alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Court of Appeals for the**

**First District of Texas at Houston**

Order

Appellate case name:James Anthony Durr v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number:01-13-00256-CR

Trial court case number:1287887

Trial court:180th District Court of Harris County

Appellant’s counsel in this case has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief stating there are no arguable grounds for appeal, based on *Anders v. California*, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  

In the motion to withdraw and brief, appellant’s counsel states that he sent appellant a copy of the record on appeal. Appellant, however, has filed a “Request for a Copy of the Trial Record,” indicating that he received a copy of the “Appellate Record” but not “the entire trial record.” Appellant requests “a copy of the trial transcripts.” Pursuant to *Kelly v. State*, No. PD-0702-13, 2014 WL 2865901 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 2014), we direct the Clerk of this Court to send, at no cost to appellant, a complete copy of the appellate record so that appellant may respond to the *Anders* brief.  

Appellant has 30 days from the date of this order to file a pro se response, if any, to the *Anders* brief and motion to withdraw filed by appellate counsel on September 19, 2013.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature:/s/ Jim Sharp

(  Acting individually       Acting for the Court

Date:  August 7, 2014
### §9307. Program advisory committees

The Secretary may direct the director of each laboratory or installation at which a major magnetic fusion facility is operated for, or funded primarily by, the Federal Government to establish, for the sole purpose of providing advice to such director, a program advisory committee composed of persons with expertise in magnetic fusion from such domestic industry, universities, government laboratories, and other scientific and technical organizations as such director deems appropriate.

(Pub. L. 96–386, §8, Oct. 7, 1980, 94 Stat. 1543.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Termination of Advisory Committees

Advisory committees established after Jan. 5, 1973, to terminate not later than the expiration of the 2-year period beginning on the date of their establishment, unless, in the case of a committee established by the President or an officer of the Federal Government, such committee is renewed by appropriate action prior to the expiration of such 2-year period, or in the case of a committee established by the Congress, its duration is otherwise provided for by law. See section 1013 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

RAYMOND P. MARIOLLE,

Plaintiff,

v.

VOLVO GROUP NORTH AMERICA, INC.

et al.,

Defendant(s).

_____________________________________/

No. C 09-1209 MMC (MEJ)

ORDER RE: JOINT DISCOVERY

DISPUTE LETTER (DKT. #36)

 I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the joint discovery dispute letter (“Joint Letter”) filed by Defendant

Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. (“Defendant”) and non-party USA Waste of California, Inc.

(“USA Waste”), on March 18, 2010. (Dkt. #36.) On April 2, 2010, the undersigned held a

telephonic conference with the parties, and ORDERED the following.

II. ORDER

USA Waste is ORDERED to produce all records relating to the Volvo truck bearing VIN

4V2DC6UE31N322649 in its possession, custody, or control, dating from the manufacture of the

vehicle through the end of December 2009. “All records” includes, but is not limited to vehicle

inspection reports, driver logs, waste yard weight load records, run sheets with route and stop

information, all reports regarding the use of the truck, reports regarding the condition of the truck,

maintenance and repair records, safety inspection records, part replacement records, accident

reports, photographs, and damage reports. (Joint Letter, Ex. A, Dkt. #36-1.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s request that USA Waste be ordered to produce the above

documentation is GRANTED, without prejudice to Defendant raising objections as to burden in the

future.

Case 3:09-cv-01209-MMC Document 38 Filed 04/06/10 Page 1 of 2
UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

COURT

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

UNITED

STATES

DISTRICT

COURT

For the Northern District of California

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2010

_______________________________

Maria-Elena James 

Chief United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 3:09-cv-01209-MMC Document 38 Filed 04/06/10 Page 2 of 2
#### Hunt *et al. v.*Davenport.

Fish, C. J.

1. An amendment to an answer was properly disallowed which set up that the note, the foundation of the action, was void for the reason that it was given for a patent right, though- not expressing upon its face its consideration. *Parr*v. *Erickson,*115 *Ga.*873 (42 S. E. 240).

*623August 19, 1912.

Complaint. Before Judge Edwards. Haralson superior court. • July 20, 1911.

*James Beall*and *Buford F. Boylcin,*for plaintiffs in error.

*Griffith &*Matthews,' contra.

2. Under the evidence and the law applicable thereto, a verdict was demanded in behalf of the plaintiff, and the trial judge did not err in so directing. *Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
§ 241.815 Termination of insurance. ( a ) *Prepayment in full.* The contract of insurance shall be terminated if the loan is paid in full prior to its maturity. Notice of the prepayment shall be given to the Commissioner, on a form prescribed by the Commissioner, within 30 days from the date of the prepayment. The insurance termination shall become effective as of the date of the prepayment, or 30 days prior to the Commissioner's receipt of the prepayment notice, whichever is later.
( b ) *Voluntary termination.* The contract of insurance shall be voluntarily terminated upon receipt by the Commissioner of a written request, on a form prescribed by the Commissioner, by the borrower and the lender for such termination, accompanied by a submission of the original credit instrument for cancellation of the insurance endorsement and the remittance of all sums to which the Commissioner is entitled. The termination shall become effective as of the date these requirements are met.
Exhibit 13.1

CERTIFICATION REQUIRED BY

RULE 13a-14(b) OR RULE 15d-14(b)

AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of SouFun Holdings Limited (the Company) on Form 20-F/A for the year ended December 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, Richard Jiangong Dai, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: November 8, 2012



/s/ Richard Jiangong DaiName:

Richard Jiangong DaiTitle:

Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 4.75
  Agreement    Party Parties
 Party A: SEED MUSIC GROUP LIMITED
 Party B: Hurray! Media Holding Co., Ltd.
 Party C1: Tien, Ting-Feng
 Party C2: Huang, Tien-Zan
   1.
    
    The Parties hereby agree that, the accounting benchmark date for equity transfer and capital
increase stated in the Original Agreement shall be 1 January, 2009. Upon the accounting
benchmark date, Party A shall be Party Bs affiliated company and Party B shall have control
in Party A, Party B is able to consolidate Party As financial statement.
 2.
    
    This Agreement is the supplemental agreement of the Original Agreement, and the provisions
set forth under this Agreement shall remain in full force and survive in the event that any
provisions set forth under this Agreement are inconsistent with the provisions set forth under
the Original Agreement.
 3.
    
    This Agreement shall execute in six (6) counterparts, of which each Party shall hold two (2)
copies respectively.
 4.
    
    This Agreement shall take effect after being stamped by Part A, B and signed by Party C on
the date first written above.




---



##### 



Party A: SEED MUSIC GROUP LIMITED
 Party B: Hurray! Media Holding Co., Ltd.
 Party C1: Tien, Ting-Feng
 Party C2: Huang, Tien-Zan
#### § 242.93 Amendment of regulations.

The regulations in this subpart may be amended by HUD at any time and from time to time, in whole or in part, but such amendment shall not adversely affect the interests of a mortgagee or lender under the insurance on any mortgage or loan already insured, and shall not adversely affect the interests of a mortgagee or lender on any mortgage or loan to be insured on which HUD has issued a commitment to insure.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 19

- 251

_____________________________
J EREMIAH W ILLIAMS , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County

. Mark Borello , Judge

. July 3, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. R AY , C.J., and W ETHERELL and M.K. T HOMAS , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Jeremiah Williams, pro se
, Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
### §7548. Study of particulate emissions from motor vehicles

#### (a) Study and analysis

(1) The Administrator shall conduct a study concerning the effects on health and welfare of particulate emissions from motor vehicles or motor vehicle engines to which section 7521 of this title applies. Such study shall characterize and quantify such emissions and analyze the relationship of such emissions to various fuels and fuel additives.

(2) The study shall also include an analysis of particulate emissions from mobile sources which are not related to engine emissions (including, but not limited to tire debris, and asbestos from brake lining).

