alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignm ent. TEX. GOV'T

CODE ANN. § 75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005).

NO. 07-03-0408-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

JANUARY 11, 2006 

______________________________

MILES E. and IRENE BALDWIN, 

Appellants

v.

ROBERT E. GARNER, individually, and TEMPLETON & GARNER,

Appellees

_________________________________

FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

NO. 75,051-E; HON. VANN CULP, PRESIDING

________________________________

Memorandum Opinion

________________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., REAVIS, J. and BOYD, S.J.1

Because I conclude the trial court erred in holding that the July 1, 1982 fee

agreement was revocable in whole or in part, I respectfully dissent to that determination.

 In Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1964) (citing Story, Equity

Jurisprudence, 7th ed. 1857, s 311), after noting the relationship between an attorney and
2

client is highly fiduciary and that their dealings are subject to scrutiny as a transaction

between a trustee and beneficiary, the Court held as follows:

[t]he burden of establishing its perfect fairness, adequacy, and equity, is

thrown upon the attorney, upon the general rule, that he who bargains in a

matter of advantage with a person, placing a confidence in him, is bound to

show that a reasonable use has been made of that confidence; a rule

applying equally to all persons standing in confidential relations with each

other.

Later, in Levine v. Bayne, Snell & Krause, Ltd., 40 S.W.3d 92, 95-96 (Tex. 2001), the Court

adopted the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 18, and held that

because a lawyer is more familiar with the intricacies of legal representation and with the

law and drafting of fee agreements, the burden falls on the lawyer to express the terms of

the payment of the fee. 

According to the agreement printed on the law firm letterhead, Baldwin sought

Garner’s services to represent him in Texas to assist in retaking unidentified property and

to “potentially” (1) file a suit to set aside a foreclosure and (2) sue Baldwin’s former attorney

for neglect and the maker of various notes. The July 1, 1982 fee agreement did not

address a refund of the $20,000 payment or any part thereof if Garner withdrew from

representing Baldwin. However, the agreement did provide that if Baldwin desired to

terminate Garner’s services at any time, counsel would return the $20,000 less amounts

advanced for payment of costs, expenses, and fees earned at $125 per hour, upon request.

Because the agreement did not provide the request for a refund could not be implied, and

was silent as to an accounting for repayment if Garner withdrew from representation,
3

applying the principles announced in Archer and Levine, I conclude the trial court erred in

construing that the $20,000 payment was not refundable, in whole or in part. 

Don H. Reavis

 Justice
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF TICE TECHNOLOGY, INC. FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED
6/30/99 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                       1,496,916
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   93,530
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    412,931
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,019,266
<PP&E>                                         774,005
<DEPRECIATION>                                 598,463
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,427,789
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          356,698
<BONDS>                                      1,332,089
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       106,115
<OTHER-SE>                                     632,887
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   739,002
<SALES>                                        130,468
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               136,439
<CGS>                                          118,712
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  295,714
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                14,943
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              14,943
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (173,566)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,699
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (165,246)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (176,265)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.02)


</TABLE>
§ 100.140 General rules. ( a ) *Voluntary self-testing and correction.* The report or results of a self-test a lender voluntarily conducts or authorizes are privileged as provided in this subpart if the lender has taken or is taking appropriate corrective action to address likely violations identified by the self-test. Data collection required by law or any governmental authority (federal, state, or local) is not voluntary.
( b ) *Other privileges.* This subpart does not abrogate any evidentiary privilege otherwise provided by law.
[62 FR 66432, Dec. 18, 1997]
#### Samuel Chase, as Administrator of the Estate of Anna Chase, Deceased, v. New York City Transit Authority.

Motion to dismiss appeal granted, with $10 costs, unless the appellant procures its appellant’s points to be served and filed on or before August 25, 1960, with notice of argument for September 6, 1960, said appeal to be argued or submitted when reached. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Valente and Bergan, JJ.
Order entered November 26, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-01036-CV

CHELSEA DAVIS, Appellant

V.

LESLIE WARE, SAMUEL BAXTER, ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-13-19281

ORDER

The clerk’s record in this case is overdue. By postcard dated September 29, 2014, we 

notified the Dallas County District Clerk that the clerk’s record was overdue and directed the 

Dallas County District Clerk to file the clerk’s record within thirty days. To date, the clerk’s 

record has not been filed and we have not received any correspondence from the Dallas County 

District Clerk’s office regarding the status of the clerk’s record.

Accordingly, we ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file the clerk’s record or 

written verification that appellant has not been found indigent and has not paid for the record 

within TEN DAYS of the date of this order. We notify appellant that if we receive verification 

she is not indigent and has not paid for the record, we will, without further notice, dismiss the 

appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b).
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to Gary 

Fitzsimmons, Dallas County District Clerk and to all parties.

/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT

CHIEF JUSTICE
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON

O RDER

Appellate case name: Lisa Rodriguez v. Universal Surgical Ass istants , Inc.

