Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


OIG-10-41 January 2010 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

 January 25, 2010 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the efficacy of the Department of Homeland Security’s 

management and oversight of its components to ensure that personnel are sufficiently 

safeguarding and controlling firearms. It is based on interviews with employees and 

officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of 

applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 


Inspector General 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1
 

Background..........................................................................................................................2
 

Results of Audit ...................................................................................................................5
 

Safeguarding Firearms.............................................................................................6 


Reporting Lost Firearms ........................................................................................10 


Accounting Inventory Control ...............................................................................11 


Actions Taken by CBP and ICE ........................................................................................13 


Conclusion .........................................................................................................................14
 

Recommendations..............................................................................................................14
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................................15 


Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology........................................................17 


Appendix B: Management Comments to Draft Report ..............................................18 


Appendix C: Reporting Lost Firearms Policies and Procedures ................................21 


Appendix D: Major Contributors to this Report.........................................................22 


Appendix E: Report Distribution................................................................................23 


Acronyms and Abbreviations 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 


DHS Department of Homeland Security 


FACTS Firearms, Armor, and Credentials Tracking System 


FMFIA Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act 


GAO Government Accountability Office 


ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 


OCAO Office of the Chief Administrative Officer 


TSA Transportation Security Administration 


USCG United States Coast Guard 


USSS United States Secret Service 


DHS Controls Over Firearms 
OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

The Department of Homeland Security’s mission includes law 

enforcement elements, which require the department, through its 

components, to manage various types of firearms. Our audit 

objective was to determine the efficacy of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s management and oversight of its components 

to ensure that personnel were sufficiently safeguarding and 

controlling firearms. 

The Department of Homeland Security, through its components, 

did not adequately safeguard and control its firearms. Components 

reported 289 firearms as lost during FYs 2006 through 2008. 

Although some reported losses were beyond the officers’ control, 

most losses occurred because officers did not properly secure 

firearms. The department did not have a specific firearm policy 

and instead relied on the components to establish specific policies 

and procedures for managing, safeguarding, and controlling 

firearms. While some component policies were sufficient, 

personnel did not always follow them and the department did not 

require that independent third parties perform firearm inventories. 

Field offices did not always promptly report lost firearms to 

component headquarters or keep inventory records updated. Lost 

firearms pose serious risks to the public and law enforcement 

officers. 

Based on the results of our audit we are making two 

recommendations to the department to improve controls over 

firearms. The Department of Homeland Security’s Management 

Directorate and Office of the Chief Administrative Officer 

concurred with the recommendations. The components we 

reviewed in detail are already taking actions to correct the issues 

we identified. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


Page 1
 
Background 

Between 2003 and 2007, the Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) and the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General 

assessed controls over firearms at 18 federal law enforcement 

agencies. The reports showed that these agencies faced similar 

challenges in safeguarding and controlling firearms and suffered 

losses of firearms under similar circumstances as the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS). In some cases, DHS losses were 

fewer than other agencies, indicating that DHS may have stronger 

controls over its firearms. 

To support its law enforcement mission DHS had over 188,548 

firearms in its inventory as of July 2009. The components with 

firearms include: 

�	 Customs and Border Protection (CBP); 

�	 Federal Emergency Management Administration 

(FEMA); 

�	 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); 

�	 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); 

�	 Science and Technology Directorate1

 (S&T); 

�	 Transportation Security Administration (TSA); 

�	 United States Coast Guard (USCG); and 

�	 United States Secret Service (USSS). 

Table 1 illustrates component inventories and table 2 illustrates the 

types of firearms carried by DHS law enforcement officers. 

