AFDD Template Guide 

20 September 2002

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TARGETING

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.9 

8 June 2006 

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-60, 

Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-1.9 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 8 JUNE 2006

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR 

Certified by: AFDC/DR (Col Eric Schnitzer) 

Pages: 129 

Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading 

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication 

Approved by: James F. Jackson, Brigadier General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center 
FOREWORD 

 Time and time again in the last several decades, air and space power has proven 

among the most powerful of weapons in the nation’s military arsenal, deciding some 

conflicts outright and enabling us to resolve others in the manner of our choosing. 

Today, air and space power can impose decisive effects anywhere on the globe at 

almost any time, but it has taken more than this global reach to make it the world’s 

premier military instrument. Sound doctrine, strategy, and operational art are also 

required and the discipline of targeting is a vital piece of Air Force operational art. 

 Guided by sound doctrine and strategy, targeting during conflict enables air and 

space power to be a decisive force in modern warfare. Targeting processes and 

principles that encompass the realms of information and influence can also have 

decisive effects upon operations other than major combat. This publication describes 

what targeting is and how it supports the overarching structure of air and space 

planning, execution, and assessment. The United States military operates according to 

effects-based principles, which tie planning, execution, and assessment together into an 

adaptive whole. Accordingly, this publication also shows why and how effects-based 

thinking is integral to effective targeting today. This document builds upon the 

foundational doctrine concepts of an effects-based approach established in Air Force 

Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. 

 Targeting has been a vital part of air and space power since the first weapon was 

dropped from an aircraft. It has evolved over a century from a matter of primitive 

guesswork into a discipline based on scientific principles and robust processes that is 

used to guide employment of much more than just weapons dropped from airplanes. 

Targeting will continue to evolve as it assimilates the insights of effects-based 

operations, improvements in battlespace awareness, and other innovations, but it will 

always be central to the way the Air Force conducts operations. 

JAMES F. JACKSON 

Brigadier General, USAF 

Commander, Headquarters 

Air Force Doctrine Center
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... v 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS....................................................................... vii 

CHAPTER ONE—Targeting Fundamentals .................................................................................. 1 

Introduction................................................................................................................................. 1 

Target Characteristics ................................................................................................................. 3 

The Targeting Process ................................................................................................................ 6 

Types of Targeting...................................................................................................................... 8 

Targeting and Targeting-Related Responsibilities ..................................................................... 9 

Principles of Targeting.............................................................................................................. 11 

Effects-Based Operations ......................................................................................................... 12 

Principles of Effects-Based Operations .................................................................................... 14 

Targeting Considerations for Stability Operations ................................................................... 15 

CHAPTER TWO—Deliberate Targeting..................................................................................... 17 

General...................................................................................................................................... 17 

Effects-Based Considerations for Planning .............................................................................. 19 

Targeting Responsibilities During Formal Planning ................................................................ 20 

The Tasking Cycle and Deliberate Targeting........................................................................... 23 

Air Tasking Cycle Phases and Their Products.......................................................................... 29 

Objectives, Effects, and Guidance........................................................................................ 29 

Target Development.............................................................................................................. 32 

Weaponeering and Allocation............................................................................................... 38 

Air Tasking Order Production and Dissemination................................................................ 42 

Execution Planning and Force Execution............................................................................. 43 

Assessment............................................................................................................................ 44 

CHAPTER THREE—Dynamic Targeting ................................................................................... 46 

General...................................................................................................................................... 46 

The Dynamic Targeting Portion of the Tasking Process.......................................................... 48 

Find ....................................................................................................................................... 50 

Fix ......................................................................................................................................... 51 

Track ..................................................................................................................................... 51 

Target .................................................................................................................................... 52 

Engage................................................................................................................................... 52 

Assess.................................................................................................................................... 52 

Other Considerations ................................................................................................................ 53 

Engagement Authority.......................................................................................................... 53 

Managing Increased Risk During Dynamic Targeting Operations....................................... 53 

Handling Changes................................................................................................................. 54 

Reduced Planning Time........................................................................................................ 55

CHAPTER FOUR— Assessment................................................................................................. 57 

General...................................................................................................................................... 57 

Measures and Indicators ........................................................................................................... 58 

The Four Levels of Assessment................................................................................................ 60
iv

Tactical Assessment.............................................................................................................. 61 

Operational Assessment........................................................................................................ 63 

Campaign Assessment .......................................................................................................... 65

National Assessment............................................................................................................. 66 

The Assessment Process ........................................................................................................... 66 

Metrics .................................................................................................................................. 67 

Key Enablers......................................................................................................................... 68 

CHAPTER FIVE—Readiness and Ongoing Responsibilities for Targeting................................ 69 

General...................................................................................................................................... 69 

Target Development ................................................................................................................. 70 

Point Mensuration..................................................................................................................... 72 

Weaponeering ........................................................................................................................... 73 

Assessment................................................................................................................................ 74 

Basic Encyclopedia Number And Designated Point of Impact Standardization...................... 74 

Database Management.............................................................................................................. 75 

Datum Management.................................................................................................................. 77 

Establishing Combined Air Operations Center Relationships.................................................. 78 

Establishing Federated and Reachback Relationships.............................................................. 79 

Equipping Targeting Organizations.......................................................................................... 80 

Training and Exercises.............................................................................................................. 81 

SUGGESTED READINGS.......................................................................................................... 85 

APPENDICES 

APPENDIX A. Targeting and Legal Considerations ................................................................... 88 

Introduction............................................................................................................................... 88 

Basic Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Their Targeting Implications ... 88 

LOAC Targeting Restrictions................................................................................................... 90 

Personnel............................................................................................................................... 90 

Objects and Places ................................................................................................................ 91 

Rules of Engagement ................................................................................................................ 92 

Role of the Judge Advocate...................................................................................................... 95 

APPENDIX B—Federated Support To Targeting And Assessment............................................ 96 

Introduction............................................................................................................................... 96 

Federation Classification ...................................................................................................... 97 

Types of Federated Support.................................................................................................. 98 

Theater Organizations............................................................................................................... 99 

Air Force Units ..................................................................................................................... 99 

Joint and National Organizations........................................................................................ 100 

Air Force Continental US (CONUS)-Based Support Organizations...................................... 101 

Joint and National CONUS-Based Support Organizations .................................................... 102 

Glossary ...................................................................................................................................... 107 
v

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) establishes doctrinal guidance for 

planning, executing, and assessing targeting operations. 

APPLICATION 

 This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, 

including regular, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard units and 

members. 

 Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

military operations, as appropriate, from stability, security, transition, and reconstruction 

operations to major operations and campaigns. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation 

when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

 Air Force assets (people, weapons, and support systems) can be used across the 

range of military operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. This 

AFDD discusses the fundamentals of organization and employment of Air Force air and 

space capabilities to accomplish the missions assigned by unified combatant 

commanders. More specific guidance on Air Force operations may be found in 

subordinate operational- and tactical-level doctrine documents. 
vi

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is “the US Air Force prefers—and in 

fact, plans and trains—to employ through a commander, Air Force forces 

(COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and space component 

commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will assume the 

COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated otherwise. The 

term "COMAFFOR" refers to the Air Force Service component commander while the 

term "JFACC" refers to the joint operational commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will normally be dualhatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are different, and should 

be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control/administrative 

control of Air Force forces through a Service A-Staff while the JFACC function 

executes tactical control of all joint air and space component forces through an air 

and space operations center. 

When multinational operations are involved the JFACC becomes a combined forces 

air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the air and space 

operations center (AOC), though commonly referred to simply as an AOC, in joint or 

combined operations is correctly known as a joint air and space operations center 

(JAOC) or combined air and space operations center (CAOC). Since nearly every 

operation the US conducts will involve international partners, this publication uses the 

terms CFACC and CAOC throughout to emphasize the doctrine’s applicability to 

multinational operations. 
vii

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 These statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which this Air Force 

doctrine document (AFDD) is built. Other information in the AFDD expands on or 

supports these statements. 

 Targeting is the process for selecting and prioritizing targets and matching 

appropriate actions to those targets to create specific desired effects that achieve 

objectives, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (Page 1) 

 Targets are areas, complexes, installations, forces, equipment, capabilities, 

functions, individuals, groups, systems, or behaviors identified for possible action to 

support the commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. (Page 1) 

 Targeting is a central component of Air Force operational art, forming an essential 

link between strategy and the tactical application of air and space power. (Page 1) 

 Targeting helps translate strategy into discrete actions against targets by matching 

ways to means. (Page 1) 

 Targeting is a command function and is inherently joint. It requires commander 

oversight and involvement to ensure proper execution. It is not the exclusive 

province of one division or type of personnel, but blends the expertise of many 

disciplines across the joint force. (Page 2) 

 Targeting is integral to the air and space component’s wartime battle rhythm and 

should always be thought of as part of a larger effects-based construct of planning, 

execution, and assessment. (Page 2) 

 Targeting consists of two broad sets of responsibilities: those tied to a particular 

conflict and those that are ongoing, performed both in peace and war. (Page 2) 

 Targeting is fundamentally effects-based. It is thus about more than just selecting 

targets for physical destruction. (Page 11) 

 Targeting is integrated with other processes that create the overall campaign 

strategy and the joint air and space operations plan, the ongoing daily tasking cycle, 

and assessment that measures progress toward campaign objectives. (Page 11) 

 Targeting is inherently estimative and anticipatory. Matching actions and effects to 

targets requires estimation and anticipation—prediction, in one sense—of future 

outcomes. (Page 12) 

 Targeting is systematic. In supporting the commander’s objectives, the tasking and 

targeting process seeks to achieve effects in a systematic manner. (Page 12) 

 Assessment encompasses all efforts to evaluate effects and gauge progress toward 

accomplishment of effects and objectives. It also helps evaluate requirements for 

future action. (Page 57) 

 To be useful as a gauge of effectiveness, a measure must be meaningful, reliable, 

and either observable or capable of being reliably inferred. (Page 58) 
viii

 Regardless of the level of assessment, the process of analyzing the adversary, 

choosing appropriate measures, evaluating progress, and recommending action 

consists of the same four basic steps: Define, monitor, analyze, and recommend. 

(Page 66) 

 Targeting must adhere to the Law of Armed Conflict and must comply with all 

applicable rules of engagement. (Page 88) 
1

Mere tonnage of explosives is a fallacious criterion. In the final 

analysis, victories are achieved because of the effect produced, not 

simply because of the effort expended. 

—Brigadier General Haywood S. “Possum” Hansell, Jr., 

Memorandum to Army Air Force Chief of Staff General “Hap” Arnold, 

26 July 1944 

CHAPTER ONE 

TARGETING FUNDAMENTALS 

INTRODUCTION 

Targeting is the process for selecting and prioritizing targets and matching 

appropriate actions to those targets to create specific desired effects that achieve 

objectives, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 

Targeting applies to targets, which are areas, complexes, installations, forces, 

equipment, capabilities, functions, individuals, groups, systems, or behaviors 

identified for possible action to support the commander's objectives, guidance, 

and intent. 

 

Targeting is a central component of Air Force operational art, forming an 

essential link between strategy and the tactical application of air and space 

power. Strategy allows planners and commanders to choose the best ways to attain 

desired outcomes. It melds ends (objectives and end states), ways (actions and effects 

of actions leading to the ends), means (resources needed and available to carry out 

planned actions), and risk (the probable “cost” of attaining the ends in terms of lives, 

equipment, effort, time, and opportunities). Strategy forms these into plans and 

guidance that can be used to task specific air and space assets through the tasking 

process and targeting. Targeting helps translate strategy into discrete actions 

against targets by matching ways to means. Targeting also explicitly includes force 

execution and assessment, so it encompasses the processes and procedures that form 

the core of how the Air Force and the combined force as a whole fight at the operational 

level. 

The procedures and processes that comprise targeting form the core of how the Air 

Force and the joint force as a whole fights at the operational-level of war. Targeting, 

however, is but one component of an overarching approach to warfare and other 

operations that emphasizes achieving US objectives by imposing discrete, desired 

effects within the operational environment (OE). Within an effects-based framework, 

targeting helps determine the most effective and efficient means of creating desired 

effects. Outside of an effects-based framework, targeting can quickly devolve into 
2

simple attrition with availability of resources, not objectives and the end state, driving 

operations. Recent conflicts have shown that victory can be achieved more effectively 

and efficiently through an effects-based approach that extends beyond just attrition. 

Although there may be occasions when attrition is a desired effect that supports an 

objective, it is more often the result of planning without regard to the effects. 

Targeting is a command function and is inherently joint. It requires 

commander oversight and involvement to ensure proper execution. It is not the 

exclusive province of one type of specialty or division, such as intelligence or 

operations, but blends the expertise of many disciplines across the joint force. 

Targeting occurs at every level of conflict, from strategic to tactical, and it is not solely 

the domain of airpower, but integrates the full spectrum of joint military capabilities to 

achieve the commander’s objectives. 

 Targeting is an iterative and cyclic process. The “targeting cycle” is simply the 

discipline and process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching actions to them. 

Targeting is integral to the air and space component’s wartime battle rhythm and 

should always be thought of as part of a larger effects-based construct of 

planning, execution, and assessment. 

 

 Targeting is anticipatory and estimative in nature. In order to discriminately choose 

certain targets over others, targeteers (a term used throughout this publication to refer 

to specialists trained in analyzing targets and developing targeting solutions to support 

the commander’s objectives) and other planners are anticipating and estimating that 

actions against those targets will be more effective and/or efficient than actions against 

other targets. Targeting seeks to exploit synergy between intelligence preparation of 

the battlespace (IPB); target development; intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR); strategy and planning; ISR employment; and assessment. An 

emerging Air Force concept currently labeled "predictive battlespace awareness" (PBA) 

attempts to capture that synergy. PBA is the situational awareness needed to develop 

patterns of behavior, constraints and opportunities of geography, topography, cultures, 

environment, and forces that allow us to misdirect, predict, and pre-empt our 

adversaries to successfully create effects when and where we choose. This concept 

requires an extremely high-fidelity model of the threat to provide a heretofore-unknown 

situational awareness capability to support effective targeting. 

 

 Saying that targeting is estimative and anticipatory—"predictive," in a very limited 

sense—does not imply that there is some magical formula, technique, or tool that will 

allow perfect anticipation of events, consequences, and reactions. The conduct of war 

and other military operations will always be a matter of art, and while tools and 

techniques can help make their planning, execution, assessment, and adaptation more 

effective and efficient, nothing can remove the elements of “friction” and uncertainty—

nothing can replace the “art” in the “art of war.” 

Targeting consists of two broad sets of responsibilities: those tied to a 

particular conflict and those that are ongoing, performed both in peace and war. 
3

The former are discussed in this document within an effects-based framework, covered 

in separate chapters on planning, execution, and assessment. A final chapter describes 

the continuous activities involved in targeting readiness and the responsibilities 

associated with support to warfighters that are not tied to particular conflicts or 

operations. These include such things as peacetime target development, creation and 

maintenance of targeting support architectures, influencing the development of 

munitions, and the training and equipping of targeting staffs. The three basic aspects of 

effects-based operations (EBO)—planning, employment, and assessment—cannot be 

divorced from one another. 

 When we discuss a “target,” we speak of what the target itself brings to the fight—its 

intrinsic or acquired characteristics. When we wish to discuss how we regard the 

target—the things we attribute to it, the value or degree of sensitivity we place upon it, 

and the approach we take toward it, we are speaking of “targeting,” the process used to 

define how we will act against the target. 

 The purpose of targeting and its associated processes is to provide commanders 

with a means of linking the end state to objectives designed to attain it, linking those 

objectives to subordinate effects at all levels, and linking the effects to specific actions 

against targets throughout the battlespace. The processes of planning, tasking, 

targeting, and assessing effects provide a logical progression that forms the basis of 

decision-making and ensures consistency with the commander’s objectives and the end 

state. 

 The planning, tasking, and targeting processes are flexible enough to provide 

solutions in situations ranging from limited-scope, quick-reaction tactical operations to 

broad multiple-theater campaigns. In all situations, this primary focus is to assist the 

commander to most effectively employ air, space, and information resources to achieve 

joint force and national objectives. 

TARGET CHARACTERISTICS 

 Every target has distinct intrinsic or acquired characteristics, the most important of 

which affect how the entity or behavior is targeted. Intrinsic characteristics are the 

initial, original, or designed characteristics a target. Acquired characteristics are 

changes that modify, enhance, or augment the intrinsic characteristics of the target. 

These characteristics form the basis for target detection, location, identification, and 

classification for future surveillance, analysis, strike, and assessment. In general, there 

are four categories of characteristics by which targets can be defined: physical, 

environmental, functional, and cognitive. These are briefly described below. The lists 

of example characteristics are not intended to be exhaustive, and some characteristics 

may belong in more than one category. 

Physical Characteristics. These are features that describe what a target is. These 

are discernable to the five senses or through sensor-derived signatures. These may 
4

greatly affect the type and number of weapons, the weapon systems, and the methods 

or tactics employed against the target. 

 Location. 

 Shape. 

 Size or area covered. 

 Appearance (outward form and features, including color). 

 Number and nature of elements. 

 Dispersion or concentration of elements. 

 Reflectivity (to heat, light, sound, radar energy, etc). 

 Structural composition. 

 Degree of hardening. 

 Electromagnetic radiation (e.g., radar and radio transmissions). 

Environmental Characteristics. These are features that describe the effect of the 

environment on the target and its surroundings. These characteristics may also affect 

the types and numbers of weapons, weapon systems, and the methods used to attack 

them. 

 Atmospheric conditions affecting the target (temperature, visibility, etc). 

 Terrain features (land form, vegetation, soil, elevation, etc). 

 Degree of concealment, camouflage, and countermeasures. 

 Physical relationships (such as proximity to noncombatants or friendly forces, etc.). 

 Dependencies (raw materials, personnel, energy, water, command/control, etc.). 

Functional Characteristics. These are features that describe what the target does

and how it does it. They describe the target’s function within the enemy system, how 

the target or system operates, its level of activity, the status of its functionality, and, in 

some cases, its importance to the enemy. Functional characteristics are often hard to 

discern, because they most often cannot be directly observed. Reaching plausible 

conclusions can often entail speculation and much deductive and inductive reasoning. 

 Target’s normal or reported activity. 

 Target status (state or condition at a given point in time [e.g., “operational,” 

“inoperative”]). 

 Degree, proportion, or percentage of functionality (e.g., “function 50% degraded”). 

 Materials the target requires in order to perform its function(s). 
5

 Functional redundancy (can the target’s function be performed elsewhere or by 

something else?). 

 Target’s ability to reconstitute itself or its function. 

 Target’s mobility characteristics. 

 Fixed (unable to move).

 Transportable (operate from fixed locations, but can be broken down and 

moved).

 Mobile (operate on the move or with very limited setup time).

 Target’s ability to defend itself.

 Target’s role as an element of the enemy’s system. 

 Target’s importance within the enemy’s strategic structure (such as its role in 

 the geopolitical system or its cultural importance).

 If the target is a person or group, what other people or groups are necessary to 

enable him/her/it to function?

 What is the nature of the connectivity between this person/group and others?

Cognitive Characteristics. Features that describe how some targets think, exercise 

control functions, or otherwise process information. These can be critical to how 

something is targeted and can be especially important from an effects-based 

perspective, where nonlethal, nonkinetic, or informational means of imposing effects are 

considered. These characteristics can also be critical to targeting an enemy system, 

since nearly every system possesses some central controlling function, and neutralizing 

this may be crucial to obtaining the desired behavior. As with functional characteristics, 

these are often difficult to discern or deduce. 

 How the target processes information. 

 How the target’s decision cycle works (if applicable). 

 Process inputs the target requires to perform its function(s). 

 Outputs to the processes the target performs. 

 How much information the target can handle. 

 How the target or system stores information. 

 If the target is a person or group of people. 

 How does the target think? 

 What are its motivations? 

 What behavior does the target exhibit?
6

THE TARGETING PROCESS 

Viewed generically, outside the context of overarching processes and the battle 

rhythm, the targeting process consists of the following general phases, most of which 

dovetail into the planning and tasking processes once battle rhythm is established, but 

which also include activities that start before the battle rhythm and others that are 

accomplished apart from any operation or process within a specific contingency. This 

process is also used to guide targeting efforts that take place entirely outside the 

context of the air estimate and tasking processes. The basic targeting process consists 

of 6 stages, or “phases” (See Figure 1.1). 

 Commander’s objectives, guidance and intent. 

 Target development, vetting, validation, nomination, and prioritization. 

Figure 1.1. Joint Targeting Process Phases 
7

 Capabilities analysis. 

 Commander’s decision and force assignment. 

 Mission planning and force execution. 

 Assessment. 

 

Commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. This is the most important step 

in the joint targeting process, because it encapsulates all the national-level guidance in 

a set of outcomes relevant to the present situation and set the course for all that follows, 

even though these are determined during strategy development and not as part of the 

targeting process, per se. Many times, however, targeteers working before formal 

planning for a contingency begins or during normal peacetime operations may have to 

infer or make assumptions concerning these. This should be done using the best 

guidance available at the time. A good specific objective must be understandable, 

require action, be attainable, allow some room to reach the solution, and provide criteria 

for use in measuring both progress and effectiveness 

Target development, vetting, validation, nomination, and prioritization. Target 

development is the systematic examination of potential target systems to determine the 

type and duration of action that must be exerted on each target to create desired effects 

that achieve the commander’s objectives. Target vetting leverages the expertise of the 

national intelligence community to verify the fidelity of the intelligence and analysis used 

to develop the target(s). Target validation determines whether a target remains a viable 

element of a target system and whether it complies with the law of armed conflict 

(LOAC) and the rules of engagement. Once targets are developed, vetted, and 

validated, they are nominated for approval and action in a given time period. As part of 

this process, they are prioritized relative to all joint targets in a joint integrated prioritized 

target list (JIPTL), which is submitted to the combined force commander (CFC) for 

approval. 

Capabilities analysis. This portion of the joint targeting process involves 

evaluating available capabilities against desired effects to determine the appropriate 

options available to the commander. The outputs of this stage inform the commander’s 

estimate within the joint planning and execution system. 

Commander’s decision and force assignment. Once the CFC has approved the 

JIPTL, joint force components prepare tasking orders and release them to executing 

forces and units. The joint targeting process facilitates creation of tasking orders by 

providing amplifying information needed for detailed unit-level planning. 

Mission planning and force execution. Upon receipt of tasking orders, tasked 

units perform detailed execution planning and perform their missions. 

Assessment. All assessments related to targeting should be included here. This 

phase evaluates the effectiveness of operations and feeds development of future 

strategy, guidance, and adaptation to the adversary’s actions. 
8

Examining these stages in light of the air tasking cycle and its relationship to 

deliberate targeting, described in Chapter Two, it is easy to see that targeting is 

absolutely integral to the tasking process. Further detail concerning the joint targeting 

process can be found in Joint Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Targeting. 

TYPES OF TARGETING 

 There are two basic types of targeting: deliberate and dynamic. 

Deliberate targeting is the procedure for prosecuting targets that are detected, 

identified, and developed in sufficient time to schedule actions against them in tasking 

cycle products such as the air and space tasking order (ATO). Targets prosecuted as 

part of deliberate targeting are known to exist in an operating area and have missions or 

actions scheduled against them, or have concepts of operations (CONOPS) developed 

to prosecute them with pre-planned on-call missions. Examples may range from targets 

on joint target lists in the joint air and space operations plan (JAOP) to new targets 

developed in sufficient time to list in an ATO. The deliberate targeting procedure is an 

integral part of the air tasking cycle, although aspects of it take place outside the tasking 

process per se. Deliberate targeting is discussed further in Chapter Two. 

Dynamic targeting is the procedure for prosecuting targets that are not detected, 

identified, or developed in time to be included in deliberate targeting, and therefore have 

not had actions scheduled against them. Targets prosecuted as part of dynamic 

targeting are previously unanticipated, unplanned, or newly detected and are generally 

of such importance to a component, the CFC, or higher authority that they warrant 

prosecution within the current execution period. If the target is not critical or timesensitive enough to warrant prosecution during the current execution period, the target 

may be developed for prosecution during a later execution period. Analysis of the target 

may also determine that no action is needed. Dynamic targeting is covered further in 

Chapter Three. 

 Target “Sensitivity.” Certain targets require special care or caution in treatment 

because failure to target them or to target them properly can lead to major adverse 

consequences. Examples might include leadership targets that must be handled 

sensitively due to potential political repercussions, targets located in areas with a high 

risk of collateral civilian damage, or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities, 

where improper targeting can lead to major long-term environmental damage. Such 

targets are often characterized as “sensitive” in one respect or another, but calling them 

“sensitive targets” is incorrect, since the “sensitivity” is attributed to them by us and is 

not an intrinsic characteristic. Nonetheless, the manner in which they are targeted is 

sensitive and may require coordination with and approval from the CFC or higher 

authorities. In most cases, it is best to establish criteria for engaging such targets in as 

much detail as possible during planning, before combat commences. These 

considerations are covered further in Chapter Two. 
9

 “Time-sensitivity” is a somewhat different matter. Many targets may be fleeting; 

many may be critical to operations. Those that are both present one of the biggest 

targeting challenges faced by the joint force. Advances in surveillance technology and 

weaponry make it possible in some instances to detect, track, and engage high-priority 

targets in real time, or to thwart emerging enemy actions before they become 

dangerous to the joint force. Joint doctrine calls the targets prosecuted in this manner 

“time-sensitive targets” (TST): “those targets requiring immediate response because 

they pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting 

targets of opportunity.” (JP 1-02) The CFC provides specific guidance and priorities for 

TSTs within the operational area. Examples might be things like a weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD)-capable combat vessel that was just detected approaching the joint 

force, a sought-after enemy national leader whose location was just identified; an 

enemy aircraft detected approaching friendly high-value assets, or an intermediaterange ballistic missile launch. The CFC designates TSTs. However, there may be 

other targets requiring “time-sensitive” treatment, which are of concern primarily to the 

CFC’s component commanders (vital to their schemes of maneuver or immediately 

threatening their forces, for instance) that the CFC may not deem to be TSTs. These 

targets are prosecuted using the same dynamic targeting methodology as TSTs, even 

though they may not be designated as such and even though their prosecution may be 

tasked and tracked by different elements in the combined air and space operations 

center (CAOC). TST prosecution is a special form of dynamic targeting and is covered 

further in Chapter Three. 

 Targeting is the shared responsibility of operations personnel, planners, and 

intelligence analysts at all levels of command within a joint force. Targeting and attack 

functions are accomplished in accordance with the LOAC and international agreements 

and conventions, as well as rules of engagement (ROE) approved by the President and 

Secretary of Defense for a particular operation. Military commanders, planners, and 

legal experts must consider the desired end state and political aims when making 

targeting decisions. These issues are dealt with further in Appendix A. 

TARGETING AND TARGETING-RELATED RESPONSIBILITIES 

 The combined forces air and space component commander (CFACC) has the 

following targeting responsibilities: 

 Plan, coordinate, integrate, task, and direct the joint air and space effort in 

accordance with the CFC’s guidance and joint force objectives. 

 Develop a JAOP derived from the CFC’s broader objectives for the operation, and 

guidance regarding the roles, missions, tasks, and responsibilities of joint air and 

space capabilities and forces. This responsibility is further elaborated in Chapter 

Two. 

 After consulting with other component commanders, recommend apportionment of 

the joint air effort that should be devoted to various air operations for a given period 

of time (see Chapter Two). 
10

 Translate air apportionment into allocation and develop targeting guidance into the 

ATO, which may include specific aim points/desired points of impact (see Chapter 

Two). 

 Direct and ensure deconfliction of joint air operations (see Chapters Two and 

Three). 

 Integrate and synchronize joint air operations (see Chapter Two). 

 Coordinate with the appropriate components, national agencies, and liaison 

elements for synchronization and deconfliction with land and maritime operations 

(see Chapter Two). 

 Coordinate with the appropriate components’ agencies and liaison elements for 

tasking of the capabilities and forces made available (see Chapter Two). 

 Monitor execution and redirect joint air and space operations as required (see 

Chapter Three). 

 Compile component target requirements and prioritize targets based on CFC 

guidance (see Chapters Two and Three). 

 Establish ROE and special instructions (SPINS) that clearly state combat 

identification (CID) requirements (for example, which CID systems will be used, who 

can declare a track “hostile,” etc.) (see Chapters Two and Three). 

 Accomplish tactical and operational assessment and support accomplishment of 

campaign and national assessment (see Chapter Four). 

Unit-level intelligence teams have the responsibility to support targeting in these key 

areas: 

 Verify the targeting guidance in the ATO, which often includes review of desired 

point of impact (DPI) coordinates against imagery and adjudication of suspected 

errors with the CAOC. 

 Ensure the integrity of targeting data provided to the mission planning process, 

which may include manual verification of coordinates, elevations, weapon azimuths, 

impact angles, and fuzing instructions whenever direct electronic transfer of such 

data is not possible. 

 Assisting in the performance of tactical assessment, through, for example, the timely 

dissemination of mission reports (MISREPS). 

Units and personnel tasked with the execution of tactical actions against targets 

have the following responsibilities: 

 Comply with all ROE and SPINS applicable to targeting, especially with respect to 

CID responsibilities (see Chapter Three). 
11

 Confirm CID of the target as hostile before taking action against it (see Chapter 

Three). 

 Submitting timely MISREPs and otherwise supporting tactical assessment efforts. 

PRINCIPLES OF TARGETING 

Targeting is focused on achieving objectives. The purpose of strategy is to create a 

mechanism whereby the commander’s objectives—and ultimately the end state—can 

be achieved. Targeting is the embodiment of strategy where courses of action, 

objectives, and effects are developed into detailed actions against targets. Like all other 

components of strategy, targeting must focus on attaining the objectives. Every target 

nominated should in some way contribute to attaining the commander’s objectives and 

end state. 

Targeting is fundamentally effects-based. It is about more than just the 

selection of targets for physical destruction. Some may regard targeting as only 

concerned with how to cause physical destruction, but this is a very limited—and 

limiting—perspective. Destruction may still be the best means to the end, but it is only 

one effect within a spectrum of possible options. Typically, it is a first step en route to 

other, higher-order indirect effects and objectives. The underlying premise of an 

effects-based approach is that it is possible to direct power (of all kinds) against targets 

in ways that cause military and political effects beyond the mere destruction of those 

targets—that ultimately cause desired changes in enemy behavior. Targeting should 

consider all possible means to achieve desired effects, drawing from all available 

forces, weapons, and platforms. 

