APPENDIX A 
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APPENDIX B 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL' S GUIDELINES

REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

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Preamble

The following Guidelines regarding the use of confidential informnts are issued under

the authority of the Attorney General as provided in sections 509, 510, and 533 oftitle 28

United States Code. They apply to the use of confidential informants in criminal investigations

and prosecutions by Departent of Justice law enforcement agencies and federal prosecuting

offices as specified in paragraph (I)(A) below.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERA PROVISIONS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . 1

, 3.

PUROSE AN SCOPE. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . 1

DEFINITIONS. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Departent of Justice Law Enforcement Agency" or "JLEA" ........ 1

Field Manager

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . 2

Senior Field Manager

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . 2

Federal Prosecuting Office" or "FPO" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Chief Federal Prosecutor

Confdential Informnt" or " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Cooperating DefendantlWitness " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Source of Inormation

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . 3

High Level Confidential Informant" ............................ 3

10. Tier 1 Otherwise Ilegal Activity" .............................. 3

11. Tier 2 Otherwise Ilegal Activity" .............................. 4

12. Fugitive

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

13. Confidential Inormant Review Commttee" or "CIRC" 

.... 

. . . . . . . . . 5

PROIDBITION ON COMMITMENTS OF IMMUNITY BY FEDERA

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

REVEALING A CONFIDENTIA INFORMT' S TRUE IDENTITY. . . 5

DUTY OF CANDOR. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . 5

MATAINING CONFIDENTIALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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II.

III.

EXCEPTIONS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION .......................

RIGHTS OF TIDRD PARTIES . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

COMPLIACE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

REGISTERIG A CONFIDENTIA INORMT .........................

SUITABILITY DElERMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Initial Suitability Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Continuing Suitability Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Review of Long-Term Confidential Informnts

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

REGISTRATION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . 11

INSTRUCTIONS. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . 11

SPECIAL APPROVAL REQUIMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

High Level ConfidentialInformants ............................ 13

dividuals Under the Obligation of a Legal Privilege of

Confdentiality or Affliated with the Media. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Federal Prisoners, Probationers, Parolees, Detainees, and

Supervised Releasees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Curent or Former Participants in the Witness Security Program. . . . . . 15

State or Local Prisoners, Probationers, Parolees, or

Supervised Releasees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Fugitives. . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . 16

RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING REGISTERED CONFIDENTIA

INFORMTS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

GENERA PROVISIONS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . 17

No Interference With an Investigation of a Confidential Informant. . . . 17

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Prohibited Transactions and Relationships . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

MONETARY PAYMNTS 

General. . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Prohibition Against Contingent Payments. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Approval for a Single Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Approval for Anual Payments. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

' . . . . . . 18

Approval for Aggregate Payments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Documentation of Payment. . . . ' ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Accounting and Reconciliation Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Coordination with Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

AUTHORIZATION OF OTHERWISE ILLEGAL ACTIVTY . . . . . . . . 19

General Provisions. . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Authorization. . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . 20

Findings

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Instrctions. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . 21

Precautionary Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Suspension of Authorization

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Revocation of Authorization

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Renewal and Expansion of Authorization. . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Emergency Authorization

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. 24

10. Designees. . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . 24

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IV.

LISTING A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMT IN AN ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE APPLICATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

SPECIAL NOTIFICATION REOUIMENTS 

............................

NOTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION

. . . . . . . . .

NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED ILLEGAL ACTIVITY. . . . . . . . 25

NOTIFICATION REGARING CERTAI FEDERA JUICIA

PROCEEDINGS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

PRILEGED OR EXCULPATORY INFORMTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FROM CHIEF FEDERA

PROSECUTORS REGARING A CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMT

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FILE REVIWS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

DESIGNEES. . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

' . . . . . . . 27

DEACTIVATION OF CONFIDENTIA.INFORMTS 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GENERA PROVISIONS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . 27

DELAYED NOTIFICATION TO A CONFIDENTIA INORMT

. . .

CONTACTS WITH FORMR CONFIDENTIA INFORMTS

DEACTIVATED FOR CAUSE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. 28

COORDINATION WITH PROSECUTORS "

.

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I. GENERA PROVISIONS

PUROSE AN SCOPE

The purose of these Guidelines is to set policy regarding the-use of Confidential

Informants, as defmed below, in criminal investigations and prosecutions by all

Deparent of Justice Law Enforcement Agencies and Federal Prosecuting

Offices, as defmed below.

These Guidelines do not apply to the use of Cooperating DefendantslWitnesses or

Sources ofInformation, as defined below, unless a Departent of Justice Law

Enforcement Agency, in its discretion, chooses to apply these Guidelines to such

persons.

These Guidelines are madatory and supersede the Attorney General' s Guidelines

on the Use of Inormnts in Domestic Securty, Organized Crime, and Other

Criminal Investigations (December 15, 1976); the Attorney General' s Guidelines

on FBI Use of Informnts and Confidential Sources (December 2 1980);

Resolution 18 of the Office of Investigative Agency Policies (August 15, 1996);

and any other guidelines or policies that are inconsistent with these Guidelines.

These Guidelines do not supersede otherwise applicable ethical obligations of

Deparent of Justice attorneys, which can, in certain circumstances (for

example, with respect to contacts with represented persons), have an impact on

law enforcement agents' conduct. 

These. Guidelines do not limit the ability of a Departent of Justice Law

Enforcement Agency to impose additional restrictions on the use of Confidential

Informants.

These Guidelines apply to the use of a Confidential Informant in a foreign countr

only to the extent that the Confidential Informnt is reasonably likely to be called

to testify in a domestic case.

These Guidelines do not apply to the use of Confidential Informants in foreign

intelligence or foreign counterintelligence investigations. .

DEFINTIONS

Departent of Justice Law Enforcement Agency" or "JLEA" -

The Drug Enforcement Admnistration;

The Federal Bureau of Investigation;

The Immigration and Naturalization Service;

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The United States Marshals Service; and

The Departent of Justice Offce of the Inspector General.

Field Manager" - a JLEA' s first-line supervisor, as defined by the JLEA

(typically, GS- 14 rank or higher).

Senior Field Manager" - a JLEA' s second-line supervisor, as defined by the

JLEA (typically, GS- 15 rank or higher).

Federal Prosecuting Office" or "FPO'! -

The United States Attorneys' Offices;

The Criminal Division, Tax Division, Civil Rights Division, Antitst

Division, and Environmental and Natual Resources Division of the

Deparent of Justice; and 

Any other litigating component of the Departnt of Justice with

authority to prosecute federal criminal offenses.

Chief Federal Prosecutor" - the head of a FPO.

Confidential Informant" or " - any individual who provides useful and

credible information to a JLEA regarding felonious crimial activities, and from

whom the JLEA expects or intends to obtain additional useful and credible

information regarding such activities in the futue.

Cooperating Defendantlitness" - any individual who:

meets the defmition of a CI;

has agreed to testify in a proceeding as a result of having provided

information to the JLEA and

(i) is a defendant or potential witness who has a wrtten agreement with a

FPO, pursuant to which the individual has an expectation of futu e judicial

or prosecutive considemtion or assistance as a result of having provided

information to the JIEA, or

(ii) is a potential witness who has had a FPO concur in all material aspects

of his or her use by the JLEA.

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10.

Source ofInformation" - any individual who:

meets the defmition of a CI;

provides information to a JLEA solely as a result of legitimate routine

access to information or records, such as an employee of the military, a

law enforcement agency, or a legitimate business , phone company, ban, airlines), and not as a result of criminal association with persons of

investigative interest to the JLEA; and

provides such information in a maner consistent with applicable law.

High Level Confidential Informant" - a CI who is part of the senior leadership of

an enterprise that

has: (i) a national or international sphere of activities, or (ii) high

significance to the JLEA's national objectives, even if the enterprise

sphere of activities is local or regional; and

engages in, or uses others to commit, any of the conduct described below

in paragraph (I)(B)(1 O)( )(i)-(iv). 

Tier 1. Otherwise Ilegal Activity" - any activity that:

would constitute a misdemeanor or felony under federal, state, or local law

if engaged in by a person acting without authorization; and

that involves -

(i) the commission, or the significant risk of the commission, of any act of

violence by a person or persons other than the Confidential Informant; 

(ii) corrpt conduct, or the significant risk of corrpt conduct, by senior

federal, state, or local public officials;

Bookmaking that is significantly associated with, or substantially controlled by,

organized crime ordinarily will be within the scope of paragraph (I)(B)(10)(b)(i). Thus, for

example, where bookmakers have a financial relationship with members or associates of

organized crime, and/or use members or associates of organized crime to collect their debts, the

conduct of those bookmakers would create a significant risk of violence, and would therefore fall

within the definition of Tier 1 Otherwise Ilegal Activity.

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(iii) the manufactuing, importng, exporting, possession, or traffckig of

controlled substances in a quantity equal to or exceeding those quantities

specified in United States Sentencing Guidelines 2Dl. l(c)(I);

(iv) fmancialloss, or the significant risk offmancialloss, in an amount

equal to or exceeding those amounts specified in United States Sentencing

Guidelines 2Bl. l(bXl)(I);

(v) a Confdential Informant providing to any person (other than a JLEA

agent) any item, service, or expertise that is necessary for the commission

of a federal, state, or local offense, which the person otherwise would have

difficulty obtaining; or

(vi) a Confdential Inormant providing to any person (other than a JLEA

agent) any quantity of a controlled substace, with little or no expectation of its recovery by the JLEA. 

Tier 2 Otherwise Ilegal Activity" - any other activity that would constitte a

misdemeanor or felony under federal, state, or local law if engaged in by a person

acting without authorization.

11.

12. Fugitive" - an individual:

for whom a federal, state, or local law enforcement agency has placed a

wanted record in the NQC (other than for a traffc or pett offense);

who is located either witin the United States or in a countr with which

the United States has an extradition treaty; and

2 The citations to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) Manual are to the

2001 Edition. The references herein to parcular USSG Sections are intended to remain

applicable to the most closely corresponding USSG level in subsequent editions ofthe USSG

Manual in the event that the cited USSG provisions are amended. Thus, it is intended that

subsection (iii) of this paragraph wil remain applicable to the highest offense level in the Drug

Quantity Table in future editions oftheUSSG Manual, and that subsection (iv) of the paragraph

wil remain applicable to dollar amounts that, in futue editions of the USSG Manual, trigger

sentencing enhancements similar to that set forth in the curent section 2B 1. 1 (b )( 1 )(1). Any

ambiguities in this regard should be resolved by the Assistant Attorney General for the Crimial

Division.

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whom the law enforcement agency that has placed the wanted reconi in

the NCIC is wiling to take into custody upon his or her arrest and, if

necessar, seek his or her extradition to its jursdiction.

13. Confidential Informnt Review Committee" or "CIRC" - a commttee, created

by a JLEA for puroses of reviewing certain decisions relating to the registration

and utili?ation of CIs, the chair of which is a JIEA official at or above the level

of Deputy Assistant Director (or its equivalent) and the membership of which

includes the following two representatives designated by the Assistant Attorney

General for the Criminal Division of the Departent of Justice (each of whom

shall be considered a "Criinal Division representative ): (i) a Deputy Assistant

Attorney General for the Criminal Division; and (ii) an Assistant United States

Attorney.

PROHIITION ON COMMTMENTS OF IMUNTY BY FEDERA

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

A JLEA agent does not have any authority to mae any promise or commitment that

would prevent the governent from prosecuting an individual for crimial aCtivity that is not

authorized pursuant to paragraph (III)(C) below, or that would limit the use of any evidence by

the governent, withut the prior wrtten approval of the FPO that has primar jursdiction to

prosecute the CI for such criminal activity. A JLEA agent must take the utmost care to avoid

giving any person the erroneous impression that he or she has any such authority. 

REVEALING A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMT' S TRUE IDENTITY

Except in the case of approvals and reviews described below in paragraphs (II)(A)(3)

(review oflong-term CIs), (III)(B)(8) (coordination concernng payments to CIs), (IV(D)(I)

(notification that CI has obtained privileged inormation), and (V)(D) (coordination concerning

deactivation of CI, but only with respect to a a whose identity was not previously disclosed),

whenever a JLEA is required to make contact of any kind with a FPO puruant to these

Guidelines regarding a CI, the JLEA may not withhold the tre identity of the CI from the FPO.

DUTY OF CANOR

Employees of the entities to which these Guidelines apply have a duty of candor in the

discharge of their responsibilities pursuant to these Guidelines. 

MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIAITY

A JLEA agent must take the utmost care to avoid conveying any confidential

investigative informtion to a CI , inormation relating to electronic

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sureilance, search warants, or the identity of other actual or potential

informants), other than what is necessary an appropriate for operational reasons.

The Chief Federal Prosecutor and his or her designee are required to maintain as

confidential the identity of any CI and the infurmation the CI has provided, unless

obligated to disclose it by law or Cour order. Ifa JLEA provides the Chief

Federal Prosecutor or his or her designee with written material containing such

information:

Such individual is obligated to keep it confidential by placing it into a

locked file cabinet when not in his or her direct care and custody;

Access to the informtion shall be restrcted to the Chief Federal

Prosecutor or his or her designee and personnel deemed necessar to cat

out the official duties related to the case;

The Chief Federal Prosecutor or his or her designee is responsible for

assurg that each person permtted access to the information is made

aware of the need to preserve the security and confidentiality of the

. inormation, as provided in this policy;

Prior to disclosure of the information to defense counselor in open Cour

the Chief Federal Prosecutor or his or her designee must give the JLEA an

opportty to discuss such disclosure and must comply with any other

applicable provision of28 C. R. 16.21- 16.29; and

At the conclusion of a case or investigation, all written materials

containing the informtion that have not been disclosed shall be forwded

to the JLEA that provided them. 

Employees of a JLEA and employees of a FPO have a continuing obligation after

leaving employment with the Dep ent of Justice and its constituent

components to maintain as confdential the identity of any CI and the information

he or she provided, unless the employee is obligated to disclose it by law or Cour

order. See 28 C. R. 16.21 - 16.29.

3 This requirement shall not prevent the Chief Federal Prosecutor or his or her designee

from keeping in the relevant case fie materials such as motions, responses, legal memoranda

Cour orders, and internal office memoranda and correspondence. If any such materials contain

information revealing a CI's tre identity, the Chief Federal Prosecutor or his or her designee

shall maintain the materials in accordance with the provisions of paragraph I(F)(2)(a)-(d), above.

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EXCEPTIONS AN DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Whenever any of the entities to which these Guidelines apply believes that an

exception to any provision of these Guidelines is justified, or whenever there is a

dispute between or among any such entities (other than a dispute with the

Criminal Division ofthe Departent of Justice) regarding these Guidelines, an

exception must be sought from, or the dispute shall be resolved by, the Assistant

Attorney General (AAG) for the Criminal Division or his or her designee. The

Deputy Attorney General or his 'or her designee shall hear appeals, if any, from

decisions of the AAG.

Whenever there is a dispute between'the Crimial Division and any of the other

entities to which these Guidelines apply, such dispute shall be resolved by the

Deputy Attorney General or his or her designee.

Any exception granted or dispute resolved pursuant to this paragraph shall be

documented in the JLEA' s files.

RIGHTS OF TID PARTIES

Nothing in these Guidelines is intended to create or does create an enforceable legal right

or private right of action by a CI or any other person.

COMPLIACE

Within 120 days of the approval ofthese Guidelines by the Attorney General

each JLEA shall develop agency-specific guidelines that comply with these

Guidelines, and submit such agency-specific guidelines to the AAG for the

Criminal Division for review. The agency-specific guidelines must ensure, at a

minimum, that the JLEA' s agents receive suffcient intial and in-service training

. in the use of CIs consistent with these Guidelines, and that compliane with these

Guidelines is considered in the annual performance appraisal of its agents. As

par of such compliance the JLEA shall designte a senior official to oversee all

aspects of its CI program, including the training of agents; registration, review

and termation of as; and notifications to outside entities.

Within 30 days of the approval of these Guidelines, each JLEA shall establish a

Confidential Informant Review Committee (CIRC) for the purose of conducting

the review procedures specified in paragraphs (II)(A)(3), (II)(D)(1), and

(II)(D)(2).

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II. REGISTERIG A CONFIDENTIA INORMT

SUITABILITY DElERMINA TION

Initial Suitabilty Determination

Prior to utilizing a person as a CI, a case agent of a JLEA shall complete and sign a

written Initial Suitability Report and Recommendation, which shall be forwarded to a Field

Manager for his or her wrtten approvaL In completig the Initial Suitability Report and

Recommendation, the case agent must address the following factors (or indicate that a paricular

factor is not applicable):

the person s age;

the person s alien status;

whether the person is a public official, law enforcement offcer, union

offcial, employee of a fmancial institution or school, member of the

militar services, a representative or affliate of the media, or a par to, or

in a position to be a par to, privileged commcations , a member

ofthe clergy, a physician, or a lawyer);

the extent to which the persQn would make use of his or her affliations

with legitimate organzations in order to provide inormation or assistance

to the JLEA, and the ability of the JLEA to ensure that the person

information or assistance is limited to criminal matters;

the extent to which the person s information or assistance would be

relevant to a present or potential investigation or prosecution and the

importance of such investigation or prosecution;

the natue of any relationship between the CI and the subject or target of

an existig or potential investigation or prosecution, including but not

limited to a curent or former spousal relationship or other family tie, and

any curent or former employment or financial relationship;

the person s motivation in providing information or assistance, including

any consideration sought from the governnt for this assistance;

the risk that the person might adversely affect a present or potential

investigation or prosecution;

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the extent to which the person s information or assistance can be

corroborated;

the person s reliability and trthfulness;

the person s prior record as a witness in any proceeding;

whether the person has a crimial history, is reasonably believed to be the

subject or target of a pending criminal investigation, is under arrest, or has

been charged in a pending prosecution;

whether the person is reasonably believed to pose a danger to the public or

other criminal threat, or is reasonably believed to pose a risk of flght;

whether the person is a substance abuser or has a history of substance

abuse;

whether the person is a relative of an employee of any law enforcement

agency;

the risk of physical han that may occur to the person or his or her

immediate family or close associates as a result of providing information

or assistance to the JLEA; and

the record of the JLEA and the record of any other law enforcement

agency (if available to the JLEA) regarding the person s prior or curent

service as a CI, Cooperatig Defendantlitness, or Source of Information

including, but not limited to, any information regarding whether the

person was at any time termnated for cause.

Continuing Suitability Review

Each CI's fie shall be reviewed by the case agent at least annually. The

case agent shall complete and sign a written Continuing Suitability Report

and Recommendation, which shall be forwarded to a Field Manager for

his or her written approval. In completing the Continuing Suitability

Report and Recommndation, the case agent must address the factors set

forth above in paragraph (II)(A)(1) (or indicate that a particular factor is

not applicable) and, in addition, the length oftime that the individual has

been registered as a CI an the length of time that the individual has been

handled by the same agent or agents

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Each JLEA shall establish systems to ensure that all available inormation

that might materially alter a prior suitability determination, including, but

not limited to, information pertaining to unauthorized ilegal activity by

the CI, is promptly reported to a Field Manager and then recorded and

maintained in the CI's file. See (IV(B)(2) below. Upon receipt of any

such information, the Field Manager shall ensure that a new Continuing

Suitability Report and Recommendation is promptly prepared in light of

such new information.

Review of Long-Term Confidential Informants

When a CI has been registered for more than six consecutive years, and, to

the extent such a CI remains open, every six years thereafter, the CIRC

shall review the CI's completed Initial and Continuing Suitability Reports

and Recommendations and decide whether, and under what conditions, the

individual should continue to be utilized as a CI. A Criminal Division

representative on the CIRC who disagrees with the decision to approve the

continued use of such an individual as a Confidential Informant may seek

review of that decision pursuant to paragraph (J)(G).

Every three years after a CI's file is reviewed pursuant to the provisions of

paragraph (II)(A)(3)(a), ifthe CI remains registered, the JLEA shall

conduct an internal review, inch-Jding review by a designated senior

headquarers offcial, of the CI's completed Initial and Continuing

Suitability Reports and Recommendations. Ifthe designated senior

headquarters offcial decides that there are an apparent or potential

problems that may warrant any change in the use of the CI, the offcial

shall (i) consult the appropriate Senior Field Manager and (ii) provide the

Intial and Continuing Suitability Report and Recommendations to the

CIRC for review in accord with paragraph (II)(A)(3)(a).

4 This provision did not apply until one year after these Guidelines' original effective

date of Januar 8, 2001 , when the ftrst set of Continuing Suitability Reports and

Recommendations was completed. Furher, durg the first three years that this provision is in

effect, each CIRC may stagger the review of some long-term CIs in order to even out the IRmber

of fies that must initially be reviewed. However, no later than four years after the original

effective date of these Guidelines, all of. the CIs who were registered for more than six

consecutive years as of the original effective date of these Guidelines must be reviewed pursuant

to this provision.

B-16
REGISTRATION

After a Field Manager has approved an individual as suitable to be a CI, the individual

shall be registered with that JLEA as a CI. In registering a CI, the JLEA shall, at a minimum

document or include the following in the CI's fies:

a photograph of the CI;

the JLEA' s efforts to establish the CI's tre identity;

the results of a criminal history check for the CI;

the Initial Suitability Report and Recommendation;

any promises or benefits, and the terms of such promises or benefits, that are

given a CI by a JLEA or any other law enforcement agency (if available to the

JLEA);

any promises or benefits, and the terms of such promises or benefits, that are

given a CI by any FPO or any state or local prosecuting offce (if available to the

JLEA); and

all information that is required to be documented in the CI's fies pursuant to

these Guidelines , the provision of the instrctions set forth in the next

paragraph).

INSTRUCTIONS

In registering a CI, at least one agent of the JLEA, along with one additional

agent or other law enforcement official present as a witness, shall review with the

CI written instrctions that state that:

information provided by the CI to the JLEA must be trthful;

the CI's assistance and the information provided are entirely voluntar;

the United States Governent wil strve to protect the CI's identity but

cannot guarantee that it wil not be divulged;

nf applicable:) the JLEA on its own canot promise or agree to any

immunity from prosecution or other consideration by a Federal

Prosecutor s Office or a Cour in exchange for the CI's cooperation , since

the decision to confer any such benefit lies within the exclusive discretion

B-17
of the Federal Prosecutor s Office and the Cour. However, the JLEA wil

consider (but not necessarily act upon) a request by the CI to advise the

appropriate Federal Prosecutor s Office or Cour of the natue and extent

of his or her assistance to the JLEA; 

nf applicable:) the CI has not been authorized to engage in any criminal

activity and has no immunity from prosecution for any unauthorized

criminal activity;

the CI must abide by the instrctions of the JLEA and ' must not take or

seek to take any independent action on behalf of the United States

Governent;

the CI is not an employee of the United States Governent and may not

represent himself or herself as such;

the CI may not enter into any contract or incur any obligation on behalf of

the United States Governent, except as specifically instrcted and

approved by the JLEA;

the JLEA canot guarantee any rewards, payments, or other compensation

to the CI;

in the event that the CI receives any rewards, payments, or other

compensation from the JLEA, the CI is liable for any taxes that may be

owed; and

5 This instrction should be provided if there is any apparent issue of criminal liability or

penalties that relates to the CI. Whether or not this instrction is given to a CI, the JLEA does

not 'have any authority to make any promise or commtment that would prevent the governent

from prosecuting an individual, except as provided in paragraphs (I)(C) above and (III)(C)

below, and a JLEA agent must avoid giving any person the erroneous impression that he or she

has any such authority.

6 This instrction should be provided to any CI who is not authorized to engage in

otherwise illegal activity. See paragraph (III)(C)(4) for instrctions that must be provided to a

CI who is, in fact, authorized to engage in otherise ilegal conduct.

B-18
(if applicable:) no promises or commtments can be made, except by the

Immigration and Naturalization Service, regarding the alien status of any

person or the right of any person to enter or remain in the United States?

The content and meaning of each of the foregoing instrctional points must be

clearly conveyed to the CI. Immediately after these instrctions have been given

the agent shall require the C to acknowledge his or her receipt and understanding

of the instrctions. The agent and the other law enforcement official shall

document that the instrctions were reviewed with the CI and that the CI

acknowledged the instrctions and his or her understanding of them As soon as

practicable thereafter, a Field Manager shall review and, if waranted, approve the

documentation.

The instrction and documentation procedures shall be repeated whenever it

appears necessary or prudent to do so, and in any event at least every twelve

months.

SPECIAL APPROVAL REQUIMENTS

. 1. High Level Confidentil Informants

Prior to utilizing an individual as a High Level Confdential Informant, a

case agent of a JLEA shall fist obtain the wrtten approval of the CIRC.

A Criminal Division representative on the CIRC who disagrees with a

decision to approve the use of an individual as a High Level Confidential

Informant may seek review of that decision pursuant to paragraph (I)(G).

In deciding whether to approve the use of a High Level Confidential

Informant, the CIRC shall have access to any Initial or Completed

Suitability Reports and Recommendations for the individual in question.

After a fmal decision has been made to approve the use of a High Level

Confdential Inormant, the CIRC shall consider whether to notify the

ChiefF deral Prosecutor of any FPO that is paricipating in the conduct of

an investigation that is, or would be, utilizing the High Level Confidential

Inormant, or any FPO that has been, or would be, working with that

individual in connection with a prosecution, of the decision to approve

that individual as a High Level Confidential Inormant. If the CIRC

determes that no such notification shall be made, the reason or reasons

for the determnation shall be provided to the Criminal Division

7 This instrction should be provided if there is any apparent issue of immigration status

that relates to the CI and the JLEA is not the Imgration and Natualization Service.

B-19
representatives on the CIRC. A Criminal Division representative on the

CIRC who disagrees with a decision not to provide such notification may

seek review of that decision pursuant to paragmph (I)(G).

Individuals Under the Obligation of a Legal Privilege of Confidentiality or

Affiliated with the Media

Prior to utilizing as a Confidential Informant an individual who is lIder

the obligation of a legal privilege of confidentiality or affiliated with the

media, a case agent of a JLEA shall fIrst obtain the wrtten approval of the

CIRC. A Criminal Division representative on the CIRC who disagrees

with a decision to approve the use of such an individual as a Confidential

Informant may seek review of that decision pursuant to paragraph (I)(G).

In deciding whether to approve the use as a Confidential Informant of an

individual who is under the obligation of a legal privilege of

confidentiality or affiliated with the media, e CIRC shall have access to 

any Initial or Completed Suitability Reports and Recommendations for the

individual in question.

After a final decision has been made to approve the use of an individual

who is under the obligation of a legal privilege of confidentiality or

affliated with the media as a Confidential Informant, the CIRC shall

consider whether to notify the Chief Federal Prosecutor of any FPO that is

paricipating in the conduct of an investigation that is, or would be

utilizing the individual, or any FPO that has been, or would be, workig

with that individual in connection with a prosecution, of the decision to

approve that individual as a Confidential Informant. Ifthe CIRC

determes that no such notification shall be made, the reason or reasons

for the determination shall be provided to the Crimial Division

representatives on the CIRC. A Crial Division representative on the

CIRC who disagrees with a decision not to provide such notification may

seek review ofthat decision pursuant to paragmph (I)(G).

Federal Prisoners, Probationers, Parolees, Detainees, and Supervised

Releasees

Consistent with extant Departent of Justice requirements, a JLEA must

receive the approval of the Criminal Division s Office of Enforcement

Operations ("OEO") prior to utilizing as a CI an individual who is in the

custody of the United States Marshals Service or the Bureau of Prisons, or

who is under Bureau of Prisons supervision. See M. ~ 9-21.050.

B-20
Prior to utilizing a federal probationer, parolee, or supervised releasee as a

, a Field Manager of a JLEA shall determine if the use of that person in

such a capacity would violate the terms and conditions of the person

probation, parole, or supervised release. If the Field Manger has reason to

believe that it would violate such terms and conditions, prior to using the

person as a CI, the Field Manager or his or her designee must obtain the

permission of a federal probation, parole, or supervised release offcial

with authority to grant such permission, which permission shall be

documented in the CI's fies. If such permssion is denied or it is

inappropriate for opemtional reasons to contact the appropriate federal

official, the JLEA may seek to obtain authorization for the use of such

individual as a CI from the Cour then responsible for the individual'

probation, parole, or supervised release, provided that the JLEA first

consults with the FPO fur that District.

In situations where a FPO is either participating in the conduct of an

investigation by a JLEA in which a federal probationer, parolee, or

supervised releasee would be utilized as a CI, or where a FPO would be

working with a fedenil probationer, parolee, or supervised releasee in

connection with a prosecution, the JLEA shall notify the attorney assigned

to the, matter prior to usig the person as a CI.

Current or Former Participants in the Witness Security Program

Consistent with extant Departent of Justice requirements, a JLEA must

receive the approval ofOEO and the sponsori prosecutor (or his or her

successor) prior to utilizing as a CI a curent or former paricipant in the

Federal Witness Security Program, provided further that the OEO wil

coordinate such matters with the United States Marshals Service. See

U.S. M. ~ 9-21.800.

In situations where a FPO is either participating in the conduct of an

investigation,by a JLEA in which a curent or former participant in the

Witness Securty Program would be utilized as a CI, or where a FPO

would be working with a curent or former paricipant in the Witness

Securty Program in connection with a prosecution, the JLEA shall notify

the attorney assigned to the matter prior to usin the person as a CI.

State or Local Prisoners, Probationers, Parolees, or Supervised Releasees

Prior to utilizing a state or local prisoner, probationer, parolee, or

supervised releasee as a CI, a Field Manager of a JLEA shall determine if

the use of that person in such a capacity would violate the terms and

B-21
conditions of the person s incarceration, probation, parole, or superised

release. If the Field Maner has reason to believe that it would violate

such terms and conditions, prior to using the person as a CI, the Field

Manager or his or her designee must obtain the permssion of a state or

local prison, probation, parole, or supervised release offcial with authority

to grant such permission, which permssion shall be documented in the

CI'sfies. If such permission is denied or it is inappropriate for

operational reasons to contact the appropriate state or local official, the

JLEA may seek to obtain authorization for the use of such individual as a

CI from the state or local Cour then responsible for the individual's

ircarceration, probation, parole, or supervised release.

In situations where a FPO is either paricipating in the conduct of an

investigation by a JLEA in which a state or local prsoner, probationer

parolee, or supervised releasee would be utilized as a CI, or where a FPO

would be workig with a state or local prisoner, probationer, parolee; or

supervised releasee in connection with a prosecution, the JLEA shall

notify the attorney assigned to the matter prior to using the person as a 

Fugitives

Except as provided below, a JLEA shall have no communication with a

curent or former CI who is a fugitive.

A JLEA is permtted to have communication with a curent or former CI

who is a fugitive:

(i) if the communication is par of a legitimate effort by that JLEA to

arest the fugitive; or

(ii) if approved, in advance whenever possible, by a Senior Field Manager

of any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency that has a wanted

record for the individual in the NCIC and, in the case of a federal warmnt

by the FPO for the issuing District.

A JLEA that has commcation with a fugitive must promptly report

such communication to all federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies and other law enforcement agencies having a wanted record for

the individual in the NCIC, and document those communications in the

CI's files. 

. .

B-22
ID. RESPONSmILITIES REGARING REGISTERED

CONFIDENTIA INORMTS

GENERA PROVISIONS

No Interference With an Investigation of a Confidential Informant

A JLEA agent tnust tae the utmost care to avoid interfering with or impeding any

criminal investigation or arrest of a CI. No agent shall reveal to a CI any information relating to

an investigation of the Cl. An agent shall not confrm or deny the existence of any investigation

of the CI, unless authorized to, do so by the Chief Federal Prosecutor; nor shall an agent agree to

a request from aCI to determe whether the CI is the subject of any investigation.

Prohibited Transactions and Relationships

A JLEA agent shall not: (i) exchange gift with a CI; (ii) provide the CI

with any thing of more than nomial value; (iii) receive any thing of more

than nominal value ftom a CI; or (iv) engage in any business or financial

transactions with a CI. Except as authorized pursuant to paragraph

(III)(B) below, any exception to this provision requires the wrtten

approval of a Field Manager, in advance whenever possible, based on a

wrtten fmding by the Field Manager that the event or transaction in

question is necessar and appropriate for operational reasons. This

written finding shall be maintained in the CI's fies.

A Federal Law Enforcement agent shall not socialize with a CI except to

the extent necessary and appropriate for operational reasons.

In situations where a FPO is either paricipating in the conduct of an

investigation by a JLEA that is utilizing a CI, or working with a CI in

connection with a prosecution, the JLEA shall notify the attorney assigned

to the matter, in advance whenever possible, if the JLEA approves an

exception under paragraph (III)(A)(2)(a) or if a Federal Law Enforcement

agent socializes with a CI in a maner not permtted under paragraph (III)(A)(2)(b). '

MONETARY PAYMNTS

General

Monies that a JLEA pays to a CI in the form of fees and rewards shall be commensurate

with the value, as determined by the JLEA, of the information he or she provided or the

B-23
assistance he or she rendered to that JLEA. A JLEA' s reimbursement of expenses incured by a

CI shall be based upon actual expenses incured.

Prohibition Against Contingent Payments

Under no circumstances shall any payments to a CI be contingent upon the conviction or

pUnshment of any inividual. 

Approval for a Single Payment

A single payment ofootween $2 500 and $25 000 per case to a CI must be authorized, at

a miimum, by a JIA' s Senior Field Manger. A single payment in xcess of $25 000 per case

shall be made only with the authorization of the Senior Field Manager and the express approval

of a designated senior headquarters offciaL

Approval for Annual Payments

Consistent with paragmph (III)(B)(3) above, payments by a JLEA to a CI that exceed an

aggregate of $100 000 within a one-year period, as that period is defined by the JLEA, shall be

made only with the authorization of the Senior Field Manager and the express approval of a

designated senior headquarers official. The headquarters official may authorize additional

aggregate annual payments in increments of$50 000 or less.

Approval for Aggregate Payments

CQusistent with paragraphs (III)(B)(3)-( 4), and regardless ofthe time frame, any

payments by a JLEA to a CI that exceed an aggregate of $200 000 shall be made only with the

authorization of the Senior Field Manager and the express approval of a designated senior

headquarters official. After the headquarters offcial has approved payments to a CI that exceed

an aggregate of $200 000, the headquarers official may authorize, subject to paragraph

(III)(B)(4) above, additional aggregate payments in increments of$100 000 or less.

Documentation of Payment

The payment of any monies to a CI shall be witnessed by at least two law enforcement

representatives. Immdiately afer receiving a payment, the CI shall be required to sign or intial

. and date, a written receipt. At the time ofthe payment, the representatives shall advise the CI

thatthe monies may be taxable income that must be reported to appropriate tax authorities.

Thereafter, those representatives shall document the payment and the advice of taxability in the

8 The CI may sign or intial the written receipt by using a pseudonym which has been

previously approved and documented in the a' s files and designated for use by only one CI.

B-24
JLEA's fies. The documentation of payment shall specify whether the payment is for

information, servi , or expenses.

Accounting and Reconcilation 

Each JLEA shall establish accounting and reconcilation procedures to comply with these

Guidelines. Among other things, these procedures shall reflect all monies paid to a CI

subsequent to the issuance of these Guidelines.

Coordination with Prosecution

In situations where a FPO is either participating in the conduct of an investigation by a

JLEA that is utilizing a CI, or workig with a CI in connection with a prosecution, the JLEA

shall coordinate with the attorney assigned to the matter, in advance whenever possible, the

payment of monies to the CI pursuant to pamgraphs (III)(B)(3)-(5) above.

AUTHORIZATION OF OTHERWISE ILLEGAL ACTIVTY

General Provisions

A JLEA shall not authorze a cr to engage in any activity that otherwise

would constitute a misdemeanor or felony under federal, state, or local law

if engaged in by a person acting without authorization, except as provided

in the authorization provisions in paragraph (III)(C)(2) below.

A JLEA is never permited to authorize a CI to:

(i) participate in an act of violence;

(ii) participate in an act that constitutes obstrcton of justice 

perjur, witness tamperig, witness intimidation, entrapment, or the

fabrication, alteration, or destrction of evidence);

(iii) paricipate in an act designed to obtain information for the JLEA that

would be unlawful if conducted by a law enfurcement agent 

breakng and enterig, ilegal wiretapping, ilegal opening or tampering

with the mail, or trespass amounting to an illegal search); or

(iv) initiate or instigate a plan or strategy to commt a federal, state, or

local offense.

B-25
Authorization

Tier 1 Otherwise Ilegal Activity must be authorized in advance and in

wrting for a specified period, not to exceed 90 days, by:

(i) a JLEA' s Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent); and

(ii) the appropriate Chief Federal Prosecutor.

Tier 2 Otherwise Ilegal Activity must be authorized in advance and in

writing for a specified period, not to exceed 90 days, by a ILEA' s Senior Field Manager. 

For puroses of this paragraph, the "appropriate Chief Federal Prosecutor

is the Chief Federal Prosecutor that: (i) is paricipating in the conduct of

an investigation by a JLEA that is utilizing that active CI, or is workig

with that active CI in connection with a prosecution; (ii) with respect to

Otherwis Ilegal Activity that would constitute a violation of federal law

would have primary jursdiction to prosecute the Otherwise Ilegal

Activity; or (iii) with respect to Otherwise Ilegal Activity that would

constitute a violation only of state or local law, is located where the

otherwise criminal activity is to occur.

Findings

The JLEA offcial who authorizes Tier 1 or 2 Oterwise Ilegal Activity

must make a finding, which shall be documnted in the CI's files, that

authorization for the a to engage in the Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Ilegal

Activity is -

(i) necessary either to -

(A) obtain information or evidence essential for the success of an

investigation that is not reasonably available without such

authorization, or

9 Even without an express act of Congress authorizing the conduct at issue, it is within

the power and the duty of federal prosecutors, as executive branch offcers, to take reasonable

measures to discha ge the duties imposed on them as executive branch offcers, and they will be

immune from state action if they take such measures under color of federal law and in good

faith.

B-26
(B) prevent death, serious bodily injur, or significant damage to

propert; and

(ii) that in either case the benefits to be obtained from the CI's

parcipation in the Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Ilegal Activity outweigh the

risks.

In making these findings, the JLEA shall consider, among other things:

(i) the importance of the investigation;

(ii) the likelihood that the information or evidence sought wil be

obtained;

(iii) the risk that the CI might misunderstand or exceed the scope of his

authorization;

(iv) the extent of the crs participation in the Otherwise Ilegal Activity;

(v) the risk that the JLEA wil not be able to supervise closely the CI's

paricipation in the Otherwise Ilegal Activity;

(vi) the risk of violence, physical injur; propert damage, and fmancial

loss to the CI or others; and

(vii) the risk that the JLEA wil not be able to ensure that the CI does not

profit from his or her participation in the authorized Otherwise Ilegal

Activity.

Instructions

After a CI is authorized to engage in Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Ilegal

Activity, at least one agent of the JLEA, along with one additional agent

or other law enforcement official present as a witness, shall review with

the CI written instrctions that state, at a minimu, that:

(i) the CI is authorized only to engage in the specific conduct set forth in

the written authorization described above and not in any other ilegal

activity;

(ii) the CI's authorization is limited to the time period specified in the

written authorization;

B-27
(iii) under no circumstance may the CI:

(A) participate in an act of violence;

(B) participate in an act that constitutes obstrction of justice 

perjur, witness tampering, witness intimidation, entrapment, or

the fabrication, alteration, or destrction of evidence);

(C) participate in an act designed to obtain information for the

JLEA that would be unlawful if conducted by a law enforcement

agent 

, 

breaking and entering, ilegal wiretapping, ilegal

openig or tampering with the mail, or trespass amounting to an

ilegal search); or

(D) initiate or instigate a plan or strategy to commit a federal, state

or local offense;

(iv) if the CI is asked by any person to participate in any such prohibited

conduct? or if he or she learns of plans to engage in such conduct, he or

she must immediately report the matter to his or her contact agent; and

(v) paricipation in any prohibited conduct could subject the CI to full

crimal prosecution.

