GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Committee on Science,

House of Representatives

August 2000 NATIONAL IGNITION

FACILITY

Management and

Oversight Failures

Caused Major Cost

Overruns and

Schedule Delays

GAO/RCED-00-141

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Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 36

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Energy 37

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements 45

Tables Table 1: NIF’s Estimated Cost and Schedule Changes 10

Figures Figure 1: The Completed National Ignition Facility 8

Figure 2: Timeline of Laboratory’s Disclosure of NIF Problems 22

Abbreviations

DOE Department of Energy

ICF Inertial confinement fusion

NIF National Ignition Facility
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

B-284392 Letr

August 8, 2000

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.

Chairman

The Honorable Ralph M. Hall

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Science

House of Representatives

The University of California, under contract to the Department of Energy

(DOE) to operate DOE’s Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in

California, is building the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the Laboratory.

In this stadium-sized laser facility, DOE’s goal is to produce intense

pressures and temperatures that may, for the first time, simulate in a

laboratory the thermonuclear conditions created in nuclear explosions. If

successful, NIF would allow scientists to evaluate the behavior of nuclear

weapons without explosive testing.

DOE considers NIF an essential component of its multibillion-dollar

Stockpile Stewardship Program, which is responsible for ensuring the

safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing.1

Stockpile Stewardship entails building and operating science facilities in

addition to NIF, replacing aging laboratory and production plant

infrastructure, and refurbishing weapons in the stockpile. DOE has

experimental facilities to support Stockpile Stewardship in all three of its

defense laboratories: Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos National

Laboratory in New Mexico, and Sandia National Laboratories in New

Mexico and California. In addition, NIF will be used to address basic and

applied science issues in areas such as astrophysics, materials properties,

and fusion research.2

1

On July 3, 1993, President Clinton announced that the United States would no longer

conduct nuclear tests, as a result of the Cold War’s end and the desire to reduce the threat of

nuclear weapons. As an alternative to such testing, DOE created the Stockpile Stewardship

Program to certify that nuclear weapons are safe and reliable.

2

Fusion results when light atoms, such as isotopes of hydrogen, are combined under very

high temperatures and pressures to make heavier ones, such as helium. Fission is the

opposite: It starts with very heavy atoms, such as uranium, and splits them into two or more

pieces called fission products. Both fusion and fission release large quantities of energy as

heat or radiation. Heat energy can be converted into steam to generate electricity.
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NIF was originally expected to cost about $2.1 billion when completed in

2002. In 1997, DOE approved a $100 million increase and delayed

completion until 2004. In September 1999, DOE announced that NIF would

cost up to $350 million more and be completed in 2006. In the wake of these

reports, you asked us to

• determine the magnitude of NIF’s cost and schedule overruns,

• document the reasons for these cost and schedule problems,

• assess the effects of NIF’s cost and schedule on other weapons and

science programs, and

• evaluate DOE’s and Lawrence Livermore’s actions to correct these

problems.

To address these objectives, we (1) examined the reviews of NIF conducted

by DOE and its advisory board, the University of California, and by

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory’s advisers and (2) analyzed NIF cost data

from DOE, Lawrence Livermore, and other DOE laboratories conducting

research in support of the project. We also conducted extensive interviews

with Lawrence Livermore and DOE officials responsible for NIF and with

officials from other DOE laboratories and scientific institutions whose

programs are affected by NIF. Appendix I describes our scope and

methodology in more detail.

Results in Brief DOE and Lawrence Livermore now estimate that NIF will eventually cost

about $3.3 billion and will be completed in 2008. These new estimates mean

NIF will cost over $1 billion more than originally planned and take 6 years

longer to complete. However, on the basis of our analysis of figures from

DOE and Lawrence Livermore, we estimate that NIF’s cost is closer to $4

billion because DOE’s estimate does not include all research and

development costs from other program areas that are needed to support

NIF. Furthermore, since significant research and development activities to

support NIF remain to be completed and technical uncertainties persist,

the cost of NIF could grow even higher and completion could take even

longer.

Our estimates of NIF’s costs are based on DOE’s “interim” report to the

Congress made on June 1, 2000. Last September, a congressional

appropriations conference committee directed DOE to present a NIF cost

and schedule plan with supporting details by June 1, 2000, or prepare to

terminate the project. But DOE said that it was unable to present a “final”
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plan until mid-September 2000. DOE’s “interim” report did not contain

details on NIF’s costs and schedules.

NIF’s cost increases and schedule delays were caused by a combination of

poor Lawrence Livermore management and inadequate DOE oversight.

Troubles began when Lawrence Livermore officials planned, and DOE

approved, a NIF budget and a construction cost contingency that were

inadequate, virtually ensuring that NIF would exceed cost and schedule

estimates. The project manager put in charge of NIF had little experience

directing large projects and had no control over separately funded laser

research and development programs that were essential for NIF’s success.

This resulted in a poorly integrated management team. Furthermore, the

Laboratory’s former laser director, who oversaw NIF and all other laser

activities, assured Laboratory managers, DOE, the university, and the

Congress that the NIF project was adequately funded and staffed and was

continuing on cost and schedule, even while he was briefed on clear and

growing evidence that NIF had serious problems. DOE’s inadequate

oversight contributed to these problems by failing to uncover the

increasing costs and delays in schedule until more than 6 months after they

were first documented within the Laboratory. A number of key DOE

program officials in headquarters and at the Laboratory told us that while

they suspected NIF problems earlier, they did not take aggressive action to

force the Laboratory to address these problems sooner. Since NIF’s

beginning, the absence of effective independent reviews has enabled the

project’s costs and schedules to grow undetected by DOE program officials

at headquarters and at Lawrence Livermore. Furthermore, none of these

reviews has examined both the construction project and its supporting

research and development activities.

Paying for NIF’s cost overruns has broad implications for DOE’s nuclear

weapons program. The Secretary of Energy has said he wants to complete

NIF but will not ask the Congress for additional appropriations to pay for

NIF’s cost increases. Instead, he announced that the Department will pay

for NIF’s overruns by reallocating funds from within DOE’s existing nuclear

weapons budget. However, DOE has not fully disclosed which programs

will be cut to pay for NIF, nor when or how this will be done. Nor has DOE

evaluated how this reallocation will affect components of the nuclear

weapons program that might be eliminated, reduced in scope, or extended

in order to fund NIF. DOE tried but was unable to secure agreement among

its three weapons laboratories that will use NIF—Lawrence Livermore, Los

Alamos, and Sandia—about how, when, or at what cost NIF should be

completed. Consequently, DOE’s June “interim” cost and schedule plan was
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not developed by taking into account the many potential impacts on DOE’s

nuclear weapons program. In addition, because DOE has not determined

how it intends to pay for NIF’s cost overruns, the potential impacts on

other science programs are unknown.

