IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lower Bucks County :

Joint Municipal Authority, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Raymond W. Dukes and : No. 619 C.D. 2019

Kathleen A. Dukes : Submitted: November 22, 2019

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: May 6, 2020

The Lower Bucks County Joint Municipal Authority (Authority) 

appeals the May 1, 2019 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial 

court) denying the Authority’s motion for post-trial relief.1 Upon review, we affirm.

The Authority operates a sanitary sewer system for the benefit of 

residences and businesses in Levittown, which is located in Bucks County, 

Pennsylvania.2 Trial Court Opinion at 1, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 251a. This 

 

1 Although dated May 1, 2019, the trial court did not enter this order on the docket until 

May 6, 2019.

2 Levitt & Sons, Inc., created the sewer system when building the Levittown community, 

and the disputed easement provisions are located in the original Levittown deed system dating to 

1952. Trial Court Opinion at 1-2, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 251a-52a; see also Transcript of 

Testimony (T.T.), 4/26/19 at 9-10, R.R. at 185a-86a. The easement benefits the Authority as the 

ultimate successor in interest to Levitt & Sons, Inc. Trial Court Opinion at 2, R.R. at 252a.
2

case involves a dispute regarding interpretation of the Authority’s sewer line 

easement, a portion of which exists along the rear of private property owned by 

Raymond W. Dukes and Kathleen A. Dukes (Landowners). Id. 

The easement provides, in pertinent part: 

15. Perpetual easements for the installation and 

maintenance of sewer, water and drainage facilities, for 

the benefit of the adjoining landowners and/or 

municipality and/or municipal or private utility company 

ultimately operating such facilities, are reserved as shown 

on the aforesaid map; also, easements in general over each 

lot for the installation of electric and telephone facilities.

16. Violation of any covenant or restriction may be 

remedied by the Company and the expense thereof shall 

be chargeable to the then owner of the lot and be payable 

forthwith upon demand. The foregoing shall be alternative 

or in addition to the enforcement provisions of paragraph 

18. 

. . . .

18. Enforcement shall be by proceeding at law or in equity, 

brought by the Company, its successors and assigns, or by 

the owner of any lot, against any person or persons 

violating or attempting to violate any covenant, either to 

restrain violation or to recover damages or both.

Easement Provisions, R.R. at 263a. On January 11, 2016, the Authority filed a 

complaint against Landowners, asserting that a tree and its root system had caused 

or would cause blockage in the sewer system, and that such blockage could cause 

sewage to back up into residential dwellings at or near Landowners’ property. Trial 

Court Opinion at 2, R.R. at 252a; see also Complaint at 2-3, ¶ 12, R.R. at 8a-9a. 

Contending that “the presence of easement violations,” such as the tree, impeded its 

ability to maintain the sanitary sewer system, the Authority requested that the trial 
3

court “require [Landowners] to remove the objects and overgrowth on [the 

Authority’s] easement.” Complaint at 3, ¶ 15-16, R.R. at 9a. 

Landowners failed to respond to the complaint,3thereby resulting in a 

default judgment. Trial Court Opinion at 2, R.R. at 252a. After retaining counsel

and successfully petitioning the trial court to open the default judgment, Landowners 

filed an answer and new matter, asserting that the tree does not, and will not in the 

immediate or foreseeable future, affect the operation of the Authority’s sewer 

system. Id.; Answer and New Matter at 3-4, ¶¶ 22-25, R.R. at 102a. The trial court 

conducted a bench trial on April 26, 2019,4in which Landowners participated pro 

se, as their counsel had withdrawn by permission of the trial court. Trial Court 

Opinion at 2, R.R. at 252a. The Authority requested a court order directing 

Landowners to remove obstructions from the Authority’s sanitary sewer easement—

namely, a large tree, a shed and an above ground pool.5 Trial Court Opinion at 2-3, 

R.R. at 252a-53a. 

