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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES RIDGWAY, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 08-cv-05221-SI 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 255

Plaintiffs have moved for partial summary judgment on their fourth cause of action. 

Docket No. 255. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court determines this motion is 

appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing set for April 28, 

2016. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary 

judgment. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are truck drivers in California previously employed by defendant Wal-Mart for 

some period of time between 1993 and the present. Docket No. 72, Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-6. 

Plaintiffs allege Wal-Mart violated California law by failing to pay plaintiffs at least the minimum 

wage for each hour worked.

The facts and procedural history of this case are summarized in numerous prior orders of 

the Court. See, e.g., Docket No. 211. In September 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in 

part plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Docket No. 158. In March 2015, plaintiffs moved

for partial summary judgment, and on May 28, 2015, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for 

summary judgment on their seventh cause of action (minimum wage claims pursuant to the 

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Industrial Welfare Commission orders). Docket Nos. 181, 211. The Court denied plaintiffs’ 

motion as to Wal-Mart’s eighth affirmative defense.

On February 4, 2016, plaintiffs filed the present motion for partial summary judgment on 

their fourth cause of action, violation of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California 

Business and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq. Fourth Am. Compl. at 19-21; Docket No. 

255, Mot. at 1. Wal-Mart filed an emergency motion for an extension of time to respond, which 

the Court granted over plaintiffs’ objection. Docket Nos. 256, 257, 258. Wal-Mart filed its 

opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment on March 25, 2016. Docket No. 268. 

Plaintiffs filed their reply on April 8, and Wal-Mart filed an objection to the reply on April 15, 

2016. Docket Nos. 275, 279.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on 

file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party 

bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has no burden to 

disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof at trial. The 

moving party need only demonstrate to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support 

the non-moving party’s case. Id. at 325. 

Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to 

“set out ‘specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting then Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(e)). To carry this burden, the non-moving party must “do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving 

party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 

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In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. 

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 

inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for 

summary judgment.” Id. However, conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving 

papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill 

Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). The evidence the parties 

present must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their UCL claim. Mot. at 1. They argue that 

because the Court found Wal-Mart’s pay policies to be in violation of California minimum wage 

laws, plaintiffs are entitled to a similar finding on their UCL claim. Mot. at 2-3 (citing Cortez v. 

Purolator Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 178 (2000) (“[A]ny business act or practice 

that violates the Labor Code through failure to pay wages is, by definition (§ 17200), an unfair 

business practice.”)). This is significant because, as plaintiffs note, minimum wage violations in 

California carry a three-year statute of limitations, whereas UCL violations are subject to a fouryear statute of limitations. Mot. at 1 (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 338(a); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 

§ 17208).

In opposition, Wal-Mart argues that plaintiffs are improperly trying to expand the Court’s 

ruling regarding Wal-Mart’s pay policies to encompass Wal-Mart’s actual practices, which it 

argues comport with California law. Wal-Mart states that the UCL requires proof of actual harm, 

and argues that the twenty-nine class member depositions taken to date show that plaintiffs have 

not suffered harm. Opp’n at 4, 8. Wal-Mart also argues that plaintiffs should be judicially 

estopped from making their present argument and that the motion is premature, given that

discovery does not close until July. Id. at 22-23.

The California Supreme Court has held that a defendant employer who improperly 

withholds wages in violation of the Labor Code “may be compelled to restore unpaid wages” 

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under the UCL. Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 168. As the Cortez court explained, “[o]nce earned, those 

unpaid wages bec[o]me property to which the employees [a]re entitled. Failure to promptly pay 

those wages [i]s unlawful and therefore an unfair business practice.” Id. As a result, an employee 

seeking restitution under the UCL may avail himself or herself of the UCL’s four-year limitations 

period, even if his or her claim for the underlying wage violation might be time-barred. Id. at 178-

79. 

Having previously held that Wal-Mart’s pay policies violate California minimum wage 

law, the Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their UCL claims. 

According to Cortez, the failure to pay wages in violation of the Labor Code “constitutes an unfair 

business practice . . . .” Id. at 174. Wal-Mart is incorrect that the California Supreme Court’s 

finding in Cortez was “mere dicta.” See Opp’n at 10. Rather, it was central to the court’s decision 

in that case that violation of California’s overtime laws constitutes a violation of the UCL. See 

Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 168, 174, 178. 