1

 The Science and Technology Directorate uses firearms solely in association with the testing mission of 

the Transportation Security Laboratory and does not issue side-arms to individuals. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 2 
 

Table 1: DHS Component Inventories as of July 20092 

88,110

45,114

34,273

10,745 9,104

734 468

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

90,000

100,000

CBP ICE USCG USSS FLETC FEMA S&T

Table 2: Types of Weapons in Component Inventories 

Handguns 

Image courtesy of CBP 

Semiautomatic / Automatic Weapons (M-4 Rifles) 

Image courtesy of Colt Defense LLC 

Shotguns 

Image courtesy of Remington 

2 We did not include the number of firearms in TSA’s inventory because this information is protected as 

Sensitive Security Information under 49 CFR 1520.5(b)(8)(ii). We also did not list the total number of 

firearms in DHS’ inventory to protect TSA’s Sensitive Security Information. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 3 
The Use of Force Policy Division at CBP and the National 

Firearms and Tactical Training Unit at ICE oversee their respective 

component firearms programs. CBP and ICE used the Firearms, 

Armor, and Credentials Tracking System (FACTS) to manage 

firearm inventories. CBP transferred its inventory data from the 

Firearms Inventory Tracking System to FACTS in April 2009. 

FACTS maintains information relating to individual firearms, such 

as the serial number, location, date of last inventory, assigned 

officer, and officer qualification scores. 

In 1982, Congress established the Federal Managers’ Financial 

Integrity Act (FMFIA) requiring executive agencies to establish 

and maintain controls that provide reasonable assurance that 

federal entities safeguard assets against waste, loss, unauthorized 

use, and misappropriation. The act also mandates that GAO’s 

internal control standards serve as the framework for agencies to 

use in establishing and maintaining internal control systems. GAO 

internal control standards provide that in establishing internal 

controls, agencies should assess the risks associated with asset 

losses and establish control activities to help ensure those risks are 

addressed. 

In addition to the FMFIA and GAO internal control standards, two 

other organizations issued advisory criteria addressing inventory 

controls. In June 1995, the Joint Financial Management 

Improvement Program addressed management’s responsibility to 

provide guidelines for developing, documenting, and implementing 

physical controls to safeguard and provide accountability for 

inventory items. In August 1983, the Commission on 

Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., an independent 

accrediting authority for law enforcement agencies, published 

accreditation standards that include procedures for inventory and 

property control. These inventory control requirements apply to 

sensitive property, such as firearms, to limit accessibility to 

authorized individuals and ensure accountability. 

DHS Management Directive 0565, DHS Personal Property 

Management, provides a general description of controls for 

managing property and does not include controls over sensitive 

items, such as firearms. 

We assessed the efficacy of DHS’ management and oversight of its 

components to ensure that personnel were sufficiently 

safeguarding and controlling firearms. During our audit, we tested 

the accuracy of inventory records for 1,528 firearms, observed 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 4 
firearm storage procedures, and reviewed inventory policies and 

procedures at 6 CBP and 10 ICE field offices. 

Results of Audit 

The department’s management and oversight of component 

safeguards and controls over firearms were not effective. A key 

reason that firearm controls were not sufficient was because DHS 

did not have specific firearms policies and procedures in place. 

Instead, DHS relied on its components to augment its general 

property management policies and procedures with specific 

guidance for safeguarding and controlling firearms. Although 

some component policies and procedures for safeguarding firearms 

were sufficient, personnel did not always follow them. Component 

personnel did not always sufficiently safeguard their firearms and, 

as a result, lost3

 a significant number of firearms between FY 2006 

and FY 2008. Most of the losses occurred because law 

enforcement officers did not sufficiently secure firearms in their 

possession. The lost firearms created unnecessary risk to the 

public and law enforcement personnel; in some cases state and 

local law enforcement officials recovered lost DHS firearms from 

felons and gang members. 

In addition, the department did not require independent third 

parties to perform annual firearm inventories, component field 

offices did not always promptly report lost and stolen firearms to 

component headquarters, and field offices did not keep inventory 

records updated. As a result, DHS could not ensure that 

components safeguarded and controlled firearms, or provided 

accountability over firearms. 

During our audit, CBP and ICE initiated changes to their 

management and oversight of firearms to correct deficiencies we 

identified during this audit. Both components are reviewing or 

strengthening policy and procedures for safeguarding firearms and 

reporting lost firearms. 