Imediately after these instrctions have been given, the CI shall be

required to sign or initial, and date, a wrtten acknowledgment of the

instrctions.10 As soon as practicable thereafter, a Field Manager shall

review and, if warranted, approve the written acknowledgment.

Precautionary Measures

Whenever a JLEA has authorized a CI to engage in Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Ilegal

Activity, it must take all reasonable steps to:' (a) supervise closely the ilegal activities of the CI;

(b) mimize the adverse effect of the authorized Otherwise Ilegal Activity on inocent

individuals; and (c) ensure that the CI does not profit from his or her participation in the

authorized Otherwise Ilegal Activity. 

10 The CI may sign or initial the written acknowledgment by using a pseudonym which

has been previously approved and documented in the CI's files and designated for use by onl

one CI.

B-28
Suspension of Authorization

Whenever a JLEA cannot, for legitimate reasons unelated to the a' s conduct 

unavailability of the case agent), comply with the precautionar measures described above, it

shall immediately: (a) suspend the CI's authorization to engage in Otherwise Ilegal Activity

until such time as the precautionar measures can be complied with; (b) inform the CI that his or

her authorization to engage in any Otherwise Ilegal Activity has been suspended until that time;

and (c) docurnent these actions in the CI's files. 

Revocation of Authorization

If a JLEA has reason to believe that a CI has failed to comply with the

specific terms of the authorization of Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Ilegal

Activity, it shall immediately: (i) revoke the CI's authorization to engage

in Otherwise Ilegal Activity; (ii) inform the CI that he or she is no longer

authorized to engage in any Otherwise Ilegal Activity; (iii) comply with

the notification requirement of paragraph (IV(B) below; (iv) make a

determination whether the CI should be deactivated pursuant to paragraph

(V); and (v) documentthese actions in the CI's fies.

Immediately afer the CI has been informed that he or she is no longer

authorized to engage in any Otherwise Ilegal Activity, the CI shall be

required to sign or initial, and date, a wrtten acknowledgment that he or

she has been informed of this factY As soon as practicable thereafter, a

Field Manager shall review and, if warranted, approve the written

acknowledgment.

Renewal and Expansion of Authoriation

A JLEA that seeks to re-authorize any Cl to engage in Tier 1 or 2

Otherwise Ilegal Activity after the expiration of the authorized time

period, or after revocation of authorization, must first comply with the

procedures set forth above in paragraphs (III)(C)(2)-(5).

11 The CI may sign or initial the written acknowledgment by using a pseudonym which

has been previously approved and documented in the CI's files and' designated for use by only

one CI. Ifthe CI refuses to signor initial the written acknowledgment, the JLEA agent who

informed the CI of the revocation of authorization shall document that the CI has orally

acknowledged being so informed and the Field Manager shall, as soon as practicable thereafter

review and, if warranted, approve the written documentation.

B-29
10.

A JLEA that seeks to expand in any material way a CI's authorization to

engage in Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Ilegal Activity by the JLEA must first

comply with the procedures set forth above in paragraphs (III)(C)(2)-5).

Emergency Authorization

In exceptional circumstances, a JLEA' s Special Agent in Charge (or the

equivalent) and the appropriate Chief federal Prosecutor may orally

authorize a CI to engage in Tier 1 Otherwise Ilegal Activity without

complying with the documentation requirerrnts of paragraphs (IIIXC)(2)-

(4) above when they each determe that a highly signficant and

unanticipated investigative opportity would be lost were the time taken

to comply with these requirements. In such an event, the documentation

requirements, as well as a written justification for the oral authorization

shall be completed within 48 hours of the oral approval and maintained in

the CI's fies.

In exceptional circumtances, a JLEA' s Senior field Manager may orally

authorize a CI to engage in Tier 2 Otherwise Ilegal Activity without

complying with the documentation requirerrnts of paragraphs (IIIXC)(2)-

(4) above when he or she determes that a highly significant and

unanticipated investigative opportity would be lost were the time taken

to comply with these requirements. In such an event, the documentation

requirements, as well as a written justification for the oral authorization

shall be completed within 48 hours of the oral approval and maintained in

the CI's fies.

Designees

A JLEA' s Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent) and the appropriate Chief Federal

Prosecutor may, with the concurence of each other, agree to designate particular individuals in

their respective offices to car out the approval fuctions assigned to them above in paragraphs (III)(C)(2)-(9). 

LISTING A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMT IN AN ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE APPLICATION

A JLEA shall not name a CI as a named interceptee or a violator in an affdavit in

support of an application made pursuant to 18 U. c. ~ 2516 for an electronic

sureilance order unless the JLEA believes that: ( a) omitting the name of the CI

from the affidavit would endanger that person s life or otherwse jeopardize an

ongoing investigation; or (b) the CI is a bona fide subject of the investigation

based on his or her suspected involvement in unauthorized criminal activity.

B-30
In the event that a CI is named in an electronic sureilance affidavit lIder

paragraph (III)(D)(I) above, the JLEA must inform the Federal prosecutor

makng the applIcation and the Cour to which the application is made of the

actual status of the CI.

IV. SPECIA NOTIFICATION REOUIMENTS

NOTIFICATION OF INESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION

When a JLEA has reasonable grounds to believe that a curent or formr CI 

being prosecuted by, is the target of an investigation by, or is expected to become

a target of an investigation by a FPO for engaging in alleged felonious criminal

activity, a Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent) of the JLEA must

immediately notiiY the Chief Federal Prosecutor of that individual' s status as a

curent or former CI.

Whenever such a notification is provided, the Chief Federal Prosecutor and

Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent), with the concurence of each other

shall notify any other federal, state or local prosecutors offices or law 

enforcement agencies that are participating in the investigation or prosecution of

the CI.

NOTIFICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED ILLEGAL ACTIVTY

Whenever a JLEA has reasonable grounds to believe that a CI who is curently

authorized to engage in specific Tier 1 or 2 OthelWise Ilegal Activity has

engaged in unauthorized criminal activity, or whenever a JLEA knows that a CI

who has no curent authorization to engage in any Tier 1 or 2 Otherwise Ilegal

Activity has engaged in any criminal activity, a Special Agent in Charge of the

JLEA (or the equivalent) shall immediately notify the following Chief Federal

Prosecutors of the CI's criminal activity and his or her status as a CI:

the ChiefPederal Prosecutor whose Distrct is located where the crimial

activity primarily occued, unless a state or local prosecuting offce in

that Distrct has filed charges against the CI for the criminal activity and

there clearly is no basis for federal prosecution in that Distrct by the

Chief Federal Prosecutor;

12 A target is "a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jur has substantial

evidence linkng him or her to the commssion of a crime and who, in the judgment of the

prosecutor, is a putative defendant." U . M. ~ 9- 11.151.

B-31
the Chief Federal Prosecutor, if any, whose Distrct is paricipating in the

conduct of an investigation that is utilizing that active CI, or is workig

with that active CI in connection with a prosecution; and

the Chief Federal Prosecutor, if any, who authorized the CI to engage in

Tier 1 Otherwise Ilegal Activity pursuant to paragraph (III)(C)(2)(a)

above.

Whenever such notifications are provided, the Chief Federal Prosecutor(s) of the

FPOs and the Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent), with the concurence

of each other, shall notify any state or local prosecutor s office that has

jurisdiction over the CI's criminal activity, and that has not already filed charges

against the CI for the criminal activity, of the fact that the CI has engaged in such

criminal activity. The Chief Federal Prosecutor(s) and the Special Agent in

Charge (or the equivalent) are not required, but may with the concurrence of each

other, also notify the state and local prosecutor s office of the person s status as a

CI.

NOTIFICATION REGARING CERTAI FEDERA JUICIA

PROCEEDINGS

Whenever a JLEA has reasonable grounds to believe that: (1) a curent or former CI has

been called to testify by the prosecution in any federal grand jur or judicial proceeding; (2) the

statements of a curent or former CI have been, or wil be, utilized by the prosecution in any

federal judicial proceeding; or (3) a federal prosecutor intends to represent to a Cour or jur that

a curent or former CI is or was a co-conspirator or other crimially culpable participant in any

criminal activity, a Special Agent in Char e (or the equivalent) oftheJLEA shall immediately

notify the Chief Federal Prosecutor for that proceeding of the individual's status as a curent or

former CI.

PRIEGED OR EXCULPATORY INFORMTION

In situations where a FPO is either paricipating in the conduct of an investigation

by a JLEA that is utilizing a CI, or workig with a CI in connection with a

prosecution, the JLEA shall notify the attorney assigned to the matter, in advance

whenever possible, if the JLEA has reasonable grounds to believe that a CI will

obtain or provide inforation that is subject to, or arguably subject to, a legal

privilege of confidentiality belonging to someone other than the CI.

13 Whenever such notifications to FPOs are provided, the JLEA must also comply with

the Continuing Suitability requirements described above in paragraph (II)(A)(2).

B-32
If the JLEA has reasonable grounds to believe that a curent or former CI has

information that is exculpatory as to a person who is expected to become a target

of an investigation, or as to a target of an investigation, or as to a defendant

(including a convicted defendant), the JLEA shall notify the Chief Federal

Prosecutor responsible for the investigation or prosecution of such exculpatory

information.

RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FROM CIDEF FEDERA PROSECUTORS

REGARING A CONFIDENTIA INFORMT

If a Chief Federal Prosecutor seeks information from a Special Agent in Charge (or the

equivalent) as to whether a partcular individual is a curent or former CI, and states the specific

basis for his or her request, the Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent) shall provide such

information promptly. If the Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent) has an objection to

providing such -iormtion based on specific circumstances of the case, he or she shall explain

the objection to the Chief Federal Prosecutor makng the request and any remaimng

disagreement as to whether the information should be provided shall be resolved pursuant to

paragraph (I)(G). 

FILE REVIWS

Whenever a JLEA discloses any inormation about a CI to a FPO pursuant to paragraphs

(IV)(A)-(E), the Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent) and the Chief Federal Prosecutor

shall consult to facilitate any review and copyig of the CI's fies by the Chief Federal

Prosecutor that might be necessary for the Chief Federal Prosecutor to fulfill his or her offce

disclosure obligations.

DESIGNEES

A Special Agent in Charge (or the equivalent) and a Chief Federal Prosecutor may, with

the concurrence of each other, agree to designate particular individuals in their respective offces

to carr out the fuctions assigned to them in paragraphs (IV)(A)-(F).

v. DEACTIVATION OF CONFIDENTIA INFORMTS

GENERA PROVISIONS

A JLEA that determes that a CI should be deactivated for cause or for any other reason

shall immediately:

deactivate the individual;

document the reasons for the decision to deactivate the individual as a CI in the

CI's fies;

B-33
if the CI can be located notify the CI that he or she has be deactivated as a CI

and obta documentation that such notification was provided in the sae maner

as set fort in pargrh (I(C)(2); and

if the CI was authoried to engage in Tier 1 or Tier 2 Otherwse ilegal Activity

purt to paragrh (IC)(2)(a)-(), revoke that authorization under the

provisions of pargrh (IIC)(7).

DELAYED NOTICATION TO it CONFENT INRMT

JLA may delay providing the notification to the CI desribed above in Paragrh

(VA)(3) durg the time such notification might jeopardie an ongoing investigation or

prosecution or might cause the flight frm prosecution of any pern. Whenever a decision is

mae to delay providig a notificaton, that decision, and the reaons supprtg it, mus be

documented in the CI's files.

CONTACTS TH FORMR CONmE INFORMS

DEACfIV ATED FOR CAUSE

Absent exceptional cirumtace that ar approved by a Senor Field Manager, in

advance whenever possible, an agent of a JLEA shall not intiate contats with or respnd to

contats from, a fonner CI who has been deativated for cause. When grted such approval

shall be documented in the CI's files. 

COORDINATION WI PROSECUTORS

In situtions where a FPO is either parcipatg in the conduct of an invesgation by a

JLEA that is utilizing a CI, or workg with a CI in connection with a prosecution, the JLA

shall cordiate with the attorney assigned to the matter, in advance whenever possible

regag any of the decisions described in parhs (VA)-(C).

Date: May 30, . 2002 (J/L John Ashcroft 

Attorney Geerl

B-34
tHE ATTORNEY GENERAL' S GUIDELINES ON

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

B-35
PREAMBLE

The following Guidelines on the use of undercover activities and operations by the

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) are issued under the authority of the Attorney General as

provided in sections 509 510, and 533 oftitle 28, United States Code. They apply to

investigations conducted by the FBI pursuantto the Attorney General's Guidelines on General

Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations. 

B-36
IV.

II.

III.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

DEFINITIONS. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

GENERA AUTHORITY AN PUROSE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

AUTHORIZATION OF UNERCOVER OPERATIONS. . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GENERA APPROVAL STANDARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

UNERCOVER OPERATIONS wmCH MAY BE AUTHORIED BY

THE SPECIA AGENT IN CHAGE (SAC) ......................... 3

OPERATIONS wmCH MUST BE APPROVED AT FBIHQ . . . , . . . . . . . . 5

CRIAL UNERCOVER OPERATIONS REVIW COMMTTEE

(UERCOVER REVIW COMMTTEE) .......................... 8

APPROVAL BY THE DIRECTOR, DEPUTY DIRCTOR,

DESIGNATED EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRCTOR, OR

DESIGNATED ASSISTANT DIRECTOR............................ 9

APPLICATION/NOTIICATIONTO FBmQ .......................

DURTION OF AUTHORIATION. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

PARTICIPATION IN OTHERWISE ILLEGAL ACTIVTY BY

UNERCOVER EMPLOYEES. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

INTERIM/MERGENCY AUTHORIZATION ...................... 14

PROTECTING INOCENT PARTIES AGAIST ENTRAPMENT "

.

ENTRAPMENT. . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . 16

AUTHORIZATION REQUIMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

EXCEPTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

B-37
VI. MONITORIG AN CONTROL OF UNERCOVER OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . 17

PREPARTION OF UNDERCOVER EMPLOYEES, INFORMTS, AN COOPERATING WITNESSES ............................... 17

REVIW OF CONDUCT. . . 

. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

CONTINUIG CONSULTATION WITH THE APPROPRITE

FEDERAL PROSECUTOR. . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. 17

SERIOUS LEGAL, ETIDCAL, PROSECUTIV OR DEPARTMENTAL

POLICY QUESTIONS, AN PREVIOUSLY UNFORESEEN

SENSITIV CIRCUMSTANCES .................................. 18

ANUAL REPORT OF THE UNERCOVER REVIW

COMMTTEE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

DEPOSIT OF PROCEEDS; LIQUIATION OF PROPRITARS . . . . 19

VII. RESERVATION ...................................................... 19

B-38
I. INTRODUCTION

The use of undercover technques, including proprietary business entities, is essential to

the detection, prevention, and prosecution of white collar crimes, public corrption, terrorism

organized crime, offenses involving controlled substances, and other priority areas' of

investigation. However, these techniques inhrently involve an element of deception and may

require cooperation with persons whose motivation and conduct are open to question, and so

should be carefully considered and monitored.

II. DEFINITIONS

Undercover Activities" means any investigative activity involving the use of an

assumed name or cover identity by an employee of the FBI or another Federal, state, or

local law enforcement organization working with the FBI.

Undercover Operation" means an investigation involving a series of related

undercover activities over a period of time by an undercover employee. For puroses of

these Guidelines, a "series of related undercover activities" generally consists of more

than three separate substantive contacts by an undercover employee with the

individual(s) under investigation. However, undercover activity involving sensitive or

fiscal circumstances constitutes an undercover operation regardless of the number of

contacts involved. A contact is "substantive" if it is a communication with another

person, whether by oral, wrtten, wire, or electronic means, which includes information of

investigative interest. Mere incidental contact, e. , a conversation that establishes an

agreed time and location for another meeting, is not a substantive contact within the

meaning of these Guidelines.

NOTE: In the context.of online communications, such as e-mail and Interet Relay Chat (IRC),

multiple transmissions or e-mail messages can constitute one contact, much like a series of

verbal exchanges can comprise a single conversation. Factors to be considered in determg

whether multiple online' transmission constitute a single ' contact or multiple contacts include the

time between transmissions, the number of transmissions, the number of interrptions, topical

transitions, and the media by which the communcations are exchanged (i. , e-mail versus IRe).

For more detailed discussion, see the Online Investigative Principles for Federal Law

Enforcement Agents, Principle 6, Section C.

Undercover Employee" means any employee of the FBI, or employee of a Federal

state, or local law enforcement agency workig under the direction and control of the FBI

in a paricular investigation, whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third

parties in the course of an investigative operation by the maintenance of a cover or alias

identity.

Proprietary" means a sole proprietorship, partership, cOlporation, or other business

entity operated on a commercial basis, which is owned, controlled, or operated wholly or

in part on behalf of the FBI, and whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third

parties.

B-39
Appropriate Federal Prosecutor" means a United States Attorney or Section Chief in

the Criminal Division of the Departent of Justice (DOl).

Joint Undercover Operation" means an Undercover operation conducted jointly by the

FBI and another law enforcement agency, except that an operation in which FBI

parcipation is confned to contrbution of limited financial or equipment resources or

technical advice does not constitute a joint undercover operation.

Ill. GENERA AUTHORITY AN PUROSE

The FBI may engage in undercover activities and undercover operations pursuant to these

Guidelines that are appropriate to car out its law enforcement responsibilities, including the

conduct of preliminar inquiries, general cries investigations, and criminal intellgen;e

investigations. In preliminar inquiries, these methods may be used to fuher the objective of

inquiry into possible criminal activities by individuals or groups-to determne whether a ful

investigation is waranted. In general crimes investigations, these methods may be used to

fuher the investigative objectives of preventing, solving, and prosecuting crimes. In criminal

intelligence investigations - i. , racketeering enterprise investigations and terrorism enterrise

investigations - these methods may be used to fuher the investigative objective of ascertaining

such matters as the membership, finances, geographical dimensions, past and futu activities

and goals of the enterprise under investigation, with a view to the longer range objectives of

detection, prevention, and prosecution of the criminal activities of the enterprise.

These guidelines do not apply to investigations utilizing confdential informants

cooperating witnesses or cooperating subjects, unless the mvestigation also utilizes an

undercover employee. However, the FBI, through the development of internal policy may

choose to apply these Guidelines to certain confdential informant, cooperating witness, and 

cooperating subject operations by referrng such matters to the Undercover Review Commttee

pursuant to Section IVD(6).

The FBI may participate in joint undercover activities with other law enforcement

agencies and may opemte a proprietary to the extent necessary to mainain an operation s cover

or effectiveness. Joint undercover operations are to be conducted pursuant to these Guidelines.

However, if a joint undercover operation is uner the direction and contol of another federal law

enforcement agency and is approved through a sensitive operations review process substantially

comparable to the process under these Guidelines, the other agency s process may be relied on in

lieu of the process under these Guidelines. In any undercover activity or operation in which an

FBI undercover employee paricipates, Sections IV.H and VLA-B of these Guidelines shall

apply, regardless of which agency directs and controls the operation.

B-40
IV. AUTHORIZATION OF UNERCOVER OPERATIONS

GENERAL APPROVAL STANDARS

Any official considering approval or authorization of a proposed undercover application

shall weigh the risks and benefits of the operation, giving careful consideration to the following

factors:

(1) The risk of personal injur to individuals, propert damage, financial loss to persons

or businesses, damage to reputation, or other har to persons;

(2) The risk of civil liability or other loss to the Governent;

(3) The risk of invasion of privacy or interference with privileged or confidential

relationships and any potential constitutional concerns or other legal' concerns;

(4) The risk that individuals engaged in undercover operations may become involved in

illegal conduct restricted in Section IV.H below; and

(5) The suitability of Governent participation in the tye of activit that is expected to

occur during the operation. 

UNERCOVER OPERATIONS WHCH MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY 

SPECIA AGENT IN CHAGE (SAC) 

(I) The establishment, extension, or renewal of all undercover operations to be

supervised by a given field office must be approved by the SAC. If the undercover

operation does not involve any of the factors listed in Section IV.C below, this approval

shall constitute authoriation for the operation. Approval requires a written

determination, stating supporting facts and circumstances, that:

(a) Intiation of investigative activity regarding the alleged criminal conduct or

criminal enterprise is warranted under any applicable departental guidelines;

(b) The proposed undercover operation appears to be an effective means of

obtaining evidence or necessar information. This fmding should include a

statement of what prior investigation has been conducted and what chance the

operation has of obtaining evidence or necessar inormation concerng the

alleged criminal conduct or criminal enterprise;

NOTE: The gathering of evidence and information through undercover operations

fuhers the investigative objectives of detecting, preventing, and prosecuting

crimes. See Sections I and III above. In fuhering these objectives, the Attorney

General' s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism

B-41
Enterprise Investigations (Par I) state that "(tJhe FBI shall not hesitate touse any

lawful techniques consistent with these Guidelines, even if intrsive, where the

intrsiveness is waranted in light of the seriousness of a crime or the strength of

the information indicating its commission or potential futue comission. This

point is to be particularly observed in the investigation of terrorist crimes and in

the investigation of enterprises that engage in terrorism. " As with other

investigative techniques, Special Agents in Charge should be guided by this

principle in considerin and approving undercover operations. The priciple, as

noted, applies with particular force where the undercover operation is directed to

gathering inormation that wil help to solve and prosecute terrorist offenses or

prevent the futue commssion of acts of terrorism.

(c) The undercover operation will be conducted with minimal intrsion consistent

with the need to collect the evidence or information in a timely and effective 

manner;

(d) Approval for the use of any confidential informant has been obtained as

required by the Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use ofConfideritial

Inormants;

(e) Any foreseeable paricipation by an undercover employee in ilegal activity

that can be approved by the SAC on his or her own authority is justified by the

factors noted in paragraph H; and

(1) Ifthere is no present expectation of the occurence of any of the sensitive or

fiscal circumstances listed in paragraph C, a statement to that effect.

(2) Undercover operations may be authorized pusuant to this subsection for up to six

months and continued upon renewal for an additional six-month period, for a total of no

more than one year. Undercover operations initiated pursuant to this subsection may not

involve the expenditue of more than $50 000 ($100 000 in drg cases of which a

maximum of $50 000 is for operational expenses), or such other amount that is set from

time to time by the Director, without approval from FBI Headquarers (FBIHQ).

(3) The SAC may delegate the responsibility to authorize the establishment, extension

or renewal of undercover operations to designated Assistant Special Agents in Charge.

The delegation of this responsibility by the SAC should be in writing and maintained in

the appropriate field office. However, all undercover operations which must be

authorized at FBIHQ must be approved by the SAC.

(4) A copy of all written approvals described in (1) above shall be forwarded promptly to

FBIHQ.

B-42
OPERATIONS WHCH MUST BE APPROVED AT FBmQ

(1) Fiscal Circumstances

In all undercover operations involving the fiscal circumstances set out below, the SAC

shall submit an application to FBIHQ in a9cordance with Section IV.F below. A

recommendation for authorization may be forwarded directly to the Director or

designated Assistant Director or, in operations involving only fiscal circumstances (a)-

(c), to the designated Deputy Assistant Director for fmal review and authorization

. provided that the approval levels conform to all applicable laws.

Applications for approval of undercover operations referred to FBIHQ only because of

fiscal circumstances need not be considered or approved by the Undercover Review

Commttee.

For purose of these Guidelines, an undercover operation involves fiscal circumstances if

there is a reasonable expectation that the undercover operation wil -

(a) Require the purchase or lease of propert, equipment, buildings, or facilities

the alteration of buildings or facilities; a contract for constrction or alteration of

buildings or facilities; or prepayment of more than one month' s rent;

NOTE: The purchase, rental, or lease of propert using an assumed name or cover

identity to facilitate a physical or technical sureilance is not an undercover operation

for puroses of these Guidelines. However, since the expenditue of appropriated funds

is involved, approval must be obtained from FBIHQ in conformance with applicable

laws.

(b) Require the deposit of appropriated fuds or proceeds generated by the

undercover operation ino bank or other fmancial institutions;

(c) Use the proceeds generated by the undercover operation to offset necessary

and reasonable expenses of the operation; 

(d) Require a reimbursement, compensation, or indemnification agre ment with

cooperating individuals or entities for services or losses incured by them in aid of

the operation (any such agreement entered into with third pares must be

reviewed by the FBI's Office of the General Counsel and Office ofthe Chief

Contracting Officer); or

(e) Exceed the limitations on duration or commtment of resources established by

the Director for operations initiated at the field offce level.

B-43
(2) Sensitive Circumstan;es

In all undercover operations involving any sensitive circumstances listed below, the SAC

shall submit an application to FBIHQ in accordance with paragraph F below. The

application shall be reviewed by appropriate supervisory personnel at FBIHQ and, if

favorably recommended, sent to the Undercover Review Commttee for consideration.

The application shall then be forwarded to the Director or a designated Assistant

Director, who may approve or disapprove the application.

For puroses of these Guidelines, sensitive circumstances are involved ifthere is a

reasonable expectation that the undercover operation wil involve -

(a) an investigation of possible criminal conduct by any elected or appointed

offcial, or political candidate, for a judicial legislative, management; or

executive level position of trst in a Federal, state, or local governental entity or

political.subdivision thereof;

(b) an investigation of any public offcial at the Federal, state, or local level in any

matter involving systemic corrption of any governental fuction;

(c) an investigation of possible criinal conduct by any foreign official or

governent, religious organization, political organzation, or the news media;

NOTE: There are some circumtances involving offcials in judicial, legislative

management, or executive-level positions which may logically be considered

nonsensitive. In such instances, the Section Chief, Integrity in Governent/Civil Rights

Section, Criminal Investigative Division, FBIHQ, who is a member of the Criminal

Undercover Operations Review Committee and has a national perspective on matters

involving public officials, must be consulted for a determination as to whether the

undercover operation should be presented to the Undercover Review Committee.

(d) Engaging in activity having a signficant effect on or constituting a signficant

intrsion into the legitimate operation of a Federal, state ' or local governental

entity;

(e) Establishing, acquirg, Qr operating a proprietary;

(1) Providing goods or services which are essential to the commssion of a crime

which goods and services are reasonably unavailable to a subject of the

investigation except ftom the Governent;

(g) Activity by an undercover employee that is proscribed by Federal, state, or

local law as a felony or that is otherwise a serious crime - but not including the

purchase of stolen or contraband goods; the delivery or sale by the Governent of

B-44
stolen propert whose ownership cannot be determned; the controlled delivery of

drgs which wil not enter commerce; the conduct of no more than five money

launderig transactions, not to exceed a maximum aggregate amount of $1

milion; the payment of bribes which are not included in the other sensitive

circumstances; or the making of false representations to third paries in

concealment of personal identity or the tre ownership ofa proprietary (this

exemption does not include any statement under oath or the penalties of perjur -

see paragraph H below);

NOTE: Some of the above activities - for example, the controlled delivery of drgs

bribe payments, and certain transactions that involve depositing fuds into banks or other

fmancial institutions- are subject to specific review and approval procedures. These

matters must be coordinated with FBIHQ.

(h) A significant risk that a person paricipating in an undercover operation wil

be arrested or wil supply falsely sworn testimony or false documentation in any

legal or administrative proceeding (see paragmph H below);

(i) Attendance at a meeting or parcipation in communcations between any individual and his or her lawyer; 

G) A significant risk that a third part wil enter into a professional or coridential

relationship with a person paricipatig in an undercover operation who is acting

as an attorney, physician, clergyan, or member of the news media;

(k) A request to an attorney, physician, member of the clergy, or other person for

information that would ordinarily be privileged or to a member of the news media

concerning an individual with whom the news person is known to have a

professional or confidential relationship;

(I) Parcipation in the activities of a group under investigation as part of a

terrorism enterprise investigation or recruiting a person from within such a group

as an informant;

(m) A significant risk of violence or physical injur to individuals or a significant

risk of fmancialloss;

(n) Activities which create a realistic potential for significant claims against the

United States arising in tort, contract, or for compensation for the "tang" of

propert, or a realistic potential for significant claims against individual

governent employees alleging constitutional torts; or

B-45
(0) Untre representations by a person participatig in the undercover operation

concerning the activities or involvement of any third person without that

individual' s knowledge or consent.

CRIMIAL UNERCOVER OPERATIONS REVIEW COMMITTEE

(UERCOVER REVIEW COMMTTEE)

(1) The Undercover Review Commttee shall consist of appropriate employees of the FBI

designated by the Director and Criminal Division attorneys designated by the Assistant

Attorney General in charge of the Crimial Division, DOJ, to be chaired by a designee of

the Director.

(2) When an application from a SAC for approval of an undercover operation involving

sensitive circumstances specified in paragraph C(2) is received by FBIHQ, upon

recommendation by the FBIHQ substantive section, the Commee members wil meet to

review the application. Criminal Division members of the Commttee may consult with

appropriate FBI personnel, senior DOJ officials, and the United States Attorney as

deemed appropriate. The Commttee shall submit the application to the Director or

designated Assistant Director with a recommendation for approval or disapproval of the

request and any recommended changes or amendments to the propooal.

(3) In addition to the considerations contained in Section IV.A above, the Commttee

shall also examine the application to determne whether adequate measures have been

taken to minimize the incidence of sensitive circumstances and reduce the risks of harm

and intrsion that are created by such circumstances. If the Committee recommends

approval of an undercover operation, the recommendation shall include a brief writt

statement explaining why the operation merits approval in light ofthe anticipated

occurrence of sensitive circumstances. 

(4) The Commttee shall recommend approval of an undercover operation only upon

reaching a consensus, provided that:

(a) If one or more ofthe designees of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of

the Criminal Division does not join in a recommendation for approval of a

proposed operation because of legal, ethical, prosecutive, or deparntal policy

considerations, the designee shall promptly advise the Assistant Attorey General

and no fuher action shall be taken on the proposal until the designated Assistant

Director has had an oppority to consult with the Assistant Attorney General;

and

(b) If, upon consultation, the Assistant Attorney General disagrees with a decision

by the designated Assistant Director to approve the proposed operation, no further

action shall be taken on the proposal without the approval of the Deputy Attorney

General or the Attorney General.

B-46
(5) The Commttee should consult the Office of the General Counsel of the FBI and the

Office of Legal Counselor other appropriate division or office at DOJ about significant

unsettled legal questions concerning authority for, or the conduct o a proposed

undercover operation.

(6) The Director, Assistant Attorney General, or other official designated by them may

refer any sensitive investigative matter, including informant, cooperating witness, and

cooperating subject operations, to the Undercover Review Commttee for advice

recommendation or comment, regardless of whether an undercover operation is involved.

A SAC may, consistent with FBI policy, submit an undercover operation for review by

FBIHQ and the Undercover Review Commttee regardless of whether the sensitive

circumstances listed in these Guidelines are present.

(7) The United States Attorney, SAC or any member of their staffs, may attend the

Undercover Review Comittee in order to advocate for the approval of an undercover

operation.

(8) If the SAC and the United States Attorney jointly disagree with any stipulation set by

the Undercover Review Commttee regarding the approval of an undercover operation

they may consult with the chairan of the Commttee who may schedule a meetig of the

commttee to reconsider the issue in question.

(9) At any time durg the undercover operation the SAC can appeal any FBIHQ decision

directly to the Assistan Director. Likewise, the United States Attorny can appeal

directly to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, or the Deputy Attorney

General as appropriate.

APPROVAL BY THE DIRECTOR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DESIGNATED

EXECUTIV ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OR DESIGNATED ASSISTANT

DIRCTOR

A designated Assistant Director may approve an undercover operation considered by the

Undercover Review Commttee, uness the investigation involves sensitive circumtace (1) 

(m). Except in the limited circumstaces described in paragraph I below, only the Director, the

Deputy Director, or a designated Executive Assistant Director may approve a proposed operation

if a reasonable expectation exists that:

(1) The undercover opemtion wil be used to parcipate in the activities of a group under

investigation as par of a terrorism enterprise investigation or to recruit a person from

within such a group as an inormant (sensitive circumstance (1)); or

(2) There may be a significant risk of violence or personal injur to individuals or a

significant risk of fmancialloss (sensitive circumstance (m)).

B-47
APPLICA TION/NOTIICATION TO FBIHQ

(1) Application to FBIHQ must be made for any undercover operation requirig FBIHQ

approval. Each application shall include: 

(a) The written SAC approval described in paragraph B(l) above;

(b) A description of the proposed operation and the paricular cover to be

employed; any informants or other cooperating persons who wil assist in the

operation, including background information, arrest record, and plea agreements;

the particular offense or criminal enterprise under investigation; and any

individuals known to be involved;

(c) A statement of the period of time for which the operation would be

maintained;

(d) A description of how the requirements concerng any inducements to be

offered as discussed in Section V.B. below have been met; and

( e) A statement of proposed expenses.

(2) Applications for approval of undercover operations involving sensitive circumstances

listed in paragraph C(2) shall also include the following inormation:

(a) A statement of which circumstances are reasonably expected to occur, what

the facts are likely to be, and why the undercover operation merits approval in

light of the circumstances, including:

(i) For undercover operations involving sensitive circumstance (g), a

statement why the paricipation in otherwise ilegal activity is justified

under the requirements of paragraph H below; and

(ii) For undercover operations involving sensitive circumstance (I), a

statement why the infiltration or recruitment is necessary, a description of

procedures to minimize any acquisition, retention, and dissemination of

information that does not relate tothematter under investigation or 

other authorized investigative activity, and an explanation of how any

potential constitutional concerns and any other legal concerns have been

addressed.

(b) A letter from the appropriate Federal prosecutor indicating that he or she has

reviewed the proposed operation, including the sensitive circumstances

reasonably expected to occur, agrees with the proposal and its legality, and wil

prosecute any meritorious case that has developed. The letter should include a

B-48
finding that the proposed investigation would be an appropriate use of the

undercover technique and that the potential benefits in detectig, preventig, or

prosecuting criminal activity outweigh any direct costs or risks of other har.

(3) An application for the extension or renewal of an undercover operation should

describe the results obtained from the operation or explain any failure to obtain

significant results and, where sensitive circumtances are involved, should include a

letter from the appropriate Federal prosecutor favoring the extension or renewal of

authority.

(4) The FBI shall immediately notify the Deputy Attorney General whenever FBIHQ

disapproves an application for approval of an undercover operation and whenever the

Undercover Review Committee is unable to reach consensus concerng an application.

DURTION OF AUTHORIZATION

(1) An undercover operation approved by FBIHQ may not continue longer than is

necessary to achieve the objectives specified in the authorization, nor in any event longer

than six months, without new authorization to proceed, except pursuant to subparagraph

(3) below.

(2) If there is significant change in either the direction or objectives of an undercover

operation approved by FBIHQ, the operation must be reviewed by the Undercover

Review Committee to determne whether a new authorization is necessary.

(3) An undercover operation which requires review by the Undercover Review

Committee may be intiated or extended on an interim' basis by the designated Assistant

Director in the event of exigent circumstances, for a period not to exceed 30 days. In the

case of an initial authorization, budget enhanement, or change in focus, the interim

authority must be ratified by the Undercover Review Committee at its next scheduled

meetig.

(4) An undercover operation intially authorized by the SAC must be reauthorized by a

designated Assistant Director, pursuant to Section IV. , if it lasts longer than 12

months Of involves the expenditue of more than $50 000 ($100 000 in drg cases of

which a maximum of $50 000 is for operational expenses), or such other amount that is

set from time to time by the Director. No unercover operation approved at the field

offce level may continue for more than one year without obtaing approval at FBIHQ.

(5) An undercover operation approved by an SAC is deemed to commence on the date

approved not on the date covert activity is begu.

(6) Among the factors to be considered in a determination by any approving official of

whether an undercover operation should be renewed or extended are:

B-49
(a) The extent to which the operation has produced the results anticipated when it

was established;

(b) The potential for futue success beyond that initially targeted;

(c) The extent to which the investigation can continue without exposing the

undercover operation; and

(d) The extent to which continuation of the investigation may cause injur,

fmancial or otherwise, to innocent parties.

PARTICIPATION IN OTHERWISE ILLEGAL ACTIVTY BY UNERCOVER

EMPLOYEES

Except when authorized pursuant to these Guidelines, no undercover employee shall

engage in any activity that Would constitute a violation of Federal, state, or local law if engaged

in by a private person acting without authorization. For purposes of these Guidelines, such

activity is referred to as otherwise ilegal activity.

(1) Justification: No official shall recomend or approve participation by an undercover

employee in otherwise illegal activity unless the paricipation is justified:

(a) to obtain information or evidence necessar for the success of the

investigation and not reasonably available without participation in the otherwise

ilegal activity;

(b) to establish or maintain credibility of a cover identity; or

(c) to prevent death or serious bodily injur.

(2) Minimization: The FBI shall take reasonable steps to minimize the participation of an

undercover employee in any otherwise ilegal activity.

(3) Prohibitions: An undercover employee shall not:

(a) participate in any act of violence except in self-defense;

(b) initiate or instigate any plan to commit crimnal acts except in accordance

with Section V (concerning avoidance of entrapment) below; or

(c) paricipate in conduct which would constitute unlawful investigative 

techniques (e. , illegal wiretapping, ilegal mail openings, breakg and entering,

or trespass amounting to an ilegal search).

B-50
(4) Self-Defense: Nothing in these Guidelines prohibits an undercover employee from

taking reasonable measures of self-defense in an emergency to protect his or her own life

or the lives of others against wrongful force. Such measures shall be reported to the

appropriate Federal prooecutor and FBIHQ, .who shall inform the Assistant Attorney

General for the Criminal Division as soon as possible.

(5) Authorization

(a) The SAC must approve all undercover operations and actiyities, including

those which contemplate participation in otherwise ilegal activity. This approval

shall constitute authorization of: 

(i) otherwise ilegal activity which is a misdemeanor or simlar minor

crime under Federal, state, or local law;

(ii) consensual monitorig, even if a crime under local law;

(iii) the purchase of stolen or contraband goods;

(iv) the delivery or sale of stolen propert which canot be traced to the

rightful owner;

(v) the controlled deliver of drgs which wil not enter commerce;

(vi) the payment of bribes which is not included in the sensitive

circumstances;

(vii) the making of false representations to third paries in concealment of

personal identity or the tre ownership of a proprietar (but not any

statement under oath or the penalties ofperjuty, which must be authorized

pursuant to subparagraph (b) below); and

(viii) conducting no more than five money laundering transactions, not to

exceed a maximum aggregate amount of $1 million.

(b) Participation in otherwise ilegal activity which is a felony or its equivalent

under Federal, state, or local law and which is not otherwise excepted uner

Section IV.C(2)(g) above, requires additional authorization by the Assistant

Director after review by the Undercover Review Commttee. See Section IV.

(c) Paricipation in otherwise ilegal activity which involves a significant risk of

violence or physical inju requires authorization by the Director, Deputy

Director, or designated Executive Assistant Director after review by the

Undercover Review Commttee. See Section IV.

B-51
(d) If an undercover employee believes it to be necessary and appropriate under

the standards set out in paagraph H( 1) above, to paricipate in otherwise ilegal

activity that was not foreseen or anticipated, every effort should be made to

consult with the SAC, who shall seek emergency interim authority from the

designated Assistant Director, and review by the Undercover Review Committee

if possible, or, if necessary, may provide emergency authorization under

paragraph I below. If consultation is impossible, and the undercover employee

concludes that there is an immediate and grave theat to life, physical safety, or

propert, the undercover employee may participate in the otherwise ilegal

activity, so long as he does not take par in and makes every effort to prevent any

act of violence. A repor to the SAC shall be made as soon as possible, who shall

submit a wrtten report to FBIHQ, which shan promptly inform the Undercover

Review Committee. A decision by an undercover employee to paricipate in

otherwise ilegal activit under this subsection may be retroactively authorized if

appropriate.

