UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N O
. 04-1196
J ER R Y G. D AL TON , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. R. J A M ES N I C HOL S ON , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(Argued September

14, 2006 Dec ided Fe bruar y 16, 2007 ) Kenneth M. Carpenter , o f T op e ka , K a ns a s, fo r t he a pp e lla nt.
Pa me la M

. Na sh , with w hom Tim S. Mc Cla in , Ge ne ra l Co un se l; R. Ra nd all Cam pb e ll , Assistant G ener al Counsel; and Richard May erick, Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel, wer e on the brief, a ll of Washington, D.C., for the appellee

. Be fore MOORMAN, L ANCE, and SCHOEL EN, Judges

. L ANCE, Judge : The appe llant, J err y G. Dalton, appe als throug h counsel a May 12, 2004, decision of the Board of

Veter ans' Appea ls (Boa

rd) that de nied servic e conne ction for r esiduals of a bac k injury , and d en i ed entitlement to an e ffe ctive date ear lier than June 20, 2000, for the assig nment of a 70% disability rati n g fo r p o st-traumatic stre ss disorder (PTSD) with major depre ssion and a total disab i l i t y ra t ing ba sed on individual unemploy ability (TDIU). Rec ord (R.) at 1-21. The Court has j urisdiction to revie w t he Board decision pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a ). F or the re asons that follow, the Court will affirm in par t, and vac ate in par

t, the May 2004 Boa rd dec ision, and remand two matters for r eadjudication consistent with thi s opinion.

I. F AC TS The a ppellant serve d on active duty in the U.S. Army

from Oc tober 1966 to Septe mber 1968, inc lud ingse rv ic e in V ie tna m. R . at 25 , 5 8. An

Ap ri l 15 , 1 96 7, se rv ic e me dic al recor d ( SMR)

re fl e c ts t hat he wa s in vo lve d in a n a uto mob ile a c c ide nt a

nd c omp la ine d o f p a in i n h is l e ft sid e . R.2

at 37. X-r ay s of the ribs we re ne g ative for fra cture s. R. at 36. The diag nostic impression was " left fl ankcon tu si on ." R. at 37 . A t se pa ratio n, the a

pp e lla nt de nie d e ve r havin g ha d a ny ba c k p ro ble ms. R. at 42. I n J une 1995, a V A re g ional office (RO) a war ded ser

vice connec tion for PTSD and assig ned a 50% disability

rating

. R. at 58- 60. There afte r, in June 1996, Marc h 1997, and Fe bruar y 1998, the appellant f

iled claims for a

n incre ased disability rating for PTS D. R. at 85, 103, 116. I n J une 1998, the a pp e lla nt, thr ou g h c ouns e l, d isa g re e d w iththe de nia l of his c la ims and

ini tiate d a

n a pp e a l. R

. at 129-41, 157-60. I

n April 1999, the Boa

rd issued a decision denying a n incre ased disability

rating for PTSD. R. at 177-83. That de cision was not appe aled a nd it became final. On J une 20, 2000, the RO rec eived a statement in suppor t of claim in w hi ch t h e a p pellant stated: " Amend orig inal claim to add back injury . Ihurt my back in Chu L ai, Vietnam in 1968. A prog ress note is in my

SMR s howing Iwent on sick c all. Iam filing for [service connec tion] under the combat advanta g e rule. Amend to a dd any seconda ry conditions to original ba ck injury ." R. at 205. He a lso stated that "this i s an i n fo rm al claim for I .U. [TDI U] benefits. Iam unable to wor k becau se o f m y

P TS D an d b ack co nd it io n. " Id. On J uly 21, 2000, VA provided the appellant with a psy chiatric compensation and pension examination. R . at 263-66. The examiner rec orded the appellant' s employ ment h i s t o ry , which included his asser

tion that he had had his ow n auto repa ir shop until 1994 when he re portedly closed it because of his back c ondition. R . at 264. The e x aminer r eport ed that the appellant " was not involved in combat but he was stationed in a combat zone. Their are a was at times under morta r and rocke t attack a

nd he ofte n was in fe ar f

or his life. He did not see any one ac tually killed." R. at 263. T h e ap p el l an tgav e a h i s t o ry o f r ec u rr en tdre am s o f w o m en an d ch i l dre n ru m m agi n g t h ro u gh gar b age and eating disca

rded f ood. He a lso reporte d ree x perie ncing , throug h drea m s, an incident that

o cc u rr ed when a

n ammunition dump ex ploded and the impac t knocked him into a wall. Id. The examiner noted that "he was in V ietnam and, althoug h he was not in direc t combat situations, he was in dang erous situations and fe arf ul for his life." R. at 266. The examiner diag nosed PTSD, chronic; major depr ession, rec urre nt, non-psy chotic, seve re. Id. Th e e xami ne r a lso op ine d th a t " [a]t t his po in t, he d oes no t s eem capab le o f m ain tai ni ng emp lo y men t. " Id.3

On Novembe r 1, 2000, t h e appellant, throug h the same c ounsel repr esenting him here on appea l, sent a letter to the RO stating that he had f iled a cla im for TDIU three month s ea rl ier a nd that pursuant to the VA examiner' s conclusions a TDIU rating should be awarde d. R. at 280. A VA For m 21-8940, entitled " Veter ans Application for I ncre ased Compensa t i o n Ba sed on Unemploy ability ," w as also re ceive d by the RO on Novembe r 17, 2000. R. at 282-83. On J anuar

y 2 4 , 2 0 0 1 , th e RO in c r e a s e d th e a p p e ll a n t' s PT SD d is a

b il it y r a ti n g to 70%,

awa rd e d T DI U, a nd a ssi g ne d a

June 20 , 2 00 0, e ff

e c tiv e date to b oth

awa rd s. R. at 28 5- 93 . With

re g ard to t he TD IU aw a rd , the RO no te d: " Ev ide nc e re c e ive d s ho ws the ve te ra n h a s b e e n una

ble to work since 1994, due to his service connec ted [P TSD ]

. . . . T h e v eteran is entitled to rec eive individual unemploy ability benef its eff ective June 20, 2000." R. at 291. There afte r, in September 2001, the RO denied se rvi ce c onnection for a bac k injury

beca use there was no e vidence that the appellant' s back c ondition was relate d to service . R. at 441-46. On J anuar

y 24, 2002, the appe llant filed a Notice of Disag re em en t (N OD) w ith the Se pte mbe r 2 00 1 RO de c isi on tha t de nie d h is b a c k c la im. R. at 44 8- 53

. On the same date , h e a lso fi le d a n N OD wi th t

he Janu a ry

24 , 2 00 1, RO de c isi on that ass ig ne d the June 20 , 200 0, e ff e c tiv e date fo r h is 7 0% dis a

bil ity ratin g fo r P TSD a nd

TD I U. R. at 45 7- 63 . H e a rgue d, int e r a lia , th a t pursuant to the [Vetera

ns Claims Assistance A ct of 2000 (V CAA), Pub. L . No. 106- 47 5, 11 4 S tat

. 2096 ], r e tr os pe c tiv e me dic a l op ini on s sh ou ld h a ve be e n o bta ine d to deter mine whethe r o r not it is fac tually asce rtainable that the veter an' s condition incre ased in severity

during the time period of January 1995 to J une 2000 and wa rr a nte d a dis a bilit y ratin g in e xce ss o f 5 0% fo r P TSD [wit h d e pr e ssi on ] an d to deter mine whether

or not the cla imant was u n ab l e to perfor m substantial ga inful employ ment for the time pe riod of January 5, 1995, to J une 20, 2000. R. at 461. I n April 2003, VA provide d the appe llant with a compensation and pension examination of his back. R. at 496-99. He reported to the examiner that he ha d hurt his back in Vietnam when an ammunition dump ex ploded. R . at 496. The e x aminer pe rfor med a phy sical examination, and revie wed c urre nt med i cal r ecor ds and the c laims file. Id. Th e e xami ne r c on c lud e d: " Af te r f ull

re vie w o f [the c la ims ] fi le a nd [SMRs ], I se e no e vid e nc e of a ny ba c k in jur y wh ile in s e rv ic e and