Targeting is integrated with other processes that create the overall campaign 

strategy and the JAOP, the ongoing daily tasking cycle that ultimately produces 

tasking orders, and assessment that measures progress toward campaign 

objectives. It cannot be separated from the overarching set of processes without 

turning it into an inputs-based exercise in target servicing—taking a target list 

determined by someone else, matching available resources to those targets, and 

waiting blindly for subsequent guidance, which usually devolves into simple attrition. 

Integrating targeting within these overarching processes enables an effects-based 

approach. 

 Targeting is interdisciplinary, requiring the efforts of personnel from many functional 

disciplines. For example, strategists and other planners bring knowledge of the larger 

context and overarching plans, operators bring experience gained from combat 

execution, while intelligence personnel provide analysis of enemy strengths and 

vulnerabilities. Judge advocates provide expertise in the application of the LOAC, as 

well as application and interpretation of ROE, while personnel with geospatial expertise 

provide data vital for mission planning and weapons delivery. An effects-based 

approach to targeting is fundamentally a team effort. 
12

Targeting is inherently estimative and anticipatory. Matching actions and 

effects to targets requires estimating and anticipating future outcomes. In some 

cases the outcome is straightforward, such as anticipating that disabling a fire control 

radar will put a surface-to-air missile battery out of action. In most cases, however, 

estimation is more complicated. Many factors contribute to successful targeting. IPB 

should yield insight on the enemy and his intentions. Target system analysis yields 

understanding of how components of the enemy system interact and how the system 

functions as a whole. ISR assets gather needed data and help improve the accuracy 

and extent of estimation. Such analyses enable planners to select targets and methods 

of affecting them that increase the probability of desired outcomes and make the most 

efficient use of limited air and space resources. This does not imply perfect knowledge 

or anticipation; uncertainty and friction still apply. 

Targeting is systematic. In supporting the commander’s objectives, the 

targeting process seeks to achieve effects in a systematic manner. Targeting, like 

the other processes that it complements, is a rational, iterative process that 

methodically analyzes, prioritizes, and assigns forces against adversary targets to 

achieve the effects needed to meet campaign objectives. If the desired effects are not 

achieved, targets are “recycled” through the tasking process, or different targets are 

selected. 

 The principles set forth above establish a broad framework on which the targeting 

discipline should build. To put them in proper context, however, one must understand 

what targets are and how they are prosecuted, as well as what targeting responsibilities 

the commander of air and space forces has. The sections below describe targets, the 

two basic types of targeting, and commanders’ responsibilities, all of which are explored 

further in the following chapters. 

EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH TO OPERATIONS 

 To understand how targeting forms one pillar of a flexible system that can 

accommodate many different strategies and achieve a wide variety of objectives 

through a wide variety of means, it is first necessary to understand the effects-based 

approach and how targeting fits within it. 

We are running an effects-based campaign that is partially 

kinetic, partially non-kinetic, partially information operations. And so 

what we judge effectiveness by is not just whether there is a hole in 

the room of a building, but whether or not the function that the 

element did before ceases to be effective. 

—Maj Gen Stanley A. McChrystal 

Vice Director of Operations, Joint Staff 

Dept. of Defense news conference on Operation

 IRAQI FREEDOM, 22 March 2003 
13

At least as far back as World War II, some air planners 

were trying to implement the essential concepts of [an 

effects-based approach]. In the late 1930’s, particularly at 

the Air Corps Tactical School, U.S. Army Air Corps 

(USAAC) thinkers had developed a number of theories 

about air warfare, including one which became known as 

the industrial-web theory. This theory was actually quite 

well grounded in concepts that became known as effectsbased. The basic idea was that a modern war machine, 

such as the German or Japanese armies of the time, 

required the support of a huge industrial complex 

comprised of many interlinked sub elements called a web. 

 Manufacturing plants, transportation systems, power production, delivery systems, 

and other critical elements made up this web. Further, there were thought to be a 

finite number and determinable number of vital links of what we now call critical nodes, 

which if successfully destroyed or debilitated, would bring about collapse of the entire 

web. (Eventually, this theory was used to develop Air War Planning Document 

[AWPD]-1, the plan that guided expansion of the USAAC during the early 40’s and 

initial strategy development for the Combined Bomber Offensive against the Germans 

prior to 1943.) 

—Edward C. Mann, Gary Endersby, and Thomas R. Searle, 

Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations

 In the most fundamental sense, an effects-based approach is one in which 

operations are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change 

systems or capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes. That is, they seek to 

understand and exploit the complex connections among individual actions, the effects—

direct and indirect—that those actions produce, how those effects influence the states 

and behaviors of complex systems in the OE, and how these effects contribute to the 

accomplishment of ultimate desired outcomes. An effect is the physical or behavioral 

state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect Effects 

and their accompanying causal linkages join actions to objectives. The actions and 

effects in any causal chain can derive from any element of national power—economic, 

political/diplomatic, military, or informational, and may occur at any point across the 

range of operations from peace to global conflict. Properly understanding the 

relationship among effects at all levels is important to planning and conducting any 

campaign. 

 Some methods that we call effects-based today have always been part of wellwaged war, but they have rarely been part of a systematic approach. Capabilities like 

precision engagement and rapid global mobility—the fruits of technological advance—

have made possible a range of effects that were not possible before. Thus, 
14

commanders today have the capability to do such things as coerce changes in enemy 

behavior while minimizing unintended destruction, set operational tempos that 

adversaries cannot match, effectively anticipate enemy courses of action in some 

cases, and dominate enemy decision cycles. In past eras, commanders had to rely on 

their own intuition to apply effects-based methods. Today, the much greater range of 

possible effects, the sophistication of the capabilities used to impose them, and the 

increasing realization that costly force-on-force warfare is politically, economically, and 

even morally difficult, make a systematic approach to EBO necessary. The section 

below recapitulates the basic principles of an effects-based approach to military 

operations found in Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2, Operations and 

Organization, and ties those principles into the targeting discipline specifically. It is vital 

to remember, however, that many effects are created through processes other than 

targeting. All instruments of national power should be considered in an effects-based 

approach, and even within the context of force-on-force engagement, such functions as 

air mobility and ISR can create effects that are crucial to achievement of objectives, or 

that can substitute for the offensive application of force in some circumstances. This 

publication, however, focuses upon how effects can be achieved through targeting. 

PRINCIPLES OF EBO 

These principles are included here in abbreviated form for ease of reference (see 

AFDD 2):

 Planning, employment, and assessment should be inextricably linked and an 

effects-based approach should attempt to meld them as seamlessly as possible. 

 EBO should focus on achievement of objectives and end state; all intended effects 

should logically support their achievement and objectives at all levels must be 

logically tied together; in this sense, EBO is an elaboration of “strategy-to-task.” 

 EBO are about creating effects, not about the platforms, weapons, or methods used 

to create them. 

 EBO should consider all possible types of effects, not just destruction and attrition 

(although these can still be very viable elements of strategy). 

 EBO should seek to achieve objectives most effectively, then most efficiently; 

accomplishing the mission comes first, but within that constraint accomplishment 

should be sought while minimizing cost in lives, treasure, time, and/or opportunities. 

 EBO cut across all disciplines, dimensions, and echelons of conflict and operations; 

operations should integrate all appropriate instruments of power, all component 

efforts, and exploit the fact that tactical actions can have direct operational or 

strategic consequences. 

 An effects-based approach recognizes that conflict is a clash of complex adaptive 

systems. 
15

 Planning must always account for how the adversary will respond to planned 

actions. 

 Warfare is complex and non-linear; many rules that apply in simple linear 

models and wargames don’t apply in the real world. 

 Cause and effect are often not easy to trace, especially for indirect effects. 

 EBO focus upon behavior, not just in physical states or changes—this can include 

the behavior of friendly and neutral actors as well as that of the adversary. 

 EBO recognize that comprehensive knowledge of all actors and of the operational 

environment are important to success, but come at a price. 

 EBO should always consider the “law of unintended consequences;” “no plan 

survives first contact with the enemy” without adapting. 

 EBO are a comprehensive way of thinking about conflict that must consider the full 

range of military operations, from peace to war and back to peace. 

 EBO are not new; most of these principles have intuitively been part of well-waged 

war for millennia. 

TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS 

 Targeting is a discipline that is relevant across the entire range of military 

operations. This publication emphasizes the critical role targeting plays as part of the 

ongoing battle rhythm in major combat, because that relationship is highly complex. 

Nonetheless, the reader should realize that targeting and effects-based principles are at 

least as applicable during stability operations as during major combat. The following 

considerations distinguish stability operations in general and targeting during them in 

particular: 

 There will be a greater emphasis on non-kinetic actions and peaceful uses of air and 

space power, such as air mobility and ISR. While these uses are vital to major 

combat operations, they may comprise the only uses of air and space power in 

some stability situations. 

 There will be closer integration among the various components of the joint force and 

the air and space component may often be employed in support of tactical 

operations on the ground. 

 There will be more thorough integration of all instruments of national power and a 

greater emphasis upon the political and economic consequences of action than in 

major combat operations. 

 There may be a need to integrate targeting efforts with the efforts of nonDepartment of Defense (DOD) governmental agencies, such as the State 

Department, and nongovernmental organizations, such as the International Red 
16

Cross, or with the governments of other nations. Such organizations may also hold 

veto power over targeting decisions made by military commanders. 

 There may be more direct interest in and influence on operations from high-level 

leadership such as unified combatant commanders, the Secretary of Defense, and 

the President. 

 There may be greater emphasis upon minimizing collateral damage (CD) and CD 

risk calculations may be scrutinized by higher-level leaders than in major combat 

operations. This concern for reduced CD usually results in stability operations 

having more restrictive ROE than typical major combat operations, and targeteers 

can expect a much larger restricted target list (RTL). All planners and operators 

must remain aware of greatly increased potential negative results of even a single 

misplaced weapon under these circumstances.

 In many stability operations, lack of large numbers of viable identified targets drives 

the bulk of force application into dynamic targeting, such as that executed through 

close air support (CAS) or on-call air interdiction missions. This fact, coupled with 

the need for minimization of CD, puts added stress on the entire dynamic targeting 

“kill chain.” This requires airtight command and control for both the air and ground 

components, especially in situations where the bulk of force application occurs in 

small numbers of ground force troops-in-contact situations. Proper use of and 

coordination with elements such as the air support operations center (ASOC), the 

tactical air control party (TACP), and the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD), 

as well as clear and rapid communications into the CAOC operations division, are 

mandatory for success. 

 Kinetic actions may have to be more thoroughly integrated with non-kinetic means 

and may entail targeting combat actions quite close to areas where operations such 

as peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance are being conducted. 

 There may be a greater emphasis on timely tactical assessment of actions and upon 

thorough operational assessment on a shorter timeline than is customary in major 

combat operations. Interest in assessments may also come from higher leadership 

or non-military organizations. 
17

CHAPTER TWO 

DELIBERATE TARGETING 

 

GENERAL 

Planning encompasses all the means through which strategies and courses of action 

(COA) are developed, such as contingency and crisis action planning, as well as 

operational or campaign design. The latter encompasses the joint air and space 

estimate process (JAEP) that produces the JAOP. Since it sets the stage for all other 

actions, planning is where sound, effects-based principles have the largest play and 

may have the greatest impact on operations. Plans must tie objectives and effects at all 

levels, and actions together into a logical, coherent whole.

 Targeting supports operational-level planning by helping validate that elements of a 

plan are feasible or are not cost-prohibitive in terms of resource expenditure, and by 

helping create the detailed tactical-level products for the opening phases of action that 

are usually appended to operational-level plans. The objectives, guidance, and intent 

derived during planning, however, guide all efforts, including targeting, throughout 

employment and assessment as well. This serves to tie planning, employment, and 

assessment together inextricably. Further, planning continues once operations 

commence and the battle rhythm is under way. Operational planning continues as 

enemy actions are evaluated or anticipated through revision of strategy and 

implementation of branches and sequels. All of the tactical-level action conducted 

during employment requires planning as well. In fact, the majority of physical planning 

effort supports tactical action once operations commence. 

 Targeting support to formal operational planning and the deliberate targeting that is 

conducted once operations begin are both accomplished through the deliberate 

targeting procedure described in this chapter. Again, deliberate targeting is the 

procedure for prosecuting targets that are detected, identified, and developed in 

sufficient time to schedule actions against them in tasking cycle products such as the 

ATO. Deliberate targeting handles targets in one of two ways: 1) plans and schedules 

specific actions against specific targets, and 2) creates on-call packages or missions 

that deal with targets through predetermined CONOPS. Preplanned missions are 

typically used against fixed targets or targets that are transportable, but operate in fixed 

Strategy is the employment of battle to gain the end in war; it must 

therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must be in 

accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy forms 

the plan of the war. 

—Carl von Clausewitz
18

locations. However, deliberate targeting can be used against mobile targets, especially 

when the target is in a defensive posture and may be in positions for long periods of 

time. On-call missions can be used against fixed, transportable, and mobile targets. 

For instance, a fixed building may be watched, but does not become a target until some 

critical person, group, or equipment arrives, at which time the on-call mission is 

scheduled on the tasking order if intelligence arrives in sufficient time. Other potential 

targets that are detected or become significant during the current execution period 

(once all formal products of the planning and tasking processes are issued), including 

the CFC’s TSTs, are dealt with using dynamic targeting (see Chapter Three). 

The effects-based principles set forth in AFDD 2 should guide all planning efforts, 

including deliberate targeting. The spectacular success US forces have enjoyed in 

major combat operations since Operation DESERT STORM was made possible in large 

part by their ability to exploit the full range of effects beyond simple destruction and 

attrition. This is an advantage that the effects-based approach confers. An effectsbased approach is even more critical for success in stability operations such as 

counterinsurgency and peace enforcement, because they rely more on “non-kinetic” 

means and less on types of effects for which cause and effect are well understood, like 

attrition. To exploit the full range of possible effects in a given situation, planners must 

understand what effects are, how they relate to actions and objectives, and how various 

types of effects can be exploited to yield desired outcomes. 

Two general targeting methodologies exist, 

each approaching the problem from opposite 

points of view. The first focuses on inputs to 

the battle; it concentrates mechanically on the 

number of sorties and ordnance delivered. 

The second approach is based upon outputs. 

In this technique, the selected targets flow 

from the commander’s intent and desired 

objectives.... Given a desired system-wide 

failure, what components will provide the 

necessary failure when destroyed? The 

process is analogous to determining what will 

cause a bridge to collapse, for example, 

rather than asking about the effects of 

destroying a single supporting pier. 

 —Steven M. Rinaldi, 

Beyond the Industrial Web:

 Economic Synergies and Targeting Methodologies
19

EFFECTS-BASED CONSIDERATIONS FOR PLANNING 

Details concerning the taxonomy of effects can be found in AFDD 2. For the sake of 

convenience, this section presents a short recapitulation of the basic concepts. In the 

most basic sense, effects-based planning takes account of actions against specific 

targets, which lead to certain effects, which in turn lead to achievement of objectives. 

Targeting is integral to an effects-based approach, because it is how targets are 

analyzed to determine how to create desired effects and where specific actions against 

those targets are determined. Targets and actions are tactical-level entities. Effects 

and causal linkages join actions against targets to objectives and the end state. Effects 

thus exist at all levels of conflict, from the tactical to the strategic. 

Effects can be intended or unintended and direct or indirect. Intended and 

unintended are straightforward in meaning. A direct effect is the first-order result of 

action with no intervening mechanism between act and outcome—usually immediate 

and empirically verifiable, like the results of weapons employment. Indirect effects are 

more complicated. An indirect effect is a second-, third-, or nth-order effect created 

through an intermediate effect or causal linkage following a tactical action—usually a 

delayed and/or displaced consequence associated with the action that caused the direct 

effect(s). Objectives are achieved through an accumulation of direct and indirect 

effects, but the effects sought at the strategic and operational levels are almost 

invariably indirect. 

Indirect effects are often categorized as physical, psychological, or behavioral; are 

assessed functionally or systemically; and can be imposed cumulatively or in a 

cascading manner, sequentially or in parallel. Physical effects materially alter a system 

or target and are most important at the tactical level. Psychological effects are those 

that impact reasoning, emotion, and motivation and result in behavioral effects—

measurable changes in behavior. These are most important at the operational and 

strategic levels of conflict. Functional effects relate to how well a system performs its 

intended function(s) and systemic effects relate to how well that system functions as a 

component of larger systems. These are most important for assessment considerations. 

Effects can accumulate over time, leading to gradual change, or can cause cascading 

change that occurs catastrophically and ripples through related and subordinate 

systems. Often, there are both cumulative and cascading components to effects, as 

when an enemy unit “breaks” in combat due to accumulated physical and psychological 

damage, but fails catastrophically at some point, affecting other units around it. 

Generally, it is best to attempt to cause cascading change or failure when possible. 

Effects can also be imposed sequentially or in parallel. Effects imposed in series, one 

after another over time, are sequential. Those imposed near-simultaneously are 

parallel effects, which place greater stress upon targeted systems and require faster 

adaptation. Parallel effects are generally preferable to sequential effects when it is 

possible to impose them. Full understanding of the types of effects and the principles of 

effects-based thinking can offer commanders more options, hasten success, and lead to 

success at lower “cost” in terms of lives, treasure, time, and opportunities. For further 
20

discussion of effects, with examples of the types mentioned above, see AFDD 2, 

Chapter Five.

TARGETING RESPONSIBILITIES DURING FORMAL PLANNING 

 Targeteers and other planners should keep the foregoing effects-based concepts in 

mind while building formal plans and conducting ongoing deliberate targeting once 

operations begin. Targeting supports every form of employment planning for joint 

operations. Joint operations planning employs an integrated process for orderly and 

coordinated problem solving and decision-making. In its peacetime application, the 

process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development 

of contingency plans. In crisis, the process is shortened as needed to support the 

dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to 

accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities. Joint 

operation planning is conducted through one of the three following processes. 

 Contingency planning is conducted principally in peacetime to develop joint 

operation plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents. It 

prepares for possible contingencies based on the best available information and 

uses forces and resources apportioned in strategic planning documents. It relies 

heavily on assumptions about political and military circumstances that will exist 

when the plan is implemented. 

 Crisis action planning (CAP) is based on current events and is conducted in timesensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces 

and resources (i.e., is based on actual circumstances vice assumptions). This 

planning is more flexible 

and responsive to 

changing events. 

 Operational Design/Campaign Planning translates national and 

theater strategy into 

strategic and operational 

concepts through development of plans for theater 

campaigns.They embody 

that commander's strategic vision for the 

arrangement of related 

operations necessary to 

attain theater strategic 

objectives. Portions of 

this process are often 

delegated to components, which create 

plans to support the Figure 2.1. The Joint Air and Space Estimate Process 

Mission Analysis 

Intelligence Preparation of the battlespace (IPB) is initiated. Stage focuses on 

analyzing the joint force commander’s mission and guidance to produce air and 

space component mission statement 

Situation and COA Development 

IPB is refined to include adversary COAs. Adversary and friendly COGs are 

analyzed. Multiple air and space COAs or one COA with significant branches and 

sequels are developed 

COA Analysis 

Friendly COAs are wargamed against adversary COAs 

COA Comparison 

Wargaming results are used to compare COAs against predetermined criteria

COA Selection 

Decision brief to the JFACC with COA recommendation. JFACC selects COA 

JAOP Development 

Selected COA is developed into a joint air and space operations plan

JOINT AIR AND SPACE ESTIMATE PROCESS 
21

combatant commander’s vision. The air and space contribution to operational 

design/campaign planning is the JAOP. This planning may take place 

independently or in support of deliberate planning and may continue through CAP. 

 The three processes are interrelated. All three may be conducted at different times 

for a given contingency and products created in one process are often used in others. 

For instance, a JAOP that is created as part of a theater CFACC’s campaign planning 

done in support of deliberate planning efforts may be taken “off the shelf” and used in 

CAP as a particular contingency unfolds and may then be executed as the air and 

space campaign plan once the crisis becomes open conflict. 

 The JAOP is created through the JAEP. Almost all targeting support to pre-conflict 

planning is accomplished through the JAEP. Targeting support is vital during three of 

the six JAEP stages: mission analysis, situation and COA development, and JAOP 

development. See Figure 2.1. 

 Mission Analysis. During this stage, IPB is started. In order to fully support an 

effects-based campaign, the intelligence community must conduct robust IPB to use as 

the foundation for planning. IPB is the first “pillar” of PBA, which provides a 

comprehensive framework for ISR support to planning and COA selection. 

Consequently, IPB must assist commanders in anticipating enemy intent and enable 

them in pre-empting enemy actions. 

 The IPB process continues throughout planning by examining adversary and 

friendly capabilities, adversary intent, and the operational environment. Enemy and 

friendly centers of gravity (COG) are also identified during this initial stage of the JAEP. 

As mission analysis is refined through later stages of the JAEP, enemy COGs are 

analyzed, yielding critical vulnerabilities or other key system nodes. These are further 

examined through target system or nodal analysis to yield target sets, targets, critical 

elements, and aimpoints. Such analysis carries a considerable information-flow cost, 

however. In order to properly identify collection and exploitation requirements for 

targeting, target system analysis must begin well in advance of operations and must 

continue throughout them. It must begin during the initial stages of IPB and draw upon 

as much ongoing peacetime targeting material as is available for the theater or area of 

operations. 

Situation and COA Development. IPB is refined during this stage and includes 

detailed analysis of COGs identified during mission analysis. COG analysis is important 

to targeting efforts because it identifies the enemy’s sources of power and will to fight 

and tries to discover how and where those sources of power are vulnerable, where 

critical nodes within them are, and how they can be exploited. Two of the most 

common techniques for COG analysis usually yield insight on enemy systems that can 

be exploited to derive target sets and individual targets. The first is the “strategic ring” 

model, which divides the enemy “organism” into systems along functional lines (like 

leadership, organic essentials (resources), infrastructure, population, and defense or 

fighting mechanisms). This technique often yields useful target sets in each of the 
22

categories, but contains another important insight: leadership and control mechanisms 

(usually depicted as the central ring) are always a COG and almost always yield useful 

targets as analysis expands into target development. The two most common variations 

on this technique are the five-ring model (using the rings specified above) and similar 

seven-ring “national elements of value” model. Another common technique begins with 

the COG as a source of power, identifies the inherent abilities that allow it to act as such 

(“critical capabilities”), identifies the essential conditions, resources, or means (“critical 

requirements”) that allow the critical capabilities to operate, and then determines where 

those critical requirements are vulnerable (“critical vulnerabilities”). While it can 

sometimes be difficult to pick critical vulnerabilities from critical requirements or 

translate the former into explicit target sets, target system and nodal analysis performed 

during target development can help “operationalize” this technique’s insights. 

JAOP Development. Operations are built from the top down, starting with the end 

state, leading to objectives at the highest levels, determining subordinate objectives 

needed to support those, then determining the effects needed to accomplish the 

objectives, and finally determining the actions necessary to create those effects. This 

stage and its ultimate product, the JAOP, describe how air and space forces will support 

the CFC’s campaign plan. The JAOP identifies objectives, desired effects, targets, and 

assessment measures in as much detail as available time and intelligence allow. 

Objectives and the end state are products of commander’s guidance, strategy 

development and planning, and while targeting efforts must always aim toward 

achieving them, they are not determined through the targeting process itself. Targeting 

is integral to JAOP development and deliberate targeting is used to help determine and 

develop target sets and targets included in the JAOP and its attachments (which may 

include full ATOs for the first day[s] of the conflict). Even if targeting information 

developed during planning is not included in the JAOP or its attachments, JAOP 

development requires considerable targeting effort in order to validate selected COAs, 

CONOPS, and other elements of the plan. Commanders and planners must know, at 

least approximately, how much effort and what resources are required to achieve the 

campaign’s desired effects. The only way to learn this is to conduct some (at least 

notional) deliberate targeting well before the conflict begins. Target selection should be 

based upon desired effects against enemy COGs, which in turn should be based upon 

the objectives for the conflict. 

 

The JAOP should be effects-based. It is the air and space component’s main source of 

guidance for effects throughout the campaign and must make use of the principles and 

planning considerations set forth here. Targeting efforts play a major role in building an 

effects-based JAOP by relating effects to particular targets and helping validate whether 

planned resources can achieve those effects. 

 The JAOP should provide broad guidelines for prioritizing targets, making clear 

which categories or sets are most important to the campaign. The JAOP should also 

provide guidance on the sequencing of targeting actions or effects, which is not the 

same thing as priority. Although parallel effects are generally best, sometimes some 

targets must be attacked first to enable effects against other targets. 
23

 The JAOP, as well as subsequently published SPINS, air and space operations 

directives (AOD), and ATOs, must clearly articulate the commander’s ROE that ensure 

operations comply with the LOAC. The JAOP and subsequent planning guidance must 

also establish appropriate control and coordination measures. Commanders may 

employ various maneuver and movement control, airspace control, and fire support 

coordination measures (FSCM) to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures 

include, but are not limited to, boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes 

to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine 

operating patrol areas, and minefields. 

Combat Identification. CID plays a critical role in all measures focused on the 

battlespace, such as dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional 

protection, and focused logistics, and has direct impact on the joint force’s ability to 

support the CFC and to employ capabilities to maintain maximum effectiveness and 

minimize fratricide. CID is the capability to attain an accurate characterization of 

detected objects in the joint battlespace that enables high confidence and timely 

application of military options and weapons. Depending on the situation and the 

operational decisions that must be made, this characterization may be limited to 

“enemy,” “friend,” or “neutral.” In other situations, other characterizations may be 

required—including, but not limited to, class, type, nationality, mission configuration, 

status, and intent. Planning guidance must clearly state CID requirements, including 

such things as which CID systems will be used, who will have authority to declare a 

track or potential target hostile, etc. For further guidance on CID, see JP 3-33, Joint 

Task Force Headquarters, and Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 

manual 3-1.1, General Planning and Employment Considerations (Secret). 

 Finally, the JAOP should establish guidelines for dynamic, especially time-sensitive, 

targeting. Dynamic targeting is one of the most labor-intensive and intellectually 

demanding challenges the air and space component faces. Anticipating as much of the 

challenge as possible and spelling out guidance and priorities in the JAOP will ease the 

burden on commanders and CAOC Combat Operations Division (COD) personnel once 

the daily battle rhythm begins. This may prevent mistakes from being made during 

employment or may at least mitigate their impact. Planners should address as broad a 

scope as possible in as much detail as time and planning resources allow. This should 

include robust ROE and related legal considerations (see Appendix A). 

THE TASKING CYCLE AND DELIBERATE TARGETING 

 Deliberate targeting provides a systematic analytical approach that focuses 

targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements and the commander’s 

objectives. It helps focus the appropriate capabilities against adversary targets at the 

right time and place to impose specific desired effects that achieve joint force 

objectives. Deliberate targeting supports the air tasking cycle, which creates a daily 

articulation of the overall air and space strategy. Deliberate targeting within the tasking 

cycle is the means Airmen use to accomplish the CFACC’s non-dynamic targeting 
24

Figure 2.2. The Air Tasking Cycle 

requirements. Therefore, this section discusses deliberate targeting within the context 

of the tasking cycle. The tasking cycle develops the products needed to build and 

execute an ATO and accomplish assessment. Although it is presented below as six 

separate, sequential phases, in reality the targeting process is bi-directional, iterative, 

multi-dimensional, sometimes executed in parallel, and part of a larger set of processes. 

It is built on a foundation laid by thorough IPB. Participants from the CAOC’s strategy, 

ISR, plans, and operations divisions accomplish various targeting responsibilities, 

integrating their products into all levels and stages of the tasking process. The cycle 

consists of the following phases performed at various levels of command (see Figure 

2.2): 

 Objectives, effects, and guidance. 

 Target development. 

 Weaponeering and allocation. 

 ATO production and dissemination. 

 Execution planning and force execution. 

 Assessment. 
25

 The tasking cycle has usually been represented as a set of distinct processes that 

separately accomplish targeting, apportion and allocate joint air capabilities, and 

produce the ATO. In fact, these processes are all closely interrelated aspects of the 

larger, overarching joint operation planning and execution system that is integrated 

throughout the campaign by the CFC. Regarding them as distinct entities misses the 

central insight that they must work together as an integrated whole if targeting and 

tasking are to be most effective. Targeting and ATO production are essential to the 

tasking cycle. Although the targeting and tasking cycles perform separate and distinct 

functions, they are highly intertwined and require close coordination between them and 

they run almost exactly in parallel once a daily battle rhythm is established. The tasking 

cycle as a whole encompasses the entire process of taking commanders’ intent and 

guidance, determining where to apply force or other actions to fulfill that intent, matching 

available capabilities and forces with targets, putting this information into an integrated, 

synchronized, and coordinated order, distributing that order to all users, monitoring 

execution of the order to adapt to changes in the battlespace, and assessing the results 

of that execution. The cycle is built around finite time periods that are required to plan, 

integrate and coordinate, prepare for, conduct, and assess air operations. These time 

periods may vary from theater to theater and much targeting effort may not be bound 

specifically to the cycle’s timeframe, but the tasking cycle and its constituent processes 

drive the CAOC’s battle rhythm and thus helps determine deadlines and milestones for 

related processes, including targeting. 

A principal purpose of the tasking cycle is to produce orders and supporting 

documentation to place a flexible array of capabilities in a position to create desired 

effects in support of the CFC’s campaign. This cycle is driven by the tyranny of time 

and distance. It takes time for ground crew to prepare aircraft for flight, for aircrew to 

plan missions, and for aircrew to fly to the immediate theater of operations from distant 

airfields. Likewise, commanders must have enough visibility on future operations to 

ensure sufficient assets and crews are available to prepare for and perform tasked 

missions. These requirements drive the execution of a periodic, repeatable tasking 

process to allow commanders to plan for upcoming operations. The ATO (usually 24 

hours in duration) and the process that develops it (usually 72-96 hours in duration) are 

a direct consequence of these physical constraints. 

 In contrast to the misperception that targeting information must be provided to the 

CFACC 72-96 hours in advance to allow targets to be struck by air assets, targets can 

actually be struck in minutes from when information is made available in the dynamic 

targeting process. The key to both the flexibility and versatility of deliberate and

dynamic targeting is a shared understanding among the functional components of 

anticipated air, land, maritime and information operations during the period of the air 

plan. Misperceptions also arise because other components may not have visibility on 

the wide variety of missions tasked to the air component in support of the CFC’s 

campaign and because air assets are often tasked to simultaneously conduct missions 

supporting overlapping campaign phases. 
26

 The ATO articulates tasking for joint air and space operations for a specific period of 

time, normally 24 hours. Detailed planning generally begins 72 hours prior the start of 

execution to properly assess the progress of operations, anticipate enemy actions, 

make needed adjustments to strategy, and enable integration of all components’ 

requirements. The actual length of the tasking cycle may vary from theater to theater. 

