U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

52–289PDF 2010

UNITED NATIONS CHAPTER VII MANDATES AND

THE U.S.–IRAQ BILATERAL AGREEMENT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL 

ORGANIZATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 17, 2009

Serial No. 111–60

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts, Chairman 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

CLIFF STAMMERMAN, Subcommittee Staff Director 

PAUL BERKOWITZ, Republican Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN FORNI, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Michael J. Matheson, Esq., Visiting Research Professor of Law, The George 

Washington University Law School .................................................................... 6

Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D., Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Congressional 

Research Service .................................................................................................. 18

Stephen G. Rademaker, Esq., Senior Counsel, BGR Group (former Assistant 

Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation) ............... 32

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Michael J. Matheson, Esq.: Prepared statement .................................................. 9

Kenneth Katzman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................... 22

Stephen G. Rademaker, Esq.: Prepared statement .............................................. 35

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

(1)

UNITED NATIONS CHAPTER VII MANDATES 

AND THE U.S.–IRAQ BILATERAL AGREEMENT 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERSIGHT,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Delahunt (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. The hearing will come to order. Recently I noted 

that my friend and colleague from Massachusetts who chairs the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee—that is obviously Senator 

John Kerry—noted that Iraq had become the forgotten war. 

Well, I agree. Iraq no longer commands daily headlines and here 

in Congress the debate now focuses on health care reform and 

there are multiple briefings and hearings on Afghanistan, but just 

because something is forgotten does not mean that it has gone 

away. 

As former Secretary of State Colin Powell warned former President George W. Bush before the invasion of Iraq, you break it, you 

own it. He was right. This hearing is about the status of that ownership, our responsibility, if you will. 

In December of last year, the United States and Iraq signed an 

agreement that is commonly known as the Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA being the acronym. I refer to it simply as the U.S.-

Iraq Bilateral Agreement because it was much more, in my opinion, than a typical SOFA. This subcommittee had held a number 

of hearings as it was being negotiated, and I believe that those 

hearings influenced and improved the ultimate agreement that was 

signed by Prime Minister Maliki and President Bush. 

I continue to have concerns about it, however, and one of those 

concerns is the subject of today’s hearing. One purpose of the bilateral agreement was to replace the United Nations Security Council 

mandate for United States troops and other international forces in 

Iraq. This mandate was what is known as a Chapter VII mandate. 

Chapter VII of the U.N. charter concerns, and I am quoting, ‘‘action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts 

of aggression.’’ In effect, a Chapter VII mandate means that the 

international community via the Security Council has passed legally binding resolutions regarding the particular country irrespective of what that country’s people or government might wish. 

2

Now, the U.S.-Iraq Bilateral Agreement effectively ended the 

Chapter VII mandate regarding international forces in Iraq. This 

was welcomed in Iraq as an acknowledgement of its sovereignty 

and national dignity. After all, a Chapter VII mandate essentially 

says that you are a ward of the international community, that you 

are not capable or trustworthy enough to run your own country, 

and for anyone, but especially a people as proud as the Iraqi people, this is profoundly insulting. 

However, a number of other Chapter VII mandates still remain 

in force regarding Iraq. Most of them stem from the Saddam Hussein era. Article 25 of the bilateral agreement committed the 

United States to working with Iraq to address these remaining 

Chapter VII mandates and restoring Iraq to full sovereignty in the 

family of nations. 

Unfortunately, this is not as easy as it sounds. These mandates 

cover a range of issues from border disputes to compensation 

claims, from the first Gulf War to the bank account which protects 

Iraq’s oil revenue from lawsuits to now obsolete provisions regarding weapons of mass destruction. Depending on how they are defined, there are almost 20 different mandates. Many of them require Iraq to take certain steps, some of which they have not accomplished, for them to be eliminated. 

Each of these mandates must be discussed, debated and voted on 

in the Security Council, and the reality of the Security Council is 

that Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as the 

United States, can veto any resolution for any reason. Thus, it is 

clear that this will require the expenditure of considerable political 

capital by the United States at the United Nations. 

Some might say that we have enough on our plate. It is time to 

move forward and address other pressing issues. But let me suggest that we have given our word in a formal document and, as 

Secretary Powell observed, we have a moral obligation to the people of Iraq, and that simply cannot be denied. 

I would also especially note, and I think this is particularly important, that while it might be off the front page in many ways, 

Iraq, its stability and its potential prosperity are essential in the 

Middle East and the entire region, and a stable Middle East is essential to our national security as well as world peace. So Iraq is 

as important as ever, albeit it may be forgotten by some. 

So this hearing is an effort to find out what needs to be done to 

terminate these mandates. What are the mandates under discussion? What is the process for eliminating them? What do the Iraqis 

have to do to help us help them? How does this affect Iraq’s internal politics and its relations with its neighbors? What are the prospects for a possible referendum in January if we do not eliminate 

at least some of these mandates? What are the implications for 

American forces remaining in Iraq? 

This hearing and I think a most important briefing in which two 

distinguished parliamentarians from Iraq will come before this 

committee and give us their perspective will explore all of these 

issues. 

But before I introduce this distinguished panel let me turn to my 

friend from California and the ranking member of this committee, 

Dana Rohrabacher, for any opening comments he might have. 

3

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

note that the chairman has taken special interest in the various 

legal and diplomatic agreements that have been made concerning 

the ongoing conflict in Iraq. The chairman was the first one to take 

notice of the Status of Forces Agreement. 

It could be the reason he was the first one to take notice is the 

fact that Congress had been totally left out of the loop that we 

were going to have a Status of Forces Agreement and what the 

meaning of that was, so the chairman did make sure that we 

looked at that issue and demanded that Congress play its rightful 

role during the last administration as that agreement went forward. 

So I am here to learn about where we stand now, now that decisions have been made that our troops will be withdrawing and are 

currently actually involved in withdrawing and what legal documents and agreements and mandates that we have. I am here to 

listen and to learn. 

I do know one thing; that we all need to ponder what the whole 

Iraqi episode in American history means to us as people and as a 

nation. We have lost 4,300 of our young people. Well, some of them 

weren’t young. Some of them were in their fifties probably I am 

sure or sixties. 

Male VOICE. That is still young. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Still young. But we lost 4,300 of our American people. Forty-three hundred died in Iraq. Forty-three hundred 

people. 

And tens of thousands more wounded. Many of them will live 

lives for the rest of their life they will live in misery, perhaps without a leg, perhaps half of their face has been shot off, perhaps they 

won’t be able to walk or have children. Thousands of Americans 

and 4,300 killed. 

One trillion dollars of Treasury—American. One trillion dollars. 

Now, what does this all mean? What is it all about? That trillion 

dollars, I might add, had it not been spent for that purpose may 

well have prevented us from going into the magnitude of the economic crisis that we are facing today. Think of the price that we 

have paid. It is an incredible price, and we need to ponder what 

this all means to us as Americans, what commitments we will 

make in the future. 

I believe that the decision to go into Iraq in the first place was 

a decision based on a benevolent intent, and I believe the benevolent intent was that the American people, all of us who participated in that decision, because we did as a Congress, believed that 

the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was a vicious and bloody and 

evil, evil regime and that we were willing to commit ourselves and 

risk the price that we paid in order to free the people of Iraq from 

this dictatorship. 

Again, we need to ponder to see if that is indeed the case. Was 

that worth it? We got rid of Saddam Hussein, and then of course 

more and more casualties, more and more treasure trying to prevent radical Islamicists from taking advantage of the chaos and the 

confusion of what happens after the transition after a dictatorship 

into some other kind of government. 

4

Was all of that worth it? What it is all about, and what are the 

remnants that are left behind that we have to deal with now? 