 

3 Landowners also failed to respond to a “Request for Admissions” from the Authority. 

See R.R. at 264a-66a.

4 The trial court opinion states that the judge conducted the bench trial on April 25, 2019. 

See Trial Court Opinion at 1, R.R. at 251a. However, the transcript of testimony from the bench 

trial is dated April 26, 2019. See T.T., 4/26/19 at 1, R.R. at 177a.

5 The Authority did not mention the shed or the swimming pool in either its complaint or 

its notice of easement violation. See Complaint at 1-4, R.R. at 7a-10a; see also Notice of Sanitary 

Sewer Easement Violation at 1-2, R.R. at 15a-16a. At the April 26, 2019 bench trial, the Authority 

asked the trial court to enter an order directing Landowners to remove not only the tree, but also 

the shed and the swimming pool. T.T., 4/26/19 at 13-14, R.R. at 189a-90a. Counsel for the 

Authority stated at the bench trial that an addendum to its complaint contains reference to the shed 

and the swimming pool. Id. at 49. Landowners agreed to remove the shed and the swimming pool 

at their own expense if a survey to be conducted by the Authority indicated that these structures 

were located within the easement area. Id.
4

The trial court determined that the Authority was required to demark 

the easement and remove the tree at its own expense. See R.R. at 169a. Noting that 

the evidence did not establish the exact location of the Authority’s easement or what, 

if any, portion of Landowners’ shed or swimming pool lay within the bounds of the 

easement, the trial court required the Authority to send a surveyor to mark the 

easement boundary on May 8, 2019. Id. Landowners would then have 60 days to 

remove any man-made obstructions within the area of the easement, such as the shed 

and the swimming pool. Id. The trial court further held that the Authority could 

remove any other trees, plants or shrubs at its own expense. Id.

On April 30, 2019, the Authority filed a motion for post-trial relief, 

which the trial court denied on May 1, 2019. See Motion for Post-Trial Relief at 1, 

R.R. at 170a. The Authority appealed to this Court on May 20, 2019. See Notice of 

Appeal, R.R. at 236a; see also Trial Court Opinion at 1, R.R. at 251a. Following the 

Authority’s filing of a statement of errors complained of on appeal, on July 18, 2019, 

the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 

1925(a). The trial court identified “[t]he principal issue before the Commonwealth 

Court [as] whether [the trial court] made the correct decision in holding the Authority 

responsible for removal of the tree or other natural (as opposed to man-made) things 

that allegedly interfered with [the Authority’s] sewer line easement, including all 

expenses and costs.”6 Trial Court Opinion at 4, R.R. at 254a. Thus, the trial court 

 

6 The trial court noted that the Authority’s appeal could be considered premature, as no 

judgment had yet been entered following the April 26, 2019 bench trial. Trial Court’s Rule 1925 

Opinion at 1, R.R. at 25a. On July 25, 2019, this Court entered an order stating, “it appears that 

judgment has not been entered on the docket below,” and requiring the Authority to file within 14 

days a certified copy of docket entries showing that it has caused the trial court to enter judgment

in order to avoid dismissal of the appeal as premature. See Cmwlth. Ct. Order, 7/25/19. The 

Authority complied with this order on August 5, 2019. 
5

noted that “[t]he real issue in dispute is which party ha[s] the liability or duty of 

maintenance for the easement.” Trial Court Opinion at 7, R.R. at 257a. The trial 

court determined that the Authority was responsible for maintaining its easement, so 

long as Landowners did not interfere with its use of the easement. Id. The trial court 

found that “[Landowners] did not interfere with the Authority’s use of the easement 

as . . . they did not plant the tree and did not, with the possible exception of the 

possible encroachment by the pool and shed, do anything that interfered with the 

Authority’s ability to use the easement area.” Trial Court Opinion at 7-8, R.R. at 

257a-58a. The trial court noted that the sewer main at issue in the present case is 

“six to eight feet deep,” and that the tree in question is estimated to be “sixty to 

eighty feet in height.” Trial Court Opinion at 5, R.R. at 255a (citing Transcript of 

Testimony (T.T.), 4/26/19 at 17 & 19, R.R. at 193a & 195a). Based on the testimony

of Philip Smythe, a field technician employed by the Authority’s engineering 

department, the trial court “found that the tree in question had the potential to, but 

did not yet, interfere with the Authority’s actual use of their [sic] sewer line.” Id. 