Appellate case number: 01

- 1 9

- 00 236

- CV

Trial court case number: 1 8

- DCV

- 2580

- 12

Trial court: 458 th District Court of Fort Bend County

On May 7, 2019, we abated the appeal and remanded the case to the trial court “pending the completion of the procedure under R ule 4.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure

. ” See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 4.2; see also T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 306a(4), (5). T he trial

court clerk has filed a supplemental clerk’s record that includes the trial court’s orders “Determining Actual Notice of Appealable Order.” Accordingly, w e reinstate the appeal

on the Court’s active docket.

Appellant’s brief is due to be filed in this Court no later than 20 days from the date

of this order. 1 See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.6(a), (d).

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature:

_

/s/ Julie Countiss
 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __ July 16, 2019

___

1 The clerk’s record was filed in this appeal on April 10, 2019. On April 9, 2019, the court reporter advised the Clerk of this Court that appellant’s counsel had notified her that “there [was] no record associated with this appeal.”
#### In the Matter of Norman K., Appellant.

In a proceeding pursuant to article 7 of the Family Court Act, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County, dated August 11, 1977, which, upon a fact-finding determination that appellant is a juvenile delinquent, placed him with the New York State Division for Youth for a period of three years. Order reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and a new dispositional hearing is ordered. Prior to the dispositional hearing, but after his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, the appellant moved for an order permitting him to.be examined by a psychologist of his own choosing at Juvenile Center. That motion was granted, on condition that a copy of the psychologist’s report be given to the Corporation Counsel, the court and the probation department. The court based its order on subdivision 4 of section 750 of the Family Court Act, which requires, *inter alia,*that "Where the respondent is found to have committed a designated felony act, all diagnostic assessments and probation investigation reports shall be made available to the court and to counsel presenting the petition and for the respondent at least five court days prior to the commencement of the dispositional hearing.” However, that section applies only to probation reports and assessments. It does not enlarge the court’s power to condition an order which permits examination by an expert. The net effect of imposing such conditions would not be to provide more information for the court, but rather, as here, to discourage the defense from using its own experts to prepare for the dispositional hearing. Thus handicapped, counsel’s ability to effectively represent his client is unnecessarily impaired. The Corporation Counsel joins with the appellant in concluding that a new dispositional hearing is required. Since there must be a new hearing, it is not necessary for us to reach the other issues raised by the appellant. Damiani, J. P., Titone, Suozzi and Rabin, JJ., concur.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VALERIE ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

KAISER PERMANENTE

INTERNATIONAL, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-01270 JSW

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING

SCHEDULE REGARDING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO AMEND

This matter is set for a hearing on July 2, 2010 on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an

amended complaint. The Court HEREBY ORDERS that any opposition to this motion shall be

filed by no later than May 14, 2010 and Plaintiff’s reply, if any, shall be filed by no later than

May 21, 2010.

If the Court determines that the matter is suitable for resolution without oral argument, it

will so advise the parties in advance of the hearing date. If the parties wish to modify this

schedule, they may submit for the Court’s consideration a stipulation and proposed order

demonstrating good cause for any modification requested.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 30, 2010 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-01270-JSW Document 85 Filed 04/30/10 Page 1 of 1
§ 2002.1 Scope of this part and applicability of other HUD regulations. ( a ) *General.* This part contains the regulations of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that implement the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552). It informs the public how to request records and information from the OIG and explains the procedure to use if a request is denied. Requests made by individuals for records about themselves under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a, are processed in accordance with 24 CFR part 2003 as well as this part. Requests for documents made by subpoena or other demands of courts or other authorities are governed by procedures contained in part 2004 of this chapter. These rules should be read in conjunction with the text of the FOIA and the Uniform Freedom of Information Fee Schedule and Guidelines published by the Office of Management and Budget. This policy does not create any right enforceable in court.
( b ) *Applicability of HUD's FOIA regulations.* In addition to the regulations in this part, §§ 15.2 and 15.106 of this title apply to the production or disclosure of information in the possession of the OIG, except as limited in paragraph (c) of this section or otherwise expressly stated in this part.
( c ) *Limited applicability of §§ 15.2 and 15.106 of this title .* The OIG has different people and entities involved in the FOIA process than those defined in § 15.2 and these people and entities are specifically identified in this part. For purposes of this part, when the words “HUD” or “Department” are used in § 15.2 or § 15.106, the term means the OIG. The OIG will follow the fee schedule at § 15.106 except as otherwise provided in this part. Where § 15.106 references § 15.103, the OIG reference in this part is § 2002.15.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE:

PROMULGATION OF FINANCIAL

REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO 42 Pa.C.S. § 3502(A) :

:

:

:

:

:

: N O

. 576

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION DOCKET

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 1 st day of September , 2022

, it is Ordered pursuant to Article V,

Section 10(c) of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and Section 3502(a) of the Judicial

Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §3502(a), that the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania is authorized to

promulgate the attached Financial Regulatio ns. The Financial Regulations are effective

September 1, 2022.

