HIGHLIGHTS OF TH

IRAQ STRATEGY RE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCI

JANUARY 2007

Summary Briefing Slides
Guiding Principles

• Success in Iraq remains critical to our nationa

success in the War on Terror.

• Failure in Iraq would have disastrous consequ

the United States, the region, and our allies.

• There is no silver bullet solution in Iraq. Every 

involves trade-offs across various risks.
• Iraq remains a central front in the Global War on T• Al-Qaida in Iraq has declared and shown its intenti

caliphate in Iraq and then to expand the caliphate w

– Sowing sectarian violence in Iraq has been and rem

strategy of al-Qaida in Iraq to reach the goal of crea

• The Freedom Agenda is advanced by the survival 

Iraq’s democratic institutions. 

– Winning in Iraq will not end the War on Terror, but it 

the War on Terror much easier.

– Failing in Iraq would make succeeding in the War o

difficult.

Relationship to the War on Te
• Our allies in the region are concerned about ne

influence in Iraq.

– Support for the Iraqi Government, however, can help 

• Iran has been cultivating influence in Iraq throu

disposal. 

– Iran’s threat involves both lethal action and the burrow

into Iraqi institutions.

• Syrian actions, while posing less of a strategic 

Iranian actions, exacerbate the tactical challengIraqi government.

The Regional Picture
• We have achieved many of our initial objectives in Iraq.

– Saddam Hussein’s regime is no longer an organized threat to Iraq, it– Iraq is governed by a freely elected government under a permanent – Democratic institutions have been established and are enabling Iraq

– Per capita incomes have increased ($743 to $1593 according to the 

also has risen) and Iraq has performed under its IMF agreement.

• But the situation in Iraq has grown increasingly complex over th

– Al-Qaida terrorism and a vicious insurgency are now combined with – The national government is eager to take lead responsibility, but it is 

governmental capability and widening sectarian divisions. 

– Power centers are devolving, with events outside the international zo

national trends.

• The political process has shown signs of maturation, but meanin

be achieved.

– Iraqi leaders have not yet achieved a single vision for a unified Iraq. 

• Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have grown in effectiveness, but the l

they must cope continue to increase.

– Professionalism and effectiveness are improving but are not yet con– Some members of the ISF, notably the police, are contributing to sec– Despite more than 300,000 trained and equipped members of the IS

are present for duty on a given day.

• Combat losses, desertion, attrition, and leave account for the m

Present Situation
• The situation in Baghdad has not improved despite 

adjustments.

– The situation in Baghdad determines nationwide trends; its 

seen as key to a unified Iraq.

– The Government of Iraq has not yet delivered promised ess– Limitations on operations have hindered the execution of se– Force levels overall in Baghdad have been inadequate to st

• Iraqi support for the Coalition has declined substa

failure of security over the past year.

– In the absence of security, communities are turning to “self-

• In his public and private statements, Prime Ministe

positive vision where all Iraqis are protected by the 

– Execution and delivery on pledges remain vital. 

Present Situation
• Primary challenge is a Sunni-based insurgency. • Political progress will help defuse the insurgency and 

dampen levels of violence. 

• National Compact is within the grasp of Iraqi leaders and 

will have meaningful impact on security.

• Majority of Iraqis will support the Coalition and Iraqi 

efforts to build a democratic state.

• Region has a strategic interest in the stabilization of Iraq.• Majority of Iraqis and Iraqi leaders see their interests as 

best advanced by a unified Iraq. 

• Dialogue with insurgent groups will help reduce violence.• Iraqi Security Forces are gaining in strength and ability to 

handle Iraq’s security challenges. 

• Primary challenge is 

communities; the censpiking.

• While political progre

intertwined, political absent a basic level 

• Effective national rec

form of a comprehenabout as the product 

• Iraqis increasingly di• Many Arab states re

support behind the Ir

• While still committed 

also advancing sectastrategies, pursuit of 

• Dialogue with insurge

may not produce stra

• Many elements of IS

handle Iraqi security 

Previous 

Key Assumptions
• Our strategic goal in Iraq remains the same: A unified democra

govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in th

• While our strategic goal requires a long-term relationship with I

in the effort and must sharpen the objectives we believe are acmonths.

• The objectives in this new phase are:

1. Defeat al-Qaida and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe 

2. Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and rega

3. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit destructive Ira

Iraq.

4. Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong democrati

serving all Iraqis and preventing the return of the forces of tyranny.

5. Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation but with the Iraq

the lead.

6. Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the tran

responsibility to the Iraqi Government. 

7. Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy including by helping Iraq m

export of oil to support Iraqi development.

8. Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the inte

Strategic Goals and Objecti
Iraqis Are in the Lead in Ensuring Success – U.S. in Support Role• Place the responsibility for success on the Iraqis• Recognize and expect that sectarian violence must be addressed by Iraqis• Encourage Iraqis to reach national reconciliation• Urge Iraqi Government to serve Iraqis in an impartial wayThe Primary Mission Is Helping Iraqis Provide Security to the Population• Help Iraqis provide greater levels of security in Baghdad in order to enable political • Help Iraqis create the security environment in which political deals needed to susta• Bolster Iraqi capabilities and transfer responsibility to able units as part of this effortModerates Will Be Vigorously Supported in their Battle with Violent Extremists• Counter extremist portrayal of Iraq’s conflict as Sunni vs. Shi’a, rather than modera• Recognize and act upon the reality that the United States has a national interest in • Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi’a, Sunnis, and KurdsWe Will Diversify our Political and Economic Effort in Iraq to Achieve Our Goals• Increase attention to developments outside of the International Zone – emphasize f• Help Iraqi provincial governments deliver to their constituents and interact with Bag• Extend the political and economic influence through the expansion of our civilian efWe Will Further Integrate Our Civil and Military Efforts• Harness all elements of national power; further augment joint civilian-military efforts • Resource at levels that assume a resilient enemy and realistic assessment of Iraqi Embedding Our Iraq Strategy in a Regional Approach is Vital to Success• Iraq is a regional and international challenge• Intensify GOI and USG efforts to expand regional and international help, counter Ira• Invigorate diplomatic efforts to improve the regional contextWe Must Maintain and Expand Our Capabilities for the Long War • Acknowledge that succeeding in Iraq is the immediate challenge, but it is not the las• Ensure we have adequate national capabilities to fight the long war, on the military 

Major Strategic Shifts
• Primary security focus was on transferring responsibility to Iraqis; 

with less focus on population security

• Coalition conceived and led Baghdad security plans.• Restrictive ROE hindered execution of Baghdad security plan.• Focused efforts on brokering National Compact among elites.• Outreach, sometimes unilateral, to Sunnis. • Helped build government capacity across the board. • Acknowledged continued Syrian and increasing lethal Iranian 

interference in Iraq.

• Trained ISF to 325,000 end-strength. • Political and economic efforts focused mainly in green zone, 

work with all national ministries.

• Military and civilian efforts coexisted outside of Baghdad.• Modest embedding with Iraqi units.• Gradual transfer of security responsibility to ISF.

• Primary security focus is on 

will facilitate the transfer of s

• Iraqi-conceived, Iraqi-led Ba• Iraqi leaders committed to p

political command and cont

• Equal focus given to local p

international zone. Hold Iraqannounced

• GOI leads outreach to insur

open for Sunni moderates.

• Target assistance to vital fu

zone especially at provincia

• Counter Iranian and Syrian • Expand size of Iraqi Army; c• Double political and econom

better promote local accomm

• Civilian and military effort in• Selective and significant inc• Accelerate transfer of battle

Previous W

Key Operational Shifts
• Commitment to non-interference in operations of the Iraqi 

Security Forces 

• Commitment to go after all those who violate the law, 

regardless of sect or religion

• Three additional Iraqi army brigades to Baghdad • Restructuring of security arrangements in Baghdad: one 

military commander, two subordinates, one Iraqi army brigade for each district

• Expansion of Iraqi Army to add units, provide replenishment 

for 30,000 positions, and increase the deployability of forces on a national basis

MOD Forces will grow from:– 10 Army Divisions to 13– 36 Army Brigades to 41– 112 Army Battalions to 132– Development of National Operations Center, National 

Counter-Terror Force, and National Strike Force

– Reform of the Interior Ministry to increase 

transparency and accountability, transform National Police into a professional force, transform local police and Facilities Protection Service

Political/Economic• Reform of Cabinet as suggested in Dec 16 PM Maliki speech• Completion of Budget – money for economic programs• Release of Iraqi funds • Launch of International Compact

• Increase in U.S. troop

to Baghdad.

– Partnering of U

nine districts o

• Increase U.S. forces 

in Anbar, and step up 

• Remobilize the Natio• Expansion of U.S. em• Doubling of PRTs and • Integration of PRTs a• Request to Congress 

CERP for PRT leade

• Jobs creation program

and Anbar

• Increase operations a• Deployment of securi• Launch of Internation• Increase in end-stren• Request to Congress 

agencies that send e

By Iraqis B

Key Tactical Shifts