(e) If an l1dercover operation results in violence in the course of crimial

activity, and an undercover employee, infonnant, or cooperating witness has

parcipated in any maner in the criminal activity, the SAC shall immediately

inform the appropriate Federal prosecutor and FBIHQ, which shall inform the

Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Crinal Division as soon as

possible.

INTERIM/MERGENCY AUTHORIZATION

(1) In situations which require the prior written authorization ofthe SAC, the SAC may

orally approve an undercover operation when he or she determines that a significant

investigative opportty would be lost were the time taken to prepare a written

authorization. The required wrtten authorization, with the justification for the oral

approval included, shall be prepared promptly and forwarded to FBIHQ.

(2) Emergency interim authorization procedures are in place within FBIHQ that provide

for expeditious review and authorization of a proposed undercover operation. See

paragraph G(3). If the SAC concludes that a sitation exists which makes even this

expedited procedure too lengthy, in any of the following situations, the SAC may

authorize the undercover operation:

(a) Insituations which would otherWise require approval by the designated

Assistant Director, the SAC may approve an undercover operation when he or she

determines that without immediate initiation, extension, or renewal of an

operation, life, proper, or personal safety of individuals would be placed in

serious danger.

B-52
(b) In situations which involve sensitive circumtance (1) or (m), the SAC may

approve an undercover operation when he or she determnes that the intiation

extension, or renewal of an operation is imperative to protect life or prevent

. .

senous mJur.

(c) In situations which involve sensitive circumstance (1), or other investigative

activity relating to terrorism, the SAC may approve an undercover operation

when he or she determines that the initiation, extension, or renewal of an

operation is necessary to avoid the loss of a significant investigative opportity.

Before providing authorization in these situations, the SAC shall attempt to consult with

the appropriate Federal prosecutor and with a designated Assistant Director.

(3) The power to provide emergency authorizations under subparagraph (2) may not be

delegated pursuant to Section IV.B(3).

(4) In situations arising under subparagraph (2), a wrtten application for approval must

be submitted to FBIHQ within 48 hours after the operation has been intiated, extended

or renewed, together with the initial finding and a wrtten description of the emergency

situation. As soon as it is notified of an emergency authorization, FBIHQ shall notify the

DOl members of the Undercover Review Commttee. If the subsequent wrtten

application for approval is denied, a full report of all activity underten durg the

course of the operation must be submitted to the Director Attorney General. , who shall inform the Deputy

(5) In online undercover operations, a SAC or his or her designee may authorize, in

wrting, continued online undercover contact for a period not to exceed 30 days if it is

essential to continue online contact with a subject in order to either maintain credibility

or avoid permanent loos of contact with a subject durng the period of time in which an

application for an online undercover operation is being prepared and submitted for

approval. If the propooed undercover operation is one that must be approved by an

Assistant Director under Section IV.C(2), the appropriate offces at FBIHQ must be

notified promptly of the decision to grant this interim authority. Furhermore, a full

report of all online activity occurng durg this period must be submitted to the

approving authority as soon as practicable. If approved, the undercover employee

maintaining online contact during this period must:

(a) Maintain an accurate recording of all online communication;

(b ) Avoid otherwise ilegal activity;

(c) Maintain as limited an online profile as possible consistent with the need to

accomplish the objectives stated above;

B-53
( d) Avoid physical contact with subjects;

(e) Take all necessary and reasonable actions during the interim period to ptotect

potential victims and prevent serious criminal activity if online contact reveals a

significant and immnent threat to third par individuals, commrcial

establishments, or governent entities; and

(1) Cease undercover activities if, during the 30-day period, a determnation is

made to disapprove the undercover operation.

V. PROTECTING INOCENT PARTIES AGAIST ENTRAPMENT

ENTRAPMENT

Entrapment must be scrupulously avoided. Entrapment occurs when the Governent

implants inthe mid of a person who is not otherwise disposed to commt the offense the

dispo ition to commt the offense and then induces the commission of that offense in order to

prosecute.

AUTHORIZATION REQUIMENTS

In addition to the legal prohibition on entrapment, additional restrictions limit FBI

undercover activity to ensure, insofar as it is possible, that entrapment issues do not adversely

affect criminal prosecutions. As a result, no undercover activity ilWolving an inducement to an

individual to engage in crime shall be authorized unless the approving official is satisfied that-

(1) The ilegal natue of the activity is reasonably clear to potential subjects; and

(2) The natue of any inducement offered is justifiable in view of the character of the

ilegal transaction in which the individual is invited to engage; and

(3) There is a reasonable expectation that offerng the inducement will reveal ilegal

activity; and

(4) One of the two following limitations is met:

(i) There is reasonable indication that the subject is engaging, has engaged, or is

likely to engage in the illegal activity proposed or in similar ilegal conduct; or

(ii) The opportty for ilegal activity has been strctued so that there is reason

to believe that any persons drawn to the opportity, or brought to it, ar

predisposed to engage in the contemplated ilegal conduct.

B-54
EXCEPTION

The alternative requirements of paragraph B(4), while not required by law, are imposed

to ensure the Governent does not offer inducements to crime to persons who are not

predisposed to do so. These standards can be waived only by the Director upon a written fmding

that the activities are necessary to protectlife or prevent other serious harm.

VI. MONITORIG AN CONTROL OF UNERCOVER OPERATIONS

PREPARTION OF UNERCOVER EMPLOYEES, INORMTS, AN

COOPERATING WITNESSES

(1) Prior to the investigation, the SAC or a designated Supervisory Special Agent shall

review with each undercover employee the conduct that the undercover employee is

expected to undertake and conduct that may be necessar durng the investigation. The

SAC or Agent shall discuss with each undercover employee any of the sensitive or fiscal

circumstances specified in Section IV.C(1) or (2) that are reasonably liely to occur.

(2) Each undercover employee shall be instrcted that he or she shall not paricipate in

any act of violence; intiate or instigate any plan to commt criminal acts; use unawful

investigative techniques to obtain information or evidence; or engage in any conduct that

would violate restrctions on investigative technques or FBI conduct contained in the

Attorney General' s Guideliues or departental policy; and that, except in an emergency

situation as set out in Section IV.H(5)(d), he or she shall not paricipate in any ilegal

activity for which authorization has not been obtained under these Guidelines. The

undercover employee shall be instrcted in the law of entrapment. When an undercover

employee lears that persons under investigation intend to con:it a violent crime, he or

she shall tr to discourage the violence.

REVIW OF CONDUCT

From time to time, during the course of the undercover operation, the SAC shall review

the conduct of the undercover employee(s) and others participating in the undercover operation

including any proposed or reasonably foreseeable conduct for the remainder of the investigation.

Any findings of impermissible conduct shall be discussed with th individual and promptly

reported to the designated Assistant Director an the members of the Undercover Review

Committee, and a determnation shall be made as to whether the individual should continue his

or her parcipation in the investigation.

CONTINUIG CONSULTATION WITH THE APPROPRITE FEDERA

PROSECUTOR

Upon initiating and thrughout the course of any undercover operation, the SAC or a

designated Supervisoty Special Agent shall consult on a continuing basis with the appropriate

B-55
Federal prosecutor, paricularly with respect 10 the propriety of the operation and the legal

sufficiency and quality of evidence that is being produced by the activity.

SERIOUS LEGAL, ETIDCAL, PROSECUTIV OR DEPARTMENTAL POLICY

QUESTIONS, AN PREVIOUSLY UNFORESEEN SENSITIVE

CIRCUMSTANCES

(1) The SAC shall consult with the chairman of the Criminal Undercover Operations

Review Commttee, FBIHQ whenever a serious legal, ethical, prosecutive, or

deparmental policy question arses in any undercover operation or if sensitive

circumstances occUr that were not anticipated The FBI shall consult with the United

States Attorney, or Assistant Attorney General, or their representative, and with DOJ

members of the Undercover Review Committee on whether to modify, suspend, or

terminate the investigation related to such issues.

(2) When unforeseen sensitive circumstances arise, the SAC shall submit a wrtten

application to FBIHQ for authorization of an undercover o'peration previously approved

at the field office level, or amend the existing application to FBIHQ pursuant to Section

IV.

ANUAL REPORT OF THE UNERCOVER REVIW COMMTTEE

(1) The Undercover Review Committee shall retain a file of all applications for approval

of undercover operations submitted to it, together with a written record of the

Commttee s action on the application and any ultimate disposition by the approving

official. The FBI shall also prepare a short sumar of each undercover operation

recommended for approval by the Commttee. These records arid sumares shall be

available for inspection by a designee of the Deputy Attorney General and of the

Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Crimial Division.

(2) On an annual basis, the Committee shall submit to the Director, the Attorney General

the Deputy Attorney General, and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the

Criminal Division a wrtten report sumarizing:

(a) the types of undercover operations approved and disapproved together with

the reasons for disapproval;

(b) the major issues addressed by the Commttee in reviewing applications and

how they were resolved; and

(c) any significant modifications to the operations recommended by the

Committee.

B-56
DEPOSIT OF PROCEEDS; LIQUIATION OF PROPRITARS

As soon as the pro frm any underver operation are no longer necessa for the

conduct of the activity, the remainin proed shall be depsited in the Treaur of the United

States as miscellaneous receipts. .

Whenever a proprieta with a net value over the amount spified by the Deparent of

Jtitice Appropriation Authorition Act or other applicable laws is to be liquidated sold, or

otherse dispsed of, the FBI shall rert the cirumces to the Attorney General and the

Comptroller Genera. The pro of the liquidaon, sae, or the dispsition, after obligations

ar met, shall be depsited in the Tre of the United Staes as miscellaneous reeipts.

VII. RESERVATION

These Guidelies are set fort solely for the purse of interl OOJ gudace. They are

not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upn to crete any rights, substative or

procur, enforceale by law by any par in any mat, civil or crial, nor do they place any

limitaons on otherwse lawfu investigative or litigatve prergatives of the Deparent of

Jusice. 

Date: May 30, 2002

John Ashcroft

Attorney Gener

B-57
BLANK PAGE 

B-58
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL' S GUIDELINES ON

GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND

TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGA TIONS

B-59
PREAMBLE

As the primary crimial investigative agency in the federal goverInt, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBi) has the authority and responsibility to investigate all criminal

violations of federal law that are not exclusively assigned to another federal agency. The FBI

thus plays a central role in the enforcement of federal laws and in the proper admistration of

justice in the United States. In discharging this fuction, the highest priority is to protect the

securty of the nation and the safety of the American people against the depredations of terrorists

and foreign aggressors.

Investigations by the FBI are premised upon the fudamental duty of governent to

protect the public againt general crimes, against organized criminal activity, andagainstthose

who would theaten the fabric of our society though terrorism or mass destrction. That duty

must be performed with care to protect individual rights and to insure that investigations are

confmed to matters of legitimate law enfrcement interest. The purose of these Guidelines

therefore, is to establish a consistent policy in such matters; The Guidelines wil enable Agents

of the FBI to perform their duties with greater certainty, confidence and effectiveness, and wil

provide the American people with, a fi assurance that the FBI is actig properly under the law.

These Guidelines provide guidance for geneml crimes and crimial intelligence

investigations by the FBI. The standards and requirements set forth herein govern the

circumstances under which such investigations may be begu, and th permssible' scope

duration, subject matters, and objectives ofthese investigations. They do not limit activities

cared out under other Attorney General guidelines addressing such matters as investigations

and information collection relating to international terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, or foreign intellgence. 

The Introduction that follows explains the background of the reissuance of these

Guidelines, their general approach and strctue, and their specific application in fuherance of

the FBI's central mission to protect the United States and its people frm acts of terrorism Par

L sets forth general priciples that apply to all investigations conducted under these Guidelines.

Par II governs investigations undertken to prevent, solve or prosecute specific violations of

federal law . Subpart A of Part III governs crimial intelligence investigations undertaken to

obtain information concerning enterprises which are engaged in racketeering activities. Subpart

B of Par III governs criminal intellgence investigations undertaken to obtain inormation

concerning enterprises which seek to fuher political or social goals through violence or which

otherwise aim to engage in terrorism or the comission of terrorism-related crimes. Parts IV

through VII discuss authorized investigative technques, dissemination and maintenance of

information, counterterrorism activities and other authorized law enforcement activities, and

miscellaneous mattrs.

These Guidelines are issued under the authority of the Attorney General as provided in

sections 509, 510, 533, and 534 of title 28, United States Code.

B-60
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ll.

CHECKIG OF LEADS AND PRELIMARY INQUIRIES . . . . . . . . . . . 1

FULL INSTIGATIONS. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . 2

AUTHORIZED INESTIGATIV TECHNIQUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

OTHER AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

GENERA PRICIPLES. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

GENERA CRIMES INVESTIGATIONS. ' ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

DEFINTIONS. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

PRELIMARY INQUIRIS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . 8

INSTIGATIONS. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . 10

CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INSTIGATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

RACKETEERIG ENTERPRISE INSTIGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Defmition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

General Authority

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . 13

Purose. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Scope

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Authorization and Renewal. . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

. . . . . 14

ORISM ENTERPRISE INSTIGATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

General Authority

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . 15

Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Scope

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

B-61
IV.

VI.

VII.

Authorization and Renewal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

INSTIGATIV TECHNIQUES

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . . . 18

DISSEMINATION AN MATENANCE OF INFORMTION .............

COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVTIES AN OTHER AUTHORIZATIONS. . . 21

COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Inormation Systems

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Visiting Public Places and Events. . . 

. . . . . . . .. . . 22

OTHER AUTHORIATIONS. . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

General Topical Researh

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Use of Online Resources Generally. . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reports and Assessments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Cooperation with Secret Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

PROTECTION OF PRIACY AN OTHER LIMITATIONS ..........

General Limitations. . . . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . 23

Maintenance of Records Under the Priyacy Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Constrction of Par . 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RESERVATION ...................................................... 24

B-62
INTRODUCTION

Following the September 11 , 2001 , terrorist attack on the United States, the Deparent

of Justice carred out a general review of existig guidelines and procedures relating to national

sec ty and criminal matters. The reissuance of these Guidelines reflects the result of that

reVIew.

These Guidelines follow previous guidelines in their classification of levels of

investigative activity, in their classification of tyes of investigations, in their standards for

intiating investigative activity, and in their identification of permtted investigative techniques.

There are, however, a number of changes designed to enhance the general effectiveness of

criminal investigation, to brig the Guidelines into conformity with recent changes in the law

and to facilitate the FBI's central mission ofpreventing the commssion of terrorist acts against

the United States and its people.

In their general strctue, these Guidelines provide graduated levels of investigative

activity, allowing the FBI the necessar flexibility to act well in advance of the commssion of

planed terrorist acts or other federal crimes. The three levels of investigative a tiv'ity are: (1)

the prompt and extremely limited checking of initial leads, (2) preliminar inquiries, and (3) full

investigations. Subject to these Guidelines and other guidelines and policies noted in Part IV

below, any lawful investigative technique may be used in full investigations, and with some

exceptions, in prelimiary inquires.

CHECKIG OF LEADS AN PRELIMARY INQUIES

The lowest level of investigative activity is the "prompt and extremely limited checkig

out of intial leads " which should be undertaken whenever information is received of such a

natue that some follow-up as to the possibility of criminal activit is warranted. This limited

activity should be conducted with an eye toward promptly determning whether fuher

investigation (either a prelimiar inquiry or a full investigation) should be conducted.

The next level of investigative activity, a preliminar inquiry, should be undertaken when

there is inormation or an allegation which indicates the possibility of crimial activity and

- whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny beyond checking initial leads. This

authority allows FBI agents to respond to inforation that is ambiguous or incomplete. Even

where the available information meets only this threshold, the range of available investigative

technques is broad. These Guidelines categorically prohibit only mail opening and

nonconsensual electronic sureilance at this stage. Other methods, including the development

of sources and inonTnts and undercover activities and operations, are permtted in prelimiary

inquiries. The tools available to develop information suffcient for the commencement of a full

investigation, or determining that one is not merited - the purose of a preliminar inquir 

should be fully employed, consistent with these Guidelines, with a view toward preventing

terrorist activities.

B-63
Whether it is appropriate to open a preliminar inquiry immediately, or instead to engage

first in a limited checking out of leads, depends on the circumstances presented. If, for example

an agent receives an allegation that an individual or group has advocated the commission of

criminal violence, and no other facts are available, an appropriate first step would be checking

out of leads to determne whether the individual, group, or members of the audience have the

apparent ability orintent to carr out the advocated crime. A similar response would be

appropriate on the basis of non-verbal conduct of an ambiguous character - for example, where a

report is received that an individual has accumulated explosives that could be used either in a

legitimate business or to commit a terrorist act. Where the limited checkig out of leads

discloses a possibility or reasonable indication of criminal activity, a preliminary inquir or full

investigation may then be initiated. However, if the available inoration shows at the outset

that the theshold standard for a prelimar inquir or full investigation is satisfied, then the

appropriate investigative activity may be initiated immediately, without progressing through

more limited investigative stages.

The application of these Guidelines' standarrn for inquiries merits special attention in

cases that involve efforts by individuals or grups to obtain, for no apparent reason, biological

chemical, radiological, or nuclear materials whose use or possession is constrained by, 

statutes as 18 U. C. 175 229, or 831. For example, FBI agents are not required to possess

information relating to an individual's intended crimial use of dangerous biological agents or

toxins prior tQ intiatin investigative activity. On the contrary, if an individual or group has

attempted to obtain such materials, or has indicated a desire to acquire them, and the reason is

not apparent, investigative action, such as conducting a checkig out of leads or intiating a

preliminary inquir, may be appropriate to determne whether there is a legitimate purose for

the possession of the materials by the individual or group. Likewise, where individl1als or

groups engage in efforts to acquire or show an interest in acquirig, without apparent reason

toxic, chemicals or thei precursors or radiological or nuclear materials, investigative action to

determine whether there is a legitimate purose may be justified.

FULL INSTIGATIONS

These Guidelines provide for two tyes of full investigations: general crimes

investigations (part II below) and criminal intelligence investigations (par III below). The

choice of the tye of investigation depends on the information and the investigative focus. A

general crimes investigation may be initiated where facts or circmmtances reasonably indicate

that a federal crime has been, is being, or wil be commtted. Preventing futue criminal activity,

as well as solving and prosecuting crimes that have already occured, is an explicitly authorized

objective of general crimes investigations. The "reasonable indication" threshold for

undertg such an investigation is substatially lower than probable cause. In addition

preparation to commit a crimial act can itself be a curent criminal violation under the

conspiracy or attempt provisions of federal criminal law or other provisions defining preparatory

crimes, such as 18U. C. 373 (solicitation of a crime of violence) or 18 U. C. 2339A

(including provision of material support in preparation for a terrorist crime). Under these

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Guidelines, a general crimes investigation is waranted where there is not yet a curent

substantive or preparatory crime, but where fucts or circumstances reasonably indicate that such

a crime wil occur in the futue.

The second tye of ful investigation authorized under these Guidelipes is the criminal

intelligence investigation. The focus of criminal intellgence investigations is the group or

enterprise, rather than just individual parcipants andsp cific acts. The immediate purose 

such an investigation is to obtain inormation concerng the natue and strctue of the

enterprise - including information relating to the group s membership, fmances, geographical

dimensions, past and futue activities, and goals - with a view toward detecting, preventing, and

prosecuting the enterprise s crimial activities. Crial intelligence investigations, usually of a

long-term natue, may provide vital intellgence to help prevent terrrist acts.

Authorized criminal intelligence investigations are of two types: racketeering enterprise

investigations (Par III.A) and terrorism enterprise investigations (Part III.B).

A racketeering enterprie investigation may be initiated when facts or circumstances

reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity as

defmed in the Racketeer Inuenced and Corrpt Organizations Act (RICO). However, the USA

PATRIOT ACT (public Law 107-56) expanded the predicate acts for RICO to include the

crimes most likely to be commtted by terrorists and their supporters, as described in 18 U.

2332b(g)(5)(B). To maintain uniformty in the standards and procedures for criminal

intelligence investigations relatig to terrorism, investigations premised on racketeerig activity

involving offenses described in 18 U. C. 2332b(g)(5)(B) are subject to the provisions for

terrorism (enterprise investigations rather than those for racketeerig enterprise investigations.

A terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or cicumstances

reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purose of: (1) fuerig political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or

violence and a federal crime, (2) engaging in terrorism as defined in 18 U. C. 2331(1) or (5)

that involves a federal crime, or (3) commtting any offense described in 18 U.

2332b(g)(5)(B). As noted above, criminal intellgence investigations premised on a pattern of

racketeering activity involving an 18 U. C. 2332b(g)(5)(B) offense are also treated as telTorism

enterprise investigations. 

As with the other tyes of full investigations authorized by these Guidelines, any lawful

investigative technique may be used in terrorism enterprise investigations, including the 

development of sources and informants and undercover activities and operations. The

reasonable indication" stadard for commencing a terrorism enterprise investigation is the same

as that for general crimes and racketeering enterrise investigations. As noted above, it is

substantially lower than probable cause.

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In practical terms, the "reasonable indication" standard for opening a crimial

intelligence investigation of an enterprise in th terrorism context could be satisfied in a number

of ways. In some cases satisfaction ofthe standard wil be apparent on the basis of direct

evidence of an enterprise s involvement in or planning for the commission of a federal offense

involving the use of force or violence to fuer political or social goals, terrorism as defmed in

18 V. C. 2331(1) or (5), or a crime described in 18 U. C. 2332b(g)(5)(B). For example, direct

information may be available about statements made in fuherance of an enterprise s objectives

which show a purose of commtting such crimes or securng their commssion by others.

In other cases, the natu of the conduct engaged in by an enterprise wil justify an

inference that the standard is satisfied, even ifthere are no known statements by paricipants that

advocate or indicate planing for violence or other prohibited acts. For example, such activities

as attempting to obtain dangerous biological agents, toxic chemicals, or nuclear materials, or

stockpiling explosives or weapons, with no discernible lawful purooe, may be sufficient to

reasonably indicate that an enterprise aims to engage in terrorism. 

Moreover, a group s activities and the statements of its members may properly be

considered in conjunction with each other. A combination of statements and activities may

justify a determination that the threshold standard for a terrorism enterprise investigation is

satisfied, even if the statements alone or the activities alone would not Warrant such a

determination.

While no partcular factor or combination of factors is required, considerations that wil

generally be relevant to the determination whether the threshold standard for a terrorism

enterprise investigation is satisfied include, as noted, a group s statements, its activities, and the

natue of potential federal criminal law violations suggested by its statements or activities. Thus

where there are grounds for inquir concerning a group, it may be helpful to gather inormation

about these matters, and then to consider whether these factors, either individually or in

combination, reasonably indicate that the group is pursuing terrorist activities or objectives as

defmed in the threshold standard. Findings that would weigh in favor of such a conclusion

include, for example, the following:

(1) Threats or advocacy of violence or other covered criminal acts

Statements are made in relation to or in fuherance of an enterprise s political or social

objectives that threaten or advocate the use of force or violence, or statements are made

in fuherance of an enterprise that otherwise theaten or advocate criminal conduct

within the scope of 18 U. C. 2331(1) or (5) or 2332b(g)(5)(B), which may concern such

matters as (y.

(i) engaging in attacks involving or threatening massive loss of life or injur;

mass destrction, or endangerment of the national security;

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(ii) killing or injurg federal personnel, destroying federal facilities, or defying

/ lawful federal authority;

(iii) kiling, injuring or intimidating individuals because of their status as United

States nationals or persons, or because of their national origin, race, color

religion, or sex; or

(iv) depriving individuals of any rights secured by the Constitption or laws of the

United States.

(2) Apparent ability or intent to Car out violence or other covered activities

The enterprise manifests an apparent ability or intent to carr out violence or other

activities within the scope of 18 U. C. 2331(1) or (5) or 2332b(g)(5)(B), M,:

(i) by acquirng, or takg steps towards acquirg, biological. agents or toxins

toxic chemicals or thei precursors, radiological or nuclear materials, explosives;

or other destrctive or dagerous materials (or plans or formulas for such

materials), or weapons, under circumstances where, by reason of the quantity or

character of the items, the lawful purpose of the acquisition is not awarent;

(ii) by the creation, maitenance, or support of an armed paramilitary

organization;

(iii) by paramilita traing; or

(iv) by other conduct demonstrating an apparent ability or intent to injure or

intimidate individuals, or to interfere with the exercise of their constitutional or

statutory rights.

(3) Potential federal crie

The group s statements or activities suggest potential federal criminal violations that may

be relevant in applying the standard for initiating a terrorism enterpriSe investigation 

such as crimes under the provisions of the U.S. Code that set forth specially defined

terrorism or support-of-terrorism offenses, or that relate to such matters as aircraft

hijacking or destrction, attacks on transportation, communications, or energy facilities

or 'systems, biological or chemical weapons, nuclear or radiological materials, civil rights

violations, assassinations or other violence against federal officials or facilities, or

explosives (e. , the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B) or appearing in such

provisions as 18 U.S.C. 111 , 115,'231 241 245, or 247).

B-67
AUTHORIED INSTIGATIV TECHNIQUES

All lawful investigative techniques may be used in general crimes, racketeering

enterprise, and terrorism enterprise investigations. In preliminar inquiries, these Guidelines bar

. the use of mail openins and nonconsensual electronic sureilance (mcluding all techniques

covered by chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code), but do not categorically prohibit the use

of any other lawful investigative technque at that stage. As set fort in Par IV below

authorized methods in investigations include, among others, use of confidential infonnants

undercover activities and operations, nonconsensual electronic sureilance, pen registers and

trap and trace devices, accessing stored wire and electronic communcations and transactional

records, consensual electronic monitoring, and searches and seizues. All requirements for the

Use of such methods under the Constitution, applicable statutes, and Departent regulations or

policies must of course, be observed.

OTHER AUTHORIED ACTIVTIES

Curent counterterrorism priorities and the advent of the Internet have raised a number of

issues which did not exist in any comparable form when the last general revision of these

Guidelines was carred out in 1989 - a time long preceding the September 11 attack's disclosure

of the full magnitude of the terrorist threat to the United States, and'a time in which the Interet

was not available in any developed form as a source of inormation for counterterrorism and

other anti-crime purooes. Part VI of these Guidelines is designed to provide clear

authorizations and statements of governng principles for a number of important activities that

affect these areas. . Amng other things, Par VI makes it clear that the authorized law

enforcement activities ofthe FBI include: (i) operatig and participating in counterterrorism

inormation systems, such as the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (VI.A(l)); (ii) visiting

places and events which are open to the public for the purose or detecting or preventing

terrorist activities (V.A(2)); (iii) caring out general topical research; such as searching online

under terms like "anthrax" or "smallpox" to obtain publicly available information about agents

that may be used in bioterrorism attacks (V.B(I)); (iv) surfing the Internet as any member of the

public might do to identify, , public websites, bulleti boards, and chat rooms in which bomb

makng instrctions, child pornography, or stolen credit card inormation is openly traded 

disseminated, and observing information open to public view in such forums to detect terorist

activities and other criminal activities (VI.B(2)); (v) preparing general reports and assessments

relatig to terrorism or other crimial activities in support of strategic plang and investigative

operations (VI.B(3)); and (vi) providing investigative assistance to the Secret Service in support

of its protective responsibilities (VI.B( 4)).

I. GENERA PRICIPLES

Prelimiar inquires and investigations governed by these Guidelines are conducted for

the purpose of preventing, detecting, or prosecuting violations of rederallaw. The FBI shall

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fully utilize the methods authorized by these Guidelines to maximize the realization of these

objectives.

The conduct of prelimiary inquiries and investigations may present choices between the

use of investigative methods which are more or less intrsive, considerig such factors as the

effect on the privacy of individuals and potential damage to reputation. Inquiries and

investigations shall be conducted with as little intrsion as the needs ofthe situation permit. It is

recognized, however, that the choice of techniques is a matter of judgment. The FBI shall not

hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent with these Guidelines, even if intrsive, where

the intrsiveness is warranted in light of the seriousness of a crime or the strength of the

information indicating its commission or potential futue commssion. This point is to be

paricularly observed in the investigation of terrorist crimes and in the investigation of

enterprises that engage in terrorism.

All preliminary inquies shall be conducted pusuant to the General Crimes Guidelines

(i. , Par II of these Guidelines). There is no separate provision for preliminary inquiries under

the Criminal Intelligence Guidelines (i. , Part III of these Guidelines) because preliminar

inquiries under Part II may be carred out not only to determine whether the grounds exist to

commence a general crimes investigation under Par II, but alternatively or in addition to

determe whether the grounds exist to co ence a racketeerig enterprise investigation or

terrorism enterprise investigation under Part ilL A prelimiary inqui shall be promptly

termnated when it becomes apparent that a full investigation is not waranted. If, on the basis of

information discovered in the course of a preliminar inquir, an investigation is waranted, it

may be conducted as a general crimes investigation, or a crimial intelligence investigation, or

both. All such investigations, however, shall be based on a reasonable factual predicate and shall

have a valid law enforcement purose.

In its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must at times intiate investigations in

advance of criinal conduct. It is important that such investigations not be based solely on

activities protected by the First Amendment or on the lawful exercise of any other rights secured

by the Constitution or laws of the United States. When, however, statements advocate criinal

activity or indicate an apparent intent to engage in crime, paricularly crmes of violence, an

investigation under these Guidelines ,may be waranted unless it is apparent, from the

circumstaces or the context in which the statements are made, that there is no prospect of harm.

General crimes investigations and criminal intellgence investigations shall be terminated

when all logical leads have been exhausted and no legitimate law enforcement interest justifies

their continuance.

Nothing in these Guidelines prohibits the FBI from ascerting the general scope and .

natue of criminal activity in a paricular location or sector of the economy, or from collectig

and maintaining publicly available information consistent with the Privacy Act.

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ll. GENERA CRIS INSTIGATIONS

DEFINTIONS

(1) "Exigent circumstaces" are circumstances requiring action before

authorization otherWise necessar under these guidelines can reasonably be obtained, in

order to protect life or substantial propert interests; to apprehend or identify a fleeing

offender; to prevent the hiding, destrction or alteration of evidence; or to avoid other

serious impairment or hindrance of an investigation.

(2) "Sensitive criminal matter" is any alleged criminal conduct involving corrpt

action by a public offcial or political candidate, the activities of a foreign governent

the activities of a religious organization or a primarly political organization or the related

activities of any individual promient in such an organiation, or the activities of the

news media; and any other matter which in the judgment of a Special Agent in Charge

(SAC) should be brought to the attention of the United States Attorney or other

appropriate offcial in the Deparent of Justice, as well as FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ).

PRELIMARY INQUIS

(1) On some occasions the FBI may receive information or an allegation not

warantig a full investigation - because there is not yet a "reasonable indication" of

crimal activities - but whose responsible handlig requires some fuer scrutiny

beyond the prompt an extremely limited checking out of initial leads. In such

circumstances; though the factual predicate for an investigation has not been met, the FBI

may initiate an "inquir" in response to the allegation or information indicating the

possibility of crimial activity.

This authority to conduct inquires short of a full investigation allows the

government to respond in a measured way to ambiguous or incomplete information, wit

as little intrusion as the needs of the situation pert. This is especially important in such

areas as white-collar crime whereno complainant is involved or when an allegation or

information is received from a source of unown reliability. Such inquiries are subject

to the limitations on duration under paragraph (3) below and are cared out to obtain the

information necessar to make an waranted. ' informd judgment as to whether a full investigation is

A preliminar inquiry is not a required step when facts or circumstanes

reasonably indicating criminal activity are alrady available; in such cases, a full

investigation can be immediately opened.

(2) The FBI supervisor authorizing an inquiry shall assure that the allegation or

other information which waranted the inquir has been recorded in wrting. In sensitive

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criminal matters, the United States Attorney or an appropriate Deparent of Justice

offcial shall be notified of the basis for an inquir as soon as practicable after the

opening ofthe inquiry, and the fact of notification shall be recorded in wrting.

(3) Inquiries shall be completed within 180 days afer initiation of the first

investigative step. The date of the first investigative step is not necessarily the same date

on which the fist incomig information or allegation was received. An extension of time

in an inquiry for succeeding 90-day periods may be granted. A SAC may grant up to two

extensions based on a statement of the reasolJS why further investigative steps are

warranted when there is no "reasonable indication" of criminal activity. All extensions

following the second extension may only be granted by FBI Headquarers upon receipt of

a wrtten request and such a statement of reasons.

(4) The choice of investigative technques in an inquir is a matter of judgment

which should take account of: (i) the objectives of the inquir and available investigative

resources, (ii) the intrsiveness of a technque, considerig such factors as the effect on

the privacy of individuals and potential damage to reputation, (iii) the seriousness of the

possible crime, and (iv) the strength of the inormation indicatin its existence or futue

commission. Where the conduct of an inquiry presents a choice beteen the use of more

or less intrsive methods, the FBI should consider whether the inormation could be

obtained in a timely and effective way by the less intrsive means. The FBI should not

hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent with these Guidelines in an inquiry, even

if intrsive, where the intrsiveness is waranted in light of the seriousness of the ,

possible crime or the stength of the informtion indicating its existence or futue

commssion. This point is to be paricularly observed in inquires relating to possible

terrorist activities.

(5) All lawful investigative techniques may be used in an inquiry except:

(a) Mail openings; and

(b) Nonconsensual electronic sureilance or any other investigative

technique covered by chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code

(18 U. C. 2510-2522). 

(6) The following investigative techniques may be used in an inquir without any

prior authorization from a supervisory agent

(a) Examination of FBI indices and files;

(b) Examination of records available to the public and other public

sources of information;

B-71
(c) Examination of available federal, state, and local governent

records;

(d) Interview of the complainant, previously established inormants

and other sources of information;

(e) Interview of the potential subject;

(1) Interview of persons who should readily be able to corroborate or

deny the trth of the allegation, except this does not include pretext

interviews or interviews of a potential subject' s employer or coworkers unless the interviewee was the complainant; and

(g)

Physical or photographic sureilance of any person.

The use of any other lawfl investigative technque that is permtted in an inquiry shall

meet the requirements and limitations of Pa IV and, except in exigent circumstances

requires prior approval by a supervisory agent.

(7) Where a prelimiary inquir fails to disclose sufficient inormation to justify

an investigation, the FBI shall terminate the inquir and make a record of the closing. In

a sensitive crimial matter, the FBI shall notify the United States Attorney of the closing

and record the fact of notification in wrting. Inormation on an inuir which has been

closed shall be available on request to a United States Attorney or his or her designee or

an appropriate Departnt of Justice official.

(8) All requirements regarding inquiries shall apply to reopened inquires. 

sensitive crimial matters, the United States Attorney or the appropriate Deparent of

Justice official shall be notified as soon as practicable after the reopening of an inquiry.

INSTIGATIONS

(1) A general crimes investigation may be intiated by the FBI when facts or

circumstaces reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or wil be

committed. The investigation may be conducted to prevent, solve, or prosecute such

criminal activity.

The standard of "reasonable indication" is suootantially lower than probable

cause. il determining whether there is reasonaQle indication of a federal criminal

violation, a Special Agent may take into account any facts or circumtances that a

prudent investigator would consider. However, the standard does require specific facts or

circumstances indicatng a past, curent, or futue violation. There must be an objective

factual basis for initiating the investigation; a mere hunch is insuffcient.

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(2) Where a criminal act may be commtted in the futue, preparation for that act

can be a curent criminl violation under the conspiracy or attempt provisions of federal

crimnal law or other provisions definig preparatory crimes, such as 18 U. C. 373

(solicitation of a crime of violence) or 18 U. C. 2339A (including provision of material

support in preparation for a terrorist crime). The standard for opening an investigation is

satisfied where there is not yet a curent substantive or preparatory crime, but facts or

circumstances reasonably indicate that such a crime wil occur in the futue.

(3) The FBI supervisor authorizing an investigation shall assure that the facts or

circumstances meeting the standard of reasonable indication have been recorded in

wrting.

In sensitive crimial matters, as defmed in paragraph A(2), the United

States Attorney or an appropriate Deparent of Justice offcial, as well as FBIHQ, shall

be notified in writing of the basis for an investigation as soon as practicable after

commencement of the investigation.

(4) The Special Agent conducting an investigation shall maintain periodic written

or oral contact with the appropriate federal prooecutor, as circumstances require and as

requested by the prosecutor.

When, durg an investigation, a matter appears arguably to warant

prosecution, the Special Agent shall present the relevant facts to the appropriate federal

prosecutor. In every sensitive criminal matter, the FBI shall notify the appropriate

federal prosecutor ofthe termination of an investigation within 30 days of such

termation. Inormation on investigations which have been closed shall be available on

request to a United States Attorney or his or her designee or an appropriate Departent

of Justice official.

(5) When a serious matter investigated by the FBI is referred to state or local

authorities for prosecution, the FBI, insofar as resources permt, shall promptly advise the

federal prosecutor in writing if the state or local authorities decline prooecution or fail to

commence prosecutive action within 120 days. Where an FBI field office canot provide

this follow-up, the SAC shall so advise the federal prosecutor.

(6) When credible information is received concerning serious crimial activity

not within the FBI investigative jurisdiction, the FBI field offce shall promptly transmit

the information or refer the complainant to the law enforcement agencies having

jursdiction, except where disclosure would jeopardize an ongoing investigation

endanger the safety of an individual, disclose the identity of an inforant, interfere with

an informant' s cooperation, or reveal legally privileged informaton. If full disclosure is

not made for the reasons indicated, then whenever feasible the FBI field office shall make

at least limited disclosue to the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction, and full

B-73
disclosure shall be made as soon as the need for restricting dissemintion is no longer

present. Where full disclosure is not made 10 the appropriate law enforcement agencies

within 180 days, the FBI field offce shall promptly notify FBI Headquarers in writing of

the facts and circumstances concerning the criminal activity. The FBI shall make a

periodic report to the Deputy Attorney General on such nondisclosure and incomplete

disclosures, in a form suitable to protect the identity of informants.

Whenever information is received concerng unauthorized criminal

activity by a confidential informant, it shall be handled in accordance with the Attorney

General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Inormts.

(7) All requirements regarding investigations shall apply to reopened

investigations. In sensitive crinal matters, the United States Attorney or the

appropriate Deparent of Justice offcial shall be notified in wring as soon as

practicable after the reopening of an investigation.

m. CRIAL INTELLIGENCE INSTIGATIONS

This section authorizes the FBI to conduct crimial intellgence investigations of certain

enterprises. These investigations differ from general crimes investigations, authorized by

Section II, in several important respects. As a general rule, an investigation of a completed

criminal act is normally confined to determning who committed that act and securng evidence

to establish the elements of the parcular offense. It is, in this respect, self-defig. An

intelligence investigation of an ongoing crimial enterprise must determe the size and

composition of the group involved; its geographic dimensions, its past acts and intended crminal

goals, and its capacity for har. While a standard criinal investigation terminates with the

decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, the investigation of a crial enterprise does not

necessarily end, even though one or more of the partcipants may have been prosecuted.

In addition, the organzation provides a life and continuity of operation that are not

normally found in a regular criminal activit. As a consequence, these investigations may

continue for several years. Furhermore, the focus of such investigations "may be less precise

than that directed against more conventional tyes of crime. United States v. United States

District Coll 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972). Unlike the usual crial case, there may be no

completed offense to provide a framework for the investigation. It often requires the fittng

together of bits and pieces of information, many meangless by themselves, to determine

whether a pattern of criminal activity exists. For this reason, the investigation is broader an less

discriminate than usual, involving "the interrelation of varous sources and tyes of

information.

Members of groups or organizations acting in concert to violate the law present a grave

threat to society. An investigation of organizational activity, however, may present special

problems particularly where it deals with politically motivated acts. There is "often. . . a

B-74
convetgenceofFirst and Fourh Amendment values" in such maters that is "not present in cases

of ' ordinary' crime. . at 313. Thus special care must be exercised in sorting out protected

activities from those which may lead to violence or serious disruption of society. As a

consequence, the guidelines establish safeguards for group investigations of special sensitivity,

including tighter management controls and higher levels of review.