Today we are going to hear about the legal remnants and some of 

the agreements, and I am here, as I say, to learn about that because that is something we have to deal with as well. We have to 

deal with some of the relationships and some of the situations that 

existed before our intervention in that situation, and we now have 

to deal with that. 

One of the I think major issues is Camp Ashraf where we have 

people who have committed themselves to pose the Islamic dictatorship in Iran, and we have a group of people who were permitted 

to stage themselves from Iraqi territory and they are now caught 

in a situation that had we not intervened wouldn’t exist, so the fact 

is it is up to us to confront the issue of Camp Ashraf and what happens to those people. 

I would hope that considering that we spent all of this money 

and all of this blood trying to establish a country that would be 

more democratic and have more concern for human rights that the 

Government of Iraq would operate with some of those values instead of with an iron fist and trying to exert its authority in situations like Camp Ashraf. 

I would hope that the 43 prisoners that they have taken from 

Camp Ashraf will be treated well, which I doubt, but that their 

human rights will be respected and the human rights of those people will be respected. How the Government of Iraq acts from now 

on will determine for the people of the United States whether or 

not it was worth us to go in and spend the lives of our children 

and spend the treasure that we could have used in our own families here at home. 

If it is a democratic government and they treat people with respect and human rights and they perhaps try to solve their own 

problems, respecting the rights of various peoples within Iraq—the 

Kurds, the Christians, other minorities—and as they treat each 

other, the Sunnis and the Shiites treat each other, that will determine whether or not the American people will look back and say 

yes, it was worth giving my son’s life to see that that vicious dictatorship was removed. 

If they make the wrong decisions in these areas, Mr. Chairman, 

I believe that there will be a deep resentment of the American people to the leaders and our Government who sent them there, but 

also to the people of Iraq who have not lived up to the opportunity 

that we paid such a dear price to give them. 

With that, I am very interested in the testimony. Thank you for 

holding this hearing today. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. Thank you, Dana. 

Well, let me begin by introducing our witnesses. They have become regulars before this particular subcommittee. They are all 

distinguished in their own right, and we welcome them back. 

First we have Professor Mike Matheson. He is a member of the 

International Law factory—faculty rather, not factory; is that some 

sort of Freudian slip there—of the George Washington University 

Law School here in Washington. He served from 2003 to 2006 as 

the American member of the U.N. International Law Commission. 

5

From 1972 to 2000, he worked in the Legal Advisor’s Office at 

the Department of State, including 2 years as Acting Legal Advisor 

of the Department. While at the State, he led efforts to create the 

International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda and 

the U.N. Compensation Commission for Gulf War Claims, and he 

headed the U.S. delegation with the rank of Ambassador to the 

U.N. Negotiations on Conventional Weapons. 

He has written a book on the U.N. Security Council in the post 

Cold War period and on international humanitarian law in recent 

conflicts, as well as multiple articles and other pieces. 

I would note that Professor Matheson currently has a consulting 

contract with the State Department in the amount of $20,000 concerning the Kosovo case before the International Court of Justice. 

However, he is appearing here today in his own capacity and not 

as a representative of the United States Government. 

Next we have Dr. Ken Katzman of the Congressional Research 

Service. He serves as a Senior Middle East Analyst for the U.S. 

Congress with a special emphasis on Iran, Iraq and the Persian 

Gulf States, Afghanistan and terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and South Asia. He is a busy guy these days. 

He has also written numerous articles and various outside publications, including a book entitled The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s 

Revolutionary Guard, and has given numerous official presentations and briefings at conferences worldwide. 

And last, but certainly not least, Steve Rademaker. He currently 

serves as Senior Counsel for the BGR Consulting Group. He joined 

BGR in 2007 following a distinguished career in all three branches 

of government. 

What is particularly interesting for the purposes of this hearing 

is that he served from 2005 to 2006 as a member of the College 

of Commissioners of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification 

and Inspection Commission, commonly known as UNMOVIC, 

which was a U.N. mandated operation regarding Iraq that has 

since been terminated. 

He continues to serve on the U.N. Secretary General’s Advisory 

Board in disarmament matters and has joined the U.N. Commission on the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism. 

In 2002, he became an Assistant Secretary of State, and from 

then until 2006 he headed at various times three bureaus of the 

Department of State, including the Bureau of Arms Control and 

the Bureau of International Security in Nonproliferation, and we 

have to note, of course, for the record that he has also held positions on the staff of the Committee of International Relations of the 

House of Representatives, including Deputy Staff Director and 

Chief Counsel. 

We welcome you all. Steve, we welcome you back. Let us begin 

with Mike Matheson. 

6

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. MATHESON, ESQ., VISITING RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF LAW, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 

UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 

Mr. MATHESON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have 

submitted a written statement. I suggest it be included in the 

record and that I give a summary at this point. 

My statement attempts to describe where matters stand with respect to the various Chapter VII measures which are still in effect 

with respect to Iraq and particularly in light of the provisions of 

the United States-Iraq agreement from last year. 

You have already noted that Article 25 of that agreement does 

recognize that the situation of Iraq is fundamentally different now 

than it was in 1991. It acknowledges that Iraq should return to the 

legal standing that it had before the Gulf War, and it pledges the 

United States to use its best efforts toward that objective. 

The Security Council itself has agreed with this general objective, and in fact over the past few years it has itself taken a number of steps to revoke or to modify some of the more onerous Chapter VII measures that had been applied to Iraq after the Gulf War: 

In particular, a lifting of the trade and financial sanctions, an easing of U.N. control over Iraqi oil and gas revenues, and the expiration of the multinational force mandate. 

Now, in July of this year the U.N. Secretary General issued a report which reported on where matters stood with respect to those 

measures that remained, and it noted that progress had been made 

on a number of points with respect to these matters. It supported 

the gradual restoration of Iraq to its prior status, but it also noted 

that there were some unresolved matters which still had to be 

dealt with. 

Now, the first area of these unresolved matters relates to the 

compensation for the losses suffered by Kuwait and other countries 

during the Gulf War. As you know, in 1991 the Security Council 

created a U.N. Compensation Commission to provide compensation 

to the various victims of the Gulf War and to make payments for 

that purpose from Iraqi oil export revenues. Ultimately the Commission awarded a total of about $52 billion 

to claimants of various nationalities, including Americans. To date, 

about $28 billion of that has been paid, which leaves about $24 billion representing unpaid claims by Kuwait for damage to the Kuwaiti environment and to the Kuwaiti oil industry. 

Originally for this purpose deductions were being made from 

Iraqi oil exports to the tune of 30 percent. This was reduced in recent years to 5 percent, and Iraq has now proposed that it be reduced to 1 percent if not eliminated altogether. Since the remaining claims against the fund are Kuwaiti, hopefully this can be resolved by some kind of accommodation reached between Iraq and 

Kuwait. 

One suggestion that apparently has been considered is that these 

unpaid amounts be used to fund investments in infrastructure 

projects in Iraq. In any event, Article 26 of the U.S.-Iraq agreement 

says that the United States is going to support Iraq in achieving 

a final resolution of these compensation issues. 

The second area of unresolved issues relates to other Iraqi debts 

and assets. At the end of last year, the Security Council decided 

7

at Iraq’s request to continue in effect a number of measures that 

had been put in place to handle Iraqi funds and assets: Specifically 

the deposit of Iraqi oil export funds into a development fund, which 

is now administered by Iraq, and the operation of an international 

advisory and monitoring board to monitor the accounting and use 

of those funds. 

These funds and Iraqi oil assets generally are made immune 

from attachments by Security Council decisions with some exceptions. Now, in the Secretary General’s July report it said that Iraq 

was now basically ready to assume these oversight responsibilities, 

but it did note that there were certain unresolved technical questions outstanding with respect to Iraqi internal controls and the deposit of certain funds into this development fund. 

