UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

REPORT ON

VIETNAM

MAY 2003
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

800 North Capitol Street, NW

Suite 790

Washington, DC 20002

202-523-3240

202-523-5020 (fax)

www.uscirf.gov
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Felice D. Gaer

Chair

Michael K. Young

Vice Chair

Firuz Kazemzadeh

Richard D. Land

Bishop William F. Murphy

Leila Nadya Sadat

Nina Shea

The Honorable Charles R. Stith

The Honorable Shirin Tahir-Kheli*

Joseph R. Crapa

Executive Director

* Effective March 24, 2003, Ambassador Shirin Tahir-Kheli was appointed Special Assistant to 

the President and Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations by 

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. This appointment necessitated Amb. Tahir-Kheli's 

resignation from the Commission.
STAFF OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

May 2003

Tad Stahnke, Deputy Director for Policy

David Dettoni, Deputy Director for Outreach

Christy Hines, Director of Government Affairs

Anne Johnson, Director of Communications

Carmelita Pratt, Director of Administration

Dwight N. Bashir, Policy Analyst

Patricia Carley, Senior Policy Analyst

Deborah DuCre, Receptionist

Scott Flipse, Policy Analyst

Allison B. Hollabaugh, Research Assistant

Susan Kemp, Communications Assistant

Caitlin Lacy, Intern

Jacqueline A. Mitchell, Executive Assistant

James W. Newton, Policy Analyst

Stephen R. Snow, Senior Policy Analyst

Eileen A. Sullivan, Deputy Director of Communications

John W. Tai, Policy Analyst
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

The PRESIDENT

The White House

 DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Vietnam, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

 FELICE D. GAER

Chair 

Enclosure

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. COLIN POWELL

Secretary of State

Department of State

 DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On behalf of the United States Commission on International 

Religious Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Vietnam, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair

Enclosure
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. DENNIS HASTERT

Speaker of the House

U.S. House of Representatives

 DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Vietnam, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair

Enclosure

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

__________

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

Washington, DC, May 1, 2003

Hon. TED STEVENS

President Pro Tempore

U.S. Senate

 DEAR MR. STEVENS: On behalf of the United States Commission on International Religious 

Freedom, I am transmitting to you the Commission’s Report on Vietnam, prepared in 

compliance with section 202(a)(2) of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 

U.S.C. 6401 et seq., P.L. 105-292, as amended by P.L. 106-55 and P.L. 107-228.

 We would welcome the opportunity to discuss with you this Report, and the policy 

recommendations that it contains. 

 Sincerely, 

FELICE D. GAER

Chair 

Enclosure
1

VIETNAM

A. Introduction

Since Congress passed the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) in September 

2001, the already poor religious freedom conditions in Vietnam have deteriorated. Key religious 

dissidents have been imprisoned; others remain in detention or under house arrest. In addition, 

the government has intensified its crackdown on religious minorities in the northwestern 

provinces and the Central Highlands. Violations associated with this crackdown include church 

closings, detention of religious leaders, and efforts to force the renunciation of faith, as well as a 

recent alleged noxious gas attack on a religious service.1 The increased repression of religious 

freedom has been reportedly sanctioned at the highest levels of the Vietnamese government, 

according to documents obtained by individuals and human rights organizations.2 

The Commission issued its last report on Vietnam in May 2001. Since the BTA was 

approved in September 2001, the Commission has continued to speak out on the deteriorating 

status of religious freedom in Vietnam. A Commission delegation visited Vietnam in February 

2002. On the basis of the findings of the delegation, as well as other information, in September 

2002, the Commission recommended that Vietnam be designated by the Secretary of State as a 

“country of particular concern” (CPC) for religious freedom violations under the International 

Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

Despite the fact that the Secretary did not include Vietnam in the Administration’s 2003 

CPC designations, the State Department has begun to voice publicly its concern about Vietnam’s 

human rights conditions in key areas, including religious freedom, and the failure of the 

Vietnamese government to respond to U.S. concerns.3 Clearly, the current approach of the U.S. 

government to advance religious freedom in Vietnam has failed to yield concrete results. The 

United States is not alone in this respect, as the government of Vietnam has also failed to 

respond to concerns raised by the European Parliament and other Western governments.

4

 

Therefore, in this report, the Commission recommends that the U.S. government intensify its 

leverage to hold the government of Vietnam to its international obligations to protect human 

rights, including religious freedom. 

Since the Commission issued its first report on Vietnam in May 2001, it has continued to 

engage in activities to focus attention on advancing religious freedom in Vietnam. In February 

2002, then-Commission Chair Michael Young testified on Vietnam before the House 

International Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on International Operations and Human 

Rights. Later that month, the Commission sent a delegation, led by Commissioner Firuz 

Kazemzadeh, to visit Vietnam.5 

During the visit, the delegation met with government officials, leaders of governmentsanctioned religious organizations, and representatives of unofficial religious groups to discuss 

official policies on religious affairs and the conditions of religious freedom. The delegation 

observed that public religious activity took place in Hanoi, Hué, and Ho Chi Minh City, and that 

individuals in those cities seemed able to worship without government obstruction. However, it 

was also clear that the government continued to exercise strict control over all religious groups, 
2

restricting their freedom to train and select their leaders, to distribute religious literature, and to 

engage in educational, social, and charitable activities. 

The delegation was limited in its ability to speak freely with individuals and to travel 

outside the large cities, particularly to ethnic minority areas. Central and provincial government 

officials were evasive and unresponsive. The government took extraordinary measures, 

including the apparent contrivance of two traffic incidents, to hinder the delegation’s ability to 

meet with detained or imprisoned religious persons, their associates, and representatives of 

unofficial religious groups. 

Since its visit to Vietnam, the Commission has continued to meet with representatives of 

the Vietnamese government and Vietnamese religious communities in and outside Vietnam, as 

well as experts on Vietnam and its relations with the United States. The Commission met with 

visiting Vietnamese government religious affairs officials and religious leaders in May 2002 and 

with Vietnam’s delegation to the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral human rights dialogue in November 

2002. 

B. Demographic Information

Vietnam, though mainly Buddhist, is a religiously pluralistic society. Vietnam has a 

population of approximately 80 million, with ethnic Vietnamese, or Kinh, accounting for some 

90 percent of the total population.6 Ethnic minorities are concentrated in Vietnam’s Central 

Highlands, where they are collectively known as “Montagnards,” and the northwestern 

provinces, where members of the Hmong ethnic group reside. Officially, the government only 

recognizes Buddhism, Roman Catholicism, Cao Daism, Hoa Hao Buddhism, Islam, and 

Protestant Christianity.7 Buddhism is the dominant religion, the adherents of which make up 

approximately 50 percent of the population. It is followed by Roman Catholicism, which has 

between 6 and 7 million adherents. The number of Cao Dai followers is estimated at 3 million. 

Expatriate Hoa Hao Buddhist groups claim that there are also 3 million Hoa Haos in Vietnam. 

The State Department indicates that there are at least 1 million Protestants in Vietnam. Others, 

however, suggest that the total Protestant population in Vietnam is no more than 400,000.8 

Members of ethnic minorities constitute approximately two-thirds of the Protestant population. 

There are approximately 65,000 Muslims in southern Vietnam. 

In addition to these officially-recognized groups, Vietnam is also home to a number of 

smaller religious communities. These include the Hindus, with approximately 50,000 members.9 

The State Department estimates that there are between several hundred and 2,000 Baha’is in 

Vietnam, who are largely concentrated in the southern part of the country.10 However, U.S. 

Baha’i representatives believe that, notwithstanding the Communist government’s ban on the 

religion after 1975, there are tens of thousands of Vietnamese Baha’is.

11 There are also several 

hundred members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints who live primarily in Ho 

Chi Minh City and Hanoi.12
3

C. Religious Freedom

1. Law and State Policy

The Constitution of Vietnam specifies that the “Communist Party of Vietnam...is the 

force leading the State and society.”13 It states that the party’s Fatherland Front “constitute[s] the 

political base of people’s power,” and “strengthens the people’s unity of mind in political and 

spiritual matters....”14 The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), through the Vietnam 

Fatherland Front, determines state policy on religious affairs.15 The Prime Minister of Vietnam, 

as one of the three most senior VCP leaders, appears to be the chief architect of the official 

policy on religion, as well as the final arbiter on this issue. The Prime Minister has issued 

decrees on religious activity and has the power to decide whether to extend government 

recognition to religious groups. The Religious Affairs Committee, which is a sub-ministerial 

agency, does not appear to be directly involved in the formulation of policies on religious affairs. 