it is m y me dic a l op ini on

tha t it is n ot lik e ly that the ve te ra n' s pr e se nt ba c k pr ob le ms a re re la te d to h is milit ary service ." R. at 498.The appellant raised a fourth argument in his ope ning br ief; howe ver, that arg ument was 1 subsequently

withdrawn in his re ply

brief. B r. at 15-18, Re ply Br . at 1. 4 I n J une 2003, th e Board r emande d the appe llant's c laims to the RO for additional development. R. at 507-13. I n J uly and S eptember 2003, the R O s ent him letters informing him of the status of his claim for se rvice connec tion for a ba ck disability and entitleme n t t o an ear lier

e ff e c tiv e date fo r h is 7 0% dis a bil ity ratin g fo r PTSD a nd

TD I U. R. at 50 7- 12 , 5 25 -3 1. An Au g us t 2003 Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC) c ontinued to de ny an eff ective date ear lier than J une 20, 2000, for

his 70% disability rating for PTS D and TDIU. R. at 515-23. I n his Subst antive Appea l, the appellant, through counsel, ar g ued, inter a lia, that the J anuar y 2001 RO decision was is s u e d p r e matu

r e ly b e c a u s e h e h a d n o t r e c e iv e d n o ti c e in c o mp li a n c e w it h th e V CA A p r io r to the adjudication. R. at 533-39. I n particula r, he a rg ued that, had the Secre tary complied with the notice

re qu ir e me nts , h e wo uld have ha d up to one y e a r t o s ub mit the e vid e nc e ne c e ssa

ry to s ub sta nti a te his

c la im– e vid e nc e that he ha d be e n un a ble to wo rk fr om June 19 97 to June 20 00 a s a re su lt of hi s service -conne cted PTSD. R. at 535. On May 12, 2004, the B oard issued the decision her e on appe al. R. at 1-21. In that decision, the B oa rd fo un d th a t ( 1) the a

pp e lla nt' s bac k co nd iti on wa s not re la te d to se rv ic e , ( 2) e nti tle me nt t o an incr ease d rating for PTSD was f irst demonstrated subsequent to J une 20, 2000, and (3) a for mal claim for T DI U was f

irst filed on J une 20, 2000. R. at 4. On appe al, the appe llant raises three ar g uments. First, with re spect to his appea l of the 1 eff ective date assig ned to his 70% disability rating for PTSD and TDI U, he a sserts that VA did not provide him with adequate notice pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a). Appe llant's B rief ( Br .) at 7-12. T h e e s s e n c e o f h is a r g u me n t is th a t V A d id n o t in f o r m h im of the mi s sing

e vid e nc e that w ou ld otherwise e ntitle him t o an ea rlier e ffe ctive date . Br . at 7. Se c o n d , h e c o n t e n d s t h a tt h e B o a r d e r r e d w h e n i tf a i l e d t o c o n s i d e r

a n d a p p l y a p p l i c a ble pr ov isi on s o f l a w a

nd re g ula tio n. B r. a t 12 -1 5. Al tho ug h th e a pp e lla nt' s b ri e fi ngon

thi s matte r i s
no t a mod el of clari ty , it

a pp e a rs , f ro m hi s r e ply

br ie f, that he is o nly

c on te sti ngthe e ff

e c tiv e date assig ned to his awa

rd of TD I U. Reply

Br . at 8 n.2 (" Mr. Da l t on did not make a c laim that the eff ective date 'for PTSD' was wrong ly decide d by VA. .

. . Only the effec tive date for t he award of TD I U i s a t is su e ." ). Hi s argume nt h e re is t wo fo ld. F irst , h e a sse rt s th a t th e B oa rd e rr e d w he n it5

conclude d, as a matter of law, that he w as not entitled to an ef fec tive date e arlier

than J une 20, 2000, fo r h is a wa rd of TD I U. B r. a t 12 -1 3. Th e ma in thr us t of this a rgume nt is tha t a cla im f or TD I U i s
an a pp lic a tio n f

or inc re a se d c omp e ns a tio n a nd the B oa rd sh ou ld h ave con si de re d 3 8 U .S. C. § 5110(b)( 2) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)( 2) (2006)

. Id. Se c on d, he a sse rt s th a t, w he n c on sid e ri nghis elig ibilit y for TD I U, the B oard should have considere d the holdings in R o berson v. Principi , 25 1 F .3 d 1 37 8 ( F e d. Cir . 2 00 1) ; Bowling v. Principi , 1 5 V e t.A pp . 1 (2 00 1) ; and

38 C.F .R. §§ 3.340(a) and 4.16(b) (2006). B r. at 14-15. Third, with reg ard to his claim for se rvice connec tion for a ba ck injury , he conte nds that the Boa rd misinterprete d 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) and the pr esumption of service c o n n ec tion under 38 U.S.C. § 105(a). B r. at 18-29. A ccor ding to the a ppellant, sec tion 115 4 (b ), ei t h er a lone, or t o get h er wi t h s ec t i o n 1 0 5 (a ), cr ea t es a p re s u mp t i o n o f s er v i ce co n n ec t i o n t h at el i m i n at es a v et er an 's need to submit medical ne x us evidenc e, unless the presumption is r ebutted by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e to the contr ary
. Id. I n response to the appellant' s first argument, the Secre tary asser ts that the VCAA does not

re qu ir e VAto g ive no tic e up on a c ha lle ng e to t

he do wn str e a m " e ff

e c tiv e date " e le me nt o f a

c la im. Secre tary ' s (Sec' y

) B r. at 10. At ora l arg ument, t h e S ec re t ar y argued, in the alter

native, that any notice er ror wa s nonprejudicial be cause the appellant, throug h his counsel, demonstrate d that he had

ac tu al kn o wl ed ge o f w h at wa s n ec es s ary t o s u b s t an t i at e h i s cl ai m
. R es p o n d i n g t o t h e ap p el l an t 's second a rg ument, the Secr etar

y ag ree s that section 5110(b)( 2) could a pp l y t o the ef

fec tive date of TDIU, if the TDI

U claim ar ises in conjunction with evidenc e of a worseningof a se rvice -conne cted disability . Sec' y

Supplemental (Suppl.) Br . at 8-9. He contends wher e the basis for the T DIU awa rd is satisfacti o n of the c riteria e stablished by 38 C.F.R. § 4.16, i.e., employ ability status, and not worsening of t he service- connec ted di sability , section 5110(b)(2) is not impli cate d. Id. F ina lly , in response to the appellant' s third arg ument, the Secr etar y asser ts that the p re s umptions create d by sectio n s 1 1 5 4 ( b ) a n d

1 0 5 ( a ) d o n o t e li mi n a te a v e te r a n ' s b u r d e n to d e mo n s tr a te a me d ic a l n exus betwee n a cur

rent disability

and an injury

or disease in service

. Sec' y Br . at 16-17. The ref

ore, he

asser ts that there e x ists a plausible basis t o s u p p o rt t h e Board' s denial of a n awa rd of se rvice

c o n n e c t i o nf

o r r e s i d u a l s o f a b a c k i n j u r y.Th e Court no te s th a t th e re c or d d oe s c on ta in a S ept ember 20 03 le tte r t

hat pu rp or ts t o 2 a dd re ss t he a pp e lla nt' s e nti tle me nt to an e a rl ie r e ff e c tiv e date fo r h is 7 0% dis a bil ity ra tin g fo r P TSD and his awa

rd of TDI U. Howe ver, nothingin the September 2003 le tter ca n be re ad as infor

ming him of what information and evidenc e is nec essar y to establish entitlement to an ear lier ef fec tive date. R. at 525-30.

