____________ Nos. 95-3128/3176

____________ Greater Kansas City Laborers * Pension Fund, a Trust Fund; * Greater Kansas City Laborers * Welfare Fund, a Trust Fund; * Greater Kansas City Laborers * Vacation Plan, a Trust Fund; * Greater Kansas City Laborers * Training Fund, a Trust Fund, * * Appellants/Cross-appellees,* * John Rider; Jeffrey Chaikin, * parties immediately above acting* as Trustees of the Greater * Kansas City Laborers Pension * Fund, Greater Kansas City * Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the Laborers Welfare Fund, Greater * United States District Court for Kansas City Laborers Vacation * the Western District of Missouri Plan and Greater Kansas City * Laborers Training Fund; * Charles Jones; Charles Mackey, * * Appellants, * * v. * * Superior General Contractors, * Inc.; Bohnert Construction * Company, * * Appellees/Cross-appellants.*

____________ Submitted: March 11, 1996 Filed: January 15, 1997

____________ Before McMILLIAN, BEAM and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

____________ McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

### The Honorable Dean Whipple, District Judge, United State s 1 

### District Court for the Western District of Missouri. New Bohnert and Superior General are coll ectively referred to 2 

### as “defendants.”
-2- Four employee trust funds -- the Greater Kansas City Laborers Pensio n Fun d, the Greater Kansas City Laborers Welfare Fund, the Greater Kansa s City Laborers Vacation Fund, and the Greater Kan sas City Laborers Training Fund (collectively plaintiffs or the Funds) -- appeal from a final order entere d in the United States District Court for the Western District o f 1 Missouri holding that defendants Bohnert Construction Company, Inc. (New Bohnert), and Superior General Contra ctors, Inc. (Superior General), were 2 not liable to the Funds under §§ 502(g)(2) and 515 of the Employe e Ret irement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145, fo r employee fringe benefit contributions allegedly due between July 1, 1992 and March 31, 1994. Greater Kansas City Laborer s Pension Fund v. Superior Genera l Contractors, Inc. , No. 94-0374-CV-W-1 (W.D. Mo. July 21, 1995 ) (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law). For reversal, the Funds argue th e district court erred in (1) holding that New Boh nert was not the alter ego of Superior General, (2) failing to consider certain documentary evidence submitted by the Funds, and (3) admitting into e vidence an NLRB charge and decision addressing whether alter ego status should apply to defendants. In addition, defendants argue on cross-appeal that the district court erre d in holding that it had jurisdiction over the present action under §§ 502(g ) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order of the district court.

I. Background

The Funds are employee trust funds established between 1962 and 1974 pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Builders Association of Missouri and various

### Th e collective bargaining agreement establishing the Fund s 3 

### was amended and revised effective January 1, 1976. Bohnert Construction Co., Inc., incorporated in 1991, doe s 4 

### not use the name “New Bohnert, ” nor did the original company refer to itself as “Old Bohnert.” We use these terms for purposes o f clarification, however, because the relationship between Ne w Bohnert and Superior General is at issue in the present case.
-3- affiliates of the Lab orers International Union of North America in Kansas Ci ty, Missouri. The Funds were established under § 302 of the Labo r 3 Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186. In a ddition, they are employee benefit plans governed by § 3 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002.

New Bohnert is a Missouri corporation in the business of constructio n in Missouri and Kansas. It was incorporated in 1991, when the constructio n company originally founded in 1979 by Al Bohnert , Bohnert Construction Co. (Old Bohnert), changed its name to Bohnert CC, Inc., and transferred its general contracting work to New Bohnert. 4

In 1981 and 1982, Charlie Morgan, Terry Tackett, and Stan Mino r joined Old Bohnert. At that time, Old Bohnert provided several types of services: general contracting, foundation work, interior work, an d ref rigeration. According to defendants’ theory of the case, Al Bohner t decided several years later to assist Morgan, Tackett, and Minor i n sta rting their own company. Thus, in 1988, Al Bohnert helped the m establ ish Superior General. Superior General was incorporated in lat e 1988. Although Al Bohnert was the majority shareholder in Superio r General, Morgan served as president of the company, made all decision s
conc erning the daily operations, and directed Superior General’s labo r relations. In 1989, Tackett became a vice-president of Superior General. At approxi mately the same time, Minor decided to sell his interest i n Sup erior General to Morgan and Tackett. Thereafter, Morgan and Tacket t operated Superior General.