RACKETEERIG ENTERPRISE INESTIGA-TIONS

This section focuses on investigations of organized crime. It is concerned with the

investigation of entie enterprises, rather thanjust individual paricipants and specific criminal

acts, and authorizes investigations to determine the strctue and scope of the enterprise as well

as the relationship of the members.

Definition

Racketeering activity is any offense, including a violation of state law

encompassed by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrpt Organzations Act

(RICO), 18 U. C. 1961(1).

General Authority

A racketeering enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or

circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in

a pattern of racketeering activity as defmed in the RICO statute, 18 U.

1961(5). However, ifthe pattern of racketeerig activity involves an

offense or offenses described in 18 U. C. 2332b(g)(5)(B), the

investigation shall be deemed a terrorism enterprise investigation and shall

be subj ect to the standards and procedures of Subpart B of this Par in lieu

qf those set fort in this Subpart. The standard of "reasonable indication

is identical to that governing the initiation of a general crimes

investigation under Par II.

Authority to conduct racketeerig enterprise investigations is in addition

to general crimes investigative authority under Part II, terrorism enterprise

investigative authority under Subpart B of this Par, and activities uner

other Attorney General guidelines addressing such matters as

investigations and information collection relating to international

terrorism, foreign counteritelligence, or foreign intelligence. Information

waranting initiation of a racketeerig enterprise investigation may be

obtained durg the course of a general crimes inquir or investigation, a

terrorism enterprise irwestigation, or an investigation under other Attrney

General guidelines. Conversely, a racketeerig enterprise investigation

may yield information waranting a general cries inquir or

B-75
Purpose

Scope

investigation, a terrorism enterprise investigation, or an investigation

under other Attorney General guidelines.

The in1ediate purpse of a racketeering enterprise investigation is

to obtain information concerning the natue and strctue of the

enterprise, as specifically delineated in paragraph (4) below, with a

view to the longer range objective of detection, prevention, and

prosecution of the criminal activities of the enterprise.

A racketeering enterprise investigation properly initiated under these

guidelines may collect such inormation as:

(i) the members of the enterprise and other persons likely to be

knowingly acting in the fuherance of racketeering activity, 

provided that the inormation concerns such persons' activities on

behalf of or in fuherance of the enterprise;

(ii) the finances of the enterprise;

(iii) the geographical dimensions of the enterprise; and

(iv) the past and futue activities and goals of the enterprise.

In obtaining the foregoing inormation, any lawfl investigative technique

may be used, in accordance with the requirements of Part IV. 

Authorization and Renewal

A racketeering enterprie investigation may be authorized by the Special

Agent in Charge, with notification to FBIHQ upon a written

recommendation seting fort the facts and circumstances reasonably

indicating that the standard of paragraph (2)(a) is satisfied.

The FBI shall notify the Organized Crie and Racketeering Section of the

Criminal Division and any affected United States Attorney s office ofthe

opening of a racket erig enterprise investigation. On receipt of such

notice, the Organized Oime and Racketeering Section shall immediately

notify the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General. In all

racketeerig enterprise investigations, the Chief of the Organized Crie

B-76
and Racketeerig Section may, as he or she deems necessar, request the

FBI to provide a report on the status of the investigation.

A racketeering enterprise investigation may be initially authorized for a

period of up to a year. An investigation may be continued upon renewed

authorization for additional periods each not to exceed a year. Renewal

authorization shall be obtained from the SAC with notification to FBIHQ.

The FBI shall notify the Organzed Crie and Racketeering Section of

any renewal, and the Organized Crime and Racketeerig Section shall

immediately notifY the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney

General.

Investigations shall be reviewed by the SAC on or before the expiration of

the period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is

authorized.

An investigation which has been termated may be reopened upon a

showing of the same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as

required for initiation of an investigation.

In addition to the authority of Special Agents in Charge under this

paragraph, the Director of the FBI, and any Assistant Director or senior

Headquarers official designated by the Director, may authorize, renew

review, and reopen racketeering enterprise investigations in conformty

with the standards of this paragraph.

TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INSTIGATIONS

This section focuses on investigations of enterprises that seek to fuer political or social

goals through activities that involve force or violence, or that otherwise aim to engage in

terrorism or terrorism-related crimes. Like the section addressing racketeering enterprise

investigations, it is concerned with the investigation of entire enterpries, rather than just'

individual paricipants and specific criminal acts, and authorizes investigations to determine the

strcture and scope of the enterprise as well as the relationship of the members.

General Authority

A terrorism enterprise investigation may be initiated when facts or

circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in

an enterprise for the purose of: (i) furtheri political or social goals

wholly or in par through activities that involve force or violence and a

violation of federal criminal law, (ii) engaging in terrorism as defied in

18 U. C. 2331(1) or (5) that involves a violation of federal criminal law

B-77
or (iii) commtting any offense described in 18 U. C. 2332b(g)(5)(B). A

terrorism enterprise investigation may also be initiated when facts or

circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in

a pattern of racketeering activity as defmed in the RICO statute, 18 U.

1961(5), that involves an offense or offenses described in 18 U.

2332b(g)(5)(B). The standard of "reasonable indication" is identical to

that governing the initiation of a general crimes investigation under Par

II. In determing whether an investigation should be conducted, the FBI

shall consider all of the circumstances including: (i) the magntude of the

threatened harm; (ii) the likelihood it wil occur; (iii) the immediacy of the

threat; and (iv) any danger to privacy or free expression posed by an

investigation. ,

Authority to conduct terorism enterprise investigations is in addition to

general crimes investigative authority under Part II, racketeerig

enterprise investigative authority under Subpar A of this Par, and

activities under other Attorney General guidelines addressing such matters

as investigations and inormation collection relating to international

terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, or foreign intelligence. Inormation

warranting intiation of a terrorism enterprise investigation may be

obtained during the course of a general crimes inquir-or investigation, a

racketeerig enterprise investigation, or an investigation under other

Attorney,General guidelines. Conversely; a terorism enterprise

investigation may yield information warantig a general cries inquir or

investigation, a racketeering enterprise investigation, or an investigation

under other Attorney General guidelines.

Mere speculation that force or violence might occur durg the course of

an otherwise peaceable demonstration is not suffcient grounds for

initiation of an investigation under this Subpar, but where facts or

circumstances reasonably indicate that a group or enterprise has engaged

or aims to engage in activities involving force or violence or other

criminal conduct descrbed in paragraph (1)(a) it a demonstration, an

investigation may be initiated in conform with the standards of that

paragraph. For alternative authorities see Part n relating to General

Crimes Investigations and the Attorney General' s Guidelines on Reporting

on Civil Disorders and Demonstrations Involvig a Federal Interest. This

does not limit the collection of information about public demonstrations 

by enterprises that are under active investigation pursuant to paragraph

(1)(a) above.

B-78
4. '

Purpose

The immediate purse of a terrorism enterrise investigation is to obtain

information concerng the natue and strctue of the enterprise as specifically

delineated in paragraph (3) below, with a view to the longer range objectives of

detection, prevention, and prosecution of the criminal activities of the enterprise.

Scope

A terrorism enterprise investigation initiated under these guidelines may

collect such information as:

(i) the members of the enterprise and other persons likely to be

knowingly acting in fuherance of its crimial objectives

provided that the inormation concerns such persons' activities on '

behalf of or in fuherance of the enterprise;

(ii) the finances of the enterprise;

(iii) the geographical dimensions ofthe enterprise; and

(iv) past and futue activities and goals of the enterrise.

In obtainig the foregoing information, any lawful investigative technique

may be used, in accordance with the requirements of Par IV.

Authorization and Renewal

A terrorism enterprise investigation may be authorized by the Special

Agent in Charge, with notification to FBIHQ, upon a wrtten

recommendation seting forth the facts or circumstances reasonably

indicatig the existence of an enterprise as described in paragraph (1)(a).

The FBI shall notify the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section of the

Criminal Division, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and any

affected United States Attorney s offce of the opening of a terrorism

enterprise investigation. On receipt of such notice, the Terrorism and

Violent Crime Section shall immediately notify the Attorney General and

the Deputy Attorney General. In all such investigations, the Chief of the

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section may, as he or she deems necessary,

request the FBI to provide a report on the status of the investigation.

A terrorism enterprise investigation may be initially authorized for a

period of up to a year. An investigation may be continued upon renewed

B-79
authorization for additional periods each not to exceed a year. Renewal

authorization shall be obtained from the SAC with notification to FBIHQ.

The FBI shall notify the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section and the

Offce of Intelligence Policy and Review of any renewal, and the

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section shall immediately notify the

Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General.

Investigations shall be reviewed by the SAC on or before the expiration of

the period for which the investigation and each renewal thereof is

authorized. In some cases, the enterprise may meet the threshold standard

but be temporarly inactive in the sense that it has not engaged in recent

acts of violence or other crimial activities as described in paragraph

(1)(a), nor is there any iIDediate threat of har - yet the composition

goals and prior history of the group suggest the need for continuing

federal interest. The investigation may be continued in such cases wit

whatever scope is waranted in light of these considerations.

An investigation which has been termated may be reopened upon a

showing of the same standard and pursuant to the same procedures as

required for initiation of an investigation.

In addition to the authority of Special Agents in Charge under this

paragraph, the Director of the FBI, and any Assistant Director or senior

Headquarers official designated by the Director, may authorie, renew

review, and reopen terrrism enterprise investigations in conformty with

the standards of this paragraph.

The FBI shall report to the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section of the

Crimial Division and the Offce of Intelligence Policy and Review the

progress of a terrorism enterprise investigation not later than 180 days

after its intiation, and the results at the end of each year the investigation

continues. The Terrorism and Violent Crime Section shall immediately

transmit copies of these reports to the Attorney General and the Deput

Attorney General.

IV. INSTIGATIV TECHNIQUES

When conducting investigations under these guidelines, the FBI may use any lawfu

investigative technique. The choice of investigative techniques is a matter of judgment

which should take account of: (i) the objectives of the investigation and available

investigative resources, (ii) the intrsiveness of a technique, considerng such factors as

the effect on the privacy of individuals and potential damage to reputation, (iii) the

seriousness of the crime, and (iv) the strength of the information indicating its existence

B-80
or futue commission. Where the conduct of an investigation 'presents a choice between

the use of more or less intrsive methods, the FBI should consider whether the

information could be obtained in a timely and effective way by the less intrsive means.

The FBI should not hesitate to use any lawfulrechniques consistent with these Guidelines

in an investigation, even if intrsive, where the intrsiveness is warranted in light of the

seriousness of the crime or the strength of the inormation indicating its existence or

futue commission This point is to be particularly observed in investigations relating to

terrorist activities.

All requirements for use of a technique set by statute, Deparent regulations and

policies, or Attorney General Guidelines must be complied with. The investigative

technques listed below are subject to the noted restrctions:

Confdential informts must be used in compliance with the Attrney General's

Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confdential Informants;

Undercover activities and operations must be conducted in compliance with the

Attorney General' s Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations;

In situations involving undisclosed participation in the activities of an

organiation by an undercover employee or cooperating private individual, any

potential constitutional concerns relating to activities of the organization

protected by the First Amendment must be addressed through full compliance

with all applicable provisions of the Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI

Undercover Operations and the Attorney General's Guidelines Regardig the Use

of Confdential Informants;

Nonconsensual electronic sureilance must be conducted pursuant to the Warrant

procedures and requirements of chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code (18

2510-2522);

Pen registers and trap and trace devices must be installed and used pursuant to the

procedures and requirements of chapter 206 oftitle 18, United States Code (18

3121-3127);

Access to stored wire and electronic communcations and transactional records

must be obtained pursuant to the procedures and requirements of chapter 121 of

title 18, United States Code (18 U. C. 2701-2712);

Consensual electronic monitoring must be authorized pursuant to Deparent

policy. For consensual monitoring of conversations other than telephone

conversations, advance authorization must be obtained in accordance with

established guidelines. This applies both to devices cared by the cooperating

B-81
parcipant and to devices installed on premises under the control of the

paricipant. See U.S. Attorneys ' Manual 9- 7 301 and 9-7.302. For consensual

monitoring of telephone conversations, advance authorization must be obtained

from the SAC or Assistat Special Agent in Charge and the appropriate U.

Attorney, Assistant Atorney General, or Deputy Assistant Attorney General

except in exigent circumstances. An Assistant Atorney General or Deput

Assistant Attorney General who provides such authorization shall notify the

appropriate U.S. Attorney;

Searches and seizues must be conducted under the authority of a valid warant

unless the search or seizue comes within ajudicially recognzed exception to the

warrant requirement. See also Attorney General' s Guidelines on Methods of

Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Paries, 28 CFR Part 59;

Classified investigative technologies must be used in compliance with the

Procedures for the Use of Classified Investigative Technologies in Criminal

Cases; and

10. Whenever an individual is known to be represented by counsel in a parcular

matter, the FBI shall follow applicable law and Deparent procedure concerng

contact with represented individuals in the absence of prior notice to their

counel. The SAC or his designee and the United States Attorney shall consult

. periodically on applicable law and Deparent procedure. Where issues arise

concerning the consistency of contacts with represented persons with applicable

attorney conduct rules, the United States Attorney should consult with the

Professional Responsibility Advisory Offce.

V. DISSEMIATION AN MATENANCE OF INFORMTION

The FBI may dissemiate information durng the checking of leads, preliminary

inquiries, and investigations conducted pursuant to these Guidelines to United States

Attorneys, the Criminal Division, and other components, officials, and officers of the

Deparent of Justice. The FBI may disseminate inormation durg the checkig of

leads, preliminary inuires, and investigations conducted pursuant to these Guidelines to

another Federal agency or to a State or local criminal justice agency when such

information:

falls within the investigative or protective of the agency; jursdiction or litigative responsibility

may assist in preventing a crime or the use of violence or any other conduct

dangerous to human life;

B-82
is required to be fuished to another Federal agency by Executive Order 10450

as amended, dated April 27, 1953, or a successor Order; or

is required to be disseminated by statute, interagency agreement approved by the

Attorney General, or Presidential Directive;

and to other persons and agencies as required by 5 U. C. 552 or as othelWise

permitted by 5 U. c. 552a.

The FBI shall maintain a database that identifies all prelimiar inquiries and

investigations conducted pursuant to these Guidelines and that permts the prompt

retrieval of information concerning the starns (open or closed) and subjects of all such

inquires and investigations.

VI. COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVTIES AN OTHER AUTHORIATIONS

In order to car out its central mission of preventing the commission of terrorist acts

against the United States and its people, the FBI must proactively draw on available soUrces of

information to identify terrorist threats and activities. It canot be content to wait for leads to

come in through the actions of others, but rather must be vigilant in detecting terrorist activities

to the full extent permtted by law, with an eye towards early intervention and prevention of acts

of terrorism before they occur. This Par accordingly identifies a nuber of authorized activities

which fuher this end, and which can be cared out even in the absence of a checkig of leads, prelimiar inquiry, or full investigation as described in Pars I-III of these Guidelines. The

authorizations include both activities that are specifically focused on terrorism (Subpar A) and

activities that are usefu for law enforcementpuroses in both terrorism and non;.terrorism

contexts (Subpart B).

COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVTIES

Information Systems

The FBI is authorized to operate and participate in identification, tracking, and

information systems for the purose of identifying and locating terrorists

excluding or removin from the United States alien terrorists and alien supporters

ofterrorist activity as authorized by law, assessing and responding to terrorist

risks and threats, or otherwise detecting, prosecuting, or preventing terorist

activities. Systems within the scope of this JXagraph may draw on and retain

pertnent information from any source permitted by law, including information

derived from past or ongoing investigative activities; other informtion collected

or provided by governental entities, such as foreign intelligence inormation and

lookout list information; publicly available information, whether obtained directly

or through services or resources (whether nonprofit or commercial) that compile

B-83
or analyze such informtion; and inormation voluntarily provided by private

entities. Any such system operated by the FBI shall be reviewed periodically for

compliance with all applicable statutory provisions, Deparent regulations and

policies, and Attorney General Guidelines.

Visiting Public Places and Events

For the purose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, the FBI is

authorized to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the public, on the

same terms and conditions as members of the public generally. No information

obtained from such visits shall be retained unless it relates to potential crimial or

terrorist activity.

OTIIR AUTHORIZATIONS

In addition to the checkig ofleads, preliminary inquiries, and investigations as described

in Parts 'I-III of these Guidelines, and counterterorism activities as described in Part A above

the authorized law enforcement activities of the FBI include carring out and retaining

information resulting from the following activities:

General Topical Research

The FBI is authorized to car out general topical research, including conducting

online searches and accessing online sites and foru as par of such research on

the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally. "General

topical research" under this paragraph means research concerning subject areas

that are relevant for the purose of facilitatig or supportg the discharge of

investigative responsibilities. It does not include online searches for information

by individuals' names or other individual identifiers , except where such searches

are incidental to topical research, such as searchig to locate writigs on atopic

by searching under the names of authors who write on the topic, or searching by

the name of a part to a case in conducting legal research.

Use of Online Resources Generally

For the purose of detecting or preventing terrorism or other criminal activities

the FBI is authorized to conduct online search activity and to access online sites

and forus on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally.

B-84
Reports and Assessments

The FBI is authorized to prepare general reports and assessments concerning

terrorism or other crimial activities for purses of strategic plannng or in

support of investigative activities.

Cooperation with Secret Service

The FBI is authorized to provide investigative assistance in support of the

protective responsibilities of the Secret Service, provided that all prelimiary

inquires or investigations are conducted in accordance with the provisions of.

these Guidelines.

PROTECTION OF PRIACY AND OTHER LIMITATIONS

General Limitations

The law enforcement activities authorized by this Par do not include maintaining

files on individuals solely for the purose of monitorig activities protected by the

First Amendment r the lawful exercise of any other rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. Rather, all such law enforcement

activities must have a valid law enforcement purose as described in this Part, and

must be cared out in conformity with all applicable statutes, Deparent

regulations and policies, and Attorney General Guidelines. In parcular, the

provisi ms of this Par do not supersede any otherwise applicable provision or

requirement of the Attorney General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations

or the Attorney General's Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential

Informants.

Maintenance of Records Under the Privacy Act

Under the Privacy Act, the permissibility of maintaining records relating to

certain activities of individuals depends in part on whether the collection of such

information is "pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law

enforcement activity." 5 U. C. 552a(e)(7). By its terms, the limitation of 5

C. 552a(e)(7) is inapplicable to activities that do not involve the

maintain( ing)" of a "record" within the meaning of the Privacy Act, or that occur

pertnent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.

Authorized law enforcement activit(ies)" for puroses of the Privacy Act include

carring out and retaining information resulting from the checking of leads

preliminar inquiries, or investigations as described in Parts I-III of these

Guidelines, or from activities described in Subpar A or B of this Par. As noted

in paragraph (3) below, however, this is not an exhaustive enumeration of

authorized law enforcement activit(ies)." Questions .about the application of the

Privacy Act to other activities should be addressed to the FBI Office of the

General Counselor the Office of Information and Privacy.

B-85
Construction of Part

This Par does not limt any activities authorize by or cared out under other

Par of these Guidelines. The speification of authori law enforcement

activities under this Par is not exhustive, and doe not limit other authoried law.

enforcement activities, such as those relating to foreign counteritellgence or foreign intellgence. 

VD. RESERVATION

Nothg in these Guidelines shal limit the genera reviews or audits of papers, fies,

contrcts, or other records in the governent' s possession, or the perfonnce ofsimilat

servces at the spcific reuest of a Deparent or agency of the United States. Such

reviews, audits or simlar services must be for the purse of detectig or preventig

violations of federa law which ar wi in the investigative re5pnsibilty o( the FBI.

Nothg in these Guidelines is intended to lit the FBI's respnsibilties to investigate

certin applicats and employees under the federal personnel seurty progr.

, C These Guidelines ar set fort solely for the purse of internl Deparent of Justice

guidace. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to crete any

ghts, substative or prourl, enforceable at law by any par in any matter, civil or cril, nor do they place any limtation On otherwse lawful investigative and litigative

prerogatives of the Deparent of Justice.

Dme: May 30, 2002

Attorney Gera 

B-86
ffice of ile tt1TmtV Oiemral

.Ksqinghm cn. 20530

May 30, 2002

MEMORAUM FOR TH HEADS AN INSPECfOR GEN

OFEXECUNEE)BPd'i.

' "A6'Bt.1H

FROM: TH A'IORNY

, /i_UlYLt:

SUBJECT: Proedures for Lawful. Wartless Monitorig of V erbal Communications

By Memoradum daed October 16, 1972, the Attorney Geer dited all feder

deparents and agencies to obta Dearent of Justice authoriion before interctig

veral communcations without the consent of all pares to the communication. Ths diective

was clarfied and contiued in forc by the Attorney Geer' s Memoradum of Septembe 22,

1980, to Hea and Inspectors Gener of Executive Dearents and Agencies. It was then supeed with new authorition proedur and relevant rules and guidelies, includig

limtations on the ty of investigations requig prior wrtten approval by the Deparent of

. Jusce, in the Attorney Genera's Memoradum of Novembe 7, 1983.

. The Attorney Genera's Memoradum of Janua 20, 1998, supersed the

aforeentioned ditives. It continued most of the authorion procur estalished in the

November 7, 1983, Memoradum, but reduced the seitive circumstaces under which prior

wrtten approval of senior offcials of the Deparent of Justice Crial Division is requied.

At the sae tie, it contiued to reuie ora authorition frm Deparent of Justice attorneys,

ordinarly local Assistat United States Attorneys, before the intiation of the use of consensual

monitorig in al investigatons not requirg prior wrtten approval. In addition, that

. Memoradum reduced and eventuly eliminated the reprtg requiment imposed on

deparents and agencies. These changes reflected the results of the exercise of the

Deparent' s review fuction over many yea, which showed that the deparents and agencies

had unfonnly been applyig the requied procedures with grt cae, consistency, and goo

judgment, and that the number of reues for consenua monitorig that were not approved had been negligible. 

. IAs in all of the prior memorada excet for the one dated October 16, 1972, ths

memoradum only applies to the consensual monitoring of oral, nonwie communcations, as

discused below. "VeraI" communications wil hereinafer be refelTed to as oral.

B-87
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General

of Executive Deparments and Agencies

Page 2

This Memorandum updates and in some limited respects modifies the Memorandum of

January 20, 1998. The changes are as follows:

First, Parts III.A.(8) and V. ofthe January 20, 1998, Memorandumrequired concurence

Or authorization for consensual monitoring by the United States Attrney, an Assistant United

States Attorney, or the previously designated Departent of Justice attorney responsible for a

particular investigation (for short, a "tral attorey ). This Memorandum provides instead that a

tral attorney must advise that the monitoring is legal and appropriate. This continues to limit

monitorig to cases in which an appropriate attorney agrees to the monitoring, but makes it clear

that this fuction does not establish a supervisory role or require any involvement by the attorey

in the conduct of the monitoring. In addition, for cases in which this advice canot be obtained

from a tral attorney for reasons unelated to the legality or propriety of the monitoring, this

Memorandum provides a fallback procedure to obtain the required advice from a designated

attorney of the Crimial Division of the Departent of Justice. Where there is an issue as to

whether providing the advice would be consistent with applicable attorney conduct rules, the

tral attorney or the desigated Crimial Division attorney should consult with the Deparnt's

Professional Responsibility Advisory Office.

Second, Part V. of the Memorandum ofJamar 20, 1998, required that an agency head

Or his or her designee give oral authorization for consensual monitorig, and stated that "(a )ny

designee should be a high-rankng supervisory offcial at headquarters level." This rule was

qualified by Attorney General Order No. 1623-92 of August 31 , 1992, which, in relation to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), authorized delegation of this approval function to Special

Agents in Charge. Experience has shown that the requirement of Special Agent in Charge

approval can result in a loss of investigative opportties because of an overly long approval

process, and indicates that allowing approval by Assistant Special Agents. in Charge would

facilitate FBI investigative operations. Assistant Special Agents in Charge are management

personnel to whom a varety of supervsory and oversight responsibilities are routinely given;

generally, they are directly involved and familiar with the circumstaces relating to the propriety

of proposed uses of the consensual monitorig technique. Part V. is accordingly revised in this

Memorandum to provide that the FBI Director s designees for puroses of oral authorization of

consensual monitoring may include both Special Agents in Charge and Assistant Special Agents

in Charge. This supersedes Attorney General Order No. 1623- , which did not allow

delegation of this function below the level of Special Agent in Charge.

Third, this Memorandum omits as obsolete Par VI. of the Memorandum of January 20

1998. Part VI. imposed a reporting requirement by agencies concerng consensual monitoring

but rescinded that reporting requirement after one year.

The Four Amendment to the United States Constitution, Title III of the Onmibus Crime

Controland Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (18 U. 251O et seq ), and the Foreign

Intelligence Sureilance Act of 1978 (50 U. C. 1801 et seq ) permit governent agents

B-88
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General

of Executive Departnts and Agencies

Page 3

acting with the consent of a part to a communcation, to engage in warrantless monitoring of

wire (telephone) commications and oral, nonwire communications. See United States

ite, 401 U. S. 745 (1971); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). Similarly, the

Constitution and federal statutes permt federal agents to engage in warantless monitoring of

oral, nonwire communcations when the communicatig parties have no justifiable expectation

ofprivacy.2 Because such monitorig techniques are paricularly effective and reliable, the

Deparent of Justice encourages their use by federal agents for the purose of gathering

evidence of violations of federal law, protecting informants or undercover law enforcement

agents, or fulfilling other, similarly compelling needs. While these techniques are lawful and

helpful, their use in investigations is frequently sensitive, so they must remain the subject of

careful, self-regulation by the agencies employing them.

The sources of authority for this Memorandum are Executive Order No. 11396

Providing for the Coordination by the Attorney General of Federal Law Enforcement and

Crime Prevention Programs ); Presidential Memorandum ("Federal Law Enforcement

Coordination, Policy and Priorities ) of September 11 , 1979; Presidential Memorandum

(untitled) of June 30, 1965, on inter alia, the utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to

overh ar nontelephone conversations; the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and the Paperwork

Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986, as amended; and the inherent authority of the Attrney

General as the chief law enforcement offcer of the United States.

DEFINITIONS

As used in this Memorandum, the term "agency" means all of the Executive Branch

deparents and agencies, and specifically includes United States Attorneys' Offices

which utilize their own investigators, and the Offices of the Inspectors General.

As used in this Memorandum, the terms "inerception" and "monitorig" mean the aural

acquisition of oral communcations by use of an electronic, mechanical, or other device.

Cf. 18 U. C. 2510(4).

As used in this Memorandum, the term "public official" means an official of any public

entity of governent, including special distrcts, as well as all federal, state, county, and

municipal governental units.

As a general rule, nonconsensual interceptions of wire communications violate 18

U.S. C. 2511 regardless of the communicating parties' expectation of privacy, unless the

interceptor complies with the cour-authorization procedures of Title III of the Omnibus Crime

Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S. C. 2510 et seq ) or with the provisions of the

Foreign Intelligence Sureilance Act of 1978 (50 U.S. C. 1801 et seq

B-89
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General

of Executive Deparments and Agencies

II.

Page 4

NEED FOR WRTTEN AUTHORIZATION

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Investigations Where Written Departent of Justice Approval is Required

A requestfor authorization to monitor an oral communcation without the consent

of all paries to ,the communication must be approved in wrting by the Director or

Associate Director of the Offce of Enforcement Operations, Criminal Division

S. Departent ofJustice, when it is known that:

(1) the monitorig relates to an investigation of a member of Congress, a

federal judge, a member of the Executive Branch at Executive Level IV or

above, or a person who has served in such capacity within the previous

two years;

the monitoring relates to an investigation of the Governor, Lieutenant

Governor, or Attorney General of any State or Terrtory, or a judge or

justice of the highest cour of any State or Tenitory, and the offense

investigated is one involving bribery, confict of interest, or extorton

relating to the performnce of his or her offcial duties;

any part to the communication is a member of the diplomatic corps of a

foreign countr;

any part to the commication is or has been a member of the Witess

Securty Program and that fact is known to the agency involved or its

officers;

the consenting or nonconsenting person is in the custody of the Bureau of

Prisons or the United States Marshals Service; or

the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney

General, any Assistant Attorney General, or the United States Attorney in

the distrct where an investigation is being conducted has requested the

investigating agency to obtain prior written consent before conducting

consensual monitorig in a specific investigation.

In all other cases, approval of consensual monitoring wil be in accoroance with

the procedures set fort in part V. below.

B-90
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General

of Executive Departnts and Agencies

(4)

(5)

(6)

III.

Page 5

Monitoring Not Within Scope of Memorandum 

Even if the interception falls within one of the six categories above, the

procedures and rules in this Memorandum do not apply to:

(1) extraterritorial interceptions;

(2) foreign intellgence interceptions, including interceptions pursuant to the

Foreign Intelligence Sureilance Act of 1978 (50 U. C. 1801 et seq

(3) interceptions pursuant to the cour-authorization procedures of Title III of

the Omnbus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (18

c. 2510 et seq

routine Bureau of Prisons monitorig of oral communications that are not

attended by a justifiable expectation of privacy;

interceptions of radio communications; and

interceptions of telephone communications.

AUTHORIATION PROCEDURES AN RULES

Required Information

The following infonmtion must be set fort in any request to monitor an oral

communcation pursuant to par II.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Reasons for the Monitoring. The request must contain a reasonably

detailed statement of the background and need for the monitorig.

Offense. If the monitoring is for investigative purpses, the request must

include a citation to the pricipal crimial statute involved.

Danger. If the monitorig is intended to provide protection to the

consenting part, the request must explain the natue of the danger to the

consenting par.

Location of Devices. The request must state where the monitoring device

wil be hidden: on the person, in personal effects, or in a fixed location.

B-91
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General

of Executive Deparnts and Agencies

(7)

(8)

(9)

Page 6

(5) Location of Monitoring. The request must specify the location and

primary judicial distrct where the monitoring wil take place. A

monitoring authorization is not restricted to the original distrct. However

if the location of monitoring changes, notice should be promptly given to

the app1;oving official. The record maintained on the request should

reflect the location change.

(6) Time. The request must state the length of time needed for the

monitorig. Intially, an authorization may be granted for up to 90 days

from the day the monitorig is scheduled to begin. If there is the need for

continued monitorig, extensions-for additional periods of up to 90 days

may be granted. In special cases 

, 

fencing" operations ru by law

enforcement agents or long-term investigations that are closely supervised

by the Departent' s Crimial Division) authorization for up to 180 days

may be granted with s:ilar extensions.

Names. The request must give the names ofpersom, if known, whose

communications the deparent or agency expects to monitor and the

relation of such persons to the matter under investigation or to the need for

the monitorig.

Attorney Advice. The request must state that the facts of the sueilance

have been discussed wit the United States Attrney, an Assistant United

States Attorney, or the previously designated Departent of Justice

attorney responsible for a particular investigaton, and that such attomey

advises that the use of consensual monitorin is appropriate under tbis

Memorandum (including the date of such advice). The attorney nmst also

advise that the use of consensual monitorig under the facts of the

investigation does not mise the issue of entrapment. Such statements may

be made orally. If the attorneys described above canot provide the

advice for reasons unelated to the legality or propriety of the consensual

monitorig, the advice must be sought and obtained from an attorney of

the Crimial Division of the Deparent of Justice designated by th

Assistant Attorney General in charge of that Division. Before providing

such advice, a designated Crimial Division Attorney shall notify the

appropriate United States Attorney or other attrney who would othelWise

be authorized to provide the required advice under this paragraph.

Renewals. A request for renewal authority to monitor oral

communications nmst contain all the informtion required for an intial

request. The renewal request must also refer to all previous authorizations

and explain why an additional authorization is needed, as well as provide

B-92
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General

of Executive Departnts and Agencies

Page 7

an updated statement that the attorney advice required under paragraph (8)

has been obtained in connection with the proposed renewal.

Oral Requests

Unless a request is of an emergency natue, it Imst be in written form and contain

all of the information set forth above. Emergency requests in cases in which

wrtten Deparent of Justice approval is required may be made by telephone to

the Director or an Associate Director of the Crinal Division s Offce of

Enforcement Operations, or to the Assistat Attorney General the Acting

Assistant Attorney General, or a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the

Criminal Division, and should later be reduced to writing and submitted to the

appropriate headquarters offcial as soon as practicable after authorization has

been obtained. . An appropriate headquarers fiing system is to be maintained for

consensual monitoring requests that have been received and approved in this

maner. Oral requests must include all the inormation required for wrtten

requests as set forth above.

Authorization

Authority to engage in consensual monitorig in situations set forth in part ILA.

of this Memorandum may be given by the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney

General, the Associate Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General or

Acting Assistant Attomey General in charge ofthe Criminal Division, a Deputy

Assistant Attorney General in the Crimial Division, or the Director or an

Associate Director of the Crimial Division s Offce of Enforcement Operations.

Requests for authorization wil normally be submitted by the headquarers of the

deparent or agency requesting the consensual monitorig to the Office of

Enforcement Operations for review.

Emergency Monitoring

If an emergency situation requires consensual monitoring at a time when one of

the individuals identified in par IILB. above canot be reached, the authorization

may be given by the head ofthe responsible deparent or agency, or his or her

designee. Such departent or agency must then notify the Office of Enforcement

Operations as soon as practicable after the emergency monitoring is authorized

but not later than thee working days after the emergency authorization.

The notification shall explain the emergency and shall contain all other items

required for a nonemergency request for authorization set forth in part lILA.

above.

B-93
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General

of Executive Departnts and Agencies

Page 8

IV. SPECIA LIMITATIONS

When a communicating part consents to the monitorig of his or her oral

communications, the monitoring device may be concealed on his or her person, in

personal effects, or in a fixed location. Each departent and agency engaging in such

consensual monitorin must ensure that the consenting part wil be present at all times

when the device is operating. In addition, each deparent and agency must ensure: (1)

that no agent or person cooperating with the deparent or agency trespasses while

installng a device in a fixed location, uness that agent or person is actig pursuant to a

cour order that authorizes the entr and/or trespass, and (2) that as long as the device is

installed in the fixed location, the premises remain under the control of the governent

or of the consenting 

par. See United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341 , 1347 (11th Cir.

cert denied, 464 U.S. 917 (1983) (rejecting the First Circuit' s holding in United States

Padila, 520 F.2d 526 (1st Cir. 1975), and approving use of fixed monitoring devices that

are activated only when the consenting par is present). But see United States

Shabazz 883 F. Supp. 422 (D. Minn. 1995).

Outside the scope of this Memorandum are interceptions of oral, nonwire

communications when no part to the comnncation has consented. To be lawful, such

interceptions generally may take place only when no part to the commnication has a

justifiable expectation of privacy, 3 or when authorization to intercept such

communcations has been obtained pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control

and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U. C. 2510 et seq ) or the Foreign Intellgence

Sureilance Act of 1978 (50 U. C. 1801 et seq ). Each deparment or agency must

ensure that no commication of any part who has a justifiable expectation of privacy is

intercepted unless proper authorization has been obtained.

PROCEDURS FOR CONSENSUAL MONITORIG WHERE NO WRTTEN

APPROVAL IS REOUIRD

Prior to receiving approval for consensual monitoring from the head of the deparent or

agency or his or her designee, a representative ofthe deparent or agency must obtain

advice that the consensual monitoring is both legal and appropriate frm the United

States Attorney, an Assistant United States Attorney, or the Deparnt of Justice

attorney responsible fur a particular investigation. The advice may be obtained orally

from the attorney. If the attorneys described above cannot provide this advice for reasons.

unelated to the legality or propriety of the consensual monitoring, the advice must be

For example, burglars, while committing a burglary, have no justifiable expectation of

privacy. Cf. United States v. Pui Kan Lam, 483 F.2d 1202 (2d. Cir. 1973), cert. denieg, 415 U.

984 (1974).

B-94
Memorandum for the Heads and Inspectors General

of Executive Departments and Agencies

Page 9

sought and obtained from an attorney of the Criminal Division of the Deparent of

Justice designated by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of that Division. Before

providing such advice, a designated Criminal Division Attorney shall notify the

appropriate United States Attorney or other attrney who would pthelWise be authorized

to provide the required advice under this paragraph.

Even incases in which no written authorization is required because they do not involve

the sensitive circumstances discussed above, each agency must continue to maintain

internal procedures for supervising, monitorig, and approving all consensual monitorig

of oral communications. Approval for consensual n;1nitoring must come from the head

of the agency or his or her designee. Any designee should be a high-ranking supervisory

offcial at headquarers level, but in the case ofthe FBI may be a Special Agent in Charge

or Assistant Special Agent in Charge.

Similarly, each departent or agency shall establish procedures for emergency

authorizations in cases involving non-sensitive circumstances similar to those that apply

with regard to cases that involve the sensitive circumstaces described in par III.D.

including obtaing follow-up oral advice of an appropriate attorney as set forth above

concerng the legality and propriety of the consensual monitorig.

Records are to be maintained by the involved departments or agencies for each

consensual monitoring that they have conducted. These records are to include the

information set forth in part III.A. above.

VI. GENERA LIMTATIONS

This Memorandum relates solely to the subject of consensual monitorig of oral

communcations except where otherwise indicated. This Memorandum does not alter or

supersede any curent policies or directives relating to the subject of obtaining necessary

approval for engaging in nonconsensual electronic sureilance or any other form of

nonconsensual interception.

B-95
APPENDIX C 
TABLE OF REVISIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES OF MAY 30, 2002 

General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Preamble 

“As the primary criminal investigative 

agency in the federal government, the 

FBI has the authority and responsibility 

to investigate all criminal violations of 

federal law not exclusively assigned to 

another federal agency. The FBI thus 

plays a central role in national law 

enforcement and in the proper 

administration of justice in the United 

States.” 

“Investigations by the FBI are premised 

upon the important duty of government 

to protect the public against general 

crimes, against organized criminal 

activity, and against those who would 

engage in political or racial terrorism or 

would destroy our constitutional system 

through criminal violence.” 

Adds text addressing terrorist acts: 

“In discharging this function, the 

highest priority is to protect the 

security of the nation and the safety of 

the American people against the 

depredations of terrorists and foreign 

aggressors.” 

“Investigations by the FBI are premised 

upon the fundamental duty of 

government to protect the public 

against general crimes, against 

organized criminal activity, and against 

those who would threaten the fabric of 

our society through terrorism or mass 

destruction.” 

Introduction 

Checking of 

Leads and 

Preliminary 

Inquiries 

No Corresponding Text Adds text describing progression 

through levels of investigative activity: 

“Where the limited checking out of 

leads discloses a possibility or 

reasonable indication of criminal 

activity, a preliminary inquiry or full 

investigation may then be initiated. 

However, if the available information 

shows at the outset that the threshold 

standard for a preliminary inquiry or 

full investigation is satisfied, then the 

appropriate investigative activity may 

be initiated immediately, without 

progressing through more limited 

investigative stages.” [Introduction A.] 

C-1 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Checking of 

Leads and 

Preliminary 

Inquiries 

No Corresponding Text Adds text emphasizing role of 

preliminary inquiries in cases involving 

weapons of mass destruction: 

“The application of these Guidelines' 

standards for inquiries merits special 

attention in cases that involve efforts 

by individuals or groups to obtain, for 

no apparent reason, biological, 

chemical, radiological, or nuclear 

materials whose use or possession is 

constrained by such statutes as 18 

U.S.C. 175, 229, or 831.” 

[Introduction A.] 

“[W]here individuals or groups engage 

in efforts to acquire or show an interest 

in acquiring, without apparent reason, 

toxic chemicals or their precursors or 

radiological or nuclear materials, 

investigative action to determine 

whether there is a legitimate purpose 

may be justified.” [Introduction A.] 