It is also important to resolve the large volume of claims against 

Iraq and debts of Iraq that date back to the Saddam regime. This 

includes claims of U.S. nationals, and this is necessary so that Iraq 

can resume its normal responsibility of a sovereign state for its assets and liabilities. Again, Article 26 of the U.S.-Iraq agreement 

says that the United States will assist Iraq in trying to resolve 

these matters as well. 

Next is the area of weapons of mass destruction. As you know, 

after the Gulf War the U.N. Security Council required the elimination of Iraqi WMD and also imposed some significant constraints 

on Iraqi activities and Iraqi capabilities that might be used in the 

future for WMD purposes. This includes chemical and biological 

weapons. It includes long range ballistic missiles and, most importantly, it includes all nuclear items and activities except for certain 

limited medical and other purposes. 

Now, at the time Iraq was required to accept a comprehensive 

and unusual regime of international inspections to verify its compliance with these provisions. In 2007, the Security Council decided 

that these extraordinary inspection regimes were no longer necessary. 

But it did keep in effect the restrictions on Iraqi nuclear and 

other activities, and the resolutions say that these will continue 

until the Security Council determines that Iraq is in compliance 

with Council resolutions and the International Atomic Energy Administration or Agency decides that Iraq is in full compliance with 

nuclear safeguards agreements. Neither of these steps has yet occurred. 

Apparently there is some further work required on technical 

issues, particularly with respect to possible future Iraqi peaceful 

nuclear activities, and I think probably there is also a policy, or 

perhaps it is a tactical question, about how the complete lifting of 

all of these restrictions at this point, how it would relate to United 

States and other nonproliferation objectives in the region, particularly with respect to Iran. 

Then there are a series of other issues on which Chapter VII 

measures remain in effect. For example, after the Gulf War the Security Council created a Boundary Commission to resolve the IraqKuwait border dispute which had been one of the ostensible causes 

for the Gulf War, and when that process of demarcation was completed the Council guaranteed the newly demarcated boundary. So 

8

the question arises as to whether it might be desirable to continue 

that guarantee of the boundary in force. 

There are also a series of measures to locate and to repatriate 

the remains and the property of Kuwaiti and third country nationals who were missing during the Gulf War. The embargo on arms 

shipments to nongovernmental entities in Iraq remains. There are 

measures to facilitate the return of Iraqi cultural property and so 

on. The Secretary General’s report this year identified a number of 

unresolved issues with respect to each of these items, so it may be 

necessary to continue these in effect until those remaining issues 

are resolved. 

In conclusion, I think all parties are agreed on the principle that 

Iraq should be restored to the legal and international status that 

it enjoyed prior to the Gulf War, but, as you said, it is not quite 

so simple. Some measures apparently need to continue in effect for 

an interim period until technical questions are resolved. That includes, for example, the administration of the oil proceeds and their 

protection from attachment. 

Some issues probably could only be eliminated when questions 

between Iraq and other states are resolved, and a good example of 

this is the compensation issue with respect to Kuwait. And it might 

be that the Council decides that certain other matters should be 

kept in force for a temporary period for policy reasons, and the 

WMD and the boundary questions may fall into that category. 

What I would stress on the whole is that this process of orderly 

resolution of these remaining Chapter VII issues need not be taken 

as any kind of derogation from Iraqi sovereignty, nor should it be 

taken as any kind of statement that Iraq is not a full, equal state 

on a par with others in the international community. 

The Security Council has used Chapter VII on many occasions in 

the past to deploy peacekeeping forces and other missions, and to 

take other measures, without derogating from the sovereignty of 

states that might be involved, and in fact all states have certain 

duties under Chapter VII, including the United States: For example, a duty to prosecute or extradite international terrorists found 

in our territory. 

So my point would be that Iraq has already been relieved of the 

great burden of the onerous restrictions from the Saddam era, and 

there is no reason why the remaining issues can’t be dealt with 

and resolved in an orderly manner with the objective of restoring 

Iraq to its full status prior to the Gulf War. 

That is the end of my presentation. Of course, I would be glad 

to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Matheson follows:]

9


52289b-1.eps
10


52289b-2.eps
11


52289b-3.eps
12


52289b-4.eps
13


52289b-5.eps
14


52289b-6.eps
15


52289b-7.eps
16


52289b-8.eps
17


52289b-9.eps
18

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Matheson. 

Next we will go to Dr. Katzman. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH KATZMAN, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN 

MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having me back; 

Mr. Rohrabacher, for asking me to appear today. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can you hit the button, Ken? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Thank you very much for asking me to appear. 

My primary responsibilities at CRS are on Iraqi politics, culture, 

history, United States policy toward Iraq rather than specifically 

the legalities of the U.S.-Iraq agreement or the United Nations. I 

will summarize my comments and ask that the remainder be submitted for the record. Thank you very much. 

In evaluating the implementation of the U.S.-Iraq Security 

Agreement, including these provisions committing the United 

States to support lifting the remaining Chapter VII resolutions 

mandate, it is useful I think to assess where Iraqi politics stand, 

and that I think addresses the broader questions in several opening statements about where the U.S. mission stands, the implications of the United States decision to intervene in Iraq in 2003. 

In general, Iraq’s political system can be characterized by peaceful competition rather than violence. However, sectarianism and 

ethnic and factional in-fighting continue to simmer, and many Iraqi 

views and positions are colored by efforts to outflank, outmaneuver 

and constrain rival factions. 

These tendencies will only grow in the run up to the January 16, 

2010, national elections in Iraq, which may also concurrently include a vote, a referendum on the U.S.-Iraq agreement subject to 

that would have to be approved by the National Assembly to have 

the referendum. That decision has not been taken yet. 

Compounding the factional tensions is the perception that Prime 

Minister Maliki is in a strong position politically. This is largely a 

result of the strong showing of his Da’wa Party in the January 31, 

2009, provincial elections. His showing in those elections was in 

turn a product of his benefitting from an improved security situation, his positions in favor of strong central government as opposed 


52289b-10.eps
19

to local tendencies or regionalism and his March 2008 move 

against Shiite militias who were virtually controlling Basra and 

Umm Qasr Port. 

Although Maliki’s coalition was the clear winner in these elections, the subsequent efforts to form provincial administrations 

demonstrated that he still needs to bargain with rival factions, including that of the radical young Shiite cleric, Moqtuda Al Sadr, 

who is studying Islamic theology in Iran with the intention of trying to improve his standing in the clerical hierarchy. 

Possibly as a result of his strength in position, Maliki is seen by 

rivals as increasingly authoritarian. He is widely assessed by 

United States and Iraqi experts as attempting to gain control of the 

security services and build new security organs loyal to him personally rather than to institutions. Some have accused him of purging security officials he perceived as insufficiently loyal. 

He has also reportedly been using security forces to politically intimidate opponents, including in Diyala Province, for example. 

Four thousand Special Operations Commandos, part of the Iraqi 

Security Forces, the official forces of Iraq, report to Maliki’s Office 

of the Commander in Chief and not to the Defense or Interior Ministries. Some of Maliki’s opponents and critics say these political 

tactics mimic the steps taken by Saddam Hussein when he was rising to power to centralize his rule. 

Maliki has also used the U.S.-Iraq agreement for his own political interest to some extent. Contributing toward the perception of 

him as a strong leader was his insistence on certain concessions 

from the United States in the negotiations on the security agreement. First and foremost was his demand that the agreement include a firm timetable for the United States to withdraw from Iraq. 

That was included in the security agreement, and President Obama 

has delineated a draw down plan that comports with the agreement. 