### -4- On January 1, 1989, Superior General signed a contract stipulation to be bound by the collective bargaining agreement between the Builder s Association and the Union. This collective barg aining agreement contained

an “evergreen clause,” meaning that the terms of agreement would b e
au tomatically renewed unless either party provided written notice o f termination to the other within a specified time period. Between 1988 and Novem ber 1992, when it ceased operations, Superior General employe d laborers performing work covered by the collective bargaining agreement. This a greement provided that Superior General would make fringe benefi t contributions to the Funds for the laborers it employed.

In March 1991, Al Bohnert incorporated another construction business , New Bohnert. At the same time, the original com pany (Old Bohnert) changed it s name to Bohnert CC, Inc., and transferred all of its genera l contracting business to New Bohnert. Defendants maintain that New Bohnert

was created because Al Bohnert wanted Kelsey Goss, one of his employees, to acquire an ownership interest in the general contracting business. Gos s became a shareholder of New Bohnert at its inception. After New Bohnert
was cr eated, Old Bohnert performed only interior finishing work an d accounting services.
Throughout its existence, Superior General had operated from its own premises, which were initially leased from Old B ohnert. As business grew, Superi or General leased additional property from other companies. I n additi on, Superior General also used the accounting department of Ol d Bohnert for its routine accounting functions. Between 1988 and 1991 , Superi or General made a single monthly payment for these accountin g services. In 1992, however, Superior General and New Bohnert began a “proportionate assessment” system in which Stan Minor had the discretion to distribute the cos t of the accounting services between New Bohnert and Superior General based upon his assessment of the use each company had mad e

### Specificall y, the district court found that Superior General 5 

### ha d “made all required fringe benefit contributions to th e Plaintiff Funds between January 1, 1989, through its cessation of operations on November 30, 1992." Slip op. at 7.
-5- of Old Bohnert’s accounting department during a particular time period.
Superi or General did a substantial amount of business with Ol d Bohnert, and later, N ew Bohnert, through a competitive bid process. These arrangements were negotiated between Charlie Morgan and Terry Tackett on behalf of Superior General and the project managers for Old Bohnert and Ne w Bohn ert. Superior General also performed subcontracting work for othe r entities.
In 1992, Superior Ge neral began to lose money and, by mid-1992, had experi enced severe financial losses. In August 1992, Charlie Morga n resigned from Superior General. Terry Tackett remained at Superior Genera l to wind up its outstanding projects. Superior General ceased operations on November 30, 1992, and therefore employed no laborers after that date.

The present litigation arose when the Funds’ trustees instituted sui t in federal district c ourt against Superior General and New Bohnert, under §§ 502(g)(2) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145, seeking fringe benefit contributions due under two collective bargaining agreements t o which Superior General was a signatory employer. The first collectiv e bargaining agreement ran from June 1, 1990, to March 21, 1993; the second
ran from April 26, 1993, through March 31, 1996. The Funds alleged that New Bohnert was an alter ego of Superior General , and that New Bohnert and Superior General shou ld be held jointly and severally liable to the Funds for any contributions due. Following a bench trial, the district cour t determined that (1) Superior General had made al l the contributions it was legally obligated to make before it c eased operations and (2) New Bohnert 5 was neither a signatory to the

### -6-

collec tive bargaining agreements nor an alter ego of Superior General

. Slip op. at 7, 9.

The district court relied on the factors presented in Iowa Express Distributi on, Inc. v. NLRB , 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir. 1984) ( Iow a Express ), cert. denied , 469 U.S. 1088 (1984), and Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union , 796 F.2d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1986) ( Crest Tankers ) , to de termine whether a successor employer which has not signed a labo r contract is nevertheless bound by its terms as an “alter ego” of a signatory employer. The district court found that Superior General and Ne w Bohnert w ere not alter egos because the two companies did not shar e subs tantially identical ownership, management, supervision, busines s purposes, operation, customers, or equipment. Slip op. at 9. The distric t court specifically found that (1) control and management of Superio r General and New Bohnert were distinct and separate, because, although Al Bohnert was the majority shareholder in Superior General, he played no rol e in its operations; (2 ) the arrangement by which Superior General utilized the accounting department of Old Bohnert was neg otiated in an arm’s length transaction; (3) separate books were kept for Superior General and Ne w Bohnert which clearly showed their separate operations and employees; and (4) although Superior General and New Bohnert did a substantial volume of busine ss with one another, such arrangements were negotiated in arm’ s length transactions, through a competitive bidding process. Id. at 4-6. Finall y, noting that “[g]enerally, an alter ego finding requires th e existence of an unlawful motive or intent to avoid the terms of th e collective bargaining agreement,” the district court found that the closin g of Superior General and the creation of New Bohn ert was not accompanied by anti-union animus. I d. at 9 (quoting Iowa Express , 739 F.2d at 1310-11), 7.

