alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 65**  **10**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. SPENCER PETERS, a/k/a Smoke , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Richmond
. Robert E. Payne , Senior District Judge. ( 3:08

- cr - 00186

- REP

- RCY

- 2 ; 3:12

- cv - 0012 8

- REP

RCY )

Submitted : August 27, 2015 Decided: August 31, 2015

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Spencer Peters, Appellant Pro Se. Peter Sinclair Duffey, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not bind ing precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Spencer Peters seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ( 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealabilit y. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (20 12 ). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (20 12 ). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner sa tisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutio nal right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that
Peters has not made the requisite showing. On appeal, we confine our review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Becaus e Peters’ informal brief does not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, Peters has forfeited appellate review of the3 court’s order. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral
argu ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
§ 27.109 Conduct of sale. ( a ) The foreclosure sale shall be conducted in a manner and at a time and place as identified in the Notice of Default and Foreclosure Sale and in accordance with the provisions of the Statute.
( b ) In addition to bids made in person at the sale, the foreclosure commissioner shall accept written one-price sealed bids from any party, including the Secretary, for entry by announcement at the sale so long as those bids conform to the requirements described in the Notice of Default and Foreclosure Sale. The foreclosure commissioner shall announce the name of each such bidder and the amount of the bid. The commissioner shall accept oral bids from any party, including parties who submitted one-price sealed bids, if those oral bids conform to the requirements in the Notice of Default and Foreclosure Sale. Before the close of the sale the commissioner shall announce the amount of the high bid and the name of the successful bidder. If the successful bidder fails to comply with the terms of the sale, the HUD Field Office representative will provide instructions to the commissioner about offering the property to the second highest bidder, or having a new sale, or other instruction at the discretion of the HUD representative.
( c ) *Prohibited participants.* Relatives of the foreclosure commissioner who may not bid include parents, siblings, spouses and children. A related business entity that may not bid or whose employees may not bid is one whose relationship (at the time the foreclosure commissioner is designated and during the term of service as foreclosure commissioner) with the entity of the foreclosure commissioner is such that, directly or indirectly, one entity formulates, directs, or controls the other entity; or has the power to formulate, direct, or control the other entity; or has the responsibility and authority to prevent, or promptly to correct, the offensive conduct of the other entity.
( d ) *Auctioneers.* If the commissioner employs an auctioneer to conduct the foreclosure sale, the auctioneer must be a licensed auctioneer, an officer of State or local government, or any other person who commonly conducts foreclosure sales in the area in which the security property is located.
#### Addie West, Respondent, v. L. J. F. Corp., Appellant.

Motion by defendant for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division denied, without costs. Beldock, Acting P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Christ and Pette, JJ., concur.
#### § 1007.1 Purpose.

This part provides the requirements and procedures that apply to loan guarantees for Native Hawaiian Housing under section 184A of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992. Section 184A permits HUD to guarantee an amount not to exceed 100 percent of the unpaid principal and interest that is due on an eligible loan. The purpose of section 184A and this part is to provide access to sources of private financing to Native Hawaiian families who otherwise could not acquire housing financing because of the unique legal status of the Hawaiian Home Lands or as a result of a lack of access to private financial markets.
### §7375. Authorization of appropriations

(a) There is authorized to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 1981 and 1982 not to exceed $10,000,000 for loans under section 402 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 [16 U.S.C. 2702], in addition to any amounts authorized for such loans by that Act; and the amounts appropriated pursuant to this subsection shall remain available until expended.

(b) There is authorized to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 1981 and 1982 not to exceed $100,000,000 for loans under section 403 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 [16 U.S.C. 2703]; and the amounts appropriated pursuant to this subsection shall remain available until expended.

(c) There is authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal year 1981 not to exceed $10,000,000 to carry out section 7374 of this title (relating to energy self-sufficiency initiatives).

(Pub. L. 96–294, title IV, §409, June 30, 1980, 94 Stat. 719.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

That Act, referred to in subsec. (a), is Pub. L. 95–617, Nov. 9, 1978, 92 Stat. 3117, known as the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 2601 of Title 16, Conservation, and Tables.
### SUBCHAPTER II—TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WATER WORKS
#### CARTHANIEL BALDWIN *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 24602)

Lavery, C. J., and McLachlan and Graendel, Js.

