AFDD Template Guide 

20 September 2002

.

Operations and 

Organization

Air Force Doctrine Document 2 

3 April 2007

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publications 0-2, 

Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF); 3-0, Joint Operations; 3-30, Command 

and Control for Joint Air Operations, and 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 3 APRIL 2007 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

This revision substantially restructures the entire publication for better 

presentation of key ideas and introduces much new and updated material. The 

publication’s title has been changed to better reflect the subject matter. The publication 

updates discussion on the Airman’s perspective. Discussion on the range of military 

operations has been updated and includes discussion of homeland operations and 

stability operations. A completely new discussion on the effects-based approach to 

military operations has been added. The discussion on expeditionary organization has 

been expanded and updated based on experience gained since publication of the 

previous version. Discussion on administrative control has been clarified and 

expanded, to include new discussion on responsibilities of host installation 

commanders. Discussion on command relationship models has been expanded and 

clarified based on experience in the field. A new chapter on joint organization greatly 

expands previous joint discussion. The discussion on planning has been greatly 

expanded, to include effects-based planning, component planning considerations, and 

the air and space estimate process. Discussion on air and space operations centers 

has been greatly expanded to include air mobility and space operations centers, 

organization, and processes. The appendices have been completely revised to support 

the current content. 

Note: This 2007 revision is only an interim change to the previous 27 June 2006 edition. 

This revision updates the vignette on page 45, deleting now-obsolete references to the 

warfighting headquarters. No other material has changed. 

 

Supersedes: AFDD 2, 27 June 2006 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DD 

Certified by: AFDC/CC (Maj Gen Allen G. Peck) 

Pages: 173 

Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication 

Approved by: T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, General, USAF 

 Chief of Staff
 

FOREWORD 

 

Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (AFDD 1), Air Force Basic Doctrine, presents the 

fundamentals of air and space power. This publication, AFDD 2, Operations and 

Organization, is the companion to AFDD 1 and provides the next level of granularity. It 

describes how the US Air Force organizes and employs air and space power at the 

operational level across the range of military operations. The concepts discussed in this 

publication—the role and responsibilities of the senior warfighting Airman; the basics 

behind our expeditionary organizational model; the fundamentals of joint and Service 

command arrangements; how we plan operations; and the means by which we place 

the collective capabilities of air and space power into the hands of a single Airman—are 

the foundations for all our operations. 

 We are in the middle of a long, shadowy war that will be punctuated by episodes 

of full-up, conventional operations. Many different types of operations will occur 

simultaneously; tempo and objectives may shift rapidly. We will be challenged to adapt 

well-practiced tactics and to think in new ways to solve unforeseen challenges. As the 

war evolves, so must we. Some aspects of warfighting, however, will remain constant. 

Our doctrine captures these enduring aspects. Our success in meeting the challenges 

of this rapidly changing world depends on our understanding and applying our doctrine. 

 Doctrine describes not only how we would command and employ air and space 

forces today, but is also the point of departure to guide us in meeting the challenges of 

tomorrow. Air and space power is a critical element in protecting our Nation and 

deterring aggression. It will only remain so if we, as professional Airmen, study, 

evaluate, and debate our capabilities and the environment of the future. Just as 

technology, world threats, and opportunities change, so must our doctrine. Each of you 

must be articulate, knowledgeable, and unapologetic advocates of our doctrine. We 

must understand what it means to be an Airman and be able to articulate what air and 

space power can bring to the joint fight. I encourage you to read our doctrine, discuss 

it, and practice it. 

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY 

General, USAF 

Chief of Staff 
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iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................vii 

Terminology Notes ..........................................................................................................ix 

Foundational Doctrine Statements ..................................................................................xi 

CHAPTER ONE—An Introduction to Air and Space Operations..................................... 1 

The Nature of Air and Space Power ............................................................................ 1 

The Airman’s Perspective............................................................................................ 2 

Air and Space Maneuver Warfare............................................................................ 3 

The Levels of War.................................................................................................... 4 

Strategy, Operational Art, and Tactics ..................................................................... 5 

Strategy ................................................................................................................ 5 

Operational Art ..................................................................................................... 8 

Tactics ................................................................................................................ 10 

Employing Air and Space Power............................................................................ 10 

CHAPTER TWO—Operations....................................................................................... 13 

The Effects-Based Approach to Military Operations .................................................. 13 

Principles of Effects Based Operations.................................................................. 16 

Air and Space Power Across the Range of Military Operations................................. 21 

The Range of Military Operations .............................................................................. 22 

Engagement, Cooperation, and Deterrence Operations ........................................ 23 

Contingencies and Crisis Response Operations.................................................... 24 

Major Operations and Campaigns.......................................................................... 25 

Homeland Operations................................................................................................ 26 

Homeland Security................................................................................................. 26 

Homeland Defense ................................................................................................ 26 

Emergency Preparedness...................................................................................... 27 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities...................................................................... 27 

The Political Dimension of Smaller-Scale Contingencies .......................................... 29 

Unity of Effort ......................................................................................................... 29 

Security .................................................................................................................. 30 

Restraint................................................................................................................. 30 

Perseverance......................................................................................................... 30 

Legitimacy.............................................................................................................. 31 

Threats to Operations................................................................................................ 31 

Termination, Transition, and Redeployment.............................................................. 32 

Conflict Termination ............................................................................................... 32 

Transition to Follow-On Operations........................................................................ 33 

Redeployment........................................................................................................ 34 

CHAPTER THREE—Commanding US Air Force Forces.............................................. 35 

The Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) ................................................... 35 

Operational Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR ................................................... 36 

Service Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR.......................................................... 37 
iv

The Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander (JFACC) ........................... 39 

Control of Other Services’ Aviation and Space Capabilities................................... 41 

CHAPTER FOUR—Organizing US Air Force Forces.................................................... 43 

The Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (AETF)............................................... 43 

Regional Organization and Control ........................................................................ 44 

Functional Organization and Control...................................................................... 45 

AETF Organization .................................................................................................... 46 

Numbered Expeditionary Air Force ........................................................................ 46 

Air Expeditionary Wing........................................................................................... 47 

Air Expeditionary Group ......................................................................................... 48 

Air Expeditionary Squadron ................................................................................... 48 

Expeditionary Elements below Squadron Level ..................................................... 49 

Provisional Units .................................................................................................... 50 

Designation of Expeditionary Units ........................................................................ 50 

The Senior/Host Air Force Installation Commander .................................................. 51 

AETF Command and Control Mechanisms ............................................................... 54 

Distributed / Split Operations..................................................................................... 55 

Command Relationship Models for US Air Force Forces .......................................... 56 

In-Theater Forces................................................................................................... 57 

Out-of-Theater Forces............................................................................................ 57 

CONUS-Based Forces ....................................................................................... 57 

OCONUS Forces Outside the AOR.................................................................... 58 

Functional Forces................................................................................................... 58 

Transient Forces .................................................................................................... 58 

Forces in Exercises................................................................................................ 58 

Transfer of Functional Forces to a Geographic Command........................................ 59 

Integrating Regional and Functional Air and Space Forces....................................... 61 

Integrating Air Mobility Operations ......................................................................... 61 

The Director of Air Mobility Forces ..................................................................... 61 

Integrating Space Operations ................................................................................ 62 

Space Coordinating Authority............................................................................. 62 

The Director of Space Forces............................................................................. 63 

Integrating Special Operations............................................................................... 63 

The Special Operations Liaison Element............................................................ 64 

Homeland Organizational Considerations ................................................................. 64 

CHAPTER FIVE—The Air and Space Component Within the Joint Force.................... 67 

Joint Force Organizational Basics ............................................................................. 67 

Theater Air and Space Command Mechanism.......................................................... 69 

Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) ............................................................... 69 

Liaisons within the Theater Air Control System (TACS)......................................... 70 

Airborne TACS Elements ....................................................................................... 70 

Ground TACS Elements......................................................................................... 70 

Integrating Component Operations: The Air Component Coordination Element ....... 71 

Joint Liaisons in the AOC .......................................................................................... 72 

Air and Space Component Relationships Within a Joint Force.................................. 73 

Joint Staffs................................................................................................................. 74 
v

Joint Staff Composition .......................................................................................... 74 

Commanders and Staff .......................................................................................... 74 

JFACC Staff ........................................................................................................... 75 

Multi-Hatting Commanders / Span of Command ....................................................... 75 

Support to Multiple Joint Task Forces........................................................................ 76 

Single-Service Task Forces....................................................................................... 77 

CHAPTER SIX—Planning for Operations ..................................................................... 79 

Joint Operation Planning ........................................................................................... 79 

Contingency Planning................................................................................................ 80 

Crisis Action Planning................................................................................................ 81 

Campaign Planning ................................................................................................... 83 

Service Component Planning .................................................................................... 84 

Effects-Based Considerations for Planning ............................................................... 85 

Actions ................................................................................................................... 87 

Types of Effects ..................................................................................................... 88 

Direct Effects ...................................................................................................... 88 

Indirect Effects.................................................................................................... 88 

Intended and Unintended Effects ....................................................................... 94 

Assessment Measures........................................................................................... 95 

Time and Effects .................................................................................................... 96 

The Air and Space Estimate Process ........................................................................ 97 

Mission Analysis..................................................................................................... 98 

Situation and Course of Action (COA) Development.............................................. 99 

COA Analysis and Refinement............................................................................... 99 

COA Comparison................................................................................................... 99 

COA Selection...................................................................................................... 100 

Joint Air and Space Operations Plan Development ............................................. 100 

Assessment............................................................................................................. 101 

CHAPTER SEVEN—Air and Space Operations Centers............................................ 105 

Regional Operations: The Falconer AOC ................................................................ 105 

AOC Organization................................................................................................ 106 

The Air Tasking Cycle.......................................................................................... 108 

Air Mobility Operations: The Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) .......................... 109 

TACC Organization.............................................................................................. 109 

The Air Mobility Tasking Message ....................................................................... 110 

Space Operations: The Air Force Space AOC ........................................................ 111 

Air Force Space AOC Organization ..................................................................... 111 

The Space Tasking Cycle .................................................................................... 112 

CHAPTER EIGHT—The AFFOR Staff........................................................................ 113 

Roles and Uses of the Air Force Forces (AFFOR) Staff .......................................... 113 

Command Section ................................................................................................... 114 

Personal Staff.......................................................................................................... 115 

Senior Component Liaisons ................................................................................. 115 

AFFOR Staff Directorates........................................................................................ 116 

Manpower and Personnel (A-1) ........................................................................... 116 
vi

Intelligence (A-2).................................................................................................. 116 

Air, Space, and Information Operations (A-3) ...................................................... 117 

Logistics (A-4) ...................................................................................................... 118 

Plans and Requirements (A-5)............................................................................. 119 

Communications (A-6) ......................................................................................... 120 

Installations and Mission Support (A-7)................................................................ 121 

Strategic Plans and Programs (A-8)..................................................................... 122 

Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned (A-9).......................................... 122 

APPENDIX A—Host Installation Administrative Control Scenarios............................. 125 

APPENDIX B—Reserve Component Implementation................................................. 129 

APPENDIX C—Sample G-Series Order Establishing an Expeditionary Unit .............. 131 

APPENDIX D—Sample G-Series Order Establishing a Provisional Unit..................... 133 

APPENDIX E—The Mission Statement and Commander’s Intent Statement ............. 135 

APPENDIX F—The Air and Space Estimate of the Situation...................................... 137 

APPENDIX G—Notional Air Component Operations Order ........................................ 139 

Suggested Readings................................................................................................... 141 

Glossary...................................................................................................................... 143 
vii

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

This document has been prepared under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the 

US Air Force. It establishes doctrinal guidance for organizing, planning, and employing 

air and space forces at the operational level of conflict across the full range of military 

operations. It is the capstone of US Air Force operational-level doctrine publications. 

Together, these publications collectively form the basis from which commanders plan 

and execute their assigned air and space missions and their actions as a component of 

a joint Service or multinational force. 

APPLICATION 

This Air Force doctrine document (AFDD) applies to the Total Force: all US Air 

Force military and civilian personnel, including regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve 

Command, and Air National Guard units and members. 

 Unless specifically stated otherwise, US Air Force doctrine applies to the full 

range of military operations, as appropriate, from stability, security, transition, and 

reconstruction operations to major combat operations. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider not only the contents of this AFDD, but also the 

particular situation when accomplishing their missions. 

SCOPE 

US Air Force assets (people, weapons, and support systems) can be used 

across the range of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 

war. This AFDD discusses the fundamentals of organization and employment of US Air 

Force air and space capabilities to accomplish the missions assigned by unified 

combatant commanders. More specific guidance on US Air Force operations may be 

found in subordinate operational- and tactical-level doctrine documents. 
viii

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ix

TERMINOLOGY NOTES 

“COMAFFOR” versus “COMAFFOR/JFACC” and “JFACC/CFACC” 

One of the cornerstones of US Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force 

prefers – and in fact, plans and trains – to employ through a commander, Air Force 

forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and space component 

commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

 To simplify the use of nomenclature, US Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the US Air Force Service component 

commander while the term “JFACC” refers to the joint component-level operational 

commander. 

 While both joint and US Air Force doctrine state that one individual will normally 

be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are different, and 

should be executed through different staffs. 

 

 When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC may become a 

“combined force air and space component commander” (CFACC). Likewise, the air and 

space operations center (AOC), though commonly referred to as an AOC, in joint or 

combined operations is correctly known as a joint AOC (JAOC) or combined AOC 

(CAOC). 

The use of “air and space” in Service terminology

US Air Force doctrine recognizes the institutional shift within the US Air Force 

from “air” to “air and space.” The language in this document reflects that shift when it is 

logical to do so (but note it is not a universal “global replacement” whenever “air” 

appears). However, in the context of joint doctrine, it is not within the purview of US Air 

Force doctrine to change terminology that has been formally accepted by the joint 

community as contained in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms. 

 Thus, Airmen may use “joint air and space operations center” or “joint force air 

and space component commander” when speaking in a Service context (such as in this 

AFDD). However, when speaking within a joint publication, “joint air operations center” 

or “joint force air component commander” are appropriate. 

 The use of “air and space” in Service doctrine will, for the time being, lead similar 

usage in joint terminology. 
x

The use of “Airman” and “Total Force” in Service doctrine 

 The US Air Force is composed of Airmen – officers and enlisted personnel from 

the Regular Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve components, as well 

as Department of the Air Force civilians, who are sworn to support and defend the US 

Constitution as a member of the US Air Force. Thus, in US Air Force doctrine, the term 

“Airman” is seamless; one’s component is almost never an issue. In those few legal 

areas where component status is relevant (as might occur in some homeland 

operations scenarios when Titles 10 and 32, United States Code, are in play), doctrine 

highlights the instance and describes the means by which a COMAFFOR may still 

achieve unity of effort, and fully leverage the Airmen under his or her command. 

 Closely allied with the notion of an Airman is that of the Total Force. Total Force 

reinforces the seamlessness of the Airman concept through organizational constructs 

that leverage and integrate the unique strengths of the regular, Guard, and Reserve 

components as well as US Air Force civilians and contractors. In short, “Airmen” refers 

to the people, “Total Force” to the policy that supports the integration of the 

components, both within and outside the US Air Force, to create Airmen. 
xi

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these 

statements. 

 Air and space power operates in ways that are fundamentally different from 

other forms of military power; thus, air power and space power are more akin to 

each other than to the other forms of military power. (Page 1) 

 At the focus of operations within any region, it is possible to place the collective 

capabilities of air and space power in the hands of a single Airman through an 

adroit arrangement of command relationships, focused expeditionary 

organization, reachback, and forward deployment of specialized talent. (Page 

1) 

 Airmen must understand the intellectual foundation behind air and space power 

and articulate its proper application at the strategic, operational, and tactical 

levels of war; translate the benefits of air and space power into meaningful 

objectives and desired effects; and influence the overall campaign planning 

effort from inception to conflict termination and into whatever post-conflict 

operations are required. (Page 2) 

 Air and space forces can strike directly at an adversary’s centers of gravity, vital 

centers, and critical vulnerabilities. (Page 3) 

 By making effective use of the vertical dimension and time, air and space 

forces can wrest the initiative, set the terms of battle, establish a dominant 

tempo of operations, anticipate the enemy, and take advantage of tactical and 

operational opportunities, and thus can strike directly at the adversary’s 

strategy. (Page 3) 

 Experience has shown that parallel, asymmetric operations are more effective, 

achieve results faster, and are less costly than symmetric or serial operations. 

(Page 11) 

 Air and space superiority allows simultaneous and rapid attack on key nodes 

and forces, producing effects that overwhelm the enemy’s capacity to adapt or 

recover. (Page 11) 

 In some situations, air and space power, whether land- or sea-based, may be 

the only force immediately available and capable of providing an initial 

response. (Page 11) 

 When employed aggressively, air and space forces can conduct operations 

aimed directly at accomplishing the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) objectives. 

(Page 12) 
xii

 Air superiority is the desired state before all other combat operations. Attaining 

air superiority provides both the freedom to attack and freedom from attack, as 

well as ensuring freedom to maneuver. Operating without air superiority 

radically increases risk to surface and air operations. (Page 21) 

 Space superiority is important in maintaining our unique advantages in 

precision, situational awareness, and operational reach. (Page 21) 

 Military agencies temporarily support and augment, but do not replace local, 

state (including National Guard forces in state active duty status), and federal 

civilian agencies that have primary authority and responsibility for domestic 

disaster assistance. (Page 29) 

 The commander of a US Air Force Service component at any joint level (unified 

combatant command, subunified combatant command, or joint task force 

[JTF]), is by joint and US Air Force definition called a commander, Air Force 

forces (COMAFFOR). (Page 35) 

 Commanders of US Air Force components have responsibilities and authorities 

that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Service’s administrative control 

(ADCON) function. (Page 37) 

 The joint force air and space component commander (JFACC) should be the 

Service component commander with the preponderance of air and space 

assets and the ability to plan, task, and control joint air and space operations. 

(Page 39) 

 The US Air Force prefers – and in fact, plans and trains – to employ through a 

COMAFFOR who is then prepared to assume responsibilities as a JFACC if so 

designated. (Page 39) 

 The air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) is the organizational 

structure for US Air Force forces afield. Regardless of the size of the US Air 

Force element, it will be organized along the lines of an AETF. (Page 43) 

 All US Air Force forces assigned or attached to a joint task force, or established 

as a single-Service task force, should be organized and presented as an AETF. 

(Page 44) 

 Not all air and space forces employed in an operation will be attached forward 

to a geographic combatant commander. Several aspects of air and space 

power are capable of serving more than one geographic combatant 

commander at a time. (Page 45) 

 The COMAFFOR should normally not be dual-hatted as commander of one of 

the subordinate operating units. This allows the COMAFFOR to focus on 

component responsibilities as the overall AETF commander while subordinate 

commanders lead their units. (Page 46) 
xiii

 Although JFCs may retain authority at the JTF level, they should normally 

designate as space coordinating authority the component commander who 

provides the preponderance of military space capabilities, the requisite ability to 

command and control them, and the resident space expertise. (Page 62) 

 Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through 

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component 

commanders. (Page 69) 

 Only commanders have the legal and moral authority to place personnel in 

harm’s way. Under no circumstance should staff agencies, including those of 

the JFC’s staff, attempt to command forces. (Page 74) 

 If a commander must wear several hats, it is preferable that the associated 

responsibilities lie at the same level of war. (Page 75) 
xiv

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1 

CHAPTER ONE 

AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS 

THE NATURE OF AIR AND SPACE POWER 

Air and space power arises from the use of lethal and nonlethal means by air and 

space forces to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Air and space 

power can rapidly provide the national leadership a full range of military options for 

meeting national objectives and protecting national interests. Across the range of 

military operations, air and space forces offer rapid, flexible, and effective lethal and 

nonlethal power. 

 Due to its speed, range, and three-dimensional perspective, air and space 

power operates in ways that are fundamentally different from other forms of 

military power; thus, air power and space power are more akin to each other than 

to the other forms of military power. Air and space power has the ability to conduct 

operations and impose effects across the entire theater, wherever targets or target sets 

might be found, unlike surface forces that typically divide up the battlefield into individual 

operating areas. Airmen view the application of force more from a functional than 

geographic standpoint, and classify targets by generated effects rather than physical 

location. 

 Air and space power is, however, not monolithic in organization and presentation. 

Because it encompasses a wide range of capabilities and operating environments, it 

defies a single, general model for organization, planning, and employment. Some 

assets and capabilities provide relatively localized effects and generally are more easily 

deployable, and thus organize and operate within a regional model. Other assets and 

capabilities transcend geographic areas of responsibility simultaneously, and thus have 

global responsibilities. Such forces are best organized and controlled through a 

functional model. However, at the focus of operations within any region, it is 

possible to place the collective capabilities of air and space power in the hands of 

a single Airman through an adroit arrangement of command relationships, 

focused expeditionary organization, reachback, and forward deployment of 

specialized talent.

Airpower has become predominant, both as a 

deterrent to war, and—in the eventuality of war—as the 

devastating force to destroy an enemy’s potential and 

fatally undermine his will to wage war. 

—General Omar Bradley 
2 

“Airmindedness” 

 “The study of aerospace 

warfare leads to a particular 

expertise and a distinctive point 

of view that General Henry H. 

(‘Hap’) Arnold termed 

‘airmindedness.’ The perspective 

of Airmen is necessarily different; 

it reflects the range, speed, and 

capabilities of aerospace forces, 

as well as threats and survival 

imperatives unique to Airmen. 

Airmindedness is much harder to 

convey than the perspectives of 

soldiers and sailors for several 

reasons. The viewpoint of the 

soldier and sailor--bounded by 

the apparent horizon--is part of 

everyday life and instinctive 

understanding; few have ever 

operated an aircraft or 

contemplated the problems of 

aerial warfare; and few popular 

sources of information reflect an 

Airman's perspective.” 

-- AFM 1-1, Volume 2, 

Basic Aerospace 

Doctrine of the United 

States Air Force, March 

1992 

 Recognizing the multifaceted yet complementary nature of air and space power’s 

capabilities, this publication describes the major organizational and operating paradigms 

of air and space power. While operations predominantly using “kinetic” means (that is, 

means that have a direct physical impact such as destruction) will remain regionally 

focused and organized, many other forms of air and space power are provided “over the 

shoulder” in a supporting relationship. This publication also discusses the variety of 

discrete operations in which air and space power can be planned and employed. 

THE AIRMAN’S PERSPECTIVE 

Since the advent of the military airplane, Airmen have claimed that airpower (and 

later, space power) provided a new element to warfare. Entirely new missions emerged 

which brought fundamental changes to the 

ways war could be fought. Airmen sought to 

take the fight straight to the heart of the 

enemy to directly achieve effects at the 

strategic level of war. Early airpower’s range 

of action, its ability to quickly react and 

refocus across the theater to changing 

demands, and its literal above-the-surface 

perspective, all pointed to a different outlook 

on how wars could be fought. While initial 

theories claimed to render surface combat 

obsolete, today’s Airmen realize that all 

domains of combat are complementary. 

However, air and space power remains 

distinctly different from other forms of military 

power in application and organization.

Airmen must understand the 

intellectual foundation behind air and 

space power and articulate its proper 

application at the strategic, operational, 

and tactical levels of war; translate the 

benefits of air and space power into 

meaningful objectives and desired 

effects; and influence the overall 

campaign planning effort from inception 

to conflict termination and into whatever 

post-conflict operations are required. 

Today, Airmen still approach war functionally, 

and have adopted an effects-based approach 

to operations that more rigorously links 

planning, execution, and assessment into an 

adaptive whole and ties specific actions to 

overall objectives and to the entire range of 

possible outcomes, intended and unintended, 
3 

 

 The Airman’s perspective 

normally encompasses the 

entire theater or joint 

operating area (JOA). There 

may be times when air and 

space power must focus on a 

specific geographic area to 

perform certain functions. 

However, it will most often be 

counterproductive for the air 

and space component to be 

assigned only to a specific 

area of operation (AO) if it is 

to remain flexible and 

versatile, able to mass effects 

wherever and whenever the 

joint strategy requires. In fact, 

joint doctrine specifically 

defines an AO as “designated 

by the JFC for land and naval 

forces” (JP 1-02). There is no 

specification of an AO for air 

and space forces. 

direct and indirect. But the differences in range, flexibility, and perspective with respect 

to surface warfare require a different approach to the application of air and space 

power. This outlook—the Airman’s perspective—demands that Airmen understand and 

apply the distinctive characteristics of air and space power in a complex joint 

environment that is experiencing profound technological change. 

Air and Space Maneuver Warfare 

Air and space power’s vertical position within 

the theater of operations confers upon it a distinct 

advantage. Traditionally, the physical structure of 

ground maneuver forces has consisted of fronts, 

flanks, and rears. Although these terms have no 

application to air and space power, it is sometimes 

useful to make an analogy in surface terms in order 

to convey air and space power’s contribution. In 

such terms, airpower adds a flank in the third 

dimension that makes the vertical battle as 

important as the horizontal battle. Using the 

metaphor of surface flanks, the airspace above the 

theater is also maneuver area but in three 

dimensions, and can be taken and exploited to 

either destroy or dislodge an enemy or achieve a 

relative advantage. Thus, as with surface flanks, a 

commander should seek to gain a position of 

advantage by turning an enemy’s vertical flank, and 

should no sooner expose one’s own vertical flank. 

Air and space power can also enable creation of a 

virtual “flank” or “rear” in a fourth dimension: time. 

By using time more effectively and by disrupting the 

enemy’s operational rhythm, a commander can 

help ensure the success of friendly actions, disrupt 

enemy strategies, and in some cases paralyze 

enemy action. 

 In a larger sense, by operating from the third dimension, air and space forces 

can strike directly at an adversary’s centers of gravity, vital centers, and critical 

vulnerabilities. This capability allows air and space forces to achieve effects well 

beyond the tactical effects of individual actions, at a tempo that disrupts the adversary’s 

decision cycle. By making effective use of the vertical dimension and time, air and 

space forces can wrest the initiative, set the terms of battle, establish a dominant 

tempo of operations, better anticipate the enemy through superior observation, 

and take advantage of tactical and operational opportunities, and thus can strike 

directly at the adversary’s strategy. Air and space power’s ability to strike the enemy 

rapidly and unexpectedly across all of the critical points, from deep to close, adds a 

significant impact to enemy morale in addition to the physical blow. 
4 

 Integrated with surface maneuver, air and space forces can reduce the need for 

things like probing actions through such capabilities as wide-ranging strikes, persistent 

reconnaissance and surveillance, and comprehensive situational awareness. This 

gives surface forces freedom of action and greatly enhances their effectiveness, and 

also enhances the effectiveness of the entire joint force. While the categorizing of 

forces as either “fires” or “maneuver” is more applicable to the land component, both 

joint and Air Force doctrine include air and space power in the maneuver category. 

Rapid, long-range, three-dimensional maneuver is inherent in air and space power, as 

is the ability to inflict both physical and psychological dislocation on an adversary. 

Thus, in cases where air and space forces present the joint force commander (JFC) 

with the preponderance of counter-surface effects, it may be appropriate for the air and 

space component commander to be the supported commander for the destruction of 

enemy surface forces, with friendly surface force commanders acting in a supporting 

role. To fully understand the implications of employing air and space power as a 

maneuver force, it is necessary to understand the various levels at which wars are 

fought. 

The Levels of War 

Warfare is typically divided into three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. 

The focus at a given level of war is not on the specific weapons used, or on the targets 

attacked, but rather on the desired effects. A given aircraft, dropping a given weapon, 

could comprise a tactical, operational, or strategic mission depending on the planned 

results. Effects at the strategic level of war address such desirable outcomes as the 

destruction or disruption of the enemy’s centers of gravity (COGs), critical 

vulnerabilities, or other vital parts of the enemy system that impair his ability or will to 

wage war or carry out aggressive activity. At this level the US determines national or 

multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and 

uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. These national objectives in 

turn provide the direction for developing overall military objectives, which in turn are 

used to develop the military objectives and strategy for each theater. Strategy is aimed 

at outcomes, thus strategic ends define this level. In general terms, the strategic level of 

war addresses the issues of WHY and WITH WHAT we will fight and WHY the enemy 

fights against us. 

 At the other end of the spectrum lies the tactical level of war, where individual 

battles and engagements are fought. While effects may be described as operational or 

strategic, all actions are defined as occurring at the tactical level. To the Airman, the 

distinction between this level and higher levels of war is fairly clear-cut; we tend not to 

fight large-scale battles (as surface forces use the term) but focus at the tactical level on 

the individual engagement. The tactical level of air and space warfare deals with how 

these packaged forces are employed, and the specifics of how engagements are 

conducted and targets attacked. Tactics are concerned with the unique employment of 

force, thus application defines this level. In short, the tactical level of war deals with 

HOW we fight. 
5 

Between the strategic and tactical levels of war lies the operational level of war. 

At this level of war, campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, 

sustained, assessed, and adapted to accomplish strategic goals within theaters or areas 

of operations. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do 

tactics; they provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve 

strategic and operational objectives. Operational effects such as air, space, and 

information superiority, defeat of enemy surface forces, battlefield isolation, and 

disruption or destruction of enemy leadership functions are the means with which the 

operational air commander supports the overall strategy. Operations involve the 

integration of combat power to achieve strategic ends, thus operational means 

represent this level. In terms of air and space operational employment and targeting, 

planning at the operational level of war determines WHAT we will attack, with WHAT 

strategy, in WHAT order, and for WHAT duration. 

Strategy, Operational Art, and Tactics 

Because the separate levels of war are somewhat abstract and artificial 

delineations, it may be more practical to think in terms of “things” rather than “levels,” 

yielding strategy, operational art, and tactics. 

Strategy 

Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing instruments of 

national power in an integrated and synchronized fashion to achieve theater, national, 

and/or multinational objectives. Instruments of power include the military instrument, 

and military strategy is thus the art and science of employing the armed forces of a 

nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat 

of force. Military strategy encompasses the ends, ways, means, and risk involved in 

securing policy objectives through use of the military instrument of power. 

 Ends comprise the reasons an operation is being conducted: the political and 

military objectives at the national and theater level, which shape the conduct of 

theater strategy. Objectives are the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable 

goals towards which every military operation should be directed. They give 

subordinate commanders a clear picture of the theater commander’s intent for 

operations. All objectives in a conflict must ultimately help bring about a 

desired end state. An end state is the set of conditions to be achieved to 

resolve the situation or conflict on satisfactory terms, as defined by appropriate 

authority (Here, “appropriate authority” may be a joint task force commander, 

joint force commander, or combatant commander, but typically refers to the 

Secretary of Defense [SecDef] or the President). In most cases, there will be a 

preliminary end state—described by a set of military conditions—when military 

force is no longer the principle means to the strategic aim. The true, broader 

end state that involves returning to or achieving a state of peace and stability 

will likely include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and political 

as well as military conditions. A properly determined end state is key to 
6 

ensuring that victory achieved with military force endures. All objectives, 

including those of the air and space component and those at the tactical level of 

war, must support achievement of the end state. 

 Ways are the methods by which objectives are achieved; that is, the effects 

that must be created to achieve the desired ends. Effects are determined and 

translated into tactical actions through operational art. Effects and operational 

art are explored at greater length in subsequent sections. It is important to 

keep in mind that ways to achieve ends at one level may become ends for 

levels below. For example, one way of helping achieve objectives in a 

particular campaign, identified by the JFC, might be “achieve and maintain air 

dominance.” This will probably then become an objective for the air and space 

component commander. This relationship holds true at all levels of war. 

 Means are the tools and resources used to execute the strategy to achieve the 

desired ends. When Airmen think about means, they should think in terms of 

people, processes, platforms, systems, and capabilities needed to accomplish 

the mission. 

 Risk is the amount of uncertainty and vulnerability commanders are willing to 

accept during an operation or campaign. Risk is inherent in every operation; 

ways and means are both subject to it. It is a variable that applies to the 

method or methods commanders select to achieve the ends. Commanders 

must consider the risk of mission failure and its implications, the risk to 

personnel and resources, the risks to non-combatants, and other similar 

factors. 

 The strategy and supporting plans for any operation can be ultimately linked back 

to national guidance. The nation’s overarching security strategy can be found in the 

National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS). The National Defense Strategy

and the National Military Strategy (NMS) contain the long-term military strategy that 

supports the NSS. The NMS is expanded into guidance for combatant commanders in 

the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Geographic combatant commanders use 

capabilities set forth in the JSCP to create overarching strategies for their areas of 

responsibility (AOR). Strategies for particular regional conflicts or contingencies are 

often distilled into operations plans (OPLANs) or concept plans (CONPLANs). 

 When conflict appears imminent or erupts, JFCs translate JSCP and appropriate 

OPLAN or CONPLAN guidance into strategies containing clearly defined, attainable 

objectives. They then conduct campaigns and operations accordingly to attain those 

objectives. Statements of strategy for a particular conflict can be found in the 

commander’s estimate of the situation and in the “mission” and “concept of operations” 

sections of an operations order (OPORD). Component commanders translate the 

JFC’s guidance into strategies encompassing their component’s contribution to the 

JFC’s campaign. In the case of the air and space component, the resulting plan takes 

the form of a joint air and space operations plan (JAOP). Component commanders and 

their subordinates use operational art to translate the JFC’s and components’ overall 
7 

strategies into the specific effects and tactical tasks through which engagements and 

operations achieve their objectives. Further guidance on planning can be found in 

Chapter 6. 

Coercion and Denial as Part of Strategy

All strategy usually involves a compromise between coercion and "brute force" or 

annihilation methods. Coercion is defined as "persuading an adversary to behave 

differently than it otherwise would through the threat or use of force." Coercion 

strategies seek to end a conflict while the adversary retains at least some capability to 

resist. Risk strategy is a form of coercion that relies on our perceived potential to attack 

those things that an adversary values, while punishment strategy seeks to coerce 

through attacks or operations that have already been conducted. Denial is a form of 

coercion strategy that destroys or neutralizes a portion of the adversary's physical 

means to resist. Throughout history, denial has been a principal mechanism by which 

enemies were persuaded to change behavior, with the degree of denial necessary 

being dictated by the enemy’s will to resist. This is still a vital part of warfare, but denial 

can be expensive in terms of lives, treasure, time, and opportunities, especially if it 

devolves into attritional, purely force-on-force combat. Human nature also tends to 

make an adversary unreceptive to coercion; history is full of "failed denial" examples 

where war continued well beyond the point that one side’s military was reduced to such 

an extent that defeat was the only possibility. 

 Coercion strategy seeks to either compel an adversary to change his current 

actions, or to deter an adversary from starting an action. Deterrence is normally 

considered easier to accomplish than compulsion, because once an adversary begins 

an action there is often considerable physical and psychological inertia attached to that 

action. An adversary can more easily be deterred without it appearing that the 

adversary suffered a defeat. 

 Today, air and space power can help facilitate other options through strategies 

that threaten or deny an adversary’s interests while bypassing many of his direct means 

of resistance. Operation ALLIED FORCE was an example of this. When attacks on 

Serbian ground forces proved only marginally effective, air and information power was 

used to place pressure directly on the interests of the Serbian cabal that kept dictator 

Slobodan Milosevic in power. This pressure indirectly coerced him to withdraw his 

forces from Kosovo and accede to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) demands. 

Effective use of air, space, and information power can often permit conflict resolution 

closer to the “pure coercion” end of the strategy spectrum, helping yield achievement of 

objectives and the end state on more favorable terms, in less time, and/or more 

efficiently than might otherwise be possible. 

Cultural Considerations in Strategy

The role played by culture in establishing the terms of conflict is another vital 

aspect of strategy that has increased in importance since the start of the Global War on 

Terror. War among Western powers has always been seen as an adjunct to politics 
8 

and commerce, and often as a dangerous distraction from them. The rewards of war 

are physical; psychological reinforcement comes predominantly from war’s spoils, not 

from war itself. In general, this view has led Western powers to try to force resolution as 

quickly and “cheaply” as practicable (in all but comparatively rare civil and religious 

wars), to seek decisive engagement with the enemy when possible, and to focus 

warfare upon defeat of the enemy’s fielded military forces. This was true even during 

Industrial Age conflicts, where the total moral and physical power of the nation state 

was mobilized for war. This is the cultural legacy that has most heavily influenced the 

modern use of air and space power. 

 People in other cultures may view things differently. In a number of non-Western 

cultures around the globe, the psychological motivation for war is more deeply ingrained 

in the people’s psyche. Some adhere to a warrior ethos, in which the act of waging war 

provides its own important psychological reinforcements. Some do not separate 

church, state, and popular culture in the Western manner, but see religion, politics, 

warfare, and even trade as part of a seamless whole. Thus, all wars they wage take on 

the single-mindedness and ferocity of religious or civil wars. 

 US commanders and strategists must consider these factors when devising 

strategies to deal with adversaries from such cultures. We must seek to understand 

how the adversary thinks and not “mirror-image”—ascribe our own thinking, motivation, 

and priorities to him. For example, during the Vietnam War we assumed that North 

Vietnamese motivations, priorities, and interests were similar to our own; this incorrect 

assumption significantly hampered the process of devising a winning strategy. We must 

also carefully plan for stability and other operations that will follow decisive combat, and 

constantly keep the conflict’s end state in mind during combat operations, considering 

all possible means for creating effects and achieving objectives, not just those 

conventionally used for destruction of fielded forces. 

Operational Art 

Operational art takes the ends, ways, means, and risk considerations derived 

from overall strategy and conceptually links them to operational level effects in 

campaign plans and similar planning products. For the Air Force, and the air and space 

component more generally, campaign plans take the form of JAOPs. Commanders, the 

staff in the air and space operations center (AOC), and operational units take the 

guidance found in the JAOP and ultimately turn it into action at the tactical level of war. 

Operational art represents the essential link between the overall strategy for the 

operation or campaign and the tactical details of its conduct. It encompasses the 

processes of planning, conducting, sustaining, assessing, and adapting operations and 

campaigns to meet strategic and operational objectives. Operational art determines 

what will be accomplished in the battlespace; it is guided by the “why” from the strategic 

level and implemented by the “how” at the tactical level. In terms of air and space 

power employed against ground targets, for example, operational art determines how 

missions and assets will be used to achieve the desired higher-level effects, and 

involves such areas as assessment and analysis of the enemy, targeting, and force 

packaging. 
9 

 Focusing an entire theater’s air and space power in a central planning-executionassessment process maximizes the overall effect on the enemy, given a finite amount of 

air and space power assets. The process of developing the JAOP, and executing it 

through the air and space tasking cycles (the cycles that produce, among other things, 

air tasking orders [ATOs] and space tasking orders [STOs]), represents the operational 

art of air and space warfare. Through this process, the air and space component 

commander (either the commander, Air Force forces [COMAFFOR] or the joint force air 

and space component commander [JFACC] as appointed by the JFC) and his/her staff 

integrate all of the available assets into an optimized final product. Through the 

combination of organization and command and control (C2), the commander is able to 

monitor execution, assess effects, and adapt operations as necessary. This identifies 

and exploits unforeseen opportunities, identifies and assesses implications of undesired 

effects, re-plans and re-synchronizes operations to adapt to changing situations, and 

determines if the executed operations are achieving their objectives. This oversight 

function allows air and space power to remain flexible during execution, while keeping 

the operational and strategic objectives in sight. Centralized control provides strategic 

focus for air and space power while decentralized execution allows tactical flexibility in 

employment of air and space forces. Centralized planning is the first step in achieving 

effective centralized control, and provides for the optimum concentration of air and 

space combat power at the required decisive points. Centralized control of air and 

space power—planning, direction, prioritization, synchronization, integration, and 

deconfliction—retains the theater-wide effectiveness of air and space power across a 

theater while balancing shifting requirements. Centralized control empowers the 

Modern communications technology provides a temptation towards 

increasingly centralized execution of air and space power. Although several recent 

operations have employed some degrees of centralized execution, such command 

arrangements will not stand up in a fully stressed, dynamic combat environment, and 

as such should not become the norm for all air operations. Despite impressive gains 

in data exploitation and automated decision aids, a single person cannot achieve and 

maintain detailed situational awareness when fighting a conflict involving many 

simultaneous engagements taking place throughout a large area. A high level of 

centralized execution results in a rigid campaign unresponsive to local conditions 

and lacking in tactical flexibility. For this reason, execution should be 

decentralized within a command and control architecture that exploits the 

ability of strike package leaders, air battle managers, forward air controllers, 

and other front-line commanders to make on-scene decisions during complex, 

rapidly unfolding operations. Nevertheless, in some situations, there may be valid 

reasons for execution of specific operations at higher levels, most notably when the 

JFC (or perhaps even higher authorities) may wish to control strategic effects, even 

at the sacrifice of tactical efficiency. 

—AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 

17 November 2003 
10 

JFACC to adapt execution to changing needs as the situation warrants. Decentralized 

execution permits the flexibility to maximize tactical success by delegating execution 

authority to responsible and capable lower level commanders to achieve effective span 

of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical 

flexibility. Centralized control and decentralized execution support the inherent flexibility 

and versatility of air and space power, giving commanders the tools to adapt to 

changing circumstances while remaining focused on campaign objectives. 

Tactics 

 

 Once the tasking orders are distributed to the wing and squadron level, the 

process arrives at the tactical level of war. Mission planning cells at these units plan the 

details for individual missions, which are then executed by individual strike packages, 

flights, or elements. The execution of these missions is decentralized, as the individual 

aircrews, forward air controllers, and air battle managers have considerable latitude on 

the tactics of how they accomplish their assigned missions. 

Employing Air and Space Power 

Air and space power is usually employed to greatest effect in parallel, 

asymmetric operations. Parallel operations are those that apply pressure at many 

points across a system in a short period of time in order to cause maximum shock and 

dislocation effects across that system. Sequential, or serial, operations, in contrast, 

are those that apply pressure in sequence, imposing one effect after another, usually 

over a considerable period of time. Parallel operations limit an enemy’s ability to react 

and adapt and thus place as much stress as possible on the enemy system as a whole. 

For example, in Operation DESERT STORM, the Iraqi command and control structure 

was severely degraded through parallel attacks on the electric grid, communications 

nodes, and command facilities. In the past, target sets were often prioritized and 

attacked sequentially, and thus it usually took considerable time for effects to be felt. In 

the meantime, the enemy was often able to adapt to losses or compensate with other 

resources, thus slowing or even negating the effects of those operations. Today, air 

and space power enable a truly parallel approach in many instances. 

 “Asymmetric” refers to any capability that confers an advantage the adversary 

cannot directly compensate for. Asymmetric operations confer disproportionate 

advantage on those conducting them by using some capability the adversary cannot 

use, will not use, or cannot effectively defend against. Conversely, symmetric 

operations are those in which a capability is countered by the same or similar capability. 

For example, tank-on-tank battles, such as the battle of Kursk during World War II, are 

symmetric, as was the Allied battle for air superiority over Germany in that same war. 

The use of Coalition air power to immobilize and defeat Iraqi armored forces in 

Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM were asymmetric, since the Iraqis 

could not counter this Coalition strength. Similarly, al Qaeda’s use of airliners as terror 

weapons against the US on 11 September 2001 was asymmetric, since there was no 

direct counter. As a rule, it is more effective and efficient to use asymmetric advantages 
11 

when they exist or can be generated. Symmetric conflict is and always has been a 

necessary part of warfare, but generally entails achieving objectives at higher cost than 

do asymmetric operations. 

Experience has shown that parallel, asymmetric operations are more 

effective, achieve results faster, and are less costly than symmetric or serial 

operations. Parallel attack is offensive military action that strikes a wide array of 

targets in a short period of time in order to cause maximum shock and dislocation 

effects across an entire enemy system. It is a type of asymmetric operation that uses 

the speed and range of air and space power, coupled with its pervasive threedimensional advantage, to strike the enemy where and how it benefits us the most. 

Symmetric force-on-force warfare is sometimes required, such as the air-to-air combat 

often associated with achieving air superiority. At the beginning of a conflict, other 

offensive operations can sometimes be accomplished in parallel with counterair 

operations. If the enemy strongly challenges our air superiority, we may be forced into 

serial operations in which all available assets must be dedicated to winning air 

superiority before any offensive operations other than counterair attack missions are 

flown. 

 Air and space superiority allows simultaneous and rapid attack on key 

nodes and forces, producing effects that overwhelm the enemy’s capacity to 

adapt or recover. As a result, the effects of parallel operations can be achieved 

quickly and may have decisive impact. In addition to the physical destruction from 

parallel attack, the shock and surprise of such attacks, coupled with the uncertainty of 

when or where the next blow will fall, can negatively affect the enemy’s morale. This 

can effectively shut down an enemy’s decision cycle and open opportunities for 

exploitation. Commanders should consider these facts when deciding how best to 

employ air and space power at the theater level. 

Parallel operations should be conducted in conjunction with other elements of a 

joint force. For example, counterland operations, in conjunction with simultaneous and 

coordinated attack by surface forces, can overwhelm an enemy’s reinforcement and 

resupply capacity or his ability to command his forces, creating synergistic effects that 

have an adverse impact throughout the enemy system. In this case, the surface and air 

and space maneuver elements of the joint force are integrated with each other, rather 

than one in support of another, to achieve decisive results. 

 Asymmetric force strategy leverages sophisticated military capabilities to rapidly 

achieve objectives. Asymmetric warfare pits our strengths against the adversary’s 

weaknesses and maximizes our capabilities while minimizing those of our enemy to 

achieve rapid, decisive effects. 

In some situations, air and space power, whether land- or sea-based, may 

be the only force immediately available and capable of providing an initial 

response. This may occur early in a crisis, before significant friendly surface forces 

can build up in-theater. In such cases, air and space power should best be brought to 
12 

bear directly against the enemy system in such a way as to reduce the enemy’s ability 

to achieve immediate war aims. 

 When employed aggressively, air and space forces can conduct operations 

aimed directly at accomplishing the JFC’s objectives. These types of operations 

may not rely on concurrent surface operations to be effective, nor are they necessarily 

directly affected by the geographical disposition of friendly surface forces. Instead, they 

are planned to achieve dominant and decisive theater-level effects by striking directly at 

enemy COGs and critical vulnerabilities, which may include fielded forces. Such 

operations are planned to disrupt the enemy’s overall strategy or degrade the enemy’s 

ability and will to fight. These operations are defined not by mission types or weapon 

systems but by the objectives sought. In some situations decisive operations can be 

conducted globally, reducing or even negating the requirement for the forward 

deployment of friendly forces. 
13 

CHAPTER TWO 

OPERATIONS 

 

The overriding objective of any military force is to be prepared to conduct combat 

operations in support of national political objectives—to conduct the nation’s wars. 

Generally speaking, war is a struggle between rival political groups, nation states, or 

other parties to attain competing political or cultural objectives. War does not have to 

be officially declared for armed forces to be thrust into wartime conditions or engage in 

combat operations; in fact, the vast majority of military operations are not conducted 

under the banner of a declared war or even preplanned combat operations. Once 

political leaders resort to the use of force, or possibly even the threat of force, they may 

place their forces “at war,” at least from the perspective of those engaged. War is a 

multidimensional activity that can be categorized in various ways: by intensity (low to 

high); by duration (short to protracted); by the means employed (conventional, 

unconventional, nuclear); or by the objectives/resources at stake (limited to general 

war). 

THE EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO MILITARY OPERATIONS 

Effects-based operations (EBO) are operations that are planned, executed, 

assessed, and adapted to influence or change systems or capabilities in order to 

achieve desired outcomes. EBO encompasses planning, execution, and assessment. 

The key insights are: that effective operations must be part of a coherent plan that 

logically supports and ties all objectives and the end state together; that the plan to 

achieve the objectives must guide employment; and that means of measuring success 

and gaining feedback must be planned for and evaluated throughout execution. EBO is 

focused upon desired outcomes—objectives and the end state—and all efforts should 

be directed in a logically consistent manner toward their attainment. In this respect, 

EBO is an elaboration of the “strategy-to-task” methodology long in use. Because it 

focuses upon the objectives, EBO is not about platforms, weapons, or methods. That 

is, EBO is “outcomes-based,” not “inputs-based.” It does not take available resources 

and attempt to reason desired outcomes from them. EBO seeks to attain objectives 

efficiently, but the availability of resources may constrain the options. That is, 

• He will win who knows when to fight and when 

not to fight. 

• He will win who knows how to handle both 

superior and inferior forces. 

• He will win whose army is animated by the 

same spirit throughout all the ranks. 

• He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take 

the enemy unprepared. 

—Sun Tzu
14 

commanders must accomplish their assigned missions, but within that constraint, they 

should be accomplished for as little “cost” (in terms of lives, treasure, time, and/or 

opportunities) as possible. 

 EBO concerns effects, which are the physical or behavioral states of a system 

that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A cause can be an action, 

a set of actions, or another effect. An action is simply the performance of an activity. 

Each action that is performed creates a progression of effects, starting with those that 

are direct and immediate and continuing on to indirect effects that are increasingly 

complex and removed in time from the original action. Planning for the “full range of 

outcomes” encompasses the objectives, but extends well beyond them to consider the 

entire range of outcomes, not just those that are planned, desired, or intended. This 

also recognizes that modern military capabilities—especially those of air and space 

power—enable commanders to consider a wide range of effects beyond more 

“traditional” types like attrition. Effects-based planning starts with the end state and 

objectives, determines the effects that must be created to achieve them and the means 

by which achievement is to be measured, then matches resources to specific actions in 

order to create those effects. This construct of actionÆeffectÆobjective is fundamental 

to all more complex and specific effects-based planning methodologies. Effects form 

the necessary causal linkages between actions and objectives. Understanding the 

differing types of effects and how they can be imposed is fundamental to thorough 

effects-based planning (see Chapter 6 for further details). 

 An effects-based approach recognizes that conflict is a clash of complex, 

intelligent systems that adapt as they interact—a fact that has sometimes been 

overlooked in more mechanistic approaches to war. This means that EBO focuses on 

behavior, not just on physical changes in the system states. An effects-based approach 

must also consider the behavior of all actors within the operating environment—friendly 

and neutral behavior, not just that of the adversary. All effects, even attrition of an 

enemy, are intended to somehow influence behavior. This also means that the “higherorder” consequences of certain actions cannot be predicted reliably and many effects 

cannot be easily anticipated or quantified. It also reinforces the age-old axioms that “no 

plan survives first contact with the enemy” and “the enemy always has a vote.” The law 

of unintended consequences is always in effect, so planning and execution must be 

flexible and adaptive. Focusing on the behavior of complex systems means that EBO 

carries a significant cost in terms of breadth and depth of information needed about the 

adversary. It is also most effective if we maintain information and decision-cycle 

superiority over the adversary. 

 Finally, EBO is a comprehensive way of looking at conflict. It cuts across all 

disciplines, dimensions, and echelons of conflict. There is usually more than one way to 

create a desired effect and determining options is not the unique province of one career 

specialty, one type of capability, one joint warfighting component, or even one 

instrument of national power. All options must be weighed in light of the objectives and 

end state; it may be possible to create a given effect “kinetically” through “bombs on 

target,” but it may be better in terms of the end state to create it non-destructively by 
15 

using capabilities like air mobility or information operations. Focusing on a wide, crossdimensional array of options makes EBO especially relevant to operations other than 

major campaigns, such as “lower-intensity” conflict and stability operations. In these 

types of operations, cause and effect are often much harder to trace and destructive 

effects are often counterproductive. These types of operations also entail much closer 

integration of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power 

with the military and require close military cooperation with non-military agencies, 

foreign governments, and other entities, and so an effects-based approach is uniquely 

suited to this increasingly important aspect of conflict. 

 Properly understanding the relationship between actions, effects, and objectives 

is important to EBO. Actions produce specific direct effects, those effects produce other 

indirect effects, and this chain of cause and effect creates a mechanism through which 

objectives and the end state are achieved. An objective is an ultimate desired outcome 

of a set of actions and effects in a particular context or situation. Objectives at one level 

may be seen as effects at another, higher level. They are the effects that all actions, 

subordinate effects, and operations should contribute to accomplishing. Effects in 

general comprise all of the results of a set of actions, whether desired or undesired, 

direct or indirect, ultimate or intermediate, expected or unexpected. For example, a 

tactical action may consist of dropping a precision-guided weapon on a bridge. The 

direct effect of that action is that the bombs detonate on target and render the bridge 

functionally useless. A series of indirect effects ripple outward from that direct effect, 

including the fact that a key enemy mechanized unit is delayed in closing to combat (a 

desired tactical indirect effect), the entire enemy ground force effort is thus critically 

weakened (a desired operational-level indirect effect), and these contribute to the 

operational-level objective of defeating an enemy ground offensive. At the same time, 

destruction of the bridge may cripple local trade and other traffic that relied on it, thus 

increasing local hostility to friendly military efforts (an undesired indirect effect) and may 

greatly hamper rebuilding and stabilization efforts after major combat operations (an 

undesired indirect effect that directly relates to the strategic objectives and end state). 

Since the bridge destruction was anticipatable, as were many of the resultant indirect 

effects, these should be planned for and ways of measuring their achievement 

(assessment) should be identified. In the case of the undesired indirect effects, 

planning to avoid or mitigate these can be almost as important as the initial planning 

that goes into desired direct and indirect effects. 

 While new under this name, the effects-based approach encapsulates many of 

history’s best practices, combining them with recent insights from science, capabilities 

enabled by technology, and lessons from employing effects-based principles in recent 

operations such as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Some effects-based methods have 

always been part of well-waged war, but they have seldom been approached 

systematically. Capabilities like precision engagement, rapid mobility, and predictive 

battlespace awareness (PBA)—the fruits of technological advance coupled with 

appropriate employment doctrine—have made possible a range of effects that were not 

possible before. Thus, commanders today have the capability to do such things as 

coerce changes in enemy behavior with minimum unintended destruction, set 
16 

operational tempos that adversaries cannot match, effectively anticipate enemy courses 

of action, and dominate enemy decision cycles. The section below defines a set of 

basic principles for an effects-based approach to military operations. 

Principles of EBO 

 

Effects-based operations seek to integrate planning, execution, and assessment. 

They are inextricably bound together because doing one inevitably involves the others 

as well. Planning encompasses all the means through which strategy and courses of 

action (COAs) are developed, such as the air and space estimate process. Since it sets 

the stage for all other actions, planning is where sound effects-based principles may 

have the greatest impact. Execution encompasses the tasking cycle and the ongoing 

operational battle rhythm, as well as all the individual unit actions that comprise the 

execution of air and space operations. Execution that is not effects-based can negate 

sound planning, such as focusing too narrowly on one or another aspect of the battle 

rhythm, as, for example, ATO production. Non-effects-based execution can easily 

devolve into blindly servicing a list of targets, with little or no strategy and little or no 

anticipation of enemy actions. Assessment encompasses all efforts to evaluate effects 

and gauge progress toward accomplishment of objectives. Assessment feeds future 

planning and is used to adapt operations as events unfold. Effects and objectives 

should always be measurable and planning for them should always include a means of 

measurement and evaluation. 

EBO should focus upon the objectives and the end state. All actions should be 

crafted so as to produce effects that attain the objectives and minimize unwanted 

effects that may hinder their attainment. An effects-based approach should logically tie 

every action taken to objectives at all levels of war and should consider the imperatives 

imposed by those higher levels, even when planning tactical actions. In this respect, 

the effects-based approach is an elaboration of the “strategy-to-task” methodology that 

has guided US military strategy for years. 

Effects-based operations are about creating effects, not about platforms, 

weapons, or methods. An effects-based approach starts with desired outcomes—the 

end state, objectives, and subordinate desired effects—and then determines the 

resources needed to achieve them. It does not start with particular capabilities or 

resources and then decide what can be accomplished with them. It also assigns 

missions or tasks according to mission-type orders, leaving decisions concerning the 

most appropriate mix of weapons and platforms to the lowest appropriate levels in the 

AOC or in the field. While it is not about technology, new platforms, weapons, and/or 

methods can enable new types of effects. These do not become truly useful to the 

warfighter, however, until they are joined with appropriate employment doctrine and 

strategy. The tank by itself did not yield Blitzkrieg. 

The effects-based approach should consider all possible types of effects. 

Warfare has traditionally focused on direct effects and more immediate indirect effects 

like attrition. While these still have a large place in warfare, an effects-based approach 
17 

must consider the full array of outcomes discussed above in order to give decisionmakers a wider range of options and provide them with a realistic estimation of 

unintended consequences. Each type of effect can play a valuable role in the right 

circumstances and thinking through the full range will encourage a flexible and versatile 

approach to war fighting. 

Effects-based operations should seek to achieve objectives most effectively, then 

to the degree possible, most efficiently. It should always accomplish the mission, but 

should seek to provide alternatives to attrition and annihilation, which are often among 

the least efficient means of achieving ends in war. Thorough evaluation of the range of 

possible effects should lead to courses of action that achieve objectives in ways that 

best support the desired end state (and thus overarching national objectives), but also 

do so with the least expenditure of lives, treasure, time, opportunities, or other 

resources. Of course, the chosen effects must first be effective. Sometimes this will 

require a strategy based on attrition or annihilation, but these will be selected only after 

careful deliberation has determined that they are the best (or only) choices. 

Effects-based operations cut across all dimensions, disciplines, and levels of 

war. Cross-dimensional thinking involves integrating all the other instruments of 

power—diplomatic, informational, and economic—with the military instrument in order to 

take a comprehensive approach to attaining the ultimate end state. Cross-dimensional 

thinking involves considering more than just military tools or techniques to achieve 

desired effects. Diplomatic, informational, economic, cultural, legal, and humanitarian 

means may also be available, and an effects-based approach should consider them all. 

Cross-discipline thinking involves considering that one’s own set of tools may not offer 

all, or the best, options in the given circumstances. Other functional specialties, 

components, Services, agencies, or nations may have the best “tool for the job” that is 

best able to impose the desired effect. Cross-discipline thinking also involves realizing 

that there is probably more than one way to accomplish the effect sought. Thinking 

across the levels of war breaks down the boundaries between the strategic, operational, 

and tactical arenas―realizing, for instance, that very small tactical actions can have 

immense strategic effects in certain circumstances. 

Effects-based operations recognize that war is a clash of complex adaptive 

systems. War is a contest of wills, a collision of living forces that creatively adapt to 

stimuli in ways scientists today describe in terms of chaos, emergence, and complexity 

theories. This has certain implications that have not always been fully exploited in the 

US approach to warfighting: 

 Planning should always try to account for how the enemy will respond to 

planned actions. All living systems adapt to changes in their environments and 

any systematic approach to warfare must account for this. An effects-based 

approach should include processes to account for likely adversary COAs and 

responses. 
18 

 Warfare is complex and non-linear. Things often assumed to be true about the 

physical world actually are not true, including the ideas of proportionality, 

additivity, and replicability. 

  Proportionality states small inputs lead to small outputs and large inputs 

to large outputs. In the real world, however, small inputs often lead to 

disproportionately large outputs. This insight has been the key to good 

military practice for millennia: all great commanders have sought ways to 

have the greatest effect on the enemy for the least expenditure of lives and 

resources. Conversely, poor and uninformed choices can lead huge inputs 

to yield operationally insignificant outputs, as was the case throughout 

World War I, the archetypal case of wasteful attritional warfare. 

  Additivity means that the whole equals the sum of its parts, but this is not 

true of living systems, which are always greater than the sum of their 

components, just as the joint force working as an integrated whole is more 

effective than its components would be if working independently. The 

behavior of complex systems depends more upon the linkages between 

components than upon the components themselves. In fact, system-wide 

behavior often cannot be deduced from analysis of the component parts. 

  Replicability holds that the same inputs always yield the same outputs, 

but intuition alone shows this to be untrue. Imperceptible changes in initial 

conditions always make exact replication of results impossible in the real 

world. Planners and commanders must be aware of these phenomena, use 

them to their advantage when able, and mitigate their negative effects as 

much as possible. “No plan survives first contact with the enemy;” even the 

most brilliantly anticipatory plans will yield surprises in execution. 

 Cause and effect are often not easy to trace. Military operations are often 

planned with the assumption that the causal links between action, effect, and 

objective are demonstrable, direct, and can be traced deductively. Most causal 

linkages important to warfighters, however, are indirect, intangible, and must 

often be discerned inductively (through observation in the real world). In many 

cases, effects will accumulate to achieve an objective or objectives, but 

progress will not be evident until the objectives are nearly achieved. In other 

cases, the mechanisms through which accomplishment comes about will not be 

readily apparent. Planners and commanders must be aware of this, seeking 

ways to increase predictive awareness and counseling patience with respect to 

results in many cases. 

Effects-based operations focus on behavior, not just physical changes. 

Traditional approaches to warfare made destruction of the enemy’s military forces the 

leading aim, usually accomplished through attrition—wearing the enemy down until 

losses exhaust him—or annihilation—his complete overthrow or conquest. These 

approaches accomplish objectives and can still be valuable parts of strategy, but an 
19 

effects-based approach emphasizes that there are alternatives; that the ultimate aim in 

war is not to overthrow the enemy’s power, but to compel him to do our will. Sometimes 

overthrow is the only means to accomplish this, but most of the time there will be other 

choices and careful examination of all types of effects will suggest them. Another 

aspect of this principle is that “the moral is to the physical as three is to one.” That is, 

we can often achieve objectives more effectively and efficiently by maximizing the 

psychological impact of our operations upon an adversary—and not just on the 

battlefield, but on enemy leaders and other critical groups as well. We can carefully 

tailor messages to populations in the operating environment, encouraging cooperation 

or other desired behavior from them. Finally, affecting the behavior of friendly and 

neutral actors within the operating environment can often be as important as affecting 

adversary behavior. When we establish rules of engagement that prohibit striking 

cultural or religious landmarks during operations, for instance, our intended "target" in 

doing so is likely to be a friendly and neutral audience more than the adversary. 

Effects-based operations recognize that comprehensive knowledge of all actors 

and the operational environment are important to success, but come at a price. 

“Comprehensive knowledge” means taking a view of the adversary that goes well 

beyond just his order of battle and the disposition of his forces. In today’s battlespace, 

gauging changes in the behavior of various actors, anticipating their actions and finding 

the portions of an adversary’s system that are most vulnerable or that he most values 

requires very robust intelligence collection and analysis capability. It also requires that 

we learn how the various actors think and how they perceive the conflict. Failure to do 

so has helped lead to defeat in the past, as it did for the US in Vietnam, when we failed 

to appreciate the implacability of North Vietnamese leadership. Further, it means taking 

a “holistic” and systems-based view of the adversary. “Systems-based” means viewing 

the adversary and other actors as complex, adaptive systems of systems; “holistic” 

means analyzing those systems as whole entities and learning how these interact with 

systems around them, rather than just examining component parts of the systems. 

Intelligence and analysis at the unit and even component level will probably not be 

sufficient to glean the level of understanding required. This necessitates federation or 

“reachback” to national-level intelligence agencies and assets that can offer the in-depth 

analysis required. Finally, obtaining “comprehensive knowledge” usually carries a very 

high information-flow and analysis cost, requiring well thought out assessment 

measures and intelligence analysis concepts of operations. 

Effects-based operations should always consider the “law of unintended 

consequences.” There will always be unintended effects, both good and bad, and 

effects that extend beyond objective accomplishment. While predictive awareness can 

help anticipate many outcomes and help mitigate the impact of unintended negative 

effects, this can never be a perfect science in a world of complex systems. Planners 

should think through the most obvious types of damage unintended effects may have 

(such as political and perception management problems associated with collateral 

civilian damage) and put consequence management mechanisms in place where 

possible. Another aspect is that today a virtual flood of data is available to commanders 

and other decision makers, and it is often hard to pick useful information from the flood. 
20 

The volume of information itself becomes a form of friction, precipitating confusion, 

lengthening decision times, and diminishing predictive awareness. Some of this can be 

mitigated by comprehensive intelligence and assessment planning before operations 

begin. 

An effects-based approach is a comprehensive way of thinking about operations. 

It provides an overarching method of employing combat capability that is not directly 

tied to any specific strategy of war or type of operation. It is more than one particular 

type of strategy or operating concept, such as parallel attack or the “indirect approach” 

in ground warfare, although effects-based thinking might suggest such courses of 

action. It is more than one particular type of “operation” like strategic attack or 

interdiction. It does not mandate the particular type, but considers all options in the 

context of all of the objectives. It also applies to more than one type of “operation” in 

the larger sense of that word: EBO can be used as effectively to help plan, execute, 

assess, and adapt a major theater war and a humanitarian relief operation. The “best” 

solution will differ from operation to operation and may change in the midst of a given 

operation as the enemy adapts to friendly action. Thus, while the effects-based 

approach does not prescribe a specific strategy, it helps choose the appropriate 

strategy for the situation and facilitates the unity of effort required to successfully carry 

out that strategy. It focuses diverse efforts towards common objectives. Conceptually, 

unified efforts derive from a coherent plan, which links national objectives to all 

subsequent military actions and includes the means of measuring achievement of those 

objectives. Finally, the effects-based approach also considers the full range of military 

operations, from peace to war and back to peace. Conflict does not end once combat 

operations cease and so strategy should not either. In fact, an effects-based approach 

can be even more important during the transition from combat to stabilization and 

reconstruction, in part because this is an area of US strategy that has been neglected in 

the past, and because effects and outcomes in these phases are often much more 

complex and require more careful anticipation than effects during combat operations. 

Likewise, reconstruction and other post-conflict issues will often influence our decisions 

on what type of strategy and level of force to employ during a conflict. 

The effects-based approach is not new. When Sun Tzu wrote “to subdue the 

enemy without fighting is the acme of skill...thus what is of supreme importance in war 

is to attack the enemy’s strategy,” he was intuitively applying effects-based principles, 

as was Napoleon when he said, “If I always appear prepared, it is because before 

entering on an undertaking, I have meditated long and have foreseen what may occur.” 

History’s great commanders always approached warfare from an effects-based 

perspective, even though they did not so name it, when they looked beyond mere 

destruction of enemy forces to the more general problem of bending the enemy to their 

will, in the process considering the full range of means through which they could 

accomplish this. “Effects-based” is simply a catch-all for some of history’s best 

practices coupled with doctrine that enables proper employment of many modern 

capabilities. 
21 

AIR AND SPACE POWER ACROSS THE RANGE OF MILITARY 

OPERATIONS 

Warfare is normally associated with the different domains of air, land, sea, and 

space. In addition, information is an environment in which some aspects of warfare can 

also be conducted. The Air Force exploits air, space, and information to achieve 

the JFC’s objectives. In addition, air and space forces accomplish a wide variety 

of traditional and information-related functions, classically described as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). These functions can be 

conducted independently from land and sea operations or can complement, 

support, or be supported by, land and sea operations. 

 From an Airman’s perspective, one issue remains preeminent across the range 

of military operations: air superiority is the desired state before all other combat 

operations. Attaining air superiority provides both the freedom to attack and 

freedom from attack, as well as ensuring freedom to maneuver. Operating without 

air superiority radically increases risk to surface and air operations. It is a key 

factor in gaining the necessary security for follow-on military operations. It can be 

localized (e.g., protection of high value assets) or theaterwide. It includes both 

offensive and defensive missions and involves the destruction of enemy aircraft, air 

defenses, and ballistic and cruise missiles, both in flight and on the ground. Offensive 

counterair is the preferred method, allowing us to choose the time and place of the 

attack, thus retaining the initiative. The JFACC, normally also designated the area air 

defense commander (AADC), is charged with integrating joint offensive and defensive 

counterair operations to achieve air superiority for the JFC. 

 Similarly, space superiority is important in maintaining our unique 

advantages in precision, situational awareness, and operational reach. Space 

superiority ensures the freedom to operate in the space domain while denying the same 

to an adversary. Like air superiority, space superiority involves offensive and defensive 

aspects. Offensive operations, using assets from all our military components, deny and 

disrupt the enemy’s access to space and space-derived information through attacks on 

spacelift and information infrastructure. Direct attack of enemy spacecraft, should such 

a capability be developed, would also be a counterspace option. Defensive operations 

secure our own space assets from attack through such methods as hardening, 

maneuver, and dispersal and include defending vital ground nodes as well as 

spacecraft in orbit. Counterspace operations are enhanced by space situational 

awareness, which can cover the spectrum from tracking space debris to following the 

maneuvers of an enemy antisatellite weapon. The COMAFFOR/JFACC should 

normally be designated the supported component commander for counterspace 

operations within a joint force. 

 Air and space power remains a vital component of successful military operations 

and the attainment of rapid and low cost victory, even if lower-level contingency 

operations or deterrence measures fail and a crisis escalates into major operations. It 

has been and will remain our clear asymmetric advantage over our enemies. War 
22 

 

 The various discrete military 

tasks associated with small-scale 

and security operations are not 

mutually exclusive; depending on 

the scenario, there may be some 

overlap between the tasks. They 

may also occur within the context of 

a larger major operation. For 

example, some tasks, such as 

nation assistance or combating 

terrorism, may be required as part of 

the post-conflict stabilization phase 

immediately following a major 

conflict, and may even be initiated 

before the cessation of major 

operations. Even though there are 

many types of operations typically 

not involving combat, Airmen must 

understand that violence (and 

casualties) may occur in virtually any 

type of operation and, therefore, 

must be ready and able at all times 

to defend themselves and their units. 

winning through the application of force has traditionally been the most important of the 

tasks assigned to the military. However, as more vital national interests (or even 

national survival) are at stake in smaller 

contingencies, the US military will become 

more deeply involved in the various types 

of contingency or stability operations. 

THE RANGE OF MILITARY 

OPERATIONS 

Military operations slide along an 

imprecise scale of violence and scale of 

military involvement, from theater-wide 

major operations and campaigns; to smaller 

scale contingencies and crisis response 

operations; to engagement, cooperation, 

and deterrence operations. No two 

conflicts are alike; scope, duration, tempo, 

and political context will vary widely. Some 

conflicts may even change from one form to 

another, either escalating or de-escalating. 

Military leaders must carefully assess the 

nature of the missions they may be 

assigned, not only to properly determine 

the appropriate mix of forces but also to 

discern implied requirements. Some 

operations involve open combat between 

regular forces; in others, combat may be 

tangential to the main effort. In some operations, the US military’s contribution may be 

entirely noncombatant; simply providing an organizational framework for an interagency 

force and key elements of infrastructure may be all that’s required. 

 Many of the challenges our armed forces face today are more ambiguous and 

regionally focused than during the Cold War. These challenges address multiple risks, 

such as: economic and political transitions, repressive regimes, the spread of weapons 

of mass destruction, proliferation of cutting-edge military technology, violent extremists, 

militant nationalism, ethnic and religious conflict, refugee overflows, narcotics trafficking, 

environmental degradation, population displacement, and terrorism. The military 

instrument of national power, either unilaterally or in combination with the economic, 

informational, and diplomatic instruments, may be called upon to meet these 

challenges. Under such circumstances, early intervention through stability operations 

may deter war, resolve conflict, relieve suffering, promote peace, or support civil 

authorities. 

 Military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other 

instruments of national or international power. To leverage effectiveness, it is 
23 

 Operations smaller than major combat 

operations are variously known as 

stability operations, small-scale 

operations, security operations, 

deterrence operations, security 

cooperation activities, transition and 

reconstruction operations, engagement 

activities, or simply contingencies. They 

may or may not involve the use or threat of 

force. The general military goals during such 

operations are to support national objectives, 

deter war, and return to a state of peace. 

Such operations should, when possible, 

facilitate long-term change to prevent a 

return to the previous conditions. In some 

operations, the prudent use of military force 

may help keep the day-to-day tensions 

between nations or groups below the 

threshold of armed conflict and maintain US 

influence in foreign lands. Other activities 

enhance trust, interoperability, and 

cooperation through regular interaction with 

friendly military forces. 

particularly important that actions 

be integrated, mutually 

reinforcing, and clearly focused 

on compatible objectives 

throughout the engaged force, 

whether US, allied, military, 

civilian, or nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs). The 

overall goal of any operation, 

regardless of scale, is to pursue 

US national policy objectives and 

to counter potential threats to US 

national security interests. 

 Air and space power 

capabilities are adaptable across 

the range of military operations. 

Certain assets may be applied to 

attain strategic-, operational-, or 

tactical-level effects against 

limited objectives as effectively 

as those mounted against more 

“traditional” wartime targets. 

Whether providing rapid, focused 

global mobility; conducting 

information operations that shape 

and influence the situation; isolating operations from air or ground interference; or 

providing the eyes and ears of a sophisticated command and control system, the 

flexibility of air and space forces is integral to any operation. Air and space forces can 

be the supported force (strategic attack; airlift or special operations to provide foreign 

humanitarian assistance or to conduct a limited raid; counterair to enforce an air 

exclusion zone; or information operations to determine treaty compliance), an 

enhancing force (air- and space-based ISR), or a supporting force (close air support, 

some interdiction, and some suppression of enemy air defenses). The specific tasks 

involved in any given air and space operation will vary greatly, depending on the 

detailed context of the larger conflict or contingency, national policies and objectives, 

forces available to do the job, and a host of other considerations. In a large, complex 

scenario, US forces may be performing several of these tasks simultaneously, in 

addition to combat operations. 

Engagement, Cooperation, and Deterrence Operations 

 

Engagement, cooperation, and deterrence operations establish, shape, maintain, 

and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities. The general 

objective is to protect US interests at home and abroad. They usually occur during 

periods of normal US military readiness and usually do not involve the immediate use or 
24 

“Air Presence:” 

A Show of Force using 

Air and Space Power 

 The term “air presence” has come into use 

to describe the use of aircraft in a particular 

manner to emphasize to a local populace that 

US airpower is on the scene. The effect of air 

presence can vary from deterring a potential 

aggressor to boosting support for local hostnation forces, and stems from the implied 

ability to conduct precision strikes whenever 

US air and space power is present. 

 Air presence is a show of force operation, 

not a new type of mission. It is conducted as 

part of traditional missions such as close air 

support, counterair, ISR, etc. The mere 

presence of aircraft will not have an effect by 

itself -- there must be some implied capability 

for weapons employment, detection of illicit 

activities, or other mission-related outcome for 

air presence to have value. 

 Air presence missions can be used in a 

number of ways, from merely being visible and 

providing reassurance; to low, noisy passes 

over potentially hostile crowds for intimidation 

in support of friendly ground forces; to actual 

weapons employment— sometimes even on 

the same mission. 

 Air presence-related missions must be 

carefully planned with detailed knowledge 

about the local population. The potential risks, 

due to exposure to enemy threats, must be 

carefully considered when planning for an air 

presence effect. Overuse of air presence 

should be avoided, as it may desensitize the 

local populace and become self-limiting. 

Overuse may also detract from other, higherpriority use of limited air assets. 

threat of force. Prudent use of 

military forces in peacetime helps 

keep the day-to-day tensions 

between nations or groups below 

the threshold of armed conflict and 

maintains US influence in foreign 

lands. Examples of such 

operations include: 

 Arms control operations. 

 Consequence 

management (CM). 

 Counterdrug operations. 

 Foreign humanitarian 

assistance (FHA). 

 Military-to-military 

contacts. 

 Nation assistance. 

 Recovery operations. 

 Unilateral and multilateral 

exercises. 

Contingencies and Crisis 

Response Operations 

Contingencies and crisis 

response operations may be single 

small-scale, limited-duration 

operations or a significant part of a 

major operation of extended 

duration involving combat. The 

general objectives are to protect 

US interests and prevent surprise 

attack or further conflict. These 

operations may occur during 

periods of slightly increased US 

military readiness (usually focused 

within a single region), and the use 
25 

or threat of force may be more probable. Many of these operations involve a 

combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with NGOs. 

Examples of such operations include: 

 Combating terrorism. 

 Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (C-CBRN) operations. 

 Enforcement of sanctions and/or maritime intercept operations. 

 Enforcing exclusion zones. 

 Ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. 

 Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). 

 Peacekeeping operations. 

 Peace enforcement operations. 

 Protection of shipping. 

 Show of force operations. 

 Strikes and raids. 

 Support to counterinsurgency. 

 Support to insurgency. 

Major Operations and Campaigns 

 

Major operations and campaigns are large-scale, sustained combat operations to 

achieve national objectives or protect national interests; such operations place the US in 

a wartime state. They are normally conducted against a nation state(s) that possesses 

significant regional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities, and the 

will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to US national 

security. Such operations typically are characterized by a joint campaign comprised of 

multiple phases. In such cases, the goal is to achieve national objectives and conclude 

hostilities on conditions favorable to the US and its multinational partners, generally as 

quickly and with as few casualties as possible. Establishing these conditions may 

require follow-on stability operations to restore security, provide services and 

humanitarian relief, and conduct reconstruction. Operations DESERT STORM, ALLIED 

FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM are examples of campaigns. 

 Refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and other 

appropriate joint publications for more detailed discussion of the various operations. 
26 

HOMELAND OPERATIONS 

The Air Force’s role in homeland operations incorporates all applications of air 

and space power within the US designed to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and 

recover from the full spectrum of threats and incidents in the fifty United States and US 

territories and possessions, whether man-made or natural. This includes homeland 

defense, defense support of civil authorities, and emergency preparedness. This 

construct for homeland operations establishes the Air Force’s responsibilities in direct 

support of homeland security. While homeland security operations may arguably be 

considered a subset within the range of military operations previously described, Air 

Force doctrine considers these activities important enough to warrant separate 

discussion. 

The DOD performs homeland defense and contributes to emergency 

preparedness and defense support of civil authorities. The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security provides a federal framework for a concerted national effort to 

prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 

terrorism, as well as minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. For 

the Air Force, homeland operations are the means by which its support to homeland 

defense, defense support of civil authorities, and emergency preparedness is 

accomplished. 

Homeland Security 

Homeland security (HS), as defined in the National Strategy for Homeland 

Security, is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 

States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 

recover from attacks that do occur. DOD contributes to homeland security through its 

military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. 

Homeland Defense 

DOD defines homeland defense (HD) as the protection of US territory, 

sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and 

aggression. HD missions include force protection actions, counterintelligence, air and 

space warning and control, counter-terrorism, critical infrastructure protection, air, 

space, and missile defense, and information security operations. In all of these 

missions, DOD either acts as the designated lead federal agency, or with a high level of 

autonomy within the National Security structure. 

 We have good doctrine for employing traditional forces in traditional roles. The 

most familiar Air Force role here is fulfilling North American Aerospace Defense 

Command’s (NORAD) air sovereignty mission through defensive counterair. Future 

missions may involve the employment of “traditional” capabilities in nontraditional ways 

against such asymmetric threats as terrorism. In extreme cases, we may be directed by 
27 

the President to use deadly force to help control an extraordinary situation such as a 

terrorist threatening the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). 

Emergency Preparedness 

The Air Force includes emergency preparedness (EP) within the homeland 

security operations umbrella. EP are those planning activities undertaken to ensure 

DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and 

the SecDef in a designated national security emergency. This includes continuity of 

operations, continuity of government functions, and the performance of threat 

assessments. 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

The National Response Plan introduced the term Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities (DSCA) to denote DOD support provided during and in the aftermath of 

domestic emergencies—such as terrorist attacks or major disasters—and for 

designated law enforcement and other activities. This term is roughly analogous to the 

term military assistance to civil authorities (MACA). DSCA missions include, but are not 

limited to, preventing or defeating terrorist 

attacks, crisis management and 

consequence management due to CBRN 

incidents; response to natural disasters 

such as earthquakes, floods, and fires; 

support to civilian law enforcement 

agencies; counter-drug operations; border 

security; and response to civil disturbances 

or insurrection. In all of these missions, 

various federal, state, or local civilian 

agencies are primarily responsible for the 

management of the particular incident. 

DOD’s involvement is supportive and is 

normally dependent on a request from the 

lead agency. DSCA missions may involve 

operating in complex legal environments, 

and may be complicated by the differences 

in duty status between Regular, Guard, and 

Reserve forces. See AFDD 2-10, 

Homeland Operations. 

