[Cite as Neumann v. Neumann, 2012-Ohio-591.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 96915

PAMELA S. NEUMANN

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

PAUL NEUMANN

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Domestic Relations Division 

Case No. D-328194 

BEFORE: Cooney, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Sweeney, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 16, 2012 

FOR APPELLANT
2

Paul Neumann, pro se 

24243 Lebern Drive 

North Olmsted, OH 44070 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Heather L. Corso 

Jennifer L. Malensek 

The Bradley Building 

1200 West Sixth Street 

Suite 502 

Cleveland, OH 44113 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM

Jacob A.H. Kronenberg 

Kronenberg & Belovich Law, LLC 

635 West Lakeside Avenue 

Suite 605 

Cleveland, OH 44113 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Paul Neumann (“Paul”), pro se, appeals the court’s 

judgment entry of divorce. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. 

{¶2} Paul and plaintiff-appellee, Pamela S. Neumann (“Pamela”), were married 

in 2004. The two had one minor child born in 2005. Pamela separated from Paul and 

filed for divorce in 2009. The child remained primarily with Pamela after the 
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separation. Shortly after the separation, Pamela was awarded a one-year protection 

order as a result of her menacing by stalking charge against Paul. 

{¶3} In May 2011, the court issued a final determination, in which the court 

named Pamela the residential parent and legal custodian. The court set forth a shared 

parenting agreement, granted Pamela child support, and awarded her attorney fees. 

{¶4} Paul now appeals from this entry, raising three assignments of error. 

Attorney Fees

{¶5} In his first assignment of error, Paul argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in awarding attorney fees to Pamela. 

{¶6} Our review of the award of attorney fees is limited to determining (1) 

whether the factual considerations upon which the award was based are supported by the 

manifest weight of the evidence, or (2) whether the domestic relations court abused its 

discretion. Gourash v. Gourash, 8th Dist. Nos. 71882 and 73971, 1999 WL 684889 

(Sept. 2, 1999), citing Oatey v. Oatey, 83 Ohio App.3d 251, 614 N.E.2d 1054 (1992). 

{¶7} R.C. 3105.73(A), which governs attorney fee awards in domestic relations 

cases, provides: 

In an action for divorce * * * or an appeal of that action, a court may award 

all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to either 

party if the court finds the award equitable. In determining whether an 

award is equitable, the court may consider the parties’ marital assets and 
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income, any award of temporary spousal support, the conduct of the parties, 

and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate. 

{¶8} The trial court found that an award of attorney fees for Pamela was justified 

in the instant case. Pamela’s fees totaled $17,077, and the court awarded $7,500 in lieu 

of spousal support. In support of its award, the court cited Paul’s “overall lack of 

cooperation and compliance with discovery and trial orders.” The court also noted 

Paul’s failure to comply with Pamela’s discovery requests and his untimely affidavits that 

contained substantive errors. 

{¶9} In addition, the court considered whether all of the legal services were 

necessary and the amount of time expended on those services. Counsel’s reduced hourly 

rates were reasonable and commensurate with the customary fees in this locality. 

Therefore, we find that the award of attorney fees was supported by competent, credible 

evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. 

{¶10} Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled. 

Custody

{¶11} In his second assignment of error, Paul argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion when it awarded him less than equal custody. 

{¶12} Paul argues that he is entitled to an equal time shared parenting plan. 

However, he did not file a shared parenting plan with the court, nor does he support his 

claim for equal time with any statutory authority. R.C. 3109.04 provides that when 
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neither parent files a plan for shared parenting, the court has jurisdiction to allocate 

parental rights in the best interest of the child. R.C. 3109.04 states: 

(A) In any divorce, legal separation, or annulment proceeding and in any 

proceeding pertaining to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities 

for the care of a child, upon hearing the testimony of either or both parents 

and considering any mediation report filed pursuant to section 3109.052 of 

the Revised Code and in accordance with sections 3127.01 to 3127.53 of 

the Revised Code, the court shall allocate the parental rights and 

responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage. Subject to 

division (D)(2) of this section, the court may allocate the parental rights and 

responsibilities for the care of the children in either of the following ways: 