Submitted on briefs April 1, 2005

officially released June *7,*2005

*Brian D. Russell,*special public defender, filed a brief for the appellant (petitioner).

*Frederick W. Fawcett,*supervisory assistant state’s attorney, filed a brief for the appellee (respondent).

*Opinion*

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Carthaniel Baldwin, appeals following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court *503denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner was convicted, following a trial to a jury, of two counts of sale of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 2 la-277 (a) and one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (a). The petitioner also was found guilty of being a subsequent offender. He was given an effective sentence of forty-four years incarceration. Our Supreme Court upheld the petitioner’s conviction. See *State*v. *Baldwin,*224 Conn. 347, 618 A.2d 513 (1993).

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly (1) denied his petition for certification to appeal and (2) concluded that his trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance that was prejudicial to him. In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged several ways in which counsel’s assistance was ineffective. In this court, the petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly determined that his counsel provided effective assistance. He supports that contention by alleging that his counsel failed (1) to investigate the clothing he was wearing on the day of the crime and (2) to inform him that the state intended to charge him as a subsequent offender and would use a plea he had entered pursuant to the *Alford*doctrine,1 prior to the crimes at issue, as part of its proof. Before we may reach those claims, however, the petitioner must demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal.

After a careful review of the record and briefs, we conclude that the petitioner has not demonstrated that the issues he raises are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different *504manner or that the questions raised deserve encouragement to proceed further. See *Lozada*v. *Deeds,*498 U.S. 430, 431-32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991); *Simms*v. *Warden,*230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994).

The appeal is dismissed.

1

 See *North Carolina*v. *Alford,*400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Uni

ted 

Stat

es D

istr

ict C

ourt

For t

he N

orth

ern 

Dis

trict

 of C

alifo

rnia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PENNY BENDER, 

Plaintiff,

    v.

HARTFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,as Administrator and Fiduciary of theBertelsmann, Inc. Employee Protection PlanNumber 503; BERTELSMANN, INC.EMPLOYEE PROTECTION PLAN NUMBER503,

Defendants.                                                                      /

No. C 09-1163 MMC

ORDER OF REFERENCE TOMAGISTRATE JUDGE

By separate order filed concurrently herewith, the Court has granted plaintiff Penny

Bender’s motion to re-open discovery for the limited purpose of deposing Bruce Luddy,

Director of Litigation and Appeals for Hartford Life Insurance and Accident Company.  All

future discovery matters in the above-entitled action are hereby REFERRED to a

Magistrate Judge to be heard and considered at the convenience of the assigned

Magistrate Judge's calendar.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2010                                                  MAXINE M. CHESNEYUnited States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01163-MMC   Document 43   Filed 04/27/10   Page 1 of 1

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2018-03-12T21:24:16-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ULY 14, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1142 6 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 03-00246-CV-4 LINDA L. HIOTT, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us WAL-MART STORES, INC., De fendant-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (July 14, 200 5) Be fo re BI RC H , BA RKE T T a nd C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M: Plaintiff L inda L. Hiott app eals th e judgm ent of t he district court, ar guin g that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in gr an tin g D ef

en da nt W al -M ar

t S tor es , Inc . ’ s m oti on f

or2

sum m ar y j udgm en t. W e ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t e ve n i f we a ssu m e the sta ck ed pic tur es that i nj ur ed

P la int if f pr es en te d aha zard , the re is no e vid en ce that the Defen da nt ha d supe rio r kn owl ed ge of t he ha zard . See Metts v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 604 S. E . 2d 235, 237 (G a. Ct . App. 200 4) ; F oodm axv . F

le m ing , 465 S . E . 2d 4 89, 490 (G a. Ct. App. 1995 ). T he j udgm ent of the district court is, theref ore, AFFIRMED.
#### Barbara H. Stern, Respondent, v. Bernard H. Stern, Appellant.