3

 Lost firearms are those no longer in the possession of the components; they include firearms that were lost 

or stolen. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 5 
Safeguarding Firearms 


The department, through its components, did not adequately 

safeguard and control firearms. During FYs 2006 through 2008, 

DHS components reported 289 handguns, M-4 rifles, and shotguns 

as lost. CBP and ICE reported 243 (84%) of the 289 lost firearms. 

The remaining 46 lost firearms (16%) were reported by USCG (9), 

TSA (22), and USSS (15)4

. 

When a law enforcement officer determines that a firearm is 

missing, CBP and ICE policies require that the officer send a 

memorandum reporting the loss, and a description of the situation 

surrounding that loss, to the supervisor. The supervisor forwards 

the notification of loss to the respective component headquarters 

personnel, who create a case file for the lost firearm. We reviewed 

243 case files for firearms reported lost by CBP and ICE. For each 

case file, we determined the reason for the reported loss and 

evaluated those circumstances against the respective component’s 

policies and procedures. 

Lost Firearms 

CBP and ICE reported 243 lost firearms during FYs 2006 through 

2008. According to our analysis: 

�	 36 firearms (15%) were lost due to circumstances beyond 

the control of the officers. For example, CBP lost firearms 

when Hurricane Katrina made landfall and ICE lost a 

firearm during an assault on an officer. 

�	 28 firearms (about 11%) were lost even though officers 

stored them in lockboxes or safes. 

�	 179 firearms (74%) were lost because officers did not 

properly secure them. 

Of the 179 firearms, CBP and ICE reported 59 (33%) firearms as 

lost and 120 (67%) firearms as stolen. Since the components’ 

guidance did not provide a standard methodology for classifying 

and reporting lost firearms, officers tended to report a firearm as 

stolen rather than lost. This was due to a common perception 

among officers that reporting a stolen firearm was more acceptable 

4

 According to Secret Service officials, 3 of the 15 firearms reported as lost or stolen between 2006 and 

2008 were actually lost in the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. The loss of these firearms was 

reported in 2008. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 6 
than reporting a lost firearm. Although CBP and ICE reported 120 

firearms as stolen, our analysis showed that these firearms were 

lost (stolen) because officers left the firearms unsecured. All 179 

losses may have been prevented had the officers properly 

safeguarded their firearms. For example, an officer left his firearm 

in the restroom of a fast food restaurant, and when he returned to 

retrieve it, it was gone. The case file listed this firearm as stolen; 

however, we believe that the firearm would not have been stolen 

had the officer exercised due diligence in safeguarding the firearm. 

The following examples further demonstrate the inappropriate 

practices some officers used to store firearms in vehicles and 

residences: 

�	 A CBP officer left a firearm unsecured in an idling vehicle 

in the parking lot of a convenience store. The vehicle and 

firearm were stolen while the officer was inside the store. 

A local law enforcement officer later recovered the firearm 

from a suspected gang member and drug smuggler. 

�	 A CBP officer left a firearm on a toolbox in the bed of a 

truck, and the firearm fell off when the officer drove home. 

Law enforcement officials later recovered the firearm from 

an individual who resisted arrest and assaulted the arresting 

officer. 

�	 An ICE officer left an M-4 rifle and a shotgun unsecured in 

a closet in his home; subsequently, both firearms were 

stolen during a burglary. State and federal law enforcement 

officers later recovered these firearms from a felon. 

�	 An ICE officer left a firearm on the bumper of a vehicle, 

which fell off as the officer left his place of employment. 

A civilian found the firearm and turned it over to the local 

police. 

Other CBP and ICE officers left firearms in places such as a fast 

food restaurant parking lot, a bowling alley, and a clothing store. 

Although our review focused on CBP and ICE, other components 

described similar incidents. For example, a TSA officer left a 

firearm in a lunch box on the front seat of an unlocked vehicle; the 

officer realized the firearm was stolen when he returned to the 

vehicle 2 days later. Officers may have prevented many of these 

losses had they exercised reasonable care when storing their 

firearms. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 7 
CBP and ICE officers lost 28 firearms even though they secured 

the firearms in lockboxes or safes. The components may have 

prevented these losses through more stringent policies and 

procedures. CBP policies and procedures for leaving a firearm in 

an unattended vehicle are inadequate and do not include 

requirements to secure the firearm to the vehicle. Although ICE 

policies and procedures for storing firearms in vehicles are more 

stringent, requiring officers to secure them to the vehicle with an 

ICE-approved safety-locking device, ICE does not require that its 

staff permanently secure the locking device to the vehicle. While 

using a safety-locking device is a good practice, the best way to 

protect firearms from theft is to store them in lockboxes properly 

mounted as recommended in the manufacturers’ guidelines. 