Part I: General Principles 

“All preliminary inquiries shall be 

conducted pursuant to the General 

Crimes Guidelines. There is no separate 

provision for a preliminary inquiry under 

the Criminal Intelligence Guidelines.” [I.] 

Authorizes preliminary inquiries to 

determine whether to commence 

Racketeering Enterprise or Terrorism 

Enterprise Investigations: 

“All preliminary inquiries shall be 

conducted pursuant to the General 

Crimes Guidelines (i.e., Part II of these 

Guidelines). There is no separate 

provision for preliminary inquiries 

under the Criminal Intelligence 

Guidelines (i.e., Part III of these 

Guidelines) because preliminary 

inquiries under Part II may be carried 

out not only to determine whether the 

grounds exist to commence a general 

crimes investigation under Part II, but 

alternatively or in addition to 

determine whether the grounds exist to 

commence a racketeering enterprise 

investigation or terrorism enterprise 

investigation under Part III.” [I.] 

C-2 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Part II: General Crimes Investigations 

“Inquiries shall be completed within 90 

days after initiation of the first 

investigative step. [A]n extension of time 

in an inquiry for succeeding 30-day 

periods may be granted . . .” [II.B.3.] 

Lengthens period of initial inquiry and 

extensions of time to: 

180 days for initial inquiry 

90 days for extensions [II.B.3.] 

“An extension of time in an inquiry . . . 

may be granted by FBI Headquarters 

upon receipt of written request and 

statement of reasons why further 

investigative steps are warranted when 

there is no ‘reasonable indication’ of 

criminal activity.” [II.B.3.] 

- Delegates to field offices authority to 

grant first two extensions 

- All further extensions are granted 

only by FBIHQ. [II.B.3.] 

“Whether an intrusive technique should 

be used in an inquiry depends on the 

seriousness of the possible crime and 

the strength of the information 

indicating the possible existence of the 

crime.” [II.B.4.] 

Adds considerations in determining 

investigative techniques: 

“The FBI should not hesitate to use 

any lawful techniques . . . even if 

intrusive, where the intrusiveness is 

warranted in light of the seriousness of 

the possible crime or the strength of 

the information indicating its existence 

or future commission. This point is to 

be particularly observed in inquiries 

relating to possible terrorist activities.” 

[II.B.4.] 

“Some of the factors to be considered in 

judging intrusiveness are adverse 

consequences to an individual’s privacy 

interests and avoidable damage to his 

reputation. [I]t is recognized that choice 

of technique is a matter of judgment.” 

[II.B.4.] 

Adds considerations in determining 

investigative techniques: 

“The choice of investigative techniques 

in an inquiry is a matter of judgment, 

which should take account of: (i) the 

objectives of the inquiry and available 

investigative resources, (ii) the 

intrusiveness of a technique, 

considering such factors as the effect 

on the privacy of individuals and 

potential damage to reputation, (iii) the 

seriousness of the possible crime, and 

(iv) the strength of the information 

indicating its existence or future 

commission.” [II.B.4.] 

Prohibited the use of mail covers during 

preliminary inquiries. [II.B.5.] 

Authorizes the use of mail covers in 

preliminary inquiries. [II.B.5.] 

Preliminary 

Inquiries 

“Where a technique is highly intrusive, a 

supervisory agent shall approve its use 

in the inquiry stage only in compelling 

circumstances and when other 

investigative means are not likely to be 

successful.” [II.B.6.] 

Eliminates requirement for supervisory 

approval of highly intrusive 

investigative techniques. [II.B.6] 

C-3 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Part III: Criminal Intelligence Investigations 

“The FBI has authority to conduct 

investigations of racketeering enterprises 

whose activities involve violence, 

extortion, narcotics, or systematic public 

corruption. A racketeering enterprise 

not engaged in such activities may be 

investigated . . . only upon a written 

determination by the Director, concurred 

in by the Attorney General, that such 

investigation is justified by exceptional 

circumstances.” [III.A.2.a.] 

Eliminates enumerated predicate 

crimes and substitutes “pattern of 

racketeering activity” as defined in the 

RICO statute. [III.A.2.a.] 

“A racketeering enterprise investigation 

may be initiated when facts or 

circumstances reasonably indicate that 

two or more persons are engaged in a 

continuing course of conduct for the 

purpose of obtaining monetary or 

commercial gains or profits wholly or in 

part through racketeering activity.” 

[III.A.2.b.] 

Defines facts or circumstances for 

initiation of racketeering enterprise 

investigation as those contained in the 

RICO statute: 

“A racketeering enterprise investigation 

may be initiated when facts or 

circumstances reasonably indicate that 

two or more persons are engaged in a 

pattern of racketeering activity as 

defined in the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 

1961(5).” [III.A.2.a.] 

No Corresponding Text Adds circumstances under which 

racketeering activity is treated as a 

terrorism enterprise investigation: 

“[i]f the pattern of racketeering activity 

involves an offense or offenses 

described in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B), 

the investigation shall be deemed a 

terrorism enterprise investigation and 

shall be subject to the standards and 

procedures of Subpart B of this Part in 

lieu of those set forth in this Subpart.” 

[III.A.2.a.] 

Racketeering 

Enterprise 

Investigations 

“A racketeering enterprise investigation 

may be authorized by the Director or 

designated Assistant Director upon a 

written recommendation . . .” [III.A.5.a.] 

Delegates to field offices authority to 

initiate racketeering enterprise 

investigation: 

“A racketeering enterprise investigation 

may be authorized by the Special Agent 

in Charge, with notification to FBIHQ 

upon a written recommendation. . .” 

[III.A.5.a.] 

C-4 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

“The FBI shall notify the Attorney 

General or his designee of the opening of 

the investigation.” [III.A.5.a.] 

Requires notification of the DOJ 

Organized Crime and Racketeering 

Section, which in turn, notifies the 

Attorney General: 

“The FBI shall notify the Organized 

Crime and Racketeering Section of the 

Criminal Division and any affected 

United States Attorney’s office of the 

opening of a racketeering enterprise 

investigation. On receipt of such 

notice, the Organized Crime and 

Racketeering Section shall immediately 

notify the Attorney General and the 

Deputy Attorney General.” [III.A.5.b.] 

“[t]he Attorney General may, as he 

deems necessary, request the FBI to 

provide a report on the status of the 

investigation.” [III.A.5.a.] 

Delegates to Chief of the DOJ 

Organized Crime and Racketeering 

Section authority to request FBI 

reports: 

“[t]he Chief of the Organized Crime and 

Racketeering Section may, as he or she 

deems necessary, request the FBI to 

provide a report on the status of the 

investigation.” [III.A.5b.] 

“A racketeering enterprise investigation 

may be initially authorized for a period 

of up to 180 days. An investigation may 

be continued upon renewed 

authorization for additional periods each 

not to exceed 180 days.” [III.A.5.b.] 

Lengthens period for initial 

authorizations and renewals: 

 “A racketeering enterprise 

investigation may be initially 

authorized for a period of up to a year. 

An investigation may be continued 

upon renewed authorization for 

additional periods each not to exceed a 

year.” [III.A.5.c.] 

Racketeering 

Enterprise 

Investigations 

“Renewal authorization shall be obtained 

from the Director or designated 

Assistant Director.” [III.A.5.b.] 

Delegates to field offices authority to 

renew racketeering enterprise 

investigations and requires notification 

to DOJ: 

“Renewal authorization shall be 

obtained from the SAC with notification 

to FBIHQ. The FBI shall notify the 

Organized Crime and Racketeering 

Section of any renewal, and the 

Organized Crime and Racketeering 

Section shall immediately notify the 

Attorney General and the Deputy 

Attorney General.” [III.A.5.c.] 

C-5 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

“Investigations shall be reviewed by the 

Director or designated senior 

Headquarters official on or before the 

expiration of the period for which the 

investigation and each renewal thereof is 

authorized.” [III.A.5.c.] 

Delegates to field offices authority to 

review racketeering enterprise 

investigations prior to renewal: 

“Investigations shall be reviewed by the 

SAC on or before the expiration of the 

period for which the investigation and 

each renewal thereof is authorized.” 

[III.A.5.d.] 

Racketeering 

Enterprise 

Investigations 

“A racketeering enterprise investigation 

may be authorized by the Director or 

designated Assistant Director upon a 

written recommendation setting forth 

the facts and circumstances reasonably 

indicating the existence of a racketeering 

enterprise whose activities involve 

violence, extortion, narcotics, or 

systematic public corruption. In such 

cases the FBI shall notify the Attorney 

General or his designee of the opening of 

the investigation. An investigation of a 

racketeering enterprise not involved in 

these activities may be authorized only 

by the Director upon his written 

determination, concurred in by the 

Attorney General, that such 

investigation is warranted by exceptional 

circumstances. . . . Renewal 

authorization shall be obtained from the 

Director or designated Assistant 

Director. The concurrence of the 

Attorney General must also be obtained 

if his concurrence was initially required 

to authorize the investigation.” 

[III.A.5.a-b] 

Expands authority to initiate, renew, 

review, and reopen racketeering 

enterprise investigations: 

“In addition to the authority of Special 

Agents in Charge under this 

paragraph, the Director of the FBI, and 

any Assistant Director or senior 

Headquarters official designated by the 

Director, may authorize, renew, review, 

and reopen racketeering enterprise 

investigations in conformity with the 

standards of this paragraph.” 

[III.A.5.f.] 

C-6 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

“A domestic security/terrorism 

investigation may be initiated when the 

facts or circumstances reasonably 

indicate that two or more persons are 

engaged in an enterprise for the purpose 

of furthering political or social goals 

wholly or in part through activities that 

involve force or violence and a violation 

of the criminal laws of the United 

States.” [III.B.1.a.] 

Adds additional bases for initiating 

terrorism enterprise investigations: 

“A terrorism enterprise investigation 

may be initiated when facts or 

circumstances reasonably indicate that 

two or more persons are engaged in an 

enterprise for the purpose of: (i) 

furthering political or social goals 

wholly or in part through activities that 

involve force or violence and a violation 

of federal criminal law, (ii) engaging in 

terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 

2331(1) or (5) that involves a violation 

of federal criminal law, or (iii) 

committing any offense described in 18 

U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B). A terrorism 

enterprise investigation may also be 

initiated when facts or circumstances 

reasonably indicate that two or more 

persons are engaged in a pattern of 

racketeering activity as defined in the 

RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961(5), that 

involves an offense or offenses 

described in 18 U.S.C. 2332b(g)(5)(B).” Terrorism [III.B.1.a.] Enterprise 

Investigations 

“A domestic security/terrorism 

investigation may be authorized by the 

Director or designated Assistant upon a 

written recommendation setting forth 

the facts or circumstances reasonably 

indicating the existence of an enterprise 

as described in this subsection. In such 

cases, the FBI shall notify the Office of 

Intelligence Policy and Review of the 

opening of the investigation.” [III.B.4.a.] 

Delegates to field offices authority to 

initiate terrorism enterprise 

investigations and changes notification 

requirements to the DOJ: 

“A terrorism enterprise investigation 

may be authorized by the Special Agent 

in Charge, with notification to FBIHQ, 

upon a written recommendation setting 

forth the facts or circumstances 

reasonably indicating the existence of 

an enterprise as described in 

paragraph (1)(a). The FBI shall notify 

the Terrorism and Violent Crime 

Section of the Criminal Division, the 

Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, 

and any affected United States 

Attorney’s office of the opening of a 

terrorism enterprise investigation. On 

receipt of such notice, the Terrorism 

and Violent Crime Section shall 

immediately notify the Attorney 

General and the Deputy Attorney 

General.” [III.B.4.a.] 

C-7 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

“In all investigations the Attorney 

General may, as he deems necessary, 

request the FBI to provide a report on 

the status of the investigation.” 

[III.B.4.a.] 

Delegates to the Chief of DOJ 

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section 

authority to request FBI reports: 

“In all such investigations, the Chief of 

the Terrorism and Violent Crime 

Section may, as he or she deems 

necessary, request the FBI to provide a 

report on the status of the 

investigation.” [III.B.4.a.] 

“A domestic security/terrorism 

investigation may be initially authorized 

for a period of up to 180 days. An 

investigation may be continued upon 

renewed authorization for additional 

periods each not to exceed 180 days.” 

[III.B.4.b.] 

Lengthens period of initial 

authorization and renewals: 

“A terrorism enterprise investigation 

may be initially authorized for a period 

of up to a year. An investigation may 

be continued upon renewed 

authorization for additional periods 

each not to exceed a year.” [III.B.4.b.] 

“Renewal authorization shall be obtained 

from the Director or designated 

Assistant Director.” [III.B.4.b.] 

Delegates to field offices authority to 

renew terrorism enterprise 

investigations and requires notification 

to DOJ: 

“Renewal authorization shall be 

obtained from the SAC with notification 

to FBIHQ. The FBI shall notify the 

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section 

and the Office of Intelligence Policy and 

Review of any renewal, and the 

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section 

shall immediately notify the Attorney 

General and the Deputy Attorney 

General.” [III.B.4.b.] 

Terrorism 

Enterprise 

Investigations 

“Investigations shall be reviewed by the 

Director or designated Senior 

Headquarters official on or before the 

expiration period for which the 

investigation and each renewal thereof is 

authorized.” [III.B.4.c.] 

Delegates to field offices authority to 

review terrorism enterprise 

investigations: 

“Investigations shall be reviewed by the 

SAC on or before the expiration of the 

period for which the investigation and 

each renewal thereof is authorized.” 

[III.B.4.c.] 

C-8 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

“In some cases, the enterprise may meet 

the threshold standard but be 

temporarily inactive in the sense that it 

has not engaged in recent acts of 

violence, nor is there any immediate 

threat of harm – yet the composition, 

goals and prior history of the group 

suggests the need for continuing federal 

interest. Under those circumstances, 

the investigation may be continued but 

reasonable efforts should be made to 

limit the coverage to information which 

might indicate a change in the status or 

criminal objectives of the enterprise.” 

[III.B.4.d.] 

Eliminates requirement to limit scope 

of temporarily inactive investigations: 

“In some cases, the enterprise may 

meet the threshold standard but be 

temporarily inactive in the sense that it 

has not engaged in recent acts of 

violence or other criminal activities as 

described in paragraph (1)(a), nor is 

there any immediate threat of harm – 

yet the composition, goals and prior 

history of the group suggest the need 

for continuing federal interest. The 

investigation may be continued in such 

cases with whatever scope is warranted 

in light of these considerations.” 

[III.B.4.c.] 

Terrorism 

Enterprise 

Investigations “A domestic security/terrorism 

investigation may be authorized by the 

Director or designated Assistant Director 

upon a written recommendation setting 

forth the facts or circumstances 

reasonably indicating the existence of an 

enterprise as described in this 

subsection. . . . Renewal authorization 

shall be obtained from the Director or 

designated Assistant Director. 

Investigations shall be reviewed by the 

Director or designated Senior 

Headquarters official on or before the 

expiration period for which the 

investigation and each renewal thereof is 

authorized.” [III.B.4.a-c] 

Expands authority to initiate, renew, 

review, and reopen terrorism enterprise 

investigations: 

“In addition to the authority of Special 

Agents in Charge under this 

paragraph, the Director of the FBI, and 

any Assistant Director or senior 

Headquarters official designated by the 

Director, may authorize, renew, review, 

and reopen terrorism enterprise 

investigations in conformity with the 

standards of this paragraph.” 

[III.B.4.e.] 

Part IV: Investigative Techniques 

“Some of the factors to be considered in 

judging intrusiveness are adverse 

consequences to an individual’s privacy 

interest and avoidable damage to his 

reputation. [I]t is recognized that choice 

of technique is a matter of judgment.” 

[IV.A.] 

Adds considerations in determining 

investigative techniques: 

“The choice of investigative techniques 

is a matter of judgment, which should 

take account of: (i) the objectives of the 

investigation and available investigative 

resources, (ii) the intrusiveness of a 

technique, considering such factors as 

the effect on the privacy of individuals 

and potential damage to reputation, 

(iii) the seriousness of the crime, and 

(iv) the strength of the information 

indicating its existence or future 

commission.” [IV.A.] 

C-9 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

“Whether a highly intrusive technique 

should be used depends on the 

seriousness of the crime and the 

strength of the information indicating 

the existence of the crime.” [IV.A.] 

“The FBI should not hesitate to use 

any lawful techniques consistent with 

these Guidelines in an investigation, 

even if intrusive, where the 

intrusiveness is warranted in light of 

the seriousness of the crime or the 

strength of the information indicating 

its existence or future commission. 

This point is to be particularly 

observed in investigations relating to 

terrorist activities.” [IV.A.] 

“All requirements for use of a technique 

set by statute, Department regulations 

and policies, and Attorney General 

Guidelines must be complied with.” The 

listed investigative techniques are 

subject to the noted restrictions. [IV.B.] 

Adds “classified investigative 

technologies” to list of investigative 

techniques. [IV.B.9.] 

“Undisclosed participation in the 

activities of an organization by an 

undercover employee or cooperating 

private individual in a manner that may 

influence the exercise of rights protected 

by the First Amendment must be 

approved by FBIHQ, with notification to 

Department of Justice.” [IV.B.3.] 

Eliminates FBIHQ and DOJ approval 

requirements and substitutes 

compliance with the Attorney General 

Guidelines: 

“In situations involving undisclosed 

participation in the activities of an 

organization by an undercover 

employee or cooperating private 

individual, any potential constitutional 

concerns relating to activities of the 

organization protected by the First 

Amendment must be addressed 

through full compliance with all 

applicable provisions of the Attorney 

General’s Guidelines on FBI 

Undercover Operations and the 

Attorney General’s Guidelines 

Regarding the Use of Confidential 

Informants” [IV.B.3.] 

“For consensual monitoring of telephone 

conversations, advance authorization 

must be obtained from the SAC and the 

appropriate U.S. Attorney, except in 

exigent circumstances.” [IV.B.7.] 

Expands approval authority in field 

offices and DOJ: 

“For consensual monitoring of 

telephone conversations, advance 

authorization must be obtained from 

the SAC or Assistant Special Agent in 

Charge and the appropriate U.S. 

Attorney, Assistant Attorney General, 

or Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 

except in exigent circumstances. An 

Assistant Attorney General or Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General who 

provides such authorization shall 

notify the appropriate U.S. Attorney” 

[IV.B.7.] 

C-10 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

No Corresponding Text Adds consultation requirement with 

the Professional Responsibility 

Advisory Office: 

“Where issues arise concerning the 

consistency of contacts with 

represented persons with applicable 

attorney conduct rules, the United 

States Attorney should consult with 

the Professional Responsibility 

Advisory Office.” [IV.B.10.] 

Part V: Dissemination and Maintenance of Information 

“The FBI may disseminate information 

during investigations conducted 

pursuant to these guidelines to another 

Federal agency or to a State or local 

criminal justice agency when such 

information: A. falls within the 

investigative or protective jurisdiction or 

litigative responsibility of the agency; B. 

may assist in preventing a crime or the 

use of violence or any other conduct 

dangerous to human life; C. is required 

to be furnished to another Federal 

agency by Executive Order 10450, as 

amended, dated April 27, 1953, or a 

successor Order; D. is required to be 

disseminated by statute, interagency 

agreement approved by the Attorney 

General, or Presidential Directive; and to 

other persons and agencies as permitted 

by Section 552 and 552a of Title V, 

U.S.C. ” [V.A.] 

Authorizes dissemination of 

information during checking of leads 

and preliminary inquiries and clarifies 

practices with respect to the DOJ: 

“The FBI may disseminate information 

during the checking of leads, 

preliminary inquiries, and 

investigations conducted pursuant to 

these Guidelines to United States 

Attorneys, the Criminal Division, and 

other components, officials, and 

officers of the Department of Justice. 

The FBI may disseminate information 

during the checking of leads, 

preliminary inquiries, and 

investigations conducted pursuant to 

these Guidelines to another Federal 

agency or to a State or local criminal 

justice agency when such information: 

A. falls within the investigative or 

protective jurisdiction or litigative 

responsibility of the agency; B. may 

assist in preventing a crime or the use 

of violence or any other conduct 

dangerous to human life; C. is required 

to be furnished to another Federal 

agency by Executive Order 10450, as 

amended, dated April 27, 1953, or a 

successor Order; D. is required to be 

disseminated by statute, interagency 

agreement approved by the Attorney 

General, or Presidential Directive; and 

to other persons and agencies as 

permitted by Section 552 and 552a of 

Title V, U.S.C. ” [V.A.] 

C-11 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

No Corresponding Text Requires maintenance of database on 

preliminary inquiries and 

investigations: 

“The FBI shall maintain a database 

that identifies all preliminary inquiries 

and investigations conducted pursuant 

to these Guidelines and that permits 

the prompt retrieval of information 

concerning the status (open or closed) 

and subjects of all such inquiries and 

investigations.” [V.B.] 

Part VI: Counterterrorism Activities and Other Authorizations 

No Corresponding Text Authorizes information systems: 

 -FBI may operate and participate in 

identification, tracking, and 

information systems for purposes of 

detecting, prosecuting, or preventing 

terrorism. 

 -System information may come from 

sources permitted by law, prior or 

ongoing investigations, government 

sources, public sources, and voluntary 

private sources. 

 -Systems operated by the FBI must 

be reviewed periodically for compliance 

with applicable statutes, rules, 

regulations, and Guidelines. [VI.A.1.] 

Counterterrorism 

Activities 

No Corresponding Text Authorizes the visiting of public places 

and events: 

 -FBI may visit any place and attend 

any event that is open to the public, for 

purposes of detecting or preventing 

terrorism. 

 - Information may not be retained 

from such visits unless it relates to 

potential criminal or terrorist activity. 

[VI.A.2.] 

C-12 
General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Section 

Previous Version 

03/21/1989 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

No Corresponding Text Authorizes online general topical 

research: 

 -FBI may search and access online 

sites and forums on subject areas to 

facilitate or support investigative 

responsibilities. 

 -Prohibits online searches on 

individual names or identifiers except 

where incidental to topical research. 

[VI.B.1.] 

No Corresponding Text Authorizes the FBI to conduct online 

searches and access online sites and 

forums for the purposes of detecting or 

preventing terrorism or other criminal 

activities. [VI.B.2.] 

Other 

Authorizations 

No Corresponding Text Authorizes the FBI to prepare general 

reports and assessments on terrorism 

or other criminal activities for purposes 

of strategic planning or investigative 

support. [VI.B.3.] 

No Corresponding Text Prohibits FBI pursuant to exercise of 

law enforcement activities authorized 

by Part VI from maintaining files on 

individuals solely for the purpose of 

monitoring First Amendment activities 

or other rights protected by the 

Constitution. [VI.C.1.] 

No Corresponding Text Requires all law enforcement activities 

authorized by Part VI to have a valid 

law enforcement purpose. [VI.C.1.] 

Protecting 

Privacy and 

Other 

Limitations 

No Corresponding Text Summarizes provisions of the Privacy 

Act and directs questions concerning 

its applicability to the FBI Office of 

General Counsel or the Office of 

Information and Privacy 

C-13 
[BLANK PAGE]

C-14 
Consensual Monitoring 

Section 

Previous Version 

01/20/1998 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Part III. Authorization Procedures and Rules 

U.S. Attorney, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney or other designated DOJ 

attorney must concur that the use 

of consensual monitoring is 

appropriate and does not raise the 

issue of entrapment. [III.A.8] 

Changes "concur" to "advise;" provides that 

designated Criminal Division attorney must 

advise if trial attorney cannot provide advice 

for reasons unrelated to the legality or 

propriety of the consensual monitoring. 

[III.A.8] 

Required 

Information 

Updated statement of attorney 

concurrence is required. [III.A.9] 

Requires updated statement of attorney 

advice. [III.A.9] 

Part V. Procedures for Consensual Monitoring Where No Written Approval Is 

Required 

Approval required from U.S. 

Attorney, Assistant U.S. Attorney, 

or DOJ attorney responsible for 

investigation. Approval may be 

oral, and attorney must concur as 

to both legality and propriety of 

consensual monitoring. [V] 

Changes "approval” to "advice"; provides that 

designated Criminal Division attorney must 

advise if trial attorney cannot provide advice 

for reasons unrelated to the legality or 

propriety of the consensual monitoring. [V] 

Approval for consensual 

monitoring must come from the 

head of the agency or his or her 

designee. Any designee should be 

a high-ranking supervisory official 

at headquarters level. [V] 

Expands approval authority for FBI designee 

to include SAC or ASAC. [V] 

Attorney authorization required. 

[V] 

Changes "authorization" to "advice." [V] 

C-15 
[BLANK PAGE]

C-16 
Confidential Informants 

Section 

Previous Version 

01/08/2001 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Part II. Registering a Confidential Informant 

Agents required reading to all CIs 

verbatim the general instructions 

applicable to all CIs. 

Agents no longer required to read 

general instructions verbatim to CIs but 

must review written instructions with 

CIs at registration and thereafter as 

required, but at least annually. [II.C] 

Instructions 

Agents required to read the following 

instructions verbatim to all CIs: 

The United States Government will 

strive to protect your identity, but 

cannot promise or guarantee either 

that you identity will not be divulged 

as a result of legal or other compelling 

considerations, or that you will not be 

called to testify in a proceeding as a 

witness.” [II.C.1.c] 

“The [JLEA} on its own cannot promise 

or agree to any consideration by a 

Federal Prosecutor’s Office or a Court 

in exchange for your cooperation, 

since the decision to confer any such 

benefit lies within the exclusive 

discretion of the Federal Prosecutor’s 

Office and the Court. However, the 

[JLEA] will consider (but not 

necessarily act upon) a request by you 

to advise the appropriate Federal 

Prosecutor’s Office or Court of the 

nature and extent of your assistance 

to the [JLEA]. [II.C.1.d] 

“You have no immunity or protection 

from investigation, arrest or 

prosecution for anything you say or 

do, and the [JLEA] cannot promise or 

agree to such immunity or protection, 

unless and until you have been 

granted such immunity or protection 

in writing by a United States Attorney 

or his or her designee.” [ II.C.1.e] 

“You have not been authorized to 

engage in any criminal activity and 

could be prosecuted for any 

unauthorized criminal activity in 

which you have engaged or engage in 

the future” [II.C.1.f] 

Agents no longer required to read 

immunity and authorized criminal 

activity instructions verbatim to all CIs 

but are required to review these 

instructions with CIs only where 

applicable. [II.C] 

C-17 
Confidential Informants 

Section 

Previous Version 

01/08/2001 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Instructions Agents required to obtain signature 

from CIs acknowledging receipt and 

understanding of instructions unless 

inadvisable to do so for operational 

reasons. 

Eliminates requirement that agents 

obtain CI’s signature but still requires 

CI’s verbal acknowledgement of receipt 

and understanding of instructions. CI’s 

written acknowledgement is still 

required for otherwise illegal activity 

authorization and receipt of payment. 

[II.C.2] 

C-18 
Undercover Operations 

Section 

Previous Version 

11/13/1992 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Part II. Definitions 

“Undercover 

Operation” – 

substantive 

contact 

“A ‘series of related undercover activities’ 

generally consists of more than three 

separate contacts by an undercover 

employee with the individual(s) under 

investigation. However, undercover activity 

involving sensitive or fiscal circumstances 

constitutes an undercover operation 

regardless of the number of contacts 

involved.” [II.B] 

Replaces “contact” with “substantive 

contact” and defines latter term: 

 “[a] ‘series of related undercover 

activities’ generally consists of more 

than three separate substantive 

contacts by an undercover employee 

with the individual(s) under 

investigation. However, undercover 

activity involving sensitive or fiscal 

circumstances constitutes an 

undercover operation regardless of 

the number of contacts involved. A 

contact is ‘substantive’ if it is a 

communication with another 

person, whether by oral, written, 

wire, or electronic means, which 

includes information of investigative 

interest. Mere incidental contact, 

e.g., a conversation that establishes 

an agreed time and location for 

another meeting, is not a 

substantive contact within the 

meaning of these Guidelines.” [II.B] 

“Undercover 

Operation” – 

online 

communications 

No Corresponding Text Explains that multiple 

transmissions or e-mail messages 

can constitute a single contact. 

Factors considered in determining 

whether multiple online 

transmissions constitute single or 

multiple contacts include the time 

between transmissions, the number 

of transmissions, the number of 

interruptions, topical transitions, 

and the media by which the 

communications are exchanged. 

[II.B] 

“Joint 

Undercover 

Operation” 

No Corresponding Text Defines term as an “[u]ndercover 

operation conducted jointly by the 

FBI and another law enforcement 

agency, except that an operation in 

which FBI participation is confined 

to contribution of limited financial 

or equipment resources or technical 

advice does not constitute a joint 

undercover operation.” [II.F] 

C-19 
Undercover Operations 

Section 

Previous Version 

11/13/1992 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Part III. General Authority and Purpose 

“The FBI may use undercover activities 

and conduct undercover operations, 

pursuant to these Guidelines, that are 

appropriate to carry out its law 

enforcement responsibilities.” [III] 

Clarifies that undercover activities 

may be used in preliminary 

inquiries, general crimes 

investigations, and criminal 

intelligence investigations. [III] 

“[T]he FBI may participate in joint 

undercover activities with other law 

enforcement agencies and may operate a 

proprietary to the extent necessary to 

maintain an operation's cover or 

effectiveness. All joint undercover 

operations are to be conducted pursuant 

to these Guidelines. [III] 

Specifies circumstances where FBI 

may rely upon another agency’s 

authorization process. “If a joint 

undercover operation is under the 

direction and control of another 

federal law enforcement agency and 

is approved through a sensitive 

operations review process 

substantially comparable to the 

process under these Guidelines, the 

other agency's process may be relied 

on in lieu of the process under these 

Guidelines.” [III] 

Part IV. Authorization of Undercover Operations 

General Approval 

Standards 

Careful consideration must be given to 

risk of invasion of privacy or interference 

with privileged or confidential 

relationships. [IV.A] 

Expands privacy considerations to 

include ”any potential constitutional 

or other legal concerns.” [IV.A] 

C-20 
Undercover Operations 

Section 

Previous Version 

11/13/1992 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

No Corresponding Text Adds note providing that the FBI 

should not hesitate to use lawful 

investigative techniques even if 

intrusive if circumstances warrant, 

especially with respect to terrorist 

offenses. “The gathering of evidence 

and information through undercover 

operations furthers the investigative 

objectives of detecting, preventing, 

and prosecuting crimes. (citations 

omitted). In furthering these 

objectives, the Attorney General's 

Guidelines on General Crimes, 

Racketeering Enterprise and 

Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

(Part I) state that "[t]he FBI shall not 

hesitate to use any lawful 

techniques consistent with these 

Guidelines, even if intrusive, where 

the intrusiveness is warranted in 

light of the seriousness of a crime or 

the strength of the information 

indicating its commission or 

potential future commission. This 

point is to be particularly observed 

in the investigation of terrorist 

crimes and in the investigation of 

enterprises that engage in 

terrorism." As with other 

investigative techniques, Special 

Agents in Charge should be guided 

by this principle in considering and 

approving undercover operations. 

The principle, as noted, applies with 

particular force where the 

undercover operation is directed to 

gathering information that will help 

to solve and prosecute terrorist 

offenses or prevent the future 

commission of acts of terrorism.” 

[IV.B.1.b] 

UCOs Which May 

Be Approved by 

the SAC 

Undercover expenditures may not exceed 

$40,000 ($100,000 in drug cases of which 

a maximum of $40,000 is for operational 

expenses). [IV.B.2] 

Increases expenditure limits from 

$40,000 to $50,000 for Group II 

undercover expenditures ($100,000 

in drug cases of which maximum of 

$ 50,000 is for operational 

expenses). [IV.B.2] 

C-21 
Undercover Operations 

Section 

Previous Version 

11/13/1992 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Fiscal circumstance (d): Require a 

reimbursement or compensation 

agreement with cooperating individuals or 

entities for services or losses incurred by 

them in aid of the operation (any 

reimbursement agreement entered into 

with third parties must be reviewed by the 

FBI's Legal Counsel Division) [IV.C.1.d] 

Expands review of third party 

agreements to include Office of the 

Chief Contracting Officer. [IV.C.1.d] 

Operations 

Which Must Be 

Approved at 

FBIHQ 

Sensitive circumstance (c): Section Chief of 

the FBIHQ White Collar Crimes Section 

must be consulted regarding conduct by 

certain non-sensitive officials. [IV.C.2.c] 

Changes consultation designee to 

Section Chief of the FBIHQ Integrity 

in Government/Civil Rights Section, 

Criminal Investigative Division. 

[IV.C.2.c] 

“Activity that is proscribed by Federal, 

state, or local law as a felony or that is 

otherwise a serious crime -- but not 

including the purchase of stolen or 

contraband goods; the delivery or sale by 

the Government of stolen property whose 

ownership cannot be determined; the 

controlled delivery of drugs which will not 

enter commerce; the payments of bribes 

which are not included in the other 

sensitive circumstances; or the making of 

false representations to third parties in 

concealment of personal identity or the 

true ownership of a proprietary (this 

exemption does not include any statement 

under oath or the penalties of perjury).” 

[IV.C.2.g] 

Clarifies that felony activity by an 

undercover employee qualifies as a 

“sensitive circumstance” requiring 

FBIHQ review and CUORC approval, 

and exempts such review for five or 

fewer money laundering 

transactions not to exceed 

maximum aggregate amount of $1 

million. [IV.C.2.g] 

“Activities which could result in significant 

claims against the United States arising in 

tort, contract, or for compensation for the 

"taking" of property.” [IV.C.2.n] 

Adds potential for constitutional tort 

claims against government 

employees as a sensitive 

circumstance: 

 “Activities which create a realistic 

potential for significant claims 

against the United States arising in 

tort, contract, or for compensation 

for the "taking" of property, or a 

realistic potential for significant 

claims against individual 

government employees alleging 

constitutional torts.” [IV.C.2.n] 

Criminal 

Undercover 

Operations 

Review 

Committee 

(Undercover 

Review 

Committee) - 

Sensitive 

Circumstances 

“The Director, Assistant Attorney General, 

or other official designated by them may 

refer any sensitive investigative matter, 

including informant, cooperating witness, 

and cooperating subject operations, to the 

Undercover Review Committee for advice, 

recommendation or comment, regardless 

of whether an undercover operation is 

involved.” [IV.D.6] 

Provides that SAC may submit an 

undercover operation for review by 

FBIHQ and the CUORC, regardless 

of whether sensitive circumstances 

are present. [IV.D.6] 

C-22 
Undercover Operations 

Section 

Previous Version 

11/13/1992 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Approval by the 

Director, Deputy 

Director, 

Designated 

Executive 

Assistant 

Director, or 

Designated 

Assistant 

Director 

Excepting emergencies, only the Director, 

Deputy Director, or Associate Deputy 

Director-Investigations may approve 

undercover operations considered by 

CUORC for sensitive circumstances (l) or 

(m). [IV.E] 

Authorizes a designated Executive 

Assistant Director to approve 

matters involving sensitive 

circumstances (l) and (m); reference 

to Associate Deputy Director of 

Investigations eliminated. [IV.E] 

*For TEIs, application must include “a 

statement why the infiltration or 

recruitment is necessary, a description of 

procedures to minimize any acquisition, 

retention, and dissemination of information 

that does not relate to the matter under 

investigation or to other authorized 

investigative activity.” [IV.E.2.a.ii] 

Requires “explanation of how any 

potential constitutional concerns 

and any other legal concerns have 

been addressed.” [IV.E.2.a.ii] 

Application/ 

Notification to 

FBIHQ No Corresponding Text Adds requirement that the FBI 

immediately notify the Deputy 

Attorney General whenever FBIHQ 

rejects an application and whenever 

the CUORC is unable to reach 

consensus concerning an 

application. [IV.E.4] 

Duration of 

Authorization 

“An undercover operation initially 

authorized by the SAC must be 

reauthorized by a designated Assistant 

Director, pursuant to paragraphs IV.C-F, if 

it lasts longer than 12 months or involves 

the expenditure of more than $40,000 

($100,000 in drug cases of which a 

maximum of $40,000 is for operational 

expenses), or such other amount that is 

set from time to time by the Director. No 

undercover operation approved at the field 

office level may continue for more than 

one year without obtaining approval at 

FBIHQ.” [IV.G.4] 

Increases expenditure limit from 

$40,000 to $50,000 for undercover 

expenditures and operational 

expenses. [IV.G.4] 

No Corresponding Text Expands SAC authorization to 

include up to five money laundering 

transactions, not to exceed a 

maximum aggregate amount of $1 

million. [IV.H.5.a.viii] 

Participation in 

Otherwise Illegal 

Activity By 

Undercover 

Employees Authorization by Director or Deputy 

Director required for otherwise illegal 

activity involving significant risk of 

violence or physical injury. [IV.H.5.c] 

Includes designated Executive 

Assistant Director as authorizing 

official. [IV.H.5.c] 

C-23 
Undercover Operations 

Section 

Previous Version 

11/13/1992 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

“In situations which require the prior 

written authorization of the SAC, the SAC 

may orally approve an undercover 

operation when he or she determines that 

a significant and unanticipated 

investigative opportunity would be lost 

were the time taken to prepare a written 

authorization.” [IV.I.1] 

Eliminates requirement that 

investigative opportunity be 

"unanticipated." [IV.I.1] 

“In situations which would otherwise 

require approval by the Director or Deputy 

Director, the SAC may approve an 

undercover operation when he or she 

determines that the initiation, extension, 

or renewal of an operation is imperative to 

protect life or prevent serious injury.” 

[IV.I.2.b] 

Authorizes SAC emergency approval 

for sensitive circumstances listed in 

IV.C.(2)(l) and (m) under certain 

conditions. “In situations which 

involve sensitive circumstance (l) or 

(m), the SAC may approve an 

undercover operation when he or 

she determines that the initiation, 

extension, or renewal of an 

operation is imperative to protect life 

or prevent serious injury.” [IV.I.2.b] 

Interim/ 

Emergency 

Authorization 

No Corresponding Text Expands SAC emergency 

authorization to terrorism matters to 

avoid loss of investigative 

opportunity. “In situations which 

involve sensitive circumstance (l), or 

other investigative activity relating 

to terrorism, the SAC may approve 

an undercover operation when he or 

she determines that the initiation, 

extension, or renewal of an 

operation is necessary to avoid the 

loss of a significant investigative 

opportunity.” [IV.I.2.c] 

C-24 
Undercover Operations 

Section 

Previous Version 

11/13/1992 

Current Version 

05/30/2002 

Interim/ 

Emergency 

Authorization 

No Corresponding Text Adds provision governing interim 

online undercover operations; in 

circumstances where continued 

online contact is essential to 

maintain credibility or avoid 

permanent loss of contact: 

 -SAC may authorize in writing 

interim operations for no longer 

than 30 days. 

 - FBIHQ must be notified if 

sensitive circumstances present. 

 -Full report of all online activity 

during period must be submitted to 

approving authority 

During interim period, the 

undercover employee must: 

 -Maintain an accurate recording 

of all online communication; 

 -Avoid otherwise illegal activity; 

 -Maintain as limited an online 

profile as possible consistent with 

the need to accomplish stated 

objectives; 

 -Avoid physical contact with 

subjects; 

 -Take reasonable and necessary 

steps to protect third parties, 

commercial establishments, or 

government entities; and 

 -Cease if, during the 30-day 

period, a determination is made to 

disapprove the undercover 

operation. [IV.I.5] 

Part VI. Monitoring and Control of Undercover Operations 

Records and summaries of undercover 

operations shall be made available for 

inspection by designee of the Associate or 

Deputy Attorney General and as 

appropriate of the Assistant Attorney 

General for the Criminal Division. [IV.E.1] 

Deletes reference to Associate 

Attorney General. [IV.E.1] 

Annual Report of 

the Undercover 

Review 

Committee CUORC required to submit annual report 

to the Director, Attorney General, 

Associate or Deputy Attorney General, and 

the Assistant Attorney General for the 

Criminal Division. [VI.E.2] 

Deletes reference to Associate 

Attorney General. [VI.E.2] 

C-25 
APPENDIX D 
USAO CRIMINAL DIVISION CHIEFS’ VIEWS ON 

ADEQUACY OF FBI COORDINATION ON 

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT GUIDELINES ISSUES1

Approval Response No. Percent 

Yes 0 0% 23. Are you aware of any situations in 

which the FBI has granted Tier I 

authorization to a CI without obtaining 

written approval from your Office? If yes, 

complete 23.a. and 23.b. No 93 100%

Notification/Consultation Response No. Percent 

Yes 25 27%

29. The revised Guidelines on Confidential 

Informants require that in the event a CI is 

named in an electronic surveillance 

affidavit pursuant to Section III.D.1., the 

FBI must inform the prosecutor making the 

application and the court to which the 

application is made of the individual’s 

actual status as a CI. (Section III.D.2.) 