In an action for a separation, the defendant husband appeals, as limited by his notice of appeal and further limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated March 2, 1960, as provides for the support and maintenance of the infant daughter of the parties. Judgment modified on the law' and the facts by striking out its fifth decretal paragraph relating to the daughter’s support. As thus modified, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the Special Term for further proceedings consistent herewith. The proof adduced fails to show a sufficient basis for directing the payment of boarding school and summer camp expenses of the daughter, particularly since the mother resides in a one-family house which, so far as appears, would be suitable for the daughter. Experience shows that a provision for payment by the father of bills submitted by the mother is too indefinite to be fairly enforcible; and that such practice tends to promote unnecessary disputes and legal proceedings. A provision for payment of a definite amount of money for support, maintenance and education of a child is more desirable where it is justified by the evidence. Beldock, Acting P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 18

- 00419

- CV

I N RE J.W. §

§

§

§

§ Original Proceeding

On Appeal from the 158th District Court

of Denton County (15

- 02463

- 16)

May 23 , 2019

Opinion by Justice Kerr

JUDGMENT

This co urt conditionally grants relator’s mandamus petition

. We direct the trial

court to vacate its August 27, 2018 order designating school attendance and the

section of its November 28, 2018 temporary orders entitled “Children’s School.” The

writ will issue on ly in the unlikely event that the trial court fails to comply with our

directive

.

We order relator and real party in interest to each pay one

- half of the costs of

this proceeding.SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _ /s/ Elizabeth Kerr

__________________ Justice Elizabeth Kerr
ex101.htm


Exhibit 10.1


 


 


 


 


AMENDMENT NO. 2


TO EXECUTIVE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT







This amendment No. 2 to Executive Employment Agreement (“Amendment Agreement”) is executed on November 10, 2010 by and between Vidaroo Corporation (the “Company”) and Micheal Morgan (“Executive”). The Company and Executive are hereby collectively referred to as the Parties. Terms not defined herein shall have the meaning set forth in the Executive Employment Agreement dated August 14, 2009, as amended on November 10, 2009 (the “Employment Agreement”).







WHEREAS, the Parties entered into the Employment Agreement pursuant to which Executive was employed as Chief Operating Officer and Chief Technology Officer of the Company;







WHEREAS, the Board of Directors of the Company has determined it is in the best interests of the Company to appoint Executive as the President of the Company pursuant to a Board resolution dated November 10, 2010;







WHEREAS, the Parties wish to further amend the Employment Agreement as a result of Executive’s appointment as President;







NOW THEREFORE, the parties do hereby agree to the following terms and conditions:








	
1.  

	
This Amendment Agreement amends the Employment Agreement between the Parties.







 



	
2.  

	
The Employment Agreement is hereby amended to provide for a modification to the incentive based compensation related to stock options based on Executive’s appointment to the position of President for the Term of the Employment Agreement.







 



	
3.  

	
The stock options originally granted to Executive shall be modified as follows:  The 2,000,000 stock options previously granted in connection with the Employment Agreement shall vest immediately and continue to have an exercise price of $0.30/share.  Executive shall be granted additional stock options to purchase 6,940,005 shares of the Company’s Common Stock at fair market value as of the date of the signing of this Amendment Agreement of $0.05/share.  These stock options shall vest ratably over the remaining life of this Employment Agreement.







 



	
4.  

	
The term of Mr. Morgan’s Executive Employment Agreement is hereby extended by two (2) years through August 14, 2014.







 



	
5.  

	
Other than specifically amended hereby, all other terms and provisions of the Employment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.







 


 




	 Vidaroo Corporation:  	 	 	 Executive:	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	

Mark Argenti, Chairman and CEO

	 	 	

Micheal Morgan, President, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Technology Officer
EXHIBIT 10.20



New York Community Bancorp, Inc.

615 Merrick Avenue

Westbury, New York 11590



June 27, 2003



Daniel L. Murphy

The Roslyn Savings Bank

One Jericho Plaza

Jericho, New York 11753-8905



Dear Daniel:



I am pleased to have this opportunity to set forth in writing certain
additional information relating to your employment at New York Community Bank (the Bank) following the consummation of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement and Plan of Merger (the Merger Agreement) entered between
New York Community Bancorp, Inc. (the Holding Company) and Roslyn Bancorp, Inc. on this date. This letter is intended to supplement your new employment agreement with the Holding Company.



At such time as you become an employee of the Bank under your new employment
agreement as a result of the merger contemplated by the Merger Agreement, you will receive a retention bonus of $600,000. However, if you voluntarily terminate employment prior to the completion of 365 days of employment after the Effective Time
other than by reason of an Event of Termination (as defined in your new employment agreement), or if you are terminated for Just Cause (as defined in your new employment agreement) within such 365-day period, you will
immediately return to the Holding Company a portion of the retention bonus equal to the product of (x) the retention bonus and (y) a fraction the numerator of which is the total number of days remaining in such 365-day period and the denominator of
which is 365.



---

Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the Merger Agreement is terminated pursuant to Article VI of the Merger
Agreement, this letter agreement will be null and void.



Please
acknowledge the foregoing in the space indicated below.



|                         |  |  |  | Sincerely,
|------------------------ |  |  |  | ----------
|                         |  |  | 
|                         |  |  |  |           
|                         |  |  |  |           
|                         |  | 
|Acknowledged and Agreed: |  |  |  |           
|                         |  | 
|/s/ Daniel L. Murphy     |  |  |  |           
|Daniel L. Murphy         |  |  |  |           



2
INITIAL REVIEW ENGINEERING REPORT
PMN: 06-0341 Standard Review Draft 6/6/2006

ENGINEER: Macek \ AMO PV (kg/yr):

Revision Notes / Assessment Overview: P-06-0341 was placed into limited standard review for human health to determine whether this case qualifies as a

. This report is an update to the FOCUS ready draft of 4/6/06. The assessment of potential inhalation exposure during use has been revised based on additional details on the facility design and work practices.

SUBMITTER: 3M Company

USE:

OTHER USES:

MSDS: Yes Label: No

Gen Eqpt:

Respirator:

Health Effects:

TLV/PEL:

CRSS (04/03/2006):

Chemical Name:

S-H20:

VP:

MW:

Consumer Use:CALL BY: Greg Macek Organization: USEPA/OPPT/EETD/CEB

CALL TO:

Organization: 3M Company

Date: 06/06/2006

Time:

Phone:

Concerning what TSCA ?

PMN: 06-0341
### §1591. Salinity control policy

#### (a) Implementation by Secretary of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior shall implement the salinity control policy adopted for the Colorado River in the "Conclusions and Recommendations" published in the Proceedings of the Reconvened Seventh Session of the Conference in the Matter of Pollution of the Interstate Waters of the Colorado River and Its Tributaries in the States of California, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wyoming, held in Denver, Colorado, on April 26–27, 1972, under the authority of section 10 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1160), and approved by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency on June 9, 1972.

#### (b) Expeditious investigation, planning, and implementation of salinity control program

The Secretary is hereby directed to expedite the investigation, planning, and implementation of the salinity control program generally as described in chapter VI of the Secretary's report entitled, "Colorado River Water Quality Improvement Program, February 1972". In determining the relative priority of implementing additional units or new self-contained portions of units authorized by section 1592 of this title, the Secretary or the Secretary of Agriculture, as the case may be, shall give preference to those additional units or new self-contained portions of units which reduce salinity of the Colorado River at the least cost per unit of salinity reduction.

#### (c) Cooperation with other Federal agencies

In conformity with subsection (a) and the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency under Federal laws, the Secretary, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Secretary of Agriculture are directed to cooperate and coordinate their activities effectively to carry out the objective of this subchapter.

(Pub. L. 93–320, title II, §201, June 24, 1974, 88 Stat. 270; Pub. L. 98–569, §1, Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2933.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, referred to in subsec. (a), which was formerly classified to chapter 23 (§1151 et seq.) of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, was revised generally by Pub. L. 92–500, Oct. 18, 1972, 86 Stat. 816, and is classified generally to chapter 25 (§1251 et seq.) of Title 33.

#### Amendments

1984—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–569 inserted "In determining the relative priority of implementing additional units or new self-contained portions of units authorized by section 1592 of this title, the Secretary or the Secretary of Agriculture, as the case may be, shall give preference to those additional units or new self-contained portions of units which reduce salinity of the Colorado River at the least cost per unit of salinity reduction.".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of 1984 Amendment

Pub. L. 98–569, §6, Oct. 30, 1984, 98 Stat. 2939, provided that: "The amendments made by this Act [amending this section and sections 620d, 1543, 1592, 1593, 1595, and 1598 of this title] shall take effect upon enactment of this Act [Oct. 30, 1984]."