Army Science and Technology Analysis for 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations 

Richard Chait, Albert Sciarretta, and Dennis Shorts 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

October 2006 
 

 ii

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or 

position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

All information and sources for this paper were drawn from unclassified materials. 

Richard Chait is a Distinguished Research Fellow at the Center for Technology and 

National Security Policy (CTNSP), National Defense University (NDU). He was 

previously Chief Scientist, Army Materiel Command, and Director, Army Research and 

Laboratory Management. Dr. Chait received his Ph.D. from Syracuse University and a 

B.S. degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. 

Albert Sciarretta is president of CNS Technologies, Inc. He is a retired Army armor 

officer, whose service included operational assignments, instructing at the U.S. Military 

Academy, acting as technology officer on armored vehicle task forces, and serving as 

Assistant to the Chief Scientist, Army Materiel Command. He has two M.S. degrees—

Operations Research and Mechanical Engineering—from Stanford University and a B.S. 

degree from the U.S. Military Academy. He has served on many National Research 

Council study committees. 

Dennis Shorts is a Research Associate at CTNSP. A former Army officer, he holds a 

double B.A. degree from Texas Christian University and an M.S. in Foreign Service from 

Georgetown University. Previously, he conducted research and taught on a Fulbright 

Grant in South Korea. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The authors would like to recognize several individuals who provided important support 

to the project. We recognize Dr. Michael Baranick for his assistance with the 

development, approval, and distribution of the questionnaire at NDU, and his continued 

guidance and support throughout the remaining phases of the project. Thanks also go to 

Mr. Tim Lo and Mr. Duncan Long in building and managing data collection for the 

questionnaire. Dr. John Lyons, in addition to providing helpful commentary on the study, 

also presented its findings to participants in the “Short Course on Transformation in 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Activity” held at NDU August 23, 2006. Dr. Stuart 

Starr’s participation in the development of the comprehensive questionnaire was also 

very much appreciated. Finally, we thank Dr. Eli Zimet for his assistance in gathering 

relevant information and for providing valuable review comments. 
 

 iii

Table of Contents 

I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 

II. Data-Collecting Methodology........................................................................................ 4 

III. Data Analysis................................................................................................................ 7 

Battle Command ............................................................................................................. 7 

Situational Awareness................................................................................................... 12 

Armored Vehicles in Urban Environments................................................................... 13 

Intelligence (Including Sensors) ................................................................................... 15 

Force Protection............................................................................................................ 16 

Unmanned Systems....................................................................................................... 19 

Non-lethal Capabilities ................................................................................................. 21 

Information Operations................................................................................................. 22 

Training and Use of Modeling and Simulation............................................................. 24 

Logistics........................................................................................................................ 25 

IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks ......................................................................... 27 

Appendix A: Acronyms .................................................................................................... 33 

Appendix B: Assessment Summary Table ....................................................................... 35 

Appendix C: Interviews in Chronological Order.............................................................. 43 

Appendix D: S&R Operations Questionnaire for NDU Students..................................... 45 
 

 iv
 

I. Introduction 

In the area of stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, this study examines 

capability gaps and science and technology (S&T) needs and concludes that some areas 

require renewed emphasis, to include: scaling Blue Force Tracking down to the 

individual soldier, developing an on-the-ground biometric identification device, and 

fielding “hover and stare” unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets for use at the platoon 

level. 

By way of background, Dr. Thomas Killion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Research and Technology, has been seeking to strengthen the technology base and 

research planning of Army S&T programs as they relate to S&R operations. By 

identifying capability gaps and, where appropriate, applying technological approaches to 

addressing those gaps, the Army should be better positioned to meet its increasingly 

S&R-focused mission requirements. 

To support the Army in this effort, the Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy (CTNSP) at National Defense University (NDU) undertook a study to assess the 

technological capability gaps in the U.S. Army’s ability to conduct S&R operations. The 

purpose of this study was threefold: 

• through field surveys, interviews, and review of related studies, to identify the 

technological shortfalls most consistently cited in land force execution of phase 

IV operations;1

• with respect to these operations, to identify capability gaps and needs and assess 

them with specific focus on the issue of technology shortfalls; and 

• with the gap analysis in hand, to highlight technology opportunities for 

consideration by Army S&T leadership. 

 

As described in the 2004 CTNSP book, Transformation for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Operations, S&R capabilities are critical to the transition from militaryled, rapid, and decisive major combat missions to civilian-led, longer-term, post-conflict 

reconstruction missions.2

 The ongoing missions in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate that 

S&R operations are high priorities for the U.S. Army. The issuance of Department of 

Defense (DOD) Directive 300.05 (Military Support for SSTR) and the updating of FM 5-

 

1

 The most widely accepted model for military campaigns involves four phases of operations. Phase I 

covers preparation for combat, Phase II encompasses initial offensive operations, Phase III is combat, and 

Phase IV involves post-conflict S&R operations. It is important to note that these phases are by no means 

discrete or sequential; thus, it is critical that the military retain full-spectrum capabilities. For a discussion 

of these four phases in Iraq, see the introduction to “On Point: The U.S. Army in Iraq,” a study of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom conducted by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS . 

Available online at <http://call.army.mil/products/on-point/intro.asp>. 2

 Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, editors, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Operations, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004). 
 

 2

0.1 Interim, “The Operations Process,” (Appendix A: Stability and Reconstruction 

Operations) speak to the crucial role that S&R operations play. Traditionally-focused 

combat operations—major conflict between large forces employing total resources and 

involving large-scale, force-on-force engagements—have given way to more complex 

S&R missions requiring full-spectrum expertise. 

In this study, the components of S&R operations are defined as follows: 

• Stabilization operations include the spectrum of military and civilian activities, 

from conflict to peace, used to establish or maintain order in states and regions, as 

well as provide security for reconstruction operations. These activities are used to 

promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the security, political, 

and information dimensions of the operational environment through a 

combination of peacekeeping, cooperative activities, and coercive actions in 

response to crisis.3,4

• Reconstruction operations encompass the reestablishment of the governmental, 

security, judicial, health, transportation, commercial, and other infrastructures of 

states and regions. Activities include the identification and training of appropriate 

personnel; the reestablishment of governmental, transportation, health, education, 

and other related institutions; and facilities construction and the reconnection of 

communications, water, waste disposal, gas, electric, oil, and other utilities.5

Combat and combat support units are very much involved in stabilization operations. 

While the execution of reconstruction operations falls primarily on combat support and 

combat service support personnel—especially the Corps of Engineers; Transportation, 

Ordnance, and Quartermaster Corps; and civil affairs support personnel—reconstruction 

missions are also often supported by non-military personnel within DOD, non-DOD 

personnel, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 

It also should be noted that stabilization missions and reconstruction missions are not 

unique, self-contained endeavors. They can occur concurrently in the same battlespace 

and are complementary operations supporting the full spectrum of military operations. 

For example, successful stabilization operations improve the security of reconstruction 

missions in a particular area of operation (AO), while at the same time, successful 

reconstruction operations help win the support of the local populace, which may reduce 

the number of significant hostile actions against U.S. forces. This phenomenon was 

identified and articulated by the then Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, 

Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, based on his experience in Baghdad in 2004.6

 

3

 FM 3-0 and FM 3-07. 

4

 DODD 3000.05, “Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR),” 

Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), November 28, 2005. 5

 As support for this discussion, see <http://www.rebuilding-iraq.net/portal/page?_pageid=95, 

1&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL>. 

6

 LTG Chiarelli is now Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. Information here is drawn from: Peter W. 

Chiarelli and Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” 
 

 3

Finally, the present study is organized along 10 major categories of military capabilities: 

battle command,7

 armored vehicles in urban environments, situational awareness (SA), 

intelligence, force protection, unmanned systems, non-lethal capabilities, information 

operations (IO), training and use of modeling and simulation, logistics. Within each 

category, existing and forthcoming Army S&T programs are mapped against stated 

technology shortfalls and capability gaps. While the issues of technology shortfalls in 

military capabilities as a whole are important, the overriding orientation of this analysis is 

focused on S&R operations. It is also important to note that the categories listed here are 

by no means discrete. In addition to the fact that many technologies have application for 

both combat and post-conflict environments, numerous issue areas noted have relevance 

in other categories. For example, intelligence has relevance to improvised explosive 

device (IED) detection and threat mitigation as well as to IO issues. 

We begin the paper by detailing the methodology that was utilized to gather data in the 

categories noted above. This is followed by an analysis of the data for the same 

categories (Chapter III). The paper then closes with a discussion of the analyses and with 

some concluding remarks (Chapter IV). 

 Military Review, July–August 2005 and “RDECOM/ DARPA Future Technology and Equipment Brief,” 

1st Cavalry Division Briefing, June 1, 2005. 7

 For the purposes of this study, command, control, and communications will be placed in this category. 
 

 4

II. Data-Collecting Methodology 

Building on the aforementioned book, Transformation for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Operations, in particular chapter seven, “Supporting Technologies,” the 

study team engaged land force leaders from the non-commissioned officer (NCO) to 

general officer-level who had experience in phase IV operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 

Balkans, and Haiti. 

The report also draws from various studies by governmental organizations and other 

components, including: the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 

specifically the Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA, and the Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward (ARCICF), Arlington, VA; The Defense Science Board; The Defense Technical Information 

Center; The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); private industry; 

interagency workshops; and a variety of other resources. 

Details of the interface with the sources noted above are shown below: 

Discussions with Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, and 

Deputy Director, U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) 

The impetus for this study came from a series of discussions with and documents 

provided by the Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division. These included a 

published article,8 presentations,9,10 and verbal discussions.11 To develop an 

appreciation of the state of Army S&T efforts at the time, members of CTNSP 

met with the Deputy Director, ARL, to discuss ongoing efforts to address S&R 

operations capability gaps and identify S&T opportunities.12

NDU Students with Recent Deployments

The proximity of CTNSP to a high-level institution of professional military 

education (PME) gave us access to a pool of senior field grade officers from 

across the service branches. These military leaders took time out of their 

schedules to respond to an extensive survey covering the gamut of technological 

issues facing units involved in S&R operations. While the majority of these 

respondents were returning from recent deployments in Iraq (over 70 percent), 

experience from operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia were 

also represented. The various experiences encompassed missions in joint and 

coalition environments, among different branches, at disparate echelons, and with 

varied equipment packages. The common themes that emerged from the surveys 

 

8

 Chiarelli and Michaelis. 

9

 Peter W. Chiarelli, Task Force Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom II, presentation for RDECOM VTC, 

September 15, 2005. 

10 Chiarelli, RDECOM/ DARPA Brief. 

11 Peter W. Chiarelli meeting, ASA(ALT), September 22, 2005. 12 Dr. Joseph Rocchio, Adelphi, MD. September 7, 2005 
 

 5

spoke to the overarching nature of some aspects of S&R operations (especially in 

urban environments). In addition to providing evaluation of equipment and 

technology in S&R operations, these officers also provided useful comments 

regarding issues wider in range; namely, highlighting the importance of 

coordinating the large number of actors (civilian and military) on the ground in 

post-conflict situations. 

Military Personnel at Fort Knox, KY and Fort Hood, TX 

Included in our data collection were interviews and focus group sessions at Fort 

Knox, Kentucky13 and Fort Hood, Texas.14 At Fort Knox, one general officer 

from the Corps of Engineers and field grade officers from the Transportation and 

Aviation Corps, as well as the Corps of Engineers, provided valuable insights 

concerning reconstruction and some stabilization operations. Their lessons 

learned gave us valuable information about the need for improved integration of 

S&R operations, better SA, and significantly improved communications in longhaul operations. At Fort Hood, combat arms officers and an NCO of the 1st

Cavalry Division gave us detailed accounts of their recent deployment in 

Baghdad. Charged with security operations in and around the International Green 

Zone, these warfighters15 executed many of the complex, full-spectrum operations 

required of S&R operations in urban environments. From establishing and 

defending traffic control points (TCPs) to conducting dismounted patrols in the 

neighborhood near the Green Zone, 1st Cavalry warfighters were attacked in a 

variety of ways—the most prominent threats came from IEDs, mortar fire, rocket 

propelled grenades (RPGs), and sniper fire. Their comments regarding the 

performance of vehicles, weapon systems, communications, and equipment in 

executing complex and dangerous stability operations were extremely valuable. 

Their critiques of battle command, SA, and local sensor networks were 

particularly thorough and consistently echoed by other data sources. Their 

description of the Abrams tank’s performance in this environment was an 

especially useful example of the vulnerabilities of our military systems in chaotic 

urban environments. Moreover, their assessment of tools for the detection of 

explosives in TCP operations provided real insight into the daunting task of 

balancing security with convenience when screening for suicide bombers, vehicle 

borne IEDs (VBIEDs), and other force protection threats. 

The Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward (ARCIC-F) 

The ARCIC-F staff’s presentation and technical data provided insight into the 

Army’s efforts to identify and address technology needs for S&R operations.16

The comprehensive nature of the material provided to us gave our report a 

baseline from which to investigate additional issues and do follow-on analysis. 

The ARCIC-F has evaluated the Army’s capabilities, and it was the “cross-

 

13 November 17, 2005. 

14 November 15, 2005. 

15 The term warfighter is meant to imply a role not just in direct combat, but in the full-spectrum of related 

responsibilities, including stabilization and reconstruction. 

16 April 10, 2006 at ARCIC-Forward offices, Arlington, Virginia. 
 

 6

walking” of needs assessments and technological shortfalls against existing S&T 

programs where we saw the most potential for our current report. It goes without 

saying that we have sought in our research to avoid duplicating existing efforts. 

Instead, in our use of independent researchers and NDU surveys, for example, we 

hoped to give value-added analysis by incorporating information and comments 

from elements that might be outside the current purview of ARCIC-F. The 

technology need areas identified by this component of TRADOC served as a 

starting point for framing the capability gaps assessed through other resources. In 

the end, we hope we have enriched Army endeavors by approaching this study 

with a slightly different perspective and reference point. 

AMC–Field Assistance in Science and Technology (FAST) 

Meeting with FAST staff, we were able to acquire information pertaining to 

fielding and implementation of equipment and systems as well as get a picture of 

the needs of warfighters.17 FAST serves as a conduit between the Army’s 

Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) and individual 

soldier suggestions, thereby reducing the fielding time required for new/modified 

equipment. The Science and Technology Assistance Teams (STATs) of FAST are 

attached to units on the ground to translate soldier needs into research and 

development (R&D) initiatives that address them. Through FAST publications 

and an interview, we surveyed the Army’s ability to identify potential 

technological needs and bring solutions to the soldier. 

Related Studies 

Recent studies also proved to be valuable in assessing capability needs and 

potential technology opportunities. In particular, a counter-IED study sponsored 

by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) was helpful in assessing the magnitude of 

S&T efforts in support of this force protection issue.18 A Natick Soldier Systems 

study provided information about the ingenuity of our warfighters in Afghanistan 

and Iraq in rapidly addressing equipment shortcomings for S&R operations.19

Finally, a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) study provided new tactical and doctrinal 

approaches for counter-insurgency operations.20

 

17 August 8, 2005 and May 31, 2006, Ft. Belvoir, VA. 

18 Team IED Study for ONR Code 32 Final Program Review, October 6, 2005. 

19 Chuck Greene, “Soldier Innovation Report 1: Soldier Innovation, Ideas, and Standard Equipment 

Modifications in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Operational Forces Interface Group, U.S. Army Soldier Systems 

Center–Natick, December 15, 2004. 

20 “Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency 

Operations,” Marine Corps Combat Development Command, June 7, 2006. 
 

 7

III. Data Analysis 

This chapter consolidates data from the interviews and reports identified in Chapter II 

into 10 areas: Battle Command, SA, Armored Vehicles in Urban Environments, 

Intelligence (including sensors), Force Protection, Unmanned Systems, Non-lethal 

Capabilities, IO, Training and Use of Modeling and Simulation, and Logistics.21 In each 

category we listed the major needs assessed and matched current and forthcoming S&T 

projects oriented toward addressing those needs. A summary of the analysis for the above 

areas is shown in Appendix B, Table 1. 

Battle Command

The primary limitations identified in this category had to do with operations in complex 

urban environments. The glut of commercial frequencies; the obstructions to friendly 

radio frequency propagation, global positioning system (GPS) reception, and multispectral emissions (for sensors); the density of people, buildings, and obstacles; and the 

general lack of maneuverability for large vehicles are all elements which contribute to the 

difficulties faced by warfighters in cities. Baghdad presents especially severe challenges 

in this area. 

Due to its complexity, this topic is divided into several sub-categories. They are C2, 

integration of S&R operations, and communications. 

Command and Control: 

• Inability to Track and Identify Dismounted Personnel in an Urban Environment.

The sheer number of civilians, coupled with poor infrastructure for vehicle and 

pedestrian traffic, make the tracking of dismounted friendly forces extremely 

difficult in urban terrain.22 To assist with identifying friendly personnel in this 

very complex environment, new polymers are being developed to embed an 

identification system into the next generation of body armor and textiles. These 

polymers will allow for Blue Force Tracking-like signals to be sent to the next 

generation of SA systems from warfighter clothing and/or armor.23 Scaling this 

 

21 These categories are based in part on the Army Capabilities Integration Center’s identified shortfall 

areas, as well as consistently identified gaps resulting from surveys and interviews. 22 Tracking of friendly personnel and equipment is an SA issue. Given its crucial importance, SA will be 

discussed in greater detail as a separate section. 

23 For more information on this technology’s integration into the U.S. Army’s Land Warrior System see, 

“Distributed Antenna Applications for Body Worn Platforms,” at PEO Soldier, Soldier Systems Center 

(Natick) <http://www.dodsbir.net/sitis/archives_display_topic.asp?Bookmark=27994>, and “When Textiles 

Go Extreme,” Washington Post, April 17, 2005. Available online at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A56477-2005Apr15.html>. 
 

 8

type of signal down to the individual soldier level will increase the complexity of 

future SA systems; however, we believe that this innovation holds the most 

promise for enhancing the identification of friendly personnel in a complex urban 

environment.24

Assessment: This is a need for both combat and S&R operations. The 

identification system should be recognizable by both ground and air Blue Force 

Tracking systems. Since this is an ongoing need for combat operations, it has 

been and will continue to be addressed through S&T efforts within DOD. In terms 

of S&R operations applicability, it is also crucial to consider use of a solution 

system for non-DOD personnel, including U.S. government, non-government 

agency, and contractor personnel involved in S&R efforts. 

• Need for Tracking Civilians in C2 and SA Systems. In S&R operations, especially 

in urban environments, friendly forces may need to identify and track indigenous 

civilian, non-combatants in their SA systems. This issue is discussed in detail in 

the subsection on force protection.

• Better Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Icons in SA Systems. To adjust from force-onforce engagements in traditional combat to counterinsurgency operations, 

warfighters require systems that allow for the identification and labeling of 

entities smaller than a platoon. Existing systems do not allow solders to label the 

location of suspected IEDs, individual combatants, or civilians with weapons. 

This is a stated at-risk shortfall identified by the Army (visual and virtual obstacle 

marking system).25 While future C2 systems will include more details in an AO, 

this is critically lacking in current operations. However, since the overarching 

architecture for this system is already in place, this issue has more to do with 

adapting and modifying the existing system rather than developing new 

technology altogether. Therefore, the Army should focus on refining this system 

to better identify the myriad elements present in an urban environment, garnering 

soldier input to ensure that all components are addressed and that future 

symbology makes sense. 

Assessment: Current C2 systems need to be reengineered to incorporate 

appropriate OPFOR icons (and perhaps others) for S&R operations. Because of 

the unpredictable needs of our warfighters in day-to-day S&R operations, it might 

be beneficial for C2 systems to have a capability for the user to design and input 

icons as they need them. While this might present a problem as icons proliferate 

 

24 For more information on these innovations, see “Electro-textiles in Future Warrior Systems” and 

“SPEAR Modular/Integrated Communications Helmet,” U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center website at 

<http://nsc.natick.army.mil/media/fact/content.htm>. 

25 ARCIC designates this technology objective as ManSup3 in “Identifying Capabilities in Stability 

Operations Briefing,” April 10, 2006. This is also addressed in the stated ARCIC at-risk shortfalls: Single 

SA system for processing and displaying intelligence information from multiple intelligence disciplines at 

all levels of classification (BA4 and BC3) and Future Force COP Visualization Capabilities (BC8). 
 

 9

without uniformity, we believe that the Army could counter this by periodically 

adopting accepted standards for new icons. 

Integration of S&R Operations: 

• Need for an Integrated S&R Operational Planning and Execution C2 System. The 

planning and execution of S&R missions should be integrated, providing a 

common operating picture (COP) to military and non-military personnel involved. 

For example, in addition to daily patrols, maneuver units need visibility of 

reconstruction activities (for example, size of quarry operations, truck routes and 

schedules for delivery of gravel, and/or the size of a security perimeter required 

for construction of an airfield) to determine and plan for daily security missions. 

This is complicated by the fact that a single reconstruction project often affects 

numerous U.S. and coalition unit sectors, especially in terms of supply movement. 

Reconstruction organizations need to base their construction plans, such as the 

delivery of materials, on the availability of security forces and must coordinate 

with U.S. and coalition units. 

Therefore, an information system is needed to integrate stabilization (maneuver, 

security, and combat missions) and reconstruction operations (construction of 

airports, buildings, communications infrastructure, etc.) into a single common 

operating environment (COE) with a COP. The system must be integrated across 

U.S. and coalition stabilization forces to account for reconstruction operations that 

may affect numerous unit AOs. The system should be similar in function to the 

Command Post of the Future (CPoF) system currently used as an operational C2 

system in Iraq allowing collaborative planning across military, governmental, 

non-governmental, coalition, and host nation organizations. This effort may need 

to be done in steps, first synchronizing U.S. S&R operations, including contracted 

security teams. 

Assessment: This capability can be addressed by re-engineering current 

Joint/Army information systems, such as CPoF. S&T research potential appears 

minimal and any efforts like integrating non-military organizations into the COP 

have already been mentioned.26

Communications: 

• Need for Better Non-Line-of-Sight Communications Devices/Systems in Urban 

Environments. The most cited shortfall in terms of communications was a general 

lack of range for devices when operating in/near buildings and urban centers. 

Current Army line-of-sight radios—for example, Single Channel Ground and 

Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)—in many instances proved inadequate for 

urban operations because the signals cannot penetrate thick masonry walls and 

surrounding fences. Satellite radios are not the answer because they do not work 

 

26 It is important to note that a variety of policy and operational security issues are associated with this 

capability. This report focuses on the more technical aspects of this capability gap. 
 

 10

inside buildings. To add to the problem, most SINCGARS radios in mechanized 

forces are designed for vehicles not dismounted patrols, which are more the norm 

in S&R operations. To augment communications capabilities, units have been 

issued AN/PRC-148 (C) Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radios (MBITR). These also 

did not work well—they had poor range (only a couple of kilometers—depending 

on the structures) in urban environments. What was found useful was the use of 

“repeater” radios like the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) 

on the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) system, but this 

again is vehicle borne. In some cases, units ended up using a police scanner radio 

system, the Motorola XTS5000, for dismounted personnel. For this system to 

work, repeater radios were placed on top of high buildings. Using these radios and 

the repeaters, dismounted patrols found that they could maintain communications 

anywhere in their 30-km AO. However, an additional problem was created in that 

repeater radios had to be secured, which put additional manpower strains on units. 

Recent reports indicate that shortcomings are being overcome with changes to 

tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), such as remaining tactically close to 

vehicle-based radios which are used as repeaters, as well as changes to standing 

operating procedures (SOPs), such as establishing temporary repeaters on top of 

buildings when patrols are out. Current Army S&T programs are working to 

address this shortfall through tactical mobile networks which will extend the 

range and reliability of devices.27 Another innovative solution comes in the form 

of aerostats that provide temporary communications networks over a given AO. 

However, issues concerning aerostat vulnerability to attack must be addressed. 

Assessment: This is both an urban combat and S&R operations critical need. It is 

being addressed with modified commercial-off-the-shelf systems (COTS), 

acquisition programs, and S&T programs.28 Additional S&T efforts do not appear 

to be needed. In the meantime, warfighters will continue to cope with 

shortcomings by modifying their TTPs and unit SOPs. 

• Interoperability of Incompatible Tactical Radio Systems. Closely related to the 

aforementioned shortfall, lack of interoperable communications equipment 

continues to plague S&R operations. Often within S&R operations, the interaction 

of joint, coalition, and host nation forces as well as non-military personnel occurs 

at very low organization levels. The compatibility of communications among 

these groups becomes critical. Assessments conducted in this regard see 

interoperability as an issue among four main groups: inter-echelon within a 

service; joint; military to host-nation or multinational entity; and military to 

civilian (whether contractor or non-governmental). DARPA’s Future Combat 

Systems Communications (FCS-C) program is addressing this shortfall by linking 

 

27 ARCIC designates this technology objective as BC3 in “Identifying Capabilities in Stability Operations 

Briefing,” April 10, 2006. 