Since 5/30/02, has a CI been named in an 

electronic surveillance affidavit in your 

Office? If yes, complete 29.a. 

No 69 73%

All 

appropriate 

cases 

23 88%

Majority of 

cases 

2 8%

Sometimes 0 0%

29a. If yes, how consistently has your 

Office received the appropriate notice from 

the FBI? 

Rarely 0 0%

 

1 This survey was an electronic questionnaire that was completed online through the 

Internet. Online respondents were required to answer each question presented; otherwise, 

they could not continue with the survey. However, several respondents did not complete 

the survey online, and instead submitted a written version via electronic mail or facsimile. 

Some of these respondents did not provide answers to some questions; as a result, the 

overall total number of respondents varies from question to question. There were a total of 

96 respondents who provided answers to this survey. 

Some questions required the respondent to answer follow-up questions that were 

automatically skipped without prompting the respondent if a certain response was entered. 

We instructed the respondents to rely exclusively on the navigation buttons provided within 

the survey program to go back and review and/or change previously entered answers and 

not to use the web browser’s “back” and “forward” buttons. This was necessary because 

the survey’s navigation buttons functioned within the confines of the survey by skipping 

questions when required, while use of the web browser’s “back” and “forward” buttons 

simply re-displayed the pages previously accessed that remained in the browser’s image 

cache. As a result, respondents who used their browser’s navigation buttons could go back 

to change their answers to questions without affecting the responses to any relevant followup questions, thus producing inconsistent response totals within related questions. 

D-1 
Notification/Consultation Response No. Percent 

Never 0 0% 

Don't know 1 4% 

Yes 1 1% 

30. The revised Guidelines on Confidential 

Informants require that when the FBI has 

reasonable grounds to believe that a 

current or former CI is being prosecuted 

by, is the target of an investigation by, or is 

expected to become a target of an 

investigation by a federal prosecuting office 

for engaging in alleged felonious criminal 

activity, a SAC must immediately notify the 

chief federal prosecutor of that individual’s 

status as a current or former CI. (Section 

IV.A.1.) Are you aware of situations in 

which the FBI has failed to notify the chief 

federal prosecutor in any of these 

circumstances? If yes, complete 30.a. 

through c. 

No 93 99% 

Yes 9 10% 

31. Are you aware of circumstances in 

which a confidential informant who was 

then authorized to engage in either Tier 1 

or Tier 2 otherwise illegal activity in the 

course of an undercover operation run by 

the FBI field office in your District engaged 

in unauthorized illegal activity since 

5/30/02 (Section IV.B)? If yes, complete 

31.a. through c. 

No 85 90% 

Yes 9 90% 31b. Do you believe that your Office and 

the FBI field office in your District have the 

same understanding of the circumstances 

requiring notification of the USAO of 

unauthorized illegal activity?2 No 1 10% 

Yes 1 1% 

32. Are you aware of circumstances in 

which a confidential informant who had no 

current authorization to engage in either 

Tier 1 or Tier 2 otherwise illegal activity 

engaged in any criminal activity in the 

course of an undercover operation run by 

the FBI field office in your District since 

5/30/02 (Section IV.B)? If yes, complete 

32.a. through c. 

No 93 99% 

 

2 The total number of responses corresponds to the number of respondents who 

answered “yes” to Question 31. Nine respondents answered “yes.” One respondent 

apparently changed his or her answer from “yes” to “no” after responding to follow-up 

Question 31b, accounting for the incongruous number of expected responses to this 

question. 

D-2 
Notification/Consultation Response No. Percent 

Yes 2 67%

32a. In the case of a confidential informant 

who had no current authorization to 

engage in either Tier 1 or Tier 2 otherwise 

illegal activity who engaged in any criminal 

activity in the course of an undercover 

operation run by the FBI field office in your 

District since 5/30/02, was the FBI’s 

obligation to notify your Office immediately 

excused because a state or local 

prosecuting office in the District had filed 

charges against the confidential informant 

for the criminal activity and there was no 

basis for federal prosecution in your 

District?3

No 1 33%

Very 

frequently 0 0%

Occasionally 1 1%

Rarely 16 17%

Never 63 67%

38. Please indicate the frequency of the 

following problems regarding the 

administration of Confidential Informants 

operated by the FBI field office in your 

District since 5/30/02: 

d) Inadequate or untimely notification to 

prosecutors of investigation or prosecution 

of Confidential Informants Don't know 14 15%

Very 

frequently 0 0%

Occasionally 1 1%

Rarely 17 18%

Never 61 65%

e) Inadequate or untimely notification to 

prosecutors of unauthorized illegal activity 

by Confidential Informants 

Don't know 15 16%

Very 

frequently 0 0%

Occasionally 0 0%

Rarely 16 17%

Never 53 56%

p) Failure to notify the appropriate federal 

prosecutor of unauthorized illegal activity 

by Confidential Informants 

Don't know 25 27%

Very serious 0 0%

Somewhat 

serious 1 1%

Occasional 

concern 

3 3%

39. Please identify the impact of the 

following problems on the success of the 

Confidential Informant Program operated 

by the FBI field office in your District since 

5/30/02: 

f) Inadequate or untimely notification to 

prosecutors of investigation or prosecution 

Minor 

concern 

13 14%

 

3 The total number of responses corresponds to the number of respondents who 

answered “yes” to Question 32. Only one respondent answered “yes.” Two respondents 

apparently changed their answer from “yes” to “no” after responding to follow-up Question 

32a, accounting for the incongruous number of expected responses to this question. 

D-3 
Notification/Consultation Response No. Percent 

of Confidential Informants No concern 76 82% 

Very serious 0 0% 

Somewhat 

serious 0 0% 

Occasional 

concern 

5 5% 

Minor 

concern 

17 18% 

g) Inadequate or untimely notification to 

prosecutors of unauthorized illegal activity 

by Confidential Informants 

No concern 71 76% 

Very serious 1 1% 

Somewhat 

serious 0 0% 

Occasional 

concern 

7 8% 

Minor 

concern 

16 17% 

q) Failure to notify the appropriate federal 

prosecutor of unauthorized illegal activity 

by Confidential Informants 

No concern 68 74% 

Very serious 1 1% 

Somewhat 

serious 1 1% 

Occasional 

concern 

6 6% 

Minor 

concern 

17 18% 

t) Failure to share information with federal 

prosecutor’s office about Confidential 

Informant’s activities in investigations in 

which the USAO is participating 

No concern 68 73% 

D-4 
APPENDIX E 
E-1

RECOMMENDATIONS 

CHAPTER THREE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES 

REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS 

Develop and Implement a Compliance Plan

(1) Develop a compliance plan for its human source program and an 

implementation plan to put the plan into practice. The compliance plan 

should specify the strategies that the FBI will employ to ensure compliance 

with applicable Guidelines governing the recruitment, validation, and 

operation of human sources and address issues such as administrative 

support (e.g., field guides, standardized forms, and “user-friendly” Intranet 

resources), training, technology, guidance, and accountability. 

Provide Enhanced Administrative and Technical Support/Automation

(2) Develop standardized forms to capture the most significant 

requirements of the Confidential Informant Guidelines and the FBI’s Manual 

of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG) for operating confidential 

informants, including a standardized “file review” cover sheet for 

Supervisory Special Agents to use in examining the files for adherence to the 

Confidential Informant Guidelines and MIOG provisions relating to 

confidential informants. The FBI should also create an electronic 

Confidential Informant User’s Manual comparable to the Field Guide for 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations. That manual should include 

compliance checklists and the standardized forms recommended above. 

The FBI should consider other administrative improvements to support the 

Criminal Informant Program, including a standard electronic Criminal 

Informant Program tickler system that can be deployed in all field divisions 

to generate non-compliance notifications to field and Headquarters 

managers, and an updated Intranet web page that includes the current 

version of the Confidential Informant Guidelines and key Office of the 

General Counsel guidance memoranda concerning confidential informants. 

(3) Institute procedures to determine whether state or local 

prosecuting offices have filed charges against confidential informants who 

engage in unauthorized illegal activity to determine whether notification 

must be provided to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in accordance with § IV.B.1.a 

of the Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

(4) Amend the forms used to authorize “otherwise illegal activity” to 

specify the thresholds referenced in § I.B.10 that distinguish Tier 1 from 

Tier 2 otherwise illegal activity. 
E-2

Make Personnel and Performance Plan Adjustments to Promote 

Adherence to the CI Guidelines

(5) Revise the promotion policies and the performance plans for 

Special Agents and executive managers to indicate, where applicable, that 

compliance or overseeing compliance with the Confidential Informant 

Guidelines will be considered in employees’ annual performance appraisals 

(in accordance with § I.I of the Confidential Informant Guidelines) and in 

promotion decisions. 

(6) Evaluate the grade level of Special Agents who serve as 

Confidential Informant Coordinators and consider allowing Confidential 

Informant Coordinators to be elevated to a GS-14 supervisory level, 

particularly in larger field offices where the Coordinator is a full-time 

position. The FBI should also ensure that Confidential Informant 

Coordinators are supervised by personnel of a higher grade level who are 

familiar with the Criminal Informant Program and who have received 

training on the Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

Provide Necessary Training

(7) Consider holding annual Informant Coordinator Conferences 

similar to those provided to Undercover Coordinators. The FBI should also 

consider opportunities for local, joint training with representatives from U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices, which could address topics such as Guidelines provisions 

requiring approval, concurrence, or notice to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices; the 

adverse consequences of Guidelines’ violations from the standpoint of the 

prosecution and the FBI; and “lessons learned” from past cases. 

(8) Review the training modules now used in New Agent Training, 

probationary training, and in-service training for Special Agents and 

Supervisory Special Agents to ensure that the Confidential Informant 

Guidelines’ requirements and risks of operating confidential informants are 

explained. 

(9) Include in the periodic training of Supervisory Special Agents a 

component or module on the importance of file reviews to the Criminal 

Informant Program. The training should also address frequently occurring 

violations of the Guidelines and MIOG provisions. A key objective of 

supervisory training should be on predictors of problems with confidential 

informants, such as long term confidential informants, confidential 

informants who have been assigned the same contact agents for an 

extensive period, confidential informants who are authorized to engage in 

otherwise illegal activity, confidential informants who have previously been 

deactivated “for cause,” and confidential informants who have been arrested 

or engaged in other unauthorized illegal activity while working as 

confidential informants. 
E-3

CHAPTER FOUR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON 

FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS 

Enhance the Role of Undercover Coordinators and Division Counsel

(10) Evaluate the grade level of Special Agents who serve as 

Undercover Coordinators and consider allowing Undercover Coordinators to 

be elevated to a GS-14 supervisory level, particularly in larger field offices 

where executive management deems it necessary to be a full-time position. 

(11) Encourage regular consultation between members of the 

undercover investigative team and the Undercover Coordinator during the 

formulation and conduct of the undercover operation. 

(12) Evaluate ways for the Undercover Coordinator to perform 

progress reviews at least every 90 days on undercover operations, a 

component of which should include an evaluation by senior managers, in 

consultation with Division Counsel and the Undercover Coordinator, of 

compliance with the Undercover Guidelines. The FBI should also create 

standardized forms to conduct these reviews. 

(13) Establish policies that promote more consistent Division Counsel 

involvement in the development and implementation of undercover 

operations, and ensure that Division Counsel are advised of anticipated 

legal problems in undercover operations.

Improve Guidance and Training

(14) Because neither the MIOG nor FBI field guides adequately 

address the issues below, provide guidance on the following: 

• the meaning of “sensitive circumstances” relating to “systemic 

corruption” of governmental functions, and the “significant risk” of 

violence or physical injury to individuals pursuant to Undercover 

Guidelines §§ IV.C.2.b and IV.C.2.m, respectively; 

• how to limit the scope of authorizations for otherwise illegal activity 

in undercover operations; and 

• special concerns and compliance issues associated with task force 

participation. 

(15) Identify ways to enhance Undercover Guidelines compliance 

training for field supervisors and undercover employees, including use of 

instructional CD-ROMs, web-based courses, and joint training with the U.S. 

Attorneys’ Offices. Absent exigent circumstances, either as part of the 

certification of undercover employees or otherwise, the FBI should require 

undercover employees to complete undercover operation compliance 

training before participating in undercover operations. The FBI should also 
E-4

ensure that all field supervisors who provide guidance pursuant to § VI.A of 

the Guidelines regarding preparation of undercover employees are familiar 

with undercover techniques, compliance requirements, and the Field Guide 

for Undercover and Sensitive Operations. 

Improve Internal Controls

(16) As part of the Undercover Coordinator’s certification currently 

provided for Group I and II undercover operation proposals, add a 

certification that the instructions set forth in § VI.A.2 of the Undercover 

Guidelines regarding lawful investigative techniques have been given to each 

undercover employee. 

(17) Amend the Group I and Group II undercover operation proposals 

forms that currently provide information regarding the expected execution of 

the undercover operation to include a section: “Facts Pertinent to Violence 

Risk Assessment.” 

(18) Require field offices seeking approval of Group I undercover 

operations to obtain concurrence letters from U.S. Attorneys’ Offices that 

meet the requirements of § IV.F.2.b of the Undercover Guidelines and 

amend § 4.8(5) of the Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations 

accordingly. 

(19) Ensure that the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit has 

access to the Inspection Division’s undercover operation audits. 

CHAPTER FIVE: ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL 

CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE 

INVESTIGATIONS 

Preliminary Inquiries

(20) Ensure compliance with the General Crimes Guidelines’ 

requirements to obtain and document authorizations for the extension, 

conversion to full investigation, and closing of preliminary inquiries. 

Criminal Intelligence Investigations

(21) Institute measures to ensure consistency in meeting and 

documenting the notification and reporting requirements provided in 

§§ III.A.5 and III.B.4 of the General Crimes Guidelines, including requiring 

FBI field offices to maintain in the relevant investigative file documentation 

of the notice of the opening of criminal intelligence investigations to DOJ’s 

Counterterrorism, Organized Crime and Racketeering Sections, Office of 

Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and the relevant U.S. Attorneys’ 

Offices as required in racketeering enterprise investigations and terrorism 
E-5

enterprise investigations. The FBI should also ensure that progress reports 

required by the Guidelines in terrorism enterprise investigations are 

provided to OIPR, DOJ’s Counterterrorism Section, and FBI Headquarters. 

(22) Discuss with DOJ how to reconcile § 100-2.3(3) of the MIOG, 

requiring Headquarters’ concurrence with the initiation and renewal of 

terrorism enterprise investigations, with §§ III.B.4.a and b of the General 

Crimes Guidelines, which authorize field level initiation and renewal of these 

investigations. 

Part VI Counterterrorism Authorities 

(23) Require field level supervisory approval prior to the exercise of 

Part VI.A.2 authorities to visit public places or attend public events for the 

purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, absent exigent 

circumstances. 

(24) Develop a standardized form or a short e-mail template to be 

completed by case agents to document their use of the Part VI.A.2 

authorities. 

(25) In light of the survey responses of Division Counsel, consider 

whether (a) field office practices since May 30, 2002, regarding predication, 

collection, record retention, indexing, and dissemination of Part VI.A 

information, and the practices regarding utilization of “zero files” or other 

files to capture Part VI.A information, are in conformity with the Guidelines 

and FBI guidance; (b) there is a need for further guidance on predication, 

collection, record retention, indexing, dissemination, or other issues; and 

(c) FBI Headquarters managers should have access to data reflecting use of 

Part VI.A.2 authorities in order to be satisfied that these authorities are 

used in conformity with the Guidelines. 

CHAPTER SIX: PROCEDURES FOR LAWFUL, WARRANTLESS 

MONITORING OF VERBAL COMMUNICATIONS 

(CONSENSUAL MONITORING) 

(26) Ensure that required authorizations for consensual monitoring 

are obtained in advance and are appropriately documented. 

(27) For monitorings that do not require DOJ approval, consult with 

DOJ to resolve whether the Consensual Monitoring Guidelines should be 

interpreted to authorize monitoring for more than 90 days (including up to 

“the duration of the investigation” as currently provided on Form FD-759), 

or whether the authorization is limited to 90 days. The resulting 

interpretation should be incorporated in the FBI’s MIOG and communicated 

to the field. 
E-6

CHAPTER SEVEN: FBI AND DOJ COMPLIANCE OVERSIGHT AND 

ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 

Criminal Undercover Operations Review Committee (CUORC)

(28) Provide CUORC members, upon request, with access to copies of 

Inspection reports concerning undercover operations, the Undercover and 

Sensitive Operations Unit on-site reviews, and after-action reports of 

undercover operations. 

(29) Consider ways for the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit 

to develop more complete information for the CUORC and other FBI 

components, such as conducting a periodic analysis of the patterns and 

trends found in its on-site reports, informing the CUORC members of any 

persistent Guidelines violations, and providing copies of its semi-annual 

report to all FBI Headquarters’ operating Divisions, the Office of the General 

Counsel, and the Training Division. 

Confidential Informant Review Committee (CIRC)

(30) To assist CIRC members in evaluating the confidential 

informants within its purview and assist field and Headquarters managers 

in their supervisory responsibilities in overseeing the Criminal Informant 

Program, require that the Initial and Continuing Suitability Reports and 

Recommendations contain more thorough answers to the suitability 

questions, such as: 

• a description of the confidential informants’ legitimate source of 

income; 

• the confidential informants’ statistical accomplishments, including 

the number of indictments, convictions, Title III wiretap 

applications, and other indicia of informants’ contributions; 

• details on how confidential informants are in a position to obtain 

relevant information; 

• details on the nature of any unauthorized illegal activity committed 

by confidential informants, including informants’ criminal history 

records and the continuing suitability reports required to be 

completed in accordance with § II.A.2.b of the Confidential 

Informant Guidelines; and 

• the informant records of any confidential informants who have 

been previously deactivated for cause by the FBI, including the 

reasons for deactivation and the field division operating the 

informants. 
E-7

(31) Consider having the Human Intelligence Unit draft “lessons 

learned” from the CIRC’s decisions, periodically communicate these lessons 

to field personnel, and incorporate them into training on the Confidential 

Informant Guidelines. 

(32) Make available to CIRC members, upon request, copies of the 

Inspection Division’s audits of the Criminal Informant Program (including 

any reinspection reports) and evaluations performed by the Human 

Intelligence Unit of compliance with the Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

Inspection Division

(33) Revise Inspection Division checklists and interrogatories to 

increase inspection coverage of Guidelines-related issues. 

(34) As part of the Inspection Division’s triennial inspections of field 

and Headquarters’ divisions, establish an audit examining the collection of 

information obtained from exercise of counterterrorism authorities pursuant 

to § VI.A.2 (Visiting Public Places and Events) of the General Crimes 

Guidelines. 

(35) Provide more thorough and timely reporting of Attorney General 

Guidelines’ violations by identifying in inspection reports the causes and 

gravity of compliance deficiencies; developing summary statistics to assist in 

determining when reinspections are appropriate; and automating key 

components of the inspection process. 

(36) Increase inspections for the Criminal Informant Program and 

other programs that are priorities or experiencing significant problems by 

performing more frequent inspections at irregular intervals. The Inspection 

Division should also develop a standard for reinspections that accounts for 

the frequency and seriousness of the Attorney General Guidelines 

deficiencies identified during the regular inspection and develop a standard 

for determining when reinspections should be conducted that accounts for 

both the number and gravity of the deficiencies found. The Inspection 

Division and the Human Intelligence Unit should reinstate its Criminal 

Informant Program reinspection process. 

(37) Address in employee performance appraisals the findings from 

Inspection Division inspections that identify either superior or deficient 

Attorney General Guidelines’ compliance performance. 

(38) Elevate egregious non-compliance with Attorney General 

Guidelines to an executive management finding in the inspection report 

rather than deferring that action until the next three-year inspection 

contingent on the detection of recurring, serious deficiencies. 
E-8

On-site Reviews by Program Offices

(39) The Inspection Division and the Human Intelligence Unit should 

institute procedures that establish follow-up inspection measures to 

reinspections that indicate ongoing compliance problems, such as assigning 

a single Assistant Inspector in Place to conduct an additional inspection 

within the first six months following the reinspection. 

(40) Modify the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit’s on-site 

review data collection instrument to better address Guidelines compliance, 

including issues such as otherwise illegal activity, potential entrapment 

issues, and task force participation. 

FBI Disciplinary Process

(41) Ensure that alleged Attorney General Guidelines’ violations 

warranting potential discipline are referred to the FBI’s Internal 

Investigations Section in a consistent fashion throughout the FBI. 

(42) Ensure that the Inspection Division’s standards for referring 

misconduct involving Attorney General Guidelines’ violations are consistent 

with practices adopted by the Internal Investigations Section. 

(43) Add separate offense codes for: (i) knowingly or recklessly failing 

to obtain proper authorization for a source’s participation in otherwise 

illegal activity; (ii) knowingly or recklessly failing to obtain proper 

authorization to operate long term, high-level, privileged or media-affiliated 

confidential informants or other informants subject to special approval 

requirements; and (iii) knowingly or recklessly failing to operate long-term, 

high-level, privileged or media-affiliated confidential informants, or other 

informants subject to special approval requirements in accordance with the 

relevant Confidential Informant Guidelines and MIOG provisions. 

CHAPTER EIGHT: HOW THE FBI IMPLEMENTED THE MAY 30, 2002, 

REVISIONS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S INVESTIGATIVE 

GUIDELINES 

(44) Assign some person or unit at FBI Headquarters the 

responsibility to develop a plan to ensure proper and timely execution of 

Attorney General Guidelines’ revisions and to coordinate implementation of 

the revisions over time. 

(45) Distribute revised Attorney General Guidelines to Chief Division 

Counsel, together with a concise summary or listing of the changes, 

sufficiently in advance of the new Guidelines’ effective date to allow field 

personnel to familiarize themselves with the revisions and to allow those 

Headquarters and field personnel who provide training on the revisions to 

develop training materials and a schedule for providing training. In 
E-9

addition, near the effective date of the revision, the FBI should develop and 

distribute standardized forms and other administrative support tools, issue 

field guidance, and identify a Headquarters point of contact who can 

address questions concerning the revisions. 

(46) Ensure that revisions to the MIOG accurately reflect any changes 

to the Attorney General Guidelines and are made on or about the effective 

date of such changes. 

(47) Make appropriate changes to the MIOG to reconcile the 

discrepancies between the Attorney General Guidelines and the MIOG that 

are identified in this report. 
APPENDIX F 
F-1

DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 

INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES AND FBI POLICY MANUALS 

 

Registration of Confidential Informants 

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding 

the Use of Confidential Informants 

Manual of Investigative Operations & 

Guidelines (Part 1) 

II.B. After a Field Manager has approved an 

individual as suitable to be a CI, the 

individual shall be registered with that JLEA 

as a CI. In registering a CI, the JLEA shall, 

at a minimum, document or include the 

following in the CI's files:

1. a photograph of the CI; 

2. the JLEA's efforts to establish the CI's true 

identity; 

3. the results of a criminal history check for 

the CI; 

4. the Initial Suitability Report and 

Recommendation; 

5. any promises or benefits, and the terms of 

such promises or benefits, that are given a 

CI by a JLEA or any other law enforcement 

agency (if available to the JLEA); 

6. any promises or benefits, and the terms 

of such promises or benefits, that are 

given a CI by any FPO or any state or 

local prosecuting office (if available to 

the JLEA); and 

7. all information that is required to be 

documented in the CI's files pursuant to 

these Guidelines (e.g., the provision of the 

instructions set forth in the next 

paragraph). (emphasis added) 

137-5(3)(d).1 In addition to those records 

generated during the SI, the following 

additional information, must be located in 

the file: 

1. A photograph of the person; 

2. Results of a criminal history check for 

the CI; 

3. Any promises or benefits, and the 

terms of such promises or benefits, 

that are given a CI by the FBI or any 

other law enforcement agency (if 

available); (Also see AGG, § I (C)) 

4. All information that is required to be 

documented in the CI's files pursuant 

to §§ 137-6 (1) through (3). (AGG, § II 

(C)(1)-(2)). 

Effective date: 01/14/2002 

Contingency Payments to Confidential Informants

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding 

the Use of Confidential Informants 

Manual of Investigative Operations & 

Guidelines (Part 1) 

III.B.2. Under no circumstances shall any 

payments to a CI be contingent upon the 

conviction or punishment of any individual. 

No corresponding provision for 

contingency payments. 

 

1 The MIOG requires the initial Suitability Report and Recommendation to list the CI’s 

name, alias(s), and date and place of birth. MIOG § 137-5(1). We construe the CI 

Guidelines to require a description of the efforts the JLEA took to obtain this information. 
F-2

Deactivation of Confidential Informants

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding 

the Use of Confidential Informants 

Manual of Investigative Operations & 

Guidelines (Part 1) 

V.A. A JLEA that determines that a CI 

should be deactivated for cause or for any 

other reason shall immediately: 

1. deactivate the individual; 

2. document the reasons for the decision to 

deactivate the individual as a CI in the 

CI's files; 

3. if the CI can be located, notify the CI that 

he or she has been deactivated as a CI 

and obtain documentation that such 

notification was provided in the same 

manner as set forth in paragraph 

(II)(C)(2); and 

4. if the CI was authorized to engage in Tier 

1 or Tier 2 Otherwise Illegal Activity 

pursuant to paragraph (III)(C)(2)(a)-(b), 

revoke that authorization under the 

provisions of paragraph (III)(C)(7). 

(emphasis added) 

137-15(12)(a). When a CI is being closed, 

an EC will be generated which will include 

the following: 

. . . . 

137-15(12)(4). Whether the CI has 

been notified that they have been 

deactivated and any authorization to 

participate in otherwise illegal activity 

has been revoked. If authorized for 

otherwise illegal activity, written 

acknowledgement by the CI of 

deactivation or two witnesses to the 

fact that the CI orally acknowledged 

his/her deactivation. 

137-15(14). If a CI is closed for 

cause, the following must be done 

immediately: 

a) Appropriate notification shall be made to 

the CI, in person, if he/she can be 

reasonably located; 

b) Document the reasons for the decision 

to deactivate the individual as a CI in 

the CI's file; 

c) If the CI was authorized to engage in 

Tier 1 or Tier 2 Otherwise Illegal Activity, 

the CI will be advised that the authority 

to participate in Otherwise Illegal 

Activity has been revoked. (AGG, § V (A)) 

d) Such notification of closure for cause 

shall be made by two Agents or an Agent 

and another "approved" law enforcement 

officer. Approved law enforcement 

officer means a task force officer or law 

enforcement officer to whom disclosure 

authority has previously been 

authorized. The notification and all 

attempts to notify the CI will be 

documented in writing. (emphasis 

added). 

Effective date: 01/14/2002 
F-3

 

Preparation of Undercover Employees, Informants, 

and Cooperating Witnesses

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding 

FBI Undercover Operations 

Field Guide to Undercover 

and Sensitive Operations 

(July 25, 2003) 

VI.A.1. Prior to the investigation, the SAC or 

a designated Supervisory Special Agent shall 

review with each undercover employee the 

conduct that the undercover employee is 

expected to undertake and conduct that 

may be necessary during the investigation. 

The SAC or Agent shall discuss with each 

undercover employee any of the sensitive 

or fiscal circumstances specified in 

§ IV.C(1) or (2) that are reasonably likely 

to occur. (emphasis added) 

10.2(1). The AGG, Section VI.A, requires 

the SAC or a designated supervisor, to 

discuss with all of the UCEs, informants, 

or cooperating witnesses involved in a UCO 

what is acceptable conduct during the 

UCO. Specifically, each UCE is to be 

instructed that he/she shall not participate 

in any act of violence except in selfdefense; initiate or institute any plan to 

commit criminal acts; use unlawful 

investigative techniques to obtain 

information or evidence; or engage in any 

conduct that would violate any FBI, AGG 

or DOJ policy or restriction on investigative 

techniques or conduct by an FBI employee. 

The UCE will also be informed that except 

in an emergency situation, he/she shall 

not participate in any illegal activity for 

which authorization has not yet been 

obtained. The UCE will be informed that if 

a UCE learns persons under investigation 

intend to commit a violent crime, he/she 

shall try to discourage the violence. The 

UCE(s) shall also be instructed on the legal 

issues concerning entrapment. 
F-4

Application/Notification to FBIHQ, Sensitive Circumstances 

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding 

FBI Undercover Operations 

Field Guide to Undercover and 

Sensitive Operations 

(July 25, 2003) 

IV.F.2.b. Applications for approval of 

undercover operations involving sensitive 

circumstances listed in paragraph C(2) shall 

also include the following information: 

(b) A letter from the appropriate Federal 

prosecutor indicating that he or she has 

reviewed the proposed operation, 

including the sensitive circumstances 

reasonably expected to occur, agrees with 

the proposal and its legality, and will 

prosecute any meritorious case that has 

developed. The letter should include a 

finding that the proposed investigation 

would be an appropriate use of the 

undercover technique and that the 

potential benefits in detecting, 

preventing, or prosecuting criminal 

activity outweigh any direct costs or 

risks of other harm.

4.2(3)(B). A letter from the appropriate 

federal prosecutor indicating that he or 

she has reviewed the proposed 

operation, including the sensitive 

circumstances reasonably expected to 

occur, agrees with the proposal and its 

legality, and will prosecute any 

meritorious case that has developed. 

The letter should also include a 

statement concerning the propriety of 

the UCO and the legal sufficiency and 

quality of evidence that is being 

produced by the activity. The letter 

should be dated within 30 days of the 

scheduled Criminal Undercover 

Operations Review Committee (CUORC) 

meeting. 

 Authorizations for Openings and Renewals of 

Terrorism Enterprise Investigations

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding 

General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Manual of Investigative Operations 

& Guidelines (Part 1) 

III.B.4.a. A terrorism enterprise investigation 

may be authorized by the Special Agent in 

Charge, with notification to FBIHQ, upon a 

written recommendation setting forth the 

facts or circumstances reasonably indicating 

the existence of an enterprise . . . . 

III.B.4.b. Renewal authorization [for terrorism 

enterprise investigations] shall be obtained 

from the SAC with notification to FBIHQ. 

100-2.3(3) With regard to full-field 

terrorism enterprise investigations of 

domestic terrorism, it is hereby the 

policy of the CTD that, consistent with 

the revised AGG, a full-field terrorism 

enterprise investigation may be 

authorized by an SAC only with 

concurrence of the appropriate CTD 

Section Chief at FBIHQ who has 

program responsibility for the type of 

case opened (domestic or 

international). . . . 

Effective Date: 07/09/2003 
F-5

Use of Mail Covers in Preliminary Inquiries

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding 

General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise 

and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations 

Manual of Investigative Operations 

& Guidelines (Part 2) 

II.B.5. All lawful investigative techniques may 

be used in an inquiry except: 

(a) Mail openings; and 

(b) Nonconsensual electronic surveillance or 

any other investigative technique covered by 

chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code (18 

U.S.C. 2510-2522). 

10-6.2(7). Requests for mail covers 

should not be submitted in 

preliminary criminal inquiry 

investigations. (“The Attorney 

General’s Guidelines on General 

Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises 

[sic], and Terrorism Enterprise 

Investigations,” effective May 30, 

2002.) 

Effective Date: 04/04/2003 

Duration of Consensual Monitoring

Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding 

Procedures for Lawful, Warrantless 

Monitoring of Verbal Communications 

Manual of Investigative 

Operations & Guidelines (Part 2) 

III.A Required Information The following 

information must be set forth in any request to 

monitor an oral communication pursuant to 

part II.A [Investigations Where Written 

Department of Justice Approval is Required]: 

. . . 

(6) Time. The request must state the length 

of time needed for the monitoring. 

Initially, an authorization may be granted 

for up to 90 days from the day the 

monitoring is scheduled to begin. If there is 

the need for continued monitoring, extensions 

for additional periods of up to 90 days may be 

granted. 

V. Procedures for Consensual Monitoring 

Where No Written Approval Is Required 

. . . 

Records are to be maintained by the involved 

departments or agencies for each consensual 

monitoring that they have conducted. These 

records are to include the information set 

forth in part III.A. above.

10-10.3(1). Nontelephonic 

Consensual Monitoring (NTCM) in 

criminal matters may be approved by 

the SAC/ASAC, for the duration of 

the investigation, except when one 

or more of the six sensitive 

circumstances is present. Requests for 

authority to conduct consensual 

monitoring when any of the six 

sensitive circumstances are present 

will be submitted in writing to FBIHQ 

for Department of Justice approval in 

ROUTINE situations. (emphasis 

added) 

10-10.3(3). SAC/ASACs may 

authorize NTCM usage for the 

duration of nonsensitive 

investigations so long as the 

circumstances under which the 

authority was granted (i.e., the subject 

matter, the consenting party or 

parties to the interception, and the 

judicial district wherein monitoring 

will take place) do not substantially 

change—the authorization will remain 

valid. Where such changes are noted, 

consideration should be given by the 

SAC/ASACs to determine whether or 

not the NTCM authority should 

continue or whether new authority 
F-6

obtained. 

Effective date: 09/30/2002 

Emergency Procedures for Consensual Monitorings That Do Not 

Require DOJ Approval

Attorney General’s Guidelines 

Regarding Procedures for Lawful, 

Warrantless Monitoring 

of Verbal Communications 

Manual of Investigative 

Operations & Guidelines (Part 2) 

V. [E]ach department or agency shall establish 

procedures for emergency authorizations in 

cases involving non-sensitive circumstances 

similar to those that apply with regard to cases 

that involve the sensitive circumstances 

described in part III.D, including obtaining 

follow-up oral advice of an appropriate attorney 

as set forth above concerning the legality and 

propriety of the consensual monitoring. 

No implementing provisions. 
APPENDIX G 
FBI RESPONSE TO OIG RECOMMENDATIONS 

Recommendations:

(1) Develop a compliance plan for its human source program 

and an implementation plan to put the plan into practice. The 

compliance plan should specify the strategies that the FBI 

will employ to ensure compliance with applicable Guidelines 

governing the recruitment, validation, and operation of human 

sources and address issues such as administrative support 

(e.g., field guides, standardized forms, and “user-friendly” 

Intranet resources), training, technology, guidance, and 

accountability. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and 

has begun implementing the changes. The Directorate of 

Intelligence (DI) is re-engineering the entire Confidential 

Human Source Program with emphasis on improving compliance 

with AG Guidelines and FBI policy. 

As the Intelligence Program Manager within the FBI, the DI is 

developing new guidelines, policies, and processes for the 

utilization of confidential human sources that reduce 

burdensome paperwork and standardize source administration 

procedures. The DI drafted two new manuals for which approval 

is pending. First, a Confidential Human Source Manual, that 

contains one set of guidelines for all confidential human 

sources, consolidates language currently used in seven 

different source manuals and standardizes requirements for 

source administration. Second, a Confidential Human Source 

Validation Manual, that includes a standard, FBI-wide 

Confidential Human Source Validation Review Process and 

provides guidance for agents and supervisory personnel to 

develop and continually evaluate sources throughout the 

lifetime of the source's operation. 

The proposed technology for automating the entire Confidential 

Human Source workflow process will standardize administrative 

processes, provide guidance to first-line supervisors who 

oversee all aspects of source administration and operation, 

and increase the ability of the FBI to track resources, 

historical data, and trends developing in the human source 

program. We expect this automation to reduce if not 

completely eliminate compliance errors with AG Guidelines and 

internal Bureau policies. 

G-1
A new training initiative will include several additional 

hours of Confidential Human Source training for new agents, in 

addition to comprehensive advanced training for agents, 

supervisors and Human Source Coordinators in the field offices. 

For over six months, DI has coordinated closely with other FBI 

Headquarters entities, and the DOJ in order to finalize 

guidelines, technology and administrative support procedures. 

Phase one of the Confidential Human Source Re-engineering 

Project is expected to be completed in January 2006 and will 

include initial manual changes and information technology 

testing. Phase two will commence in April 2006 and will 

enable the FBI, through automation, to standardize the 

workflow process. In addition, AG Guidelines requirements 

will be built into the automated workflow with the goal of 

reducing significantly, if not entirely, compliance errors 

with AG Guidelines and FBI policies. 

(2) Develop standardized forms to capture the most 

significant requirements of the Attorney General Guidelines 

and the FBI’s Manual of Investigative Operations and 

Guidelines (MIOG) for operating confidential informants, 

including a standardized “file review” cover sheet for 

supervisory special agents to use in examining the files for 

adherence to the Confidential Informant Guidelines and MIOG 

provisions relating to confidential informants. The FBI 

should also create an electronic Confidential Informant User’s 

Manual comparable to the Field Guide on Undercover and 

Sensitive Operations. That manual should include compliance 

checklists and the standardized forms recommended above. The 

FBI should consider other administrative improvements to 

support the Criminal Informant Program, including a standard 

electronic Criminal Informant Program tickler system that can 

be deployed in all field divisions to generate non-compliance 

notifications to field and Headquarters managers, and an 

updated Intranet web page that includes the current version of 

the Confidential Informant Guidelines and key Office of 

General Counsel guidance memoranda concerning Confidential 

Informants. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. We 

agree that standardized forms and file review cover sheets 

will decrease the instances of non-compliance with the AG 

Guidelines and FBI policy. This is a major component of our 

Confidential Human Source Re-engineering initiative. Our 

automation initiative provides agents and supervisors with 

electronic templates that relate to all aspects of human 

G-2
source administration and validation. The proposed templates 

promote adherence to AG Guidelines and FBI policies through 

built-in features that prevent users from proceeding without 

completing critical areas of the template, and through icons 

and links that allow agents to simultaneously access relevant 

portions of the human source manuals for reference purposes. 

In April 2005, DI updated its Human Intelligence Planning and 

Policy Unit Intranet web page for human source information. 

The site includes human source guidelines and policies, 

administrative samples, project updates, personnel assignments 

and press releases. Based on previously described proposals 

to improve administrative support, we anticipate that the 

“Confidential Informant User's Manual” recommendation will be 

satisfied. In the interim, we will consider creating and 

implementing stop-gap uniform standardized forms throughout 

the FBI. 

(3) Institute procedures to determine whether state or local 

prosecuting offices have filed charges against Confidential 

Informants who engage in unauthorized illegal activity to 

determine whether notification must be provided to the U.S. 

Attorney's Office in accordance with Section IV.B.l.a of the 

Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs that such procedures are 

desirable and will explore how best to accomplish this goal 

recognizing that a field office’s ability to be informed of 

such matters may vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 

and recognizing, as well, that any such policy must be 

consistent with operational security and the protection of 

source identity. 

The current AG Guidelines and FBI policy require a Special 

Agent in Charge (or the equivalent) to immediately notify an 

appropriate Chief Federal Prosecutor (CFP) of a CI's 

unauthorized illegal activity. Notification must be made to: 

(1) the CFP whose District is located where the criminal 

activity primarily occurred, unless a state or local 

prosecuting office in that District has filed charges against 

the CI for the criminal activity and there clearly is no basis 

for federal prosecution (Section IV.B.1.a); (2) the CFP, if 

any, whose District is participating in the conduct of an 

investigation that is utilizing the "active" CI; and (3) the 

CFP, if any, who authorized the CI to engage in Tier 1 

otherwise illegal activity. 