While Lawrence Livermore and DOE have made changes to improve NIF

management and strengthen oversight, concerns remain about NIF’s cost

and technical uncertainties, the absence of an independent review, and the

impact of paying for NIF’s cost overruns on the Department’s nuclear

weapons program. To ensure that DOE has an effective independent

assessment of NIF, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy arrange for

an outside scientific and technical review of the technical challenges

remaining for NIF that could affect the project’s cost and schedule risks. To

ensure an appropriate balance between NIF and the rest of the nuclear

weapons program, we further recommend that the Secretary of Energy not

reallocate funds from the nuclear weapons program to pay for NIF until

DOE (1) evaluates the impact of the current cost and schedule plan, as well

as any other options for NIF, on the overall nuclear weapons program and

(2) certifies that the selected NIF cost and schedule plan will not negatively

affect the balance of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Background NIF’s primary mission is to support DOE’s Stockpile Stewardship Program,

which is intended to maintain the nation’s nuclear arsenal indefinitely

through scientific research and periodic weapon refurbishment. In 1990,

the National Academy of Sciences recommended that DOE build a laser

capable of simulating thermonuclear conditions, which would allow

nuclear weapons scientists to evaluate nuclear weapons’ behavior without

testing. In 1993, DOE approved plans for the laser, now called the National

Ignition Facility, and in 1996, chose to build it at Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory in Livermore, California. DOE has two other weapons

laboratories that also perform essential research in support of maintaining

the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile: the Los Alamos

National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Sandia National Laboratories

in New Mexico and California.
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The NIF project was originally approved in 1995 at a cost of $1.1 billion,

excluding another $1 billion in related research and development costs and

program funding, for completion in 2002.3 Increases approved in 1997

brought the project cost to $1.2 billion, with completion in 2004, which is

the current approved baseline. DOE now estimates that NIF project costs

will be about $2.2 billion, with completion delayed until 2008.

The stadium-sized NIF (85 by 200 meters) will focus 192 laser beams on a

tiny capsule of nuclear fuel, compressing it by pressure. If NIF achieves its

ultimate goal, the compressed nuclear fuel will “ignite” to release more

energy than was added and simulate conditions during a thermonuclear

explosion. Achieving ignition is an important goal in certain types of

weapons physics experiments and is important for understanding basic

fusion science. Achieving ignition is not expected until 2010, or about 2

years after NIF begins full operations. Originally, Lawrence Livermore

estimated it would achieve ignition by 2003.4

NIF, when completed, will be nearly 60 times as powerful as any previous

laser. As shown in figure 1, NIF has many different components. It is

composed of a conventional facility, or building; the laser beam path

infrastructure, which includes supporting structures, vessels, cabling, and

utilities; the laser, which includes thousands of glass and optical

components; and a target chamber surrounded by lenses known as “final

optics.”

3

Completion occurs when the building, infrastructure, laser systems, and optical

components are installed. At that point, experiments can begin.

4 In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE said that 2004 would be the earliest year for

gaining ignition.
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Figure 1: The Completed National Ignition Facility

Source: DOE.

NIF is managed by DOE’s Inertial Confinement Fusion Program, which is

part of the agency’s Office of Defense Programs.5 This office conducts

essential research for the NIF effort. According to DOE plans, about 85

percent of the facility’s experiments will be for nuclear weapons physics.

The remaining experiments will be for nuclear weapons effects and basic

and applied sciences. DOE’s Oakland Operations Office is responsible for

day-to-day oversight of NIF and is expected to ensure that the Laboratory is

meeting its contracting responsibilities. The Oakland office also prepares

the Laboratory’s annual performance appraisal. For the NIF project,

Oakland staff also review monthly and quarterly Laboratory progress

reports and transmit them to DOE headquarters for review. The University

of California manages the Laboratory for DOE and reviews Laboratory

performance annually as part of its oversight role.

5

During our review, the National Nuclear Security Administration was created and assumed

responsibility for DOE’s Defense Programs (including the Stockpile Stewardship Program

and NIF), effective March 1, 2000. The stockpile stewardship activity was reorganized and

renamed. Since our work was performed before and after these administrative changes

were occurring, for clarity we refer throughout this report to the organization and

terminology in use before the changes took place.
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NIF’s Cost Overruns

Could Grow

Using preliminary projections by DOE and Lawrence Livermore, we

estimate that the total cost of building NIF is about $3.9 billion, when all

supporting research and related program activity costs are included.

Moreover, because significant research and development remains to be

completed, the cost of completing NIF could grow even higher. DOE has

not provided details on how much NIF will cost each year, how cost

increases will be paid for, or what existing programs and activities will be

cut to fund NIF in the future. DOE knew in June 1999 that a new NIF cost

and schedule was needed, and a congressional appropriations conference

committee directed DOE to present a new cost and schedule plan by June

1, 2000. However, DOE provided only “interim” estimates on June 1, 2000,

and announced it will give the Congress a “final” cost and schedule plan by

mid-September 2000.

NIF’s Total Cost Is Likely to

Reach $3.9 Billion, With

Completion Delayed 6 Years

We estimate that, on the basis of DOE and Laboratory data, NIF’s total cost

could reach at least $3.9 billion. Although DOE’s June 2000 “interim” NIF

cost estimate is about $3.3 billion, we identified additional costs of over

$600 million that directly support the completion of NIF and should be

considered part of its total costs. As shown in table 1, DOE’s latest estimate

includes $2.12 billion for total project costs (funds for construction

activities associated with the NIF building and its contents) and $1.14

billion for research and development and related program funds that

directly support NIF (drawn from DOE’s Inertial Confinement Fusion

Program).

Although DOE officials included most of the supporting research and

development and related program funds as part of the Department’s June

2000 “interim” estimate, they did not include all supporting costs.

Specifically, they excluded costs for designing and fabricating a NIF target

and funds directly contributing to the NIF effort at other laboratories and

contractors.6 DOE officials told us that funds for developing a NIF target

are more of a weapons research concern and therefore should be

considered outside the program. Since these funds are necessary for NIF’s

success, we believe they should be included in any discussion of total NIF

costs. The costs for designing and fabricating a NIF target ($491 million)

6

Participating Internal Confinement Fusion contractors besides Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory are Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, the

University of Rochester, and General Atomics.
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and NIF support costs from other laboratories and contractors ($136

million) should be added to DOE’s estimate, according to our analysis of

Laboratory costs and discussions with the individual laboratories

contributing to the NIF effort. As shown in table 1, this would bring the

total estimated cost of completing NIF to about $3.9 billion.

Table 1: NIF’s Estimated Cost and Schedule Changes

a

1995 and 1997 costs are GAO estimates based on available Laboratory data.

b DOE defined completion in the 1997 baseline as occurring in fiscal year 2003, when half of

NIF’s beams become operational. This baseline assumed all 192 beams would be operational

in fiscal year 2004.

c

We did not assess the accuracy of DOE’s estimates of project costs ($2.12 billion),

supporting research and development (R&D) and related program funds ($1.14 billion).

d

Includes the following additions to DOE’s 6/1/00 estimate: $491 million for target physics

and $136 million for direct support of NIF by other DOE laboratories and inertial

confinement fusion contractors.

e

We did not assess the accuracy of DOE’s revised completion date.

Dollars in billions

Baseline change

Project

costs

Supporting

research and

development

and related

program funds

Total

costs

Fiscal year

of

completion

1995 Original baseline $1.07 $1.00a $2.07 2002

1997 Baseline change 1.20 1.04a $2.24 2004b

2000 Estimates—DOE (6/1/00) 2.12 1.14 $3.26 2008

2000 Estimates—GAO (6/1/00) 2.12c 1.77d $3.89 2008e
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Technical Uncertainties

Could Drive NIF Costs Even

Higher

Unresolved technical problems may further drive up the cost of NIF. A

November 1999 review by a technical subgroup to Lawrence Livermore’s

advisory panel (the NIF Council7

) highlighted several technical problems

that must be solved for NIF to operate as planned.8 The most challenging

technical issue raised by the subgroup is the need to develop optical

components that can withstand the laser’s powerful beams as they reach

the spherical target chamber. When operating, the laser beams focus on a

system of glass lenses that surround the target chamber. These lenses must

be able to withstand high levels of intense ultraviolet energy. Several

Laboratory officials agree that lenses for the target chamber pose a major

technical challenge and that there is currently no solution to this problem.

So serious is this issue that the subgroup recommended that NIF scientists

should be thinking “out of the box” for design alternatives. A May 2, 2000,

technical review by another NIF Council subgroup also noted that the

optical lenses remain an unresolved issue. Unless the Laboratory can

fabricate lenses to withstand the enormous energy from the laser beams,

the lenses will have to be replaced more often, making laser operation at

high power levels much more expensive than planned.

Substantial technical and cost uncertainties also persist in the research and

development needed to design and build a target for NIF’s laser beams,

according to the NIF Council and its subgroups. Still to be determined are

physics and engineering issues for designing and fabricating a NIF target.

The NIF Council’s May subgroup report noted that fundamental work also

remains on this technical issue.

The NIF Council and its subgroups have all concluded that the difficult

technical issues facing NIF pose serious challenges but should not present

insurmountable obstacles to completing the project. Laboratory officials

said that they are confident that all these difficult technical challenges can

be solved and noted the Laboratory has met other NIF technical challenges

successfully.

7

The NIF Council, which advises the Laboratory on NIF-related issues, is composed of

leading experts on lasers from academia, government, and scientific institutions. It has

recently been replaced by the NIF Programs Review Committee.

8

NIF Technology Review, Technology Resource Group of the NIF Council (Nov. 4, 1999).
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In its January 2000 interim report on NIF, the Secretary of Energy Advisory

Board NIF Laser System Task Force also noted the technical issues cited by

the NIF Council and acknowledged that technical issues still remain that

will require significant attention. However, it stated that these issues

should not prevent the completion of NIF.9 Although both the NIF Council

and the Advisory Board’s task force expressed confidence in the

Laboratory’s ability to solve its remaining technical problems, neither

group speculated on the risks posed by the many technical uncertainties,

nor estimated their impact on future costs and schedules.

DOE’s Cost and Schedule

Plans for NIF Are Not

Complete

The details of DOE’s June 1, 2000, NIF cost estimates are sketchy, even

though DOE senior officials learned in late June 1999 that NIF was over

budget and behind schedule and that a new cost and schedule plan was

needed. In its September 1999 report on energy and water development

appropriations for fiscal year 2000, the conference committee directed

DOE to submit a new cost and schedule by June 1, 2000, after declaring

“disappointment” at learning of NIF’s cost overruns and schedule delays.10

The committee also directed that if DOE could not prepare a new cost and

schedule by this date, it should develop a plan for terminating the NIF

project. However, DOE’s June 1, 2000, report provided only “interim”

figures for a new NIF cost and schedule and no termination plan. DOE did

not provide annual funding profiles for its cost and schedule plan, stating

only that it will seek “up to” specific amounts in fiscal years 2002 to 2005

($130 million to $150 million), and “additional funds as needed” to

complete the project in later years. DOE officials also did not disclose the

programs from which NIF increases will be funded or the impacts of these

changes. DOE promised to submit a “final” plan to the Congress by midSeptember 2000. This final plan, according to DOE, will include cost and

schedule estimates with supporting details on annual funding

requirements, funding sources, and deadlines, and an independent cost

analysis. On June 27, 2000, DOE submitted a revised budget request for

fiscal year 2001 that provides more cost information but does not give

many details beyond fiscal year 2001.

9

On October 6, 1999, Secretary Richardson requested that the Secretary of Energy Advisory

Board form a task force to review the engineering and management aspects of the assembly

and installation of the NIF laser system. The task force is composed of board members and

individuals with expertise in systems engineering, laser science, and project management. It

issued an interim report on January 10, 2000.

10H.R. Rep. No. 106-336, at 96-97 (1999).
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Management and

Oversight Weaknesses

Led to Cost Overruns

and Schedule Delays

NIF’s cost increases and schedule delays were caused by poor Laboratory

management, which included weaknesses in planning, budgeting, and

project control. DOE’s oversight weaknesses contributed to cost and

schedule problems, and coupled with no effective independent review of

NIF, allowed NIF problems to go undetected. Standards we have developed

require federal agencies to establish and maintain an effective system of

internal controls over their operations.11 Such a system is the first line of

defense in safeguarding assets and preventing and detecting errors. Under

our standards, managers should, among other things, ensure that their staff

have the required skills to meet organizational objectives, that the

organizational structure clearly defines key areas of authority and

responsibility, that progress be effectively measured, and that operations

be effectively monitored. These conditions were not present in the way NIF

was managed by the Laboratory and overseen by DOE.

Planning and Budgeting

Deficiencies

Laboratory managers told us that NIF will cost more and take longer

because they (1) had not planned for the complexities associated with

assembling and installing the highly intricate and tightly packed network of

laser beams in a structure that requires high cleanliness standards and (2)

underestimated the cost of building major laser components. These results

occurred, according to Laboratory officials who examined the project,

because the original NIF managers lacked adequate project management

capabilities and, in particular, had no systems engineering focus within the

NIF management hierarchy. As a result, these managers did not properly

identify the full scope of the NIF effort and had greatly underestimated the

project’s engineering complexities. On the basis of our discussions with

current and former DOE officials, Laboratory managers, and other experts,

we believe several additional reasons contribute to NIF’s cost overruns and

schedule delays. For example:

• DOE and Laboratory officials initially developed a budget for the NIF

project that was clearly inadequate, given its technical risks, complexity,

and large size. DOE and Laboratory officials associated with NIF told us

that they recognized it would cost more than planned but that they

accepted this unrealistic budget in the belief that the Congress would

not fund NIF at a higher cost and that the value of NIF to the future of

11Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, Nov.

1999).
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the Laboratory overshadowed potential cost concerns. Current and

former DOE and Laboratory officials also told us that NIF would help

the Laboratory maintain its nuclear weapons and science capabilities

and attract new scientists.

• DOE and Lawrence Livermore used a construction budget contingency

of 15 percent, which is now widely recognized by DOE and the

Laboratory as being too low for such a complicated project.

Contingencies are an essential planning factor in any construction

project, allowing for unanticipated cost increases. The NIF Council and

an independent engineering firm indicated that a 25- to 35-percent

contingency in the beginning of the project would have been more

realistic given the risks associated with NIF. DOE guidelines suggest a

20- to 40-percent contingency, depending on project complexity.

• After the project was approved, Laboratory officials began construction

in tandem with essential research and development. While such a “fasttrack” strategy is successful on projects with well-defined costs and

designs and with little technical complexity, the NIF project does not

meet these conditions. Starting construction early can save costs

initially but is more costly if extensive changes are needed later. For

NIF, the fast-track approach may have caused the Laboratory to focus

too much attention on meeting construction goals at the expense of

conducting and integrating necessary research and development

solutions. DOE and Laboratory officials acknowledge that this approach

affected basic construction decisions on the size and design of the

facility and eventually led to cost increases and delays when changes

had to be made to accommodate the results from subsequent research

and development.

• According to Laboratory officials, to cut costs early in the project, they

considered, but rejected, hiring outside industrial engineering firms to

manage major parts of NIF construction. Such firms could have

provided the experience to manage this large project, especially for

assembling laser components with exacting cleanliness standards, such

as those in the semiconductor assembly industry. The Laboratory is now

contracting with such firms to help complete NIF.

Unrealistic budgets, a low contingency, and the fast-track construction

strategy imposed substantial cost pressures that affected project

management decisions. The NIF Council criticized Laboratory officials for

failing to develop engineering prototypes that could have tested various

NIF components and technologies before planning to assemble them—a

strategy rejected, in part, because of cost pressures. For example,

according to the Council, to save money, Laboratory managers dismantled
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a laser scientific prototype—called the Beamlet—that would have been

useful for conducting experiments on technical problems now affecting

NIF.

Weak Laboratory Project

Management

After DOE approved NIF in 1993, the Laboratory did not appoint project

managers with the management and technical expertise needed for such a

large and complex undertaking and failed to install an effective reporting

structure that could have flagged emerging technical issues and project

risks. For example:

• The NIF Project Manager originally selected had no previous experience

managing large projects, and other managers had little or no expertise in

lasers, hindering their ability to understand the significance of some

problems as they arose. Furthermore, the project lacked a chief

engineer, whose responsibilities could have focused on integrating the

construction project with needed research and development efforts.

• The NIF Project Manager held a relatively low position in the

Laboratory’s organization. Despite the NIF project’s high profile and its

critical importance to the future of the Laboratory and to DOE’s

Stockpile Stewardship Program, the NIF Project Manager reported to a

Deputy Associate Director who, in turn, reported to the Associate

Director for Laser Programs, who then reported to the Director of the

Laboratory. A separate manager was in charge of the inertial

confinement fusion (ICF) research and development programs, which

were crucial to the success of NIF. The NIF project manager and the ICF

research manager each reported on different milestones. No one

coordinated the two efforts or estimated how one program’s missed

milestones could affect the other program or the overall NIF effort. Both

the project and research and development managers filed separate

progress reports, and no one at the Laboratory or DOE assessed the

impacts of problems and risks on projected budgets and schedules.

• Senior officials from Lawrence Livermore, the University of California,

and DOE concluded that the NIF managers were overconfident about

their own abilities to solve project problems. These officials now

acknowledge that they should not have placed as much trust in the NIF

managers and that the Laboratory’s “can-do” culture prompted the NIF

managers to convince themselves, then DOE and others, that they

needed no outside help to successfully build NIF. The Laboratory’s

former top laser manager embodied this self-reliant attitude and was

very persuasive in convincing others that NIF would be built within cost

and schedule. In its review of NIF, the Secretary’s Advisory Board task
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force reported that DOE’s weapons laboratories “have a tendency not to

flag problems to the outside world, where they actually might find

counsel and help, but rather prefer to go it alone for periods too long.”

Inadequate DOE Oversight

Allowed Problems to

Worsen

DOE acknowledges that its managers in headquarters and at the

Laboratory site office did not properly oversee NIF and, as a result,

remained unaware of major cost and schedule problems until several

months after Laboratory managers had first documented them. As a result,

the Laboratory continued to present—unchallenged by DOE—an

inaccurate picture of NIF’s progress.

Several reasons help to explain DOE’s oversight weaknesses. At the core of

DOE’s problems is its historical reliance on contractors to conduct the

Department’s missions in the absence of an effective oversight process and

structure. For example, in response to the charge by outside reviewers of

DOE’s “micro-management,” the Department, in the mid-1990s, shifted

from a “compliance-based” to a “performance-based” management style.

DOE’s Oakland Operations Office, which is directly responsible for NIF,

explained to us in 1997 that it had changed its “approach to oversight.” The

old approach “relied on DOE identifying problems and solutions” while the

new approach “relies on [the] contractor identifying problems and

solutions.”

In addition, the Department lacked staff with sufficient management and

technical skills to properly oversee NIF’s managerial and technical

complexities. Neither DOE headquarters staff nor field managers were

skilled in managing large projects, nor did the field staff have technical

proficiency in laser operations. Also, these staffs’ oversight roles were

diluted by other competing responsibilities—neither headquarters staff nor

field managers were full-time NIF overseers. Only four DOE on-site

technical staff worked on NIF oversight, along with one senior

headquarters manager, and each had other duties.

To gauge NIF’s progress, DOE relied heavily on Laboratory-prepared

monthly and quarterly NIF reports. However, the reports did not reveal

emerging cost and schedule problems, even though they required an

assessment of project risk. These progress reports conveyed project status

for senior DOE officials, based on criteria developed jointly by DOE and

the Laboratory. The progress reports focused mainly on meeting

construction and research milestones, not on linking specific successes

and failures to impacts on future milestones, the budget, or the overall
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project schedule. The reports also did not identify significant technical or

managerial risks facing the project, even when these were recognized by

senior project managers. Moreover, the Laboratory downplayed potential

problems in its reports, hoping that as problems emerged they would be

resolved quickly.

There was not a clear chain of command between DOE’s headquarters and

its on-site field office at Lawrence Livermore, thereby diffusing

accountability for NIF. DOE’s Defense Programs funded NIF and assigned a

project director in headquarters, who provided Laboratory managers with

programmatic direction. Day-to-day supervision of NIF, however, was

assigned to a project manager from DOE’s field office located on site at

Lawrence Livermore. However, this field office manager reported to

another part of DOE—the Office of Science—and not to the project

director in Defense Programs.12 While a 1997 memorandum of

understanding defined the field project manager’s responsibilities, it left

unchanged the misdirected reporting to Science rather than Defense

officials in Washington, D.C., who were responsible for the project.

Laboratory officials said that they considered DOE’s chain of command

confusing and really did not know to whom they reported on a day-to-day

basis. Because of this confusion, the DOE field manager had difficulty in

taking active control of a project that fell outside of his chain of command.

When suggesting revisions to the memorandum of understanding in 1998,

DOE’s field manager noted that the memorandum continues to serve a

useful purpose in the “absence of consistently accepted understanding of

the roles of HQ and the Field.”

While DOE managers were hampered by their own technical, managerial,

and organizational weaknesses, they missed opportunities to enforce

Laboratory accountability. For example:

• DOE officials did not aggressively act on their own suspicions. DOE

field and headquarters officials told us they started suspecting NIF cost

and schedule problems early in 1999 but then allowed the Laboratory’s

monthly and quarterly reports, which were reviewed and approved by

on-site DOE staff, to continue reporting satisfactory progress until June

1999. These DOE officials, including both headquarters and field staff,

12We previously highlighted weaknesses in DOE’s chain of command. See Department of

Energy: Views on DOE’s Plan to Establish the National Nuclear Security Administration

(GAO/T-RCED-00-113, Mar. 2, 2000).
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did not aggressively pursue their suspicions by demanding more

information in progress reports or by alerting senior DOE officials to

potential problems. When the Secretary of Energy visited the Laboratory

in early June to dedicate the NIF target chamber—and declared NIF to

be within budget and on time—many DOE staff already knew that NIF

had cost and schedule problems.

• DOE’s Office of Field Management, a headquarters office that was

responsible for, among other things, preparing status reports for senior

DOE managers on large construction projects, raised management

issues regarding NIF that were largely ignored by NIF program

managers in headquarters. In June 1999, as a result of growing concern

with NIF, this office proposed a management action plan for NIF that

recommended DOE track eight different elements, including status

measures, risk assessments, pending actions, and completion dates. The

office was abolished in June 1999 as part of a broader DOE

reorganization. Its functions were transferred to other parts of DOE, but

the recommendation was never acted upon.

• DOE negotiated a contract with the University of California that placed

little emphasis on NIF performance, even though the project dominated

the Laboratory’s budget and mission. Also, DOE’s evaluation of the

Laboratory’s performance did not reflect NIF cost and schedule

problems. As late as August 1999, the Laboratory’s self-evaluation

claimed “outstanding” performance for the Laser Directorate, which

included NIF. This score contributed to an overall DOE score for the

Laboratory of “excellent.” The Laboratory’s performance fee is based on

these scores.

• DOE did not enforce the requirement that the Laboratory update its

estimates for the project’s total cost and schedule in its monthly and

quarterly reports. Enforcing this requirement could have revealed

growing cost and schedule problems months earlier, giving DOE and

Laboratory officials more time to prepare a new baseline.

Independent Review

Mechanisms Did Not Work

The absence of effective independent reviews to ensure that project risks

were recognized and addressed in a timely and effective manner was a

major flaw in how DOE and the Laboratory managed NIF. Attempts to

provide independent reviews all had limitations. For example:

• In 1996, the Laboratory established the NIF Council as an advisory

group to provide Livermore staff with technical advice; however, this

group was not independent. Members were chosen by the Laboratory’s

senior laser manager, who also prepared its charter, and received and
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responded personally to its reports. Some NIF Council members

described themselves to us as “friendly advisers” rather than as

independent overseers. Although the Council provided valuable advice

on wide-ranging technical issues, its members were unaware of the

project’s cost and schedule problems for many months. Also, the NIF

Council was not aggressive in providing managerial advice, although

this was one of its charter responsibilities.

• To fulfill a congressional request that DOE contract for independent

reviews of its projects, a NIF review was conducted in early 1999, but

the contractor performing the review did not report any significant cost,

schedule, or technical issues for NIF.13 At the time of this review, over

two dozen senior NIF managers knew the project faced growing

problems that threatened both its costs and schedules, but these

concerns were not shared with the reviewers. The contractor’s report

concluded that NIF was “by far the best managed of any U.S.

Government Project” that the contractor had reviewed. DOE’s actions

may have compromised the contractor’s independence. For example,

DOE imposed strict time limits on the contractor, which prevented a

detailed review. DOE also instructed the contractor to not examine NIF

supporting research and development, which was a vital part of the NIF

program. We discovered that a DOE manager and the Laboratory’s NIF

Project Manager edited the contractor’s draft report before it was

submitted to the Congress. For example, they suggested changes to the

final report that had the effect of downplaying the extent to which some

research and development tasks remained unresolved and posed cost

and schedule risks. Finally, DOE’s on-site office at Livermore urged

headquarters to discourage the contractor from making a second visit to

the Laboratory.

The Laboratory Withheld

NIF’s Problems From DOE

and the University of

California

The failure of senior Laboratory officials to disclose technical issues that

threatened the NIF project’s costs and schedules was a serious error in

judgment, according to Laboratory and DOE officials we interviewed. Many

Laboratory managers were aware of serious NIF problems months before

these became public, yet they told us that they were not in a position of

responsibility to report the problems outside the Laboratory. When asked

why he did not disclose that a consensus of his senior managers believed

13External Independent Review of the Department of Energy National Ignition Facility

Project at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site, Detailed Review and

Assessment Report. Lockwood Greene Technologies (Mar. 29, 1999).
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NIF could no longer be completed within current budgets and schedules,

the Laboratory’s highest ranking laser manager responded that he first

wanted to “validate” the extent of the problems before reporting them to

the Laboratory Director, the University of California, or DOE. Even after

these problems were validated, the laser manager delayed disclosing NIF’s

cost and schedule problems. As figure 2 shows, technical issues affecting

NIF’s cost and schedule were first raised in the summer of 1998, were

documented in early December, and were more completely documented

and presented to the Laboratory’s laser director in March 1999. Yet DOE

was not formally told about the significance of these issues until late June

1999. The Secretary of Energy was not made aware of the cost and

schedule problems until August 1999, 2 months after he and DOE’s Chief

Operating Officer had publicly praised NIF’s budget and schedule

successes.
Page 21 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility
Page 22 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

Figure 2: Timeline of Laboratory’s Disclosure of NIF Problems Internal Laboratory Activities 1993 External Activities

1999

Dec. 10, 1998 Engineer tells Laser Director that NIF overrun is $100−$400 

million and is 12-18 months late. Engineer is told to continue his investigation.

Summer 1998 NIF threat list of technical issues shows potential cost overrun of $100 million.

Jan 1993 NIF is approved for $1.1 billion for completion by 2002.

Dec. 1998 DOE’s Office of Field Management raises concerns on NIF’s cost and schedule to DOE program managers, but no action is taken.

Feb. 26/Mar. 4, 1999 Lab Director tells Congressional 

Committees “NIF is on budget and schedule for completion by 2003.”

March 1997 NIF is rebaselined to $1.2 billion with completion by 2003. (“Completion” meant installing half of NIF’s 192 laser beams; all beams were expected in 2004.) Construction begins. 

March 14, 1999 Two dozen senior NIFOfficials reach consensus on engineer’s Dec. 10 findings.

Sept. 1998 Concerned about progress, a deputy Laser Director asks a Lab engineer to investigate NIF. Nov. 1998 NIF Project Manager says that NIF is 

“on its cost and schedule”. 
Page 23 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

Internal Laboratory Activities 1999 External Activities

2000

Oct. 6-7, 1999 NIF Council concludes that meeting original NIF cost and schedule is “unrealistic” given technical and management problems.

June 10, 1999 Other senior lab officials briefed on

cost and schedule problems.

June 9, 1999 Lab Director told of NIF’slarge cost and schedule problems.

May 24, 1999 Engineer validates cost

and schedule warnings.

May, 1999 Quarterly lab review concludes satisfactoryprogress on all issues, including cost and schedule.

March 30, 1999 Engineer warns Laser Director that NIF needs $300 million more and 18 months longer. He is told to validate results.

Mid April, 1999 Laser Director tells Lab Director 

that NIF is “getting harder” to keep within cost, but gives no details.

June 11, 1999 Secretary Richardson proclaims NIF on cost and schedule in remarks that surprise Lab officials.

June 23, 1999 DOE HQ officials briefed on cost and schedule problems.

July 29, 1999 Lab quarterly review discloses for the 

first time minor schedule problem with NIF.

March 29, 1999 A team of Independent reviewers concludes NIF is “by far, the best managed” federal project they have seen.

March 30, 1999 DOE’s NIF Project Director asks engineer if NIF has problems he should know about, but hears few details.

June 1, 2000 DOE submitted “Interim” report to the 

Congress on new cost and schedule baselines.

Aug. 15, 1999 Lawrence Livermore sends it’s annual self-assessment to the University of California, claiming NIF is on budget and schedule.

Sept. 15, 2000 DOE’s new date for “final” baseline report to Congress.

Aug. 1999 Lab monthly report concludes both NIF cost and schedule are “major” problems.

(continued)

Jan-May, 1999 DOE site officials suspect NIF cost and schedule problems but told by lab that it can solve problems.
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NIF’s Cost and

Schedule Delays Will

Affect Weapons and

Science Programs

NIF’s primary mission is to support DOE’s nuclear weapons program—also

known as the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program, which costs

$4.5 billion annually, is intended to maintain the nation’s nuclear arsenal

indefinitely through scientific research and periodic refurbishing of

weapons. Three different weapons laboratories—Livermore, Los Alamos,

and Sandia—conduct significant weapons-related scientific research.

Paying for NIF’s cost overruns from within DOE’s current nuclear weapons

program accounts—as the Energy Secretary has pledged—could

significantly affect portions of these laboratories’ programs, as well as the

Stockpile Stewardship Program as a whole. In developing its new cost and

schedule estimate, DOE did not take into account which Stockpile

Stewardship Program components might be eliminated, reduced in scope,

or extended in order to fund NIF.

NIF’s Relationship to the

Stockpile Stewardship

Program

DOE’s Stockpile Stewardship Program is intended to maintain the nation’s

nuclear weapons in a safe and reliable state through a program of scientific

study and periodic refurbishing of the weapons. Currently, the scientific

study of nuclear weapons is organized around the concept of “campaigns.”

DOE describes campaigns as focused scientific and technical efforts to

develop and maintain critical capabilities needed to certify that the nation’s

nuclear weapons are safe and reliable. Campaigns have definitive

milestones, specific work plans, and specific end dates. All campaigns have

milestones for completing scientific studies by 2005, although some will be

completed later, up to 2010. NIF experiments would be useful for a number

of campaigns, including the campaigns to (1) certify the yield (explosive

energy) in a nuclear weapon’s “primary,” (2) determine what is needed to

produce a militarily effective nuclear weapon’s “secondary,” and (3) certify

that a nuclear weapon can withstand a hostile (i.e., wartime) environment

during use.14

The other key feature of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is the effort to

extend the lifetime of the nation’s nuclear weapons through a series of

planned refurbishments. These refurbishments will involve disassembling

weapons and replacing selected components in order to extend each

weapon’s life for several more decades. Refurbishments for two weapons

14The “primary” is the fission stage of a thermonuclear weapon. Detonated first, the primary

produces the extremely high temperatures and pressures required to produce fusion in the

weapon’s “secondary.” The “secondary,” or thermonuclear stage, of a nuclear weapon

produces its energy through the fusion of deuterium and tritium nuclei.
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in the stockpile—the W76 and the W80—are scheduled to begin later this

decade. NIF could be useful to the refurbishment process by allowing

weapons scientists to study the potential effect of proposed changes on a

weapon’s safety and reliability.

Stockpile stewardship is being carried out as an integrated program

involving the three nuclear weapons laboratories, four production plants,

and a test site. Integration can occur on several levels. For example, the

three laboratories are expected to share experimental facilities, like NIF, in

order to reduce the overall cost of the program. In addition to sharing

facilities, the DOE laboratories work together to develop an annual

certification to the President and the Congress that the nation’s nuclear

weapons remain safe and reliable without the use of underground testing.

DOE and its three weapons laboratories believe that NIF is a major

component of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Experiments conducted

on NIF are expected to assist in the work of the campaigns as well as in the

refurbishment of the stockpile. NIF is also expected to help attract and

train new weapons scientists to replace the program’s currently aging

workforce.

NIF’s Delays Will Affect the

Timing of Some

Experiments

In general, the delays NIF will experience will not affect meeting the

campaigns’ 2005 milestones since NIF was not expected to be ready in time

for those. Some weapons scientists told us that, even before NIF’s

problems became public, they had already planned alternative experiments

in case NIF was not ready on time. However, according to program

documents, NIF’s delays will in turn delay the achievement of some of the

experiments needed for the 2010 milestones by as much as 3 years. With

respect to weapons refurbishment, the expected delays in NIF will mean

that it will not be available to help analyze the impact of any proposed

changes in the W76 or W80 weapons.

Many important experiments can still be conducted on other facilities or on

a partially completed NIF. For example, studies of the high-energy density

properties of materials used in nuclear weapons can be conducted with

only 48 to 96 beams installed in NIF (NIF is designed for 192 beams). This

information is vital in modeling the performance of nuclear weapons.

Livermore’s Target Physics Review Committee, a NIF Council technical

subgroup, recommended in May 2000, that while NIF should be completed

to its full 192-beam configuration, a first cluster of 48 beams should be

given a high priority and brought up for experiments as soon as practical,
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both for weapons physics experiments and to attract and retain the best

scientists. The former Associate Director for Defense and Nuclear

Technologies at Lawrence Livermore told us that while he believes not

having NIF available may introduce some risk into the stockpile, this

increased risk does not approach any level that would indicate that the

stockpile is unsafe and unreliable.

The Budgetary Impact of

NIF Could Be Significant

In a September 1999 statement responding to the problems NIF was

experiencing, the Secretary of Energy said,

“I expect all cost issues to be handled within our DOE defense programs and Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) budget funding lines. We will reprioritize our

national security program to reallocate dollars, people, and other resources—so the U.S.

taxpayer does not foot additional bills because of these problems.”

Assuming the Secretary enforces his pledge to fund NIF’s cost overruns

from the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s current budget, significant

portions of the nuclear weapons program could be affected. Currently,

several DOE officials and veteran weapons experts believe the program is

under significant stress as numerous activities compete for its limited

budget. These activities include building and operating additional science

facilities beyond NIF, replacing aging laboratory and production plant

infrastructure, and refurbishing weapons in the stockpile. This stress is

expected to increase as the result of increased security requirements,

potential new problems with the stockpile, and the need to address the

program’s aging scientific and production workforce.

DOE has not revealed how it intends to pay for NIF’s cost overruns, and

Los Alamos and Sandia officials are concerned about how NIF’s cost

increases will affect the Stockpile Stewardship Program at their

laboratories. DOE attempted to gain consensus among the weapons

laboratories on a path forward for NIF. An April 2000 “White Paper” signed

by DOE and its three weapons laboratories concluded that NIF was

important to the Stockpile Stewardship Program, but no agreement was

reached on how many beams NIF should have or how it should be funded.

The paper’s authors explicitly stated that the White Paper

“does not address the appropriate revised scope for NIF, the schedule for deployment, the

proper cost baseline, or the impact on the balance within the Stockpile Stewardship

Program. Consequently, concurrence with the views stated here should not be construed as

support for any specific path forward or for other yet to be resolved issues.”
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This lack of agreement regarding how NIF should be developed and funded

was echoed in comments made to us by senior weapons scientists at the

three laboratories. For example:

• The Associate Director for NIF Programs at Livermore believes that NIF

is critical to certifying the nuclear weapons stockpile and supports

completing a full 192-beam NIF. In discussions with us, he recognized

that NIF is not the only essential facility in the Stockpile Stewardship

Program and agreed that the rest of the program should not become

unbalanced by funding NIF. He believed Livermore might accept a

“pause” in completing NIF of about 3 years at the 120-beam level.

• The Deputy Director of the Nuclear Weapons Program at Los Alamos

told us that he believes NIF should be stopped at 48 beams. This level of

NIF would support about 80 percent of the experiments the program

needs to perform. He believes that funding a larger NIF would seriously

unbalance the stewardship program by taking funds away from needed

research and production activities. Other Los Alamos weapons

scientists also expressed the view that NIF had only a 50-percent chance

of achieving ignition.

• The Senior Vice President for Nuclear Weapons Programs at Sandia

National Laboratory told us he believes there is no clear role for NIF

that requires it to be built to full power immediately. He believes that

NIF should be built to a smaller scale—such as 48 or 96 beams—and

operated for some period of time before additional investments are

made. Taking this approach would allow the NIF program to

demonstrate with certainty how much it costs to build and operate NIF.

Senior DOE officials told us that when such fundamental disagreements

existed in the past, they would hold a “summit” to reconcile the views.

However, according to our interviews with senior DOE officials, the

Secretary did not reconcile these views before he made his decision

regarding the “interim” cost estimate (rebaseline). The Secretary’s

rebaseline decision was not made in the context of which stewardship

program components might be eliminated, reduced in scope, or extended

in order to fund NIF. Rather, the Secretary relied on overall funding

options. None of the various rebaselining options considered by the

Secretary described what the specific effects would be on the overall

stewardship program for fiscal year 2001 and in the future. DOE is still

trying to determine how to adjust the Stockpile Stewardship Program for

fiscal year 2001 and beyond to pay for NIF.
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Potential Impact on Science

Programs

The Secretary’s pledge notwithstanding, some scientists believe that

science programs are vulnerable to budget cuts. DOE sponsors a wide

variety of science activities in such areas as high-energy physics, advanced

computing, and fusion. Scientists at several universities told us that they

believe funding for civilian research may be cut as a result of NIF cost

overruns. Several scientists pointed out that each fusion energy experiment

may take several years to plan, design, and conduct, requiring a long-term

commitment for funding. Budget cuts would delay the development and

implementation of these experiments—the very research that in 1990 the

National Academy of Sciences recommended NIF be designed to conduct.

Scientists expressed mixed views about NIF’s effect on science research

schedules. While some scientists told us that schedule problems may delay

needed experiments on NIF, others said that delays could actually be

beneficial. Delays could provide additional time to observe the initial

operations of NIF and to better design and modify planned experiments.

DOE and Laboratory

Corrective Actions Are

in Process

DOE, Laboratory, and University of California officials are taking several

actions designed to strengthen the management and oversight of NIF. Some

actions are complete, but most are still under way. Many of these actions

address specific deficiencies in existing processes and organizational

structures. These actions are encouraging, but implementation has only

just begun in many areas, so an assessment of their ultimate value is

premature.

DOE Actions The Secretary of Energy has taken several actions to establish

accountability for NIF’s problems and to improve DOE’s oversight. Stating

that he was “deeply disturbed” to learn of NIF’s cost and schedule problems

and “gravely disappointed” with both the Laboratory and the University of

California, he ordered DOE to withhold at least $2 million of the

University’s 1999 program performance fee in recognition of the

“significant mission disruption caused by the project’s problem.” The

Secretary also ordered a report, due later in the year, that can recommend

disciplinary action against DOE officials responsible for NIF’s

mismanagement. Other actions announced by the Secretary include the

following:

• creating a new headquarters NIF Project Office whose manager is

dedicated to NIF,
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• assigning six full-time employees to oversee NIF on site at Lawrence

Livermore, and

• placing NIF on the Department’s Chief Operating Officer’s list of

projects that require senior management attention (watch list), where it

is subject to more stringent reporting requirements.

NIF has also been designated a pilot project for the new Project

Management and Oversight function. DOE intends to hire an outside

contractor who will give DOE project management expertise on-site at the

Laboratory. This contractor will be paid from the $2 million fee that the

University was required to return to DOE. Although not yet fully in place,

other key features of this new function include the following:

• creating a headquarters Office of Engineering and Construction

Management to provide guidance and expertise on project management,

• developing a career track for project managers, long a weak link in

DOE’s ability to attract and hire highly qualified project managers, and

• requiring and budgeting for more research and development before

committing to major construction funding.

This new project management system will also attempt to establish clearer

lines of responsibility from DOE headquarters to the field units that

perform day-to-day contractor oversight at major construction projects.

This is to be accomplished by requiring that DOE’s on-site oversight

managers report to the headquarters program offices responsible for the

projects, as well as reporting through their field offices. DOE’s

headquarters chain of command is now more direct for the NIF project.

DOE’s on-site field manager for NIF will report directly to Defense

Programs in headquarters, and DOE has advised us that his performance

rating will be the responsibility of Defense Programs in headquarters, not

the Oakland Operations Office.

The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board NIF Task Force also made

recommendations in its January 2000 interim report. A main

recommendation was to have DOE develop intensive internal review

processes similar to those used successfully by its Office of Science to

track projects for budget and schedule. DOE plans to start this new process

in August 2000. The task force also called on DOE to clarify roles and

responsibilities between headquarters and field offices and recommended

that NIF be completed in phases. DOE is still studying these

recommendations.
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While improved processes and organizational fixes are helpful, DOE has

difficulty implementing management reforms. For example, a 1991 DOE

initiative, called the “Financial and Project Management Improvement

Program,” sought to give line managers early review authority over projects

and outlined a plan to hire more well-qualified project managers. DOE

acknowledged in 1999 that its project management suffers from “serious

systemic issues needing correction.” In addition, past DOE reorganizations

have attempted to clarify chains of command and upgrade project

management skills, also with little success.

Lawrence Livermore

Actions

The Laboratory is taking a variety of corrective actions to improve its

management of NIF. The original NIF project manager was reassigned to

another laboratory, and the Laboratory’s laser director resigned. In

addition, the University of California did not give its Lawrence Livermore

director a salary raise. Other Laboratory actions include the following:

• The Laboratory is reorganizing the NIF project to create clearer lines of

responsibility and to better focus on major risk areas. The new structure

promises to give the NIF project manager more authority and a more

direct line to top management. This new structure could more closely

integrate the NIF project with the laser research and development

program that supports it. The new project manager has experience with

large projects and has appointed a chief engineer.

• The reporting details and procedures for NIF progress reports are being

changed to better reflect project risks and their potential impacts on

future budgets and schedules. While reporting standards already exist,

these new requirements are intended to make the reporting process

more accurately reflect the NIF’s project status.

• The Laboratory has replaced its NIF Council with a new NIF Programs

Review Committee that will report to the Laboratory director, not just

the laser director. In turn, the Laboratory director will forward each

report to DOE. Laboratory officials told us that they will “invite” DOE to

participate in selecting new committee members.
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The University of California, as the contractor operating Lawrence

Livermore for DOE, maintains its own oversight structure for the

Laboratory. In its report on NIF’s problems, the University called for clearer

roles and responsibilities within the Laboratory, involving the Laboratory

director more directly in NIF management, creating a new senior position

of associate director for NIF, and improving the Laboratory’s

communications procedures.15 The report also called on DOE to demand

accountability from the Laboratory. The University has restructured its

own advisory council to better oversee all of its national laboratories and

has created a new panel on project management. The Laboratory is

addressing these recommendations.

Conclusions DOE, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the University of

California all share responsibility for NIF’s cost and schedule problems.

Each lacked the appropriate skills to manage and oversee the project and

exercised oversight powers poorly. In addition, inadequate independent

reviews enabled the Laboratory to withhold significant information from

external reviewers and the Congress for months. The result is a billiondollar overrun and multiyear schedule delay that could worsen because

substantial research and development is still incomplete. Unfortunately,

the Congress cannot know with assurance just how much NIF will cost,

where in DOE’s budget the money will come from, what impact NIF will

have on the overall nuclear weapons program, or how long it will take to

complete, even though 1-1/2 years have passed since the Laboratory first

questioned whether it could meet its most recent cost and schedule.

These conditions have now spawned new reforms by the Laboratory and

the University to improve their management and organizational

shortcomings. NIF has also taught DOE to continue its efforts at

streamlining chains of command between headquarters program offices

and field management units. But the Department must work hard to hire—

and retain—competent project managers. Also, since construction began,

the NIF project has not been subject to a comprehensive and effective

independent review that covers both the project and its supporting

research and development activities. DOE must provide for effective

independent review of its projects to ensure that it has the best possible

15Report of the University of California President’s Council National Ignition Facility (NIF)

Review Committee, University of California (Nov. 18, 1999).
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advice on technical and managerial issues and that it is aware of the

remaining risks to NIF’s cost and schedule.

NIF was designed to be a national facility to support an integrated

Stockpile Stewardship Program for maintaining the safety and reliability of

the nation’s nuclear arsenal. As such, we would have expected any decision

about future NIF funding to be made in the context of what stewardship

program components might be eliminated, reduced in scope, or extended

in order to fund NIF’s cost increases, as well as what impact any decision

would have on the success of the overall program. The lack of agreement

among NIF’s users—the nuclear weapons laboratories—about the

appropriate path forward indicates to us that considerably more work

needs to be done before a final decision on NIF is made. Without such an

agreement, the Secretary of Energy is unable to assure himself, and the

Congress, that the appropriate cost/benefit trade-off has been made

between funds for finishing NIF and funds for the other portions of the

Stockpile Stewardship Program needed to maintain a safe and reliable

nuclear weapons arsenal.

Recommendations To ensure that DOE has an effective independent review of NIF, we

recommend that the Secretary of Energy arrange for an outside scientific

and technical review of NIF’s remaining technical challenges as they relate

to the project’s cost and schedule risks.

To ensure an appropriate balance between NIF and the rest of the nuclear

weapons program, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy not

reallocate funds from the nuclear weapons program to NIF until DOE (1)

evaluates the impact of its cost and schedule plan, as well as any other

options for NIF, on the overall nuclear weapons program and (2) certifies

that the selected NIF cost and schedule plan will not negatively affect the

balance of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE raised a number of issues

concerning how NIF’s costs should be counted and our characterization of

the technical uncertainties facing the project. DOE also said that it is

already implementing our recommendation for an external independent

review and that it has met the “intent” of our recommendation to evaluate

the impact of NIF’s cost increases and schedule delays on the overall

nuclear weapons program.
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With respect to the first issue, DOE said that a substantial portion of the

cost increases we cited is for developing a target for NIF and that this

amount should be not included as part of NIF’s construction costs. We are

not suggesting that these costs be included as construction costs. But we

are suggesting that all NIF costs be identified. Both our figures and DOE’s

show cost increases in related programs and research and development. To

give the Congress a more accurate picture of the total costs associated with

the NIF project, the cost of designing and building a target—without which

the NIF cannot operate—is an essential component of the entire NIF effort,

regardless of its budget account label. In addition, we included costs borne

by other laboratories that directly contribute to the NIF effort that are not

reflected in the NIF project figures that DOE has prepared.

Concerning our presentation of the project’s technical uncertainties, DOE

disagreed with our characterization of final stage optics as an unresolved

technical risk, noting that problems associated with optics are only an

issue of “economics” and that NIF’s technical uncertainties are well

understood. We disagree. As DOE’s own expert reviewers have noted, final

optics is NIF’s most challenging technical area and remains an unresolved

issue. As DOE noted in its letter, if optics cannot be made to withstand

NIF’s high-intensity lasers, they will suffer damage and will have to be

replaced more often. This outcome has the effect not only of increasing

NIF’s operating costs but also of limiting its performance because fewer

laser firings would result for a given operating budget. In addition, as we

noted in our report, substantial technical and cost uncertainties persist in

the research and development needed to design and build a target for NIF’s

laser beams.

DOE said that it is implementing our recommendation on the need for an

independent scientific and technical review of NIF. DOE also cited a large

number of past and ongoing technical and cost reviews of NIF, noting that

it has been aggressive in obtaining expert reviews of NIF’s technical

challenges. DOE also said that it is planning an internal review of NIF in

August 2000 that will include an independent cost estimate, and that this

review is designed to give the Department “a higher level of confidence”

that it can complete NIF as planned. We agree that the technical and cost

components of NIF have been frequently reviewed in the past. However,

past reviewers did not discover and report on the NIF’s fundamental

project and engineering problems, bringing into question their

comprehensiveness and independence. Also, since cost and schedule

problems were first identified in late 1998, there have been no effective

independent reviews of NIF that have related technical challenges to its
B-284392

Page 34 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

cost and schedule risks. The internal review DOE is planning for August

2000 resembles the process DOE’s Office of Science uses to evaluate its

major science projects and has potential for providing valuable insights

into technical and managerial issues. However, we believe internal review

processes supplement—but cannot replace—the value of a separately

conducted scientific and technical evaluation managed by experts outside

DOE and its laboratory system.

Finally, DOE also said it has already met the “intent” of our

recommendation to evaluate the impact of NIF’s funding options on the

Stockpile Stewardship Program. DOE stated that its June 1, 2000, “interim”

report to the Congress and its fiscal year 2001 revised budget request of

June 27, 2000, contain “an option that considers” the impacts of NIF on the

overall Stockpile Stewardship Program. However, neither of these reports

contains an analysis of the impacts of NIF’s cost increases on the balance

of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. DOE’s June 1 report contained no

details on how NIF cost increases will be funded. Its June 27 revised budget

request only contains details for fiscal year 2001 on how the Department

intends to reallocate funds to pay for NIF’s cost increases. These

reallocations included reductions in various Stockpile Stewardship

Program components managed by Lawrence Livermore and other national

laboratories but did not describe how its proposed reallocations and

associated delays will affect the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s

campaigns and their objectives and milestones. In addition, the revised

budget request did not describe how paying for NIF affects Stockpile

Stewardship Program activities beyond fiscal year 2001. Because this is a

long-term integrated program, we believe that the Secretary of Energy

needs to present in more detail how planned cuts and delays caused by NIF

affect the overall Stockpile Stewardship Program’s objectives and

milestones. The Laboratory’s own technical advisers have recommended

that better planning is needed to show how NIF is to be used within the

Stockpile Stewardship Program and that such a plan should assess the

impacts of delays on both NIF and other Stockpile Stewardship Program

facilities.16

Appendix II includes the full text of DOE’s comments and our response.

16Report of the National Ignition Facility Target Physics Program Review Committee, May 2,

2000.
B-284392

Page 35 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Honorable Bill

Richardson, Secretary of Energy, and the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director,

Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to

others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at

(202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Jim Wells,

Director, Energy, Resources,

and Science Issues
Page 36 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To determine the magnitude of the National Ignition Facility’s (NIF) cost

and schedule overruns, we examined all Laboratory progress reports and

quarterly documentation and interviewed Laboratory and Department of

Energy (DOE) program officials. We worked closely with budget officials

from each of the three defense laboratories to determine the amount of

their funds that supported the NIF project. From these discussions, we

constructed a detailed table of NIF’s costs.

To document the reasons for the cost and schedule problems, we examined

past reviews of NIF, including those conducted by the University of

California and the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on NIF.

We also held extensive interviews with the authors of these reviews. We

also interviewed all former and current project managers and past senior

managers at DOE and the Office of Management and Budget. We also

examined documents from the NIF Council and interviewed its members

on several different occasions. We also interviewed senior budget officials

from DOE and officials from the now defunct Office of Field Management.

These individuals provided us with substantial documentation of past

reviews of NIF’s progress.

To assess the impacts from the problems, we interviewed a wide range of

scientists from Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia national

laboratories. We also interviewed past and current officials and scientists

from universities and from private interest groups.

To evaluate DOE and Laboratory actions to correct these problems, we

examined the previously mentioned reviews and interviewed the authors of

these reviews. This included interviewing officials from the University of

California and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. We also attended each of

the four Secretary of Energy Advisory Board meetings on NIF and

interviewed members of the board to ascertain their understanding of NIF’s

technical and managerial problems. We also interviewed the authors of the

engineering firm that conducted a review of NIF.

Our review was performed from October 1999 through July 2000 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 37 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy ApendxiI

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this

appendix.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 38 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 39 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 40 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 41 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

See comment 3.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 42 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

See comment 4.
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 43 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 44 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Energy’s letter

dated July 28, 2000.

GAO’s Comments 1. Our response is included in the body of the report.

2. Our response is included in the body of the report.

3. Our response is included in the body of the report. In addition, DOE’s

listing of a GAO review of the NIF Project/ICF Program in 1998 is

misleading because we have not previously analyzed the NIF Project or

ICF Program. We did receive a one-day briefing in 1998 on NIF and ICF

program issues that was part of another assignment. Also, DOE stated

that the Lockwood-Greene review was conducted before the NIF cost

and schedule problems were identified. However, as we noted in our

report, Lawrence Livermore’s NIF managers were aware of cost and

schedule problems before Lockwood-Greene conducted its visits in

early 1999.

4. Our response is included in the body of the report.
Page 45 GAO/RCED-00-141 National Ignition Facility

Appendix III

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements ApendxiI

GAO Contacts Jim Wells, (202) 512-3841

Gary Boss, (202) 512-3841

Acknowledgements In addition to those named above, James Noel, Thomas Kingham, William

Lanouette, and Robert Sanchez made key contributions to this report.

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