1 Rule 10 of the Rules o f the Court of Appe

als reads as follo

ws: The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum

opini on it shall be design ated “MEMORANDU

M OPINION

,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case. 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE CHERYL S. MURPHY v. CARL D. MARTIN, ET AL 

### . Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 98C-70 Hamilton V. Gayden, Jr., Judge

No. M1999-02273-COA-R3-CV - Decided July 13, 2000

The trial court dismissed this negligence action for the failure to prosecute. On appeal the plaintiff asserts that she did not have adequate notice that her lawsuit was in jeopardy. We affirm the tria l court. Tenn. R. App. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and Remanded C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which K OCH and C AIN , JJ. joined. Cheryl S. Mur

phy, Antioch

, Tennessee, Pro

Se

MEMORANDUM OP

INION 1
On January 9, 19

98, the appellant,

acting pro se, f

il ed acomplaint again

st two defendants seeking to recover a judgment for personal injuries she sustained in an automobile accident. Neither defendant filed an answer, and no further action was taken by the plaintiff. O n Febr uary 3, 1999, the circuit court filed and served notice on the appellant that the case would be dismissed unless the plaintiff set the case for trial within thirty days or obtaine d the court’s permission to proceed. On February 26, 1999, the plaintiff did file a motion to be allowed to proceed. The motion itself did not offer any reaso

n for th e lo ng delay a

nd the motion was not

supported by

the plaintiff’s a

ffidavit stating any reasons. The record does not contain any evidence that the plaintiff attempted to get the-2-

court to act on the motion. On August 18, 1999, the court dismissed thecomplaint for want of prosecution. On September 2, 1999, the plaintiff filed a motion for relief from the judgment

under Rule 60.02, Ten n. R. Civ. Proc. That motion is apparently sti ll pending. Appellant’s assertion on appe al that she did

not have ad equate notice that her action was about to be dismissed is completely refuted by the rec ord. She does not assert that she did not get the February

3 notice, and, in f

act, we could

infer that her receipt of that order prompted her to fi

le the motion of Febr

uary 26. Eve

n then, the court d

id not dismiss the cas

e for nearly

six months. The appellant states on appeal that she was involved in several other car accidents after she filed the complaint in this case. The last accident, in December of 1998, allegedly left he r disabled and unable to prosecute this action. But this court is not the place to

introduce that proof. So far as the record shows, that evidence has never been introduced in the trial court, and was never even pled until after the case had been dismissed.
We take no position in th

is appeal on the ru

le 60.02 motion file

d in the trial court, nor on the appellant’s ability to refile the action pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court for Davidson County for any furt her proceedin

gs necessary. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant Che ryl S . Mu rph y.