Callner, appellant.

Gen. No. 28,682.

Suit against City of Chicago. Judgment for city. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. W. E. Helander, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district.

Affirmed for failure of appellant to file record.

See City v. Salmitsky, 210 Ill. App. 159.

Opinion filed June 25, 1923.

No appearance for appellant. No appearance for appellee.

Per Curiam.
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JOHN A. W. HALLEY

Attorney at Law, SBN 111682

620 Jefferson Avenue

Redwood City, CA 94063

Tel: (650) 366-6789

Fax: (650) 365-5386

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

CORY MOSBY, Case No. 3:09-cv-01667-MMC

Petitioner

ORDER

v.

JAMES YATES, Warden,

Respondent

_________________________________/

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, it is hereby ordered that Petitioner may have until

February 25, 2010 to file his traverse to the answer of respondent.

Dated: __________ _______________________________

MAXINE CHESNEY

JUDGE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

February 9, 2010

Case 3:09-cv-01667-MMC Document 15 Filed 02/09/10 Page 1 of 1
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FORM 10-QSB AND
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</TABLE>
IB 

Union Calendar No. 324 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 2925 

[Report No. 109–568] 

To amend the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act of 1991 

to extend the authority for drought assistance. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 15, 2005 

Mr. HINOJOSA (for himself, Mr. OTTER, Mr. SALAZAR, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. 

GRIJALVA, Mr. UDALL of Colorado, and Mr. DOGGETT) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Resources 

JULY 17, 2006 

Additional sponsors: Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. REHBERG, Mr. HASTINGS of 

Washington, and Miss MCMORRIS

JULY 17, 2006 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 

House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on June 15, 2005] 

A BILL 

To amend the Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief 

Act of 1991 to extend the authority for drought assistance. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
2 

•HR 2925 RH

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF THE RECLAMATION STATES 

2 EMERGENCY DROUGHT RELIEF ACT OF 1991. 

3 The Reclamation States Emergency Drought Relief Act 

4 of 1991 (43 U.S.C. 2210 et seq.) is amended— 

5 (1) in section 104(c), by striking ‘‘September 30, 

6 2005’’ and inserting ‘‘September 30, 2010’’; and 

7 (2) in section 301, by striking ‘‘fiscal years 1992, 

8 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 

9 2003, and 2004’’ and inserting ‘‘the period of fiscal 

10 years 2006 through 2010’’. 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS

hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
Union Calendar No. 324 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 2925 

[Report No. 109

–568] 

A BILL 

To amend the Reclamation States Emergency 

ity for drought assistance. Drought Relief Act of 1991 to extend the authorJULY 17, 2006 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Comand ordered to be printed mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
I 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2586 

To extend the suspension of duty on 4-[[4,6-bis(octylthio)091,3,5-traizine2-yl]amino]-2,6-bis(1 1-dimethylethyl)phenol. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 24, 2005 

Mr. BONNER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To extend the suspension of duty on 4-[[4,6- 

bis(octylthio)091,3,5-traizine-2-yl]amino]-2,6-bis(1 1- 

dimethylethyl)phenol. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. 4-[[4,6-BIS(OCTYLTHIO)–1,3,5-TRAIZINE-2- 

4 YL]AMINO]-2,6-BIS(1,1- 

5 DIMETHYLETHYL)PHENOL. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Heading 9902.32.30 of the Har7 monized Tariff Schedule of the United States (relating to 

8 4-[[4,6-bis(octylthio)–1,3,5-traizine-2-yl]amino]-2,6- 

9 bis(1,1-dimethylethyl)phenol) is amended by striking ‘‘12/ 

10 31/2006’’ and inserting ‘‘12/31/2008’’. 
2 

•HR 2586 IH 

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

2 subsection (a) applies to goods entered, or withdrawn from 

3 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ
#### Chester A. Jaromin, Jr., Appellant, v Donna J. Northrup, Respondent.