The Chairman of the Committee told the Commission delegation in February 2002 that the 

Committee’s major responsibilities include investigating complaints about religious freedom 

violations and reporting them to the office of the Prime Minister.

In mid-January 2003, the VCP Central Committee held its seventh plenum, at the end of 

which it issued a communiqué that directed the government to increase its management of 

religious affairs. The communiqué noted: 

The religious situation and the religion-related work, however, still develop in a 

complicated manner imbued with factors of instability. Complaints and disputes 

over land and property establishments are increasing and severe in some areas, 

particularly in ethnic communities. Some clergymen have abused religious belief 

to carry out anti-government activities.16 

The communiqué stated that the government must “[i]ncrease the state management of 

religious affairs,” “[g]uide all religions in carrying out external relations in line with the party 

and government’s foreign policy,” and “continu[e] to raise public awareness about our 

government’s religious policy.”17

Notwithstanding Vietnam’s constitutional guarantee of the freedom of religion and belief 

for its citizens, the government uses various laws and decrees to maintain tight control over all 

religious communities, and detain or imprison religious leaders. In April 1999, the Vietnamese 

government issued a “Decree Concerning Religious Activities,” which defines the extent of the 

Vietnamese government’s control of religious communities and activities. In particular, article 5 

of the decree states: 

All activities which threaten freedom of religious belief, all activities using 

religious belief in order to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 

to prevent the believers from carrying out their civic responsibilities, to sabotage 

the union of all the people, to go against the healthy culture of our nation, as well 

as superstitious activities, will be punished in conformity with the law.”18 

The decree also stipulates that religious organizations must be registered with the state 

and religious activities must be approved by the relevant levels of government, including, in 
4

some cases, the Prime Minister.19 The government must also approve the nomination, 

ordination, and the transfer of clergy and lay “specialists.”20 Furthermore, religious 

organizations and officials must report to the Bureau of Religious Affairs about their activities 

abroad, and when necessary, obtain the government’s authorization to interact with foreign 

organizations and individuals.

21 Finally, the decree essentially ensures that the Vietnamese 

government need not return confiscated religious properties to their original owners.22

The National Assembly of Vietnam has been considering a new ordinance on religious 

affairs that may be ratified in late 2003. According to Vietnamese officials with whom the 

Commission delegation met, the new ordinance would supercede prior government decrees on 

religious affairs such as the 1999 decree but nevertheless codify in law policies and procedures 

already employed by the state to manage religious affairs.23 

A government decree on administrative detention is another instrument used to detain and 

harass religious leaders and believers for activity related to freedom of religion.24 Both the UN 

Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief and the UN Human Rights Committee 

have expressed concerns about the use of this decree, which allows for detention without trial for 

up to two years for alleged national security offenses.25 Such offenses are further defined in the 

Vietnamese Criminal Code to include attempts to undermine national unity, such as promoting 

division between religious believers and nonbelievers.26

Vietnam’s policies on religious affairs clearly emanate from the political center in Hanoi. 

However, the Commission delegation found that considerable power to implement those policies 

has been delegated to provincial-level officials. For example, the provincial governments have 

the power to determine who will be accepted into Catholic seminaries, ordained upon graduation, 

and where priests will be assigned or transferred. Provincial governors can decide to arrest or to 

place an individual within their jurisdiction in administrative detention under the aforementioned 

administrative detention decree.

27

 Given the highly centralized nature of the political system in 

Vietnam, the party and the central government are ultimately responsible for the violations of 

religious freedom that continue to take place. Thus far, as the State Department has indicated, 

the central authorities have not taken effective measures to address these violations.28 

2. Violations of Religious Freedom

a. Religious prisoners

Religious groups and others outside Vietnam have identified approximately 100 religious 

adherents who remain in prison or under some form of detention, including house arrest, in 

connection with the exercise of their right to freedom of religion. As of January 2003, as many 

as 70 Montagnards were serving lengthy prison sentences in connection with the February 2001 

protests over land rights and restrictions on religious freedom in the Central Highlands.

29

Eighteen Hoa Hao Buddhists are reportedly either in prison or under house arrest.

30 The 

overseas spokesperson for the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) has stated that there 

are at least 20 UBCV-affiliated monks and lay leaders who are either under house arrest or in reeducation camps or prisons.

31 As many as 20 Hmong Protestants reportedly remain in detention. 

Finally, there are at least 10 Catholic priests and lay adherents who are still imprisoned.32 
5

The most prominent prisoners or detainees include Most Venerable Thich Huyen Quang, 

the UBCV Supreme Patriarch who has been under house arrest without charge for over 20 years; 

Venerable Thich Quang Do of the UBCV; Mr. Le Quang Liem, a Hoa Hao Buddhist leader; and 

Father Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly, a Catholic priest who was detained and sentenced to 15 years 

in prison in October 2001, after he submitted written testimony to the Commission in February 

2001. The State Department has been calling for the release of these individuals, to no avail. In 

January 2003, Fr. Ly’s niece and two nephews were sentenced to lengthy prison sentences for 

forwarding information about his imprisonment and Vietnam’s religious freedom conditions to 

Vietnamese-American journalists in California.33 

Individuals who have been arrested or detained on account of their religious activities are 

often charged with crimes that are unrelated to religion, including, for example, “slandering the 

government,” “disrupting the unity of the people,” and “causing public disorder.” In the 

Commission’s meetings with Vietnamese officials, the latter asserted that these individuals are 

not being punished for their religious beliefs, but rather for breaking the law.34 In response, the 

Commission has consistently pointed out that there are aspects of Vietnamese law, such as the 

vague offenses mentioned above, that Vietnamese officials have used to punish individuals for 

the exercise of internationally protected human rights, including the rights to freedom of 

expression and freedom of religion or belief. 

b. Central Highlands and northwestern provinces

The government intensified its crackdown against Montagnard Christians in the Central 

Highlands in 2002. Since putting down the Central Highlanders’ peaceful protests for land rights 

and religious freedom in February 2001, the government has demonstrated a resolve to ensure 

that similar protests would not be repeated. In the crackdown targeting the Central Highlanders, 

the government has apparently equated the ethnic, cultural, and religious identities of all 

Montagnards with the independence aspirations of a segment of that community, including a 

small faction that advocates violence.35 In fact, the government’s suppression of religious 

freedom is a major factor in the tense relationship between the state and the Montagnards and 

other ethnic minorities. 

According to a credible source, local district officials have entered Montagnard churches 

to openly denounce the congregations for engaging in “illegal foreign activities,” and have 

confiscated church property, including tithes.36 Human Rights Watch reported that local 

authorities have arrested or detained individuals and banned Christmas church services.37 The 

same report also noted that the government has renewed its efforts to force the renunciation of 

Christianity among Central Highlanders, while engaging in a public campaign to denigrate 

Protestant Christianity.38 Finally, the government has refused to recognize a great majority of 

the over 400 Protestant churches in the Central Highlands. Three hundred of these were forced 

to close by the government in the first nine months of 2002, despite written protests from the 

leaders of the Evangelical Church of Vietnam in the south.

39

 

The government continues its crackdown against Hmong Protestants in the northwestern 

provinces.40 In August 2002, Mr. Mua Bua Senh, a Hmong Protestant in Lai Chau province, 

reportedly died as a result of severe and continuous beatings by officials sustained since April 

2001, when 30 officials – public security officials, border police, and political leaders – went to 
6

the man’s village trying to force five Christian families to renounce their faith.41 According to 

the Center for Religious Freedom of Freedom House, four of the families refused and were 

driven out of their homes, and the heads of the families, including Mr. Senh, were beaten.42 In 

December 2002, local authorities in the province of Lai Chau reportedly used noxious gas to 

attack Hmong Christians during a house church worship service.43 

c. Government restrictions on religious communities

These particularly severe violations of religious freedom have taken place as the 

government continues to place restrictions on all religious communities and practitioners, 

registered or otherwise. State and Communist Party officials also interfere in the internal affairs 

of organized religious communities. 

The indigenous Hoa Hao Buddhist and Cao Dai communities are administered by 

government-appointed “management committees” that prevent these communities from 

maintaining their respective observances and practices, and from selecting their leaders 

according to their own requirements, including the celebration of the Hoa Hao founder’s death 

and the use of traditional ceremonies to select Cao Dai leaders. Moreover, the government has 

refused to return confiscated religious properties. A Hoa Hao Buddhist told the Commission 

delegation that the government has refused to permit the publication of all of the founder’s 

writings.44 

 The activities of the banned UBCV and monks who are affiliated with the group are 

restricted. Many UBCV leaders are in prison or under house arrest, while others are subject to 

constant police surveillance, harassment, intimidation, and other restrictions.45 The Commission 

delegation was informed that monks who are able to function as religious leaders, but who have 

either supported or been identified with the UBCV, also face government harassment, including 

interference with their assignments to Buddhist temples and the denial of their requests for the 

construction of new buildings or the repair of old ones.46 These monks are also limited in their 

ability to travel and conduct charitable works. In late 2001, the government arrested several lay 

leaders of the UBCV-affiliated Buddhist Youth Movement after Mr. Ho Tan Anh, one of the 

movement’s leaders, engaged in self-immolation to protest religious repression.47 

A potentially significant development took place in April 2003 with respect to the 

UBCV. In March 2003, the Supreme Patriarch of the UBCV was permitted to receive urgent 

medical treatment in Hanoi.48 While he was recuperating from the surgery, he met with the U.S. 

Ambassador to Vietnam and officials from the European Union. In April 2003, he met the Prime 

Minister of Vietnam, who suggested that his detention and that of Thich Quang Do, the secondranking UBCV leader, were mistakes made by local officials.49 The Prime Minister, however, 

did not indicate that the government would release the two Buddhist monks.50 In addition, the 

Prime Minister reportedly remained adamant that the government of Vietnam would not 

recognize the UBCV. 

With regard to the Catholic Church, the government restricts the number of applicants to 

the six Catholic seminaries operating in Vietnam.51 Government officials, through regular 

“consultation” between the provincial governments and the Catholic dioceses, interfere in the 

ordination and assignment of priests. The government also plays an active role in the selection 
7

of bishops, vetoing papal appointments of which it disapproves. The Church is unable to 

communicate in writing with its parishioners and permission is required to print and distribute a 

newsletter for priests. The government has yet to return many confiscated church buildings.

Although the government has recognized the respective Evangelical Churches of 

Vietnam in the north and the south (ECVNN and ECVNS), it restricts the activities of the two 

organizations. The leaders of both organizations informed the Commission delegation in 

February 2002 that the government has not permitted them to establish seminaries.52 Since then, 

the government of Vietnam granted final approval for the ECVNS to establish a seminary, which 

was reportedly opened in February 2003.53 The government, however, has denied the ECVNN’s 

request to recognize Hmong Christian churches as members of the ECVNN.54 According to one 

of the Commission delegation’s Vietnamese interlocutors, the government has meted out 

punishments, including fines and detention, to those among the ECVNN who secretly provide

religious training to Hmong Christians.55 

Notwithstanding official harassment, Protestant “house churches” in the south have 

experienced tremendous growth in recent years. Many house church leaders have been fined for 

engaging in religious activities. Some have been beaten and jailed. The government has 

opposed the training of new pastors and lay workers, and the police have raided house church 

services and confiscated Bibles and hymnals. The police have also threatened to destroy the 

residences of house church leaders.56 

According to Baha’i representatives in the United States, before 1975 there was an 

estimated 200,000 adherents to the Baha’i faith in Vietnam. After 1975, the government banned 

the Baha’i faith, and some of its leaders were imprisoned while community properties were 

confiscated.57 The government does not recognize the Baha’i faith and the Chairman of the 

Religious Affairs Committee informed the Commission delegation that the government had no 

plans to grant the Baha’is’ request for recognition because, in the government’s view, the 

community does not meet the relevant administrative criteria. However, it is unclear what those 

criteria are or in what aspects the community fails to meet them.58 

D. U.S.-Vietnam Relations

U.S.-Vietnam relations have continued to expand since they were normalized in 1995. 

As a reflection of the growing ties, since 2000, several high-level visits have taken place. In 

November 2000, then-President Bill Clinton became the first U.S. President to visit Vietnam 

since 1969. In July 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Vietnam to attend the 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, during which he met 

privately with Vietnamese officials. In December of that year, Vietnamese Deputy Prime 

Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung visited the United States. In 2002, both Vietnamese Deputy Prime 

Minister Nguyen Manh Cam and Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien visited the United States.59 

 Bilateral economic ties have also deepened. According to the Department of Commerce, 

bilateral trade has grown steadily between 1994 and 2002, when total trade reached almost $3 

billion, nearly twice the amount in 2001.60 At the same time, the U.S. trade deficit with Vietnam 

has reached nearly $2 billion.61 The United States has pledged $33.6 million in bilateral 

assistance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2003.62 In FY2002, total bilateral aid for Vietnam exceeded $30 
8

million, including programs on food assistance ($11 million), HIV/AIDS prevention ($8.5 

million), Fulbright exchanges ($5 million annually), land mine victims and orphans ($3 million), 

technical cooperation with the U.S. Department of Labor ($1.5 million), and technical assistance 

to help Vietnam implement trade reforms ($4.6 million). In 2000, Congress authorized an 

annual budget of $5 million for a new educational exchange program, the “Vietnam Education 

Foundation,” which will begin in 2003 and continue until 2016.63 

The Vietnamese government’s record on human rights, including religious freedom, has 

been an issue in the bilateral relationship.64 Senior U.S. officials, in meetings with their 

Vietnamese counterparts, have raised concerns about the lack of religious freedom and other 

human rights in Vietnam. Secretary Powell, in his private meetings with senior Vietnamese 

officials during the 2001 ASEAN Regional Forum, reportedly raised such concerns, particularly 

with respect to the imprisonment of Fr. Ly. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage also 

raised religious freedom concerns during meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Tan 

Dzung, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Manh Cam, and Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien in 

2001 and 2002.65 In August 2002, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom 

John V. Hanford III visited Vietnam and met with Vietnamese officials to discuss religious 

freedom concerns. In November 2002, U.S. officials also raised religious freedom issues during 

the 10th round of the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral human rights dialogue that took place in Hanoi, 

Vietnam. 

Despite the concerns expressed about the conditions of human rights in Vietnam by highlevel U.S. officials, the government of Vietnam has shown little, if any, progress on this issue. 

In January 2003, following the 10th round of the bilateral human rights dialogue, the State 

Department, in a report to Congress, stated that it was “dissatisfied with the lack of progress 

from these dialogues,”66 and that it “made clear” to the Vietnamese government that the 

continuation of these dialogues would be contingent on “concrete results.”67 In addition, the 

State Department’s report indicated that the Vietnamese government had not made any progress 

on releasing political and religious activists, ending official restrictions on religious activity, and 

respecting the rights, including religious freedom, of ethnic minorities. It also noted an apparent 

deterioration of the religious freedom situation in the Central Highlands.68 

Reflecting the concerns of a number of Members of the U.S. Congress, in April 2003, 

Congressman Christopher Smith introduced the Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2003. Virtually 

the same bill was passed by the House of Representatives just before Congress approved the 

BTA in September 2001. Like the previous bill, the 2003 Act cites the Commission’s findings 

and, among its other provisions, would prohibit increases in U.S. non-humanitarian assistance to 

Vietnam unless the Vietnamese government “has made substantial progress” in its respect for

human rights, including religious freedom.69 

E. Commission Recommendations 

I. Advocate Specific Steps to Advance Religious Freedom and Reform the Legal 

Framework

1. The U.S. government should make clear to the government of Vietnam that 

ending violations of religious freedom is essential to the continued expansion of U.S.-
9

Vietnam relations. In this context, the U.S. government should urge the Vietnamese 

government to:

1.a. halt the arrest, detention, imprisonment, and intimidating surveillance 

of persons on account of their manifestation of religion or belief, including 

members of ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and the northwestern 

provinces; release individuals who are currently so restricted; 

1.b. cease practices that coerce individuals to renounce any religion or belief, 

such as detention, imprisonment, ill treatment, or destruction of residential 

and religious buildings;

1.c. cease bans on religious gatherings in ethnic minority areas, and permit 

religious groups to gather for observances of significant religious holidays as 

determined by those groups, subject only to such limitations as provided in 

international law;

1.d. guarantee the freedom to engage in religious activities (including the 

freedom for religious groups to govern themselves and select their leaders, 

worship publicly, express and advocate religious beliefs, distribute religious 

literature, and conduct educational, charitable, and humanitarian activities) 

outside the government and state-controlled religious organizations, and 

eliminate controls on the activities of officially registered organizations; 

1.e. return confiscated religious properties and cease undue interference 

with the construction of new religious buildings and the repair of existing 

ones;

1.f. permit domestic Vietnamese religious organizations and individuals to 

interact freely with foreign organizations and individuals;

1.g. cease the arbitrary detention of members of ethnic minorities who have 

returned to Vietnam from Cambodia;

1.h. repeal the administrative detention decree that allows for detention of 

up to two years without charge for engaging in “anti-state activity”; and 

1.i. repeal the 1999 Administrative Decree on Religion and ensure that any 

new law on religion meets international standards.