28 In this regard, Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW) technology holds promise in overcoming the limitation of 

operating in urban environments. For a discussion of next generation communications technologies, see 

Larry Williams and Allen Kuptez, “The 4G soldier—New Developments in Military Mobile 

Communications,” Communications and RF Design, June 2003 available at <http://rfdesign.com/ 

images/archive/306mil_Williams52.pdf>. 
 

 11

previously incompatible systems into an interoperable network. This system is 

currently being transitioned to U.S. Special Forces Command for evaluation and 

fielding.29 

Of continued concern, however, is the enduring inadequacy in tying nonmilitary 

elements into the COP of C2 systems during S&R operations. There is an overreliance on cell phones among contractors, international government 

organizations (IGOs), and NGO elements in communicating with military entities. 

Obviously, operational security (OPSEC) is a crucial issue. While the creation of 

the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction at the State 

Department is a positive step in centralizing S&R operations management, 

specific technological solutions have yet to be applied uniformly. Low-level, 

commercially available communications security (COMSEC) does much to 

mitigate OPSEC issues, but it is hoped that further standardization of Provincial 

Reconstruction Team (PRT) doctrine and equipment packages will address this 

shortfall to some extent. Not surprisingly, evidence suggests that close 

coordination among military and non-military entities at the early stages of S&R 

operations does much to surmount obstacles in communications. 

Assessment: Technical efforts appear to be on track for addressing 

communications interoperability issues, with near term solutions currently being 

evaluated and fielded. The identification and tracking of nonmilitary elements as 

well as their integration into the COP of C2 systems is most likely an acquisition 

activity. COMSEC of non-military systems within a military network continues to 

be a technical issue, and may benefit from S&T investments. 

• Too Few Translators and Translations Devices. The bottom line here is that 

human translators are always considered more useful than translation devices. 

Translation devices, in addition to being scarce, do not always work well because 

of too many unrecognizable idioms or loss of nuance. In S&R operations, this 

lack of communication is debilitating.30 

DARPA’s Global Autonomous Language Exploitation (GALE) program is 

seeking to address this capability gap in foreign language translation. The initial 

program, to be completed by 2010, is focused on Arabic and Chinese. While not 

specifically addressing the need for “pocket” translation devices (GALE focuses 

on distillation and translation of large media outlets into searchable databases) its 

development and fielding will likely create synergies in portable devices. 

 

 

29 Dr. Tony Tether, “DARPA Director’s Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee,” March 29, 

2006. 

30 From a doctrinal aspect, the Army leadership is looking to revamp the military education of the enlisted 

and officer ranks to possibly make language instruction a more central component. However, this issue is 

outside the scope of this study. For a deeper look at reforming PME with respect to language ability and 

cultural knowledge, see Henry Leonard et. al, “Something Old, Something New: Army Leader 

Development in a Dynamic Environment.” Rand Arroyo Center Report, February 2006. This report can be 

found at <www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG281.pdf>. 
 

 12

Assessment: More sophisticated language translation software is needed and is 

being addressed by DARPA. Army S&T efforts in this regard would have limited 

utility. Making use of existing language training technology to train deploying 

soldiers might go part of the way in addressing this need, but the pace and scope 

of future missions will most likely outstrip language training efforts. 

Situational Awareness 

Currently, friendly forces in vehicles are linked to FBCB2 systems. Dismounted 

personnel are not linked to this system. In order to address this shortfall, several efforts 

within the military (to include DARPA, PEO Soldier, Natick, and Army S&T) are trying 

to scale Blue Force Tracking technology down to the individual soldier level. 

• Limited SA Capability in an Urban Environment. A common complaint of 

warfighters operating in Baghdad is that the current standard-issue Precision 

Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR), in addition to being too cumbersome, lacks 

the detail and specificity to show locations in urban environments. These same 

soldiers have also noted the ability to display location in three dimensions would 

be especially useful. At the company level, some dismounted military personnel 

have resorted to individually purchasing COTS solutions, such as Garmin 

systems, which are smaller and easier to use than vehicle-based systems and 

primarily support the self-location of dismounted personnel. However, the major 

trade-off in making use of such commercial systems is the lack of detailed map 

databases (most databases identify only major roads, even in cities such as 

Baghdad; a view of maps on the Internet illustrates the problem). The inability to 

self-locate inside large buildings, observe the location of other friendly forces, 

view OPFOR data, and link GPS devices together into netcentric C2 systems are 

additional shortcomings of current COTS positioning systems. We feel that it 

might be useful for current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in future 

contingencies, for COTS systems to be specially adapted and fielded for military 

use only. These systems would then be compatible with military-grade map 

databases, while avoiding most OPSEC threats. 

The Army is seeking to address this capability gap with alternatives to GPS for 

location and navigation in complex environments.31 Related to this overriding 

initiative are a variety of geospatial information integration and generation tools. 

The challenge continues to be providing the dismounted soldier the ability to 

access accurate map databases with a system that is secure, mobile, and easy to 

use. 

In terms of reconstruction operations, GPS systems are pivotal to the coordination 

and delivery of relief supplies, building materials, and other civil operations. Next 

 

31 ARCIC designates this technology objective as BC6 in “Identifying Capabilities in Stability Operations 

Briefing,” April 10, 2006. 
 

 13

generation GPS use must incorporate the many participants involved in S&R 

operations while not forfeiting OPSEC. 

 

Assessment: Additional S&T efforts are required and must continue to address the 

problem of limited SA capabilities, especially in 3-dimensional location (3-D 

positioning synchronized and presented with 3-D displays) of dismounted 

personnel in large urban environments, including above-ground and sub-surface 

structures.32 The capability to disseminate this information to appropriate SA 

systems is also a requirement. The enhancement of commercial map databases for 

current AOs in Iraq and Afghanistan is a non-S&T effort, but must take place to 

provide an interim solution. 

Armored Vehicles in Urban Environments 

In S&R operations (especially in urban operations), a trade-off must be made between 

armor and maneuverability. The Abrams tank is extremely survivable; for example, only 

one tank crewman died (and two were wounded) during the entire tour of the 3rd-8th

Cavalry.33 (The death occurred when the tank struck an IED with an estimated 15 152mm 

rounds in a daisy chain.) Tanks are so survivable that they are used to escort soldiers 

going on leave. However, tank mobility in urban environments is significantly inhibited 

by low hanging electrical wires (due to a do-it-yourself electrical system in Iraq); cars, 

pedestrians, and children playing in the streets, among other obstacles. Figure 1 provides 

a view of a typical street in Baghdad. Under these conditions, if tanks move slowly 

enough to minimize damage to their surroundings, they become very vulnerable to attack. 

To make matters worse, rules of engagement (ROE) normally prevent the use of the main 

tank gun, so machine guns become the weapon of choice. Further limitations of the 

Abrams tank in an urban environment include: the viewing systems, which are in the 

horizontal plane and mostly oriented toward the front of the tank and in line with the 

turret; the mounted machine guns, which must be fired with the commander and loader 

partially exposed outside of the tank; the lack of mounted external phones for 

communications with dismounted infantry;34 and the vulnerability to attacks from the 

rear. Thus, SA, lethality, combined operations, and survivability are significantly 

degraded during movements through narrow urban streets. The Tank Urban Survivability 

Kit (TUSK) program addresses all of these shortcomings and allows tanks to move at the 

slower speeds required to prevent damage to the local urban infrastructure, as well as to 

support the infantry. 

 

32 This encompasses location tracking by higher echelon elements, other units within an area, and selflocation of the individual soldier. 

33 Interviews with warfighters of the 3rd-8th Cavalry, Ft. Hood, TX, November 15, 2005. 34 The TUSK program calls this the “Tank Infantry Phone.” 
 

 14

 

Figure 1: Abrams tank with dismounted infantry during confined urban operations. 

Assessment: Fighting in urban environments will become increasingly important, as 

evidenced by the following: in the past 13 years, the U.S. military has been engaged in 13 

operations in complex urban terrain; most of the operations in Iraq have been S&R 

operations in urban environments; all intelligence and defense analyses point to a 

persistent requirement for U.S. forces to operate in urban environments for both the near 

and far-term; and the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) lists the ability to 

operate in urban terrain as a critical capability requirement. 

The introduction of the Future Combat Systems (FCS) will greatly enhance the Army’s 

ability to conduct combat operations in urban environments. There is also an increasing 

likelihood that post-combat operations for FCS will center on S&R operations in urban 

environments. To prevent problems such as those faced by the Abrams in S&R 

operations, the design of and the technologies feeding into FCS must take into account 

the constraints of full-spectrum operations. These constraints, driven by ROEs and the 

desire to protect non-combatants and minimize collateral damage, include: the inability 

to fire large caliber weapons and missiles; the lack of long range fires: maneuverability 

hampered by civilian vehicles and infrastructure obstructions; and critically, the inability 

to turn on active protection systems. Additionally, close-in, constrained fights, including 

attacks from rooftops are a high likelihood. S&T efforts must support a full-spectrum 

design of FCS for combat and S&R operations.35 

 

35 For a detailed discussion of FCS, see “The Army’s Future Combat Systems Program and Alternatives,” 

Congressional Budget Office Report, August 2006. Available at <http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/74xx/ 

doc7461/08-02-Army.pdf>. 
 

 15

Intelligence (Including Sensors) 

Because of its direct applicability to combat operations, the issue of operational 

intelligence is addressed by many S&T programs. As is the case across the board in the 

evolution of military operations, warfighters will be required to deal with an everincreasing volume and complexity of intelligence. In terms of phase IV operations, better 

tools to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence will serve to mitigate the actions of 

“spoilers” seeking to disrupt S&R operations. In addition, better intelligence gathering 

and analytical tools will allow the Army to apply more focused and efficient energy to 

those S&R operations objectives most sorely needed in a given AO. Intelligence is an 

issue that cuts across many of the other categories identified here. This section, therefore, 

will focus on issues not covered elsewhere. 

• Need for Undetectable, Long Duration Remote Networked Sensor Systems. In 

S&R operations, most military units operate from static bases, often within urban 

areas. Their bases are susceptible to sniper attacks and harassing fires from small 

mortars and RPG shots. Perimeter security, especially at night, is needed to 

reduce these attacks but is very manpower-intensive. Undetectable, long duration 

remote networked sensor systems with automated monitors would address this 

issue. Autonomous monitoring is important as human error becomes more likely 

as the number of displays to monitor and the amount of time spent staring at 

screens increases. With this in mind, the Army Battlespace Terrain Reasoning and 

Awareness program acts as an overarching system that addresses components of 

this need by analyzing topographic and climatic information in order to help 

commanders plan actions appropriate for their missions (especially in regard to 

security). The DARPA Persistent Operational Surface Surveillance and 

Engagement (POSSE) program adds further capabilities in this regard. To 

mitigate the interference of hostile and non-hostile personnel on autonomous 

sensing systems, DARPA is also developing a host of technological solutions 

stemming from its formerly named Smart Dust program. This project sought to 

integrate sensing devices onto platforms measuring no bigger than a cubic 

millimeter. Leveraging nanotechnology, the objective is to create completely 

undetectable systems that mimic dust particles.36 Army efforts such as the 

Disposable Sensor Network project are also of benefit in addressing this 

problem.37 

Assessment: Army and DARPA S&T efforts emphasize the need for establishing 

networks comprised of cheap, expendable sensors. However, these programs are 

more in line with the scenario of a unit using a short-duration sensor network 

prior to and during an attack to provide immediate information. S&R operations 

 

36 For more information, see the University of California at Berkeley’s Robotics Department website at 

<http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/~pister/SmartDust/>. 37 Research in this technology is being led by the Night Vision and Electronic Sensor Directorate 

(NVESD), Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC), U.S. 

Army RDECOM. For current information on this technology, see “Sensors and Electronics,” Army Science 

and Technology Master Plan, Volume 1, July 2005. 
 

 16

are unique in that they require long-duration, tamper-proof sensor networks. 

Longer duration sensing is closely linked to extended battery life, which is a 

capability being addressed in many DOD programs. Many commercial perimeter 

security systems exist which can satisfy the need for long duration sensing, so it 

seems more advantageous to re-engineer COTS systems than to expend S&T 

funds. 

• Need “See Through the Wall” Capability. This capability is consistently cited as a 

technological shortfall. It is needed to effectively maintain security in urban 

environments and support the clearing of rooms and buildings. The Army’s suite 

of sensing through-the-wall technologies, as well as third generation infrared 

technologies, are the most prominent programs in place seeking to address this 

need.38 DARPA is also developing a radar scope that will allow warfighters to 

detect the presence of personnel within rooms (stated to be successful through 12 

inches of concrete). There are also mobile sensor systems (using unmanned 

ground vehicle (UGV) platforms), which can provide the required information 

indirectly by moving into rooms and behind the walls in question. 