Length will be based upon CFC guidance, CFACC direction, and theater needs. The 

length should be specified in theater standard operating procedures or other directives. 

If it is modified for a particular contingency, this should be specified in the CFC’s 

operations plan (OPLAN) or the CFACC’s JAOP. The net result of this part of the 

tasking cycle—and of deliberate targeting efforts—is that there are usually five ATOs in 

various stages of progress at any one time. (This is illustrated in figure 2.3.) 

 At least one ATO undergoing assessment at various levels. 

 One currently being executed. 

 One in production. 

 One in detailed planning (target development and weaponeering). 

 One in strategy development (objectives and guidance). 

 Some assets may not operate within the established cycle. These include most 

space assets, which are tasked via the space tasking order, although some theaterspecific space operations will probably be included in the daily ATO for the sake of 

situational awareness, integration, and synchronization. Special operations function 

within a 96-hour planning cycle, but will more often operate within or drive the dynamic 

targeting process. Certain information operations (IO) capabilities operate within a 96-

hour cycle as well, and it is critical for CAOC planners to know if special operations 

forces (SOF) and IO personnel will assist with targeting. Intertheater air mobility assets 

are others that do not necessarily operate within the tasking cycle. In large operations, 

the existence of differing planning cycles among components can lead to increased 

complexity in the process. Most component planning cycles are approximately 72-96 

hours. However, the requirement within the air tasking cycle to manage as many as five 

separate ATOs drives the requirement for discipline to manage defined inputs and 

outputs during particular slices of time. 

 The CAOC combat plans division (CPD) should work closely with the air mobility 

division (AMD) to determine how intertheater mobility is integrated into the ATO. Some 

long-range combat assets based outside the theater of operations but operating within 

the joint operations area may be airborne on a tasked mission before the ATO that 

covers their weapons’ times over target is published. These assets require the most 

current draft ATO information and all updates that affect their missions. Other missions 

that are not under the CFACC’s control may be included in the ATO to provide visibility 

and assist coordination and deconfliction. 

 Deliberate targeting supports every phase of the joint air estimate process and the 

air tasking cycle and is interwoven throughout the phases up to and including ATO 

production and dissemination. Effective deliberate targeting comes at a high cost in 
27

Figure 2.3. Notional CAOC Battle Rhythm with Multiple ATOs 

D - 3 D - 2 D - 1 D - Day D + 1 D + 2 D + 3 D + 4

ATO B

ATO C

ATO D

ATO E

ATO A

AOD A JIPTL A SEND A FLY A ASSESS

AOD B JIPTL B SEND B FLY B ASSESS

AOD C JIPTL C SEND C FLY C ASSESS

AOD D JIPTL D SEND D FLY D ASSESS

AOD E JIPTL E SEND E FLY E ASSESS

D + 5

terms of the volume and flow of information. Targeting and assessment, which are 

integrally related, impose most of the intelligence collection burden the joint force 

carries—to support deliberate targeting efforts before, dynamic targeting efforts during, 

and assessment during and after ATO execution. Successful targeting requires indepth information on such things as enemy force posture, capabilities, and movement; 

target vulnerability; enemy leadership’s intentions, habits, and movement patterns; the 

flow and interconnections of enemy economic behavior; and the linkages and 

interconnections within major infrastructure systems like electrical power and electronic 

communications webs. The process also takes into account such things as friendly 

objectives, CONOPS, ROE, target time constraints, and friendly force capabilities to 

create five general types of products: 

 Target nomination lists that achieve desired effects in order to meet commander’s 

objectives, guidance, and intent. 

 Weapons recommendations based upon effects chosen to achieve commander’s 

objectives. 

 Weaponeering analyses to support effects-based kinetic and non-kinetic weapon 

recommendations. 

 Force / capabilities selection and planning. 

 Target materials, built to support current and future targeting efforts.
28

Figure 2.4. Notional Tasking Process Milestones 

Showing Relationship to Tasking Cycle Phases 

Target 

Development

Target 

Development MAAP

Target 

Development MAAP ATO

Production

AOD

Effects, MOEs

Target 

Development

Target

Coordination MAAP ATO

Production

ATO Push /

Unit Mission 

Planning

ATO

Execution

ATO Push /

Unit Mission 

Planning

ATO

A

B

C

D

D - 3 D - 2 D - 1 D-Day

am pm am pm am pm am pm

AOD

Approval

JIPTL

Approval JIB MAAPApproval

ATO Milestones: Approval

AOD

Effects, MOEs

AOD

Effects, MOEs

AOD

Effects, MOEs

Target

Coordination

Target

Coordination

Objectives, 

Effects, Guidance

Assessment

Target Development

Weaponeering & 

Allocation ATO

Production Execution Planning &

Force Execution

Assessment

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

 The discussion in this chapter concentrates on that part of the tasking cycle that 

culminates in production and dissemination of the ATO. This process resides primarily 

in the CAOC’s strategy, combat plans, and ISR divisions. Once the ATO is published, 

adjustments are made in the COD and targeting decisions are handled through dynamic 

targeting. Refer to Chapter Three for details. The final phase of the cycle is 

assessment, which may be less wedded to the battle rhythm’s timeline than the other 

phases. It is accomplished primarily by the ISR division and the operational 

assessment team (OAT) within the strategy division (SD). Assessment is covered in 

Chapter Four. See Figure 2.4 for notional tasking process milestones. 
29

AIR TASKING CYCLE PHASES AND THEIR PRODUCTS 

Objectives, Effects, and Guidance 

Purpose of the Phase 

Clear understanding of the commander’s objectives and guidance is essential for 

effective tasking and targeting. As mentioned in Chapter One, objectives are the clearly 

defined, decisive, attainable, and measurable goals toward which every military 

operation should be directed. They provide focus for those at all stages of the tasking 

cycle and give targeting personnel the overarching purpose for their efforts. Guidance

sets limits and boundaries on the objectives and how they are attained. It establishes 

constraints—things we must do—and restraints—things we must not do. Together, the 

two embody a commander’s intent for military operations. 

 This phase starts with CFC guidance to the joint force components. The CFC 

consults with his component commanders, decides on modifications to their COAs or 

schemes of maneuver, and issues guidance and intent. This has been done in various 

ways in different conflicts, but an emerging best practice is that used during Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) by the CFC. He established a single board to provide a forum 

for review of campaign progress, his intent, component schemes of maneuver, and 

macro-level targeting priorities. 

 The overarching purpose of this board is to integrate (not just synchronize and 

coordinate) component efforts at the operational, scheme-of-maneuver level. The 

board can thus be called a joint integration board (JIB) or a combined integration board 

(CIB). This board would replace and expand the scope of the joint targeting 

coordination board (JTCB), established as an option in joint doctrine. The J/CIB would 

occur earlier in the cycle and focus more at the operational, “scheme of maneuver” level 

than the JTCB. The CFC determines whether a J/CIB will be held and defines its role. 

In general, however, each J/CIB should cover four broad topics: 

 Assessment of campaign progress since the last meeting (usually the last 24 hours), 

with recommendations for future action. 

 Broad guidance for the next 72 hours issued by the CFC. 

 Major operations (schemes of maneuver) over the next 48 hours, briefed by each of 

the components. 

 Macro-level review and guidance on joint maneuver and fires (including especially 

targeting and ISR priorities) over the next 24 hours, to help guide joint dynamic 

targeting efforts for the upcoming execution period. 

The CFC will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, 

coordination, and deconfliction associated with joint air targeting to the CFACC and will 

ensure that this process is a joint effort. The CFACC must possess a sufficient 

command and control (C2) infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of 
30

joint planning expertise. A targeting mechanism tasked with detailed planning, 

weaponeering, and execution is also required to facilitate the process. 

The CFACC should prepare prior to the J/CIB by consulting with senior component 

liaisons and the staff to determine what modifications are needed to the air scheme of 

maneuver and to determine the air apportionment recommendation for the CFC’s 

approval. Air apportionment is the determination and assignment of total expected 

effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air 

operations for a given period of time. Once battle rhythm starts, that period is usually 

24 hours. The apportionment recommendation can be approved as part of the JIB or 

separately after it. Once approved, the apportionment decision should be included in 

the ultimate product of this phase, the AOD. In deriving guidance to be considered at 

the JIB and published in the AOD, the CFACC is supported by the CAOC SD’s strategy 

plans and strategy guidance teams. The strategy guidance team is primarily 

responsible for producing the AOD. 

The JIB may be supplemented by a joint or combined effects working group 

(J/CEWG) and a joint or combined assessment working group (J/CAWG), which will 

seek to resolve targeting and effects planning, coordination, and deconfliction at the 

action-officer level. The J/CEWG and J/CAWG are not standing bodies, rather they are 

scheduled meetings of selected elements from all components with an input to 

targeting, intended to ensure coordination at the lowest effective level. The J/CEWG 

and J/CAWG coordinate, monitor, and integrate efforts to ensure desired effects are 

being created in the OE, that undesired effects are mitigated, and that targeting and 

assessment efforts are appropriate to ensure mission success. The J/CEWG and the 

J/CAWG are the appropriate fora for vetting particular issues that arise in coordinating 

and deconflicting individual targeting decisions. 

The objectives, effects, and guidance phase is also where effects and their 

accompanying measures of effect (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) are 

determined. Strategy guidance and strategy plans teams work closely with the CPD 

Targeting Effects Team (TET), (formerly known as the guidance, apportionment, and 

targeting [GAT] Team) and the ISR division (ISRD) to determine effects that achieve the 

stated objectives, select appropriate measures and indicators for assessment, and 

determine ISR requirements to collect against the MOEs. Results of this effort may be 

published as lists of tasks or desired effects in the AOD. 

 Finally, considerations of the LOAC and ROE for the conflict will directly affect all 

phases of the tasking process (and thus targeting). Targeteers must understand and be 

able to apply the basic principles of these disciplines as they relate to targeting. See 

Appendix A for further discussion of LOAC and ROE. 

Products of the Phase 

 The Air and Space Operations Directive. The CAOC strategy division drafts the 

AOD for CFACC approval. In a normal battle rhythm, this is done on a daily basis. The 
31

AOD is the vehicle for the CFACC to express his intent for a specific day and 

communicate the CFC’s apportionment decision. Apportionment guidance should 

reflect prioritized operational objectives and relevant tactical tasks with approximate 

weights of effort for each objective. Specific weights of effort should be avoided due to 

the difficulty in precisely measuring effects of air, space, and IO, and to allow maximum 

flexibility in planning the application of airpower. However the CPD can use these 

weights of effort, along with existing friendly force capabilities, to estimate the numbers 

of aimpoints by effect or objective to focus target development. (See Air Force 

Operational Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures [AFOTTP] manual 2-3.2, Air and 

Space Operations Center, for an AOD sample). 

The prioritized tasks in the AOD should be effects-based and reflect commander’s 

guidance and intent. By crafting effects-based tasks for the AOD, target developers 

within the CAOC’s ISRD gain the flexibility to identify and nominate the most effective 

means to achieve the desired effects. Tasks that are not effects-based are often targetbased, meaning that there is little flexibility in the selection of targets, and can lead to 

the inefficient use of scarce air and space resources. The AOD is the primary vehicle 

for communicating desired effects to target developers and others involved in targeting 

on a daily basis. Robust, logical lists of effects-based tasks with appropriate MOEs and 

ISR collection requirements are a necessary part of the AOD. 

 The AOD should also be used to express the CFC’s and CFACC's guidance 

regarding what target categories (target sets) are time-sensitive targets, what the 

priority is among them, and what types of dynamic targeting would cause preplanned 

missions to be re-tasked. Categories of TST, high-value targets, and other objects of 

dynamic targeting should be presented in the context of the desired effects, and those 

desired effects prioritized against the desired effects for preplanned targets. This allows 

the COD to rapidly assess the value of preplanned targets against TST or emerging 

targets to determine whether or not to re-task air, space, or information assets. This 

guidance also reduces the possibility of all newly detected targets being struck. Just 

because a target can be engaged within the ATO execution period does not mean that 

effort should be diverted from preplanned targets to engage it. 

 While daily guidance is critical to subsequent phases of the ongoing tasking cycle, 

the SD strategy plans team also works on longer-range planning, including study of 

branches and sequels. Conclusions drawn from this study should be disseminated 

throughout the CAOC to assist in focusing later target development and intelligence 

collection efforts. 

 Finally, the AOD should include the CFACC’s guidance on which targets or target 

sets require immediate assessment feedback. ISR collection assets are usually limited 

in number and the collection requirements for target development, IPB, indications and 

warnings, and other taskings may have a higher priority than tactical assessment. 

Operations will be more efficient if tactical assessment is focused on a select few high 

priority targets or sets. 
32

Target Development 

 Purpose of the Phase 

 

 This is the phase in which the efforts of deliberate targeting relate specific targets to 

objectives, desired effects, and accompanying actions. Targeteers within the ISRD and 

the CPD TET take the effects determined during the objectives, effects, and guidance 

phase and analyze which targets must be struck (or otherwise affected) to accomplish 

them. Target development requires thorough examination of the adversary as a system 

of systems in order to understand where critical linkages and vulnerabilities lie. Critical 

things are those a system requires in order to function. Critical linkages within a system 

often enable the functioning of several interrelated parts of the system, and so affecting 

them in the right way can disable several components or even cause cascading systemwide failure. Vulnerable things are those that can be attacked or otherwise affected with 

relative ease. Thorough analysis should reveal “critical vulnerabilities,” if they exist. 

These are elements of the adversary’s system that are both critical and vulnerable. 

Analysis is made effective through access to the greatest possible breadth of subject 

matter expertise and information regarding the functioning of systems that support 

adversary behavior. This research will require expertise beyond that normally available 

on the CFACC’s planning staff. It requires cooperation with other planning staffs and 

national interagency groups throughout the process. Much of the required analysis is 

done before conflict begins. See Chapter Five and Appendix B for further details. 

 Target development involves five distinct functions, each discussed below: 

 Target analysis. 

 Target vetting. 

 Target validation. 

 Target nomination. 

 Collection and exploitation requirements. 

 The purpose of these together is to relate target development to tasking. The target 

nomination part of the process usually culminates in a target coordination meeting, held 

by the TET within the CPD, with the assistance of the various joint components and 

multi-national liaison elements. The TET collates target nominations from all sources. It 

works with the ISRD and other agencies to analyze targets. It screens all nominated 

targets to ensure they meet commander’s intent and are relevant. It allocates and 

prioritizes the nominated targets based on the best potential to achieve desired effects 

and objectives and coordinates this target allocation to ensure other components’ 

priorities and timing requirements are met. The product of this effort, when approved by 

the CFC or designated representative, is the JIPTL. 

 There are no absolutes in target development or its relation to the larger tasking 

cycle. As noted, all the phases of the tasking process are intertwined. Target 
33

development efforts can frequently force refinement of desired effects or even 

objectives, especially if weaponeering and allocation efforts indicate that a particular 

targeting avenue of approach is impractical. Target development efforts also frequently 

reach forward to influence weaponeering and allocation choices, dynamic targeting 

during execution, and the assessment process. The results of detailed target 

development are often stored in target system studies, individual target folders and 

targeting databases that can be studied by all levels of command and used in future 

target development efforts. 

Target Analysis takes the desired effects determined during planning or the first 

phase of the tasking cycle and matches them to specific targets. This analysis looks at 

the importance of various potential targets as enablers of enemy capabilities, as critical 

elements within enemy systems, or as potential trigger points for desired enemy 

behavior changes. There are many means available to accomplish this. Two of the 

most common that have been used in the past are target system and critical node 

analysis. 

 Target system analysis (TSA), as its name implies, approaches targets and target 

sets as systems to determine vulnerabilities and exploitable weaknesses. Targeteers 

review how a functional target system works as a whole and analyze the interactions 

between components. TSA takes a system-of-systems approach to look at 

interdependencies and vulnerabilities between systems as well as intra-system 

dependencies in order to maximize the effectiveness of target development. TSA begins 

in peacetime, before the commencement of conflict, and is accomplished with federated 

support and “reachback” (see Chapter Five and Appendix B). 

 As part of a comprehensive system-of-systems analysis (SOSA) approach, TSA 

focuses on one or more of the many “functional target systems” identified in Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA) handbooks within a particular theater, such as infrastructure 

targets across a whole region or nation (like electrical power or petroleum, oil, and 

lubricants [POL] production), or non-infrastructure systems such as financial networks. 

SOSA seeks to find nodes common to more than one system, focusing on the 

interactions and interrelationships between system elements, in order to determine their 

degree and points of interdependence and to discern linkages between their functions. 

The ultimate goal of TSA is to find critical nodes and vulnerabilities that, if disrupted or 

affected in a specific manner, create effects that achieve the commander’s objectives. 

The analysis performed in target development proceeds through successively 

greater levels of detail, flowing from the macro (broad scope) level to the micro 

(narrowly focused) level. This winnowing approach is essential to preserve the linkage 

between desired effects and objectives and the specific actions that are taken against 

particular targets. It determines the necessary type, breadth, and duration of action that 

must be exerted on each target to generate effects that are consistent with the 

commander’s objectives. 
34

 Targets for consideration come from a variety of sources. Many are developed preconflict and confirmed during planning. These may or may not come from a theater joint 

target list (JTL) maintained in peacetime. JTLs are consolidated lists of selected targets 

considered to have military significance in a combatant commander’s area of 

responsibility. Many more are suggested during JAOP development or by the SD as 

the air and space component’s strategy evolves during a conflict. Many are derived by 

the CAOC’s targeteers themselves, as target analysis suggests the means of achieving 

desired effects. 

 Many targets are nominated by other joint force components in order to help 

achieve their desired effects. Upon dissemination of the AOD, and based on CFC 

guidance, components begin to develop their nominations for inclusion in the next ATO. 

Some targets may be suggested by government agencies outside the DOD or by 

foreign governments. The product of target analysis is a list of proposed target 

nominations designed to achieve the effects determined in earlier stages of planning 

(such as JAOP development or the objectives, effect, and guidance stage of the tasking 

cycle), which will then be validated. Other products may include creation of or additions 

to no-strike or restricted target lists (see “products of the phase,” below).

Target research within the tasking cycle often entails studying previously 

unidentified or unlocated targets. Responsibility for the research lies primarily, but not 

solely, with the ISRD, which uses federated aid and reachback (see Chapter Five and 

Appendix B) to ensure that the CAOC obtains, analyzes, and disseminates the 

information it needs for further target development. The CAOC’s information warfare 

element may also be crucial to target research, especially in helping understand 

battlespace communications and intelligence systems as well as human factors. 

 Much ISRD effort must also be put into determining the status of previously struck 

targets, enemy recovery and recuperation efforts, and changes in enemy tactics, 

processes, and strategy. This information is critical in validating the effectiveness of 

friendly action. It helps shape ongoing target development within the tasking cycle by 

showing where re-strikes or other further action may be required. It is also crucial to the 

SD’s efforts to identify needed changes in the overall air and space strategy. 

Target vetting leverages the expertise of the national intelligence community to 

verify the accuracy and fidelity of the intelligence and analysis used to develop the 

target. Additionally, vetting reviews individual targets’ compliance with the LOAC and 

ROE. See Appendix A for further discussion of LOAC and ROE requirements. 

Target validation ensures all vetted targets achieve the effects and objectives 

outlined in a commander’s guidance and are coordinated and deconflicted with 

agencies and activities that might present a conflict with the proposed action. It also 

determines whether a target remains a viable element of the target system. During the 

development effort, the targets may also require review and approval based on the 

sensitive target approval and review process, coordinated through the combatant 

commander to national authorities. This phase is done by targeteers within the CPD 
35

TET, in consultation with the strategy plans team within the SD and other experts and 

agencies, as required. The first part of validation asks such questions as: 

 Does the target meet CFACC or higher commanders’ objectives, guidance, and 

intent? 

 Is the target consistent with LOAC and ROE? 

 Is the desired effect on the target consistent with the end state? 

 Is the target politically or culturally “sensitive?” 

 What will the effect of striking it be on public opinion (enemy, friendly, and 

 neutral)?

 What are the risks and likely consequences of collateral damage? 

 Is it feasible to attack this target? What is the risk? 

 Is it feasible to attack the target at this time? 

 What are the consequences of not attacking the target? 

 Will attacking the target negatively affect friendly operations due to current or 

planned friendly exploitation of the target? 

 The second part of validation starts the coordination and integration of actions 

against the target with other operations. This continues after the ATO is produced and 

responsibility is assumed by the COD. Part of coordination is deconfliction, which is 

largely a checklist function. The checklist should be developed during JAOP 

development and be appropriate to the particular organization and conflict. Many 

offices and agencies must be coordinated with to prevent fratricide, collateral damage, 

or propaganda leverage for the enemy. Some examples of where coordination and 

integration are required: 

 SOF. The joint forces special operations component commander (JFSOCC) must 

deconflict joint special operations with the CFC and the other component 

commanders to avoid fratricide. This is best done at a CFACC targeting 

coordination meeting held as part of the TET’s function. The CAOC should work 

through the special operations liaison element (SOLE) for deconfliction. 

 Army forces. CAOC personnel should work through the BCD within the CAOC and 

the ASOC to ensure that air and space component targeting is coordinated and 

integrated with land component operations. Careful crafting and placement of 

FSCM facilitate this. 

 Search and rescue. 

 Information operations. 

 Other government agencies. 
36

...the nature of warfare has changed. When cities were struck in 

past wars, none doubted that civilians, embassies, hospitals, and 

schools would be in harm’s way. Today, our ability to strike 

precisely has created the impression that sensitive sites can be 

safe in the middle of a war zone. Our desire to protect innocents 

in the line of fire has added an enormous burden on all of us that 

we accept. It is our job to do our best to ensure that only 

appropriate targets be struck. 

—George Tenet 

Former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 

 Remarks to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 22 

 The first three stages result in what might be called “target allocation”—working 

interactively with other elements in the CAOC to determine which targets “make the cut” 

on the given day’s ATO. This is not always an easy decision, especially in conflicts 

where resources are limited and/or the target lists are lengthy. Still, it is a vital part of 

what the CPD does. The final stage produces a list of validated target nominations that 

will be submitted to higher authority for approval on target nomination lists. 

 Target Nomination. Once targets are identified and validated, they are nominated 

through proper channels for approval. Historically, this has often entailed deliberation 

through a high-level coordinating body such as a JTCB, but evolving best practice 

(including practice in OIF) suggests that detailed targeting functions should be 

delegated to components (as joint doctrine permits), leaving commanders free to 

concentrate on integrating the joint force scheme of maneuver in a JIB. 

 

 Once all of the component, allied, and agency target nominations for a given ATO 

are received, the TET prioritizes the nominated targets and places them in a target 

nomination list (TNL) based on the commander’s objectives. The TET then vets the 

TNLs through the appropriate coordinating bodies representing the joint force 

components and other required agencies to ensure their requirements are supported, 

joint force priorities are met, and desired effects are achieved. 

 If targeting functions are delegated appropriately, the final deconfliction and 

coordination of components’ nominations should be at a target coordination meeting run 

by the TET. Component representatives should be prepared to justify target selections, 

since not all targets may be struck based on the CFC’s apportionment decision and the 

CFACC’s target allocation. If differences arise and cannot be resolved at the meeting, 

the issue should be coordinated at higher levels for resolution. The meeting should not 

generally address mating of specific weapons to targets, but it should consider nonkinetic options and initiate the planning and coordination needed for those options. 

Additionally, the meeting may address the availability of certain “high demand” weapons 

or munitions on a particular ATO. However, the availability of weapons or capability 
37

should not drive the nomination of targets—this is antithetical to an effects-based 

approach. 

 The result of coordination is the JIPTL, which is submitted to the CFC or designated 

representative for approval. Again, targets may be added to no-strike or restricted 

target lists as a result of this part of the process, too. 

Determining collection and exploitation requirements through assessment is critical 

to targeting efforts. This stage attempts to answer the question, “how will we know 

we’ve achieved the desired effects?” by establishing intelligence collection and 

exploitation requirements for each nominated target. This stage begins with target 

analysis and runs parallel to the other stages. The requirements must be articulated 

early in the tasking process to support target development and ultimately assessment. 

Targeteers must work closely with collection managers to ensure that target 

development, pre-strike, and post-strike requirements are integrated into the collection 

plan, along with any changes that occur throughout the tasking cycle. This intelligence 

support is also required to prepare for future targeting during execution (e.g., to pre-task 

real time ISR assets) and to support post-strike assessment of success. Properly 

identifying collection and exploitation requirements is one of the keys to effective PBA. 

The product of this stage may be a joint integrated prioritized collection list (JIPCL). 

 

Products of the Phase 

The JIPTL is a prioritized list of targets and associated data approved by the CFC 

or designated representative and maintained by the joint force. An approved JIPTL is 

the central product of the target development phase. Targets and priorities are derived 

from the recommendations of components in conjunction with their proposed operations 

supporting the CFC’s objectives and guidance. Although it draws from many sources, 

the CPD TET has primary responsibility for the JIPTL within the CAOC. 

The JIPCL is a prioritized list of intelligence collection and exploitation requirements 

needed to support indications and warning, analysis, and future target development 

efforts and to measure whether desired effects and objectives are being achieved. 

Requirements and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components in 

conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the CFC’s objectives and 

guidance. An approved JIPCL may be a product of answering information gaps as well 

as the collection and exploitation requirements stage of target development. The ISRD 

has primary responsibility within the CAOC for the JIPCL, although considerable 

consultation with the SD OAT is required. 

The no strike list (NSL) is a list of geographic areas, complexes, installations, 

forces, equipment, capabilities, functions, individuals, groups, systems, or behaviors 

that will not have action planned against them Attacking these may violate LOAC or 

interfere with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments. Combatant 

commanders and JFCs determine which targets are included on the NSL based upon 
38

inputs from components, supporting unified commands, or higher authorities. Targets 

on this list require national-level approval to strike. 

The restricted target list is a list of targets that have specific restrictions imposed 

upon them. Actions on restricted targets are prohibited until coordinated and approved 

by the establishing headquarters. Targets are restricted because certain types of 

actions against them may have negative political, cultural, or propaganda implications, 

or may interfere with projected friendly operations. The RTL is nominated by elements 

of the joint force and approved by the CFC. Targets on this list may only be struck with 

CFC or higher approval. This list also includes restricted targets directed by higher 

authorities. Actions taken by an opponent may remove a target from the RTL. 

 The CFC’s staff develops and maintains the NSL and RTL. The components 

recommend changes to it during peacetime, while the J-2 is developing the JTL, and 

during conflict. 

 

Weaponeering and Allocation 

Purpose of the Phase 

Weaponeering is the part of the tasking process for estimating the quantity and 

types of lethal and non-lethal weapons needed to achieve desired effects against 

specific targets. (Note: This modifies the joint definition found in JP 1-02.) Allocation, 

in the broadest sense, is the distribution of limited resources among competing 

requirements for employment. This has two aspects that are relevant to the air tasking 

cycle: allocation of targets and allocation of forces. Weaponeering and allocation 

function together to produce the master air attack plan (MAAP); see “products of the 

phase,” below. These efforts also commence before the JIPTL is approved and 

continue past MAAP production into execution planning. They are integral to all of 

targeting. 

Weaponeering considers such things as the desired effects against the target (both 

direct weapons effects and indirect desired outcomes), target vulnerability, delivery 

accuracy, damage criteria, and weapon reliability. Targeteers quantify the expected 

results of lethal and non-lethal weapons employment against prioritized targets to 

produce desired effects. It results in probable outcomes given many replications of an 

event. It does not predict the outcome of every munition delivery, but represents 

statistical averages based on modeling, weapons tests, and real-world experience. 

With modern precision and near-precision weapons, however, the probabilities of 

accurate delivery and of achieving intended direct effects are very high and are still 

increasing. Weaponeering is normally done by the ISRD targeting team prior to TET 

using methodologies prepared by the joint technical coordinating group for munition 

effectiveness and data found in the joint munitions effectiveness manuals (JMEM). The 

final weaponeering is chosen by the MAAP Team. The output of weaponeering is a 

recommendation of the quantity, type, and mix of lethal and non-lethal weapons needed 
39

to achieve desired effects while avoiding unacceptable collateral damage. All approved 

targets are weaponeered to include at least the following:

 Target identification and description. 

 Recommended aim points/DPIs. 

 Desired level(s) of damage, degradation, or exploitation. 

 Weapon system and munitions recommendations. 

 Fuzing requirements (if required). 

 Probability of achieving desired direct effect(s). 

 Target area terrain, weather, and threat considerations. 

 Collateral damage considerations. 

 WMD agent dispersal / collateral effects. 

 Precautions must be taken to avoid or minimize civilian casualties and damage to 

civilian infrastructure. The danger of collateral damage varies with the type of target, 

terrain, weapons used, weather, and the proximity of civilians and their structures. 

According to LOAC, incidental damage to civilian objects must not be excessive in 

relation to the expected military advantage to be gained. If an attack is directed against 

dual-use objects that might be legitimate military targets but also serve a legitimate 

civilian need (e.g., electrical power or telecommunications), then this factor must be 

carefully balanced against the military benefits when making a weapons selection, as 

must reconstruction and stabilization considerations following the end of hostilities. 

Thus, those conducting weaponeering must always keep campaign objectives and the 

end state in mind, as must those in other CAOC teams and divisions who review 

weaponeering solutions and the MAAP. The methodologies and data used for 

weaponeering analyses are also capable of producing estimations of collateral damage 

risk to noncombatants and non-targeted facilities. Established ROE and LOAC also 

address collateral damage concerns. (See Appendix A for further information.) 

Targeteers must comply with Joint Chiefs of Staff CD estimation methodology. For 

example, it may sometimes be necessary to strike a target more precisely than would 

otherwise be necessary in order to avoid collateral civilian damage. Certain levels of 

collateral damage estimation require expertise that lies outside of the CFACC's—or 

even CFC's—control and must be coordinated through the ISRD via federated and 

reachback relationships. 

 In another sense, the very precision of certain weaponeering solutions, especially 

against some hardened and/or buried targets, may cause ripple effects through other 

CAOC divisions or joint agencies because intended effects may not be readily visible. 