Despite its assertions to the contrary, Wal-Mart’s opposition largely constitutes an attempt 

to relitigate the previous summary judgment motion in which the Court found Wal-Mart’s pay 

policies to be unlawful. Wal-Mart raises many of the same arguments that it raised in opposition 

to plaintiffs’ prior motion. See Docket No. 190. Although Wal-Mart now presents more evidence 

regarding its pay practices, in the form of testimony from recent class member depositions, that 

cannot change the Court’s earlier finding that “the pay policies detailed in [Wal-Mart’s Driver 

Pay] Manuals violate California wage law by failing to pay drivers at least minimum wage for all 

of the time they work . . . .” Docket No. 211 at 15. The Court follows the law of the case and, per 

Cortez, finds that the prior summary judgment adjudication in plaintiffs’ favor mandates that the 

Court likewise rule for plaintiffs as to their UCL claim. For this reason, the Court disagrees that 

plaintiffs’ motion is premature. Additional class member testimony regarding Wal-Mart’s pay 

practices will not alter the Court’s prior ruling that the pay policies violate California law. 

Likewise, Wal-Mart’s arguments regarding actual harm are misplaced given the question 

that plaintiffs have put before the Court today. To support its proposition that the UCL requires 

evidence of actual harm, Wal-Mart relies in part on cases that analyzed questions of standing that 

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arose following amendments to the UCL in 2004. See Opp’n at 8. These amendments barred 

members of the general public from bringing suit but permitted UCL suits brought “by a person 

who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair 

competition.” See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204. The class members in this case clearly have 

standing under the UCL amendment to prosecute their claims. Wal-Mart also cites to class 

certification decisions, or decisions relying on class certification analysis, in which courts 

questioned whether plaintiffs could show harm on a classwide basis. See, e.g., Campion v. Old 

Republic Home Prot. Co., 272 F.R.D. 517, 533-34 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (insured's proposed class 

action alleged that insurer fraudulently induced insured to buy home warranty policy for repair or 

replacement of appliances, in violation of UCL and other California consumer and contract laws); 

Campbell v. Vitran Express, Inc., No. 11-cv-5029, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31360 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 

2, 2016) (declining to hold employer’s policies facially invalid “because such a ruling would not 

advance the adjudicative process”). The Court is not persuaded that these cases are applicable to 

the factual situation faced in this case in light of the Court’s prior rulings. Moreover, the Court 

has stated that if an individual class member did not in fact suffer lost wages, such evidence may 

be relevant if and when it comes time to determine the amount of relief to which the class member 

is entitled. See Docket No. 211 at 15. 

Finally, there is nothing inconsistent between the position plaintiffs took in their prior 

motion and the position they take now. It is true that plaintiffs previously sought adjudication that 

Wal-Mart’s pay policies violate California’s minimum wage law. See, e.g., Docket No. 205, Tr. 

of Proceedings, May 1, 2015, at 2:15-19 (noting that plaintiffs were in effect seeking “a 

declaration that the driver pay policy violates California law”). Having obtained such 

adjudication, it is not inconsistent for plaintiffs next to seek a finding that a UCL violation exists. 

Wal-Mart’s argument for judicial estoppel appears to rest largely on a misapprehension that an 

unlawful policy cannot constitute an unfair business act or practice under the UCL. This is not so. 

As California courts have stated, “The UCL’s scope is broad. By defining unfair competition to 

include any ‘unlawful . . . business act or practice’ [citation], the UCL permits violations of other 

laws to be treated as unfair competition that is independently actionable.” Ticconi v. Blue Shield 

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of Cal. Life & Health Ins. Co., 160 Cal. App. 4th 528, 538 (2008) (quoting Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 

Cal. 4th 939, 949 (2002)); see also Steinhebel v. Los Angeles Times Communications, LLC, 126 

Cal. App. 4th 696, 712 (2005); Application Group v. Hunter Group, 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 907 

(1998) (“[W]here the employer’s policy or practice is forbidden or found to violate the Labor 

Code, it may also be held to constitute an ‘unlawful business practice’ subject to redress under the 

[UCL].”) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court need not estop plaintiffs from making their 

current argument. 

By their motion, plaintiffs have presented the narrow question of whether, in light of the 

Court’s prior minimum wage ruling, plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their UCL 

claim. The Court finds that they are.1

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary 

judgment on their fourth cause of action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 25, 2016

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

 

1 Because the Court’s decision rests on the law of the case and on the California Supreme 

Court’s decision in Cortez, the Court need not consider the evidence that plaintiffs cited in their 

reply and to which Wal-Mart objects. See Docket No. 279. 

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