6 II. AN AL YSI S A. Compliance With the Duty To Notify Pursuant to the VCAA, upon receipt of a complete or subs tantially complete a

pplication for benef its and prior to a

n initial unfa

vorable decision on a claim by an ag ency of orig inal jurisdiction, the Secr etar

y is r equire d to inf

orm the appellant of the infor mation and evidenc e not of re cord that (1) is nec essar

y to substantiate the cl ai m, (2) the Sec reta ry will seek to obtain, if any , and (3) the

a pp e lla nt i s e xpe c te d to pr ov ide , if a ny , a nd to r e qu e st that the c la ima nt p ro vid e any

e vid e nc e in h is possession that pe rtains to the claim. See 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 3( a ); Pelegrini v. Principi , 18 Vet.App. 11 2, 11 9, 12 1 ( 20 04 ); Quartuccio v . Principi , 16 Vet.App. 183, 187 (2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2006). F ailure to c omply with any of t h es e require ments may be re mandable e rror
. Qu ar tuc c io , 16 Vet.App. at 183. I f t h e Court finds such an e rror , it must "take due a ccount of the rule of pr e jud ic ia l er

ro r. " 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1( b) (2 ); see Conway v . Principi , 353 F.3d 1369, 1374-75 (F ed. Cir . 2 00 4 ) ; Ove rton v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 427, 435- 36, 443 (2006) (failure to provide cla imant notice of infor

mation nece ssary

to substantiate claim has " natura l effe ct of produc ing pr ejudice" ). J uly 2003 letter

s fr om t he RO we re the on ly

do cume nts re lie d u

po n b y the B oa rd in deter mining that VA ha d proper ly notified the appe llant of the i nformation and e vidence nece ssary to substantiate entitlement to a n ear lier eff

ective date. R. at 7. Upon revie w of the r ecor d, the Court notes that there is only one letter dated July

2003, and that letter

did not address the a

ppellant' s awa

rd of an inc rea sed disability

rating for his PTSD and his awa rd of TD I U, or what is nece ssary to warr ant

an ea rlier e ffe ctive date for those c laims. R. at 507-12. Ther e beingin the rec ord no pre

2 adjudicator

y letter re lied upon by the Board as satisfying VA' s duty to notify , the Court holds that the B oa rd e rr e d in c on c lud ingtha

t th e du ty to n oti fy ha d b e e n sat is fi ed. R. at 8; see Lock

lear v. Nicholson , 2 0 V e t.A

pp . 4 10 , 4 13 (2 00 6) (B oa rd fi nd ing s r e g a rd ingc omp lia nc e wi th t

he du ty to

n o t i f y ar e f i n d i n g s o f

f a c tr e v i e w e d

u n d e r t h e " c l e a r l y

e r r o n e o u s " s t a n d a r d

o f r e v i e w ); see also7

Mayfield v . Nicholson , 444 F.3d 1328, 1335 ( Fe d. Cir. 2006) (whe ther a com m u nication satisfies section 5103(a ) is a " substantially fac tual deter

mination"). Ha v in g f o u n d e r r o r , th e Co u rt m

u s t " ta k e d u e a c c o u n t o f

th e r u le o f p r e ju d ic ia l e r

ror." 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 1( b) (2 ); see Conway , 3 53 F .3 d at 13 74 -7 5; Ove rton 20 Vet.App. at 434-38. Her e, the Se c re tary

a sse rt s th a t any

no tic e e rr or w as no t preju dic ia l be c a us e the a pp e lla nt, thr ou g h h is

c ouns e l, d e mon str a te d a c tua l kn ow le dg e of the inf or ma tio n a nd e vid e nc e ne c e ssa

ry to s ub sta

nti a te his claim. See O verton , 2 0 V e t.A pp . at 43 8 ( ho ldi ngthat c ouns e l' s a c tio ns a nd c omm un ic a tio ns to VAa re fa c tor s to c on sid e r w he n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a c la ima nt ha d a me a nin g fu l op po rt un ity to

e ff e c tiv e ly pa rt ic ipate in t

he pr oc e ssi ngof

his c la im) . T he Cou

rt a g re e s. Significa ntly , as can be g leane d from the r ecor d, appellate counsel ha s been r epre senting Mr. Dalton at the RO, in pursuit of an inc rea sed disability rating for his PTSD, since a pproxi mately

1998. R. at 129-32, 140-41, 144-46, 157- 59, 186-87, 194-96, 279- 80, 457-63, 491-92, 533- 39, 546-47. Counsel has also bee n repr esenting him in pursuit of an awa rd of TD I U and a ssignment of an ea rlier eff ective da te for that awar d since 2000. R. at 279-80, 457-63, 491-92, 533- 39, 546-47. The c rux of the a ppellant' s argument is that, at the time of the initial adjudication in J anuar y 2001, he believe d that he had submitted suffic ient evidenc e, and VA had not g iven him any rea son to believe that the

e vid e nc e of

re c or d w ou ld n ot p ro ve his c la im. Th e pr ob le m with the a pp e lla nt' s argume nt i s th a t it mi s u n d e r s ta

n d s th e s c o p e o f th e n o ti c e r e qu ir e d b y th e V CA A

. A s w e r e c e n tly held in L o ckle ar , su pr a , VA is not req u i re d t o provide a claimant with a pr edec isional adjudication. See Lock lear , 20 Vet.App. at 415-16. I n other words, the VCAA notice r equire ment deals with evide nce g ather ing

and do e s n ot r e qu ir e VA" to r ule on the pr ob a tiv e va lue of inf or ma tio n a nd e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in

con nect io n wi th a cl aim pri or to rend eri ng a deci si on on th e mer it s of th e cla im it sel f." Id. at 416; see also Dingess v . Nicholson , 19 Vet.App. 473, 490 (2006) (" Wit hin the VA adjudicator y scheme , section 5103(a ) is f

ocused on notice that is requir ed to be pr ovided to a cla imant upon rec eipt of a complete or

substantially

complete a

pplication for be nefits and pr ior to an initial adjudication." ). We are also convince d that the appe llant, throug h his counsel, demonst rate d actua l knowledg e of the information and evidenc e necessar y to establish entitlement to an ear lier ef fec tive date. In particula

r, the a rgum en t s t h e appellant pr esente d to the RO in his J anuar y 2002 NOD de mon str a te his a

wa rene ss of the ne e d f

or me dic a l e vid e nc e " to d e te rm ine wh e the r o r n ot i t is8

fa c tua lly a sc e rt a ina

ble that th e ve te ra

n' s c on dit ion

inc re a se d in

se ve ri ty " a nd

wh e the r h e wa s " un a

ble to p e rf or m su bs tanti a l g a inf

ul e mpl oy

me nt" pr ior to J un e 20 , 2 00 0, the e ff e c tiv e date ini tia lly assig ned. R. at 461. These matters wer e re manded by the B oard in June 2003 for addit i o n al deve lopment and compliance with the VCA A, and we re subse quently rea djudicated by

the RO in the Aug ust 2003 S S OC . R. a t 50 1- 05 , 5 15 -2 3; see Pric kett v. Nicholson , 2 0 V e t. A p p
. 3 7 0 , 3 7 7 ( 2 0 0 6 )

. T h e r efor e, beca use the re cord de monstrates that the a p p ellant, throug h his counsel, was a war e of the information and evidence nece ssary to establish entitlement to an earlier effe ctive date prior to t he

re me dia l r e mand , w e c on c lud e tha t th e a pp e lla nt w a s a ff

or de d a me a nin g ful oppo rt

un ity to eff ectively partic i p at e i n t he adjudication of his claims for an e arlier eff ective da te for his 70% disability rating for PTSD and awa rd of TDIU. Henc e, we conclude that he wa s not prejudiced by VA' s failure to satisfy

the duty to notify prior to the initial adjudication. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261; Conway and Ove rton , both su pra . There being no other e rror asser ted as to the de nial of an e arlier eff ective f or his 70% disability

rating for PTSD, the B oard' s decision on that matter will be a ffirme d. The a ppellant' s entitlement to an ea rlier e ffe ctive date for his TDIU awa rd is addre ssed below. B. Entitlement to an Ea

rlier Ef fec tive Date f

or TDIU I n the instant case , the Board determined that "[e]ntitl ement to an ef fec tive date e arlier

than J une 20, 2000[,] for the awa rd of TDIU [was] not show n as a matter of law

. " R

. at 5 (c i t ing 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a))

. I n rea ching this determination, the B oard f ocused on June 20, 2000, as the date of the claim for TDIU, and sear ched the rec ord for any prior formal or i nformal claim. R. at 20- 21. Be cause there was no evidenc e of an intent to apply for TD I U bene fits prior to J une 20, 2000, the B oard c oncluded that June 20, 2000, was the a ppropriate eff

ective date. R. at 21. Th ere is no dispute on appeal that June 20, 2000, was the date of the a ppellant' s claim for TDIU. The que stion presented by this appeal is whethe r the g rant of a n application for