Storing Firearms at Field Offices 

Law enforcement officers at field offices did not always use the 

locking devices provided by CBP and ICE to store their firearms in 

vehicles. We observed firearm storage procedures and verified 

1,528 firearm serial numbers at 6 CBP and 10 ICE field offices. 

Officers stored 152 of the 1,528 firearms we examined in vehicles. 

Of the 152 firearms stored in vehicles, 58 (38%), were unsecured. 

CBP and ICE provided most officers with lockboxes and a locking 

cable to secure their firearms. However, in these 58 cases, the 

officers did not use the locking devices. In addition to the locking 

devices, some ICE facilities provided officers access to lockers to 

secure their firearms during working hours, as shown below: 

Lockers provided for ICE officers to secure firearms – DHS-OIG Photo 

Even though the officers had securing devices and access to these 

lockers, some officers chose to leave their firearms unsecured in 

their vehicles. The following examples and photos illustrate how 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 8 
 

some officers stored firearms in vehicles5: 

�	 An ICE officer stored the keys for his assigned 

government-owned vehicle next to a windshield wiper 

blade. We observed the officer retrieve the keys, unlock 

the trunk, and reveal an unsecured firearm, body armor, and 

radio equipment. After our verification of the firearm serial 

number, the officer returned the keys to the windshield 

wiper blade. 

Keys to government- issued vehicle stored next to windshield wiper – DHS-OIG Photo 

�	 CBP and ICE firearms instructors left firearms unsecured in 

vehicles. The firearms were stored in bags that were 

visible from the windows of the vehicles and not secured to 

the vehicles. 

� Other CBP and ICE officers stored firearms in glove 

compartments and center consoles, under seats, and in 

various types of bags. 

Firearm unsecured in 

duty belt in an 

officer’s vehicle 

– DHS-OIG Photo 

5 We notified local supervisors of these issues as we identified them. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 9 
Recovered Firearms 

According to CBP and ICE case files, 65 (27%) of the 243 lost 

firearms were recovered; of the 65 recovered firearms, 50 (77%) 

were recovered by the components or civilian organizations, and 

15 (23%) were recovered by other law enforcement organizations. 

Although lost firearms account for a minor percentage of DHS’ 

total firearms inventory, they pose serious risks to civilians and 

non-civilians alike. Local law enforcement organizations 

recovered 15 DHS firearms from felons, gang members, criminals, 

drug users, and teenagers. For example, law enforcement officers: 

�	 Recovered a firearm from a suspected gang member. The 

suspect was driving a recreational vehicle with modified 

hidden compartments that had trace evidence of illegal 

drugs. 

Firearm recovered 

with gang symbol 

etched on the barrel. 

— Photo courtesy of 

the Lake City Police 

Department 

�	 Recovered a lost firearm from an individual who was in 

possession of cocaine. 

�	 Recovered a firearm from a drug dealer while executing a 

narcotics search warrant. 

Reporting Lost Firearms 

Although officers immediately reported the lost firearms to their 

supervisors and the National Crime Information Center6 as 

required, officers did not always report lost firearms to the 

component headquarters in a timely manner. In some cases, it took 

nearly 3 years to report the loss to the component headquarters. 

According to the case files, CBP and ICE staff took an average of 

6

 The National Crime Information Center is a computerized database for ready access by law enforcement 

agencies to assist in apprehending fugitives, locating missing persons, locating and returning stolen 

property, and protecting the law enforcement officers encountering the individuals described in the system. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 10 
about 2 months and 4 months, respectively, to report lost firearms 

to component headquarters, ranging from the day of loss to nearly 

3 years after the loss. The reporting delays were due to incomplete 

reporting policies and procedures. 