 Military forces can be used in a multitude of ways to support civil authorities in an 

emergency. The mix of regular, Guard, and Reserve forces can provide flexibility to 

local and regional authorities based on differences in duty status. Additionally, the Civil 

Air Patrol may provide additional capabilities unique to domestic operations. Most of 

the support we give to civil authorities will be in already familiar roles – conducting airlift 

of supplies to affected areas or providing medical or engineering assistance to people in 

Disaster relief efforts, such as the 

response to Hurricane Katrina, are a 

very visible example of defense 

support of civil authorities in homeland 

operations. 
28 

need. Examples of Air Force capabilities that may be requested in a domestic disaster 

or emergency include (but are not limited to): 

 Air mobility. Air Mobility Command (AMC) may provide airlift, aeromedical 

evacuation, and other air mobility capabilities to support local, state, DOD, or 

other federal agencies. 

 Air traffic control (ATC). Air Force special tactics combat controllers or air 

traffic controllers can deploy to remote, abandoned, or inactive airfields and 

plan, organize, supervise, and establish terminal air traffic control (ATC) 

operations. 

 Communications. Deployable Air Force communications systems can provide 

worldwide, single-channel, secure voice and record communications, and 

secure on-site communications. 

 Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force can provide 

ISR capabilities to monitor designated locations and provide persistent airborne 

or space-based surveillance. They could, for example, be used to monitor 

floodwaters, assess hurricane or tornado damage, or assist in tracking terrorist 

activities. ISR assets could also be used to collect airborne nuclear debris and 

perform damage assessment following a domestic nuclear event. Note, 

however, that national intelligence oversight policies (Executive Order 12333 

and others) may limit DOD entities’ intelligence roles within the US and similarly 

restrict the collection and retention of information on US persons. 

 Investigative support. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations could 

provide investigative expertise to support criminal investigations and 

counterintelligence services. 

 Engineer support. Air Force civil engineer forces are capable of rapidly 

responding to worldwide contingency operations. Capabilities include operation 

and maintenance of facilities, airfields, and infrastructure; air-insertable heavy 

construction; aircraft rescue and facility fire suppression; construction 

management of emergency repair activities; and CBRN event detection, 

mitigation, and response management. 

 Search and rescue. Air Force assets could provide rapid response capability 

for search, transportation, insertion, and extraction functions in support of 

rescue activities or law enforcement. 

 Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). EOD capability includes the detection, 

identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of 

unexploded explosive ordnance. 

 Health Services. US Air Force Medical Service capabilities, while primarily 

designed to meet its wartime mission, are easily adaptable for civil disaster 
29 

response. Small, incremental packages of tailored medical capability can be 

rapidly deployed to meet immediate and short-term civilian requirements.

 The military’s role in domestic emergencies is well defined and, by Constitutional 

law, is limited in scope and duration. Military agencies temporarily support and 

augment, but do not replace local, state (including National Guard forces in state 

active duty status), and federal civilian agencies that have primary authority and 

responsibility for domestic disaster assistance. Air Force contributions in DSCA 

operations will be in support of a Federal agency designated by the President or as 

indicated in the National Response Plan (NRP). Further discussion of the Air Force role 

in this mission area is contained in other Service and joint doctrine publications. 

 US Air Force organization for homeland operations should be consistent with the 

organizational model for any other expeditionary operation. See Chapter 4 for further 

discussion. Also see AFDD 2-10, Homeland Operations, for more details about 

organizational and command considerations in operating a mix of regular, Guard, and 

Reserve forces in homeland scenarios.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES 

A distinguishing characteristic of contingency or “stability” operations is the 

degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. In addition to the 

principles of war stated in AFDD 1, the political considerations and the nature of many 

of these operations require an underpinning of several additional principles: unity of 

effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.

Unity of Effort 

Often the military will not be the sole, or even the lead, agency in contingency 

operations. Some operations will, by their nature, be predominantly military. In most 

situations, however, the military will be one agency of many. As is especially common 

in stability operations, military forces will often find themselves supporting the other 

instruments of national power. While unity of command is critical within the military 

forces, most of these operations will demand unity of effort among a wide range of 

agencies to ensure that they coordinate their resources and focus on the same goal. 

 The participants in contingency-type operations often include a diverse and 

varied group. Missions of a humanitarian or diplomatic nature will involve a number of 

civilian agencies from the US and other countries. Some of the US State Department 

organizations involved may include the Agency for International Development and the 

US Information Agency. Other executive agencies, such as the Departments of 

Commerce, Treasury, or Justice, may be represented. Military members need to be 

familiar with the requirements of these other agencies, as well as with the capabilities 

they offer. 

 In many cases, more than just government agencies will be involved, and just as 

frequently, international organizations may be involved. The United Nations (UN), for 
30 

example, oversees a number of relief organizations. Regional organizations, such as 

NATO, are getting more involved in small contingencies. These organizations offer a 

means for dealing with problems beyond the scope of local governments. NGOs, such 

as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), often take the lead in 

humanitarian missions. They tend to have operational expertise and a solid regional 

orientation. Unity of effort becomes critical during interagency operations and can best 

be achieved through consensus building. 

Security 

Security takes on a different meaning in stability operations than it does in war. 

Commanders have an obligation to protect their forces, but the threat and the means for 

countering it are quite different in stability operations. Forces may be threatened in any 

operation, even in such things as humanitarian missions. The threat will vary 

depending on local circumstances, but the commander must be aware that it always 

exists. Although US forces have a right to self-defense, Airmen must bear in mind the 

concepts of necessity and proportionality. Necessity means personnel must be in 

imminent danger before taking any forceful self-defense actions. Proportionality means 

whatever force is used must be limited in intensity and duration to the force reasonably 

required to decisively counter the threat. 

Restraint 

Restraint is the disciplined application of military force appropriate to the 

situation. Commanders should recognize that in some types of operations, excessive 

use of force may lead to escalation to a higher intensity conflict; could adversely affect 

efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy; and may impede the attainment of both short- and 

long-term goals. Commanders should begin developing a force structure by outlining 

the necessary air and space power capabilities needed for an operation and then follow 

up by deploying the appropriate “tailored” force required. In order to maintain effective 

security while also exercising restraint, commanders should develop very clear and 

precise rules of engagement (ROE). ROE for contingency operations often will be more 

restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in sustained combat 

operations. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. For all 

operations, and especially contingency operations, Airmen should understand that no 

more than an appropriate or proportional use of force is justifiable. However, the 

concept of restraint should not preclude the ability to use armed force, both lethal and 

nonlethal, when necessary in self-defense.

Perseverance 

The patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for 

as long as necessary to achieve them, is paramount. Some contingency operations will 

involve a one-time occurrence or a short-term operation to maintain stability until local 

authorities can take over. Many missions, however, especially peace operations and 

nation-building, will require a long-term commitment. The US must be prepared to stay 
31 

involved in a region for a protracted time in order to achieve its strategic goals. Most 

problems cannot be solved overnight; if a situation has been building for a long time, it 

may take the same amount of time or longer to resolve it. With this in mind, objectives 

should be established for the conditions under which forces may leave, rather than 

simply by a timetable for departure. 

Legitimacy 

In order to reduce the threat to American forces and to enable them to work 

toward their objective, the US must be viewed as a legitimate actor in the mission, 

working towards international interests rather than just its own. While legitimacy is 

principally generated by US political leadership, legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation 

could be affected more by the actions of the military. One key means of promoting 

legitimacy for certain types of contingency operations is through robust and effective 

military public affairs operations. Commanders should work closely with the host-nation 

government (if, in fact, there is one) at all levels to help preserve and foster the sense of 

legitimacy. 

THREATS TO OPERATIONS 

Threats to Air Force interests occur across the range of military operations. A 

threat can be small in execution but have a large-scale outcome. These threats can 

undermine mission capability as severely as sabotage or engagement with regular 

enemy forces. Commanders should consider the effects intended to be produced by 

the threat, not just the nature of the threat itself. 

 Small-scale operations conducted by agents, insiders, saboteurs, sympathizers, 

partisans, extremists, and agent-supervised or independently initiated terrorist activities 

may present a grave danger to Air Force interests and may occur anywhere within the 

range of military operations. These operations may derive their personnel resources 

from nation-states or non-state actors, such as the al-Qaeda terrorist organizations. 

Often asymmetric in nature, these threats may be unorganized or well orchestrated and 

may take the form of insider threats, demonstrations, riots, random sniper incidents, 

physical assaults, kidnappings, aircraft hijackings, or bombings. 

 Intelligence gathering and the sabotage of air or ground operations conducted by 

special operations, guerrilla, and unconventional forces or small tactical units are 

threats that enter the realm of state-to-state combat operations. This type of threat is 

often asymmetric in nature. Major attacks by large tactical forces that may use air, 

space, land, or maritime operations are at the large-scale end of state-to-state conflicts. 

Attacks may also come from aircraft and theater missiles/artillery armed with 

conventional weapons and WMD. The Air Force uses its air and space warfare 

functions to counter and engage these threats. Engagement of these forces takes it out 

of the realm of force protection into combat operations. 
32 

TERMINATION, TRANSITION, AND REDEPLOYMENT 

Planning for termination, transition, and redeployment from operations is just as 

critical as the planning to engage in the operation in the first place; this is especially true 

of stability operations. Air Force commanders should focus on creating the proper air 

and space power effects to help meet the operational commander’s military objectives. 

Once the JFC’s objectives are met and the proper conditions for terminating the 

operation exist, commanders should be prepared to plan and execute their 

disengagement strategy. The commander’s strategy should be well coordinated with 

other agencies and organizations involved in the operation, and will likely include the 

State Department, other coalition forces, the host nation, NGOs, and/or international 

organizations. In some cases, Air Force forces will disengage when appropriate effects 

have been created and the commander’s objectives are met. In some cases, Air Force 

forces will disengage from smaller contingencies and redeploy to larger conflicts. 

Conflict Termination 

 

Conflict termination is a vital aspect of tying military actions to strategic 

objectives, establishing an end state that provides a “better state of peace,” and 

ensuring long term US national objectives are met. Cessation of hostilities will usually 

follow one of three patterns. The first is the victor imposing its will on the vanquished by 

force or other means. The unconditional surrender of the Axis powers ending World 

War II is one example. Another method may be through a mutual, negotiated 

settlement between the parties involved, such as the negotiations between US and 

North Vietnamese representatives that ended US military involvement in the war in 

Vietnam. Finally, a settlement may be imposed or brought about by a third power. 

NATO’s intervention in the Bosnian civil war resulted in the Dayton Accords, which 

ended the conflict. The end of conflict is rarely predictable or even final. 

 The combatant commander’s strategy should ultimately result in the military 

portion of the desired end state. Termination planning should establish the conditions 

and detail the actions needed to attain the chosen national security goals and 

objectives. Also, the way a conflict is conducted may have a great effect on the actual 

end state achieved. For example, unnecessarily aggressive operations may foster ill 

feelings from the populace, may aggravate refugee problems, or may collaterally 

damage or destroy so much infrastructure that recovery is more difficult. 

Termination planning should begin as early in the conflict as possible, preferably 

prior to the beginning of a conflict. Termination planning is extremely difficult as the 

conflict can evolve in many directions, forcing a revision of the original termination plan 

and, in some cases, a change in definition of the end state. The greatest difficulty at the 

operational level is translating national goals into quantifiable military objectives that 

create the conditions needed to achieve the desired end state. 

 Regardless of how termination comes about, operational concerns should be 

addressed early in the termination effort to avoid resumption of combat. Provision for 
33 

the security of remaining forces, responsibilities toward the civilian population, prisoner 

of war accounting, and repatriation are all issues that should be addressed during the 

termination phase. Providing for the security of former adversaries and other basic 

human needs will significantly enhance peaceful resolution of the conflict, as will 

restoring elements of vital public infrastructure that may have been damaged or 

destroyed as a result of combat operations. Establishing rules of engagement and 

targeting criteria, intelligence and other information operations, media, funding, force 

structure, medical care, and coordination with nonmilitary organizations are key 

considerations for friendly forces to better understand their role. These considerations 

may lead to expanded or increasingly constrained postures to preclude the resurgence 

of hostilities, enhance public support, and ensure the security of military operations. 

The influence of nonmilitary instruments of national power will increase as termination 

approaches and is achieved. Consideration of the requirements for the other 

instruments of national power will significantly support achieving desired objectives. 

 Whether conflict termination is imposed by decisive military victory or through a 

negotiated settlement, air and space forces may play a critical role in any post-hostility 

transition. Air and space forces offer national leaders a potent force to support political 

and economic instruments of national power during post-hostilities. COMAFFORs must 

therefore clearly and explicitly define the capabilities of their respective forces to meet 

the objectives of conflict termination. 

Transition to Follow-On Operations 

Transition occurs when control of the ongoing mission is transferred to another 

organization or when a change of mission is brought about by changing circumstances 

or objectives. As with planning for conflict termination, planning for transition should 

extend throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment. Joint 

task force (JTF) operations may be transferred to another military force, a regional 

organization, an international agency such as the UN, or civilian organizations. The 

process of transferring control of an operation to another military force or organization is 

situation-dependent; often, high-level interagency approval is required with long lead 

times. After a conflict, regeneration of force capabilities will be a primary consideration 

in the transition plan. Key transition decisions may involve the following considerations: 

 Requirements for a residual force or response capability. 

 Follow-on occupation, nation-building, or humanitarian missions. 

 Protection of the force. 

 Alliance and/or coalition force considerations. 

 Availability of intertheater and intratheater air mobility assets. 

 Applicable host nation environmental standards. 
34 

 Mission analysis should provide the initial information to commence transition 

planning. An end state, time frame for operations, guidance from higher authority, and 

political policy can be determined through the analysis process, which should provide 

the impetus for commencing transition planning. 

 When operations transition from one form to another, the nature of the forces 

assigned and attached to the JTF and the air and space expeditionary task force 

(AETF) may change to match new missions. Accordingly, it may be necessary to reexamine joint force and Service organizations and command relationships as the 

Services bring different sets of competencies to bear. 

Redeployment 

Redeployment activities are directed at the transfer of individuals, units, and/or 

materiel and can begin at any point during joint force operations. For this reason, 

redeployment planning should occur early in the joint operation planning process so 

planned redeployment operations reflect exit or transition strategy concerns developed 

during mission analysis. Redeployment is not merely reversing the deployment 

process. Redeployments are planned and executed as discrete, mission-based 

operations within the overall context of the joint force mission. Redeployment may 

include movement of individuals, units, and/or materiel deployed in one area to another, 

to another location within the same area, to the zone of interior for the purpose of further 

employment, or to continental US (CONUS) and/or outside CONUS (OCONUS) home 

and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing. 

 The redeployment of forces out of an area of conflict also requires careful 

planning. Forces and capabilities should be withdrawn in a coherent manner that 

smoothly phases down operations and returns personnel and equipment to their home 

bases. For example, planners should retain adequate C2 and force protection assets 

in-theater to cover personnel and materiel during the redeployment. In some cases 

(such as in humanitarian or peacekeeping operations), forces or capabilities may not be 

immediately withdrawn until an indigenous capability is established. In other cases, 

forces may be swinging from one area of conflict directly into another. In this case, the 

smooth flow of forces and support must be carefully planned to ensure the smooth 

buildup of combat capability into the new theater. Proper planning for these types of 

actions is as important as the initial planning. 

Force protection is as important during redeployment as during any other stage 

of the joint operation. The time between redeployment preparation and operational 

employment at the new destination or return to the home and/or demobilization station 

is potentially a period of great vulnerability for the redeploying unit. During this 

transition period, the redeploying unit may not be able to fully sustain or defend itself 

because some or all of its elements are configured for movement and may not have full 

mission capability. 
35 

CHAPTER THREE 

COMMANDING US AIR FORCE FORCES 

 

This chapter examines the Service and joint aspects of commanding air and 

space power at the operational level. It also addresses another important aspect of 

Service command: the role of lower echelon installation commanders. Recent 

operations, notably Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, 

highlighted the nuances in on-base command arrangements and support requirements 

that result from mixed forces deploying forward, often to bare bases. 

 Air Force expeditionary organization and preferred command arrangements are 

designed to address unity of command, a key principle of war. Clear lines of authority, 

with clearly identified commanders at appropriate echelons exercising appropriate 

control, are essential to achieving unity of effort, reducing confusion, and maintaining 

priorities. Because of the joint nature of air and space power, attention was placed on 

commanding joint air operations through a JFACC; less well understood was the role of 

the COMAFFOR. However, during numerous deployments in the last decade, the Air 

Force has learned a great deal about the nuances of commanding Service operations 

afield. As a result, the Air Force no longer looks at the COMAFFOR’s job, as some Air 

Force officers mistakenly did, as simply a “lesser included case” nested within the 

JFACC’s tasks. 

 

THE COMMANDER, AIR FORCE FORCES 

The commander of a US Air Force Service component at any joint level 

(unified combatant command, subunified combatant command, or JTF), is by 

joint and US Air Force definition called a "COMAFFOR." At the unified combatant 

command level, the combatant commander’s Air Force Service component is specified 

in the SecDef’s “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. When a JTF is formed 

within a theater, the JTF commander normally reports directly to that theater's unified 

combatant commander; both joint and Air Force doctrine include JTF commanders 

under the umbrella of "joint force commanders." If Air Force forces are attached to a 

JTF (thereby forming a JTF-level Service component), they should be presented as an 

AETF, and the AETF commander is designated the COMAFFOR for that JTF since 

he/she now presents a US Air Force Service component to a joint force commander. 

The qualifications of the combat commander 

determine to a larger extent than any other single 

element the effectiveness of a unit in combat. 

—General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold 
36 

Thus, depending on the scenario, the position of COMAFFOR may exist simultaneously 

at different levels within a given theater as long as each COMAFFOR is separately 

assigned or attached to and under the operational control of a different JFC. In 

the case where Air Force forces are operating in support of a JTF but are not attached to it, they do not constitute a separate JTF-level Service component under a 

separate COMAFFOR. In this instance, there remains a single COMAFFOR at the 

theater level. 

 

 The COMAFFOR provides unity of command. To a JFC, a COMAFFOR 

provides a single face for all Air Force issues. Within the AETF, the COMAFFOR is the 

single commander who conveys commander’s intent and is responsible for operating 

and supporting all Air Force forces assigned or attached to that joint force. Thus, the 

COMAFFOR commands forces through two separate chains of responsibilities, the 

operational and the administrative. The operational chain runs through joint channels 

from the JFC and is expressed in terms such as operational control (OPCON), tactical 

control (TACON), and support. The administrative chain runs through Service channels 

only, from the AETF, up through the appropriate major command (MAJCOM), to the Air 

Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) and Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF); this authority is 

expressed as administrative control (ADCON). 

Operational Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR 

When Air Force forces are assigned or attached to a JFC, the JFC normally 

receives OPCON of these forces. This authority is best exercised through subordinate 

JFCs and Service component commanders and thus is normally delegated accordingly. 

If not delegated OPCON, or if the stated command authorities are not clear, the 

COMAFFOR should request delegation of OPCON. When the COMAFFOR is 

delegated OPCON of the Air Force component forces, and no JFACC has been 

designated, the COMAFFOR has the following operational and tactical responsibilities: 

(Note: if a JFACC is designated, many of these responsibilities belong to that functional 

component commander role) 

 Prepare air and space plans to support the JFC’s estimate. 

 Develop and recommend COAs to the JFC. 

 Develop an air and space strategy and operations plan that states how the 

COMAFFOR plans to exploit Air Force air and space capabilities to support the 

JFC’s objectives. 

 Establish (or implement, when passed down by the JFC) theater ROEs for all 

assigned and attached forces. For those Service or functional components that 

operate organic air assets, it should be clearly defined when the air component 

ROEs also apply to their operations (this would normally be recommended). 

 Make air apportionment recommendations to the JFC. 
37 

 Task, plan, coordinate, and allocate the daily air and space effort. 

 Normally serve as the supported commander for counterair operations, 

strategic attack, the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, most counterspace 

operations, theater airborne reconnaissance and surveillance, and other 

operations as directed by the JFC. As the supported commander, the 

COMAFFOR has the authority to designate the target priority, effects, and 

timing of these operations and attack targets within the entire joint operating 

area (JOA). 

 Function as a supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations 

such as close air support (CAS), air interdiction within other components’ areas 

of operations (AOs), and maritime support. 

 Act as airspace control authority (ACA), area air defense commander (AADC), 

and space coordinating authority (SCA), if so designated. 

 Coordinate personnel recovery operations, including combat search and rescue 

(CSAR). 

 Direct intratheater air mobility operations and coordinate them with intertheater 

air mobility operations. 

 Conduct joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of 

other Services in joint operations for which the COMAFFOR has or may be 

assigned primary responsibility, or for which the US Air Force component’s 

facilities and capabilities are suitable. 

Service Responsibilities of the COMAFFOR 

Commanders of US Air Force components have responsibilities and 

authorities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Service’s ADCON function. 

Through the JFC’s command authority, the JFC normally will conduct operations 

through the COMAFFOR by delegating OPCON of the Air Force component forces to 

the COMAFFOR. Through the Service’s ADCON authority, the COMAFFOR will have 

complete ADCON of all assigned Air Force component forces and specified ADCON of 

all attached Air Force component forces. The specified ADCON responsibilities listed 

below apply to all attached forces, regardless of MAJCOM or US Air Force component 

(regular, Guard, or Reserve). The COMAFFOR also has some ADCON responsibilities 

for Air Force elements and personnel assigned to other joint force components (such as 

liaisons). The Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) 

retain all other ADCON responsibilities, such as Reserve Component activation, 

inactivation, partial mobilization, and length of tour. Additionally, intertheater forces, 

such as intertheater airlift and forces transiting another COMAFFOR’s area of interest, 

will be subject to the ADCON authority of the respective COMAFFOR while transiting 

that COMAFFOR’s area for administrative reporting and for TACON for force protection 

requirements derived from the combatant commander. 
38 

 As the Service component commander to a JFC, the COMAFFOR has the 

following responsibilities: 

 Make recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces in 

the Air Force component. 

 Accomplish assigned tasks for operational missions. 

 Organize, train, equip, and sustain assigned and attached Air Force forces for 

in-theater missions. 

  Prescribe the chain of command within the AETF. 

  Maintain reachback to the Air Force component rear and supporting Air 

Force units. Delineate responsibilities between forward and rear staff 

elements. 

  Provide training in Service-unique doctrine, tactical methods, and 

techniques. 

  Provide for logistics and mission support functions normal to the 

command. 

 Inform the JFC (and the combatant commander, if affected) of planning for 

changes in logistics support that would significantly affect operational capability 

or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate 

the proposals prior to final decision or implementation. 

 Provide lateral liaisons with Army, Navy, Marines, special operations forces 

(SOF), and coalition partners. 

 Maintain internal administration and discipline, including application of the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 

 Establish force protection and other local defense requirements. 

 Provide Service intelligence matters and oversight of intelligence activities to 

ensure compliance with laws, executive orders, policies, and directives. 

 If the COMAFFOR is also the standing MAJCOM commander to a combatant 

commander (as, for example, the commander US Air Forces in Europe [USAFE] to the 

commander US European Command [CDRUSEUCOM]), the MAJCOM commander has 

the following additional responsibilities: 

 Develop program and budget requests that comply with combatant commander 

guidance on war-fighting requirements and priorities. 
39 

 Inform the combatant commander (and any intermediate JFCs) of program and 

budget decisions that may affect joint operation planning. 

 

 The COMAFFOR is responsible for overseeing the morale, welfare, safety, and 

security of assigned and attached forces. Subordinate commanders will issue orders 

and direct actions in support of those responsibilities and will ensure these orders and 

directives are consistent with the policies and directives of the COMAFFOR exercising 

ADCON of those forces. The responsibilities of parent MAJCOMs and lead commands 

are to organize, train, equip, and provide forces; the responsibility of the COMAFFOR is 

to ensure specialized training is conducted based on mission needs. The COMAFFOR 

and properly designated subordinate commanders will exercise disciplinary authority in 

accordance with the UCMJ and relevant Air Force instructions (AFIs). These 

commanders will advise parent MAJCOMs of any disciplinary action taken against 

deployed personnel. Because of the overlapping and interconnecting areas of ADCON 

that are divided among the various commanders, it is essential that the appropriate 

written orders clearly state which elements of ADCON authority and responsibility are 

executed by which commander. 

THE JOINT FORCE AIR AND 

SPACE COMPONENT 

COMMANDER 

If air and space assets from more 

than one Service are present within a joint 

force, the JFC normally will designate a 

JFACC to exploit the full capabilities of 

joint air and space operations. The 

JFACC should be the Service 

component commander with the 

preponderance of air and space 

capabilities and the ability to plan, 

task, and control joint air and space 

operations. If working with allies in a 

coalition or alliance operation, the JFACC 

may be designated as the combined force 

air and space component commander 

(CFACC). The JFACC recommends the 

proper employment of air and space 

forces from multiple components. The JFACC also plans, coordinates, allocates, tasks, 

executes, and assesses air and space operations to accomplish assigned operational 

missions. Because of the theaterwide scope of air and space operations, the JFACC 

will typically maintain the same JOA/theaterwide perspective as the JFC. The JFACC, 

as with any component commander, should not also be dual-hatted as the JFC. 

“The JFC will normally assign JFACC 

responsibilities to the component 

commander having the preponderance 

of air assets and the capability to 

effectively plan, task, and control joint 

air operations.” 

—JP 3-30, Command and Control 

for Joint Air Operations 

 Because of its organic ability to 

command and control air and space 

power through the AOC, the Air Force 

prefers—and in fact, plans and 

trains—to employ through a 

COMAFFOR who is then prepared to 

assume responsibilities as a JFACC 

if so designated. 
40 

 Functional component commanders normally exercise TACON of forces made 

available to them by the JFC. Thus, a COMAFFOR exercises OPCON of Air Force 

forces and, acting as a JFACC, normally exercises TACON of any Navy, Army, Marine, 

and coalition air and space assets made available for tasking (i.e., those forces not 

retained for their own Service’s organic operations). 

 

 The JFACC must be prepared to assume the following responsibilities, as 

assigned by the JFC: 

 Organize a JFACC staff manned with personnel from each component to reflect 

the composition of air and space capabilities and forces controlled by the 

JFACC. 

 Develop a JAOP to support the JFC’s objectives. 

 Plan, coordinate, allocate, and task the joint air and space capabilities and 

forces made available to the JFACC by direction of the JFC. 

 Develop daily anticipatory guidance for construction of the air operations 

directive (AOD). 

 Recommend apportionment of the joint air effort to the JFC after consultation 

with the other component commanders. 

 Control execution of current joint air and space operations to include: 

  Counterair, to include theater missile defense. 

  Strategic attack. 

  Counterland. 

  Countersea. 

  Counterspace. 

  Intratheater air mobility. 

  Information operations. 

 Coordinate: 

  Personnel recovery operations, including CSAR, for assigned and 

attached forces. 

  Intertheater air mobility support. 
41 

  SOF operations with the joint force special operations component 

commander (JFSOCC) or the commander, joint special operations task 

force (JSOTF). 

 Perform assessment of joint air and space operations at the operational 

(component) and tactical levels. 

 Serve as ACA, AADC, and SCA, if so designated. 

 Serve as the supported commander for counterair operations, strategic attack, 

the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, and theater airborne reconnaissance 

and surveillance. As the supported commander, the JFACC has the authority 

to designate the target priority, effects, and timing of these operations and 

attack targets across the entire JOA (to include targets within land and maritime 

AOs). 

 Serve as the supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for operations 

such as CAS, air interdiction within the land and naval component AOs, and 

maritime support. 

 If the JFACC is appointed from another Service (for example, in those instances 

where the COMAFFOR does not possess the preponderance of air and space assets 

and the ability to command and control them), the COMAFFOR will pass TACON of 

assigned and attached forces to the JFACC as directed by the JFC. In such cases, the 

COMAFFOR will maintain an effective command and control structure to perform 

Service-specific functions. In addition, the COMAFFOR should coordinate with the 

JFACC through an air component coordination element (ACCE). 

Control of Other Services’ Aviation and Space Capabilities 

By definition, the JFACC controls air and space assets of other Services, in 

whole or in part, depending on the situation. However, the JFACC only controls those 

capabilities “made available for tasking” as directed by the JFC. The other Services 

have developed their air and space arms with differing doctrinal and operating 

constructs in mind, and may retain control of some or all of their assets to perform their 

organic scheme of maneuver. These tactical mission priorities (primarily support of 

surface forces) may constrain their availability to conduct the broader scope of air and 

space operations at the strategic and operational levels of war. Similar concerns also 

apply to the aviation arms of our allies. The JFACC must consider these differing 

philosophies when developing the air and space portion of a joint campaign. 

 Army aviation and space assets normally are retained for employment as 

organic forces within its combined arms paradigm. However, some Army 

helicopters could be employed in CAS, interdiction, or other missions, in which 

case they may come under the purview of the JFACC when the JFACC has 

been tasked to plan and execute the theater interdiction effort. The same can 

hold true for other systems (such as the Army Tactical Missile System) when 
42 

employed for interdiction or offensive counterair, depending on tasking and 

target location. As a minimum, Army aviation elements should comply with the 

airspace control order (ACO) to deconflict airspace and friendly air defense 

planning. Placing Army aviation and space assets on the ATO/ACO will reduce 

the risk of fratricide and provide better overall integration with other air and 

space operations. 

 Naval aviation and space assets include carrier-based aircraft, land-based 

naval aircraft, cruise missiles, and a small number of satellites. They provide a 

diverse array of power projection capabilities. Such assets, beyond those 

retained as needed for fleet defense and related naval missions, are usually 

available for tasking via the air tasking process. Additionally, Navy AEGIS 

capabilities may be integrated into the overall theater missile defense effort. 

 Marine aviation assets. The primary mission of Marine aviation is support of 

the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) ground element. Sorties in excess 

of organic MAGTF direct support requirements should be provided to the JFC 

for ATO tasking through the JFACC. 

 SOF aviation assets. The JFC may assign control of SOF aviation forces to 

either a Service or a functional component commander. When SOF air assets 

are employed as part of joint SOF operations, the JFC may assign control of 

those forces to the JFSOCC, who may in turn designate a joint special 

operations air component commander (JSOACC) responsible for planning and 

executing joint special air operations. However, if SOF aviation assets are 

assigned primarily in support of the theater air operation, then the JFC should 

attach control of those assets to the COMAFFOR as part of the AETF. 

Whether operating autonomously or in conjunction with conventional forces, 

special operations must be integrated into, and closely coordinated with, other 

air activities supporting the theater campaign. In order to coordinate and 

deconflict operations in their common operating environment, the deep 

battlespace, the JFSOCC and the JFACC exchange liaison teams. The 

JFSOCC provides the AOC a special operations liaison element (SOLE) to 

coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SOF operations, strategy, and plans with 

conventional air, and the JFSOCC in turn receives an ACCE from the JFACC. 

 Regardless of whether the JFACC exercises TACON of other Services’ forces, 

the JFACC, in the normally expected multi-hatted roles of ACA, AADC, and SCA, 

normally requires inclusion of such forces on the ATO and ACO. This provides 

situational awareness of all friendly aviation in the area of responsibility (AOR)/JOA, 

prevents fratricide, and deconflicts airspace. 
43 

CHAPTER FOUR 

ORGANIZING US AIR FORCE FORCES 

 

Organization is critically important to effective and efficient operations. Service 

and joint force organization and command relationships—literally, who owns what, and 

who can do what with whom, and when—easily create the most friction within any 

operation. Therefore, it is absolutely imperative that Airmen understand the 

fundamentals of Air Force and joint organization and command relationships. 

 With fewer forces forward, the US relies much more heavily on projecting forces 

from the CONUS. Also, the “major theater war” scenario has given way to more 

numerous, ad hoc deployments for unanticipated missions. As a result, the US Air 

Force became “expeditionary.” Forces no longer necessarily deploy according to a 

fixed script. There may not be a mature command structure to fall in on, much less 

“warm” bases ready for operations. Indeed, the entire joint force may have to be 

assembled on the fly with a mix of in-theater and deploying forces, as a crisis unfolds. 

 During the latter half of the 1990s, the Air Force fine-tuned its expeditionary 

organization—the AETF. In many operations, culminating recently in Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM, the concept was successfully employed. Also, in addition to Service 

organization, we have also learned much about how to integrate a joint force efficiently 

and effectively. When intelligently applied, the AETF model can assist or alleviate 

some of the heavy thinking during the early stages of a contingency. 

THE AIR AND SPACE EXPEDITIONARY TASK FORCE 

The AETF is the organizational structure for US Air Force forces afield. 

Regardless of the size of the US Air Force element, it will be organized along the 

lines of an AETF. The AETF presents a JFC with a task-organized, integrated 

package with the appropriate balance of force, sustainment, control, and force 

protection. The AETF presents a scalable, tailorable organization with three elements: 

a single commander, embodied in the COMAFFOR; appropriate command and control 

mechanisms; and tailored and fully supported forces. 

It turned out to be another scrambled outfit...with 

so many lines of responsibility, control, and 

coordination that it resembled a can of worms. I 

made a note to tell Walker to take charge, tear up 

the chart, and have no one issue orders around 

there except himself. After he got things 

operating simply, quickly, and efficiently he could 

draw up a new chart if he wanted to. 

—Lieutenant General George Kenney, 

Australia, 1942
44 

 The AETF will be tailored to the mission; this includes not only forces, but also 

the ability to command and control those forces for the missions assigned. The AETF 

should draw first from in-theater resources, if available. If augmentation is needed, or if 

in-theater forces are not available, the AETF will draw as needed from the air and space 

expeditionary force (AEF) currently on rotation. These forces, whether in-theater or 

deployed from out of theater, should be fully supported with the requisite maintenance, 

logistical support, health services, and administrative elements. These forces will form 

up within the AETF as expeditionary wings, groups, squadrons, flights, detachments, or 

elements, as necessary to provide reasonable spans of control and command elements 

at appropriate levels and to provide unit identity. 

 

Regional Organization and Control 

In response to a military situation, a combatant commander will normally 

organize a JTF. If the entire theater is engaged, the combatant commander may be the 

JFC. If the situation is less than theater-wide, the combatant commander may establish 

a subordinate JTF commanded by a subordinate JFC. In either case, the combatant 

commander will first look to assigned, in-theater forces. If augmentation is required, the 

JFC will request additional forces through the SecDef. Upon SecDef approval, 

additional forces will transfer into the theater and will be attached to the gaining 

combatant commander, and the degree of control gained over those forces (i.e., 

OPCON or TACON) will be specified in the deployment orders. The gaining combatant 

commander then normally delegates OPCON of these forces downward to the JTF 

commander who should, in turn, delegate OPCON to his Service component 

commanders within the gaining JTF. All US Air Force forces assigned or attached 

to a joint task force, or established as a single-Service task force, should be 

organized and presented as an AETF. 

 Within a joint force, the JFC may organize forces in a mix of Service and 

functional components. All joint forces contain Service components, because 

administrative and logistics support for joint forces are provided through Service 

components. Therefore, by definition, every joint force containing assigned or 

attached Air Force forces will have a COMAFFOR. 

 The COMAFFOR normally exercises OPCON over Air Force forces within the 

AETF. The JFC normally establishes functional component commands when 

forces from two or more military Services must operate in the same dimension 

or domain or there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned 

mission. Functional component commanders, such as the JFACC, are thus 

optional. If functional component commands are established, the Service 

component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked, and 

with the requisite ability to provide command and control, normally will be 

designated as that functional component commander. Functional component 

commanders normally exercise TACON of forces made available for tasking. 

Thus, for air and space forces, the COMAFFOR may be dual-hatted as the 

JFACC. The US Air Force prefers—and in fact, plans and trains— to employ 
45 

Air Force Component Command Structure

As a result of studies culminating in 2006, the Air Force re-engineered its topend command and control structures in support of each combatant commander. 

This effort, initially known as the warfighting headquarters initiative, settled on a 

two-pronged approach. First, the Service is establishing a headquarters 

organization to serve the combatant commander at the strategic level. This 

headquarters activity will include a small staff (e.g. protocol, public affairs, 

strategic-level theater security cooperation, legal, etc). 

Second, the Service is also establishing an operationally-oriented 

organization, the component numbered air force (NAF), within each combatant 

command. This organization includes a headquarters element designed to 

support the Air Force component commander at the operational and tactical 

level. It will include an AOC weapons system and AFFOR staff, each 

appropriately tailored to support their combatant commander. These two 

organizations, while distinct, are part of any US Air Force component command 

structure and may be merged into one organization when feasible or necessary. 

The net result is an established, known structure, properly equipped and manned 

with trained personnel, to enable the Air Force Service component commander 

to better carry out the total COMAFFOR and JFACC responsibilities for the 

combatant commander. 

The basics of doctrine remain unchanged: The component commander is 

the COMAFFOR and as such exercises both operational authorities (e.g., 

OPCON and TACON) when delegated by the JFC and administrative control 

(ADCON) of all assigned and attached US Air Force forces and should also be 

prepared to assume responsibilities as the JFACC. 

In the event of multiple JTFs in an AOR, the Air Force component 

commander may attach air component coordination elements (ACCEs) to the 

respective JTFs or sister component headquarters to ensure each JTF or 

component commander receives proper air and space support. In this case, 

there would only be one COMAFFOR/JFACC per theater. 

The implementation of this command structure will be more explicitly 

defined and implemented in accordance with Air Force policy directives and 

instructions.

through a COMAFFOR who is then prepared to assume responsibilities as a 

JFACC if so designated. 

Functional Organization and Control 

Not all air and space forces employed in an operation will be attached 

forward to a geographic combatant commander. Several aspects of air and space 
46 

power are capable of serving more than one geographic combatant commander 

at a time. Such forces, such as intertheater air mobility, space, and special operations 

forces, are organized under functional combatant commanders to facilitate cross-AOR 

optimization of those functional forces. When such forces are deployed in a geographic 

combatant commander’s AOR, they will often remain under the OPCON of their 

respective functional combatant commander and operate in support of the regional 

geographic combatant commander. Within a theater, this support relationship is 

performed through specially designated representatives attached to regional AETFs, 

such as the Director of Air Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR-Air) for air mobility forces and 

the Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR) for space forces. In some 

circumstances, after coordination with the owning commander and upon SecDef 

approval, control of such functional forces may be transferred to a geographic 

commander with specification of OPCON or TACON. 

 There will usually be a tension between regionally-organized forces and 

functionally-organized forces. The former seek effectiveness at the point of their 

operation, while the latter seek efficiency across several regions. At critical times, the 

requirement for effectiveness may trump efficiency, and additional functional forces may 

be transferred to the regional command and organized accordingly (see related 

discussion later in this chapter). These situations require careful and continuing 

dialogue between competing senior commanders and their common superior 

commander. 

AETF ORGANIZATION 

The AETF is the Air Force’s primary warfighting organization and the means by 

which we present forces to a JFC. When established, AETFs will form up under the 

designated Air Force component headquarters. AETFs can be sized and tailored to 

meet the specific requirements of the mission. The basic building block of an AETF is 

the squadron; however, a squadron normally does not have sufficient resources to 

operate independently. Thus, the smallest AETF is normally an air expeditionary group; 

larger AETFs may be composed of several expeditionary wings. Within an AETF, the 

COMAFFOR organizes forces as necessary into wings, groups, squadrons, flights, 

detachments, or elements to provide reasonable internal spans of control, command 

elements at appropriate levels, and to retain unit identity. 

 Depending on the size of the AETF, the rank of the COMAFFOR may run from 

general to lieutenant colonel. The COMAFFOR should normally not be dual-hatted 

as commander of one of the subordinate operating units. This allows the 

COMAFFOR to focus on component responsibilities as the overall AETF 

commander while subordinate commanders lead their units. 

Numbered Expeditionary Air Force (NEAF) 

NEAF is the generic title for an AETF made up of multiple expeditionary wings 

and is the largest sized AETF. NEAFs will normally carry an appropriate numerical 

designation based on NAFs historically associated with the region or command. 
47 

Subordinate expeditionary units will retain their own numerical designations. Use of the 

NEAF designation is also intended to provide appropriate unit awards and honors credit 

for the units and staffs within the NEAF. The NEAF commander will normally be the 

COMAFFOR. 

Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) 

AEW is the generic title for a deployed wing or a wing slice within an AETF. An 

AEW normally is composed of the wing command element and subordinate groups and 

squadrons. AEWs will normally carry the numerical designation of the wing providing 

the command element. Subordinate expeditionary groups and support squadrons will 

carry the numerical designation of the parent AEW. Subordinate mission squadrons 

and direct combat support units will retain their numeric designation in an expeditionary 

The Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force 

The Air Force component in a joint force will organize as an air and 

space expeditionary task force (AETF). The AETF is a scalable, tailorable 

organization with three components: a single commander, embodied in the 

COMAFFOR; appropriate command and control mechanisms; and tailored 

and fully supported forces. The elements of an AETF may be deployed 

forward in to a theater, or some may be available elsewhere in a theater or 

even in the CONUS, available via reachback. 

The AETF may be a fully combat capable, 

numbered Air Force-sized composite force 

fighting a major operation with a substantial intheater presence, as in Operation IRAQI

FREEDOM. 

It may be a few squadron elements of 

combat aircraft with associated support, as part of 

a standing operation, as in Operations 

NORTHERN and SOUTHERN WATCH. 

It may be an air mobility operation delivering 

food and medical supplies in a relief operation, as 

in Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the 2005 

tsunami relief effort in southern Asia. 

An AETF’s desired effect might not directly 

involve air and space power. After supporting the 

initial insertion of forces into Haiti in 1994, the Air 

Force’s main element in Operation UPHOLD 

DEMOCRACY was a medical unit. 
48 

status. Use of the AEW designation is also intended to provide appropriate unit awards 

and honors credit for the parent unit. An AEW may be composed of units from different 

wings, but where possible, the AEW is formed from units of a single wing. The AEW 

commander normally reports to the COMAFFOR. 

Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) 

AEG is the generic title for a deployed group assigned to an AEW or a deployed 

independent group assigned to an AETF. Unlike traditional “home station” groups, 

which are functionally organized (i.e., operations group, maintenance group, etc.), 

expeditionary groups that are deployed independent of a wing structure will contain 

elements of all the functions to conduct semi-autonomous operations. An AEG is 

composed of a slice of the wing command element and some squadrons. Since Air 

Force groups are organized without significant staff support, a wing slice is needed to 

provide the command and control for echelons smaller than the normal wing. An AEG 

assigned to an AEW will carry the numeric designation of the AEW. An independent 

AEG will normally carry the numerical designation of the unit providing the command 

element and/or the largest portion of the expeditionary organization. Deployed 

assigned or attached squadrons will retain their numerical designation and acquire the 

“expeditionary” designation. Use of the AEG designation is also intended to provide 

appropriate unit awards and honors credit for the parent unit. An AEG may be 

composed of units from different wings, but where possible, the AEG is formed from 

units of a single wing. If deployed as an independent group, the AEG commander will 

normally report to the COMAFFOR. If deployed as a group subordinate to an 

expeditionary wing, the AEG commander reports to the AEW commander. The AEG is 

normally the smallest independently deployable AETF. 

Air Expeditionary Squadron (AES) 

AES is the generic title for a deployed squadron within an AETF. Squadrons are 

configured to deploy and employ in support of crisis action requirements. However, an 

individual squadron is not designed to conduct independent operations; it normally 

requires support from other units to obtain the synergy needed for sustainable, effective 

operations. As such, an individual squadron or squadron element should not be 

presented by itself without provision for appropriate support and command elements. If 

a single operational squadron or squadron element is all that is needed to provide the 

desired operational effect (for example, an element of C-130s performing humanitarian 

operations), it should deploy with provision for commensurate support and command 

and control (C2) elements. The structure of this AETF would appear similar to an AEG. 

In some operations, not all support and C2 elements need to deploy forward with the 

operational squadron. Some may be positioned “over the horizon,” constituting 

capabilities provided through reachback. A single squadron or squadron element may 

deploy without full support elements if it is planned to augment a deployed AEW or 

AEG, and would thus obtain necessary support from the larger units. Under certain 

circumstances when less than squadron size detachments are involved, it may not be 

appropriate to attach them as a full AETF complete with COMAFFOR and C2 structure. 

In those cases, the more appropriate and effective mechanism may be to task the Air 
49 

 

 Historically, when Airmen talked 

about augmentation, discussion 

was generally limited to 

augmenting the AOC or a joint 

staff. Recent experience has 

provided new examples of 

augmentation between Services, 

either to round out manpower or 

provide specific skills at a low 

echelon. Examples include Airmen 

supplementing Army convoy 

operations in Iraq and Army 

Guardsmen backfilling deployed Air 

Force security forces at Air Force 

installations in the CONUS. 

 When Airmen are tasked to 

augment another Service, the 

AETF model should be applied as 

a template to help focus discussion 

of organization and command 

arrangements. The operational 

(OPCON/TACON) and administrative (ADCON) chains of 

command should be carefully 

specified, and an Air Force 

element, with an Airman in charge, 

should be identified to fulfill 

ADCON responsibilities. 

Force as a supporting unit under the OPCON of the COMAFFOR at the next higher 

echelon. 

Expeditionary Elements below 

Squadron Level 

In addition to expeditionary 

wings, groups, and squadrons, the Air 

Force may deploy elements below the 

squadron level for specific, limited 

functions. These include individuals 

and specialty teams such as explosive 

ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, 

military working dog teams, security 

forces, liaison teams, etc. They may 

deploy as part of an AETF or 

independently of other Air Force units, 

in remote locations, and may operate 

directly with other Services. For 

ADCON purposes, these elements 

should normally be attached to the 

commander of a recognizable Air 

Force entity in the region, either a 

deployed AETF or the Air Force 

Service component to the engaged 

combatant commander. Examples of 

such deployed elements might be a 

psychological operations team 

augmenting a Joint Psychological 

Operations Task Force (JPOTF), an 

EOD team augmenting a 

predominately surface force, or an Air 

Force element supplementing Army 

convoy operations. Air Force 

personnel assigned to a joint staff may 

also fall in this category. 

 In many circumstances, 

elements below squadron level and 

even individual persons may deploy to 

provide a specific capability. In such 

cases, formal establishment and 

designation of an AETF may not be 

warranted. However, the Air Force 

contingent should still be organized as 
50 

a single entity (perhaps named simply as “Air Force element”) and led by the senior 

Airman in the contingent. In any case, the AETF model should still be used as a 

template to answer some basic questions: 

 What is the operational branch of the chain of command? Who is in charge of 

the operational mission, and to whom does the Air Force contingent report? 

 What is the Service administrative branch of the chain of command? Who is in 

charge of the Air Force contingent, and to whom does that senior Airman look 

for Service support (which Air Force installation or unit)? 

 What command and control mechanism does the contingent need? A small 

planning cell? A slice of a squadron or wing operations center? Or just a cell 

phone or radio link back to the home station? 

 What formal orders are required to attach the contingent or personnel to 

another agency? Deployment orders, G-series orders or simple TDY orders? 

 What additional Service and joint training may be required to enable the 

deploying Airmen to properly accomplish the mission? 

 Furthermore, for such small deployments, the senior Airman should be identified. 

Because designation as a COMAFFOR may not be appropriate, the senior Airman 

should instead be designated as, for example, commander, Air Force element; team 

chief; or officer or noncommissioned officer in charge. This formally identifies the senior 

Air Force member as leader of the deployed element. 

Provisional Units 

In some instances, expeditionary forces will not form around active numbered 

units. This may occur, for example, when there are insufficient active numbered units in 

the AEF rotation to satisfy a very large operation or a single major force provider cannot 

be identified. In such cases, provisional units may be created using predesignated 

inactive units. A unit under a single provisional unit designation should also be 

considered to provide continuity of operations for extended contingency operations in 

which units are frequently rotated in and out (e.g., Operations NORTHERN and 

SOUTHERN WATCH and IRAQI FREEDOM). Upon completion of the operation for 

which the unit was formed, the unit designation and history will be inactivated. 

Provisional wings, groups, and squadrons are normally generically designated simply as 

AEWs, AEGs, and AESs. 

Designation of Expeditionary Units 

An AETF will be assigned a name based on a numerical designation determined 

by heritage considerations and the name of the operation under which it is tasked. The 

name will include the heritage-based number (normally derived from a regional NAF) 
51 

followed by the name of the operation. For example, an AETF for Operation DENY 

FLIGHT was designated “16 AETF—DENY FLIGHT.” 

Wings, groups, and squadrons are designated “expeditionary” from the time they 

are attached until no longer attached to an AETF. Within the task force, numbered units 

simply add “expeditionary” to the normal designation of the unit. For example, the 123d 

Fighter Wing becomes the 123d Expeditionary Fighter Wing; the 456th Mission Support 

Group becomes the 456th Expeditionary Mission Support Group, and the 789th Air 

Refueling Squadron becomes the 789th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron. For 

planning purposes, wings, groups, and squadrons may be generically designated simply 

as AEWs, AEGs, and AESs. 

 Units operating from their normally assigned, in-place location, such as 

permanently assigned units in Korea under US Pacific Command (USPACOM), or North 

America-based ANG units participating in homeland air defense within Operation 

NOBLE EAGLE, need not adopt expeditionary nomenclature since they are not truly 

expeditionary. The overall operation, however, should still be modeled as an AETF to 

delineate clear chains of operational and administrative authority. 

 Other deployed wings, groups, and squadrons that are not assigned or attached 

to the AETF, but provide significant support (such as airlift and tanker units in the 

intertheater air bridge or space and special operations units in direct support), may be 

designated “expeditionary” at the discretion of their owning MAJCOM or Service 

component commander. Normally, these “expeditionary” forces provide their support 

through their functional chains of command. 

THE SENIOR/HOST AIR FORCE INSTALLATION COMMANDER 

An installation commander, regardless of Service, always exercises some 

authority over and responsibility for forces on his/her base for protection of assigned 

forces and assets, lodging, dining, and administrative reporting, regardless of the 

command relations of those forces. These are inherent in his/her responsibilities as an 

installation commander. 

 Ultimately, the Air Force Service component commander within a region is 

responsible for fulfilling ADCON responsibilities and common logistics support for all Air 

Force forces within his/her region, regardless of organization of assignment of those 

forces. These ADCON responsibilities are exercised through commanders at 

subordinate echelons. The ADCON chain is clear for non-deployed forces at home 

station during peacetime. However, the ADCON chain during expeditionary operations 

requires some fundamental guidance, especially during those fluid times when forces 

are initially building up in remote deployed locations. 

 The senior Air Force commander on any base where Air Force forces are 

present has responsibilities for care and provisioning of the Air Force forces on that 

installation, regardless of organization. For example, a conceivable mix of host and 

tenant Air Force organizations at a single base could include: 
52 

 A small permanent party at the group or detachment level. 

 A wing or group sized AETF conducting sustained operations from that base. 

 Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) assets operating in-theater 

but not attached to the host AETF. 

 Air mobility forces bedded down in-theater, supporting an air bridge under the 

OPCON of US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) (through Air 

Mobility Command [AMC]). 

 Transient forces using the base for a staging base for further deployment. 

 Other scenarios may have forces 

belonging to other Service components 

operating from an Air Force-owned base, such 

as Army special operations forces or Marine 

aviation units. Although the provision of 

logistics support is inherently a Servicespecific responsibility, the senior Air Force 

commander, as the host base commander, 

has responsibility for providing protection and 

other base operating support as directed by 

the governing operations order or interService 

agreements. In scenarios where another 

Service is the host, clear lines of authority over 

critical issues, especially airfield operations, 

must be clearly delineated, preferably in 

writing. 

 G-series orders should detail which 

commanders are responsible for providing 

specific elements of specified ADCON to 

deployed units and what authority that 

commander may use to carry out these 

responsibilities (see appendices C and D for 

examples). The orders are not required to 

spell out all support and sustainment 

responsibilities. For a notional example, the 

orders might specify that lodging, dining, and 

force protection will be provided by the 36 AEW from Air Forces Pacific (AFPAC) and 

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). The minimum ADCON responsibilities and authorities to 

go forward should be responsibility for UCMJ, protection of assigned forces and assets, 

lodging, dining, and force reporting. These responsibilities apply under a wide variety of 

basing situations: 

An Emerging Concept: 

The Senior Airfield Authority

The senior airfield authority (SAA) 

is an emerging concept for 

resolving C2 issues and mitigating 

concerns about airfield authority on 

those airbases with mixed forces, 

especially in airbase opening 

scenarios. Designated by the JFC, 

the SAA on each base should 

normally be selected from the 

Service with the preponderance of 

airfield operations capabilities and 

assets to support operation of the 

airbase. During rapidly unfolding 

airbase opening scenarios, the 

designated SAA may not be 

immediately available. In such 

scenarios, current Air Force 

proposals recommend that the 

commander of the contingency 

response group opening the base 

act as SAA until arrival of the JFCdesignated SAA. 
53 

 Whether the base is owned and operated by the Air Force, by another US 

Service, or by the host nation. 

 Whether or not the senior Air Force officer on a given installation is the host 

installation commander. 

 Whether or not the Air Force forces present on the installation are assigned or 

attached to the senior Air Force officer’s same expeditionary unit or even to the 

same AETF. 

 Whether or not the Air Force forces present are Regular, Guard, or Reserve, 

and regardless of whether or not the Guard forces are federalized. 

 For example, when Air Force aircraft are operating from a dual-use base where 

the installation commander is neither Air Force nor an Airman, clear lines of authority 

over airfield operations must be established. 

 To properly fulfill ADCON responsibilities on an installation, a senior Air Force 

line officer (preferably a commander of a designated echelon; that is, an “A-coded” 

commander) should be clearly identified. If such a senior officer is not clearly identified, 

either by position (as, for example, by his/her standing as the designated host 

installation commander) or otherwise in writing, the senior Air Force line commander 

present on an installation should assume responsibility for ADCON issues for all Air 

Force forces on that installation. The following guidelines are offered for further 

clarification: 

 Preferably, the designated senior officer should also be the commander of a 

clearly identifiable echelon, such as an AEW or AEG, and not lower than 

squadron level (AES). 

 When operational and support forces are present on the same base, the senior 

officer should normally be appointed or designated from the operational forces 

by the COMAFFOR. 

 When two or more equally-sized units are present on the same installation, and 

a single host installation commander has not yet been formally designated, the 

senior-ranked line officer should assume ADCON responsibilities for all Air 

Force forces on that installation until such time as either the COMAFFOR or 

JFC formally designates a host installation commander or host Service. 

 This senior officer is responsible for coordinating all required aspects of support 

with the host nation, any supporting Service, and the owning MAJCOM or 

combatant command as required. 

 Specified elements of ADCON should always be written in the G-series orders 

and clearly identify the support to be provided to a subordinate expeditionary or 

host unit. 
54 

The AOC is the senior element within 

the theater air control system (TACS). 

The TACS includes the AOC plus 

subordinate ground and airborne 

elements, and is directly involved in the 

command and control of most air 

missions. Collectively, the TACS has the 

capability to plan, direct, coordinate, and 

control all air and space forces assigned, 

attached, or made available for tasking; 

monitor the actions of both friendly and 

enemy forces; plan, direct, coordinate, 

and control air defense and airspace 

control; and coordinate for required 

space support. 

While this publication focuses on the 

AOC it is important to remember that the 

entire TACS is necessary for the 

COMAFFOR’s effective command of 

air and space power.

 A commander’s UCMJ authority only extends to regular, Reserve, and 

federalized Guard forces. 

 If support is provided to deployed units on a lengthy, recurring basis, Air Force 

MAJCOMs should specify ADCON relationships between MAJCOMs in 

standing command-to-command agreements. 

 See Appendix A for some sample base-level ADCON scenarios. 

Refer to AFI 38-101, Air Force Organization, specifically Chapter 5, Organizing 

Provisional Units, for more specific policy guidance. 

AETF COMMAND AND 

CONTROL MECHANISMS 

The COMAFFOR requires 

command activities as tools to assist in 

exercising OPCON, TACON, and 

ADCON. The COMAFFOR uses one of 

several types of AOC to exercise control 

of air and space operations, and a 

Service component staff (commonly 

called the AFFOR staff) to exercise 

support operations and administrative 

control. 

 The character of the operations 

center may vary, depending on the 

nature of the forces. For control of 

regional operations, it may be one of the 

large, fixed Falconer AOCs. For air 

mobility operations, the operations 

center may be the Tanker Airlift Control 

Center (TACC) at Scott AFB, while 

space operations would leverage the Air 

Force Space AOC at Vandenberg AFB. 

These centers normally will work 

together in a mutually supporting 

command arrangement, with one of 

them designated as the supported 

center. While these operations centers 

are organic to Air Force operations, with 

proper augmentation from the other 

Services and coalition partners they 

may evolve into a joint or combined 

center, depending on the type of 
55 

operation and nature of the forces within the air and space component. See Chapter 7 

for a summary of AOC types, organization, and processes. 

 An AETF also needs a command entity responsible for the deployment and 

sustainment of Air Force forces. The AFFOR staff is the mechanism through which the 

COMAFFOR exercises his/her Service responsibilities. These sustainment activities 

are sometimes referred to as “beds, beans, and bullets.” The AFFOR staff is also 

responsible for the long-range planning and theater engagement operations that falls 

outside the AOC’s current operational focus. See Chapter 8 for a summary of AFFOR 

staff organization and processes. 

 The core capabilities of the AOC and AFFOR staff should be well established, 

but they should be tailored in size and function according to the theater and the 

operation. Not all operations require a “full-up” AOC with over 1,000 people or a large 

AFFOR staff. Smaller operations, such as some humanitarian operations, can in fact 

make do with a small control center that does little more than scheduling and reporting. 

Also, not all elements of the operations center or AFFOR staff need be forward; some 

may operate “over the horizon,” using reachback to reduce the forward footprint. The 

goal is to maximize reachback and minimize forward presence in “harm’s way” as much 

as possible. 

DISTRIBUTED / SPLIT OPERATIONS 

Several aspects of modern operations almost always require distributed C2. For 

example, a JFACC should normally send ACCEs to other key headquarters in a joint 

force, while the AOC remains further back in a theater. Also (although not entirely 

desirable) the JFACC may not be co-located with the JFC, resulting in a form of 

distributed operation. Thus, regardless of Service and joint force laydown, the JFACC 

should always be conscious of the need to actively communicate with and command all 

elements associated with the C2 network, and communicate with other commanders in 

the joint force. 

 Reachback provides ongoing combat support to the operation from the rear while 

a distributed operation indicates actual involvement in operational planning and/or 

operational decision-making. In some scenarios, the COMAFFOR may elect to leave 

some elements at their home station and use reachback to obtain their support. This 

may be the case for some planning and analysis elements, resulting, for example, in a 

“split” AOC or AFFOR staff. When elements or functions of the AETF are placed in 

geographically separated locations, the COMAFFOR should maintain the same degree 

of control as if they were forward deployed. Supported/supporting relationships must be 

clearly specified to ensure the COMAFFOR has the degree of control required. 

 The decision to establish split or distributed operations invokes several tradeoffs: 

 The fewer the number of personnel/forces deployed forward, the less support is 

required to be pushed across great distances; however, face-to-face interaction 
56 

between forward and rear decision makers may be limited, and decision 

making timelines may stretch. 

 Fewer personnel/forces forward reduce security requirements; however, their 

expertise is no longer immediately at hand for ad hoc problem solving. An “out 

of sight, out of mind” attitude may also become a challenge. 

 Split/distributed operations require more bandwidth for communications. These 

links then become vulnerabilities. However, a distributed operation may 

arguably be more survivable and less prone to single-point failure. 

 Refer to AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, for further discussion of split and 

distributed operations. 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIP MODELS FOR US AIR FORCE FORCES 

When employing military forces, a combatant commander first turns to those 

forces already assigned. Assigned forces are delineated in the SecDef’s “Forces for 

Unified Commands” memorandum, and the combatant commander exercises 

combatant command (COCOM) and OPCON over them. When the situation requires 

additional forces, the combatant commander makes the appropriate request through 

JCS channels. Upon SecDef approval, additional forces may then be deployed. Since 

the additional forces are normally assigned to a different combatant commander, the 

deployment order should clearly delineate the degree of command authority to be 

exercised by the gaining commander. Gained forces are then usually attached to the 

appropriate in-place Service component commander. 

 The deployment order is the primary instrument for transferring forces and 

establishing supported and supporting relationships between combatant commanders. 

Forces may also be transferred by an execute order which executes an approved 

OPLAN. Other orders created during the planning process, such as warning, alert, 

planning, and fragmentary orders, may also specify or shape command relationships, 

but they do not transfer forces. The SecDef, as the only authority for transferring forces 

between combatant commanders, normally signs deployment orders. This deployment 

order should specify to whom the deployed forces are assigned or attached and the 

command relationship (OPCON or TACON) to be exercised by the gaining commander. 

Air Force component commanders may shape command and support relationships by 

working through their chains of command to shape the details of orders being drafted by 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). While the JFC ultimately has the authority to determine 

the delegation of command among subordinates, Air Force commanders should make 

consistent recommendations and present forces in a consistent manner to the JFC. 

For Air Force forces, there are four general models for command relationship: 

forces deployed and executing operations within the theater to which they are attached; 

forces executing missions inside the theater of operations but based outside the theater 
57 

(i.e., across AORs); functional forces with global missions; and transient forces. 

Considerations for these relationships should include the ability of gaining commands to 

receive the forces and to command and control them appropriately; the characteristics 

and support requirements of the forces involved; and the operating locations of the 

forces. These four models illustrate the most probable combinations in assigning 

responsibility for operational control and administrative control; however, many nuances 

are possible, and commanders must exercise sound professional judgment when 

setting up command relationships. (Note: In the following examples, “supported 

combatant commander/JFC” specifically means the in-theater commander who is 

tasked with executing the operation for which the forces under discussion may be 

assigned or attached.) 

In-Theater Forces 

In general, when Air Force forces deploy into a theater to conduct operations, 

OPCON of those forces should normally go forward to the combatant commander 

assigned the mission. To the maximum extent possible, specified elements of ADCON 

should also go forward to the regional COMAFFOR to whom the forces are attached. 

ADCON authorities and responsibilities can run concurrently between the gaining 

COMAFFOR and the parent organizations of the deployed forces and should be clearly 

specified. For assigned forces, the regional COMAFFOR already exercises OPCON 

and ADCON. 

Out-of-Theater Forces

There are two general cases in which Air Force forces may execute missions 

inside a theater of operations while based outside the theater. These cases involve 

CONUS-based forces and forward-based forces operating from outside the AOR. In 

either case, operational control of forces should transfer forward to the commander 

executing the mission, and ADCON will depend on where the forces are based. 

CONUS-Based Forces

CONUS-based forces that launch from the CONUS, conduct operations in 

another theater, and recover in CONUS should transfer OPCON to the supported 

combatant commander/JFC upon sortie generation. ADCON should remain with the 

original MAJCOM. An example would be a bomber launching from CONUS, striking a 

target overseas under the command of a regional force, and returning to CONUS. 

Another example would be bombers placed on alert in CONUS in support of 

commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) tasking. For both of these 

examples, OPCON should transfer to the supported combatant commander/JFC who is 

executing the mission; this is the preferred arrangement. However, if the tasked 

combatant commander/JFC is only granted TACON of these forces, OPCON in this 

case remains with the commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) and 

ADCON remains with the commander, Air Combat Command (ACC). 
58 

OCONUS Forces outside the AOR 

For OCONUS units stationed outside the theater of operations tasked to conduct 

sustained operations in that theater, OPCON should normally transfer forward to the 

supported combatant commander/JFC, and ADCON is best held by the COMAFFOR for 

the geographic region in which they bed down. An example of this situation would be 

bombers stationed at Diego Garcia (in the USPACOM AOR) but conducting operations 

under the command of US Central Command. The commander, US Central Command 

(CDRUSCENTCOM) would exercise OPCON of the bombers most likely through his 

COMAFFOR, the commander, Air Forces Central (AFCENT). The PACAF commander 

would exercise ADCON through the Air Force Service component for the Pacific region, 

AFPAC. 

Functional Forces 

Functional forces (such as air mobility and space forces) satisfy mission 

requirements across multiple AORs and are thus best centrally controlled. For such 

forces, the functional combatant commander will normally retain OPCON of assigned 

forces and execute as a supporting commander to the supported geographic combatant 

commander. 

 In those cases where functional forces bed down in a geographic commander’s 

AOR, the Air Force host base commander (or senior Air Force officer present on the 

installation, if the Air Force is a tenant) will exercise a minimum degree of ADCON, 

usually only for force protection, UCMJ, dining and lodging, and some limited force 

reporting. (See Chapter 3 for more discussion on the ADCON responsibilities of host 

installation commanders). The extent and nature of the elements of ADCON that will be 

exercised by the geographic commander should be specified in deployment orders 

and/or command-to-command agreements. 

Transient Forces

Geographic or local commanders do not normally exercise OPCON of transient 

forces (i.e., forces merely transiting an AOR or JOA and not part of an AETF, and not 

participating in combatant commander-sponsored joint exercises). However, such 

forces are subject to local force protection, UCMJ, lodging and dining, and 

administrative reporting requirements. Per Joint Pub 0–2, Unified Action Armed Forces 

(UNAAF), “Transient forces within the assigned AOR of a combatant commander are 

subject to the area commander’s orders in some instances, e.g., for coordination 

for emergency defense or allocation of local facilities. However, transient forces are not 

part of the area commander’s command, and the area commander is not in their 

normal chain of command.” [Emphasis in original] 

Forces in Exercises 

Forces participating in joint exercises under the orders of a combatant 

commander or other SecDef directed training should normally be under the OPCON of 
59 

the sponsoring combatant commander. Forces participating in such joint training should 

normally be attached to the combatant commander with specification of OPCON via 

SecDef approved deployment orders. 

 Unless otherwise specified by the SecDef, and with the exception of the US 

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, a geographic combatant commander has 

TACON for exercise purposes whenever forces not assigned to that combatant 

commander undertake exercises in that combatant commander's AOR. TACON begins 

when the forces enter the AOR and is terminated upon completion of the exercise, after 

departing the AOR. In this context, TACON provides directive authority over exercising 

forces for purposes relating to that exercise only; it does not authorize operational 

employment of those forces. This blanket specification of TACON for exercise 

purposes does not apply to USTRANSCOM assets within any AOR or to forces 

deployed for exercises in USNORTHCOM AOR. OPCON and TACON for 

USTRANSCOM forces or forces exercising in USNORTHCOM AOR remain as 

established by the SecDef. 

TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONAL FORCES TO A GEOGRAPHIC 

COMMAND 

In some situations, a geographic commander may request additional functional 

forces beyond those apportioned or allocated during deliberate or crisis action planning. 

The decision to transfer functional forces, with specification of OPCON, to a geographic 

combatant commander should be balanced against competing needs across multiple 

AORs. The requirement for effectiveness within a region may trump the global 

efficiency sought by functional combatant commanders. Therefore, after coordination 

with the owning functional commander and upon SecDef approval, functional forces 

may be transferred to the geographic command and organized accordingly. 

 The decision to attach additional functional forces has two parts. First, the 

decision should consider whether: 

 The geographic combatant commander will use the forces at or near 100% of 

their capability with no residual capability for other global missions. 

 The forces will be used regularly and frequently over a period of time, not just 

for a single mission employment. 

 The geographic commander has the ability to effectively command and control 

the forces. 

If the answer to all three questions above is “yes,” then the functional forces 

should be attached to the geographic combatant command. If any of the above 

questions are answered “no,” then the functional forces should remain under the 

OPCON of the functional combatant commander’s COMAFFOR and be tasked in 

support. 
60 

If the decision is to attach forces, the second question is whether the forces will 

be attached with specification of OPCON or TACON. 

 Specification of OPCON: OPCON is the more complete—and preferred—

choice of control. It includes “the authority to perform those functions of 

command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing 

commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving 

authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes 

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.” 

It “normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to 

employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers 

necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include 

authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, 

internal organization, or unit training” (JP 1-02). 

 Specification of TACON: TACON is the more limited choice of control. It is 

“limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within 

the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.” It 

“provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force 

or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task” 

(JP 1-02). JP 0-2, UNAAF, states “when transfer of forces to a joint force will 

be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining commands and JFCs 

will normally exercise OPCON over the attached forces.” While it is possible for 

the SecDef to attach forces across combatant command lines with the 

specification of only TACON and not OPCON, such action would deviate from 

the joint doctrine and policy established in the UNAAF and would result in a 

more confused chain of command with OPCON and TACON split between two 

different combatant commanders. 

 Regardless of which form of control is transferred, regional COMAFFORs have 

inherent responsibilities for such issues as local force protection, lodging, and dining. 

Thus, if a regional COMAFFOR holds OPCON of forces outside the AOR, he or she is 

not responsible for such issues – that is the responsibility of the COMAFFOR in the 

region in which they are bedded down. In a parallel fashion, if such out-of-region forces 

divert into bases in his/her region (for example, for emergencies), that COMAFFOR is 

now responsible for basic support and protection. 

 As an example, a combatant commander requests tankers in support of a 

regional operation. If the tankers are totally committed to that operation and are 

unavailable to perform any other missions, OPCON of these tankers may be transferred 

to the supported combatant commander/JFC. If, on the other hand, the tankers are only 

partially employed in that operation, and thus are available for other missions (such as 

support to the intertheater air bridge), CDRUSTRANSCOM should retain OPCON to 

optimize overall tanker utilization. As another example, missile warning satellites can 

provide warning to the supported combatant commander/JFC through a direct support 
61 

relationship, but CDRUSSTRATCOM retains OPCON to optimize missile warning 

mission requirements globally. 

INTEGRATING REGIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL AIR AND SPACE 

FORCES 

As previously stated, air and space power is usually presented through a mix of 

regional and functional models, with the latter usually supporting the former. Functional 

forces usually maintain a separate organization from the supported regional 

organization, and are integrated in the theater through specially trained liaisons 

attached to the regional COMAFFOR. The most likely functional capabilities to be 

provided in such a supporting relationship are air mobility operations, space operations, 

and special operations. 

Integrating Air Mobility Operations 

Because air mobility forces serve several regions concurrently, their employment 

must be balanced between regional and intertheater requirements and priorities. At the 

same time, the air mobility systems performing intratheater and intertheater missions 

within a given region must operate in close coordination to provide responsive and 

integrated aerial movement to the supported combatant commander. 

 Carefully constructed command relationships can allow an interlocking 

arrangement to manage intratheater and intertheater air mobility operations. Normally, 

intratheater air mobility forces will be attached to the JFC, with OPCON as appropriate 

delegated to the COMAFFOR. Intertheater air mobility forces normally remain under 

the control of USTRANSCOM, delegated downward within AMC to Eighteenth Air Force 

(18 AF) as appropriate (refer to the command relationship discussion for functional 

forces earlier in this chapter). Within a regional operation, the DIRMOBFOR-Air, with 

the air mobility division (AMD) in the AOC, provides the pivotal link between the 

intertheater and intratheater air mobility operations. 

The Director of Air Mobility Forces 

Within an AETF, the DIRMOBFOR-Air is the JFACC’s designated coordinating 

authority for air mobility operations. The DIRMOBFOR-Air, normally a senior Air Force 

air mobility officer familiar with the AOR, coordinates on behalf of the JFACC with the 

AMD in the AOC. The DIRMOBFOR-Air may be sourced by the theater Air Force 

component commander or nominated by the AMC commander. To ensure close 

coordination with the overall theater effort, the DIRMOBFOR-Air is normally assigned to 

the JFACC’s special staff. In those instances when no JFACC is designated, or the 

JFACC is from another Service, the DIRMOBFOR-Air should normally report to the 

COMAFFOR. The DIRMOBFOR-Air’s specific authorities and responsibilities include: 

 Coordinate the integration of intertheater air mobility support provided by 

USTRANSCOM-assigned air mobility forces. 
62 

 Coordinate the tasking of USTRANSCOM air mobility forces (air and ground) 

assigned or attached to the JFC. 

 Coordinate the tasking of intratheater air mobility forces (air and ground) 

attached to the theater or JTF. 

 Coordinate with the AOC director to ensure all air mobility operations attached 

to and supporting the JFC are fully integrated with the air tasking cycle and 

deconflicted with all other air operations. 

 Coordinate with 18 AF, through the AMD and the TACC, all intertheater air 

mobility missions to ensure the most effective use of these resources in 

accomplishing the JFC, theater, and USTRANSCOM missions. 

Integrating Space Operations 

 

Space presents another form of military operations that, much like air mobility, 

usually are best presented functionally to a regional commander through a supporting 

relationship if they are not attached. Space command and control brings another level 

of complexity because many space assets that support military interests come from a 

variety of organizations, some outside of DOD. These capabilities often have 

nontraditional chains of command. In some cases, authority may be split between 

organizations due to shared interagency responsibilities. Much like air mobility through 

the DIRMOBFOR-Air, space capabilities within a regional operation are normally 

focused within a JTF by the designation of a single authority for space operations. 

Space Coordinating Authority 

 

Within a regional operation, the JFC should designate SCA to facilitate unity of 

effort with DOD-wide space operations and non-DOD space capabilities. Although 

JFCs may retain authority at the JTF level, they should normally designate as 

SCA the component commander who provides the preponderance of military 

space capabilities, the requisite ability to command and control them, and the 

resident space expertise. In most cases, the JFACC provides these capabilities 

through the Air Force’s organic space C2 infrastructure. Responsibilities of SCA 

include: 

 Determine, deconflict, and prioritize military space requirements for the JTF. 

 Recommend appropriate command relationships for space to the JFC. 

 Help facilitate space target nomination. 

 Maintain space situational awareness. 

 Request space inputs from JTF staff and components during planning. 
63 

 Ensure optimum interoperability of space assets with coalition forces. 

 Recommend JTF military space requirement priorities to JFC. 

The Director of Space Forces 

Within an AETF, the DIRSPACEFOR serves as the senior space advisor to the 

JFACC. The DIRSPACEFOR, an Air Force space officer, coordinates, integrates, and 

staffs activities to tailor space support to the JFACC. In addition, when the JFACC is 

designated as SCA, the DIRSPACEFOR will work the day-to-day SCA activities on 

behalf of the JFACC. If the COMAFFOR is neither SCA nor the JFACC, the 

COMAFFOR should establish a space liaison to the JFACC through an ACCE. The 

DIRSPACEFOR is part of the JFACC’s special staff. Whether a permanent member of 

the theater MAJCOM staff or provided to the theater by Air Force Space Command 

(AFSPC), the DIRSPACEFOR should be pre-identified to allow that officer time to 

become familiar with that theater’s space requirements. The DIRSPACEFOR’s specific 

responsibilities include: 

 Provide senior space perspective for strategy and daily guidance development, 

target selection, force enhancement to terrestrial operations, and special 

technical operations (STO) activities relating to space operations. 

 Facilitate AFSPC, USSTRATCOM, and national support to the JFC. 

 Provide assistance to the JFACC in determining and achieving military space 

requirements. 

 Assist regional AOC staff in developing and staffing space related operational 

requirements and policy matters. 

 Recommend appropriate command relationships for space to the JFACC. 

Integrating Special Operations 

Special operations forces normally operate through separate theater special 

operations components. When SOF operate in concert with “conventional” JTFs, they 

usually take the form of a separate JSOTF within the JTF, commanded by a JFSOCC. 

While SOF normally pursue SOF-unique objectives, they may also be tasked to operate 

in support of conventional objectives or require conventional support of their objectives: 

 SOF may act as an economy of force measure, striking conventional targets 

that allow joint air assets to strike more appropriate targets. 

 SOF may be able to conduct surgical operations beyond the capabilities of joint 

air and space forces. For example, they may strike against WMD production or 

storage facilities inaccessible to joint air due to environmental or dispersal 

concerns. 
64 

 Because of unique training and multiple air/ground combat power delivery 

capabilities, SOF may combine with joint air and space operations in a 

synergistic attack (e.g., terminal guidance operations). 

 SOF may enhance joint air and space operations with specialized personnel 

and platform capabilities to assist in locating deep targets. 

 Whether operating under control of the JFSOCC or in support of the JFACC, 

SOF aviation missions are integrated into other air activities supporting the theater 

campaign. Integration is crucial because the JFACC and the JFSOCC normally share 

common operational areas, and their assets routinely operate in the deep battlespace. 

SOF aviation and surface assets are integrated closely in all joint air operations, from 

planning through execution. To ensure this, the JFSOCC provides the JFACC a SOLE 

to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SOF operations, strategy, and plans with other 

air operations. In return, the JFACC provides an ACCE to the JFSOCC. 

The Special Operations Liaison Element 

Whether operating autonomously or in conjunction with conventional forces, SOF 

aviation and surface assets must be closely integrated into all joint air operations—from 

planning through execution—to provide coordination and deconfliction, prevent 

fratricide, and exploit synergistic effects. Integration is crucial since air assets and SOF 

are the only forces that normally operate deep in enemy territory. 

 The JFSOCC provides the SOLE to the JFACC. The SOLE works for the 

JFSOCC in the AOC and serves as his liaison staff. The SOLE integrates all SOF air 

and surface operations with joint air operations via the air tasking process. Specific 

functions include ATO and ACO generation; real time mission support within the AOC; 

operations and intelligence support for targeting; combat airspace control for prevention 

of fratricide; coordination with special plans functions; and coordination with the joint 

personnel recovery center (JPRC). The SOLE also assists in the deconfliction of joint 

special operations areas (JSOAs) and unconventional warfare operating areas with the 

JFACC. 

 

HOMELAND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 

For most homeland contingency scenarios, Air Force forces should be presented 

as an AETF under the OPCON of a COMAFFOR, just as in any other theater. For 

homeland operations, Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH), at Tyndall AFB, FL, normally 

fulfills the role of the Air Force component to USNORTHCOM, the supported combatant 

command. The Commander, AFNORTH is also the JFACC within the NORAD chain for 

the CONUS NORAD region. The command relationships between a JFC and a 

COMAFFOR in a homeland context should be as previously described for any other 

region—although legal and interagency considerations may have significant impact, the 

CONUS is not a special case regarding C2 or organization of air and space forces. As 

noted previously, single-Service task forces may also be established in homeland 

operations. 
65 

 In some DSCA operations, a JFC may elect to allocate combat support forces to 

subordinate functional task force commanders (TFCs) with a specification of OPCON to 

the TFC. For example, a JFC in a major disaster relief operation might organize his/her 

forces into separate engineering, transportation, and medical task forces. This 

organizational scheme—a legacy construct which sidesteps the role of Service 

components and Service component commanders—divides Air Force assets among 

other component commanders and fractures Service unity of command. Thus, this is 

not the most operationally effective scheme for achieving unity of command and unity of 

effort under a single Airman. Ideally, the JFC allows the COMAFFOR to retain OPCON 

of all assigned and attached Air Force forces. The COMAFFOR then provides direct 

support to the various functional TFCs with the COMAFFOR as a supporting 

commander. 

 In disaster relief operations, particularly in consequence management of a 

manmade or natural disaster, the Air Force contribution will likely include a Total Force 

mix of regular, Guard, and Reserve capabilities. A normal tiered response to a large 

event results in local, state, and then Federal resources (at the request of the governor) 

working in direct support to a lead federal agency. This poses unity of effort challenges 

for any COMAFFOR. Regular officers cannot command “non-federalized” ANG forces, 

and a “non-federalized” ANG commander cannot command regular forces. Unity of 

effort for regular and ANG units are synchronized through the use of “Coordinating 

Authority” given the commander assigned responsibility for Air Force assets. As 

described in the UNAAF, Coordinating Authority may be granted and modified through a 

memorandum of agreement to provide unity of command and unity of effort for 

operations involving Guard, Reserve, and regular component forces engaged in 

interagency activities. Coordinating Authority is the authority to “require consultation 

between the agencies involved.” Coordinating Authority is a consultation relationship, 

not an authority through which command may be exercised. 