TDIU is an

awa rd of incr ease d compensation gove rned by the provisi ons of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)( 2) for purposes of assig nment of an e ffe ctive date ? I n other wor ds, when as s i gn i ng the ef fec tive date, must the Boa rd consider

whether it is fa ctually

asce rtainable that an incr ease in disabilit y sufficie nt to support t h e aw ar d o c c u r r e d i n t h e o n e y e a r

p r i o r t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f

o r T D I U ?9 1. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Section 5110(a) of title 38, U.S

. C o de, g overns the a ssignment of an ef fec tive date f

or an
awa rd of be ne fi ts: Unless spec ifically provided otherwise in this chapte r, the eff ective date of an a

war d based on a

n orig inal claim, a claim reope ned afte r final adjudication, or a c laim for incre ase, of

compensation, dependenc y and indemnity co mpensation, or pension, sh a ll be fi xed in ac c or da

nc e wi th the fa c ts fo un d, bu t sha ll not be e a rl ie r tha n the date of re ceipt of a

pplication there for. 38 U. S.C. § 5 11 0( a ). Th e Se c re tary ' s im ple me nti ng re g ulatio n simil a rl y state s th a t th e e ff e c tiv e date sh a ll b e the date of

re c e ipt of c la im or the date e nti tle me nt a ro se , w hic he ve r i s late r, un le ss t he c la im is rece ived within one y ear afte r sepa

ration fr om service

. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.400. An exception to this g ener al rule occur s when there is an awar d of incre ased c ompensation.

" Th e e ff e c tiv e date of a n aw a rd of inc re a se d co mpe ns a tio n sha ll be the e a rl ie st d a te a s o f w hic h it is ascer tainable that a

n incre ase in disability

had occ urre d, if application is receive d within one y ear fr om su c h date ." 38 U. S.C. § 5 11 0( b) (2 ); se e als o H ar pe r v . B ro wn , 10 Vet.App. 125, 126 ( 1997) (finding exception in section 5110(b)(2) limit ed to instance s where the incre ase in ser vice- connec ted disability prec edes the claim); 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)( 2). Ag ain, the Secr etar y 's implementing

re g ulatio n, lik e the statut e , pr ov ide s that the e ff e c tiv e date sh a ll b e the " [e]a rl ie st d a te it i s f

a c tua lly

asce rtainable that an incr ease in disabilit y had occurre d if claim i s rec eived within [one] y ear from such date otherwise, date of re ceipt of c laim." 38 C.F .R. § 3.400(o)(2)

. 2. ThePa rti es' A rgum e nts The a ppellant contends that an awa rd of TDIU is an aw ard of incre ased c ompensation, and the re fo re , the B oa

rd mus t con sid e r wh e the r it is fa c tua lly a sc e rt a ina ble that an in c re a se in d isa bil ity

occur red w ithin one y ear

prior to the application. Br. at 12-13. The Sec reta ry conce des that there may be instance s where the provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) are implicated, e.g ., when the TD I U c la im a

ri se s in c on jun c tio n w ith the wo rs e nin g of a se rv ic e -c on ne c te d d isa

bil ity . Se c ' y

Sup pl. Br . at 8-9. How ever , the Secr etar y sug g ests that, beca

use an awar d of TDI

U is based on a

finding of individual unemploy ability , not all awar ds of TDIU re sult from an incre ase i n d i sability , and there fore , not ever

y awa rd fa lls withi n the exception provided in sec tion 5110(b)(2). Id.10

Notwithstanding this g ener al caveat, on the facts of this case , the Secr etar y conce ded at or al

ar gu m en tt h at t h e ap p el l an t 's aw ar d o f T DIU w as b as edi n p ar to n a w o rs en i n g o f t h e ap p el l an t 's

se rv ic e -c on ne c te d PT SD a nd his ina bil ity to ma int a in su

bs tanti a lly

g a inf ul e mpl oy me nt a s a re su lt of that condition. Nonethe less, the Secr etar y continues to maintain that a re mand is not warr anted beca use, he a sserts, th e Bo ard applied section 5110(b) (2) a nd that there is no factua l basis in the

rec o rd fo r t h e gra

nt of an e arlier

eff ective da te. I n this reg ard, the Secre tary contends that the medical e vidence demonstrates that the appellant' s PTSD wor sened in July 2000, afte r the claim for TDIU was filed. Finally , he asserts that the appellant could not have met the criter ia for T DIU ea rlier than the date of his incre ased sc hedular rating for PTSD, because the appe llant was rated only 50% disabled prior to J une 20, 2000. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) (g ener ally requiringa sing le servic econnec ted disability

to be rated at 60% or

more for an aw ard of

TDIU). First, we addre ss whether we a g ree that the provisions of sec tion 5110(b)(2) a pply to the

a pp e lla nt' s awa rd of TD I U. Th e n, we dis c us s and re je c t the Se c re tary ' s a sse rt ion s th a t a re mand is not warr anted unde r these c ircumstance s.

3. TDIU–an Award of Increase d Compensation To be e ligible f

or a TD I U rati n g, a claimant must be unemploy able a s a re sult of service -conne cted disabilities. Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a), a v et er an who is unable to secure or follow a substantially

g ainful occ upation beca

use of service- connec ted disabilities and who has either one service -conne cted disabili ty rate d at least 60% or

multipl e ser

vice- connec ted disabilities y ielding a combined rating of

70% or more (with at l east one of t hose disabilities rated 40% or more) is eligible f

or a TD I U rating. In addition, "ve tera n s wh o are unemploy able by rea son of

se rv ic e -c on ne c te d disa

bil iti e s, bu t who fa il to mee t the pe rc e nta g e sta nd a rd s set fo rt

h in [ 38 C.F .R. § 4.16(a) ]" should be g iven extraschedula r consider ation. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b). As stated a

b o v e , th e qu e s ti o n p r e s e n te d b y th is a p p e a l is w h e th e r a n a w a r d o f T D I U is an
awa rd of inc re a se d c omp e ns a tio n f or purp os e s o f a ssi g nin g a n ef fe c tiv e date purs ua

nt to 3 8 U .S. C. § 5110(b)( 2). I n the i nstant case , the award of TDIU was based on 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a)–in January 2001, the RO deter

mined that the appe llant was unable to secure or follow a su b s t an t i al ly g ainful

o cc u p at i o n as a r esult of servic e-c onnecte d disabiliti es and at the time increa sed the a ppellant's dis a bil ity ratin g fo r s e rv ic e -c on ne c te d PTS D fro m 50 % t o 7 0% , me e tin g the TD I U e lig ibi lity11

require ment that a veteran have a service -conne cted disability rating of at lea st 60%. The Sec reta ry
conce des, and the Court a g ree s, that under the fac ts presente d by this appeal, the a

ppellant' s awa

rd of TDIU was a

n awa rd of incr ease d compensation. There fore , the Board was require d to consider and apply 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2). The basis for our conclusion ca

n be found in our c asela

w. Gene rally , in the context of an awa rd of incre ased compensation, we have he ld that "[s] ection 51 10 (b )( 2) is i nv ok e d o nly wh e re it ha s be e n de te rm ine d that the e vid e nc e wa rr a nts a n in c re a se to th e nex t d is abi li ty

lev el. " Hazan v. Gobe r , 10 Vet.Ap p
. 5 1 1 , 5 1 9 (1997). In W ood ( Clarence) v. Derwinski , we f

ound that an application "for unemploy ability

compensation [ is] an applica tion for

' incre ased c ompensation' within the meaning of [section 5110(b)(2) ]." 1 Vet.App. 367, 369 (1991). I n rea ching that deter

mination, we explained that the appellant, who w as alre ady rate d 60% disabled fo r his se rv ic e -c on ne c te d re sid ua ls of lum

ba r spi ne fu sio ns , wa s "m e re ly a tte mpt ing to sho w that hi s
con di ti on was mo re incap aci tat in g th an the lev el at whi ch it was th en ev alu ate d. " Id. a t 36 8- 69 ; see als o Gr e e n v . B ro wn , 10 Ve t.A pp . 111 , 119 (1 99 7) (" [S]ec tio n 511 0( b) (2 ) p la inl y a pp lie s a ft e r i ts

e n a c t m e n tt o t h e h y

p o t h e t i c a l v e t e r a n w h o , c l a i m i n g an i n c r e a s e i n d i s a b i l i t y , i s aw a r d e d

a T D IU rating .") . Consist ent with our holding in W ood ( Clarence) , su

pra , we reiter ated in Nor ris v . W est , that "unde r t he VA statutory and reg ulatory scheme evidenc e of a vete ran' s unemploy ability arising fr om a n a lr e a dy a llo we d s e rv ic e -c on ne c te d d isa bil ity is ind e e d ev ide nc e of a n in c re a se in t he se ve ri ty of that dis a

bil ity ." 12 Ve t.A

pp . 4 13 , 4 20 (1 99 9) ; se e als o H ur d v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 449, 451- 52 (2000) ( applying r

ules g overningeff

ective dates for inc rea sed ratings to TDIU awa rd). I nitially , w e n o te th a t th e r e c a n b e n o d o u b t th a t a n a w a r d o f T D I U to a v e te r a n who was previously rate d less than 100% disabled is an "inc rea se" in compensation. Se e Nor ris , 12 Vet.App.

