alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32

 (a) Certification of Quarterly Report by Chief Executive Officer.

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report of GraphOn
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Robert Dilworth, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

   (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
   of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

   (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
   respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                                             /s/ Robert Dilworth
                                             -------------------
                                             Robert Dilworth
                                             Chief Executive Officer
                                             November 7, 2005



<PAGE>


(b) Certification of Quarterly Report by Chief Financial Officer.


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report of GraphOn
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2005 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, William Swain, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

   (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
   of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

   (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
   respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                                             /s/ William Swain
                                             -----------------
                                             William Swain
                                             Chief Financial Officer
                                             November 7, 2005
#### Shepard Oil Company, Inc., Appellant, v Marion Ryan, Doing Business as Sunny’s, Respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Fulton County Court, entered April 28, 1977, which denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. After issue was joined and a bill of particulars served in an action for goods sold and delivered, plaintiff moved for summary judgment in the sum of $220.44. Defendant did not submit any papers in opposition. The motion was denied. Plaintiff contends that mere oral argument of counsel, unsupported by affidavits or other evidence, cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment where the supporting papers show a prima facie entitlement to such relief. We agree. In *Holdridge v Town of Burlington*(32 AD2d 581), we held that once a prima facie showing had been made by movant, it is incumbent upon a defendant to come forward with matters of an evidentiary nature to demonstrate the presence of triable issues. In *Holdridge,*as here, the defendant submitted no affidavit or other supporting paper in opposition, nor was even a perfunctory showing made of any evidentiary facts underlying the contentions orally made to the trial court and here. Review of plaintiffs motion papers readily indicates a viable cause of action for goods sold and delivered. Defendant’s affirmative defense that she advised plaintiff on March 13, 1974 that its services and materials were no longer desired, raises no issue of fact. The record clearly shows that plaintiff delivered kerosene to defendant in April and November of 1974, and that defendant made a partial payment on November 26, 1974. Order reversed, on the law, with costs, and plaintiffs motion for summary judgment granted. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Staley, Jr., Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CANDACE GHOLSON, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

MYLAN, INC., et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-02042 JSW

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING

SCHEDULE

On April 1, 2010, Defendant Alza Corporation filed a motion to dismiss, which is

noticed for hearing on June 4, 2010. Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion shall be due on April

16, 2010, and Alza’s reply brief shall be due on April 23, 2010. If any of the parties seek to

modify this briefing schedule, they must submit a request demonstrating good cause for a

modification. If the Court finds the matter suitable for disposition without oral argument, it

shall notify the parties in advance of the hearing date.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-02042-JSW Document 65 Filed 04/02/10 Page 1 of 1
### §451f. Exchanges subject to mortgage contracts

Any exchange pursuant to this subchapter of land that is subject to a mortgage contract with the Secretary of Agriculture under sections 1006a and 1006b of title 7, and any disposition pursuant to this subchapter of property that is subject to such a mortgage contract, shall be effected only in such form and manner and upon such terms and conditions as are consistent with the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture over such mortgage contract and such property under the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, as amended [7 U.S.C. 1000 et seq.], as supplemented by sections 1006a and 1006b of title 7.

(Aug. 13, 1953, ch. 428, §7, 67 Stat. 568.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, referred to in text, is act July 22, 1937, ch. 517, 50 Stat. 522, which is classified generally to chapter 33 (§1000 et seq.) of Title 7, Agriculture. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1000 of Title 7 and Tables.
James A. Shea Letter Agreement



  
 Exhibit 10.1

 Gordmans Stores, Inc. 
 12100 West Center Road 
 Omaha, NE 68114-3998 

November 4, 2010 
 James A. Shea 

Dear James: 
 On behalf of Gordmans Stores, Inc.
(the “Company”), I am pleased to invite you to become a member of the Company’s Board of Directors (the “Board”). You will be designated as a Class I director. Your term of service on the Board will commence on
November 1, 2010 and expire at the annual meeting of stockholders in 2011. 
 As a member of the Board, you will receive annual
compensation of $50,000. You will be reimbursed for all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by you in connection with your service to the Company. In addition, you will be covered by the Company’s D&O insurance. 

Our expectation is that the Board will meet at least quarterly and that you will participate in those meetings in person to the extent possible. We also
ask that you make yourself available to participate in various telephonic meetings from time to time. 
 Your service on the Board will be in
accordance with, and subject to, the Company’s Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation and Amended and Restated Bylaws, as the same may be further amended from time to time. In accepting this offer, you are representing to us that you
do not know of any conflict that would restrict you from becoming a director of the Company. 
 To accept this offer, please sign below and
return the fully executed letter to us. You should keep one copy of this letter for your records. This letter sets forth the terms of your service with the Company and supersedes any prior representations or agreements, whether written or oral. This
letter may not be modified or amended except by a written agreement, signed by a duly authorized representative of the Company and by you. 








 James A. Shea 
 November 4, 2010 
  Page
 2
 of 2 
  

 We look forward to working with you. If you have any questions, please call me at 561-948-7510.

  

	
	Sincerely
	
	Gordmans Stores, Inc.
	