 A similar situation may occur in a DSCA scenario when a mix of medical and line 

Air Force forces are presented to a JTF commander. Because medical officers cannot 

command line forces, a senior line officer may have to be designated to serve as 

COMAFFOR. 
66 

Intentionally Blank 
67 

CHAPTER FIVE 

THE AIR AND SPACE COMPONENT WITHIN THE JOINT FORCE 

Modern warfare requires flexibility in execution to adapt to a wide variety of 

scenarios; this drives a need to assemble the right mix of forces from the appropriate 

Services to tailor the operation. This need to assemble the right forces drives a 

corresponding need for proper organization, command and control mechanisms, and 

appropriate command relationships. Current Service and joint doctrine provide much 

useful guidance on organization; however, assembling a joint organization demands 

careful, conscious thought. This chapter draws from doctrine and experience to provide 

the basics of setting up and commanding a joint air and space component within a joint 

force. 

JOINT FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL BASICS 

When a crisis requires a military response, the geographic combatant 

commander will usually form a tailored JTF. If Air Force forces are required, they will 

stand up as an AETF within the JTF. The AETF will normally form up beneath the Air 

Force component headquarters. The AETF commander, as the COMAFFOR, will 

provide the single Air Force face to the JTF commander. Other Services may also 

provide forces, and normally stand up as separate Army, Navy, and Marine forces, each 

with their respective commander (commander, Army forces [COMARFOR]; commander, 

Navy forces [COMNAVFOR]; and commander, Marine forces [COMMARFOR]). This 

JTF organization, along purely Service lines, is the most basic joint force organization 

(See Figure 5.1). Each separate Service component commander normally exercises 

OPCON over assigned and attached forces, as delegated from the JFC. 

 Employing forces through Service components, however, does not allow for the 

true integration of key functional activities – especially air and space power. Further, 

Army, Navy, and Marine forces are usually assigned individual AOs, which are subsets 

of the JFC’s JOA, which presents a less-than-total view of the theater. By comparison, 

an air and space component commander has the same operational level, JOA-wide 

perspective as the JFC. 

The greatest lesson of this war has been the extent 

to which air, land, and sea operations can and must 

be coordinated by joint planning and unified 

command. The attainment of better coordination and 

balance than now exists between services is an 

essential of national security. 

—General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold 
68 

Because all four Services have forces that operate in the air domain, and two of 

them have land forces, the designation of functional commanders allows greater 

synergy by integrating similar activities across Service boundaries. Functional 

component commanders can also focus their planning and execution above the tactical 

level at the operational level of war. However, the designation of joint force air and 

space, land, maritime, and special operations component commanders (JFACC, 

JFLCC, JFMCC, and JFSOCC respectively) is at the discretion of the JFC. This 

functional component model has the added benefit in that, of all possible models, it 

most easily transitions to one that supports combined (coalition) employment, and the 

functional component commanders become combined component commanders 

(CFACC, CFLCC, CFMCC, and CFSOCC). 

Joint Force 

Commander

Navy

Forces

COMNAVFOR

Army

Forces 

Air Force 

Forces 

COMAFFOR 

Figure 5.1. Joint Task Force organization along purely 

Service lines. This is the most basic joint force organization

COMARFOR

Marine Corps 

Forces 

COMMARFOR

Figure 5.2. Joint Task Force organization with functional and 

Service component commanders. This represents the Air 

Force’s preferred joint force organization 

Navy

Forces

COMNAVFOR

Army

Forces

COMARFOR 

Air Force 

Forces 

COMAFFOR 

Marine Corps 

Forces 

COMMARFOR

JFACC

Air & Space 

Forces Made 

Available 

JFLCC

Land Forces

Made Available

JFMCC

Naval Forces

Made Available

JFSOCC

SO Forces 

Assigned/Attached/

Made Available 

Joint Force 

Commander
69 

In some cases, a combatant 

commander may elect to form a JTF 

around a Service or functional 

component, depending on the nature 

of the mission and that component’s 

ability to provide command and 

control. Thus, a COMAFFOR/JFACC 

or COMARFOR/JFLCC might also be 

designated as the JFC. In such 

cases, that commander’s staff should 

be augmented sufficiently to provide 

a representative mix of expertise for 

the mission and forces 

assigned. Under these circumstances 

a lower-level headquarters and 

command structure will be required to 

avoid dual-hatting a commander and 

staff at different echelons of 

command. 

 

In all cases, the JFC is ultimately responsible for delineating the command 

relations to support his or her organization and empowering subordinate commanders 

appropriately. Normally, a JFC receives OPCON of assigned or attached forces and 

delegates that control (OPCON) to the appropriate Service component commanders. 

Delegation of OPCON allows Service component commanders the necessary authority 

to fully organize and employ their forces: 

“Operational control is the authority to 

perform those functions of command 

over subordinate forces involving 

organizing and employing commands 

and forces, assigning tasks, 

designating objectives, and giving 

authoritative direction necessary to 

accomplish the mission. Operational 

control includes authoritative direction 

over all aspects of military operations 

and joint training necessary to 

accomplish missions assigned to the 

command. Operational control 

should be exercised through the 

commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this 

authority is exercised through 

subordinate joint force 

commanders and Service and/or 

functional component 

commanders.” (JP 1-02). (Emphasis 

added) 

THEATER AIR AND SPACE COMMAND MECHANISM 

The theater air control system (TACS) is the mechanism for commanding and 

controlling theater air and space power. It consists of airborne and ground elements to 

conduct tailored C2 of air and space operations throughout the spectrum of conflict, 

including air defense, airspace control, and coordination of space mission support not 

resident within theater. The structure of the TACS should reflect sensor coverage, 

component liaison elements, and the communications required to provide adequate 

support. As an organic Air Force weapon system, the TACS remains under OPCON of 

the COMAFFOR. In multinational commands, the name and function of certain TACS 

elements may differ, but multinational air components have similar capabilities. 

Air and Space Operations Center 

The AOC is the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes personnel and 

equipment of the necessary disciplines to ensure the effective conduct of air and space 
70 

operations (e.g., communications, operations, intelligence, etc.). As the operations 

command center of the JFACC, it provides the capability to plan, task, execute, monitor, 

and assess the activities of assigned or attached forces. When the JFACC is 

designated as the AADC, ACA, and SCA, these functions are also performed through 

the AOC. The AOC monitors execution of air operations and directs changes as the 

situation dictates. As the focal point of the TACS, the AOC should have secure and 

redundant communications with operations, logistics, weather, and intelligence centers, 

higher and lateral headquarters, as well as subordinate units to preclude degradation in 

its ability to control air forces. See Chapter 7 for a more detailed description of the 

AOC. 

Liaisons within the TACS 

Joint components and headquarters staffs normally exchange liaisons and 

coordinating elements with each other in order to better integrate planning, execution, 

and assessment. Specifically, the JFACC normally provides an ACCE laterally to sister 

components as needed, and to the JFC. In return, the JFACC normally receives a 

battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) from the Army as an adjunct to the AOC, as 

well as liaisons from the other components (e.g., a SOLE from the JFSOCC; a MARLO 

from the Marines; and a NALE from the Naval component) (Chapter 7 discusses these 

liaisons in greater detail). Specifics such as relative location of headquarters and type 

of planned military operations will dictate the size of such liaison elements. These 

liaison elements should have adequate communications with their respective 

component commands to support informed decisions regarding the use and 

sustainability of their force’s assets. The JFACC also employs the DIRMOBFOR-Air 

and DIRSPACEFOR to integrate air mobility and space respectively. See Chapter 7 for 

an expanded discussion of these elements. 

Airborne TACS Elements 

Airborne TACS elements provide a highly responsive, flexible, and survivable 

system to support the execution and coordination of theater air and space operations. 

They may be employed autonomously during the early stages of theater contingencies 

and conflicts or in concert with multinational and joint Service C2 systems. Airborne 

TACS elements can rapidly react to changing situations by adjusting sensor and 

communications coverage to support ATO execution. Airborne elements rely on 

onboard systems as well as direct connectivity with off-board intelligence collectors 

(such as RC-135 RIVET JOINT) to accurately assess the combat arena and adjust 

force execution. Airborne elements of the TACS include the E-3 Airborne Warning and 

Control System (AWACS), the Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (Joint 

STARS), and forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC-As). 

Ground TACS Elements 

Ground-based TACS elements provide similar capabilities as airborne elements 

but with reduced range, flexibility, and mobility. They are an important interface 
71 

between the TACS, ground-based air defense activities, and Army ground maneuver 

and fires units. Ground TACS responsibilities are often delegated to the control and 

reporting center (CRC) and air support operations center (ASOC). Ground TACS 

elements include: the CRC; CRC remote radars; ASOCs; tactical air control parties; and 

expeditionary operations centers (EOCs). Even though some of these elements are colocated with Army forces to better provide close support, these elements remain under 

the command of the JFACC, not the Army element with which they are co-located. See 

AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, for more detailed discussion on these TACS elements. 

INTEGRATING COMPONENT OPERATIONS: THE AIR COMPONENT 

COORDINATION ELEMENT 

The JFACC may establish one or more ACCEs with other component 

commanders’ headquarters to better integrate air and space operations with their 

operations, and with the JTF headquarters to better integrate air and space operations 

within the overall joint force. When established, these elements act as the JFACC’s 

primary representatives to the respective commanders and facilitate interaction among 

the respective staffs. The ACCE facilitates integration by exchanging current 

intelligence, operational data, and support requirements, and by coordinating the 

integration of JFACC requirements for airspace coordinating measures, joint fire support 

coordinating measures, close air support, air mobility, and space requirements. As 

such, the ACCE is a liaison element, not a C2 node; thus, the ACCE normally has no 

authority to direct or employ forces. The make-up of the ACCE is dependent on the 

scope of the operation and the size of the staff they will liaise with. If the ACCE will 

perform liaison duties for both the COMAFFOR and JFACC staff, the ACCE should be 

tailored with the expertise necessary to perform effectively. Element expertise may 

include plans, operations, intelligence, airspace management, logistics, space, and air 

mobility, as needed. The ACCE also communicates the component commander’s 

decisions and interests to the JFACC. However, the ACCE should not replace, 

replicate, or circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the 

component/JTF staffs, nor supplant normal planning performed by the AOC and AFFOR 

staff. The ACCE director is the JFACC’s personal and official representative, and as 

such should have sufficient rank to effectively work with the component or JTF 

commander to which he or she is attached. Finally, to maintain proper perspective and 

focus, the ACCE director should not normally be dual-hatted as the commander of a 

tactical unit. 

 Normally, the ACCE should: 

 Ensure the JFACC is aware of each commander’s priorities and plans. 

 Ensure the JFACC staff coordinates within their surface component/JTF 

headquarters counterparts to work issues. 

 Ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the JFACC’s capabilities and 

limitations (constraints, restraints, and restrictions). 
72 

 Ensure appropriate commanders are aware of the JFACC’s plan to support the 

surface commander’s scheme of maneuver and the JFC’s intent and 

objectives. 

 Facilitate JFACC staff processes with the surface/JTF commanders. Provide 

oversight of other JFACC liaisons to component/JTF headquarters staffs, if 

directed. 

 Ensure information flows properly between the AOC/AFFOR staff and sister 

components and JFC. 

JOINT LIAISONS IN THE AOC 

Depending on the nature of the operation, the JFACC may have a number of 

liaison teams within the AOC to facilitate planning and execution among the other 

components in the joint force. 

 Component Liaisons. Component liaisons work for their respective component 

commanders and with the JFACC and staff. Each component normally provides liaison 

elements that work within the AOC. These liaison elements consist of experienced 

specialists who provide component planning and tasking expertise and coordination 

capabilities. They help integrate, coordinate, and deconflict their component’s 

participation in joint air and space operations. The air and space component may 

require other liaison augmentation to support AOC functions such as Coast Guard, 

Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Air 

Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and Federal Aviation 

Administration in various operational and support areas. 

 Battlefield Coordination Detachment. The BCD supports integration of air and 

space operations with ground maneuver. BCD personnel are integrated into AOC 

divisions to support planning, operations, air defense, intelligence, airlift/logistics, 

airspace control, and communications. In particular, the BCD coordinates ground force 

priorities, requests, and items of interest. One of the BCD’s most important functions is 

to coordinate boundary line and fire support coordination line changes and timing. The 

BCD brings ground order of battle (both friendly and enemy) situational awareness and 

expertise into the AOC and will normally brief the ground situation/intelligence update. 

The BCD may also provide current ground situation inputs to AOC teams for 

incorporation into daily briefings and intelligence summaries. 

 Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element. The NALE personnel from the 

maritime components support the AOC in integrating naval air, naval fires, and 

amphibious operations into theater air operations and monitor and interpret the maritime 

battle situation for the AOC. 

 Marine Liaison Officer. MARLOs are representatives of the COMMARFOR and 

his associated aviation combat element commander. The MARLOs will support the 

JFACC in integrating MAGTF fires, maneuver, and Marine air into the theater campaign 
73 

and supporting JAOP. This team will be well versed in the MAGTF commander’s 

guidance, intentions, schemes of maneuver, and direct support aviation plan. 

 Special Operations Liaison Element. US Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) provides a SOLE to the JFACC to coordinate and integrate all SOF 

activities in the entire battlespace. The SOLE is comprised of representatives from SOF 

aviation, intelligence, airspace, logistics, Air Force special tactics teams, Army special 

forces, and Navy Sea-Air Land teams (SEAL). SOLE personnel work within the various 

AOC functional areas to ensure that all SOF targets, SOF teams, and SOF air 

taskings/missions are deconflicted, properly integrated, and coordinated during all 

planning and execution phases. The prevention of fratricide is a critical product of the 

SOLE’s efforts. 

 Coalition/Allied Liaison Officers. LNOs representing coalition/allied surface 

forces may improve AOC situational awareness regarding the disposition of friendly 

forces, especially when those forces do not have a mature TACS. They are also 

essential for unity of effort for coalition air defense operations and airspace 

deconfliction. When teamed with linguists, they can help overcome language barriers 

with remote allied/coalition forces. In force projection scenarios into an immature 

theater, AOC directors must anticipate the need for LNOs and actively seek them out 

via the JFC staff, in-country military group 

(MILGROUP), staff country team, or direct contact 

with coalition forces, if necessary. 

AIR AND SPACE COMPONENT 

RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN A JOINT FORCE 

The JFC normally assigns broad missions to 

the component commanders; with each mission 

comes a specification of supported commander for 

that mission. As an example, the JFC may designate 

the JFACC as the supported commander for strategic 

attack, air interdiction, and theater airborne ISR 

(among other missions). As such, the JFACC is 

responsible to the JFC for planning, coordinating, and 

executing these missions, and other component 

commanders support the JFACC. When outlining 

supported/supporting relationships, the JFC usually 

does not specify the degree and timing that support 

should be; the subordinate commanders normally 

work that out. 

 For some missions or functions, specification 

of support alone may be insufficient in order for a 

functional component commander to fully integrate 

and employ forces made available. In such 

During World War II, 

General MacArthur and 

his senior Airman, Lt Gen 

Kenney, had a close 

working relationship. As 

a result, General Kenney 

enjoyed a high level of 

trust to employ air power 

as best fit his 

commander’s objectives.
74 

instances, the JFC may grant a subordinate commander TACON of specific elements of 

another component’s resources (this, in fact, is the usual command authority exercised 

by functional component commanders over forces made available to them). This 

provides that commander with a more finite degree of control. The commander 

responsible for a mission should be given the requisite authority to carry out that 

mission. 

 The JFACC should establish a close working relationship with the JFC to ensure 

the best representation of air and space power’s potential. When possible, the JFACC 

should co-locate with, or at least be positioned close to, the JFC, so they may benefit 

from frequent personal interaction. This fosters the personal trust between senior 

commanders essential to joint operations. It also helps keep a greater air and space 

power presence in the joint force headquarters, especially during planning, as well as 

keeping the JTF headquarters staff from trying to plan and run air component 

operations in the perceived absence of the JTF’s senior Airman. To facilitate this, in 

some situations the JFACC may even elect to co-locate with the JFC at the expense of 

residing in the AOC. 

JOINT STAFFS 

Joint Staff Composition 

Effective joint operations require real integration of significant multi-Service 

capabilities. The composition of a truly joint staff should reflect the composition of the 

subordinate joint forces to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have 

a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of assigned or attached forces. 

The presence of liaisons on a single-Service staff does not transform that Service staff 

into a joint staff. The joint staff should be composed of appropriate members in key 

positions of responsibility from each Service or functional component having significant 

forces assigned to the command. 

 The same general guidelines for joint staffs apply to coalition operations. Key 

staff positions ought to be a representative mix of US and allied officers. As with a joint 

staff, the key concepts are shared responsibilities and trust. And as with a joint staff, 

liaisons alone don’t make a Service staff into a coalition staff. 

Commanders and Staff 

“Commanders command, staffs support.” Within a joint force, only those with the 

title of “commander”—i.e., the JFC, the Service component commanders, and the 

functional component commanders—may exercise any degree of operational control 

over forces. Only commanders have the legal and moral authority to place 

personnel in harm’s way. Under no circumstance should staff agencies, 

including those of the JFC’s staff, attempt to command forces. Special cells 

formed within a joint staff to oversee or advise the JFC on special interest activities 

should not exercise direct control over component forces. In accordance with joint 
75 

policy as stated in the UNAAF, it is permissible for joint staff agencies to issue orders 

and directives in the name of the commander of the higher command to the commander

of the immediate subordinate command. Staff agencies should neither attempt to nor 

be permitted to directly command or control elements of the subordinate forces. 

JFACC Staff 

When the COMAFFOR is designated the JFACC, the JFACC may need to 

establish a small joint or combined staff to deal with coalition issues beyond the purview 

of the AFFOR staff. Additionally, some 

AFFOR staff personnel may be present 

in the AOC to provide the JFACC with 

access to Air Force component 

information; normally, such AFFOR 

staff personnel will not be dual-hatted 

within the AOC. Augmentation within 

each AOC directorate from relevant 

Service components and coalition 

partners ensures adequate joint 

representation on the JFACC staff. At 

the discretion of the JFACC, officers 

from other Services and coalition 

partners may fill key deputy and 

principal staff JFACC positions. 

Finally, for very large and complex 

operations, as might be encountered 

with large coalition operations, a 

COMAFFOR dual-hatted as a JFACC 

may delegate some aspects of 

COMAFFOR functions to a subordinate 

deputy COMAFFOR to ensure that they 

receive the proper attention. 

MULTI-HATTING COMMANDERS / SPAN OF COMMAND 

Caution should be applied when multi-hatting commanders. Too many “hats” 

may distract a commander from focusing on the right level of war at the right time, or 

may simply overwhelm the commander with detail. Of equal importance is the fact that 

a commander’s staff can usually operate effectively only at one level of war at a time. If 

a commander must wear several hats, it is preferable that the associated 

responsibilities lie at the same level of war. While it is normally inappropriate for 

either a Service or a functional component commander to also serve as the JFC, it is 

entirely appropriate for a JFACC to also serve as the AADC, ACA, and SCA, since all 

four functions lie at the operational level and all four functions are supported through the 

same command node (the AOC). To alleviate the overload, a multi-hatted commander 

Principles of Organization 

 A commander and staff can only focus 

on one level of war at a time. 

 If it’s important enough to commit 

American combat forces, it’s important 

enough to provide them full-time 

commanders. 

 If you need to establish ad-hoc 

committees to integrate your components’ 

operations, your organizational structure is 

probably flawed. 

 If someone outside your command is 

doing your planning, make them part of 

our command structure. 

 Good people can compensate for a 

bad organization—up to a point. 
76 

may delegate some functions (but not the ultimate responsibility) to appropriate 

deputies. 

 More challenging are those instances 

when a commander’s hats vertically span 

several levels of war, as in the case when the 

JFC (normally acting at the theater-strategic 

level) is also acting as a functional 

component commander (operational level), 

and also as the commander of one of the 

operating (tactical) units. In such cases, the 

commander may be inadvertently drawn to 

the tactical level of detail at the expense of 

the operational-level fight. Also, dual- or 

multi-hatting a functional or Service 

component commander as the JFC raises a 

special caution in itself, as it 

“...may place this commander in an 

unwieldy position, foster a parochial 

single-Service or component view of 

overall joint operations and 

component contributions, and create 

potential conflicts of interest.” (JP 3-

33, Joint Task Force Headquarters) 

Thus, although this option is available to combatant commanders when designing 

subordinate JTFs, caution is needed when vertically multi-hatting commanders, as it 

tends to create “part-time commanders.” 

SUPPORT TO MULTIPLE JTFs 

As previously discussed, a combatant commander normally establishes a 

subordinate JTF to conduct operations; forces are normally attached as needed, with 

specification of OPCON to the subordinate JFC. Again as previously discussed, when 

the Air Force is tasked to provide forces, an AETF is established within the JTF, with a 

COMAFFOR and appropriate command and control mechanisms. However, if a 

combatant commander establishes multiple JTFs within the AOR, there may be 

insufficient Air Force assets and C2 capabilities to provide each JTF with its own, 

discrete Air Force component. In these circumstances, the most effective and efficient 

application of air and space power may dictate air and space assets be retained at the 

theater level as a supporting command and apportioned to support the multiple JTF 

commanders according to the combatant commander's theater-wide priorities. In this 

situation, the Air Force component commander will normally recommend to the 

combatant commander that air and space assets be controlled at the theater level, 

under the command of the theater Service component commander or JFACC (as 

Within a joint force, the air 

component commander (either 

COMAFFOR or JFACC) is co-equal 

to the land and maritime component 

commanders and subordinate to the 

JFC. When a JFC is dual-hatted as 

one of the subordinate component 

commanders, this co-equal status is 

compromised and may result in loss 

of operational effectiveness for the 

overall joint force. If the JFC is dualhatted as the JFLCC (as was done, 

for example, in Operation DESERT 

STORM), then the JFACC must be 

able to deal with that dual-hatted 

individual as a co-equal when 

wearing his JFLCC hat while still 

recognizing his superior authority 

with his JFC hat.
77 

appropriate) and apportioned to support subordinate JTFs as needed. The theater level 

JFACC may then deploy ACCE teams to the subordinate JTF headquarters and other 

component headquarters as needed to ensure they receive the appropriate level of air 

support. The ACCE will provide on-hand air and space expertise to the subordinate 

JTF commanders and the direct link back to the “theater COMAFFOR/JFACC” and the 

AOC. 

 The three-part test described in Chapter 4 for transferring functional forces to a 

geographic combatant commander may similarly apply in these situations. As stated 

previously, the combatant commander may decide that the need for effectiveness at the 

JTF level may trump efficiency across the AOR. These situations require careful and 

continuing dialogue between competing joint and component commanders and their 

common superior commander. 

SINGLE-SERVICE TASK FORCES 

Normally, a military response requires elements from two or more Services to 

provide an adequate spectrum of capabilities. On occasion, the response may only 

require the capabilities found in one Service. In other instances, as may be 

encountered during disaster relief operations in the CONUS, the combatant commander 

may decide that operations are sufficiently limited in scope as to not warrant the 

creation of a full JTF with its attendant joint staff and its additional manpower and 

logistical footprint. In these instances, single-Service task forces may be formed. If so 

tasked by a combatant commander, the Air Force will form an AETF; control over that 

AETF will be through the Service component commander. The COMAFFOR should 

exercise OPCON over the AETF. 
78 

Intentionally Blank 
79 

CHAPTER SIX 

PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS 

 

War has always been a complex undertaking; modern war especially so. To 

ensure an orderly transition from peace to conflict, and to ensure orderly deployment 

and employment of American forces, theater and functional combatant commanders 

use an extensive and thorough planning process. The resulting plans, backed with 

identified forces and deployment schedules and implemented through a series of 

universally understood orders, provide the mechanism for bringing together the 

resources, equipment, and personnel needed when wielding the military instrument of 

national power. 

JOINT OPERATION PLANNING 

Planning is conducted at every echelon of command and across the range of 

military operations. Joint military planning encompasses four broad types: joint strategic 

planning, security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. 

Only the last is of concern in this publication; details concerning the others can be found 

in JP 5-0, Doctrine for Joint Operation Planning. Joint operation planning employs an 

integrated process for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision-making. In 

its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and 

fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened as 

needed to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the 

process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning 

activities. Joint operation planning is conducted through one of the three following 

processes: contingency planning; crisis action planning (CAP); and campaign planning. 

 Two key steps or phases are common to all three types of joint operation 

planning, as well as to much operational-level component and Service planning that 

takes place in support of it. These are: 

 Situation Monitoring, in which the situation or contingency requiring planning 

is recognized, reported, and assessed for implications to current strategy and 

existing operations plans. Situation monitoring consists of situation 

If I always appear prepared, it is because 

before entering an undertaking, I have meditated 

long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not 

genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly 

what I should do in circumstances unexpected by 

others; it is thought and preparation. 

—Napoleon Bonaparte
80 

development, in which the triggering contingency is initially identified and 

reported, and situation assessment, in which relevant intelligence is gathered, 

analyzed and fed as appropriate to planners and commanders. Situation 

monitoring continues throughout the planning process and keeps it adapting to 

changing situations as needed. 

 Planning, which includes all of the activity that the joint planning and execution 

community (JPEC) must accomplish to prepare for the anticipated operation. 

This includes mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces 

leading up to, but not including, the actual movement of those forces. As 

required, planners also address post-conflict stabilization, redeployment, 

reconstitution, and demobilization, as many of these considerations require 

preparation before operations begin. As part of all subordinate processes, the 

planning stage consists of mission analysis, resulting in a mission statement; 

COA development and selection, which includes staff and commanders’ 

estimates; and detailed plan development, which includes development of the 

commanders’ concept of operations (CONOPS) and development of 

subordinate plans. 

 There are very few separate Air Force procedures for deliberate and crisis action 

planning beyond some internal Air Force MAJCOM-level procedures. The purpose of 

the following discussion is to illustrate the linkage between the products of planning and 

how they affect Air Force leaders and forces in the field. Specifics concerning the 

products of the deliberate and crisis action planning processes can be found in the Joint 

Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) manuals (Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff [CJCS] Manual 3122 series). 

CONTINGENCY PLANNING 

Contingency planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint 

operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. During 

contingency planning, the SecDef, combatant commanders, and/or JFCs determine the 

level of detail required for contingency planning and provide in-process review of 

planning processes. It prepares for possible contingencies based on the best available 

information and using forces and resources apportioned in strategic planning 

documents. It relies heavily on assumptions about political and military circumstances 

that will exist when the plan is implemented. Plan production generally takes from 12 to 

24 months and involves the entire JPEC. 

 In the contingency planning process, the CJCS issues guidance through the 

JSCP and the supported combatant commander issues a warning or planning order to 

initiate planning and establish his intent. The supported commander then develops and 

decides upon a COA and CONOPS, encapsulating that decision in a commander’s 

estimate. The entire JPEC then initiates detailed planning, eventually producing an 

OPLAN, CONPLAN, or functional plan (FUNCPLAN). OPLANs and some CONPLANs 

are reviewed by the CJCS and approved by the SecDef. Herein lies a key value of this 

process: OPLANs and some CONPLANs contain lists of apportioned forces and their 
81 

time-phased deployment schedules. These forces and detailed deployment schedules 

may provide the basis for plans needed in crisis action planning. 

CRISIS ACTION PLANNING 

Crisis action procedures are used in timesensitive situations to plan for military action. 

Here, the situation is dynamic, and time for 

planning may be limited to a matter of days or 

even hours. An adequate and appropriate military 

response in a crisis demands flexible procedures 

keyed to the time available, rapid and effective 

communications, and use of previous planning 

and detailed databases and region analyses 

whenever possible. 

 With the decision of the President or 

SecDef to develop military options, the CJCS 

issues the warning order (WARNORD), which 

defines the objectives, anticipated mission or 

tasks, pertinent constraints, command 

relationships, and, if applicable, tentative combat 

forces available to the commander for planning 

and strategic lift allocations. Further guidance 

relating to the crisis, such as changes to existing 

ROE, antiterrorism/force protection 

considerations, or any specific directions from the 

President or SecDef, will also be provided as 

necessary. 

 The President and SecDef will task a 

geographic or functional combatant commander 

who becomes the supported combatant 

commander. Depending on the operation, the 

supported combatant commander may establish a 

JTF to accomplish the mission. Air Force 

interaction with a JTF may take several forms, 

depending on whether they are internal or external 

to the JTF. 

 Within a JTF, Air Force elements will normally be presented to the supported 

combatant commander as a task-oriented, tailored AETF under the command 

of a COMAFFOR. 

 External to a JTF, Air Force elements will provide support but normally remain 

under the control of their parent Unified and Service commands. 

 There is a tendency in our 

planning to confuse the 

unfamiliar with the improbable. 

The contingency we have not 

seriously considered looks 

strange; what looks strange is 

thought improbable; what is 

improbable need not be 

considered seriously. 

—Thomas C. Schelling, in the 

Preface to Roberta 

Wohlstetter’s “Pearl Harbor: 

Warning and Decision” 
82 

 The command relationships and the precise degree of control (what the gaining 

commander will exercise and the losing commander will relinquish) will be specified in 

deployment orders (DEPORD) or other appropriate JOPES products that subsume 

deployment instructions. Generally, forces should be assigned to, attached to, or in 

direct support of a JTF. 

 Upon receipt of the WARNORD, or sooner, the combatant commander convenes 

the battle staff or crisis action team, and starts structuring a JTF. The combatant 

commander’s subordinate Service and functional component commanders usually 

augment the combatant commander’s staff to develop COAs as recommended military 

responses to the developing crisis. Air Force planners from the designated Air Force 

component may be tasked at this time to augment the combatant commander’s 

planning team. The Air Force component commander should ensure qualified planners 

and liaisons are tasked to augment the combatant commander’s staff while the Air 

Force component and JFACC staffs retain the right manning balance. The 

COMAFFOR’s task at this time is to advise the combatant commander or JFC on the 

best employment of air and space power in developing COAs. 

 

 Upon receipt and review of the combatant commander’s COAs, the President 

and SecDef select one. Prior to COA selection, the combatant commander may receive 

a CJCS planning order (PLANORD) to compress execution planning. A PLANORD 

does not replace formal SecDef approval of a COA. The planning order should identify 

forces and resources for planning; define the objectives, subordinate effects, tasks, 

operational limitations (restraints and constraints); contain any further relevant Joint 

Staff planning guidance; and give a deadline for submitting an OPORD. 

 Once the President and SecDef select a course of action, the CJCS publishes an 

alert order (ALERTORD). This communicates the SecDef decision to develop a 

detailed military response to the crisis. The contents are similar in format to the 

planning order, except the operation description clearly states the message is an 

ALERTORD and execution planning (but not execution) for the selected COA has been 

authorized. The contents of an ALERTORD may vary, and sections may be deleted if 

the information has already been published. 

 Execution planning is the detailed planning necessary to execute the selected 

COA. The actual forces, sustainment, and strategic transportation resources are 

identified, and the concept of operations is described in an OPORD that coordinates the 

execution of military action. Based on the JFC’s guidance and intent, the component 

commanders begin their respective detailed planning. This means providing inputs to 

the joint air and space estimate process (JAEP) used to develop the Service or 

functional component OPORD and the JAOP. 

 Once a SecDef decision is made to commence the operation, the CJCS 

transmits an execute order (EXORD) directing the combatant commander to carry out 

the military action. The issuance of an EXORD is time-sensitive. The format may vary; 
83 

however, information previously provided in the warning, planning, or alert orders will 

not be repeated. Upon receiving this order, the JTF elements execute their assigned 

missions. 

 The broad outline of all information provided by the sum of all the orders should 

provide the following total picture: 

 Authority —a statement indicating authority for issuing the order. 

 Situation—a description of the latest politico-military situation that has 

generated a need for a response by US military forces. 

 Mission—a refined statement of objectives, tasks, and purpose. 

 Execution—course of action, a list of the major combat forces approved for the 

operation, coordinating instructions, C-day and D-day, expected duration, ROE, 

psychological operations guidance, deployability status, operations security 

(OPSEC), deception guidance, etc. 

 Administration and Logistics—allocation of intertheater lift, load planning, 

logistics factors, public affairs guidance, etc. 

 Command and Signal— command relationships, communications, and signal 

guidance. 

CAMPAIGN PLANNING 

Campaign plans allow theater commanders to set operational tempo, direct the 

conduct of battles, link tasks and effects to objectives, develop operational concepts, 

and coordinate logistics to achieve victory. Campaign planning is a primary means by 

which supported JFCs arrange unified action and guide their subordinate and 

supporting commanders’ planning. Campaign planning binds major military operations 

together at the operational level. The campaign plan drives when to fight, what to 

accomplish, and how operations are conducted and concluded. They embody that 

commander's strategic vision for the arrangement of related operations necessary to 

attain theater strategic objectives. It is critical for joint success that all perspectives and 

possible options are considered when developing a campaign plan. To enhance joint 

integration and consideration of a fuller range of options, planning expertise from the 

various components should assist the joint planning staff; or portions of the plan may 

even be delegated to the appropriate component for development. Even non-combat 

stability operations are often driven by campaign plans (e.g., Operation PROVIDE 

COMFORT that provided humanitarian supplies to the Kurds in northern Iraq). 

Complete understanding of a system from a military perspective requires that 

one knows what is critical, what is vulnerable, and how the two are related. Critical 

expresses the essence of what a system requires in order to act or perform as intended. 

Vulnerable expresses where a system can be easily attacked or otherwise influenced. 
84 

Knowing how the two relate can be the key to influencing the system’s behavior in 

desired ways. A useful way of analyzing this problem is the concept of the center of 

gravity. A COG is a characteristic, capability, or source of power from which a system 

or entity derives its freedom of action, physical strength, and/or will to fight. COGs as 

entities or systems have critical capabilities that enable them to act as such. These 

capabilities have certain critical requirements—conditions, resources, or means—that 

enable the critical capabilities. Some of these requirements are vulnerable to attack or 

influence; these are the system’s critical vulnerabilities. Affecting critical vulnerabilities 

in appropriate ways should decisively affect the associated COGs and yield decisive 

changes in the enemy system state or behavior. 

 There are generally few COGs and, at the higher levels of war; they may be less 

tangible in nature than at lower levels. For example, at the strategic level, a COG might 

be a key alliance or national will; at the operational or tactical levels, a COG might be a 

key military force. A number of popular models exist to help analyze COGs; these are 

outside the scope of this publication. However, properly analyzing COGs should help 

establish clarity of purpose, focus friendly efforts, and yield results disproportionate to 

the effort expended. Therefore, COG analysis is a valuable effects-based tool (seeking 

to be “most effective then most efficient”). Planners should analyze both friendly and 

enemy COGs in order to best realize Sun Tzu’s dictum, “know the enemy and know 

yourself and in a hundred battles you will not be defeated.” 

Planning operations requires precise communication of a commander’s intent 

and a shared, clear understanding of the appropriate operational concepts at each level 

of command. Once the JFC has formulated the overall strategy to accomplish the 

national objectives, the theater commander imparts it to his component commanders. 

They then devise a game plan for supporting the JFC’s strategy by developing COAs 

and schemes of maneuver for the assets under their command, and integrating these 

with the efforts of other components or elements of the joint or combined force. It is 

from this point onward that strategic concepts are translated into operational missions. 

The JFC’s appreciation of the strategic situation and statement of the strategic and 

operational objectives form the basis for determining the component objectives. The 

capabilities of air and space power must be included in strategic planning at the highest 

level. If the JFC focuses solely on the classic “post buildup counterattack” as the 

decisive phase of combat, the JFC may miss an opportunity to drive the enemy out of 

the fight early on. 

Campaign planning today can be significantly enhanced by solid application of 

effects-based principles. Effective application, however, requires understanding the 

nature of effects and how they interrelate. This understanding must inform all planning 

for employment and assessment. 

SERVICE COMPONENT PLANNING 

Once a COA is selected, the JFC then develops an OPORD that describes the 

COA and tasks supporting commanders to implement the approved COA effectively. 
85 

The primary purpose of the OPORD is to provide guidance and direction to subordinate 

units. The Service component command develops Service aspects of the COA, 

determines force and resource requirements, and builds time phased force deployment 

data (TPFDDs) to implement the deployment aspects of the COA. The Service 

component command also works within Service channels to identify combat support 

forces, critical materiel, sustaining supplies, filler and replacement personnel, and 

Reserve Component asset availability. 

 As the JFC develops the OPORD prior to execution, subordinate Service and 

functional components are also tasked to develop supporting plans and/or OPORDs. 

These products should then be cross-walked by the JFC staff to ensure integration. 

Simultaneously and in coordination, the COMAFFOR’s staff, usually led by the A-5, will 

develop an Air Force component supporting plan or OPORD to capture that information 

pertinent to Air Force forces deploying to and employing within the particular AO. 

 The Service component supporting plan or OPORD should follow JOPES 

formats, and be comprehensive enough to cover all combat support aspects of how the 

Air Force will fight. The Service OPORD may overlap the JFACC’s JAOP—the sole 

employment plan for air and space component forces—in some respects, but this may 

be necessary to give appropriate guidance to the COMAFFOR’s AFFOR staff where 

their duties differ from those of the JFACC’s AOC staff. Although deliberate planning 

may provide many rich samples of theater planning, often the OPORD or supporting 

plan developed must now reflect the reality of the situation (now that many of the 

deliberate planning assumptions are no longer assumed). 

 This OPORD should include a basic plan plus appropriate annexes and 

appendices. Ownership of the annexes and appendices is divided amongst the AFFOR 

staff, and, once developed and approved, should be made available to all Air Force 

units within the AETF. See Appendix G for a sample of a notional OPORD. 

EFFECTS-BASED CONSIDERATIONS FOR PLANNING 

“Effect” refers to the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an 

action, a set of actions, or another effect. Effects are parts of a causal chain that 

consists of objectives, effects, actions, and the causal linkages that conceptually join 

them to each other. Actions produce specific direct effects, those effects produce other 

indirect effects, and this chain of cause and effect creates a mechanism through which 

objectives and ultimately the end state are achieved. An effects-based approach to 

military operations means taking action against enemy systems so as to create specific 

effects that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes. From a 

planning perspective, however, operations are built “from the top down,” starting with 

the desired end state at the highest level, determining subordinate objectives needed to 

bring it about, then deriving the effects and causal linkages needed to accomplish the 

objectives, and finally determining the tactical actions and resources necessary to 

create those effects. 
86 

 

An action, the lowest link in the causal chain, is simply performance of an activity. 

Effects are the entire set of consequences the actions precipitate, which link the actions 

to objectives, but which may also extend well past objective accomplishment. 

Objectives are the ultimate intended (desired) effects in a particular context or situation. 

Objectives at one level may be seen as effects at another, higher level. Effects, 

however, comprise all of the results of a set of actions, whether desired or undesired, 

ultimate or intermediate, expected or unexpected. 

