alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 05-621 

________________________________________________________________________ 

DOUBLE TAXATION 

Shipping and Aircraft 

 Agreement between the 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

and CAPE VERDE 

Signed at Praia March 16, 2005 
 NOTE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

 Pursuant to Public Law 89—497, approved July 8, 1966 

(80 Stat. 271; 1 U.S.C. 113)—

“. . .the Treaties and Other International Acts Series issued 

under the authority of the Secretary of State shall be competent 

 evidence . . . of the treaties, international agreements other than 

treaties, and proclamations by the President of such treaties and 

international agreements other than treaties, as the case may be, 

therein contained, in all the courts of law and equity and of maritime 

jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the 

United States, and of the several States, without any further proof 

or authentication thereof.” 
CAPE VERDE 

Double Taxation: Shipping and Aircraft 

Agreement signed at Praia March 16, 2005; 

 Entered into force June 21, 2005.
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of California

DEAN APOSTOL,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

TOM VILSACK,

Defendant(s).

_____________________________________/

No. C 09-01807 MEJ

ORDER DISCHARGING SECOND

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

ORDER RE CASE MANAGEMENT

DEADLINES

On January 25, 2010, the Court issued a second order to show cause in this matter regarding

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations, and his general failure to prosecute. 

(Dkt. #25.) Although Plaintiff did not respond to the OSC as ordered, Plaintiff’s counsel appeared

on his behalf at the February 18, 2010 hearing. So that this case may proceed on the merits, the

Court hereby DISCHARGES the January 25, 2010 OSC. Based on discussions at the hearing, the

Court hereby ORDERS as follows:

1) Plaintiff shall respond to and produce all outstanding discovery by March 10, 2010;

2) Plaintiff’s deposition shall take place on March 24 and 25, 2010, subject to the

interpreter’s availability. The only reason the deposition may not go forward is if the

interpreter is unavailable;

3) Defendant’s counsel shall e-file a proposed order regarding SSA and the release of

Plaintiff’s medical records from Dr. Lee. Plaintiff shall ensure that any necessary

release authorizations, both from himself and SSA, are submitted to Dr. Lee by

February 25, 2010;

Case 3:09-cv-01807-MEJ Document 27 Filed 02/18/10 Page 1 of 2
UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED 

STATES 

DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

4) The Court shall conduct a status conference on April 8, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. in

Courtroom B, 15th Floor, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. The

parties shall file a joint status report by April 1, 2010.

5) The pretrial deadlines in this case, as established in the September 25, 2009 Case

Management Order, (Dkt. #13), are hereby CONTINUED by 21 days. This applies

to all deadlines up through and including the dispositive motion filing deadline and

hearing date. Thus, the new hearing date for dispositive motions is July 15, 2010.

6) All pretrial and trial deadlines after the dispositive motion hearing are VACATED. 

This applies to all deadlines beginning with Paragraph J in the September 25 Order.

Failure to comply with any part of this Order may result in the imposition of sanctions, up to

and including dismissal of this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 18, 2010 _______________________________

Maria-Elena James 

Chief United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 3:09-cv-01807-MEJ Document 27 Filed 02/18/10 Page 2 of 2
#### § 3286.301 Purpose.

The purpose of this subpart D is to establish the requirements for a person to qualify to provide the training required under subpart C of this part. This training is required for manufactured home installers who want to be licensed in accordance with the HUD-administered installation program.
§ 72.10 Responsibility if a will intended to operate locally exists. ( a ) If a will that is intended to operate in the foreign country is discovered and the legal representative named in the will qualifies promptly and takes charge of the personal estate in the foreign country, the consular officer should assume no responsibility for the estate, and should not take possession, inventory and dispose of the personal property and effects or in any way serve as agent for the legal representative.
( b ) If the legal representative does not qualify promptly and if the laws of the country where the personal estate is located permit, however, the consular officer should take appropriate protective measures such as— ( 1 ) Requesting local authorities to provide protection for the property under local procedures; and/or
( 2 ) Placing the consular officer's seal on the personal property of the decedent, such seal to be broken or removed only at the request of the legal representative.
( c ) If prolonged delays are encountered by the local or domiciliary legal representative in qualifying and/or making arrangements to take charge of the personal estate, the consular officer should consult the Department concerning whether the will should be offered for probate.
§ 3280.812 Wiring of expandable units and dual units. ( a ) Expandable or multiple unit manufactured homes shall use fixed-type wiring methods and materials for connecting such units to each other.
( b ) Expandable or multiple unit manufactured homes not having permanently installed feeders and which are to be moved from one location to another, shall be permitted to have disconnecting means with branch circuit protective equipment in each unit when so located that after assembly or joining together of units the requirements of § 3280.803 will be met.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-41197

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

OSCAR DELGADILLO,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:14-CR-176-1

Before DAVIS, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the judgment in a criminal case, Oscar Delgadillo raises an 

argument that he concedes is foreclosed by United States v. Betancourt, 586 

F.3d 303, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2009), which held that knowledge of drug type and 

quantity is not an element of a 21 U.S.C. § 841 offense. Knowledge of drug 

type and quantity likewise is not an element of offenses under the related 

statutes of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) and § 960(a). United States v. Valencia-Gonzales, 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 16, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 14-41197 Document: 00513079743 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/16/2015
No. 14-41197

2

172 F.3d 344, 345-46 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 

F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1978). The unopposed motion for summary disposition 

is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-41197 Document: 00513079743 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/16/2015
### §1463. Disposition of receipts

All sums received under the provisions of section 1460 of this title shall be deposited in the Treasury to the credit of miscellaneous receipts.

(Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 370, §6, 37 Stat. 498.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified to section 492 of Title 5 prior to the general revision and enactment of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, by Pub. L. 89–554, §1, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 378.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           4,910
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,223
<ALLOWANCES>                                       517
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                11,487
<PP&E>                                           5,148
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,460
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  14,175
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            1,691
<BONDS>                                             22
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            10
<OTHER-SE>                                      12,453
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    14,175
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 5,986
<CGS>                                            1,126
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    3,210
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   142
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   2
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,708
<INCOME-TAX>                                       623
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,085
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
NUMBER 13-20-00028-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

 

$3,363.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On Appeal from the 414th District Court

of McLennan County, Texas.

ORDER OF ABATEMENT

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes

Order Per Curiam

This cause is before the court on appellant’s motion to appoint counsel. Appellant 

is currently proceeding pro se attempting to appeal an asset forfeiture judgment.

The Texas Legislature has provided for the possibility of appointed counsel in civil 

matters by conferring upon a district court judge the discretion to “appoint counsel to 

attend to the cause of a party who makes an affidavit that he is too poor to employ counsel 
2

to attend to the cause.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §24.016 (West, Westlaw through 2013 

C.S.). Under exceptional circumstances, “the public and private interests at stake [may 

be] such that the administration of justice may best be served by appointing a lawyer to 

represent an indigent civil litigant.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 

594 (Tex. 1996).

Accordingly, we now ABATE this appeal and REMAND the cause to the trial court 

for further proceedings. Upon remand, the trial court shall immediately cause notice of a 

hearing to be given and, thereafter, conduct a hearing to determine the following: 

1. Whether appellant desires to prosecute this appeal;

2. Whether appellant is indigent;

3. Whether appellant is entitled to a free appellate record due to his or 

her indigency;

4. Whether appellant is entitled to appointed counsel; and, 

5. What orders, if any should be entered to assure the filing of 

appropriate notices and documentation to dismiss appellant's appeal 

if appellant does not desire to prosecute this appeal, or if appellant 

desires to prosecute this appeal, to assure that the appeal will be 

diligently pursued.

If the trial court determines that appellant does want to continue the appeal and 

that appellant is indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel, the trial court shall 

appoint counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. If counsel is appointed, the name, 

address, telephone number, email address, and state bar number of said counsel shall 

be included in an order appointing counsel.

The trial court shall cause its findings and recommendations, together with any 

orders it may enter regarding the aforementioned issues, to be included in a supplemental 
3

clerk's record. Furthermore, the trial court shall cause a supplemental reporter's record of 

any proceedings to be prepared. The supplemental clerk's record and supplemental 

reporter's record, if any, shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court on or before the 

expiration of thirty days from the date of this order.

It is so ORDERED.

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

19th day of November, 2020.
#### V. LOEWERS GAMBRINUS BREWERS CO., Respondent, v. LITHAUER, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Eirst Department.

January 9, 1903.)

Action by the V. Loewers Gambrinus Brewers Company against Edward T. Lithauer. W. H. Bennett, for appellant. C. J. G. Hall, for respondent.

No opinion. Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements. See 73 N. Y. Supp. 947.
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Rand Logistics, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the period ended March 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on June 29, 2007 (the "Report"), the undersigned, in the
capacity and on the date indicated below, hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.

Date: June 29, 2007

                                                     /s/ Joseph W. McHugh, Jr.
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Joseph W. McHugh, Jr.
                                                     Chief Financial Officer
### §4853. Worker protection

Not later than 180 days after October 28, 1992, the Secretary of Labor shall issue an interim final regulation regulating occupational exposure to lead in the construction industry. Such interim final regulation shall provide employment and places of employment to employees which are as safe and healthful as those which would prevail under the Department of Housing and Urban Development guidelines published at Federal Register 55, page 38973 (September 28, 1990) (Revised Chapter 8). Such interim final regulations shall take effect upon issuance (except that such regulations may include a reasonable delay in the effective date), shall have the legal effect of an Occupational Safety and Health Standard, and shall apply until a final standard becomes effective under section 655 of title 29.

(Pub. L. 102–550, title X, §1031, Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 3924.)
Uni

ted 

Stat

es D

istr

ict C

ourt

For t

he N

orth

ern 

Dis

trict

 of C

alifo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAMUEL SALDAÑA,

Plaintiff,

    v.