To the extent that notice of proposed rulemaking may be required by Pa.R.J.A.

103, the immediate promulgation of the regulations is hereby found to be in the interest

of efficient administrati on.

This Order is to be processed in accordance with Pa.R.J.A. 103(b) and is effective

immediately.
#### § 232.565 Maximum loan amount.

The principal amount of the loan shall not exceed the lower of the Commissioner's estimate of the cost of the fire safety equipment, including the cost of installation and eligible fees, or the amount supported by ninety percent (90%) of the residual income, which is ninety percent (90%) of the amount of net income remaining after payment of all existing debt service requirements, as determined by the Commissioner. The cost of installation may include the cost of such other work to be performed on the project necessary to meet the requirements of the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Commissioner to enhance the fire safety of the project, and such costs incidental to installation as may be approved by the Commissioner.

[40 FR 4908, Feb. 3, 1975, as amended at 80 FR 48028, Aug. 11, 2015]
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 22, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-40896

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE ALEJANDRO MEDINA-HUITRON, also known as Jose A. Medina,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:04-CR-112-ALL

--------------------

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Alejandro Medina-Huitron appeals the sentence imposed

following his conviction for attempting to reenter the United

States following a prior deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326 and 6 U.S.C. §§ 202 and 557. Finding no error, we affirm.

Medina first argues that, in light of United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the district court erred in

imposing a sentence utilizing the Sentencing Guidelines as

mandatory. As Medina did not preserve this issue, we review only
No. 04-40896

-2-

for plain error. See United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 520

(5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed (Mar. 31, 2005)

(No. 04-9517); see also United States v. Malveaux, __F.3d__,

No. 03-41618, 2005 WL 1320362 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 2005). 

Application of the Guidelines as mandatory, even absent a Sixth

Amendment violation as is the case here, is plain or obvious

error after Booker. See United States v. Valenzuela-Quevedo, 407

F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 2005). However, Medina cannot show that

the error affected his substantial rights because the record does

not indicate that the district court would have imposed a lower

sentence under an advisory, rather than a mandatory, Guidelines

scheme. See id. To the contrary, the sentencing transcript

demonstrates that the district court believed Medina’s 16-month

sentence to be appropriate in light of Medina’s criminal history. 

 Medina’s second argument, that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(b)(1) and

(2) are unconstitutional, is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 239-47 (1998). See United

States v. Martinez-Mata, 393 F.3d 625, 629 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004),

cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1877 (2005). Medina concedes this

point, but raises it to preserve the matter for further review. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.
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August 3, 2017********
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 248 (Tuesday, December 28, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Page 77774]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-28292]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

National Park Service


Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for 
the Proposal To Improve the Arlington County, VA Potomac Interceptor 
Sewer System

AGENCY: National Park Service, Interior.

ACTION: Availability of the Decision Notice and FONSI for the proposal 
to improve the Arlington County, Virginia Potomac Interceptor Sewer 
System.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to Council on Environmental Quality regulations and 
National Park Service (NPS) policy, the NPS announces the availability 
of the Decision Notice and FONSI for the Improvements to the Arlington 
County, Virginia Potomac Interceptor Sewer System. The Decision Notice 
and FONSI identify Alternative A as selected by the NPS for action. It 
is the preferred and environmentally preferred alternative in the 
Environmental Assessment. Under this alternative, improvements will be 
made to the existing sewer system which will minimize impacts to the 
environment and the community by providing additional sewer capacity to 
eliminate sewer overflows, back-ups and surcharging, to address the 
aging elements of the system, while maintaining continuous service to 
existing users, to provide available capacity for future users, and 
implement a cost-effective project that minimizes capital and operating 
costs.

DATES: The Environmental Assessment, upon which the decision and FONSI 
were made, was available for public comment for 30 days in June--July 
2003. Three responses were received in favor of the preferred 
alternative.

ADDRESSES: The Decision Notice and FONSI will be available for public 
inspection Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. through 4 p.m. at the GWMP 
Headquarters, Turkey Run Park, McLean, Virginia. The FONSI can also be 
viewed on the GWMP Web site at http://www.nps.gov/gwmp.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Decision Notice and FONSI completes the 
Environmental Assessment process.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Sarah Koenen (703) 289-2540.

    Dated: October 18, 2004.
Audrey F. Calhoun,
Superintendent, George Washington Memorial Parkway.
[FR Doc. 04-28292 Filed 12-27-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4312-52-P
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 17

- 00011

- CR

Ricky D. Elliot

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From the 371st District Court

o f Tarrant County (1447427D )

April 12 , 201 8

Opinion by Justice Mei er

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Bill Meier

Justice Bill Meier