	 /s/ Thomas V. Taylor

	Thomas V. Taylor
	Chairman of the Board

 ACCEPTED AND AGREED: 

I hereby accept, and consent to be designated as a director of Gordmans Stores, Inc., and agree to so serve. 

 

	
	 /s/ James A. Shea

	James A. Shea
	
	 James A. Shea

	Print Name
	
	 November 5, 2010

	Date
### **CHAPTER 27—PUBLIC LANDS IN OKLAHOMA**

#### SUBCHAPTER I—GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec.
1091 to 1094. Repealed.
1095.
Reservations between sections for highway purposes.
1096 to 1098. Repealed.
1099.
Division into counties before opening to settlement; reservation for county seats.
1100 to 1102g. Repealed.

#### SUBCHAPTER II—TOWN SITES

1111 to 1119. Repealed.

#### SUBCHAPTER III—LANDS IN GREER COUNTY

1131 to 1134. Repealed.
EXHIBIT 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION


I, Aaron Dobrinsky, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of RoomLinX, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial  condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer  and  I  are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a) designed such disclosure  controls and procedures,  or caused such disclosure
controls and  procedures to be designed  under our  supervision,  to ensure that
material  information  relating to the registrant is made known to us by others,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) evaluated  the  effectiveness  of the  registrant's  disclosure  controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions  about the effectiveness
of the disclosure  controls and procedures,  as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) disclosed  in this report any changes in the  registrant's  internal  control
over  financial  reporting  that occurred  during the  registrant's  most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's  fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has  materially  affected,  or is  reasonably  likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal controls over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed,  based on our
most recent  evaluation of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  to the
registrant's  auditors  and the audit  committee  of the  registrant's  board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) all  significant  deficiencies  and  material  weaknesses  in the  design  or
operation of internal  control over  financial  reporting  which are  reasonably
likely  to  adversely  affect  the  registrant's  ability  to  record,  process,
summarize and report financial information; and

b) any  fraud,  whether  or not  material,  that  involves  management  or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over
financial reporting.


Date:  November 19, 2004

                                         /s/ Aaron Dobrinsky
                                         ------------------------------
                                         Aaron Dobrinsky
                                         Chief Executive Officer
#### M. L. Moody, appellee, v. Hubert J. Schwall, appellant.

Gen. No. 28,202.

Suit for commission for sale of real estate. Judgment for plaintiff. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lee W. Carrier, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1922.,

Affirmed.

Opinion filed May 28, 1923.

E. W. Adkinson, for appellant. Leland V. Pierson, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.
§ 245.430 Decision on request for approval. ( a ) After considering the mortgagor's request for approval and the materials submitted in connection with the request, HUD must notify the mortgagor in writing of its approval or disapproval of the proposed covered action, including, if applicable, its adjustment upward or downward of the proposed reduction in tenant-paid utilities. HUD must provide its reasons for its determination.
( b ) The mortgagor must notify the tenants of HUD's decision in the manner provided in § 245.15. If HUD has approved the proposed covered action, the notice must state: ( 1 ) The effective date of the covered action (which must be at least 30 days from the date of service of the notice and in accordance with the terms of existing leases);
( 2 ) In the case of HUD's approval of a conversion from project-paid utilities to tenant-paid utilities or a reduction in tenant utility allowances, the amount of the rent to be paid to the mortgagor and the utility allowance for each unit; and
( 3 ) In the case of HUD's approval of a conversion of residential units in a multifamily housing project to a nonresidential use or the transfer of the project to a cooperative housing mortgagor corporation or association, which residential rental units are to be converted and whether the conversion is to nonresidential use or to cooperative or condominium units.
NO. C 09-02057 RS 

STANDBY ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

*E-Filed 3/24/10* 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 

CRAIG YATES, ET AL., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

RICCARDO’S RISTORANTE 

E PIZZERIA, ET AL, 

 Defendants. 

____________________________________/

No. C 09-02057 RS

STANDBY ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 

 The Court has been informed that the above-entitled action has settled. Accordingly, the 

Court vacates all pretrial and trial dates. The parties are required to file a stipulation of dismissal by 

May 20, 2010. If a stipulation of dismissal is not filed by that date, the parties are ordered to 

appear on May 27, 2010, at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 3, 17th Floor of the San Francisco 

Courthouse and show cause why the case should not be dismissed. 

Case 3:09-cv-02057-RS Document 15 Filed 03/24/10 Page 1 of 2
NO. C 09-02057 RS 

STANDBY ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

Failure to comply with this Order may result in dismissal of the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 3/24/10 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 3:09-cv-02057-RS Document 15 Filed 03/24/10 Page 2 of 2
KKC/MOATT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GREGORY WAYNE WILLIAMS,

 Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY, Warden

 Respondent.

No. 09-73278

ORDER

Before: SILVERMAN, PAEZ and BEA, Circuit Judges. 

The application for authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 habeas corpus petition in the district court is denied. Petitioner has not

made a prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) that:

(A) the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered

previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts

underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a

whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence

that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found

the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.