This happened during DESERT STORM, when Iraqi hardened aircraft shelters were 

repeatedly struck because the results of earlier fully effective attacks were not 

immediately apparent. 
40

 It is critically important to stress that all estimates generated during this phase are 

situation-specific, reflecting the pairing of a particular force against a particular target, 

under a particular condition of employment. As such, users of this information should 

be cautioned against assuming that the estimated effectiveness of a force capability 

under one set of circumstances is broadly applicable to other circumstances. Relatively 

minor targeting variations may have an exaggerated impact on effects estimates. It is 

equally important to stress these estimates of performance are not designed to take into 

account considerations outside of the realm of weapon-target interaction (e.g., they do 

not address whether or not the delivery system will survive to reach the target.)

Targeteers must know the capabilities of platforms, weapons, and fuzes for kinetic 

weapons available for use and be aware of their availability. They must also be familiar 

with the standard conventional load platforms in their theater and delivery tactics. 

Weaponeering results will only be useful if the employment parameters assumed in 

weaponeering match those used in combat. Targeteers should work closely with the 

operations and logistics staff to obtain required information. As a rule of thumb, theater 

component targeting branches should request a copy of the time-phased force and 

deployment data (TPFDD) to obtain units’ expected input options selected from the 

JMEM’s automated programs, to provide realistic planning data. Weaponeering must 

also take into account the availability of the various weapons being considered. Certain 

high value weapons, such as those capable of deep penetration or other special effects, 

are normally limited in number and should only be used against those targets that both 

require the weapon for successful attack and are of sufficiently high priority to warrant 

the expenditure of the resource. Making these decisions is part of “target allocation.” 

Finally, some weapons, particularly certain IO capabilities, require long lead times in 

planning, deployment, and approval, which means that such capabilities must be 

thought about early and included in the JAEP. 

Allocation. As mentioned previously, there are two types of allocation relevant to 

the tasking cycle. The first is “target allocation” and it starts early in the targeting 

process. Prior to the TET target coordination meeting, the MAAP team determines how 

many aimpoints can be serviced on the given ATO day from the MAAP Team. The TET 

then goes over the lists of nominated targets and determines which “make the cut” on 

that day’s proposed JIPTL. The TET must work closely with the SD and the MAAP 

team to ensure the prioritized list ties into the JAOP and AOD appropriately. The SD 

must ensure the TET understands how effects and objectives are prioritized, how they 

are to be achieved over time, and that it has a macro-level idea of the number of targets 

associated with each objective. The TET then collects target nominations from other 

sources and works a daily allocation of targets that have been planned against the 

effects and objectives to build the daily JIPTL. Approaching JIPTL construction in this 

way helps avoid an ad hoc, target-servicing approach. 

 The second type of allocation is “force allocation” (or air allocation as it is 

customarily thought of). This is the translation of the air apportionment decision into the 

total number of sorties or missions by weapon system type available for each operation 

or task. (Note: This modifies the joint definition found in JP 1-02.) It falls under the 
41

CPD MAAP team, which takes the final prioritized list of weaponeered targets and 

allocates airpower by melding available capabilities and resources with the TET’s 

weaponeering recommendations. The result is a translation of the total weight of air 

effort into the total number or sorties or missions required to achieve desired effects. 

 Although not complete until the MAAP is produced, force allocation also starts early 

in the cycle. Each air capable joint force component submits an allocation request 

(ALLOREQ) message to the CFACC (timed to coincide with the beginning of the MAAP 

part of the tasking process, usually not later than 36 hours prior to the start of a given 

ATO day). ALLOREQs contain requests for air and space component support and 

information on sorties from other components not required for organic component 

support that are available for CFACC tasking. The MAAP team works with the TET 

through JIPTL production, then takes inputs from them, the component liaisons, the 

AMD (especially concerning tanker availability), and others to produce the MAAP. They 

determine an overall sortie flow for the ATO period and determine how that flow should 

be divided into “packages”—discrete sets of missions and sorties designed to 

complement each other or provide required support (for example, tankers and electronic 

warfare assets “packaged” with the strike assets they are supporting). They also 

determine required times over target or times on station. Packages are arranged in 

sequence and used to determine a timeline and resource requirements for the ATO 

period. Each package should be deconflicted in time, space, and effect. 

 Part of the allocation and MAAP portions of the tasking process is creation of an ISR 

and assessment plan. Theater ISR assets must be carefully orchestrated to ensure 

optimal coverage of the operational environment. Assets should be positioned not only 

to provide tactical assessment of targets planned for attack, but must be able to detect 

emerging targets and be flexible enough to collect against them as well. At the same 

time, ISR assets must continue to monitor the “bigger picture,” in order to help discern 

whether desired effects are being created and whether the enemy is adapting his COAs 

to our actions. The assessment plan cannot be made in a vacuum, but must be closely 

coordinated with all other planning efforts. 

 

The CAOC should establish procedures to ensure that the organizations nominating 

targets receive continuous feedback on the status of their nominations throughout the 

tasking cycle. For example, not all targets nominated will be approved for the JIPTL, 

nor will all targets on the JIPTL be included on the ATO. There must be a feedback 

mechanism to ensure that targets not attacked, for any reason, are reported to the 

nominating authority for consideration on future JIPTLs. 

Products of the Phase 

The MAAP is the CFACC’s time-phased air and space scheme of maneuver for a 

given ATO period, synthesizing commander’s guidance, desired effects, supported 

components’ schemes of maneuver, friendly capabilities, and likely enemy COAs, and 

allocating friendly resources against approved targets. (Note: this modifies the joint 
42

definition found in JP 1-02) The MAAP is usually presented in the form of a decision 

briefing for the CFACC. The CPD MAAP team is responsible for producing the MAAP. 

The sortie allotment message (SORTIEALOT) is a means by which the CFC can 

allot sorties to meet requirements of subordinate commanders that are expressed in 

their air employment and/or allocation plans. It may or may not be produced during this 

phase of the tasking cycle, based on availability of limited air resources and component 

requirements. 

ATO Production and Dissemination 

Purpose of the Phase 

 This phase finalizes the ATO and associated orders, physically produces them, and 

disseminates them to combat units. It is based on commanders’ guidance (especially 

the AOD), the MAAP, and component requirements. This is accomplished by the CPD 

ATO production team. Airspace control and air defense instructions must be provided 

in sufficient detail to allow components to plan and execute all missions listed in the 

ATO. These are usually captured in the airspace control order (ACO) and the day’s 

SPINS. These directions must enable combat operations without undue restrictions, 

balancing combat effectiveness with the safe, orderly, and expeditious use of airspace. 

Instructions must provide for quick coordination of task assignment or reassignment and 

must direct aircraft identification and engagement procedures and ROE appropriate to 

the nature of the threat. These instructions should also consider the volume of friendly 

air traffic, friendly air defense requirements, identification friend or foe technology, 

weather, and adversary capabilities. Instructions contained in the SPINS and the ACO 

are updated as frequently as required. The ATO, ACO, and SPINS provide operational 

and tactical direction at appropriate levels of detail. The level of detail should be very 

explicit when forces operate from different bases and multi-component and/or 

composite missions are tasked. By contrast, less detail is required when missions are 

tasked to a single component or base. Components may submit critical changes to 

target requests and asset availability during this phase of the cycle. 

Products of the Phase 

The ATO is a method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate 

units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to 

targets and specific missions. It normally provides specific instructions to include call 

signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. The ATO may 

subsume the ACO and SPINS, or these may be published as separate orders.

SPINS are a separate instruction or section of the ATO that provides information 

that is not otherwise available in the ATO, but is necessary for its implementation. It 

includes such information as commanders’ guidance (often including the AOD itself), 

the C2 battle management plan, ROE, combat search and rescue procedures, the 
43

communications plan, general instructions for inter- and intra-theater airlift, and so on. It 

may also include the ACO. 

The ACO provides direction to deconflict, coordinate, and integrate the use of 

airspace within the operational area. (Note: this does not imply any level of command 

authority over air assets.) It may be included as a section of or appendix to the SPINS 

(and thus of the ATO). 

Execution Planning and Force Execution 

Purpose of the Phase 

 Execution planning includes the preparation necessary for combat units to 

accomplish the decentralized execution of the ATO. It generally consists of the 12 

hours immediately prior to the start of a given day’s ATO execution period. Force 

execution refers to the 24-hour period in which a particular ATO is executed by combat 

units. The CAOC aids both, preparing input for, supporting, and monitoring execution. 

The commander of Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), as the Air Force’s warfighting 

commander, directs execution of Air Force air and space capabilities. If a CFACC is 

appointed, that commander directs execution of air and space capabilities and forces 

made available for joint or combined operations. It is normal, of course, for the 

COMAFFOR to also be the CFACC. Inherent in this is the authority to redirect joint or 

combined air assets. Under the Air Force doctrine of centralized control and 

decentralized execution, unit commanders are given the freedom and flexibility to plan 

missions and delivery tactics as long as they fall within timing requirements, ROE, and 

intent of effects. The CFACC coordinates redirection of sorties that were previously 

allocated for support of component operations with affected component commanders. 

During execution, the CAOC is the central agency for revising the tasking of air 

forces. It is also responsible for coordinating and deconflicting any changes with 

appropriate agencies or components. It may or may not have authority to re-direct use 

of space and information capabilities supporting theater efforts, depending upon the 

asset. 

 Due to battlespace dynamics, the CFACC may be required to make changes to 

planned operations during execution. The CAOC must be flexible and responsive to 

changes required during execution of the ATO. Forces not apportioned for joint or 

combined operations, but included on the ATO for coordination purposes, can be 

redirected only with the approval of the respective component or allied commanders. 

During execution, the CFACC is also responsible for retargeting air assets to respond to 

emerging targets or changing priorities. The CFACC may delegate the authority to redirect missions made available for higher priority targets to C2 mission commanders as 

necessary. The CAOC must be notified of all redirected missions, however. 

 The COD supervises the detailed execution of the ATO. Targeteers are an integral 

part of combat operations. They monitor ATO execution and recommend alternate 
44

targets when necessary. Normally, targeting changes are needed due to adverse 

weather, assessment requirements, or modification of priorities. The ability to quickly 

recommend good alternate targets is very important to the flexibility of air and space 

power. Combat operations targeteers should be aware of all significant information for 

targets on the current ATO, desired effects and objectives, all guidance, ROEs, and 

weaponeering lookup tables as appropriate. More on this topic can be found in the next 

chapter. 

 The rational use of force relies on the capability to identify adversary entities as a 

precursor to taking action against them, especially if doing so entails the use of force. 

CID of all battlespace entities is thus a critical enabling capability in any use, or potential 

use, of military force. Identifying adversary or enemy entities is essential, of course, but 

so is identifying friendly and neutral entities. “Blue force tracking” (BFT) is a core 

function of CID. BFT is the employment of techniques to identify and track US, allied, 

and coalition forces for the purpose of providing commanders enhanced situational 

awareness and reducing fratricide. For more information on CID and BFT, see AFTTP 

3-1.1 (Secret), Appendix 2. 

Results and Products of the Phase 

 This is the phase in which targets are actually struck (or otherwise affected) and 

direct effects are created. Other products include physical damage assessments and 

MISREPs, used in helping make physical damage and other assessments. 

Assessment 

Purpose of the Phase 

 Assessment is the measure of progress in a campaign or operation, the means of 

telling whether desired effects are being created and objectives achieved, and of 

evaluating what needs to be done next. Effective planning and execution require 

continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of friendly and enemy action. Consequently, 

assessment is much more than “battle damage” or “combat assessment,” as it has 

traditionally been presented—and more than just an intelligence function that takes 

place after execution has concluded. Planning for it begins prior to commencement of 

operations, takes place throughout planning and execution, and continues after the 

conflict is over. It is a central part of an effects-based approach to conflict. It consists of 

four distinct levels: tactical assessment (which includes assessment of physical 

damage), component-level operational assessment, CFC-level operational assessment, 

and national-level assessment. Each lower level feeds the levels above it and provides 

a basis for broader-based evaluation of progress. This subject is treated in detail in 

Chapter Four.
45

Products of the Phase 

 Products include various tactical, operational, and campaign assessment products 

discussed further in Chapter Four, along with recommendations for future action. 
46

CHAPTER THREE 

DYNAMIC TARGETING 

GENERAL 

 “Dynamic targeting” is a term that applies to all targeting prosecuted outside of a 

given day’s preplanned ATO targets. It represents the targeting portion of the 

“execution” phase of effects-based operations. It is essential for commanders and 

CAOC personnel to keep effects-based principles and the objectives in mind during 

dynamic targeting and ATO execution. It is easy for those caught up in the daily battle 

rhythm to become too focused on tactical-level details, losing sight of objectives and 

desired effects or other aspects of commander’s intent. When this happens, execution 

can devolve into blind target servicing, unguided by strategy and with little or no 

anticipation of enemy actions. 

Dynamic targeting is different from deliberate targeting in terms of the timing of the 

steps in the process, but not much different in the substance of the steps. Ultimately, 

“dynamic” targets are targets—as such, their nomination, development, execution, and 

assessment still take place within the larger framework of the targeting and tasking 

cycles. However, all targets processed during the current execution cycle have one 

thing in common: they are “time-sensitive” to some degree or have increased in priority 

due to battlespace changes. Some, indeed, are fleeting and require near-immediate 

prosecution if they are to be targeted at all. Such targets require a procedure that can 

be worked through quickly and that facilitates quick transition from receipt of intelligence 

through targeting solution to action against the target. Recent operations have 

indicated that this compressed decision cycle is best handled through a specialized subprocess, known as the dynamic targeting procedure. Seen from the larger cycle’s 

perspective, dynamic targeting takes place within phases five (“execution planning and 

force execution”) and six (“assessment”) of the targeting and tasking cycles. The earlier 

phases serve to provide commanders’ targeting guidance and determine CONOPS for 

making the resources that will prosecute dynamic targeting available. 

 

The combat operations division has overall responsibility for implementation of 

dynamic targeting. Successful dynamic targeting, however, requires a great deal of 

prior planning and coordination with other divisions within the CAOC and with other 

components. If dynamic targeting is to be done correctly, planners must develop a plan 

When the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because 

of timing. Thus the momentum of one skilled in war is overwhelming 

and his attack prompt. 

 —Sun Tzu 
47

that makes assets available to the COD prior to the start of execution. This can be 

done in a number of ways. Among the most common methods are: 

 Preplanned target reference methods and coordination measures such as kill boxes. 

 “On-call” or pre-positioned strike and ISR packages (including tanker support) for 

rapid response to emerging targets (such as on-call air interdiction missions 

available for tasking during ATO execution; missions on ground alert; and/or air-toground weapons loaded on aircraft performing defensive counterair missions). 

 Using IPB to determine the most probable areas where targets will emerge during 

execution. 

 Diverting airborne assets assigned to lower priority targets to strike the recently 

identified target. 

 Coordination and synchronization of dynamic targeting operations by streamlining 

procedures. 

 Developing procedures for rapid handover of the mission tasking to another 

component for mission execution if the air and space component cannot attack a 

target that emerges. 

 Divisions other than the COD have important roles to play in dynamic targeting. The 

SD, for instance, must capture macro-level targeting guidance to include component 

priorities in the daily AOD. Many items in the AOD, like commander’s intent, anticipated 

weapons available, ROE, acceptable risk levels, and elements of the ISR collection 

plan, may be vital. ROE are especially important to this form of time-compressed 

targeting. While the SD typically drafts ROE inputs with advice from the judge advocate 

(JA), all involved in planning and execution must clearly understand the ROE. 

Compliance with ROE is a shared responsibility between the CFACC staff, subordinate 

command elements, and aircrews/operators. Due to the time-sensitive nature of targets 

prosecuted during execution, clear guidance should be developed to enable rapid 

prosecution. 

 Liaison officers (LNO) from coalition partners, other components, and other Services 

are essential during dynamic targeting. LNOs—particularly the SOLE, BCD, and other 

government agencies (OGA)—may be able to provide the CFACC with additional 

options for dealing with emerging targets as well as provide locations and activities of 

friendly forces. LNOs work deconfliction issues and their forces on the ground can also 

assist friendly forces by finding, fixing, tracking, targeting, and assessing targets 

 Successful prosecution of a target during execution sometimes requires that 

targeting be completed in minutes. To achieve this time compression, the CFACC 

should consider implementing procedures that enable the phases of dynamic targeting 

to be performed simultaneously rather than sequentially. It has been common practice 

in the last several conflicts to establish a joint team dedicated to prosecution of TSTs. 

Dedicating teams to specific target categories may not always be advisable, however, 

since the entire COD is involved in the effort to prosecute dynamic targets and creating 
48

separate teams may result in unwanted isolation, impede unity of effort, and inhibit the 

cross-flow of information. Ideally, one joint COD team should perform targeting of all 

dynamic targets. 

 Successful prosecution of targets during execution also requires well organized and 

well rehearsed procedures for sharing sensor data and targeting information, identifying 

suitable strike assets, obtaining mission approval, and rapidly deconflicting weapon 

employment. The reaction time between the sensor and shooter can be greatly 

accelerated if there are clearly articulated objectives, guidance, priorities, and intent for 

dynamic targeting before targets are even identified. The appropriate response for each 

target depends heavily on the level of conflict, the clarity of the desired outcome, and 

ROE. 

THE DYNAMIC TARGETING PORTION OF THE TASKING PROCESS 

 Dynamic targeting includes prosecution of several categories of targets: 

 CFC-approved TSTs—targets of such high priority to friendly forces that the CFC 

designates them as requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon 

pose) a danger to friendly forces or they are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of 

opportunity. The CFC is ultimately responsible for TST prosecution and relies upon 

the component commanders for conducting TST operations. 

 Targets that are considered crucial for success of friendly component commanders’ 

missions, but are not CFC-approved TSTs—for sake of convenience, these will be 

referred to in this chapter as “high payoff targets.” 

 Targets scheduled to be struck on the ATO being executed, but which have changed 

status in some way (such as FSCM changes). 

 Other targets that emerge during execution that friendly commanders deem worthy 

of targeting, prosecution of which will not divert resources from higher-priority 

targets. 

 Each of the four categories of targets specified above is prosecuted via the same 

dynamic targeting portion of the tasking process—they differ only in relative priority. 

 CID plays an important part in dynamic targeting. For prospective targets, there are 

essentially three levels of CID that are relevant to CAOC personnel and those tasked to 

carry out actions against them. At the first level, the track or entity is identified as 

friendly, foe, or neutral. At the next level, the prospective target’s type of platform is 

identified. This will aid in determining the nature of tactical action required against it and 

will assist in prioritizing the target. Finally, a third level entails determining the 

prospective target’s intent (as by its track relative to friendly forces) when possible. This 

will further aid in establishing the prospective target’s priority, and may sometimes entail 

reclassifying a target as a TST based on its potential threat to friendly forces. 
49

Figure 3.1. The Dynamic Targeting Process 

Dynamic targeting consists of six distinct phases: 

 Find. 

 Fix. 

 Track. 

 Target. 

 Engage. 

 Assess. 

 The relationship of these phases to each other and the steps that compose them 

are illustrated in Figure 3.1. These are the same phases used to prosecute joint TSTs, 

as explained in the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting 

Time-Sensitive Targets (AFTTP(I) 3-2.3, also known as the “TST MTTP”). This method 

is commonly referred to as “F2T2EA” or colloquially as the “kill chain.” Each of the 

phases is discussed below. 
50

Emerging 

Target

Emerging Emerging 

Target

Probable TST Probable TST Probable TST Fix, track, and target IAW established TST 

procedures (see TST MTTP)

Fix, track, and target IAW established TST Fix, track, and target IAW established TST 

procedures (see TST MTTP) procedures (see TST MTTP)

Probable Target 

(non-TST)

Probable Target Probable Target 

(non-TST)

Target IAW component priorities and 

procedures, or...

Pass to planned targeting process

Target IAW component priorities and Target IAW component priorities and 

procedures, or... procedures, or...

Pass to planned targeting process Pass to planned targeting process

Not a target Not a target Not a target Discard, or...

Enter on NSL

Discard, or... Discard, or...

Enter on NSL Enter on NSL

Unknown Unknown Unknown Continue find phase Continue find phase Continue find phase

Find Phase Input Find Phase 

Determination Action

Figure 3.2. Find Phase Determinations and Follow-on Actions 

Find 

 The find phase involves ISR detection of an emerging target, some aspect of which 

suggests that it fits within one of the dynamic targeting categories listed above. The find 

phase requires clearly designated guidance from commanders, especially concerning 

target priorities, and the focused ISR collection plan based on IPB, to include named 

areas of interest and target areas of interest. Following this collection plan leads to 

detections, some of which will be “emerging targets”—detections that meet sufficient 

criteria (established by the CAOC with commander’s guidance) to be considered and 

developed as a target. The time sensitivity and importance of this target may be initially 

undetermined. Emerging targets usually require further ISR and analysis to develop 

and confirm. This further analysis will result in one of four determinations which shape 

follow-on actions, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. 

 A good collection plan will not be passive. Commanders should not send out 

sensors without an idea of what they will collect. Instead, they should be anticipatory, 

which involves confirming anticipated results, not just blind detection. The result of the 
51

find phase is a probable target nominated for further investigation and development in 

the fix phase. 

Fix 

 The fix phase positively identifies an emerging target as worthy of engagement and 

determines its position and other data with sufficient fidelity to permit engagement. It 

may begin when the emerging target is detected or after. When the emerging target is 

detected, sensors are focused on it to confirm its identity and precise location. This 

may require implementing a sensor network or diverting ISR assets from other uses to 

examine it. The CFACC may have to make the decision on whether diversion of ISR 

resources from the established collection plan is merited, but this decision can most 

often be made by COD personnel on the CAOC “ops floor.” Data correlation and fusion 

confirms, identifies, and locates the target, resulting in its classification in one of the four 

target categories listed above. Target location and other information must be refined 

enough to permit engagement, which requires ISR capabilities that can identify 

stationary and mobile targets, day or night, in all weather, through all forms of terrain, 

camouflage, and concealment—all in a timely manner. Systems that can do this are a 

relatively recent development, and permit a degree of flexibility and timeliness that were 

not possible in the past. An estimation of the target’s window of vulnerability frames the 

timeliness required for prosecution and may affect the prioritization of assets and risk 

assessment. 

 If a target is detected by the aircraft or system that will engage it (for example, by a 

missile-armed Predator, or a battle management command and control platform such as 

the airborne warning and control system [AWACS] or the joint surveillance target attack 

radar system [Joint STARS]), this may result in the find and fix phases being completed 

near-simultaneously, without the need for “traditional” ISR input. It may also result in 

the target and engage phases being completed without a lengthy coordination and 

approval process. Battle management systems can often fix target locations precisely 

enough to permit engagement without need for further ISR collection. Growth in sensor 

technology also permits “non-traditional” sources of ISR to supplement the find, fix, and 

track phases, integrating data from platforms other than those traditionally dedicated to 

intelligence collection to include information gleaned from weapons systems or even 

munitions themselves, helping to build a common operating picture that commanders 

can use to shorten the F2T2EA cycle. 

Track 

 The track phase takes a confirmed target and its location, maintains a track on it, 

and confirms the desired effect against it. Sensors may be coordinated to maintain 

situational awareness (SA) or track continuity on targets. Windows of vulnerability 

should be updated when warranted. This phase requires relative reprioritization of ISR 

assets, just as the fix phase may, in order to maintain SA. If track continuity is lost, it 

will probably be necessary to reaccomplish the fix phase—and possibly the find phase 

as well. The track phase results in track continuity and maintenance of identification on 
52

the target, maintained by appropriate sensors or sensor combinations; a sensor 

prioritization scheme (if required); and updates on the target’s window of vulnerability (if 

required). The process may also be run partially “in reverse” in cases where an 

emerging target is detected and engaged, but once it becomes clear it is a valid target, 

the sensors detecting it can examine recorded data to track the target back to its point 

of origin, such as a base camp, and thus potentially eliminate a wider threat or destroy 

more lucrative targets where only one might have been engaged without the benefit of 

newer tracking technologies. Such “point of origin hunting” has proven especially useful 

during stability and counterinsurgency operations such as those in Iraq. 

Target 

 The target phase takes an identified, classified, located, and prioritized target; 

finalizes the desired effect and targeting solution against it; and obtains required 

approval to engage it. During this phase, COD personnel must review target 

restrictions, including collateral damage, ROE, LOAC, the NSL, the RTL, and FSCM. 

This phase accomplishes the equivalent of the “target validation” stage of the larger 

tasking cycle. It also accomplishes effects validation and weaponeering. COD 

personnel match available strike and sensor assets against desired effects, then 

formulate engagement options. They also submit assessment requirements. 

 

 The selection of assets for a specific target will be based on many factors, such as 

the location and operational status of ISR and strike assets, support asset availability, 

weather conditions, ROE, target range, the number and type of missions in progress, 

available fuel and munitions, the adversary threat, and the accuracy of targeting 

acquisition data. This can be the lengthiest phase due to the large number of 

requirements that must be satisfied. In many cases, however, dynamic targeting can 

be accelerated if target phase actions can be initiated and/or completed in parallel with 

other phases. 

Engage 

 In this phase, identification of the target as hostile is confirmed and engagement is 

ordered and transmitted to the pilot, aircrew, or operator of the selected weapon 

system. The engagement orders must be sent to, received by, and understood by the 

“shooter.” The engagement should be monitored and managed by the engaging 

component (for the air and space component, by the CAOC). The desired result of this 

phase is successful action against the target. 

Assess 

 In this phase, predetermined assessment requests are measured against actions 

and desired effects on the target. ISR assets collect information about the engagement 

according to the collection plan (as modified during dynamic targeting) and attempt to 

determine whether desired effects and objectives were achieved. In cases of the most 

fleeting targets, quick assessment may be required in order to make expeditious re-
53

attack recommendations. The subject of assessment is covered thoroughly in the next 

chapter. 

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 

Engagement Authority 

 The authority to engage should be delegated to the C2 node that has the best 

information or situational awareness to execute the mission and direct communications 

to the operators and crews of the weapon systems involved. If the CFACC is delegated 

TST engagement authority by the CFC, that commander may delegate his engagement 

authority to a lower level (e.g., CAOC director or chief of combat operations). The 

CFACC has the authority to redirect those forces over which he has operational or 

tactical control. For all others, the affected component commander must approve all 

requests for redirection of apportioned air assets. Components execute the ATO as 

tasked and recommend changes to the CAOC as appropriate, given emerging CFC and 

component requirements. 

 At the tactical level, engagement authority normally resides with the “shooter” 

(aircrew, system operator, etc.) for those planned events on the current ATO being 

executed; this follows the tenet of decentralized execution. The fact that planned 

missions on an ATO have been approved for release by the CFACC passes 

engagement authority to the “shooters” personally executing those ATO missions, who 

must adhere to all guidance included in the ATO (SPINS, ACO, ROE, etc.). In dynamic 

targeting situations, where the target is not specified in the ATO prior to takeoff or 

execution, engagement may require that the “shooter” be “cleared to target” from a C2 

entity outside the CAOC (like Joint STARS, AWACS, TACP, forward air controllers 

[ground or airborne]) due to identification or other criteria required prior to attack. 

 Engagement authority for those events that the CAOC maintains control over (like 

TSTs in many cases) will be passed to crews via tactical C2 means (AWACS, Joint 

STARS, etc.), with required criteria met when appropriate. Engagement authority for 

certain “sensitive” targets may reside at a higher level than the CFC, but will be passed 

appropriately through the component commander when the situation arises. 

 Placing the appropriate level of battlespace awareness at subordinate C2 nodes can 

streamline the C2 cycle and allow timely engagement during dynamic targeting. 

Decentralized C2 nodes should be able to exchange sensor, status, and target 

information with a fidelity that permits them to operate as a single, integrated C2 entity 

in order to effectively perform decentralized, coordinated execution of time-sensitive 

attacks. 

Managing Increased Risk During Dynamic Targeting Operations 

 Understanding the level of acceptable risk is critical to successful targeting during 

execution. With compression of the decision cycle comes increased risk due to 
54

insufficient time for the more detailed coordination and deconfliction that takes place 

during deliberate targeting. Commanders must assess risk early, determine what 

constitutes acceptable risk, and communicate their intent. CFC guidance may stipulate 

acceptable risk when engaging TSTs. If it does not, then the CFACC must seek to 

obtain it. When new targets are acquired, Airmen in the CAOC and in the field must rely 

on commanders’ guidance and their own experience to assess acceptable risk. 

 Particular targets may be determined to be such a threat to the force or to mission 

accomplishment that the CFACC is willing to accept a higher level of risk in order to 

attack the target immediately upon detection. Items to be considered in the risk 

assessment include: 

 Risk to friendly forces (fratricide), risk to non-combatants, and collateral damage 

potential. 

 LOAC and ROE compliance. 

 Increased risk to attacking forces due to accelerated planning and coordination. 

 Redundant attacks and wasting limited resources. 

 Accepted use of non-optimal weapons and fuzing. 

 Opportunity cost of diverting assets from their planned missions. 

 These considerations must be balanced against the danger of not attacking the 

target in time and thus risking mission failure, harm to friendly forces, or losing the 

opportunity to strike the target. More commonly, the risk associated with dynamic 

targeting involves the trade-off of diverting ISR and strike assets from alreadyscheduled missions to emerging targets. This should only be done when commanders’ 

priority given to the new target exceeds that of the old. Proper planning (for such things 

as on-call assets) can mitigate much of this opportunity cost, however. 

Handling Changes 

The COD must be ready to respond with new targeting information in order to provide 

seamless operations when changes occur. These include things like: 

 Responding to changes in friendly operations. For instance, if an aircraft tasked 

to prosecute a target has to abort for maintenance reasons, the COD must know the 

target’s relative priority in order to provide appropriate targeting guidance. If the 

target is low priority, it may be best to place it on a subsequent day’s ATO. If it is of 

higher priority, COD personnel will determine how best to direct or divert resources 

to prosecute it. COD personnel will have the best picture of what resources are 

available to prosecute it and what diverting resources may cost. Likewise, if an 

aircraft or package is diverted to prosecute a TST, the COD must identify the 

target(s) which will no longer be struck, as well as the new target which will be 

attacked. This information must be passed to the targeteers and collection 

managers to ensure coordinated collection and assessment on the new targets. 
55

 Responding to changes in weather. A target planner’s actions will be similar to 

when he responds to changes in friendly operations. Further, changes in weather 

may require changes to the platforms and/or weapons required to engage a 

particular target. 