 Perspective is important here. What may seem an action to the operational-level 

warfighter may seem like an objective to warfighters at tactical units. Conversely, what 

may be an objective for the air and space component commander may seem an action 

to the President of the United States. See Figure 6.1. For example, “gain and maintain 

air superiority to X degree in and over area Y for Z period” may be an objective for the 

JFACC, but will likely be one of the effects the JFC gives the JFACC to deliver in 

support of the notional objective “defeat enemy A’s offensive into region B.” In turn, the 

JFACC’s objective may seem like an action to the President, who has given the JFC the 

desired effect of “defeating A’s offensive” in order to accomplish his national strategic 

objective of “restoring stability and maintaining political order in global region M.” The 

perspective that matters for the purposes of Air Force doctrine is that of the operationallevel warfighter: the COMAFFOR/ JFACC and the personnel in the AOC, the Air Force’s 

organic operational-level weapon system. From this perspective, actions are individual 

sorties, missions, or tactical tasks. Objectives are the air and space component’s 

tactical and operational-level objectives. Effects are the consequences of tactical tasks, 

which link them to the objectives. From this perspective, a bomb dropped on a 

DIRECT

EFFECT ACTION

INDIRECT

EFFECTS

INDIRECT

EFFECTS

INDIRECT

EFFECTS

OBJECTIVE

(INDIRECT

EFFECT)

National / Strategic

Campaign (JFC, JTF/CC)

Operational (Component)

Tactical

OBJECTIVE

(INDIRECT

EFFECT)

OBJECTIVE

(INDIRECT

EFFECT)

OBJECTIVE

(INDIRECT

EFFECT)

Level of Conflict

linkages leading to Intended causal unintended effects

linkages

DIRECT

EFFECT ACTION

INDIRECT

EFFECTS

INDIRECT

EFFECTS

INDIRECT

EFFECTS

OBJECTIVE

(INDIRECT

EFFECT)

National / Strategic

Campaign (JFC, JTF/CC)

Operational (Component)

Tactical

OBJECTIVE

(INDIRECT

EFFECT)

OBJECTIVE

(INDIRECT

EFFECT)

OBJECTIVE

(INDIRECT

EFFECT)

Level of Conflict

linkages leading to Intended causal unintended effects

linkages

Figure 6.1 Hierarchy of Effects and Objectives
87 

All 

Effects

Indirect Effects

(outer circle)

• Functional / systemic or 

psychological

• Seldom immediate

• Evaluated qualitatively, often 

subjectively

• A.k.a. second-, third-, etc., or 

higher-order effects

Intended

Effects

Unintended

Effects

Direct Effects

(inner circle)

• Physical

• Immediate (usually)

• Evaluated empirically

• Quantifiable

• A.k.a. first-order effects

Objectives

Objectives • Special subset of intended indirect 

effects

• Ultimate desired effects for a 

particular context or situation

• Shares other characteristics of IEs

Figure 6.2 Basic Types of Effects

All 

Effects

Indirect Effects

(outer circle)

• Functional / systemic or 

psychological

• Seldom immediate

• Evaluated qualitatively, often 

subjectively

• A.k.a. second-, third-, etc., or 

higher-order effects

Intended

Effects

Unintended

Effects

Direct Effects

(inner circle)

• Physical

• Immediate (usually)

• Evaluated empirically

• Quantifiable

• A.k.a. first-order effects

Objectives

Objectives • Special subset of intended indirect 

effects

• Ultimate desired effects for a 

particular context or situation

• Shares other characteristics of IEs

Figure 6.2 Basic Types of Effects

particular target is an action and the efforts designed to get the bomb there are the 

accompanying tactical task. The effects range from direct (the bomb detonates on 

target and causes the intended damage) through indirect at varying levels (the damage 

may disable an enemy air defense operations network, for instance, which helps gain 

air superiority), to objectives (“gain and maintain air superiority to X degree in and over 

region Y for Z period”). This is the perspective that will be used throughout this 

publication and elsewhere in Air Force doctrine. 

Actions 

 

 Actions are taken in order to achieve desired effects. In general, there are two 

broad categories of actions that are relevant at the tactical and operational levels: 

kinetic and non-kinetic. Kinetic actions are those taken through physical, material 

means like bombs, bullets, rockets, and other munitions. Non-kinetic actions are 

logical, electromagnetic, or behavioral, such as a computer network attack on an enemy 

system or a psychological operation aimed at enemy troops. While non-kinetic actions 

have a physical component, the effects they impose are mainly indirect—functional, 

systemic, psychological, or behavioral.
88 

Types of Effects 

There are four broad 

categories of effects, which 

often overlap. These 

categories are: direct, 

indirect, intended, and 

unintended. Within these 

categories, especially within 

the realm of indirect effects, 

there are many 

subcategories. 

 Understanding some 

of these special types of 

effects is vital to an effectsbased approach to war. 

The relationship among 

these four types of effects 

and the objectives, a special 

subset of intended indirect 

effects, is shown in Figure 

6.2. 

Direct Effects 

Direct effects are the 

results of action with no 

intervening effect or 

mechanism between act 

and outcome. They are also 

known as “first-order 

effects.” In most cases they 

are physical, immediate, 

and easy to recognize. 

They can usually be 

assessed empirically and 

can often be quantified in a 

meaningful way. 

Indirect Effects 

Direct effects trigger 

additional outcomes—

intermediate effects or 

mechanisms that produce a 

Direct and Indirect Effects 

 A practical example of direct and indirect 

effects might involve a bomb hitting an enemy 

battlefield command vehicle. 

 The destruction of the vehicle and its crew by 

the bomb is the direct effect of the tactical action 

or task. 

 A part of the direct effect in this case was the 

loss of the command vehicle’s C2 equipment, 

leading to the indirect effect of degrading the unit’s 

ability to function cohesively. The vehicle might 

also have represented a portion of the unit’s 

physical combat capability, which may also be 

degraded by the vehicle’s loss. Loss of so precise 

a target may help condition enemy troops to 

abandon their vehicles and heavy equipment for 

fear of being killed in them, further degrading 

combat capability. Neutralization or degradation of 

the unit may be a tactical level objective. Loss of 

the vehicle and its crew may also degrade the 

unit’s ability to communicate and function as part 

of a larger unit, so the combat capability and 

cohesion of larger echelons may be affected. If 

the vehicle contained a commander, this unit’s 

ability to function will probably be further 

degraded, although if the commander was 

ineffective and his replacement talented, this may 

represent a net gain in enemy effectiveness. If a 

senior commander were killed in the vehicle, this 

may have operational-level consequences, rippling 

down to all the enemy’s tactical units and greatly 

facilitating accomplishment of friendly operational 

objectives like defeat of the enemy army. If the 

senior commander were also an enemy national 

leader, this tactical action may have profound 

strategic consequences, rippling through all enemy 

systems, affecting all instruments of the enemy’s 

power, and greatly hastening achievement of 

friendly strategic objectives and the end state. All 

of these outcomes are indirect effects. 
89 

final outcome or result. These are indirect effects, also known as “higher-order effects,” 

or sometimes distinguished by the order in which they occur relative to the initial action, 

as in “second-order,” “third-order,” and so on. Indirect effects can be physical, 

functional, systemic, or psychological. They may also occur in a cumulative or 

cascading manner and can be imposed in parallel or sequentially. They are seldom 

immediate, are usually displaced from the direct effects in time and/or space, and are 

often hard to quantify or measure empirically. They are often assessed or evaluated in 

qualitative terms. Generally, the less direct the effect—the further removed it is in the 

causal chain or in time from the initial action—the harder it is to predict before the fact 

and measure after. Historically, it has proven extremely difficult to predict beyond thirdorder effects with any degree of certainty. 

Objectives are the ultimate desired effects in a particular context or situation—

what one desires to accomplish in a given set of circumstances. All military operations 

should be directed toward achieving them. They are a special subset of indirect 

intended effects, and so are presented here under the general heading of “indirect 

effects,” but planners and targeteers should not lose sight of the fact that “effects” in 

most planning and targeting contexts refers to outcomes subordinate to and supporting 

achievement of the objectives. Objectives are always planned for and predicted. They 

are also always indirect effects and share the characteristics of other indirect effects. 

Even if a tactical-level “objective” is expressed in terms of direct physical damage 

(“destroy the enemy command vehicle,” say, or “attrit enemy armor by fifty percent”), the 

effect being sought is really indirect (degradation of enemy command function and 

cohesion in the first case; degradation of enemy combat power and ability to act in the 

second). Outcomes expressed in such terms may be effects, but they are not 

objectives. Objectives should be clearly defined, decisive, attainable, and measurable. 

Objectives exist at all levels, from national-strategic down to tactical, and all levels must 

be logically tied to each other and to the end state. 

 The end state defines what the President, SecDef, JFC, and other leaders want 

the situation to be when operations conclude. This usually includes a discrete set of 

military outcomes as well as a larger set encompassing all instruments of national 

power. Joint doctrine speaks of the end state as defining achievement of the 

commanders’ objectives, but in reality the end state is a special subset of the objectives, 

those that comprise what the post-conflict environment should look like. 

 During planning, objectives must be created before subordinate effects and 

actions are identified. Starting planning with actions or the resources available to carry 

them out leads to “input-based” planning, which focuses on how to attack and answers 

the question, “given my resources, what targets can I attack?” It provides no guidance 

on why targets should be struck, or on how operations support overarching campaign or 

national objectives. An input-based approach is the antithesis of an effects-based 

approach, which is focused upon outcomes. Effects-based planning starts with 

objectives and works down to effects and actions. Further, to be truly effects-based, 

plans must logically tie objectives at all levels together and must integrate objectives, 

effects, and actions into a logical, coherent whole. Objectives start at the national level 
90 

and extend down to the tactical level, at which actions are carried out. An effects-based 

plan should be able to explicitly trace the reasons for every tactical action through the 

hierarchy of tactical effects and objectives, operational-level effects and objectives, to 

national and strategic ends. Actions and effects that do not support the entire structure 

of objectives have no place in an effects-based plan. 

 Other Types of Indirect Effects: Physical, Psychological, and Behavioral. 

Physical effects are the results of actions or effects that physically alter an object or 

system. Most physical effects are direct, but some may be indirect. Often, unintended 

or undesirable physical effects, like “collateral damage” can be major concerns in a 

campaign. 

 Psychological effects are the results of actions or effects that influence the 

emotions, motives, and reasoning of individuals, groups, organizations, and 

governments. These result in changes in the outward behavior of the individual, group, 

organization, or government known as behavioral effects. While it is seldom possible to 

measure psychological effects directly, their behavioral results can be measured. 

Nonetheless, the intermediate psychological states leading to behaviors can be 

important to understanding causal mechanisms during planning. In most cases, friendly 

targeting actions are intended to produce—and accomplishment of objectives 

requires—some change in enemy behavior. Unless the enemy is destroyed outright, all 

such changes entail a change in the enemy’s emotions, motivations, and/or reasoning. 

Thus, there is a psychological component to almost every set of effects and this 

component is often among the most important in terms of achieving objectives, 

especially at the operational and strategic levels. Victory at the operational level has 

historically involved defeat of enemy forces, and this inevitably involves a psychological 

component. There are very few instances in history where an enemy, however 

thoroughly defeated, was completely denied means of resistance. Ultimately, collapse 

entailed a choice or series of choices framed by emotion, motivation, and reason. The 

same is true of the resistance of an enemy nation or system as a whole at the strategic 

level. Here, the psychological component is even stronger. Good strategy requires 

realizing this and tailoring effects so as to produce the maximum psychological impact 

upon the enemy, such as those achieved in the Balkans conflicts. 

 Functional and Systemic Effects. Functional effects are the direct or indirect 

effects of an action on the ability of a target or target system to function properly. 

Analysis and assessment of functional effects answer the questions, “in what ways and 

to what extent has the system the target is part of been affected by action taken against 

it?” Targets are usually elements of larger systems, even if they are systems 

themselves. Effects that relate to how well the targeted system functions as part of 

larger systems of which it is a part are systemic effects. Analysis and assessment here 

answer the question, “in what ways and to what extent has the system the target is part 

of been affected by action taken against it?” 

 Functional and systemic effects are important to warfighters because they are 

often key indicators of the overall success of a particular action. There will always be 
91 

functional and systemic indirect effects 

imposed by actions against systems, but 

learning the degree of degradation is 

often a goal of the assessment process 

and answers can be used as guideposts 

toward objective accomplishment. This is 

formally established in the assessment 

process—functional assessment (formerly 

known as Phase II battle damage 

assessment [BDA]) is an element of 

tactical assessment and target system 

assessment (formerly Phase III BDA) is 

an element of the components’ 

operational assessment. 

 In general, both functional and 

systemic effects are assessed at the 

component level, although system 

assessment may take place at a higher 

level or require participation of the 

federated assessment process. It is 

sometimes difficult to distinguish between 

functional and systemic effects if the 

targets themselves are complex systems. 

Perspective matters a great deal. Even at 

the operational level within the AOC, the 

distinctions involved may become blurred. 

A key to distinguishing between them is 

to think of functional effects in terms of 

impact on individual nodes within a 

system that operates at the operational 

level and systemic effects in terms of the 

impact on the operational-level system as 

a whole. 

Cumulative and Cascading 

Effects. Indirect effects can be achieved 

in a cumulative or cascading manner. Those effects that result from the aggregation of 

many direct and indirect effects are said to be cumulative. These effects typically flow 

from lower to higher levels of employment and occur at the higher levels, but they can 

occur at the same level as a contributing lower-order effect. 

 Some indirect effects ripple through the adversary system, usually affecting other 

systems. These are called cascading effects. Typically, they flow from higher to lower 

levels of employment and are the result of affecting nodes that are critical to many 

related systems or sub-systems. 

Examples of 

Functional and Systemic Effects 

 In the case of the combat C2 

vehicle used in the previous 

examples, its inability to function as 

designed after attack is a functional 

effect. The effect of the vehicle’s and 

commander’s loss on the combat 

capability of the larger unit to which it 

belonged is a systemic effect. 

 Good examples of the distinction 

between these when the targets 

themselves are complex entities can 

be found within electrical and 

integrated air defense systems 

(IADS). In the case of an electrical 

system, individual substations or 

power plants might be the individual 

nodes, even though they are complex 

systems themselves. Effects on such 

individual facilities are functional 

effects in most contexts. Systemic 

effects would be those on electrical 

power production or availability across 

an entire region or nation. In the case 

of an IADS, functional effects might be 

those upon individual sector 

operations centers (SOC), radar sites, 

or missile batteries and systemic 

effects would be those pertaining to 

the operation of the IADS as a whole 

or across a large region. 
92 

 As a practical matter, some 

of the most desirable effects have 

both cumulative and cascading 

aspects to them. The point at 

which a military unit “fails” and 

ceases to be a coherent fighting 

force is a common example. The 

collapse itself may be engendered 

by an accumulation of losses 

(although the precise point at 

which this will occur is often 

difficult to predict) and represents a 

cumulative effect. The unit’s 

collapse, however, may engender 

significant changes that ripple 

through constituent elements, 

subordinate units, and other 

connected or related systems. 

These are cascading changes. 

 Cascading effects are 

generally preferable to cumulative, 

if it is possible to create them. 

Cascading effects may accomplish 

desired ends more effectively, 

since removal of critical nodes may 

ensure more thorough collapse or 

more complete neutralization than 

might a cumulative, attritional 

approach. They may also achieve 

ends more efficiently, requiring 

fewer resources to achieve 

equivalent effects, thus freeing 

them for other uses. Some 

systems do not lend themselves to 

this type of approach and it may 

not always be possible to identify 

key nodes or target them, but 

targeting efforts should strive to do 

so whenever possible. 

 Sequential and Parallel 

Effects. Sequential, or serial, effects are the results of actions or effects that are 

imposed one after another. Parallel effects are the results of actions or effects that are 

imposed at the same time or near-simultaneously. In general, it is often better to 

Examples of 

Cumulative and Cascading Effects 

 In the C2 vehicle example, the lessening 

of the enemy unit’s combat power through 

loss of the vehicle would be part of the 

cumulative effects of attack upon the unit, 

as would the unit’s eventual collapse through 

attrition of many of its vehicles and 

personnel. The effects of the loss of the 

combat commander in the vehicle on 

subordinate and associated units would be a 

cascading effect. 

 In the case of an IADS, air superiority 

may be achieved through the accumulation 

of effects against the IADS’ components and 

achieving it may cascade into many other 

desirable effects as it frees air and space 

resources to perform other missions and give 

other components of the joint force freedom 

of action. 

 An electrical network, as an integrated 

complex system, demonstrates a different 

aspect of cascading effects. Bombing many 

generator halls, substations, and power 

distribution junctions can cumulatively lead to 

the desired effect of widespread system 

failure. However, so can targeting a few 

critical nodes within the network, then 

allowing internal system stress to cause 

successive cascading system-wide failure. 

Nature has inadvertently caused such effects 

with US power grids several times and 

Coalition forces were able to achieve them 

early in Operation DESERT STORM by 

attacking a few key Iraqi power plants and 

distribution nodes. 
93 

impose effects in parallel rather than sequentially. Parallel effects have greater 

potential for causing system-wide failures by placing stress on the enemy system in a 

manner that overwhelms its capacity to adapt. This is common sense—everyone is 

better at handling problems coming one after another from a single source than from 

many different sources or directions simultaneously. Some of the advantages parallel 

attack confers are purely physical, but many 

are psychological. Simultaneous stress from 

many sources is a major cause of 

psychological strain or breakdown and an 

effects-based approach seeks changes in 

enemy behavior more than it seeks simple 

destruction of enemy capability. Thus, as a 

rule, effects-based targeting should attempt to 

place the enemy under maximum 

psychological stress at all times through 

parallel efforts. Even if one is seeking 

predominantly physical effects, the 

psychological strain will act in synergy with the 

physical to have more impact than the physical 

effects could on their own. Another advantage 

of parallel operations is that they take less time 

to achieve desired effects and objectives. If 

shortage of time is an overriding concern in a 

campaign, planners and targeteers should 

recommend a parallel approach. 

 Parallel effects come at a cost, however: they are almost always harder to 

impose, require more of all resources except time, are more complex, and must be 

planned more thoroughly, especially in terms of integration and synchronization with 

other operations. Further, there may be reasons effects cannot or should not be 

imposed in parallel. In some cases, there may not be sufficient resources or capabilities 

to impose them in this manner. This was the case in the Combined Bomber Offensive 

during World War II. There simply were not enough bombers to attack German systems 

in parallel until very late in the war, when parallel attack on the transportation and fuel 

industries became possible (and paid off). In other cases, a sequential approach is 

necessary because events must happen in a certain order to ensure success. Almost 

always, some degree of air dominance is usually required prior to commencing major 

land or maritime operations. For example, in the opening minutes of DESERT STORM, 

Army and Air Force helicopters targeted certain key early warning nodes in order to 

facilitate penetration of Baghdad’s air defenses with stealth aircraft. This one sequential 

strike helped guarantee the success of the parallel efforts that followed. In some 

conflicts commanders may decide to “pull punches” and not engage in parallel attacks—

that is, to deliberately hold to a sequential approach in order to coerce a particular 

political solution from an adversary against whom a “no holds barred” attack is not 

warranted. In other cases, political considerations may so restrain operations as to 

make a parallel approach infeasible or unacceptable. This is really more an issue of 

Examples of 

Sequential and Parallel Effects 

 In the case of an IADS, an 

example of sequential effects

might be a counterair operation 

that first takes down early 

warning radars, then SOCs, then 

airfields and enemy aircraft, and 

finally now-autonomous enemy 

missile sites. Parallel effects

might be the same operation 

conducted against all these 

nodes simultaneously in order to 

place greater stress on the 

system and complicate the 

enemy’s adaptation requirements.
94 

strategy than targeting per se, but may help explain the larger political-military context 

behind some targeting decisions—why a parallel approach is not being used when it 

seems possible to do so. 

Intended and Unintended Effects 

Every action produces a set of outcomes. Some of those outcomes are 

intended, others are not. Intended effects are outcomes, events, or consequences. 

They are the desired, planned for, and predicted outcomes of an action or set of 

actions. They can be direct or indirect. They should always represent a net gain in 

terms of accomplishing objectives or the conflict’s end state; in fact, objectives are a 

special subset of intended effects, as noted above. Unintended effects are outcomes of 

an action that are not part of the original intent. These effects may be undesired or 

present opportunities for exploitation. Almost all actions produce some unintended 

effects. They can be direct or indirect, but are usually the latter. If unplanned, they can 

also be desirable or undesirable from the friendly point of view, leading to outcomes that 

help or hinder achievement of friendly objectives. In the combat example presented 

earlier, most of the indirect effects presented were intended, or, if unintended, at least 

had a positive impact upon friendly efforts. The case of the enemy commander being 

replaced by a more capable officer in the example above is an illustration of a negative 

unintended effect. Unwanted civilian injuries or unwanted collateral damage to civilian 

property are examples of those unintended effects that are planned for, or for which risk 

is accepted, but are undesirable. Collateral civilian damage, of course, has become a 

major concern for commanders in the last several conflicts. 

 There is another aspect of unintended effects that is easy to overlook in planning. 

Even successful operations carry a cost in terms of lost opportunities. For example, 

destroying certain C2 or communications nodes in order to degrade enemy cohesion 

can remove valuable sources of friendly intelligence on enemy action or intent. 

Likewise, destroying transportation nodes like bridges in order to impede enemy 

movement may interfere with the future friendly ground scheme of maneuver. Effective 

planning must account for these “opportunity costs.” An effects-based approach should 

suggest alternatives to outright destruction that can create desired effects without 

removing future opportunities for exploitation. For instance, in strategic attacks against 

enemy electrical power, carried out to cripple conflict-sustaining resources and disrupt 

national leadership functions, planners can use non-destructive weapons to bring down 

power for a given period of time, or can destroy only a few critical nodes, in order to 

avoid wholesale destruction of power infrastructure that would impede post-campaign 

stabilization efforts. In other cases, good planning can suggest opportunities for 

exploitation. In Operation DESERT STORM, planners deliberately took down bridges in 

Iraq that carried fiber-optic trunks in order to force Iraqi leadership to resort to more 

exploitable, radio-based communications. This is an aspect of planning that is beyond 

the scope of the targeting discipline by itself. It requires the integrated efforts of the 

entire AOC team. 

 The key to good planning in general and good targeting in particular is to refine 

PBA so as to anticipate and plan for as many unintended effects and enemy counter-
95 

actions as possible, thus increasing the circle of intended or predicted effects and 

decreasing the circle of the unintended. Planners should attempt to manage 

unintended effects by thinking through the range of possible outcomes and developing 

means to mitigate those that are undesirable. It will often be difficult to predict and 

accurately assess the risk of undesirable unintended effects, but the fact that success 

may be illusive does not absolve planners of the responsibility to try. 

Assessment Measures 

Success can be made less elusive by making informed choices concerning its 

measurement. Within an effects-based construct, it is impossible to think about actions 

and their effects without considering how accomplishment of the effects should be 

measured. Assessment is the process through which they are measured and the 

specific measures themselves are determined during planning. Assessment requires 

specific measures to gauge results achieved in the overall mission and performance of 

assigned tasks. These measures can be broken into three broad categories: 

 Measures of performance (MOPs): Objective or quantitative measures 

assigned to the actions and against which the action’s accomplishment, in 

operations or mission terms, is assessed. 

 Measures of effectiveness (MOEs): Independent qualitative or quantitative 

measures assigned to an intended effect (direct or indirect) against which the 

effect’s achievement is assessed. 

 Success Indicators (SIs): The conditions indicating attainment of objectives. 

 MOPs answer questions like, “were the weapons released as intended on the 

planned target?” At the direct effect level, MOEs answer such questions as, “was the 

intended direct effect of the mission (e.g., target destruction, degradation (to a defined 

point), or delay (for a given time) created?” At the indirect level, they may answer things 

like, “has the enemy IADS been degraded sufficiently to allow unimpeded air operations 

above 15,000 feet?” It can be seen that there can be a significant qualitative and even 

subjective component to this evaluation, depending upon how terms are defined. An 

operational level SI might answer, “Has air dominance been achieved to the necessary 

degree?” and might entail several independent measures that show this has been 

accomplished. An SI might answer such questions as, “how are we progressing toward 

achieving the required degree of air dominance?” 

As one progresses from the tactical, more direct, level into the realm of indirect 

effects and objectives, measures become less empirical and quantifiable. There may 

be “gray areas” within lower-level indirect effects where it is difficult to distinguish 

between MOPs and MOEs/ SIs, but in all cases, accomplishment of tactical 

tasks/actions are measured by MOPs and accomplishment of effects and objectives are 

measured by MOEs and SIs. Planners must also identify the essential elements of 
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information (EEI) needed to support the MOEs and develop strategies or CONOPS for 

obtaining them. 

Time and Effects 

Finally, there is a temporal aspect of effects that must be understood to fully 

employ effects-based warfare. Time is a matter that should be considered throughout 

planning, employment, and assessment. The effects-based approach offers a few key 

insights. First, the enemy is a thinking organism and so psychological stress is 

ultimately at least as important as physical stress in inducing desired changes in 

behavior. Planners should thus time attacks to apply the greatest amount of 

psychological and physical stress possible, allowing both forms of stress to complement 

each other. There are two major means of doing this: surprise and simultaneity. 

Surprise, of course, means timing attacks when the enemy least expects them. This is 

a precept so old that it is enshrined as a principle of war. Simultaneity means giving the 

enemy as many different challenges to deal with at the same time as possible, thus 

maximizing stress. Simultaneity is at the heart of parallel effects, discussed above. 

When possible, surprise and simultaneity should be combined for maximum impact. 

 Secondly, decision cycle speed can be a key determinant of success. Thinking 

entities work through the problems of observing phenomena, orienting mentally 

toward them, deciding upon a course of action regarding them, and then acting upon it 

at different speeds. These four steps describe Colonel John Boyd’s famous “OODA 

loop,” also known as the decision cycle. Generally, the faster one can work through the 

cycle, the better chance one has of anticipating or preempting a rival’s actions. Thus, 

speed in the decision cycle confers advantage. Gaining a “speed advantage” in 

decision cycles means anticipating as much enemy action as possible during planning 

(before operations begin), thinking through the consequences of those potential actions, 

having a well-thought out game plan for intelligence collection and assessment during 

operations, choosing appropriate assessment measures, keeping the process that tasks 

assets flexible and responsive, and using all available means to enhance situational 

awareness throughout the battlespace. 

 Third, some effects require time to progress through an enemy system and to 

become apparent through assessment. This is especially true of more difficult strategy 

and targeting challenges like coercion, but it can also apply to “simpler” problems like 

enemy unit or system collapse. While effects are working their way through a system or 

are accumulating toward a collapse or similar system state change, there may be few 

outward signs that the change is coming that are visible to observers. Even the best 

assessment measures may not suffice to show evidence of impending change. Many 

systems in nature change this way—accumulating inputs gradually over time until 

suddenly (often with little prior warning) they fail or otherwise change. Military units 

close to breaking often exhibit this sort of change, as do other complex systems such as 

electrical grids, economic networks, or even whole nations (the collapse of the Soviet 

Union is widely reckoned to have been such a change). Commanders, planners, and 

targeteers must be aware that this often happens and be prepared to counsel patience 
97 

in some cases. Even though assessment appears to indicate no significant changes in 

the enemy’s situation, the chosen course of action may be working. The proof, 

however, may not be forthcoming until the desired change is underway. Effective PBA 

can reduce some of the uncertainty that accompanies predicting change. 

 Lastly, planners must consider how long a delay between action and ultimate 

effect they are willing to accept and weigh this against the intended scope of the effects 

they seek to impose. This can be a very important consideration. For instance, striking 

enemy supplies stored near the line of battle will have a more immediate effect than will 

striking supplies stored in rear-area warehouses, but striking the latter may have more 

widespread impact. Striking enemy factories will further delay impact, but will have the 

most widespread effects. Planners and targeteers must choose different sets of targets 

if effects are to be felt quickly than if they are to have the greatest ultimate impact. 

Attempts to have an immediate impact may delay the achievement of longer-range 

goals. Such trade-offs must be considered in establishing timing criteria. 

THE AIR AND SPACE ESTIMATE PROCESS 

The method by which the Air Force and air and space components plan at the 

operational level of war is called the air and space estimate process. This process 

creates the JAOP. It helps enforce an effects-based approach to planning by explicitly 

requiring delineation of objectives, requiring planners to consider likely enemy courses 

of action and appropriate responses to them, and by integrating assessment into 

planning through selection of appropriate measures for chosen actions, effects and 

objectives. It also directly parallels the higher levels of joint operation planning and can 

be conducted in conjunction or in parallel with them. 

 Air and space planners focus on creating effects within the theater of operations 

or JOA to achieve JFC objectives. The scope and perspective of air and space 

operations present air and space component planners a dilemma between effective 

operational-level planning and an overindulgence in tactical guidance. Commanders 

throughout the air and space estimate process must be diligent in addressing the 

appropriate scope and perspective required for effective planning. Unlike other 

planning efforts within a joint force, there is no formal subordinate-level planning below 

the component level for air and space operations. The majority of support planning 

below the component level is in tactical execution, not operational implementation. 

Thus, the scope of air and space planning spans from strategic to tactical levels. 

 In addition to building the plan for the deployment, beddown, sustainment, and 

employment of air and space forces, planning should include considerations for conflict 

termination, stabilization, and redeployment of forces. Conflict termination is an area 

that planners have often overlooked. While planning for the transition from peace to 

conflict, lodgment and the actual employment of military forces are vitally important 

aspects of campaign planning; the transition from conflict back to peace is at least 

equally important. Incomplete or careless planning for conflict termination can result in 

the waste of valuable national resources or even a return to hostilities. The list of 
98 

considerations for conflict termination is long and unique to each situation, but “planning 

for the peace” is absolutely necessary. Typical conflict termination considerations 

include such actions as providing an interim security force, restoring government 

functions in both enemy and friendly areas, enforcing restrictions and sanctions, 

providing force protection, restoring some elements of civil infrastructure, and providing 

food and shelter for the indigenous population. 

 Similarly, the redeployment of forces out of an area of conflict also requires 

careful planning. Forces and capabilities should be withdrawn in a coherent manner 

that smoothly phases down operations and returns personnel and equipment to their 

home bases. For example, planners should retain adequate C2 and force protection 

assets in-theater to cover personnel and materiel during the redeployment. In some 

cases (such as in humanitarian or peacekeeping operations), forces or capabilities may 

not be immediately withdrawn until an indigenous capability is established. In other 

cases, forces may be swinging from one area of conflict directly into another. In this 

case, the smooth flow of forces and support must be carefully planned to ensure the 

smooth buildup of combat capability into the new theater. Proper planning for these 

types of actions is as important as the initial planning. 

The air and space estimate process culminates in an articulation of the JFACC’s 

selected COA and air and space strategy (often in the air and space estimate of the 

situation [see sample at Appendix F]) which, with the JFC’s approval, is expanded and 

articulated in the JAOP. The estimate process and resulting JAOP development can 

take place during contingency, crisis action, and campaign planning. There are six 

stages of the air and space estimate process: mission analysis, situation and COA 

development, COA analysis, COA comparison, COA selection, and JAOP development. 

Mission Analysis 

Mission analysis entails analyzing the JFC’s guidance, the situation, the 

resources, and the risks involved in the conflict. This initial analysis provides the 

background required to write the JFACC’s mission statement. A mission statement 

includes the “who, what, when, where, and why” of an operation. For example, the 

mission statement must clearly identify who will accomplish the mission; what is 

supposed to be accomplished, such as objectives and essential tasks; where the action 

is likely to take place; when it will begin; and why the operation is being conducted. The 

“why” identifies the purpose of an operation, including the desired end state, and is 

often the most important part of the mission statement. Intelligence preparation of the 

battlespace (IPB) is also begun during mission analysis. 

 This phase culminates in a mission statement and the JFACC’s intent for the air 

and space component. The commander’s intent statement should focus the staff 

throughout the entire planning process. It should also address acceptable risk for the 

commander. The end state defines the commander’s criteria for mission success. By 

articulating the air and space component’s purpose, the JFACC provides his/her 
99 

overarching vision of how the conditions at the end state support the joint campaign and 

follow-on operations. 

Situation and COA Development 

This phase involves four distinct tasks. The first two are expanding and refining 

the initial IPB completed in Phase I and COG analysis. Expanded IPB is essential to 

developing and analyzing both enemy and friendly COGs. This is especially critical for 

air and space planning given the perspective and scope of air and space operations. 

Identification and analysis of COGs are a parallel effort between the JFC and the 

various components. Enemy COGs, as the sources of strength, power, and resistance, 

are significant entities and should therefore be relatively apparent once an analysis has 

been accomplished. 

 The third task is the development of friendly courses of action. Air and space 

planners develop alternative COAs by varying the ends, ways, means, and risks. The 

operational objectives normally fill the “what” guidance for COA development; the 

supporting tactical objectives, effects, and tasks help define the “how” for planners. 

Once planners define the objectives and supporting effects, they further refine potential 

air and space COAs based on the priority, sequence, phasing, weight of effort, matched 

resources, and assessment criteria. The value of this last is hard to overemphasize; 

choosing objectives and effects should always be accompanied by choosing suitable 

ways to measure their achievement. The result of COA development is a minimum of 

two valid COAs or a single valid COA with significant branches or sequels. This is the 

most comprehensive and labor intensive task in this phase. Once completed, the final 

step is a risk analysis on the courses of action the staff has developed. 

COA Analysis and Refinement

During COA analysis and refinement, each COA is wargamed against the 

enemy’s most likely and most dangerous COAs. Wargaming is a valuable step in the 

estimate process designed to stimulate ideas and provide insights that might not 

otherwise be discovered. Although actual wargaming usually involves tactical level 

considerations, the challenge in the air and space estimate process is to wargame 

strategic and operational level courses of action. COA analysis concludes when 

planners have refined each plan in detail and identified the advantages and 

disadvantages of each COA. 

COA Comparison 

 COAs are compared against a pre-determined criterion to provide an analytical 

method to identify the best employment options for the air and space component. This 

is often followed by analytical comparison via a decision matrix that identifies and 

weights the criteria for comparison. Each COA is then based upon the established 

criteria and an overall score for each COA is obtained. A recommended COA is then 
100 

determined based upon the results of the decision matrix and the list of 

advantages/disadvantages obtained from this stage of analysis. COA comparison 

provides an analytical method to identify the best plan for the air component. 

COA Selection

COA selection begins with a staff recommendation and ends with a JFACC 

approved COA and guidance. Once the COA is identified and adjusted (if required), the 

estimate products contribute directly to JAOP preparation. 

JAOP Development 

The JAOP details how joint air and space forces will support the JFC’s campaign 

plan. JAOP development is a balance between articulating theater air and space 

strategy, providing effective supporting estimates, and applicability in detail. The JAOP 

details how the theater air and space effort will contribute to the JFC’s overall campaign 

plan. At a minimum, the JAOP should: 

 Establish the air and space strategy, course(s) of action, and commander’s intent in 

terms flexible yet detailed enough to be useful in guiding day-to-day campaign 

activities. 

 Identify objectives and effects, with subordinate effects, a range of courses of action 

to achieve the effects, and measures of effectiveness delineated in sufficient detail 

to validate the overall campaign strategy. 

 Address how air and space operations from all Services, components, and nations 

involved will be integrated and harmonized across the battlespace. 

 Address how the overall air and space scheme(s) of maneuver will be integrated 

with the other components’ schemes of maneuver. 

 Provide broad effects-based guidelines on target selection, prosecution, 

prioritization, and level of effort to guide targeting efforts during the campaign. 

 Publish constraints, restraints, ROE, law of armed conflict considerations, combat 

identification measures, and other concerns that could impinge upon execution of air 

and space efforts. 

 Clearly and thoroughly establish C2 relationships for air and space capabilities and 

the responsibilities of the JFACC. 

 Establish broad control measures needed to manage theater airspace. 

 Establish an overall theater collection plan and concept of operations for theater 

airborne ISR and analysis to achieve campaign assessment efforts. 
101 

 Identify campaign phasing and logical branches (potential alternate developments) 

and sequels (follow-on outcomes). 

 Identify beddown requirements and considerations. 

 Identify ongoing support requirements and concepts of operations, to cover such 

areas as logistics, communications, force protection, etc. Attach supporting 

estimates as needed. 

 Include considerations for conflict termination, stabilization, and redeployment of 

forces, to include such things as concepts of operations for feeding indigenous 

populations and similar humanitarian requirements. 

 Establish responsibilities for managing/requesting aircraft diplomatic overflight 

clearance requests through US Embassies with foreign nations transited during 

deployment and employment of air forces. 

 Once the JAOP is approved, it becomes the overarching guidance for theater air 

and space operations. Within the daily AOC process, the strategy division references 

the JAOP when developing the JFACC’s daily guidance which is disseminated in the 

AOD. This begins the translation of the overall plan into a daily execution order, 

normally expressed by the ATO and STO. 

 For more detailed discussion on the JAOP, refer to AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, and 

Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFOTTP) 2-3.2, Air and 

Space Operations Center. 

ASSESSMENT 

Assessment of success is an inextricable part of planning and employment in an 

effects-based approach. Effects and objectives must always be measurable and 

planning for them should always include means of measurement and evaluation. As a 

guide to planning, therefore, assessment warrants further consideration. 

Assessment encompasses all efforts to evaluate effects and gauge progress 

toward accomplishment of effects and objectives. It also helps evaluate requirements 

for future action. It seeks to answer two questions: “How is the conflict going?” and 

“what needs to be done next?” Contrary to many common depictions and descriptions, 

assessment is not really a separate stage of planning or tasking processes. Rather, it is 

interleaved throughout planning and execution and is integral to them, since it works 

together with planning to determine future courses of action and is conducted in large 

part during execution. 

 The comprehensive, effects-based view of assessment ties evaluation of 

progress at the tactical level to all other levels of conflict, including the national strategic 
102 

Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Unit & Component Unit & Component Unit & Component

Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment JFC JFC

National Assessment National Assessment National Assessment National Leadership National Leadership

Assessment Level Responsible Agent

Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Component Component Component

Figure 6.3 Levels of Assessment

Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Unit & Component Unit & Component Unit & Component

Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment JFC JFC

National Assessment National Assessment National Assessment National Leadership National Leadership

Assessment Level Responsible Agent

Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Component Component Component

Figure 6.3 Levels of Assessment

Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Unit & Component Unit & Component Unit & Component Unit & Component Unit & Component Unit & Component

Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment JFC JFC

National Assessment National Assessment National Assessment National Assessment National Assessment National Assessment National Leadership National Leadership National Leadership

Assessment Level Responsible Agent

Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Component Component Component Component Component Component

Figure 6.3 Levels of Assessment

level. The proper focus of assessment conducted by and for the air and space 

component should be on the operational level of war. Effective assessment, however, 

must support commanders’ objectives at all levels, support commanders’ decision 

cycles in real time, and provide a basis for predictive analysis. Thus, the “complete 

picture” of assessment must address the entire spectrum of conflict at all levels, focus 

upon effects and objectives, permit component validation of assessment efforts, 

standardize federation with intelligence entities outside the theater of conflict, utilize all 

intelligence specialties effectively, and integrate analysis efforts with those of other 

components and federated partners. This leads to the four-tiered approach to 

assessment set forth below and depicted in Figure 6.3. 

 Tactical Assessment: The overall determination of the effectiveness of 

tactical operations. Measures associated with tactical assessment are usually 

empirical, quantifiable means of defining whether tactical actions and their 

effects were accomplished. It is performed by units in the field and by the joint 

force’s functional or Service components. 

 Operational Assessment: The components’ evaluation of the achievement of 

their objectives, through assessment of effects, operational execution, 

environmental influences, and attainment of the objectives’ success indicators, 

in order to develop strategy recommendations. It also includes any required 

analysis of causal linkages. Operational assessment builds upon tactical 

assessment and is the first echelon of truly effects-based assessment. Means 

of evaluating effect accomplishment are called MOE and those measuring 

achievement of objectives are called SI. Operational assessment is 

accomplished at the functional (or Service) component level. 
103 

 Campaign Assessment: The JFC’s broad qualitative and analytical effectsbased determination of the overall effectiveness of military operations and 

recommendations for future action. Campaign assessment is essentially 

operational assessment accomplished at a higher level. It integrates 

components’ operational assessments into an evaluation of progress toward 

the JFC’s objectives and the overall end state. The focus is broader than 

operational assessment, since campaign assessment must consider all 

components’ efforts, the efforts of multinational partners, and all the other 

instruments of US national power as well. 

 National Assessment: Broad review of the effectiveness of the national 

security strategy and whether national leadership’s objectives for a particular 

crisis or contingency or situation are being met. Campaign assessment and 

combatant commander assessments from around the world feed national 

assessment. National assessment also considers assessments and analysis 

from agencies and departments outside the DOD, from foreign governments, 

and from the President’s immediate advisors. 

At all levels of assessment, the chosen measures, whether MOPs, MOEs, or 

success indicators, must be meaningful, reliable, and observable. Meaningful means 

the measure must be tied, explicitly and logically, to objectives at all levels. Reliable 

means it must accurately express the intended effect. If quantitative measures are 

used, they must be relevant. Observable means that existing intelligence collection 

methods can measure it. 

 Further detail and guidance concerning assessment can be found in AFDD 2-1.9, 

Targeting. 
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Intentionally Blank 
105 

CHAPTER SEVEN 

AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS CENTERS 

 

To plan, execute, and assess air and space power, the Air Force has developed 

a series of tailored air and space operations centers that can be networked to provide 

the full range of air and space power to a joint force. Because air and space forces are 

not monolithic in execution and force presentation—some are organized regionally, 

others functionally—the nature of AOCs has been tailored to better plan and execute 

this mix. This chapter briefly describes the three key variants: the regional Falconer 

AOC; the tanker airlift control center (TACC) for air mobility; and the Air Force Space 

AOC for space forces. 

REGIONAL OPERATIONS: THE FALCONER AOC 

The AOC weapon system (AN/USQ-163) is also known as the “Falconer.” It is 

the operations command center of the JFACC and provides the capability to plan, task, 

execute, monitor, and assess the activities of assigned or attached forces. The Falconer 

AOC is the senior C2 element of the TACS and includes personnel and equipment from 

many necessary disciplines to ensure the effective conduct of air and space operations 

(e.g., communications, operations, intelligence, etc). 

 The AOC provides operational-level C2 of air and space forces as the focal point 

for planning, executing, and assessing air and space operations. Although the Air 

Force provides the core manpower capability for the AOC, other Service component 

commands contributing air and space forces, as well as any coalition partners, may 

provide personnel in accordance with the magnitude of their force contribution. The 

AOC can perform a wide range of functions that can be tailored and scaled to a specific 

or changing mission and to the associated task force the COMAFFOR presents to the 

JFC. Thus, for smaller scale operations, the Air Force would not necessarily provide all 

of the elements described in the following sections if the situation does not warrant 

them. 

 The primary functions of the AOC are to: 

 The staff is simply the servant of the general 

force; it exists but to further the welfare of the 

fighting establishment. Those within it are remiss 

if they fail to keep this rule uppermost. 

 

 —Brig Gen S. L. A. Marshall, US Army 
106 

 Develop air and space operations strategy and planning documents that 

integrate air, space, and information operations to meet JFACC objectives and 

guidance. 

 Task and execute day-to-day air and space operations; provide rapid reaction, 

positive control, and coordinate and deconflict weapons employment as well as 

integrate the total air and space effort. 

 Receive, assemble, analyze, filter, and disseminate all-source intelligence and 

weather information to support air and space operations planning, execution, 

and assessment. 

 Integrate space capabilities and coordinate space activities for the JFACC. 

 Issue space control procedures and coordinate space control activities for SCA 

when the JFACC is designated as SCA. 

 Provide overall direction of air defense, including theater missile defense 

(TMD), for the AADC when the JFACC is designated the AADC. 

 Plan, task, and execute the theater air- and space-borne ISR mission. 

 Conduct component-level assessment to determine mission and overall air and 

space operations effectiveness as required by the JFC to support the theater 

assessment effort. 

 Produce and disseminate ATOs and ATO changes. 

 Plan and task air mobility operations according to the theater priorities. 

AOC Organization 

 

The baseline AOC organization includes an AOC commander, five divisions 

(strategy, combat plans, combat operations, ISR, and air mobility), and multiple 

support/specialty teams. Each integrates numerous disciplines in a cross-functional 

team approach to planning and execution. Liaisons from other Service and functional 

components may also be present to represent the full range of joint air and space 

capabilities. The following provides a summary of the major elements of an AOC. 

 The AOC Commander is charged with effectively managing air and space 

operations and establishing the AOC battle rhythm. The AOC commander develops 

and directs processes to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute, and assess air and 

space operations in the AOR/JOA based on JFC and JFACC guidance. The AOC 

commander commands the AOC weapons system (but not AETF forces) and should be 

prepared to command a C/JAOC when the COMAFFOR is designated as the C/JFACC. 
107 

 The Strategy Division concentrates on long-range planning of air, space, and 

information operations to achieve theater objectives by developing, refining, 

disseminating, and assessing progress toward achieving the JFACC air and space 

strategy. The strategy division is normally task organized into three functionally 

oriented core teams: the strategy plans team, the strategy guidance team, and the 

operational assessment team. Key products include the JAOP, the AOD, and other 

JFACC guidance. 

 

 The Combat Plans Division applies operational art to develop detailed 

execution plans for air and space operations. The combat plans division is normally 

task organized into four functionally oriented core teams: the targeting effects team 

(TET); the master air attack plan (MAAP) team; the ATO production team; and the C2 

planning team. The division’s key products are an area air defense plan (AADP), 

airspace control plan, and a daily ATO, ACO, special instructions (SPINS), and joint 

integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). 

 The Combat Operations Division monitors and executes current operations. 

The combat operations division is also the focal point for monitoring the execution of 

joint and combined operations, such as time sensitive targeting (TST), TMD, joint 

suppression of enemy air defense (JSEAD) supported by theater forces, and joint air 

attack team (JAAT). The combat operations division is normally task-organized into 

three functionally oriented core teams, offensive operations, defensive operations, and 

ISR support. The division’s main product is daily ATO/ACO changes. 

 The ISR Division, in conjunction with the strategy, combat plans, combat 

operations, and air mobility divisions, plans and executes airborne ISR operations and 

provides combat ISR support to air and space planning, execution, and assessment 

activities. The ISR division has four core teams: the analysis, correlation and fusion 

team; the targets/combat assessment team; the ISR operations team; and the 

processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) management team. Major products 

include: the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) annex to the 

ATO (or the ISR collection plan); updated IPB; air component target nomination list; and 

intelligence summaries. 

 The Air Mobility Division plans, coordinates, tasks, and executes the theater air 

mobility mission. Unlike the other AOC divisions that work solely for the AOC 

commander, the AMD coordinates with the DIRMOBFOR-Air but must remain 

responsive to the tempo and timing of the AOC commander's operation. The 

DIRMOBFOR-Air is responsible for integrating the total air mobility effort for the JFACC 

and, in this capacity, coordinates with the AMD on behalf of the JFACC to execute the 

air mobility mission. The AMD coordinates with the JTF’s joint movement center (JMC), 

the theater air mobility operations control center (AMOCC) (if established), the theater 

deployment distribution operations center (DDOC) (if established), and the TACC. The 

AMD is comprised of four core teams: the airlift control team (ALCT); the air refueling 

control team (ARCT); the air mobility control team (AMCT); and the aeromedical 

evacuation control team (AECT). Major products include airlift apportionment plans 

and air refueling inputs to the MAAP, ATO, ACO, and SPINS. 
108 

 Further detail concerning the structure, functions, processes, and personnel 

within the AOC can be found in AFOTTP 2-3.2, The Air and Space Operations Center, 

and in the Air Force Instruction (AFI) 13-1AOC series of publications. 

The Air Tasking Cycle 

A key product of the air tasking cycle is the development of an AOD for a 

particular day’s activities based on the operational guidance provided by the JFC and 

the JFACC. The AOD should be considered the air and space component’s 

operational-level guidance for the day it covers. It is essentially a daily extract and 

adaptation of the JAOP. 

 The air tasking cycle provides for the continuous collection, correlation, 

prioritization, and assessment of a variety of relevant inputs, in accordance with the 

JFC’s and the JFACC’s intentions, ultimately resulting in production of an ATO. The 

cycle provides a repetitive process for planning, coordination, allocation, execution, and 

assessment of air missions as well as many space and information efforts. The cycle 

also accommodates changing tactical situations, the JFC’s revised priorities and 

objectives, and requests for support from other Service and functional component 

commanders as they perform analogous planning functions/cycles for their respective 

operations. The JFACC recommends apportionment to the JFC and then allocates 

resources based on the JFC’s apportionment decision. The ATO, when combined with 

the ACO and SPINS, provides operational and tactical direction for air operations 

throughout the range of military operations, as well as establishing the timing, priority, 

and desired effects from supporting forces. The ATO, ACO, and SPINS are detailed 

documents specifying numbers of sorties, refueling tracks and times, targets, times over 

target, ordnance, coordinating and controlling agencies, communications frequencies 

and procedures, airspace deconfliction measures, and other vital information. Each 

cycle’s products normally cover a 24-hour period. Once battle rhythm is ongoing, there 

are typically five sets of these products at any given time: one undergoing assessment 

(yesterday’s plan); one in execution (today’s plan); one in production (tomorrow’s plan); 

one in final planning, to include considerations like detailed targeting and deconfliction 

(the following day’s plan); and one in strategy for AOD development (three days out). 

 In many situations, the JFACC issues mission type orders to assigned and 

attached air units. Mission type orders state the objectives to be accomplished but 

leave the detailed mission planning to the tasked units. This enables subordinate 

echelons to exploit fleeting opportunities. Mission type orders can help the JFACC 

reduce “micro-management” when developing and transmitting an ATO. The JFACC 

passes along required planning information to units via SPINS and the ACO and 

normally includes his/her commander’s intent as part of the ATO. Tactical unit 

commanders and flight leaders determine the tactics employed to accomplish the 

missions at the unit level. The ATO is subsequently implemented and assessed by the 

TACS. Further information on the tasking cycle can be found in AFDD 2-1.9, Targeting. 
109 

AIR MOBILITY OPERATIONS: THE TANKER AIRLIFT CONTROL 

CENTER 

The TACC at Scott AFB, IL, is the AOC serving the Air Force component to 

USTRANSCOM. As the single point of contact for its customers, the TACC plans and 

executes all USTRANSCOM tanker, airlift, and support missions. The TACC performs 

detailed pre-mission planning and provides that information to the air mobility units, the 

airlift and tanker crews, and operating locations for mission execution. During 

execution, the 18 AF commander exercises OPCON over Air Force crews and aircraft 

on USTRANSCOM missions. Within a regional JTF, the DIRMOBFOR-Air provides the 

links between the regional air component’s air mobility operations and the TACC’s 

intertheater air mobility operations. 

TACC Organization 

The TACC consists of seven directorates led by a director of operations. (For a 

more detailed description, see AFOTTP 2-3.5, Global Mobility Air and Space Operations 

Center, when published). 

 Director of Operations. The director of operations provides immediate 

oversight and decision making in the day-to-day activities of the TACC, and 

serves as the command’s representative to the Joint Staff, Air Force Operations 

Center, National Military Command Center, USTRANSCOM, DOD, and other 

agencies. 

 Mobility Management. Tasks units to support strategic/theater airlift and 

tanker requirements. Coordinates with AFRC and ANG on their availability to 

support worldwide mobility taskings. Manages the joint airborne/air 

transportability training and air refueling allocation process. 

 Command and Control. Assumes mission control 24 hours prior to mission 

origination and is the direct link between the aircrew and TACC during mission 

execution. Performs logistics planning during execution and coordinates 

resolution of maintenance problems. Additionally, provides integrated flight 

management, intelligence updates and threat warning, computer flight plans, 

and obtains diplomatic aircraft clearances. 

 Current Operations. Plans and monitors organic/commercial airlift and air 

refueling missions to meet the customer requirements for movement of 

passengers, cargo, support for classified programs, nuclear airlift, fighter and 

bomber deployment and employment, air refueling, distinguished visitor airlift, 

homeland defense, and support to USSTRATCOM’s nuclear mission. The 

directorate acts as the focal point for tanker/airlift special access required 

programs and is the single source validator for all DOD air refueling missions. 
110 

 Global Readiness. Focal point for all CJCS TPFDD-based exercises and 

contingencies. Responsible for the development of CONOPS, aircrew 

brochures, airlift airflows, and coordinating AMC-provided ground support and 

contingency response group element packages. Also maintains management 

oversight of the air mobility tasking (AMT) message, AMC’s single integrated 

tasking process for all AMC mobility taskings. 

 Global Channel Operations. Directs regularly scheduled worldwide airlift 

operations (“channel missions”) for passenger and cargo movement and 

aeromedical evacuation in the Defense Transportation System. Develops route 

structures, schedules airlift and aeromedical evacuation missions, and provides 

oversight on channel system performance. Works with AMC aerial ports, 

patient movement requirement centers and en route locations to meet 

sustainment movement requirements. 

 Operations Management. Develops synergy across all directorates in crossfunctional issues both internal and external to the TACC. Provides support for 

the daily operations summary briefing, executive decision-making briefings, and 

official TACC orientations. Develops and implements best business practices 

providing data and analytical support. Provides real-time assessments of air 

mobility assets including cargo and passengers on AMC missions. Tracks and 

analyzes force packages associated with contingencies and exercises. 

Conducts TACC orientation and training to meet qualification and certification 

requirements. 

Air Mobility Tasking Message 

The AMT message is the primary tasking instrument that ties together all the 

planning and deployment information AMC units need to rapidly deploy and effectively 

execute their global reach mission. The AMT cycle translates global and theater 

requirements into a coherent, executable plan for Air Force air mobility forces, providing 

for the effective and efficient employment of mobility assets. The AMT is published on 

the worldwide web as unclassified with classified supplements, if required. The AMT 

tasks all AMC mission support requirements for AMC-assigned and scheduled 

missions, airfield surveys, Joint Readiness Training Center schedules, AMC-provided 

theater augmentation support requirements identified in theater plans, theater and 

Service exercises, TPFDD, aviation packages, manning assistance, and all AEF 

taskings. In some cases, the AMT may be the only document an air mobility unit 

receives that puts together what the unit is tasked to support, where they are going, 

when they must be there, how they will get there, how long they will be gone, what 

equipment they need to take, and for whom they are working. This information is fed 

into the Global Transportation Network, which tracks all aspects of movement of 

personnel and cargo, and is accessible to all Service customers. 
111 

SPACE OPERATIONS: THE AIR FORCE SPACE AOC 

The Air Force Space AOC is located at Vandenberg AFB, CA. It includes the 

personnel, facilities, and equipment necessary to plan, execute, and assess Air Force 

space operations and integrate space power into global military operations as directed 

by CDRUSSTRATCOM. The Air Force Space AOC is an in-place analog of the theater 

AOC that accomplishes parallel planning and operational functions for USSTRATCOM. 

The Air Force Space AOC has a number of systems, including a tailored set of Falconer 

AOC equipment. As part of the Air Force component under USSTRATCOM, the Air 

Force Space AOC works directly with regional COMAFFORs to plan and integrate air 

and space operations. Much as a regional AOC normally functions as a C/JAOC, the 

Air Force Space AOC normally may task Army and Navy space assets when such are 

made available. Thus, the Air Force Space AOC is often referred to as the joint space 

operations center (JSpOC). 

Air Force Space AOC Organization 

The Air Force Space AOC is composed of four divisions: strategy, combat plans, 

combat operations, and ISR. (For more information, see AFOTTP 2-3.4, Space Air and 

Space Operations Center.) 

 Strategy Division. Develops the commander’s intent, priority, and guidance. 

Develops the space operations directive (SOD), which guides the development 

of the STO. Develops space COAs. Leads CAP and space estimate 

processes. Recommends tactical objectives and tasks for employment of 

space capabilities. 

 Combat Plans Division. Produces, coordinates staff review and approval, and 

disseminates an operationally sound STO, which is the tool used to task and 

execute day-to-day US joint space operations and represents the daily 

implementation of the SOD. The STO is normally produced weekly; it can be 

produced daily if required by the operational tempo. Derived from 

CDRUSSTRATCOM mission-type orders, the STO provides guidance for all 

global US space assets, deconfliction for theater joint space operations, and 

SPINS for the period it covers. Every space operation during that period should 

be on the STO. 

 Combat Operations Division. Executes the current STO. Produces STO 

changes as necessary in response to operational dynamics (e.g., satellite 

anomalies, periods of interest, missile launches). 

 ISR Division. Provides near-real time analysis in support of generation and 

execution of the STO. Provides intelligence to perform offensive and 

defensive counterspace missions. Performs indications and warning of 

potential enemy attacks against US space forces. Provides analysis of foreign 

space and strategic system trends and developments. ISR division personnel 
112 

are usually matrixed into the other divisions to aid in strategy and plans 

development, operational execution, and assessment. 

The Space Tasking Cycle 

The space tasking cycle translates global and theater requirements into a 

coherent, executable plan for US joint global and theater space forces, providing for the 

effective and efficient employment of space assets. The space tasking cycle is 

integrated with the air tasking cycle to provide daily tactical tasking for US joint global 

space forces, much as the ATO provides operational tasking for theater air assets. Due 

to the global nature of many space assets, the space tasking cycle coordinates and 

deconflicts multiple-theater space requirements and global space effects with theater 

operations. 

The primary product of the space tasking cycle is the STO. It provides operators 

a common frame of reference for space effects, incorporating all US joint space 

operations. While similar to the ATO, in outlining missions, timing, and tasking, the STO 

is unique due to the global nature of many space missions. Much as the ATO 

orchestrates an integrated theater air, space, and information operations effort, the STO 

optimizes global US joint space operations by balancing high-demand low-density 

space assets against global and theater requirements. Derived from 

CDRUSSTRATCOM’s orders and the supported JFC’s requirements, the STO provides 

mission tasking to individual space units for the period it covers. Examples of STO 

mission taskings include: optimizing the global positioning system (GPS) for theater 

precision air strikes, focusing Defense Support Program missile warning in a particular 

area to alert troops to missile attacks, and in the future, providing detailed mission data 

to integrate counterspace operations into the theater campaign. 

 The Air Force Space AOC produces and executes a single STO because it has 

space situation awareness, validated intelligence, and weapon system knowledge to 

ensure integration and synchronization of global and theater space effects. The space 

tasking cycle is synchronized with the air tasking cycle to optimize space support to the 

theater, although the publication time of the STO is not necessarily similar to that of the 

ATO. The theater AOC and Air Force Space AOC run similar and parallel processes, 

such as the TET and MAAP. 
113 

CHAPTER EIGHT 

THE AFFOR STAFF 

 

Most AETFs provide for an AFFOR staff function to support the COMAFFOR. 

The AFFOR staff is the vehicle through which the COMAFFOR fulfills his/her 

operational and administrative responsibilities for assigned and attached forces, and is 

responsible for the long-range planning that occurs outside the air tasking cycle (e.g., 

deliberate planning). The AFFOR staff consists of functionally-oriented directorates, a 

command section, a personal staff, and any required liaisons. The AFFOR staff may 

issue traditional mission type orders on behalf of the COMAFFOR to direct subordinate 

units to execute actions outside of the scope of the ATO. Two examples of such orders 

include setting a baseline force protection condition or directing the move of a unit to 

another operating base. The AFFOR staff should develop a habitual working 

relationship with the AOC to help fulfill the COMAFFOR’s full range of responsibilities 

and to integrate overall Service component staff efforts with the AOC battle rhythm. 

ROLES AND USES OF THE AFFOR STAFF 

An AFFOR staff should be ready to fill one or more roles: that of a theater-wide 

Air Force Service component, an Air Force warfighting component within a JTF, or the 

core or “plug” within a JTF headquarters. If not carefully structured, an AFFOR staff 

may be dual- or triple-hatted with deleterious consequences as the staff struggles to 

focus at the right level at the right time. 

 The Service staff’s most basic task is to support the Air Force Service component 

to its respective unified combatant commander in the performance of theater-wide 

organize, train, and equip responsibilities. The next level of activity is supporting the Air 

Force component within a subunified command or a JTF. These two activities demand 

different levels of engagement (theater-strategic versus operational) and thus different 

focus. Ideally, these activities would be accomplished by two separate and distinct 

staffs; such a breakout of responsibilities is more easily accomplished in those regional 

Service commands which include both a MAJCOM activity and an Air Force component 

headquarters activity, such as in USAFE and PACAF. In these cases, the MAJCOM Astaff can focus on the theater-wide support to the combatant commander while the 

Service component headquarters AFFOR staff supports the COMAFFOR’s role as 

commander of the JTF’s air and space component and Service component. 

 A bulky staff implies a division of 

responsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, 

whereas a small staff implies activity and 

concentration of purpose. 

 

 —General William Tecumseh Sherman 
114 

 The structure and division of labor within an AFFOR staff that is dual-tasked as 

both a Service component to a unified combatant commander and a Service component 

headquarters AFFOR staff supporting a JTF (as, for example, is currently found within 

the Air Force component in USCENTCOM) may find itself split between the broad 

theater-level Service responsibilities and the JTF-level operational responsibilities. This 

would likely require two groups within the AFFOR staff, one to focus on theater 

component staff activities and the other on operational warfighting issues. In 

accordance with Service and joint doctrinal admonitions against dual-hatting a 

commander vertically across different levels of war, it would similarly be a mistake to 

dual-hat a single AFFOR staff for both of these functions, as one function will invariably 

suffer due to the inability to properly focus at the correct level of war at the right time; 

differences in battle rhythms within the joint force; differing levels of connection within 

interagency processes; and other similar challenges. 

 

 An AFFOR staff may have a third potential role in addition to operational staff 

and Service staff: forming the core for a JTF headquarters (HQ) staff, as in scenarios 

when the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFC. In such a scenario, the AFFOR staff, 

either in whole or in part, would be augmented by joint and coalition staff as required. 

Another option for staffing a JTF HQ might be to pull a “plug” from the AFFOR staff as 

an add-on to another Service’s staff to form the core of the JTF staff. In either of these 

cases, the AFFOR staff would require augmentation from outside the theater to backfill 

the manning requirements. As with the previously-described division of labor between a 

theater-wide Service component and operational warfighting component, the same 

caveats apply: those AFFOR staff individuals functioning as a JTF HQ should be 

separate from the other AFFOR staff activities. 

 The following discussion of AFFOR staff duties is not intended to be all-inclusive. 

The differing mission requirements of any given operation may dictate different task 

emphasis and staff arrangements. Very large or complex operations, for example, may 

require all staff directorates. In some cases, senior component liaison elements may 

not be needed; in other cases, some of the required support may be obtained through 

reachback. For very small or limited operations, a full AFFOR staff may not be required. 

As a rule of thumb, the size and span of the AFFOR staff should normally be held to the 

smallest number of divisions necessary to handle the demands of the operation. For 

example, for a very small, forward deployed operation, the AFFOR staff may consist of 

only A-1 through A-6; for support of major, theater-wide operations all nine directorates 

(A-1 through A-9) may be present. Other operations may employ an AFFOR staff split 

into forward and rear elements, using reachback to maintain unity of effort. In each 

case, based upon regional requirements, the COMAFFOR will determine the size, 

shape, and location of the AFFOR staff and AOC to best support the operation. See 

Figure 8.1. Further information can be found in AFOTTP 2-3.3, Air Force Forces (when 

published). 

COMMAND SECTION 

The command section is normally composed of the commander (COMAFFOR), 

vice commander, chief of staff (COS), command chief master sergeant, executive 
115 

assistant, and appropriate administrative support personnel. Within the command 

section, the COS coordinates and directs the daily activities of the AFFOR staff; 

approves actions, orders, and plans, as authorized by the COMAFFOR; and ensures 

COMAFFOR decisions and concepts are implemented by directing and assigning staff 

responsibilities. The COS formulates staff policies, reviews staff actions for adequacy 

and proper coordination, and ensures required liaison is established with supporting 

agencies and commands, host nations, the JFC, and other components. 

PERSONAL STAFF 

The COMAFFOR has several staff activities that normally function outside the Astaff directorates. These activities fulfill specific responsibilities usually related to 

providing close, personal advice or services to the commander, or assist the 

commander and the component staff with technical, administrative, or tactical matters. 

These activities may include the commander’s legal advisor; public affairs advisor; 

inspector general; protocol advisor; historian; chaplain; counterintelligence and special 

investigations; financial management; force protection; air mobility operations 

(DIRMOBFOR-Air); space operations (DIRSPACEFOR); medical; and safety. Based on 

the needs of the operation and the requirements of the AFFOR staff, some of these 

activities may be located within the A-staff directorates. 

 

Senior Component Liaisons 

The senior liaison officer (LNO) from each component represents his or her 

respective commander to the COMAFFOR/JFACC. Subordinate LNOs from each 

component may perform duties throughout the staff as required, providing weapon 

A – 1

Manpower & 

Personnel

A – 2

Intelligence

A – 3

Air, Space, &

Information 

Operations

A – 4

Logistics

A – 5

Plans & 

Requirements

A – 6

Communications

A – 7

Installations

& Mission

Support

A – 8

Strategic 

Plans & 

Programs

A – 9

Analys es, 

Assessment , 

& Lessons 

Learned

Chief of Staff

COMAFFOR

Personal Staff Liaisons

Figure 8.1. Notional AFFOR Staff Organization 
116 

system expertise. LNOs must be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of 

their units and Service. 

AFFOR STAFF DIRECTORATES 

Manpower and Personnel (A–1) 

The director of manpower and personnel is the principal staff assistant to the 

COMAFFOR on manpower and personnel management. The A–1 is responsible for 

executing personnel policies, developing procedures as necessary, and supervising the 

administrative requirements for personnel. Because component commanders normally 

receive personnel support from their Service headquarters, the A–1 role is primarily an 

Air Force component function. Key responsibilities of the A–1 may include: 

 Ensure that subordinate Air Force units are kept informed of personnel actions 

that affect them. 

 Monitor Air Force unit strengths and accountability by means of daily personnel 

status reports. 

 Advise the commander and staff on matters concerning unit replacement plans 

and status of all components. 

 Provide control and standardization of personnel procedures. 

 Maintain records to support recommendations for unit and DOD awards and 

decorations. 

 Oversee the administration of augmentees and preparation of evaluation, 

efficiency, and fitness reports. 

 Assist the COMAFFOR in determining the need for, and structure of, 

organizations. 

 Assist the COMAFFOR in determining and documenting manpower 

requirements. 

 Assist the COMAFFOR in identifying available manpower resources. 

 Operate and maintain contingency manpower and resource management 

systems. 

Intelligence (A–2) 

The director of intelligence is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR for 

providing intelligence on enemy locations, activities, and capabilities, and probable 

enemy COAs. The A–2 provides intelligence support to forces within the assigned area 
117 

of operations. The A–2 does not normally direct ISR collection assets when an ISR 

Division is resident in the AOC; this is normally the province of the ISR division director. 

Key responsibilities of the A–2 may include: 

 Serve as the principal advisor to the A–3 and COMAFFOR on ISR architecture 

and support requirements. 

 Manage intelligence requirements; prioritize based on mission needs (if not 

performed by the AOC ISR division). 

 Validate subordinate unit requests for assistance (e.g. manning, systems, etc). 

 Coordinate intelligence support from national, DOD, Service, and joint 

intelligence elements and coalition intelligence sources (if not performed by the 

AOC ISR division). 

 Coordinate intelligence and information collection and analysis to support the 

COMAFFOR and the JFC as directed (if not performed by the AOC ISR 

division). 

 Provide liaison officers to JFC and lateral components’ intelligence staffs as 

directed. 

 Prescribe security and releasability requirements for intelligence information. 

Air, Space, and Information Operations (A–3) 

The director of air, space, and information operations serves as the principal staff 

assistant to the COMAFFOR in the direction and control of all assigned and attached Air 

Force forces. When OPCON of Air Force units is formally transferred to the 

COMAFFOR, the A-3 ensures they are capable of performing tasked missions. This 

includes monitoring unit deployments and beddown locations, combat readiness, 

mission rehearsals, force protection, and training activities. Key responsibilities of the 

A–3 may include: 

 Organize the operational aspects of the headquarters staff. 

  Recommend AETF organization. Normally, responsible for defining and 

leading implementation of the C2 operational architecture (forward-deployed

and reachback locations, deployed wing and group operations centers, 

etc.). 

  Establish and manage daily staff battle rhythm, to include daily briefings 

and meetings. 

  Monitor deployed unit operational situation reports. 
118 

  Oversee training and standardization/evaluation of AETF operational 

units. 

  Coordinate AEF unit availability and sourcing with the AEF Center and/or 

appropriate MAJCOM staff. 

  Establish guidance for and monitoring of OPSEC. 

 Coordinate operational issues with the JFC and component staffs. Typical 

issues would include: 

  Establish liaison with appropriate supporting commands and agencies. 

  Provide information on the number and location of all friendly air and 

space assets. 

  Coordinate joint and coalition training with other components. 

  Establish force protection requirements, including civil defense. 

  Recommend commander’s critical information requirements. 

  Identify essential elements of information with A–2. 

 Advise the COMAFFOR on management of air, space, and information 

resources for which the COMAFFOR has OPCON/TACON or has established 

supported/supporting relationships. 

 Assist A-5 in the preparation of plans and orders relating to current operations. 

Logistics (A–4) 

The Director of Logistics is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR for 

JOA-wide implementation of combat support capabilities and processes. This 

encompasses the coordination and supervision of force beddown, transportation, 

supply, maintenance, logistics plans and programs, and related combat support 

activities. In general, the A–4 formulates and implements policies and guidance to 

ensure effective support to all Air Force forces. Most of the challenges confronting this 

division will be Air Force component-unique. Key responsibilities of the A–4 may 

include: 

 Coordinate the overall combat support functions and requirements of the 

COMAFFOR and maintain liaison with combat support functions of other 

components and the JTF J–4. 

 Advise the commander concerning combat support matters that affect the 

accomplishment of COMAFFOR missions. 
119 

 Establish and operate a logistics readiness center. 

 Identify, coordinate, and track combat support requirements to ensure deployed 

forces are sustained from the onset of operations, including CONUS resupply 

and reachback, procurement of supplies and services from local sources within 

deployment locations, time definite delivery movements, theater distribution 

with JTF J–4 and other Services, and timely retrograde of personnel and 

reparable materiel. 

 Formulate COMAFFOR combat support policies. 

 Provide combat support expertise to the strategy division in the AOC when 

necessary. 

 Coordinate beddown of Air Force forces. 

 Coordinate common item supply support that is a COMAFFOR responsibility. 

 Track the ammunition and fuel support capability of all COMAFFOR forces. 

 Identify and track transportation movement requirements. 

 Arrange for and coordinate COMAFFOR host-nation support requirements with 

the JTF J–4. 

 Coordinate agreements for inter-Service supply and support with components 

and JTF J–4. 

 Exercise staff supervision or cognizance over applicable aircraft maintenance, 

recovery, and salvage operations. 

 Track and coordinate theater aerial ports and theater distribution processes 

affecting Air Force operations. 

 Plan for and establish forward operation bases, as directed, to sustain effective 

operations. 

Plans and Requirements (A–5) 

The director of plans and requirements serves as the principal staff assistant to 

the COMAFFOR for all consolidated planning functions. In coordination with the A–4, 

the A–5 conducts comprehensive force-level movement and execution planning 

throughout the campaign. This involves preparation and subsequent refinement of the 

force flow, beddown, and redeployment in the TPFDD. The A–5 may perform longrange theater engagement (deliberate planning) that falls outside of the AOC’s current 

operational focus. Close coordination must occur between A–5 and the strategy 

division to ensure planning efforts are complementary. The A–5 normally publishes the 
120 

Air Force component OPORD to support the JFC’s campaign. Key responsibilities of 

the A–5 may include: 

 Facilitate component OPORD development. 

 Perform collaborative planning with the JTF and the coalition and Service 

staffs. 

 Establish effective relations with host nation personnel and US embassy. 

 Monitor the effects of current operations on follow-on (post-hostility) operations. 

 Monitor events outside the JOA for impacts on present mission. 

 Initiate and oversee AFFOR support of JTF crisis action planning activities. 

 Integrate Air Force execution planning efforts with JTF HQ, the JFACC’s staff (if 

applicable), coalition, and Service staffs throughout the campaign. 

  Determine support requirements for additional forces or capabilities. 

  When necessary, prepare air allocation request and air support request 

messages. 

Communications (A–6) 

The director of communications is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR 

for communications-electronics and automated information systems. This includes 

establishing the theater communications and automated systems architecture to support 

operational and command requirements. Key responsibilities of the A–6 may include: 

 Coordinate the overall communications and information functions of the 

COMAFFOR and maintain liaison with communications and information 

functions of the other components, the JTF J–6, joint communications control 

center, joint communications support element, and Defense Information 

Systems Agency area communications operations center as required. 

 Formulate COMAFFOR communications and information policies. 

 Ensure frequency allocations and assignments meet technical parameters 

under host-nation agreements, coordinate these actions with the A–3 and JTF 

J–6, deconflict frequencies, and provide communications-electronics operating 

instructions for assigned forces. 

 Oversee the construction and maintenance of AOC communications and 

automated systems architectures. 
121 

 Assign call signs in accordance with Service and joint communications security 

directives. 

 Plan, coordinate, and monitor communications security procedures and assets. 

 Coordinate information protection requirements and procedures with the AOC 

information operations (IO) team. 

 Advise the AOC on development of communications architecture inputs to the 

JAOP. 

 Coordinate plans with JTF J–6. 

 Establish a systems control (SYSCON) to monitor, troubleshoot, and report all 

communications assets, mission systems, and the connectivity supporting Air 

Force forces. Establish a theater communications reporting chain that ensures 

all critical activation and outage information is centralized at the SYSCON and 

reported to higher headquarters as needed. 

 Ensure communications and information interface requirements are satisfied. 

 Plan, engineer, direct, monitor, and maintain required communications and 

information connectivity to subordinate Air Force units (to include reachback 

units) and other components. 

 Oversee all Air Force postal, multimedia, information management, client 

workgroup administration, communications-computer operations and 

maintenance, and airfield systems support. 

Installations and Mission Support (A–7) 

The director of installations and mission support is the COMAFFOR’s primary 

advisor for installations, mission support, force protection, security, civil engineering, 

explosive ordnance disposal, fire fighting, C-CBRN response, mortuary affairs, food 

and exchange services, contracting, and security forces, and all cross-functional 

expeditionary combat support. Additionally, the A–7 works in coordination with the A–4 

on formulation of beddown plans and coordination and supervision of force beddown. 

Key responsibilities of the A–7 may include: 

 Coordinate the overall installation support functions and requirements of the 

COMAFFOR and maintain liaison with support functions of other components 

and the JTF. 

 Advise the COMAFFOR concerning civil engineering and mission support 

matters that affect the accomplishment of COMAFFOR missions. 

 Establish and operate an emergency operations center. 
122 

 Formulate COMAFFOR civil engineering and installation mission support 

policies. 

 Coordinate all COMAFFOR firefighting, EOD, and C-CBRN readiness 

requirements. 

 Coordinate all COMAFFOR food service, mortuary affairs, lodging, and field 

exchange requirements. 

 Coordinate morale, welfare, and recreation activities. 

 Assist the COMAFFOR in administering Air Force non-appropriated funds. 

 Identify contractor personnel employed in the AOR to support Air Force forces, 

and monitor contractor support activities to ensure continuity of operations. 

 In coordination with A–4, coordinate beddown of all Air Force component 

forces, and of all JFACC forces when the COMAFFOR is designated JFACC. 

 Serve as the interface for other service regional wartime construction 

management support, contracting support, and real estate activities for 

lease/use of host nation facilities and basing. 

Strategic Plans and Programs (A–8) 

The director of strategic plans and programs provides the COMAFFOR 

comprehensive advice on all aspects of strategic planning. Key responsibilities of the 

A–8 may include: 

 Act as the Service component liaison with the JTF or unified command J–8 on 

joint issues and with the MAJCOM A–8 for Air Force-specific capabilities. 

 Conduct program assessment and provide coordinated resource inputs to the 

supporting MAJCOM’s program objective memorandum (POM) process. 

Analyses, Assessments, and Lessons Learned (A–9) 

 

The director of analyses, assessments, and lessons learned collects, documents, 

reports, and disseminates critical information necessary to analyze, assess, and 

document the air and space aspects of campaigns and contingencies, and to document 

lessons observed. (Note: A–9 functions do not include campaign operational 

assessment, a task performed within the AOC). This information provides the primary 

source documents for both contemporary and future Air Force planning and analysis. 

Moreover, they serve as an official permanent record of component mission 

accomplishment. Key responsibilities of the A–9 may include: 
123 

 Maintain liaison with JTF operational analysis functions and serve as the focal 

point for reachback efforts to other Air Force analytic organizations. 

 Assess the success of operations and make recommendations to the 

COMAFFOR. 

 Assist the A–3 in exercise design, development, rehearsal and analysis; 

conducts red teaming and COA analysis. 

 Provide analytical support to deliberate and crisis action planners. 

 Support the OAT in the AOC strategy division team and for projects outside the 

OAT scope. 

 Distribute lessons observed and learned to inform and guide planning and 

execution. 

 Facilitate after action reviews and develop remediation plans. 

 Evaluate, collect, organize, safeguard, and preserve historically significant 

documents, including orders, plans, reports, and senior staff interviews, and 

prepares contingency reports on all Air Force component activities. 

 

At the Very Heart of Warfare lies Doctrine. . .
124 

Intentionally Blank 
125 

APPENDIX A 

HOST INSTALLATION ADCON SCENARIOS 

The following scenarios illustrate some of the basing combinations that may be 

encountered on forward-deployed installations. 

Scenario 1: An AFSOC detachment deploys to a base in USCENTCOM’s AOR. An 

expeditionary Air Force element (e.g., an AEW) is already in-place and operating from 

that base with the AEW commander executing ADCON over Air Force forces deployed 

to that base. 

 As the base commander and the senior Air Force officer on the installation, the 

AEW commander has inherent responsibilities for force protection, lodging, 

dining, reporting, some reasonable logistics support, and some limited aspects 

of UCMJ. 

 G-series orders should specify elements of ADCON for the deployed AFSOC 

units . If this type deployment occurs frequently or lasts for a lengthy period of 

time, AFSOC and AFCENT should draft a command-to-command agreement 

specifying the items of ADCON that each command will be responsible for. In 

addition, USSOCOM and USCENTCOM should also consider a command-tocommand agreement covering inter-Service arrangements. 

Scenario 2: An AFSOC detachment deploys to an Army-owned airbase in 

USEUCOM’s AOR that is also hosting a deployed expeditionary Air Force element (e.g., 

an AEG). 

 The Army commander, as the installation commander, has inherent 

responsibilities for force protection, lodging, and dining, based on a support 

relationship. 

 The AEG commander, as the senior Air Force officer on the installation, has 

inherent responsibilities to support the AFSOC detachment for ADCON and 

other Air Force-unique support, and to intercede with the installation 

commander on behalf of the AFSOC detachment if their needs are not met. 

The AEG commander is also responsible for obtaining, through Air Force 

channels, necessary Service-unique support on behalf of the AFSOC 

detachment that cannot otherwise be obtained through AFSOC channels. 

 G-series orders should specify elements of ADCON for the deployed AFSOC 

units. If this type deployment occurs frequently or lasts for a lengthy period of 

time, AFSOC and USAFE should draft a command-to-command agreement 

specifying the items of ADCON, including UCMJ, that each command will be 

responsible for. In addition, USSOCOM and USEUCOM should also consider 

a command-to-command agreement covering inter-Service arrangements. 
126 

Scenario 3: An AMC (USTRANSCOM-owned) tanker AEG deploys to Moron AB, Spain 

(USEUCOM AOR) to support airbridge operations. They are OPCON to AMC through 

the TACC. The host unit at Moron is the 496th Air Base Squadron (ABS), a USAFE 

tenant unit on this Spanish-owned base. 

 Normally the senior Air Force officer on the installation has inherent 

responsibilities for UCMJ, force protection, lodging, dining, reporting, and some 

reasonable logistics support. In this case, the tenant traces ADCON through 

the theater. Since the theater has a squadron commander present, that 

individual retains responsibility for force protection, lodging, dining, reporting, 

and logistics support. 

 UCMJ authority over the AMC troops should be a coordinated effort between 

the AEG commander (AEG/CC), the 496 ABS/CC, and the home unit/CC and 

specified authorities should be published in applicable documents such as an 

OPORD series document, or existing command-to-command agreement. 

 The AEG should route their requests for theater support for lodging, food, and 

equipment through the 496 ABS, who will retain their role as the interface with 

Spanish authorities and USAFE/USEUCOM. 