The Fun ds then filed this timely appeal. In addition, Superio r General and New Bohnert filed cross-appeals, arguing that

### -7-

the district court lacked jurisdiction under §§ 502(g) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145, to hear the present case because it fall s within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.

II. Discussion

A. Alter Ego Analysis

For reversal, the Funds first argue the district court applied a n incorrect legal stand ard in concluding that New Bohnert was not the alter ego of Superior General and was therefore not li able for any contributions to th e Funds. Specifically, the Funds contend that the district cour t placed undue weight on its finding that anti-uni on animus did not motivate the closing of Superior General and the creation of New Bohnert. The Fund s argue that “the mere existence of ‘some legitimate business reason’ for a change in corporate organization should not alone prevent a finding o f alter e go status." Crest Tankers , 796 F.2d at 238 n.2 (quoting NLRB v
. Allcoast Transfer, Inc. , 780 F.2d 576, 581 (6th Cir. 1986)). The Fund s contend that the district court’s finding of no anti-union animus does not preclude a determination that Superior General a nd New Bohnert operated as alter egos.

Defendants argue that the district court’s alter ego analysis did no t place undue weight on the absence of unlawful motivation. Defendants argu e that t he district court made specific factual findings rejecting ever y ele ment of the alter ego analysis. They further maintain that thes e factual findings are not clearly erroneous and should therefore be upheld on appeal.

Determination of alter ego status involves a mixed question of law and fact. We therefore review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its c onclusions of law de novo. See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance

### We note, ho wever, that a plaintiff may not attempt to pierce 6 

### the corporate veil to enforce an ERISA judgment against a n individual not liable for the underlying ERISA violation. Peacock v. Tho mas , 116 S. Ct. 862, 865-66 (1996). The Supreme Court ha s held that such an action constitutes an improper attempt to us e ancillary jurisdiction “to imp ose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that jud gment.” Id

. -8- Co. , 48 F.3d 365, 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 300 (1995).
The parties and the district court may have mistaken the applicable law. The fa ctors set forth in Iowa Express and Crest Tankers fo r determining alter ego status under labor law do not control the question of Sup erior General's and New Bohnert’s corporate relationship, if any , because the present action arises under §§ 502(g) and 515 of ERISA, 2 9 U.S.C. § § 1132(g), 1145. We have previously applied corporate la w principles to determine employer liability under ERISA, where suc h principles comport with the language and purposes of the statute. See Pip e Fitters H ealth & Welfare Trust v. Waldo, R., Inc. , 969 F.2d 718, 720-2 1 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 1054 (1993); Rockney v. Blohorn , 877 F.2d 637, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1989). The alter ego doctrine as developed 6 under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. , involves a more lenie nt standard for disregarding the corporate form than that empl oyed in corporate law. The focus of the labor law alter eg o doct rine “is on the existence of a disguised continuance of a forme r busin ess entity or an attempt to avoid the obligations of a collectiv e bargaining agreement.” Iowa Express , 739 F.2d at 1310-11 (quoting Penntec h Papers, Inc. v. NLRB , 706 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied , 464 U.S. 892 (1983)). By contrast, the alter ego doctrine as developed unde r
cor porate law provides that the legal fiction of the separate corporat e entity may be rejected in the case of a corporat ion that (1) is controlled by another to the extent that it has independent existence in form only an d (2) is used as a subterfuge to defeat

### -9-

public convenience, t o justify wrong, or to perpetuate a fraud. See In re B.J. McAda ms, Inc. , 66 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 1995) ( McAdams ), cert
. denied , 116 S. Ct. 2546 (1996); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc. , 519 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1975) ( Lakota ). Thus, control by one company over its alleged al ter ego is necessary under the corporate law standard. See McAdams , 66 F.3d at 937; see also Pepper v. Litton , 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) ("The ess ence of the [corporate law alter eg o] test is whether or not under all the circumstances th e transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside.") (footnote omitted).
Although the underlying congressional policy be hind ERISA favors the disregard of the corporate entity in situations where employees are denied the ir pension benefits, such policy interests are not implicated in th e present case, which does not involve an individual pensioner’s claim for benefits; rather, it involves a pension fund’s attempt to collect unpaid contri butions. See Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pensio n Fund v. Central Transport, Inc. , 85 F.3d 1282, 1288 (7th Cir. 1996)