Nevertheless, the trial court “did find that its existence was such that future 

maintenance of the sewer line would be easier if the tree was removed and that 

removal could prevent roots from eventually growing down to the depth of the sewer 

line even though they had not done so in decades.” Id. The trial court noted that 

Landowners did not object to removal of the tree, but only disputed the Authority’s 

claim that Landowners bear the cost. Trial Court Opinion at 4, R.R. at 254a. 

The trial court cited Berwick Township v. O’Brien, 148 A.3d 872 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2016), noting that the easement agreement in that case “clearly 

contemplated that the township’s right of access might entail the clearing of 

vegetation and trees within the right of way.” Trial Court Opinion at 8, R.R. at 258a. 
6

Despite acknowledging that, unlike the present case, Berwick did not involve the

question of which party was responsible for removing trees and bearing the cost

thereof, the trial court reasoned that the easement agreement’s provision for the 

“maintenance of inspection of sewer lines” in that case permitted the township to 

remove trees and clear vegetation within its right-of-way. Trial Court Opinion at 8-

9, R.R. at 258a-59a. The trial court further noted that it was undisputed in Berwick 

that the cost fell on the party enjoying the easement. Id. The trial court therefore 

reasoned that the easement provisions contested in the present case “manifestly 

contemplate[] that maintenance of the sewer lines may need to be effected by 

removal of trees and other naturally occurring vegetation by the Authority.” Trial 

Court Opinion at 10, R.R. at 260a. Thus, the trial court concluded that under both 

the express language of the easement provisions as well as Pennsylvania caselaw, 

the Authority bore the responsibility of removing the tree as the party benefitting 

from the easement. Trial Court Opinion at 11, R.R. at 260a. However, the trial court 

determined that “[a]ny man-made obstructions to the easement, placed there by 

[Landowners], need[ed] to be removed by them at their expense.” Id. The trial court

further found that the language of the easement provision at issue was “clearly 

unambiguous,” as “it affords the Authority [the] right to install and maintain [its] 

facilities.” Trial Court Opinion at 10, R.R. at 260a (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Authority appealed to this Court. 

Before this Court, the Authority contends that as the owner of the 

easement, “it is entitled to protect [the] same against intrusion from beyond its 

confines.” Authority’s Brief at 19-20. The Authority asserts that vegetation, such 

as the tree, can intrude and potentially infiltrate and block the sewer main. See id.

at 20. The Authority asserts that tree roots seek out potential nutrients from sewer 
7

systems, and that growth of the roots may affect not just Landowners’ home, but 

also all residents upstream. Id. at 22. The Authority asserts that the language of the 

easement does not burden it with the cost of abating intruding vegetation. Id. at 20. 

Rather, the Authority maintains that “the obligation to address the encroachment 

falls upon the party whose vegetation is encroaching upon the easement.” Id. The 

Authority contends that implicit in its right to peaceful enjoyment of the easement is 

the right not to have the property encroached upon by growth from adjoining 

properties, as well as the right not to incur costs to protect the sewer main from those 

incursions. Id. at 22. 

The Authority cites Jones v. Wagner, 624 A.2d 166 (Pa. Super. 1993) 

for support, a case in which the Superior Court held that a landowner was entitled to 

exercise self-help in order to remedy a technical trespass by trimming branches 

protruding from a neighbor’s tree to the extent they hung over the property line. 