[833 NYS2d 813]—

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (Paula L. Feroleto, J.), entered March 3, 2006 in a personal injury action. The order granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries he sustained when the motor vehicle in which he was a passenger was rear-ended by a vehicle operated by defendant. We conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). We note *1265that plaintiff conceded that he has abandoned his claim with respect to the 90/180 category of serious injury.

With respect to the remaining categories, permanent loss of use, permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use, we conclude that defendant met her initial burden by establishing that plaintiff did not sustain a qualifying serious injury that was causally related to the accident, and plaintiff failed to raise any issues of fact with respect to those categories *(see generally Zuckerman v City of New York,*49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of a physician who first examined him more than SVa years after the accident. Plaintiffs physician failed to address the gap in plaintiffs treatment, and he failed to address the finding of defendant’s expert that the abnormality at L4-5 was caused by an osteophyte, a characteristic of plaintiff’s preexisting chronic and long-term degenerative condition at that level *(see Pommells v Perez,*4 NY3d 566, 572-575 [2005]). Plaintiff correctly argues that, as a general principle, “conflicting expert opinions may not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment” *(Cooper v City of Rochester,*16 AD3d 1117, 1118 [2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]; *see Pittman v Rickard,*295 AD2d 1003, 1004 [2002]; *Williams v Lucianatelli,*259 AD2d 1003 [1999]). Nevertheless, plaintiffs physician failed to “provide either ‘a numeric percentage of. . . plaintiffs loss of range of motion’ or a *‘qualitative*assessment of. . . plaintiffs condition.’ ” *(Parkhill v Cleary,*305 AD2d 1088, 1089 [2003], quoting *Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys.,*98 NY2d 345, 350), nor did plaintiffs physician “ ‘compare! ] the plaintiffs limitations to the normal function, purpose and use of the affected body organ, member, function or system’ ” *(id.,*quoting *Toure,*98 NY2d at 350). Further, the opinion of plaintiffs physician is based only upon plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain and thus is insufficient to overcome defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment *(see Kinchler v Cruz,*22 AD3d 808 [2005]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Lunn, Peradotto and Pine, JJ.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-60529

Conference Calendar

 

RICHARD AMOS MCGEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JAMES ANDERSON; WALTER BOOKER;

BARBARA BAILEY; UNKNOWN ARP STAFF,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:98-CV-10-B-D

--------------------

August 27, 1999

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Richard Amos McGee (Mississippi prisoner # 71701) appeals

the district court’s dismissal of his pro se and in forma

pauperis (IFP) civil rights complaint wherein he complained of 

the forfeiture of 60 days of his accrued earned time based on the

dismissal, as frivolous, of a previous lawsuit by him. See

Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-138(3)(a),(b) (1996). In addition to

challenging application of the statute, McGee argued that the

defendants “took it upon themselves” to apply the statute and 
No. 98-60529

-2-

thus acted in a retaliatory manner. McGee further alleged that

the defendants had continued their retaliation by not granting

him administrative relief from the forfeiture. 

 A district court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it

has no arguable basis either in law or in fact. Siglar v.

Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). We review such a

dismissal for an abuse of discretion. Id. 

 Insofar as McGee is seeking damages and the restoration of

earned time based on the allegedly improper application of Miss.

Code. Ann. § 47-5-138, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by concluding that McGee may not raise this claim in a

§ 1983 action and must first pursue such a claim through a writ

of habeas corpus. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481-82

(1994); Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998),

cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1052 (1999). Favorable termination is

not, however, a requisite of a retaliation claim. See Woods v.

Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, because

McGee’s allegations of retaliation are insufficient to give rise

to a retaliatory animus, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal

of the complaint as frivolous. See Sojourner T v. Edwards, 974

F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992)(court may affirm judgment on any

basis supported by the record).

 AFFIRMED.
#### § 201.29 Ineligible participants.

No loan may be insured under this part where the lender has been advised in writing by HUD or otherwise knows that any participant in the transaction as a dealer, home manufacturer, contractor, supplier, or broker, or as its agent or representative, has been suspended or debarred, or has otherwise been determined by HUD to be ineligible to participate in the title I program.