CBP and ICE have incomplete requirements for reporting lost and 

stolen firearms. Both of their policies and procedures state that 

when a firearm is lost or stolen the officer must report the loss or 

theft immediately or as soon as practicable to a supervisor. 

However, beyond the initial reporting, some critical reporting 

requirements are not stated. For example, CBP and ICE policies 

and procedures do not state the timeframes for reporting lost 

firearms to the National Crime Information Center. (See Appendix 

C for the table illustrating the incomplete reporting requirements.) 

In addition, CBP operates under three inconsistent policies: the 

former Customs policy, the former Immigration and Naturalization 

Service policy, and the current ICE policy (only one CBP division 

follows the current ICE policy). Although ICE has only one 

policy, it does not address all the critical reporting requirements. 

Without consistent reporting requirements, the components and 

department cannot maintain visibility over firearms inventories. 

Accounting Inventory Control 

Independent third parties do not conduct annual firearms 

inventories at CBP and ICE. In addition, component personnel did 

not always enter some acceptances and transfers into the inventory 

system promptly. CBP and ICE rely on law enforcement 

personnel and their supervisors to conduct inventories. The delays 

in acceptances and transfers occurred because CBP and ICE do not 

have policies and procedures addressing the timelines for these 

actions. As a result, the inventories were not always accurate or 

updated. 

Annual Inventory 

Independent third parties do not conduct annual inventories of 

firearms at CBP and ICE. CBP and ICE guidance does require that 

field office personnel conduct annual inventories to ensure the 

completeness and accuracy of the firearms inventory information 

within the inventory system. The policy requires personnel to 

complete an annual inventory over a 30-day period. The officer 

assigned the firearm is responsible for verifying the serial number 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 11 
 

and other pertinent information, and entering the data into FACTS. 

Subsequently, the officer’s supervisor is responsible for ensuring 

that the officer appropriately inventoried the correct firearm 

through visual inspection of the officer’s firearm and verification 

of the information entered into FACTS. We identified six cases of 

lost firearms where supervisors did not perform a visual 

inspection; however, they still verified the firearm within the 

inventory system over several years.7

 The following history of one 

of these six lost CBP firearms illustrates this annual inventory 

control weakness: 

�	 September 2004 – An officer’s firearm was stolen from his 

vehicle but the loss was not recorded in the FACTS 

inventory system. 

�	 August 2005 – Another officer recorded in FACTS that the 

stolen firearm was in his possession. 

�	 September 2005 – This officer’s supervisor affirmed 

information about this firearm in FACTS. 

�	 December 2006 – A third officer entered the firearm 

information into FACTS (as if it were not lost). 

�	 December 2006 – This officer’s supervisor affirmed the 

firearm information in FACTS. 

�	 August 2007 – The third officer again entered firearm 

information into FACTS (as if it were not lost) as part of 

the annual inventory process. 

� September 2007 – Supervisor verified this firearm 

information in FACTS. 

As of 2009, CBP and ICE require supervisors to affirm, within the 

inventory system, that they visually verified the serial numbers of 

officers’ firearms during the annual inventory. Although this is a 

reasonable control, affirmations do not replace inventories 

performed by independent third parties. 

Acceptances and Transfers 

Component personnel did not always promptly update acceptances 

of firearms and transfers of officers’ firearms in the inventory 

system. Component policies and procedures do not address the 

7 We referred these six cases to the CBP Office of Internal Affairs for further review. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

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timely inputting of acceptances and transfers. Acceptances occur 

to document the receipt of new firearms. Transfers occur to 

document a change in an officer’s duty station or a change in status 

of an issued firearm. As a result, the components did not always 

maintain up-to-date inventory records, which reduced 

accountability in the management of firearms. 

Our review of CBP and ICE resulted in 29 inventory control 

inaccuracies (22 at CBP and 7 at ICE). For example: 

�	 A CBP facility did not include three firearms issued to the 

facility in their inventory system. CBP updated the 

inventory when we pointed out the discrepancy. 