. Moreover, even if such interests were at stake in the present case, w e believe the corporate law standard for determining alter ego status strike s
an appropriate balance between the congressional intent of ERISA and the long-established principle that a corporation’s existence is presumed to be sep arate and may be disregarded only under narrowly prescribe d circumstances. See Lakota , 519 F.2d at 638.
Applying the corporate law standard of alter eg o status to the facts of the present case, we hold that New Bohnert was not an alter ego o f Super ior General. Our review of the record indicates that the factua l findings of the district court were not clearly erroneous. As noted above , the district court found that control and management of Superior General and New Bohnert were distinct and separate and that transactions between the two companies were

### As an alternative basis for holding New Bohnert liable fo r 7 

### unpaid fringe benefit contribu tions, the Funds argue that Superior General and New Bohnert constituted a single employer. In Iow a Express Distrib., Inc. v. NLRB , 739 F.2d 1305, 1310 (8th Cir.) , cert. denied , 469 U.S. 1088 (1984), we explained that “[t]he single employ er doctrine is a [National Labor Relations] Board creatio n that treats two or more related enterprises as a single employe r for purposes of holding the enterprises jointly to a singl e bargaining obligation or for the purpose of considering liability for any unfair labor practices.” Factors to be considered i n determining whether two distinct business entities are to be deemed a single employer for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act in clude: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) common management , (3 ) centralized control of labor relations, and (4) commo n ownership or financial control

. Id.; see also Crest Tankers, Inc. v. National Maritime Union , 796 F.2d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1986 ) (des cribing factors relevant to single employer analysis). Th e sin gle employer doctrine is not relevant to the present case , however, because we hold that corporate law principles govern the assessment of the corporate relationship, if any, between Ne w Bohnert and Superior General.
-10- negotia ted at arm’s length. See slip op. at 4-6. When examined de nov o under the two-part corporate law test set forth in McAdams for determining alter ego status, these facts lead us to conclude that New Bohnert wa s neith er controlled by Superior General “to the extent that it ha s independent existence in form only” nor “used as a subterfuge to defea t public con venience, to justify wrong, or to perpetuate a fraud.” Se e McAdams , 66 F.3d at 937. We therefore hold that New Bohnert is not liable

as an alter ego of Superior General for fringe benefit contributions to th e Funds. 7

B. Documentary Evidence

The F unds next argue that the district court erred in failing t o consider certain documentary evidence submitted by the Funds in support of their contention that New Bohnert is an alter ego of Superior General

. They argue that the district court placed exclus ive weight on testimony by Al Bohne rt and Charles Morgan that the two companies were operate d separ ately and erroneously failed to consider contradictory documentar y evidence. Yet the Funds do

### -11-

not specify in their briefs which documents were allegedly disregarded by the distr ict court. Rather, they argue that had the district cour t considered the documentary evidence, it would have found that the requisit e
common control and ownership existed between New Bohnert and Superio r General.

Defend ants respond, and we agree, that the Funds are essentiall y challenging the factual findings of the district court, which may not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. A factual finding is clearly erroneou s if the reviewing cour t is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Sherman , 67 F.3d 1348, 1353 (8th Cir. 1995). We cannot say that the district court's findings of fact ar e clearly erroneous. T he district court was not required to “make specific findings with respect to all of the evidence presented, nor even refer to all the evidence introduced.” Griffin v. City o f Omaha , 785 F.2d 620, 628 (8th Cir. 1986). We note, however, that the district court did refer to several pieces of documentary evidence in its memorandum opinion, includin g
a sublease, an accounting agreement, and the corporate books of Superior General and New Bohne rt. Slip op. at 4-8. The district court's reliance
on the credibility of witness testimony in reaching its conclusions does not constitute a basis for setting aside its factual findings. See Steven s
v. McHan , 3 F.3d 1204, 1206 (8th Cir. 1993) (findings supported by th e record but based prim arily on a trial judge’s decision on the credibility of the witnesses can “`virtually never be clear error'”) (quoting Anderson

v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)); see also In re Centra l Arkansas Broadcasting Co. , 68 F.3d 213, 215 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Where there is more than one permissible view of the evidence, we may no t hold that the choice made by the trier of fact was clearly erroneous.”).

### -12- C. Admissibility of NLRB Charge and Decision

Finall y, the Funds argue that the district court abused it s discretion in admitti ng into evidence a 1993 unfair labor practice charge filed against defendants and a decision by the B oard not to prosecute this charge. In the unfair labor practice charge, the local unions which had executed the collective bargaining agreement wit h Superior General alleged that Superior General had repudiated the collective bargaining agreement in violation of § 8(b)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) , (3), and (5). App. at 45-46. As in the present case, the liability of Ne w Bohnert was premised upon an alter ego theory. The Board decided not to prosecute the charge after determining that New Bohnert was not an alter ego of Superior General. Id. at 46. Noting that the district court had pre viously ruled that the Board decision could not collaterally estop a finding of alter ego liability in the present ac tion, the Funds argue that the unfair labor practice charge and Board decis ion were irrelevant to the alter ego issue and therefore inadmissible at trial.

