IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1608

Filed November 21, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF I.C.,

Minor Child,

L.B., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joseph L. Tofilon, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Brandy R. Lundy of Lundy Law, PLC, Fort Dodge, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Alesha M. Sigmeth Roberts of Sigmeth Roberts Law, PLC, Clarion, attorney 

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Carr, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 

(2023).
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CARR, Senior Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. Termination of the 

mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests, none of the exceptions to 

termination should be applied, and it would be contrary to the child’s best interests 

to give the mother an extension of time. We affirm the termination of the mother’s 

parental rights.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

L.B. is the mother and S.C. is the father of I.C., born in 2017.1 There have 

been concerns about the mother’s substance abuse, mental-health needs, and low 

intellectual functioning. In 2022, the Iowa Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) received a report that the mother was permitting a homeless man, 

A.M., to stay in her apartment and watch the child while she was at work. There 

was also a report that A.M. inappropriately touched the child. The mother did not 

believe the child’s statements and continued in a romantic relationship with A.M.

The child was removed from the mother’s care in September and placed 

with family friends. The child was adjudicated to be in need of assistance (CINA) 

under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(3)(b) (2022). A parenting evaluation “strongly 

recommended that [the mother] have someone to reside with her to assist her if 

[the child] is to return to her home” based on her mental-health problems and 

intellectual disability. 

The mother began participation in recommended Dialectical Behavioral 

Therapy (DBT) and she participated in this every two weeks. The therapist 

1 The father was in prison throughout the juvenile court proceedings. He has not 

appealed the termination of his parental rights.
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determined the mother should have normal therapy as the therapist did not think 

the mother could “handle” DBT therapy. It was also recommended that she 

participate in group alcohol counseling. She attended this counseling for a period 

of time but then quit. After a few months, the mother re-engaged with group alcohol 

counseling.

The mother was in a relationship with A.S., who was using 

methamphetamine and marijuana. He pled guilty to a charge of possession of 

methamphetamine, second offense, and was placed on probation. He told social 

workers that he smoked marijuana every day. The mother and A.S. had a 

contentious relationship. The mother and A.S. lived in an apartment with A.S.’s 

mother. 

On August 23, 2023, the State filed a petition to terminate the parents’ 

rights. At the hearing, A.S. became upset and left the courtroom during the 

testimony of the family’s HHS social worker. The mother testified she was in the 

process of obtaining independent housing. She asked for an extension of time for 

the child to be returned to her care.

The juvenile court entered an order on September 20 terminating the 

mother’s rights under section 232.116(1)(f) (2023). The court found termination 

was in the child’s best interests, noting, “The mother still suffers from poor mental 

health and is mentally unable to care for the child. [The mother] is no closer to 

reunification today than when [the child] was removed 12 months ago.” The court 

declined to apply any of the exceptions to termination found in section 232.116(3). 

The court also denied the mother’s request for a six-month extension of time. The 

court stated, “The unfortunate fact of the matter is that the mother is not mentally 
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and intellectually capable of raising I.C. on her own and will not be able to do so in 

six months under even the most optimistic of scenarios.” The mother appeals the 

termination of her parental rights.

II. Standard of Review

Our review of termination proceedings is de novo. In re A.B., 815 

N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). The State must prove its allegations for termination 

by clear and convincing evidence. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). 

“‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means there are no serious or substantial doubts 

as to the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. Our 

primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re J.S., 846 N.W.2d 36, 40 

(Iowa 2014).

In general, we follow a three-step analysis in reviewing the termination of a

parent’s rights. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). First, we consider

whether there is a statutory ground for termination of the parent’s rights under

section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we look to whether termination of the parent’s

rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). Third,

we consider whether any of the exceptions to termination in section 232.116(3)

should be applied. Id. But in instances where the parent does not raise a claim

relating to any of the three steps, we do not address them and instead limit our

review to the specific claims presented.2 See id. at 40 (recognizing we do not

consider a step the parent does not challenge).