#### (b) Report to Congress

The Administrator shall report to the Congress the findings and results of the study conducted under subsection (a) not later than two years after August 7, 1977. Such report shall also include recommendations for standards or methods to regulate particulate emissions described in paragraph (2) of subsection (a).

(July 14, 1955, ch. 360, title II, §214, as added Pub. L. 95–95, title II, §224(d), Aug. 7, 1977, 91 Stat. 767.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 214 of act July 14, 1955, was renumbered section 216 by Pub. L. 95–95 and is classified to section 7550 of this title.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Aug. 7, 1977, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 406(d) of Pub. L. 95–95, set out as an Effective Date of 1977 Amendment note under section 7401 of this title.

#### Study on Suspended Particulate Matter

Pub. L. 95–95, title IV, §403(a), Aug. 7, 1977, 91 Stat. 792, directed Administrator of EPA, not later than 18 months after Aug. 7, 1977, in cooperation with National Academy of Sciences, to study and report to Congress on relationship between size, weight, and chemical composition of suspended particulate matter and nature and degree of endangerment to public health or welfare presented by such particulate matter and availability of technology for controlling such particulate matter.
### §1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

(R.S. §1979; Pub. L. 96–170, §1, Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284; Pub. L. 104–317, title III, §309(c), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

R.S. §1979 derived from act Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, §1, 17 Stat. 13.

Section was formerly classified to section 43 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

#### Amendments

1996—Pub. L. 104–317 inserted before period at end of first sentence ", except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable".

1979—Pub. L. 96–170 inserted "or the District of Columbia" after "Territory", and provisions relating to Acts of Congress applicable solely to the District of Columbia.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1979 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 96–170 applicable with respect to any deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws occurring after Dec. 29, 1979, see section 3 of Pub. L. 96–170, set out as a note under section 1343 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
#### DUNN v. NEW YORK EDISON CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

March 21, 1905.)

. Evidence—Production of Papers—Jurisdiction.

Defendant having failed to produce a release containing defendant’s promise to pay plaintiff wages sued for during disability under a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that it could not be found, defendant’s attorney was called as a witness, and admitted that he had the release in his possession in court. *Held*that, the release being material, the court had. jurisdiction to compel the attorney to produce it, and, in case of his refusal to do so, to punish him for contempt.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 20, Cent. Dig. Evidence, §§ 1540-1548.]

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Second District.

*788Action by Patrick J. Dunn against the New York Edison Company. From a Municipal Court judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Argued before SCOTT, O’GORMAN, and BLANCHARD, JJ.

Gennert & Gennert, for appellant.

Beardsley & Hemmens, for respondent.

O’GORMAN, J.

While in the defendant’s employment, the plaintiff was injured, and was sent by the defendant’s superintendent to the defendant’s doctor for treatment. The doctor induced the plaintiff to execute a release to the defendant of 'all claims for his injury, and.in consideration thereof promised the plaintiff that he would receive his wages while unable to work. This action was brought to recover wages under this agreement. The doctor testified that he had no recollection of making such a promise, and the defendant denied his authority to do so. Upon the trial one of the defendant’s officers was called by the plaintiff, and asked to produce the general release. He had been duly served with a subpoena duces tecum to produce it, but testified that he was unable to find it. The defendant’s attorney, then in court, was called to the stand by plaintiff’s counsel, and after numerous evasive answers finally admitted that the release called for by the subpoena was in court, and in his possession. The trial justice was then asked to order the attorney to produce the paper, and the court replied, “I have no power,” to which ruling an exception was taken. This was error. The court had the power, and the production of the paper should have been, ordered, and, in default of its production, the person having the paper under his control should have been committed for contempt. Boynton v. Boynton, 25 How. Prac. 490, affirmed 41 N. Y, 619; Stone v. Mansfield, 27 Misc. Rep. 560, 58 N. Y. Supp. 339. The release was material; It was the consideration for defendant’s promise. Its recitals, it is claimed, tended to prove the contract sued on, and to establish the doctor’s authority.

Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event. All concur.
#### In the Matter of Marvin Neill Krumholz for Admission to the Bar.

Motion to renew application for admission to the Bar granted. Concur — Botein, P, J., Breitel, Rabin, Valente and Stevens, JJ.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                      Exhibit 11

ALLIN COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION

CALCULATION OF NET LOSS PER COMMON SHARE


      (Dollars in thousands, except per share data)

<TABLE> 
<CAPTION> 
                                                       Three Months         Three Months         Nine Months           Nine Months
                                                          Ended                 Ended                Ended                 Ended
                                                       September 30,         September 30,       September 30,         September 30,
                                                           1996                  1997                1996                  1997
                                                       -------------         -------------       -------------         -------------
<S>                                                    <C>                   <C>                 <C>                    <C>
Net Loss                                               $     (2,096)         $      (1,992)      $      (4,609)         $    (7,736)


Accretion and dividends on preferred stock                     --                       50                --                    169
                                                       ------------          -------------       -------------          -----------

Net loss attributable to common shareholders           $     (2,096)         $      (2,042)      $      (4,609)         $    (7,905)
                                                       ============          =============       =============          ===========
Net loss per common share                              $      (0.81)         $       (0.39)      $       (1.77)         $     (1.52)
                                                       ============          =============       =============          ===========

Weighted average common and common equivalent    
    shares outstanding during the period                  2,400,000              5,184,067            2,400,000           5,184,067

Effect of conversion of preferred stock
    issued within one year of the offering                  203,385                  --                 203,385               --
                                                       ------------          -------------        -------------         -----------

Shares used in calculating net loss per common
    share                                                 2,603,385              5,184,067            2,063,385           5,184,067
                                                       ============          =============        =============         ===========

</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David George Newcombe, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County, entered May 15, 1961, denying his application to dismiss an indictment containing several counts, to which he, on July 22, 1958, had pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny second degree, in satisfaction of all the counts. Defendant had not been sentenced on his guilty plea, having been in Federal custody at the time set for sentencing and having remained in such custody until the time of the making of this application in November, 1960, and thereafter. He based his application on the claim that he had been deprived of a speedy trial. Order affirmed. Such affirmance is without prejudice, however, to the right of the defendant, if so advised, to renew his claim on any appeal which he may take from the judgment entered after he has been sentenced. Beldock, Ughetta, Christ, Hill and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
### §8009. Miscellaneous provisions

#### (a) Utilization of elderly and permanently disabled adult persons

Each public housing agency and nonprofit corporation shall, to the maximum extent practicable, utilize elderly and permanently disabled adult persons who are residents of public housing projects or projects assisted under section 1701q of title 12, but who are not eligible project residents, to participate in providing the services assisted under this chapter. Such persons shall be paid wages which shall not be lower than whichever is the highest of—

(1) the minimum wage which would be applicable to the employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.], if section 6(a)(1) of such Act [29 U.S.C. 206(a)(1)] applied to the resident and if he or she were not exempt under section 13 [29 U.S.C. 213] thereof;

(2) the State or local minimum wage for the most nearly comparable covered employment; or

(3) the prevailing rates of pay for persons employed in similar public occupations by the same employer.

#### (b) Tax treatment of services received

No service provided to a public housing resident or to a resident of a housing project assisted under section 1701q of title 12 under this chapter, except for wages paid under subsection (a) of this section, may be treated as income for the purpose of any other program or provision of State or Federal law.

#### (c) Individuals receiving aid considered residents of own household

Individuals receiving services assisted under this chapter shall be deemed to be residents of their own households, and not to be residents of a public institution, for the purpose of any other program or provision of State or Federal law.

#### (d) Regulations

The Secretary may issue regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

(Pub. L. 95–557, title IV, §410, Oct. 31, 1978, 92 Stat. 2109.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, referred to in subsec. (a)(1), is act June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, which is classified generally to chapter 8 (§201 et seq.) of Title 29, Labor. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 201 of Title 29 and Tables.