 Re-targeting. If a target that was to be prosecuted is no longer a viable target for 

whatever reason, targeteers must have alternate targets to assign to a strike 

mission. Time is important because assets may already be airborne 

 Responding to TSTs. When a TST is identified, the COD must decide the best 

time to attack it. COD targeteers are involved in these efforts and provide guidance 

to planners concerning the characteristics and vulnerability of the target. Targeteers 

must be familiar with possible targets so that quick assessments and guidance can 

be given before the window of opportunity to strike the TST is gone. 

 

Reduced Planning Time 

 Dynamic targeting has two significant limitations compared with deliberate targeting: 

the lack of detailed weaponeering and increased threat exposure. Commanders and 

the COD should consider these limitations when deciding whether to prosecute a target 

using dynamic targeting methods. 

 Weaponeering. Due to the reduced planning time available, targets prosecuted 

using dynamic targeting will be engaged with less consideration given to key 

weaponeering issues such as fuze settings or axes of attack. In some cases, 

assets may be diverted to prosecute these targets with munitions not optimal for the 

given task. Since these considerations may carry increased risk of mission failure, 

collateral damage, or even harm to friendly troops, commanders must weigh the 

potential benefits gained by prosecuting the target quickly. Whenever possible, 

COD personnel should work with ISRD targeteers to ensure that proposed targeting 

solutions are sufficient for the given task. This often requires significant 

coordination. 

 Increased Threat. High threat target areas are normally attacked by packages with 

dedicated support, such as electronic jamming and defense suppression munitions. 

The shortened dynamic targeting planning window may not allow for the same level 

of support, thereby exposing aircrews to greater risk. Time for target area threat 

analysis is also reduced, further increasing risk to the attacker. 

Unit-Level Targeting Responsibilities 

 Individual flying units have targeting responsibilities that support and enhance CAOC 

efforts and tactical-level execution. Commanders, mission planners, and intelligence 

specialists within these units must ensure the validity and accuracy of the targeting 

information provided them for mission planning purposes. This responsibility may 

include verification of ATO guidance coordinates and adjudication of problems with the 

CAOC if errors or conflicts become evident. Specific data provided to mission planners 
56

should be checked for integrity, including verification of DPI coordinates and elevations, 

weapon azimuths and impact dive angles, and fuzing instructions when direct electronic 

transfer of such data is not possible or fails. 

 Considerable benefits can also be derived from air and ground units working 

together directly to accomplish mission planning at the tactical level when 

circumstances permit. Army ground liaison officers (GLOs) working with tactical air 

units can provide insight into ground component plans and offer direct coordination for 

missions flown in support of associated ground unit efforts. Such coordination can 

prove particularly useful during stability operations and other circumstances where air 

played primarily a supporting role, but can be beneficial during major combat operations 

as well, especially during urban operations or other similar situations requiring close 

coordination with ground units. 
57

CHAPTER FOUR 

ASSESSMENT 

GENERAL 

Assessment encompasses all efforts to evaluate effects and gauge progress 

toward accomplishment of actions, effects, and objectives. It also helps evaluate 

requirements for future action. It helps answer two questions: “How is the conflict 

going?” and “what needs to be done next?” In an effects-based construct, it is not 

possible to think about actions and their effects without considering how 

accomplishment of those effects should be measured. Effects and objectives should 

always be measurable and planning for them should always include means of 

measurement and evaluation. Assessment is not really a separate “phase” of the air 

and space tasking—or any other—cycle, as descriptions and graphics often imply for 

the sake of conceptual clarity. Rather, it is interleaved throughout planning and 

execution and is integral to them. Its measures are determined during planning. It 

works together with planning to determine future courses of action. It is conducted in 

part during execution. It is an inseparable and integral component of the effects-based 

approach to conflict. 

 

 Over a decade of lessons learned from conflicts since DESERT STORM emphasize 

that the traditional concepts, practices, organizations, and tool sets constituting 

traditional “battle damage assessment” (BDA) do not meet warfighters’ needs for 

assessment that can be acted upon in the high tempo of today’s battlespace, or that 

encompasses the full spectrum of operations. The traditional approach to assessment 

is too focused on the tactical-level, requires CFC-level validation of all BDA (which 

significantly hampers management of federated assessment and slows the process), is 

more concerned with assessing actions than effects, and does not facilitate 

communication between federated partners. The very term BDA is limiting, since 

assessment extends well beyond “battle damage.” 

 Any comprehensive view of assessment should tie evaluation of progress at the 

tactical level to all other levels of war, up to and including the national strategic level. 

The proper focus of assessment conducted by the air and space component should be 

on the operational level of war. An effective assessment construct should also support 

“...To fully exploit Air Force technological advances and operational 

capabilities, we must merge air, space, intelligence and information 

operations into a seamless capability. {We} must lead the way, linking 

the intelligence and information operations functions from the air and 

space domains to better support the decision maker.” 

 —General Hal Hornburg, 

Former Commander, Air Combat Command 
58

commanders’ objectives at all levels, support commanders’ decision cycles in real time, 

and provide the basis for analysis. To accomplish these things, an effective 

assessment construct must address the entire spectrum of operations and all levels of 

war, permit component validation of assessment elements, focus on effects, 

standardize federation, utilize intelligence specialties effectively, and integrate analysis 

efforts to the maximum extent possible. 

MEASURES AND INDICATORS 

 At all levels of assessment, planners must choose criteria that describe or establish 

when actions have been accomplished, desired effects have been created, and 

objectives have been achieved. These criteria are called “measures and indicators.” 

There are three distinct types of measures: 

 Measures of Performance: Objective or quantitative measures assigned to the 

actions of a tactical task and against which a tactical task’s accomplishment, in 

operations or missions terms, is assessed. MOP are associated with actions and 

thus exist only at the tactical level of conflict. 

 Measures of Effect: Qualitative or quantitative measures assigned to an intended 

effect (direct or indirect), against which the effect’s achievement is directly 

assessed. Some of these may be direct forms of measurement, like an eyewitness 

account of a bridge span being down; some may be more circumstantial indicators, 

such as measurements of traffic backed up behind a downed bridge. 

 Success Indicators (SI): The conditions indicating the progress toward or 

achievement of an objective or end-state condition. SI are normally qualitative and 

may be subjective. SI are normally developed from the most critical end state 

conditions that attainment of an objective will manifest in the operating environment. 

SI are independent from MOP and MOE and can exist at all levels of conflict, but 

primarily reside at the operational and strategic levels. 

Measures and indicators are selected during planning. When selecting assessment 

measures, planners must identify the essential elements of information required to 

collect against them and provide guidance in the collection plan and JIPCL if special 

ISR or other PBA resources are needed. These measures must be refined or amended 

during the tasking cycle, as the tactical situation or the status of the target changes. 

Selection of assessment measures is an iterative, ongoing effort. 

 There may often be “gray areas” between MOP, MOE, and SI—empirical data 

supporting objective accomplishment, for instance—but all measures that determine 

accomplishment of objectives are SI, regardless of the level of war. To be useful as a 

gauge of effectiveness, a measure, whether an MOP, MOE, or SI, must be 

meaningful, reliable, and either observable or capable of being reliably inferred. 

Meaningful means it must be tied, explicitly and logically, to objectives at all levels. 

Reliable means it must accurately express the intended effect. If quantitative measures 

are used, they must be relevant. It is not sufficient to choose “fifty percent of enemy 
59

armor attrited” as an MOE without understanding why that measure is relevant to 

objectives. Observable means that existing intelligence collection methods can 

measure it. 

 Only MOE and SI are associated with OA and higher levels of assessment. They 

are qualitative, sometimes subjective measures, independent of MOP or other empirical 

measures that determine whether indirect effects and the objectives they lead to are 

being accomplished. Qualitative means primarily that judgment must be made in the 

absence of meaningful quantitative measures (see Figure 4.1 for a notional example). 

Military personnel tend to be less comfortable with these than with more empirical 

measures, since they are generally trained to regard their profession as more of a 

science than an art, but often the numbers themselves involved in quantitative 

measures can deceive. Seemingly “scientific” quantitative measures are often poorer 

representations of what should happen in the battlespace than more qualitative 

measures, like “enemy armor units A, B, and C not offering larger than platoon sized 

resistance to forces closing on Phase Line X until at least day Y.” Such a measure may 

be much more relevant to the friendly scheme of maneuver, be easier to collect against, 

and be easier for commanders to act upon. It is often easier, especially at the higher 

levels of assessment, to choose qualitative measures that are logically tied to 
60

Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Tactical Assessment Unit & Component Unit & Component Unit & Component

Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment Campaign Assessment JFC JFC

National Assessment National Assessment National Assessment National Leadership National Leadership National Leadership

Assessment Level Responsible Agent

Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Operational Assessment Component Component Component

Figure 4.2. Four Levels of Assessment 

objectives. Quantitative measures, on the other hand, can, through their very seeming 

certainty, take on a life of their own, leading to actions that do not contribute to 

accomplishing objectives or the end state. For example, during DESERT STORM, 

strategic attack missions took down key nodes to deny power within the Iraqi electrical 

system. This effect was accomplished with little destruction of Iraqi civilian electrical 

power infrastructure. Nonetheless, many power generator plants were destroyed later 

in the campaign, in part because traditional empirical measurements of electrical 

capacity showed that the Iraqis still had substantial usable resources. This hampered 

civilian recovery following the campaign. This example also points out the importance 

of integrating assessment into employment planning and target development efforts 

early on. 

THE FOUR LEVELS OF ASSESSMENT 

 Assessment consists of four distinct but interrelated levels: 

 Tactical Assessment: Determination of the effectiveness of kinetic and non-kinetic 

tactical military operations through empirical and objective methods 
61

 Operational Assessment: Evaluation of effects generated by tactical actions and 

other battlespace influences toward achieving component operational objectives 

and recommendations for future action 

 Campaign Assessment: The CFC’s broad qualitative and analytical determination 

of the overall effectiveness of military operations and recommendations for future 

action 

 National Assessment: Broad review of the effectiveness of national security 

strategy and whether national leadership’s objectives for a particular crisis or 

contingency are being met 

Tactical Assessment (TA) 

 Tactical Assessment is the evaluation of tactical actions against assigned tactical 

tasks. “Performance-based” means that it uses empirical, objective, usually quantifiable 

measures when collecting and analyzing data from tactical actions. TA assessors take 

this collected data; aggregate, analyze, and archive it; and determine details 

commanders will need in order to take further action. In many cases, TA assessors 

may make a recommendation for re-attack, especially if it is clear that a scheduled 

action was not successful. TA answers such questions as: 

 Was the intended action accomplished? 

 Was the intended direct effect accomplished? 

 Has the target’s status changed? 

 Is re-engagement, re-attack, or “re-influence” necessary? 

 TA feeds higher levels of effects-based assessment. In the current era of low-level 

global conflict punctuated by frequent large campaigns, it is also imperative that TA, like 

all levels of assessment, be able to analyze and perform meaningful evaluations across 

the entire spectrum of military conflict. 

 TA consists of several component elements: 

 Physical damage assessment (PDA) estimates the extent of physical damage to a 

target based upon observation or empirically based interpretation. PDA involves 

cooperative effort between units in the field and the CAOC. Sometimes it utilizes 

data from other components or national agencies. Sources such as inflight reports 

(INFLTREP), MISREP, and weapon system video are commonly used to generate 

PDA. 

 Functional assessment (FA) estimates the remaining functional or operational 

capability of a targeted object or entity. FA is usually inferred from reported physical 

damage and should include estimates of recuperation or replacement time. Note, 

however, that targets affected by many IO and other non-kinetic capabilities will 

often not have physical damage, requiring assessors to perform FA in the absence 
62

of PDA. Assessment planners must anticipate appropriate measures and indicators 

for such effects. 

 Munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA) evaluates whether the selected 

weapon or munition functioned as intended. It examines the munitions’ known 

parameters, the delivery tactics used, and the interaction between the munition and 

the delivery platform. MEA is fed back into the planning process to validate or 

adjust weaponeering and platform selections. It is also the form of assessment with 

the highest potential “payoff” in terms of weapons and tactics development, because 

the data it generates is fed into the JMEM revision process, resulting in more 

accurate future weaponeering. 

 Estimated damage analysis (EDA): Many times during execution, it is not 

possible to wait on ISR verification of strike results without inordinately delaying 

higher-level assessments. EDA is the technique of using existing munitions 

effectiveness or other data to estimate weapons effectiveness on targets. This 

information is used to determine if collection assets other than those inherent in the 

weapon(s), aircraft, or aircrew are required to establish the level of physical and 

functional damage inflicted on selected targets. EDA focuses on estimations of 

weapons effectiveness and therefore allows the commander to accept risk in the 

absence of other information, and is appropriate for all but high-priority targets. 

 Lower-scale conflict assessment is an evolving area of assessment and is 

comparatively recent. In smaller-scale contingencies and stability operations, there 

may be significant play of non-military instruments of national power and 

considerable interaction between the military and non-DOD or nongovernmental 

agencies. These may require assessment at the tactical level that is required for 

higher effects-based operational- and strategic-level assessments. Exactly what 

form these assessments will take at the tactical level is hard to say, but will be tied 

to demands that are specific to the conflict and the cultures or nations it is waged in. 

In smaller conflicts, the degree of interest from command echelons above 

component level may be greater, as may the need for timeliness in tactical and 

higher-level assessments. These operations will require analytical skills ranging far 

beyond weapons effects into political, socio-economic, cultural-ideological, 

psychological and international arenas. It will also require coordination with 

analytical and academic centers outside the DOD. 

 Weather and environmental effects can play a considerable role in determining 

the results of targeting actions. At the tactical level, combat weather flights (CWF) 

are responsible for determining and integrating weather effects into the decision 

cycle. At the component level, weather personnel assigned to the CAOC assess 

and integrate weather effects into near-term execution decisions, as well as longerterm strategy considerations. Additionally, operational weather squadrons help 

anticipate weather effects by providing CWFs and other weather personnel with 

accurate common characterizations of the current and future environment. 

 Logistics status: Tactical action results in the expenditure of munitions, fuel, and 

other materiel. This must be tracked and shown to commanders as part of a 

comprehensive view of current and projected friendly capability. 
63

 Units in the field perform some of the TA functions, but “ownership” of TA should be 

at the functional (or Service) component level. Incorporating all the elements listed 

above into an amalgamated TA effort owned by component commanders will greatly 

expedite TA and will thus make timely and relevant higher-level, effects-based 

assessment possible. Within the CAOC, several divisions share responsibility for TA. 

The ISRD develops PDA, with inputs from the COD and units. They must rapidly 

evaluate MISREPs, weapon system video, and other available intelligence to 

recommend immediate restrike to the COD or to commanders. EDA is accomplished by 

targeteers in the ISRD and CPD. Those same targeteers are critical team members in 

the MEA process, providing inputs as part of a collective responsibility with operations 

experts. While some FA may be accomplished at the CAOC level, most is performed 

by the theater joint intelligence operations center (JIOC) or through reachback or 

federated support (see Chapter Five), due to demands for expertise, resources, 

manning, and the battle rhythm. Weather effects are determined by the WST, 

leveraging reachback support from the operational weather unit for their region. 

Logistics inputs may come from many sources, including the COMAFFOR’s A-4 

(Logistics) and the AMD. Lower-intensity conflict types of MOPs may have to come 

from interagency federated support or even from sources outside US control. 

Assessment of non-kinetic action and non-lethal effects may require significant 

coordination with the SD’s OAT and the CAOC’s IO Flight. 

Operational Assessment (OA) 

 Operational assessment at the component level is the first truly effects-based 

echelon of assessment. TA includes evaluation of direct effects and some immediate 

indirect, second-order effects, but OA is the first level at which complex, indirect effects 

are evaluated, progress toward objectives is measured, and recommendations for future 

action extending beyond simple physical re-attack are made. In one sense, TA is 

“historical” or “confirmatory”—it tells what has happened, as an aid to determining 

whether friendly forces are “doing things right.” OA is a crucial form of assessment that 

should be more “anticipatory” or “predictive,” seeking to answer whether friendly forces 

are “doing the right thing.” The focus of OA is also much broader than TA’s, expanding 

from simple destruction, attrition, or damage to the entire range of effects options. OA 

answers mid- to long-term (days and beyond) questions such as: 

 Are component objectives being achieved? If not, why not? 

 Does friendly level of effort need to be modified for this phase of the operation? 

 Does component strategy need to be adjusted? If so, how? 

 Are there unanticipated operational limitations? 

 Do objectives need to be modified? If so, how? 

OA builds upon TA, incorporating other elements as well: 
64

Aggregate of TA products: Includes all the results of TA relevant to particular 

effects and objectives. However, OA may not be able to wait on a complete TA picture 

before delivering “actionable” advice to commanders. OA measures are qualitative, and 

while they build upon what objective data is available, they sometimes entail informed 

but subjective judgment concerning accomplishment of effects. 

Several key elements of PBA feed OA: 

 Target system assessment: An estimate of the overall effectiveness of force 

employment against selected enemy target systems. This is a component-level 

fusion of FA products against targets in a particular system, using them to assess 

overall impact upon a system’s capabilities. It is particularly important that this 

assessment be based on desired effects rather than simple empirical measures 

of damage. Many times, effects against systems like electricity and 

communications can be achieved with little physical damage. 

 Evaluation of enemy action and intent is a critical prerequisite to evaluation of 

progress toward objectives. Some of this assessment can be empirical: 

disposition of enemy units, amount of enemy electronic or aerial activity, and so 

on. Much, of necessity, will entail qualitative evaluation, especially as assessors 

tackle the problem of enemy intent. This part of OA will likely be accomplished in 

tandem with the equivalent portions of CFC-level campaign analysis and with 

federated and reachback support. 

Risk assessment considers the risks of friendly attrition, political cost from 

collateral damage and other unintended indirect effects, the cost of lost opportunities 

involved in pursuing the chosen COA, and the consequences of failure to achieve the 

objective(s) to develop a comprehensive picture of the potential costs of friendly action. 

This is a vital input to evaluation of progress and recommendations for future action. 

The full range of military operations—stability, engagement, deterrence, and 

other aspects of smaller-scale contingencies—are more important here than in TA. In 

smaller conflicts, it may be necessary to consider “strategic” issues, such as how 

effectively other instruments of national power (like diplomatic, informational, and 

economic) are integrated with military efforts. This may also require evaluation of 

coalition efforts. The largest share of responsibility for this form of assessment normally 

rests with the CFC, but some may be relevant to the component level and component 

assessment inputs will be usually be required to accomplish campaign assessment. 

Evaluation of progress toward objectives is one of the two most important 

elements of OA. This is fundamentally an effects-based and qualitative evaluation, 

building upon empirical data, but involving significant analyst and commander judgment. 

Sometimes there will be very little objective data pointing toward accomplishment. As 

discussed in the sections on effects, many indirect effects are hard to measure until 

they happen. Planners and commanders must be patient and counsel patience in light 

of this—success may be around the corner, even if this is hard to see predictively. 

Recommending future action is the other vitally important aspect of OA. Based 

on analysis of the other elements, OA recommends continuing, modifying, or completely 

changing the component strategy. Resulting recommendations may include such things 
65

as shifting the priority of air and space targeting, changing the overall weight of effort, 

transitioning to another operational phase, or branch initiation. 

 OA is primarily a component responsibility. Again, in the more traditional 

assessment construct, operational assessment was solely the province of the CFC and 

his staff, but this does not represent best practice, any more than it does for TA. Within 

the CAOC, OA is the responsibility of the SD operational assessment team, using 

resources and personnel from the ISRD to collect and collate needed information. OA 

will also likely involve component coordination directly with reachback and federated 

partners. There is still a large of piece of assessment that must reside at the CFC’s 

level. This is called campaign assessment. 

Campaign Assessment (CA) 

Campaign assessment is essentially OA accomplished at the CFC’s level. Its focus 

is broader, however, since the CFC must consider how all components’ actions 

contribute to overall accomplishment of campaign objectives. CA must also consider 

how other instruments of national power are being integrated with military efforts, 

regardless of the scale of the conflict, and must evaluate coalition efforts as well. CA 

answers long-term questions like, 

 Are overall campaign objectives being achieved? If not, why not? 

 Does the campaign strategy need to be adjusted? If so, how? 

 Should the campaign transition to a new phase, branch, or sequel? 

 How are operations impacting follow-on or end state considerations? 

 CA consists of the same elements as OA, but is an amalgamation of component 

operational, rather than tactical, assessments. CA is accomplished by the CFC’s staff, 

principally the J-2, with extensive federated support. The CAOC provides inputs to CA 

through its OA products and receives CA products that can be used by the CFACC and 

the SD to modify air and space component strategy through the AOD. The SD and 

ISRD must thus have extensive and frequent interaction with the CFC’s J-2. These 

The problem with getting into an accounting numbers game is 

the number of things, whether they're SAM radars,...MiG-21s, or 

SU-17s, the numbers are normally inaccurate. The going-in 

position [is] the intel community will work with us on how many 

they could possibly have or how many they purchased or how 

many they had X number of weeks ago or months ago. What you 

don't know is how many are operable. 

—General T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF); at the time OIF CFACC 

 Press interview, 5 April 2003 
66

relationships are best cemented in peacetime, but this is not always possible in an age 

of expeditionary operations. At very least, CAOC assessors should seek to build these 

relationships during planning, just as they must with federated partners. 

National Assessment (NA) 

 National assessment takes the accumulated results of CA from around the world 

and combines it with assessments of the effectiveness of other instruments of national 

power to build an evaluation of how strategic objectives are being met in a particular 

conflict and how progress in various conflicts is contributing to achievement of national 

security objectives. There is no single formal process for this type of assessment at 

present. It is accomplished by many agencies in many departments of the executive 

branch of the government, such as the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 

President’s National Security Council. Detailed treatment of this level of assessment is 

beyond the scope of this document, but products of it may often influence the conduct of 

campaigns and operations. 

THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS 

Regardless of the level of conflict, everyone involved in the targeting process should 

incorporate a means for conducting assessment of their mission. Regardless of the 

level of assessment, the process of analyzing the adversary, choosing 

appropriate measures, evaluating progress, and recommending action consists 

of the same four basic steps: Define, monitor, analyze, and recommend. These 

are discussed below. 

 Define. Operational objectives, tactical objectives, and tactical tasks, along with the 

associated MOE and MOP, are defined during JAOP development. The supporting 

metrics provide indicators used during TA and OA. Having well-defined assessment 

criteria in the JAOP provides the entire CAOC with a clear indication of what the 

CFACC intends to accomplish for the CFC. The job of those tasked with assessment 

responsibility then becomes one of examining how well the CFACC is using air, space 

and information capabilities to achieve objectives. JAOP-derived measures should be 

refined into tactical-level requirements and measures during the planning portions of the 

tasking cycle. 

 Monitor. Monitoring the situation will likely be the most time- and resource-intensive 

aspect of assessment. The CAOC must monitor both the friendly and enemy situation. 

They must monitor combat operations and all the other factors that may have an impact 

on the situation. The act of monitoring does not serve each level of assessment 

discretely, but serves all forms of assessment simultaneously, even though certain ISR 

platforms are collecting against specific requirements. Monitoring requires extensive 

expertise from a wide variety of sources: intelligence, operations, other components’ 

liaisons, federated and reachback partners, and so on. 

 Analyze. Assessors must take a critical look at the supporting metrics defining 

success in achieving tasks and objectives to provide commanders with a coherent 
67

picture drawn from an often-overwhelming stream of data. The data are not directly 

useful to commanders in most cases. Intelligence, targeting, and strategy personnel 

must evaluate the data stream and glean what is useful and significant from it. This is 

the most conceptually difficult part of the process, even if it consumes fewer man-hours 

than monitoring, but is essential if commanders are to have assessment products they 

can act upon. Even TA entails analysis, as there is sometimes considerable “art” to 

determining even physical damage levels based on sensor data. 

 

 Recommend. Recommendations may range from a simple, near-immediate reattack call from the COD to advising a major change in campaign strategy, depending 

upon the level of assessment involved. They may include such things as shifting of air 

operations priority, weight of effort, and branch or sequel initiation. Even at the 

operational level, they may include lesser measures such as modifying the MOE to 

reflect new requirements, or utilizing new capabilities or forces. 

Metrics 

 The SD should develop metrics to determine if air operations are properly linked to 

the overall air and space strategy and the larger hierarchy of campaign and national 

objectives. These metrics evaluate the results achieved during air and space 

operations. Metrics can either be objective (using sensors or aircrews to directly 

observe damage inflicted) or subjective (using indirect means to ascertain results) 

depending on the metric applied to either the objective or task. Both qualitative and 

quantitative metrics should be used to avoid unsound or distorted results. Metrics can 

either be inductive (using sensors or personnel to directly observe the battlespace and 

build SA cumulatively) or deductive (using indirect means to deduce results from what 

was previously known of the adversary and battlespace). Measures of success are 

indications that the effects achieved are influencing enemy activity in desired ways 

among various target systems. 

 Tactical tasks identify the focus areas for application of air and space power in 

support of tactical objectives. MOP evaluate the immediate activity performed to assess 

tactical tasks. Paired with the tasks, MOP use performance assessment techniques to 

determine “if we’re doing things right” to achieve success. MOP lend themselves to 

quantitative and/or statistical analysis techniques, based on reported observations and 

I'll tell you up front that our sensors show that the 

preponderance of the Republican Guard divisions that 

were outside of Baghdad are now dead. We've laid on 

these people. I find it interesting when folks say we're 

softening them up. We're not softening them up, we're 

killing them. 

—General T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley 

CSAF; at the time OIF CFACC 

Press interview, 5 April 2003
68

facts. Assessors should craft MOP that are meaningfully objective (quantitative), 

understandable, relevant, collectable, and logically tied to the hierarchy of effects and 

objectives. 

Key Enablers 

Implementing a more comprehensive view of assessment will enhance situational 

awareness, make “actionable” assessment easier, and facilitate commanders’ decisionmaking. Several issues should be addressed in order to enable and enhance this 

process. 

Accurate ATO Tracking. Accurate tracking and reporting of ATO results is 

essential for effective TA, the first vital link in the assessment chain. Implementing 

innovations like using an ATO coordinator (“football carrier”) to process a given ATO 

through its entire life cycle, and instituting a combat reports cell within the COD may 

facilitate this. 

Air Force Reachback and Joint / National Federation. Develop relationships and 

agreements by which components can work directly with reachback and federated 

partners as necessary. For example, if analysts at DIA are helping determine the 

capability of the adversary’s integrated air defense system (IADS), CAOC targeteers 

and assessors should be allowed to work directly with DIA action officers to obtain the 

best means of implementing desired effects like air dominance. Insisting that the DIA 

may only work directly with the joint force intelligence directorate (J-2), as is often now 

done, adds an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy that extends planning and assessment 

timelines. 

Integrated C2 Systems. Targeting systems and databases should be able to 

interface with collection management systems and databases, which should in turn 

interface seamlessly with the theater battle management core system (TBMCS), and so 

on up the chain. 

Automation. Computers are making it possible to automate much of the manual 

labor required in targeting and assessment, freeing CAOC personnel from being 

database and target list managers and allowing them to concentrate on targeting and 

planning issues. 
69

 Target Development 

 Point Mensuration 

 Weaponeering 

 Assessment 

 BE Number & DPI 

 Standardization 

 Database Management 

 Datum Management 

 Establishing CAOC 

 Relationships 

 Establishing Federated 

and Reachback 

 Relationships 

 Equipping Targeting 

 Organizations 

 Training and Exercises 

Figure 5.1. 

Readiness Responsibilities 

for Targeting 

CHAPTER FIVE 

READINESS AND ONGOING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TARGETING 

 

GENERAL 

 Targeting does not begin and end within the 

air tasking cycle. It neither starts when a conflict 

starts, nor ends when a conflict ends. Targeting 

is a 24/7, 365 days-a-year effort. This chapter 

refers to those activities that should be 

accomplished prior to the onset of hostilities as 

“targeting readiness.” 

 According to the Unified Command Plan, 

each geographic or functional combatant 

commander is assigned a COMAFFOR. 

Targeting readiness is the responsibility of the 

COMAFFOR. 

 Each COMAFFOR has certain targeting 

resources (principally personnel) assigned to him 

to conduct required targeting activities. In 

practice, however, targeting is federated among 

many different units and organizations. It is the 

COMAFFOR’s responsibility to ensure these 

various organizations are conducting their duties 

so as to meet the needs of specific deliberate, 

crisis action, and campaign planning efforts, to 

include OPLAN, contingency plan (CONPLAN), 

and JAOP development. This is often easier 

said than done, as many of these agencies do not fall under the COMAFFOR’s control 

and likely have competing priorities. For instance, Air Combat Command’s 480th 

Intelligence Wing, headquartered at Langley AFB, which provides operational 

 ...our product in war is dead targets, and our product in peace is all 

that goes into generating the warrior proficiency that kills those 

targets in wartime. 

—General John P. Jumper 

Former CSAF 

24 February 2000
70

intelligence to combatant commanders, consists of several physically separated 

squadrons and does not fall under any geographic combatant command. As such, it is 

called upon to support US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), Central Air Forces (CENTAF), 

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and other targeting efforts, often at the same time. Unless 

clear guidance or memoranda of agreement are put in place, a COMAFFOR may see 

part of his expected federated targeting infrastructure assigned to other tasks. Effective 

delineation of duties is critical if this federated targeting system is to work in both peace 

and war. Such federated support is necessary for all aspects of ongoing targeting 

readiness, and is important to keep in mind while addressing specific targeting duties. 

 Targeting duties are typically the responsibility of the targeteers in air intelligence 

squadrons (AIS) and information operations teams (IOT). These units provide the core 

personnel for an air intelligence group (AIG) or air and space operations group (AOG), 

depending on the theater. Commanders of these units must ensure that their personnel 

are conducting all necessary targeting planning activities for their areas of responsibility 

during peacetime. 

TARGET DEVELOPMENT

 Much of peacetime targeting readiness is geared toward target development. 

Targeteers work closely with AIS intelligence analysts to develop target intelligence and 

target system models. However, they may have to coordinate with many types of 

intelligence analysts (general military intelligence, imagery, signals intelligence 

[SIGINT], human intelligence [HUMINT], etc.), outside of the CAOC. See Appendix B 

for specifics. Even if there are no official federation procedures in place, CAOC 

targeteers should still work with these organizations to utilize their expertise. 

Selection of targets is dependent on a 

systematic study of available intelligence. Without 

such intelligence and its systematic analysis there 

can be no rational planning for the application of 

air power. An organization with a high degree of 

analytical competence is required to perform this 

targeting function. It requires competent, trained 

personnel who understand the capabilities and 

limitations of intelligence as well as aerospace [sic] 

forces. These individuals must have access to a 

current database and the knowledge to use it. 