G-3
Determining whether a state or local prosecutor filed charges 

against a CI is the responsibility of the case agent handling 

the CI. Case agents conduct periodic criminal history record 

checks, maintain contact with CIs, and conduct ongoing 

background investigations of CIs in order to determine whether 

a CI engages in UIA. The first-line supervisor of the agent 

is responsible for ensuring the CFP is properly notified after 

UIA by a CI occurs, if required. 

To better assist agents and supervisors with tracking 

notifications to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, DI will consider 

designing a standard 90-day file review format that prompts 

the first-line supervisor to ensure the following 

documentation is contained in the file, if applicable: (1) the 

nature of any UIA by a source during the 90-day period under 

review; (2) the status and/or disposition of any charges filed 

by state or local prosecutors related to the UIA; and (3) the 

name of the CFP notified and date of notification. The new 

file review format will also reflect whether the CI’s 

assistance is utilized in a current federal prosecution and 

whether the CI has authorization to engage in OIA. 

Appropriate manual revisions and re-engineering efforts will 

be undertaken in order to implement this new requirement. 

(4) Amend the forms used to authorize "otherwise illegal 

activity" to specify the thresholds referenced in Sections I.B. 

10 that distinguish Tier 1 from Tier 2 otherwise illegal 

activity. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. 

Implementing Bureau-wide standardized forms that include the 

definitions of Tier 1 OIA and Tier 2 OIA, and prompt agents to 

provide specific information about the anticipated criminal 

activity, will provide useful guidance for agents and 

supervisors. 

The threshold information from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

may be too voluminous to include on a paper form. 

Alternatively, the threshold information can be accessible to 

FBI employees through the HIU's Intranet web page and built-in 

links to the proposed automated re-engineering system. 

Appropriate manual revisions and re-engineering efforts will 

be undertaken to implement this new requirement. 

(5) Revise the promotion policies and the performance plans 

for Special Agents and executive managers to indicate, where 

applicable, that compliance or overseeing compliance with the 

G-4
Confidential Informant Guidelines will be considered in 

employees' annual performance appraisals (in accordance with 

Section I.I of the Confidential Informant Guidelines) and in 

promotion decisions. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

current promotion policy and performance plan mandate that all 

FBI GS-10 to GS-15 employees comply with the AG Guidelines. 

Although the policy does not single out one specific set of AG 

Guidelines, e.g. "Confidential Informant Guidelines," the FBI 

believes this mandated element is addressed sufficiently 

because it encompasses all applicable AG Guidelines. The 

Bureau will take steps to enforce the policy and hold 

accountable agents who fail inordinately in matters of 

compliance. 

(6) Evaluate the grade level of Special Agents who serve as 

Confidential Informant Coordinators and consider allowing 

Confidential Informant Coordinators to be elevated to a GS-14 

supervisory level, particularly in larger field offices where 

the Coordinator is a full-time position. The FBI should also 

ensure that that Confidential Informant Coordinators are 

supervised by personnel of a higher grade level who are 

familiar with the Criminal Informant Program and who have 

received training on the Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and 

will conduct the review. 

(7) Consider holding annual Informant Coordinator Conferences 

similar to those provided to Undercover Coordinators. The FBI 

should also consider opportunities for local, joint training 

with representatives from U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, which could 

address topics such as Guidelines provisions requiring 

approval, concurrence, or notice to the U.S. Attorneys’ 

Offices; the harm of Guidelines’ violations from the 

standpoint of the prosecution and the FBI; and “lessons 

learned” from past cases. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. 

However, we ask that the text of the OIG report include the 

following in-service training provided by the Asset/Informant 

Unit: 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT, CIVIL 

RIGHTS UNIT IN-SERVICE, FBI ACADEMY 

DATE: 01/08/2003 

G-5
NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 45 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: EXTRATERRITORIAL DESIGNATION AND SENSITIVE 

CIRCUMSTANCES, S-VISA PROGRAM REVIEW, SPBP PROGRAM REVIEW, 

CRITICAL SKILLS DEVELOPMENT, FBI HQ 

DATE: 02/13/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 100 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT, 

ATLANTA DIVISION 

DATE: 05/15/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 50 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT INSERVICE, FBI ACADEMY 

DATES: 06/23 -27/03 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 56 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents and Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: ASSET/INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY, USOU 

IN-SERVICE, FBI ACADEMY 

DATE: 06/25/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 48 

ATTENDEES: Special Agents and Task Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT, LAS 

VEGAS DIVISION 

DATES: 08/12 - 13/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 70 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT, COLUMBIA DIVISION 

DATES: 8/13/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 50 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT, DENVER DIVISION 

DATES: 9/8-12/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 50 

G-6
ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: USOU IN-SERVICE, FBI ACADEMY, CIP POLICY 

DATES: 9/17/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 50 

ATTENDEES: Special Agents and Task Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: DHS PAROLE CONFERENCE, SPBP MATTERS- NEW 

ORLEANS 

DATES: 9/23-24/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: APPROX 150 

ATTENDEES: Special Agents & Other Law Enforcement Officials 

TITLE OF COURSE: CIP (ANCHORAGE DIVISION) 

DATES: 9/30/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 50 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT, LITTLE ROCK DIVISION 

DATES: 10/09/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 50 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT, LOUISVILLE DIVISION 

DATES: 10/24-26/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 50 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT, ANCHORAGE DIVISION 

DATES: 10/29 - 30 /2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 45 

ATTENDEES: Supervisory Special Agents, Special Agents & Task 

Force Officers 

TITLE OF COURSE: INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT SEMINAR (A/IU), FBI 

ACADEMY 

DATES: 10/26-31/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 50 

ATTENDEES: Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: CIVIL RIGHTS IN-SERVICE (HQ), FBI ACADEMY 

DATES: 11/06/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 45 

ATTENDEES: Special Agents 

G-7
TITLE OF COURSE: BACK TO BASICS, FBIHQ 

DATES: 11/21/2003 (TWO SESSIONS) 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: APPROX 100 

ATTENDEES: Executive Assistant Directors, Assistant Directors, 

Deputy Assistant Directors & Supervisory Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: BACK TO BASICS, FBIHQ 

DATES: 12/05/2003 (TWO SESSIONS) 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: APPROX 100 

ATTENDEES: Executive Assistant Directors, Assistant Directors, 

Deputy Assistant Directors & Supervisory Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: BACK TO BASICS, FBIHQ 

DATES: 12/08/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: APPROX 100 

ATTENDEES: Executive Assistant Directors, Assistant Directors, 

Deputy Assistant Directors & Supervisory Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: BACK TO BASICS, FBIHQ 

DATES: 12/17/2003 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: APPROX 100 

ATTENDEES: Executive Assistant Directors, Assistant Directors, 

Deputy Assistant Directors & Supervisory Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: BACK TO BASICS, FBIHQ 

DATES: 01/08/2004 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: APPROX 100 

ATTENDEES: Executive Assistant Directors, Assistant Directors, 

Deputy Assistant Directors & Supervisory Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE DEVELOPMENT AND 

OPERATIONS IN-SERVICE - ADVANCED, FBI ACADEMY 

DATES: 02/22 - 26/2004 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 13 

ATTENDEES: Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: CIP POLICY, DRUG IN-SERVICE 

DATES: 06/24/2004 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 40 

ATTENDEES: Special Agents 

TITLE OF COURSE: CIP POLICY – BEST PRACTICES 

DATES: 07/15/2004 

NUMBER OF ATTENDEES: 18 

ATTENDEES: Assistant Directors, Deputy Assistant Directors 

and Assistant Special Agents in Charge 

G-8
Note: This list excludes training provided to foreign law 

enforcement authorities, training that focused primarily on 

national security assets, and CIP training conducted after 

July 31, 2004. The former Asset/Informant Unit (A/IU), 

currently called the HIU, also hosted a Coordinator's 

Conference in August 2004. 

(8) Review the training modules now used in New Agent 

Training, probationary training, and in-service training for 

Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents to ensure that 

the key Confidential Informant Guidelines requirements and 

risks of operating confidential informants are explained. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

HIU and the Training Division are updating training modules in 

conjunction with the Confidential Human Source Re-engineering 

Initiative. In the interim, DI will review all human source 

training modules at the FBI Academy to ensure current 

requirements and risks of operating CIs are explained fully. 

Additionally, in the future, Confidential Human Source 

Training Presentations will be available to field offices via 

the Intranet web page. 

(9) Include in the periodic training of Supervisory Special 

Agents a component or module on the importance of file reviews 

to the Criminal Informant Program. The training should also 

address frequently occurring violations of the Guidelines and 

MIOG provisions. A key objective of supervisory training 

should be on predictors of problems with confidential 

informants, such as long term confidential informants, 

confidential informants who have been assigned the same 

contact agents for an extensive period, confidential 

informants who are authorized to engage in otherwise illegal 

activity, confidential informants who have previously been 

deactivated “for cause,” and confidential informants who have 

been arrested or engaged in other unauthorized illegal 

activity while working as confidential informants. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and 

has begun implementation. In April 2005, the DI provided 

specific guidance for conducting Confidential Human Source 

file reviews to FBI Headquarters Supervisory Special Agents 

who are en route to field supervisory positions. Emphasis was 

placed on recurring violations of the AG Guidelines and MIOG 

provisions. Regular training and training materials will be 

made available to field office supervisory personnel in the 

future. 

G-9
A new training initiative is underway which will include 

several additional hours of human source training for new 

agents, in addition to comprehensive advanced training for 

agents, supervisors and Human Source Coordinators in the field 

offices. DI anticipates that a new training curriculum will 

be developed by early 2006. 

(10) Evaluate the grade level of Special Agents who serve as 

Undercover Coordinators and consider allowing Undercover 

Coordinators to be elevated to a GS-14 supervisory level, 

particularly in larger field offices where executive 

management deems it necessary to be a full-time position. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and 

will conduct the evaluation. 

(11) Encourage regular consultation between members of the 

undercover investigative team and the Undercover Coordinator 

during the formulation and conduct of the undercover operation. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. 

Proper and effective coordination between the undercover team 

and all facets of the FBI's undercover program are essential 

to an effective, efficient, safe and successful investigation. 

Communication among key players in the undercover operation 

should occur throughout the undercover process. 

The FBI's Field Guide on Undercover Operations (FGUSO) 

recognizes the importance of regular consultation among 

members of the undercover team. Recently, the Undercover and 

Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU) determined that communication 

is enhanced with the addition of an intelligence analyst and a 

field office Reports Officer to the undercover team. The 

undercover investigative team presently includes the squad 

supervisor, case agent, contact agent, undercover employee, 

account or financial analyst. The team is augmented by the 

Chief Division Counsel (CDC), Asset Forfeiture Coordinator, 

Financial Manager, Undercover Coordinator and the Special 

Agent in Charge (SAC). 

Section 10 of the FBI's FGUSO specifically describes the 

responsibilities and conduct of undercover operation personnel. 

For example, it notes that the SAC agrees that he or she “. . . 

will meet regularly with the undercover agents . . . ,” and 

“. . . the . . . will maintain contact with the undercover 

team. . . ." FGUSO outlines the roles and responsibilities of 

G-10
the various other components of the undercover investigative 

team. 

In addition to the existing policy, USOU provides training and 

conducts on-site reviews of undercover operations to ensure 

regular consultation occurs within the field office. Training 

now exists for all members of the undercover investigative 

team. Such training is in undercover certification courses, 

Group I writing seminars and FBI executive briefings at the 

field level during on-sites and at the FBIHQ level during new 

SAC orientations.

The FBI will add language to Section 10 of the FGUSO which 

outlines responsibilities of the Undercover Coordinator. It 

will include language emphasizing the need for ongoing 

consultation between the Undercover Coordinator and the 

undercover teams. The FBI will continue to send this message 

through training, undercover reviews and executive level 

briefings.

(12) Evaluate ways for the Undercover Coordinator to perform 

progress reviews at least every 90 days on undercover 

operations, a component of which should include an evaluation 

by senior managers, in consultation with Division Counsel and 

the Undercover Coordinator, of compliance with the Undercover 

Guidelines. The FBI should also create standardized forms to 

conduct these reviews. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation, as 

qualified below. Currently, the FBI employs a management tool 

known as a file review in all of its investigations. In the 

file review process, a field supervisor who maintains 

authority over a particular case agent reviews that agent's 

case file at least once every 90 days, sometimes sooner. The 

supervisor uses a standard FBI form to conduct this review and 

ensure compliance with all laws, policies and procedures, 

including those related to undercover matters. 

Once the FBI supervisor completes his or her review of the 

agent's investigations (including those employing the 

undercover technique), the results of the file review are 

maintained for a period of time. They are also reviewed by an 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge to ensure proper compliance. 

The file review records are subsequently maintained for review 

by the FBI Inspection Division. 

G-11
Additionally, all those who approve an undercover operation at 

the field office level must again review it if it comes up for 

renewal. For sensitive circumstance-related undercover 

operations, several FBIHQ units also review the proposal. 

In short numerous review processes already exist, and the 

creation of another entity to perform a review might well be 

redundant. The FBI, however, will consider whether further 

reviews of the type recommended might be useful. 

The FBI will design a semi-annual inspection tool for use in 

all undercover operations. Also, the FBI will make available 

another management tool in the form of a checklist. The FBI 

will use the checklist every 180 days to manage field 

undercover operations.

(13) Establish policies that promote more consistent Division 

Counsel involvement in the development and implementation of 

undercover operations, and ensure that Division Counsel are 

advised of anticipated legal problems in undercover operations. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Chief Division Counsel (CDC) in an FBI Field Office plays an 

important role in all undercover operations. Based upon 

present operating standards and existing FBI policy, the CDC's 

role in the undercover operation is ongoing throughout the 

undercover operation. 

The CDC is regularly consulted by the field office Undercover 

Coordinator, squad supervisor, and at times, a prospective 

undercover employee during the formulation of an undercover 

operation. The CDC also serves as a member of the field 

office undercover review committee. 

The CDC regularly prepares a stand-alone legal analysis of the 

proposed undercover operation. On sensitive undercover 

operations, the CDC routinely coordinates with the Office of 

the General Counsel at FBIHQ. In all undercover operations, 

the CDC signs the undercover proposal noting his or her review 

and that the proposal is in compliance with the Attorney 

General Guidelines and FBI policy. At each six-month interval 

of the undercover operation, the CDC again reviews and 

analyzes the operation. 

The FBI will add language to Section 10 of the Field Guide 

that outlines specific responsibilities regarding the CDC in 

undercover operations. 

G-12
(14) Because neither the MIOG nor FBI field guides adequately 

address the issues below, provide guidance on the following: 

• the meaning of "sensitive circumstances" relating to 

"systemic corruption" of governmental functions, and the 

"significant risk" of violence or physical injury to 

individuals pursuant to Undercover Guidelines Sections 

IV.C.2.b & IV.C.2.m, respectively; 

• how to limit the scope of authorizations for otherwise 

illegal activity in undercover operations; and 

• special concerns and compliance issues associated with 

task force participation. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation as 

modified for each of the four subsections below but, as a 

general matter, disputes the premise that existing guidance on 

these matters is “inadequate.” 

• the meaning of "sensitive circumstances" relating to 

"systemic corruption"

The Manual of Investigative Operations, Part II, Section 10-11 

is the governing administrative document concerning undercover 

operations. That particular section of MIOG refers to the 

FGUSO, Section Three, which addresses all of the sensitive 

circumstances enumerated within the Attorney General 

Guidelines on Undercover Operations. Specifically, Section 

3.2.A of the FGUSO addresses the public corruption sensitive 

circumstances. 

Concerning the “systemic corruption” guidance, the FBI 

believes that adequate procedural guidance exists to ensure 

that a rational, sound determination is made as to the 

existence or absence of systemic corruption. Pursuant to the 

Guidelines and the FGUSO, the Section Chief, Integrity in 

Government/Civil Rights Section, CID, has the authority and 

perspective to determine whether public corruption is systemic 

in any given case. In addition, the Public Corruption Unit 

(PCU) at FBI has authored a special instructional document 

titled Field Guide for Public Corruption Investigations, which 

provides further guidance to assist in making this 

determination. Finally, the Undercover and Sensitive 

Operations Unit works closely with the Public Corruption Unit, 

the Office of the General Counsel, and the field office in all 

G-13
undercover operations that involve public corruption to 

determine the presence or absence of this circumstance on a 

case-by-case basis. 

Nevertheless, the FBI concurs that field offices would be 

assisted by the addition of language in the Field Guide which 

better describes and defines “systemic corruption.” Such a 

definition will be developed by USOU in consultation with the 

PCU and the Office of the General Counsel and some examples of 

what constitutes systemic corruption will also be included. 

• the meaning of "significant risk of violence or physical 

injury"

The Manual of Investigative Operations, Part II, Section 10-11, 

is the governing administrative document relative to 

undercover operations. That particular section of MIOG refers 

to the FBI's Field Guide on Undercover and Sensitive 

Operations (FGUSO). Section Three of the FGUSO addresses all 

of the sensitive circumstances enumerated within the Attorney 

General Guidelines on Undercover Operations. Specifically, 

section 3.2.D addresses the safety sensitive circumstance. 

Simply defined, a significant risk of violence is a situation 

where it is more likely than not that violence will occur and 

that violence is likely to result in seriously bodily injury, 

or even death. A review of undercover operations has found 

that no authorized undercover operation has had the occurrence 

of serious bodily injury or death. The Undercover and 

Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU), in conjunction with other 

FBIHQ entities, to include the Office of the General Counsel, 

undertakes sufficient program management in the area of 

significant risk of violent or physical injury. Undercover 

operations, both sensitive and non-sensitive are thoroughly 

reviewed to ensure that all risks of violence or injury are 

minimized. Undercover operations often employ additional 

safeguards that may include operations orders and other checks 

and balances to ensure safety is paramount, and risk is either 

reduced or eliminated. With sensitive undercover operation 

proposals, USOU reviews undercover scenarios that include all 

potential references to violence. In situations where the 

absence of violence cannot be ensured, USOU has disapproved of 

the undercover scenario. 

Despite the procedural safeguards, the FBI will add language 

similar to above to the Field Guide that further explains what 

G-14
constitutes a significant risk of violence to the extent 

possible. 

• How to Limit the Scope of authorization for Otherwise 

Illegal Activity

The FBI concurs with this recommendation and will add language 

to its Field Guide that promotes a three-part analysis to 

determine whether OIA is appropriate: 1) OIA should be the 

minimum necessary to prove the elements of the offense(s) and 

consistent with prosecutive guidelines; 2) OIA should, when 

feasible, reflect realistic limitations; and 3) OIA should, 

when feasible, be measurable and not open-ended. In addition, 

a policy of imposing case-specific stipulations by the CUORC 

will be recommended as circumstances dictate. 

• Guidance on the Special Concerns and Compliance Issues 

Associated with Task Force Participation in Undercover 

Operations

The FBI concurs with this recommendation. USOU has developed 

guidance, policy and training relative to both FBI and non-FBI 

participants in undercover operations. With the most recent 

modification to the Attorney General Guidelines in 2002, USOU 

requested and received concurrence from the Department of 

Justice (DOJ) to change the term “undercover agent” to 

“undercover employee,” the recognition of the fact that other 

than FBI employees sometimes perform undercover duties. 

The FBI then created new policy concerning undercover 

employees. The policy, enacted in 2002 and enhanced in 2003, 

is contained the FGUSO, sections 10 and 11. 

The standards to participate in undercover operations 

conducted under the direction and control of the FBI do not 

differ depending on the organizational affiliation of the 

undercover employee. The FBI employs three phases to certify 

all law enforcement persons assigned undercover roles in FBI 

undercover operations. Phase one includes the collection of 

various administrative data, Henthorn/Giglio reviews and 

pending administrative inquiries. Additionally, a nondisclosure agreement and a completed memorandum of 

understanding are sought from the task force officer and 

his/her agency. In Phase two, prospective undercover 

employees must successfully undergo and complete a 

psychological examination. Lastly, completion of Phase three 

G-15
certifies the agent or task force officer for use as an 

undercover employee. 

Clear policy, guidance and training are afforded to 

prospective non-FBI personnel under consideration for use as 

undercover employees. USOU is aware that compliance with such 

standards and policies may not be consistent in all FBI field 

offices. To ensure effective program oversight, USOU 

thoroughly reviews all sensitive and non-sensitive undercover 

operations for compliance to the three phases of certification. 

Additionally, on-site reviews and the inspection process serve 

as methods to ensure compliance in this area. 

To improve program management in undercover operations 

relative to task force officers, USOU will employ a Task Force 

Officer review mechanism. The following criteria are for 

consideration of non-FBI employees in an undercover capacity:

• Complete a required undercover employee consideration 

checklist 

• Obtain a MOU/letter of agreement from the TFO's agency 

• Conduct Henthorn/Giglio review 

• Conduct pending internal affairs review 

• Successfully complete a Safeguard psychological 

assessment or equivalent 

• Complete a TFO non-disclosure form 

• Obtain certification from a Special Agent in Charge, 

pursuant to FGUSO, section 11 or successfully complete 

the FBI undercover certification course

(15) Identify ways to enhance Undercover Guidelines 

compliance training for field supervisors and undercover 

employees, including use of instructional CD-ROMs, web-based 

courses, and joint training with the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. 

Absent exigent circumstances, either as part of the 

certification of undercover employees or otherwise, the FBI 

should require undercover employees to complete undercover 

operation compliance training before participating in 

undercover operations. The FBI should also ensure that all 

field supervisors who provide guidance pursuant to Section 

VI.A of the Guidelines regarding preparation of undercover 

employees are familiar with undercover techniques, compliance 

requirements, and the Field Guide for Undercover & Sensitive 

Operations. 

G-16
FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

FBI employs sophisticated and advanced undercover training. 

Many countries have modeled their undercover programs and 

their undercover training after the FBI. Numerous state, 

local and federal agencies emulate the FBI's undercover 

program. 

Following the OIG recommendation above, the FBI determined 

that all members of the undercover review team, with the 

exception of the field supervisor, receive some type of 

specialized undercover related training. Undercover employees 

are trained in backstopping and certified for use in 

undercover operations. Case agents receive training relative 

to managing the undercover investigation. Case accountants or 

financial analysts receive training to ensure their compliance 

with confidential funding matters. Immediately upon review of 

the OIG report, the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit 

(USOU) developed a block of instruction for FBI supervisors 

concerning undercover operations. On 07/19/2005, USOU 

personnel presented the first block of instruction to about 45 

FBI supervisors at the Supervisor's Management Course at the 

FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. 

USOU will continue to enhance undercover training for all 

members of the undercover investigative team using all means 

possible. Undercover compliance, awareness and certification 

will be made part of a newly enhanced undercover operation 

proposal.

(16) As part of the Undercover Coordinator's certification 

currently provided for Group I and II undercover operation 

proposals, add a certification that the instructions set forth 

in Section VI.A.2 of the Undercover Guidelines regarding 

lawful investigative techniques have been given to each 

undercover employee. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU) will amend the 

undercover proposal. The amendment will include a 

certification that the instructions set forth in Section 

VI.A.2 of the AGG have been given to each undercover employee. 

The new undercover proposal includes a section where all 

members of the undercover investigative team certify their 

review of the AGG.

(17) Amend the Group I and Group II undercover operation 

proposals forms that currently provide information regarding 

G-17
the expected execution of the undercover operation to include 

a section: "Facts Pertinent to Violence Risk Assessment." 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU) will amend the 

undercover proposal. The amendment will include a section 

titled "Facts Pertinent to Violence Risk Assessment." USOU 

will provide field guidance about the information required in 

this new section of the undercover proposal. 

(18) Require field offices seeking approval of Group 1 

undercover operations to obtain concurrence letters from U.S. 

Attorneys' Offices that meet the requirements of Section 

IV.F.2.b of the Undercover Guidelines and amend Section 4.8(5) 

of the Field Guide for Undercover & Sensitive Operations 

accordingly. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU) will be 

responsible to ensure full compliance of Section IV.F.2.b of 

the Attorney General Guidelines on Undercover Operations. 

Specifically, USOU will ensure that the letter received from 

the respective United States Attorney's Office (USAO) is 

signed by the United States Attorney (USA), or the applicable 

official who is acting in that capacity at the time the letter 

is authored. 

Additionally, USOU will ensure that all USAO letters 

associated with Group I UCO submissions contain the following 

language: 

• the USAO has reviewed the proposed operation, including 

any sensitive circumstances reasonably expected to occur 

• the USAO agrees with the proposal and its legality 

• the USAO finds that the proposed investigation would be 

an appropriate use of the undercover technique 

• the USAO believes that the potential benefits in 

detecting, preventing, or prosecuting criminal activity 

outweigh any direct costs or risks of other harm 

• the USAO will prosecute any meritorious case that is 

developed. 

G-18
(19) Ensure that the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit 

has access to the Inspection Division's undercover operation 

audits. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU) Chief has 

already coordinated this matter with an Assistant Inspector of 

the Inspection Division (INSD). USOU and INSD have reviewed 

inspection-related criteria associated with the FBI's 

undercover programs and made changes resulting in a more 

effective and efficient review of the undercover program 

during the inspection process. For example, INSD now grants 

USOU access to its undercover operation audits. 

(20) Ensure compliance with the General Crime Guidelines’ 

requirements to obtain and document authorizations for the 

extension, conversion to full investigation, and closing of 

preliminary inquiries. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

FBI will ensure compliance with the General Crimes Guidelines' 

requirements to obtain and document authorizations for the 

extension, conversion to full investigation, and closing of 

preliminary inquiries. 

(21) Institute measures to ensure consistency in meeting and 

documenting the notification and reporting requirements 

provided in Sections III.A.5 and III.B.4 of the General Crimes 

Guidelines, including requiring FBI field offices to maintain 

in the relevant investigative file documentation of the notice 

of the opening of criminal intelligence investigations to 

DOJ's Counterterrorism, Organized Crime and Racketeering 

Sections, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and 

the relevant U.S. Attorneys' Offices as required in 

racketeering enterprise investigations and terrorism 

enterprise investigations. The FBI should also ensure that 

progress reports required by the Guidelines in terrorism 

enterprise investigations are provided to OIPR, DOJ's 

Counterterrorism Section, and FBI Headquarters. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation with 

the exception discussed below. The Criminal Investigative 

Division, Criminal Intelligence Section, Criminal Intelligence 

Management & Policy Unit (CIMPU) was established in March 2003. 

The CIMPU recognized that the FBI had a problem with 

consistency in meeting and documenting the notification and 

reporting requirements in III.A.5 and III.B.4 of the General 

G-19
Crimes Guidelines, and immediately took steps to develop and 

institute policy and procedures to remedy this problem. 

Within three months, by electronic communication (EC) to all 

field offices, dated 06/23/2003, entitled "Racketeering 

Enterprise Investigations (REI)", the CIMPU reiterated FBI 

policy and procedures for uploading all communications in an 

REI and for meeting and documenting the notification and 

reporting requirements provided in III.A.5 and III.B.4 of the 

General Crimes Guidelines. 

All field offices were specifically advised of the policy and 

procedures necessary to comply with AG and FBI Guidelines for 

REIs and the necessity of advising CIMPU of the initiation of 

all REIs. CIMPU advised the field that upon notification of 

an REI, CIMPU would review the file for compliance issues and 

upon ensuring the file was in compliance, notify DOJ OCRS of 

the initiation of the REI and document that in the field 

office REI file, both electronically in the FBI's Automated 

Case Support (ACS) system and by hard copy mailed to the field 

office. 

As part of its compliance review, upon notification of the 

initiation of an REI by the field office, CIMPU will also 

institute a check to ensure the field office has notified the 

appropriate U.S. Attorneys’ Office. 

With respect to terrorism enterprise investigations (TEI), the 

Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS) meets regularly 

with counterparts in the Counterterrorism Section at DOJ to 

brief them on the openings, progress, and renewals of these 

investigations. DTOS will take measures to ensure that 

compliance with the Guidelines notice requirements are 

consistently documented in field office case files. In 

addition, although the General Crimes Guidelines envision that 

the TEI will be used to gather criminal intelligence in 

international terrorism cases, the Counterterrorism Division 

made the policy decision to restrict the TEI to domestic 

terrorism only and to collect intelligence on and investigate 

international terrorism matters under the National Security 

Investigative Guidelines rather than the General Crimes 

Guidelines. For this reason, notice to OIPR of TEI openings, 

progress, and renewals is not made as domestic terrorism is 

not within OIPR’s charter. If this policy is changed to open 

TEIs on international terrorism, notice to OIPR of those cases 

will be made as a matter of course. 

(22) Discuss with DOJ how to reconcile Section 100-2.3(3) of 

the MIOG, requiring Headquarters' concurrence the initiation 

G-20
and renewal of terrorism enterprise investigations, with 

Sections III.B.4.a & b of the General Crimes Guidelines, which 

authorize field level initiation and renewal of these 

investigations. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with the recommendation that 

reconciliation between the Guideline authority for field 

office approval of TEIs and the MIOG requirement for HQ 

approval should be discussed with DOJ. The Counterterrorism 

Division, however, requires FBIHQ concurrence of SAC 

authorization to initiate and renew a TEI to ensure 

centralized program management of these investigations, which 

typically involve groups with a nation-wide presence, and to 

permit higher level review of these sensitive investigations 

that usually implicate first amendment concerns. Although it 

is the FBI’s position that these reasons for the variance from 

the Guidelines authority are valid, this matter will be 

discussed with DOJ and appropriate reconciliation pursued. 

(23) Require field level supervisory approval prior to the 

exercise of Part VI.A.2 authorities to visit public places or 

attend public events for the purpose of detecting or 

preventing terrorist activities, absent exigent circumstances. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Counterterrorism Division will send a communication to all 

field offices setting forth this policy. 

(24) Develop a standardized form or a short e-mail template 

to be completed by case agents to document their use of the 

Part VI.A.2 authorities. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Counterterrorism Division will request that this statistic be 

captured under the re-engineering process currently underway.

(25) In light of the survey responses of Division Counsel, 

consider whether (a) field office practices since May 30, 2002, 

regarding predication, collection, record retention, indexing, 

and dissemination of Part VI.A information, and the practices 

regarding utilization of "zero files" or other files to 

capture Part VI.A information, are in conformity with the 

Guidelines and FBI guidance; (b) there is a need for further 

guidance on predication, collection, record retention, 

indexing, dissemination, or other issues; and (c) FBI 

Headquarters managers should have access to data reflecting 

G-21
use of Part VI.A.2 authorities in order to be satisfied that 

these authorities are used in conformity with the Guidelines. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with the recommendation to 

consider the three matters listed above. The Counterterrorism 

Division will consult with the Office of the General Counsel 

to review existing guidance and to determine whether 

additional guidance concerning the collection, retention, and 

dissemination of Part VI.A.2 information is required and, if 

so, how to make those data available to HQ program managers. 

(26) Ensure that required authorizations for consensual 

monitoring are obtained in advance and are appropriately 

documented. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and 

will ensure that required authorizations for consensual 

monitoring are obtained in advance and are appropriately 

documented. 

27) For monitorings that do not require DOJ approval, consult 

with DOJ to resolve whether the Consensual Monitoring 

Guidelines should be interpreted to authorize monitoring for 

more than 90 days (including up to "the duration of the 

investigation" as currently provided on Form FD-759), or 

whether the authorization is limited to 90 days. The resulting 

interpretation should be incorporated in the FBI's MIOG and 

communicated to the field. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with the recommendation. By 

letter dated August 25, 2005, the Director of DOJ, Office of 

Enforcement Operations (OEO), advised that the Consensual 

Monitoring Guidelines should be interpreted to authorize 

monitoring for more than 90 days (including up to “the 

duration of the investigation” as currently provided on Form 

FD-759). The FBI is also evaluating OEO’s response to 

determine if any further clarification of current FBI policy 

is advisable. 

(28) Provide CUORC members, upon request, with access to 

copies of Inspection reports concerning undercover operations, 

the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit on-site reviews, 

and after-action reports of undercover operations.

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU) Chief has 

already coordinated this matter with an Assistant Inspector of 

G-22
the Inspection Division (INSD). USOU and INSD have reviewed 

inspection-related criteria associated with the FBI's 

undercover programs and already effected modifications to 

enhance a more effective and efficient review of the 

undercover program during the inspection process. The INSD 

has agreed to permit the USOU access to the INSD's undercover 

operation audits. 

(29) Consider ways for the Undercover and Sensitive 

Operations Unit to develop more complete information for the 

CUORC and other FBI components, such as conducting a periodic 

analysis of the patterns and trends found in its on-site 

reports, informing the CUORC members of any persistent 

Guidelines violations, and providing copies of its semi-annual 

report to all FBI Headquarters operating Divisions, the Office 

of General Counsel, and the Training Division. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit (USOU) enjoys a 

positive relationship with the members of the Criminal 

Undercover Operations Review Committee (CUORC). As noted in 

OIG recommendation 28, the AGG, Section D, defines the role 

and responsibility of the CUORC. Since its inception, the 

CUORC has ensured the FBI's proper application of the 

undercover technique in a variety of investigative and 

intelligence matters. 

The FBI vigorously reviews the conduct of its undercover 

personnel and undercover operations. Any inconsistencies with 

the AGG or FBI undercover policy are brought forthwith to the 

CUORC. 

The FBI's semiannual report is maintained in accordance with 

all applicable records management policies. As such, 

appropriate entities inside and outside the FBI can conduct an 

appropriate review of the report(s) as needed.

(30) To assist CIRC members in evaluating the confidential 

informants within its purview and assist field and 

Headquarters managers in their supervisory responsibilities in 

overseeing the Criminal Informant Program, require that the 

Initial and Continuing Suitability Reports and Recommendations 

contain more thorough answers to the suitability questions, 

such as: 

• A description of the legitimate source of income of 

confidential informants. 

G-23
• The confidential informants' statistical accomplishments, 

including the number of indictments, convictions, Title III 

wiretap applications, and other indicia of the informant's 

contributions. 

• Details on how confidential informants are in a position to 

obtain relevant information. 

• Details on the nature of any unauthorized illegal activity 

committed by confidential informants, including the 

informants' criminal history record and the continuing 

suitability reports required to be completed in accordance 

with Section II.A.2.b of the Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

• The informant record of any confidential informant who was 

previously deactivated for cause by the FBI, including the 

reasons for deactivation and the field division operating the 

informant. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

Directorate of Intelligence will amend the SR&R forms to 

prompt agents to provide more thorough answers to suitability 

questions. In the CIRC context, the thorough responses will 

allow DOJ attorneys to concentrate on decision-making rather 

than fact-finding. 

(31) Consider having the Human Intelligence Unit draft 

"lessons learned" from the CIRC's decisions, periodically 

communicate these lessons to field personnel, and incorporate 

them into training on the Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. When 

resources are available, “lessons learned” from the CIRC’s 

decisions will be drafted and disseminated to field office 

personnel monthly through an electronic communication or the 

Intranet web page. These lessons will be incorporated into 

training on the Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

(32) Make available to CIRC members, upon request, copies of 

the Inspection Division's audits of the Criminal Informant 

Program (including any reinspection reports) and evaluations 

performed by the Human Intelligence Unit of compliance with 

the Confidential Informant Guidelines. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. The 

FBI will consider any requests from CIRC members for 

G-24
Inspection Division audits of the Confidential Informant 

Program, re-inspection reports concerning human sources, and 

HIU evaluations. However, we believe that generally it is not 

necessary for the DOJ to receive this information in order to 

carry out the essential purpose of the CIRC. 

(33) Revise Inspection Division checklists and 

interrogatories to increase inspection coverage of Guidelinesrelated issues. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. In 

July 2005, the INSD revised informant program checklists to 

include all matters recommended by the OIG, and increased 

inspection coverage of guidelines-related issues. The revised 

checklist questions cover all AGG issues related to the 

operation of criminal informants. 

(34) As part of the Inspection Division's triennial 

inspections of field and Headquarters' divisions, establish an 

audit examining the collection of information obtained from 

exercise of counterterrorism authorities pursuant to Section 

VI.A.2 (Visiting Public Places and Events) of the General 

Crimes Guidelines. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. 

(35) Provide more thorough and timely reporting of Guidelines 

violations by identifying in inspection reports the causes and 

gravity of compliance deficiencies; developing summary 

statistics to assist in determining when reinspections are 

appropriate; and automating key components of the inspection 

process. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. It 

should be noted the INSD Criminal Informant Program (CIP) 

checklists have been revised to collect information on the 

causes of identified deficiencies. In addition, the INSD is 

in the process of creating a computer database to assist in 

analyzing the results of compliance audits.

(36) Increase inspections for the Criminal Informant Program 

and other programs that are priorities or experiencing 

significant problems by performing more frequent inspections 

at irregular times. The Inspection Division should also 

develop a standard for reinspections that accounts for the 

frequency and seriousness of the Guidelines deficiencies 

identified during the regular inspection and develop a 

G-25
standard for determining when reinspections should be 

conducted that accounts for both the number and gravity of the 

deficiencies found. The Inspection Division and the Human 

Intelligence Unit should reinstate its Criminal Informant 

Program reinspection process. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. 

(37) Address in employee performance appraisals the findings 

from Inspection Division inspections that identify either 

superior or deficient Guidelines compliance performance. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation to 

address this element of performance in employee performance 

appraisals and will explore ways to accomplish this goal 

within the limits of the regulations that govern this process 

as well as the limitations of the FBI Performance Appraisal 

System. 

(38) Elevate egregious non-compliance with Guidelines to an 

executive management finding in the inspection report rather 

than deferring that action until the next three-year 

inspection contingent on the detection of recurring, serious 

deficiencies. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation.

(39) The Inspection Division and the Human Intelligence Unit 

should institute procedures that establish follow-up 

inspection measures to reinspections that indicate on-going 

compliance problems, such as assigning a single Assistant 

Inspector in Place to conduct an additional inspection within 

the first six months following the reinspection. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. 

(40) Modify the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit onsite review data collection instrument to better address 

Guidelines compliance, including issues such as otherwise 

illegal activity, potential entrapment issues, and task force 

participation. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation.

(41) Ensure that Attorney General Guidelines violations 

warranting potential discipline are referred to the FBI's 

G-26
Internal Investigations Section in a consistent fashion 

throughout the FBI. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. 

(42) Ensure that the Inspection Division’s standards for 

referring misconduct involving Guidelines violations are 

consistent with practices adopted by the Internal 

Investigations Section. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and a 

new process has already been implemented by the INSD. 

(43) Add separate offense codes for: (i) knowingly or 

recklessly failing to obtain proper authorization for a 

source's participation in otherwise illegal activity; (ii) 

knowingly or recklessly failing to obtain proper 

authorization to operate long-term, high level, privileged or 

media-affiliated confidential informants or other informants 

subject to special approval requirements; and (iii) knowingly 

or recklessly failing to operate long-term, high level, 

privileged or media-affiliated confidential informants, or 

other informants subject to special approval requirements in 

accordance with the relevant Confidential Informant Guidelines 

and MIOG provisions. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. A 

team from the INSD and the Office of Professional 

Responsibility has been formed to ensure that the three new 

offense codes are added in accordance with the relevant 

Confidential Informant Guidelines and MIOG provisions. 

(44) Assign some person or unit at FBI Headquarters the 

responsibility to develop a plan to ensure proper and timely 

execution of the revisions and to coordinate implementation of 

the revisions over time. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation and 

will determine the best way to implement it. 

(45) Distribute the revised Guidelines to Chief Division 

Counsel, together with a concise summary or listing of the 

changes, sufficiently in advance of the new Guidelines' 

effective date to allow field personnel to familiarize 

themselves with the revisions and to allow those Headquarters 

and field personnel who provide training on the revisions to 

develop training materials and a schedule for providing 

G-27
training. In addition, near the effective date of the revision, 

the FBI should develop and distribute standardized forms and 

other administrative support tools, issue field guidance, and 

identify a Headquarters point of contact who can address 

questions concerning the revisions. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation. 