 Specified ADCON that AMC requires from USAFE beyond the above items 

should be specified in G-series orders for the AMC forces. If this type 

deployment occurs frequently or lasts for a lengthy period of time, AMC and 

USAFE should draft a command-to-command agreement specifying the items 

of ADCON that each MAJCOM will be responsible for. 

(NOTE: The following scenarios do not imply that air reserve component [ARC] 

individuals have a higher incidence of discipline problems when deployed. They are 

only to highlight key points commanders must keep in mind when commanding a mix of 

personnel within the Total Force.) 

Scenario 4: Two ARC individuals, deployed to Diego Garcia, are involved in a minor 

incident in violation of base safety protocols and the Status of Forces Agreement (Diego 

Garcia is British-owned; the US Navy hosts the base; the base is in the USPACOM 

AOR). One is a Reservist serving a voluntary tour as part of the administrative section 

of the bomber AEW deployed there; the other is a mobilized ANG person working aerial 

port for the AMC AEG also deployed there. Both are in volunteer status and the ANG 

member is federalized. 

 Authority and responsibility for the Reservist are split between the commander, 

Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC/CC) and the local Commanders (bomber 

AEW and base). To ensure good order, discipline in this case should be 

coordinated between the individual’s “home” commander, AFRC HQ, and the 

local commanders. An issue here is the mandatory return date specified in the 

individual's orders. Holding an individual “over” to process discipline may not 
127 

be optimal and may actually inhibit effective processing of a replacement by 

using resources to hold a member who may be outprocessed while not on 

orders. 

 Like the Reservist, the Guardsman's discipline should be coordinated with 

several organizations: the providing unit commander; the National Guard 

command center (a Title 10, US Code [U.S.C.], organization); the local unit 

commander (AEG/CC); the local USAF/CC; and a base representative. 

Because the Guardsman is federalized, the UCMJ does apply. 

Scenario 5: Guardsmen are deployed from home station performing disaster relief 

within the US or its territories and still in “state” status (i.e., Title 32, U.S.C.). One is 

caught after curfew in a specifically prohibited activity. 

 In accordance with federal law under Titles 10 and 32, Guard members may 

not legally perform duty outside the US or its territories in Title 32 status. 

Additionally, Guardsmen may perform certain missions (for example, homeland 

defense or wild fire support where interstate issues may arise) in either Federal 

status, state active duty status under an interstate agreement, or under Title 32. 

 The Guardsman is subject to local civilian jurisdiction and may be subject to the 

member’s state code of military justice. Because of “state” or Title 32 status, 

the member's ADCON chain is through the local commander and the member's 

state. The Governor, the State Adjutant General, and the providing unit 

commander should be involved. Complicating this issue is differing state-tostate agreements. A coordinated approach will ensure good order optimizing 

the on-scene commander's effectiveness and the ability of the ANG to continue 

efficient support. 
128 

Intentionally Blank 
129 

APPENDIX B 

RESERVE COMPONENT IMPLEMENTATION 

The Air Force, under the Total Force construct, has a substantial part of its forces 

in Air Force Reserve Command and the Air National Guard. The SecDef may make 

these forces available during the planning process. While they may seamlessly operate 

alongside the regular Air Force, they are subject to different levels of activation and 

different degrees of operational and administrative control. These types of control are 

discussed in more detail in the main text. The degrees of control and when they are 

gained by a COMAFFOR are discussed below. Furthermore, difference in length of tour 

availability may pose continuity challenges for a COMAFFOR, and planners should 

carefully consider such issues for any category of mobilization. 

 Mobilization. The process whereby a nation makes the transition from a 

normal state of peacetime preparedness to a warfighting posture. It involves 

the assembly, organization, and application of the nation’s resources for 

national defense and it encompasses all activities necessary to prepare 

systematically and selectively for war. 

 Volunteerism. The process by which the SECAF places on active duty those 

ARC members who have volunteered for activation. The ARC structure retains 

ADCON except for forces attached to the COMAFFOR; the COMAFFOR has 

specified ADCON over assigned and attached forces. OPCON transfers in 

accordance with SecDef orders. Volunteerism is usually used as a bridge to 

expand regular component force capabilities while awaiting legal authority for 

Presidential Reserve Callup authority. Volunteerism is used to partially offset 

high regular component operational tempos in the overseas theaters and in 

CONUS. 

 Presidential Reserve Callup (PRC). The President may call up to 200,000 

Reserve members for up to 270 days to meet the requirements of an 

operational mission. The President must notify Congress of the action and his 

reasons for declaring PRC. The ARC structure retains ADCON, except for 

forces attached to the COMAFFOR; the COMAFFOR has specified ADCON 

over assigned and attached forces. OPCON transfers in accordance with 

SecDef orders. 

 Partial Mobilization. In time of national emergency declared by the President 

or when otherwise authorized by law, up to one million reserve members may 

be involuntarily activated for not more than 24 consecutive months. The ARC 

structure retains ADCON, except for forces assigned and attached to the 

COMAFFOR; the COMAFFOR has specified ADCON over attached forces. 

OPCON transfers in accordance with SecDef orders. 

 Full Mobilization. This requires passage by Congress of a public law or joint 

resolution declaring war or national emergency. Provides authority to mobilize 
130 

all reserve units and individuals in the existing force structure and the material 

resources to support the expanded structure, for the duration of the emergency 

plus six months. ADCON transfers to the gaining COMAFFOR, and OPCON 

transfers in accordance with SecDef orders. At this time, the Air Reserve 

Personnel Center forwards the master personnel record of each mobilized ARC 

member to the Air Force Personnel Center and the field records group to the 

gaining military personnel flight. 

Under the Total Force construct, the Air Force uses a variety of associate units 

for training, leveraging resources, and providing familiarization between the regular and 

reserve components. Associate units share the weapon systems of an equipped unit 

and perform the same mission. The associate models include: 

 Classic Associate: A regular Air Force unit retains principal responsibility for 

a weapon system that it shares with one or more ARC units. Administrative 

control will remain with the respective components. 

 Active Associate: An ARC unit has principle responsibility for a weapon 

system which it shares with one or more regular units. Reserve and regular 

units retain separate organizational structures and chains of command. 

 ARC Associate: Two or more ARC units integrate with one retaining principal 

responsibility for the weapon system. Each unit retains separate organizational 

structures and chains of command. 

 Integrated Associate: Members of two or more components belong to one 

unit, where the host component command structure remains and the staff is 

integrated at the operations level. Administrative control and support are 

provided by the respective components via detachments. Each component is 

subject to the same operational chain of command but relies upon separate 

administrative chains of command.
131 

APPENDIX C 

SAMPLE G-SERIES ORDER ESTABLISHING 

AN EXPEDITIONARY UNIT 

G-series orders are published to activate, inactivate, redesignate, assign, and 

reassign units and detachments subordinate to a MAJCOM, field operating agency 

(FOA), or direct reporting unit (DRU); and to attach one unit to another. A MAJCOM, 

FOA, or DRU manpower and organization function may authenticate and publish Gseries orders. Refer to AFI 38-101, Air Force Organization, for more detailed 

guidance. In addition, AFI 33-328, Administrative Orders, provides general guidelines 

about orders preparation. 

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

HEADQUARTERS AIR MOBILITY COMMAND 

SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225-5307 

SPECIAL ORDER 

GXXX-XX DATE 

1. ( ) The HQ XXth Air Expeditionary Group (AEG), a provisional unit, is activated at 

Any Island, British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) effective (dd/mm/yr) and assigned to 

the XXth Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (XX AETF)-[Operation Name] for the 

following specified ADCON elements: making recommendations to the COMAFFOR on 

the proper employment of subordinate units; accomplishing assigned tasks; organizing, 

training, equipping and sustaining assigned and attached forces; reachback to the US 

Air Force rear and supporting US Air Force units; force protection; morale, welfare and 

discipline; and personnel management. Additionally AMC, the parent MAJCOM, will 

issue AF Forms 35, Appointment of Commander Orders, and share UCMJ authority. 

USTRANSCOM will exercise operational control through the 18 AF Tanker Airlift Control 

Center. 

2. ( ) The following provisional units are designated and activated at Any Island, BIOT, 

effective (dd/mm/yr) and assigned as indicated for the purposes of administrative 

support and exercise of UCMJ authority. 

Unit Assignment 

YY Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron (EARS) XX AEG 

ZZ Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (EAS) XX AEG 

3. ( ) Upon inactivation the provisional units will permanently retain any honors gained 

while active as provisional units. 
132 

4. ( ) Authority: AFI 38-101 

FOR THE COMMANDER 

DISTRIBUTION: 

HQ USAF/DPMO 

AFHRA/RS 

All referenced units 

Other units and staff agencies as needed 

Classified by: 

Dated: 

Declassify on: 
133 

APPENDIX D 

SAMPLE G-SERIES ORDER ESTABLISHING 

A PROVISIONAL UNIT 

G-series orders are published to activate, inactivate, redesignate, assign, and 

reassign units and detachments subordinate to a MAJCOM, field operating agency 

(FOA), or direct reporting unit (DRU); and to attach one unit to another. A MAJCOM, 

FOA, or DRU manpower and organization function may authenticate and publish Gseries orders. Refer to AFI 38-101, Air Force Organization, for more detailed 

guidance. In addition, AFI 33-328, Administrative Orders, provides general guidelines 

about orders preparation. 

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

HEADQUARTERS AIR COMBAT COMMAND 

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA 23665-2778 

SPECIAL ORDER 

GXXX-XX DATE 

1. ( ) Effective the date of this order, HQ 345th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), a 

provisional unit, is activated at Location, Country, and assigned to the XXth Air and 

Space Expeditionary Task Force. (XX AETF – [Operation Name]) for the purposes of 

specified ADCON to include: making recommendations to the COMAFFOR on the 

proper employment of subordinate units; accomplishing assigned tasks; organizing, 

training, equipping and sustaining assigned and attached forces; reachback to the US 

Air Force rear and supporting US Air Force units; force protection; morale, welfare and 

discipline; and personnel management. 

2. ( ) Effective the date of this order, the following units are activated at Location, 

Country, and assigned as indicated for the purposes of command and control and 

administrative support: 

UNIT ASSIGNMENT 

HQ 345th Expeditionary Operations Group (EOG) 345 AEW 

345th Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron 345 EOG 

1st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron 345 EOG 

2d Expeditionary Fighter Squadron 345 EOG 

HQ 345th Expeditionary Maintenance Group (EMG) 345 AEW 

345th Expeditionary Maintenance Operations Squadron 345 EMG 

345th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 345 EMG 

345th Expeditionary Munitions Maintenance Squadron 345 EMG 

745th Expeditionary Munitions Maintenance Squadron 345 EMG 
134 

HQ 345th Expeditionary Mission Support Group (EMSG) 345 AEW 

345th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron 345 EMSG 

345th Expeditionary Communications Squadron 345 EMSG 

345th Expeditionary Mission Support Squadron 345 EMSG 

345th Expeditionary Services Squadron 345 EMSG 

345th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron 345 EMSG 

345th Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron 345 EMSG 

345th Expeditionary Medical Operations Squadron 345 AEW 

3. ( ) Upon Inactivation, the provisional units will permanently retain any honors gained 

while active as provisional units. 

4. ( ) Authority: AFI 38-101, DAF XXXs 

FOR THE COMMANDER 

DISTRIBUTION: 

HQ USAF/DPMO 

AFHRA/RS 

All units mentioned in order 

Others as needed 

Classified by: 

Dated: 

Declassify on: 
135 

APPENDIX E 

THE MISSION STATEMENT 

AND COMMANDER’S INTENT STATEMENT 

The culmination of the mission analysis stage of the joint air estimate process is 

a mission statement and a statement of the commander’s intent, both approved by the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC. 

Mission Statement. The mission statement should be a clear and concise 

statement of the operation’s objective and purpose. It should include the operation’s 

specified, implied, and essential tasks. The mission statement forms the basis for 

further planning and should be included in planning guidance, the planning directive, the 

air and space estimate of the situation (and other staff estimates, as required), any 

CONOPS, the completed JAOP, and, as warranted, in tasking cycle AODs. The 

following is a notional example of a mission statement: 

“When directed, the CFACC will conduct joint air, space, and information 

operations to deter aggression and protect deployment of the joint force.” 

“Should deterrence fail, the CFACC, on order, will gain and maintain air 

and space superiority to enable coalition operations within the operational 

area. Concurrently, the CFACC will support the CFLCC in order to 

prevent enemy seizure of vital areas (to be specified).” 

“On order, the CFACC, supported by the CFLCC and CFMCC, will render 

enemy fielded forces combat ineffective and prepare the battlespace for a 

joint ground counteroffensive. Concurrently, the CFACC will support the 

CFMCC in maintaining maritime superiority. The CFACC, on order, will 

support CFLCC and CFSOCC ground offensive operations, degrade the 

ability of enemy national leadership to rule the country as directed, and 

destroy enemy weapons of mass destruction in order to restore territorial 

integrity, end the enemy military threat to the region, support maintenance 

of a legitimate friendly government, and restore regional stability.” 

Commander’s Intent Statement. The statement of the JFACC’s intent should 

be a clear, concise expression of the purpose of the operation, its broad method of 

accomplishment, and the intended end state. It may also include the commander’s 

assessment of the enemy commander’s intent and assessment of where and how much 

risk is acceptable during the operation. The statement of intent should be included in 

planning guidance and directives (as required), the air and space estimate of the 

situation (and other staff estimates, as required), any CONOPS, the completed JAOP, 

and, as warranted, in tasking cycle AODs. The following is a notional example of an 

intent statement: 
136 

“End-state. At the end of this operation: Enemy military forces will be 

capable of limited defensive operations, will have ceased offensive action, 

and will have complied with coalition war termination conditions; the 

surviving adversary state will retain no weapons of mass destruction 

capability; the CFACC will have passed air traffic control to local 

authorities; allied territorial integrity will be restored; and CFACC 

operations will have transitioned to support of a legitimate and stable 

friendly government.” 

“Purpose. The purpose of the combined air and space operations I 

command will initially be to deter adversary aggression. Should 

deterrence fail, I will gain and maintain air, space, and information 

superiority; render enemy fielded forces ineffective with combined 

airpower; degrade enemy leadership and offensive military capability as 

directed; and support combined ground and special operations in order to 

restore territorial integrity and ensure the survival or restoration of a 

legitimate government in a stable region.” 
137 

APPENDIX F 

THE AIR AND SPACE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 

The COMAFFOR/JFACC’s estimate of the situation is often produced as the 

culmination of the COA development and selection stages of the JAEP. It can be 

submitted in response to or to support creation of a JFC’s estimate of the situation. It 

should also be used to assist in creation of the JAOP and daily AODs (as required). It 

reflects the air and space component commander’s analysis of the various COAs that 

may be used to accomplish the assigned mission(s) and contains his or her 

recommendation as to the best COA. The estimate may contain as much supporting 

detail as needed to assist further plan development, but if the air and space estimate is 

submitted to the JFC or combatant commander for a COA decision, it will generally be 

submitted in greatly abbreviated format, providing only the information essential to the 

JFC for arriving at a decision. The following is a notional example of an air and space 

estimate in paragraph format. Use of the format is desirable, but not mandatory and 

may be abbreviated or elaborated where appropriate. (It is often published in message 

format, for which see CJCSM 3122.01, JOPES Volume 1,Planning Policies and 

Procedures). 

1. Mission. State the assigned or deduced mission and its purpose

a. JFC’s mission statement (from the JFC’s estimate), or other overarching 

guidance if the latter is unavailable. 

b. COMAFFOR/JFACC’s mission statement. Include additional language 

indicating how overarching guidance will be supported, as required. 

2. Situation and Courses of Action. 

a. Commanders’ Intent

1) JFC’s commander’s intent statement, if available (or other overarching 

guidance stipulating the end state, as required). 

2) COMAFFOR/JFACC’s commander’s intent statement (see Appendix 

E). 

b. Objectives and Effects. Explicitly state air and space component 

objectives, assigned and implied, and the subordinate effects required to 

support their achievement. Include as much detail as required to ensure that 

each objective is clear, decisive, attainable, and measurable. 

c. Considerations affecting possible courses of action. Include only a brief 

summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of 
138 

the operating environment and the relative capabilities of the antagonists that 

have a significant impact on the alternative COAs. 

d. Adversary capability. Highlight, if applicable, the adversary capabilities and 

psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of 

the mission, giving information that would be useful in evaluating the various 

COAs. 

e. Force protection requirements. Describe potential threats to friendly 

forces, including such things as the threat of terrorist action prior to, during, 

and after the mission that can significantly affect accomplishment of the 

mission. 

f. Own courses of action. List COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and 

acceptable means of accomplishment the mission. If specific COAs were 

prescribed in the WARNING ORDER, they must be included. For each COA, 

the following specific information should be addressed: 

1) Combat forces required. List capabilities needed, and, if applicable, 

specific units or platforms. For each, list the following, if known: 

 a) Force provider. 

 b) Destination. 

 c) Required delivery date(s). 

 d) Coordinated deployment estimate. 

 e) Employment estimate. 

 f) Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate. 

2) ISR forces required. List capabilities needed, and, if applicable, specific 

units or platforms. 

 a) List additional information as in 1), above, if known. 

3) Support forces required. List capabilities needed, and, if applicable, 

specific units or platforms. 

 a) List additional information as in 1), above, if known. 

3. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. Highlight adversary capabilities 

and intent (where known) that may have significant impact on friendly COAs. 

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action. For submission to the JFC, 

include only the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for 

the favored COA. Discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 

alternative COAs if this will assist the JFC in arriving at a decision. 

5. Recommended Course of Action. State the COMAFFOR/JFACC’s 

recommended COA.
139 

 APPENDIX G 

NOTIONAL AIR COMPONENT OPERATIONS ORDER 

1. Situation 

A. General / Guidance (Summarize theater environment and overall JFC intent for 

use of air and space power) 

B. Area of concern (AOR boundary, area of interest, etc.) 

C. Deterrent options (Not normally used) 

D. Enemy forces (Overview of the hostile threat, COGs) 

E. Friendly forces (Overview of friendly capabilities, COGs) 

F. Assumptions (List, as required) 

G. Legal considerations (List, as required) 

2. Mission 

A. COMAFFOR mission statement 

3. Execution 

A. Concept of Operations 

(1) COMAFFOR’s intent, objectives, and employment concepts 

(2) Phase directive for each phase of the operation 

B. Tasks 

(1) General missions/guidance to subordinate AETF units 

(2) Expected support from Air Force higher headquarters (e.g., parent 

MAJCOM, AEF Center, Air Force Operations Center, etc.) 

(3) Component’s supporting and supported requirements 

C. Coordinating instructions 

(1) Exchange of LNOs 

(2) Explain operational terms not defined in current joint publications 

4. Administration and Logistics 

A. Concept of support (Broad, summary level guidance on provision of agile 

combat support to AETF units) 

B. Logistics (Overview level guidance, Reference to Annex D) 

C. Personnel (Overview level guidance, Reference to Annex E) 

D. Public Affairs (Overview level guidance, Reference to Annex F) 

E. Civil Affairs (Overview level guidance, Reference to Annex G) 

F. Meteorological and Oceanographic (Overview level guidance, Reference to 

Annex H) 

G. Geospatial Information (Overview level guidance, Reference to Annex M) 

H. Medical services (Overview level guidance, Reference to Annex Q) 

5. Command and Control 

A. Command 

(1) Command relationships (Annex J) 

(2) Memoranda of understanding 
140 

(3) Designation and location of all AETF unit command headquarters 

(4) Continuity of operations 

B. Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (General overview of C4 

systems and procedures required to support AETF operations) 

Annexes: (Note: All annexes listed below will be accounted for; if not used, list as “not 

used”) 

A. Task Organization 

B. Intelligence 

C. Operations 

D. Logistics 

E. Personnel 

F. Public Affairs 

G. Civil Affairs 

H. Meteorological and Oceanographic 

I. (Not used) 

J. Command Relationships 

K. Communications and Information 

L. Environmental 

M. Geospatial information and services 

N. Space 

O. (Not used) 

P. Host-nation support 

Q. Health services 

R. (Not used) 

S. Special Technical Operations 

T. (Not used) 

U. (Not used) 

V. Interagency coordination 

W. (Not used) 

X. Execution checklist 

Y. (Not used) 

Z. Distribution 
141 

All Air Force doctrine 

documents are available on 

the Air Force Doctrine Center 

web page at: 

https://www.doctrine.af.mil/

SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications 

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare

AFDD 2-2, Space Operations

AFDD 2-4, Combat Support

AFDD 2-5, Information Operations

AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations

AFDD 2-7, Special Operations

AFDD 2-8, Command and Control

AFDD 2-9, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

AFDD 2-10, Homeland Operations

AFOTTP 2-1.1, Air and Space Strategy and Operational Art

AFOTTP 2-3.2, Air and Space Operations Center

AFI 13–1 AOC, volume 3, Operational Procedures—Air and Space Operations 

Center 

AFI 38-101, Air Force Organization

Joint Publications 

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations 

JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations

JP 3-26, Homeland Security

JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations 

JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters 

JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

Other Publications 

Boyne, Walter J., Clash of Wings: Airpower in WWII (Simon & Schuster) 1994. 

Cohen, Elliot A., Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in 

Wartime (The Free Press) 2002. 

Cowley, Robert, editor, No End Save Victory (G. P. Putnam's) 2001. 

Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story 

of the Conflict in the Gulf (Little, Brown and Company) 1995. 

Gray, Colin S., Why Strategy is Difficult, Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1999. 
142 

Griffith, Thomas E., MacArthur's Airman: General George C. Kenney and the 

War in the Southwest Pacific (University Press of Kansas) 1998. 

Hammond, Grant T., The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security

(Smithsonian Institution Press) 2001. 

Hanson, Victor David, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of 

Western Power (Doubleday) 2001. 

Kenney, George C., General Kenney Reports: A Personal history of the Pacific 

War (Air Force History Office) reprinted 1997. 

Mann, Edward, Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations

(Air University Press) 2002. 

Michel, Marshall L., The Eleven Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam 

Battle (Encounter Books) 2002. 

Murray, Williamson, and Allen R. Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second 

World War (The Belknap Press of Harvard University) 2000. 

Weinberg, Gerhard L., A World at Arms (Cambridge University Press) 1994. 

CSAF Reading List 

 The CSAF’s professional reading list, with links to book reviews, is 

available on the US Air Force web site at:

http://www.af.mil/library/csafreading/index.asp. The list is subject to revision. 

Readers are encouraged to check the US Air Force web site (http://www.af.mil) 

for the most current information. 
143 

GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AADC area air defense commander 

AADP area air defense plan 

ABS air base squadron 

ACA airspace control authority 

ACC Air Combat Command 

ACCE air component coordination element 

ACO airspace control order 

ADCON administrative control 

AECT aeromedical evacuation control team 

AEF air and space expeditionary force 

AEG air expeditionary group 

AES air expeditionary squadron 

AETF air and space expeditionary task force 

AEW air expeditionary wing 

AFCENT Air Forces Central 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFI Air Force instruction 

AFNORTH Air Forces Northern 

AFOTTP Air Force operational tactics, techniques, and 

procedures 

AFPAC Air Forces Pacific 

AFRC Air Force Reserve Command 

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 

AFSPC Air Force Space Command 

ALCT airlift control team 

ALERTORD alert order 

AMC Air Mobility Command 

AMCT air mobility control team 

AMD air mobility division 

AMOCC air mobility operations control center 

AMT air mobility tasking 

ANG Air National Guard 

AO area of operations 

AOC air and space operations center 

AOD air operations directive 

AOR area of responsibility 

ARC air reserve component 

ARCT air refueling control team 

ASOC air support operations center 

ATC air traffic control 

ATO air tasking order 

AWACS airborne warning and control system 
144 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BDA battle damage assessment 

BIOT British Indian Ocean Territory 

C2 command and control 

CAOC combined air and space operations center (USAF) 

CAP crisis action planning 

CAS close air support 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

C-CBRN counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, 

CC commander 

CDRUSCENTCOM Commander, United States Central Command 

CDRUSEUCOM Commander, United States European Command 

CDRUSJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command 

CDRUSPACOM Commander, United States Pacific Command 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command 

CFACC combined force air component commander (JP 1-02); 

combined force air and space component commander 

(USAF) 

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

CM consequence management 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

COMARFOR commander, Army forces 

COMMARFOR commander, Marine Corps forces 

COMNAVFOR commander, Navy forces 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN concept plan; operation plan in concept format 

CONUS continental United States 

COS chief of staff 

CSAF Chief of Staff, United States Air Force 

CSAR combat search and rescue 

DDOC deployment distribution operations center 

DEPORD deployment order 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIRMOBFOR-Air director of air mobility forces 

DIRSPACEFOR director of space forces 

DOD Department of Defense 

DRU Direct Reporting Unit 

DSCA Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
145 

EBAO effects-based approach to operations 

EBO effects-based operations 

EEI essential elements of information 

EOC expeditionary operations center 

EOD explosive ordnance disposal 

EP emergency preparedness 

EXORD execution order 

FHA foreign humanitarian assistance 

FOA field operating agency 

FUNCPLAN functional plan 

GPS global positioning system 

HD homeland defense 

HN host nation 

HQ headquarters 

HS homeland security 

IADS integrated air defense system 

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 

IO information operations 

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JAEP joint air and space estimate process 

JAOC joint air and space operations center (USAF) 

JAOP joint air and space operations plan (USAF) 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JFACC joint force air and space component commander 

(USAF) 

JFC joint force commander 

JFLCC joint force land component commander 

JFMCC joint force maritime component commander 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list 

JMC joint movement center 

JOA joint operations area 

JOPES Joint Operations Planning and Execution System 

JP Joint Publication 

JPEC joint planning and execution committee 

JPOTF joint psychological operations task force 

JPRC joint personnel recovery center 

JSCP joint strategic capabilities plan 

JSEAD joint suppression of enemy air defense 

JSOA joint special operations area 
146 

JSOACC joint special operations air component commander 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JSpOC joint space operations center 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

JTF joint task force 

LNO liaison officer 

MAAP master air attack plan 

MACA military assistance to civil authorities 

MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 

MAJCOM major command 

MARLO Marine liaison officer 

MOE measure of effectiveness 

MOP measure of performance 

NAF numbered Air Force 

NALE naval and amphibious liaison element 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NEAF numbered expeditionary air force 

NEO noncombatant evacuation operation 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NMS National Military Strategy 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NRP National Response Plan 

NSS National Security Strategy 

OCONUS outside the continental United States 

OODA observe, orient, decide, act 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OPSEC operations security 

PACAF Pacific Air Forces 

PBA predictive battlespace awareness 

PED processing, exploitation, and dissemination 

PLANORD planning order 

POM program objective memorandum 

ROE rules of engagement 

RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 

SAA Senior Airfield Authority 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SEAL sea-air-land team 
147 

SECAF Secretary of the Air Force 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SI success indicator 

SOC Special Operations Command; sector operations 

center 

SOD space operations directive 

SOF special operations forces 

SOFA status of forces agreement 

SOLE special operations liaison element 

SPINS special instructions 

STO space tasking order; special technical operations 

SYSCON systems control 

TACC Tanker Airlift Control Center 

TACON tactical control 

TACS theater air control system 

TET targeting effects team 

TF task force, Total Force 

TFC task force commander 

TMD theater missile defense 

TPFDD time phased force deployment data 

TST time sensitive targeting 

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice 

UN United Nations 

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces 

US United States 

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe 

U.S.C. United States Code 

USCENTAF United States Central Command Air Forces 

USCENTCOM United States Central Command 

USEUCOM United States European Command 

USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 

USPACOM United States Pacific Command 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

WARNORD warning order 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 
148 

Definitions 

action. The performance of an activity. An act or actions are taken in order to 

create a desired effect. Actions may be kinetic (physical, material) or non-kinetic 

(logical, behavioral). Actions are invariably tactical, usually producing tacticallevel direct effects. (AFDD 2) 

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or 

other organizations in respect to administration and support, including 

organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel 

management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, 

demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational 

missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-

02) 

adversary. A party with whom one has a conflict, peaceful or otherwise. (AFDD 

2) 

Airman. Any US Air Force member (officer or enlisted, regular, Reserve, or 

Guard, along with Department of the Air Force civilians) who supports and 

defends the US Constitution and serves our country. US Air Force Airmen are 

those people who formally belong to the US Air Force and employ or support 

some aspect of the US Air Force’s air and space power capabilities. An Airman 

is any person who understands and appreciates the full range of air and space 

power capabilities and can employ or support some aspect of air and space 

power capabilities. (AFDD 1-1) 

air and space expeditionary force. An organizational structure to provide 

forces and support rotationally, and thus on a relatively more predictable basis. 

They are composed of force packages of capabilities that provide rapid and 

responsive air and space power. Also called AEF. (AFDD 1) 

air and space expeditionary task force. The organizational manifestation of US 

Air Force forces afield. The AETF provides a joint force commander with a taskorganized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of force, 

sustainment, control, and force protection. Also called AETF. (AFDD 1) 

air and space power. The synergistic application of air, space, and information 

systems to project global strategic military power. (AFDD 1) 

air component coordination element A component level liaison that serves as 

the direct representative of the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR)/joint 

force air and space component commander (JFACC) to interface with other 

components or joint task force commanders and their respective staffs. This 

element facilitates the integration of air and space power by exchanging current 

intelligence, operational data, support requirements and coordinating the 

integration of COMAFFOR/JFACC requirements for airspace coordinating 
149 

measures, joint fire support coordinating measures, and close air support. 

Element expertise includes plans, operations, intelligence, airspace 

management, and air mobility. Also called ACCE. (AFDD 2) 

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where such placement 

is relatively permanent, and/or where such organization controls and administers 

the units or personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the functions, 

of the unit or personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or functions 

where such duties or functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (JP 1-02) 

asymmetric. Any capability that confers an advantage an adversary cannot 

directly compensate for. (AFDD 2) 

asymmetric operations. Operations that confer disproportionate advantage on 

those conducting them by using capabilities the adversary cannot use, will not 

use, or cannot effectively defend against. (AFDD 2) 

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an organization where such 

placement is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to specific 

functions where such functions are secondary or relatively temporary, e.g., 

attached for quarters and rations; attached for flying duty. (JP 1-02) 

behavioral effect. An effect on the behavior of individuals, groups, systems, 

organizations, and governments. (AFDD 2) 

campaign assessment. The JFC’s broad qualitative and analytical effectsbased determination of the overall campaign progress, effectiveness of 

operations, and recommendations for future action. (AFDD 2) 

cascading effect. One or more of a series of successive indirect effects that 

propagate through a system or systems. Typically, cascading effects flow 

throughout the levels of conflict and are the results of interdependencies and 

links among multiple connected systems. (AFDD 2) 

causal linkage. An explanation of why an action or effect will cause or 

contribute to a given effect. (AFDD 2) 

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from 

which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to 

fight. Also called COGs. (JP 3-0) 

coercion. Persuading an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise would 

through the threat or use of force. (AFDD 2) 

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing 

mission under a single commander established and so designated by the 
150 

President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance 

of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have 

geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02) 

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command 

authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 

164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands 

unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 

Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the 

authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command 

over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all 

aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to 

accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command 

(command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through 

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component 

commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority 

to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander 

considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is 

inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 

1-02) 

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed 

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 

procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also 

called C2. (JP 1-02) 

commander, Air Force Forces: The senior US Air Force officer designated as 

commander of the US Air Force component assigned to a joint force commander 

(JFC) at the unified, subunified, and joint task force level. In this position, the 

COMAFFOR presents the single US Air Force voice to the JFC. Also called 

COMAFFOR. (AFDDs 1, 2) 

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for 

coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military 

Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the 

same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require 

consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to 

compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, 

the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority 

consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be 
151 

exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar 

activities than to operations. (JP 0-2) 

coordination. The necessary action to ensure adequate exchange of 

information to integrate, synchronize, and deconflict operations between 

separate organizations. Coordination is not necessarily a process of gaining 

approval but is most often used for mutual exchange of information. Normally 

used between functions of a supporting staff. Direct liaison authorized 

(DIRLAUTH) is used to coordinate with an organization outside of the immediate 

staff or organization. (AFDD 1) 

cumulative effect. An effect resulting from the aggregation of multiple, 

contributory direct or indirect effects. (AFDD 2) 

crisis management. Measure to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and 

prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management 

will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, 

special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the 

capability of the lead federal agency. Also called CM. (JP 1-02) 

denial. A form of coercion strategy that destroys or neutralizes a portion of the 

adversary's physical means to resist. (AFDD 2) 

direct effect. First-order result of an action with no intervening effect between 

action and outcome. Usually immediate, physical, and readily recognizable (e.g., 

weapons employment results). (AFDD 2) 

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an 

action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or 

consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of 

freedom. (JP 1-02) 

effects-based approach to operations. Operations that are planned, executed, 

assessed, and adapted to influence or change systems or capabilities to achieve 

desired outcomes. Also called EBAO. (Note: Sometimes colloquially but incurrectly referred to as “effects-based operations,” or EBO) (AFDD 2) 

end state. The set of conditions that needs to be achieved to resolve a situation 

or conflict on satisfactory terms, as defined by appropriate authority. (AFDD 2) 

enemy. An adversary who opposes one’s will through use of force. (AFDD 2) 

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, 

facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting 

potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the 
152 

coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the 

effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the 

enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02) Because 

terminology is always evolving, the US Air Force believes a more precise 

definition is: [An integrated application of offensive and defensive actions that 

deter, detect, preempt, mitigate, or negate threats against US Air Force air and 

space operations and assets, based on an acceptable level of risk.] (AFDD 2-4.1) 

{Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the US Air Force and is offered for 

clarity.} 

functional effect. An effect on the ability of a system to function properly. 

(AFDD 2) 

homeland defense. The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic 

population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. 

Also called HD. (AFDD 2-10) 

homeland security. A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks 

within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 

minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Also called HS. 

(AFDD 2-10) 

indirect effect. A second, third, or nth-order effect created through an 

intermediate effect or causal linkage following a causal action. It may be 

physical, psychological, functional, or systemic in nature. It may be created in a 

cumulative, cascading, sequential, or parallel manner. An indirect effect is often 

delayed and typically is more difficult to recognize and assess than a direct 

effect. (AFDD 2) 

intended effect. A proactively sought effect. (AFDD 2) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and 

coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may 

be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority 

necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing 

commander. Also called JFACC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02) 

[The joint force air and space component commander (JFACC) uses the joint 

air and space operations center to command and control the integrated air and 

space effort to meet the joint force commander’s objectives. This title 

emphasizes the US Air Force position that air power and space power together 

create effects that cannot be achieved through air or space power alone.] [AFDD 

2] {Words in brackets apply only to the US Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 
153 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise 

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint 

force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02) 

joint force land component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning 

and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as 

may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the 

authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the 

establishing commander. Also called JFLCC. (JP 1-02) 

joint force maritime component commander. The commander within a unified 

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the 

establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment 

of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and 

assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such 

operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component 

commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks 

assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02) 

joint publication. A publication containing joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, 

techniques, and procedures that involves the employment of forces prepared 

under the cognizance of Joint Staff directorates and applicable to the Military 

Departments, combatant commands, and other authorized agencies. It is 

approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the 

combatant commands and Services. Also called JP. (JP 1-02) 

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the 

Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an 

existing joint force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02) 

link. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes in a 

system. (AFDD 2) 

measure of effect. An independent qualitative or quantitative empirical measure 

assigned to an intended effect (direct or indirect), against which the effect’s 

achievement is assessed. (AFDD 2) 

measure of performance. A quantitative empirical measure of achieved actions 

against associated planned/required actions and against which a task’s or other 

action’s accomplishment is assessed. (AFDD 2) 
154 

military assistance to civil authorities. The broad mission of civil support 

consisting of the three mission subsets of military support to civil authorities, 

military support to civilian law enforcement agencies, and military assistance for 

civil disturbances. Also called MACA. (JP 1-02) 

national assessment. A broad, overarching review of the effectiveness of 

national security strategy and whether national leadership’s objectives for a 

particular campaign or operation are being met. (AFDD 2) 

node. A tangible entity that is a physical, functional, or behavioral element of a 

system. (AFDD 2) 

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which 

every military operation should be directed. 2. The specific target of the action 

taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is 

essential to the commander’s plan, or, an enemy force or capability without 

regard to terrain features). See also target. (JP 1-02) (Note: the US Air Force 

does not support use of “objective” in the sense of its second joint definition.) 

OODA loop. The process of observing phenomena, orienting mentally toward 

them, deciding upon a course of action concerning them, and acting on that 

decision. Also known as the decision cycle. (AFDD 2) 

operational assessment. Joint force components’ evaluation of the 

achievement of their objectives, both tactical and operational, through 

assessment of effects, operational execution, environmental influences, and 

attainment of the objectives’ success indicators, in order to develop strategy 

recommendations. It also includes any required analysis of causal linkages. 

(AFDD 2) 

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders 

at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control 

is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated 

within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant 

commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and 

the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the 

Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those 

functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and 

employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and 

giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational 

control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and 

joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. 

Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force 

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. 
155 

Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and 

forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control 

considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of 

itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, 

discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02) 

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major 

operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic 

objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics 

and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the 

strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, 

initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these 

events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do 

tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and 

provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic 

objectives. See also strategic level of war; tactical level of war. (JP 1-02) 

parallel attack. Offensive military action that strikes a wide array of targets in a 

short period of time in order to cause maximum shock and dislocation effects 

across an entire enemy system. (AFDD 2) 

parallel effect. The result of actions or effects that are imposed at the same 

time or near-simultaneously. (AFDD 2) 

parallel operations. Operations that apply pressure at many points across a 

system in a short period of time in order to cause maximum shock and 

dislocation effects across that system. (AFDD 2) 

physical effect. An effect that physically alters an object or system. (AFDD 2) 

psychological effect. An effect on the emotions, motives, and reasoning of 

individuals, groups, organizations, and governments. They are commonly 

intermediate steps toward behavioral effects. (AFDD 2) 

sequential effects. Effects that are imposed one after another. Also known as 

serial effects. (AFDD 2) 

sequential operations. Operations that apply pressure in sequence, imposing 

one effect after another, usually over a considerable period of time. Also known 

as serial operations. (AFDD 2) 

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of 

a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) 

security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to 

accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and 

multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess 
156 

risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop 

global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military 

forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02) 

strategy. The art and science of developing and employing instruments of 

national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, 

national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02) 

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains 

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that 

helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or 

supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02) 

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all 

aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint 

operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term 

refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in 

response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the 

context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives 

assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and who is 

responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the 

assistance required. (JP 1-02) 

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or 

other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. 

Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as 

appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander 

who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander's force, and 

who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported 

commander. (JP 1-02) 

symmetric operations. Operations in which a capability is countered by the 

same or similar capability. (AFDD 2) 

systemic effect. An effect on the entire operation of a system or systems. 

(AFDD 2) 

tactical assessment. The overall determination of the effectiveness of tactical 

operations. (AFDD 2) 

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is 

limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within 

the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. 

Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be 

delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant 
157 

command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the 

command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing 

commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary 

of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and 

directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within 

the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02) 

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are 

planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units 

or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 

maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to 

achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02) 

task force. 1. A temporary grouping of units, under one commander, formed for 

the purpose of carrying out a specific operation or mission. 2. A semi-permanent 

organization of units, under one commander, formed for the purpose of carrying 

out a continuing specific task. (JP 1-02) 

Total Force. The US Air Force organizations, units, and individuals that provide 

the capabilities to support the Department of Defense in implementing the 

national security strategy. Total Force includes regular Air Force, Air National 

Guard of the United States, and Air Force Reserve military personnel, US Air 

Force military retired members, US Air Force civilian personnel (including foreign 

national direct- and indirect-hire, as well as nonappropriated fund employees), 

contractor staff, and host-nation support personnel. (AFDD 2) 

unintended effect. An outcome of an action (whether positive or negative) that 

is not part of the commander’s original intent. (AFDD 2)