Finally, as the [United States Strategic Bombing 

Survey] states, the lack of this ability at the 

beginning of a future national emergency might 

prove disastrous! 

—John Glock 

 “The Evolution of Air Force 

Targeting,” Airpower Journal, Fall 1994 
71

 Ideally, target development should support an OPLAN or CONPLAN, which 

provides required targeting guidance and forms the basis for a JAOP that can be used 

in actual conflict. In reality, the US often enters contingencies without established 

deliberate planning products, or those that exist require extensive modification when an 

actual contingency arises. Obviously, it is impossible to have a plan for every 

conceivable contingency, but waiting to conduct target development until a contingency 

develops will put planners at a huge disadvantage. Targeteers must utilize existing IPB 

products to identify areas and subjects that may be of concern in the future. Even 

without established plans to guide them, targeteers should always seek out as much 

guidance from commanders as they can. Target development should always be geared 

toward achieving certain valid objectives, and all effects and actions that targeteers 

recommend should support those objectives. In some targeting methodologies, such as 

TSA discussed in Chapter Two, targeteers derive notional objectives based on tasks 

their theater is likely to receive and they base their target development on these 

objectives. Such a technique can be used even where formal TSA methodologies are 

not implemented. 

Target Folders 

 Target development results in the creation of a target folder (either electronic or 

physical) which includes the justification for considering the entity a target and detailed 

information on the target to guide further planning efforts. Each target should have a 

single target folder. Because theater JIOC and other Services have targeteers 

supporting deliberate and contingency planning efforts, it is important for AIS targeteers 

to coordinate with these organizations to avoid duplication of effort when building target 

folders. This is especially important when clear planning guidance is lacking or a 

delineation of duties among the Service and functional commands has not yet been 

properly established. 

Joint Target List 

 Once targeteers have adequately developed targets and target systems to 

determine the causal linkages that help to achieve specific effects and objectives, they 

must nominate them for inclusion in the appropriate JTL for a specific plan or 

contingency. Normally the combatant command’s J-2 maintains this list. 

Communication between AIS targeteers and the J-2 is critical to ensure effective 

prosecution of specific targets once hostilities begin. Methods of nomination vary with 

each theater. In the event J-2 is not maintaining the JTLs for whatever reason, the AIS 

or AOG should maintain the lists itself, in accordance with any applicable combatant 

command directives. 

No-Strike and Restricted Target Lists 

During targeting efforts, targeteers nominate targets for inclusion on NSLs and RTLs. 

Like JTLs, these lists are usually maintained by the J-2. See Chapter Two for details. 

Building them in peacetime will help reduce the possibility of attacking entities that are 
72

protected from attack (based on ROE, LOAC, or international law) and help speed 

target development once the battle rhythm has started. 

Collateral Damage Estimates 

 Often, a target is on the RTL or NSL because of CD concerns. Thus, CD analysis 

begins during peacetime target development. Historically, individual theaters conducted 

CD estimation according to their own standards. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

directives now provide a coherent five-level process that standardizes DOD CD 

practices. Although some aspects of estimating CD occur during weaponeering, 

targeteers, in conjunction with intelligence analysts, can begin the process by applying 

general CD rules for identifying buildings, structures, areas, or other entities in proximity 

to an intended target that may be of concern. As non-kinetic and non-lethal weapons 

proliferate, CD concerns may go beyond typical kinetic effects. Information operations 

specialists can assist in identifying such non-kinetic CD concerns. 

Intelligence Gaps 

Often, lack of adequate intelligence may hinder comprehensive target development. In 

such cases, targeteers should identify intelligence gaps and submit requests for 

intelligence collection, analysis, and/or production that will give them the information 

they need to complete target development. All production requests are given to the AIS 

ISR operations flight for submission. This is true for planners assigned to both the AIS 

as well as those assigned to other flights or squadrons in the AIG or AOG. 

POINT MENSURATION

 Mensuration is simply the act of precisely measuring something. It is commonly 

used in targeting parlance to refer to the exact measurement of a target’s geographical 

coordinates. Point mensuration has always been an important part of targeting, since 

the points measured represent the DPIs for the munitions employed. As the accuracy 

of weapons delivery has improved, the importance of mensuration has grown in 

proportion. Accurate mensuration is a vital part of today’s targeting. Due to the 

potential consequences of inaccurately mensurating coordinates, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff have mandated that those involved in point mensuration be certified to do it 

according to Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions. When accomplished before ATO 

execution, it permits employment of an entire class of weapons (those, like global 

positioning system (GPS)-aided and cruise missiles that guide to pre-set coordinates). 

PBA begins on D minus 365 

—General John P. Jumper, 

Former CSAF 

Remarks to the 2002 Air and Space Conference, 

Washington D.C., 7 Mar 2002 
73

This also allows CAOC personnel to significantly shorten the dynamic targeting “kill 

chain.” GPS-aided weapons are not so much “smart” as they are “obedient.” They 

guide to the mensurated point they are programmed to attack, so accurate mensuration 

is vital to their employment. Mensuration is not required for accurate employment of all 

weapons, however. 

 Because mensuration is a form of measurement, errors are inevitable and the extent 

of the estimated error must be captured as part of the coordinate. The standard method 

endorsed by National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is to express coordinate 

accuracy as a “circular error” (CE) and vertical accuracy as a “linear error” (LE) to a 90 

percent degree of certainty (CE/LE 90%). When NGA validates a mensuration software 

algorithm, it is actually the fidelity of the CE/LE accuracy estimates over a range of 

mensuration situations that is judged. These estimates are used during weaponeering 

to derive type and quantity of weapons, and targeting coordinate data must be 

considered incomplete without them. The modernized intelligence database and the 

ATO both have coordinate accuracy fields for this reason. 

The effort to mensurate coordinates, especially for a target set with a large number 

of DPIs, can be extremely long. Technological advances have helped shorten the effort 

somewhat, but for the time being at least, it will remain manpower- and time-intensive. 

If this planning is not conducted beforehand, it may adversely affect the CAOC’s battle 

rhythm or even unit mission planning. Conversely, targeteers may become rushed, 

leading to mensuration errors that prevent effective employment or have unwanted 

effects like CD. Targeteers will not know what munitions will be used to prosecute a 

target, thus the more precise they are in mensurating coordinates, the more options 

they will give targeteers during a conflict. Again, this effect is magnified during dynamic 

targeting. 

WEAPONEERING

 Like point mensuration, weaponeering can be very time-consuming. Thus, the more 

that is accomplished prior to hostilities, the more options planners will have during a 

conflict. For example, if a targeteer only weaponeers for GBU-12s against a certain DPI 

prior to hostilities, then GBU-12s are the only option to prosecute the DPI during combat 

unless there is sufficient time to weaponeer another munition. This has ripple effects, 

since it entails reevaluation of such things as CD criteria. Even if there is time, this will 

slow weaponeering of other targets and may even affect the battle rhythm. The more 

done prior to conflict, the more weaponeering options commanders and planners have 

during conflict. 

 Weaponeering will not diminish in importance because of non-kinetic and non-lethal 

weapons. Rather, it will increase the importance of pre-conflict weaponeering. 

Providing commanders and planners with options prior to hostilities, rather than 

developing options during hostilities, gives them more time to consider the best course 

of action. Anticipation is the best way to compress the decision cycle. 
74

ASSESSMENT

 In the “traditional” view of assessment, there is little to do outside of ongoing 

operations. This is untrue. Personnel involved in assessment can review pre-conflict 

target development materials and try to determine appropriate MOE for them. In fact, 

this should go hand-in-hand with peacetime target development, just as it should during 

conflict. Assessment personnel should also cultivate relationships with federated 

partners during peacetime, to expedite flow of information once conflict begins. Finally, 

information and other non-kinetic weapons, as well as the low-intensity transnational 

nature of the Global War on Terror, have made the possibility of less overt force 

employment a reality. Things may be happening in many parts of the world that require 

astute and thorough assessment, even if major campaigns are not being conducted. 

 The traditional approach to assessment has led to underutilization of “assessors” in 

peacetime. Often, there is little emphasis on their specialty until a commander asks, 

“How are we doing?” during operations. Commanders should ensure assessors are 

properly utilized in peacetime by encouraging them to foster the necessary federated 

relationships and by encouraging them to study targeting and assessment from prior 

operations to determine how a conflict in their theater would be affected. Every conflict 

is different, but many concepts hold true regardless of where the conflicts are fought. 

For example, adversaries may use the same aircraft and munitions regardless of 

theater. Many nations have similar weaponry, even if how they use them differs. Also, 

as CAOCs become more standardized, the opportunity to learn lessons from other 

CAOCs increases. For instance, assessors may learn from a conflict like OIF about the 

difficulties associated with accurately assessing how a nation’s C2 network is 

functioning once it has been attacked and can take steps to minimize this in their 

theater. 

 Peacetime commanders can further assist wartime performance of their assessment 

personnel by protecting them from excessive non-assessment taskings and by ensuring 

adequate manning of assessment cells. These cells should include personnel from 

operations, intelligence, IO, and space specialties at a minimum. 

 Another important aspect of assessment during peacetime is the role MEA plays in 

helping guide munitions procurement. The specifics of this subject are outside the 

scope of this publication, but one of the main purposes of MEA is to guide the process 

of weapon acquisition and modification and to feed JMEM revision in order to produce 

better weapons and weaponeering solutions. 

BASIC ENCYCLOPEDIA NUMBER (BE#) AND DPI STANDARDIZATION

 All targeteers in the CAOC should understand the theater BE# plan for a conflict. 

While many targets already have BE#s assigned, many identified during combat do not 

have them. Without an established plan for assigning BE#s, components may take it 

upon themselves to assign them, creating the potential for confusion and lack of 

situational awareness on what targets are being struck. Confusion can adversely affect 
75

the battle rhythm or, worse, result in targeting errors. Thus, CAOC targeteers should 

coordinate with their combatant command’s J-2 to ensure a standardized BE# naming 

convention is used. Standard DPI numbering is also important, and the joint targeting 

committee is finalizing the adoption of the joint designated point of impact (JDPI) 

concept using a six-character format with a central numbering registry involving the joint 

commands and allied nations. A theater DPI registry will ensure standardization of DPIs 

and eliminate duplication and possible error. 

 The convention should address both static and mobile targets. It is usually not 

feasible to assign standard BE#s to mobile targets. However, for proper data base 

management, such mobile targets still require some sort of identification. While the 

numbers may not be actual BE#s, the theater must still have some way of identifying 

the target. Again, CAOC planners should understand the theater naming convention to 

minimize targeting errors and the time needed for effective air planning. 

DATABASE MANAGEMENT

Proper database management is necessary for effective targeting. Many systems 

used in the field are “stovepiped” and cannot talk to one another. If interoperable 

systems and databases are not available, it is the targeteer’s responsibility to develop 

procedures (in peacetime) to overcome the difficulties associated with using systems 

that are not interoperable. There are many users of information in the CAOC. Ideally, 

everyone should work from the same database, but this is rarely the case. 

 Targeteers must coordinate with many different teams to ensure the flow of 

information in the CAOC is as seamless as possible. Those with whom targeteers 

should coordinate include (but are not limited to): 

 Analysis, Correlation, and Fusion Team (ACFT). The ACFT in the ISRD is 

responsible for updating enemy order of battle (EOB) databases. Targeteers must 

be able to pull from this database to ensure targeteers are using the most current 

EOB. 

 ISR Operations Team. The ISR operations team in the ISRD is responsible for 

planning and coordinating intelligence-gathering missions by CFACC assets. They 

also have insight into intelligence-gathering platforms the CFACC does not own, 

including spacecraft. Ensuring targeting and collection management databases are 

the same will cut down the time required to task collection assets to support 

targeting efforts, especially in the case of dynamic targeting. 

 Tactical Assessment Cell. The TA cell in the ISRD is responsible for assessing 

the immediate results and effects of tactical operations. Often, these assessments 

lead to some type of follow-on action by friendly forces. 

 Combat Operations Intelligence Team. The ISR Team in the COD, led by (and 

sometimes consisting only of) the senior intelligence duty officer (SIDO), provides 

intelligence support to ATO execution in the areas of analysis, collection 

management, targeting, and assessment. Having main targeting databases interact 
76

with those in combat operations is essential for seamless targeting support when 

the ATO requires modification. This importance is magnified when supporting 

dynamic targeting operations, especially those involving TSTs. 

 Dynamic Targeting Team. The targeting team in the COD works for the dynamic 

targeting team chief, but closely coordinates with the SIDO’s personnel. This team 

consists of, at a minimum, a target intelligence duty officer and a target duty 

technician. 

 Operational Assessment Team. The OAT in the SD is responsible for determining 

whether or not desired effects are being created and if those effects are leading to 

the attainment of CFACC and CFC objectives. The targeting database must match 

up with that used by the OAT so that specific targets can be tracked to specific 

effects and objectives. 

 Strategy Plans Team. The strategy plans team in the SD is responsible for 

building the overall CFACC strategy and is responsible for producing the JAOP. 

This phase of planning may involve a need to access targeting databases in order to 

support JAOP creation. 

 Information Operations Team. The IOT is responsible for identifying opportunities 

to achieve desired effects primarily through non-kinetic means. Based upon its full 

integration throughout the CAOC planning cycle, the IOT is also often able to 

recommend different options or parallel courses of action to maximize success in 

achieving a specific effect. 

 The main targeting database resides in automated command and control tools 

(currently TBMCS). Problems with TBMCS have led targeteers in some theaters to 

...the critical linchpin for both the error in identification of 

the building and the failure of the review mechanisms is 

the inadequacy of the supporting data bases and the 

mistaken assumption the information they contained would 

be necessarily accurate. The misidentification of the 

targeted building as the [correct target] would not have 

occurred had the data bases had the correct location of 

the Chinese Embassy. All the data bases that contained 

information on the Chinese Embassy placed it at its 

original, pre-1996 location some four miles away. Thus, 

the question of possible damage to the Embassy was 

never a consideration. 

—George Tenet, 

 Former Director of Central Intelligence 

Remarks to the House Permanent Select Committee 

on Intelligence concerning the inadvertent Chinese 

Embassy bombing, Operation ALLIED FORCE, 22 July 
77

build other databases. However, since the ATO is built using command/control tools, 

whatever database targeteers build must be interoperable with the C2 tools of record. 

Nonetheless, targeteers should realize that existing databases and systems often do 

not work properly. Having a backup system for target database management is 

necessary for the times when electronic systems fail. 

DATUM MANAGEMENT

A datum is a mathematical model of the Earth used to calculate the coordinates on 

any map, chart, or survey system. There are many different datums that theaters can 

use for their geospatial intelligence needs. It is important that targeteers, especially 

those conducting point mensuration, understand the different datums that are used in 

theater. Certain aircraft utilize different datums in their on-board computers. Maps and 

charts use different datums as well. Point mensuration imagery may use other datums. 

Understanding the different datums is crucial for ensuring aircraft systems have the 

correct coordinates for munitions employment. 

 The possibility of targeting errors can greatly increase when different datums are 

used. During Operation DENY FLIGHT, units utilized maps and charts based on the 

ED-50 datum, some aircraft computers used the WGS-72 datum, and the J-2 provided 

target coordinates based on the WGS-84 datum. A specific coordinate plotted using a 

WGS-84 datum can be off by hundreds of meters if plotted using another datum. Such 

coordinate errors can result in devastating force employment errors, often resulting in 

attacking people and places that were not meant for attack. Errors can also be caused 

by discrepancies in vertical datums. Space-based systems, such as GPS and GPSaided weapons, and imagery source material from sensors with space-based guidance 

provide coordinate elevations using the WGS-84 height above ellipsoid (HAE) datum. 

Most airborne navigation and littoral operations depend on mean sea level (MSL) 

altitudes and elevations. Both can be accurate, but the problem is that several methods 

to convert between HAE and MSL are in use. This often leads to conversion errors, 

which corrupts the HAE vertical component required in PGM tasking coordinates. In 

Afghanistan, garbled conversions caused problems for B-52s using joint direct attack 

munitions (JDAM) to attack cave entrances on vertical mountainsides. 

 Steps have been taken to prevent datum errors from happening. Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3900.01B has been drafted to clarify guidance 

on using both horizontal and vertical datums and standard coordinate and height 

formats for most operations. The NGA produces all new maps with the WGS-84 datum 

and in joint operations users must now reference horizontal and vertical coordinates to 

this datum. GPS also broadcasts its coordinates in this same datum. However, some 

possibility for error still exists. NGA reproduces certain older maps that use a WGS-72 

datum. Also, if one is forced to use local maps, different countries use different datums. 

Most of the time, utilizing datum conversion software can minimize the possibility for 

error. In any case, targeteers should understand the different datums used in their 

theater prior to hostilities so measures can be taken to ensure accurate coordinates are 

provided to warfighters. 
78

 Limiting the number of datums used in theater is the obvious solution. However, as 

this is not always possible, especially in coalition operations, targeteers must be aware 

of the different datum needs of all the weapon systems that may be used in the 

operation. 

ESTABLISHING CAOC RELATIONSHIPS

 The units that make up the core of the CAOC are often assigned to various other 

organizations during peacetime. Operations, IOT, and logistics personnel are usually 

assigned to the theater AOG. Intelligence personnel are assigned to either the AOG or 

the theater A-2. Units must thus learn to coordinate their activities and perform their 

wartime CAOC functions in peacetime. This is especially important for targeting, since 

it cuts across CAOC divisional lines and involves a great deal of interaction with 

organizations outside the CAOC. As the primary “keepers” of targeting during 

peacetime, AIS targeteers must carefully establish relationships with these other units 

and agencies to ensure smooth targeting procedures are in place to support the tasking 

cycle during hostilities. 

Combat Plans Squadron (CAOC combat plans and strategy divisions) 

 The CAOC’s CPD “owns” targeting. Core CPD personnel reside in peacetime in the 

major command (MAJCOM) or numbered Air Force (NAF) combat plans squadron 

(CPS). However, members of the targeting and TA team within the ISRD carry out most 

targeting duties. Core ISRD personnel reside in peacetime in the MAJCOM or NAF 

AIS. As such, it is critical that targeting personnel in both the CPS and AIS routinely 

coordinate with each other during peacetime. This will ensure a smooth transition to 

working in a combat environment when the CAOC is officially stood up to support a 

contingency. 

 Most of the SD’s core personnel also reside in the CPS in peacetime. Targeting 

personnel should be involved in the building of the campaign’s air and space strategy 

and must coordinate with strategists in the CPS as strategy is developed. 

Combat Operations Squadron (CAOC combat operations division) 

 Although the CPD “owns” targeting, targeting expertise is also needed in the 

CAOC’s COD. This usually entails responding to changes in the ATO made necessary 

by changes in the tactical situation. Because of the extremely dynamic nature of 

activities in the COD, it is imperative that pre-coordination occur between the targeteers 

who will be working in the COD and the COD’s ops planners. Such coordination is 

necessary to build the trust in personal knowledge and capabilities that such operations 

require. 
79

Information Operations Flight/Squadron 

 These organizations offer depth of expertise about information operations in 

general. Such expertise is often spread to the other CAOC divisions for integration 

within specific CAOC processes. IOT personnel can assist targeteers in identifying key 

enemy nodes and in weaponeering and assessment for non-kinetic attacks. 

ESTABLISHING FEDERATED AND REACHBACK RELATIONSHIPS

 Targeting is, by nature, a cooperative effort. So is the intelligence support it 

requires. Neither can be accomplished without the aid of experts and agencies outside 

the CAOC. Both require reachback and federated support to be effective. Federation is 

the cooperative effort between the CAOC and/or COMAFFOR staff and all other 

Services and agencies (including joint and national) outside it. Reachback is a subset 

of federation; the cooperative effort between the CAOC and other Air Force agencies. 

 Peacetime AOGs and AIGs are not manned to provide all the expertise needed to 

support wartime targeting and assessment. Augmentees will fill out the CAOC when it 

stands up or readies itself for conflict, but the peacetime core of the organization must 

establish the federated and reachback relationships agencies needed to support their 

efforts. Even peacetime targeting demands will probably require daily coordination with 

agencies outside the CAOC, as they produce and consolidate analysis that supports 

theater air and space planning. 

 During peacetime, this coordination may be somewhat informal, as higher-level 

units provide intelligence to multiple users. However, combat demands much closer 

links and hence more formal coordination. The start of hostilities is not the time to begin 

solidifying these relationships. Many agencies support multiple theaters and have 

competing demands upon their time and effort. For this reason, proper coordination 

between CAOCs and other agencies is critical to ensure a continued, timely flow of 

pertinent intelligence. It is the responsibility of the CAOC to ensure these relationships 

are in place and that all federated and reachback partners understand their roles in how 

they support the CAOC’s battle rhythm. 

 Federated and reachback relationships apply to both target development and 

assessment. Ideally, the organizations that support development of given targets or 

target systems should also conduct assessment on them during hostilities. The 

analysts that developed the targets already have a deep understanding of them and 

probably also developed MOE for them. However, manpower and tasking priorities will 

dictate if this is possible. 

 The number of units and agencies that can be called upon to lend reachback or 

federated support is staggering. There are literally thousands of analysts who, with 

proper coordination, can be called upon to support CAOC targeting and assessment in 
80

both peace and in war. See Appendix B for more information on these units and 

agencies. 

EQUIPPING TARGETING ORGANIZATIONS

The forces the COMAFFOR presents to the CFC should include all the equipment 

they require to conduct combat operations. This includes target data and materials, 

especially for mission areas like strategic attack and counterair, which are conducted 

principally by the air and space component. The following sections discuss equipment 

considerations. 

Analytical Tools 

 Targeting always requires solid intelligence analysis. While details are beyond the 

scope of this document, commanders must ensure that analysts and collection 

managers have the tools necessary to collect and analyze the information they need for 

targeting. 

Geospatial Intelligence Tools 

 Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and 

geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and 

geographically referenced activities on the earth. GEOINT is necessary for battlespace 

visualization, enabling planners to “see” natural and cultural features. The most basic 

geospatial intelligence tools are maps and charts. There are digital geospatial tools 

available for targeteers to use. Such tools provide a means of updating displays more 

accurately and conveniently than paper displays. Nonetheless, paper maps and charts 

are still in high demand and may become necessary if electronic means are somehow 

compromised. AOG/AIG intelligence directorates and A-staff A-2s must ensure that 

targeteers have access to appropriate digital tools and that adequate numbers of maps 

and charts are available for use by CAOC personnel. 

 Analysts also require mensuration tools to provide coordinates with the accuracy 

necessary for effective munitions employment. Point mensuration tools include the 

massive database of imagery needed for these activities. Large hard drives are 

necessary to store all these data. Point mensuration systems, software, and 

methodologies that do not utilize the digital point positioning data base and are not 

certified NGA standards are not approved to provide coordinates for GPS aided 

weapons. 

 Targeteers also need access to current imagery for target development and 

assessment. This is produced by many different units and distributed via the image 

product library system over Intelink. For more timely imagery, however, planners may 

need access to specific ISR systems. To fully exploit imagery, use of an electronic light 

table is necessary. In addition, commercial imagery may be available for use in 

targeting and assessment. The current commercial imagery system is Eagle Vision. 
81

Weaponeering Tools 

 The JMEM is the standard reference for determining the munitions needed for an 

attack. The most effective tool from JMEM is the JMEM automated weaponeering 

system. Commanders must ensure adequate numbers of JMEM workstations are 

available for weaponeering. However, as non-kinetic and non-lethal weapons continue 

to make their way into the Air Force inventory, targeteers will have to expand their 

thinking of what weaponeering is. Commanders can assist by ensuring targeteers have 

tools to exploit such capabilities as they become available. 

MAAP and “Operational Art” Tools 

MAAP personnel need access to displays to aid in the development of the MAAP. 

Digital displays should be utilized to provide the wings and MAAP personnel with 

additional time for mission planning and significantly cuts down MAAP production time. 

Additionally, tools are available to automate some of the MAAP aircraft-munition-target 

matching effort. Any tools used should permit horizontal and vertical integration across 

functional areas in the OE. 

Dynamic Targeting Tools 

 The highly fluid environment of the COD demands tools that targeteers can use to 

quickly and accurately respond to ATO changes. Typically, these tools are merely a 

reflection of the tools used by targeteers, analysts, and collection managers in the 

ISRD. 

Collateral Damage Estimation Tools 

Targeteers require a common tool allowing them to conduct collateral damage 

estimation and mitigation to ensure compliance with ROE and the LOAC. 

TRAINING AND EXERCISES

 There is no longer a specific Air Force Specialty Code for targeting. The only 

people who receive targeting training during technical school are intelligence personnel, 

but such training is only rudimentary and is not adequate for combat operations. Thus, 

it is imperative that targeteers in the CAOC receive appropriate follow-on training to 

achieve the level of proficiency needed for CAOC targeting. It is the responsibility of 

peacetime commanders to ensure all personnel involved in targeting understand their 

roles and duties. This applies to intelligence personnel as well as operators, weather 

personnel, IO specialists, and any others who are involved with CAOC targeting. It also 

includes federated and reachback partners. A number of courses provide training on 

targeting. 
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Formal Training 

 Combat Targeting Course (CTC). This Air Education and Training Command 

(AETC)-sponsored course is the Air Force’s primary targeteer training course. 

Anyone working directly in the ISRD targeting and assessment team or the 

COD/CPD targeting team should consider this course 

 Joint Targeting School. This US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)-sponsored 

course is another course for those who are working in ISRD and/or COD/CPD 

targeting. The joint targeting school provides a modern, joint perspective on 

targeting issues. 

 BDA Course. This DIA-sponsored course provides the fundamentals of tactical 

assessment 

 Point mensuration training and certification program. This program is an 

integral part of the geospatial point mensuration process and is required to build aim 

points for JDAM employment.

 Collection Manager’s Course. This AETC-sponsored course is not specifically 

necessary for targeting. However, those involved with targeting will benefit by 

gaining an understanding of ISR collection assets, how they are tasked, and 

timelines for ISR asset tasking, collection, exploitation, and reporting 

 Information Warfare Applications Course. This AETC-sponsored course is 

critical for information warfare (IW) specialists. As IW comes to play a larger role in 

Air Force operations, understanding of IW will become increasingly important, and 

nowhere more so than in targeting efforts 

 Weaponeering Mobile Training Teams. These AETC-sponsored teams are 

available for those who cannot attend the combat training center or are in need of 

refresher training. Instructors travel to bases to conduct training, instead of 

requiring students to travel to Goodfellow AFB 

Initial Qualification Training (IQT) 

 The Air Force has established a formal training unit for IQT of those filling CAOC 

positions. Located at Hurlburt Field, it was formally called the joint aerospace command 

and control course. This course will indoctrinate personnel into the inner workings of 

the CAOC. Targeting is addressed, but not explained in depth as it is in other 

specialized courses. 

Mission Qualification Training (MQT) 

 Each standing CAOC (the MAJCOM or NAF’s AOG, AIG, and/or AIS) is required to 

have an MQT program. MQT provides more in-depth training in CAOC processes, 

including targeting, as well as nuances specific to the theater. 
83

Exercises: Exercises:

 Minor coalition involvement Minor coalition involvement

 Permissive political Permissive political 

environment environment

 Mature theater (developed Mature theater (developed 

plans)

 Joint doctrine observed Joint doctrine observed 

by players by players

 Written and explicit Written and explicit 

commanders’ guidance commanders’ guidance 

and objectives and objectives

 Planning driven by Planning driven by 

desired effects desired effects

 JFACC produces JIPTL JFACC produces JIPTL

Reality: Reality:

 Major coalition involvement Major coalition involvement

 Constraining political Constraining political 

environment environment

 Immature theater (plans not Immature theater (plans not 

fully developed) fully developed)

 Joint doctrine frequently Joint doctrine frequently 

not observed by players not observed by players

 Commanders’ guidance Commanders’ guidance 

and objectives often vague and objectives often vague 

or unwritten

 Planning driven Planning driven 

by capabilities by capabilities

 JFC often retains control JFC often retains control 

of JIPTL of JIPTL

Figure 5.1 Exercises vs. Reality 

Advanced Training 

 

 Joint Air and Space Operations Planning Course. This AETC-sponsored course 

trains participants how to develop a JAOP. Broad targeting concepts are addressed 

in the course. Attending the course provides insight for targeteers and analysts on 

the larger context of campaign planning 

 Contingency Wartime Planning Course. This AETC-sponsored course trains 

participants on the deliberate and crisis action planning processes, thus giving 

larger-context insight into those disciplines 

 Command and Control Warrior’s Advanced Course. This Air Warfare Centersponsored course provides “Master’s” level CAOC training. Like CAOC formal 

training unit, the focus is on all CAOC processes, not just targeting 

 USAF Weapons School (USAFWS). The mission of the USAFWS is to teach 

graduate-level instructor courses, which provide the world’s most advanced training 

in weapons and tactical employment to officers in the combat air forces. (Also 

commonly know as the “WIC”.) 

Exercises 

 The primary Air Force CAOC training exercise is BLUE FLAG, held three to four 

times a year. However, there are many other CAOC exercises, held by MAJCOMs, 

located throughout the world. Because many exercises use notional battlespace (e.g., 
84

the “Califon” scenario), it is important for targeteers (and other intelligence personnel) to 

be involved with the exercise planning at the earliest stages in order to inject as much 

realism as possible into the scenario. Constant coordination between targeteers, the 

combat plans squadron, and exercise A-Staff A-5 (Plans) is necessary to ensure 

exercise objectives and planning timelines are known. 

 It is often difficult to exercise the full targeting effort in C2-only exercises. For 

notional scenarios, target materials are not available and must be created, which is an 

extremely time consuming effort. Many times, target materials are simply not created at 

all. This severely limits the CAOC’s ability to fully exercise targeting. In many cases 

targeting simply consists of management of a list of targets without any intelligence 

available to train planners on how and why certain targets are chosen for attack. Such 

“target servicing” is contrary to an effects-based approach and should be discouraged. 

 This lack of realism also harms assessment efforts. As the exercise runs, targets 

are simulated struck (or not). However, there is no imagery to correspond to strikes. All 

information that CAOC personnel would normally receive (INFLTREPs, MISREPs, 

imagery, SIGINT, etc.) is at best simulated by reports created electronically by the 

simulation. This can also result in negative training. Without a comprehensive game 

plan for training, targeteers and assessors will simply be regurgitating information 

produced by the simulation. Again, getting involved in the planning of the exercise at 

the earliest stage is critical if the exercise is to have as much realistic targeting and 

assessment training as possible. 