Assessment: S&T programs are adequately addressing this issue. 

Force Protection 

If personnel central to the execution of S&R operations cannot perform their duties, 

stability and reconstruction cannot take place. Security is a sine qua non for rebuilding in 

a post-conflict environment. Technologies such as enhanced body and vehicle armor, as 

well as impressive advances in medical response, have done much for soldier 

survivability. However, shortfalls in this category have the most impact on U.S. 

casualties and therefore hold a high priority. 

No program in the current Army (and joint) R&D effort commands more attention than 

counter-IED research and development. IEDs have become the number one cause of U.S. 

military casualties from hostile action in Iraq since the conclusion of major combat 

operations.39 Without delving into any classified material, we have attempted here to 

outline some of the force protection measures in place and to evaluate future needs. 

However, for security reasons, we have not included S&T issues related to the IED 

threat. This detailed information will be included in a classified version given to the 

project sponsor. 

• Need for Rapidly Locating Point of Origin for Mortar and Sniper Attacks. It is no 

surprise that urban environments make identifying attackers in a civilian 

 

38 Commercial vendors are also working on this system. Most prominent among them the SoldierVision 

system from the Time Domain Corporation uses ultra-wideband pulses to “see through” most building 

materials (with a 30-foot standoff capability). 

39 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Saban Center for 

Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. Available online at <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/ 

saban/iraq/index.pdf>. 
 

 17

population incredibly difficult. An important follow-on effect, aggressive U.S. 

response to attacks, can lead to further alienation of the civilian population. 

When collateral damage (namely, innocent casualties) occurs, a shift from a 

neutral to a hostile orientation in indigenous populations cripples S&R operations 

objectives. Therefore, accurate and rapid identification of combatants becomes a 

key capability. 

In terms of locating snipers, promising technological advances are being made 

with the DARPA Boomerang shooter detection system. More than 100 of these 

systems, which use advanced acoustical analysis to hone in on gunshots, are 

currently in use in Iraq.40 Anecdotal evidence suggests that these systems are 

more helpful in giving SA in convoy operations where road noises usually drown 

out hostile fire. In addition, the Networked Embedded Systems Technology 

(NEST) system is providing a common software infrastructure for sensor nets. In 

a test in 2005, an ad hoc system of acoustic sensors using this architecture was 

able to detect, within two meters and in two seconds, a rifle shot. For mortar 

attacks, current counter-battery radar (AN/TPQ Firefinder series) meets 

operational needs. However, some warfighters complain about too many false 

positives being registered. The most recent ARL effort, Unattended Transient 

MASINT41 System (UTAMS), has performed very well in addressing this 

problem and others. Given that most mortar attacks in Iraq occur on time-delay or 

through remote means, DARPA’s development of high-strength counter-mortar 

nets that catch rounds might prove to be a more efficient and effective way to 

protect U.S. warfighters. The Army Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar (C-RAM) 

program also holds promise for active protection of static sites against incoming 

threats. 

Assessment: S&T efforts are adequately addressing this problem. 

Inability to Quickly Check People, Baggage, and Vehicles at Check Points. The 

need to effectively screen a civilian population for security purposes must be 

balanced with the importance of allowing the unimpeded flow of commercial 

traffic. Security must be conducted in a way that accounts for the potential that a 

populace, frustrated with limited freedom of movement and invasive checks, will 

become uncooperative and even hostile. Most evidence suggests that the 

chemical-reaction based sprays, x-rays, and other technological tools used for 

screening are time-consuming and give too many false positives. A recent field 

report verified that checking traffic and personnel at control points continues to be 

an issue—even with warfighters using an array of sensors and dogs to assist with 

the screening process.42 The sensors, however, still tend to have high false alarm 

rates and often generate more information than an operator can handle. Because 

of varying cultural constraints, dogs cannot, in certain situations, be used to sniff 

 

40 Dr. Tony Tether, “DARPA Director’s Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee,” March 29, 

2006. 

41 Measurements and Signatures Intelligence. 

42 Bing West field report, June 1, 2006. This field report will be discussed further in Chapter IV. 
 

 18

people. Tailored TTPs, as well as bomb-sniffing dogs, are currently the most 

effective screening tools. 

Commercial entities are working to develop more effective, simple sprays and 

electronics that can detect the presence of explosives. No single, stand-alone 

detection technology can accomplish this security screening task. The bottom line 

is that several technologies and tools must be integrated into an effective whole. 

Efforts like the DOD Vehicle Entry-Point Screening program are underway.43

Complicating these efforts are environments such as Baghdad, where explosive 

residue and an ambient residual presence of explosive particulate is prevalent due 

to frequent bombings. 

There is also a related expressed need for a system of traffic control at control 

points. Portable “stoplights” and other foreign language-capable digital signage 

could potentially make operations at these high density points run more smoothly. 

This, of course, is not an S&T issue as such, but a portable system that could 

become an organic issue item to military police units would be advantageous. 

Assessment: S&T efforts are needed to reduce false alarm rates of sensors for 

detecting explosives and to develop automated systems for fusing and analyzing 

the overwhelming amount of data and imagery being generated by current 

sensors. 

• Inability to Quickly Identify and Track the Population. In S&R operations, 

identifying large numbers of civilians is a daily need. Current approaches use 

face-to-face interactions, reviewing personal identification documentation, and 

maintaining lists of citizens on cumbersome databases such as Microsoft Excel 

spreadsheets. These approaches are very tedious and inefficient. Local police 

forces in the U.S. successfully use systems based on the “reach-back” 

identification of fingerprints, photos, and license plates.44 This system is adequate 

for the occasional ID check for a traffic violation or apprehension. S&R 

operations, however, demand magnitudes more in the number of daily checks. 

For example, the 3rd-8th Cav processed approximately 10,000 pedestrians and 

3,500 vehicles each day through six traffic control points to the International 

Green Zone. With such numbers of people, automated systems are needed that 

are very user-friendly and have a high throughput. 

The Army currently does not have the capability to biometrically identify an 

individual on-the-spot. There exists in limited commercial use a highly portable, 

thumbprint-centered biometric identification device.45 For usefulness in military 

application, a device of this type would have to be properly interfaced with the 

 

43 Defense Technology Objective JD.09. 

44 By “reach-back,” we mean the remote checking of information contained in a centralized database. 45 The Chicago Police Department makes use of a portable biometric device that can take a thumbprint as 

well as a digital picture. This information is provided by Dr. Samuel Musa, Senior Research Fellow, 

CTNSP. 
 

 19

existing Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS). Doing so, would greatly 

enhance warfighter capabilities. For future S&R operations, the Army must 

incorporate a hand-held system that will allow on-the-spot identity checking as 

well as the capability to remotely input identification data into a centralized 

database. 

Assessment: Although this is a need that exists across the full range of military 

operations, the scale of the task in S&R operations is usually much more 

challenging. Potential solutions should be assessed in terms of accuracy and 

throughput. For example, to increase throughput, there should be minimal input 

on the part of the person being identified, ideally a passive rapid face recognition 

system would be better than an active fingerprint identification system. The 

approach for addressing this problem includes a combination of: assessing 

commercially fielded systems used by U.S. police forces and emergency 

responders, responding to user feedback on developed DOD systems, and 

considering novel S&T approaches like stand-off biometric identification.46 The 

creation of an Army Technology Objective (ATO) with regard to this challenge is 

recommended. 

Counter-IED Technology. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the discussion for 

this topic is withheld in order to comply with DOD OPSEC policies. The material 

has been provided to the sponsor.

Unmanned Systems 

UAVs perform a variety of crucial tasks in current operations ranging from intelligence 

and surveillance to attack functions. 47,48 UGVs are important in explosive ordnance 

disposal (EOD) and other potential-IED investigations, as well as for reconnaissance of 

rooms, underground structures, and caves. Unmanned systems are playing an important 

and growing role in reconnaissance and security of convoy routes. Taking things a step 

further, DARPA’s “Grand Challenge” seeks to develop a fleet of wholly autonomous 

ground vehicles that would be able to conduct supply and logistics missions without 

human drivers.49 Early successes bode well for this endeavor. 

 

46 Stand-off biometric identification technologies are characterized by little or no cooperation on the part of 

the individual being identified. These methods include voice analysis and facial recognition software. For 

more detailed information on this technology, see: The National Biometrics Challenge, National Science 

and Technology Council, Subcommittee on Biometrics, Executive Office of the President, August 2006. 

47 Comments from officers recently returned from duty in Iraq cited UAV sound signatures as an issue on 

some missions, with the buzzing of the current systems compromising stealth. However, development and 

wider deployment of aerostats and electric motor UAVs are addressing this issue. 48 For an in-depth look at how DOD plans to integrate UAVs, as well as UGVs, into future operations, see 

“Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap: 2005-2030,” Undersecretary of Defense (AT&L), August 2005. 

The report can be accessed at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/usd/Roadmap%20Final2.pdf>. 

49 For more information, see DARPA’s “Grand Challenge” website at <http://www.darpa.mil/ 

grandchallenge/index.asp>. 
 

 20

Unmanned Systems: 

• Fixed-wing UAVs do not provide uninterrupted viewing. Fixed-wing UAVs 

cannot “hover and stare,” so if a particular sector of interest is to be viewed 

repeatedly, the vehicle has to circle back to the point. This is time-consuming 

and cumbersome. In order to address this shortcoming, DARPA has developed a 

suite of rotary-wing UAVs: the A-160 unmanned helicopter, the company-level 

Organic Air Vehicle-II, and the platoon-level Micro Air Vehicle and Wasp 

systems. Rotary-wing UAVs use more fuel than fixed-wing UAVs of similar 

size and thus have less “on-station” time. 

Assessment: The Army should continue to coordinate its S&T efforts with 

DARPA to develop longer duration, “hover and stare” capabilities. To avoid 

limitations due to airspace congestion, the most promise seems to center on 

platoon-level systems which are “backpack-able.” 

• Deconflicting Airspace Issues. Members of the 1st Cavalry Division noted their 

inability to use organic UAVs because of airspace restrictions. To address this, 

formerly battalion-level organic UAV assets have been consolidated at higher 

echelons in order to more comprehensively coordinate their deployment. While 

this might improve de-confliction capabilities, it also might increase the response 

time when units request UAV assets. 

Assessment: S&T efforts are needed for both deconflicting airspace and 

enhancing obstacle/crash avoidance capabilities of tactical UAVs. However, 

payload limitations will most likely make this a very difficult capability to 

integrate onto existing platforms. The de-confliction of airspace for UAVs must 

be addressed since the Army will continue to push toward a future force 

comprised of many UAVs, which will compete for airspace with each other, Army 

manned systems, and joint manned and unmanned systems. 

• Availability and Affordability of UAV and UGV Assets. Rapid fielding continues 

apace. In terms of UGVs used in bomb disposal, there seems to be a need for 

expendable, scout systems for use in EOD investigations and IED detonations. 

Currently, the loss of expensive EOD robots—Threat and Local Observation 

Notice (TALON)—during IED neutralization missions constitutes monetary and 

operational costs. 

Assessment: S&T may be appropriate, especially in developing affordable, 

expendable UGVs.50

 

50 One such robotic device that holds promise is the Bombot. A recent news report details its use as an 

expendable EOD device in Iraq. See Shelby Spires, “Robot Role Saving Lives in War Zone,” Huntsville 

Times, September 18, 2006. 
 

 21

• Limited Range Issue when Operating UGVs in Urban Environments. As with 

radio systems in urban settings, radio frequencies used by the operating control 

unit for TALON EOD robots have limited range in built-up environments. 

Although systems such as the TALON can also be operated by a command wire, 

it is often not feasible for control since it necessitates some proximity for the 

operator as well as the likelihood of the wire becoming entangled. As a possible 

solution, some EOD personnel have suggested that a companion UGV could act 

as a mobile repeater for the TALON, retransmitting the control signal and 

boosting its range. 

 

Assessment: Efforts to adapt signal repeaters for use in UGV operations in 

urban environments should be pursued to a greater extent.

Non-lethal Capabilities 

Non-lethal weapon (NLW) capabilities are an identified Army S&R operational shortfall. 

This capability is important in performing crowd control duties and restoring 

maintenance of order in riot situations. Beside Tazers and other hand-held devices used 

mainly in detainee operations, few consistent NLW systems are in use by warfighters. 

Creative applications of existing equipment—such as driving a tank in reverse so that hot 

exhaust dispels crowds—have been seen. Having been designated the executive agent for 

the DOD NLW weapons program, the USMC-led Joint Non-lethal Weapons Directorate 

(JNLWD) drives research and application endeavors in this field. 

