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REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING 

CENTER’S EFFORTS TO SUPPORT 

THE SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Audit Division 

Audit Report 05-34 

August 2005

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REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER’S 

EFFORTS TO SUPPORT 

THE SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 

(9/11 Commission) recommended in its July 2004 final report that the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) assume responsibility for screening commercial airline 

passengers and that in doing so the TSA use the information contained 

within the federal government’s terrorist watch lists. The 9/11 Commission 

further recommended that air carriers be required to provide the TSA with 

the passenger information necessary to conduct such screening. 

Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which directed the DHS to “commence 

testing of an advanced passenger prescreening system that will allow the 

Department of Homeland Security to assume the performance of comparing 

passenger information . . . to the automatic selectee and no-fly lists, utilizing 

all appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated terrorist watchlist 

maintained by the Federal Government.” In response to this directive, in 

August 2004 the TSA announced an initiative known as “Secure Flight.” 

The consolidated terrorist watch list (known as the Terrorist Screening 

Database, or the TSDB) that will be used in the Secure Flight screening process 

was developed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The TSC, established 

through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 on September 16, 2003, is 

a multi-agency effort administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

to consolidate the government’s approach to terrorist screening.1 The TSC 

operates a round-the-clock call center to field inquiries from state and local law 

enforcement, border inspectors, and government agents abroad who have 

screened the identity of an individual and received a hit against the 

consolidated watch list of known or suspected terrorists. 

We conducted this review of the TSC’s actions with regard to Secure 

Flight in response to House Report 109-072, which directed the Office of the 

Inspector General to evaluate the TSC’s plan to support the Secure Flight 

program and to report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees 

on the results of our review. 

 1

 In June 2005, the OIG reported on its review of the TSC’s administration, 

operations, information systems, data reliability, and accomplishment of mission-critical 

functions. That report (Review of the Terrorist Screening Center, Report Number 05-27)

contains detailed descriptions of the TSC’s processes and functions. 

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Creation of Secure Flight 

 According to the TSA, the Secure Flight program improves previous 

airline passenger screening programs by consolidating functions now 

separately conducted by 65 air carriers transporting 1.8 million passengers 

on 30,000 flights each day that leave approximately 450 airports where 

security screening is required.2

Although the TSA originally planned to implement the Secure Flight 

program in April 2005, several delays have pushed its launch date for the 

initial phase (referred to as “pre-operational testing”) to the second week of 

September 2005. During the initial phase, Secure Flight will involve a still 

undetermined number of air carriers, and the total number of passengers 

initially screened will be dependant upon the specific carriers involved. The 

Secure Flight program is expected to gradually increase the number of 

participating carriers, with full implementation currently scheduled for fiscal 

year (FY) 2007. 

Coordinating Secure Flight Efforts 

In October 2004, the TSA and the TSC jointly developed the general 

process for Secure Flight screening. In January 2005, the TSC asked for and 

received the assistance of a full-time TSA executive to work as the TSC 

Secure Flight Program Coordinator. However, it was not until February or 

March 2005 that the TSA and the TSC began to actively work together on 

the Secure Flight program. At that time, regularly scheduled, joint meetings 

with all key participants were initiated to define the roles of the supporting 

agencies and discuss the status of Secure Flight’s development.3 

 2

 Beginning in the late 1990s, the Department of Transportation began using the Computer 

Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS I) to screen air travelers and select individuals for 

enhanced security screening. Air carriers performed this screening in two ways: (1) by comparing 

domestic airline passenger manifest information, referred to as passenger name records, against 

certain aviation risk criteria known as the CAPPS I rules; and (2) by comparing passenger 

information against two of the federal government’s watch lists: the no-fly list, which included 

names of individuals that were to be denied transport on commercial flights because they were 

deemed a threat to civil aviation; and the selectee list, which included names of individuals whom 

air carriers were required to “select” for additional screening prior to permitting them to board an 

aircraft. In March 2003, the TSA began developing the next phase of the CAPPS program 

(CAPPS II). However, after significant criticism of the program, the TSA cancelled CAPPS II in 

August 2004 and announced its new initiative - Secure Flight. 

3

 Aside from the TSA and the TSC, other key stakeholders include the Terrorist Screening 

Operations Unit (TSOU) in the FBI Counterterrorism Division, the DHS’s Federal Air Marshal 

Service (FAMS), and the Department of Defense’s North American Aerospace Defense Command 

(NORAD). The TSOU will coordinate any necessary law enforcement response to anticipated or 

realized encounters with individuals who are a match against a watch list record. The FAMS will 

monitor and resolve any on-board activity of flights in progress, while NORAD will monitor affected 

flights and take any necessary airspace actions.

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TSA officials told us that they are satisfied with the TSC’s support of 

the Secure Flight program and believe that the TSA and the TSC have a 

positive partnership. However, TSC officials believe that their ability to 

prepare for the implementation of Secure Flight has been hampered by the 

TSA’s failure to make, communicate, and comply with key program and 

policy decisions in a timely manner, such as the launch date and volume of 

screening to be conducted during the initial implementation phases. 

Planning for Operational Changes at the TSC 

The TSC recognizes that the Secure Flight program will significantly 

increase TSC’s call center activity. When Secure Flight becomes operational, 

the TSC will perform many of the same processes currently conducted for 

calls received from state and local law enforcement, border inspectors and 

agents, as well as government agents abroad. However, the TSC anticipates 

a significantly greater operational work load as a result of Secure Flight and 

an increased need for staff, space, and funding. 

Organization

The TSC developed three sub-teams to ensure that it properly 

addressed all areas of support for the Secure Flight program – an operations 

team, an information technology (IT) team, and a policy/legal team. These 

teams meet on a weekly basis with the TSC Secure Flight Program 

Coordinator to discuss the status of their projects and to prioritize their 

work. 

Funding

 The TSC’s total funding for FY 2005 is $64.23 million – $29 million in 

base funding and an additional $35.2 million obtained through the FY 2005 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. These additional funds were 

provided by Congress for Secure Flight and other unspecified TSC 

infrastructure improvements. In its FY 2006 budget request, the FBI again 

requested $29 million in base funding for the TSC. However, in November 

2004 the FBI requested an out-of-cycle budget enhancement of $75 million 

for TSC improvements, preparations for Secure Flight, and other TSC 

initiatives, bringing the TSC’s total funding request for FY 2006 to 

$104 million. 

Officials in the TSC Administration Branch stated that Secure Flight 

cannot operate without substantial modifications to the TSC’s existing 

IT environment, including greater infrastructure as well as capability 

enhancements to the TSDB and the TSC’s Encounter Management 

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Application (EMA).4 But the TSC could not provide the exact costs of 

modifications required to support Secure Flight because, according to the 

TSC, the organization had planned to make many improvements to its 

operations and information technology environment prior to Secure Flight. 

When Secure Flight was announced, the TSC considered the program’s 

needs in determining and refining the necessary modifications to its 

databases and processes. TSC officials told us that they were unable to 

disentangle Secure Flight-prompted funding needs from those necessary for 

other planned changes to existing TSC systems and operations because 

Secure Flight enhancements were fully integrated with other anticipated 

modifications. The current immature state of the TSC’s IT environment 

makes specifically identifying Secure Flight enhancements more complex 

because the TSC’s systems continue to evolve. Our June 2005 report noted 

this immaturity and included 16 recommendations related to the TSC’s IT 

systems, planning, and operations. 

The Director of the TSC informed us that she agrees that the TSC 

needs to identify its Secure Flight funding needs separately from other TSC 

endeavors. Additionally, she acknowledged that because certain 

requirements of the TSC’s overall systems, staffing, and procurements are 

paid by other federal agencies or divisions within the FBI, the TSC is 

unaware of how much the organization truly costs to run. The Director 

stated that she recognizes the importance of having designated budget staff 

to perform budget formulation, analysis, and execution, but the TSC does 

not currently possess the expertise to perform these functions. 

However, as a result of our discussions with the Director of the TSC 

and her staff in July 2005 about the TSC’s inability to determine the cost of 

implementing Secure Flight, the TSC informed us that it would make another 

attempt to estimate its Secure Flight costs. Subsequently, the TSC 

formulated a methodology to attempt to identify the percentage of the total 

call volume, customers, and staff at the TSC that were expected to be 

related to Secure Flight. These percentages were applied to budget 

categories to allocate the costs of each category and added to those costs 

directly and solely related to Secure Flight to estimate the overall cost of 

supporting the program. 

According to this methodology, $8,034,732, or 12.5 percent, of the 

TSC’s $64.23 million in funding for FY 2005 is in direct support of the Secure 

 4

 EMA is the TSC’s tool for recording the details of all incoming calls to its call center 

resulting from government encounters with individuals that appear to be a hit against a watch list 

record. Call center staff record the information they receive from the caller, the TSC determination 

of whether the individual is a match with a TSDB record, whether the caller was forwarded to law 

enforcement for further action, and the final disposition of the encounter.

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Flight program. The TSC estimated that an additional $13,256,696, or 

20.6 percent of the total, will be used for indirect costs for the Secure Flight 

program.5 This amounts to a total of $21,291,428, or 33.15 percent of the 

total funding for Secure Flight in FY 2005. For FY 2006, the TSC estimated 

that its expected expenditures directly related to Secure Flight will amount 

to $11,417,869, or 11.6 percent of the budgeted resources. Indirect costs 

for Secure Flight in FY 2006 are expected to amount to $26,099,699, or 

26.4 percent of the total TSC planned spending for FY 2006. Therefore, 

according to the TSC, the total cost for Secure Flight (direct and indirect) in 

FY 2006 is projected to amount to 38 percent ($37,517,568) of the total 

requested TSC budget. 

SUMMARY OF FY 2005 AND FY 2006 TSC SPENDING PLAN 

FY 2005 FY 20066

BUDGET 

Base $29,000,000 $29,000,000 

Supplemental 35,230,000 NA 

Enhancement NA 75,000,000 

Total $64,230,000 $104,000,000 

SPENDING 

Direct Secure Flight $8,034,732 $11,417,869 

Indirect Secure Flight 13,256,696 26,099,699 

Non-Secure Flight 42,938,572 61,217,432 

Total $64,230,000 $98,735,000 

Source: Terrorist Screening Center, July 2005 

We were unable to perform transaction testing or an in-depth analysis 

of the cost breakdowns provided by the TSC because the information was not 

provided until July 18, 2005. The TSC also has not been able to adequately 

estimate its projected workload increase due to TSA’s failure to provide a 

 5

 The costs identified as direct include expenditures that are fully attributable to 

Secure Flight. The indirect costs represent areas in which the TSC has planned for changes to 

its general organization and infrastructure and a portion of those modifications has been 

charged to Secure Flight based on the percentage of the total call volume, customers, and 

staff at the TSC expected to be related to Secure Flight activities. 

6

 The spending information includes all non-personnel funding included in the FY 2006 

budget submission for the TSC. An additional $5,265,000 was requested for an increase in 

the number of full-time equivalent FBI positions assigned to the TSC. The TSC did not include 

any personnel figures in the spending information that it gave to us because all its positions 

are provided by the participating agencies, such as the FBI or the DHS. 

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reliable and definitive implementation schedule for the Secure Flight program 

as a whole. Moreover, the TSC’s total and indirect costs are based upon 

assumptions of growth in areas outside of Secure Flight, and in this review we 

did not examine these non-Secure Flight enhancements. 

Given these factors, we are unable to reach a conclusion as to the 

accuracy of the financial information the TSC provided our auditors to explain 

its direct and indirect costs of implementing Secure Flight. We recommend 

that the TSC develop the capacity to produce more accurate financial and 

budgetary projections that identify its Secure Flight funding needs separately 

from other TSC endeavors. However, as it stands currently from the 

information provided, the OIG cannot determine how much of the $75 million 

out-of-cycle budget enhancement requested by the TSC for FY 2006 

appropriately reflects the TSC’s actual anticipated expenses for Secure Flight 

versus other enhancements. 

Planning for Secure Flight Information Technology 

We were told by TSC officials that it initially appeared that the TSA did 

not plan for the TSC to be directly involved in the Secure Flight screening 

process. The TSA assumed that it would be responsible for conducting all of 

the electronic searches as well as all human vetting for terrorist screening 

related to domestic air travel. Under this scenario, the TSC’s role would be 

limited to providing a copy of its consolidated watch list database to the TSA. 

However, according to TSC officials, the TSA’s plan did not account for 

having to communicate the results of the Secure Flight matches to the law 

enforcement agencies responsible for responding to hits against the watch 

list. 

 

Besides omitting arrangements for any necessary law enforcement 

response, the TSA neglected to plan for the complex process of record 

additions, deletions, and modifications made to the TSDB on a continual 

basis. According to the TSC’s IT officials, this oversight resulted from the 

TSA’s initial assumption that it would receive a relatively static copy of the 

TSDB against which the TSA would compare the passenger data obtained 

from the airlines. 

Once the TSA and the TSC agreed on the TSC’s necessary role in the 

screening process, many of the processes that the TSA had already developed 

had to be re-designed and re-tooled. For example, although TSC officials 

reported that in May 2005 the TSA began to communicate more openly and 

proactively with the TSC, in the middle of June, just weeks prior to the 

original laboratory testing date, the TSA identified problems with the data file 

formats that are critical for transmission of passenger information from the 

airlines to the TSA Secure Flight Office and the subsequent transmission of 

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TSA Secure Flight-determined watch list matches to the TSC. According to 

TSC officials, two separate teams at the TSA designed the two processes and 

apparently did not coordinate the basic file structures or consult the TSC. TSC 

IT officials said that the TSA’s file format problem might not have occurred 

had the standards for data exchange been established prior to designing and 

developing the systems and applications. 

Officials in the TSC IT Branch said they will be prepared for the launch 

of Secure Flight and have established electronic interfaces for the exchange of 

data, modified the TSDB to allow for the watch list to be shared with the TSA, 

and developed significant enhancements to the TSC’s current systems to 

accommodate Secure Flight screening and to facilitate the necessary law 

enforcement response to domestic travelers who are a match against the 

watch list. The TSC stated that its plans for these actions are on track and 

will be finalized before the launch of the Secure Flight program. 

Other Preparations in Support of Secure Flight 

To assist individuals who believe they were inappropriately delayed or 

prohibited from boarding their flights by the Secure Flight program, the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 directed the DHS to 

establish a timely and fair method to appeal or correct any erroneous data in 

the terrorist screening database. In response, the TSA established a new 

redress office, increased its staffing, and drafted new processes and 

procedures. TSA officials indicated that the TSC would play a supporting role 

in the redress process, but would not have direct contact with the public. 

However, the TSA and the TSC have not reached agreement on certain 

important redress concepts, such as the amount and specificity of information 

that is provided to redress requestors. 

In addition, the TSA and the TSC have worked together to address a 

number of legal requirements for both agencies, including the issuance of 

System of Records Notices (SORN), which is required by the Privacy Act of 

1974.7 On July 28, 2005, the TSC published a SORN that covers its current 

 7

 The TSDB is considered a “system of records” because it contains data regarding 

individuals that is retrieved by name or by some identifying number, symbol, or other piece of 

information. Both the TSA and the TSC are required by the Privacy Act to publish in the 

Federal Register a description of their own records as well as any new use of the information 

contained therein and to provide the public an opportunity to comment. This informs the 

public of the purpose for the system and includes information such as a description of the 

types of individuals reflected in the records, the data collected, the reason for data collection, 

the data safeguard and security processes, and rules and purposes for sharing the data. 

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and anticipated screening operations, including those related to Secure 

Flight.8 

Conclusions 

The TSC’s Secure Flight screening responsibilities are anticipated to 

begin in September 2005, when Secure Flight is launched. We found that 

the TSC has designed its necessary electronic connections to accommodate 

the transfer of terrorist watch list records, airline passenger information, and 

screening results; developed new processes to facilitate law enforcement 

responses to encounters with individuals who are a match against the 

consolidated terrorist watch list; and is on schedule for testing its newly 

established systems and procedures relating to Secure Flight. 

However, the TSA has repeatedly adjusted the implementation date for 

Secure Flight, from April 2005 to August 2005, to the most recent target 

date of September 2005. In addition, the TSA has changed its Secure Flight 

implementation plan and as of July 31, 2005, is unsure how many airlines 

will participate in the initial phase. As a result, neither the TSA nor the TSC 

knows how many passenger records will be screened and cannot project the 

number of watch list hits that will be forwarded to the TSC for action. This 

shifting of critical milestones has affected the TSC’s ability to adequately 

plan for its role in the Secure Flight program. 

In addition, we found that the TSC lacks the ability to identify specific 

costs that are in support of the Secure Flight program. At the exit 

conference for this audit, TSC officials stated that they do not currently have 

the ability to project baseline budget information related to the cost of 

adding Secure Flight to the TSC’s regular operations. TSC officials attributed 

this lack of fundamental data to their stage of development, noting that the 

organization has been in existence for less than 2 years. TSC management 

stated that the TSC’s base budget of $29 million was derived from 

conservative estimates developed during the organization’s earliest days and 

this amount cannot meet its normal operating requirements. They further 

stated that the composition of the TSC as an intergovernmental organization 

within the FBI makes the situation more complex. In addition, TSC officials 

stated that the structure of the FBI’s financial systems limits its flexibility in 

categorizing and summarizing costs associated with its varied projects and 

programs. TSC officials said that they understand the importance of being 

able to discretely project and track costs by program, budget category, or 

organizational unit. However, the TSC stated that it currently is unable to 

 8

 Prior to the issue of its SORN, the TSC was covered by an existing FBI SORN 

related to its central records system. 

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accurately estimate the incremental cost of adding programs that increase 

the TSC’s range of operations, such as Secure Flight. 

The TSC’s difficulties in estimating the costs for Secure Flight are 

exacerbated by the TSA’s failure to specifically define the scope of each 

implementation phase. As a result, the TSC has been unable to adequately 

project its resource requirements for responding to the expected increase in 

workload. 

In sum, the TSC is trying to plan for a program that has several major 

undefined parameters. Specifically, the TSC does not know when Secure 

Flight will start, the volume of inquiries expected and the resulting number 

of resources required to respond, the quality of data it will have to analyze, 

and the specific details of the phased-in approach for taking the program 

from “pre-operational testing” in September 2005 to full operational 

capability in FY 2007. 

At the end of our report, we made five recommendations to the TSC to 

help it support the Secure Flight program. TSC management has agreed 

with our recommendations and their response to each is located in 

Appendix III. Our analysis of the response is included in Appendix IV. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECURE FLIGHT CONCEPT..... 1

AIRLINE PASSENGER PRESCREENING ........................................................... 2 

CREATION OF SECURE FLIGHT................................................................... 3 

Implementation Plan for Initial Operating Capability ........................... 3

SECURE FLIGHT OVERVIEW...................................................................... 4 

CHAPTER 2: TSC’S PREPARATIONS TO SUPPORT SECURE FLIGHT ... 6

COORDINATING SECURE FLIGHT EFFORTS ..................................................... 6 

PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL CHANGES AT THE TSC......................................... 8 

Formation of TSC Secure Flight Working Group .................................. 8

Funding for Secure Flight................................................................ 9

PLANNING FOR SECURE FLIGHT-RELATED INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY................... 14 

TSC and TSA IT Coordination ........................................................ 15

Secure Flight IT Processes ............................................................ 18

PLANNING FOR LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN SUPPORT OF SECURE FLIGHT............. 21 

Legal Considerations .................................................................... 21

Redress...................................................................................... 23

Quality Assurance........................................................................ 24

CHAPTER 3: OIG CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........... 26

RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................ 27 

APPENDIX I: AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ...... 29

APPENDIX II: ACRONYMS USED THROUGHOUT THE REPORT......... 31

APPENDIX III: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE. 33

APPENDIX IV: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS 

AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE REPORT.......... 39

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CHAPTER 1: Establishment of the Secure Flight Concept 

The need to strengthen commercial aviation security escalated after 

the attacks of September 11, 2001. Among other security measures, the 

U.S. government has sought to enhance the prescreening of passengers 

before they board commercial airliners at airports across the country. 

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 

(9/11 Commission) recommended that the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) assume the responsibility for screening commercial airline 

passengers, and that the DHS use information contained within federal 

government watch lists to do so.9 The 9/11 Commission further 

recommended that air carriers be required to provide the TSA with the 

necessary passenger information to conduct such screening. Shortly 

thereafter, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

directed the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security to “commence testing 

of an advanced passenger prescreening system that will allow the 

Department of Homeland Security to assume the performance of comparing 

passenger information . . . to the automatic selectee and no-fly lists, utilizing 

all appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list 

maintained by the Federal Government.”10 

The Terrorist Screening Center’s (TSC) consolidated terrorist watch 

list - known as the Terrorist Screening Database, or the TSDB – is intended 

to be used in the Secure Flight screening process. The TSC was established 

through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 on September 16, 2003, 

and began initial operations on December 1, 2003. The TSC is a multiagency effort, administered by the FBI, and was created to consolidate the 

government’s approach to terrorist screening.11 

We conducted this review in response to House Report 109-072 

(Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 

Terror, and Tsunami Relief 2005), which directed the Office of the Inspector 

General to evaluate the TSC’s plan to support the Secure Flight program and 

 9

 The 9/11 Commission Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States (July 2004) 

10 Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004) 

11 In June 2005, the OIG issued a review of the TSC’s administration, operations, 

information systems, data reliability, and accomplishment of mission-critical functions. This 

report, Review of the Terrorist Screening Center, Report Number 05-27, contains detailed 

descriptions of the TSC’s processes and functions. 
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to report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committee on the results 

of our review by August 1, 2005. 

Airline Passenger Prescreening 

In the late-1990s, the Department of Transportation began using the 

Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS I) to screen air 

travelers and select individuals for additional airport security screening. Air 

carriers conducted this screening by comparing domestic airline passenger 

manifest information (passenger name records) against certain aviation risk 

criteria known as the CAPPS I rules. Additionally, after September 11, 2001, 

air carriers began comparing passenger information against: (1) the federal 

government’s “no-fly” list, which includes names of individuals who are to be 

denied transport on commercial flights because they are deemed a threat to 

civil aviation; and (2) the federal government’s “selectee” list, which 

includes names of individuals that air carriers are required to select for 

additional screening prior to permitting them to board an aircraft. 

On November 19, 2001, Congress enacted the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act, which established the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) in the Department of Transportation.12 On 

March 1, 2003, the TSA and its management of CAPPS I was transferred to 

the newly created Department of Homeland Security, as mandated in the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002.13

Also in March 2003, the TSA began developing the next phase of the 

CAPPS program, or CAPPS II, under the TSA’s Office of National Risk 

Assessment. The CAPPS II program planned for transferring responsibility 

for prescreening passenger information from the airlines to the federal 

government. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report compared 

the CAPPS II program to its predecessor and described the new initiative as 

a screening system “to perform different analyses and access more diverse 

data, including data from government and commercial databases, to classify 

passengers according to their level of risk (i.e., acceptable risk, unknown 

risk, or unacceptable risk), which would in turn be used to determine the 

level of security screening each passenger would receive.”14 However, 

another review conducted by the GAO had identified a number of problems 

 12 Pub. L. No. 107-71, §115 Stat. 597, 637 (2001) 

13 Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002) 

14 Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks 

Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, Government Accountability Office 

(GAO-05-356, March 2005) 

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with the CAPPS II program that had not been addressed, including the lack 

of critical elements necessary for sound project planning and privacy 

protection.15 TSA officials cancelled CAPPS II in August 2004 in light of a 

DHS internal review of the program, the 9/11 Commission recommendation 

for including the terrorist watch list in the passenger screening process, and 

other factors. 

Creation of Secure Flight 

Soon after the TSA cancelled the CAPPS II program, it announced the 

Secure Flight initiative. This new program for prescreening domestic 

commercial aviation passengers was intended to replace aspects of CAPPS II 

by screening passenger records against the government’s consolidated 

watch list of known or suspected terrorists maintained by the TSC. 

The TSA originally had planned to implement its Secure Flight program 

in April 2005. However, TSA delayed the start of the initial passenger 

prescreening operations to August 19, 2005. According to the March 2005 

GAO report, the delay in the program implementation date and other 

supporting TSA milestones resulted from a number of factors, including the 

receipt of hundreds of comments on privacy issues related to Secure Flight. 

In early July 2005, the TSA announced another change in Secure 

Flight’s implementation date. As a result of the air carriers’ request to TSA 

not to implement the program before the Labor Day holiday, the TSA pushed 

the launch date for the initial phase of Secure Flight (referred to as “preoperational testing”) to the second week of September 2005. 

Implementation Plan for Initial Operating Capability

According to the TSA, Secure Flight will result in greater effectiveness, 

efficiency, and consistency by consolidating functions now separately 

conducted by 65 air carriers that transport 1.8 million passengers on 30,000 

flights each day from approximately 450 airports where security screening is 

required.16 TSA officials said that when Secure Flight initially begins 

operations in September 2005, it will involve anywhere from one to seven 

 15 Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces 

Significant Implementation Challenges, Government Accountability Office (GAO-04-385, 

February 12, 2004) 

16 Statement of Justin P. Oberman, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Security 

Administration, Secure Flight/Registered Traveler, to the Subcommittee on Economic 

Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity, Committee on Homeland Security, 

United States House of Representatives (June 29, 2005).

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carriers. The total number of passengers initially screened will be 

determined based upon the specific carriers involved. For example, in an 

initial estimate using two air carriers (one major and one minor carrier), the 

TSA estimated that approximately 350,000 domestic passengers would be 

screened per day. This number represents approximately 20 percent of the 

1.8 million total domestic airline passengers per day. In fiscal 

year (FY) 2006, the Secure Flight program is expected to gradually increase 

the number of carriers involved. According to the TSA, full implementation 

of Secure Flight is currently scheduled for FY 2007.17

Secure Flight Overview 

To bring air passenger prescreening under government control and 

include the consolidated terrorist watch list in the screening process, the 

TSA, working in conjunction with the TSC, developed an initial flow chart 

that illustrated the process of exchanging critical data and the performance 

of essential tasks. 

According to the flow chart, when an individual makes or changes a 

flight reservation with a commercial airline, a record is created in the 

airline’s reservation system.18 [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] prior 

to the passenger’s departure, the airlines will electronically transmit a 

portion of the record to the TSA Secure Flight office.19 The Secure Flight 

system will electronically compare this record against a copy of the TSDB 

residing at the TSA. Possible matches against the database (called “hits”) 

will be sent to a TSA Secure Flight analyst for additional review, while 

records that did not result in a hit against the TSDB will be cleared with the 

airline for passenger travel. For all passenger records that result in a hit 

against the database, the TSA will electronically notify the airline that the 

passenger cannot be issued a boarding pass. When handling hits, the TSA 

 17 TSA officials stated that of the 65 total domestic air carriers, only 19 airlines will need to 

have technical connections to the TSA for Secure Flight; another 24 airlines will have indirect 

connections through these 19 airlines. The remaining 22 airlines do not have electronic reservation 

systems, and therefore will transmit passenger data manually to the TSA. TSA officials stated that 

they expect to connect [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] airlines to Secure Flight by spring 

2006. 

18 The passenger name record contains information including the passenger’s name, 

flight itinerary, and seat assignment. 

19 According to the TSC, when passengers book or modify their travel reservations within 

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] of the flight departure time, the TSA automated 

system will prioritize the screening of these records ahead of those for flights with later 

departure dates. A TSA official stated that, in order to enable all passenger prescreening to 

occur without having to delay flights, airlines will most likely be required to adhere to the general 

standard that passengers must be checked in at the airport within 30 minutes of their scheduled 

departure time.

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Secure Flight analyst will search the National Counterterrorism Center’s 

(NCTC) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) in an effort to 

eliminate any false positives from these initial matches.20 

Watch list hits that have not been cleared by TSA analysts will be 

electronically transmitted to the TSC for final adjudication. The record 

transmitted to the TSC will contain passenger information as well as the 

results of the TSA Secure Flight analyst’s efforts to adjudicate the match. 

The TSC analyst will review the record, conduct additional database 

searches, and make a final determination as to whether the individual 

attempting to travel is a valid match against the consolidated terrorist watch 

list.21 For encounters with individuals who are determined to be valid hits 

against the watch list, the TSC will notify the appropriate responding agency. 

The following chart provides an overview of the flow of information in the 

Secure Flight process. 

OVERVIEW OF SECURE FLIGHT INFORMATION FLOW

Airlines TSA - Secure

Flight

TSC - Call

Center

Responding

Law

Enforcement

Agencies

TSDB

Passenger

Data

Hits Against

TSDB

Data

Copy of

TSDB on TSA

Network

TSDB Watch

List Data

Final Hit

Disposition

Data

Receipt

Confirmation

Encounter

Data

Source: TSC Management

 20 The NCTC was established by Presidential Executive Order 13354 on August 27, 2004. 

The NCTC is intended to serve as the primary organization within the U.S. government for 

analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed by the U.S. government pertaining to 

terrorism and counterterrorism. The NCTC operates TIDE, the successor system to TIPOFF, 

which was the Department of State’s database of records on known or suspected international 

terrorists. 

21 Additional database searches at the TSC constitute a check of the FBI’s Automated 

Case Support (ACS) system and the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File (VGTOF). 

The ACS database is the FBI’s case management program, and the VGTOF database is the FBI’s 

system for tracking terrorist and violent gang information, which resides on the National Crime 

Information Center (NCIC) system. Only terrorist information in the VGTOF database, not 

violent gang related records, is used for screening purposes by the TSC. 

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CHAPTER 2: TSC’s Preparations to Support Secure Flight 

Since the announcement of the Secure Flight initiative in August 2004, 

the TSC has begun preparations for supporting this additional terrorist 

screening effort. The TSC’s role in Secure Flight involves performing tasks 

similar to those it currently conducts in screening suspected terrorists at 

ports of entry and within the United States. However, in preparing for the 

launch of Secure Flight, the TSC has implemented a number of changes in 

anticipation of a significant increase in the volume of screening requests. 

Coordinating Secure Flight Efforts 

During the course of the development of the TSA’s Secure Flight 

program, the TSA reorganized or restructured the office responsible for the 

initiative at least two times. According to the GAO, in November 2004 the 

DHS attempted to consolidate and strengthen TSA’s screening capability by 

combining the Office of National Risk Assessment – which developed 

CAPPS II – with the Credentialing Program Office to become the Office of 

Transportation Vetting and Credentialing. In April 2005, this office was 

restructured to create the Office of Secure Flight/Registered Traveler. 

According to TSC officials, this repeated restructuring has hampered 

communication and coordination between the TSA and the TSC and has 

impeded the TSC’s ability to fully plan for the implementation of Secure 

Flight, as detailed below. 

In September 2004, officials from TSA and the TSC met to discuss 

initial plans for implementing Secure Flight, and in October 2004 jointly 

developed a high-level process flow chart for Secure Flight. In 

December 2004, the TSC IT Branch provided the TSA with data from the 

TSDB for the purpose of conducting preliminary testing related to Secure 

Flight. In January 2005, the TSC asked for and received the assistance of a 

full-time TSA executive to work as the TSC Secure Flight Program 

Coordinator. However, it was not until February or March 2005 that the TSA 

and the TSC began to actively work together on the Secure Flight program. 

At that time, regularly scheduled, joint meetings with all key participants 

were initiated to define the roles of the supporting agencies and discuss the 

status of Secure Flight’s development.22 TSA officials explained that this 

 22 Aside from the TSA and the TSC, other key stakeholders include the Terrorist 

Screening Operations Unit (TSOU) in the FBI Counterterrorism Division, the DHS’s Federal Air 

Marshal Service (FAMS), and the Department of Defense’s North American Aerospace Defense 

Command (NORAD). The TSOU will coordinate any necessary law enforcement response to 

anticipated or realized encounters with individuals who are a match against a watch list 

record. The FAMS will monitor and resolve any on-board activity of flights in progress, while 

NORAD will monitor affected flights and take any necessary airspace actions. 

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delay resulted from their devotion of significant resources to data testing 

and that they simply did not have time to coordinate with the TSC. Early 

discussions included the level of information contained within the joint 

concept of operations between the TSA and the TSC and the level of 

participation the TSC and FBI Counterterrorism Division staff would be 

expected to have in the Secure Flight process. 

In March 2005, the TSA finalized its initial Secure Flight concept of 

operations. According to the March 2005 GAO report, the concept of 

operations document provides “a high-level perspective of how the system 

will operate and includes the roles and responsibilities of key staff and 

organizations. It also provides information necessary to begin finalizing 

other documents, such as system requirements.”23 However, the GAO 

reported that key operational decisions for Secure Flight had not yet been 

made, such as how passenger information would be transferred from the 

airlines to the TSA Secure Flight office. Since issuance of the GAO report, 

the TSC has collaborated with the TSA on a revised concept of operations 

document that provided for the participation of the TSC, which was finalized 

on July 13, 2005.24

In addition to the concept of operations document, the TSC and TSA 

have collaborated on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) intended to 

outline the agencies’ respective roles and responsibilities for the Secure 

Flight program. The TSC initially prepared a draft of the document and 

submitted it to the TSA in May 2005. As of July 31, 2005, the document had 

not been finalized. 

We spoke with officials at both the TSA and the TSC about the working 

relationship that had developed between the two agencies. TSA officials 

expressed their satisfaction with the TSC’s support of the Secure Flight 

program and believe that the TSA and the TSC have a positive partnership. 

Further, the TSA stated that the TSC had assisted the TSA significantly in its 

development of processes and IT-related projects. According to TSA 

officials, the relationship between the TSA and the TSC will allow for a more 

consistent and unified law enforcement response to airline security incidents 

and help the TSA in ensuring transportation security. 

 23 Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks 

Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, Government Accountability Office 

(GAO-05-356, March 2005) 

24 This concept of operations is a TSA-originated document and the TSA declined to 

provide it to us until it was finalized. We received evidence of the finalization at our exit 

conference with the TSC on July 26, 2005. Therefore, we were unable to examine this 

document prior to the completion of our review. 

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The TSC has expressed its willingness to assist the TSA in its Secure 

Flight initiative. Further, despite TSC personnel initially being excluded from 

the TSA’s preliminary planning for the program, we found that the TSA/TSC 

relationship has evolved into a more positive working partnership. However, 

TSC officials explained that their ability to prepare for the implementation of 

Secure Flight has been hampered by the TSA’s failure to make, 

communicate, and comply with key program and policy decisions, such as 

the planned launch date and initial participation volume (discussed in 

Chapter 1) and the IT connections and redress responsibilities discussed 

later in this chapter. 

Planning for Operational Changes at the TSC 

The Director of the TSC stated that the portion of the agency’s 

activities dedicated to Secure Flight has evolved over time. She estimated 

that only a small portion of the TSC’s resources were dedicated to Secure 

Flight in the winter of 2004. However, the TSC’s efforts have increased 

incrementally since then. The Director estimated that by mid-July 2005 

about 60 to 70 percent of the TSC’s work could be attributed to preparations 

for the Secure Flight program because of the impending launch of the 

initiative and the large of amount of preparations underway.

The TSC stated that once preparations for the Secure Flight program 

are finalized, the program is launched, and screening begins, Secure Flight 

will be an additional important TSC customer that will significantly increase 

its call center activity. The TSC will perform much of the same screening 

processes it currently conducts for calls from state and local law 

enforcement, border patrol agents, and government agents abroad. As of 

July 2005, TSC screeners were receiving about 100 inquiries per day 

resulting from hits against the watch list database forwarded from these 

sources. Based on information currently available, the TSC expects that full 

implementation of Secure Flight will result in [SENSITIVE INFORMATION 

REDACTED] additional screening inquiries per day, representing an increase 

of [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] percent of its current screening 

operations. 

Formation of TSC Secure Flight Working Group

To ensure that the TSC addressed all areas of support for the Secure 

Flight program, the TSC developed three sub-teams – an operations team, 

an information technology (IT) team, and a policy/legal team. These teams 

meet on a weekly basis with the TSC Secure Flight Program Coordinator to 

discuss the status of their projects and to jointly prioritize their work. 

According to the TSC, the combination of these sub-teams and the 

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leadership of the Program Coordinator resulted in a multi-disciplined internal 

working group that organized and prioritized the agency’s Secure Flight 

objectives and streamlined its approach to the program. 

Funding for Secure Flight

The TSC stated that the Secure Flight program will significantly impact 

its space, staffing, and funding needs. TSC officials also stated that other 

TSC projects have taken a back seat while they focused on the planning and 

development of Secure Flight requirements. 

TSC Budget Information

 The TSC’s base budget for FY 2005 is $29 million. In addition, it 

recently obtained through the FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act additional funding of $35.23 million, which the TSC will 

have 2 years to spend. These additional funds were provided by Congress 

for Secure Flight and other unspecified infrastructure improvements. As a 

result, the TSC received a total of $64.23 million in FY 2005. 

The FBI’s initial FY 2006 budget request of $29 million for the TSC was 

later supplemented in November 2005 by an out-of-cycle request of 

$75 million for TSC enhancements, including a new facility, state-of-the-art 

telecommunications equipment for call center operations, and preparations 

for Secure Flight and other government initiatives that will result in 

additional terrorist screening opportunities. Therefore, the FBI’s total 

funding request for the TSC for FY 2006 amounts to $104 million. 

Tracking of TSC Secure Flight Costs 

At the outset of our review, we requested an accounting of the TSC’s 

expected and actual Secure Flight costs. In response, the TSC stated that 

Secure Flight cannot operate without substantial modifications to the TSC’s 

existing IT environment, such as the ability to handle a significant increase 

in the number of screening inquiries, the development of data interfaces 

with new participating agencies, improvements allowing for real-time 

connectivity with users, and other necessary enhancements to the TSDB and 

the TSC’s Encounter Management Application (EMA).25 According to TSC 

 25 EMA is the TSC’s tool for recording the details of all incoming calls to its call 

center resulting from government encounters with individuals that appear to be a hit 

against a watch list record. Call center staff record the information they received from the 

caller, the TSC determination of whether the individual is a match with a TSDB record, 

whether the caller was forwarded to law enforcement for further action, and the final 

disposition of the encounter.

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officials, they are using the Secure Flight requirements as the basis for all 

modifications to the TSC’s databases and processes that have any 

connection to Secure Flight. As a result, TSC officials said they could not 

distinguish Secure Flight funding needs from those necessary for other TSC 

system enhancements not related to Secure Flight. 

In response to our request, however, the TSC Administration Branch 

prepared and provided a summary spending plan. We reviewed this 

document and noted several problems. For example, the document stated 

that the TSC could attribute only $1.5 million directly to the Secure Flight 

program. The $1.5 million only captured estimates for contractor funding 

for initial IT development, including the identification of requirements and 

concept development for Secure Flight. Moreover, the document did not 

specify how Secure Flight affected other expected costs or what portion of 

the TSC’s activities were impacted by Secure Flight. As a result, we 

expressed to the TSC the importance of more specifically allocating its costs 

so that the resource requirements of discrete programs or initiatives can, at 

a minimum, be estimated. 

The Director of the TSC agreed with the need to identify Secure Flight 

funding needs separately from other TSC endeavors. Additionally, she 

acknowledged that because certain TSC expenses, such as systems, staffing, 

and procurements, are paid by other federal agencies or divisions within the 

FBI, the TSC is unaware of how much the organization truly costs to 

operate. The Director stated that she recognizes the importance of having 

designated budget staff to perform budget formulation, analysis, and 

execution, but stated that the TSC does not currently possess the expertise 

to perform these functions. Given the importance of its mission and the 

large amount of money it annually receives, we believe it is critical that the 

TSC have a budget staff able to track its costs and requirements. 

Review of Funding Information 

As a result of our discussions with the TSC Director and her staff in 

July 2005, the TSC subsequently informed us that it would make another 

attempt to more precisely reconstruct its estimation of Secure Flight costs. 

In mid-July, we received a breakdown of FY 2005 and FY 2006 Secure Flight 

direct costs as well as the indirect costs in proportion to the total costs for 

the TSC as a whole. 

To separate Secure Flight indirect costs from the total costs for all TSC 

programs and activities, the TSC identified the percentage of the total call 

volume, customers, and staff at the TSC that were expected to be related to 

Secure Flight activities. These percentages were applied to budget 

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categories to allocate the costs of each category and to estimate the overall 

cost of supporting Secure Flight. 

As shown in Table 1, the breakdown provided by the TSC reveals that 

12.5 percent ($8,034,732) of the TSC’s $64.23 million in appropriated and 

supplemental resources in FY 2005 is estimated to be in direct support of the 

Secure Flight program. An additional 20.6 percent ($13,256,696) of the 

total is estimated as indirect costs for the Secure Flight program. This 

amounts to a total of $21,291,428 for Secure Flight-related expenses in 

FY 2005, or 33.15 percent of the TSC’s total FY 2005 funding. 

TABLE 1: FY 2005 TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER RESOURCES26

Category TSC Total 

Secure 

Flight 

Direct 

Other TSC 

Secure 

Flight 

Indirect 

Secure 

Flight Total 

Secure 

Flight % 

of TSC 

Total 

Building 

Requirements $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 0.00% 

Leases 903,467 0 903,467 169,400 169,400 18.75% 

Office Supplies and 

Equipment 4,626,825 51,557 4,575,268 2,450,010 2,501,567 54.07% 

Hardware/Software 21,664,019 829,235 20,834,784 3,941,848 4,771,083 22.02% 

IT Contracts & 

Reimbursable Staff 21,975,146 6,870,935 15,104,211 4,685,746 11,556,681 52.59% 

Operational 

Contracts & 

Reimbursable Staff 9,624,437 283,005 9,341,432 1,167,679 1,450,684 15.07% 

Training, Travel, 

and Security 1,841,709 0 1,841,709 392,714 392,714 21.32% 

Disaster Recovery 1,531,250 0 1,531,250 191,406 191,406 12.50% 

Other 

Requirements 2,063,147 0 2,063,147 257,893 257,893 12.50% 

Total $64,230,000 $8,034,732 $56,195,268 $13,256,696 $21,291,428 33.15% 

Source: Terrorist Screening Center, July 2005 

As shown in Table 2, the TSC estimated its FY 2006 budget 

expenditures directly related to Secure Flight will amount to 11.6 percent 

($11,417,869) of the resources included in the FY 2006 President’s Budget 

request for the TSC. Indirect costs for Secure Flight in FY 2006 are 

projected to amount to 26.4 percent ($26,099,699) of the TSC’s total 

anticipated budget for FY 2006. Therefore, the total cost for Secure Flight 

(direct and indirect) in FY 2006 is projected to account for 38 percent 

($37,517,568) of the TSC’s total requested budget. 

 26 The direct costs shown in Table 1 reflect Secure Flight actual expenditures 

through May 2005, projected expenditures for the remainder of FY 2005, and FY 2005 

obligations to be paid in FY 2006. 

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TABLE 2: FY 2006 TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER RESOURCES27

Category TSC Total Secure 

Flight Direct Other TSC 

Secure 

Flight 

Indirect 

Secure 

Flight Total 

Secure 

Flight % 

of TSC 

Total 

Building 

Requirements $ 800,000 $ 0 $ 800,000 $ 320,000 $ 320,000 40.00% 

Leases 5,947,737 0 5,947,737 2,379,095 2,379,095 40.00% 

Office Supplies and 

Equipment 18,011,740 0 18,011,740 9,601,258 9,601,258 53.31% 

Hardware/Software 24,122,768 5,100,000 19,022,768 2,907,496 8,007,496 33.19% 

IT Contracts & 

Reimbursable Staff 24,417,249 3,527,885 20,889,364 7,528,284 11,056,169 45.28% 

Operational 

Contracts & 

Reimbursable Staff 15,985,220 2,789,984 13,195,236 1,649,405 4,439,389 27.77% 

Training, Travel 

and Security 7,144,973 0 7,144,973 1,205,997 1,205,997 16.88% 

Disaster Recovery 505,313 0 505,313 63,164 63,164 12.50% 

Other 

Requirements 1,800,000 0 1,800,000 445,000 445,000 24.72% 

Total $98,735,000 $11,417,869 $87,317,131 $26,099,699 $37,517,568 38.00% 

Source: Terrorist Screening Center, July 2005

The majority of the TSC’s actual and projected Secure Flight direct 

costs in both FY 2005 and FY 2006 are related to IT enhancements and 

operational expenditures to support an anticipated increase in call center 

activity. A significant portion of the overall program costs are percentages 

of TSC enhancements and infrastructure improvements that are not related 

directly to Secure Flight, but which the TSC has stated will support all of its 

activities. As previously noted, the TSC budget increases for both FY 2005 

and FY 2006 were to support Secure Flight and other initiatives. 

We were unable to perform transaction testing or an in-depth analysis 

of the cost breakdowns provided by the TSC because the information was 

not provided until July 18, 2005. The TSC also has not been able to 

adequately estimate its projected workload increase due to the TSA’s failure 

to provide a reliable and definitive implementation schedule for the Secure 

Flight program as a whole. Moreover, the TSC’s total and indirect costs are 

based upon assumptions of growth in areas outside of Secure Flight, and in 

this review we did not examine these non-Secure Flight enhancements. 

Given these factors, we are unable to reach a conclusion as to the 

accuracy of the financial information the TSC provided our auditors to 

explain its direct and indirect costs of implementing Secure Flight. We 

 27 This budget includes all non-personnel funding included in the FY 2006 budget 

submission for the TSC. An additional $5,265,000 was requested to enhance the number of 

full-time equivalent FBI positions assigned to the TSC. The TSC did not include any 

personnel figures in the information that it provided to us because all of its positions are 

provided through the participating agencies, such as the FBI or the DHS. 

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recommend that the TSC develop the capacity to produce more accurate 

financial and budgetary projections that identify its Secure Flight funding 

needs separately from other TSC endeavors. However, as it stands currently 

from the information provided, the OIG cannot determine how much of the 

$75 million out-of-cycle budget enhancement requested by the TSC for 

FY 2006 appropriately reflects the TSC’s actual anticipated expenses for 

Secure Flight versus other enhancements. 

At the exit conference for this audit, TSC officials stated that they do 

not currently have the ability to project baseline budget information related 

to the cost of adding Secure Flight to the TSC’s regular operations. TSC 

officials attributed this lack of fundamental data to their stage of 

development, noting that the organization has been in existence for less 

than 2 years. TSC management stated that the TSC’s base budget of 

$29 million was derived from conservative estimates developed during the 

organization’s earliest days and this amount cannot meet its normal 

operating requirements. They further stated that the composition of the TSC 

as an intergovernmental organization within the FBI makes the situation 

more complex. In addition, TSC officials stated that the structure of the 

FBI’s financial systems limits its flexibility in categorizing and summarizing 

costs associated with its varied projects and programs. TSC officials said 

that they understand the importance of being able to discretely project and 

track costs by program, budget category, or organizational unit. However, 

the TSC stated that it currently is unable to accurately estimate the 

incremental cost of adding programs that increase the TSC’s range of 

operations, such as Secure Flight. 

Delayed Projects

According to the TSC, it has been forced to delay the implementation 

of security measures, database enhancements, and quality control 

improvements to provide support for the launch of Secure Flight. TSC 

officials informed us that such delays will impact the accuracy, 

completeness, thoroughness, and security of the consolidated watch list 

information. TSC officials said that the following projects were delayed 

because of Secure Flight: 

• Implementation of a new version of the TSDB, which was to provide 

real-time updates to the National Crime Information Center database; 

• Enhancement of the TSDB through the development and inclusion of 

stringent information system rules over data integrity; 

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• Repair of the interface with a participating agency database to allow 

for the necessary electronic transfer and receipt of updated data; 

• Development of direct connections between the TSDB and its 

customers, allowing for real-time watch list queries; 

• Enhancements to the encounter management system to streamline 

and automate certain procedures involved in the quality assurance 

process; 

• Preparations for and installation of a firewall that will improve the 

security of the TSDB; and 

• Over 40 individual modifications to the TSDB software to improve the 

system for use within the TSC Nominations Unit. 

Each of the projects listed above relate directly or indirectly to the 

findings and recommendations in our June 2005 report. We are tracking the 

TSC’s accomplishment of these items through that report and have observed 

that these projects have incurred delays. At the exit conference, TSC 

officials reported that several of the delayed projects have been initiated or 

completed. 

Planning for Secure Flight-Related Information Technology 

As reported in our June 2005 audit of the TSC, the TSC was operating 

in an immature IT environment when it hired a Chief Information Officer 

(CIO) in August 2004. Our previous report included 16 recommendations 

related to the TSC’s IT systems, planning, and operations. In an effort to 

develop and stabilize the IT environment in preparation for implementation 

of the Secure Flight program, the CIO has spearheaded a number of 

initiatives. 

First, TSC officials have begun to develop an IT-specific strategic plan 

that identifies nine major objectives related to issues such as security, life 

cycle planning, and data accuracy and completeness. The TSC intends to 

incorporate this IT-specific information in its overall strategic plan, which is 

also in development.28

 28 In our June 2005 report, we recommended that the TSC develop a formal, 

comprehensive strategic plan. We are tracking the TSC’s progress in achieving this 

objective. 

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Second, in order to streamline IT functions, the TSC has reorganized 

its IT Branch into four areas – engineering, project management, 

applications, and operations. The engineering area designs the top-level 

physical IT system, drafts diagrams of the general construction of the 

system, and conceptualizes security architecture. The project management 

area plans, schedules, and tracks various IT-specific projects and assists 

with all types of TSC projects, such as scheduling and tracking the TSC’s 

proposed move to a new facility. The applications area manages software 

development, including determining user requirements and designing, 

testing, and deploying the programs. The operations area provides 

maintenance and support for the TSC’s data systems, applications, and 

users. 

In addition, the TSC established an office responsible for developing 

business/data rules to ensure the integrity of the watch list data. This office 

will assist in the TSC’s quality assurance efforts and have responsibility for 

ensuring that the TSA Secure Flight office has an up-to-date watch list at all 

times. 

We believe that these initiatives will assist the TSC in enhancing its IT 

environment. A better-functioning IT environment is critical to the smooth 

introduction of the TSA Secure Flight program into the TSC’s operations. 

TSC and TSA IT Coordination

TSC officials said that it initially appeared to them that the TSA did not 

plan for the TSC to be directly involved in the Secure Flight screening 

process. The TSC officials said that the TSA assumed that it would be 

responsible for conducting all of the electronic searches and vetting for 

terrorist screening related to domestic air travel. Under this scenario, the 

TSC’s role would be limited to providing a copy of the consolidated watch list 

database to the TSA. However, according to TSC officials, the TSA’s initial 

plan did not account for communicating vetting results to the law 

enforcement agencies responsible for responding to hits against the watch 

list. The TSC, which derives its authority from Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive-6, is the entity responsible for consolidating 

government terrorist watch list screening and to facilitate any associated law 

enforcement actions. Therefore, the TSC sought a broader role in the TSA’s 

Secure Flight program. 

The TSC also said that the TSA initially neglected to plan for the 

complex process of record additions, deletions, and modifications made to 

the TSDB on a continual basis. According to the TSC’s IT officials, this 

deficiency resulted from the TSA’s initial assumption that it would receive a 

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relatively static copy of the TSDB against which it would compare the 

passenger data obtained from the airlines. 

Once the TSA and the TSC agreed to the TSC’s expanded role in the 

Secure Flight program, many of the processes that the TSA had already 

developed had to be re-designed and re-tooled to accommodate the TSC’s 

involvement. This necessitated the previously discussed revisions to the 

Secure Flight concept of operations document. In addition, the TSC’s 

planning for Secure Flight has been affected by several other actions and 

decisions by the TSA, including: 

• TSC officials stated that the TSA established the initial target 

implementation date of August 19, 2005, based on the TSA’s initial 

concept of operations in which the TSC’s participation was limited to 

providing a copy of the TSDB to the TSA. Once the TSA and the 

TSC agreed on the TSC’s expanded role in the screening process, 

the TSC attempted to meet the TSA’s August 19 implementation 

date. TSC officials stated that the resulting compressed work 

schedule created significant risk for a project as complex as Secure 

Flight because under such a timetable project life cycles must be 

collapsed. As a result, the TSC has had to complete all aspects of 

project development in parallel, meaning that while the TSC’s IT 

staff are still attempting to determine all of the system or software 

application requirements, the same systems and software 

applications are simultaneously being designed and developed. 

• In preparation for Secure Flight, a TSA contractor performed initial 

passenger data testing against the TSDB by comparing June 2004 

domestic passenger flight data to a December 2004 version of the 

consolidated watch list. The TSC was not heavily involved in the 

preparations for this experiment and, according to the TSC CIO, 

poor test design and data parameters resulted in higher-thanacceptable projections of expected matches against the database. 

Specifically, the test was initially designed to compare passenger 

names with the universe of TSDB records and resulted in an 

unmanageable number of instances in which a match could not be 

conclusively determined. In an effort to narrow the match results, 

the TSA contractor reviewed the effect of including other identifying 

information, such as passenger date of birth. The contractor then 

prepared new estimates based upon the concept of including 

passenger birthdates and limiting results to those individuals that 

matched against a TSDB name and birth date [SENSITIVE 

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INFORMATION REDACTED].29 Based on this new model, the TSA 

estimated that at full implementation Secure Flight would result in 

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] watch list matches 

forwarded to the TSC each day. 

TSC IT officials suggested that the test could have been improved 

by [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]. In addition, the TSC 

advised that the TSA should not use the entirety of the TSDB for its 

searches because many records in the database do not contain 

sufficient identifying information. 

The TSA and TSC subsequently agreed that the copy of the TSDB 

provided to the TSA will be limited to records containing both a full 

name and date of birth, [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]. 

As of June 14, 2005, the TSDB contained a total of 274,873 records 

and the agreed upon subset that the TSC will provide to the TSA 

Secure Flight Office amounted to 120,382 records. Based upon the 

reduced size of the database, the TSC currently is projecting it will 

receive an additional [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] 

screening inquiries per day from the Secure Flight program. 

However, because the TSA has not yet issued the necessary 

regulation to require airlines to collect date of birth information 

within domestic travel reservations, the TSC does not know whether 

the database queries during the first phase of the program will be 

aided by the inclusion of passenger birth dates. 

• In an effort to formalize and standardize its systems development 

processes, the TSC initiated development of an Interface Control 

Document. The Interface Control Document is a written agreement 

that establishes organizations’ expectations and arrangements 

regarding how their information systems will connect, interact, and 

operate. The TSC drafted an Interface Control Document in 

conjunction with the TSA; however, according to TSC IT officials, 

the TSA was hesitant to commit to the overall planning process 

necessitated by the Interface Control Document concept. Because 

the document was not finalized until July 7, 2005 – well into the 

Secure Flight development phase – the TSA and TSC IT systems 

were developed without mutually agreed-upon standards. 

 29 This concept was reviewed in a hypothetical setting because the June 2004 airline 

passenger records did not include dates of birth. 

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• According to TSC IT personnel, the TSC has implemented the 

Terrorist Watchlist Person Data Exchange Standard (TWPDES) that 

was adopted by the intelligence community in the fall of 2004.30 

The TSC is attempting to adhere to this established standard in all 

of its IT systems. However, as a result of the TSA’s reluctance to 

use the TWPDES, together with the compressed work schedule, the 

TSC has had to deviate from the TWPDES and modify its processes 

and file structure for exporting data to the TSA. Although the TSC 

has asserted that this deviation from the accepted standard was 

necessary, we believe that it will have to be addressed in the future 

through modifications to the database interfaces between the TSC 

and the TSA. 

TSC officials reported that beginning in May 2005 coordination 

between the two organizations improved greatly. However, in the middle of 

June, just weeks prior to the original laboratory testing date, the TSA 

identified problems with the data file formats that are critical for 

transmission of passenger information from the airlines to the TSA Secure 

Flight Office and the subsequent transmission of TSA Secure Flightdetermined watch list matches to the TSC. According to TSC officials, two 

separate teams at the TSA designed the two processes and apparently did 

not coordinate the basic file structures and did not consult the TSC. Until 

the basic format was finalized in July 2005, the TSC was not certain what 

data fields it would receive. TSC IT officials stated that the TSA’s file format 

problem might not have occurred had standards been established and the 

Interface Control Document finalized prior to developing the Secure Flight 

systems and applications. 

Secure Flight IT Processes

As outlined in the Secure Flight Overview section in Chapter 1, the 

domestic flight screening process involves four main data interface 

connections for the transmission of: (1) passenger data from the airlines to 

the TSA Secure Flight Office; (2) TSDB watch list updates from the TSC to 

the TSA Secure Flight Office; (3) initial watch list match results from the TSA 

Secure Flight Office to the TSC; and (4) final screening results from the TSC 

to the TSA Secure Flight Office as well as to appropriate responding entities 

such as the FBI Counterterrorism Division, FAMS, or NORAD. Of these four 

data connections, the TSC is directly involved in three. 

 30 The TWPDES codifies the intelligence community’s protocol for the exchange of 

information regarding known and suspected terrorists. 

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Airline Passenger Data to the TSA Secure Flight Office – The TSA 

assumed responsibility for developing these data interfaces. To fully 

accomplish the mission of the Secure Flight program, the TSA ultimately will 

need to develop a connection between its Secure Flight Office and each 

commercial airline reservation database. However, as previously discussed, 

the TSA experienced internal problems regarding the development of the file 

format for this data transfer. According to TSA officials, the necessary 

interfaces with select air carriers will be operational to begin test operations 

in September 2005. 

TSDB Watch List Updates to the TSA Secure Flight Office – After the 

initial transfer of appropriate watch list records, the TSC will transmit, in 

near real-time, three types of watch list record updates to the TSA Secure 

Flight Office – additions, modifications, and deletions. 

The TSA has assumed responsibility for this data interface. However, 

TSC IT officials stated that for their normal screening operations, they have 

been working to develop an interface so that a computer system (such as 

the one being developed for the TSA Secure Flight program) could connect 

directly with the TSDB for terrorist screening.31 According to the TSC 

officials, this direct interface will provide for greater data accuracy, integrity, 

and security for the TSDB because it eliminates the need to copy, update, 

maintain, and secure the TSDB in another location. The TSC had planned to 

have this capability by May 2005. The TSC officials stated that the TSA 

ultimately refused the integration of this option in the Secure Flight program 

because of the compressed work schedule. In order to meet the TSA’s 

Secure Flight implementation deadline, the TSC was forced to delay 

development of its direct interface process for its other screening customers. 

To support its current operations, the TSC established a stand-alone 

network for the TSDB. In addition, on May 23, 2005, the TSC began 

operating the newly created TSCNet that was established on an existing 

sensitive but unclassified platform called the Open Source Information 

System (OSIS). In preparation for Secure Flight, the TSC has tested a 

connection between the TSDB network and the newly created TSCNet. 

Further, the TSC has established a direct connection to the DHS’s network, 

DHSNet, which is also on the OSIS platform. The TSC intends to use these 

multiple connections to exchange TSDB records with the TSA. [SENSITIVE 

INFORMATION REDACTED] provides a back-up that will automatically re-

 31 Currently, screeners such as border inspectors or state and local police officers 

access the consolidated watch list indirectly through copies of the database loaded on their 

agencies’ network or computer system that are updated on a daily basis. 

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route data transmissions in the event of a failure in the primary interface to 

ensure continuation of Secure Flight operations. 

TSC IT officials said they finished testing the connection to DHSNet on 

July 13, 2005, and plan to submit to the FBI CIO the necessary documents 

to obtain specific accreditation for the new connection. The TSC anticipates 

that this process will be fully tested and the new connections accredited prior 

to the implementation of the TSA Secure Flight program. 

Watch List Matches from the TSA Secure Flight Office to the TSC – For

passengers determined to be possible matches against the watch list, the 

results of the TSA’s vetting of passenger records need to be transmitted 

electronically to the TSC for final adjudication. Each record (called a 

Request for Action, or RFA) will contain passenger information obtained from 

the airline as well as results of the analysis performed by the TSA Secure 

Flight staff. 

TSC assumed responsibility for this data interface, and it modified and 

enhanced its existing encounter application to create a new application, 

entitled Encounter Management Application – Secure Flight (EMA SF). The 

EMA SF data will be transmitted electronically to the TSA Secure Flight Office 

via the TSC’s and DHS’s mutual connection with OSIS. According to TSC IT 

officials, the TSC was able to enhance operational capability, minimize the 

impact to its current screening customers, and conserve resources by 

modifying its existing encounter management application to serve this 

function. 

The EMA SF application is designed to streamline TSC functions by 

electronically transmitting data and pre-populating data fields, thereby 

eliminating the need to manually re-type data. Because of the compressed 

implementation schedule, the EMA SF will only contain the functions 

necessary to meet initial operating capability. However, according to the 

TSC it will be fully operational. Over time, the TSC intends to make further 

enhancements to the system to enable the sharing of more complete data. 

The TSC completed testing the prototype EMA SF application at the 

beginning of June 2005. The end users, including representatives from the 

TSC call center, TSA, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and FBI 

Counterterrorism Division met in mid-July 2005 and tested the design of the 

application. TSC IT officials stated that user testing of the application design 

is critical because the process assists in the identification of any real-life 

situations that were not addressed during system design. Two additional 

testing phases remain for the EMA SF application. The final testing phase is 

scheduled to begin on August 2, 2005, and run for approximately 25 

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business days. TSC IT officials anticipate that the final test phase will be 

successfully concluded and the application will be ready for the 

September 2005 implementation date. 

TSC Disposition of Final Watch List Hits to the TSA and Responders – 

Upon receipt of the TSA’s initial vetting results, the TSC will conduct 

additional screening on the passenger record, make a final determination as 

to whether the individual attempting to travel is a valid match against the 

watch list, and electronically return the final disposition result to the TSA 

Secure Flight Office. In addition, when the TSC’s review reveals a positive 

or inconclusive identity match, the TSC will communicate the available 

details of the match (such as passenger name, flight information, and 

handling instructions) to the law enforcement agencies responsible for 

responding to the anticipated encounter with an individual on the watch list. 

The TSC assumed responsibility for this data interface and will use its 

enhanced EMA SF. The new application will assist in coordinating an 

appropriate law enforcement response by ensuring that all participating 

agencies view the same data in near real-time. 

The TSC will use the OSIS network to enable its partners to access the 

EMA SF application. According to TSC IT officials, the North American 

Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), FAMS, and the TSA have 

established and tested network connections with DHSNet and OSIS. In 

addition, because the TSC had an existing working relationship with the FBI 

Counterterrorism Division for its normal business operations, it did not need 

to establish a new network connection for TSA Secure Flight. 

Planning for Legal and Policy Issues in Support of Secure Flight 

In preparation for supporting the TSA’s Secure Flight program, the TSA 

and the TSC have worked together to address several legal requirements. 

In addition, in an attempt to maximize terrorism screening while minimizing 

passenger inconvenience, the TSC and the TSA have also begun quality 

assurance and redress projects. 

Legal Considerations

According to the TSC Privacy Officer, the TSDB is considered a “system 

of records” as defined by the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, because it 

contains data regarding individuals that can be retrieved by the name of the 

individual or by an identifying number, symbol, or other piece of 

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information.32 As a result, both the TSA and the TSC are required to publish 

in the Federal Register a description of their records or a new use of the 

information and to provide the public an opportunity to comment. This 

System of Records Notice, or SORN, informs the public of the purpose for 

the system and includes information such as a description of the types of 

individuals reflected in the records, the data collected, the reason for data 

collection, the data safeguard and security processes, and rules and 

purposes for sharing the data. 

The TSA has issued at least two SORNs for the Secure Flight program 

and will need to issue an additional SORN specifically addressing TSA’s 

implementation of the operational screening. According to TSA officials, this 

notice will be published prior to implementation of the TSA Secure Flight 

program in September 2005. 

According to TSC officials, the TSC is currently operating under an 

existing FBI SORN covering the FBI’s central records system. However, 

according to the TSC Privacy Officer, the TSC has elected to draft its own 

SORN because of the TSC’s unique mission. On July 28, 2005, the TSC 

published its SORN, which applies to Secure Flight and all of TSC’s current 

and anticipated screening operations. 

In addition to the Privacy Act, both the TSC and the TSA are subject to 

the E-Government Act of 2002, which discusses the need to conduct and 

publish, as appropriate, Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA).33 A PIA relates 

specifically to an IT system that collects, maintains, or disseminates 

personal information about members of the public who are not government 

employees, agencies, or instrumentalities. The PIA informs the public about 

issues such as affected individuals, types of information collected, and 

information safeguard procedures. 

The TSA has published multiple PIAs for the Secure Flight program and 

will need to conduct an additional PIA specifically addressing the 

implementation of the operational screening. According to TSA officials, this 

notice will be published prior to implementation of the TSA Secure Flight 

program in September 2005. The TSC Privacy Officer stated that she has 

begun to conduct and draft a PIA for all TSC IT-programs.34 

 32 Pub. L. No. 93-579 (1974) 

33 Pub. L. No. 107-347 (2002) 

34 According to the TSC Privacy Officer, the TSC initially conducted and drafted a PIA 

during the initial stages of its standup, but this draft became obsolete because the TSC’s 

IT-related systems were changing quickly. TSC officials noted that the E-Government Act 

exempts systems containing national security and sensitive information, such as the TSDB, 

from the requirement to conduct a privacy impact assessment. 

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Redress

To assist individuals who believe they were inappropriately delayed or 

prohibited from boarding their flights because of the Secure Flight program, 

the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (the Intelligence 

Reform Act) directed the DHS to establish a timely and fair method to appeal 

these determinations and to correct any erroneous data found in the terrorist 

screening database. To provide domestic airline passengers a redress 

process, TSA officials indicated that they would expand and enhance existing 

procedures for individuals raising issues with flight problems related to the nofly, selectee, and CAPPS I screening processes that have been in existence for 

several years. To augment its redress operations, the TSA stated that it 

established a new office, increased its staffing, and drafted new processes and 

procedures. 

According to the TSA, the TSC will play a supporting role in the redress 

process and will not have direct contact with the public about these issues. 

When an individual submits a request for redress to the TSA, the individual 

will be required to provide specific, verifiable identifying information such as 

passport or visa number, birth certificate number, or driver’s license 

number. The TSA will review available information, request TSC assistance 

in obtaining more detailed investigation-specific data if necessary, and 

respond to the redress requestor. If the individual is determined to be a 

false positive (a close enough match to a TSDB record that will result in a hit 

against the watch list despite the person not being a true match of the 

watch-listed individual), the TSA may place the person on a “cleared list” 

that includes the individual’s additional identifying information. This cleared 

list will be included in the airline screening process and may therefore speed 

the process for these individuals during subsequent attempts to travel. 

Because the responsibility for fully establishing and implementing 

redress policies and procedures rests with the TSA, we could not review the 

plans for enhancing this area as it relates to the Secure Flight program.35 

 35 During our review TSC officials expressed concern regarding one aspect of the 

redress process. TSA officials have asserted that the Intelligence Reform Act requires the 

agency to inform redress requestors of the specific results of the inquiry – whether the 

requestor’s name is on a government watch list or is similar to a name on the watch list. TSC 

officials believe that the TSA’s interpretation of the legislation is overly broad and the integrity 

and effectiveness of the watch lists will be irreparably damaged if the TSA releases such 

details to the public. The TSC stated that officials from the FBI Counterterrorism Division, 

NCTC, Central Intelligence Agency Office of the General Counsel, and the counsel to the 

Director of National Intelligence have expressed similar concerns. At the exit conference, TSC 

officials reported that they believed the TSC and the TSA had reached an agreement in 

principle on this issue. However, the TSC stated that the agreement was not yet final and 

that details still need to be addressed. 

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However, we found that the TSC had devoted significant effort to enhancing 

its own activities related to the redress process. In July 2005, the TSC 

Privacy Officer issued a revised protocol outlining the TSC’s procedures for 

handling redress inquiries. In addition, the TSC provided us with evidence 

that appropriate TSC staff had received training on the new protocol. 

Quality Assurance

In the June 2005 OIG report on the TSC, we identified errors, 

omissions, and inconsistencies in the TSDB. As a result, the TSC is currently 

performing a review of all TSDB records in the database for accuracy and 

completeness. The TSC has initiated a major quality assurance effort to 

ensure that all records are analyzed through a record-by-record search, in 

order of highest priority first. TSC officials have stated that this effort will 

verify the integrity of historical TSDB data and allow the quality of new data 

to be controlled through the automated processes included in the most 

recent version of the TSDB. However, TSC officials stated that they believe 

many errors and omissions in the records are directly attributable to the 

records received from the source and nominating agencies and that these 

inaccuracies contribute significantly to the overall reliability of the TSDB. 

The TSC’s record-by-record review will likely not be completed before 

Secure Flight is implemented. In addition, as of April 2005, the head of the 

TSC Data Management Office has been assigned full time to Secure Flightspecific issues. The TSC CIO expressed concern that, as a result, the watch 

list data was not being checked sufficiently for accuracy and that available 

and necessary security measures had not been implemented. 

The compressed time frame of our review did not allow us to perform 

additional testing on the TSDB records. However, while conducting our 

fieldwork at the TSC, we were informed of a recent incident in which a 

participating agency combined two separate records and forwarded the data 

to the TSC as a single record for inclusion in the TSDB. As a result, the 

TSDB record included erroneous identifying information and an individual 

was falsely identified as a positive match against the watch list. The TSC 

redress staff informed us that the TSC had identified the error, provided the 

originating agency with its findings, and confirmed that the source record 

was corrected. 

In addition, officials at the TSC informed us that the volume of issues 

handled through the quality assurance process is increasing. To manage 

this increased workload, the TSC has increased manpower by hiring new 

permanent employees and temporary duty staff. Even with these 

enhancements, TSC officials expressed concern regarding their ability to 

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manage the quality assurance process because the volume of inquiries will 

greatly increase once the TSA Secure Flight program is implemented. 

According to TSC officials, their Quality Assurance staff requested an 

enhancement to the EMA system that would automate the tracking and 

management of the quality assurance process. However, the development 

of the requested enhancement has been delayed because the IT staff has 

been dedicated to Secure Flight issues. 

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CHAPTER 3: OIG Conclusions and Recommendations 

Upon full implementation, the Secure Flight program will be the first 

time the government will routinely screen all domestic air travelers. As a 

result, information about millions of domestic travelers will be collected and 

compared to the consolidated watch list of terrorist information. This 

process will require high standards of data accuracy and information 

safeguards. 

The TSC has a significant role in Secure Flight, including helping in the 

development of the overall process flow for the program, assisting in the 

design of the information system architecture, establishing the roles of key 

stakeholders, and ensuring that the new screening process allows for an 

appropriate law enforcement response to encounters with known or 

suspected terrorists. However, the implementation of the Secure Flight 

program at both the TSA and the TSC has been hindered by project delays 

and uncertainty about project scope, logistics, and the resources needed to 

support the program’s mission. 

The TSA has repeatedly adjusted the implementation date for Secure 

Flight, first from April 2005 to August 2005, and most recently to September 

2005. Moreover, the TSA does not currently have a definitive plan for the 

number of airlines and related passenger records that will be included in the 

various phases of program implementation. The TSA’s shifting of program 

scope and critical milestones has also affected the TSC’s ability to 

adequately plan for fulfilling its role in the Secure Flight program. In 

addition, although the TSA and TSC describe its current relationship as “a 

positive partnership,” they have had to overcome communication and 

coordination obstacles, including organizational changes at the TSA and the 

TSA’s initial development and testing of program requirements without the 

involvement of the TSC. 

In our review of the TSC’s plans for implementing its Secure Flight 

responsibilities, we determined that most of its efforts are on track to meet a 

projected launch date of September 2005. Specifically, the TSC has 

designed its necessary electronic connections to accommodate data flow, 

developed new processes to facilitate law enforcement response to 

encounters with individuals who are a match against the consolidated 

terrorist watch list, and is on schedule for testing its newly established 

systems and procedures. 

However, the TSC has not tracked its costs that are directly in support 

of the Secure Flight program and did not have a Secure Flight-specific 

spending plan. Therefore, the TSC cannot accurately estimate the added 

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costs for the Secure Flight initiative. The TSC’s difficulty in developing such 

an estimate is further exacerbated by the TSA’s failure to specifically define 

the scope of each implementation phase. As a result, the TSC has been 

unable to adequately project its resource requirements for responding to the 

expected increase in workload resulting from Secure Flight. 

Although we are unable to specifically quantify the TSC’s financial 

needs, we believe that the TSC needs enhancement of its current base 

funding to accomplish its mission-critical functions. According to the TSC, it 

has been forced to delay the implementation of security measures, database 

enhancements, and quality control improvements to provide support for the 

launch of Secure Flight. TSC officials informed us that such delays will 

impact the accuracy, completeness, thoroughness, and security of the 

consolidated watch list information. 

In sum, the TSC has faced difficulties in trying to support a program 

that has several critical undefined parameters. The TSC has little certainty 

of the start date of Secure Flight, the volume of inquiries expected and the 

resulting number of resources required to respond, the quality of data it will 

need to analyze, and the specific details of the phased-in approach for taking 

the program from “pre-operational testing” in September 2005 to full 

operational capability in FY 2007. 

To help the TSC more accurately identify its funding requirements and 

handle its responsibilities under the Secure Flight Program, we provide five 

recommendations for the TSC. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the TSC: 

1. Work closer with the FBI budget staff or develop an in-house capacity 

to formulate, execute, and track a TSC budget that captures cost 

information by program and accounts for the total fiscal requirements 

of the organization; 

2. Re-examine and regularly update the agency’s resource estimates as 

soon as the Secure Flight program is implemented and true workload 

figures are established; 

3. Coordinate with the TSA to adopt the Terrorist Watchlist Person Data 

Exchange Standard protocols for data exchange; 

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4. Develop an aggressive schedule for the completion of the record-byrecord review of the TSDB and encourage participating agencies to 

improve the quality of all watch list source records to improve overall 

data accuracy, completeness, and thoroughness; and 

5. Implement, in priority order and as appropriate, the projects that are 

currently on hold while planning for Secure Flight because these 

projects have significant implications for data integrity, security, and 

system efficiency. 

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APPENDIX I 

AUDIT OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Audit Objective 

The objective of our review was to evaluate the TSC’s plan to support 

the Secure Flight program, as requested by the House Appropriations 

Committee in House Report 109-072. 

Scope and Methodology

We performed our audit in accordance with Government Auditing 

Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, and 

accordingly, included such reviews of records and procedures that we 

considered necessary. Our audit covered, but was not limited to, activities 

during the period beginning with the announcement of the Secure Flight 

program in August 2004 through July 2005. The scope of our review did 

not include reviewing the TSC’s overall compliance with laws and 

regulations or its internal control structure. 

To accomplish our objectives, we conducted work primarily at the 

TSC (located in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area) and interviewed 

contractors and representatives from various participating TSC 

departments working within the Operations Branch, Information 

Technology Branch, Administration Branch, the Terrorist Screening Tactical 

Operations Center or TSTOC (previously referred to as the Call Center), 

Nominations Unit, and other support areas. Additionally, we met with 

officials at the TSA responsible for the Secure Flight program and at the 

Department of Homeland Security Office of Policy and Redress. We also 

interviewed FBI officials at FBI Headquarters who previously worked in the 

Budget Formulation and Presentation Unit. 

We gained a working knowledge of the TSC’s operations during our 

recent audit of the TSC (for which our audit report was issued in 

June 2005). During that audit we interviewed additional officials from a 

variety of agencies, including the National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI 

Criminal Justice Information Services Division, and the FBI Terrorist 

Screening Operations Unit (formerly the FBI Counterterrorism Watch). 

Additionally, we reviewed legislative material regarding the history 

of Secure Flight, program requirements, privacy and testing publications, 

and memoranda, correspondence, electronic communications, and 

minutes of meetings related to the TSC’s support of Secure Flight. We 

also reviewed and collected financial documents, planning documents, 

workload data, position descriptions, prior audit reports, and 

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APPENDIX I 

congressional testimony. In addition, we attended numerous Secure 

Flight meetings at the TSC that were attended by key individuals from the 

TSA, FBI/TSOU, and the TSC.

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APPENDIX II 

ACRONYMS USED THROUGHOUT THE REPORT

ACS Automated Case Support 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CAPPS Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EMA Encounter Management Application 

FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

ICD Interface Control Document 

IT Information Technology 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

OIG Office of the Inspector General 

OSIS Open Source Information System 

OTVC Office of Transportation Vetting and Credentialing 

PIA Privacy Impact Assessment 

RFA Request for Action 

SORN System of Records Notice 

TIDE Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSC Terrorist Screening Center 

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APPENDIX II 

TSDB Terrorist Screening Database 

TSOU Terrorist Screening Operations Unit 

TWPDES Terrorist Watchlist Person Data Exchange Standard 

VGTOF Violent Gang and Terrorist Organizations File 

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APPENDIX III 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE 

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APPENDIX III 

REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER’S 

EFFORTS TO SUPPORT THE SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM

Terrorist Screening Center Response

The United States (US) Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General 

(OIG) conducted a review of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) efforts to support the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program from April of 2005 through July 

of 2005. This review was called for in the “Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 

Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief Act, 2005.” The purpose of that review 

was to evaluate the TSC’s plan to support the Secure Flight program and to report the findings to 

the House and Senate Appropriations Committees by August 1, 2005. 

On July 26, 2005, the TSC received the DOJ/OIG draft report. The response by the TSC 

was due to the DOJ/OIG by the close of business July 27, 2005. 

 

Executive Summary

The TSC was established September 16, 2003, and became operational on December 1, 

2003. Since its inception, the TSC has become one of the most unique, innovative and forward 

thinking operations in the United States Government’s (USG’s) counterterrorism arsenal. Never 

before has the USG maintained a centralized list of all known or suspected terrorists that is 

available to federal, state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies, as well as a 

growing list of foreign governments for the purpose of twenty four hours a day, seven days a 

week terrorism screening. For the first time in US history, terrorist watchlist information is 

shared in a multi-agency environment that also connects the intelligence community to a vast 

network of state and local law enforcement officers. The TSC’s novel approach to terrorism 

screening facilitates assistance to agencies at the front lines of terrorism screening, protection of 

the American public from terrorist attack, increasing the safety of the American people as well as 

the law enforcement officers who serve them. The TSC is a new concept and is a living and 

growing environment that is constantly evolving to meet emerging threats and requirements 

within the framework of its governing documents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

(HSPD) - 6, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), and Addendum A. Moreover, the 

watchlisting process is a new initiative that is Government-wide. Each agency has the 

responsibility to provide accurate information when nominating a name for the watchlist. 

Because this government wide system was never in existence, the quality of data provided for 

watchlists varies from agency to agency. However, as the process matures there will be greater 

consistency in the quality of data passed. 

A central mandate to the TSC mission is to consolidate the Government’s approach to 

terrorism screening. A significant area of terrorism screening that has gone unaddressed is the 

screening of domestic air passengers against the consolidated terrorist watchlist known as the 

Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) maintained by the TSC. To close this gap in terrorism 

screening, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) announced the establishment of the 

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APPENDIX III 

Secure Flight program in August of 2004 with a view to conduct passenger prescreening against 

the 

TSC’s TSDB in 2005. For this program to be successful, the TSC, in accordance with 

HSPD-6, must provide direct support to the TSA and its Secure Flight program. However, for 

the TSC to provide appropriate support, close coordination between the two agencies is 

necessary, and TSA is responsible for providing its program requirements. 

In August 2004, when the Secure Flight program was announced, TSC immediately 

began to make budget plans based on information that TSA provided regarding their information 

technology, operational and administrative requirements related to Secure Flight. Secure Flight 

was only one of several new initiatives the TSC had to support; however, because of the volume 

of passengers flying on domestic flights, it will have a dramatic impact on TSC’s operations. 

The TSC prepared for the new initiatives by establishing an information technology 

infrastructure, personnel base, and long range planning processes. The Secure Flight program 

came while TSC was still a fledgling organization, and had no regular, routine, or predictable 

workload. In order to be able to accurately predict the Secure Flight workload, TSA was unable 

to provide to the TSC specific estimates such as volume of calls, volume of passengers traveling, 

information systems architecture, scope of projects, logistics and other resources. However, 

even without this information, the TSC continued to prepare for Secure Flight based on 

conservative estimates of these data elements. Due to the uniqueness of the TSC’s intergovernmental participation, the TSC leveraged its capabilities across programs and activities. It 

used any available resource from any of the participating HSPD-6 partners to include personnel, 

licenses, databases, hardware, software and other materials. The TSC has also taken great care 

to leverage every conceivable opportunity available through its partners to increase resources, 

efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in those areas where the TSC’s own budget or allocated 

personnel are not sufficient to address mission requirements. 

TSC concurs with DOJ/OIG’s assessment that the TSC “needs enhancement” of current 

base funding to accomplish its critical mission functions. 

With this as a short summary background, the TSC offers the following in response to the 

DOJ-OIG preliminary draft review of the TSC’s plans to support the TSA’s Secure Flight 

program: 

Recommendation #1:

Work closer with the FBI budget staff or develop an in-house capacity to formulate and 

execute a TSC budget that captures cost information by project and tracks the total fiscal 

requirements of the organization. 

Response:

The TSC agrees with this recommendation and acknowledges the need to work with the 

FBI’s Finance Division to build the TSC in-house financial personnel capacity. 

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The TSC was created in an out of cycle budget environment. As a result, the TSC did not 

have the opportunity to participate in the budget process initially, nor did it have the background 

to give a true estimate of normal operating requirements (also known as base lining). Funding 

for the first fiscal year (FY) was reallocated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 

support of the TSC from participating agencies' FY 2004 budgets. No personnel were granted to 

the TSC through the budget process to stand up or operate it. Because the budget formulation 

process leads the execution phase of the budget process by two and one half years, the TSC did 

not have sufficient input into a budget until January of 2005. 

 

However, the TSC has been diligent in its fiscal responsibility to ensure expenditures 

create a maximum value to cover the array of projects requiring support and implementation 

since its inception. In support of this effort, the TSC established a Project Management Office 

(PMO) and supporting processes to develop project management and financial 

budget/accounting tools for the purpose of projecting and tracking actual expenses. This system 

allowed TSC to identify the development costs of the infrastructure that would be required to 

support TSC’s maturation and identified initiatives. Due to the approach used by the TSC to 

develop its infrastructure to support multiple programs, many of the projects tracked also 

contribute to building the infrastructure that supports all of these programs, to include Secure 

Flight. Therefore, each project generally supports multiple programs. This approach was taken 

because the TSC had not received any funding related to specific programs. The supplemental 

funds, while subject to DOJ/OIG review, were not solely limited to the Secure Flight program. 

The TSC was asked by the DOJ/OIG to provide specific dollar amounts associated with 

the costs of preparing for Secure Flight. The TSC provided that information based on its current 

methodology. Due to the fact that it did not have the TSA’s requirements, the TSC made 

conservative estimates because there was no historic baseline for Secure Flight. When the 

baseline for Secure Flight is established, in conjunction with all other programs the TSC is 

supporting, the TSC will be able to implement an effective cost accounting system for the Secure 

Flight program that will not only provide actual direct and indirect costs, but also allow for more 

accurate estimates of future costs. In addition, the TSC’s “improvements to its operations and 

information technology environment,” are not specifically to address Secure Flight but also to 

address the other TSC supported programs. 

Recommendation #2:

 

Re-examine and regularly update the agency’s resource estimates as soon as the Secure 

Flight Program is implemented and true work-load figures are established. 

Response:

The TSC agrees with this recommendation and will continue to coordinate these efforts 

with TSA to ensure the most accurate and current data is available. 

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The TSC developed workload projection estimates for initial resource requirements to 

support the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of Secure Flight. These estimates have focused on 

frontline call center personnel, supervision, and support. The estimate used for staffing is 

conservative, having used the low end volume estimate for actual hiring. TSC also has a plan to 

respond to a significantly increased volume of work associated with Secure Flight should that be 

required. Surge capability will be achieved with TDY’s until a true baseline of volume can be 

determined. Systems will be in place to collect workload volume information, and the length of 

time required to work a Request for Action (RFA) will be monitored and analyzed. As the 

history is accumulated and trended by the day of the week and hour of the day, the TSC will 

develop a baseline for call center staffing and adjust appropriately. As soon as an air carrier 

rollout plan is developed by TSA, the TSC will plan to calculate revised resource estimates as 

there is an increase in carriers and volume. TSC will look to minimize additional costs as the 

program grows by implementing cross utilization with other TSC products and services. Initial 

training costs have been planned, and as growth is experienced TSC will continuously revise 

classroom training and on the job training costs. 

With respect to IT, the development of baseline data will provide the needed information 

to make any adjustments to communications, hardware, and software requirements accurately. A 

number of enhancements to Secure Flight are already planned for 2006 development that will 

improve efficiency of the TSC Secure Flight process. As experience with the system develops, 

other best practices and modifications will be identified, and TSC will develop and implement 

improvements. Also, TSA and TSC have previously agreed to Quarterly Reviews of the Concept 

of Operations and Interface Control Documents as part of a structured review after standing up 

the Secure Flight program. This approach will also assist in the TSC financial methodology. 

As a result of these operational and information technology evaluations taken from the 

Secure Flight baseline, the TSC will recalculate financial costs of Secure Flight not only on an 

immediate basis, but on a quarterly basis thereafter. This approach is already built into the TSC 

financial methodology. 

Recommendation #3:

Coordinate with the TSA to adopt the Terrorist Watch Person Data Exchange Standard 

protocols for data exchange. 

 

Response:

The TSC agrees with this recommendation and has plans to implement this 

recommendation in the future. 

The TSC notes that the TSC is using the Terrorist Watch Person Data Exchange Standard 

protocols, but that the TSA is not presently equipped to use this standard. However, once Secure 

Flight operational testing provides realistic figures on data quantities and processing times, TSC 

will work with TSA to bring their present simplified initial data exchange protocol into 

conformance with the national standard used by TSC elsewhere. 

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Recommendation #4:

Develop an aggressive schedule for the completion of the record-by-record review of the 

TSDB and encourage participating agencies to improve overall data accuracy, completeness, and 

thoroughness. 

Response:

The TSC agrees with this recommendation and has previously developed this schedule 

and methodology. The TSC will endeavor to expedite this review based on its current staffing. 

On April 1, 2005, the TSC's Data Integrity Unit implemented a comprehensive recordby-record quality assurance (QA) review of the entire TSDB and will continue this effort. The 

TSC has identified priority records that will be reviewed first, since they have surfaced 

continually in ongoing QA projects. Some of these records were initiated from both the FBI and 

the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC is also conducting a record by 

record review. As previously mentioned, the watchlisting process is a new initiative that is 

Government-wide. Each agency has the responsibility to provide accurate information when 

nominating a name for the watch-list. Because this government wide system was never in 

existence, the quality of data provided for watch-lists varies from agency to agency. However, 

as the process matures there will be greater consistency in the quality of data passed. 

Recommendation #5:

Prioritize and implement projects that are currently on-hold while planning for Secure 

Flight because these projects have significant implications on data integrity, security, and system 

efficiency. 

Response:

The TSC agrees with this recommendation and takes continuous action in this area. 

 

The TSC has been using a project management tool to track its priorities of all TSC 

projects and will expand the use of this tool. From December 1, 2003, the TSC has had to 

continuously and aggressively reprioritize its projects based on emerging requirements, current 

events, and limited funding. This approach will continue to be used in the future. 

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APPENDIX IV 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS 

NECESSARY TO CLOSE REPORT 

 We provided a draft audit report to the FBI and the TSC for review and 

comment. The TSC’s response is incorporated as Appendix III of this report. 

Although the cover letter to the response notes that FBI review for 

classification issues was pending, we subsequently received written 

confirmation that the report does not contain any classified information. 

The TSC concurred with the five recommendations we made in the 

audit. Our analysis of the TSC’s response to each recommendation is 

provided below. 

Recommendation Number: 

1. Resolved. The TSC stated that it agreed with our recommendation to 

work closer with the FBI budget staff or develop an in-house capacity 

to formulate, execute, and track a TSC budget that captures cost 

information by program and accounts for the total fiscal requirements 

of the organization. In its response, the TSC stated that it needs to 

work with the FBI’s Finance Division to build the TSC’s personnel 

capacity for conducting budget and financial tasks. According to the 

TSC, its ability to estimate its Secure Flight costs has been significantly 

hampered by the lack of information from the TSA related to the 

detailed requirements of the Secure Flight program. The TSC believes 

that once Secure Flight is launched and a baseline for the program can 

be established, the TSC will be able to implement an effective cost 

accounting system for the Secure Flight program that will not only 

provide actual direct and indirect costs, but also allow for more 

accurate estimates of future costs.

 This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the 

TSC has established and implemented an effective cost accounting 

system. However, the TSC needs to enhance its financial personnel 

capacity in order to develop such a system. In addition, specific and 

accurate Secure Flight cost projections are dependent upon the 

availability of valid Secure Flight operational data. In the interim, 

please keep us regularly informed of your progress in implementing 

the new accounting system and building the in-house capacity to 

operate and manage the new system to formulate accurate and 

reliable financial data. 

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APPENDIX IV 

2. Resolved. In its response, the TSC stated that it will continue to 

coordinate with the TSA to ensure that the most current and accurate 

Secure Flight data is available. According to the TSC, it plans to 

develop baseline figures for Secure Flight and use that baseline to 

calculate revised resource estimates as Secure Flight is implemented 

and screening volume in the TSC’s call center increases. In addition, 

the TSC said it intends to continually evaluate the technological needs 

of the Secure Flight program and the need for additional 

enhancements to its IT systems or modifications to the underlying 

agreements between the TSC and the TSA. The TSC said it will use 

these operational and IT evaluations to recalculate the overall financial 

costs of Secure Flight on a quarterly basis. 

 To close the recommendation, please provide us with the Secure Flight 

baseline data and evidence of the quarterly reviews of the program 

costs, needs, and agreements. 

3. Resolved. The TSC stated that it agreed with our recommendation to 

adopt the Terrorist Watchlist Person Data Exchange Standard 

(TWPDES) protocol, but noted that the TSA is not presently equipped 

to use the standard. According to the TSC, once Secure Flight 

operations have begun and reliable data on the screening volume and 

processing times are available, the TSC plans to work with the TSA to 

bring the data exchange into conformance with the TWPDES. To close 

this recommendation, please provide evidence that the TWPDES has 

been successfully adopted and the standard is adhered to in the 

transfer of TSDB data to the TSA. 

4. Resolved. In its response, the TSC stated that it agreed with our 

recommendation and will expedite the record-by-record review of the 

TSDB. The TSC also noted that the quality of watch list records is 

heavily dependent upon the quality of information provided by the 

nominating agencies and that this quality is expected to improve as 

the terrorist watch-listing and screening processes mature. According 

to the TSC, the National Counterterrorism Center, a primary source of 

terrorist records, is also conducting a record-by-record review of its 

watch list records. 

 To close this recommendation, please provide evidence of your 

attempts to expedite the TSC’s record-by-record review of the TSDB. 

The TSC should establish aggressive milestones for the successful 

completion of the project and track its progress against these 

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APPENDIX IV 

milestones. In addition, please provide documentation to support your 

interaction with participating agencies related to improving the overall 

accuracy, completeness, and thoroughness of terrorist watch list data. 

5. Resolved. The TSC stated that it agreed with our recommendation 

and is taking continuous action to reprioritize its projects. According 

to the TSC, it has been using project management software to track its 

varied projects and intends to expand the use of this tool. This 

recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the TSC 

has developed a plan for implementing, in priority order, the projects 

that had been placed on hold due to Secure Flight. 

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