2 The mother does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 

statutory ground for termination of parental rights in this case, so we do not address 

that issue.
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III. Best Interests

The mother claims termination of her parental rights is not in the child’s best 

interests. She asserts that she and the child enjoy their time together during 

supervised visits.

In considering the best interests of a child, we give “primary consideration 

to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing 

and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the 

child under section 232.116(2).” Id. at 41. “It is well-settled law that we cannot 

deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination 

under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and 

be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id.

At the termination hearing the mother testified she did not believe A.M. 

inappropriately touched the child because it never happened while she was 

present, although she admitted she sometimes left the child alone with A.M. She 

stated that even though A.M. allegedly touched the child, she still chose to be in a 

relationship with him. Her relationship with A.M. ended only when he became 

involved with someone else and she became involved with A.S. As noted, A.S. 

has problems with substance abuse. The mother continues to associate with 

inappropriate paramours and places her relationship with them over the well-being 

of the child. 

Furthermore, the mother is unable to effectively care for the child due to her 

mental-health problems and low intellectual functioning. The parenting evaluation 

found the mother was unable to care for the child on her own. We determine that 

termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interests.
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IV. Exceptions

The mother asserts that the juvenile court should have applied an exception 

to termination. She states that termination of her parental rights would be 

detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See

Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). 

The exceptions to termination found “in section 232.116(3) are permissive,

not mandatory.” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 324 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). 

“The court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to apply the factors in

section 232.116(3) to save the parent-child relationship based on the unique

circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child[ ].” In re A.R., 932

N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). “[O]nce the State has proven a ground for

termination, the parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an

exception to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3) . . . .” In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). The child’s best interests remain our first

consideration. Id. at 475.

The juvenile court found:

The Court finds that there is no clear and convincing evidence 

that termination would be detrimental to the child due to the 

closeness of the parent-child relationship. . . . It is true that [the child]

is bonded with his mother, but any sadness the child may experience 

in the short-term will be far outweighed by the benefits to him in the 

long-term.

We agree with the court’s assessment. The mother has not met her burden to 

show termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to the child. See Iowa 

Code § 232.116(3)(c).
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V. Extension of Time

The mother contends the juvenile court should have granted her an 

extension of time. She testified that she was working on obtaining housing. The 

mother planned to move into her own apartment, where she stated the child could 

be placed in her care.

A six-month extension of time may be granted under sections 232.104(2)(b) 

and 232.117(5) if parental rights are not terminated following a termination hearing. 

In re D.P., No. 21-0884, 2021 WL 3891722, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2021).

An extension of time may be granted if the court “determin[es] that the need for 

removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the 

additional six-month period.” In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) 

(quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). “The judge considering [the extension] 

should however constantly bear in mind that, if the plan fails, all extended time 

must be subtracted from an already shortened life for the children in a better 

home.” Id. (citation omitted).

On this issue, the juvenile court stated:

The mother’s main argument in favor of six additional months 

is that she will soon be eligible for a housing voucher, which will allow 

her to get a place of her own to bring [the child] back to. While that 

would be a commendable accomplishment, the lack of suitable 

housing is not the Court’s main concern. Even if [the mother] got the 

best apartment ever, [the child] could not be safely returned to the 

mother there. The unfortunate fact of the matter is that the mother is 

not mentally and intellectually capable of raising [the child] on her 

own and will not be able to do so in six months under even the most 

optimistic of scenarios. [The mother] is to be applauded for all the 

hard work she has put in, but those efforts have not put her in a place 

where she can safely and effectively raise I[the child] on her own.

[The mother’s] mental health is still too fragile and she has identified 

no one who could be healthy and positive supports for her. Her 

current drug-using boyfriend is not appropriate.
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Unfortunately, the Court has no confidence that the mother’s 

prognosis will be better in six months’ time. [The mother] has had a 

year to work towards reunification, but she is no closer to that goal 

than she was 12 months ago.

We conclude a six-month extension of time is not appropriate. The 

evidence does not show the child could be returned to the mother’s care within six 

months. At the termination hearing, the mother showed she would still be unable 

to protect the child.

We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

AFFIRMED.