• Limitations on the Availability and Use of NLWs. Given that the line between 

combat operations and stability operations is often not definitive, warfighters are 

forced to perform a wide spectrum of duties in stressful, ambiguous 

environments. Overwhelming use of force, the trademark of the U.S. military, is 

no longer an appropriate response in current operations where combatants and 

densely packed civilian populations commingle. Therefore, to control threatening 

situations without causing the harmful collateral damage attendant with modern 

firepower, NLWs will and should serve a more central role. The USMC is 

leading this effort with acoustic and directed energy weapons as well as nonlethal rounds in existing firearms. DARPA (along with the JNLWD) is also 

developing an artificial polymer “snow,” which can cause a surface to quickly 

become slippery, with an accompanying technology for rapidly returning the 

surface to normal traction. This holds potential for guarding against VBIEDs. 

NLWs give commanders and warfighters a wider range of options for dealing 

with threats and disturbances. Moreover, the very nature of NLW use (temporary, 

reversible effects) ensures that collateral damage is kept to a minimum in 

operations where civilians are a large presence. However, one problem that must 

be addressed is that, on the receiving end, NLWs still look like lethal weapons, so 

the use of NLWs could potentially escalate a situation. 
 

 22

Evidence shows that soldiers are making use of powerful lights to ward off 

civilian vehicles when they veer too close.51 Green-light lasers and pin-flares also 

have been fired at civilian vehicles that did not slow down at check points or 

encroached upon convoys. While protecting the force against VBIEDs and other 

threats of this nature remains critical, it is hard to argue with the contention that 

innocent civilians should not have their bad driving punished by lethal force. 

Moreover, future NLWs should be added to existing weapons platforms so that 

soldiers do not have to take their hands off their weapon. In this regard, lethal and 

non-lethal options should be within easy reach. This capability will necessitate a 

high level of training for warfighters to make split-second decisions about what 

type of force to use. This is no different, however, from the types of choices they 

are often forced to make. The caliber and intensity of their training will continue 

to stand warfighters in good stead. 

The Army should increase its interaction with the USMC in regard to NLW and 

seek to concentrate on how this capability can be used in S&R operations. It 

seems that these weapons would be most useful during convoy operations and 

traffic control point screening, where the intentions of civilians in vehicles are 

unclear or when mutual misunderstanding can result in civilian casualties. A 

NLW that could affect a moving vehicle (by cutting off the engine or 

incapacitating the occupant) would be especially useful in preventing innocent 

civilian casualties.52 

Finally, NLWs should not detract from a warfighter’s ability to use lethal force. In 

other words, the NLW should not be so cumbersome that it prevents the 

warfighter from using his lethal weapon in a timely manner. 

Assessment: The Army should continue to work collaboratively with the JNLWD 

on NLW S&T efforts. The NLWs should be designed in a manner that does not 

degrade the warfighter’s ability to engage the enemy with lethal force, if needed. 

Information Operations 

With the instantaneous transmission of words and images around the globe, IO takes on 

an importance never before seen. Insurgencies, such as in Iraq, have used this changed 

dynamic to their greatest advantage—waging an effective “hearts and minds” campaign 

to rally individuals against coalition efforts. Almost nothing is more important than the 

attitude of the public the United States is seeking to help in S&R operations. The capacity 

of the Army (and, indeed DOD) for addressing this notion of strategic communication in 

 

51 Interview with Major Lawrence Dring, Former FAST Officer, May 31, 2005. 52 The field report in Chapter IV states that the TTP most often used by warfighters when vehicles come too 

close to a convoy is firing a shot near or into the civilian’s car. 
 

 23

S&R operations is not robust.53 Responses to our survey, discussions in our interviews, 

articles quoting General John Abizaid (CENTCOM Commander),54 and an IO article 

written by Colonel Ralph Baker (Commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored 

Division)55 all point to the need for better IO in S&R operations. These individuals and 

others call for better IO policies, unit operating procedures, employment, and awareness 

of the value of IO. The last two points are drivers for technology improvements, namely 

IO tools and education/training systems. 

While translation devices such as DARPA’s GALE project will help the Army gain 

awareness of indigenous populations’ media and general orientation, there seems to be 

little by way of new technology that will increase its ability to more effectively publicize 

reconstruction successes and counter deleterious insurgent propaganda.56 One IO product 

that may be of benefit would be a planning tool that maps cultural diversity, identifying 

the population of an area by ethnicity, religion, and race, and then uses that information 

in enhanced political, military (air, land and sea), economic, social, information, and 

infrastructure (PMESII) planning tools. Help in this area is coming from DARPA with its 

initiation of a PMESII tool effort entitled the Integrated Battle Command. 

We live in, as several reports on IO have stated, the age of the “strategic corporal.” 

Individual events at the tactical level truly have strategic implications in terms of 

international media coverage and insurgent propaganda. Moreover, reports of collateral 

damage and innocent casualties always reverberate stronger and farther than stories 

centered on the opening of a new school or water treatment facility. Credibility is an 

important issue here as well. Last year’s revelation that a defense contractor was paid to 

plant favorable news reports about U.S. reconstruction efforts in the Iraqi media severely 

undermined American credibility regarding free press and democracy issues.57 

Assessment: Overall, S&T and acquisition programs are in place to address IO needs. 

However, one area where an impact can potentially be made is in the development of 

PMESII planning tools which take into account IO planning. In addition, technology can 

also be leveraged to improve military IO capabilities by developing realistic training 

models and simulations that create scenarios involving media relations, civil-military 

interaction, and strategic communications elements of S&R operations (additional 

aspects of training using modeling and simulation is discussed further in the following 

portion of this study).58 

 

53 This assessment comes directly from Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 

Institutionalizing Stability Operations within DOD (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

September 2005), 15. 

54 Paul De La Garza, “In Search of Ground Truth,” St. Petersburg Times, September 3, 2006. 55 Ralph O. Baker, “The Decisive Weapon. A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on 

Information Operations,” Military Review, May–June 2006, 13-32. 56 Respondents to the NDU survey wanted tools that could assist them in getting the positive word out 

(about American reconstruction efforts) to the populace as quickly and efficiently as possible. 57 For more information about the controversy surrounding Lincoln Group actions, see “U.S. Is Said to Pay 

to Plant Articles in Iraq Papers,” The New York Times, December 1, 2005. 58 For a more detailed discussion of some of these aspects—especially civil-military interaction—see 

Franklin Kramer, Stuart Starr, and Larry Wentz, “Perspectives on Information and Communications 

Technology (ICT) for Civil-Military Coordination in Crises,” Command and Control Research and 
 

 24

Training and Use of Modeling and Simulation 

While U.S. warfighters are unparalleled in their training for traditional combat 

engagements, their readiness for taking on S&R operations is lacking. There are simply 

no Army-wide programs that standardize S&R operations training. To be fair, it is 

difficult to create such a standardized curriculum given that experiences can be so varied, 

but core skills such as language and cultural knowledge are simply indispensable and 

should be cultivated as much as possible in the pre-deployment phase. As the Interagency 

Working Group (IWG) on building S&R operations capacity has stated, the U.S. 

government must actively predict and prepare for intervention in failed and failing 

states.59 

• Lack of Adequate Training in S&R Operations for U.S. Personnel.60,61

Simulations and models have the potential for equipping future forces with the 

tools necessary to assist with carrying out post-conflict reconstruction missions. 

The Army, in particular, increasingly will be called on to perform S&R 

operations. Therefore, future leaders at all levels of command must be able to 

carry out the full gamut of operations: civil administration duties, humanitarian 

missions, security raids, and coordination with NGO and civilian elements—all 

under the intense scrutiny of the international press.62 The Army has a host of 

training endeavors to address the changing nature of battle, but while taking into 

account asymmetric threats in models and simulations, it has not explicitly 

expressed an intention to focus on S&R operations. The Adapted Training 

System, the Dismounted Virtual Training System, and an assortment of gaming 

technologies are being refined and implemented. Given the flexibility of new 

modeling and simulation platforms, Army leaders can develop in their 

warfighters a level of proficiency in S&R operations to cope with ongoing and 

potential missions. Some NDU survey respondents have indicated as much by 

 Technology Symposium 2006, June 20, 2006, and Larry Wentz, “An ICT Primer: Information and 

Communications Technologies for Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief and Stabilization and 

Reconstruction,” Defense & Technology Paper 31, (CTNSP: Washington, DC, July 2006). 

59 Dr. Barbara Sotirin et. al, “The Proceedings of the Conference on Interagency Requirements for Regional 

Stability/Capacity Building R&D,” January 10, 2005. 

60 Related to this capability gap is a lack of adequate training on new equipment for use in S&R operations. 

With the rapid fielding of new and modified systems, some recently deployed officers have identified 

potential weaknesses in new equipment training (NET) and human systems integrations/manpower and 

personnel integration (HSI/MANPRINT) endeavors. Note: MANPRINT is defined as the principles, 

analyses, design parameters, and techniques to minimize total ownership costs and ensure individual 

systems are built to accommodate the human performance characteristics of the user population that will 

operate, maintain, and support the system. 

61 Under the rubric of communication, the issue of interagency cooperation is significant. The White House 

IWG for Capacity Building R&D, led by Dr. Barbara Sotirin, is heading R&D initiatives that address many 

of the other categories here. Germane to this section, their work identifies a necessity to coordinate a 

common lexicon among the U.S. government as it concerns S&R operations. 

62 For more information, see Henry Leonard et. al, Something Old, Something New: Army Leader 

Development in a Dynamic Environment.” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Arroyo Center, February 2006). 
 

 25

recommending that future simulations involve such scenarios as getting power to 

a civilian population or coordinating proper sewage disposal while 

simultaneously trying to track and capture insurgents. Moreover, cultural 

awareness training must go beyond the “pocket guide” level. A 2005 workshop 

on S&R operations education at the U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and 

Stability Operations Institute brought together experts from within and outside 

the government to address these issues. While technology plays an important role 

in facilitating dissemination of information, the workshop participants 

acknowledged that creating common baseline knowledge of S&R operations 

across government agencies is still a formidable task.63 

Additional R&D efforts, as identified by the White House IWG involve training 

that incorporates military interaction with civilian populations as well as a 

baseline level of media savvy for even the lowest level soldier. Finally, the 

current dynamic where “major parties leading S&R operations train and learn 

separately, with distinct and separable training, awareness, and simulation 

systems” must be changed.64 Simulations must be accurate and involve all the 

elements that make real operations with its myriad actors so complex. Future 

modeling and simulation architecture in development has the capacity and 

sophistication to incorporate this complexity. It is the responsibility of higher 

echelon Army leaders to ensure that training is effective in this regard. 

Assessment: An S&T need here is in the area of modeling the cultural and S&R 

operations details of the current AO and appropriately representing them in 

current Army training systems. 

• Lack of Adequate Training for Foreign S&R Operations Personnel. Although it 

is paramount that U.S. personnel receive the training necessary to successfully 

execute S&R operations, models and simulations also could prove useful for 

helping host nation leaders and reconstruction personnel to build capacity in their 

own country. 

Assessment: Same as above, except with the additional problem of needing a 

training system that supports multiple foreign languages.

Logistics 

Logistics and materiel are needed to rebuild the physical assets of a collapsed nation. 

Humanitarian and medical missions also rely heavily on tasks organized under this 

heading. 

 

63 The presentations and findings of the “Peace and Stability Operations Education Workshop” at the U.S. 

Army War College can be found at <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/publications/Chapter%202.pdf>. 64 Dr. Barbara Sotirin, “Civil Reconstruction and Force Transition (CRAFT) Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Briefing,” November 1, 2005. 
 

 26

• Most Logistics Equipment Not Designed for Long-Duration Needs of S&R 

Operations. Here, the most pressing issue has to do with generators. Instead of 

providing temporary power for contingency operations in Iraq, generators have 

become the main power source for many city-level S&R operations because of 

the lack (or unreliability) of a local power source. The Army has several 

technology programs that involve finding alternate, efficient power sources. 

Although not explicitly stated, these alternate power sources will have S&R 

operations applicability. Cheap, reliable, and portable generator capacity would 

do much to influence the indigenous population’s attitude regarding U.S. S&R 

operations. This is especially true in the early stages of S&R operations, that 

crucial window of time when opinions are still being formed (this would also 

have IO ramifications).65 

Assessment: S&T efforts should focus on expanding power sources outside of 

fossil fuels. Innovations in harnessing wind and solar power in contingency 

environments would have great utility (especially in lowering the number of 

convoy missions). A durable, foldable solar energy panel, for example, that could 

store energy would go great lengths in satisfying military and civilian needs 

(obviously, this would be especially useful in sunny desert climates). A 

collapsible, portable wind turbine might serve the same purpose. The Army would 

do well to research how the private sector is approaching this alternative energy 

technology. 