a t 42 0 ( inf

or ma l c la im f

or TD I U i s, in e sse nc e , a c la im fo r a n inc re a se d r a tin g ). Th is c on c lus ion is supported by

the Secr etar

y ' s form, VA F orm 21-8940, entitled " Veter an' s Application for Incre ased Compensation Ba sed on I ndividual Unemploy ability ." R. at 282 (emphasis added). Second, a s we stated in Nor

ris and W

ood ( Clarence) , both su

pra , an a l re ady

service -conne cted ve tera n who become s unable to sec ure or follow a s u b s t an t ially

g ainful occ upation as a r esult of that servic econnec ted disabil i ty

has log ically

underg one an inc rea se in disability . The ve tera n has g one fr om
a state of be inga ble to s e c ur e or

fo llo w a su bs tanti a lly

g a inf ul o c c up a tio n, tho ug h n ot n e c e ssa ri ly employ ed, to being unable to sec ure or follow a substantially

g ainful occ upation.12

Moreove r, we are not persuade d by the Secr etar

y ' s sugg estion th at ap p lication of sec tion 5110(b)( 2) to awa rd s of TDI U is limi ted to those circ umstances whe re the re is a c oncomitant incre ase in the c laimant' s schedular disability rating

. Although an i ncre ase to the nex t disabilit y level during the one y ear

prior to re ceipt of the claim is g ener ally require d for a

pplication of sec tion 5110(b)(2 ), see H

azan , su pra , i n t h e c o n t ex to f a n aw ar d o f T DIU, an i n cr ea s e i n t h e c l ai m an t 's schedula r rating f or his service -conne cted disabili ty is not nece ssarily require d. That is beca use an
awa rd of TD I U p ur su a nt t o 3 8 U .S. C. § 4. 16 (a ) r e qu ir e s b oth (1 ) a sin g le se rv ic e -c on ne c te d d isa bil ity rate d at 60% or mor e (or

multipl e ser

vice- connec ted disabilities y ielding a combined rating of 70% or more, w ith at least one of those disabiliti es rated 40% or mor e), and (2) a n inability

to secure or follow a substantially

g ainful occ upation. For p u rp o s es of section 5110(b)(2) , both criteria of a TD I U r a tin g un de r § 4. 16 (a ) a re ty pes of di sab ilitie s, and , th e re fo re , p ro vid e d th a t bo th c ri te ri a to support an aw ard of

TDIU ar e pre sent during the applica ble period, it is i rre levant which of the two

c ri te ri a fi rs t be c a me fa c tua lly

a sc e rt a ina

ble . I f i t c a n b e a sc e rt a ine d th a t e ith e r or bo th c ri te ri a
m an i f e s t e d d u r i n g t h e o n e ye a r p r i o r t o r e c e i p t o f t h e c l a i m , t h e n t h e " i n c r e a s e i n d i s a b i l i t y" require ment of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(2) is satisfied. By this opini on, we do not intend to a nswer the question whether ever y awa rd of TD I U is an

aw ar d o f i n c r e a s e d c o mp e n s a t i o n
. W e r e c o g n i z e t h a t u n d e r s o m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s an aw a r d o f T D IU may not amount to an awa

rd of incr ease d compensation; for example, TDI U m ay be awarde d as par t of an initial awa

rd of disability

compensation benefits. Ther efor e, our h o l d i n g is lim ited to the fac tual scena

rio prese nted: The g rant of an application for TDIU based on an inability to secure or follow a subst antially g ainful occupation as a result of an already service -conne cted disability and the c o n c e s s io n b y th e Se c r e ta r y th a t th e T D I U a w a r d w a s b a s e d in p a rt o n th e w o r s e ning of the service -conne cted PTSD. Acc ording ly , we hold that a claimant awa rded TDIU based on a

n alre ady service -conne cted

c on dit ion , w hic h la

te r r e nd e rs him

un a ble to s e c ur e or fo llo w a sub sta nti a lly g a inf

ul o c c up a tio n, is entitled to consideration of an ef fec tive date pur suant to section 5110(b)( 2). Se e Nor ris , 12 Vet.App.

a t4 2 1

- 2 2 ( e v i d e n c e o f

u n e mp l o y a

b i l i t y d u e t o a 7 0 % d i s a

b i l i t y r a t i n g r e a s o n a

b l y r a i s e d T D IU

c la im) ; Gree n and W

ood ( Clarence) , both su

pra . Henc e, the Boar d is require d to searc h the re cord to determine w hether

it is factually

asce rtainable that in the one y ear prior to the application there13

was an incre ase in disability

. Se e Sc ott v . B ro wn , 7 Ve t

. Ap p
. 1 8 4 , 1 8 9 (1 9 9 4 ) ( ap p ro v i n g Bo ar d 's consideration of "a ll the evidence of re cord" for the y ear prec eding the claim to asc ertain whether disability incre ased in seve rity). As set for th above, a

n incre ase in disability can be demonstrated throug h satisfac tion of either or both criteria

of § 4.16(a ). 4. Ap pli c ati on of L aw t

o F ac ts I n the instant case , the Boa rd err ed when it conc luded " as a matter of law " that entitlement to a n e arl ie r e ff

e c tiv e date for TD I U h a d n ot b e e n e sta bli sh e d. R. at 5 ( qu oti ngB oa rd (e mph a sis added) ). More over, w e ar e not convince d that the B oard c onsidere d section 5110(b) (2) a s it was require d to do. First, the Board did not cite se ction 5110(b)( 2) whe n rea ching its determination on this matter. R. at 5. I n fac t, when it concluded, " as a ma tte r of l aw, " that entitlement to an ear lier eff ective date for T DI U had not bee n established, the B oar d s p ecifically cited only

to section 5110(a)

. Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . Se c on d, c on tr a ry to t he Se c re tary ' s po sit ion , the Court is u na ble to dis c e rn fr om the B oa

rd ' s r e a so ns or

ba se s th a t it

c on sid e re d w he the r i t w a s f a c tua lly a sc e rt a ina

ble tha t i n t h e y e a r p r i o r t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f

o r T D I U t h e r e w a s a n i n c r e a s e i n d i s a b i l i t y
. A l t h o u g h it appea rs t hat t he Board may have searc hed the rec ord for an informa l claim or an intent to apply for TD I U p ri or to June 20 , 200 0 (R. a t 20) , it is n ot e nti re ly c le a r t hat th e B oa

rd re vie we d th e re c or d w ith an ey e towar d whether

the appe llant's PTSD alone r ender ed him unable to sec ure o r fo llow a substantially

g ainful occ upati o n in that one-y ear period. Com

pa re R. at 20 (B oard' s conclusory

asser tion that rec ords reg arding the per iod before J une 20, 2000, re flec t unemploy abilitydue to lowback disa bility ), with R. at 291 (RO' s conclusory asser tion that evidence rec eived shows a ppellant unable to wor

k since 1994 a s a re sult of PTS D). W hether an incr ease in disabilit y

occur red in the y ear prior to the application for TDIU, by its very nature , is a fa ct ual deter mination that must be made b y t h e Bo ar d in the first instance. Se e He ns le yv . W est , 212 F.3d 1255, 1263- 64 (F ed. Cir. 2000) (c ourt of appe als may rema nd if it deter

mines that lower tribuna l failed to make finding of fa ct

e sse nti a l to de c isi on ); W

anless v. Principi , 18 Ve t.A pp . 3 37 , 3 37 (2 00 4) (p e r c ur iam or de r) ; se e als o 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( d) (1 ); Sammarco v . Derwinski , 1 Ve t