There is a specific stipulation in the security agreement which 

Maliki had wanted that by June 30 of this year the United States 

would withdraw forces from Iraq’s cities. U.S. military leaders had 

advised Maliki that there are certain areas of Iraq, particularly 

Mosul in the north and Sadr City, the Sadris neighborhood of 

Baghdad, a very large neighborhood, where U.S. forces should remain beyond June 30. 

Maliki refused and disagreed with that, and the U.S., in order 

to fulfill its commitments under the security agreement, agreed to 

pull U.S. forces out of Mosul and Sadr City by June 30, and that 

was accomplished. There was also a demand purportedly urged by 

the Iranians in the security agreement that there is a provision 

that facilities in Iraq cannot be used by the United States to attack 

other countries, particularly Iran, and that was a demand that was 

included also in the security agreement. 

On the other hand, Maliki’s political position is not unassailable, 

and it is argued that he might sink or swim with perceptions of 

changing security situations. His position could potentially weaken, 

even dramatically, if the security situation deteriorates, and there 

was some thinking that he was very much embarrassed by major 

bombings on August 19 which killed about a hundred Iraqis and 

severely damaged the Finance and Foreign Ministries. 

20

Because Maliki still is politically strong, there are various coalitions that are forming to try to best him in the January 16, 2010, 

national elections for a new Parliament, and of course the Parliament determines the next government. Maliki would like to continue as Prime Minister after those elections. 

A major development came just a few weeks ago when an Iraq 

National Alliance formed, which is a coalition of some former allies 

of Maliki, particularly the Supreme Council, the Islamic Supreme 

Council of Iraq, a fairly pro Iranian party; the Sadrist Movement; 

Fadilah Party, which is a small Shia Party mainly in Basra; and 

allies of Ahmad Chalabi Iraq National Congress. Ahmad Chalabi 

was part of the new coalition, as well as former Prime Minister 

Ibrahim al-Jafari, who was from the same party from Maliki, but 

Maliki ousted him as Da’wa leader and now Jafari wants to get 

him back, so to speak. 

So these various coalitions are forming, and some question why 

former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi, who will be part of the briefing after this hearing, did not join the new alliance. He has been 

generally a critic of Maliki and has even been mentioned over the 

past few years as agitating to replace Maliki, but because of 

Allawi’s rivalry with Ahmad Chalabi many experts attribute that 

to the fact that Allawi is not part of this new coalition. 

Maliki is negotiating with a lot of different parties to get his own 

block to countervail against this new block that has formed. One 

person he is allegedly purportedly talking to is Saleh Mutlaq, who 

is going to be part of the briefing after this hearing, other Sunnis. 

And some would say this is a positive because now we have Shias 

allying with Sunnis in some cases. That was not the case during 

the civil war period, 2006–2007, so we now have cross-sectarian alliances forming. 

The main problem I think in Iraqi politics is the Arab-Kurdish 

dispute that is not getting any better. There have been some near 

clashes up in the north. A very, very pro era party won the provincial elections in the north and would like to push the Kurds out 

of disputed villages in Nineveh Province. Mosul is the capital of 

Nineveh. That is a huge problem. General Odierno has now recommended a plan to have some confidence building measures involving U.S. force. 

Just to start concluding, the security agreement gives Maliki the 

opportunity to burnish his Iraqi debt, nationalist credentials. By allowing a Cabinet vote on the referendum he shows that he is taking other views into account. It is likely, however, the Maliki—he 

signed the agreement. It is unlikely I think that he will try to agitate either for a referendum necessarily or, if there is a referendum, for it to be voted down since Maliki did sign onto it and 

he is to some extent co-opted by it. 

It is unlikely he would agitate to vote down the referendum. If 

the referendum is held and voted down, U.S. troops might be required to withdraw by January 2011 rather than the December 

2011 under the existing security agreement, and President 

Obama’s draw down plan meets that timeframe. 

I would just conclude by saying the Iraq-Kuwait issue is a major 

issue. Obviously Kuwait wants all its reparations funds. The main 

claims that they are still owed are for the damage to the oil fields 

21

that was done by Saddam’s invasion. Iraq wants to stop paying this 

compensation, the reparations that cost Iraq $660 million from 

January to June of this year, so it is about $110 million per month 

that Iraq is paying for this compensation. Iraq views that as funds 

that could be used better for economic development. Kuwait of 

course wants full reparations. 

I would say President Obama, in his meeting with Maliki on July 

22, made a clear statement supporting the Iraqi position saying the 

Iraqi people should not be held to account for what Saddam did, 

but the Kuwaitis so far are not backing down, and this is an irritant in Iraq-Kuwait relations. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Katzman follows:]

22


52289a-1.eps
23


52289a-2.eps
24


52289a-3.eps
25


52289a-4.eps
26


52289a-5.eps
27


52289a-6.eps
28


52289a-7.eps
29


52289a-8.eps
30


52289a-9.eps
31


52289a-10.eps
32

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you. 

Steve Rademaker. Steve? 

STATEMENT OF STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, ESQ., SENIOR 

COUNSEL, BGR GROUP (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION) 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Rohrabacher, 

members of the subcommittee, it is a great pleasure for me to testify today before you on the continued application to Iraq of United 

Nations mandates imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. 

charter. 

I did want to note at the outset for the record that I am a registered lobbyist for the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. I 

believe, however, that I was not invited to appear here today as a 

spokesman for the Kurdistan Regional Government, but rather in 

my personal capacity, so anything that I say today will represent 

my own personal views and not necessarily those of the Kurdistan 

Regional Government or anyone else. 

As you know, I was a late addition to this panel, and therefore 

I have not studied this issue to the same degree as my distinguished co-panelists. I do, however, share the view that, as a general proposition, the struggling democracy that is today’s Iraq 

should, to the maximum extent possible, be treated as a normal, 

sovereign nation. 

Restrictions that were imposed by the international community 

on Saddam Hussein’s regime need to be reassessed in the vastly 

improved situation that prevails today. I therefore support the 

Bush administration’s undertaking in Article 25 of the U.S.-Iraq 

Security Agreement to use its best efforts to help Iraq take the 

steps necessary to regain its previous international legal standing. 

I believe that the main contribution I can make to today’s hearing is to share with the members of the subcommittee my own experience as an official of the Bush administration in seeking to free 

Iraq from one of the Chapter VII mandates that remained in place 

even after the removal of Saddam Hussein. 

From 2005 to 2006, I represented the United States as a member 

of the College of Commissioners of the United Nations Monitoring, 

Verification and Inspection Commission, which was known as 

UNMOVIC. This Commission was established in 1999 as the successor to a similar U.N. entity, the United Nations Special Commission, or UNSCOM, that was established by the Security Council 

upon the conclusion of the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. Both entities were charged, along with the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, with inspecting and dismantling Iraq’s weapons of mass 

destruction and long range missile programs. 

I think the key point to bear in mind is that UNMOVIC was financed using Iraqi funds, funds which were held in the U.N. maintained Oil for Food Program account. This meant that UNMOVIC 

operated at no cost to the United Nations and therefore there was 

no natural constraint on the size of its budget or staff. During my 

time as an UNMOVIC Commissioner, the organization’s budget 

was in excess of $10 million per year, which was substantially less 

33

than in previous years, but still a lot of money for an organization 

that had no real work left to do. 

Shortly after I was appointed as a Commissioner for UNMOVIC 

I came to the conclusion that UNMOVIC was no longer necessary 

and should be abolished, and I spent the remainder of my time on 

the College of Commissioners seeking to build a consensus in favor 

of eliminating the organization. I have to tell you, though, that this 

proved to be very challenging, and I quickly discovered that there 

were a number of competing agendas at work, and because no 

country other than Iraq was paying for UNMOVIC, there was almost no pressure to restrain those agendas. 