• Dismounted Warfighters Have to Carry Too Many Types of Batteries to Power 

Critical Devices. The Army has identified as a critical technological shortfall the 

lack of alternative power for dismounted warfighters. There is little 

interoperability for batteries and power sources among the host of devices used 

by the soldier on the ground. The DARPA Palm Power program is actively 

seeking to solve this problem by providing a “universal” power source that is 

light, portable, and reliable. 

Assessment: A number of S&T efforts are underway. These programs should also 

consider S&R operations-specific needs. 

 

65 For more on this topic of renewable energy, see “In Iraqi War Zone, U.S. Army Calls for ‘Green’ 

Power,” Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 2006. Available online at <http://www.csmonitor.com/ 

2006/0907/p01s04-usmi.html>. 
 

 27

IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 

We begin by comparing the assessments presented in the previous section with a written 

assessment provided by a senior consultant to CTNSP as part of his recent trip to Iraq, 

henceforth referred to as the field report.

66 Traveling throughout Iraq, the CTNSP 

consultant was able to meet with a host of military professionals taking part in efforts 

there, ranging from general officer to corporal, from USMC combat teams to Army 

infantry units. Overall, many of the shortcomings cited in the field report corroborated 

the needs we have identified. 

Although the field report did not emphasize problems with communications in Iraq, we 

believe gaps remain and are currently being overcome in part by soldier TTPs. For 

example, dismounted patrols were conducted in close proximity to their respective High 

Mobility Multi Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) both for command and control 

and hydration needs. However, it must be noted that in urban S&R operations this 

“tethering” of dismounted patrols to their command/transport vehicles greatly hinders 

interface with the civilian population and can lead to less thorough security operations. 

Given that most buildings in Iraq were no higher than three stories, no major 

communications issues were witnessed in regard to clearing buildings. However, taller 

buildings in Baghdad (and future operations in more sophisticated urban environments) 

require more robust communications assets. An interesting recommendation made was to 

modify the AN/PRC-148 radio to utilize a higher frequency, thereby increasing its 

range.67 While this would help in extending the range of the radio over flat terrain, it 

would do little for warfighters operating in an urban area where structures have a 

significant impact on radio frequency propagation. Reinforcing our data, the field report

cited the widespread use of commercial solutions such as the Motorola XTS series of 

radio. On the subject of inter-service and civil-military interoperability, the field report 

stated little by way of problems. However, the reason for this lack of observation was 

most likely due to the fact that when external elements entered Army or USMC AOs, 

they were issued Army or USMC equipment. Again, this does not appear to compensate 

for a more overarching capability gap. 

In terms of situational awareness, the field report findings coincide directly with our 

study, especially in terms of tracking dismounted personnel. Warfighters are purchasing 

small, lightweight GPS devices for use on the ground (most prominently, Garmin 

systems) instead of using the military-issued PLGR, which is deemed cumbersome and 

not detailed enough for urban operations. Still, a consistent shortfall in this area is the 

inability to collect 3-D data and present 3-D situational awareness in a 2-D display. 

Moreover, warfighters in Iraq, as the field report and our study suggest, would benefit 

from scaling GPS and Blue Force Tracking down to the individual fire team/soldier. 

Corroborating our findings, the field report shows that this capability remains a priority. 

 

66 Bing West Interview, May 18, 2006 and Report dated June 1, 2006. 

67 Ibid. 
 

 28

The issue of reconstruction operations was also addressed in the field report. Bypassing 

any debate on whether improving the quality of life for a populace undercuts an 

insurgency’s motivation and ability to wage violence, data here corresponds to our 

study’s stated gap: technology which can coordinate efforts into a COP is lacking. The 

model we see as most beneficial in this endeavor is akin to the CPoF system which, if 

modified for S&R operations, could provide a collaborative tool to tie in military, 

interagency, NGO, and IGO elements for reconstruction operations. With regard to the 

underlying contention that S&R operations are as important a mission to the Army as 

traditional combat operations, it is important to note that the field report detailed an onthe-ground, maneuver force mindset that sees reconstruction operations as secondary to 

their stabilization efforts. While this might be a natural response to an environment such 

as Iraq where security continues to be a serious challenge, future operations will require a 

maneuver force invested in supporting reconstruction as well as stabilization. 

See-through-wall capabilities and remote sensor systems were two other issues 

touched upon in the field report. Warfighters continue to express a need for both these 

technologies. In terms of the sensor systems, the field surveys of soldiers highlighted the 

fact that current systems, when emplaced, were often compromised by inquisitive 

civilians (mostly children) and/or insurgents. Our study advocates the development of 

autonomous sensors that are more difficult to detect in order to overcome this obstacle. 

One of the most pressing issues in military operations is force protection. In Iraq, enemy 

snipers are especially deadly for warfighters. The field report showed that, although 

acoustic sensors were available to some units, the probability of having a device on hand, 

in operation at the moment of attack, and in line with the attack was low. Moreover, the 

ambient noise level of a place like Baghdad degraded the device’s efficacy. In the end, a 

non-technical solution is usually employed to neutralize enemy snipers: slow, meticulous 

sweeps by Special Operations Forces (SOF). 

Enemy mortar fire was sufficiently dealt with by using mortar-locating radar. Because of 

warfighters’ ability to quickly respond to such attacks, this has become the less preferred 

method of attack by the insurgents. 

The field report also covered the topic of IEDs, but due to security considerations its 

findings are not included in this discussion. This material has been provided to the 

sponsor. 

The inability to quickly identify individuals and screen people at control points

continue to be a problem faced by soldiers. The field report emphasized the fact that a 

system for rapidly identifying the civilian population is a crucial shortfall in Iraq. The 

BATS does not meet the task because it is too cumbersome and takes too much time to 

work. The field report goes on to point out that some units were making use of Excel 

spreadsheets to conduct censuses of their respective AOs. There exists a portable, 

thumbprint-based biometric device that might interface with the BATS database, 

potentially making it a more nimble system providing an on-the-spot readout of the 
 

 29

individual scanned. However, this device does not preclude the need to build a 

comprehensive identity database for Iraqi citizens. 

Screening for suicide bombers at control points is another topic covered in the field 

report, but due to security considerations the findings are not included in this discussion. 

This material has been provided to the sponsor. 

Unmanned systems play an invaluable role in Iraqi operations. The field report

supported the identified need for a “hover and stare” capability that cannot be met with 

the current stable of fixed-wing UAVs. As both our study and the field report have 

pointed out, the complexity of urban operations necessitates such a capability. As an 

update to our findings, it seems that issues having to do with de-confliction of airspace 

have been dealt with by removing organic UAV assets from lower echelon forces and 

placing them at the brigade level and above. In addition, the policy of conducting 

helicopter operations mostly at night has, to some extent, cleared airspace. As far as 

integration of UAV assets goes, the field report shows that USMC and Army elements 

have worked out coordinated UAV operations (facilitated by familiarity of operators and 

the use of digital chat features). 

A non-lethal weapon capability is possibly the one category where the field report and 

our findings are in most disagreement. Where NLWs can give warfighters more options 

and prevent the escalation of tense situations in stabilization operations, the field report

from Iraq showed that they served almost no role whatsoever in the environments visited 

(where insurgents were constantly using deadly force). Other sources of information, as 

the body of our study has pointed out, have presented different findings. We believe that 

this contradiction has more to do with the current state of security in some parts of Iraq 

than with the overarching usefulness of NLWs in S&R operations in general. 

 

By way of concluding remarks, we note that in undertaking our study, we have attempted 

to identify the potential for technology contributions to S&R operations. However, it is 

just as important to keep in mind the less tangible and interdependent aspects of these 

endeavors. The demands of on-the-ground execution of S&R operations are many and 

complex and only some have technical solutions. The Army also must attend to the 

overarching principles that govern the success of stability and reconstruction. As a 

starting point, stability cannot take place without the security that military forces provide. 

Accordingly, security cannot take root until the indigenous population views the potential 

for development as a viable alternative to violence. Though it is often more arduous and 

time-consuming to engage populations patiently and with regard for their own views on 

their development (rather than to simply impose U.S. objectives) culturally-sensitive 

interaction is more enduring and more effective in the long run.68 

 

68 In this regard, the former director of the U.S. Agency for International Development has laid out some 

overriding principles and their overlap with military doctrine. They are: ownership, capacity building, 

sustainability, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and accountability. In-depth study of these 

elements of S&R are outside the scope of this study, however this last point on culturally-sensitive 

interaction is a highlight worth noting. For more information, see Andrew Natsios, “The Nine Principles of 

Reconstruction and Development,” Parameters, Autumn 2005. 
 

 30

In this vein, some critics contend that some of the very technological innovations the U.S. 

military seek to bring to S&R operations only serve to alienate American forces from the 

civilian populations they are attempting to help creating mutual rifts that are exacerbated 

by cultural and linguistic ignorance as well as external “spoilers.”69 Accordingly, postconflict endeavors can become hobbled. Critics go on to posit that technological 

evolution also drives U.S. military (namely, Army) transformation along traditional and 

conventional warfare lines, all the while deluding ground force leaders with the sense that 

their organizations are adapting to the increasingly asymmetric and S&R operationsheavy nature of international engagements.70

We believe that while the dynamics cited above can certainly become pitfalls, technology 

can act as an enabler for helping U.S. soldiers achieve successes on the ground. 

Moreover, as we note in the previous chapter, training and use of modeling and 

simulation technology can be leveraged to better prepare warfighters for S&R missions, 

giving them the opportunity to achieve full-spectrum proficiency. It should also be noted 

that an additional critique (focused on technology limitations in combat operations) is 

shown and discussed in the sidebar. 

Given that this study focused on the traditional combat operations involved in the invasion of Iraq 

across flat terrain, its findings have limited relevance to the focus of this report, which deals with 

S&R operations in urban environments. However, some useful parallels in terms of the technology 

gaps are identified. The MIT report corroborates our study in citing the limitations in line-of-sight 

communications systems. The Army’s efforts to develop robust, long-range, non-line-of sight 

systems will be a key factor in equipping soldiers for future missions. 

Where the MIT report cites the great effectiveness of Blue Force Tracking systems for keeping 

track of friendly forces in vehicles and tanks, our study takes that innovation a step further by 

focusing on efforts to scale the system down to the dismounted soldier level. As mentioned 

previously in our study, advanced materials are providing the enabling platforms that will 

incorporate these capabilities into wearable tracking devices. 

The usefulness of new body armor and usage of UAVs were two further issues which reinforced 

points featured in our report. Moreover, the lack of a COP was identified as a shortfall during 

missions in Iraq. However, while the MIT study focused on traditional kinetic operations, our 

report focused on issues having to do with S&R operations. 

David Talbot, “How Technology Failed in Iraq,” MIT Technology Review, October 12, 2004. 

Overall the Army (as well as the Defense Department as a whole) continues to identify 

and address shortfalls in a timely and capable manner, however there are a few areas that 

 

69 The most prominent of these criticisms is in BG Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for 

Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review, November–December 2005. 70 Ibid., 14. 
 

 31

need more attention.71 These high-payoff technological areas warrant increased 

investment. Scaling Blue Force Tracking technology down to the individual soldier level, 

and incorporating this into a newly configured situational awareness display (with a 

wider array of icons and 3-D viewing) is one such area. Re-engineering current 

Joint/Army information systems, such as CPoF, to develop integrated S&R operational 

planning and execution C2 systems also would be advantageous. Another area that would 

benefit from increased focus is development of on-the-ground biometric devices that can 

remotely record and submit data into a central population database as well as check a 

person’s identity against that database. In terms of UAVs, the Army should increase the 

capabilities of platoon-level forces by incorporating “hover and stare” UAV assets down 

to this lower echelon. Moreover, NLWs should be developed that can disable a moving 

vehicle during convoy or traffic control point operations. The Army also should renew 

efforts to harness environmental energy sources while in austere environments by 

developing rugged, portable systems that can store energy derived from solar and wind 

power. 