�	 An ICE officer transferred from one office to another but 

the officer’s information, including inventory data for his 

firearm, did not transfer to the new inventory records for 

several weeks. ICE updated the inventory records when we 

pointed out the discrepancy. 

Actions Taken by CBP and ICE 

CBP is developing and implementing changes in its management 

and oversight of firearms to improve firearms accountability and to 

correct deficiencies identified during our audit. To correct the 

deficiencies, CBP initiated the following actions: 

�	 Transitioned to a web-based firearms accountability system 

in April 2009. 

�	 Created a monthly review process of lost firearms to 

improve its oversight and accountability. 

�	 Developed a unified Use of Force Policy, which is 

currently in the staffing and approval process. 

�	 Reviewed policies and procedures regarding the 

safeguarding and controlling of firearms in vehicles to 

determine if they are sufficient. 

�	 Utilized the CBPnet to remind law enforcement personnel 

of the reporting requirements for lost, stolen, or missing 

firearms. 

�	 Developed a presentation that addresses the proper methods 

for safeguarding and controlling firearms, which CBP plans 

to use annually. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 13 
ICE initiated changes in its management and oversight of firearms 

to correct deficiencies identified during our audit. To correct the 

deficiencies, ICE initiated the following actions: 

�	 Developed methods to promote firearms security awareness 

through policy and procedure clarifications, and posters to 

reinforce firearms storage requirements. 

�	 Drafted a memorandum to remind all ICE program office 

directors of their responsibility to ensure that armed 

personnel safeguard all issued or approved personally 

owned firearms in accordance with ICE policies and 

procedures. 

�	 Drafted a second memorandum to provide supplementary 

guidance regarding the processes officers should use to 

report lost and stolen firearms and the required 

documentation for transfer and receipt of firearms. 

�	 Recommended that its Office of Professional 

Responsibility Management Inspection Unit expand the 

scope of their firearms field audits to include a review of 

the individual officers’ storage practices. 

Conclusion 

The prescribed guidance for DHS and the augmented guidance 

developed by the components are incomplete and inconsistent to 

ensure that firearms are protected against loss and unauthorized 

use. By developing standard policies and procedures, DHS could 

reduce the number of lost firearms and improve its accountability 

over its firearm inventory. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Undersecretary for Management: 

Recommendation #1: Develop department-wide policies and 

procedures for safeguarding and controlling firearms. At a 

minimum, these policies and procedures should include: 

a.	 Requirements for properly securing firearms, including a 

requirement to use properly mounted lockboxes. 

b.	 Timelines for recording acceptances and transfers in the 

inventory system. 

c.	 Requirements for reporting lost firearms, including 

classification of lost versus stolen, and timelines for 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 14 
reporting lost firearms to supervisors, local law 

enforcement, the National Crime Information Center, and 

component headquarters. 

d.	 Inventory procedures that include having an independent 

third party observe annual inventories. 

Recommendation #2: Assess firearm security equipment needs 

for each officer assigned a firearm, issue security equipment as 

needed, and reaffirm to each officer the requirement to always 

properly secure firearms. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

DHS provided comments to our draft report, concurring with both 

recommendations. Below is a summary of the written response 

from DHS and our analysis of the response. A copy of the 

Undersecretary of Management’s response, in its entirety, appears 

in Appendix B. 

DHS Response to Recommendation #1: The Undersecretary of 

Management concurred with our recommendation and said that the 

Office of the Chief Administrative Officer (OCAO) has begun a 

complete revision of the DHS Property Management policy 

directive. Key controls addressed within the DHS Property 

Management policy directive will include the proper storage of 

weapons; recording and updating firearms inventory; classification 

of lost and stolen, and timeliness for reporting lost or stolen 

firearms; and proper inventory procedures. 

OIG Evaluation: This recommendation is resolved, but remains 

open pending confirmation that the DHS implemented these key 

controls and that the key controls address the recommendation. 

Developing effective policies and procedures will assist in 

mitigating the risk of lost firearms. 