One such agenda was that of the management and staff of 

UNMOVIC. To be blunt, this was a collection of people who had 

very good paying jobs that they wanted to keep, and as a result 

they spent a great deal of time coming up with rationales for preserving the existence of the organization. They were very good at 

identifying unfinished tasks that they proposed to finish, both inside of Iraq and outside of Iraq. 

They also were very quick to propose new missions for the organization, missions in most cases completely unrelated to Iraq. At 

various times they proposed that UNMOVIC could become a U.N. 

inspections mechanism for Iran. They proposed that it could become a standby weapons of mass destruction inspection mechanism 

attached to the U.N. Secretariat to be deployed on short notice anywhere in the world where it might be needed. 

At one point they suggested that they should become an inspections mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. At another point they suggested that they could take over responsibility 

for running Iraq’s export control system, which was something that 

Iraq and all countries were required under U.N. Resolution 1540 

to establish. 

I suppose it is not surprising that the employees of the organization would have as an agenda preserving their jobs, but I was surprised to discover that there was a lot of sympathy for this among 

some of my fellow Commissioners. The rationale or the explanation 

that my fellow Commissioners would provide varied. In the case of 

a number of the Commissioners from less developed countries, I 

think the bottom line was that they were eager to ensure the nationals from their countries who had jobs at UNMOVIC were able 

to keep their jobs. It was that simple. 

Beyond this, there were Commissioners from a number of G8 

countries—in other words, large industrialized countries, allies of 

the United States—who were ideologically committed to the idea 

that the United Nations should have some sort of weapons of mass 

destruction inspections capability. 

And since UNMOVIC afforded that capability, they were reflectively attached to the notion that UNMOVIC should be kept in 

business and used in the future however it might be convenient for 

the U.N. Frankly, for them the rationale made no difference. They 

just favored the preservation of UNMOVIC even if in the near term 

it had nothing to do. 

Then there was Russia. Russia had a very different agenda. It 

was determined, as best I would tell, to use UNMOVIC to underscore that the Bush administration had invaded Iraq on the basis 

34

of faulty intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass destructions programs, so Russia took the position that it could only agree to abolish UNMOVIC if the organization were given about a year to write 

a final report on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. 

And in their conception, this report was to be essentially a U.N. 

review of the so-called Duelfer Report, which was a U.S. Government-sponsored report on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and 

the Russians insisted that the UNMOVIC inspectors be given access to all the information that the Duelfer Commission had had 

access to as they prepared their review of the Duelfer Report. 

To me it was remarkable that none of these agendas had anything to do with the best interests of the Iraqi people, and very few 

of the agendas had any serious relationship to UNMOVIC’s original 

mandate, which was to identify and dismantle weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq. I was not able during my time as a 

Commissioner to make much headway against these agendas. 

Fortunately, after I left the College, after I left the State Department, I was succeeded by two very able public servants, Frank 

Record and then Robert Witajewski, both of whom shared my commitment to abolishing UNMOVIC. Mr. Record should be well 

known to many in this room because, like me, he spent much of 

his career on the professional staff of this committee. Mr. 

Witajewski is a now retired career Foreign Service Officer who distinguished himself in this and many other endeavors over a period 

of more than two decades at the State Department. 

Messrs. Record and Witajewski continued to pursue the abolition 

of UNMOVIC during their service on the College of Commissioners, 

and with the passage of time they encountered less resistance to 

the idea. The United Kingdom and France eventually joined them 

in providing leadership on this issue, and eventually even Russia 

came around. 

Once consensus was achieved among the P5 members of the U.N. 

Security Council it became possible for the Security Council to act 

to abolish UNMOVIC, and that finally happened in June 2007 with 

the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1762. 

The main lesson I would draw from this experience for the remaining Chapter VII mandates that we are discussing today is that 

we need to look or we need to expect institutional resistance to 

change in these mandates, and we should look skeptically at rationalizations that may be offered for continuing to treat Iraq differently than other countries. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will conclude my remarks, and I 

stand prepared to respond to any questions you or the other members may have. Thank you.

35


52289e-1.eps
36


52289e-2.eps
37


52289e-3.eps
38

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Rademaker. 

I also want to note the presence of our colleague from Minnesota, 

Keith Ellison, an individual with great interest in issues involving 

the Middle East and obviously clearly what is transpiring in Iraq. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Matheson, for really enumerating what 

are the outstanding issues, the outstanding items, if you will, that 

still fall under the Chapter VII mandate. From your vantage 

point—and this is to everybody on the panel. Let me begin with 

you. What kind of progress is being made in terms of the discussions and the negotiations that are going on? Would you give it a 

satisfactory? 

Obviously we are going to have an opportunity to hear from two 

distinguished parliamentarians from Iraq, but in terms of the process itself what is the current status? What are the most difficult 

issues, the most thorny issues, and is there a timeframe which is 

reasonable to assume that most of particularly the more difficult 

issues can be resolved? 

Mr. MATHESON. Well, I think it varies depending upon which 

area you are talking about. There are some areas in which the outstanding issues seem to be technical in question—for example, in 

the accounting for deposits into this development fund and the 

Iraqi accounting controls and so on—which hopefully might be resolved simply by a greater, more concentrated effort by Iraqis and 

others to resolve the technical questions. 

Some involve more substantial interests; for example, the compensation question issue, which obviously is a question of whether 

the burden of these unpaid claims will lay upon the new Iraq regime or will be borne by Kuwait. They are hopeful Iraq and Kuwait 

could negotiate a resolution of that, but obviously that involves 

some serious substantive interests on both sides. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Are those discussions ongoing? 

Mr. MATHESON. Well, the Secretary General’s report suggests 

that there have been discussions and it expresses some kind of very 

guarded optimism about the possibilities, but I don’t know whether 

to endorse that. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Ken Katzman, do you have knowledge of the discussions and how they are proceeding? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, the report that is referenced, there is a tantalizing statement in that report about a possible compromise 

under which Iraq would not any longer be paying compensation, 

but the monies—instead of being compensation, it would be an 

Iraqi investment in Kuwait instead of paying money into this reparations fund. 

The same money would go, but it would be an investment that 

Iraq could eventually earn a profit on, and Iraq would still have equity. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, and I know negotiations obviously are not 

necessarily transparent, nor should they be, but is anyone on the 

panel aware of the American or the U.S. involvement in terms of 

encouraging those negotiations? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, I would just add the Emir of Kuwait was 

here a few weeks ago, and this wasn’t reflected in the official 

communique ́. It was a very brief communique ́ after his meeting 

39

with President Obama, but in my discussions around town clearly 

this was discussed. 

Some compromises along these lines of investment, reducing the 

compensation amount, the percentage. These are all under active 

discussion is my understanding. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I think we can welcome that discussions 

are going on and there appears to be significant or some American 

involvement because clearly according to the bilateral agreement 

we do have that obligation to assist Iraq and help the parties reach 

an agreement. 

I would like to go for a moment to the referendum issue, and 

clearly it would appear whether there is a referendum has not been 

decided by the Council of Representatives. And I think it was you, 

Dr. Katzman, who indicated that that probably will not be decided 

until things sort out politically in terms of the forthcoming election. 

Would the referendum and the elections in January be held simultaneously? 

Mr. KATZMAN. That is what the Iraqi Cabinet has decided. Now 

it is for the Parliament to decide whether to endorse that or not 

have a referendum at all or have it some different time. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think what is fascinating is I hear you describe 

the shifting alliances. It is beginning to sound like a democracy, 

particularly when coalitions that are nonsectarian-based are coming together for obviously their own self-interest, but I daresay that 

that is a much more preferable situation and something that might 

be familiar here in this particular institution as well. 