(1) If neither parent files a pleading or motion in accordance with division 

(G) of this section, if at least one parent files a pleading or motion under 

that division but no parent who filed a pleading or motion under that 

division also files a plan for shared parenting, or if at least one parent files 

both a pleading or motion and a shared parenting plan under that division 

but no plan for shared parenting is in the best interest of the children, the 

court, in a manner consistent with the best interest of the children, shall 

allocate the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the children 

primarily to one of the parents, designate that parent as the residential 
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parent and the legal custodian of the child, and divide between the parents 

the other rights and responsibilities for the care of the children, including, 

but not limited to, the responsibility to provide support for the children and 

the right of the parent who is not the residential parent to have continuing 

contact with the children. 

{¶13} R.C. 3109.04(F) provides relevant factors for the court to consider. 

Having reviewed the judgment entry, this court finds that the trial court considered each 

element of R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (2) when determining the best interest of the child. 

Having addressed each element, the court found that it was in the child’s best interest to 

make Pamela the residential parent and legal custodian, in addition to setting forth a 

detailed shared parenting schedule. Therefore, we find that the trial court’s shared 

parenting plan was not an abuse of discretion. 

{¶14} Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled. 

Temporary Spousal Support

{¶15} In his third assignment of error, Paul argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it awarded temporary spousal support to Pamela without a proven need 

and without a full evidentiary hearing. 

{¶16} A trial court has considerable latitude when determining the amount of 

spousal support to award in a divorce proceeding. Bolinger v. Bolinger, 49 Ohio St.3d 

120, 122, 551 N.E.2d 157 (1990). A trial court’s decision regarding spousal obligations 
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will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Pauly v. Pauly, 80 Ohio 

St.3d 386, 390, 686 N.E.2d 1108 (1997); Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 421 

N.E.2d 1293 (1981). So long as the decision of the trial court is supported by some 

competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case, we will not 

disturb it. Masitto v. Masitto, 22 Ohio St.3d 63, 66, 488 N.E.2d 857 (1986). “Since it 

is axiomatic that a trial court must have discretion to do what is equitable upon the facts 

and circumstances of each case, it necessarily follows that a trial court’s decision in 

domestic relations matters should not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision involves 

more than an error of judgment.” Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 

1028 (1989). 

{¶17} R.C. 3105.18(B) authorizes the trial court to award reasonable temporary 

spousal support to either party during the pendency of any divorce or legal separation 

proceeding. When determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, 

the court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C). The trial court is not 

required to comment on each statutory factor; the record need only show that the court 

considered the statutory factors when making its award. Carman v. Carman, 109 Ohio 

App.3d 698, 703, 672 N.E.2d 1093 (1996). Civ.R. 75(N)(1) authorizes the trial court to 

grant spousal support pendente lite to either party without oral hearing upon the filing of a 

motion and supporting affidavit. The other party may then file counter affidavits within 

14 days of the filing of the motion. Civ.R. 75(N)(2). 
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{¶18} On September 29, 2009, Pamela moved for spousal support pendente lite 

and attached a supporting affidavit. Paul filed an answer and an affidavit in reply to her 

motion without objection to her request. Her motion was granted on January 21, 2010. 

The trial court based its order of temporary support on Pamela’s income of $0 and Paul’s 

income of $75,200. Based on these figures, the trial court determined that a temporary 

spousal support award of $1,734 per month was appropriate. 

{¶19} On February 23, 2010, Paul filed an application for a Civ.R. 75(N) 

hearing. A hearing was scheduled and reset several times until the final date set for trial. 

 The court allowed Paul to fully cross-examine Pamela on this issue at trial. 

{¶20} Paul argues that the trial court erred in awarding temporary spousal 

support to Pamela. However, Paul never produced evidence to rebut the temporary 

support order. Moreover, the trial court’s judgment entry of divorce does not continue 

spousal support. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the temporary support order or 

the manner in which the court determined the appropriate amount. 

{¶21} Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶22} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the domestic 

relations court to carry this judgment into execution. 
9

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

___________________________________________________ 

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., and 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR