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ELECTIONS IN SIERRA LEONE: A STEP TOWARD

REGIONAL STABILITY?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 16, 2002

Serial No. 107–83

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

THOMAS P. SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

CHARISSE GLASSMAN, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

ALYSSA JORGENSON, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

William M. Bellamy, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 6

Dave Peterson, Senior Program Officer for Africa, National Endowment for 

Democracy ............................................................................................................. 22

John Prendergast, co-Director of the Africa Program, International Crisis 

Group .................................................................................................................... 25

Binaifer Nowrojee, Counsel, Human Rights Watch/Africa ................................... 33

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 5

William M. Bellamy: Prepared statement ............................................................. 8

The Liberian Democracy Initiative: Prepared statement ..................................... 20

The Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas: Prepared statement ........ 21

Dave Peterson: Prepared statement ....................................................................... 24

John Prendergast: Prepared statement ................................................................. 28

Binaifer Nowrojee: Prepared statement ................................................................. 36

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New York: Prepared statement ............................................................ 45

(1)

ELECTIONS IN SIERRA LEONE: A STEP 

TOWARD REGIONAL STABILITY? 

THURSDAY, MAY 16, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. I am going to call this hearing of the Subcommittee 

on Africa to order at this time and ask everybody to take their 

seats. 

The title of this particular hearing is ‘‘Elections in Sierra Leone: 

A Step Toward Regional Stability?’’ After years of brutal civil war, Sierra Leone held an election on 

Tuesday. This election appears to have gone well. Sierra Leone’s 

newfound stability is most welcomed, and it is most welcome because an estimated 60,000 Sierra Leoneans were killed and many 

more than that were wounded and maimed in 10 years of fighting. 

Perhaps nowhere in the world have children been so exploited as 

they have in Sierra Leone. 

There is no other country that this Subcommittee has spent more 

time on over the last several years than Sierra Leone. One can’t 

help but be moved by the photos of Sierra Leoneans who had their 

hands amputated by the Revolutionary United Front managing to 

cast ballots last Tuesday. It is a hopeful week in Sierra Leone. 

This progress has been backed by the United Nations’ largest 

peacekeeping operation. Stiffened by British troops, unfunded mandates has managed to pressure the RUF rebel group, notorious for 

its campaign of systematic amputations, into suing for peace. 

We owe a big debt of gratitude to Britain for its work, as well 

as to Nigeria and other countries that have stepped into Sierra 

Leone. UNAMSIL has come a long way since its poorly motivated 

troops surrendered to RUF forces 2 years ago, bringing this peacekeeping operation to near collapse at that time. 

Peace prospects in Sierra Leone are linked to conditions in neighboring Liberia. Liberian President Charles Taylor’s continued support for the RUF led the U.N. Security Council last week to extend 

a ban on weapons sales to Liberia. International travel by Liberian 

officials has also been banned and the export of diamonds from Liberia. 

I would like to see a timber ban added. Foreign logging companies are enriching Charles Taylor and, by extension, the RUF, 

2

while exploiting the timber forest there and caring little about sustainability. China and France oppose a U.N. timber ban, and perhaps this is because Chinese and French companies have logging 

interests in Liberia. 

For the sake of the entire region that it preys upon, Charles Taylor, Inc., with its ties to international organized crime, must be 

shut down. Hindered by these U.N. sanctions and pressured by 

rebels, the Taylor government could implode. The U.S. must anticipate the day when democracy in Liberia is possible, the day when 

political opponents and journalists aren’t beaten, aren’t imprisoned 

or tortured. 

We should be doing more to bolster democratic forces in Liberia 

and more to bolster democracy in Guinea. We should be working 

to break its government’s monopoly on the radio. 

If Sierra Leone is going to build on its progress, it will have to 

better manage its abundant natural resources, especially its diamonds. The new government must work to see that diamonds now 

contribute to national development, not to national destruction. 

Corruption in the government must be recognized, and it must be 

fought. 

It is critical that the U.S. and the international community stay 

committed to Sierra Leone. There will be pressure to scale down 

and close out UNAMSIL. The slower that happens, the better. The 

British troops should be encouraged to stay as long as possible, as 

well as the Nigerians. Elections are a step in the right direction. 

We should not fool ourselves, though. This election is only one step 

in what hopefully will be a national recovery. Let us not blow a big 

investment by running out the door. 

The special court needs to be supported so it can try ex-RUF 

leader Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor and others responsible for 

this country’s human rights nightmare. The U.S. has been working 

with West African militaries in Nigeria, in Ghana, in Guinea and 

elsewhere to improve their professionalism. Attentiveness to 

human rights is a must. These modest programs are very worthwhile investments in regional stability. 

A year ago, UNAMSIL was floundering and the RUF was an active military force. Great challenges lay head, but Sierra Leone 

today looks a whole lot better than a year ago and certainly than 

3 years ago. I look forward to this Subcommittee’s continued work 

with the Administration on Sierra Leone, especially concerning 

UNAMSIL’s future and especially concerning independent radio 

broadcasting in the region. 

I will now turn to the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee for 

any opening statements, Mr. Don Payne of New Jersey. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the statement made by Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA) at today’s hearing on the elections in Sierra 

Leone. 

‘‘After years of brutal civil war, Sierra Leone held an election on Tuesday. This 

election appears to have gone well. Sierra Leone’s newfound stability is most welcomed. An estimated 60,000 Sierra Leoneans were killed and many more wounded 

3

and maimed in ten years of fighting. Perhaps nowhere in the world have children 

been so exploited. ‘‘There is no other country that this Subcommittee has spent more time on over 

the last several years than Sierra Leone. One can’t help but be moved by the photos 

of Sierra Leoneans who had their hands amputated by the Revolutionary United 

Front [RUF] managing to cast ballots. It’s a hopeful week in Sierra Leone. ‘‘This progress has been backed by what is the United Nations’ largest peacekeeping operation. Stiffened by British troops, UNAMSIL has managed to pressure 

the RUF rebel group, notorious for its campaign of systematic amputations, into 

suing for peace. We owe a big debt of gratitude to Britain for its work, as well as 

to Nigeria and other countries that have stepped into Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL has 

come a long way since its poorly motivated troops surrendered to RUF forces two 

years ago, bringing this peacekeeping operation to near collapse. ‘‘Peace prospects in Sierra Leone are linked to conditions in neighboring Liberia. 

Liberian President Charles Taylor’s continued support for the RUF led the U.N. Security Council last week to extend a ban on weapons sales to Liberia, international 

travel by Liberian officials, and the export of diamonds from Liberia. I would like 

to see a timber ban added. Foreign logging companies are enriching Taylor, and by 

extension the RUF, while exploiting primeval timber and caring little about sustainability. China and France oppose a U.N. timber ban, perhaps because Chinese and 

French companies have logging interests in Liberia. For the sake of the entire region that it preys on, ’Charles Taylor, Inc.,’ with its ties to international organized 

crime, must be shut down. ‘‘Hindered by these U.N. sanctions, and pressured by rebels, the Taylor government could implode. The U.S. must anticipate the day when democracy in Liberia 

is possible—the day when political opponents and journalists aren’t beaten, imprisoned, and tortured. We should be doing more to bolster democratic forces in Liberia, 

and more to bolster democracy in Guinea. We should be working to break its government’s monopoly on the radio. ‘‘If Sierra Leone is going to build on its progress, it will have to better manage 

its abundant natural resources, especially its diamonds. The new government must 

work to see that diamonds now contribute to national development, not national destruction. Corruption in the government must be recognized and fought. ‘‘It is critical that the U.S. and the international community stay committed to 

Sierra Leone. There will be pressure to scale-down and closeout UNAMSIL. The 

slower the better. The British troops should be encouraged to stay as long as possible. Elections are a step in the right direction; we should not fool ourselves though: 

this election is only one step in what hopefully will be a national recovery. Let’s not 

blow a big investment by running out the door. The Special Court needs to be supported so it can try ex-RUF leader Foday Sankoh, Charles Taylor and others responsible for this country’s human rights nightmare. The U.S. has been working with 

West African militaries, in Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and elsewhere, to improve their 

professionalism. Attentiveness to human rights is a must. These modest programs 

are very worthwhile investments in regional stability. ‘‘A year ago, UNAMSIL was floundering and the RUF was an active military 

force. Great challenges lay ahead, but Sierra Leone today looks a whole lot better 

than a year ago, and certainly three years ago. I look forward to this Subcommittee’s continued work with the Administration on Sierra Leone, especially concerning 

UNAMSIL’s future and independent radio broadcasting in the region.’’

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce. Let me commend you for holding this very important hearing regarding the 

elections in Sierra Leone, a step toward regional stability. 

We are well aware of the importance of the Mano River relationships; and in order for that region to progress, there has to be an 

understanding and working relationship with the three countries of 

Liberia and Sierra Leone and Guinea. So, hopefully, this will start 

to move a process forward where we can focus more attention on 

that region. 

Let me say that in January of 2002, following a nationwide completion of the disarmament of the former rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front, the RUF, U.N. officials formally declared the 

end to the country’s decade-long conflict. As we recall, it was a very 

fierce battle at times. At one point it was just the Nigerian troops 

without financial support even from the U.S. or the U.N., that 

4

stayed there during terrible times. I think we have to certainly express our appreciation for what Nigeria did not only in Liberia but 

also in Sierra Leone. 

According to preliminary reports coming out of Sierra Leone, 

there was an estimated 80 percent turnout of that country’s 2.3 

million voters. As we know, that is the first election it has had in 

6 years. As a matter of fact, 6 years ago, Congressman Amo Houghton put a resolution on the floor commending the people of Sierra 

Leone, who at that time had the election where they came out to 

vote in spite of those elements that were trying to discourage them. 

Though of course, we saw, following that turnout, that the forces 

came into play anyway. 

But the people of Sierra Leone have shown a tremendous amount 

of resilience, a tremendous amount of determination, and I think 

that we owe it to that country to give it as much support as we 

can. At least half of Sierra Leone’s 5.5 million people were displaced during the war and sought safety in other parts of the country or fled to neighboring Guinea or Liberia. 

Sierra Leone is now at peace, but its peace is fragile. Diplomats 

and analysts warn that a rebellion spreading from native Liberia 

and weapons proliferating across the border in West Africa, where 

AK–47s can be bought for as little as $100, could again destabilize 

Sierra Leone. 

The Mano River countries—Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea—

have each been plagued with border insecurities, refugee flows and 

intermittent fighting for over a decade. The militaries or rebel 

groups from each of these countries at some point have violated the 

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the West Africa region. 

Reverend Jesse Jackson 4 or 5 years ago was able to get the 

three Presidents together for a meeting; and I would hope that 

once we get proper government stability in the countries and clear 

up the issue in Liberia that it is essential that the Presidents, the 

heads of state of the Mano River region countries, should come together and to have dialogue. I would hope that the U.N. would 

have goals of that happening as soon as we can get a stable government, which may be some time off, in Liberia. 

According to reports, rebel groups seeking to overthrow Charles 

Taylor of Liberia, called Liberians United for Reconciliation and 

Democracy, has reached 25 kilometers outside of Monrovia. I hope 

that the witnesses here today will be able to shed some light on 

the identity of the LURD, Liberians United for Reconciliation and 

Democracy, and who is providing financial support to the rebel 

groups. 

I am very concerned about U.S. policy toward West Africa. I don’t 

believe we have, during the past Administration or this one, put 

enough emphasis or time or focus on West Africa. While I fully support the U.N. Security Council’s Liberian sanctions placed against 

the Charles Taylor government as a result of Liberia’s support for 

the RUF, I cannot support foreign military financing, even though 

it is nonlethal assistance, to the government of Guinea. 

President Conte is no democrat. In November of 2001 President 

Conte won a referendum that is likely to make himself President 

for life. 

5

Secondly, I do not believe that the U.S. Government will accomplish its overall humanitarian strategic objectives by funding military assistance to a government of a leader who came to power 

through a military coup. Assisting a non-democratic elected government is not a way to counter insurgencies and to halt rebel activities in their country. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a statement 

by members of the Guinean community, and I quote:

‘‘We are rather puzzled to note that our government and the 

U.S. openly supports the regime of General Conte. The U.S. 

Government has provided training to an entire battalion of 

special forces for an institution that General Conte uses to subvert the rights of Guinean people.’’

They further call for an extension of the arms embargo on Guinea and to administer programs through a civil society only. They 

publicly denounce the human rights and election violations and imposed travel bans on members of the Guinean government. 

I think it will be very important that we focus attention on the 

Mano River region, and hopefully we will get some answers here 

today. 

Once again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. 

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection, we will include that. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Thank you for calling this hearing on ‘‘Elections in Sierra Leone: A Step Toward 

Regional Stability.’’ In January 2002, following the nation-wide completion of disarmament of Sierra Leone, government officials, leaders of the former rebel group the 

Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and U.N. officials formally declared the end of 

the country’s decade-long conflict. 

According to preliminary reports coming out of Sierra Leone, there was an estimated 80 percent turnout among the country’s 2.3 million voters, the first in six 

years. Hopefully this signals an end to a war-ravaged decade in the West African 

region. Sadly, the 10 year civil war in Sierra Leone and the 7° year civil war in 

Liberia that ended in 1997 devastated the economies of both countries. 

At least half of Sierra Leone’s 5.5 million people were displaced during the war, 

and sought safety in other parts of the country or fled to neighboring Guinea and 

Liberia. Sierra Leone is now at peace, but it’s peace is fragile. Diplomats and analysts warn that a rebellion spreading in neighboring Liberia and weapons proliferating across borders in West Africa, where an AK-47 assault rifle can be bought for 

less than $100, could again destabilize Sierra Leone. 

The Mano (MANO) River Countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea have each 

been plagued with border insecurities, refugee flows, and intermittent fighting for 

over a decade. The militaries or rebel groups from each of these countries—at some 

point—have violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the West Africa region. 

According to reports, a rebel group seeking to overthrow Charles Taylor of Liberia 

called Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), has reached 25 

kilometers outside of Monrovia. I hope the witnesses today will be able to shed some 

light on the identity of LURD and who is providing financial support to the rebel 

group. I am very concerned about U.S. policy toward West Africa. While I fully support the UN Security Council’s Liberian sanctions, placed on Charles Taylor’s government as a result of Liberia’s support for the RUF, I cannot support Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds—non-lethal assistance—to the Guinean government. 

President Conte is no democrat. In November 2001, President Conte won a referendum that is likely to make him president for life. Secondly, I don’t believe the 

U.S. government will accomplish its overall humanitarian and strategic objectives 

by funding military assistance to the government of a leader who came to power 

6

through a military coup. Assisting a non-democratic government is not the way to 

counter insurgent rebel activities in neighboring countries. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record the statement by members 

in the Guinean community and I quote, ‘‘we are rather puzzled to note that our government openly supports the regime of General Conte. The U.S. government is 

poised to provide training to an entire battalion of Special Forces; the very institution that General Conte uses to subvert the right of the Guinean people.’’ They further call for:

• An extension of the arms embargo on Guinea (similar to Liberia);

• Administer programs through civil society only;

• Publicly denounce the human rights and electoral violations;

• and Impose travel bans on members of the Guinean government

In conclusion, let me say that the U.S. should allocate financial assistance to place 

monitors on the border of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. 

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ROYCE. Ms. Lee from California. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to thank you 

also for calling this hearing. I look forward to the testimony. 

I would like to insert my statement into the record. 

Mr. ROYCE. We shall do that, without objection. 

Congressman Tancredo? 

Mr. TANCREDO. No questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. I will introduce Mr. Bellamy. I will direct those at 

the hearing that we have screens, and on those screens we can include some photographs of the recent elections in Sierra Leone as 

well as some of the history in Sierra Leone. 

With that said, let me introduce William Bellamy. 

He joined the Foreign Service in 1977. He has served in Africa, 

Australia, and Europe. Mr. Bellamy was appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa and African Affairs in 

June of 2001, after serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs for the previous 10 months. He was the 

Acting Assistant Secretary of State during Assistant Secretary 

Walter Kansteiner’s travel in Africa, and we want to thank him for 

joining us today. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Bellamy. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BELLAMY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

With your permission, instead of reading my prepared testimony, 

I would like to spend just 4 or 5 minutes highlighting some of the 

key aspects and request that the full text be inserted in the record. 

Mr. ROYCE. Without objection, we will do that. Thank you. 

Mr. BELLAMY. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I 

am very pleased to be here today to review with you the progress 

that has been made toward restoring peace in Sierra Leone. 

The elections held 2 days ago throughout Sierra Leone represent 

a major milestone in that country’s road to peace. The people at Sierra Leone turned out in impressive numbers to vote peacefully for 

their next government. 

Mr. Chairman, this might not have come about had it not been 

for your early and ongoing concern about the tragic suffering of the 

people of Sierra Leone. The region has certainly come a long way 

7

since May of 2000, when Sierra Leonean rebels of the Revolutionary United Front, the RUF, took hundreds of U.N. peacekeepers hostage and posed a direct threat for the third time in 3 

years to the capital of Freetown. 

I don’t believe any of us here would have dared predict then that 

a combination of U.N. and British peacekeeping, backed by vigorous American diplomacy, would succeed in ending this war and 

putting democracy back on track in this conflict-torn country in 

just 2 years. 

Despite this success, we must not be complacent. Peace in Sierra 

Leone is not guaranteed. The region remains troubled, as evidenced 

by recent events in Liberia. There is much that remains to be done 

before this corner of Africa will be secure in peace. 

The Sierra Leone elections will put in place a democraticallyelected government that faces a number of challenges. Provided the 

immediate post-election period remains peaceful, the international 

community will need to consider how and when the 

U.N.peacekeeping operation, UNAMSIL, draws to a close. 

UNAMSIL’s current mandate expires in September, September 

30 of this year. We will want to see a phased reduction of 

UNAMSIL’s troop strength but accomplished in a very smooth 

manner. 

Though the United Kingdom will maintain a small military 

forces in Sierra Leone, the government will need some UNAMSIL 

presence until it can better establish its authority throughout the 

country. We will consult closely with Congress on the phase-out of 

this peacekeeping operation. This has been the U.N.’s largest 

peacekeeping operation ever, and we appreciate the support of Congress over UNAMSIL’s lifetime. 

Even the best-intentioned government in Sierra Leone will have 

a difficult time sustaining piece if it remains under threat from its 

neighbor, Liberia. We are trying to neutralize this threat in two 

ways. 

First, we are continuing to try to compel President Taylor to 

sever all links with the RUF by keeping pressure on his regime 

through international sanctions aimed at keeping weapons out of 

Liberia and denying Taylor access to the resources he needs to pursue regional destabilization. 

On May 6, the U.N. Security Council renewed for another year 

a ban on arms imports, a ban on diamond exports, and a ban on 

travel by Taylor and his close associates and senior Liberian government officials. That sanctions resolution also called on Taylor to 

allow for verifiable international monitoring of revenues derived 

from Liberia’s ship registry and timber industry, to assure that 

funds from those sources are used only for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes. 

The United States has openly condemned the renewed, senseless 

violence in Liberia and has called on all states in the region to respect the international borders of their neighbors. To forestall further internal violence, it is imperative that the Taylor government 

create conditions conducive to reestablishing peaceful political competition. 

8

To date, Taylor has played a shell game, offering greater political 

openness, but then intimidating anyone he perceives as too outspoken or too much of a potential threat. 

Mr. Chairman, an important component of our regional strategy 

is to expand the horizons of democratic development in the region. 

Towards this end, we are supporting the establishment of multiple 

independent short- and medium-wave radio stations in the region. 

As a long proponent of the use of radio broadcasting in closed societies, Mr. Chairman, you are well aware that there can be no fair 

political contest where the government monopolizes the dissemination of information. 

We are also seeking to strengthen civil society groups and are 

prepared to support electoral processes that we see as having a 

good chance of being relatively free, fair and inclusive. The parliamentary elections in Guinea later this year may, for example, 

warrant our support. 

Mr. Chairman, we became heavily involved in the region for humanitarian reasons, to stop the brutality of the war in Sierra 

Leone and to foster peace and stability. Our efforts and those of 

our partners produced positive results, despite the predictions of 

many that Sierra Leone was doomed to further carnage and war. 

We must continue those efforts in order to solidify the gains that 

have been achieved. Leaving the region to slip back into turmoil 

would create conditions conducive to those who seek to attack our 

system and values. We must not let that happen. 

Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Bellamy. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bellamy follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. BELLAMY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to review with you the progress that has been made toward restoring peace in Sierra 

Leone. The elections held two days ago, May 14, throughout Sierra Leone, represent 

a major milestone on that country’s road to peace. The people of Sierra Leone 

turned out in impressive numbers to vote peacefully for their next government. Mr. 

Chairman, this might not have come about had it not been for your early and ongoing concern about the tragic suffering of the people of Sierra Leone. The region has 

certainly come a long way from May 2000, when the Sierra Leonean rebels of the 

Revolutionary United Front, or RUF, took hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage 

and posed a direct threat for the third time in three years to the capital, Freetown. 

I don not believe any of us would have dared predict then that a combination of 

UN and British peacekeepers, backed by vigorous American diplomacy, would succeed in ending this war and putting democracy back on track in this conflict torn 

country in two years time. Despite this success, we must not be complacent. Peace 

in Sierra Leone is not guaranteed. The region remains troubled as evidenced by recent events in Liberia. There is much that remains to be done before this corner 

of Africa will be secure in peace. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like briefly to review the multi-faceted, regional approach 

we have pursued over the past two years that brought peace to Sierra Leone. First 

of all, we played an essential role in shoring up the shaken UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone—UNAMSIL. We did so by helping to recruit effective reinforcements from around the world, and by training seven West African battalions 

through Operation Focus Relief for service in UNAMSIL. UN officials commended 

the OFR-trained battalions for their peacekeeping abilities and professionalism. We 

also provided non-lethal military assistance to Guinea when it came under serious 

attack from the RUF rebels of Sierra Leone in September 2000. In Sierra Leone, 

we supported the significant British effort to retrain the Sierra Leone army by providing non-lethal equipment and three U.S. military personnel to serve in the international military assistance training team (IMATT). Perhaps most importantly, we 

9

secured smart, targeted international sanctions on the government of Charles Taylor of Liberia, which raised the cost to that government of supporting the RUF. 

Faced with a determined international community, under military pressure from 

Guinea and with its main backer under international sanctions, the RUF decided 

last May to begin to disarm and demobilize. 

The actual process of disarmament and demobilization began on May 18, 2001, 

and did not officially end until January 11, 2002. During this period, over 47,000 

combatants were demobilized and roughly 26,000 light and medium weapons were 

turned in to UNAMSIL for destruction. The challenge is now to reintegrate these 

combatants into civilian life. The United States is playing an important role in this 

process. USAID’s ‘‘Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program’’ has enrolled over 40,000 ex-combatants and war-affected youth in a course of nonformal remedial education addressing basic livelihood skills, civic education and 

health. Another USAID reintegration program targets local government officials, 

civil society activists and community leaders. USAID has expended $5.6 million on 

these two programs, which have earned high marks for their effectiveness. In addition, we provided $1.9 million through the World Bank to help fund the ‘‘reinsertion 

payments’’ that the Sierra Leonean government had promised to disarmed combatants to help them in the early stage of their reintegration into civil society. The UN 

Children’s Fund (UNICEF) is doing an excellent job preparing former child soldiers 

for civilian life. It is essential that we be under no illusions that this reintegration 

process will be quick or easy; undoing years of being accustomed to taking what you 

want at the point of a gun is not a quick or simple process. 

Many of Sierra Leone’s hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons 

(IDPs) and refugees are now returning home with assistance from our refugee and 

disaster assistance programs as well as humanitarian programs of other donors. The 

refugees and IDPs too will need to be reintegrated into their home communities. 

Bringing to justice those who have committed atrocities and traumatized Sierra 

Leone for so many years is another important element in sustaining peace in Sierra 

Leone. I am pleased to report that the Special Court championed by the United 

States has finally been established by the United Nations and Sierra Leone. This 

is a hybrid court—neither a Sierra Leonean nor a UN institution—that will seek 

to bring to justice those who bear the greatest responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law and related Sierra Leonean law. The United States is 

pleased that UN Secretary General Annan appointed U.S. citizen David Crane as 

the Court’s prosecutor, and we have already provided $5 million toward the first 

year’s functioning of the court. We anticipate providing a similar amount for the 

court’s anticipated two additional years of operation. Sierra Leone is also in the 

process of setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that will seek 

to heal the wounds of war by getting oppressors to face their victims and seek acceptance into the new peaceful life of Sierra Leone. We have notified Congress of 

our intention to contribute $500,000 to the TRC, which should begin its twelve to 

eighteen months work by September this year. 

The presidential and legislative elections of May 14 put in place a democratically 

elected government that faces a number of challenges. Provided the immediate postelection period remains peaceful, the international community will need to consider 

how and when UNAMSIL will end. UNAMSIL’s current mandate expires on September 30. We will want to see phased a reduction in UNAMSIL’s troop strength 

accomplished in a prudent manner. Though the United Kingdom will maintain a 

small military force in Sierra Leone, the government will need some UNAMSIL 

presence until it can better establish its authority throughout the country. We will 

consult closely with Congress on the phase out of this peacekeeping operation. This 

has been the UN’s largest peacekeeping operation ever, and we appreciate the support of the Congress over UNAMSIL’s lifetime. 

Once Sierra Leone is able to protect its own borders, and the potential for extraterritorial aggression is neutralized, sustained peace in Sierra Leone will depend 

mainly on the willingness of its elected leaders to provide good governance and economic opportunities to the people of Sierra Leone. In this regard, it will be extremely important that the diamond wealth of the country is used to benefit the 

people and not just a narrow political class. We have helped Sierra Leone create 

a diamond export certification regime that has bolstered the reliability of Sierra 

Leone’s legal diamond exports and that will serve as the basis for Sierra Leone’s 

full participation in the global rough diamond certification system known as the 

Kimberly Process. This is expected to come into effect at the beginning of 2003. We 

are prepared to work with Sierra Leone in ensuring that its diamond industry contributes to peace and economic growth rather than war. We are also prepared to 

protect our multi-hundred million-dollar investment in peacekeeping by helping Sierra Leone rebuild institutions and reconstruct vital infrastructure. This year we 

10

have allocated $9 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $5.4 million in Development Assistance (DA) for this purpose. In addition, USAID provided $26 million of food aid in 2002 alone through American NGOs and the World Food Program. 

Even the best-intentioned government in Sierra Leone will have a difficult time 

sustaining peace if it remains under threat from its neighbor, Liberia. Liberia’s President Charles Taylor helped create the RUF and was an essential external supporter and provider of arms. Unfortunately, Taylor has accepted in Liberia those 

members of the RUF who refused to disarm, demobilize and participate in the 

peaceful political life of Sierra Leone. We understand a number of these recalcitrant 

fighters have been incorporated into Taylor’s panoply of security forces. Supported 

by the Taylor government, they represent a serious potential threat to the nascent 

peace in Sierra Leone. 

We are trying to neutralize this potential threat in two ways. First, we are continuing to try to convince President Taylor to sever all links with the RUF by keeping pressure on his regime through international sanctions aimed at keeping weapons out of Liberia and denying Taylor access to resources he can use to pursue regional destabilization. On May 6, the UN Security Council renewed for another year 

a ban on arms imports, a ban on diamond exports and a ban on travel by Taylor 

and his close associates and senior Liberian government officials. That sanctions 

resolution also called on Taylor to allow for verifiable international monitoring of 

revenues derived from Liberia’s ship registry and timber industry to assure that 

funds from those sources are used only for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes. These sanctions are not against the Liberian people; they are 

specifically targeted against Charles Taylor and his cronies. We expect Liberia to 

comply with this request of the international community. 

It would be a tragedy if the new peace in Sierra Leone were to be followed by 

renewed conflict in Liberia, a country that has also suffered horribly from civil conflict during the 1990s. The Taylor government has recently made much of the supposed threat posed by the armed group calling itself Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). The LURD is, to the best of our knowledge, a loosely 

organized armed group comprised mainly of Mandingos and Khran. Its avowed aim 

is the ouster of the Taylor government. It has been blamed for attacks on logging 

operations in Lofa County and for attacks on towns in central Liberia and even on 

the periphery of Monrovia. 

It is unclear whether the LURD has been involved in even a fraction of the incidents blamed on it and for which it has taken credit. Information we have indicates 

that most recent ‘‘attacks’’ have actually been perpetrated by Taylor’s own unpaid 

military and para-military forces. However, the fact remains that there are armed 

factions operating in Liberia and that the peace and welfare of the Liberian people 

is again at risk. There is a growing population of over 100,000 new internally displaced persons and 20,000 new Liberian refugees as a result of the confusion caused 

by the ‘‘attacks’’ this year. We are closely monitoring the situation and will do our 

part to ensure that these innocent people receive needed humanitarian aid from the 

international community. 

The United States has openly condemned the renewed senseless violence in Liberia and has called on all states in the region to respect the international borders 

of their neighbors. To forestall further internal violence, it is imperative that the 

Taylor government create conditions conducive to reestablishing peaceful political 

competition. To date, Taylor has played a shell game, offering greater political opening but then intimidating anyone who he perceives as too outspoken or too much 

of a potential threat. The recent arrest and beating of human rights activist Tiawan 

Gongloe is a prime example of Taylor’s repression. Presidential elections are scheduled to be held in Liberia in October 2003. The United States is under no illusion 

about their ability to reflect the will of the Liberian people as things stand now. 

Opposition political parties and groups remain hopelessly fractured and rightly 

afraid to campaign. Opposition groups know they need to return to run a political 

campaign, but we can understand their hesitancy to do so. Nevertheless, the Liberian opposition must get more organized and engaged. No opposition leader can be 

credible to the Liberian people if he or she stays forever safe in exile. Liberia needs 

the talents and resources of its diaspora, including some eighteen thousand who reside in the United States, if it is to recover peace and prosperity.) 

An important component of our regional strategy is to expand the horizons of 

democratic development in the region. Toward this end, we are supporting the establishment of multiple independent short and medium wave radio stations in the 

region. As a long proponent of the creative use of radio broadcasting in closed societies, Mr. Chairman, you are well aware that there can be no fair political contest 

where the government monopolizes the dissemination of information. We are also 

11

seeking to strengthen civil society groups and are prepared to support electoral processes that we see as having a good chance of being relatively free, fair and inclusive. 

The parliamentary elections in Guinea later this year may, for example, warrant 

our support. 

U.S.-Guinean relations took on a new dynamic following the Liberian-supported 

RUF attacks into Guinea beginning in September 2000. The United States moved 

to aid Guinea, a victim of external aggression and the generally welcoming host to 

close to an estimated 500,000 refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia. We provided 

approximately $1 million in non-lethal military equipment and supplies and offered 

to train four companies of Guinean infantry. That training was delayed by a series 

of events, most notably the terrorist attacks of September 11 on the United States. 

With Guinea facing continued small scale incursions, we intend to follow through 

on our commitment. U.S. military trainers will deploy to Guinea later this month 

to begin the long-promised training, which will include a significant human rights 

component. 

We do not wish to see a new war in the region that will cause yet another humanitarian disaster. We intend to use our engagement with Guinea to try to ensure 

there is no new regional conflagration. Toward this end, we encourage continuation 

of the Mano River Union dialogue agreed at the February 27, 2002 summit in 

Rabat. We are also exploring modalities for providing greater capacity, such as an 

aerial surveillance platform, for monitoring the borders between Guinea, Sierra 

Leone and Liberia. 

The region is walking a tightrope. Taylor and the recalcitrant RUF remain a 

threat to Sierra Leone. This threat must be countered. However, it must not be 

countered in a way that will result in renewed civil war in Liberia. Such a war 

would prove disastrous for the region, including Cote d’Ivoire, which is just beginning to recover from its own internal political upheaval. 

Mr. Chairman, we became heavily involved in the region for humanitarian reasons, to stop the brutality of the war in Sierra Leone, and to foster peace and stability in the region. Our efforts and those of our partners produced positive results 

despite the predictions of many that Sierra Leone was doomed to further carnage 

and war. We must continue those efforts in order to solidify the gains that have 

been achieved. Leaving the region to slip back into turmoil would create the conditions conducive to those who seek to attack our system and values. We must not 

let that happen. 

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you, first, has UNAMSIL been a success 

for U.N.peacekeeping in Africa? Is this an unqualified success, in 

your view? 

Mr. BELLAMY. I think UNAMSIL peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, 

by almost any measure, Mr. Chairman, yes, is a success; and I 

think it is perceived as such by our partners and by much of Africa. 

Mr. ROYCE. Do you think its performance there has consequences 

for conflict resolution in the rest of Africa? 

Mr. BELLAMY. The UNAMSIL experience in Sierra Leone taught 

us many lessons, Mr. Chairman. I think, from the debacle of May 

of 2000, the sending in of U.N. forces that were ill-briefed and illprepared to deal with the threat, the necessity of ensuring that 

forces sent to the theater had the right equipment and had the 

right training, the importance of political-military coordination, I 

think we learned many lessons from UNAMSIL. To that extent, 

yes, I think it is definitely applicable in other contexts. 

Mr. ROYCE. UNAMSIL recovered from the early errors and you 

have learned a lot or we have learned a lot from that operation. 

But let me ask you, now we talk about drawing down that 17,500-

soldier force. Safely, how quickly or slowly should we draw down 

those forces? Let us try to get your estimate on the record for that. 

Mr. BELLAMY. I would certainly say, Mr. Chairman, that we 

must be prudent in any drawdown of UNAMSIL forces. I think 

there is general agreement in the U.N. that we need to wait to see 

the results of these elections. We need to see what sort of governVerDate Feb 1 2002 17:03 Jun 25, 2002 Jkt 079669 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\051602\79669 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
12

ment is formed in Sierra Leone. We need to gauge its stability. We 

need to see how capable this government is of extending its authority and administering Sierra Leonean territory. These are all measurements we must take between now and September when the 

UNAMSIL mandate comes up for renewal. 

I would hesitate—I could not hazard, Mr. Chairman, a timetable 

at this point as to how quickly or how slowly UNAMSIL will be 

drawn down, only to say that there is, I think, wide consensus that 

we must not, as you said, squander a large investment by running 

out the door. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think their presence there is the key to maintaining 

stability, and I think we risk a return of instability if we don’t recognize that this is going to be a process that is going to take some 

time. 

I have another line of questioning. That has to do with our preparation in Liberia, our democracy-building efforts there. 

For some time, I have tried to get radio operational there. What 

happens if the LURD overthrows the Taylor government in Liberia? I know that is a possibility you seem to discount. But is the 

U.S. and the international community prepared to weigh in in a 

major way to promote broadbased democracy should something like 

that occur? Are we thinking a few steps ahead? 

I guess my question is, has the United States been doing enough 

to aid civil society in Liberia to prepare Liberians and give Liberians access to facts and support in building a civil society? 

Mr. BELLAMY. Mr. Chairman, let me say, first of all, that we do 

not look forward to the prospect of the LURD, this dissident army, 

overthrowing the government in Monrovia simply because we do 

not believe that would enhance the chances of creating the democratic development that you have just outlined. 

But you are very right to ask the question, what are we doing 

to go beyond the pressure we are putting on Charles Taylor to prepare for a post-Taylor Liberia? The answer is that for a number of 

years we have maintained a fairly active AID program in Liberia 

that has worked exclusively through civil society and NGOs to develop capacities in a variety of areas and to make up for the shortcomings of the government’s own administration. 

We have throughout this period been hampered by the fact that 

the Liberian opposition, the democratic opposition in Liberia, has 

been thoroughly intimidated and thoroughly beaten into the ground 

by Charles Taylor and by the fact that many of Liberia’s most able 

and best-equipped of potential political leaders have moved into 

exile. It has been difficult to locate a legitimate democratic opposition to work with. 

That situation is beginning to change now, we believe. We are 

seeing the first stirings of a renewal of opposition, very timid 

though it is, opposition activity in Liberia; and we will be requesting congressional support next year for funding for political party 

training, for working to develop the capacity of democratic organizations. We will also be seeking funding for radio broadcasts in Liberia to open up—further open up the political space in that country. 

Mr. ROYCE. I had a chance to meet Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, as you 

have met her in the past, as well. In a situation where there was 

13

no way to get the message out, she still returned to run against 

Charles Taylor a few weeks ago. That is the last I have heard of 

how she is doing. Can you tell us anything about how things are 

on the ground over there for her and for anyone else who wishes 

to assert their interest in running for elective office in Liberia? 

Mr. BELLAMY. Mr. Chairman, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is a good example of perseverance of democratic Liberians in exile. She, I think 

correctly, feared for her safety at certain points in the recent past 

and was understandably reluctant to return to Monrovia. She has 

since gone back several times to Monrovia. She has stepped up her 

political activities. 

We stay in close touch with her. She is someone I think that 

many Liberians would like to see play a larger role in the political 

future of their country. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. We might go to Mr. Payne, but I wanted 

to ask one quick last question. That is whether at the U.N. Security Council the United States pressed the point on sanctions on 

the export of Liberian timber? 

We have talked in the past about the environmental consequences of the way this is done and the fact that it does not benefit the country. Did we press the point? 

Mr. BELLAMY. Absolutely. 

I will just quickly mention, Mr. Chairman, that 2 months ago it 

was not at all a foregone conclusion that we would even get a renewal of the existing sanctions; and we are delighted that a lot of 

hard work paid off and we were able to renew the existing sanctions. In fact, we were not able to get everything we wanted, because we pushed for timber sanctions, but we got timber on the 

agenda. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Bellamy. 

We will go to Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate your short statement and willingness to take our 

questions. 

Just hitchhiking onto what the Chairman indicated about the reduction of U.N. troops, after the blunder of sending 50 light-armed 

troops into the heart of the RUF-controlled territory, which absolutely made no sense, we have seen, with the deployment of an 

adequate number of troops and the program of bringing in combatants to retrain and so forth—I think it would really be a big mistake if we became too ambitious about quickly reducing the number of troops. 

First of all, with the elections being over and with the new government now attempting to put in its programs, to have a downturn and withdrawal of troops I think makes very little sense. I 

would even hope that they would not even start to reduce troops 

until the new government begins to function. There is no guarantee 

that new edicts will be respected, so I would hope that our voice 

in the U.N. would be—let us be very, very cautious. 

We took a blunder, and we made it successful. Now, let us not 

waste all of that energy by having a rapid deployment or withdrawal. I hope that you would concur with our views on that. 

Also, I would hope—you see, one of the ways—there are many 

reasons why in countries rebel groups are able to fester and grow. 

14

It is because the central government in many instances simply does 

not service the rural community. That was specifically the problem 

in Sierra Leone. Freetown was serviced to some degree, but the 

rest of the country was just abandoned, never dealt with. Therefore, you get elements of hostility toward the government, which 

does not serve them at all. 

It certainly does not mean, therefore, that you say that a group 

like the RUF should come to be, but that is what does happen. 

Groups like the RUF even become supported by the people in the— at least they were originally, before all of those horrible atrocities 

began. But you find support from people because they feel they 

have been abandoned. 

Has there been any discussion—or do you intend to have discussions with Mr. Kabbah on his reelection, that they look at Sierra 

Leone as a totality—and not only Freetown, not only being able to 

do things in the town and therefore once again creating the dissatisfaction in the rest of the country. 

Mr. BELLAMY. That is a very valid and a very good point, Congressman. Certainly the origins of the conflict in Sierra Leone have 

a great deal to do with the gulf between the capital and the rest 

of the country. 

In our conversations, we don’t know whether President Kabbah 

will be reelected, but assuming that he is, or regardless of who is 

elected, part of our message to that government will be the necessity of redressing this legacy of neglect in the countryside, developing strong governmental institutions and directing governmental 

resources toward the neglected sectors of the population. Because 

there is—no government is going to enjoy legitimacy and the country is not going to be stable until that problem is addressed. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Another question, in the past it seemed like President Kabbah 

was simply an extension of the British government. If he is going 

to be able to serve his country, will the U.S. also attempt to be 

there to assist in nation building—or not nation building in the 

sense that is negative but to help with the ministries and things 

of that nature in civil society? 

Mr. BELLAMY. Yes, sir. Yes, we will. The British presence is 

drawing down and will be drawn down further. I think we will 

hear less and fewer accusations that Mr. Kabbah is a puppet or 

agent to the British, and we have every intention of remaining engaged in Sierra Leone and working with the new government to develop its administrative and its governing capacities. 

Mr. PAYNE. I think that another shortcoming would be if, once 

again, Mr. Kabbah hires Sandline, or whatever the mercenary 

group from Britain was there previously, to simply protect the diamond mines. I think mercenaries, whether they are Executive Outcome from South Africa or Sandline from Britain, paid fighters, 

really should have no place. We should have U.N. people. We do 

not need to have mercenaries there to supposedly protect a legitimate government. 

Mr. BELLAMY. That is quite right. I could not agree with you 

more. 

One of the reasons the British have invested so much money and 

time in training a new Sierra Leonean army is so that desperate 

15

measures, such as bringing in mercenaries, do not occur in the future. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

I just want to finally conclude. You usually have to say something when you take a little more time. The Chairman does not, 

but if you are not the Chairman, you have to ask if you can have 

one more question. May I have one more question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

The whole question of Liberia, as you know, there is a tremendous amount of interest on the part of African Americans because 

of the historic relationship between Liberia and African Americans 

from 1820 to the first free people. However, much of what has not 

been made public is that Sierra Leone even has a longer history. 

The British granted freedom to slaves that fought on the British 

side against the Colonies, and they lived up to their agreement, although the British lost, and they took former slaves from the U.S. 

That is how Freetown became—got its name. So, therefore, there 

is some tie to Sierra Leone, as there is to Liberia. Do you know 

who is supporting this rebel group? 

Secondly, I think Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf would have had a 

good opportunity if she—it is hard to win the presidency of a country when you live in another country, and that is one thing that 

has to be changed. Either you are going to be there or you are 

going to be coming in at luncheon time and the same thing is going 

to happen again. 

Mr. BELLAMY. Absolutely. In our contacts with Ellen Johnson 

Sirleaf and with other members of the political diaspora, we have 

made the point that the political battle to be fought is in Liberia, 

and the sooner those who need to fight the battle can get back, the 

better. 

As to your question on who is supporting the LURD, our information on the LURD is not at all as complete as we would like it 

to be, but our best information suggests that the bulk of support 

this organization is receiving is from Liberians abroad, Liberians in 

exile. There have been earlier credible reports of some support for 

the LURD from elements within Guinea, with the Guinean Armed 

Forces. There are various sources of support for this somewhat ragtag guerilla army. 

Mr. PAYNE. Finally, just in Angola, UNITA troops are starving 

to death, literally. I have never been a supporter of UNITA. I was 

always on the other side. However, I do feel that there should be 

some immediate action on the part of the U.N. or to get the Red 

Cross involved or someone to tell the government of Angola that 

they cannot allow this to continue and that there must be humanitarian assistance to those troops who have laid down their arms 

and are looking for a new Angola. It is wrong that this is happening. 

Mr. BELLAMY. Congressman, I completely agree. We are very 

concerned about the situation in the demobilization centers in Angola. 

Three things have to happen: The government of Angola has to 

sign an agreement with the U.N. to allow the U.N. to implement 

a very good plan that it already has in place for feeding and taking 

16

care of the soldiers and their families in these camps; we need a 

point of contact within the UNITA government that the international community can liase with so the considerable bilateral assistance that we are providing can be routed effectively; and we are 

also insisting that the government in Luanda move on to develop 

a political dialogue, in addition to a military dialogue, that it has 

with the UNITA leaders. 

We are very active in Luanda, and in New York I was on the 

phone with the U.N. regarding this. We are on the issue and fully 

share your concern that we need to make urgent representations 

to the government of Luanda on this. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Bellamy, let me just add my voice to our Ranking Member’s, Don Payne’s, on that issue, and hope that you can 

secure that objective. 

Okay, we are going to go to Mr. Tancredo of Colorado. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Bellamy, with all the discussion here and your testimony 

with regard to the importance of UNAMSIL in the successful transition to—at least into a peaceful election, it begs the question, 

then: To what extent do you believe what is happening in Sierra 

Leone is something that can be sustained, something that is not a 

relatively superficial structure that exists now as a result of 

UNAMSIL? To what extent is it really the manifestation of sort of 

a groundswell of support for democracy? What indices would you 

use to determine whatever you think is the outcome? 

Mr. BELLAMY. Congressman, I think, as Congressman Payne underlined a moment ago, the critical post-election issue or post-conflict issue in Sierra Leone will be how capably the government organizes itself, how seriously it takes its responsibilities for reaching 

out to a traumatized population, how it marshals resources and 

international support in order to deliver services to its citizens. 

Unless that happens, you are correct, the good results to now 

may turn out only to be superficial, the result of an antiwar 

groundswell. 

We recognize that dilemma, and our engagement in Sierra Leone 

and our modest aid programs in Sierra Leone are going to be oriented and directed to that effort to strengthen the government’s capacity in those areas. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, let me pursue that just a little bit. How can 

you be sure that those activities that you have described for the 

government—how can you be sure that that is what will instill in 

the population an innate desire to retain a democratic system? 

Mr. BELLAMY. I suppose we do not have any such guarantee or 

any such absolute—any absolute certainty. But I think what we do 

know, Congressman, is that the lack of such performance on the 

part of previous Sierra Leonean governments was definitely a contributing factor to the civil war, the conditions of civil war that 

have existed in that country for more than a decade. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. Let me ask you just a couple of other 

quick questions with regard to the special court. 

Given the mandate of the court, which is to prosecute war crimes 

in Sierra Leone, what if Charles Taylor is identified as a perpetrator of war crimes? What would be the outcome of that? 

17

Number one, is it a possibility that he will be named? Number 

two, what will happen if he is? 

Mr. BELLAMY. I would have to go back and read the mandate, 

but I believe it is possible that non-Sierra Leoneans can be, in fact, 

named and pursued by the court, whether they are Liberian or 

whether they are from someplace else. 

A prosecutor for the court has just been named. He expects to arrive in Freetown in July. He will pull his team together and commence work shortly thereafter. It will be up to this prosecutor to 

decide who he—who is pursued and who is indicted. We are not 

going to interfere in that process, but if the trail leads to Charles 

Taylor, we are not going to complain. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Okay. One more question: What is Libya doing 

in this mess? Are they being mischievous? 

Mr. BELLAMY. I think that is probably fair to say. Again, we don’t 

always have as much information as we would like. Libya has historically been a source of support for Charles Taylor. Libya we 

know has supplied arms. We also know that, because of the sanctions applied to Charles Taylor, he does not really have the revenue that he used to have. He has difficulty arranging for arms 

shipments and external support. 

So while the basis for a business arrangement still exists between Libya and Liberia, the means to conduct it and perhaps the 

willingness on the part of the Libyans appears to be somewhat perhaps slightly diminished. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Bellamy. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Ms. Barbara Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Hello, Mr. Bellamy. Let me ask you a couple of questions with 

regard to the United States’ commitment and involvement really 

specifically with regard to helping with the rebuilding of the governmental institutions and what type and the levels of development assistance are we providing. 

Specifically, I want to know a little bit more about the HIV and 

AIDS pandemic in Sierra Leone. Do we have a handle on that? Do 

we know what the numbers are, and do we know what is happening with regard to the peacekeeping forces? Have they been provided with condoms and all the types of AIDS prevention measures 

that we know work? 

Mr. BELLAMY. If I may, I don’t believe I am in a position to give 

you a good or satisfactory answer in terms of the HIV/AIDS situation in Sierra Leone or how the UNAMSIL, the peacekeeping forces 

there, have been part of that. But I will certainly undertake to provide that information as soon as I can get hold of it. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. That would be very helpful. 

Mr. BELLAMY. In terms of the sort of support that we propose or 

are giving and propose to give to Sierra Leone, first and foremost—

and I think I mentioned, it is the support to the peacekeeping 

forces in an ongoing peacekeeping presence of some sort to enable 

the government to achieve a more stable situation and extend its 

administration. 

18

We are going to continue to fund the special court. We are going 

to hopefully fund the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which 

is a parallel structure and not a court of law but a structure somewhat similar to that erected in South Africa at the end of the 

apartheid for exposing the truth of the atrocities and the terrible 

recent history of Sierra Leone and reaching some means of reconciliation. 

We very recently rescheduled Sierra Leone’s bilateral debt to the 

United States and by scheduling this debt we have given Sierra 

Leone a bit of breathing room and a much-needed economic boost. 

In the future, some of the projects that we are looking at for the 

next year or two include continuing to provide election support and 

strengthening the electoral systems in Sierra Leone. We propose to 

provide support to the justice sector, building up Sierra Leone’s 

fledgling judicial institutions. 

We also have under way a very successful program that was 

launched as part of the demobilization and disarmament process 

whereby child soldiers, young people, ex-combatants, are given 

basic livelihood skills, basic job training, basic socialization and are 

prepared for reinsertion into civil society. 

So those are a few examples of the sorts of programs that we 

have under way now and that we will be continuing in the future. 

Ms. LEE. Can I just ask you what our level of funding is in 2002, 

and then what will it be in 2003 in terms of development assistance? 

Mr. BELLAMY. Okay. Our development assistance in 2003, we have requested $3.9 million in development assistance. We have 

not made a specific request for ESF, but we will. Sierra Leone is 

not a line item in our budget, but we will be requesting money 

from our Africa regional funds to continue supporting the special 

court and to manage the programs that I have just mentioned to 

you. Without being specific, the number last year for that was $9 million, and I suspect that the request will be similar this year. The 

$9 million last year, much went for support and demobilization. 

That is not an expense this year. Hopefully, that can be used for 

purposes of reconstruction. 

Ms. LEE. You say the other category, the $3.9 million, that is development assistance? 

Mr. BELLAMY. Yes. 

Ms. LEE. What was it in 2002? 

Mr. BELLAMY. 5.4. 

Ms. LEE. Million? 

Mr. BELLAMY. Million. 

Ms. LEE. We went down? 

Mr. BELLAMY. The request went down compared to 2002. 

Ms. LEE. Can you give me an explanation for that, given the 

enormous need that we know the country has and the people have 

as a result of the war? 

Mr. BELLAMY. I will have to give you more precise information 

on that. I don’t have an explanation of what accounts for that $1.5 

million. 

Ms. LEE. Could you? Because I have a concern—I am sure some 

Committee Members may have the same concern—that as we move 

19

forward to try to assist the recovery efforts and assist the civil society and people, the people of Sierra Leone, we need to provide the 

basic—provide that type of development assistance that they 

should have; and to go down on that at this critical juncture to me 

seems to be really very inappropriate and very counterproductive. 

Mr. BELLAMY. With your permission, I would like to get together 

with our eight colleagues and perhaps provide you and the Committee with a more detailed explanation of what the assistance 

looked like in 2002 and what we have in mind for 2003. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Bellamy. 

We will now go to our second panel. I am going to ask our panelists—since we have already read their statements, I am going ask 

the witnesses to please keep their remarks to under 5 minutes. 

I am going to ask our panelists, since we have already read their 

statements, I am going to ask our witnesses to please keep their 

remarks to under 5 minutes. We are going to hear from Mr. Dave 

Peterson, Senior Program Officer for Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy. Since 1988, the NED has identified and assisted hundreds of African organizations and activists working for 

democracy and human rights. 

Mr. Peterson has a bachelor’s degree from Columbia College, and 

a master’s degree from the Columbia School of Journalism in New 

York, and a master’s degree in African studies and international 

economics from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies. Mr. Peterson has published numerous articles on African 

politics. 

We also have John Prendergast, co-Director of the Africa program of the International Crisis Group. He formerly worked as special advisor on African conflicts at the State Department and was 

Director of African Affairs at the National Security Council. He has 

also worked for a variety of NGOs on issues of peace, human 

rights, and humanitarian assistance in Africa. He has authored numerous books and journal articles on Africa. 

We have Binaifer Nowrojee. She is counsel with Human Rights 

Watch’s African Division. She has been with the organization since 

1993, and prior to that served as staff attorney on Africa for the 

Lawyers Committee on Human Rights. She has led numerous factfinding missions to Africa to investigate human rights abuses and 

is the author of many reports and articles on human rights in Africa. 

Ms. Nowrojee holds a law degree from Columbia Law School and 

a master’s in law from Harvard Law School. 

And before proceeding, without objection, I would like to enter 

into the record statements from two U.S.-based Liberian organizations. The Liberian Democracy Initiative is an independent organization dedicated to advancing the interests of Liberia; and secondly, the Union of Liberian Associations in the Americas is the 

largest umbrella organization of Liberians and their associations. 

And hearing no objection, the statements from these two organizations will be entered in the record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

20

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE LIBERIAN DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE

On the eve of the historic elections in Sierra Leone, it is truly fitting for the Liberian Democracy Initiative (LDI) to join this honorable body in examining the ‘‘Elections in Sierra Leone: A Step Towards Regional Stability.’’ Reports indicate that the 

polls were by far the most orderly and peaceful in Sierra Leone since the country 

gained independence from Britain in 1961. 

Although Sierra Leone provides an element of hope for democracy in the West African Sub-Region, yet governmental instability will exist especially when government such as the current Liberian Government continues to disrupt its neighbors’

political systems and sovereignty. At this critical time of much needed peace and 

stability in Sierra Leone, neighboring Liberia is going through serious fighting and 

turmoil around Monrovia. 

All of Africa is impressed with the tremendous progress made by the people of 

Sierra Leone in achieving an end to strings of barbaric massacre of their people by 

dissidents bent on destroying the fabrics of democracy in West Africa. It comes as 

no surprise to members of the United States Congress and other members of the 

international community, that the people of Sierra Leone would have one day join 

other nations in moving their country towards democracy. This undertaken effort 

is truly monumental. 

The Liberian people have consistently paid a supreme price to experience a day 

of true democracy and its principles in action in the country instead of a pseudodemocratic format that has undermined the integrity of the country and her people. 

The people of Liberia like the people of Sierra Leone have a common interest in 

peace, stability, and respect for human dignity. 

However, democracy and lasting peace is only possible in the West African SubRegion when Charles Taylor, president of Liberia is actively contained as well as 

pressurized to institute practical and verifiable democratic measures aimed at holding the elections in 2003 and respecting human rights of the Liberian people as well 

as his neighbors. Taylor ascended to power in 1997 when elections were held after 

the senseless killings of over 200,000 Liberians. Voters were intimidated to vote 

Charles Taylor or risk yet another civil war. 

The whole world continues to witness how Liberians are suffering from inhumane 

and oppressive acts by the Taylor administration. In the face of renewed brutality 

and cruelty, LDI has no alternative but to call for the resignation of Mr. Taylor as 

president of the Republic of Liberia. He is incompetent and has misled the Liberian 

people by failing to uphold the Liberian Constitution as well as to protect the basic 

fundamental rights of the Liberian people. Mr. Taylor has failed our people and 

clearly demonstrated that he is increasingly intolerant of criticism and cannot preside over a constitutional democratic government, people and a country like Liberia. 

As Liberians prepare for the general and presidential elections in 2003, we are 

calling on peace-loving and pro-democratic nations not to stand aside and allow a 

tyrant like Charles Taylor to once more continue to rule the people of Liberia with 

iron hands as he has done during the last five years. 

LDI will leave no stone unturned in monitoring and working for democratic principles and practices in Liberia. We continue to sponsor and undertake projects for 

democratic changes in the country. In the interest of democracy, peace, and human 

dignity, LDI is co-sponsoring a Pro-Democracy Conference on Liberia at the University of the District of Columbia this June to facilitate an understanding amongst 

pro-democracy advocates, civic society, opposition political parties and others that 

the bigger picture of interest is the Republic of Liberia, and the protection of the 

rights of her people. 

Accordingly, LDI calls on the United States Government and Congress—as a true 

champion and partner of democracy in the New World—to assist us in actively undertaking endeavors to ensure democracy and lasting peace in Liberia. Therefore, 

we resolve that the U.S. Government:

Insist on press freedom in Liberia as well as the freeing of all journalists and 

political detainees currently jailed on bogus charges by the Taylor administration.

Pressurize the Taylor regime to allow foreign journalists and United Nations 

inspectors full and unimpeded access to monitor the release of journalists, politicians, child soldiers and others presently detained in Liberia.

Exerts pressure on Mr. Taylor either to put in place practical and verifiable 

democratic measures before elections in 2003 or for him to resign.

Provides logistical, technical and financial assistance to opposition political 

parties and pro-democracy groups like LDI.

21

Request the United Nations sanctions on Liberian rubber and timber as well 

as create an independent auditing of the maritime funds.

Freezes the bank accounts of Mr. Taylor, his senior government officials, and 

his family members and friends who are engaged in his commercial dealings.

Increases humanitarian aid to the Liberian people. For the U.S. Government 

and the international community to continue to find creative ways and means 

to provide assistance and support for the Liberian people and democratic institutions through the work of local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Liberia. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE UNION OF LIBERIAN ASSOCIATIONS IN THE AMERICAS

West Africa is among the world’s most unstable sub-regions. In the last decade, 

Liberia and Sierra Leone have been embroiled in protracted Civil Wars. Liberia and 

Guinea continue to accuse each other of launching border raids. The remarkable 

intervention of the international community, especially Great Britain, in Sierra 

Leone led to an end to the war and holding of elections on May 14, 2002.We commend the efforts to bring relative peace to Sierra Leone and the continued strides 

to bring lasting peace to our neighbor. This is a great accomplishment, because a 

major obstacle to peace and stability in West Africa is the lack of viable systems 

of governance and democratization. With peace coming to Sierra Leone, Liberia is 

once again in the spotlight in the wake of renewed rebel activities and sanctions 

imposed as a result of actions of the Liberian Government, inimical to peace and 

stability not only in Liberia but the entire sub-region. Over the last decade rebel 

groups have caused widespread instability in the sub-region and President Charles 

Taylor bears responsibility for much of the long-standing aggression. The recent 

gains by the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) has 

made it even more important for special attention to be given to Liberia if regional 

stability is to be achieved. 

Over the last few weeks, the Taylor Government has been increasingly intolerant 

of divergent views. A State of Emergency was imposed in February 8, 2002, indiscriminate arrests of peaceful citizens carried out, newspapers closed, and recently 

human rights activist Tiawon Gongloe was detained, tortured until he collapsed and 

hospitalized. The Armed Forces of Liberia has been called to active duty and remilitarization of the society is in full gear. The recruitment of child soldiers as well as 

constant threats and intimidation of civil society persists. There is the need for constitutionalism and principles of law, respect for human rights, political pluralism, 

accountable and transparent government, and proper management of public finance 

as well as empowerment of the civil society. 

In view of the prevailing circumstances, the Union of Liberian Associations in the 

Americas (ULAA), the umbrella organization of all Liberians and their associations, 

calls upon the Government of the United States and the international community 

to pay special attention to Liberia to avert regional stability. Pressure should be 

used to obtain a negotiated solution that would end Liberia’s conflict and a ceasefire between LURD and the Liberian Government. Unless something is done immediately to stop the violence, misery and death in Liberia, there will continue to be 

regional instability. A substantive peace negotiation among civil society and the opposition would be necessary. 

ULAA calls upon the international community to secure fundamental reforms and 

that the scheduled free and fair elections are held. These reforms include the restructuring of the Armed Forces, the removal of decrees and orders that prevent the 

opposition from effectively functioning as political institutions, financial accountability, freedom of the press and other freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. 

President Taylor must understand that unless concrete actions are taken that will 

convince the stakeholders that free and fair elections can and will be held, Liberians 

and the international community will continue to press for arrangements whereby 

such elections are held. 

ULAA calls upon the international community to diplomatically encourage the development of responsible alternatives to the approach of the Taylor Government to 

governance and democratization. and give significant assistance to the empowerment of civil society. Experiences show the need for a people centered approach to 

security. Human security especially when it comes to the right of the individual to 

live in peace and to satisfy his/her basic needs should share equal status with traditional concerns for regime survival. 

Finally, President Taylor’s rule has fueled regional instability in the region of 

West Africa. He continues to push a grand scheme of political change and unless 

something is done to arrest the current deteriorating state of affairs in Liberia, the 

22

fragile peace in Sierra Leone and the resultant free and fair elections will not yield 

the desired stability in the region. The United States and the international community must compel President Taylor to implement a comprehensive and constructive 

program of institutional reforms, including security reform, re-establishment of rule 

of law to pave the way for free and fair elections and lasting stability in the subregion.

Mydea Reeves-Karpeh (Mrs.) 

National President

Mr. ROYCE. We will start with Mr. Peterson. 

STATEMENT OF DAVE PETERSON, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER 

FOR AFRICA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 

Mr. PETERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Members of the Committee, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify this afternoon. The National Endowment for Democracy is currently supporting more than a dozen civil society 

human rights NGOs in the Mano River Union. And, in fact, I 

would like to acknowledge the presence today here of two human 

rights activists, Charlie Hughes from the Forum for Democratic 

Initiatives of Sierra Leone, and Benedict Sano from the Center for 

Human Rights Education of Liberia. 

Mr. ROYCE. We would like to ask Mr. Hughes and Mr. Sano to 

stand. Welcome. 

Mr. PETERSON. They have been doing tremendous work in those 

two countries. 

I think that the point has already been made in the testimony 

before that the elections in Sierra Leone demonstrate both the potential and the fragility in the region. Even as Sierra Leoneans celebrate their elections, civil war threatens to engulf Liberia. But I 

think that the most important lesson of the past few years the 

international community can get from these elections is that with 

the political will and the necessary resources, these crises can be 

addressed. 

When the international community pushed for a quick and cheap 

solution to Sierra Leone’s war with the Lome Accord in 1999, the 

agreement soon fell apart, and unprepared U.N. troops were held 

hostages by the rebels, and it was only the direct intervention of 

the British and a huge buildup of U.N. troops that managed to restore order. The international community cannot cut off and ignore 

Liberia’s problems or fail to acknowledge the injustices fueled by 

Guinea dictatorship. To do so would only invite more death and destruction. 

But I would like to make a few other specific points. First, war, 

violence, and dictatorship cannot solve the region’s problems. I am 

convinced that very few Liberians, Sierra Leoneans or Guineans 

want more death and destruction. As much as we may detest the 

government of Charles Taylor in Liberia, it must be acknowledged 

that he was generally recognized by the international community 

to have been democratically elected and enjoys a mandate until the 

next elections. Any attempt to remove him by force will only bring 

more suffering on the Liberian people. 

Given Liberia’s history, we should have learned that any group 

seizing power by military means would more likely than not be 

worse than Taylor and is unlikely to be considered legitimate by a 

large portion of Liberians. Whatever such groups may say, they inVerDate Feb 1 2002 17:03 Jun 25, 2002 Jkt 079669 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\051602\79669 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
23

evitably commit grave human rights abuses and create pretexts for 

their opponents to do the same, as Human Rights Watch has documented. The violent insurgency of the LURD should be unequivocally condemned and the flow of arms cut off to all of the belligerents. If LURD does not immediately enter into negotiations, it 

should be placed on the list of terrorist organizations, just as the 

RUF was, which would serve to cut off their financial support, including any coming from groups in the U.S. or the Government of 

Guinea. Any foreign support provided to Guinea that is utilized in 

any way to support the LURD rebels should be ended immediately. 

Secondly, I think that Sierra Leone has shown the way for Liberia and Guinea. If all the sides in Sierra Leone can accept that 

there was a free and fair process even after all the years of civil 

war and atrocities, then there is no reason the same cannot happen 

in Liberia and Guinea. The 90 percent turnout in Sierra Leone is 

proof of the faith that citizens in the region put in democracy. 

There should be stronger international support for democratic institutions and processes, including civil society and elections in both 

Liberia and Guinea, and continued support for these in Sierra 

Leone. 

Liberia will hold elections in 2003. It shouldn’t be the roll of the 

U.S. or other countries to interfere with the outcome of these elections. However, by creating both pressure and incentives for an 

open process, one in which Liberians are given a chance to debate 

issues, compare a range of candidates and begin to reestablish 

democratic processes and institutions, then no matter who wins the 

elections, Liberia will be a better country, more stable and free, 

and no longer a threat to its neighbors. If the violence is allowed 

to continue, there will be no elections. Taylor will only become 

more repressive, the region more unstable, and the human and material costs more enormous. 

Guinea has never really had a free and fair election, and the social tensions that are building there are only likely to end in explosion. Without greater insistence on behalf of democratic change in 

Guinea, our pressure on Liberia will be nothing but hypocrisy. 

Finally, strategic implications for the West Africa region and the 

rest of the African continent and many other parts of the world 

should be drawn. Stability and democracy in Sierra Leone will reinforce the advances that have been made in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, 

Senegal, Mali and Niger. All of these are democracies. It could open 

up the political space in Liberia, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. 

Peacekeeping and elections have worked thus far in Sierra 

Leone. They can also work in Congo and even in Sudan. This is not 

to underestimate the challenges in terms of political will and resources or the differences from one situation to the next. In fact, 

it is only to underline them. 

If it costs the international community a billion dollars over several years to help Sierra Leone, then we need to be prepared to 

spend 10 times that in Congo, a country 10 times the size. But if 

after 50,000 deaths Sierra Leoneans can come together and begin 

to heal their wounds, then it might indeed be possible in some of 

these other places. 

In conclusion, continuation and expansion of assistance to civil 

society and democratic institution-building in the Mano River 

24

Union is a great investment. Such assistance must be combined 

with aid for basic social infrastructure and economic development. 

In the end, if this type of assistance is sustained in Sierra Leone, 

that country will have a good chance of overcoming its terrible 

past, rebuilding and joining the family of democratic nations. 

As well, there are many courageous peaceful democracy activists 

in Liberia who have recently been starved of resources to continue 

their work. The National Endowment for Democracy has tried to 

fill some of this gap, but much more needs to be done. Activists 

from all three countries, including Guinea, are beginning to collaborate in pressing their governments for peace and democracy. They 

need and deserve our support. 

Thank you very much. That is all I have to say. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVE PETERSON, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER FOR AFRICA, 

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify 

this afternoon. Although the remarks I will be making are my personal opinions and 

do not represent those of the organization I work for, the National Endowment for 

Democracy, I think it is important to point out that the Endowment is a congressionally-funded grant-making organization that has been active in the countries of 

the Mano River Union for more than 12 years. NED is currently supporting more 

than a dozen groups in the sub-region, such as the Press Union of Liberia, the Justice and Peace Commission, the Center for Law and Human Rights Education, and 

the Liberia Institute of Journalism in Liberia; the Campaign for Good Governance, 

National Forum for Human Rights, Forum for Democratic Initiatives and Radio Bo 

in Sierra Leone; and the Organisation Guineene des Droits de l’Homme in Guinea, 

as well as an initiative called the Mano River Union Civil Society Movement that 

spans all three countries. In discussing the way forward for the Mano River Union 

countries in the aftermath of Sierra Leone’s recent elections, I hope that my remarks will to a great extent reflect the opinions and aspirations of many of the individuals in these groups with whom the Endowment has had the privilege to work. 

Sierra Leone’s elections demonstrate both the potential and the fragility of the region. Even as Sierra Leoneans celebrate their peaceful elections, civil war again 

threatens to engulf Liberia, and I doubt that either Guinea or Sierra Leone can long 

remain immune from the contagion of violence if Liberia does not stabilize. I do not 

have time to review the history and social roots of the crisis that have made these 

three countries among the poorest, bloodiest, and most corrupt in the world, despite 

abundant natural resources and human talent. But the most important lesson of the 

past few years is that if the international community can muster the political will 

matched with the necessary resources, this crisis can be properly addressed and surmounted. When the international community pushed for a quick and cheap solution 

to Sierra Leone’s war with the Lome Accord in 1999, the agreement soon fell apart, 

the unprepared UN troops were held hostage by the rebels, and it was only the direct intervention of the British and a huge build-up of the UN troops that managed 

to restore order. Similarly, the international community cannot simply cut off and 

ignore Liberia’s problems, and must not fail to acknowledge the injustices and instability fueled by Guinea’s dictatorship. Nor can the international community afford 

to pack up and leave Sierra Leone now that they have had their elections. The US 

and others must be engaged in the region with significant resources, or the costs 

in terms of refugees and death will be sure to climb dramatically once again. 

I would like to make a few more specific points: 

First, war, violence and dictatorship cannot solve the region’s problems. I am convinced that very few Liberians, Sierra Leoneans or Guineans want more death and 

destruction. As much as we may detest the government of Charles Taylor in Liberia, 

it must be acknowledged that he was generally recognized by the international community to have been democratically elected and enjoys a mandate until the next 

round of elections. Any attempt to remove him by force will only bring more suffering on the Liberian people. Given Liberia’s history, we should have learned that 

any group seizing power by military means would likely be considerably worse than 

Taylor, and is unlikely to be considered legitimate by a large portion of Liberians. 

25

Whatever such groups may say, they inevitably commit grave human rights abuses, 

and create pretexts for their opponents to do the same (as Human Rights Watch 

has recently documented). The violent insurgency of the LURD should be unequivocally condemned, and the flow of arms should be cut off to all of the belligerents, 

and if LURD does not immediately enter into political negotiations, LURD should 

be placed on the list of terrorist organizations just as the RUF was, which would 

serve to cut off their financial support, including any coming from groups in the US 

or the government of Guinea. Any foreign support provided to Guinea that is utilized in any way to support the LURD rebels should end immediately. 

Secondly, Sierra Leone has shown the way for Liberia and Guinea. If all sides in 

Sierra Leone can accept that there was a free and fair process, even after years of 

civil war and atrocities, then there is no reason the same cannot happen in Liberia 

and Guinea. The 90 percent turnout in Sierra Leone is proof of the faith that citizens in the region put in democracy. There should be strong international support 

for democratic institutions and processes, including civil society and elections, in 

both Liberia and Guinea, and continued support for these in Sierra Leone. Liberia 

will hold elections in 2003. It should not be the role of the U.S. or other countries 

to interfere with the outcome of these elections. However, by creating both pressure 

and incentives for an open process, one in which Liberians are given a chance to 

debate issues, compare a range of candidates, and begin to re-establish democratic 

processes and institutions, then no matter who wins the elections, Liberia will be 

a better country, more stable and free, and no longer a threat to its neighbors. If 

the violence is allowed to continue, there will be no elections, Taylor will only become more repressive, the region more unstable, and the human and material costs 

more enormous. Guinea has never had a really free and fair election, and the social 

tensions that are building there are only likely to end in an explosion. Without a 

greater insistence on behalf of democratic change in Guinea, our pressure on Liberia 

will be nothing but hypocrisy. 

Finally, the strategic implications for the West African region, the rest of the African continent, and even many other parts of the world, should be drawn. Stability 

and democracy in Sierra Leone will reinforce the advances that have been made in 

Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Mali, and Niger. It could open up the political space 

in Liberia, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. Peacekeeping and elections have worked thus 

far in Sierra Leone; they can also work in Congo, Sudan, and perhaps other parts 

of the world. This is not to underestimate the challenges in terms of political will 

and resources, or the differences from one situation to the next, in fact it is only 

to underline them. If it cost the international community a billion dollars over several years to help Sierra Leone, then we may need to be prepared to spend ten times 

as much in Congo, a country ten times the size. But if, after more than 30,000 

deaths, Sierra Leoneans can come together and begin to heal their wounds, then it 

might indeed be possible in many other places. 

In conclusion, a continuation and expansion of assistance to civil society and 

democratic institution building in the Mano River Union is a great investment. Such 

assistance must of course be combined with aid for basic social infrastructure and 

economic development. In the end, if this type of assistance is sustained in Sierra 

Leone, that country will have a good chance of overcoming its terrible past, rebuilding and joining the family of democratic nations. As well, there are many courageous, peaceful democracy activists in Liberia who have recently been starved of resources to continue their work; NED has tried to fill some of this gap, but much 

more needs to be done. Activists from all three countries, including Guinea, are beginning to collaborate on pressing their governments for peace and democracy. They 

need and deserve our support. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Prendergast. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-DIRECTOR OF THE 

AFRICA PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today 

for the International Crisis Group. We have an office in Freetown 

and are monitoring events throughout the region. So we very much 

appreciate your invitation. 

It is certainly justifiable to take a moment today to celebrate 

democratic elections and extol the virtues of the beginnings of a 

success story in Sierra Leone, but it is indeed only a beginning, as 

everyone here has concurred today. The giant elephant in this 

26

hearing room today is the regional agenda of destabilization emanating from Liberia. Our written testimony deals with some of the 

issues internal in Sierra Leone, but I want to focus in the first instance on the issues coming from Liberia. 

It is important we take a second to understand what is motivating—what are the motivations and objectives of those destabilizing the region. Charles Taylor continues, with Libyan support, 

to push a grand scheme of political change in West Africa which 

involves intertwined objectives of achieving a greater Liberia and 

asset-stripping of the vast natural resource base of the region. For 

the last 10 years since his assistance for the RUF’s first incursion 

in Sierra Leone, he has been the key figure in the attempted destabilization of Guinea and Sierra Leone. As long as Charles Taylor 

remains in power, the entire region will be unstable. He and his 

rogue commercial and military allies feed on instability, leaving 

unaddressed the root causes of regional decay, which are endemic 

poverty, the lack of economic opportunity and a history of parasitic 

governance throughout the region. 

Mr. Tancredo, you asked about Libya. Well, Taylor’s agenda 

dovetails very, very closely with Qadhafi’s aims, which stretch back 

to the 1980s when he set out to sponsor a wave of insurrections in 

Africa to displace Western influence. Taylor was one of the first 

graduates of Libya’s elite school of insurrection. He obviously listened well in his classes. 

The threat of Liberia’s conflict spilling back into Sierra Leone is 

a real one in the near future. A number of former RUF fighters 

who opted out of the disarmament process are now fighting with 

Taylor’s forces in Liberia, effectively forming Taylor’s own Foreign 

Legion. The involvement of Sierra Leone’s militias, fighters in the 

war on both sides, is another cause for concern. The impetus for 

this move is money, of course, and the related lack of employment 

and earning opportunities back in Sierra Leone. The flow of excombatants back and forth across the Sierra Leone and Liberian 

border, often with weapons acquired in Liberia, threatens the stability of the border region and beyond. 

I would like to focus for a minute on specific U.S. policy initiatives at this critical juncture. Again, the written testimony has specific recommendations regarding the internal Sierra Leone priorities which we need to remain focused on, but I want to continue 

to highlight the regional dimensions of a peaceful Sierra Leone 

which in the end requires a just peace and real democracy in Liberia, as my colleague Mr. Peterson has just pointed out. 

Regional stability demands U.S. leadership at this point and 

what we are calling for to be a dual-track, internationally supported peace effort which would have as its starting point a new 

and serious peace process aimed at resolving Liberia’s civil war. In 

the context of that effort, a parallel international diplomatic engagement is needed to deal with the regional cross-border security 

issues by building upon the Mano River Union’s initiatives in this 

regard. 

The two issues are deeply intertwined. Liberian opposition forces 

throughout the region believe the only way they can return to Liberia is through the barrel of a gun and have found regional support. 

Similarly, disaffected, impoverished or opportunistic elements from 

27

throughout the region, particularly Sierra Leone, have found 

Charles Taylor to be a generous godfather supporting dissident 

units to destabilize neighboring countries. The internal Liberian 

conflict must be dealt with as the major contagion in West Africa, 

while the disputes between neighboring countries must be addressed in order to reduce cross-border support for rebel movements. 

What we are calling for, Mr. Chairman, is a contact group—that 

the U.S. lead an effort to build such a contact group that would include the United Kingdom, France, Nigeria and other actors of importance in order to create such a new and serious peace process 

for Liberia which would be backed by intensive involvement and 

pressure from the international community. The aim—it is almost 

identical to what Dave has just told you—is to create consensus 

among key internal Liberian elements by creating consensus 

amongst the fractious external actors in the region and beyond. 

Success will depend on whether this group of external actors can 

unify behind a common approach. Harmonizing France’s considerable influences in the region with the objectives of other European 

nations, the United States and Nigeria will be key. 

We think also that the administration should pressure the 

LURD, its sponsor Guinea, and the Liberian Government to convene substantive peace negotiations which involve civil society and 

opposition as well from Liberia and negotiate a cessation of hostilities in the context of a renewed peace process. As part of that 

peace process, the Bush Administration, along with others with influence, should demand that the Liberian Government implement 

a program of comprehensive institutional reform including security 

sector reform and reestablishment of the rule of law to pave the 

way for free and fair elections. Support should be provided by us 

if real verifiable steps are taken in this regard. 

Fourth, the Bush Administration and other donors should use 

the time before the end of Taylor’s term to fund and help develop 

independent Liberian civil society and media institutions, and offer 

support and protection to independent political voices, and build on 

the kind of things that NED has been doing. 

Fifth, we would focus attention on the three Es undergirding the 

effectiveness of sanctions on Taylor. Liberia’s greatest susceptibility 

to pressure remains the financial element of leverage. The three Es 

I am referring to are evidence gathering. We need to do a better 

job of building the evidentiary chain for moving on sanctions busters for breaking the sanctions in Liberia. 

Second, we need to enforce these sanctions and move on the 

sanctions busters across the globe. A few people have been arrested 

and indicted; we have to do more on that. 

And third, and finally and most importantly, and, Mr. Chairman, 

you referred to this, we need to expand these sanctions. We need 

to hold out the real threat of expanding sanctions to the timber and 

maritime industries, the principal remaining sources of revenue for 

Liberia, Incorporated. 

Thanks very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

28

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AFRICA

PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

I would like to begin by thanking the Committee for offering me the opportunity 

to testify and present the work of the International Crisis Group in Sierra Leone 

and the broader Mano River region. Sierra Leone was one of ICG’s first projects; 

recently we have expanded our project to include a focus on the broader regional 

issues, because we believe there is no prospect for lasting security in Sierra Leone 

until the conflict that began within Liberia, and has touched several other states 

of the region, is resolved. As this testimony was written, Sierra Leoneans were 

going to the polls to choose a new President and parliament. My oral testimony will 

offer an update on what we know about the election’s results and implications. 

I. OVERALL OUTLOOK FOR SIERRA LEONE

Today there is no active fighting in Sierra Leone, but the country has yet to win 

the peace. This realization must shape the next phase of any international strategy 

toward Sierra Leone and the broader region. The international community needs to 

use the immediate period after the elections to drive hard at consolidating the peace 

process, for Sierra Leone’s future still hangs in the balance. The international community tends to see elections as an exit strategy, but Sierra Leone remains vulnerable. 

Eleven years after the fighting in Sierra Leone began, the country’s fundamental 

problems remain largely unchanged: first, the self-perpetuating cast of political 

characters that led the country to war and prolonged human suffering; second, the 

status quo of corrupt and weak one-party government; third, the unfinished regional 

conflict. 

The international community has invested time, effort, and approximately $2 billion in an expensive, but ultimately successful, peacekeeping mission. It was this investment that made this week’s presidential and parliamentary elections possible. 

However, the difficult task of rebuilding and changing the political landscape must 

start now, or that money will have been largely wasted as Sierra Leone will remain 

a permanent breeding ground for war, chaos and illegal commercial activity. 

II. THE INTERNAL CLIMATE

Sierra Leone has made important progress in the run-up to the elections and the 

elections themselves. 

First, the UN’s disarmament program was declared successfully completed on 17 

January 2002. A total of 72,490 combatants completed the disarmament program, 

including 24,352 RUF and 37,377 CDF forces. (Of those disarmed officially, 6,845 

were children.) While there remain suspicions of hidden arms caches, UNAMSIL is 

satisfied that the majority of the weapons, especially heavy weaponry, have been 

forfeited during this process. A special UN investigative team recently submitted a 

review of the DDR process to the UN Security Council arguing that disarmament 

had been successful. 

The RUF has been disrupted. Many rank and file soldiers have broken with the 

RUF Party (RUF–P) leadership over issues of broken promises, unpaid allowances, 

and allegations of corruption among senior commanders. There are, however, concerns that some former soldiers have not disbanded or returned home but remain 

concentrated in former RUF strongholds, and there are reports that the RUF chain 

of command still exists in salient areas like Makeni and Magburaka in the north. 

Other RUF fighters opted out of the peace process and chose to join RUF commander, Sam Bockarie, in fighting Charles Taylor’s war against the Liberians 

United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) dissident group. Nevertheless, the 

lack of weapons and the increasing fragmentation of the RUF, including numerous 

reports of ex-RUF shifting allegiance to the two main political parties in Sierra 

Leone (the Sierra Leone People Party—SLPP—and the All Peoples Congress—APC) 

give the international community and Sierra Leoneans confidence that the RUF 

poses little threat to stability and peace in the near future. 

The government, for its part, has fully extended its authority across the country, 

although uncertainty remains about the army’s continued loyalty and the capacity 

of the police to fulfill its role of tackling internal security. The police are lagging 

behind the pace of army reform—in large part because of limited financial assistance. 

The International Military Advisory Training Team, led by the British, has reported positive developments in restructuring the army, though they admit that border security is a continuing challenge. The true test will come when UNAMSIL begins to draw down its forces and the newly constituted Republic of Sierra Leone 

29

Armed Forces (RSLAF) are required to fill the vacuum created by the departure of 

the international forces. Currently, the army is not capable of performing such a 

task. The UN Security Council plans to review the peacekeeping mission’s size, and 

Secretary General Kofi Annan is expected to make his recommendation on the future of UNAMSIL in September. While UNAMSIL does not need to maintain its 

present size of 17,500, any future rationalization of the peacekeeping force must ensure that UNAMSIL troops are strategically restructured to patrol key salient regions of Sierra Leone, particularly the eastern districts of Kailahun and Kono, as 

well as the southern border near Zimmi. 

The first round of national elections for President and parliament was held on 

May 14. The preparation and conduct of the elections was relatively free of unpleasant incidents and violence, with only occasional incidents of low-level violence. Indeed, the many political parties and rallies, and the wide extent of public engagement in the elections, were encouraging signs of the widespread commitment to 

peace. One major exception to this picture was the questions raised about the impartiality of the National Election Commission—questions supported by ample evidence, such as underage voters being added in SLPP strongholds and the attempt 

by the National Electoral Commission to disqualify the vice presidential candidate 

of the APC party . 

III. MAJOR CHALLENGES

The newly elected government, backed by its supporters in the international community, faces four key challenges: improving governance and fighting corruption; 

promoting justice and reconciliation; finalizing disarmament and reintegration of excombatants; and coping with the regional problem. The government has 6 months 

between now and the start of the dry season—when conflict could resume—in which 

to show signs of change and deliver progress. 

Corruption 

Let me begin with the corruption that permeates all levels of government and society, was at the core of the problems leading up to the start of the war more than 

ten years ago, and remains largely unaddressed. 

This problem is very difficult, but the U.S. and the international community 

should not underestimate or throw away the leverage they have. Indeed the international community has assisted the government in implementing a series of controls on corruption through the development of systems of accountability. For example, accounting systems for salaries and budgets has reduced the number of ‘‘ghost’’

employees and decreased the opportunities for padding budgets and diverting funds. 

Britain and the European Union have played a major role in the establishment of 

accountability mechanisms for the Ministry of Finance. These accounting procedures 

and computer programs make it easier to account for the inflow and outflow of 

funds, and more difficult to divert funds. But other measures are still needed, such 

as increasing the independence of the judiciary, removing the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) from under government control, and preventing it from becoming, as 

it increasingly has, a key instrument of Presidential authority rather than an impartial body. 

In addition to untying the Anti-Corruption Commission from government control, 

ICG also strongly urges the U.S. and other donor governments to help foster change 

from within. Instead of walking away from Sierra Leone, donors must work with 

reformers, civil society groups and political parties that can act as catalysts for 

change in the capital and across the country. 

Justice/Accountability/Reconciliation 

Second, a key aspect of winning the peace involves fostering accountability and 

justice for wartime atrocities, and reconciliation among combatants and civilians. 

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court provide the 

two main venues for healing these wounds. The international community, especially 

the United States, has pushed hard for the creation of the Special Court. There is 

less confident support among Sierra Leoneans. Some fear that the use of the Special 

Court will provoke violent responses by former combatants. Others would prefer to 

move on and forget about the past while using the money allocated to the Special 

Court for more basic purposes, such as food, housing, and medical needs. Regardless, it is clear that the Special Court will be in operation by the start of the fall. 

David Crane has been appointed as Special Prosecutor, and funding is available for 

the first year of operation (funds have been pledged but not yet delivered for the 

second and third years of operation). The Court is mandated to try those who bear 

the greatest responsibility for the atrocities; given time and budget constraints on 

its mandate, the number of indictments is unlikely to surpass two dozen. Most of 

30

those are likely to be RUF leaders, yet most Sierra Leoneans believe that the perpetrators go beyond the RUF leadership and include some key politicians close to 

the SLPP governing party. 

If the Court focuses on only the top 24 perpetrators, then the TRC becomes the 

only other venue for reconciliation (although there is some thought that street justice may also be the option of choice for some). The TRC is in the start-up phase 

now and is scheduled to begin hearings in late summer. The main tension between 

these two institutions is the primacy the Special Court has over the TRC, and therefore the open access of the Court to all proceedings (and therefore information) of 

the TRC. There is some concern that this distribution of power will weaken the TRC 

by deterring individuals from testifying. 

There are also important concerns that the government is working to bias the 

TRC, using its veto over the choice of Commissioners to ensure a biased selection 

that favors its attempts to control the truth. The international community has very 

little leverage over the selection of candidates for the TRC. The choice of a few Commissioners with a known and strong bias for the SLPP government over other more 

impartial nominees for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the appointment of a strong SLPP sympathizer to the post of interim Executive Secretary, suggests a clear strategy to bias the Commission. Although the TRC has a confidentiality clause, the presence of pro-SLPP supporters on the Commissioner is likely 

to deter anyone from coming forward to speak against members of the SLPP. 

UNAMSIL and civil society have also strongly protested legislation which gives Sierra Leone’s attorney general the ability to defer or stop TRC proceedings. 

The two institutions of accountability, the Special Court and Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are distinct but seek the same common goals of ensuring accountability in Sierra Leone, assisting in bringing sustainable peace and helping to 

build a culture of respect for human rights. Both institutions have the capacity to 

contribute dramatically to the stability and longevity of peace, justice and democracy in Sierra Leone. However, their poor designs could reduce the level of support 

of civil society and the legal community, especially if both institutions are seen as 

politically-motivated forums for targeting potential political rivals and challengers 

and blocking the indictment of key government officials for their role in the war. 

The burden will fall on Special Prosecutor David Crane, and by extension on the 

United States which pressed for his appointment, to ensure that government biases 

do not undermine the running of the Court and by extension the TRC. Sierra 

Leone’s government will present Crane with tough choices and significant attempts 

at interference. 

Even with these potential glitches, the Special Court remains an effective tool for 

addressing not just national but regional instability. One element of that is the possibility, left open by the Court’s mandate, of indicting Liberian President Charles 

Taylor for his role in sparking Sierra Leone’s atrocities. This possibility, if pursued, 

could significantly increase the leverage that the international community has over 

Taylor. 

DDR Issues 

The successful demobilization and reintegration of former combatants poses a 

challenging task for the Sierra Leonean government and international community. 

While the former combatants turned in their weapons, they have not yet dispersed 

and returned to their home communities. This is true of both the RUF and the Civil 

Defence Forces (CDF), although it is impossible to disperse the CDFs given the fact 

that most of them fought in their own communities. RUF soldiers remain concentrated in their former strongholds, due to a fear of returning to their home communities and a preference for remaining among friends while there remains the 

promise of assistance from the RUF party. 

Demobilization is needed to break the RUF chain of command, to discourage any 

thoughts of regrouping for violence, and to encourage the reintegration of these 

former combatants as productive members of society. The reintegration programme 

is designed to provide six months of training and a living stipend to former combatants who are actively involved in a training program. But rising concern over the 

viability of the reintegration fund has already led to clashes. Unless the program 

receives funding from the international community soon, the fund is likely to be 

bankrupt by August of this year. This would leave roughly two thirds of those who 

disarmed without the possibility of completing reintegration training. Many ex-combatants will then see no alternative but to join any of the forces fighting in Liberia’s 

conflict. Already, the government faces a steep challenge in handling the large number of disgruntled, unemployed, former combatants currently in the streets of large 

towns—and crime rates are reported to be rising. 

31

IV. REGIONAL INSTABILITY

In a very real sense, the war that inflicted such gruesome casualties on Sierra 

Leone’s citizens has not ended—both because the corrupt one-party rule that 

spurred discontent inside Sierra Leone has been largely restored, and because the 

regional instability that sparked the fighting has not been dealt with. Peace in Sierra Leone cannot be secured without an end to the civil war in Liberia and its regional implications—and it is to that topic that I would like to turn for the remainder of my statement. 

Liberian President Charles Taylor continues, with Libyan support, to push a 

grand scheme of political change in West Africa, which involves intertwined objectives of achieving a Greater Liberia and asset stripping of the vast natural resource 

base of the region. For the last 10 years (since his assistance for the RUF’s first 

incursion into Sierra Leone), he has been the key figure in the attempted destabilization of Guinea and Sierra Leone. As long as Charles Taylor remains in power, 

the entire region will remain unstable. He and his rogue commercial and military 

allies feed on instability, leaving unaddressed the root causes of regional decay—

endemic poverty, the lack of economic opportunity, and a history of parasitic governance. 

The threat of Liberia’s conflict spilling back into Sierra Leone in the future is real. 

The armies of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone have largely remained confined to 

their national territories. But a number of former RUF fighters, who opted out of 

the disarmament process, are now fighting with President Charles Taylor’s forces 

in Liberia—effectively forming his Foreign Legion. The involvement of CDF fighters 

in the war is another cause for concern. Numerous reports indicate that some CDF 

forces have moved into Liberia to join one side or the other in the ongoing conflict. 

The impetus for this move is money, and the related lack of employment and earning opportunities in Sierra Leone. The flow of ex-combatants back and forth across 

the Sierra Leone-Liberian border, often with weapons acquired in Liberia, threatens 

the stability of the border region. Already there are reports of Liberian government 

forces, among others, conducting raids in Sierra Leone to obtain basic foodstuffs and 

other goods. The flow of refugees from Liberia into Sierra Leone has also been a 

strain on the country’s already meager resources. 

The remarkable intervention of the international community to end the war in Sierra Leone has helped shift the front line of what is a regional conflict away from 

the capitals of that country and Guinea to within striking distance of Liberia’s capital, Monrovia. Liberia’s internal situation has been the dynamic that has provided 

fuel for the broader war, and no peace in the region will be viable until it—and Taylor’s agenda—are dealt with more forcefully. 

That situation has returned to the spotlight as a result of the recent gains made 

by the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). As this testimony was being written, the LURD has reportedly advanced as close as 25 kilometers from Monrovia. This would be consistent with the LURD’s stated objective 

of moving on the capital before the rainy season begins in June. The key unknown 

variable is the degree of support the LURD may enjoy inside Monrovia, whether 

from within the Armed Forces of Liberia army or from the former Black Berets, 

forces from the interim government of 1990–1994. Any threat from within the capital will surely elicit a dire response from Taylor in the form of arrests, torture and 

extra-judicial killings of those suspected of support for the LURD. 

While relatively little is known about the LURD, ICG believes that it is a serious 

military force capable of challenging President Taylor’s control over much of Liberia. 

It has received material support from Guinea and from Sierra Leone militias; it is 

also benefiting from the calculated indifference from Great Britain and the U.S.—

all increasingly wary of Taylor’s adventurism. However, the LURD is also an organization in flux, without a defined political program or unified leadership, and riven 

with internal splits. It is a loose coalition of anti-Taylor forces, drawing on a variety 

of politicians, militia factions, and refugees. Some of them may be interested in 

treading the democratic path, but for now they, like Charles Taylor, seem only interested in power that comes from the barrel of a gun. 

For all these reasons, it is clear that the LURD does not represent any kind of 

promising alternative to Taylor’s rule. That alternative will have to be found within 

Liberian civil society and opposition groups. 

The extension of sanctions by the United Nations Security Council on the government of President Charles Taylor on May 7, 2002 is a welcome sign that the international community recognizes that Sierra Leone’s peace remains tenuous as long 

as Taylor continues to provide support to the RUF. But the United States will have 

to make a more comprehensive and conscious regional effort if peace there is to be 

secured. At the moment, Taylor is working hard to use the existing Mano River 

32

Union diplomatic efforts as a framework to demonstrate his commitment to peace, 

ease LURD pressure, build support for sanctions on Guinea, and buy himself time 

to launch a counter-offensive. But no process, however illusory, should be allowed 

to divert attention from the immediate cause of violent conflict in West Africa: 

Charles Taylor and his commercially-driven regional agenda. The recent extension 

of the state of emergency gives Taylor added measure to round up suspected LURD 

supporters in Monrovia and also undermine the possibilities of holding elections in 

April 2003, although elections can be held as late as October 2003. 

The Liberian-driven regional conflict feeds on a region-wide phenomenon of bad 

governance. Guinea’s undemocratic and corrupt leadership, combined with uncertain 

preparations for presidential succession, is a slowly ticking time bomb. Cote d’Ivoire 

is also destabilized by governance problems and competition over support for Taylor 

or various LURD factions. In particular, we believe that the United States should 

take a hard look at its support for Guinea in this context, and insist that its government take serious and verifiable steps towards democratization, or else risk the end 

of that assistance. Guinea’s serious internal problems need to begin to be addressed, 

or else it too will inevitably become an element of further regional instability. The 

U.S. should also press Guinea on the behavior of LURD forces, and to lean on 

LURD leaders when serious negotiations begin in Liberia. 

However, President Conte and Guinea are not the primary cause of the crisis in 

the region; Charles Taylor is. The conflict in Liberia and instability in the broader 

region can only end with a new, externally sponsored peace process that includes 

all the major stakeholders—governments, civil society as well as armed opposition— and achieves a genuinely free and fair election in which the Liberian people have 

a real choice of who governs them. 

V. WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. BE DOING?

I would like to conclude my statement by offering concrete recommendations for 

the U.S. role in the Mano River region—and for Congressional oversight of that role. 

First, in Sierra Leone itself: 

The international community must assure the sustainability of the peace that has 

been so expensively achieved. UNAMSIL’s mandate should remain robust and focused on the strategic and at-risk points of the country, but the increased stability 

of the country and the improved capacity of the army and police should allow 

UNAMSIL to downsize over the next year. However, any assessment of UNAMSIL’s reduction-in-force must take into account the increased instability in Liberia and its 

implications for Sierra Leone. 

Together with other donors, the United States should make a serious commitment 

to support both anti-corruption campaigns and the development of civil society and 

political organizations that help in the investigation of corrupt practices—and offer 

Sierra Leoneans an alternative to one-party rule. 

With the prosecutor of the Special Court, David Crane, being an American citizen, 

the United States m ust play a leadership role in making sure that the Court is 

successful—and not undermined by government politicking. 

The United States must do its part to provide funding that meets expectations 

and fulfills commitments for the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants—particularly focusing on training and employment programs that are an investment in peace and economic prosperity. 

Second, the United States has an important role to play in tackling the regional 

challenges. The U.S. does not have the luxury of ending its involvement in the region. The regional conflict has not ended, and the threat of future instability, casualties, and chaos—with all the opportunities for diamond-smuggling, money-laundering, and other criminal and terrorist activity that implies—is very real. The 

United States must take the lead through diplomatic initiatives, pressure on the 

Taylor government, and support for civil society, in encouraging the development of 

responsible alternatives to Taylor’s regime in Liberia. Both pressure and ’principled’

engagement will be necessary to obtain a negotiated solution that ends Liberia’s conflict and secures fundamental reforms. 

This would involve U.S. leadership in a dual track internationally supported peace 

effort, which would have as its starting point a new and serious peace process aimed 

at resolving Liberia’s civil war. In the context of that effort, a parallel international 

diplomatic engagement is needed to deal with regional cross-border security by 

building upon the Mano River Union initiative in this regard. The two issues are 

deeply intertwined. Liberian opposition forces throughout the region believe the only 

way they can return to Liberia is through the barrel of the gun, and have found 

regional support. Similarly, disaffected, impoverished or opportunistic elements from 

throughout the region, particularly Sierra Leone, have found Charles Taylor to be 

33

a generous godfather, supporting dissident units to destabilize neighboring countries. The internal Liberian conflict must be dealt with as the major contagion in 

West Africa, while the disputes between neighboring countries must be addressed 

in order to reduce cross-border support for rebel movements. 

Specifically, the Bush administration should: 

Lead efforts to form a ‘‘Contact Group’’ which would also include the U.K., France, 

Nigeria, and others to help create a new and serious peace process for Liberia, 

backed by more intensive international involvement and pressure. The aim would 

be to create consensus among key external stakeholders before constructing an internal process involving Liberian stakeholders. Success will depend on whether this 

group of external actors can unify behind a common approach. Harmonizing 

France’s considerable influence in the region with the objectives of other European 

states, the U.S., and Nigeria will be key. 

Pressure the LURD, its sponsor Guinea and the Liberian government to convene 

substantive peace negotiations which involve civil society and opposition, and to negotiate a cessation of hostilities in that context. 

Demand that the Liberian government implement a program of comprehensive institutional reform, including security sector reform and re-establishment of rule of 

law to pave the way for free and fair elections. Support should be provided if real, 

verifiable steps are taken in this regard. 

Use the time before the end of Taylor’s term to fund and help develop independent Liberian civil society and media institutions, and offer support and protection to independent political voices. Ultimately, such support should be aimed at 

creating a coordinated effort by donors to support the development of a non-violent 

‘‘third force’’ in Liberian politics. This effort would aim to support the return to and/

or participation in the Liberian polity by key opposition and civil society leaders, 

in the context of serious international monitoring of their safety and security. 

This will be a long-term process. Unless we address the underpinning of the violence in Liberia, the region potentially faces further fighting and more atrocities 

which will continue the cycle of death and destruction, while Charles Taylor and his 

associates—Liberian, regional and beyond—profit from this misery and instability. 

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Now we will go to Ms. Nowrojee. 

STATEMENT OF BINAIFER NOWROJEE, COUNSEL, HUMAN 

RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA 

Ms. NOWROJEE. Thank you. I would like to endorse what both of 

my colleagues have said. The advantage of going last is that a lot 

of it has been said, so I will try to be brief. 

Human Rights Watch has had an office in Freetown for the last 

4 years, and a lot of our work has been documenting the unspeakable brutality that has taken place during the war. You can imagine how heartened we are to see the election take place in Sierra 

Leone. The signs of hope are many: Forty-seven thousand combatants have demobilized; refugees are returning home and being reunited with their families; the diamond revenues are going up and 

going to the coffers of the government; and on May 14th Sierra 

Leoneans went to the polls to elect their President and Parliamentarians. 

But like my colleagues here have said, the elections do bring 

peace and security, but they are just the first step. After a decade 

of civil war, Sierra Leone’s state institutions and economy are basically destroyed, and there is a culture of violence, corruption, and 

impunity that has taken root. And so the international commitment has to remain in order to begin to address those. 

The silver lining on that is that the transition period gives a rare 

opportunity to develop new state structures and the opportunity to 

do so with strong human rights components integrated into that 

structure, and to create mechanisms that can secure respect for 

34

human rights. And in that regard there are two important transitional justice mechanisms that will play a key role: The Special 

Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which will be 

going forward. 

In addition to the rebuilding process within the country, it is important to recognize that long-term prospects for peace in Sierra 

Leone are dependent on developments in the sub-region. And as Sierra Leone’s brutal conflict comes to an end, violence and instability are rapidly escalating in Liberia. I just returned from Liberia, and the neighboring countries having documented war crimes 

and serious human rights abuses by both Liberian Government 

forces and rebels from the LURD, including summary executions, 

rapes, abductions, looting, and burning of villages. In the face of renewed rebel actions, the Taylor government is becoming increasingly intolerant of dissent and remilitarizing the society. There has 

been a real rise in militia groups. 

Another aspect of the spreading conflict is the role of Guinea, 

and although it is important to recognize that Charles Taylor bears 

primary responsibility for much of the long-standing violence and 

aggression in the sub-region, at this time Guinea is also playing a 

destabilizing role by providing logistical and some military support 

to the Liberian rebels. 

The escalating conflict and growing lawlessness in Liberia has 

the potential to upturn the fragile peace in Sierra Leone. Combatants are crossing from both sides of the border. Sierra Leonean excombatants are crossing into Liberia to fight as mercenaries, and 

Liberian Government troops and rebels are crossing into Sierra 

Leone to loot or escape fighting. Sierra Leone could face a security 

threat since LURD rebel forces are clandestinely operating a supply line along that border, and there appears to be no consistent 

policy on the part of the Sierra Leone Government or the U.N. 

peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, on how to address this problem. 

In view of the close links between the Guinea Government and 

the LURD rebel forces in Liberia, the deployment of UNAMSIL 

peacekeeping troops on the Sierra Leone-Liberia border raises fears 

that this area could become a base of operation for the LURD as 

well, and at a minimum those Guinea battalions of UNAMSIL 

should be removed from the border. Ideally they should be replaced 

completely. 

The possibility of the Liberian conflict destabilizing the sub-region once again is a dire prospect indeed for a region that has already endured so much war, human abuse and suffering. So it is 

imperative that the international community remain engaged to establish conditions for a sustainable peace and for protection of 

human rights in all three of these countries in the sub-region. 

I would like to talk a bit about U.S. policy. In many ways U.S. 

policy has been already contributing in this direction. For example, 

the U.S. has been involved in strengthening regional peacekeeping 

efforts.In Sierra Leone the U.S. policy is concentrated on ending 

the Liberian Government support for the RUF and supporting the 

U.N. intervention. The U.S. has been the largest contributing Nation for the Special Court on Sierra Leone, which is great. 

35

In Liberia as well, the U.S. has played a strong role. U.S. pressure on the Liberian Government to address human rights abuses 

has been commendably strong and consistent. Unfortunately, U.S. 

assistance and support to Liberia’s beleaguered civil society community is not as strong as it could have been. Mr. Bellamy just 

mentioned a bit about how difficult it was to deal with the very 

weak and cowed political opposition. What he didn’t mention was 

there is a courageous and outspoken human rights community and 

independent journalists who are being hammered by the Taylor 

government at this point in time, and much more could be done by 

the U.S. to help strengthen them. 

In that regard I would just like to mention very quickly a small 

example of this. Tiawan Gongloe, one of Liberia’s leading lawyers, 

was recently brutalized in police custody. Human Rights Watch is 

trying to bring him here for medical treatment. We fear he has had 

serious kidney damage. Yesterday the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia 

issued him a visa, but did not give visas to his family members. 

Surely he should be allowed to come with his loved ones to receive 

medical treatment here, and surely that is not too big of a request 

to make. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me just interrupt you to say that several of us 

on this Committee have also written a letter to Secretary Powell 

on his behalf asking for intervention in this regard. And we will 

follow up again on behalf of the family. But truly the way he was 

beaten and pummeled in that prison as a journalist speaks volumes. 

But let me let you continue. 

Ms. NOWROJEE. I would like to mention U.S. policy toward Guinea, because the U.S. has been much less consistent or vocal about 

condemning abuses of the LURD rebels or speaking about Guinea’s 

flagging human rights record and its destabilization of Liberia. And 

the U.S. now has an important role to play vis-a-vis Guinea. It is 

about to begin a long-delayed training program of 3 million U.S. 

dollars in support for the Guinean military, focusing on border security. 

In terms of our recommendations, we believe that sustainable 

peace can only come to this sub-region if there is consistent pressure on all three of the Mano River Union countries to 1) end the 

cross-border attacks and illicit weapon flows; 2) to cease support for 

rebel activity; 3) to respect the rule of law and human rights; and 

4) to create state institutions that are transparent and accountable, 

particularly state security and law enforcement forces. 

In addition to the constructive and important efforts that the 

U.S. has already been engaged in, there are several other things 

that could strengthen that approach. In that regard, Human Rights 

Watch recommends the following, amongst other things: U.S. military assistance to Guinea should be conditioned on an end to Guinean support for the LURD rebels. The U.S. Government should call 

on the LURD to end human rights abuses against civilians. Greater support should be provided to civil society groups and the independent media in the Mano River Union, and the U.S. should continue to remain involved in the U.N. efforts in the Mano River 

Union to restrict illicit weapon flows and to establish international 

justice mechanisms. 

36

Without a comprehensive approach it is likely that the conflict in 

the Mano River Union will continue and ultimately be at a higher 

cost not only for the citizens of these countries, but also for the 

international community. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nowrojee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BINAIFER NOWROJEE, COUNSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/

AFRICA

Thank you very much for convening these hearings and inviting Human Rights 

Watch to testify. My name is Binaifer Nowrojee. I serve as counsel with Human 

Rights Watch’s Africa Division. I have been with the organization since 1993. Prior 

to that, I served as staff attorney on Africa for the Lawyers Committee for Human 

Rights from 1989 to 1992. I have been involved in human rights research and advocacy on West Africa since 1989. 

After ten years characterized by unspeakable brutality and widespread human 

rights abuses against civilians, the devastating civil war in Sierra Leone between 

government forces and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) appears to be 

over. Human rights abuses in Sierra Leone have significantly decreased following 

the deployment of 17,000 United Nations (U.N.) peacekeepers. 

The May 14, 2002 elections are a significant milestone, and the signs of hope are 

many: over 47,000 combatants have been disarmed and demobilized; hundreds of 

thousands of refugees are returning home; civilians abducted from their villages 

during rebel attacks are being reunited with their families; the government revenue 

from Sierra Leone’s vast diamond wealth has gone up; and on May 14, Sierra 

Leoneans went to the polls to elect their president and parliamentarians. 

While Human Rights Watch is encouraged by Sierra Leone’s progress, its longterm prospects for peace are dependent on continued attention, not only to the rebuilding process within Sierra Leone, but also to developments in the sub region. 

As Sierra Leone’s brutal conflict comes to an end, violence and insecurity are rapidly 

escalating in Liberia. At this time, Guinea is playing a destabilizing role in providing support to the Liberian rebels. The renewal of war in Liberia poses a real 

threat to sustainable peace and security, not only to Liberia, but also to Sierra 

Leone and Guinea. 

HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN SIERRA LEONE

Within Sierra Leone, the peace remains fragile. The new government is beginning 

the process of establishing and consolidating its authority in the face of enormous 

challenges. The transition period, however, provides a rare opportunity to develop 

new state institutions with strong human rights components integrated into their 

structure, and to create mechanisms that can secure and enforce respect for human 

rights throughout the society. 

The deep-rooted issues that gave rise to the civil war—a culture of impunity, endemic corruption, weak rule of law, and the inequitable distribution of the country’s vast natural resources—remain largely unaddressed. For decades, the majority of 

Sierra Leoneans have been betrayed by the state institutions responsible for representing and protecting them; embezzlement and abuse of authority resulted in the 

near collapse of most government institutions; the army and police intimidated, extorted money from, and sometimes colluded with the rebels; and the judicial system 

was largely subject to political manipulation and bribe taking, leaving justice unattainable for most. 

Unless there is significant reform to Sierra Leone’s justice and law enforcement 

institutions, combined with a committed effort to address the root causes of the war, 

the recent signs of hope will likely, and sadly, be short-lived. Human Rights Watch 

believes the following three issues should be among the priorities: 

(1) Accountability for Past Abuses 

In order to have a future built on respect for human rights and justice, accountability for the horrific atrocities, which have characterized the war, is of paramount 

importance. Those accused of war crimes also have a right to a fair and speedy trial. 

Former rebels from the Revolutionary United Front, Armed Forces Revolutionary 

Council, and Westside Boys continue to be detained without due process guarantees. 

During the war, the overwhelming majority of abuses were committed by RUF 

rebels and former Sierra Leonean Army soldiers (from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and later West Side Boys). These abuses included the summary execution of civilians; amputation of limbs; widespread abduction of thousands of civilVerDate Feb 1 2002 17:03 Jun 25, 2002 Jkt 079669 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\051602\79669 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ians who were later recruited as fighters and used for forced labor; the widespread 

sexual violence against women and girls including individual and gang rape, sexual 

assault with objects such as firewood, umbrellas and sticks, and sexual slavery; the 

use of civilians as human shields; and the wanton destruction of property. However, 

serious abuses were also committed by the government-allied civil defense forces militias, including the systematic use of child combatants and the torture and execution of prisoners, and soldiers from the Nigerian-led peacekeeping force known as 

ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group), including the summary execution of suspected rebels and their collaborators. 

Two important international justice mechanisms can play an important role in 

this regard. The Special Court for Sierra Leone, a groundbreaking U.N. effort that 

combines international and domestic mechanisms and laws, is charged with bringing to justice key leaders responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as certain violations of Sierra Leonean law committed since November l996. The court is envisioned to try 

some twenty to thirty of those from all warring factions who have both direct and 

indirect command responsibility for the most serious abuses and violations. Once 

constituted, the special court is to be operational for at least three years. In April 

2002, the chief prosecutor and the registrar were appointed, and the Special Court 

is expected to bring its first indictments by the end of 2002. Human Rights Watch 

believes the Special Court can play an important role not only within Sierra Leone, 

but also to address the involvement of regional players, such as Liberian president 

Charles Taylor, in providing logistic, financial, and military support to the RUF. 