To facilitate continued efforts at addressing U.S. Army S&R operations shortfalls 

through technology, a follow-up workshop at some point in the future might well address 

the issues covered in this report. Potential attendees would include personnel from other 

government agencies as well as NGO and IGO representatives. In addition to providing a 

forum for more in-depth examination of these S&R operations-related technological 

aspects, a workshop would cultivate the kind of “cross-pollination” of ideas beneficial for 

integrating solutions across disparate actors. The White House IWG has gone far in 

coordinating this type of interaction and we would seek to build upon their momentum.72 

The White House IWG examined how training, modeling, and simulation technologies can be 

leveraged for increasing the proficiency and efficacy of U.S. S&R operations. Through continued 

lobbying for making these training aids as widely available as possible, the group has ensured that 

the varied actors involved in S&R operations at any given point in time are better able to 

overcome the difficulties inherent in coordinating and achieving unity of effort. The IWG’s 

advocacy for development of a “social weather map” also highlights its work in linking disparate 

systems into coherent programs. This overarching program, for example, ties in the various 

elements of imagery intelligence, social science software, and telecommunications to provide 

predictive tools for analysts and policy makers alike. 

Finally, the vital nature of S&R operations and the rapidly changing dynamics of current 

missions (as well as the potential requirements for future operations) necessitates the 

updating of the material found in this report. We will seek to keep the information here 

current and useful by updating this report with a continuing series of periodic surveys of 

NDU students. By doing so, we will gain a better understanding of how shortfalls are 

being addressed. This also will help us to see persistent and/or emerging trends in S&R 

 

71 It is significant to note that where the Army might not have a concentrated S&T effort (in translation 

devices, for example), there are DARPA endeavors which fill these gaps and are leveraged. Existing 

programs in other Services also address Army needs. 72 Sotirin et. al, Regional Stability/Capacity Building R&D. 
 

 32

operations requirements. The comments and suggestions of these field grade officers will 

continue to play a major role in shaping how we analyze the challenges warfighters face 

in S&R missions. 
 

 33

Appendix A: Acronyms 

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

AO Area of Operation 

ARCIC-F U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center–Forward 

ARL U.S. Army Research Laboratory 

ASA(ALT) Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology 

ATO Army Technology Objective 

BATS Biometric Automated Toolset System 

BG Brigadier General 

C2 Command and Control 

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

COE Common Operating Environment 

COMSEC Communications Security 

COP Common Operating Picture 

COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 

CPoF Command Post of the Future 

C-RAM Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar 

CTNSP Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DUSD(AS&C) Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and 

Concepts 

EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System 

FAST Field Assistance in Science and Technology 

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below 

FCS Future Combat Systems 

FCS-C Future Combat Systems Communications 

FMSO Foreign Military Studies Office 

GALE Global Autonomous Language Exploitation 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HMMVW High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

HSI/MANPRINT Human Systems Integration/Manpower and Personnel Integration 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

IED Improvised Explosive Device 

IGO International Government Organization 

IO Information Operations 

IWG Interagency Working Group 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Office 

JNLWD Joint Non-lethal Weapons Directorate 
 

 34

MASINT Measurements and Signatures Intelligence 

MBITR MultiBand Inter/Intra Team Radio 

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

NDU National Defense University 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 

NEST Networked Embedded Systems Technology 

NET New Equipment Training 

NGO Non-Government Organization 

NLW Non-Lethal Weapon 

ONR Office of Naval Research 

OPFOR Opposing Force 

OPSEC Operational Security 

PEO Program Executive Office 

PLGR Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver 

PMESII Political, Military (air, land and sea), Economic, Social, Information 

and Infrastructure 

POSSE Persistent Operational Surface Surveillance and Engagement 

PME Professional Military Education 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

R&D Research and Development 

RDECOM U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command 

RFID Radio Frequency Identification 

ROE Rules of Engagement 

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade 

S&R Stabilization and Reconstruction 

S&T Science and Technology 

SA Situational Awareness 

SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 

SOF Special Operations Forces 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 

SSTR Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction 

STAT Science and Technology Assistance Team 

TALON Threat and Local Observation Notice (robot) 

TCP Traffic Control Point 

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TTPs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

TUSK Tank Urban Survivability Kit 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

USMC United States Marine Corps 

UTAMS Unattended Transient MASINT System (mortar location system) 

VBIED Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device 
35

Appendix B: Assessment Summary Table 

Identified S&R 

Technology Limitation 

Current Supporting 

Programs 

Assessment Ac

BATTLE COMMANDCommand and Control: 

• Inability to Track and 

Identify Dismounted Personnel in an Urban Environment 

• Army Technology 

Objectives (ATOs): 

III.BC2006.01 [BC3, BC8, BA4]73

• S&T programs 

addressing this issue 

• Mainta

scaling level 

• Better “OPFOR” Icons 

in SA Systems 

• Capabilities exist to 

address this issue, but specific programs are not currently underway. Not S&T 

• No add

effort 

• Add thi

Battle Csystems for thosdevelop

Integration of S&R Operations: 

• Need for an Integrated 

S&R Operational Planning and Execution C2 System

• This capability can be 

addressed by reengineering current Joint/Army information systems (e.g., CPoF). S&T research potential appears minimal 

• No add

effort 

• Add thi

collaboand exein the fiand for develop

73 All associated ARCIC shortfall categories are shown in brackets throughout this table. 
36

Identified S&R 

Technology Limitation 

Current Supporting 

Programs 

Assessment Ac

Communications: 

• Need for Better NonLine-of-Sight 

Communications Devices/Systems in Urban Environments 

• ATOs: 

III.BC.2003.01; III.BC.2006.03; III.BC.2006.04; III.BC.2006.01; [BC1, BC3, BC6, ManSup4] 

• Sufficient S&T, 

acquisition, and COTS programs addressing this issue 

• No add

effort 

• Interoperability of 

Incompatible Tactical Radio Systems 

• ATOs: 

III.BC.2003.01; III.BC.2006.03; III.BC.2006.04; III.BC.2006.01 [BC1, BC3, BC6, ManSup4] 

• S&T programs 

addressing parts of this issue. Gaps appear in secure military to nonmilitary communications 

• S&T sh

gaps in of secunon-secmilitary commu

• Too Few Translators 

and Translations Devices 

• DARPA S&T programs • DARPA S&T programs 

addressing this issue 

• No add

effort 
37

Identified S&R 

Technology Limitation 

Current Supporting 

Programs 

Assessment Ac

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 

• Limited SA Capability 

in Urban Environments 

• ATOs: 

IV.EN.2002.01; IV.EN.2003.03; III.BC.2006.01 [BA4, BC3, BC6,BC8, Manup3, ManSup4] 

• S&T programs 

addressing this issue are present, but insufficient. COTS provide limited solutions, but inadequate for dismounted personnel 

• S&T ne

tracking dismou3-dimenespeciabuildingground 

ARMORED VEHICLES IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 

• Armored Vehicles in 

Urban Environments 

• [ManSup10]; 

Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK) 

• S&T and acquisition 

programs addressing the problem 

• S&T sh

spectruFCS foS&R op
38

Identified S&R 

Technology Limitation 

Current Supporting 

Programs 

Assessment Ac

INTELLIGENCE (INCLUDING SENSORS) 

• Need for Undetectable, 

Long Duration Remote Networked Sensor Systems 

• ATOs 

III.SE.2005.01; III.GC.2004.06; IV.EN.2002.01 [Protection 4, ManSup5]

• DARPA S&T Programs 

• Sufficient S&T 

programs addressing short-duration tactical sensors, which have limited use in S&R. COTS solutions might prove more costeffective and useful 

• S&T sh

increasissues oand lonfunctionsensorsof COTadvanta

• Need “See Through the 

Wall” Capability 

• ATOs 

III.SE.2004.04; III.SE.2006.01; IV.SE.2006.02 [MDM1, BA2] 

• DARPA S&T Programs 

• S&T addressing this 

issue 

• No add

effort 

FORCE PROTECTION 

• Need for Rapidly 

Locating Point of Origin for Mortar and Sniper Attacks 

• ATOs 

III.BC.2006.01; IV.EN.2002.01 [BC7, BA1] 

• DARPA S&T Programs 

• Sufficient S&T 

programs addressing this issue. 

• No add

effort 
39

Identified S&R 

Technology Limitation 

Current Supporting 

Programs 

Assessment Ac

• Inability to Quickly 

Check People, Baggage, and Vehicles at Check Points 

• ATOs 

III.SE.2006.05 [ManSup1, BA1] 

• S&T programs, but high 

false alarm rates and lack of an integrated, automated system persist 

• S&T eff

areas of false alfusion aanalysimultipl

• Inability to Quickly 

Identify and Track the Population 

• [BATS, BA3] • S&T programs, but no 

specific ATOs to address this issue 

• Increas

through ATO 

• Counter-IED 

Technology 

• Assessment withheld to 

comply with DOD OPSEC policies. This material is provided to the sponsor 
40

Identified S&R 

Technology Limitation 

Current Supporting 

Programs 

Assessment Ac

UNMANNED SYSTEMS 

• Fixed-wing UAVs do 

not Provide Uninterrupted Viewing 

• ATOs 

III.BC.2006.02; IV.EN.2002.01 [BA4, HE1] 

• DARPA S&T Programs 

• Sufficient S&T and 

acquisition programs 

• No add

effort 

• Deconflicting Airspace 

Issues 

• No S&T programs for 

tactical level UAVs. Enhancements limited by very small payloads for these vehicles 

• S&T eff

both deairspacobstaclavoidanof tactic

• Availability of UAV and 

UGV Assets 

• ATO  III.BC.2006.02 

• S&T and acquisition 

programs for UAVs, but affordable, expendable UGVs needed 

• S&T ef

appropin deveaffordaUGVs 

• Limited Range Issue 

when Operating UGVs in Urban Environments 

• S&T program does not 

exist, but current technology can be used meet this need 

• S&T eff

signal rin UGV urban eshould greater 
41

Identified S&R 

Technology Limitation 

Current Supporting 

Programs 

Assessment Ac

NON-LETHAL CAPABILITIES 

• Limitations on the 

Availability and Use of Non-lethal Weapons 

• ATOs 

III.SE.2005.03 [Lethality2] 

• JNLWD S&T Programs 

• Sufficient S&T and 

acquisition programs 

• No add

S&T eff

INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

• Information Operations • [BA1, TLDE1] • Sufficient S&T and 

acquisition programs 

• S&T an

programArmy cdevelopplannintake intplannin

TRAINING AND USE OF MODELING AND SIMULATION 

• Lack of Adequate 

Training in S&R Operations for U.S. Personnel

• ATOs 

II.MS.2006.01; IV.HS.2003.03; IV.HS.2006.01 [TLDE1, TLDE2, TLDE3, TLDE4, TLDE5, TLDE6] 

• S&T and acquisition 

programs, however they are not geared toward cultural and/or integrated S&R missions 

• S&T eff

develop culturaS&R opcurrent 
42

Identified S&R 

Technology Limitation 

Current Supporting 

Programs 

Assessment Ac

• Lack of Adequate 

Training for Foreign S&R Personnel 

• ATOs 

II.MS.2006.01; IV.HS.2003.03; IV.HS.2006.01 [TLDE1, TLDE2, TLDE3, TLDE4, TLDE5, TLDE6] 

• S&T and acquisition 

programs, however they are not geared toward cultural and/or S&R missions 

• S&T eff

develop culturaS&R opcurrent systemsforeign capabil

LOGISTICS 

• Most Logistics 

Equipment not Designed for Long-Duration Needs of S&R operations

• ATOs 

III.GC.2004.02; III.LG.2004.03; III.SS.2002.01; IV.LG.2006.03; [ManSust3, MDM4, MDM5] 

• DARPA S&T Programs 

• S&T and acquisition 

programs 

• No add

effort spneeded, Army wexaminsector salternasources 

• Dismounted Warfighters 

Have to Carry Too Many Types of Batteries to Power Critical Devices 

• ATOs 

III.GC.2004.02; III.LG.2004.03; III.SS.2002.01; IV.LG.2006.03; [ManSust3, MDM4, MDM5] 

• DARPA S&T Programs 

• S&T and acquisition 

programs, but not geared for S&R operations 

• Curren

must cooperati
 

 43

Appendix C: Interviews in Chronological Order 

Field Assistance in Science and Technology, Army Materiel Command, Ft. Belvoir, VA 

(August 8, 2005 and May 31, 2006)

• Mr. James Gibson, Director 

• Major Lawrence Dring, Ordnance Corps, Former FAST Officer in Iraq. Currently 

Assistant Project Manager, Soldier, Weapons Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. 

U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL), Army Research, Development, and Engineering 

Command (RDECOM) (September 7, 2005)

• Mr. Joseph Rocchio, Deputy Director 

Meeting in Arlington, VA (September 22, 2005)

• Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division74

1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX (November 11, 2005)

• Major Tim Karcher, Armor Corps, Operations Officer (S3), 1st Battalion - 9th

Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. He served in this 

position in Iraq. 

• Major Scott Taylor, Armor Corps, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion - 8th Cavalry 

Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. He served in this position in Iraq. 