2. The U.S. government should urge the Vietnamese government to establish a 

mechanism for reviewing cases of persons detained under suspicion of, or charged 

with, offenses relating to state security, “anti-state activities,” “slandering the 

government,” “disrupting the unity of the people,” and “causing public disorder.” 

This mechanism should also review cases of detained or imprisoned religious 

leaders, many of whom have been charged with specious criminal offenses.
10

As indicated in this report, Vietnamese government officials continue to commit 

egregious violations of religious freedom, particularly against religious minorities who reside in 

the Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces. Indeed, the government’s intensified 

control of religious affairs is a major factor in the ongoing tension between the state and the 

members of religious minorities. Alleged government documents released by the Center for 

Religious Freedom of Freedom House since November 2000 indicate that the state has a central 

role in the violations of religious freedom in the Central Highlands and the northwestern 

provinces.70 

Under international human rights standards, a government can restrict the freedom to 

manifest religion or belief, but only in ways that are directly proportionate to the actual need to 

promote specific interests, such as the protection of public order, safety, health, and the rights 

and freedoms of others.71 Vietnamese restrictions on religious freedom go well beyond these 

permissible limitations. The U.S. government should urge the Vietnamese government to bring 

its laws and practices into conformity with international standards on the freedom of religion and 

belief, and in particular to eliminate facets of state control of and undue government interference 

with religious groups and the conduct of religious activities. 

Furthermore, a large number of individuals in Vietnam have been detained, imprisoned, 

or otherwise limited in their movements or subjected to surveillance because they manifest their 

religion or belief. These individuals include those who have been charged with, or detained 

under suspicion of, offenses that penalize the manifestation of religion or belief, as well as 

individuals that have been charged with criminal offenses for the purpose of harassing those 

individuals. In order to take meaningful steps to protect the right to freedom of religion and 

belief, the U.S. government should urge the Vietnamese government to review these individual 

cases, and individuals who have been either improperly charged or unjustly confined should be 

released or have such charges dropped, as appropriate.

II. Use U.S. Leverage to Encourage Vietnam to End Religious Freedom Violations 

3. The President should designate Vietnam as a “country of particular concern” in 

accordance with the provisions of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

(IRFA).

Under IRFA, the President or his designee, the Secretary of State, is required to designate 

as “countries of particular concern” (CPCs) those countries the government of which has 

engaged in or tolerated “systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom,” as 

defined in the law.72

As discussed above, since 2001, the already poor conditions of religious freedom in 

Vietnam have deteriorated and the government has increasingly engaged in particularly severe 

violations of religious freedom against members of several religious communities, particularly 

with respect to the religious minorities who reside in the Central Highlands and the northwestern 

provinces. These violations, which include prolonged detention and imprisonment of religious 

leaders and forced renunciation of faith, result from policies on religious affairs reportedly 

sanctioned at the highest levels of the Vietnamese government. In October 2002, the 

Commission recommended that Vietnam be designated a CPC.
11

 In January 2003, the State Department, in a report to the Congress, expressed its 

dissatisfaction with the lack of progress by the government of Vietnam on the release of religious 

prisoners, the cessation of government surveillance and harassment of religious groups, and the 

halting of official restrictions on religious activity, noting an apparent deterioration of religious 

freedom conditions in the Central Highlands.

73 The same report stated that Ambassador-atLarge for International Religious Freedom John V. Hanford III, in his meeting with Vietnamese 

officials during the November 2002 bilateral human rights dialogue, outlined specific actions 

that the government of Vietnam needs to undertake to avoid future CPC designations.74 That list 

of specific actions has not been made public. Nonetheless, by the State Department’s own 

admission, the conditions of human rights, including religious freedom, have not improved since 

November. Yet, the Secretary of State has not designated Vietnam as a CPC. The Commission 

believes that a CPC designation for Vietnam is warranted at this time. The State Department 

does not need to wait until next year’s CPCs are named; Vietnam can be designated at any time 

of the year. 

By all accounts, the U.S.-Vietnam economic relationship continues to grow, particularly 

since the Congress ratified the BTA. A CPC designation for Vietnam would send a strong 

message to the Vietnamese government that a continued crackdown on religious freedom will 

not be ignored or glossed over. Under IRFA, CPC designations must be accompanied by 

appropriate policy responses. IRFA does not, however, dictate what the precise response must 

be in every case. There are many options, since the statute provides an extensive list of policy 

tools of varying intensity from which to choose. 

4. The U.S. Congress should pass and the President should sign the Vietnam 

Human Rights Act of 2003. 

In its May 2001 report, the Commission noted that the approval of the BTA without any 

U.S. action with respect to religious freedom risked worsening the religious freedom situation in 

Vietnam because the government of Vietnam might interpret such an act as a signal of U.S. 

indifference to human rights and religious freedom. In September 2001, immediately preceding 

its ratification of the BTA, the House of Representatives passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act 

of 2001 by a vote of 410 – 1. However, despite an attempt to bring the bill to a vote, the Senate 

did not take any further action during the 107th Congress. 

As mentioned above, in April 2003, Congressman Christopher Smith introduced an 

updated Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2003. Like the previous bill, the Act would condition 

future increases in non-humanitarian bilateral assistance to Vietnam on a Presidential 

certification of demonstrated improvements in the Vietnamese government’s protection of 

religious freedom and other human rights. In the light of the current conditions in Vietnam, the 

passage of this legislation at this time would signal that the U.S. government is not indifferent to 

the Vietnamese government’s deteriorating respect for human rights, including religious 

freedom, and would demonstrate U.S. commitment to advance human rights in Vietnam.

5. The United States should withhold its support for loans to Vietnam from 

international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 

the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), except those providing 

for basic human needs, until the government of Vietnam agrees to make substantial 
12

improvements in the protection of religious freedom, as measured by the standards 

itemized in 1.a through 1.i above.

According to the IMF, the World Bank, and the ADB, between 2001 and 2005, the 

Vietnamese government will receive approximately $1 billion in loans from these international 

financial institutions to further Vietnam’s economic development.75 

In May 2001, the Commission recommended that the U.S. government instruct its 

respective representatives at the IMF and the World Bank to withhold their support for loans to 

the government of Vietnam until that government agrees to make substantial improvements in 

the protection of religious freedom.76 If the United States withholds support for economic aid 

through international financial institutions that primarily benefits the Vietnamese government, 

the United States would demonstrate that it is not indifferent to violations of religious freedom 

and other human rights.

Congress has set down policy guidelines for the withholding of U.S. support for IMF, 

World Bank, or ADB loans on human rights grounds in both the International Financial 

Institutions Act of 1977 and IRFA.77 The severity of the Vietnamese government’s violation of 

religious freedom and its unwillingness to make sustained improvements in the protection of 

religious freedom warrant this action. The United States, as a member of the IMF, World Bank, 

and ADB Executive Boards, should withhold its support for loans to the government of Vietnam 

until that government agrees to make substantial improvements in the protection of religious 

freedom, as measured by the standards set out in recommendation 1. The United States should 

not withhold its support for loans made for the purpose of providing for the basic human needs 

of the Vietnamese people.

6. The U.S. government should take steps to ensure that the annual U.S.-Vietnam 

human rights dialogue involves high-level officials and, along with consideration of 

other human rights, serves as a forum to: (a) communicate U.S. concerns about the 

protection of freedom of religion and belief in Vietnam; (b) review the requirements 

of international human rights standards regarding the right to freedom of religion 

and belief; and (c) establish measurable goals, practical steps for improvement, and 

specific timetables for implementing these steps. To facilitate these goals: 

• the Congress should continue to require the State Department to report to it 

on any progress achieved through the dialogue; and 

• the U.S. government should include the Commission as a formal participant 

in the dialogue. 

The usefulness of any bilateral dialogue as a mechanism for promoting human rights, 

including religious freedom, should be measured by concrete results. To this end, the conditions 

outlined in recommendation 1 could be used to measure the progress of the Vietnamese 

government’s efforts to protect religious freedom. As indicated in this report, the Congress 

requires the State Department to report on the status of the dialogue.78 In an effort to maintain 

transparency of the dialogue and other U.S. efforts to advance human rights in Vietnam, the 

Congress should continue to require the State Department to do so. 
13

Since its establishment, the Commission has met privately with the Vietnamese 

delegations to the bilateral human rights dialogue whenever the dialogue took place in 

Washington, D.C. Meanwhile, the Commission continues to advise the Congress and the State 

Department regarding the conditions of religious freedom in Vietnam. Based on the 

Commission’s various exchanges with Vietnamese government officials, it is clear that the 

government of Vietnam recognizes the Commission as an important U.S. government 

interlocutor on the issue of human rights, particularly with respect to religious freedom. The 

State Department should invite the Commission to become a formal member of the U.S. 

delegation to future sessions of the bilateral human rights dialogue.

7. In its public interventions, discussions, and other activities in multilateral 

institutions, the United States should raise prominently violations of religious 

freedom in Vietnam, particularly in the Central Highlands and northwestern areas 

of the country. 

The United States should intensify its efforts to use appropriate international fora to bring 

attention to the Vietnamese government’s violations of human rights. Moreover, the U.S. 

government, in keeping with its stated policy goal in Asia to support the Association for 

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), should explore further cooperation with the ASEAN Human 

Rights Working Group.79 The United States should encourage the Vietnamese government to 

join the working group by establishing a national human rights organization as a demonstration 

of Vietnam’s commitment to protect human rights, including religious freedom.80

8. The U.S. government should urge the Cambodian government to abide by its 

international commitments and recognize as refugees members of ethnic minorities 

in the Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces, as well as other 

Vietnamese, who have fled that country and who meet international criteria.

In January 2002, the governments of Vietnam and Cambodia and the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reached an agreement regarding the repatriation of 

thousands of Montagnards who had fled to Cambodia in the aftermath of the Vietnamese 

government’s 2001 crackdown in the Central Highlands. That agreement broke down in March 

2002 because the Vietnamese government refused to honor its commitment to provide UNHCR 

personnel regular access to the Central Highlands to monitor the repatriation process.81 

Although the agreement stipulated that repatriated refugees would not experience government 

harassment, international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 

International have called into question the treatment of the Montagnards upon their return to 

Vietnam, alleging that many have been interrogated, detained, and beaten.82 Many repatriated 

Montagnards were reportedly given lengthy prison sentences for “organizing illegal 

migrations.”83 The aforementioned human rights organizations also stated that Cambodian 

officials were complicit in the forced repatriation of Montagnard refugees.84 Since March 2002, 

the Cambodian government has closed two refugee camps that sheltered Montagnard refugees. 

In April 2003, the government of Cambodia announced that it would close the UNHCR refugee 

transit center in Phnom Penh as soon as the few remaining Montagnard refugees are resettled.85 

In addition, there continue to be allegations that the government of Cambodia has permitted 

Vietnamese military or police to enter Cambodia for the purpose of capturing Montagnards 

hiding in Cambodia.86 
14

Montagnards are not the only refugees to experience difficulties in Cambodia. In July 

2002, Thich Tri Luc, a Vietnamese Buddhist monk affiliated with the banned UBCV and who 

was granted refugee status by the UNHCR, disappeared in Cambodia. The International 

Buddhist Information Bureau has expressed the fear that he was abducted by Vietnamese 

officials who were permitted by the Cambodian government to operate in Cambodia.87 In 

August 2002, two Chinese Falun Gong practitioners granted refugee status by the UNHCR were 

deported to China by the Cambodian authorities.88 

Cambodia is a party to both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 

the 1967 Protocol to that convention. Under these treaties, Cambodia is committed not to expel 

or return refugees to a country where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of 

their religion or other protected status. 

The U.S. government should urge the government of Cambodia, in accordance with its 

international commitments, to recognize as refugees members of ethnic minorities in the Central 

Highlands and the northwestern provinces, as well as other Vietnamese, who have fled that 

country and who meet international criteria.

III. Strengthen Monitoring and Reporting of Vietnam’s Human Rights Violations

9. As a part of the annual Congressional review of the Jackson-Vanik waiver for 

Vietnam, the Congress, in conjunction with the Commission, should review 

Vietnam’s human rights practices, including particularly severe violations of 

religious freedom. 

In September 2001, the Congress ratified the BTA, granting Vietnam conditional normal 

trade relations status. However, Vietnam is still subject to the requirements of the JacksonVanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which denies certain trade benefits to countries 

with non-market economies that also have restrictive emigration policies. Under the amendment, 

the President can choose to waive these requirements, which has been done for each of the last 

five years. If the President issues a waiver, the waiver is subject to congressional review. 

As discussed in detail in this report, the conditions of religious freedom in Vietnam have 

deteriorated since Congress ratified the BTA. Specifically with regard to freedom of movement, 

in the last year, numerous reports have provided detailed accounts of the forced repatriation of 

Montagnard refugees who fled to Cambodia, which allegedly involves Vietnamese officials 

operating in Cambodia, as well as the detention and imprisonment of Montagnards who have 

returned to Vietnam.89 

Immediately prior to the ratification of the BTA, the House of Representatives 

unanimously passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2001, which expressed serious concerns 

about the conditions of human rights, including religious freedom in Vietnam. Given the recent 

deterioration in respect to human rights, as well as the failure of the Vietnamese government to 

address U.S. concerns, the Congress should intensify its review of any Presidential JacksonVanik waiver and conduct a thorough, public investigation of the conditions of human rights, 

including religious freedom, in Vietnam. Such efforts would demonstrate that the Congress 
15

remains committed to advancing U.S. policy to promote human rights in Vietnam alongside the 

great expansion of bilateral trade that was unleashed by the approval of the BTA.

10. The U.S. government should urge the Vietnamese government to provide U.S. 

and other foreign government officials, human rights and humanitarian groups, 

international organizations, and journalists regular and unhindered access to 

members of all religious communities in Vietnam, particularly those in the Central 

Highlands and the northwestern provinces. The international affairs and trade 

committees of the Congress should send delegations to visit the Central Highlands 

and the northwestern provinces. 

The government of Vietnam has provided U.S. government officials, international 

organizations, journalists, and international human rights and humanitarian organizations very 

limited access to the Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces to assess the nature and 

extent of human rights violations there. The Commission’s request to visit these areas was 

denied. According to the State Department, since then-U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Pete 

Peterson’s visit to three Central Highland provinces in July 2001, which took place in the 

aftermath of the February 2001 protests, U.S. diplomats have visited the region on at least eight 

occasions. Yet, each time, U.S. officials encountered resistance from and were restricted by 

local officials. In March 2003, a senior Department of State official stated that the U.S. 

government has been “frustrated at the Vietnamese government’s refusal to allow [it] reasonable 

access to the region for further investigation.”90 This lack of access is a significant obstacle to 

gaining a more complete picture of the situation in the Central Highlands and the northwestern 

provinces. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Freedom House, and other human 

rights organizations have provided extensive accounts, based on interviews conducted outside 

these regions, detailing numerous allegations of serious government violations of human rights, 

including egregious violations of religious freedom. Yet the full scope of those violations is not 

known. 

Representatives of foreign governments and international organizations who visited 

Vietnam to assess its human rights conditions have regularly cited the government’s interference 

with their work, including the members of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and 

the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, who visited Vietnam in 1994 and 

1998, respectively. The Commission delegation that visited Vietnam in February 2002 had 

similar experiences. 

The U.S. government should press the government of Vietnam to provide unfettered 

access to all parts of Vietnam. The United States should also urge the government of Vietnam to 

invite the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 

Religion or Belief for return visits that will be conducted with full and unhindered access. Other 

UN rapporteurs, including those concerning the right to freedom of expression and internally 

displaced persons, should also be invited. Furthermore, the Vietnamese government should 

ensure that individuals who cooperate with human rights investigators do not suffer any 

harassment or punishment as a result of that cooperation.
16

IV. Support Programs to Advance Freedom of Religion in Vietnam

11. The U.S. government should take the steps necessary to overcome the jamming 

of Radio Free Asia (RFA) broadcasts and the blocking of the RFA Internet site in 

Vietnam. The U.S. government should also urge the Vietnamese government to 

allow RFA personnel into the country. 

Currently, Radio Free Asia (RFA) has daily programs in the Vietnamese language that 

are transmitted to the people of Vietnam. RFA programs focus on news about Vietnam, 

including issues pertaining to religious freedom and other human rights. As the RFA President 

has stated, the goal of the service is “to bring news and information about their own country to 

populations denied the benefits of freedom of information by their governments.”91 

The government of Vietnam has continuously interfered with RFA broadcasts into 

Vietnam, and has begun to block access to the RFA Internet site. In addition, the government of 

Vietnam continues to deny RFA personnel access to the country. While RFA broadcasts face 

active interference from the Vietnamese government, Vietnam’s state television and radio 

programs are transmitted unhindered on a daily basis, via Cuba and Canada, to the United 

States.92 In February 2003, Representatives Ed Royce and Zoe Lofgren introduced the Freedom 

of Information in Vietnam Act, which calls for the United States to increase its funding to RFA 

in order to take the necessary steps to overcome the Vietnamese government’s jamming of 

RFA’s broadcasts and interference with access to the RFA Internet site.93 These problems are 

also addressed in the Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2003.

Given that RFA is an important vehicle to deliver objective news and information about 

religious freedom and other human rights in Vietnam,94 the U.S. government should take steps to 

overcome the Vietnamese government’s interference with RFA broadcasts, its Internet site and 

access to the country by its personnel, and continue to support RFA human rights programming.

12. The U.S. government should, through its foreign assistance and exchange 

programs, support individuals in Vietnam who advocate human rights, including 

religious freedom, the rule of law, and legal reform. It should also support 

exchanges between Vietnamese religious communities and U.S. religious and other 

non-governmental organizations concerned with religious freedom in Vietnam. 

The Vietnamese government generally prohibits the establishment of indigenous, 

independent human rights, humanitarian, and other such organizations, although there are 

individuals in Vietnam who advocate legal reform and greater protections of human rights, 

including religious freedom. These persons come from several areas of Vietnamese society, 

including academia, the legal profession, the ranks of journalists, and religious communities. 

Many of the most prominent advocates are former senior Communist Party officials, the 

government, and the military. Together, these individuals have called for the state to respect the 

human rights of Vietnamese citizens, as well as greater democracy in Vietnam. 

The U.S. government maintains an extensive network of exchange programs vis-à-vis 

Vietnam. For example, according to Ambassador Burghardt, the Fulbright Exchange Program in 

Vietnam is the largest Fulbright program in the Asia-Pacific region.95 The U.S. government 
17

should ensure that its foreign assistance and exchange programs support those Vietnamese who 

are working to advance human rights, including religious freedom.

 

1

 Center for Religious Freedom, “Vietnamese Gas Church Service,” Freedom House, March 28, 

2003 (http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/news/bn2003/bn-2003-03-28.htm, accessed April 1, 

2003).

2

 A credible source provided the Commission with a copy of central government instructions, 

dated October 2002, regarding the government’s crackdown against Montagnards who advocate 

independence, known as “Dega.” See also Center for Religious Freedom, Directions for 

Stopping Religion, Freedom House, November 2000 

(http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/country/vietnam/vietnam_index.htm, accessed April 1, 

2003).

3

 U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Department of State Report to Congress on the 

Government of Vietnam’s Progress Toward Improved Human Rights For the Period August 

2001 – December 2002, January 8, 2003.

4

 The Australian government held its first bilateral human rights dialogue with the government of 

Vietnam in May 2002, and the European Union’s latest human rights dialogue with Vietnam 

took place in December 2002. European Parliament (EP) members have been particularly 

outspoken on the issue of human rights in Vietnam. Mr. Olivier Dupuis, an EP member, visited 

Vietnam in June 2001, when he staged a sit-in in the pagoda to which Thich Quang Do has been 

confined to protest the government’s arbitrary detention of the UBCV leader. He was 

subsequently arrested and expelled from the country. See International Buddhist Information 

Bureau, “European MP stages sit-in inside Thanh Minh Zen Monastery,” June 6, 2001. David 

Brunnstrom, “Euro MP Said Arrested in Protest Over Vietnam Monk,” Reuters, June 6, 2001. 

5

 The Commission extends its appreciation to the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vietnam for its 

assistance in connection with this visit.

6

 U.S. Department of State, Background Notes, “Vietnam,” July 2001 

(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/4130.htm, accessed February 28, 2003).

7

 U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2002, 

“Vietnam,” October 2002 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2002/13916pf.htm, accessed 

February 28, 2003).

8

 Interview with former missionary in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2003. Vietnamese 

house church leaders in HCMC told the Commission delegation that there were between 400,000 

and 500,000 Protestant Christians in southern Vietnam who practice their faith in over 1,000 

house churches. Interview with house church leaders, HCMC, February 26, 2002. 

9

2002 International Religious Freedom Reports, “Vietnam,” (Internet).
18

 

10 2002 International Religious Freedom Reports, “Vietnam,” (Internet).

11 National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is in the United States, “Situation of Baha’is in Laos 

and Vietnam,” November 21, 2001.

12 2002 International Religious Freedom Reports, “Vietnam,” (Internet).

13 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Constitution of Vietnam (1992), art. 4. 

14 Ibid., art. 9. 

15 Freedom House, Directions for Stopping Religion, (Internet). The Fatherland Front serves as 

the Communist Party’s “link” with Vietnamese citizens, including non-Communist Party 

members. In that role, it controls several hundred center-level, and provincial- and municipallevel mass organizations throughout Vietnam. It plays an important role in determining the 

state’s policies with respect to different social-political issues, including religious affairs. See 

Zachary Abuza, Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam, 2001, 20. 

16 Voice of Vietnam, “Communist Party of Vietnam issues communiqué on seventh plenum,” 

BBC, January 23, 2003.

17 Ibid.

18 Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Decree of the Government Concerning Religious Activities 

(April 19, 1999), trans. Stephen Denney. [Translated from Vietnamese to French by Eglise 

D’Asie.]

19 Ibid., arts. 14.

20 Ibid., arts. 20, 21.

21 Ibid., arts. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26.

22 Ibid., art. 11, sec. 3 states, “The buildings, land and other items transmitted by these 

organizations or by religious officials to the organs of the State for it to manage and use, in 

application of the political line of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of the Provisional 

Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, or of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, or given 

or offered to the State, are now the property of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”

23 Interview with Chairman of the Religious Affairs Committee, February 22, 2002.

24 During the Commission delegation’s meeting with Vietnamese Justice Ministry officials, 

Vietnamese officials asserted that individuals placed on administrative detention are permitted 

to leave home for work, as long as they report regularly to provincial officials. Interview with 

Justice Ministry officials, February 22, 2002. 

25 Government of Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Administrative Detainment Policy, art. 1 and 2. 
19

 

UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Civil and Political Rights, Including the 

Question of Religious Intolerance, E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.2, December 29, 1998, ¶¶ 17, 18, 19. 

Regarding Government Decree 31, the Human Rights Committee has recommended that

Vietnam “ensure that no persons are subjected to arbitrary restriction of their liberty and that all 

persons deprived of their liberty are promptly brought before a judge or other officer authorized 

to exercise judicial power by law, and that they can only be deprived of their liberty on the basis 

of a judgment based on law, as required by article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Covenant 

(ICCPR).” UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 

Committee, CCPR/CO/75/VNM, July 26, 2002, ¶ 8.

26 UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, Civil and Political Rights, Including the 

Question of Religious Intolerance, E/CN.4/1999/58/Add.2, December 1998.

27 Government of Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Administrative Detainment Policy (Attached to 

Directive No. 31/CP), provided by Human Rights Watch.

28 U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Department of State Report to Congress on the 

Government of Vietnam’s Progress Toward Improved Human Rights For the Period August 

2001 – December 2002. 

29 Human Rights Watch, “New Assault on Rights in Vietnam’s Central Highlands: Crackdown 

on Indigenous Montagnards Intensifies,” January 2003. The Human Rights Watch report 

provided a list of Montagnard political and religious prisoners. The three most common charges 

were “undermining national unity,” “destabilizing public security,” and “organizing ‘illegal 

migrations.’” In April 2002, Human Rights Watch also published a report that provided an indepth analysis of the causes of the tension between the Vietnamese government and the Central 

Highlanders. Human Rights Watch, “Repression of Montagnards,” April 23, 2002. Amnesty 

International has also reported on the plight of the Montagnards. See Amnesty International, 

“No sanctuary: The plight of the Montagnard minority,” December 18, 2002. This report 

includes a section of religious repression in the Central Highlands as well as a list of Montagnard 

prisoners. The International Christian Concern also reported on the ongoing repression of 

Montagnard Christians in the Central Highlands. See International Christian Concern, “ICC 

Fact-Finding Mission to Vietnam: Persecution and Harassment Continues,” April 29, 2003. 

30 Central Council of Administrators of Hoa Hao Buddhist Church, “New List of Hoa Hao 

Buddhists in Prison and Under House Arrest,” September 2002.

31 International Buddhist Information Bureau, “Partial list of Buddhists in prison and under house 

arrest,” July 2002.

32 This information was provided to the Commission staff by various U.S.-based Vietnamese 

religious organizations that wish to remain unnamed.

33 Associated Press, “Three relatives of jailed dissident priest charged with espionage,” January 

24, 2003. Amnesty International, “Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: The espionage case against 

the nephews and niece of Father Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly,” April 10, 2003. Amnesty 
20

 

International, “Viet Nam: Crackdown on dissent continues,” April 10, 2003. 

34 Similar statements have been repeated in meetings with the Commission delegation in 

Vietnam and in the Commission’s meeting with the Vietnamese delegation to the November 

2002 U.S.-Vietnam human rights dialogue.

35 Human Rights Watch, “New Assault on Rights in Vietnam’s Central Highlands: Crackdown 

on Indigenous Montagnards Intensifies.” Human Rights Watch, “Repression of Montagnards.” 

The ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces of Vietnam have a 

long history of strained relationship with the ethnic Vietnamese and successive governments, 

including during French rule and during the Vietnam War. After 1975, the relationship between 

the Communist regime and the Montagnards in the Central Highlands was further strained by the 

mass migration of ethnic Vietnamese into the region, at times encouraged and approved by the 

government. These migrants came to occupy lands traditionally held by ethnic minorities. 

Furthermore, the fact that ethnic minorities constitute approximately two-thirds of the Protestant 

population in Vietnam introduced another volatile element into the already tense relationship. 

36 Interview with a former missionary in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2003.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid. The International Christian Concern claimed that as of March 2003, only two 

Montagnard churches in the province of Dak Lak remained open out of the original 417. See 

International Christian Concern, “Vietnamese Church Under Severe Persecution, Only Two 

House Churches Remain Open in the Central Highlands,” March 18, 2003. 

40 Center for Religious Freedom, “Vietnam Police Rape, Beat, and Imprison Hmong Christians,” 

Freedom House, April 28, 2003 (http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/news/bn2003/bn-2003-

04-28.htm, accessed April 29, 2003).

41 Center for Religious Freedom, “Hmong Christian killed for faith in Vietnam last summer; U.S. 

should hold Vietnam accountable at upcoming bilateral human rights meeting,” Freedom House, 

November 7, 2002 (http://www.freedomhouse.org/religion/news/bn2002/bn-2002-11-07.htm, 

accessed March 6, 2003).

42 Ibid. The authorities reportedly forced their way into their houses and threw all of their 

personal property out of the house. Mr. Senh was reportedly beaten several more times in 

November 2001. He was taken to several clinics and hospitals, including Military Hospital No. 

103 in Hanoi, but to no avail. His condition continued to deteriorate and he died on August 7, 

2002. 

43 Freedom House, “Vietnamese Gas Church Service,” (Internet).

44 Telephone interview with detained Hoa Hao leader in Ho Chi Minh City, February 2002.
21

 

45 Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, Violations of Civil and Political Rights in the Socialist 

Republic of Vietnam: Alternative Report on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights, July 2002.

46 Interviews with Buddhist leaders, February 2002. 2002 International Religious Freedom 

Reports, “Vietnam,” (Internet).

47 Violations of Civil and Political Rights in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, July 2002. 2002 

International Religious Freedom Reports, “Vietnam,” (Internet).

48 In March 2003, European Union representatives and U.S. diplomats met the Supreme Patriarch 

in Hanoi, where he underwent medical treatment. There was some initial concern on the part of 

the UBCV’s overseas spokesperson that the government intended to confine him either to Hanoi 

or to a village outside from his current place of confinement after he sent a letter to the 

government leadership questioning the reason for his detention and that of Thich Quang Do, and 

calling for the government to recognize the UBCV’s “legitimate status” and to re-establish the 

organization’s “freedom of religious activities.” See International Buddhist Information Bureau, 

“Buddhist leader Thich Huyen Quang faces hardships in Hanoi after issuing a statement calling 

for the re-establishment of the banned UBCV,” March 28, 2003. Meanwhile, the government 

continues to claim that the Supreme Patriarch is not under house arrest. On March 21, 2003, the 

Vietnamese Embassy in the United States provided a statement about the Supreme Patriarch’s 

medical procedure and noted that a “delegation from the European Union” and “[a] diplomat 

from the U.S. Embassy in Hanoi” visited him during his recuperation. According to the State 

Department, the President of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and the representatives of the 

government-sanctioned Buddhist Church of Vietnam also visited the Supreme Patriarch. 

49 International Buddhist Information Bureau, “Vietnam Prime Minister Phan Van Khai holds 

talks with Patriarch Thich Huyen Quang in Hanoi on the situation of the banned Unified 

Buddhist Church of Vietnam,” April 2, 2003. 

50 Ibid. See also Vietnam Committee on Human Rights, “Despite landmark meeting between 

Prime Minister Phan Van Khai and dissident Buddhist leader Thich Huyen Quang, Vietnam 

Committee on Human Rights condemns on-going assault on freedom of expression and religion 

in Vietnam,” April 22, 2003.

51 Interviews with Vietnamese Catholic bishops, Vietnam, February 2002.

52 Interviews with Vietnamese Protestant leaders, Vietnam, February 2002.

53 Vietnamese Embassy in the United States, “The facts about human rights and religious 

freedom in Vietnam,” April 8, 2003.

54 Interview with Vietnamese Protestant leader, Vietnam, February 2002.

55 Interview with Vietnamese Protestant leader, Vietnam, February 2002.
22

 

56 Interviews with Vietnamese Protestant leaders, Vietnam, February 2002. Interview with 

Vietnamese Protestant leader, Washington, D.C., October 2002.

57 Baha’i Assembly in the United States, “Situation of Baha’is in Laos and Vietnam,” November 

21, 2001.

58 2002 International Religious Freedom Reports, “Vietnam,” (Internet).

59 Ambassador Burghardt, “Remarks at the Asia Society,” January 21, 2003 

(http://hanoi.usembassy.gov/wwwhamb030121.html, accessed April 23, 2003).

60 U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Trade Balance with Vietnam,” February 20, 2003 

(http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5520.html, accessed February 25, 2003).

61 Ibid.

62 Mark E. Manyin, “The Vietnam-U.S. Normalization Process,” Issue Brief for Congress, March 

19, 2003, 8.

63 Ambassador Raymond Burghardt, “Remarks at the Asia Society,” (Internet). This initiative 

provides fellowships for Vietnamese students to pursue graduate and post-graduate studies in the 

United States in the physical, natural, and environmental sciences, mathematics, technology, and 

medicine. It also assists U.S. citizens in obtaining teaching opportunities in Vietnam. See U.S. 

Department of Education, “Vietnam Education Foundation Appoints Executive Director,” March 

17, 2003 (http://www.ed.gov/PressReleases/03-2003/03172003.html, accessed April 15, 2003).