. Ap p. 111, 113-14 (1991) (" Whether the B[oard' s] ul ti mate c o n c lu s io n s a r e c o r r e c t o r n o t,

. . . th e in c o mp le te n a tu r e o f th e d e c is io n b elow does not permit prope r re view by this Court.").14

Fur thermore , that the i ncre ase in the appellant's PTSD disability rating from 50% to 70% a nd

awa rd of TDIU seeming ly was based on the J uly 2000 VA compe nsation and pension examination does not r elieve the Boa

rd of its responsibility

to review the evidenc e of r ecor d to asce rtain whe ther an incr ease in disabilit y

occur red in the one y ear

prior to the application. See Se rvello v. D erwinski , 3 Ve t

. Ap p . 196, 200 (1992) ( althoug h incre ased r ating was ba sed upon evide nce submitted subsequent to application for incre ased r ating , Boa rd erred in not considering evidenc e about status of c on di ti on du ri ngon e -y e a r p e ri od pr ior to a pp lic a tio n) . T he re fo re , b e c a us e the B oa

rd fa ile d to deter mine whether

both criteria

for TDI U under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) wer e present during the one -y ear period prior

to J une 20, 2000, with either one first bec oming a scer tainable at any

time during that pe ri od , t he Co ur

t w ill re mand

the ma tte r f

or a pp lic a tio n o f 3 8 U .S. C. § 51 10 (b )( 2) and 38 C.F .R. § 3.400(o)( 2). See Schafrath v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 589, 592-93 (1991) (stating that the B oard must consider and discuss a ll applicable pr ovisions of law and re g ulation where t h ey are made "pote ntially

applicable throug h the asser tions and issues raised in the r ecor d")

. Fur ther, we are not pe rsuade d by the Secre tary ' s argument that the appellant is not entitled to an ef fec tive date for TDIU ear lier than the eff ective date of his 70% disability rating for PTSD. I n making this a

rg ument, the Secre tary ignor es 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b) ( extraschedular TDIU), whic h does not contain the 60% disability rating criter ion of § 4.16(a)

. On appe al, the appe llant also argues that the Board e rre d when it fa iled to consider a nd apply the holdings in Roberson and Bowling , b oth

su pr a , and 38 C.F.R

. §§ 3. 34 0( a ) a

nd 4. 16 (b ). No ne the le ss, be c a us e the a pp e lla nt m a ke s a

te rs e argument in his ope ning br ief on this matter a nd inasmuch as a

finding of er

ror will not result in a

reme dy broade r than a

rema nd, the Court wi l l n o t ad d ress thi s assertion of e rror
. See M ahl v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 37, 38 (2001) (holding that, when rema nd is a ppropriate , the Court need not "a naly ze and discuss all the other c laimed er rors t h at wo u l d result in a re medy no broade r than a

re mand " ); cf. Coker v . Nicholson , 1 9 V e t.A pp . 4 39 , 4 42 (2 00 6) (a

pp ell ant mu st p le a d w ithso me particu la r it y th e a ll e g a ti o n o f

e r r o r s o th e Co u rt i s a

b le to r e v ie w an d

a s s e s s th e v a li d it

y o f the

a pp e lla nt' s argume nts ). We, the re fo re , lea ve op e n the qu e sti on s w he the r t he a pp e lla nt i s e nti tle d to a TDI U awa rd base d on § 4.16(b) a

nd what cr iteria must be met for application of sec tion 5110(b)(2) in connec tion with a TDI U awa rd based on § 4.16(b). "Anarr ow dec ision preserve s for the a ppellant an opportunity to argue thos e claimed err ors before the Boa rd at the readjudication, and, of cour se,15

befo re t hi s C ou rtin an ap peal , s ho ul d t he Bo ard rul e again st hi m. " Best v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 18, 20 (2001). On r emand, the a ppellant is fre e to s u b m i t ad d i t i onal evidenc e and a rg ument and the Boa rd m ust consider any

such evide nce or

argument submitt ed. See Kay v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 52 9, 53 4 ( 20 02 ); Kut

sc he ro us k yv . W est , 12 Vet.App. 369, 372- 73 (1999) ( per c uriam orde r). C. Se rv ic e Conne c tio n f

or a B a c k D isa

bil ity Establishing ser

vice c onnection g ener ally require s (1) medic al evidenc e of a curr ent disabil i t y ; (2) medical or, in ce rtain circ umstances, lay evidenc e of in-se rvice incurre nce or ag g ravation of a disease or injury ; a nd (3) medical evidenc e of a nexus between t h e claimed in-servic e disease or injury and the prese nt disabilit y
. Se e Hi c k so n v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 247, 253 (1999); Cal uz a v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 498, 506 ( 1995), a ff 'd per curiam , 78 F.3d 604 (F ed. Cir. 1996) (table) ; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2006). A f ind ingof se rv ic e c on ne c tio n is a

fi nd ing of

fa c t r e vie we d und e r t

he " c le a rl y

e rr on e ou s" standard of

revie w set for

th in 38 U. S

. C

. § 7 2 6 1 (a )(4). See Ru sso v . B ro wn , 9 Vet.App. 46, 50 (1 99 6) ; Swa nn v . B ro wn , 5 Ve t.A pp . 2 29 , 2 32 (1 99 3) . " A f a c tua l f ind ing' is " c le a rl y

e rr on e ou s" wh e n a lth ou g h th e re is e vid e nc e to sup po rt it, the re vie wi ng c ourt on the e nti re e vid e nc e is l e ft wi th th e def in it e andfi rm con vi cti on th at a m i s t a k e has been com mi tt ed. '" Hersey v. De rwinski , 2 Vet.App. 91, 94 ( 1992) (quoting United States v. U.S. G ypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The Court may

not substit ute its judgment for the factual determinations of t he Board on issues of

ma te ri a l f a c t merely

be c a us e the Court

wo uld have de c ide d th os e iss ue s d if fe re ntl y in t he fi rs t instance. Se e id

. I n addition, the Boa rd is r equire d to provide a w ritten statement of the rea sons or bases f or its findings a

nd conclusions on all m ater ial issues of fa ct and law prese nted on the re cord; t h e s t at em en tm u s t b e a d eq u at e t o en ab l e a cl ai m an tt o u n d er s t an d t h e p re ci s e b as i s fo r t h e B o ar d 's decision, as well as to fac ilitate reviewin this C ourt. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( d) (1 ); Al lda yv . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 517, 527 ( 1995); Gilbert v. De rwinski , 1 Ve t.A pp . 4 9, 57 (1 99 0) . T o c omp ly wi th t his require ment, the B oard must ana ly ze the cre dibilit y

and probative value of the evidence, a ccount f or the evidenc e that it finds persua sive or unper suasive, and provide the rea sons f or its rejection of a

ny materia l evidenc e fa

vorable to the claimant. Se e Cal uz a , 7 Vet.App. at 506; Ga br ie lso n v . B ro wn , 7 Vet.App. 36, 39- 40 (1994).16 1. Statutory and Regulatory Provisions Section 1154(b) of title 38, U.S. Code , ease s the evidentiar y burden of

combat vete rans by pe rm itt ingthe us e , und e r c e rt a in c ir c ums tanc e s, of lay e vid e nc e . Se c tio n 1 15 4( b) pr ov ide s: I n the ca se of a

ny veter an who e ng ag ed in combat with the ene my in active se rvice with a military , naval, or

air org anization of the United States during a period of wa r, campa ign or

expedition, t he Secr etar

y shall acc ept as suff

icient pr o o f o f ser

viceconnec tion of any

disease or

injury alleg ed to have been inc urre d in or ag g ravated by such ser vice satisfactory lay or ot her evidence of ser vice incur renc e or a g g ravation of such injury

or disease , if co n s i s t ent wit h the circ umstances, c onditions, or hardships of suc h service , notwithstanding the f act that ther e is no officia l rec ord of such incurre nce or ag g ravation in such service , and, to that end, shall resolve ever y re a so na ble do ub t in fa