 It is critical that training be as realistic as possible. Airmen who learn operational art 

using fictional countries, with no live targets, no live ISR platforms, no real imagery, no 

real weapons risk, and without fully developing exercise targeting scenarios will not 

have adequate experience in targeting to be effective during wartime. 
85

SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications 

(NOTE: AFDDs and AFDC publications can be accessed via the HQ Air Force Doctrine 

Center website at https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp) 

AFDD 2: Operations and Organization

AFDD 2-1: Air Warfare

AFDD 2-5: Information Operations

AFDD 2-8: Command and Control

AFDD 2-9: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations

AFDD 2.1.2: Strategic Attack

AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland

AFDD 2-4.5: Legal Support 

AFDCH 10-01: Air and Space Commander’s Handbook for the JFACC

(NOTE: AFOTTPs can be accessed via the Air Warfare Center’s AFOTTP web-site at 

https://505ccw.hurlburt.af.mil/505og/505os/AFOTTPLibrary.htm) 

AFOTTP 2-1.1: Air and Space Strategy

AFOTTP 2-3.1: USAF Command and Control Nodes

AFOTTP 2-3.2: Air and Space Operations Center

AFOTTP 2-3.4: Joint Air and Space Operations Center 

(NOTE: All other USAF publications can be accessed via the Air Force Publications 

web-site at http://www.e-publishing.af.mil) 

AFI 13-1AOC V1: Ground Environment Training – Air and Space Operations Center 

AFI 13-1AOC V2: Standardization/Evaluation Program – Air and Space Operations 

Center 

AFI 13-1AOC V3: Operational Procedures – Air and Space Operations Center

AFI 14-117: Air Force Targeting
86

AFPAM 14-118: Aerospace Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Joint Publications 

(NOTE: Joint Publications can be accessed via the Joint Doctrine web-site at 

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine.htm) 

JP 1-02: DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 

JP 2-01: Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations

JP 2-01.3: Joint TTP for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

JP 3-0: Joint Operations

JP 3-08: Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental 

Organization Coordination During Joint Operations

JP 3-09: Joint Fires 

JP 3-09.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support

JP 3-13: Information Operations

JP 3-30: Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

JP 3-60: Joint Targeting

JP 5-0: Joint Operation Planning

JP 5-00.2: Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures

CJCSI 3900.01B, Position Reference Procedures 

Other Publications 

(NOTE: AU publications can be accessed via the Air University Press web-site at 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress) 

Air Land Sea Applications Center, Multi-Service TTP for Time-Sensitive Targets. 2004. 

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 1976. 

Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA Battle Damage Assessment Quick Guide

(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (GPO)). 2003.
87

DOD, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Chapter IV) 

(Washington, DC: US GPO). 1992. 

Glock, John, “The Evolution of Air Force Targeting,” Airpower Journal, Fall 1994 

(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University (AU) Press. 1994. 

Headquarters, US Air Force, The Air War Over Serbia: Aerospace Power in Operation 

ALLIED FORCE (Washington DC: US GPO). 2000. 

Mann, Edward, Gary Endersby, Thomas Searle, Thinking Effects: Effects-Based 

Methodology for Joint Operations (Maxwell AFB, AL: AU Press). 2002. 

Meilinger, Phillip, editor, The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory

(Maxwell AFB, AL: AU Press). 1997. 

Rinaldi, Steven, Beyond the Industrial Web: Economic Synergies and Targeting 

Methodologies (Maxwell AFB, AL: AU Press). 1995. 

Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press). 1994. 
88

APPENDIX A 

TARGETING AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 

INTRODUCTION 

 This appendix supports targeting by describing the various international legal 

obligations that impact upon targeting decisions. Legal considerations and international 

legal obligations directly affect all phases of targeting. Those involved in targeting 

should have a thorough understanding of these obligations and be able to apply them 

during the targeting analysis. 

Specifically this appendix discusses briefly the legal considerations impacting 

targeting: 

 Basic principles of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). 

 LOAC considerations concerning personnel. 

 LOAC considerations concerning objects and places. 

 ROE considerations. 

 “ROE-like” restrictions. 

The last section outlines the role of judge advocates (JAs) in targeting. 

Targeting must adhere to the LOAC and all applicable ROE. It is the policy of 

the DOD that the Armed Forces of the United States will comply with the law of war 

during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and, unless 

otherwise directed by competent authorities, the US Armed Forces will comply with the 

principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations. The “law of war” is a 

term encompassing all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the 

United States including treaties and international agreements to which the United States 

is a party, and applicable customary international law. The “law of war” is also 

commonly referred to as the LOAC. 

 NOTE: This appendix is not all-encompassing. There may be instances that will be 

an exception to one of the listed legal considerations. These instances will be 

determined by the particular facts of a given situation and highlights the need for 

constant coordination between planners, operators and JAs. 

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LOAC AND THEIR TARGETING IMPLICATIONS 

LOAC rests on four fundamental principles that are inherent to all targeting 

decisions: military necessity, unnecessary suffering, proportionality, and distinction 

(discrimination).
89

Military Necessity. Is this target a valid “military objective”? “Military necessity” 

acknowledges that attacks can be made against targets, but only targets that are valid 

“military objectives.” In this case, the term “military objective” in this context comes from 

the description in the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention that describes 

military objectives as “...(T)hose objects by their nature, location, purpose or use make 

an effective contribution to military action...” Though the US is not a signatory to the 

Additional Protocol it views this definition as an accurate restatement of customary 

international law that we recognize and with which we comply. 

 NOTE: The word “objective” as used above should not be confused with the way 

“objective” is defined in the DOD Dictionary of Military Terms (“1. The clearly defined, 

decisive, and attainable goals towards which every military operation should be 

directed.”) 

 

 For example, a residential home does not usually make an effective contribution to 

military action so is not usually a valid military target. However, there are instances and 

circumstances when something like a residence is a valid military target if an adversary 

is using it for military purposes (such as a military command post, a fighting position, 

etc.). In that case, the purpose or nature of the objective has been changed by the 

adversary’s actions. 

Unnecessary Suffering (Humanity). Will the use of a particular weapon used to 

strike a target cause unnecessary suffering? This principle is based in the Hague 

Conventions restrictions against using arms, projectiles, or materials calculated to 

cause unnecessary suffering. All conventional weapons in the US inventory are 

permissible for use unless otherwise restricted by higher authority for operational 

reasons. These weapons have been reviewed to determine if they comply with the 

LOAC and have been determined not to cause unnecessary suffering when used in the 

manner in which they were designed. However, this principle also prohibits using an 

otherwise lawful weapon in a manner that causes unnecessary suffering. 

 An example of causing unnecessary suffering would be to modify munitions to 

disperse glass projectiles to complicate providing medical treatment to the wounded. 

The bottom line is to use weapons and munitions as they are designed. 

Proportionality. Does the military advantage to be gained from striking a target 

outweigh the anticipated incidental civilian loss of life and property if this target is 

struck? This requires the anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property 

incidental to attack is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 

advantage expected from striking the target. Planners and commanders must weigh 

the expected military advantages to be gained from affecting a target (kinetic or nonkinetic) against the incidental loss or injury to civilians and the damage or destruction of 

civilian property. The “military advantage anticipated” refers to the advantage 

anticipated from those actions considered as a whole, and not only from isolated or 

particular actions. A “military advantage” is not just a tactical gain, but can span the 

spectrum of tactical, operational, or strategic. 
90

 For example, an armored vehicle used in combat is located at a school. The vehicle 

is a valid target. However, destroying the vehicle with certain types of munitions may 

place lives and safety of nearby noncombatants in jeopardy. The potential for injury to 

noncombatants should help guide the choice of munitions and/or other actions chosen 

against the vehicle. 

 

Distinction (Discrimination). Have we distinguished between combatants and 

non-combatants; have we distinguished between military objectives and protected 

property or places? The principle, based on customary international law, requires 

parties to direct operations only against combatants and military objectives. It prohibits 

“indiscriminate attacks”. 

 For example: Dropping munitions—guided or not—in a residential area without 

regard to whether there are combatants or military objectives in the area simply 

because there “might be” adversary forces there would be an indiscriminate attack. The 

use of gravity-guided munitions (non-precision) against enemy combatants or military 

objectives is not of itself an indiscriminate attack. 

LOAC TARGETING RESTRICTIONS 

Personnel 

 Are we targeting personnel protected under LOAC? Intentional direct attacks on 

civilians are prohibited. However, this is distinctly different from the incidental injury that 

may be caused to civilians or civilian objects as a result of an attack on a valid military 

target (collateral damage). Collateral damage is an issue of proportionality. 

 Protection of the Civilian Population. Civilian populations may not be 

intentionally targeted for attack. Acts of violence designed to spread terror among the 

civilian population are prohibited. However, civilians may not be used as “human 

shields” to protect military targets from attack. The fact that they may be used to do so 

does not necessarily prevent the military object from being attacked. As directed or 

time permitting, targets surrounded by human shields will probably need to be reviewed 

by higher authority for policy and legal considerations based on the specific facts. 

 Protection of Wounded and Sick. Direct attacks on wounded and sick who are no 

longer contributing to an adversary’s military operations are prohibited by the Geneva 

Conventions. As noted above, the incidental additional injury that might be caused to 

sick and wounded still on the battlefield in the proximity to valid military targets is an 

issue of proportionality. The sick and wounded may also not be used as “human 

shields” to protect military targets from attack. The fact that they may be used to do so 

does not necessarily prevent the military object from being attacked. As directed or 

time permitting, targets surrounded by human shields will probably need to be reviewed 

by higher authority for policy and legal considerations based on the specific facts. 
91

 Protection of Prisoners of War. Direct attacks on prisoners of war (POW) are also 

prohibited by the Geneva Conventions. This occurs from the moment they have 

surrendered because they are no longer considered “combatants” at that point. POW 

camps or detention facilities should be marked to be visible from the air as such. 

However, it is important that any POW facility is also noted as such on a NSL to ensure 

there is no confusion on the part of aircrew between the POW facility and adversary 

forces that may be conducting rear-area operations. 

Objects and Places 

 Are we targeting an object or place protected under LOAC? Intentional direct 

attacks on civilian objects are prohibited. However, this is distinct from the incidental 

injury that may be caused to civilian objects as a result of an attack on a valid military 

target. Likewise, there are instances when based on the facts of a particular situation a 

civilian object may be a valid military target. These are discussed below. 

 Protection of Civilian Objects. Civilian objects may not be intentionally targeted 

for attack. Civilian objects are civilian property and facilities other than those used to 

support or sustain the adversary’s warfighting capability. Civilian objects that are being 

used to engage in or support hostilities may lose their protected civilian status and be 

legitimate military targets. 

Civilian objects that may be legitimate military targets. Some facilities or 

objects that might be considered as civilian objects but are actually legitimate military 

targets based on the facts surrounding their nature, location, purpose, and use: 

 a. Dual-Use Objects. These are facilities or objects that serve both a military and 

civilian purpose and may be legitimate military targets. For example a power grid that 

supports an enemy airbase, but also supports civilian cities/towns is dual-use, but might 

be considered a legitimate military target. A target such as this would need to be 

examined in light of “proportionality” concerning whether targeting the power grid would 

be disproportionate to the effects caused to the surrounding civilian objects supported 

by the same power grid. Typically dual-use targets will require a higher level of 

approval authority because of the concerns on the impact on the civilian population. 

 b. Economic Objects. These are typically factories, workshops and plants that 

make an effective (though not necessarily direct) contribution to an adversary’s military 

capability. Like dual-use targets, these typically require a higher level of approval 

because of the particular facts and circumstances regarding the nature, location, use, 

and purpose of the target. 

c. Lines of Communication. Transportation systems (roadways, bridges, etc) and 

communication systems (TV, radio), while civilian in nature, may also be considered 

legitimate military targets based on their use. Like dual-use and economic objects, 

these may require higher level of approval based on the particular facts and 

circumstances regarding nature, location, use, and purpose of the target. 
92

Protection of Medical Units, Hospitals, and Medical Transport. Under the 

Geneva Conventions, these are not to be attacked. These should be marked by a 

distinctive medical emblem such as the Red Cross, Red Crescent, or some other 

internationally recognized symbol to show that they are for medical use. Known 

medical facilities and structures will typically be placed in the combatant commander’s 

no-strike list database. Like civilian personnel, these may not be used to shield 

legitimate military targets. For instance, placing a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system 

next to a hospital does not prevent an attack on the SAM system if necessary in selfdefense. Usually the combatant commander will issue guidance concerning the 

approval authority for mobile systems placed next to such protected objects when not 

acting in self-defense. 

Protection of Religious, Cultural, and Charitable Buildings and Monuments. 

Under the Hague Conventions, international treaties and customary law, buildings and 

monuments devoted to religion, art, charitable purposes, or historical sites are not to be 

attacked. These should be marked with internationally recognized distinctive emblems 

(such as the blue shield with two white triangles). Known buildings and monuments 

devoted to religious, cultural, and charitable purposes will typically be placed in the 

combatant commander’s “no-strike list” database. “Cultural” properties are usually 

considered irreplaceable and the property of all mankind. Like civilians, these may not 

be used to shield legitimate military targets. For instance, placing a SAM in the ruins of 

an ancient temple would not prevent an attack on the SAM system if necessary in selfdefense. Usually the combatant commander will issue guidance concerning the 

approval authority for striking mobile systems placed next to such protected buildings or 

monuments when not in self-defense. 

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 

Have applicable restrictions or requirements imposed by the ROE been complied 

with prior to striking a target? The ROE are directives issued by competent military 

authority to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which air, ground, and 

naval forces will initiate or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. 

(JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Essentially, ROE are rules 

for a particular operation that govern the use of force to reflect the will of the civilian and 

military leadership. ROE constrain the actions of US military forces to ensure their 

actions are consistent with domestic and international law, national policy, and 

objectives. Although ROE are not law, they are authoritative restrictions issued at the 

appropriate level of command to control the use of force. ROE are based on domestic 

and international law, history, strategy, political concerns, and a vast wealth of 

operational wisdom, experience, and knowledge provided by military commanders and 

operators. ROE may be more restrictive than the LOAC for a given situation, but they 

can’t be more permissive than allowed under LOAC—therefore compliance with ROE 

should guarantee compliance with LOAC. 
93

Personnel involved in targeting should be involved in the development and 

refinement of ROE along with the judge advocates. Just as tasking and targeting are 

cyclical, so too is ROE development, and it may require constant input and refinement 

in order to meet operational requirements. 

What is contained in ROE. There is usually information in the ROE that is directly 

applicable to how, when, or under what circumstances targets may be struck. The ROE 

may contain such information as target approval authorities for certain types or classes 

of targets (e.g., economic objects, lines of communication), and approval authority for 

time-sensitive or high-collateral damage targets. It may also contain information 

regarding what weapons may be used, (like cluster bombs or anti-personnel mines) the 

conditions for use and approval authority for their use. 

Where ROE Are Found. ROE may be found in the standing rules of engagement 

(SROE), a combatant commander’s theater-specific ROE, and ROE issued specifically 

for an operation (such as with Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI 

FREEDOM). 

 a. Standing Rules of Engagement. These are contained in a classified Joint 

Chiefs of Staff Instruction. The SROE provide implementation guidance on the inherent 

right of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. The 

SROE also provide a framework for the development and implementation of ROE 

across the spectrum of military operations. The important point to remember is that the 

SROE are not tailored to specific military operations. They provide guidance in the 

absence of operation-specific ROE, and do not contain specific targeting restrictions or 

considerations based on the circumstances of a particular operation. 

 b. Theater-Specific Rules of Engagement. These are the combatant 

commanders’ theater-specific ROE. These ROE address specific strategic and political 

sensitivities of the AOR, and must be approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. Theater-specific ROE may have been issued in a separate message. Like the 

SROE, these will not provide specific targeting restrictions or considerations based on 

ongoing operational constraints. 

 c. Operation-Specific ROE. These ROE are promulgated by the President, 

Secretary of Defense, combatant commander and component commanders and are 

based upon the specific factors underlying the operation. The ROE might be sent to the 

components via message from the combatant commander or could be incorporated into 

the OPORD. The ROE are usually re-stated in the JAOP and in Section Five of the air 

and space component’s daily SPINS. 

 ROE Considerations. For examples of the kinds of issues to be considered in 

ROE development, refer to AFDD 2-4.5, Legal Support, Chapter Three (Legal Support 

for Rules of Engagement) and to AFDCH 10-01, Air and Space Commander’s 

Handbook for the JFACC (ROE appendix). 
94

 a. AFDD 2-4.5, Legal Support, ROE Chapter. This chapter provides guidance in 

how to develop ROE. Considerations discussed include: ROE development is a 

collaborative effort (vertical and horizontal among organizations); ROE development 

must integrate all players (JA, commanders, planners, operators); ROE should not be 

too specific or restrictive; and ROE need to provide simple, clear guidance to 

accomplish the mission. 

 b. Air and Space Commander’s Handbook for the JFACC. This handbook is a 

quick “spin up” reference and focuses on CFACC effectiveness. Considerations 

discussed in the appendix include: ROE requires mission analysis; ROE development 

is an integral part of operational planning; and ROE should not substitute for guidance, 

intent and judgment. 

“ROE-like” Restrictions Impacting Targeting 

 Are there any other restrictions that may impact targeting? Restrictions that are not 

formally issued as ROE may exist in other documents. In theory, these would be 

explicitly incorporated in the ROE or at least incorporated by reference. In practice, this 

is not always the case. As such, it is imperative that all personnel involved in targeting 

work—operators, planners and judge advocates—ensure they are aware of all

applicable targeting restrictions regardless of how these restrictions are characterized or 

issued. Some examples are listed below. 

Target Lists. The NSL, RTL, and JTL are compiled and maintained by the 

combatant command. An NSL will contain those facilities and structures that are 

protected under LOAC (churches, hospitals, etc). The RTL contains facilities and 

structures for which approval must first be obtained from the establishing authority 

before striking. These are on the RTL because there is some function or valid military 

reason for why it should not be struck. Targets on the JTL may also contain restrictions 

in the target folders. Although a target itself may be approved for strike and placed on 

the JTL, its target folder may restrict specific DPIs from being struck or restrict the size 

or type of munitions that may be used against the target or some of its DPIs. For 

example, if a target is near a sensitive site, such as a school, the DPIs closest to the 

school may be restricted entirely or restricted to only certain types of weapons. 

Collateral Damage Methodology (CDM). Historically, various combatant 

commands have conducted CDM according to their own standards. Joint Chiefs of 

Staff directives now delineate a coherent five-step process that standardizes DOD CDM 

practices. 

The JAOP. Many restrictions from the combatant commander, CFC, and the 

CFACC will be found in sections of the JAOP that set forth standing orders or 

commander’s intent. 

 

Special Instructions. SPINs are periodically issued by the CAOC and usually have 

several sections that may contain ROE. Most SPINs have a subsection specifically 
95

called “ROE” that may contain ROE changes until a new version or regular changes to 

the OPORD can be published. This section will also contain any amplification the 

CFACC deems necessary for complex ROE provisions. 

Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO). In some past operations, restrictions from the 

combatant commander impacting targeting were also published in FRAGOs. 

Fire Support Annex. The fire support annex to an OPORD may also contain 

additional guidance or information concerning targeting. 

Coalition Concerns. Coalition forces may have their own set of ROE that may not 

be similar to US ROE. That may impact whether coalition forces have the authority to 

strike certain sensitive targets such as leadership, WMD, etc. or the type of support they 

are able to provide to US forces striking those targets. US forces operating from 

coalition bases (e.g., Diego Garcia) may also have restrictions placed on them—and on 

the targeting they execute—by coalition ROE as well. Close coordination is required 

with coalition partners during targeting to facilitate the understanding of their ROE and 

the limits it may impose on them. 

ROLE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 

So what does the JA have to do with targeting? The JA assists the planners and 

operators with reviewing targets for compliance with applicable LOAC/ROE restrictions 

(including collateral damage and other combatant commander restrictions) prior to 

mission execution. Legal advice and counsel is necessary to the development, 

interpretation, modification, and proper implementation of the ROE. JAs and their 

support staff should be trained, operationally oriented, and readily accessible to assist 

planners and operators with international legal considerations and ROE or related 

issues. JAs have an affirmative duty to provide legal advice to commanders and their 

staffs that is consistent with the international and domestic legal obligations and the 

governing ROE. The complexity of international legal considerations along with the 

ROE requires JAs to be available at all stages in the tasking cycle. JAs are usually 

available 24/7 to the strategy, plans and operations divisions within an CAOC. 

Additionally, JAs are usually available at the expeditionary wing and group level to 

assist commanders, aircrew, and planners at the tactical level with targeting-related 

issues at that level. It should be emphasized, however, that inputs and counsel 

provided by the JA and staff are advisory rather than authoritative. Legal considerations 

must be weighed against military necessity, imminent threat, and/or operational gain by 

the CFACC and CFC. 
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APPENDIX B 

FEDERATED SUPPORT TO TARGETING AND ASSESSMENT 

INTRODUCTION 

Targeting and assessment requirements are typically more than theaters can 

support internally, due to deficiencies in manpower and specialized expertise. Thus, in 

practice, targeting is federated among many different organizations—in the theater, in 

the US, and worldwide. The COMAFFOR may have direct authority over some units, 

but will not have control over other targeting organizations. It is therefore crucial that 

theater strategists, planners, and targeteers develop the necessary relationships with 

these units and organizations during peacetime so that intelligence support to targeting 

and assessment will flow smoothly during contingencies. While theater targeting units 

can seldom, if ever, directly task federated organizations, they can develop working 

relationships through which these organizations can provide support the theater needs. 

The key to an effective federation system is knowing the capabilities of the various 

units and organizations—Air Force, joint, and national—that can be called upon for 

support. There are many organizations that can and do produce intelligence and other 

information useful to theater targeting and assessment efforts. Such expertise has 

always been important, but it is essential for an effects-based approach to conflict, 

which relies on greater SA, more comprehensive planning, and deeper knowledge of 

the adversary than an attrition-based approach does. 

 CAOC strategists, planners, targeteers, and intelligence analysts are generalists in 

the sense that they must have knowledge of a wide variety of weapon, target, and 

political systems. Federated targeting organizations have specialists with extensive 

knowledge on specific target systems in specific nations. Utilizing this expertise is 

absolutely necessary if targeteers are to conduct effective target development that 

imposes the specific effects chosen by planners to achieve commanders’ objectives. 

There are many kinds of information available to support targeting and assessment 

efforts. Traditional approaches to both have emphasized imagery intelligence—usually 

overhead imagery from satellites and reconnaissance aircraft. While imagery is 

We [at United States Strategic Command] provided federated 

intelligence support to multiple regional combatant commands, 

conducting battle damage assessment and intelligence analysis, 

and leading the intelligence community-wide effort to find and 

characterize underground facilities in Afghanistan. 

 —Admiral James Ellis 

Commander, United States Strategic Command

Remarks to the House Armed Services Committee, 13 Mar 03 
97

certainly still important, other “INTs” such as HUMINT, SIGINT, measurement and 

signature intelligence (MASINT), foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT), 

and open-source intelligence (OSINT); can be equally—and sometimes more—

important to targeteers and planners. Collaboration with federated organizations will 

enable analysts to pull together this multitude of intelligence to utilize in targeting. 

Federation Classification 

 There are two fundamental ways to classify federated support, which affect how 

relationships are built, help determine how taskings are conveyed, and influence how 

information is disseminated. All components—Air Force and joint, official and 

unofficial—are required for effective federation. 

Air Force and Joint/National. CAOC planners are concerned with two federated 

systems: one internal to the Air Force (also known as “reachback”) and one that 

involves joint and national agencies. The Air Force only has control over the reachback 

system. The joint/national system is based on the needs of geographic combatant 

commanders or CFCs. These needs are coordinated with the larger joint community 

through the Joint Staff J-2’s deputy director for targeting (J2T). However, the 

COMAFFOR should submit requirements through the combatant commander or CFC 

for any joint or national federated support he or she needs. In both cases, federated 

support should be coordinated prior to hostilities. Such coordination should delineate 

specific duties to federated partners, establish timelines, and determine the methods of 

communication to be used. Additionally, whenever possible, COMAFFORs should 

coordinate federated partner participation in theater exercises. Without proper 

coordination, federated partners may be unclear of duties once hostilities begin. 

Exercise participation may reveal points of friction, process errors, and operational 

limitations that coordination alone may not reveal. Federated partners may also have 

conflicting priorities if multiple contingencies occur simultaneously in different theaters, 

as most federated partners are not subordinate to a single, specific theater and solid 

peacetime working relationships may help reduce the impact of such seams or priority 

conflicts. 

Official and Unofficial. Targeting and assessment are year-round efforts. In the 

past, many organizations supported theater targeting efforts even though they were not 

We need to do a better job of human intelligence. There are some 

things that you are just not going to see from space. Overhead 

imagery is very important, but we should not over-emphasize it. They 

[potential adversaries] know how to conceal the imagery, and that 

won’t give us the complete picture. 

—Dr. Stephen Younger, 

Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 

Comments concerning intelligence support

 for precision strike capabilities, 2004 
98

officially part of a federated team. This support was often slow, due to limitations of 

existing communication technology. Development of the internet and creation of Intelink, 

however, ushered in a whole new era of federated partnership. Much of the intelligence 

that was created for and sent to specific theaters in years past is now disseminated to 

the world via the net. Peacetime federation, therefore, is often informal. During 

hostilities, however, formal relationships are necessary, since timelines are severely 

reduced. For instance, NGA produce daily imagery for use in target development. 

They produce this imagery because that is what sensors have taken pictures of. CAOC 

planners can coordinate with NGA to obtain these products, but they require no formal 

relationship to do so. While the intelligence community is doing its mission, the CAOC 

is simply taking advantage of available resources. During a conflict, however, the 

CAOC’s needs may require specific NGA action and be much more time-critical. This 

may require a formal request for support from the CFC to the NGA. Obviously, if the 

need can be anticipated and planned for, the partners can accomplish the necessary 

requests and coordination, which will improve the timeliness and quality of the support. 

The bottom line is that, while peacetime requirements may be met a less formal 

federated structure, contingencies dictate that all federation partners know exactly what 

support is required of them, the timelines involved with providing the support, and in 

what manner they need to provide it. 

Types of Federated Support 

 Federated partners can provide support to many stages of targeting. 

Objectives, effects, and guidance. Many federated organizations, both Air Force 

and joint, have analysts who have studied specific targets, target sets, nations, and 

regions for many years. Many of the analysts with deepest understanding are civilians 

working for national intelligence agencies. Their comprehensive expertise may be 

useful to CAOC strategists when developing objectives, effects, and measures of 

effectiveness. 

 

Target Development. Federated targeting units conduct target development yearround. Theater targeting units can utilize this information, reducing redundancy as well 

as workload. There are a large number of intelligence and other analytic organizations 

that specialize in certain targets or target systems. For instance, the Air Force 

Information Warfare Center (AFIWC) can provide information on command and control 

linkages; the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) has engineers who specialize in 

lines of communication, electrical power generation, and POL distribution; and DIA’s 

Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) are experts in surface-to-air missiles. 

These, and many other organizations, can be called upon to provide expertise for 

specific targeting efforts. Even if these organizations are not official members of a 

theater federated targeting effort, they can still be utilized to assist with target 

development. 

Collateral Damage Estimation. While CAOC personnel can conduct most of the 

effort required to estimate collateral damage, some estimates require advanced 
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estimation methods that only national organizations have expertise in. JWAC and the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), for example, have specialists who can 

assist in this effort. 

 

Weaponeering. Many units specialize in weaponeering for specific munitions or 

target categories. For instance, the 20th Intelligence Squadron at Offutt AFB 

specializes in weaponeering for hardened and deeply buried targets. Targeteers at 

USSTRATCOM specialize in similar activities. Weaponeering is time-consuming; 

utilizing federated partners to conduct weaponeering frees CAOC planners to focus on 

other critical planning activities. 

Point mensuration. Federated partners can assist CAOCs with point mensuration. 

Because it is so time consuming, mensuration may overwhelm CAOC targeteers. Many 

Air Force and joint units, especially NGA, can provide expertise in this area. 

Assessment. Partners can assist CAOCs in determining appropriate MOE and in 

analyzing collected data. Joint and national agencies may be particularly useful in 

helping make political and economic types of assessment. Ideally, the same units that 

provide support for target development should also assist with the post-attack 

assessment of those targets and target sets, regardless of the means of attack. 

Obviously, analysts who support target development will already have detailed 

knowledge that can be put to use during assessment. Establishing federated 

relationships early will help ensure this happens. 

 The preceding list is not all-inclusive. CAOC targeteers should understand and 

utilize all federated specialties available. Understanding the capabilities of all possible 

federated partners will provide insight into the types of support that are available for use 

throughout all CAOC processes. 

THEATER ORGANIZATIONS 

 There are numerous organizations that may be called upon to support theater 

targeting and assessment efforts. It is imperative that CAOC targeteers understand the 

organizations that they can utilize to support CAOC targeting efforts...both in peacetime 

and during wartime. 

Air Force Units 

Core CAOC. There are two core units that support targeting for most CAOCs: the 

AOG and the AIS. IOTs also support targeting and are integral to AOG. In addition, 

theaters have two supporting intelligence units: the distributed ground system and the 

information operations group. Further, the director of space forces may be of 

assistance in coordinating space requirements in support of targeting. 

The majority of Air Force targeteers are assigned to Air Force component AIS’ and 

they provide the lion’s share of input to the targeting effort. However, AOG CPS 
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personnel form the core of the targeting effort. Some AIS’ are organizationally 

subordinate to the MAJCOM or NAF AOGs. Other AIS’ are subordinate to a NAF Air 

Intelligence Group. Regardless, these are peacetime organizations. During 

contingencies, AIS’ “become” the ISRD of their corresponding CAOCs. 

Deployable Common Ground System (DCGS). The AF has developed specific 

units to provide enhanced intelligence and targeting support for worldwide operations—

above what the theater AIS can provide. DCGS is the system and the individual units 

are called Deployable Ground Systems (DGS). While these units do not provide 

support directly to targeteers, they do provide SIGINT and imagery support to theater 

CAOCs that ultimately supports targeting and assessment. CAOCs should coordinate 

DGS support through the theater A-2. 

There are currently five operational DGS’. While they each have a primary theater, 

the DCGS operates as a single entity and specific DGS’ can be called upon to flex from 

their primary theater to support a more critical area, as warfighter needs dictate. 

Targeteers must keep this in mind when coordinating DGS reachback support to the 

CAOC. While not officially part of a theater CAOC, these units can provide invaluable 

IMINT and SIGINT support to CAOC IPB, targeting, collection management, and 

assessment efforts. 