S. WALSH,

Defendants._______________________________                                

)))))))))) 

No. C 09-1288 MMC (PR)  

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’SFIRST REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OFTIME

(Docket No. 12)

GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, defendant’s request for an extension of time to file a

summary judgment or other dispositive motion is hereby GRANTED.  Defendant shall file

such motion no later than March 15, 2010.  Within thirty days of the date the motion is

filed, plaintiff shall file with the Court and serve on defendant’s counsel opposition thereto. 

Defendant shall file a reply to plaintiff’s opposition within fifteen days of the date such

opposition is filed.

This order terminates Docket No. 12.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 5, 2010

_____________________________MAXINE M. CHESNEYUnited States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01288-MMC   Document 16   Filed 01/05/10   Page 1 of 1

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2018-03-12T12:27:23-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
No. 89-1298.

#### Ingersoll-Rand Co. *v.*McClendon.

Sup. Ct. Tex. Motions of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American Paper Institute, Inc., and Equal Employment Advisory Council for leave to file briefs as *amici curiae*granted. Certiorari granted.
(No. 84-CC-1417

#### Richard Jaterka, Claimant, *v.*The State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Order on motion to dismiss filed April 3, 1984.*

*Order on stipulation filed November 21, 1986.*

Heller & Morris & Associates, Ltd., for Claimant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Erin O’Connell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

*132ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Respondent to dismiss and Claimant’s response to said motion.

Respondent bases its motion to dismiss on the ground that the accident on which this claim is based occurred on November 1, 1982, and that the notice of claim was filed on May 2,1983, one day late, in violation of section 22 — 1 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1), which requires notice of claim be filed within six months.

Claimant’s response sets forth that May 1,1983, was a Sunday and cites section 1.11 of “An act to revise the law in relation to the construction of the statutes” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 1, par. 1012), which states:

> “The time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Saturday or Sunday or is a holiday as defined or fixed in any statute now or hereafter in force in this State, and then it shall also be excluded. If the day succeeding such Saturday, Sunday or holiday is also a holiday or a Saturday or Sunday then such succeeding day shall also be excluded.”

Claimant also cited among his cases, in support of his position, *In re Application of County Treasurer*(1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 753, which states that Sundays and holidays will be excluded in the statutory computation of notice period within which taxpayers might file complaints.

It is hereby ordered that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be, and the same is, denied, and this cause is ordered set for hearing before a Commissioner.

*133ORDER ON STIPULATION

Holderman, J.

This cause coming to be heard on this date upon the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice filed herein by the above-named parties, and the Court having examined said stipulation and being fully advised in the premises, finds that the parties have stipulated and agreed to dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, and that the Court further finds that all costs have been paid.

It is therefore ordered that the claim of the Claimant against the Respondent be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
#### § 901.10 Act.

*Act* means the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-465, October 17, 1980), as amended.

[56 FR 55458, Oct. 28, 1991]
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Philip Politzer, Appellant. Martin P. Catherwood, as Industrial Commissioner of the State of New York, Respondent.

Appeal by the claimant from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board which denied his claim for benefits. The claimant who worked as a salesman was informed by his employer that his employment was being terminated on September 20, 1957. He was paid on that date and also given an additional two weeks’ salary. No claim for benefits was filed until June 23, 1958, thus giving the claimant only 13 weeks of employment from the beginning of his base period to September 20, 1957. The claimant clearly had 40 weeks of employment in the 104 weeks preceding the filing of his claim but the Industrial Commissioner denied the claim for failure to have 15 weeks of employment in the 52 weeks preceding the filing of the claim (Unemployment Insurance Law, § 527 [Labor Law, art. 18]). . The claimant requested a hearing contending that the extra two weeks’ pay was vacation pay which should be counted to give him the necessary 15 weeks. Although this pay was originally labeled severance pay on the employer’s books it was changed, after the claimant filed for benefits, to vacation pay. The Referee affirmed the initial determination finding that the employment had terminated on September 20, 1957. The claimant appealed and sought a further hearing at which he testified that he had taken orders from customers during the two weeks following September 20, 1957 and he produced copies of some such orders. His explanation for not having produced these earlier was that he “didn’t have sense enough”. He admitted that he was under no obligation to work during that period, that he had been working on the orders before and that he did it on his own. The board affirmed the decision of the Referee. The issue here is whether the two weeks following September 20, 1957 were “ weeks of employment ” for the claimant. Section 524 defines a *“*week of employment ” as “ a week in which a claimant did some work in employment for an employer ”. It would appear that a question of credibility was presented to the board as to whether any work was actually performed during the two-week period in question. In any event the board could determine as it did that the claimant’s employment terminated on September 20, 1957 and therefore that he was not “ in employment ” during this two-week period. The evidence indicates not only that the employer terminated the employment as of that date but also that the claimant understood that such was the ease. Decision unanimously affirmed, without costs. Present — Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ.
Exhibit 32(a)




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Emergent Group Inc. (the “registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “report”), I, Bruce J. Haber, Chief Executive Officer of the registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




(1) The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2) The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.




August 11, 2010/s/
Bruce J. HaberBruce J. HaberChief Executive Officer