vo r o f t he ve te ra n. Se rv ic e c on ne c tio n o f s uc h in jur y or dis e a se may be rebutted by clea

r and convincing evidenc e to the contra ry . The re asons for g ranting or deny

ing se rvice connec tion in each c ase sha ll be rec orded in full. 38 U. S.C. § 1 15 4( b) . T he Se c re tary ' s im ple me nti ngre g ulatio n s imi larl y pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: Satisfactory

lay or other e vidence that an inj ury or disease was incur

red or ag g ravated in combat will be ac cepte d as suffic ient proof of service connec tion if the evidenc e is consistent with the circumstanc es, conditi o n s or har dships of such servic e eve n though the re is no off

icial re cord of

such incurr ence or ag g ravation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d) ( 2006). 2. Combat Veterans and Sec tion 1154( b) Section 1154(b) ha s been inter prete d to reduc e the e videntiary burden f or combat vetera

ns with respec t to evidence of in-servic e incur renc e or a g g ravation of an injury or disease ; it is not, as the appe llant argues, equiva lent to a stat u t o ry p re s u mption that the claimed condition is service

connec ted. S

e e C o l l e t t e v
. Br own , 8 2 F.3d 389, 392 ( Fe d. Cir. 1996) (" Section 1154(b) doe s not

c re a te a statut or y pr e su mpt ion

that a c omb at ve te ra

n' s a lleg e d d ise a se or inj ur y is

se rv ic e -c on ne c te d. " ); se e als o J e ns e n v . B ro wn , 19 F.3d 1413, 1416- 17 (F ed.Cir. 1994) (notingthat section 1154(b) "e vinces a strong intent to provide g ener ously for the service -conne cted disabilities of combat vetera

ns by liberalizing the me thods of proof a llowed" ); W ade v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 302, 3 0 4 -0 5 (1 9 9 8 ) ( d i s cu s s i n g Col e tte and subsequent decisions of this Court interpre ti n g s ec t i on 1154(b) as reduc ing the evidentiar y burden only as t o the questi on of i n-ser vice incurrenc e). I n other words, under

section 1154(b) , lay

statements may

be suff icient t o establish the in-ser vice incur renc e of an injury or dis e a se , but ap pli c a tio n of that sec tio n doe s not al te r the fu nd a me nta l r e qu ir e me nts17

of a c urre nt disabilit y

or a me dical nexus to service ( the first and third Hickson , su pra , e le ments, respe ctively

). Se e Lib e rti ne v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A pp . 5 21 , 5 23 -2 4 ( 19 96 ); C alu za , 7 Vet.App. at 507-08. There fore , a vete r a

n who establishes in-ser

vice incur renc e of a n injury or disease throug h application of sec tion 1154(b) must nonetheless submi t "suff icient evidenc e of a

causa l nexus betwee n that ins e r v i c e e v e n t a n d h i s o r

h e r c u r r e n td i s a b i l i t y a s r e qu i r e d

b y Cal uz a ." See W

ade , 11 Vet.App. at 305;

see also H

uston v . Principi , 18 Ve t.A pp . 395 , 402 (2 00 4) ; Cly bu rn v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 296, 303 (1999) ( holding that the provisions of sec tion 1154(b) do not provide a substitut e for

medical ne x us evidenc e). Although the appellant de dicated a larg e por t i o n of his brief to inviting the Court to adopt a cha ng e i n ex i s t i n g law, i.e., one which would re ad sec tion 1154(b) as e liminating the nee d for medical ne x us evidenc e, we see no r eason to de part fr om th e C o u rt 's curr ent interpre tation of the benef it be stowed by 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b). The appellant seeme d to c oncede as much d u ri n g o ral argument when he rec og nized that the rig ht to rec eive compensation from VA re quires evide nce of a medica l nexus betwee n an in-ser vice e vent and c urre nt disabilit y . Moreove r, because the Boa rd failed to provide an ade quate state ment of re asons or bases for its c onclusion reg ardingthe sec ond Hickson e le me nt, the ma tte r mus t be re mand e d fo r re a dju dic a tio n. Th e re fo re , we a lso deem it

unnece ssary

to acc ept the appe llant's invitation.

3. The Board's Reasons or Bases I n the decision on appea l, the Boa rd denie d the appe llant's c laim for ser vice c onnection for a bac k disability

upon finding that he had f ailed to s at i s fy the sec ond Hickson element–in-se rvice incurre nce or

ag g ravation of a disea s e or injury . R. at 14. I n rea ching this conclusion, the Boa rd acknow ledg ed the a

ppellant' s contention that he had injured hi s back during service in Vietnam and proceed ed to analy

ze his claim pursuant to section 1154(b). I nitially , the B oard note d that the appellant ' s SMR s and sepa ration examination report do not indicate that he had suf fer ed a ba ck inj ur y duri ng se rv ic e
. R. a t 13

. B oth his e ntr a nc e a nd

se pa ra tio n e xami natio n r e po rt s st a te that hi s spine was e valuated a s normal. Moreove r, a se paration r ep o rt of medica l history prepa red by the appellant shows that he denied ba ck trouble of an y k ind. To the extent that his S MRs show treatment for a " left flank co n t u sion," the B oard r easone d that the lack of subsequent tre atment

rec ords, and no notation of ba ck proble ms on separation, either by the appellant or the examiner, lea d18

"the Boa rd to conc lude t hat, even if this injury wer e to the back (rather than to the ribs or ' left flank' ), it was transient in nature , and wa s not productive of a chronic disability ." R. at 13. The Boa rd' s analy sis is fa

ulty for a number of r easons. F irst, the Boa rd fa iled to determine whether the appe llant's la

y evidenc e wa s satisfactor y
. S e e C oll e tte , 82 F.3d at 393 (finding that

se c tio n 1 15 4( b) re qu ir e s a three-s tep se qu e nti a l ana ly sis ); se e als o Ca luz a , 7 Vet.App. at 507 (holding that section 1154(b) permits a combat veter an to establish in-servic e incur renc e of a n injury

or dis e a se thr ou g h " lay

or oth e r e vid e nc e " if

(1 ) t he e vi dence is s a tis fa c tor y ; ( 2) the e vid e nc e is

c on sis te nt w iththe c ircum stan c e s, c on dit ion s o r h a rd sh ips of se rv ic e ; and

(3 ) i t c a n p re va il notwithstanding the f

act that ther e is no offic ial rec ord of the incurr ence during service ). Satisfac tory evidenc e is evidenc e that is cre dible. Se e id

. a t 51 0- 11 . " Cr e dib le e vid e nc e " is " that w hic h is pl aus ib le o r cap abl e of b ein g beli eved ." Id. a t 50 6; se e als o Co lle tte , 82 F.3d at 392. Deter minations of cre dibilit y

are finding s of fa ct to be made by the Boa rd in the first instance. Se e Cal uz a , 7 Vet.App. at 512; Lay no v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 465, 469 ( 1994) (f inding that the w eig ht and cr edibility

of evide nce " is a fac tual deter mination going to the probative value of the evidenc e to b e ma de a ft e r t

he e vid e nc e ha s b e e n a dmi tte d" ); see also W ood ( Bruce) v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 190, 193 (1991) ( "T he [Boar d] h as t h e d u t y to assess the cr edibility

and we ight to be g iven to the evidenc e." ). I n making a dete rm i n ati on of whe ther the se ction 1154(b) pr esumption has been trig g ere d, the B oard is not per mitted to weig h the veter an' s lay evidenc e ag ainst contrar

y evidenc e. Se e Col le tte , 82 F.3d at 394. Nor may the Boa rd rely on the abse nce of

an off icial re cord to find the lay evidence not cr edible bec ause that would be inconsistent with the purpose of section 1154(b)