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), mandated under the 1999 Lome ́

Peace Accord, seeks to establish an impartial historical record of the conflict, promote reconciliation and healing, and make preventative recommendations for the future. The TRC will give victims and perpetrators a forum to address the horrors of 

the war. Once constituted, the seven TRC commissioners, three international and 

four Sierra Leoneans, will determine the commission’s format. The TRC will operate 

for one year, after a three-month preparatory phase, with the possibility of a sixmonth extension. 

Despite considerable efforts to establish the TRC—spearheaded by UNAMSIL and 

the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights—it has yet 

to commence operations due in part to serious funding shortfalls and bureaucratic 

delays within the U.N. In order to be most effective, it should not ignore the conditions that gave rise to the war and give equal attention to abuses committed by all 

sides of the war, including the collusion between the national army and rebel forces; 

the clandestine business dealings between rebel forces and businessmen, elected 

representatives, government officials and peacekeeping forces. Additionally, it 

should examine the involvement of regional players who provided logistical, financial and military support to rebel groups. 

(2) Rebuilding the Judiciary and Law Reform 

The government must, as a matter of priority, create a justice and law enforcement system that promotes the rule of law and respects human rights. The Ministry 

of Justice, the courts, the law enforcement agencies, and the prison administration 

are all institutions that must be developed to guarantee official accountability. 

In order to establish the rule of law, it is imperative that the national judicial 

system, which has all but collapsed, be strengthened. While there were serious problems with the judicial and legal systems before the conflict, the ten-year war has 

clearly exacerbated them. At present, the law courts are only functional in the capital and two other provincial towns. There is an insufficient number of judges, magistrates, prosecutors and courtrooms, which has led to huge backlogs, and the prolonged unlawful detention of hundreds. Corruption within the legal system is endemic, and scores of cases, many involving key politicians, are being blocked or protected from further investigation or prosecution. Additionally, legal reform efforts 

are needed to change antiquated discriminatory laws that do not meet international 

human rights standards. 

The local, or tribal courts, and the often-discriminatory customary law on which 

they are based, must also be reviewed, revised and properly regulated. An estimated 

seventy percent of the population relies on customary, or tribal law, which is adjudicated through the local courts. These local courts are often discriminatory, particularly to women, and frequently abuse their powers by illegally detaining persons or 

charging excessively high fines for minor offences. 

Now that the government’s ability to generate state revenue has improved, it 

must show a commitment to the rule of law by providing adequate resources to the 

judiciary for the hiring and training of quality personnel. The international commuVerDate Feb 1 2002 17:03 Jun 25, 2002 Jkt 079669 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\051602\79669 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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nity should also increase funding and provide technical support to human rights 

groups providing legal aid services to the indigent. 

The United Kingdom (U.K.) has since 1998 made a significant commitment to the 

Sierra Leone legal system through their Law Development Project, which seeks to 

restore and strengthen the legal institution and update the legal code in Sierra 

Leone. Human Rights Watch commends this effort and hopes other donors will follow suit. 

(3) Training and monitoring of the Army and Police 

The national Sierra Leone army and police have over the years been the source 

of considerable instability, corruption and indeed suffering. From extortion at military and police checkpoints, to rape of women in police custody, to high-level army 

collusion with rebel forces, to the execution of alleged rebels and collaborators, their 

acts have enjoyed near immunity from prosecution. Their history of serious and systematic human rights abuses, particularly by the then Sierra Leonean soldiers who 

in l997 formed part of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Party and later West Side 

Boys, is well documented. 

Since l999, the British-led International Military Advisory and Training Team 

(IMATT) has endeavored to reform, restructure and rehabilitate the army, now 

called the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). Some 14,000 Sierra 

Leonean soldiers, many former rebels, have now been retrained and are currently 

deployed countrywide. Some 130, mostly British, Canadian, and Australian officers 

are, and will for years to come, be embedded into key decision making positions 

within the Ministry of Defense, military headquarters and battalions and brigades 

country-wide. 

The hands on approach and tight supervision of the newly trained army appears 

to be rendering results; human rights monitors have received very few reports of 

indiscipline and blatant abuses against civilians. A few high-level officers and several lower level officers have, in fact, been suspended from their positions for corruption and mismanagement, something that would never have happened in years past. 

However, since l999, the army has been unable to hold court martial boards and 

try their own cases. In 2001, British advisors and Sierra Leonean officers rewrote 

the Rules of Procedure and Standing Regulations for Court Martial Boards so as to 

bring them up to international standards. The new regulations were in October 

2001 submitted to the office of the Minister of Justice for approval. However, they 

have yet to be approved, and as a result no court martial can take place. There are 

currently eight military personnel, including two officers, who have cases pending. 

If corruption, indiscipline and impunity within the military are to be addressed, 

these regulations must be passed and cases involving the RSLAF must begin to be 

adjudicated. 

Since l998, the Commonwealth secretariat, largely funded by the U.K. government’s Department for International Development (DFID), has led a significant effort to restructure and retrain the beleaguered Sierra Leone Police (SLP), including 

the secondment of a British Inspector General. For decades the SLP was used as 

a repressive arm of the one party state, and their institutionalized corruption led 

to considerable mistrust, fear and disrespect. The focus of the current training effort, called the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF), has been 

on ending political interference of the police, and addressing problems with senior 

police management, which was saturated with deeply corrupt and unprofessional officers. However, the three full-time staff and nine part-time CPDTF consultants, 

who are largely Freetown based, are unable to provide sorely needed ‘‘hands-on’’ supervision and mentoring on the basic building blocks of policing. The CPDTF has, 

however, set up an internal investigation unit to look into complaints of corruption, 

mismanagement and unprofessionalism, and has commendably dismissed many, and 

indeed prosecuted several, police officers for corrupt practices. They have also made 

an effort to establish special units to respond to domestic and sexual violence. 

Human Rights Watch continues to receive frequent complaints of corrupt, unprofessional and in some cases abusive practices by police, including the taking of 

bribes at checkpoints or to investigate complaints; inability to conduct proper criminal investigations; intimidation of local businessmen; impounding of vehicles and 

fabrication of claims for the purposes of extortion; and encouraging out of court settlements between perpetrators and victims. 

While the task of rehabilitating the police force is enormous, and the CPDTF has 

made significant strides, Human Rights Watch believes the current training approach—which at British pounds 12 million [approximately U.S. $18 million] for 

three years is very expensive—is failing to provide the back to basics training and 

day to day supervision needed to transform the police into a truly professional force. 

We therefore urge the international community to revisit the current training model 

39

and adopt one that provides for the imbedding of supervisors and trainers into all 

levels of the police force. 

REGIONAL ASPECTS TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN SIERRA LEONE

Prospects for sustainable peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea remain tenuous as the intertwined conflicts continue to spill over the borders, offsetting gains 

that are made in each country to restore calm. As Sierra Leone’s brutal conflict 

comes to an end, violence and insecurity are rapidly escalating in Liberia. At this 

time, Guinea is playing a destabilizing role in providing support to the Liberian 

rebels 

The conflicts of the Mano River Union countries, encompassing Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, have shown a ready potential to overflow and destabilize each 

other. A long-standing web of shifting military and political alliances exists among 

the three governments and the various armed opposition groups. Accountability for 

serious abuses is practically nonexistent, and military impunity in all three countries remains a serious problem. The area is also awash with hundreds of ex-combatants willing to cross over to any side as mercenaries. 

THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT AND THE IMPACT ON SIERRA LEONE

Charles Taylor, both as leader of the former Liberian rebel group known as the 

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and as president of Liberia since 1997, 

bears primary responsibility for much of the long-standing aggression and violence 

in Liberia and the sub-region. For years, Taylor helped fuel the Sierra Leonean conflict through his arming and support of the RUF rebels, as well as facilitation of 

illegal diamond exports from rebel-controlled areas. In return, when Taylor’s government came under armed attack from Liberian dissidents in 1999, 2000 and 2001, 

RUF forces assisted in expelling them from Liberia. 

Only five years after Liberia began a shaky transition to peace, the country is 

once against immersed in war. Since June 2000, fighters from the rebel Liberians 

United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) have launched repeated hit-andrun attacks moving steadily towards the capital Monrovia. 

Both Liberian government forces and LURD are responsible for committing war 

crimes and other serious human rights abuses against civilians, including summary 

executions of civilians, rape of girls and women, abduction, and looting and burning 

of villages. In the face of renewed rebel action, the Taylor government has become 

increasingly intolerant of dissent and, since the imposition of a state of emergency 

in February 2002, has intensified its harassment and intimidation of the independent press, civil society groups, and legitimate political opposition groups who 

have been imprisoned, harassed, beaten and in a few cases, killed. 

Despite being subject to an arms embargo continuously since 1992, the Taylor 

government continues to procure weapons. In some cases, the weapons were forwarded to RUF rebels in Sierra Leone, breaking a second embargo. U.N. investigators have documented a network of arms brokers and transport companies that provided false documents and relied on lax controls in Slovakia, Moldova, Ukraine, and 

Kyrgyzstan to arrange illegal weapons purchases. In 1999 and 2000, respectively, 

Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire knowingly provided false cover for arms shipments 

destined to Liberia. 

The illicit flow of arms to Liberia continues. Evidence strongly suggests that a 

plane that crashed outside Monrovia in February 2002 carried an illegal military 

cargo for the Taylor government. The flight was one of three suspicious flights from 

Chad, using planes fraudulently registered in Moldova and filing false flight plans. 

U.N. investigators were blocked from investigating the crash. 

Liberia’s illicit arms purchases are often financed through off-budget spending, or 

payments not accounted for in the budget. For example, income received by the 

United States-based Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry 

(LISCR) was twice used to pay for Liberia’s arms purchases. After LISCR refused 

to engage in the practice, as of August 2000, other off-budget outlays of maritime 

funds were utilized. U.N. investigations also established that in 1999 a timber company paid for an illegal arms shipment. In an important move, the U.N. Security 

Council recently ordered Liberia to audit its shipping and timber revenue to ensure 

that the funds are no longer misused. 

The escalating conflict and growing lawlessness in Liberia has the potential to upturn the fragile peace in Sierra Leone. A growing number of Liberian refugees and 

combatants are crossing the Sierra Leone border, and the area threatens to become 

unstable once again. Hundreds of ex-combatants from Sierra Leone, who may later 

pose a threat to Sierra Leone, have crossed into Liberia to fight as mercenaries either for the Liberian government or for the LURD. Since 2001, LURD forces operVerDate Feb 1 2002 17:03 Jun 25, 2002 Jkt 079669 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\051602\79669 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ating from Sierra Leone have been clandestinely recruiting and operating a supply 

line along the Sierra Leone/Liberia border. Liberian government troops and LURD 

rebel soldiers often cross from Liberia into Sierra Leone for the purpose of looting, 

to sell on looted goods, to buy provisions, to escape fighting, and, in a few cases, 

to abduct people who are then forced to work as porters for them. Liberian army 

deserters are also to be found on the Sierra Leone side of the border, where they 

could present an additional security threat. There appears to be no consistent policy 

on the part of either the Sierra Leonean government or the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, on how to address this problem. 

There is an urgent need for border security to be strengthened, including screening to ensure that combatants are clearly distinguished and separated from civilians 

seeking refugee protection in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leonean government needs 

to establish an adequate police presence along the border areas, and to establish a 

status determination body to screen combatants from refugees. Additionally, there 

is a need for improved policing to ensure that refugees are adequately protected and 

to guarantee the civilian nature of all refugee camps. The United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees should ensure as a priority the civilian nature of the refugee camps, increase the number of international protection staff, and work closely 

with neighboring host governments to establish screening mechanisms at the border 

to separate Liberian combatants from refugees. 

THE ROLE OF GUINEA IN DESTABILIZING LIBERIA

At this time, the government of Guinea is playing a destabilizing role in providing 

considerable logistical and some military support to the Liberian rebels that operate 

from Guinea. Evidence indicates that this support is being given with the knowledge 

and support of high-ranking Guinean officials, including the president. 

Domestically, President Lansana Conte ́ remains largely intolerant of opposition 

and turns a blind eye to frequent abuses by his security forces. A November 2001 

constitutional referendum that removed a two-term limit on the presidency, and virtually ensures him of lifetime rule, is widely believed to have been manipulated in 

his favor. 

Guinea’s support to the LURD intensified after the Liberian government, assisted 

by Sierra Leonean rebel fighters and Guinean dissidents, launched a series of crossborder attacks into Guinea in late 2000 and early 2001. They attacked towns and 

refugees camps containing Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees, causing thousands 

to become further displaced and killing and wounding hundreds of refugees and 

Guinean civilians. These Liberian-led incursions into Guinea were opposed by Guinean government forces, backed by members of Sierra Leonean civil defense force militias and Guinea-based LURD fighters. They pushed back the Liberian and RUF 

forces, and the Guinean army also carried out helicopter, artillery and ground attacks into RUF-held areas of northern Sierra Leone, killing scores of civilians and 

burning villages. 

In view of the close links between the Guinean government and the LURD rebel 

forces in Liberia, the participation of Guinean troops in the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, should give cause for concern. The Guinean contingent of UNAMSIL is currently deployed in Sierra Leone’s Pujehun District, which 

borders Liberia, raising fears that this area too could become a base of operations 

for the LURD, enabling them to strike into Liberia from two directions. Human 

Rights Watch recommends the replacement of the Guinean forces in the UNAMSIL 

operation in Sierra Leone with non-West African troops that are not implicated in 

the sub-regional conflict. At a minimum, the Guinea battalions should be removed 

from Pujehun District, and not be deployed near the Sierra Leone/Liberia border 

where the likelihood of their involvement in Liberian rebel support and/or refugee 

intimidation is higher. 

UNITED STATES POLICY

For the past few years, United States (U.S.) policy on Sierra Leone has concentrated on ending Liberian government support for the RUF, supporting the U.K. 

military actions in Sierra Leone, and providing humanitarian assistance. Additionally, the U.S. pledge of U.S. $15 million over three years to the proposed Special 

Court for Sierra Leone was the largest of any contributing nation. The U.S. total 

humanitarian and emergency contribution in FY 2001, including grants to aid and 

refugee agencies, through USAID for food relief, assistance to refugees, and development programs was U.S. $75 million. 

U.S. pressure on the Liberian government to address human rights abuses has 

commendably been strong and consistent. Relations between the U.S. and Liberia 

deteriorated as President Taylor’s role in fueling the war in Sierra Leone became 

41

more evident. In accordance with the U.N. sanctions imposed in May 2001, the U.S. 

prohibited the importation of Liberian rough diamonds. The Bush administration 

continued the Clinton policy of isolating Taylor politically and diplomatically, although less publicly. Administration officials have stressed that until Taylor ceases 

efforts to destabilize the sub-region, U.S. policy will remain unchanged. 

The U.S. has been much less vocal about condemning Guinea’s flagging human 

rights record and its destabilization of Liberia. The U.S. has expressed concern 

about the human rights situation in Guinea in its annual human rights report to 

the U.S. Congress, but has not made any public statements expressing concern 

about Guinea’s role in supporting the LURD incursion. The closest it came to doing 

so was in a March 1, 2002 statement in which the U.S. ambassador in Monrovia 

condemned the renewed fighting in Liberia and called on the Liberian government 

to take steps to respect human rights and the rule of law. Although it stopped short 

of naming Guinea, the statement did call on ‘‘all parties in the region to cease supporting any group that seeks political change through violence and to respect their 

neighbor’s borders.’’ 11 U.S. Embassy Office of Public Affairs, ‘‘Statement Regarding 

Renewed Fighting in Liberia made by U.S. Ambassador Bismarck Myrick at the 

American Embassy,’’ March 1, 2002. 

The U.S. now has an important role to play vis-a-vis Guinea’s support for the 

LURD. The U.S. is beginning a long-delayed training program for the Guinean military, focusing on border security military to assist that country in defending against 

the destabilizing activities of the RUF and Charles Taylor in Liberia. In June 2001, 

the Bush administration notified Congress of its intention to provide U.S. $3 million 

in non-lethal training and equipment to the Guinean military to assist that country 

in defending against the destabilizing activities of the RUF and Charles Taylor in 

Liberia. Congressional concerns about abuses by the Guinean military led to additional reporting and monitoring requirements. The training is designed in four sixweek segments for four companies, but will pause after the first two to conduct an 

impact assessment, which will include monitoring of the troops’ behavior once they 

are deployed on the border, as well as a human rights assessment. State Department sources state that the U.S. has urged President Conte ́ to curtail his support 

for the LURD, and that the second phase of the U.S. training would be predicated 

on a cut-off of Guinean support for the LURD. 

Additionally, the U.S. has been involved in efforts to address regional security and 

peacekeeping efforts. In 2000, a program called Operation Focus Relief (OFR) was 

initiated by former President Bill Clinton to train and equip seven battalions of 

West African troops for peacekeeping with the U.N. in Sierra Leone. The training 

was conducted by U.S. Special Forces. The first phase of the program trained two 

Nigerian battalions that were deployed in January 2001 to serve with UNAMSIL. 

The second phase, which ended in August, trained troops from Ghana and Senegal. 

The third phase, involved three further Nigerian battalions. For FY 2001, OFR was 

budgeted at U.S. $24 million in peacekeeping funds, as well as U.S. $32 million in 

Department of Defense funds for equipment and transportation. The U.S. also deployed three military officers to work with the Sierra Leone army as part of the 

British training program. These officers, as well as other U.S. Embassy officials, had 

some responsibility for monitoring the performance of the U.S.-trained troops. In addition, for fiscal year 2002, Congress approved U.S. $26 million for the West African 

Stabilization Program, part of the U.S.’s voluntary peacekeeping operations budget, 

which includes $8 million in additional training and equipment for the troops 

trained for peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, known as Operation Focus Relief. 

CONCLUSION

While the election brings much needed peace and security to Sierra Leone, serious 

human rights issues remain. After a decade of civil war, Sierra Leone’s state institutions and economy have been destroyed, and a culture of violence, corruption, and 

impunity has taken root. The transition period, however, provides a rare opportunity to develop new state institutions that have strong human rights components 

integrated into their structure, and to create mechanisms that can operate to guarantee, secure, and enforce respect for human rights throughout the society. In particular, the transitional justice mechanisms, the Special Court and the Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission, as well as judicial-rebuilding are important. In addition, 

continued monitoring, transparency, and accountability among the state security 

and law enforcement agencies are also key. 