Joint and National Organizations 

Joint Units 

Theater Joint Intelligence Operations Center or Joint Analysis Center (JAC). 

The theater JIOC (or JAC in US European Command) is the central point for theater 

intelligence tasking, collection, analysis, and production. JIOCs also have targeting 

offices that produce target folders based on deliberate planning taskings. In addition, 

JIOCs, in coordination with theater J-2s, maintain the JTL, NSL, and RTL for specific 

OPLANs or CONPLANs. JIOCs have liaisons from the major national intelligence 

agencies to facilitate effective national intelligence support to the theaters. These 

liaisons typically include personnel from DIA, NGA, the National Security Agency (NSA), 

and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (the roles of these organizations are 

explained later in this appendix). 

Theater Cruise Missile Support Agency (CMSA). CMSA-Pacific (Camp Smith, 

Hawaii) and CMSA-Atlantic (Norfolk, Virginia) can provide valuable targeting information 

for cruise missile employment (airborne and seaborne). 

Global Cryptologic Center (GCC). A GCC is an NSA site to ensure NSA-derived 

intelligence supports theater planning, force employment, and assessment. CAOC 

planners can coordinate with the GCC or go through the theater NSA representative at 

the JIOC (the cryptologic support group); but a theater can’t directly task an GCC—it 

must go through NSA. However, air and space planners can consult with their theater’s 
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supporting GCC. There are three US-based GCCs, each with a focus on a specific 

theater, or multiple theaters. 

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). A NIST is a team composed of 

personnel from DIA, NSA, NGA, CIA, or other national intelligence agencies that is 

deployed, upon request by a CFC, to facilitate the flow of timely all-source intelligence 

between his joint task force (JTF) and Washington during crises or contingency 

operations. The NIST concept is designed to create a dynamic flow of intelligence to 

and from the JTF operational area. The NIST provides reachback to national 

intelligence agencies and provides the CFC and his staff with knowledge of each 

agency’s resources and capabilities that normally does not exist at the JTF level. Team 

members provide a direct agency liaison for the JTF, and have an understanding of 

where to go in their parent agency to obtain the best support for the commanders’ 

priority intelligence requirements. 

AIR FORCE CONTINENTAL US-BASED SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS 

Headquarters USAF 

HQ USAF. AF/A2 and A3I are the focal points for coordinating the Air Force’s 

CONUS-based targeting and assessment reachback support. 

Air Force Network Operations and Security Center (AFNOSC). The AFNOSC 

provides the commander of Air Force network operations the means to ensure the 

security, integrity, and timely delivery of ISR information transiting the Air Force 

enterprise network. The AFNOSC directs activities of the Regional NOSCs and winglevel network control centers to ensure integrity of the Air Force segment of the global 

information grid. Health of the network directly impacts targeting capability. 

Air Combat Command (ACC) 

ACC Intelligence Directorate (ACC/A2) plays a large part in coordinating the Air 

Force’s CONUS-based reachback support, as many organizations involved are 

subordinate to ACC. As the analytical arm of the A2 staff, the ACC intelligence 

squadron will factor into the federated process. 

Operational or Intelligence Wings. There are currently several units that provide 

worldwide targeting support, helping to develop target planning products and geospatial 

intelligence materials for strike missions across the globe. These units maintain the 

only DOD-controlled image base production entity outside the NGA, collecting satellite 

and airborne imagery from commercial sources. Other functions include peacetime 

supervision of theater IOTs and some elements of non-continental US (CONUS) DGS 

units, and coordinating the Air Force’s tactics and reporting program. Headquarters 

ACC can provide commanders and planners more information concerning what the 

various units are and what functions they perform. 
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Air Force Information Warfare Center is the Air Force center of excellence for IO. 

AFIWC produces IO analyses and data for combat operations and targeting (and 

acquisition programs as well). It also assesses IO vulnerabilities of units and conducts 

adversary IO operation and vulnerability assessments. 

National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) is the sole national center for 

integrated intelligence analysis on air and space systems, forces, and threats. It 

assesses current and projected foreign air and space capabilities and intentions, 

develops targeting and mission planning intelligence materials, and evaluates evolving 

technologies of potential adversaries. Such technical information is useful in 

determining how to create specific effects on specific targets and target systems. In 

addition to expertise on worldwide air assets, NASIC also has leading experts on longrange surface-to-surface missiles (such as medium-range and intercontinental ballistic 

missiles). 

Air Force Space Command 

Air Force Space Command has deep expertise in space operations. Such 

information can prove useful when analyzing and targeting enemy space capabilities. 

Targeteers at the joint space operations center (JSpOC) evaluate theater AODs and 

nominate specific space-related targets to meet a theater commander’s objectives. 

Their expertise is invaluable when analyzing and targeting enemy space capabilities. 

Air Mobility Command (AMC) 

AMC Intelligence maintains databases on airfields worldwide in the event AMC 

must utilize those bases. Such information may be useful when targeting enemy 

airfields. 

Air Force Materiel Command 

Air Armaments Center (AAC) is responsible for the development, acquisition, 

testing, deployment, and sustainment of all non-nuclear air-delivered weapons. The 

information they provide may be beneficial during weaponeering and conducting 

munitions effectiveness assessments. 

JOINT AND NATIONAL CONUS-BASED SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

J-2 Intelligence Directorate, Deputy Director for Targeting (J2T). The J-2 is the 

national level focal point for crisis intelligence to support military operations as well as 

indications and warning. J2T is the coordinator for all joint and national federation 

needs of a unified command or JTF. CAOC targeteers should coordinate their 

federation needs with the MAJCOM or NAF A-2, who will then coordinate with the 
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CFC’s J-2. However, the CAOC should first determine which of its needs can be met by 

utilizing Air Force reachback partnerships. 

National Agencies 

Defense Intelligence Agency. The JCS J-2 is dual-hatted as the Director of DIA. 

DIA is a major producer and manager of foreign military intelligence with a worldwide 

outlook. DIA is normally the first stop when analysts need foreign military intelligence to 

support targeting and assessment. In addition to the main DIA Center in Washington, 

DC, DIA maintains two specialized intelligence centers: 

 Missile and Space Intelligence Center provides worldwide scientific and technical 

intelligence concerning threat guided missile systems, directed energy weapons, 

selected space programs/systems and related C2 to support operationally deployed 

forces. MSIC has experts knowledgeable on SAMs as well as short-range ballistic 

missiles. 

 Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) produces finished, all-source 

medical intelligence in support of military planning and operations. Assessments, 

forecasts, and databases are prepared on worldwide infectious disease occurrence, 

global environmental health risks, foreign military and civilian health care capabilities 

and trends, and militarily significant life science technologies. 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the primary national producer of 

geospatial-intelligence, which is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial 

information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically 

referenced activities on the earth. Products include controlled imagery, digital elevation 

data and selected feature information, which can be rapidly augmented and fused with 

other spatially referenced information such as intelligence, weather, and logistics data 

resulting in an integrated, digital view of the mission space. NGA also produces many 

of the maps and charts Airmen utilize for mission planning. 

National Security Agency employs mathematicians, linguists, engineers, and 

computer scientists focusing on information assurance (code making) and SIGINT 

(code breaking). NSA’s code breakers collect, process, analyze, and exploit foreign 

adversaries’ communications. NSA maintains its headquarters at Fort Meade, 

Maryland. However, it also has three regional centers, each with a regional focus. 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency is a combat support agency charged with 

developing methods to deal more effectively with threats by nuclear, radiological, 

chemical, biological, and high explosive weapons of mass destruction and preventing 

future threats. The agency focuses DOD efforts to prepare for and respond to WMD 

attacks. These technologies provide commanders options for effective targeting against 

enemy WMD capabilities, WMD delivery methods, and underground or hardened 

structures, as well as enhanced capabilities to assess enemy WMD operations. 
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Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is a combat support agency 

responsible for planning, engineering, acquiring, fielding, and supporting global netcentric solutions and operating the defense information system network. DISA seeks to 

guarantee our forces global information dominance by providing jointly interoperable 

systems that have assured security, survivability, availability, and superior quality. 

Because of DISA’s expertise in developing, maintaining and protecting US information 

methods, they may prove useful in developing targeting strategies to attack enemy 

information methods and systems. 

Unified Commands 

Functional Unified Command Joint Intelligence Centers. The four CONUSbased functional unified commands—USSTRATCOM, USJFCOM, US Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM), and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—

each has a JIOC. Each of these unified commands has a global outlook and, as such, 

is capable of providing targeting and assessment support to combatant commands 

worldwide in the areas of special operations, transportation, WMD, space, nuclear 

forces, and information warfare, to name a few. 

Joint Warfare Analysis Center. Subordinate to USJFCOM, JWAC provides 

planners with specialized lines of communications analysis for use in developing 

targeting strategies. JWAC provides innovative and accurate engineering and 

modeling-based targeting options with an understanding of risks and consequences, 

including collateral damage estimates. 

Joint Information Operations Center. Subordinate to USSTRATCOM, this center 

is responsible for the integration of IO into military plans and operations across the 

spectrum of conflict. The center provides direct command and control warfare (C2W) 

tactical and technical analytical support to operational commanders. The center 

supports the integration of operations security, psychological operations, military 

deception, electronic warfare and destruction throughout the planning and execution 

phases of the operations. Direct support is provided to unified commands, JTFs, 

functional and service components, and subordinate combat commanders. The center 

maintains specialized expertise in C2W systems engineering, operational applications, 

capabilities and vulnerabilities. 

Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). JSpOC is the primary USSTRATCOM 

interface for space effects to the supported commander, to include all aspects of 

deliberate planning, crisis action planning, adaptive campaign planning and the air 

tasking cycle. The JSpOC is responsible for analyzing and targeting enemy space 

capabilities in support of theaters in addition to their global mission. JSpOC targeteers 

can evaluate theater AODs and nominate specific space-related targets to meet a 

theater commander’s objectives 

Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME) is 

a vital joint service activity that develops operational effectiveness estimates for all non-
105

nuclear munitions and continuously updates JMEMs used by the Services for training 

and tactics development, operational targeting, weapons selection, aircraft loadouts, 

and planning for ammunition procurement, survivability, and development of improved 

munitions. JTCG/ME directs the analytical effort of working groups necessary to 

determine degrading effects of various terrain environments on non-nuclear munitions 

effectiveness and improving the database for target vulnerability, delivery accuracy, and 

weapons characteristics. JTCG/ME promotes and develops standardized procedures 

and models used by the Services and the munitions industry for the evaluation of nonnuclear munitions effectiveness and conducts special studies concerning munitions 

effectiveness. 

JTCG/ME is managed through the JTCG/ME program office within the Army Materiel 

Systems Analysis Activity at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. Part-time 

participants from the various Services are organized into working groups that represent 

the major areas of interest. These groups include air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, 

anti-air, target standardization, special effects, and information operations. Principal 

Service members serve on the JTCG/ME steering committee to direct group activities 

and funding. The US Army, as lead Service, appoints the steering committee chairman. 

 

Sister Services 

The US Army maintains an intelligence collection and analysis structure that Airmen 

may utilize when conducting many air and space operations. The Intelligence and 

Security Command (INSCOM) provides a wide variety of ground-based intelligence 

through its main production center, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC). 

The US Navy also maintains an intelligence collection, analysis, and production 

structure that Airmen may utilize when conducting many air and space operations. 

Because the Navy’s “forward from the sea” concept and its large airpower capability, US 

Navy intelligence has a focus in many ways similar to Air Force intelligence. There are 

three main organizations that Airmen can utilize for targeting and assessment support. 

The Office of Naval Intelligence’s (ONI) main production center is the National Maritime 

Intelligence Center (NMIC). 

US Marine Corps, through the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), provides 

tailored intelligence based on expeditionary profiles in littoral areas. 

Non-Military Organizations 

Central Intelligence Agency gathers, analyzes, and produces most of the nation’s 

HUMINT. HUMINT may be able to provide targeteers with information not available 

though other intelligence collection methods. This may be particularly important in the 

case of terrorist organizations, which are often distributed networks with limited physical 

infrastructure. HUMINT is absolutely essential for analysis of such organizations. 
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Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). As the lead 

foreign affairs agency and the enabler of US diplomacy, the State Department has a 

unique perspective on the nations of the world. Such insight, as collected, analyzed, 

and produced by INR, can be extremely influential when planning, executing, and 

assessing military operations. Intelligence concerning political and military leaders, 

cultural trends and thoughts, and economics—to name just a few areas—can give 

Airmen intelligence that ties military strategy to the entire spectrum of national power, 

which can be essential for a truly effects-based approach to conflict. Even from a purely 

military standpoint, such intelligence can enhance understanding of adversary 

motivations, helping to influence or bend them to our will...the ultimate goal in any 

operation. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Encompassing Citizen and Immigration 

Services, Customs and Border Patrol, Transportation Security, the Secret Service, and 

the Coast Guard, DHS, with its three primary missions—prevent terrorist attacks within 

the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage 

from potential attacks and natural disasters—has a wealth of intelligence on enemies, 

and potential enemies, of the US. Although DHS looks “inward,” air and space planners 

may be able to “connect the dots” and utilize DHS-derived intelligence when it leads to 

foreign-based terrorist organizations and infrastructures. 

Department of Justice (DOJ). With subordinate organizations such as the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration, DOJ-derived 

information, like that of the DHS, may help focus targeting efforts when it leads to 

foreign-based terrorist organizations and infrastructures. 
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GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AAC Air Armaments Center 

ACC Air Combat Command 

ACFT analysis, correlation, and fusion team 

ACO airspace coordination order 

AETC Air Education and Training Command 

AFB Air Force base 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFIWC Air Force Information Warfare Center 

AFMIC Air Force Medical Intelligence Center 

AFNOSC Air Force Network Operations and Security Center 

AFOTTP Air Force operational tactics, techniques, and procedures 

AFTTP Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

AIG air intelligence group 

AIS air intelligence squadron 

ALLOREQ allocation request 

AOC air and space operations center 

AOD air and space operations directive 

AOG air and space operations group 

ASOC air support operations center 

ATO air tasking order 

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 

AWPD-1 Air War Planning Document-1 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BDA battle damage assessment 

BE# basic encyclopedia number 

BE / UID basic encyclopedia number and ten-digit unit identification 

numbers 

BFT blue force tracking 

C2 command and control 

C2W command and control warfare 

CA campaign assessment 

CAOC combined air and space operations center 

CAP crisis action planning 

CAS close air support 

CAWG combined assessment working group 

CD collateral damage 

CDM collateral damage methodology 

CEWG combined effects working group 

CENTAF Central Air Forces 

CFACC combined force air and space component commander 
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CFC combined force commander 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CIB 

CID 

combined integration board 

combat identification 

CJCSI Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction 

CMSA cruise missile support agency 

COA course of action 

COD combat operations division 

COG center of gravity 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CONOPS concept of operations 

CONPLAN 

CONUS 

contingency plan 

continental United States 

CPD combat plans division 

CWF combat weather flight 

DCGS distributed common ground/surface systems 

DGS distributed ground station 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DPI desired point of impact 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EBO effects-based operation 

EDA estimated damage assessment 

EOB enemy order of battle 

F2T2EA find, fix, track, target, engage, assess 

FA functional assessment 

FISINT foreign instrumentation signal intelligence 

FRAGO fragmentary order 

FSCM fire support coordination measure 

GAT guidance, apportionment, and targeting (now called TET) 

GCC Global Cryptologic Center 

GEOINT geospatial intelligence 

GPS global positioning system 

HAE height above ellipsoid 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IADS integrated air defense system 
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IMINT imagery intelligence 

INFLTREP 

INR 

inflight report 

Department of State Intelligence and Research Division 

INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command 

IO information operations 

IOT information operations team 

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace 

IQT initial qualification training 

ISR intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

ISRD intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance division 

IW information warfare 

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff 

J2T joint force intelligence directorate deputy director for targets 

J/CFACC joint/combined force air and space component commander 

JAC joint analysis center 

JAEP joint air and space estimate process 

JA judge advocate 

JAOC joint air and space operations center 

JAOP joint air and space operations plan 

JAWG joint assessment working group 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JDAM joint direct attack munition 

JDPI joint designated point of impact 

JEWG 

JFACC 

joint effects working group 

joint force air and space component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander 

JIB joint integration board 

JIOC joint intelligence operations center 

JIPCL joint integrated prioritized collection list 

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list 

JMEM joint munitions effectiveness manual 

JP joint publication 

JSpOC joint space operations center 

JTCB joint targeting coordination board 

JTCG/ME Joint Technical Coordinating Committee for Munitions 

Effectiveness 

JTF joint task force 

JTL joint target list 

JWAC Joint Warfare Analysis Center 

LOAC law of armed conflict 

LNO liaison officer 

MAAP master air attack plan 
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MAJCOM major command 

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence 

MCIA Marine Corps intelligence activity 

MEA munitions effects assessment 

MISREP mission report 

MOE measure of effect 

MOP measure of performance 

MQT mission qualification training 

MSIC Missile and Space Intelligence Center 

MSL mean sea level 

NA national assessment 

NAF numbered air force 

NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center 

NGA National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 

NGIC National Ground Intelligence Agency 

NIST national intelligence support team 

NMIC National Maritime Intelligence Center 

NSA National Security Agency 

NSL no-strike list 

OA operational assessment 

OAT operational assessment team 

OE 

OEF 

operational environment 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

OGA other governmental agency 

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence 

OPLAN operation plan 

OSINT opens-source intelligence 

PACAF Pacific Air Forces 

PBA predictive battlespace awareness 

PDA physical damage assessment 

POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants 

POW prisoner of war 

ROE rules of engagement 

RTL restricted target list 

SA situational awareness 

SAM surface-to-air-missile 

SD strategy division 

SI success indicator 

SIDO 

SIGINT 

Senior Intelligence Duty Officer 

signals intelligence 
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SOF special operations forces 

SOLE special operations liaison element 

SORTIEALOT sortie allotment message 

SOSA system of system analysis 

SPINS special instructions 

SROE standing rules of engagement 

TA tactical assessment 

TACP tactical air control party 

TBMCS Theater Battle Management Core System 

TET targeting effects team (formerly called GAT) 

TNL target nomination list 

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data 

TSA target systems analysis 

TST time sensitive targets 

USAAC United States Army Air Corps 

USAFE United States Air Forces Europe 

USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command 

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

Definitions 

action. Performance of an activity. Actions are taken to achieve intended effects. 

Actions can be kinetic (physical, material) or non-kinetic (logical, behavioral). Actions 

are invariably tactical, usually producing tactical-level direct effects; subsequent causal 

linkages will determine the nature of higher-order indirect effects. (AFDD 2-1.9)

air and space expeditionary task force. A deployed numbered Air Force (NAF) or 

command echelon immediately subordinate to a NAF provided as the US Air Force 

component command committed to a joint operation. Also called AETF. (JP 1-02) [The 

organizational manifestation of Air Force forces afield. The AETF provides a joint force 

commander with a task-organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of 

force, sustainment, control, and force protection.] {Italicized words in brackets apply 

only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

air and space power. The synergistic application of air, space, and information 

systems to project global strategic military power. (AFDD 1) 

allocation. In a general sense, distribution of limited resources among competing 

requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air sorties, nuclear weapons, 
112

forces, and transportation) are described as allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, 

etc. See also allocation (air) (JP 1-02)

allocation (air): The translation of the air apportionment decision into total numbers of 

sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task. See also allocation. (JP 1-

02) [The translation of the air apportionment decision into total numbers of sorties or 

missions by weapon system type available for each operation or task] {Italicized words 

in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources 

among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for 

planning). (JP 1-02)

apportionment (air). The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by 

percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations for a 

given period of time. Also called air apportionment. (JP 1-02)

assessment. 1. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or 

planned intelligence activity. (JP 1-02) [The evaluation of progress toward the creation 

of effects and the achievement of objectives and end state conditions.] {Italicized words 

in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

battle rhythm. A commander’s pace, pattern, or systematic process used to plan and 

execute an engagement, battle, or campaign. (AFDD 2-1.9)

blue force tracking. The employment of techniques to identify US, allied, and coalition 

forces for the purposes of providing commanders enhanced situational awareness and 

reducing fratricide. Also called BFT. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or 

operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1–02) 

campaign assessment. The joint force commander’s broad qualitative and analytical 

determination of the overall campaign progress, effectiveness of operations and 

recommendations for future action. Also called CA. (AFDD 2)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at 

accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1–

02) 

cascading effect. An indirect effect that ripples through an adversary system, usually 

affecting other systems. Typically, cascading effects flow throughout the levels of war 

and are the result of interdependencies or linkages among multiple adversary systems. 

(AFDD 2-1.2) 

causal linkage. An explanation of why an action or effect will cause or contribute to a 
113

given effect (AFDD 2) 

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a 

military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. Also called 

COGs. (JP 1-02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political 

leadership, social dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, 

industrial, or economic) strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a 

given strategic, operational, or tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical 

strength, or will to fight] {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are 

offered for clarity.} 

collateral damage. Unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects 

that would not be lawful military targets in the circumstances ruling at the time. Such 

damage is not unlawful so long as it is not excessive in light of the overall military 

advantage anticipated from the attack. (JP 1-02)

combat identification. The capability to attain an accurate characterization of detected 

objects in the joint battlespace to the extent that high confidence, timely application of 

military options and weapons resources can occur. Depending on the situation and the 

operational decisions that must be made, this characterization may be limited to 

“enemy,” “friend,” or “neutral.” In other situations, other characterizations may be 

required—including, but not limited to class, type, nationality, mission configuration, 

status, and intent. Also call CID. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

combined force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

subunified commander, or combined task force commander authorized to exercise 

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also 

called CFC. (JP 1–02) 

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 

the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 

commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 

the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 0-2)

cumulative effect. An effect resulting from the aggregation of multiple, contributory 

direct or indirect effects. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

deliberate targeting. The part of the tasking process for prosecuting targets that are 

detected, identified, and developed in sufficient time to schedule actions against them in 

tasking cycle products such as the air tasking order. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

direct effect. First-order result of an action with no intervening effect between action 

and outcome. Usually immediate, physical, and readily recognizable (e.g., weapons 

employment results). (AFDD 2-1.9) 
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dynamic targeting. The part of the tasking process for prosecuting targets that are not 

detected, identified, or developed in time to be included in deliberate targeting, and 

therefore have not had actions scheduled against them. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

effect indicator. Independent, qualitative or quantitative condition(s) that indicates the 

achievement of an effect. (AFDD 2-1.9)

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set 

of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. 

A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom (AFDD 2-1.9) 

effects-based operations. Operations that are planned, executed, assessed, and 

adapted to influence or change systems or capabilities in order to achieve desired 

outcomes. Also called EBO. (AFDD 2)

emerging target. A potential target, which, upon initial detection, meets sufficient 

criteria to be considered and further developed. The criticality and time sensitivity of the 

potential target is initially undetermined. (AFDD 2-1.9)

end state. The set of conditions that needs to be achieved to resolve the situation or 

conflict on satisfactory terms, as defined by appropriate authority. (AFDD 2). 

geospatial information and services. The concept for collection, information 

extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery 

(both commercial and national source), gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, 

hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise 

location on the earth’s surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and 

operations including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, 

simulation and precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework 

for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common 

interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, 

and publications; in digital simulation and modeling databases; in photographic form; or 

in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributed centerline data. Geospatial 

services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and also 

includes instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial 

data. (JP 1-02)

geospatial intelligence. The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial 

information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically 

referenced activities on the earth. Also known as GEOINT. (AFDD 2-1.9)

indirect effect. A second, third, or nth-order effect created through an intermediate 

effect or causal linkage following a causal action. May be physical, psychological, 

functional, or systemic in nature. May be created in a cumulative, cascading, sequential, 

or parallel manner. An indirect effect is often delayed and typically is more difficult to 
115

recognize and assess than a direct effect. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

intended effect. A proactively sought effect. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 

electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 3-13. This term and its 

definition approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to 

reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of 

operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for 

each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then 

analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on 

operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is 

a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or 

more Military Departments participate. (JP 1–02) 

joint target list. A consolidated list of selected targets considered to have military 

significance in the combatant commander’s area of responsibility. Also called JTL. (JP 

1-02)

joint integrated prioritized target list. A prioritized list of targets and associated data 

approved by the joint force commander or designated representative and maintained by 

a joint force. Targets and priorities are derived from the recommendations of 

components in conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the joint force 

commander’s objectives and guidance. Also called JIPTL. (JP 1-02)

kinetic. Relating to actions that involve the forces and energy of moving bodies, 

including physical damage to or destruction of targets through use of bombs, missiles, 

bullets, and similar projectiles. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

law of armed conflict. See law of war. Also called LOAC. (JP 1-02)

law of war. That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. 

Also called the law of armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

link. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes in a system. 

(AFDD 2-1.9) 

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of 

advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the 
116

ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle to 

cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the battlespace 

through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in 

respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02) [Air and space 

power is a maneuver element in its own right, co-equal with land and maritime power; 

as such, it is no longer merely a supporting force to surface combat. As a maneuver 

element, it can be supported by surface forces in attaining its assigned objectives.] 

{Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

measures and indicators. Encompassing term for the various criteria used to evaluate 

progress within the assessment process (AFDD 2-1.9) 

measure of effect. Independent qualitative or quantitative empirical measure assigned 

to an intended effect, against which the effect’s achievement is assessed. Also call 

MOE. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

measure of performance. A quantitative empirical measure of achieved actions 

against associated planned/required actions and against which a task’s or other action’s 

accomplishment, is assessed. Also called MOP. (AFDD 2-1.9)

national assessment. A broad, overarching review of the effectiveness of national 

security strategy and whether national leadership’s objectives for a particular operation 

or campaign are being met. Also called NA. (AFDD 2-1.9)

node. A tangible entity that is a physical, functional, or behavioral element of a system. 

(AFDD 2-1.9)

non-kinetic. Relating to actions that produce effects without direct use of the force or 

energy of moving objects, including such means as electromagnetic radiation, directed 

energy, information operations, etc. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

no-strike list. A list of geographic areas, complexes, or installations not planned for 

capture or destruction. Attacking these may violate the law of armed conflict or interfere 

with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments. Also called NSL. (JP 

1-02) [The no-strike list is a list of geographic areas, complexes, installations, or 

personnel not planned for capture or destruction. Attacking personnel may violate 

LOAC or interfere with friendly relations with indigenous personnel or governments.] 

{Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals towards which every 

military operation should be directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for 

example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the 

commander’s plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). 

See also target. (JP 1-02) 

operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational 
117

objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, 

campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force 

commander’s strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by 

integrating the key activities at all levels of war. (JP 1-02)

operational assessment. A joint force components’ evaluation of their achievement of 

their objectives, both tactical and operational, through assessment of effects, 

operational execution, environmental influences, and attainment of the objectives 

success indicators, in order to develop strategy recommendations. Also called OA. 

(AFDD 2-1.9)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any 

echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in 

combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. 

When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship 

the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over 

these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the 

authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving 

organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating 

objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. 

Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations 

and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. 

Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force 

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational 

control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ 

those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to 

accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction 

for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. 

Also called OPCON. (JP1-02) 

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations 

are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within 

theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by 

establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, 

sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying 

resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader 

dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative 

support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are 

exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1-02) 

predictive battlespace awareness. The situational awareness needed to develop 

patterns of behavior, constraints, and opportunities of geography, topography, culture, 

environment, and forces that allow us to misdirect, predict, and pre-empt our 

adversaries. Also called PBA. (AFDD 2-1.9)
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psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 

and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 

individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign 

attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 

1–02) 

reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or 

equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 1-02) 

restricted target list. A list of restricted targets nominated by elements of the joint force 

and approved by the joint force commander. This list also includes restricted targets 

directed by higher authorities. Also called RTL. (JP 1-02) [A list of targets that have 

specific restrictions imposed upon them. Actions that exceed specific restrictions are 

prohibited until coordinated and approved by the establishing headquarters. Targets 

are restricted because certain types of actions against them may have negative political, 

cultural, law of armed conflict or propaganda implications, or may interfere with 

projected friendly operations. The RTL is nominated by elements of the joint force and 

approved by the combined force commander. This list also includes restricted targets 

directed by higher authorities.] {Words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are 

offered for clarity.}

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate 

the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or 

continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-

02) 

strategic attack. Offensive action conducted by command authorities action aimed at 

generating effects that most directly achieve our national security objectives by affecting 

an adversary’s leadership, conflict-sustaining resources, and/or strategy. (AFDD 2-1.2) 

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group 

of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives 

and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these 

objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; 

sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other 

instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve 

these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with 

strategic plans. (JP 1–02) 

success indicator. The conditions indicating the progress toward and/or achievement 

of an objective or end-state condition. Also called SI. (AFDD 2-1.9) 

tactical assessment. The overall determination of the effectiveness of tactical 

operations. This consists of several elements: physical damage assessment, functional 

assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, estimated damage analysis, lower-
119

intensity conflict assessment, weather effects, and logistic status. Formerly known (in 

less comprehensive form) as combat assessment or CA. Also called TA (AFDD 2-1.9)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or 

military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary 

to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational 

control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the 

level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant 

commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the 

losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary 

of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the 

application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission 

or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1–02) 

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned 

and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. 

Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat 

elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 

1–02) 

target. 1. An area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function, 

individual, group, system, or behavior identified for possible action to support the 

commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent. Targets fall into two general categories: 

deliberate and dynamic. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or 

person against which intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and 

numbered for future firing. 4. In gunfire support usage, an impact burst that hits the 

target. Also called TGT. (JP 1-02) 

targeteer. Multi-disciplinary specialists highly trained in analyzing targets and 

developing targeting solutions to support the commander’s objectives. (AFDD 2-1.9)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the 

appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and 

capabilities. (JP 1-02). [The part of the tasking process for selecting and prioritizing 

targets and matching appropriate actions to those targets to create specific desired 

effects that achieve objectives, taking account of operational requirements and 

capabilities.] {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for 

clarity.}

time-sensitive targets. Those targets requiring immediate response because they 

pose (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting 

targets of opportunity. Also called TSTs. (JP 1-02)

weaponeering. The process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or 

nonlethal weapons required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, 
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considering target vulnerability, weapons effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage 

criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability. (JP 1-02) [Weaponeering is the part of 

the tasking process for estimating the quantity and types of lethal and non-lethal 

weapons needed to achieve desired effects against specific targets.] {Italicized words in 

brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}