As I said earlier in my own remarks, and let me just throw this 

at you. I think it is really important for the United States not only 

to assist in terms of meeting its obligations under the bilateral 

agreement, but to continue to stay engaged. I think it is clear that 

the elections that will be held in January are of critical importance 

in terms of what occurs not only in Iraq subsequently, but in the 

entire region. 

Let me pose to all of you, and this is not directly on issue, but 

the possibility of the United Nations with American support, with 

United States support, a substantial monitoring presence and effort 

in terms of those elections to reassure the Iraqi people of the integrity of the electoral process. 

Clearly what has occurred in Afghanistan is profoundly disturbing and is potentially destabilizing in Afghanistan. I had a conversation in fact yesterday—he is not here now—with our colleague 

and friend from Indiana, Mr. Burton, and I haven’t had a chance 

yet to talk to Mr. Rohrabacher, about the United States and this 

Congress pressing the administration and the United States to provide for a substantial presence to provide for security in terms of 

the electoral process as it develops and hopefully culminates in a 

free and fair and fully engaged citizenry going to the polls in January. 

You know, I think that is something that we should do. I have 

discussed with Mr. Burton, and I will obviously with Mr. Rohrabacher, sending a letter to the administration to that effect and 

conveying to the appropriate United Nations officials how significant that is. Care to comment, Ken Katzman? 

40

Mr. KATZMAN. I would just comment that General Odierno’s 

draw down plan envisions—well, President Obama’s plan is to 

draw down to approximately 50,000 United States forces by August 

next year. There are right now approximately 120,000 United 

States forces in Iraq. 

The current understanding is the U.S. will stay roughly at that 

level until the election, so there will be about 120,000 U.S. 

forces——

Mr. DELAHUNT. What do you think about deploying them——

Mr. KATZMAN [continuing]. And withdraw the 70,000 right after 

the election. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. What about deploying those forces to ensure the 

security of polling places and hopefully enhancing, if you will, the 

confidence of the Iraqi people in the integrity of those elections? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Yes. The U.S. military I don’t believe is——

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don’t believe we have that authority under the 

bilateral agreement. 

Mr. KATZMAN. The agreement. Well, in previous elections the 

Iraqis were in the front line on security for elections with the 

United States available if there were a problem. 

Under the United States-Iraq pact there is not an exception for 

the elections for the United States to redeploy into the Iraqi cities, 

so I suspect it will be roughly the same where the United States 

is sort of over the horizon, but available if a problem occurs. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. But again I think my own sense is that there is 

so much riding on these particular elections, at least from my perspective, particularly given what we observed occurring in Afghanistan where the election results are very much in doubt. 

Maybe pressing both our own administration, as well as the 

Maliki government, to ensure that there is a more fully engaged 

and visible presence of American military in a backup role obviously respecting the sovereignty of Iraq because what I see occurring is if there is not an election that has the confidence of the 

Iraqi people there is the potential for deterioration in terms of 

what clearly is a very fragile situation. 

While elections certainly are not the essence, if you will, of democracy, you have to have them to get to the point where you have 

institutions that are viable and mature. Any comment? 

[No response.] 

Mr. DELAHUNT. None? Seeing that, I am going to recognize my 

friend from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

again thank you for calling this hearing. 

Again, let me note that you were one of the first Members of 

Congress to focus on these types of agreements, the Status of 

Forces Agreement, and to draw the attention of the Congress to the 

importance of what was being done, those treaties and agreements 

that were being made during the last administration. 

I also congratulate our panel. I thought Mr. Matheson gave us 

a very good understanding of the outstanding issues and Mr. 

Katzman, of course, gave us what he always does when he testifies, 

a very I would say detailed account of where we stand at the moment and how the political issues stand in Iraq and how they affect 

these outstanding issues. 

41

Of course, Mr. Rademaker, let me just note that your testimony 

was very enlightening because it gives us an insight into some of 

the unseen challenges that we must overcome in order to solve and 

to deal with the outstanding issues, so all in all this panel really 

was a top notch panel. Thank you all for participating. 

A couple of specific questions and points. Let me just note in 

terms of the Iraqi debt to Kuwait, which seems to be one of these 

outstanding issues. I think that when we confront the issue we 

must understand that Kuwait was a country that was destroyed—

destroyed—by the invasion of Iraq. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 

caused the equivalent of millions of lives lost in the United States. 

If we would have an analogous situation to our population size 

and what happened in Kuwait, it would have been the equivalent 

of the killing of millions of Americans and the destruction of all of 

our major assets, not to mention all the buildings that were gutted, 

the treasure that was looted. It would be the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of POWs that would have been taken from the 

United States and murdered while in captivity. 

I think there is a totally legitimate debt that is owed to the people of Kuwait, and we should not in our efforts to try to just close 

the loop and bring an end to loose ends and to tie everything together and then move on. We must not do that at the expense of 

a very honest and legitimate debt that is owed to the people of Kuwait. They suffered tremendously and needlessly. We have visited, 

those of us who visited that, and saw the destruction. We are talking about wealth and part of a compensation. 

Let us just put it this way. When the Iraqi troops withdrew the 

destruction of the amount of oil that was burned and destroyed and 

infrastructure that was destroyed was just an overwhelming percentage of their national economy, so let us not discount that. 

I don’t know. Perhaps maybe the solution lies not in having the 

Iraqis now in vest in projects in Kuwait from which the Iraqis 

would eventually profit. Maybe the opposite should be looked at. 

Maybe we should look at a situation where the Kuwaitis agree 

that the money that they are being repaid could be spent in Iraq, 

and then the compensation, then the profit eventually would go to 

the Kuwaitis while at the same time building Iraqi infrastructure. 

Maybe that is the solution rather than just suggesting that we in 

some way diminish the amount of compensation the Kuwaiti people 

will receive for what they suffered. 

I think it is philosophical, and let me just ask the panel. This is 

not a very detailed philosophical analysis here. When we look at 

a debt like this we have a people, Iraq. The people of Iraq were not 

in control of their government. This was not a democratic government that planned this invasion. 

How much morally and legally do the people of one country have 

when they are controlled by a dictatorship that commits them to 

certain actions that end up causing this type of destruction? Is that 

a moral obligation and a legal obligation of one people to repay 

what their dictatorship has brought upon them, even though if it 

had been a democracy at the time Iraq probably would not have 

invaded Kuwait? 

42

Mr. MATHESON. Well, I think the legal answer is straightforward. 

Yes, Iraq is still liable for those amounts of damage, particularly 

since the Security Council under Chapter VII ruled it so. 

But that doesn’t answer all your questions. Obviously both sides 

have equities here. The new Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people 

have a certain legitimacy in saying why should we be held responsible for Saddam’s sins. On the other hand, as you point out, the 

Kuwaiti people were not responsible for that either, so should they 

bear the burden? 

In the long run, I think probably there is a need for some kind 

of pragmatic solution for this. As a matter of fact, if the current 

situation goes on it would take 15 or 20 years for these amounts 

to be repaid in any event. So Kuwait has an interest in a long-term 

satisfactory relationship with Iraq. So does Iraq with Kuwait. So 

logically there should be some kind of a mutual accommodation. 

What you just suggested, as I understand it, is a specific thing 

which has been under consideration and that might be reasonable, 

but we are talking about $24 billion, which even today is not a 

small amount, so obviously this is a matter that has to be negotiated out with some kind of mutual understanding and pragmatic 

attitude. 

Mr. KATZMAN. Just briefly, I think one of the considerations that 

some of the international partners are looking at is some Iraqis are 

getting resentful of the compensation process, and this goes back 

even to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. There is a lot of resentment 

between Iraq and Kuwait. 