. See D ambach v . Gober , 223 F.3d 1376, 1380- 81 (F ed.Cir. 2000); see also Buc hanan v. Nicholson , 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 ( Fe d. Cir. 2006) (holding that the lack of contempora

neous medica l rec ords do e s n ot, in a

nd of its e lf , r e nd e r l ay e vid e nc e no t c re dib le ); Cal uz a , 7 Ve t.A pp . at 51 1 ( in deter mining whe ther lay

evi d en ce is satisfa ctory the B oard ma

y proper ly consider inter

nal consistency , fac ial plausibilit y , and consistenc y with other evide nce su b m i tted on behalf of the veter an). Rather than make thi s nece ssary cre dibilit y deter mination, the Boa

rd pre maturely

conclude d that "the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e does not demonstrate that the veteran incur red a n in-servic e back injury

or that, if he did, it was othe r than tr an s i en t i n nature and [was] resolved without any19

residual disability ." R. at 14. Wit h respe ct to the Boa rd' s first conclusion that the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e does not de monstrate that the a ppel l an t incurre d an in-ser vice ba ck injury , we a

re unable to disce rn fr om the Board' s rea soning whether it deter mined that the appe llant's la y evidenc e was not cr edible, or w h et h er i t ac cepte d the lay evidenc e as c redible, but found that there w as evidenc e to the contr ary

that weig hed ag ains t finding a n in-servic e bac k injury . Moreove r, in the

a bs e nc e of a fi nd ingthat th e lay

e vid e nc e wa s n ot s a tis fa c tor y , th e B oa rd sh ou ld h a ve pr oc e e de d to analy ze whether

the alleg ed in-ser

vice injury was consistent with the circ umstances, conditions, or hardships of se rvice

. S

e e C o l l e t te , su pra . Given this failure , the B oard' s statement of re asons or b as es d o es n o t fa ci l i t at e ju d i ci al re v i ew n o r i s i th el p fu l t o u n d er s t an d i n g t h e b as i s fo r t h e B o ar d 's decision. Wit h respe ct to the B o ar d' s alternative conclusion that any in-servic e bac k injury

"w as appar ently

transient in nature," this finding is a medic al conc lusion that the Boar d is not competent to m a ke . R. a t 14 ; see M

cLendon v. Nicholson , 20 Vet.App. 79, 85 (2006) ("The Boa rd also er red in its f inding that Mr. Mc L endon' s in-service back injury was a cute without chr onic re sidual disability . Having found t hat M r. McL endon suffere d an in-ser vice ba ck injury , the deg ree of that injury and whether any disabiliti es resulted there from are medical assessments that the B oard is not

c omp e te nt to re nd e r in the fi rs t in sta nc e ." ); see also Colvin v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 171, 175 (1991) (h o l d i n g t h at t h e B o ar d m ay co n s i d er o n l y i n d ep en d en tm ed i ca l ev i d en ce i n s u p p o rt o f i t s fi n d i n gs and may not substit ute its own medical opinion). Finally , to the e xte n t t

h e B o a r d conclude d that the third Hickson element–medic al nexus–was

no t sat isf ie d , t h e B o a r d

i mp r o p e r l y

r e l i e d o n an i n a d e qu a t e m e d i c a l e xam i n a t i o n t o r e a c h t h is conclusion. The B oard r elied on the r eport of an April 2003 VA ex amination to conclude that "the

rec ord conta ins a medica l conclusion by which the idea

of a ne x us betwee n the veter an' s curr ent bac k disability and his milit ary service is ex pressly reje cted." R. at 15. The examination report c ontains the following conclusion: "A fter full revie w of [the claims] file and [S MRs] , I seeno evide nce of any back injury while in servic e and it is my medical opinion that it is not likely that the veter an' s prese nt back problems are related t o his milit ary service ." R. at 498 (e mphasis added) . A plain re ading of this sentenc e sugg ests that the s ole premise for the examiner' s conclusion was the l ack of notation

or tr e a tme nt o f a

ba c k in jur y in s e rv ic e . Ind e e d, it a

pp e a rs that th e me dic a l e xami ne r i mpe rm iss ibl y20

ignor ed the a

ppellant' s lay

asser tions that he had sustained a back injury

during service

. See R. at 49 6 ( e xami ne r re c or de d a

pp e lla nt' s a sse rt ion

that he ha d in

jur e d h is b a c k w he n a

n ammunit ion

dump
e xplod e d, he wa s th ro wn

by the fo rc e , a

nd land e d on his b a c k) ; see also Buc hanan , 451 F.3d at 1336 (noting that VA' s examiner' s opinion, whic h relied on the absenc e of contempora n eo u s medical

ev i d en ce , "f

ai l ed t o co n s i d er wh et h er t h e la y s t at em en t s p re s en t ed s u ff i ci en tev i d en ce o f t h e e t i o l o gy of [the ve te ra

n' s] disa bil ity su c h th a t hi s c la im o f s e rv ic e c on ne c tio n c ou ld b e pr ov e n" ); Coburn v. Ni c h o lson , 19 Vet.App. 427, 432 ( 2006) (" [R ]eliance on a veter an' s statement re nders a medical repor t incredible only

if the B oard r ejec ts the statements of the ve tera n.") ; Re on al v . B ro wn , 5 Vet.App. 458, 460- 61 (1993) ( a medica l opinion based on an inac curate fa ctual p re m ise has no pr ob a tiv e va lue ); cf

. Mariano v
. P r in cipi , 1 7 Vet.App. 305, 312 ( 2003) (holding that VA medica l examiner' s conclusions wer e of " questionable proba tive value" beca

use examiner failed to consider

cer tain information). Although a m edica l opinion based on rec itations of a claimant that have been rejec ted by the Boa rd is of little probative value , se e Cob ur n and Reonal , both su

pra , the B oard' s consideration of the third Hickson element in t h i s case specif ically assumed an in- service back injury . R. at 15 (" [E]ve n if

the B oa rd we re to a ssume , f

or the purp os e of

thi s d isc us sio n o nly , th a t th e vet era n d id incur a n in-servic e bac k injury , the medica l evidence fails to demonstrate a nexus between such assumed injury

and his curr ent disability .") . I pso fac to, the medical e x aminer c annot re l y o n the absenc e of me dical re cords c orrobor ating that injury to conclude that there is no re lationship be tw een the appe llant's c urre nt disabilit y and his milit ary

service

. See Sm ith v. Derwinski , 2 Vet.App. 137, 140 (1992) ( noting that the pur pose of section 1154(b) was "to overc ome the adver se eff ect of a lac k of off icial record of incurre nce or ag g ravation of a disease or injury and tre atment there of" (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1157, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), re pr int e d in 1941 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1035)). There for e , in

r e a d judicating on rema

nd the appe llant's c laim for ser vice c onnection for

a bac k disability , if t h e Bo ard determines that the e vidence establishes in-ser vice oc curr ence of a ba ck inj ur y , b e c a us e the Ap ri l 20 03 VA e xami natio n wa s in a de qu a te , V A' s d uty to a ssi st r e qu ir e s V A t o provide the appellant with an adequate medical ex amination of his back. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d); R. at 494 (Fe bruar

y 2003 Boa rd dete rmination that a m edica l examination was ne eded r eg ardingthe issue of ser

vice c onnection for

residuals of a

back injury

).21

Given this disposit ion, the Court will not addre ss the rema ining a rg uments and issues ra ised by the appellant. Se e Be

st , 15 Vet.App. at 20. On rema nd, the appe llant is free to submit additional evidenc e and a

rg ument and the B oard must consider any such evidence or argument submitt ed. See Kay , 16 Ve t.A

pp . at 53 4; Kutscherousky , 1 2 V e t. Ap p
. a t 3 7 2

- 7 3

. T h e B o a r d s h a ll p r o c e ed expeditious ly , in a ccor dance with 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2006) (requiringSecre tary to provide for

"e x peditious treatment" of cla ims remanded by the Court).

III . C ON CL USI ON Up on c on sid e ratio n o f t

he fo re g oin g ana ly sis , the r e c or d o n a pp e a l, a nd the pa rt ie s' br ie fs , the May 12 , 2 00 4, B oa

rd de c isi on is AF F I RME D as to the B oa rd ' s den ia l of an

e a rl ie r e ff

e c tiv e date fo r the 70 % dis a

bil ity ratin g fo r PTSD , VA CA TE D a s to the B oa rd ' s de nia l of a n e ff

e c tiv e date

ear lier than J une 20, 2000, for the awa rd of TDIU and as to the Boa rd' s denial of se rvice connec tion for r esiduals of a

back injury , and t h e two matters are REMANDED f or re adjudication consistent with this opi nion.