DHS Response to Recommendation #2: DHS concurred with 

our recommendation. The OCAO will review the component’s 

requirements for firearm security equipment and collaborate with 

them to determine the effectiveness of their current equipment. In 

addition, the OCAO will require that all components conduct 

annual firearm security requirements awareness training. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 15 
OIG Evaluation: This recommendation is resolved, but remains 

open pending confirmation that DHS implemented these policies 

and procedures and that the policies and procedures appropriately 

address the recommendation. Developing effective policies and 

procedures will assist in mitigating risks associated with 

maintaining security over firearms. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 

Page 16 
Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

This report provides the results of our work to determine the 

efficacy of DHS management and oversight of component 

safeguards and controls over firearms. To achieve our objectives 

we: 

�	 Interviewed DHS officials regarding management of 

personal property, specifically firearms, and the related 

policies and procedures for DHS and the components; 

�	 Reviewed DHS organizational charts, and manuals for 

tracking systems and firearms inventories; 

�	 Reviewed case files and data for the components’ lost 

firearms from FYs 2006 through 2008; 

�	 Contacted law enforcement agencies and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation to obtain information regarding the 

circumstances surrounding the recovery of lost firearms; 

�	 Interviewed officers, observed the storage of firearms, and 

physically verified that serial numbers and the make and 

model of the officers’ firearms matched the inventory 

listing provided to us by CBP and ICE; 

�	 Conducted fieldwork at 16 CBP and ICE locations, verified 

the serial numbers for 1,528 issued firearms, and observed 

storage practices for 152 firearms; 

�	 Reviewed prior audit reports regarding DHS, the 

components, and other federal agencies that have armed 

law enforcement officers; and 

�	 Assessed the reliability and validity of data provided by the 

components by performing a physical verification of 

inventory data and comparing relevant data from multiple 

sources. 

We conducted our audit between February and July 2009 under the 

authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and 

according to generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


Page 17
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to Draft Report 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


Page 18
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to Draft Report 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


Page 19 

Appendix B 

Management Comments to Draft Report 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


Page 20 

 

 

Appendix C 

Reporting Lost Firearms Policies and Procedures 

CBP Policies ICE Policy 

Critical Reporting Steps Customs Policy 

Immigration and 

Naturalization 

Service Policy 

ICE Interim Policy 

Report lost firearm to 

supervisor Immediately As soon as practical Immediately 

Report lost firearm to 

local law enforcement Not stated 

As soon as 

possible from 

supervisor 

Not required 

Report lost firearm to 

component headquarters No timeframe Within 24 hours Immediately from supervisor 

Report lost firearm to 

National Crime 

Information Center 

No timeframe Not stated No timeframe 

Memo prepared by 

employee Not stated Within 48 hours Within 48 hours 

Report to Joint Intake 

Center (JIC) Not stated 

Not stated 

Not stated 

Significant Incident 

Report Not stated Within 24 hours Not stated 

Report of survey No timeframe No timeframe Not stated 

CBP - Internal Affairs No timeframe Within 24 hours 

by HQs Not applicable 

ICE - Office of 

Professional 

Responsibility 

Not applicable Not applicable 

As soon as 

practicable from 

supervisor 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


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Appendix D 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Linda Howard, Director 

Sean Pettersen, Audit Manager 

David DeHaven, Auditor-in-Charge 

Lindsay Cabral, Auditor 

Brian Blaha, Auditor 

Victoria Phan, Program Analyst 

Kevin King, Program Analyst 

Joseph Faulk, Program Analyst 

Lisa Vonder Haar, Desk Officer 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


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Appendix E 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary, Management 

DHS Audit Liaison 

Acting Commissioner, CBP 

CBP Audit Liaison 

Assistant Secretary, ICE 

ICE Audit Liaison 

Acting Administrator, TSA 

TSA Audit Liaison 

Administrator, FEMA 

FEMA Audit Liaison 

Director, FLETC 

FLETC Audit Liaison 

Commandant, USCG 

USCG Audit Liaison 

Director, USSS 

USSS Audit Liaison 

Acting Under Secretary, S&T 

S&T Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

DHS Controls Over Firearms 


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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.