A lot of Iraqis view Kuwait as wealthy and sort of getting very 

wealthy without a lot of work, needing to work hard, and there is 

this resentment. I think what some international partners want to 

try to do is avoid a situation where the Iraqis feel they are sort of 

continuing to get a bill for Kuwait’s wealth. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let us note this. That is a good point, 

and that is a good understanding of the sentiments in Iraq toward 

this, but let us note the rebuilding of Kuwait was not an easy matter. 

The Kuwaitis, their country was devastated and destroyed. Rebuilding that infrastructure took an enormous amount of effort and 

money to rebuild in Kuwait. Now, they are rich now because they 

went through that process. 

I could understand where people would just look at the situation 

as it is now, but let us not forget that struggle of rebuilding that 

country. That would be the equivalent of people who would come 

into our major cities and destroy all of our major cities, et cetera. 

Mr. Rademaker, your thoughts on that point? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Just a few 

thoughts. 

I agree with what my co-panelists have said. I think there is no 

question under international law about the responsibility of Iraq 

for the damage that was inflicted on the Government and people 

of Kuwait. I think there may be a question, though, that should be 

asked about the timing for payment of that debt. 

I think we should all be mindful, and I think the Kuwaitis 

should be mindful, of what may be an analogy earlier in the last 

century. You know, the historical judgment is that one of the prime 

43

contributors to Hitler’s rise to power in Germany was the insistence of France in particular on the repayment of onerous war reparations that basically crippled the German economy and created 

a situation where someone like Adolf Hitler could come to power. 

I don’t think it would be in Kuwait’s interest or anyone else’s interest for the payment of these reparations to be so onerous that a 

similar situation might be created in Iraq. 

Let me point out a further analogy involving Germany, which is 

that to this very day 60 years—more than 60 years—after the end 

of World War II Germany is still paying reparations to the state 

of Israel basically because of Nazi Germany’s treatment of the Jewish people. Again, it is similar to Saddam Hussein in the sense that 

it was not exactly a democratic decision in Germany to launch the 

Holocaust—it was a decision made by a dictatorship—but now, 60 

years later, Germany is still in the business of paying reparations. 

Let me just make one further comment, a personal reaction I 

have to this whole issue, though, and that is to point out that to 

the extent it is claimed that this is an issue of Iraq’s ability to develop itself, a constraint on the resources available to the Iraqi 

Government, and a complaint that in the past year they lost $600 

million that was basically revenue from oil exports that otherwise 

would have been available to them to develop their economy, yes, 

they lost $600 million. 

On the other hand, they lost billions—probably tens of billions—

of dollars in oil revenue that they would have generated had they 

taken some pretty obvious steps to get their house in order, to attract foreign investment into their oil industry. 

You know, to the extent there is a complaint that Iraq needs 

more money and shouldn’t have to pay these reparations, there are 

some things they could do such as passing an oil law to make it 

possible for them to generate a lot more money than they are losing in making reparations. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you for that point, and let us note 

that as we analyze what is not only moral, but practical—legal, 

moral and practical—in terms of how to go about analyzing what 

we do with the debt and the policies, the economic policies there, 

let us note that I believe it is 3 trillion barrels of oil in reserve in 

Iraq. 

Three trillion. I think that is the figure. Mr. Katzman, is that 

what I have heard? 

Mr. KATZMAN. I have to check, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It is not near that? 

Mr. KATZMAN. That is high. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is high? That was in testimony that was 

given to us I think in the full committee. Was it here or was it the 

full committee? I remember that testimony at 3 trillion. 

Let us say it is 2 trillion barrels worth of oil. Whatever their reserves are, it is overwhelming. It is huge. It is one of the countries 

with a small population that has one of the biggest oil reserves in 

the world, whatever exactly what it is. 

So let us note that I think Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world, whatever that number is, and that is trillions 

of dollars one way or the other. So we need to keep that in mind, 

and I think the point Mr. Rademaker makes is that, yes, even 

44

though some of the timing of repaying some of these debts or dealing with the outstanding issues that are left might be costly, this 

is a society if they do what is right they will be able to meet that 

challenge. 

One last area, Mr. Chairman, of questions I would like to ask 

Mr. Rademaker about that, and maybe the panel could come in as 

well. Where does it stand? Where do we stand? We know Mr. 

Rademaker is representing the Kurdish Regional Government, so 

let us put that in perspective. 

I personally believe that the Kurds have demonstrated a certain 

friendship toward the United States that has not been demonstrated by other people in Iraq, and we have repaid that friendship and loyalty while our troops were there by not having a consulate. We don’t even have a consulate in Erbil, in the Kurdish regional area, when 12 other countries do. 

What do you see, and then I will ask the panel what they see, 

as the leftover situation that we have to deal with and will it be 

dealt with in terms of allowing the Kurds to be able to understand 

that they will have some modicum of security once our troops 

leave? 

If you could just have a couple minutes on each one. I don’t want 

to prolong it here. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think, Mr. Rohrabacher, you were initially directing that question to me, and let me just respond briefly because 

I think Mr. Katzman probably can give us the most authoritative 

blow-by-blow description of the situation, but I do think there is 

general recognition that one of the biggest challenges facing the 

United States during its remaining time in Iraq is to prevent conflict between the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq and the rest of 

the country. 

General Odierno and the other U.S. commanders are very much 

focused on that problem. That is at the security level. I think there 

are also things at the diplomatic level that Ambassador Hill is committed to trying to work on in order to improve that relationship 

and hopefully lay the ground for peaceful, stable relations within 

Iraq after the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A one word answer. Are you optimistic or 

pessimistic that we are going to be able to come to a situation 

where that challenge is met? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I think the jury is still out, and I guess I am 

concerned. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Mr. Matheson? 

Mr. MATHESON. I would defer to Mr. Katzman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Katzman? 

Mr. KATZMAN. I would say the evidence would suggest pessimism 

on this issue. 

Now, the United Nations assistance mission in Iraq circulated in 

July a compromise plan on how to resolve the main issue is the territorial issue. The Kurds believe there are certain sections of 

Northern Iraq that are under the Central Government that should 

be part of their Kurdish Regional Government, and this has been 

the core of the dispute. 

The U.N. is trying to have a compromise. They have circulated 

a plan. The various parties have said they will use it as a base to 

45

start from, but it really has not jump started any real serious compromise. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we need to change something in the status quo in order to have a more optimistic assessment that we have 

a chance to succeed here, so we need some changes in the reality 

area. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panel. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Let me go to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana, the 

ranking member, senior Republican on the committee dealing with 

the Middle East. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to sit in 

here. I appreciate that. 

I think the only questions that I have dealt with the—and I am 

not sure you are the ones I ought to be talking to. Perhaps we 

should be discussing this at the briefing that is going to follow, but 

I would like to get your views as experts on the long-term stability 

of Iraq, especially in view of the fact that Iran is next door and 

they are still involved in some of the nefarious activities over there 

and whether or not Iraq is going to be able to, with its own military and its own peace force, defend the new democracy that they 

have there. 

There have been a number of people with whom I have talked 

who have some serious reservations and doubts about whether or 

not Iraq will be able to survive if we pull out by I think—when is 

it—next June and whether or not we ought to adjust that timetable, although Mr. Maliki I understand is pretty firm in his desire 

to have us leave by that time. 

So I would just like to get your assessment of that if you think 

you are qualified to make that assessment. I know it is a prognostication, but I would just like to know what you have to say. 

Mr. KATZMAN. Yes. Thank you. I will start off on that. According 

to the U.S. military and the U.S. State Department, Iran has lost 

some influence in the past year. Most pro Iranian parties did not 

do well in the January 2009 provincial elections, and the Shia militias in the south that Iran was supporting have been diminished 

by Iraqi military operations and a general sort of rejection of the 

population of Iraq to armed factions operating outside of government control. 