Steps must also be taken to address the spreading conflict in Liberia, abetted by 

Guinea’s support of the Liberian rebels. There is likely to be a further escalation 

in human rights abuses against civilians as the area of fighting widens, causing 

42

more death and displacement in Liberia. As a result, the fragile peace in Sierra 

Leone could easily be destabilized as a result of a spillover of the Liberian war. 

This is a dire prospect indeed for the people of a region that has already endured 

so much war, wanton abuse and human suffering over more than a decade. It is 

imperative, therefore,that all possible efforts are made by the international community to establish conditions for a sustainable peace and the protection of human 

rights in all three countries in the sub region. To achieve this, the international 

community will need to adopt a comprehensive sub-regional approach if there is to 

be any hope. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Human Rights Watch urges the U.S. government to work with all relevant 

parties in the international community to bring sustained pressure to bear on 

all the Mano River Union countries to: (1) End cross-border attacks and illicit 

weapons flows; (2) Cease support for armed rebel activity; (3) Respect the rule 

of law and human rights; (4) Prevent and punish war crimes and other 

human rights abuses; (5) Create state institutions that are transparent and 

accountable. In particular, allow judicial independence and ensure that state 

security and law enforcement forces have clear and public directives governing the duties of its officers, with strict enforcement, and punitive action 

for violations.

• Continue to sustain attention on institution building that promotes respect 

for the rule of law and human rights.

• Provide greater support to civil society groups and the independent media in 

the Mano River Union.

• Condition all U.S. military assistance to Guinea, scheduled to begin in May 

2002, on an end to Guinean support for the LURD rebels.

• Continue to call for the maintaining and strengthening of existing U.N.-mandated controls on the flow of weapons that could destabilize the sub-region, 

and to establish the mechanisms necessary to break the cycle of impunity. Illicit weapons flows into the sub-region should continue to be monitored, and 

Guinea’s role in the Liberian conflict should be investigated and ended. The 

U.N. should mandate the placement of international military observers and 

human rights monitors along the Guinea/Liberia and Sierra Leone/Liberia 

borders to monitor and investigate cross-border attacks.

• Advocate for the replacement of the Guinean forces in the UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone with non-West African troops that are not implicated 

in the sub-regional conflict. At a minimum, the Guinea battalions should be 

removed from Pujehun District, and not be deployed near the Sierra Leone/

Liberia border where the likelihood of their involvement in Liberian rebel 

support and/or refugee intimidation is higher. Work to secure and get commitments for the deployment of an adequate number of troops along the Sierra 

Leone/Liberia border to prevent cross-border attacks.

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you, Ms. Nowrojee, as you speak about 

what the international community could do in order to assist in 

human rights in Guinea, Guinea has a pretty lively independent 

press, but the government controls the radio there, and most people get their information from the radio. Would the establishment 

of an independent radio broadcasting system, would that be helpful 

in terms of building civil society and human rights, in your view? 

Ms. NOWROJEE. Absolutely. I think the more access to information people can have in that region, it is important. Most people in 

that sub-region are glued to their radios all the time, those who 

have radios, and they are constantly listening to BBC because that 

is the only place where they receive news from that they feel is impartial or anywhere near accurate. So any efforts to begin to diversify the sources of information would be welcomed and would contribute. 

Mr. ROYCE. But specifically developing programs which country 

by country focus on news within country and carry the voices of political opposition, the case of Charles Taylor, for example, in neighVerDate Feb 1 2002 17:03 Jun 25, 2002 Jkt 079669 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\051602\79669 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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boring Liberia, he is listed as one of the top enemies of press freedom worldwide by journalists. If done right throughout the region, 

it might give voice to human rights activists on an ongoing basis 

in a way that the populous would actually hear. 

Ms. NOWROJEE. Yes. I would concur with that completely. I think 

that the more information that people can get access to, and the 

more voices they can hear that can diversify their ability to make 

choices about their own lives, the better. 

Mr. ROYCE. I thank you. 

I wanted to ask Mr. Prendergast, in your testimony you mention 

the possibility of a newly created Special Court in Sierra Leone actually going through the process of the potential to indict Liberian 

President Charles Taylor for his role in basically masterminding a 

lot of the mayhem that went on there. 

I was going to ask you how likely you thought that would be that 

that could come to pass, and how would such an indictment, should 

it happen, affect U.S. policy toward Liberia? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Well, Mr. Crane will have to sift through all 

the evidence—the new special prosecutor will have to work very, 

very diligently to put the kind of dossier together to bring forth the 

indictment. Certainly it will provide a great deal of additional leverage to the United States in the context of, as I mentioned earlier, what needs to happen is negotiations to deal with the internal 

Liberian civil war. And so, indeed, this will be, I think, an important component of U.S. policy going forward, and we should—or the 

U.S. should be putting as much effort as it can to collect that kind 

of evidence. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

I was also going to ask Mr. Peterson, at what point does President Taylor forfeit the democratic legitimacy that you suggest he 

has? At what point in terms of how many political opponents are 

killed, or how many journalists are tortured, or how many rebel 

groups are established, at what point does he lose his legitimacy, 

in your view? 

Mr. PETERSON. Well, I think that it is the kind of question that 

this international tribunal might be helpful in answering. I think 

the Liberian people first and foremost are the ones that need to answer that question. As I said, there are elections that are set for 

next year in 2003. If Taylor allows a free and fair process, then I 

think that the Liberian people should be the best judge of what his 

behavior has been, whether it has been to destabilize the region or 

to repress the human rights and civil rights of Liberians themselves. 

I think that the United States needs to do really is to focus on 

trying to ensure that there is free and fair process in terms of elections. If there are no elections, then it will be clear that Taylor’s 

agenda is not democracy and that he has lost his legitimacy. 

Mr. ROYCE. I think that, given the treatment of journalists who 

try to report on what is going on in Liberia, and given the elimination of potential political opponents and the silencing of any 

other voices, there is not a way for people to get information out. 

And so I was just going to ask, what are the prospects for fair and 

free elections, given what has happened in the last few weeks in 

terms of beatings and assassinations and everything else; what is 

44

the prospect for actually having a free election there? And what is 

the likelihood that he even holds an election? 

Mr. PETERSON. I think that the prospects are worth pursuing. I 

don’t think that free elections are impossible in Liberia by any 

means, no less so than they were in Sierra Leone. If Sierra Leone 

could hold free and fair elections after all of the war and mayhem 

there, then I think Liberia should be also. It is not going to be 

easy. 

Mr. ROYCE. But the difference is that in Sierra Leone basically 

the RUF were defeated. After so many amputations, people are so 

galvanized in their opposition, and now with a 17,500-man force on 

the ground, there is the potential to actually hold an election, 

where, instead of losing a hand for casting a ballot, you are encouraged to go to the polls. It is sort of the reciprocal situation since 

it was Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor who developed the MO 

of loss of a hand for casting a ballot, so I wondered what the likelihood would be. 

Mr. PETERSON. I think it is possible. I really do. And I think that 

if the only alternative is war and insurrection, then I think the 

only losers will be the Liberian people. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

I will go to Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. We have about a minute left to vote, but 

I just would like to thank all of you. We do not have time for too 

many questions. I do, however, have to just say that I don’t know 

whether another military takeover of Liberia will be the answer either. I somewhat concur with you that for the LURD to take over, 

it simply means that there is going to be a counter-LURD group 

4 or 5 years from now to take over militarily from the group that 

took over from the LURD group, and that perhaps the only possibility is the fact that we should encourage elections. The last time 

I think the elections were free and fair, that Taylor just had an 

overwhelming presence, had money, the election wasn’t stolen, the 

people voted for him. Maybe they voted for him because they wanted the war to end. Whatever the reason, it was not an unfair election. 

And I do think that we had an opportunity to work with Taylor 

at the beginning of his inception; however, I think that the U.S. 

policy was just anti-Taylor, anti the fact that he won it, and, therefore, our policy just did not do anything to encourage independent 

groups from being able to flourish and being able to have democracy come alive. We had a window of opportunity that I think the 

U.S. policy wasted and therefore allowed Taylor to become more 

entrenched, and then to become more power-hungry, and then to 

become more involved with the RUF. And so the policy just spiraled downward. 

I don’t think that to have the LURD take over is going to be the 

answer because, like I said, there is then going to be another group 

to come in and take them over, and the people will continue to suffer. There are going to be elections next year. See if they are fair 

and free, and if they are not, then the mandate is there we have 

to do something else. 

45

We have about less than a minute. If I lose my vote, I am going 

to have to see John Prendergast in particular. Thank you. We have 

to leave. 

Mr. MEEKS. I wanted to submit—I am sorry I was not here earlier, but I had an opening statement that I wanted to submit for 

the record. 

Mr. TANCREDO. [Presiding.] Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meeks follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY W. MEEKS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Thank you Chairman Royce and my friend, Ranking Member Donald Payne, for 

calling this hearing today. 

Clearly in recent years The Mano (MANO) River Countries of Liberia, Sierra 

Leone and Guinea have been characterized by a nexus of political and economic instability, civil wars, and low intensity conflicts. Such conditions are a microcosm of 

the conditions faced by African peoples in nations and regions throughout the African continent. 

It seems to me that as we actively support the electoral process for the people 

of Sierre Leone, by which most accounts seem to have gone well. It is my hope that 

we will also reflect and perhaps learn a few lessons from our failures in Sierre 

Leone about how our policies can either truly help or hinder the abilities of Africans 

to bring peace to their lives. 

Mr. Chairman, it is high time that we begin to fundamentally re-think what we 

mean by peace and how we think about conflict. Peace is not simply the absence 

of war or violence. Peace cannot be achieved in one nation while the conditions 

which sow the seeds for conflict exist in a neighboring nation. 

Mr Chairman, it seems to me that until we understand that war and conflicts are 

not the problems, but the symptoms of deep seated political, social and economic 

structural issues within African societies, then we are not seriously talking about 

sustainable peace in Africa. 

At best if we are only talking about elections, sanctions on individual people or 

nations, or infusions of aid to help those affected by war, then it seems that we are 

trying to manage conflicts as opposed to helping to empower Africans to resolve 

them. 

If we confuse supporting one undemocratic government against an undemocratic 

force in the name of supporting peace in Sierre Leone, then we should not be surprised if our actions indirectly sow the seeds of future conflicts in Guinea. I question 

if this is an optimal approach to sustainable peace in Africa? 

Mr. Chairman, it seems high time that we begin to understand that sustainable 

peace processes in the region and indeed for all African societies can not be imported from the United States, Europe or the international community. 

Sustainable peace cannot be magically created by elections. Individual efforts to 

ban conflict diamonds or the sale of weapons are noble, but they pale in comparison 

to the scope and nature of the causes of conflicts. 

Our aid, trade, economic and security policy actions must ultimately help address 

both the internal and external structural issues which foster the conditions which 

make conflicts possible. And such policies must be guided by an understanding that 

conflicts and wars, are often times different overlapping conflicts over scarce resources, politics and power. 

As we explore the many inter-related sources of conflict which plague the Mano 

River region, 

I would hope that our policy approaches would take on more regional and holistic 

dimensions. And most of all I would hope that we would do a better job in supporting African peoples, particular African women and African youth, to address the 

underlying structural causes of the conditions which perpetuate conflicts. Thank 

you.

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, given an opportunity I seldom get, that is 

to have this gavel in my hand here for a moment, I am going to 

pose a question which is somewhat more philosophical than practical, but I have so much brain power in front of me, and it seems 

like an opportunity that I cannot resist, because we sit here, and 

time after time, hearing after hearing, we are looking at problems 

46

in sub-Saharan Africa, in Africa in general that test our ability to 

rely upon a template, a template of democracy as a solution to 

these problems. 

And I just wonder, given what we said—I mean, so much of it 

sounds just like wishful thinking in a way not just for Sierra 

Leone, but for the region, even many expanding out, that we can 

ever accomplish our goals of a peaceful and prosperous African continent. And I wonder if I could just ask you briefly, anybody and 

all of you, to respond to that concern. That is all. 

Mr. PETERSON. If I may, in my opening remarks I mentioned if 

you looked at the West African region in the last 10 years, there 

has been real progress. I don’t think we should be discouraged. 

Mr. TANCREDO. They are heading in that direction. Not there yet. 

Mr. PETERSON. Mali has also had democratic elections. There is 

a new President there. Ghana had great elections last year. Senegal had good, free, fair elections. The ruling power stepped down. 

You have—but Burkina Faso had elections. They were legislative 

elections where the opposition made great gains. You have Benin, 

you have Nigeria, you have got Ghana. I am not underestimating 

the problems that these countries still have. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Especially when we consider that everything 

seems tenuous put in the context of a regional conflict that could 

so easily tip everything off the table. 

Mr. PETERSON. That is right. It is very tenuous and very fragile. 

But as Sierra Leone demonstrates, that where the international 

community has the political will and devotes the resources, that 

even the worst of these problems can actually be dealt with in a 

constructive way. And I think that where we can put much more 

modest resources into some of these situations before they get as 

far out of hand as Sierra Leone did, then we can save ourselves a 

lot of money and save a lot of lives and help these countries to 

make it, you know, the way many of them actually have. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I am going to ask John also to comment, everyone actually, especially John in this regard simply because you 

know how people often think back to their school—their educational experiences and say, I remember one teacher that was just 

great, stands out in my mind. That is how I think of John in my 

introduction to Africa, as a matter of fact, on our trip to Sudan. 

What are your observations? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I want to try to take the general question 

that you are asking and focus on the specific issue of today’s hearing and say that indeed, Sierra Leone gives us the art of the possible, even in such a—against the backdrop of such recent chaos, 

and the art of the nearly impossible, what are we going to do about 

Liberia and the challenge that represents? But I do believe that we 

have the tools at our disposal in the international community if 

acting within the region we have a chance. 

But that means that we will have to engage more deeply than 

we are now on the diplomatic side and on the longer-term process 

of democracy-building, because, as you know, Congressman 

Tancredo, these elections are just one element of the broader democracy-building strategy. But in this particular case you have a 

situation which, if there was more diplomatic effort tied to more serious pressure—which is one of the first things you said, there has 

47

to be more pressure on Taylor. The existing sanctions regime is not 

enough. It is good, a good start. We moved the ball down the field 

a bit. We cut his sources of support and raised the cost of his doing 

business in the region and internationally. But we have to ramp up 

the pressure. That means, just to reiterate, we have to enforce the 

existing ones and expand the new ones. And the timber and maritime industries is where he is getting his money. We have got to 

go after those one way or another, and that is going to take congressional pressure and leadership like it did for the earlier set of 

sanctions. 

You guys have led in a lot of these kind of things, and your continuing advocacy will be dispositive, but just ramping up the pressure without a serious diplomatic—without a serious peace process 

is going to be irrelevant, because there has to be a way to channel 

Charles Taylor’s fear and uncertainty about his own future into 

gains on the part of those struggling for change in Liberia. And the 

stakeholders in Liberia have to be part of that. We have to be involved in constructing such a peace process. We have to get our 

hands dirty. 

We suggest a contact group. There are a million approaches to 

undertake this, but we have to work with the region, with the 

Mano River Union and with Nigeria particularly in terms of how 

to craft that process, Because right now Taylor is using the disparate little diplomatic efforts to string everybody along to try to 

put more pressure on Guinea, rightly so, and really to delay serious 

action of the nature that my two colleagues have pointed out. 

And so I think at this point we have to build the process, build 

the peace process, but at the same time understand that that may 

not work. We have to really seriously invest in the independent 

voices that again my two colleagues have talked about in Liberia 

that have struggled over the last more than decade now against 

significant odds to maintain and build networks of human rights 

organizations, of democracy promotion, civic education organizations and all the kinds of activities that civil society throughout the 

world promotes, and to build that kind of a third way between Taylor, Incorporated, and between the LURD, a third way that involves elements of the opposition, civil society and those beyond 

that within Liberia that want to see a way forward. Help establish 

some consensus because, of course, as in every one of these countries, the divisions within the opposition and civil society are often 

as bad as within the government, and so helping to create that 

kind of thing. 

It is a two-track approach, build the peace process, but do not 

put all of your eggs in that basket and invest in this approach, and 

that is going to take a little bit more resources than we are putting 

in now and a lot more diplomatic engagement. 

Ms. NOWROJEE. Can I just add briefly? 

Mr. TANCREDO. Of course, of course. 

Ms. NOWROJEE. It sometimes feels that these conflicts are intractable, but if you look at Liberia’s collapse after 5 years of peace 

back into war, it is very explainable. And some of it has to do with 

a very sloppy international intervention that took place in Liberia. 

Compare it to a much better model in Sierra Leone, and I think 

48

what we will see in 5 years that Sierra Leone will be in much better shape than Liberia. 

And if you look at the international intervention that took place 

in the last war in Liberia, had it been done differently, it would 

have been a different place. You had a West African peacekeeping 

force which had regional politics intervening in the conflict. You 

had forces that were not well trained, that committed human 

rights violations themselves. They set up anti-Taylor proxy groups 

that then took on a life of their own. The U.N. came in, but only 

with an observer mission that did not have lines of command over 

the regional peacekeepers. They had no ability to have any power. 

The peace accord that led to the peace had an amnesty for fighters, which the international community quietly accepted. Then the 

international community rushed through an election in their bid to 

call this a success story without key elements of the peace accord 

being put in place, including the restructuring of their armed forces 

and the return of refugees, and just packed up, went home and left 

the place in Taylor’s hands. 

Look at Sierra Leone. It is a completely different international 

intervention: 17,000 U.N. peacekeepers, highly professional, deployed throughout the country. Assistance to restructure and retrain the local security forces. Despite amnesty in the peace accord, 

the international community said, no, we do not recognize this. We 

are still going to put in the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; a long-term commitment by the British to 

stay in key decision-making positions to ensure that mechanisms 

and state institutions could be built. And look at the difference. In 

5 years, Sierra Leone will likely be in much better shape, and in 

Sierra Leone the likelihood that you will not have a human rights 

abuser on the scale of Taylor being voted in because of the nature 

of the intervention. 

So I think we made mistakes as the international community in 

Liberia, and we are living with them today, and Liberians are bearing the front line of that as it descends into war again. But it is 

not a given that these place will collapse. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. Thank you. Feeling now as imperious 

with this as I do, I am going to order everything that you have said 

done immediately. 

Thank you all very much for joining us today and for your very 

insightful testimony. 

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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