• Sergeant Ken Raymos, Armor Corps, Abrams Tank Gunner, 3rd Battalion - 8th

Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. He served in this 

position in Iraq. 

U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, KY (November 17, 2005)

• Major General Thomas P. Bostick, Commanding General, Corps of Engineers. He 

served as the Assistant Division Commander-Maneuver, and then as Assistant 

Division Commander-Support, 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, from August 

2002–June 2004, deploying with the division in support of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. From June 2004–June 2005 he served as Commander of the Gulf 

Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Deputy for 

Construction, Project and Contracting Office in Baghdad, Iraq where he was 

responsible for over $18 billion in reconstruction. 

• Major John Wrann, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort 

Knox, KY. He served as a Combat Engineer Company Commander in the 4th

 

74 MG Chiarelli served in this position until November 2005. After promotion to the rank of Lieutenant 

General, he assumed command of the Multi National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). 
 

 44

Infantry Division as the Operation Iraqi Freedom (the Iraq War) ended. He then 

operated his own forward operating base and had responsibility for administering 

a city of about 200,000 people in an area of about 25 square kilometers, about 80 

km north of Baghdad. 

• Major Kim Phillips, Transportation Corps, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort 

Knox, KY. She served as a Transportation Officer in the 101st Corps Support 

Group in direct support of 1st Cavalry Division. Her mission included 

coordinating transportation assets over most of Iraq. 

• Captain Gabe Marriott, Aviation, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, 

KY. He served as an aviator in Afghanistan and as the Battalion Adjutant (S1), 

3rd-101st Avn (Apache) in Iraq from February–September 2003. He served in the 

same unit in Afghanistan as an Attack Platoon Leader from February–August 

2002. 

Independent Contractor/CTNSP Consultant (May 22, 2006)

• Mr. Bing West 
 

 45

Appendix D: S&R Operations Questionnaire for NDU 

Students 

Your Personal Information

Name 

Phone 

Branch of Service: 

Grade 

Location of Most Recent Overseas Deployment

Dates of most recent tour: 

Unit/Organization: 

Position within Unit/Organization: 

Brief Description of Activities: 

From A (excellent) to F (Failing) rate the following. If not applicable, then 

NA. 

Communications capabilities

Battalion and Below: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers 

below, please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We 

would also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of communications 

and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Small Unit Level: Open, uncluttered terrain 

Small Unit Level: Urban environments 

Within your service: Open, uncluttered terrain: 

Within your service: Urban environments 

Your service to other services: Open, uncluttered terrain 

Your service to other services: Urban environments 

Military-to-non governmental organizations (to include 

contractors): 

Military-to-host nation military and security forces: 

Military-to-host nation civilians: 

Military-to-U.S. civilian agencies: 
 

 46

Additional comments: 

Battalion to Brigade and above: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the 

answers below, please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. 

We would also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of 

communications and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Within your service: Open, uncluttered terrain: 

Within your service: Urban environments 

Your service to other services: Open, uncluttered terrain 

Your service to other services: Urban environments 

Military-to-non governmental organizations (to include international 

organizations, charities, and contractors): 

Military-to-host nation military and security forces: 

Military-to-civilian leadership: 

 

Additional comments: 

Please assess the ability of existing TRANSLATION ASSETS to support the 

following: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of translation and SRO. 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Translation of spoken language: 

Translation of written language: 
 

 47

Additional comments: 

Open, uncluttered terrain: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the 

answers below, please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. 

We would also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of sensor 

capabilities and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Daytime, clear weather: Battalion and below 

Daytime, clear weather: Battalion to Brigade and above 

Nighttime, clear weather: Battalion and below 

Nighttime, clear weather: Battalion to Brigade and above 

Daytime, adverse weather: Battalion and below 

Daytime, adverse weather: Battalion to Brigade and above 

Nighttime, adverse weather: Battalion and below 

Nighttime, adverse weather: Battalion to Brigade and above 

 

Additional comments: 

Urban Environment: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers 

below, please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We 

would also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of sensor 

capabilities and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Daytime, clear weather: Battalion and below 

Daytime, clear weather: Battalion to Brigade and above 

Nighttime, clear weather: Battalion and below 

Nighttime, clear weather: Battalion to Brigade and above 

Daytime, adverse weather: Battalion and below 

Daytime, adverse weather: Battalion to Brigade and above 

Nighttime, adverse weather: Battalion and below 

Nighttime, adverse weather: Battalion to Brigade and above 
 

 48

Additional comments: 

Assess the value of the support that was received from the sensors on the 

following platforms: 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Manned aircraft: Fixed wing 

Manned aircraft: Rotary wing 

Satellites: 

 

Additional comments: 

Survivability: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would 

also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of vehicle survivability 

capabilities and SRO. If you have significant experience with an 

additional vehicle or vehicles, we would especially welcome your 

additional comments on those vehicles.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Ability of vehicle to operate after small arms attack: 

Ability of vehicle to operate after RPG attack: 

Ability of vehicle to operate after IED attack: 

Additional comments: 

Crew Protection: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of vehicle crew protection 

capabilities and SRO. If you have significant experience with an additional 

vehicle or vehicles, we would especially welcome your additional comments 

on those vehicles.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Ability of vehicle to protect the crew from small arms attack: 

Ability of vehicle to protect the crew from RPG attack: 

Ability of vehicle to protect the crew from IED attack: 
 

 49

Additional comments 

Reliability: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of vehicle reliability and SRO. 

If you have significant experience with an additional vehicle or vehicles, we 

would especially welcome your additional comments on those vehicles.) 

A

B

C

D

F

N/A

 

Additional comments: 

Agility: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please 

expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of vehicle agility capabilities 

and SRO. If you have significant experience with an additional vehicle or 

vehicles, we would especially welcome your additional comments on those 

vehicles.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

In an urban environment: 

In open terrain: 
 

 50

Additional comments: 

C3 and displays capability on board: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of 

the answers below, please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" 

field. We would also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of vehicle 

C3 and display capabilities and SRO. If you have significant experience with 

an additional vehicle or vehicles, we would especially welcome your 

additional comments on those vehicles.) 

A

B

C

D

F

N/A

Additional comments: 

Lethality: (In the "Comments" field, identify your vehicle's lethality/weapon 

systems. If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please 

expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of vehicle lethality and SRO. If 

you have significant experience with an additional vehicle or vehicles, we 

would especially welcome your additional comments on those vehicles.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Firepower: 

Accuracy: 

Suitability of armament in an urban environment: 

Suitability of armament in open terrain: 

 
 

 51

Additional comments: 

Urban Environment: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers 

below, please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We 

would also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of indirect fire 

capabilities and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Availability: 

Effectiveness: 

Additional comments: 

Open terrain: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of indirect fire capabilities and 

SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Availability: 

Effectiveness: 

Additional comments: 

Urban Environment: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers 

below, please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We 

would also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of air support 

capabilities and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Availability: 

Effectiveness: 
 

 52

Additional comments: 

Open terrain: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of air support capabilities and 

SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Availability: 

Effectiveness: 

Additional comments: 

Assess the ability of existing NAVIGATION SYSTEMS to support your needs 

in: (In the "Comments" field identify any Navigation Systems being 

assessed by you. If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of navigation systems and 

SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Open terrain: 

Urban terrain: 

Within large buildings: 

Additional comments: 

To supply and re-supply materiel in a timely fashion in an urban 

environment: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of logistics capabilities and 

SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Supply of war fighting materiel (ammunition, armor, fuel, batteries, 

night vision goggles, weapons, vehicles, etc.): 

Supply of soldier's needs (medical care, food, clothing, shelter, 

recreation): 
 

 53

Additional comments: 

To supply and re-supply materiel in a timely fashion in open terrain: (If you 

give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please expand on your 

response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also welcome any further 

thoughts on the subject of logistics capabilities and SRO.) 

 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Supply of war fighting materiel (ammunition, armor, fuel, batteries, 

night vision goggles, weapons, vehicles, etc.): 

Supply of soldier's needs (medical care, food, clothing, shelter, 

recreation): 

Additional comments: 

The ability of existing power sources to support your needs for: (If you give 

a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please expand on your 

response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also welcome any further 

thoughts on the subject of logistics capabilities and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Hand-held devices: 

Transportable/mobile systems: 

Additional comments: 

Did you receive ROBOTIC SYSTEM support from unmanned ground vehicles 

(UGVs) or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs))? 

Yes

No

If "yes" was indicated on the previous question, assess the quality of 

support you received from the following sources: (If you give a grade of 

D or F for any of the answers below, please expand on your response(s) 

in the "Comments" field. We would also welcome any further thoughts 

on the subject of robotic systems and SRO.) 
 

 54

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Ground based: 

UAVs (low altitude): 

UAVs (high altitude): 

Additional comments: 

Assess existing FORCE PROTECTION capabilities in the following areas: (If 

you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please expand on 

your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also welcome any 

further thoughts on the subject of force protection and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Ability to locate sources of indirect fire: 

Ability to locate snipers: 

Effectiveness of body armor: 

Additional comments: 

Ability to deal with improvised explosive devices (IEDs): (If you give a 

grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please expand on your 

response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also welcome any further 

thoughts on the subject of force protection and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Prediction (Battlespace awareness, use of automated tools, 

situational awareness information, C3 systems): 

Detection (detection of IED components, insurgents, etc.): 

Prevention (prevent enemy C2, prevent enemy attack): 

Neutralization (render IED useless, safe disposal): 

Mitigation (armor, first responders, MEDEVAC, C3): 

Post attack forensics (rapid determination of IED components and 

opposing force tactics; and rapid dissemination of that 

information):

 
 

 55

Additional comments: 

Please assess the ability of NON-LETHAL WEAPONS to support your 

operational needs: (In the "Comments" field identify any Non-Lethal 

Weapons being assessed by you. If you give a grade of D or F for any of 

the answers below, please expand on your response(s) in the 

"Comments" field. We would also welcome any further thoughts on the 

subject of non-lethal weapons and SRO.) 

A

B

C

D

F

N/A

Additional comments: 

For each of the following INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) AND IORELATED functions in which you participated, please assess the quality of 

the support that you were provided by existing technology: (If you give a 

grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please expand on your 

response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also welcome any further 

thoughts on the subject of information operations and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Psychological operations: 

Computer network operations: 

Electronic warfare: 

Military deception: 

Operational security: 

Counter intelligence: 

Physical security: 

Information assurance: 

Combat camera: 

Public affairs: 

Civil-Military operations: 
 

 56

Defense support to public diplomacy: 

Intelligence support: 

Additional comments: 

Please assess the ability of existing Models, Simulations, and Games to 

support the following functions: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the 

answers below, please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. 

We would also welcome any further thoughts on the subject of modeling 

and simulation and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Education on the culture of the area of responsibility (AOR): 

Training and preparation for deployment to the AOR: 

Operations support, including course of action identification and 

assessment: 

Mission rehearsal: 

Planning combat service support (e.g., logistics, resupply): 

 

Additional comments: 

Assess the TRAINING received from the following sources and in the 

following areas in preparation for stabilization and reconstruction 

operations: (If you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, 

please expand on your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also 

welcome any further thoughts on the subject of training and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Combat Training Center: 

Classroom training: 

Distributed on-line training: 

Training for civil affairs: 

Language training: 

 
 

 57

Additional comments: 

Please assess the ability of existing DATABASES to support the following: (If 

you give a grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please expand on 

your response(s) in the "Comments" field. We would also welcome any 

further thoughts on the subject of databases and SRO.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Detainee identification: 

Vehicle identification: 

Additional comments: 

Were you involved with RECONSTRUCTION operations? 

Yes

No

If "yes" was indicated on the previous question, please assess the 

following reconstruction-related capabilities: (In the "Comments" field 

below, briefly describe your reconstruction activities. Also, if you give a 

grade of D or F for any of the answers below, please expand on your 

response(s) in the "Comments' field". We would also welcome any 

further thoughts on the subject of ability to support reconstruction.) 

(Percentages) A B C D F N/A

Ability to prioritize reconstruction projects: 

Ability to understand the impact of reconstruction efforts on local 

communities: 

Ability to integrate new utility services with existing services: 

Availability of repair and construction equipment: 

Quality of repair and construction equipment: 

Ability to translate structural, roadway, or utility designs/blueprints: 

Ability to locate utility tunnels and service lines buried underground 

or embedded in structures: 

Ability to test utility services and existing/installed lines: 

Ability to coordinate and transport materials to the right place at 

the right time: 

 
 

 58

Additional comments: 

Please offer your overall impression of the state of SRO technology 

capabilities and your top priorities for improvement. We would also 

welcome any further expansion on, or explanation of, your answers above.