Authority’s Brief at 23 (citing Jones, 624 A.2d at 167-69). The Authority further 

noted that, in Jones, the landowner exercising self-help was not required to 

demonstrate physical harm and that it could recoup expenses from the trespasser. 

Id. at 24-25 (citing Jones, 624 A.2d at 171).7

Further, the Authority maintains that Pennsylvania law does not support 

the trial court’s distinction between the duty to abate man-made encroachments upon 

easements as opposed to those of natural origin. Id. at 26. The Authority also 

contends that the trial court erred in relying upon Berwick, as that case is factually 

distinguishable. Id. at 27. The Authority further asserts that the trial court erred in 

 

7 We note that Jones is inapposite, as it dealt with a landowner’s ability to exercise selfhelp to remedy a technical trespass, as opposed to allocation of the duty to maintain an easement. 

See Jones, 624 A.2d at 105.
8

determining that the tree did not constitute an encroachment upon its easement, 

because Landowners did not plant the tree. Id. at 28. 

Landowners, proceeding pro se, counter that the roots of the tree in 

question would not interfere with the sewer system unless one of the system’s pipes 

leaked. Landowners’ Brief at 1. Landowners further point out that in the 28 years 

since purchasing their home, the Authority had not previously claimed that 

Landowners could not permit a tree to grow on the easement. Id. at 2.

The question sub judice is whether the disputed easement language 

obligates the Authority or Landowners to remove the tree in question and to bear the 

cost thereof. “It is well established that the same rules of construction that apply to 

contracts are applicable in the construction of easement grants.”

8

 Zettlemoyer v. 

Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp., 657 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. 1995); see also Starling v. 

Lake Meade Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 162 A.3d 327, 341 (Pa. 2017) (stating that 

“[t]he same principles that apply to the interpretation of a contract apply to the 

interpretation of a deed”). “When interpreting a contract, the court’s paramount goal 

is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as reasonably manifested by 

the language of their written agreement.” Halpin v. LaSalle Univ., 639 A.2d 37, 39 

(Pa. Super. 1994). “The intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the document 

itself when the terms are clear and unambiguous.” Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal 

Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. 1986). “A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably 

susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than 

one sense.” Id. 

 

8

“Whether a trial court properly interpreted a contract is a question of law and . . . [the 

appellate] [c]ourt’s scope of review is plenary. . . . We need not defer to the conclusions of the trial 

court and are free to draw our own inferences.” Liddle v. Scholze, 768 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 

2001).
9

Here, the contested easement language grants the Authority

“[p]erpetual easements for the installation and maintenance of sewer, water and 

drainage facilities, for the benefit of the adjoining landowners and/or municipality 

and/or municipal or private utility company ultimately operating such facilities[.]” 

Easement Provisions, R.R. at 263a (emphasis added). We conclude that this

language is not ambiguous, as it clearly grants the Authority an easement for the 

purpose of maintaining its sewer system, and such a provision is not “capable of 

being understood in more than one sense.” See Hutchison, 519 A.2d at 390. “As a 

general rule, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the owner of the land 

subject to an easement of a nature that requires the maintenance of means for its 

enjoyment is not bound to keep such means in repair or to sustain any expense in 

maintaining them in a proper condition.” Frable v. Schoenberger, 40 Pa. D. & C.

2d 655, 660 (1966); see also Stanton v. Lackawanna Energy, Ltd., 886 A.2d 667, 

674 (Pa. 2005) (acknowledging that “an owner of an easement is generally 

considered a possessor of property and is required to maintain its easement” and also 

“any equipment within it”).9 Removing a tree from an easement is a maintenance 

issue. See, e.g., Berwick, 148 A.3d at 887 (noting that the township had the right to 

 

9 Pennsylvania is consistent in this regard with settled law across various jurisdictions. See 

425 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 72 Westlaw (database updated February 2020) 