In light of our above holding that the labor law standard fo r determining alter ego status does not control the present case, we agree that the unfair labor practice charge and the Board decision wer e irrel evant to the question whether New Bohnert was liable to the Fund s under ERISA as an alter ego of Superior General. However, in bench trials , the admission of incompetent or irrelevant evidence is not a ground fo r
revers al “when there is sufficient competent evidence to support th e judgment and it does not appear that the court w as induced by . . . [that] evidence to make essential findings that it otherwise would not have made. ” O’Connor v. Peru State College , 781 F.2d 632, 639 (8th Cir. 1986); see als o Harr is v. Rivera , 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (“In bench trials, judge s routinely hear inadmissible evidence that they a re presumed to ignore when makin g decisions.”). In the present case, the factual findings of th e district court are supported by

### -13-

sufficient evidence i n the record. Nor was the district court induced by the evidence to make essential findings that it otherwise would not have made. Thus, admission of this irrelevant evidence was harmless error.

D. Cross-Appeal

New Bo hnert and Superior General argue on cross-appeal that th e distric t court erred in determining that it had jurisdiction under § § 502 (g) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145, over the presen t
ac tion. Citing Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advance d Lightweight Concrete Co. , 484 U.S. 539, 545-53 (1988) ( Advance d Lightweight ), defendants contend that the remedy provided in §§ 502(g) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1145, does not confer jurisdiction o n federal district courts to determine whether an employer’s unilatera l decision to refuse to make postcontract contributions violates the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq . In Advanced Lightweight , the defendant company wa s
a par ty to two multi-employer collective bargaining agreements tha t requir ed monthly contributions to eight employee benefit plans. Th e company made the requ isite contributions until the expiration date of the multi-employer agreem ents but made no contributions thereafter. 484 U.S. at 541-42. The plans’ trustees sued the company in federal district court , alleging that the com pany's unilateral decision to discontinue making its contributions constituted a breach of its duty t o bargain in good faith in viola tion of § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). 484 U.S. a t 541 -42. The complaints alleged that the federal court had jurisdictio n under § 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145. The Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, held in favor of the company on th e ground that an employer’s liability under § 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145 , was limited to the effective period of the colle ctive bargaining agreement and that the section does not confer federal jurisdiction to determin e whether an employer’s refusal to make postcontract contributions violates the NLRA. 484

### The district court did not consider New B ohnert’s repudiation 8 

### defense in determining that New Bohnert and Superior General were not liable for fringe benefit contributions. See slip op. a t 8-10.
-14- U.S. at 549. The Cou rt reasoned that the text and legislative history of §§ 502(g) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145, described th e employer’s contractual obligation to make contributions but omitted an y reference to the nonc ontractual obligation imposed by the NLRA. 484 U.S. at 545-49.

Defendants argue that Advanced Lightweight cont rols the present case and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction under §§ 502(g) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145, to entertain the actio n brought by the Funds, because it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Defendants maintain that the present case, like Advance d Lightw eight , involves conduct alleged to constitute a violation of th e NLRA, because the Funds claimed that New Bohnert was liable under the labo r law standard for alter ego status for unpaid con tributions and New Bohnert raised the defense of repudiation of the collective bargaining agreement. 8

We hold that the district court had jurisdictio n under §§ 502(g) and 51 5 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145, over the present case

. Defe ndants’ reliance on Advanced Lightweight is misplaced, because th e Funds, unlike the plaintiff trustees in Advanced Lightweight , did not clai m that defendants’ fail ure to make fringe benefit contributions constituted

an unfair labor practice. Moreover, defendants’ jurisdictional argument also fails in light of our above holding that the labor law standard for alter ego status does not govern the alter ego liability of a defendan t corporation in a suit brought under §§ 502(g) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145, seeking fringe benefit contributions.

### -15- Nor does the present case fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB bec ause New Bohnert raised the defense of repudiation of the collectiv e bargai ning agreement. Defendants’ argument is foreclosed by the well

establi shed principle that an action does not arise under federal la w through the assertion of a defense. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust , 463 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1983).

III. Conclusion

We hold that the district court did not err in holding that Ne w Bohnert was not liable as an alter ego of Superior General for fring e benefit contributions allegedly owed to the Fund s under ERISA. We further hold that the district court had jurisdiction over the present action unde r §§ 502(g) and 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g), 1145. Accordingly, the order of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.