64 Ambassador Raymond Burghardt, “Remarks at the Asia Society,” (Internet). In his 

speech, Ambassador Burghardt said: 

“Human rights is an issue...that deeply and genuinely concerns the American people as a 

whole....Our values, our views on this subject, will probably always be different from 

those of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Nor do we even see the freedoms spelled out 

in Vietnam's own Constitution applied across the board within the country. [The various 

freedoms, including the] freedom of belief and of religion are guaranteed in the 

Constitution, but “in accordance with the provisions of the law.” The kicker is that 

anything that “undermines national solidarity” – such as criticism of the Party or its 

leaders, or suggestions of the desirability for a multi-party system-is not covered by 

freedom of speech....

“So we have some differences on human rights, and [they] impede the development of an even 

better bilateral relationship. But we also recognize that Vietnam has largely abandoned its 

previous approach of uniformly insisting that these are “internal affairs” in which the U.S. and 

other countries have no right to intervene. We now have an annual official dialogue during 

which we discuss our differences and offer candid assessments. We held this year’s dialogue in 

November in Washington. We for the first time were able to include representatives from the 

Ministries of Public Security and Justice as well as Foreign Affairs folks. On the religious front, 
23

 

last year Vietnam welcomed a delegation from the U.S. Commission for International Religious 

Freedom in February and the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom in August. 

Vietnam also joined the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2001 and is already canvassing for 

support for re-election to another three-year term.”

65 Assistant Foreign Minister Le Vang Bang informed Commissioner Shea and the Commission 

staff about the meeting between Deputy Secretary Armitage and Deputy Prime Minister Dzung 

during Assistant Foreign Minister Bang’s December 2001 meeting with the Commission. 

Information regarding Deputy Secretary Armitage’s meetings with Deputy Prime Minister Cam 

and Foreign Minister Nien was confirmed by the State Department’s Vietnam Desk Officer. 

66 House International Relations Committee, U.S. Department of State Report to Congress on the 

Government of Vietnam’s Progress Toward Improved Human Rights For the Period August 

2001 – December 2002. 

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 H.R. 1587, “Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2003,” April 3, 2003.

70 Freedom House, Directions for Stopping Religion, (Internet).

71 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 29; International Covenant on Civil 

and Political Rights, Art. 18 (3); UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 

and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Art. 1 (3).

72 See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA), § 402 (b)(1)(A), 22 U.S.C. § 6442 

(b)(1)(A). “Particularly severe violations of religious freedom” are defined in IRFA § 3 (11), 22 

U.S.C. § 6402 (11) as:

“systematic, ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom, including violations such as –

(A) torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged detention 

without charges; (C) causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine 

detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security 

of persons” (emphasis added).

73 U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Department of State Report to Congress on the 

Government of Vietnam’s Progress Toward Improved Human Rights For the Period August 

2001 – December 2002. 

74 Ibid. 

75 International Monetary Fund, “IMF Approves US$368 Million PRGF Arrangement for 

Vietnam,” April 6, 2001. Asian Development Bank, “ADB Lending Program to Vietnam Will 

Average US$280 million Annually,” August 22, 2002. Report of the United States Commission 
24

 

on International Religious Freedom, May 1, 2001, 147. 

76 Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, May 2001, 147.

77 Sec. 701, International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 (IFIA), 22 U.S.C. § 262d; IRFA § 

405(a)(12), 22 U.S.C. § 6445. The IFIA stipulates that the U.S. government shall take actions to 

“advance the cause of human rights,” such as withholding support for non-humanitarian loans to 

countries “whose governments engage in a pattern of gross violations of internationally 

recognized human rights,” including “particularly severe violations of religious freedom,” as 

defined by IRFA. In addition, the Gramm Amendment to the Bretton Woods Agreements Act 

mandates U.S. opposition to IMF credits to communist regimes, such as Vietnam. See 22 U.S.C. 

§ 286aa. 

78 Section 702 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 requires the State 

Department to 

“Not later than December 31 of each year or 60 days after the second United States-Vietnam 

human rights dialogue meeting held in a calendar year, whichever is earlier, the Secretary shall 

submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report covering the issues discussed at the 

previous two meetings and describing to what extent the Government of Vietnam has made

progress during the calendar year toward achieving the following objectives:

(1) Improving the Government of Vietnam’s commercial and criminal codes to bring 

them into conformity with international standards, including the repeal of the 

Government of Vietnam’s administrative detention decree (Directive 31/CP).

(2) Releasing political and religious activists who have been imprisoned or otherwise 

detained by the Government of Vietnam, and ceasing surveillance and harassment of 

those who have been released.

(3) Ending official restrictions on religious activity, including implementing the 

recommendations of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance.

(4) Promoting freedom for the press, including freedom of movement of members of the 

Vietnamese and foreign press.

(5) Improving prison conditions and providing transparency in the penal system of 

Vietnam, including implementing the recommendations of the United Nations Working 

Group on Arbitrary Detention.

(6) Respecting the basic rights of indigenous minority groups, especially in the central 

and northern highlands of Vietnam.

(7) Respecting the basic rights of workers, including working with the International 

Labor Organization to improve mechanisms for promoting such rights.
25

 

(8) Cooperating with requests by the United States to obtain full and free access to 

persons who may be eligible for admission to the United States as refugees or 

immigrants, and allowing such persons to leave Vietnam without being subjected to 

extortion or other corrupt practices.”

79 Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, “Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center,” 

December 11, 2002. In his speech, Assistant Secretary Kelly stated that the United States 

“want[s] to work with ASEAN in the areas of good governance, rule of law, investment and 

development policies, democratization, and civil society, on the belief that these values are the 

foundation of a modern, pluralistic society.” Since the Human Rights Working group was 

established in 1996, it has made some progress with respect to the creation of a permanent 

human rights mechanism in Southeast Asia. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and 

Singapore have established national working groups to participate in the Working Group. Burma 

is reportedly considering the establishment of a national working group. Correspondence with 

Professor Carlos Medina, Secretary General of the ASEAN Human Rights Working Group, 

March 31, 2003.

80 Ibid. Professor Medina stated that Vietnam has established a “focal point” within the 

government liaise with the Working Group. 

81 Amnesty International, “No sanctuary: The plight of the Montagnard minority.”

82 Human Rights Watch, “New Assault on Rights in Vietnam’s Central Highlands: Crackdown 

on Indigenous Montagnards Intensifies.”

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Human Rights Watch, “Vietnam: New Documents Reveal Escalating Repression,” April 21, 

2003.

86 Amnesty International, “No sanctuary: The plight of the Montagnard minority.”

87 Agence France Presse, “Human Rights Watch appeals to Cambodia PM over missing monk,” 

August 6, 2002.

88 Reuters, “UN objects to Cambodia Falun Gong deportations,” August 20, 2002. After the 

UNHCR lodged its protest, the Cambodian national police chief reportedly stated that the 

government was unaware that the two Chinese refugees were under UNHCR protection. He said 

that the two individuals were deported as “illegal immigrants” and at the “request of the Chinese 

Embassy” in Phnom Penh. See Associated Press, “Cambodia police admit deporting Falun 

Gong members, but say they were unaware of U.N. protection,” August 29, 2002.

89 Amnesty International, “No sanctuary: The plight of the Montagnard minority.” Human 

Rights Watch, “New Assault on Rights in Vietnam’s Central Highlands: Crackdown on 
26

 

Indigenous Montagnards Intensifies.”

90 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew P. Daley, “U.S. Interests and Policy Priorities in 

Southeast Asia,” Statement before the House International Relations Committee, March 26, 

2003.

91 Radio Free Asia, “A Message from the RFA President” (http://www.rfa.org/front/about/, 

accessed April 7, 2003).

92 Commission staff correspondence with RFA personnel, April 8, 2003.

93 H.R. 1019, “Freedom of Information in Vietnam Act of 2003,” February 27, 2003.

94 The International Broadcasting Bureau estimates that, despite government jamming, 

approximately 4 percent of Vietnamese adults listen regularly to RFA broadcasts. Also 

according to RFA officials, the RFA Internet site registers thousands of hits from Vietnam on a 

daily basis despite the government’s efforts to block the site. Correspondence with Radio Free 

Asia’s Director of Vietnam Services, April 8, 2003.

95 Ambassador Raymond Burghardt, “Remarks at the Asia Society,” (Internet).