However, counterbalancing that, the leading parties in the Iraqi 

Government structure are pro Iranian parties, and they were started by the same ideology really that spawned the Islamic Revolution 

in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini was in exile in Najaf, Iraq, in the 

1960s, and a lot of his ideology about Islamic government, Shiite 

Islamic government, are the ideology basically of the ruling parties 

of Iraq right now, so there is a very close symbiotic relationship between the Iraqi Government and the Iranian Government at this 

point. 

Mr. BURTON. Do you think that because they have that relationship there is a danger that that whole area could be controlled by 

more radical elements down the road? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, anything is possible, but what we are seeing, 

what we have seen recently, is there is an Iraqi nationalism, and 

the Iraqi public, even the Shias in the south, do not want to be told 

46

what to do by Iran or dictated to or have their affairs controlled 

by Iran, so I think that gives some reason for hope that Iran will 

not sort of take over Iraq, if that is the implication. 

But still, you know, Maliki is doing a lot of things Iran would 

like to see. That doesn’t mean Iran is telling him to do it and he 

answers, but the two think alike on many issues. Absolutely. 

Mr. BURTON. Any other comments? 

[No response.] 

Mr. BURTON. If not, Mr. Chairman, what I will do is wait until 

we have the briefing and talk to them about it as well. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Burton. 

The distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe? 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I direct my questions first 

to Mr. Katzman, and the rest of you can chime in if you wish. I 

want to zero in on Camp Ashraf. 

I want to know what the Iranians really want to do with those 

folks in Camp Ashraf. What are their long-range intentions and 

what is the United States first doing about it, and, second, under 

the Geneva Convention how does the rest of the world view that 

situation? I personally am concerned about what happens to them 

based upon the fact of what has already happened to them. 

Dr. Katzman, if you would address that issue I would appreciate 

it. 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, the Ashraf situation is obviously a very difficult situation because the population of Ashraf were basically invited in by Saddam Hussein. 

There was a certain alignment with Saddam Hussein against 

Iran at the time, and then the United States overthrew Saddam 

Hussein and now the Government of Iraq is not aligned with this 

group that is in Ashraf and is more aligned with the Government 

of Iran, so Maliki and the Government of Iran see eye-to-eye really 

that the population of Ashraf needs to go elsewhere. 

Now, that said, Iraq has agreed under our agreement and under 

international law to certain stipulations under international law 

that there are limits to what the Iraqi Government can do about 

the Ashraf situation. They cannot just simply send them back to 

Iran. There is a process to try to find other places for members of 

the Ashraf to go. 

Mr. POE. Well, why send them to other places? Why can’t they 

stay in Camp Ashraf? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Well, Iraq is now a sovereign country, and the 

view is that the Iraqi Government has a right to decide whether 

this group can stay or not stay. 

Mr. POE. And so what is your opinion? Do you think the Iraqi 

Government will move them to a place where the current Government of Iran will have influence over the camp? I mean, if you 

were a resident of Camp Ashraf, what do you think is going to happen to you? 

Mr. KATZMAN. If I were a resident of Camp Ashraf I would be 

one pretty nervous person, sir. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. Okay. So what are we doing to make sure that—I 

mean, other than saying the Iraqi Government has agreed under 

international law and they have told us they are going to be good 

47

guys and treat the Iranians in Camp Ashraf nicely, how do we see 

this playing out? Tell me how this is going to play out. 

I understand the politics over the years has changed, but what 

do you think is going to happen to these folks? 

Mr. KATZMAN. It is very difficult to say. You know, again at CRS 

we don’t really opine on one way or the other, but if indeed the 

United States completes a draw down at 2011, December 2011, 

then the Iraqi Government could take various decisions. Presumably the Iraqi Government is going to meet its obligations that it 

has pledged to. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. POE. Certainly. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Iraq is a signatory presumably to the Convention 

Against Torture, and dealing with those particular provisions if 

there is reason to believe or it is more likely that sending an individual to a country, even if it is a country of home origin, where 

there is a more than likely chance of torture or inhumane and degrading treatment, wouldn’t the Convention, the treaty, obligate 

the Iraqi Government to find another nation that would receive 

those that express concern? Am I correct in that statement, Mr. 

Katzman? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Yes. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. So I think that by international treaty are we 

going to accept the assurances put forth by the Iraqi Government? 

In many respects that is why the elections, and I want to get back 

to that, are so critical in terms of their integrity, and I am sure 

these are issues that will be debated in this nascent democracy. 

In fact, we are having a similar problem in terms of relocating 

detainees that have been cleared for release from Guantanamo. I 

am sure some of you are aware that Mr. Rohrabacher and I have 

had a number of hearings on 22 Chinese Muslims from Northwestern China who are Uighurs and where because of our obligations under the Convention Against Torture and given the history 

of the Chinese Communist Government vis-a`-vis the Uighurs we 

find ourselves in a position where we cannot legally by virtue of 

that treaty and I would suggest morally return them to Communist 

China where there is a likelihood that they would be tortured and 

even maybe killed. So these are tough issues that have to be 

worked out. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

So, Dr. Katzman, if you were a resident at Ashraf you would be 

nervous about your future. What is your opinion of not the Iraqi 

Government, but the Iraqi people’s kind of sense about Camp 

Ashraf? Can you kind of give me something what the people are 

thinking? 

Mr. KATZMAN. I would say basically the Shiite Muslims are probably almost certainly more opposed to the Ashraf staying there, 

and Sunni Arabs are considered somewhat more welcoming and 

less inclined to try to ask them to leave. 

Mr. POE. All right. Either one of the other two witnesses want 

to weigh in on that? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the gentleman yield for a moment? 

Mr. POE. Of course. 

48

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Seeing that we do have someone who is representing the Kurdish Regional Government here on our panel, 

might I suggest that one alternative that perhaps hasn’t been examined is the possibility of moving Camp Ashraf into the Kurdish 

regional area rather than where it is and that might be acceptable 

as compared to leaving them where they are at or repatriating 

them to Iran? 

Just a thought. The regional government might think about that 

and perhaps make an offer in that regard. 

Mr. RADEMAKER. Mr. Rohrabacher, this is the first time I have 

heard such a suggestion. I will pass it on to others who might be 

interested. 

It is true that the Kurdish region has served as something of a 

refuge for other groups in Iraq that have worried for their safety 

in the southern regions of the country. I think there is a practical 

dimension here with Camp Ashraf, which is that whoever finds 

themselves with these people in their midst will probably have a 

serious diplomatic problem with Iran, and I think that is true for 

the government in Baghdad today, and it would be true of any government that——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It may be easier. The Shiite population of the 

Kurdish regional area is what? 

Mr. RADEMAKER. I can’t give you the exact percentages. It is relatively small. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Katzman, would you like to comment on that? 

Mr. KATZMAN. Sir, the Kurds blame the Ashraf residents for cooperation in Saddam’s repression of the Kurds after the 1991 war 

when there was a Kurdish uprising. They blame the group for helping Saddam put down the Kurdish uprising, so I would say the 

chances of them accepting that are very, very slim to none. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you for putting that in a historical perspective. 

Mr. POE. Reclaiming my time, I do yield back to the chairman. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I thank the gentleman for that rather interesting discussion. 

Let me thank the panel for their testimony. It was, as always, 

informative. The formal hearing of today’s proceedings has ended, 

but we are not finished because shortly we will welcome and are 

honored to have with us two of our fellow legislators from the Iraqi 

Parliament known as the Council of Representatives, former Prime 

Minister Ayad Allawi and Saleh al Mutlaq, the leader of the National Dialogue Front. 

So we will recess for 3 or 4 minutes and then reconvene for the 

briefing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

50


52289n.eps
51

Æ


52289m.eps