FILED

JAN 21 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

Case: 09-73278 01/21/2010 Page: 1 of 2 DktEntry: 7202046 Case 3:09-cv-01925-SI Document 7 Filed 01/29/10 Page 1 of 2
KKC/MOATT

No petition for rehearing or motion for reconsideration shall be filed or

entertained in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

Case: 09-73278 01/21/2010 Page: 2 of 2 DktEntry: 7202046 Case 3:09-cv-01925-SI Document 7 Filed 01/29/10 Page 2 of 2
#### § 229.455 Textbooks and curricular material.

Nothing in these Title IX regulations shall be interpreted as requiring or prohibiting or abridging in any way the use of particular textbooks or curricular materials.
IIB 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 289 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 2, 2005 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 8200 South Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, 

California, as the ‘‘Sergeant First Class John Marshall 

Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

HR 289 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION. 

2 The facility of the United States Postal Service lo3 cated at 8200 South Vermont Avenue in Los Angeles, 

4 California, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Ser5 geant First Class John Marshall Post Office Building’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REFERENCES. 

7 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 

8 paper, or other record of the United States to the facility 

9 referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference 

10 to the ‘‘Sergeant First Class John Marshall Post Office 

11 Building’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives February 1, 

2005. 

Attest: JEFF TRANDAHL, 

Clerk.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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G:\JLALL\CASES\CIVIL\09-1225\Dismissal.Patelco.wpd 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Blessing U. Ahuruonye,

Plaintiff,

v.

Patelco Credit Union,

Defendant.

________________________________/

No. C 09-1225 JL

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

 The parties hereto, by their counsel, having advised the court that they have agreed

to a settlement with Patelco Credit Union only, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this cause of

action be dismissed with prejudice; provided, however that if any party hereto shall certify

to this court, within ninety days, with proof of service thereof, that the agreed consideration

for said settlement has not been delivered over, the foregoing order shall stand vacated

and this cause shall forthwith be restored to the calendar to be set for trial.

DATED: June 3, 2010

__________________________________

 James Larson

 United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01225-JL Document 42 Filed 06/03/10 Page 1 of 1
#### Expert Metal Slitters Corp., Respondent, v John Joseph Maniaci, Appellant.

[832 NYS2d 817]—

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for moneys allegedly converted by the defendant’s decedent, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Leviss, J.H.O.), entered February 2, 2006, which, after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the plaintiff and against him in the principal sum of $40,062.73.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

After a nonjury trial, the trial court determined that the defendant’s decedent, who was the plaintiffs bookkeeper, and who had access to the plaintiff’s checks, had converted $40,062.73 of the plaintiffs funds by forging the signature of the president of the plaintiff on 35 of the plaintiffs checks, and using them to pay for the premiums on an insurance policy that was “[f]or” the decedent. Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the court’s determination was not only supported by legally sufficient evidence *(see Cohen v Hallmark Cards,*45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]), but was also warranted by the facts *(see*
      *804
      *Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford,*60 NY2d 492, 499 [1983]).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Schmidt, J.E, Krausman, Covello and Balkin, JJ., concur.
208 A.2d 392.

#### Bernard Fournier *vs.*United Transit Company.

MARCH 25, 1965.

Present: Condon, C. J., Roberts, Paolino, Powers and Joslin, JJ.

Condon, C. J.

This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence that was tried in the superior court to a jury and resulted in a disagreement. At the conclusion of the evidence the defendant had moved for a directed verdict. In accordance with rule 46 of the rules of the superior court the trial justice reserved decision thereon until after the jury reported their disagreement whereupon he denied the motion and the defendant excepted thereto. The case is here on its bill of 26 exceptions but only the above exception is being pressed.

The plaintiff did not object when the bill of exceptions was presented to the trial justice for allowance nor did he object when the case was docketed and assigned for hearing in this 'court. Nevertheless we must now sua sponte hold that the bill of exceptions does not comply with the statute providing for appellate review in this court. Under *446G. L. 1956, §9-24-17, any person who has taken exception may prosecute a bill of exceptions seven days after verdict or notice of decision where trial was had without a jury. In *Metcalf*v. *Interstate Transit Corp.,*61 R. I. 486, we held that this statute “makes procedure 'by a bill of exceptions available to a litigant only if begun within seven days after a verdict or a final decision has been rendered against him. A disagreement by a jury is neither a verdict nor a final decision, and therefore this chapter does not permit procedure ;by bill of exceptions to be begun, within the time limited, after such disagreement”.

*William G. Gilroy, Thomas H. Needham,*for plaintiff.

*McGee, Gifford and Giannini, Frank J. McGee,*for defendant.

We have heretofore held that the right of review by bill of exceptions and the manner of its exercise are statutory in origin and jurisdictional. *Worthington*v. *Shewcov,*89 R. I. 169. This being so, we are without power to entertain such a bill unless it complies with the requirement of the ■statute. Since the defect in that respect in the instant bill of exceptions has come to our notice, we are bound to deny review thereunder.

For the reason above stated the bill of exceptions is dismissed,. and the case is remitted to the superior court for further proceedings.