(46) Ensure that revisions to the MIOG accurately reflect any 

changes to the Guidelines and are made on or about the 

effective date of such changes. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation with 

the reservation that if a considered agency decision is made 

to impose more restrictive procedural requirements in the MIOG 

for agency oversight purposes than those required by the 

Guidelines, then such distinctions and the reasons therefore 

be documented and explained in the MIOG revisions. 

(47) Make appropriate changes to the MIOG to reconcile the 

discrepancies between the Guidelines and the MIOG that are 

identified in this report. 

FBI Response: The FBI concurs with this recommendation that 

appropriate changes to the MIOG should be made where true 

discrepancies exist. Furthermore, the responsibility for 

making the MIOG changes should be assigned to the FBI HQ 

entity that disseminated the field wide guidance on the 2002 

revisions. 

G-28
APPENDIX H 
 

OIG ANALYSIS OF THE FBI RESPONSE 

TO OIG RECOMMENDATIONS 

 In accordance with the OIG’s standard procedures, the OIG provided 

a draft of this report to the FBI on July 12, 2005, for its review. The FBI 

comments to the draft report are provided in Appendix G. In its response, 

the FBI concurred with 43 of the 47 recommendations and concurred with 

the remaining 4 recommendations, with modifications. In many of the 

responses, the FBI provided a description of actions or procedures it has 

recently implemented or proposes to implement in response to our 

recommendations. We are asking the FBI to provide to us, when they are 

implemented, a description of these actions and procedures. When we 

receive this material, the OIG will examine whether the FBI’s actions 

address our recommendations and whether those recommendations should 

be closed. 

 Our analysis of the FBI’s comments on each recommendation follows. 

Recommendation Number: 

1. Resolved. In response to this recommendation to develop a 

compliance plan for the FBI’s human source program and an 

implementation plan to put the plan into practice, the FBI stated that it 

concurs with this recommendation. The FBI stated that its Directorate of 

Intelligence is re-engineering the Human Source Program with emphasis on 

improving compliance with the Attorney General’s Guidelines and FBI 

policy. The FBI described the elements of its re-engineering efforts, which 

include new guidelines, policies, manuals, technologies, training initiatives, 

and processes for the utilization of human sources. 

 As this review was completed, the FBI had not yet finalized the 

various elements of its re-engineering initiative, and no new Guidelines or 

Guidelines interpretations have been issued. Please provide us the 

approved re-engineering plan when it is completed, as well as the 

compliance and implementation plans called for in the recommendation. 

2. Resolved. In response to this recommendation to develop 

standardized forms to capture the most significant Attorney General 

Guidelines and MIOG requirements for operating confidential informants, a 

standardized file review “cover sheet,” and an electronic user’s manual, the 

FBI stated that it concurs with this recommendation. The FBI stated that 

standardized forms and file review cover sheets are a major component of 

the re-engineering initiatives for the Human Source Program and that the 

automation component of that initiative will have “built-in features that 

H-1

H-1
prevent users from proceeding without completing critical areas of the 

template . . .” In addition, because the FBI does not anticipate that the 

initial aspects of the initiative will be implemented until January 2006, the 

FBI stated that it will consider creating and implementing stop-gap uniform 

standardized forms throughout the FBI. 

 Please provides us with the approved re-engineering plan, including 

plans for standardized electronic forms, file review “cover sheets,” and a 

user’s manual to be used throughout the FBI, together with guidance and 

notifications necessary to implement the changes. In addition, if the FBI 

decides to provide stop gap standardized forms until the reengineering 

initiatives are in place, please provide us with the standardized forms and 

any other interim measures to address this recommendation on an interim 

basis. 

3. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI institute 

procedures for determining if state or local prosecuting offices have filed 

charges against confidential informants who engage in “unauthorized illegal 

activity (OIA),” the FBI stated that it concurs with this recommendation. 

The FBI stated that case agents who handle CIs are responsible for 

determining whether a state or local prosecutor has filed charges against 

the CI and that first-line supervisors are responsible for ensuring that that 

the Chief Federal Prosecutor is notified if a CI engages in unauthorized 

illegal activity. However, the FBI acknowledged that a field office’s ability to 

learn of unauthorized activity by its CIs varies widely among local law 

enforcement agencies. The FBI stated that the Directorate of Intelligence 

will consider designing a standard 90-day file review format (and related 

manual revisions and re-engineering efforts) which will prompt the first-line 

supervisor to ensure that relevant documentation is contained in the CI’s 

file. 

 Please provide a description of the new procedures, together with any 

guidance or notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

4. Resolved. In response to this recommendation to amend forms used 

to authorize “otherwise illegal activity” so as to assist case agents in 

distinguishing Tier 1 “otherwise illegal activity” from Tier 2 “otherwise illegal 

activity,” the FBI stated that it concurs with this recommendation. The FBI 

stated that implementing Bureau-wide standardized forms that include the 

definitions of Tier 1 and Tier 2 OIA and prompt agents to provide specific 

information about the anticipated “otherwise illegal activity” in which the CI 

is authorized to participate will provide useful guidance for agents and 

supervisors. However, the FBI notes that because the U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines information may be too voluminous to include in a standardized 

form, this information will be accessible through the Human Intelligence 

H-2

H-2
Unit’s Intranet web page and links to the proposed automated reengineering system. 

 Please provide us with the standardized forms and related manual 

revisions, together with any guidance or notifications necessary to 

implement this recommendation, and describe the pertinent re-engineering 

efforts. 

5. Unresolved. In response to this recommendation to revise the FBI’s 

promotion policies and the performance plans for Special Agents and 

executive managers to indicate, where applicable, that compliance or 

overseeing compliance with the Confidential Informant Guidelines will be 

considered in employees’ annual performance appraisals, the FBI stated 

that it concurs with the recommendation. However, the FBI stated that it 

believes the current mandatory element sufficiently addresses Section I.I of 

the Confidential Informant Guidelines’ requirement because the referenced 

element contains a reference to “all applicable AG Guidelines.” 

 We do not believe the FBI’s current performance plans comply with 

Section I.I of the Confidential Informant Guidelines. Prior to the May 2002 

revisions of the CI Guidelines, which require that compliance with the CI 

Guidelines be explicitly referenced in performance plans, there was a 

generic reference in the critical elements for Special Agents GS 10 to GS 14 

and for GS 15 and Senior Level Special Agents to “make decisions in 

accordance with existing policies and procedures (e.g., follows Attorney 

General guidelines).” The critical element for these agents in the forms 

effective during the period prior to the most recent revision contained the 

same generic reference. Accordingly, we believe that the Guidelines’ revision 

issued in January 2001 to make explicit reference to the Confidential 

Informant Guidelines was intentional and that the generic reference in the 

performance plans effective April 2005 does not comply with the spirit or the 

letter of the revisions to the Guidelines. 

 In its response to this recommendation, the FBI also did not address 

parallel changes the OIG recommends for referencing compliance and 

overseeing compliance with the CI Guidelines in FBI promotion policies. 

 Accordingly, this recommendation remains unresolved. The FBI may 

resolve this recommendation by revising its performance plans for all 

Special Agents and executive managers to indicate that compliance or 

overseeing compliance with the Confidential Informant Guidelines will be 

considered in employees’ annual performance appraisals, and making 

corresponding revisions to its promotion policies. 

6. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI evaluate 

the grade level of Special Agents who serve as Confidential Informant 

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Coordinators and consider allowing Confidential Informant Coordinators to 

be elevated to a GS-14 supervisory level, particularly in larger FBI field 

offices, the FBI stated that it concurs with this recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide us with the results of the FBI’s review and 

analysis. 

7. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI consider 

holding annual Informant Coordinator Conferences as well as opportunities 

for local, joint training with representatives from the U.S. Attorney’s Offices 

on certain topics (such as Guidelines’ provisions requiring approval, 

concurrence or notice to the U.S. Attorney’s Offices; the harm of Guidelines’ 

violations from the standpoint of the prosecution and the FBI; and “lessons 

learned” from past cases), the FBI stated that it concurs with this 

recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide us with the results of the FBI’s 

consideration of holding annual Informant Coordinator Conferences as well 

as the other joint training programs and topics referenced in our 

recommendation. 

8. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI review 

the training modules now used in New Agent training, probationary 

training, and in-service training for Special Agents and Supervisory Special 

Agents to ensure that key Confidential Informant Guidelines’ requirements 

and risks of operating informants are explained, the FBI stated that it 

concurs with this recommendation. The FBI also stated that the Human 

Intelligence Unit and the Training Division are updating training modules in 

conjunction with the re-engineering initiatives and, in the interim, will 

ensure that current Guidelines’ requirements and risks of operating CIs are 

fully explained. 

 Accordingly, please provide us with the current training modules; any 

interim, updated training modules used pending completion of the Human 

Source re-engineering initiatives; and the training modules developed as 

part of those initiatives. 

9. Resolved. In response to this recommendation to include in the 

periodic training of Supervisory Special Agents a component or module on 

the importance of file reviews to the Criminal Informant Program and 

frequently occurring Guidelines and MIOG violations with the objective of 

stressing predictors of problems with confidential informants, the FBI stated 

that it concurs with this recommendation and has begun implementation. 

The FBI stated that the Directorate of Intelligence has provided specific 

guidance for conducting human source file reviews to Headquarters 

Supervisory Special Agents who are en route to field supervisory positions, 

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with emphasis on recurring Guidelines and MIOG violations, and that 

regular training and training materials will be made available to field office 

supervisory personnel in the future. 

 Accordingly, please provide us with details of the new training 

modules and other aspects of the training component of the re-engineering 

initiative. 

10. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI evaluate 

the grade level of Special Agents who serve as Undercover Coordinators and 

consider allowing Undercover Coordinators to be elevated to a GS-14 

supervisory level, the FBI stated that it concurs with this recommendation. 

In addition, the FBI stated that it may, if feasible, direct a study to 

determine whether the duties and responsibilities of the Undercover 

Coordinators are commensurate with a grade change to a GS-14. The FBI 

also stated that it will advise Special Agents in Charge to assign GS-14 

supervisors collateral duties as Undercover Coordinators, resulting in 

changes in 16 of the FBI’s 56 field offices. 

 Accordingly, please provide the referenced study and the results of the 

FBI’s analysis. 

11. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI 

encourage regular consultation between members of its undercover 

investigative teams and Undercover Coordinators during the formulation 

and conduct of undercover operations, the FBI stated that it concurs with 

this recommendation. The FBI also stated that it will add language to the 

USOU’s Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations outlining 

responsibilities of the Undercover Coordinator, including the duty to 

regularly consult with undercover teams, and will ensure such 

consultations continue through training, undercover reviews, and executive 

level briefings. 

 Accordingly, please provide details of the revised Field Guide 

provisions and other measures the FBI has agreed to undertake. 

12. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI evaluate 

ways for Undercover Coordinators to perform progress reviews at least every 

90 days on undercover operations, a component of which should include an 

evaluation by senior managers, in consultation with Division Counsel and 

the Undercover Coordinator, of compliance with the Undercover Guidelines, 

the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation, with modification. 

The FBI noted that 90-day file reviews are already conducted by supervisors 

and are reviewed by an Assistant Special Agent in Charge “to ensure proper 

compliance,” and that undercover operation proposals involving “sensitive 

circumstances” are reviewed by several Headquarters’ units. 

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 The FBI stated that in lieu of a 90-day progress review or progress 

reviews conducted by Undercover Coordinators, it will design a semi-annual 

inspection tool for use in all undercover operations and will make available 

a checklist to assist FBI managers in managing field undercover operations. 

The FBI stated that it believes that these measures, in conjunction with 

existing review processes at the field and Headquarters level, are sufficient 

to ensure compliance with the Undercover Guidelines. The FBI’s response 

did not, however, indicate what steps it has taken or will take to ensure that 

Undercover Coordinators and Division Counsel are consulted in the course 

of the progress reviews. 

 Accordingly, while we believe the FBI’s response addresses the intent 

of our recommendation, it does not fully address our recommendation. 

Please provide details of the FBI’s planned semi-annual inspection tool, new 

checklist, and efforts to ensure that Undercover Coordinators and Division 

Counsel are consulted in the course of the progress reviews. 

13. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI establish 

policies that promote more consistent Division Counsel involvement in the 

development and implementation of undercover operations and ensure that 

Division Counsel are advised of anticipated legal problems in undercover 

operations, the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation. The 

FBI stated that it will add language to Section 10 of the Field Guide for 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations that outlines specific responsibilities 

of the Chief Division Counsel in undercover operations. The FBI did not, 

however, indicate how it intended to reinforce the role of Division Counsel 

other than Chief Division Counsel in undercover operations in its 

communications and guidance to Division Counsel and in periodic training 

of Division Counsel. In view of the fact that not all Chief Division Counsel 

will be in a position to become involved in all significant developments 

involving undercover operations, we believe the measures undertaken in 

response to this recommendation, including guidance and training, be 

directed to all Division Counsel. 

 Accordingly, please provide the revised Field Guide provisions and 

indicate how the FBI intends to promote consistent Division Counsel 

involvement in the development and implementation of undercover 

operations. 

14. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI revise 

portions of the MIOG and the Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive 

Operations to provide guidance on the meaning of four key phrases in the 

Undercover Guidelines applicable to undercover operations, the FBI stated 

that it concurs with the recommendation, with modification. As a general 

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matter, the FBI disputed the premise that its existing guidance is 

“inadequate.” 

 a. The meaning of “sensitive circumstances” relating to 

 “systemic corruption” of government functions 

 With respect to the meaning of the phrase, “sensitive circumstances” 

relating to “systemic corruption” of governmental functions, the FBI stated 

that there is adequate procedural guidance to ensure that a “rational, sound 

determination is made as to the existence or absence of systemic 

corruption.” The FBI further stated that the its Public Corruption Unit has 

authored special guidance and that the unit works closely with the 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit and the Office of the General 

Counsel to determine whether such circumstances exist. The FBI stated 

that field offices would nonetheless be assisted by Field Guide revisions that 

better describe and define “systemic corruption,” and that this material will 

be developed by the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit in 

consultation with the Public Corruption Unit and the Office of the General 

Counsel. 

 b. The meaning of “significant risk” of violence or physical 

 injury to individuals 

 With respect to the meaning of the phrase “significant risk” of violence 

or physical injury to individuals, the FBI stated that a “significant risk of 

violence” is a situation where “it is more likely than not that violence will 

occur and that violence is likely to result in serious[ly] bodily injury or even 

death.” The FBI further stated that a review of undercover operations has 

found that no authorized undercover operation has had the occurrence of 

serious bodily injury or death and that risks of violence or physical injury 

are minimized. The FBI noted that in situations where the absence of 

violence cannot be ensured, the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit 

has disapproved the proposal. The FBI stated that, despite existing 

procedural safeguards, it will add language to the Field Guide that further 

explains what constitutes a significant risk of violence to the extent 

possible. 

 c. How to limit the scope of authorizations for “otherwise illegal 

 activity” in undercover operations 

 With respect to “otherwise illegal activity” during undercover 

operations, the FBI stated that it will add language to its Field Guide for 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations that promotes a three-part analysis to 

determine whether “otherwise illegal activity” is appropriate and recommend 

a policy imposing case-specific stipulations by the CUORC as circumstances 

dictate. 

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 d. Special concerns and compliance issues associated with task 

 force participation 

 With respect to special concerns associated with task force 

participation in undercover operations, the FBI stated that the Field Guide 

for Undercover and Sensitive Operations contains guidance concerning 

undercover employees and that the standards to participate in undercover 

operations conducted under the direction of the FBI do not differ depending 

on the organizational affiliation of the undercover employee. The FBI stated 

that clear policy, guidance, and training are afforded to non-FBI personnel 

under consideration for use as undercover employees. The FBI 

acknowledged, however, that compliance with such standards and policies 

“may not be consistent in all FBI field offices,” but that the Undercover and 

Sensitive Operations Unit “thoroughly reviews all sensitive and nonsensitive undercover operations for compliance to the three phases of 

certification.” The FBI stated that in order to improve program management 

of undercover operations relative to task force officers, the Undercover and 

Sensitive Operations Unit will employ a Task Force Officer review 

mechanism which will employ specified compliance criteria. 

 Accordingly, with respect to all four issues, please provide the new 

definitions and Field Guide revisions, and details of the Task Force Officer 

review mechanism. 

 

15. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI identify 

ways to enhance Undercover Guidelines compliance training for field 

supervisors and undercover employees, the FBI stated that it concurs with 

the recommendation. The FBI acknowledged that while other members of 

its undercover review teams receive some type of specialized undercoverrelated training, field supervisors do not receive such training. The FBI 

noted that undercover employees, case accountants, and financial analysts 

receive certain types of training, but did not indicate whether their training 

is relevant to Guidelines compliance. The FBI stated that upon receipt of 

the OIG draft report, the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit has 

developed a block of instruction for FBI supervisors and that it completed 

the first block of instruction to about 45 supervisors at the Supervisor’s 

Management Course held on July 19, 2005. 

 Accordingly, please provide details of the new training for FBI 

supervisors and enhanced training measures for undercover employees. 

16. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI add a 

certification as part of the Undercover Coordinator’s certification for Group I 

and Group II undercover operations proposals, to the effect that the 

instructions set forth in Section VI.A.2 of the Undercover Guidelines 

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regarding lawful investigative techniques have been given to each 

undercover employee, the FBI stated that it concurs with the 

recommendation and will amend the undercover proposal form and the 

pertinent certification. 

 Accordingly, please provide the revised proposal form and certification 

for Group I and Group II undercover operations proposals, together with any 

guidance and notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

17. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI amend 

its Group I and Group II undercover proposal forms to include a section 

titled, “Facts Pertinent to Violence Risk Assessment,” the FBI stated that it 

concurs with the recommendation and will amend the undercover proposal 

form. 

 Accordingly, please provide the revised undercover proposal form, 

together with any guidance and notifications necessary to implement this 

recommendation. 

18. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI require 

field offices seeking approval of Group I undercover operations to obtain 

concurrence letters from U.S. Attorneys’ Offices that meet the requirements 

of Section IV.F.2.b of the Undercover Guidelines and make corresponding 

changes to Section 4.8(5) of the Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive 

Operations, the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide copies of the revised portion of the Field 

Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations, together with any guidance 

and notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

19. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI ensure 

that the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit have access to the 

Inspection Division’s undercover operations audits, the FBI stated that it 

concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide the notifications necessary to implement 

this recommendation. 

20. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI ensure 

compliance with the General Crimes Guidelines’ requirements to obtain 

authorizations for the extension, conversion to full investigation, and closing 

of preliminary inquiries, and maintain appropriate documentation, the FBI 

stated that it concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please describe how the FBI intends to ensure 

compliance with the General Crimes Guidelines’ requirements to obtain 

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authorizations for extensions and conversions to full investigation, and 

maintain appropriate documentation, together with any guidance and 

notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

21. Unresolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI 

institute measures to ensure consistency in meeting and documenting the 

notification and reporting requirements provided in Sections III.A.5 and 

III.B.4 of the General Crimes Guidelines and ensure that progress reports 

required by the Guidelines in terrorism enterprise investigations are 

provided to OIPR, DOJ’s Counterterrorism Division, and FBI Headquarters, 

the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation, with one exception. 

The FBI stated that in March 2003 it established the Criminal Intelligence 

Management & Policy Unit (CIMPU) in the Criminal Intelligence Section of 

the Criminal Investigative Division. According to the FBI, CIMPU took steps 

to develop and institute policies and procedures to remedy the notification 

and reporting problems regarding racketeering enterprise investigations. 

The FBI stated that an electronic communication (EC) dated June 23, 2003, 

was sent to all field offices noting current policy. With respect to terrorism 

enterprise investigations, the FBI stated that the Domestic Terrorism 

Operations Section meets regularly with counterparts in the 

Counterterrorism Section of the DOJ Criminal Division to brief them on the 

initiation, progress, and renewals of these investigations and will take 

further steps to ensure that compliance with the Guidelines requirements 

are consistently documented in field office case files. 

 In the course of our field work during this review, we identified at 

least four racketeering enterprise investigation files involving investigations 

initiated after the June 23, 2003, EC was sent to the FBI’s field divisions 

that did not contain the required notifications. Accordingly, we continue to 

have concerns about the adequacy of the steps taken by the FBI to ensure 

compliance with these Guidelines requirements. We believe that the FBI 

has not taken steps necessary to ensure that notification and reporting 

requirements provided in Sections III.A.5 and III.B.4 of the General Crimes 

Guidelines are satisfied and appropriately documented. Therefore, this 

recommendation can be resolved when the FBI demonstrates that it has 

instituted appropriate steps to ensure that the notification and reporting 

requirements for criminal intelligence investigations are satisfied and 

appropriately documented. 

 The exception noted in the FBI’s response concerns whether the FBI 

must notify the OIPR of the initiation and renewal of terrorism enterprise 

investigations. According to the FBI, following issuance of the May 2002 

Attorney General Guidelines, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division made a 

policy decision to restrict the use of terrorism enterprise investigations to 

domestic terrorism matters. Therefore, it reasons that because “domestic 

terrorism is not within OIPR’s charter,” notice to OIPR is not made. When 

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the OIG asked OIPR whether it was aware of the FBI’s interpretation and 

practice, OIPR stated that it was not aware of these changes until they were 

brought to its attention by the OIG. Moreover, an OIPR official noted that 

28 U.S.C. § 0.33b provides in part that the Counsel for Intelligence policy 

shall: 

 (e) Evaluate Departmental activities and existing and proposed 

 domestic and foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities to 

determine their consistency with United States intelligence policies and 

law; . . . and (g) Analyze and interpret current statutes, Executive orders, 

guidelines, and other directives pertaining to domestic security, foreign 

intelligence and counterintelligence activities . . ." (Emphasis added.) 

 Accordingly, we believe the FBI and DOJ should confer about the 

FBI’s current interpretation of this Guidelines’ requirement, particularly in 

view of the implications for review of terrorism-related investigations arising 

from the establishment of a National Security Division within the 

Department of Justice and FBI’s new National Security Service. The results 

of these consultations should be reported to the OIG. 

22. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI discuss 

with DOJ how to reconcile Section 100-2.3(3) of the MIOG, requiring 

Headquarters’ concurrence with the initiation and renewal of terrorism 

enterprise investigations, with Sections III.B.4a & b of the General Crimes 

Guidelines, which authorize field level initiation and renewal of these 

investigations, the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation. The 

FBI stated that it requires FBI Headquarters’ concurrence of SAC 

authorization “to ensure centralized program management of these 

investigations, which typically involve groups with a nation-wide presence, 

and to permit higher level review of these sensitive investigations that 

usually implicate first amendment concerns.” The FBI stated that it will 

discuss the matter with DOJ to pursue an appropriate reconciliation. 

 Accordingly, please provide details of the resolution resulting from the 

consultation between the FBI and DOJ representatives, together with any 

guidance or notifications regarding the resolved interpretation. 

23. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI require 

field-level supervisory approval, absent exigent circumstances, prior to the 

exercise of Part VI.A.2 authorities to visit public places or attend public 

events for the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorism, the FBI stated 

that it concurs with this recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide the standardized form, guidance, and 

notifications that the Counterterrorism Division distributes to implement 

this recommendation. 

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24. Unresolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI 

develop a standardized form or short e-mail template to be completed by 

case agents documenting their use of Part VI.A.2 authorities in the General 

Crimes Guidelines, the FBI stated that it concurs with this 

recommendation. However, the FBI stated only that the Counterterrorism 

Division will request that this statistic be captured as part of the reengineering process. 

 While we believe it is important for the FBI to capture statistics on its 

use of Part VI.A.2 authorities to visit public places or attend public events 

for the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorism, we believe that FBI 

agents should use a standardized form or template to document their use of 

these authorities (e.g., date of visit, group or event monitored, and short 

justification for the monitoring), not merely to capture statistics. 

Accordingly, we do not believe the FBI’s response adequately addressed the 

intent of this recommendation. We ask the FBI to reconsider developing a 

standardized form to be completed by case agents documenting their use of 

Part VI.A.2 authorities in the General Crimes Guidelines, together with 

guidance and notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

25. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI consider 

whether field offices practices since May 30, 2002, regarding predication, 

collection, record retention, indexing, and dissemination of Part VI.A 

information, and practices regarding utilization of “zero files” or other files 

used to capture Part VI.A information, are in conformity with the Guidelines 

and FBI guidance; whether there is need for further guidance on these 

subjects; and whether FBI Headquarters managers should have access to 

data reflecting use of Part VI.A.2 authorities, the FBI stated that it concurs 

with the recommendation. The FBI stated that the Counterterrorism 

Division will consult with the Office of the General Counsel to review 

existing guidance and to determine whether additional guidance is needed. 

 Accordingly, please provide the results of the FBI’s review of existing 

guidance and any new guidance, together with the notifications necessary to 

implement this recommendation. 

26. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI ensure 

that required authorizations for consensual monitoring are obtained in 

advance and are appropriately documented, the FBI stated that it concurs 

with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide details regarding how the FBI intends to 

ensure that required authorizations for consensual monitoring are obtained 

in advance and are appropriately documented. 

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27. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI consult 

with DOJ to resolve whether, for purposes of monitorings that do not 

require DOJ approval, the Consensual Monitoring Guidelines should be 

interpreted to authorize monitoring for more than 90 days (including up to 

“the duration of the investigation” as currently provided on Form FD-759), 

or whether the authorization is limited to 90 days, and to incorporate any 

clarification of policy in the FBI’s MIOG, the FBI stated that it concurs with 

the recommendation. According to the FBI, by letter dated August 25, 

2005, the Director of the DOJ Criminal Division’s Office of Enforcement 

Operations (OEO), advised that the Consensual Monitoring Guidelines 

should be interpreted to authorize monitoring for more than 90 days 

(including up to “the duration of the investigation” as currently provided on 

Form FD-759). 

 Accordingly, please provide a copy of OEO’s letter and any resulting 

guidance and notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

28. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI provide 

CUORC members, upon request, with access to copies of Inspection reports 

concerning undercover operations, the on-site reviews conducted by the 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit, and after-action reports of 

undercover operations, the FBI stated that it concurs with the 

recommendation. The FBI further stated that the Unit Chief of the 

Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit has coordinated this 

recommendation with an Assistant Inspector of the Inspection Division. 

 However, the FBI did not specifically address the portion of our 

recommendation that CUORC members, upon request, also be provided 

copies of the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit’s on-site reviews 

and after-action reports of undercover operations. 

 Accordingly, please provide provides details of the procedures and 

notifications the FBI has made in implementing this recommendation with 

respect to the availability of Inspection reports to CUORC members and the 

availability to CUORC members of on-site reviews and after-action reports. 

29. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI consider 

ways for the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit to develop more 

complete information for the CUORC and other FBI components, including 

information such as trend analysis from on-site reports, persistent 

Guidelines violations, and copies of its semi-annual report to all FBI 

Headquarters operating divisions, the FBI stated that it concurs with the 

recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide details as to how the Undercover and 

Sensitive Operations Unit develops more complete information for the 

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CUORC and other FBI components, particularly with regard to trend 

analysis of on-site reports and persistent Guidelines violations. 

30. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI require 

that the initial and continuing suitability reviews of confidential informants 

contain more thorough answers to suitability questions to assist CIRC 

members in evaluating confidential informants and assist field and 

Headquarters managers in their supervisory responsibilities, the FBI stated 

that it concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide copies of the revised initial and continuing 

suitability forms, together with any guidance and notifications necessary to 

implement this recommendation. 

31. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI consider 

having the Human Intelligence Unit draft “lessons learned” from the CIRC’s 

decisions, periodically communicate these lessons to field personnel, and 

incorporate them into training on the Confidential Informant Guidelines, the 

FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide materials regarding “lessons learned” from 

the CIRC’s decisions, together with any guidance and notifications 

necessary to implement this recommendation. 

32. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI make 

available to CIRC members, upon request, copies of the Inspection 

Division’s audits of the Criminal Informant Program (including re-inspection 

reports) and evaluations performed by the Human Intelligence Unit of 

compliance with the Confidential Informant Guidelines, the FBI stated that 

it concurs with the recommendation. However, the FBI stated that it will 

“consider” requests from the CIRC for these reports and materials and does 

not believe it is necessary for the DOJ representatives on the CIRC to receive 

this information in order to carry out the CIRC’s essential purposes. 

 We believe the Inspection Division’s audits of the Criminal Informant 

Program (including any reinspection reports) and the Guidelines-related 

evaluations performed by the Human Intelligence Unit can provide highly 

useful information for all members of the CIRC. Accordingly, we believe that 

the FBI should provide this information to CIRC members, upon request. 

Please provide any FBI guidance and notifications implementing the FBI’s 

response to this recommendation. 

33. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI revise 

the Inspection Division’s checklists and interrogatories to increase 

inspection coverage of Guidelines-related issues, the FBI stated that it 

concurs with the recommendation. 

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 Accordingly, please provide copies of the revised checklists and 

interrogatories, together with any guidance and notifications necessary to 

implement this recommendation. 

34. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI establish 

an audit examining the collection of information obtained from the exercise 

of counterterrorism authorities pursuant to Part VI.A.2 (Visiting Public 

Places and Events) of the General Crimes Guidelines, the FBI stated that it 

concurs with the recommendation. 

 However, when the OIG reviewed the July 2005 checklist, we 

determined that it does not provide adequate direction for collecting data 

regarding the FBI’s use of Part VI.A.2 authorities. We provided suggestions 

for a revised checklist that would capture this data. Accordingly, please 

provide information regarding the new audit, and the revised checklist, 

together with any guidance and notifications necessary to implement this 

recommendation. 

35. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI provide 

more thorough and timely reporting of Guidelines violations by identifying in 

inspection reports the causes and gravity of compliance deficiencies; 

developing summary statistics to assist in determining when re-inspections 

are appropriate; and automating key components of the inspection process, 

the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation. The FBI further 

stated that the Inspection Division’s Criminal Informant Program checklists 

have been revised to collect information of the causes of identified 

deficiencies and that the Inspection Division is in the process of creating a 

computer database to assist in analyzing the results of compliance audits. 

 Accordingly, please provide copies of the revised checklists and a 

description of the new automation and other procedures to be employed in 

analyzing the results of compliance audits, together with any guidance and 

notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

36. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI increase 

inspections for the Criminal Informant Program and other program priorities 

by performing more frequent inspections at irregular times, develop a 

standard for re-inspections that accounts for the frequency and seriousness 

of Guidelines deficiencies identified during the regular inspection, and 

reinstate the reinspection process initiated by the Human Intelligence Unit 

(formerly the Asset/Informant Unit), the FBI stated that it concurs with the 

recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide details of the FBI’s revised inspections 

plan, its standard for re-inspections, and instructions regarding the 

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reinstitution of the Human Intelligent Unit’s reinspection process, together 

with any guidance and notifications necessary to implement this 

recommendation. 

37. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI address 

in employee performance appraisals the findings from Inspection Division 

inspections that identify either superior or deficient Guidelines compliance 

performance, the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation and 

will explore ways to accomplish this goal within the limits of the regulations 

that govern this process as well as the limitations of the FBI Performance 

Appraisal System. 

 Accordingly, please provide details of the review of the FBI’s employee 

performance appraisals and any revisions that address pertinent Guidelines 

compliance findings from Inspection Division reports, together with any 

guidance and notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

38. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI elevate 

egregious non-compliance with the Attorney General Guidelines to an 

executive management finding in inspection reports rather than deferring 

that action until the next 3-year inspection, contingent on the detection of 

recurring, serious deficiencies, the FBI stated that it concurs with the 

recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide copies of any guidance and notifications 

necessary to implement this recommendation. 

39. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the Inspection 

Division and the Human Intelligence Unit in the Directorate of Intelligence 

institute procedures that establish follow-up inspection measures to reinspections that indicate on-going compliance problems, the FBI stated that 

it concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide details of the new follow-up inspection 

procedures, together with any guidance and notifications necessary to 

implement this recommendation. 

40. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI modify 

the Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit’s on-site review data 

collection instrument to better address Guidelines compliance (including 

issues such as otherwise illegal activity, entrapment, and task force 

participation), the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide copies of the revised data collection 

instrument, together with any guidance and notifications necessary to 

implement this recommendation. 

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41. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI ensure 

that Attorney General Guidelines’ violations warranting potential discipline 

are referred to the FBI’s Internal Investigations Section in the Inspection 

Division in a consistent fashion throughout the FBI, the FBI stated that it 

concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide copies of any guidance and notifications 

necessary to implement this recommendation. 

42. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI ensure 

that the Inspection Division’s standards for referring misconduct involving 

Guidelines violations are consistent with practices adopted by the 

Inspection Division’s Internal Investigations Section, the FBI stated that it 

concurs with the recommendation. The FBI further stated that a new 

process has already been implemented by the Inspection Division. 

 Accordingly, please provide a description of the new processes in place 

in response to this recommendation, together with any guidance and 

notifications necessary to implement this recommendation. 

43. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI add 

separate offense codes for (i) knowingly or recklessly failing to obtain proper 

authorization for a source’s participation in otherwise illegal activity; (ii) 

knowingly or recklessly failing to obtain proper authorization to operate long 

term, high-level, privileged or media-affiliated confidential informants or 

other informants subject to special approval requirements; and (iii) 

knowingly or recklessly failing to operate long-term, high-level, privileged or 

media-affiliated confidential informants, or other informants subject to 

special approval requirements in accordance with the relevant Confidential 

Informant Guidelines and MIOG provisions, the FBI stated that it concurs 

with the recommendation. The FBI stated that a team from the Inspection 

Division and the Office of Professional Responsibility has been formed to 

ensure that the three new offense codes are added in accordance with the 

relevant Confidential Informant Guidelines and MIOG provisions. 

 Accordingly, please provide us with the revised offense codes and any 

related guidance necessary to implement this recommendation. 

44. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI assign 

some person or unit at FBI Headquarters the responsibility to develop a 

plan to ensure proper and timely execution of future Attorney General 

Guidelines revisions and to coordinate implementation of the revisions over 

time, the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation. The FBI 

further stated that it will determine the best way to implement the 

recommendation. 

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 Accordingly, please provide a description of the new procedures, 

together with any guidance and notifications necessary to implement this 

recommendation. 

 

45. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI 

distribute revised Attorney General Guidelines to Chief Division Counsel, 

together with a concise summary or listing of the changes, sufficiently in 

advance of the new Guidelines’ effective date to allow field personnel to 

familiarize themselves with the revisions and to allow those Headquarters 

and field personnel who provide training on the revisions to develop training 

materials and a schedule for providing training, the FBI stated that it 

concurs with the recommendation. 

 Accordingly, please provide a description of the new procedures, 

together with any guidance and notifications necessary to implement this 

recommendation. 

46. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI ensure 

that revisions to the MIOG accurately reflect any changes to the Attorney 

General’s Guidelines and are made on or about the effective date of such 

changes, the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation. The FBI 

notes, however, that “if a considered agency decision is made to impose 

more restrictive procedural requirements in the MIOG for agency oversight 

purposes than those required by the Guidelines, then such distinctions and 

the reasons therefore be documented and explained in the MIOG revisions.” 

 As stated in our report, the MIOG is the FBI’s official reference guide 

on operational procedures. It is vital that it be fully updated when the 

Guidelines changes or soon thereafter. However, we found that requests for 

changes to the MIOG were received by the FBI’s Records Management 

Division from 2 to 11 months after the May 2002 Guidelines changes were 

issued. We also found that some updates to the MIOG were not completed 

until more than two years after the revised Guidelines became effective. 

 In addition, we note that, using the FBI’s current technology, revision 

of the MIOG involves several steps, including requests for revisions from the 

substantive unit, logging of the revision into the FBI’s mainframe automated 

manuals application, followed by uploading into SOFTBOOK and, 

ultimately, the FBI’s Intranet. 

 Accordingly, please provide details of how the FBI plans to ensure that 

revisions to the MIOG accurately reflect any changes to the Attorney 

General’s Guidelines and are made on or about the effective date of such 

changes together with any guidance and notifications necessary to 

implement this recommendation. 

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47. Resolved. In response to this recommendation that the FBI make 

appropriate changes to the MIOG to reconcile the discrepancies between the 

Attorney General’s Guidelines and the MIOG that are identified in the 

report, the FBI stated that it concurs with the recommendation “when true 

discrepancies exist.” 

 Accordingly, please provide details on its resolution of the 

discrepancies identified in the report and any revised MIOG provisions, 

together with any guidance and notifications necessary to implement this 

recommendation. 

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APPENDIX I 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 

ABSCAM FBI sting operation 

ACS Automated Case System 

AD Assistant Director (FBI) 

ADIC Assistant Director in Charge 

AAG Assistant Attorney General 

AGG Attorney General Guidelines 

A/IU Asset/Informant Unit 

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge 

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearm and Explosives 

CDC Chief Division Counsel 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CI Confidential Informant 

CIC Confidential Informant Coordinator 

CID Criminal Investigative Division 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CIP Criminal Informant Program 

CIRC Confidential Informant Review Committee 

CISPES Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador 

CM Consensual Monitoring 

CUORC Confidential Undercover Operation Review Committee 

CS Confidential Source 

CSR&R Continuing Suitability Report and Recommendations 

CTD Counterterrorism Division 

CW Cooperating Witness 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

DI Directorate of Intelligence 

DIA Delegated Investigation/Adjudication 

DIO Delegated Investigation Only 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DRB Disciplinary Review Board 

EC Electronic Communication 

ELSUR Electronic Surveillance 

FAQ Frequently Asked Question 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

I-1

I-1
FBIHQ Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters 

FCI Foreign Counterintelligence Investigation 

FGUSO Field Guide for Undercover and Sensitive Operations 

FIG Field Intelligence Group 

FOIA Freedom of Information Act 

GAO General Accountability (formerly Accounting) Office 

GCI General Crimes Investigation 

GPO Government Printing Office 

GS General Schedule 

HIU Human Intelligence Unit 

IB Intelligence Base 

IIS Internal Investigations Section (FBI) 

IIU Internal Investigative Unit 

ILU Investigative Law Unit 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

IPU Initial Processing Unit 

ISR&R Initial Suitability Report and Recommendations 

JLEA Department of Justice Law Enforcement Agency 

LCN La Cosa Nostra 

LEEU Law Enforcement Ethics Unit 

LEGAT Legal Attaché 

LMRDA Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 

MAOP Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures 

MIOG Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

NSI National Security Investigation 

NTCM Nontelephonic Consensual Monitoring 

OCRS Organized Crime and Racketeering Section 

OGC Office of the General Counsel 

OIA Otherwise Illegal Activity 

OIG Office of the Inspector General 

OIPR Office of Intelligence Policy and Review 

OPEA Office of Program Evaluations and Audits 

OPEAU Organizational Program, Evaluation and Analysis Unit 

OPR Office of Professional Responsibility 

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I-2
PI Preliminary Inquiry 

REI Racketeering Enterprise Investigation 

RICO Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 

RMD Records Management Division 

SAC Special Agent in Charge 

SCLC Southern Christian Leadership Conference 

SES Senior Executive Service 

SID State Identification Number 

SIS Suitability Inquiry Status 

SR&R Suitability Report and Recommendations 

SSA Supervisory Special Agent 

SWP Socialist Workers Party 

TEI Terrorism Enterprise Investigation 

UCC Undercover Coordinator 

UCO Undercover Operation 

UIA Unauthorized Illegal Activity 

UORC Undercover Operation Review Committee 

USAO United States Attorney’s Office 

USOU Undercover and Sensitive Operations Unit 

VCF Virtual Case File 

I-3

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