(recognizing that, “[w]hether by agreement or a common-law right or duty, the owner of an 

easement must keep it in repair,” and “[t]he owner of the servient tenement ordinarily is under no 

duty to maintain or repair it, in the absence of an agreement imposing such a duty”); see also 25 

AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 73 (database updated February 2020) (stating, “[i]n order 

that the owner of an easement may perform the duty of keeping it in repair, he or she has the right 

to enter the servient estate at all reasonable times to effect necessary repairs and maintenance”);

27 AM. JUR. 2D Energy and Power Sources § 166 (database updated February 2020) (noting that 

“[t]he terms of a private grant of an easement to maintain [a public utility] may expressly or 

impliedly include a right to trim or remove trees, shrubs, or other vegetation to prevent interference 

with [its operation]” and that “easements may give a gas pipeline corporation the right to remove 

trees growing above its gas pipeline when they endanger or interfere with the construction, 

operation, or maintenance of the pipeline”).
10

clear vegetation and trees from the easement area as part of its ability to inspect and 

maintain its sewer lines under the terms of the easement agreement); Duquesne Light 

Co. v. Longue Vue Club, 63 A.3d 270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (involving an easement 

agreement which provided that an electric utility’s ability to maintain its easement 

entailed the “right to trim or remove any trees, shrubbery or obstructions which . . . 

[the electric utility] may deem necessary to prevent interference or threatened 

interference with the . . . maintenance . . . of [its] transmission system). Thus, the 

Authority’s contention that Landowners must remove the tree at their own expense

lacks support. 

However, we agree with the Authority that the trial court overstated the 

extent to which Berwick lends support. The easement agreement in Berwick

delineated in detail the township’s right to remove trees from within the easement 

area for the purpose of maintaining sewer lines and its corresponding duty to 

compensate landowners, see Berwick, 148 A.3d at 884-86, whereas the easement 

provisions at issue here broadly grant the Authority an easement for the installation 

and maintenance of its sewer system, see Easement Provisions, ¶ 15, R.R. at 263a. 

Nevertheless, that Berwick involved a more detailed easement agreement does not 

indicate that the trial court reached the wrong result. The easement agreement in 

Berwick merely memorialized the general rule that landowners should not bear the 

cost of maintaining the easement area. See Frable, 40 Pa. D. & C. 2d at 660. Simply 

put, the Authority, as easement holder, is responsible for maintaining its sewer 

system by removing the tree at its own expense where the provisions governing its 

easement do not shift this burden to Landowners. 

We note that the Authority’s brief seems to suggest that the tree is 

located outside of the easement area in Landowners’ backyard and that the roots are 
11

growing toward the easement area. The Authority’s suggestion is belied by the 

record herein. The Authority’s second request for admission, which it alleges was 

deemed admitted, states that “[t]he tree . . . is located and growing within the 10-

foot[-]wide sewer easement . . . .” R.R. at 161a; see also Authority’s Brief at 9. 

Additionally, Smythe, the Authority’s field technician, when asked how he knows 

that the tree is in the easement, testified at the bench trial that he “measured the 

easement based on the original plot plan.” T.T., 4/26/19 at 23, R.R. at 199a. Smythe 

also identified three photos he had taken of Landowners’ backyard, which were 

admitted without objection, and are labeled as “79 Tall Pine Lane – Above ground 

pool, trees and shed atop public sewer main.” R.R. at 166a-68a; see also T.T., 

4/26/19 at 15, R.R. at 191a. Further, counsel for the Authority noted before the trial 

court that the tree was “on the sewer easement.” T.T., 4/26/19 at 46, R.R. at 222a. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Lower Bucks County :

Joint Municipal Authority, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Raymond W. Dukes and : No. 619 C.D. 2019

Kathleen A. Dukes :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 6th day of May, 2020, the May 1, 2019 order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County denying the Lower Bucks County Joint 

Municipal Authority’s request for post-trial relief is hereby AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge