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SUDAN: A REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S

NEW POLICY AND A SITUATION UPDATE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 3, 2009

Serial No. 111–76

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey, Chairman 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

NOELLE LUSANE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

LINDSAY GILCHRIST, Subcommittee Professional Staff Member 

SHERI RICKERT, Republican Professional Staff Member 

ANTONINA KING, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Major General Scott Gration, USAF, Retired, United States Special Envoy 

to Sudan, U.S. Department of State ................................................................... 12

Randy Newcomb, Ph.D., President and Chief Executive Officer, Humanity 

United ................................................................................................................... 35

Mr. Enrico Carisch, Former Coordinator, United Nations Panel of Experts 

on the Sudan ........................................................................................................ 43

Mr. John Prendergast, Co-founder, Enough Project ............................................. 53

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa and Global 

Health: Prepared statement ................................................................................ 4

Major General Scott Gration, USAF, Retired: Prepared statement .................... 15

Randy Newcomb, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 38

Mr. Enrico Carisch: Prepared statement ............................................................... 48

Mr. John Prendergast: Prepared statement .......................................................... 58

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 78

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 79

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ................................................... 80

(1)

SUDAN: A REVIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S NEW POLICY AND A SITUATION UPDATE 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Payne, 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. PAYNE. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health will come to order. Agenda, Sudan: A Review of the Administration’s New Policy and a Situation Update. 

First of all, let me begin by welcoming our first panelists. But before we get into the hearing on Sudan, I would like to regretfully 

report that this morning an estimated 20 people were killed in 

Mogadishu in Somalia, including three ministers. Two of the ministers I knew very well. I visited Mogadishu 7 months ago and met 

with these ministers, the Minister of Education, the Minister of 

Health, and we had had previous meetings in Nairobi. It was a 

graduation of the medical school in Mogadishu where this tragedy 

occurred. And so we would like to express our condolences to the 

victims and their family members, the transitional Federal Government of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the people of Somalia. 

Secondly, I just got off the phone with the President of Puntland. 

Puntland, as you know, is one of the three Somali regions that include Somalia, Puntland, and Somaliland. And we just reached an 

agreement this morning on prisoners who were being detained by 

the government of Puntland. These were people from the Ogaden, 

and they were being held without cause. And so we have been 

working with the President of Puntland to try to get their release. 

And this morning the President will announce that he will commute their sentences and he will release them. And so I would like 

to thank the President of Puntland and Amnesty International, 

and Jim Hill, who have been working with Puntland’s representative in the Ogaden community here in this area. 

Let me then move to our hearing this morning, Sudan: A Review 

of the Administration’s New Policy and a Situation Update. Let me 

also express my deep appreciation to the witnesses who are certainly among the most knowledgeable people on Sudan. Over the 

years, we have held so many hearings and briefings on Sudan, and 

people here are tremendously interested in trying to bring attenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tion to the suffering of innocent civilians and in the hope of promoting a just peace for all. 

Many believe and hope that the signing of the Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement or the Darfur Peace Agreement would bring 

about the much-desired peace and stability in Sudan. Unfortunately and despite multiple efforts, millions of Sudanese continue 

to suffer. I sometimes wonder if we will ever get a just peace in 

Sudan as long as the al-Bashir regime is in power. For those who 

still believe that a peace agreement with this regime will bring an 

ending to the suffering, I say look again at the situation in Darfur 

and in Abyei. 

Some of us saw firsthand the aftermath of the burning of Abyei 

by government and pro-government militia in May 2008 when more 

than 50,000 people were displaced from their homes. As a Senator, 

President Obama stated, ‘‘For years, the Government of Sudan has 

thwarted the will of the United States and the international community and offended the standards of our common humanity. Before we improve our relations with the Government of Sudan, conditions must improve for the Sudanese people. We cannot stand 

down. We must continue to stand up for peace and human rights.’’

I fully agree with then-Senator Obama, now our President. It 

was not long ago that we witnessed another horrific genocide in Africa. The international community, including the United States, 

turned a blind eye to the gruesome genocide in Rwanda in 1994. 

In Rwanda, an estimated 1 million people died in less than 100 

days. In Darfur, 6 years since the genocide began, the people of 

Darfur are still waiting for the suffering to end. 

A few years ago I stated, ‘‘If Rwanda was a black mark on our 

conscience, Darfur is a cancer that will destroy the moral fiber of 

our society.’’ This is still the case. I am not opposed to a policy of 

engagement. In fact, I always argue we should give peaceful dialogue a chance before we declare war. 

For some, our policy is too focused on punitive measures. I beg 

to differ. The United States has been at the forefront when it 

comes to engagement. We never disengaged. The United States has 

appointed more special envoys to Sudan than it has to any other 

country in Africa. Why? In order to secure a just peace. We have 

imposed punitive measures against this regime, but we have always helped the Sudanese people. 

In October 2009, last month, the Obama administration announced a new policy toward Sudan. The policy focuses on three 

priorities: An end to the conflict in Darfur, implementation of the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the CPA, and ensuring Sudan 

does not become a safe haven for international terrorist groups. 

The new policy clarifies a number of issues that surfaced in recent months and reaffirms the conflict in Darfur, that it is genocide, stating that the United States’s primary objective in Darfur 

is ‘‘a definite end to conflict, gross human rights abuses and genocide in Darfur.’’ The new Sudan policy also states that cooperation 

on counterterrorism without verified progress on other issues will 

not lead to a normalization of relations. 

The administration also plans to enhance U.S. assistance to 

South Sudan and to help prepare that country for a possible twoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
3

state outcome should the people choose independence in the 2011 

referendum. I fully support the policy objectives of the new policy. 

The question remains, What if the regime continues to obstruct 

these efforts? What are we doing to promote justice and accountability? The United States Government supports a transparent, 

free and fair election in Sudan. Can those elections be free and fair 

while 3 million people are still displaced in refugee camps? By supporting the elections with Bashir as a candidate, are we saying no 

to justice and accountability? It is my hope that through the course 

of today’s hearing we will gain greater insight into these critical 

issues. 

Let me once again thank our distinguished witnesses. And before 

I introduce them, let me turn to our Senator, who has graced us. 

As you know, Senator Brownback has been a leading witness and 

fighter on the questions of Sudan, and in lieu of the ranking member, I will certainly turn the mike over. We are pleased to have you 

with us, Mr. Senator. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

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53830f-1.eps
5


53830f-2.eps
6

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Chairman Payne, I 

appreciate it. Thank you for the invitation to be here today. I know 

this is highly unusual, but I am honored and I am pleased. 

I would note to the crowd, and a number of people already know 

this, but when we declared genocide when it was taking place in 

Darfur, it was Congressman Payne, you were the one that led that 

effort and that charge. And a number of people were saying, Well, 

do we really want to do this, is this really the time, is this really 

the place? And you fought and said yes, it is, let us not do it after 

it happens, let us try to stop it while it is happening. And you 

leaned in aggressively, and we did that for the first time in I believe the history of this country. And it was important. 

That is what draws my attention to be here today. In the ashes 

of World War II, the international community adopted the Geneva 

Convention and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 

of the Crime of Genocide, designed among other reasons to protect 

against and deter future mass atrocities. 

Now, since its adoption, these conventions have served as the 

basis for targeting and bringing to justice several notorious war 

criminals and perpetrators of mass atrocities. The United States 

has participated in several cases. We helped to bring to justice 

former Serbian leader Karadzic, the so-called Butcher of Bosnia, 

accused of slaughtering hundreds of thousands of innocent people. 

We even put a $5 million reward for information leading to his capture, and he currently resides in prison at The Hague. 

Charles Taylor, the warlord turned leader of Liberia, assumed 

power in the 1990s on an election slogan of ‘‘He killed my ma, he 

killed my pa, but I will vote for him.’’ Taylor was directly involved 

in coordinating and supporting unthinkable atrocities over many 

years. The Congress passed legislation offering a $2 million reward 

for Taylor’s capture. He was caught having fled to Nigeria and now 

sits in a prison at The Hague alongside some of the world’s worst 

offenders of human rights. The United States was involved in that 

one as well. 

Yet despite American interest and involvement in these and 

other cases, there is only one instance in the history of the United 

States when our Government acknowledged and declared a genocide at the time it was taking place. It was one I just alluded to. 

That place is Sudan, and the genocide declared in 2004 continues 

under our watch today. 

Under the reign of President Bashir, the Khartoum Government 

has committed two genocides. Sudan has become a haven for al 

Qaeda, another terrorist organization, while the regime provides 

support for Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army, the most horrific terrorist group in Central Africa today. 

Added to that, in March, the International Criminal Court issued 

an arrest warrant for Bashir on five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes. His government responded 

by expelling more than a dozen humanitarian groups from Darfur, 

seizing their assets and threatening life-saving operations in 

Darfur. 

Based on our nation’s leadership in the past, one might think 

that such a unique and tragic designation in Sudan would have 

triggered a massive effort not only to bring an end to the genocide 

7

but also to bring justice to the perpetrators. And indeed, at one 

point, the tragedy of Sudan’s genocide did stir this country. 

I recall, as many of the people in the audience will, mass rallies 

to save Darfur, headlined by Hollywood celebrities, countless student initiatives at universities across the country and successful efforts to divest at the state and local level. At that time, for the 

American people, nothing short of peace for the victims and justice 

for the criminals would suffice. This was the organic compassion 

embedded in the American ethos bursting forth to aid our brothers 

and sisters in distress a world away. 

Now the previous administration fell short of ending the ongoing 

genocide. The Obama administration’s new policy would actually 

provide a package of incentives to offer the perpetrators of genocide 

to the indicted war criminal, Omar al-Bashir, incentives. In effect, 

the policy is to allow the genocidal regime in Khartoum to trade 

away some political and territorial concessions in exchange for 

measures, such as diplomatic recognition and the easing of sanctions, which flaunt the fundamental principles of justice and accountability. 

I strongly oppose any approach toward Sudan that gives incentives and rewards to a genocidal regime headed by the Sudanese 

President, who is an indicted war criminal himself. Such a policy 

is engagement to the extreme and blind to fundamental principles 

of justice. This new policy sends the wrong messages to tyrants 

around the world, that they will not be brought to justice and instead may even receive American concessions for merely rolling 

back the intensity of their brutality. 

Our Government is trying to apply nuance to genocide, an approach that would be comical were it not so reprehensible. We cannot trade justice for peace. The ends do not justify the means. 

I look forward to hearing from the witness today, General 

Gration, of your thoughts on this. But I cannot believe we would 

offer incentives to a genocidal regime that is headed by an indicted 

war criminal. 

I thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me this 

unusual honor to serve with you on this panel. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, let me thank you very much and once again express my appreciation for the many years that you have worked on 

this issue and codel travel that you led a decade ago or more, so 

your record is very clear, and I appreciate you taking the time to 

come here. Thank you. 

Congresswoman Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank 

you for your leadership in holding this hearing. And I want to associate myself with Senator Brownback’s remarks with regard to 

your leadership and being really the lone voice for many years in 

terms of declaring genocide as taking place in Sudan. We all know 

that that is the case, and we appreciate your leadership and for 

bringing us together really in a bipartisan way. I see Congressman 

Wolf in the audience. 

I visited Sudan the first time, I have been three times with Mr. 

Royce of California. And I think that all of us have concluded that 

this is an issue of humanitarian concerns. It is one of national seVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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curity. It is an issue that should not be happening on our watch. 

Genocide should not be happening in this century. 

I am pleased to see General Gration. We talked before about the 

new policy. I am anxious to hear what has developed in moving forward on this because I think we all are anxious to see some concrete results. The people of Sudan deserve no less. 

I also have to commend the young people in our faith community 

for continuing with the simple message of save Darfur. They have 

really, truly been the wind beneath our wings here in Congress to 

bring this bipartisan consensus on divestment, on genocide and all 

of the actions that we have taken here. 

But we all know, as time and history have shown us, that the 

regime in Khartoum can be very creative in its obstinacy and in 

complying with international law on human rights even as it continues to perpetrate further crimes and injustices. Sudan and its 

people have gone through a heck of a lot over the years. Too many 

deaths, too many people have been forced from their homes, too 

many families have been destroyed, too many women have been 

raped, too many children have been killed. 

We have a moral responsibility to help the people of Sudan, the 

people of Darfur, achieve a peaceful and a stable future. So I hope 

that this new policy will produce a better set of results than what 

we have seen before, but I also know that we must retain our ability to impose harsher sanctions if this new direction does not bear 

fruit. 

Thank you again, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. We will now hear from Mr. Royce, who 

for many years was the chair of the Subcommittee on Africa and 

has been a member of the committee for decades and has also 

worked very diligently on the whole question of Sudan. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I would 

say it is good to have General Gration before the committee. As the 

General well knows, we have a difference of opinion and have had 

for some time with respect to how we move forward with Khartoum. 

I have been watching these war criminals for quite some time. 

At one point, General Gration, you and I had an opportunity in 

Darfur to see some of this firsthand. And I just wanted to thank 

John Prendergast, who is with us today, who helped guide us into 

Darfur, Sudan on that trip. And traveling alongside actor Don 

Cheadle, I chaired the delegation. We brought a Nightline camera 

crew, who you will remember, John, documented the atrocities that 

were committed not just by the Janjaweed militia used by the Sudanese Government—they also documented the atrocities committed by the Sudanese Government itself. 

And this gets to the point that I want to make. And I also want 

to thank some of the other members who traveled with us, Barbara, on that trip, as Congresswoman Lee did. But I wanted to 

make several observations here. 

One is thanks to the good work of Don Payne, and I chaired the 

committee when we put the genocide resolution through, we have 

a number of people that were involved in a principal way in putting this country on record in terms of where we would stand on 

9

the issue of genocide. And we have the first eyewitness, we have 

the eyewitness accounts ourselves as to what was happening. 

And I can share with you the testimony of one young boy who 

was missing his hand, and when asked what happened to it, he 

said, ‘‘Janjaweed.’’ And the pictures that he and others had 

sketched out of the attacks that had occurred on his village were 

attacks not just by Janjaweed but also by Antonov Planes, operated 

by the Sudanese Government, that had dropped bombs on his city. 

We went into Tina, which had been bombed by the Sudanese 

Government. We saw sketches of the halftracks and military vehicles and Sudanese Army troops that did the follow-up work to the 

Janjaweed when the Janjaweed was first sent in to commit the 

atrocities. The Army, the Sudanese Army came in afterwards. 

These are the reasons why Bashir is a war criminal, why he has 

been indicted by the International Criminal Court. 

But this is only the beginning. The discussion in terms of what 

his militia, which is being worked up in southern Sudan to again 

begin this process, these are the war crimes of a head of state who 

to this day won’t allow many of the NGOs back into Sudan in order 

to assist in trying to bring some level of humanity and sustenance 

to the victims of this. 

But think for a minute what it means when the Sudanese Government assists a person like Joseph Kony, who is in the process 

of recruiting young children into the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

Think about the fact that you have a militia whose purpose is simply to commit rape and mayhem across Central Africa. And then 

you have the surrendered commander of Kony’s units who says 

that the Lord’s Resistance Army is sponsored by Khartoum. This 

is something that we have known for a long time. 

But it is good to finally have an officer in Kony’s forces come forward and say no, we are in fact sponsored by Khartoum and testified to the intention of LRA leader Joseph Kony to move along the 

Central African Republic border of Chad and then into Darfur to 

meet officers of the Sudan armed forces, long reputed to be the 

LRA sponsors. 

‘‘Kony told me,’’ says the officer, ‘‘that he was going to meet 

Fadeel, the SAF officer who coordinates LRA activities. He wants 

them to give him logistical support and a safe haven.’’ Well, for 

many years that was the safe haven. That was the line of support 

for munitions and for wounded soldiers who were taken up and 

patched back into shape. This is the regime in Khartoum that we 

are dealing with. 

And I will add one other thing. Kony urged all LRA units to 

make their way to Darfur and report to the first Arab military post 

they came across. Kony is desperate. He said things are very hard. 

We were constantly on the move. Sometimes we would not rest for 

a week. The Ugandans were pursuing us everywhere. 

Well, this, my friends, is the reality of what is happening today. 

And the question is, What is the world going to do to bring an end 

to Kony’s work, to bring an end to the barbarism that occurs and 

the suicidal and the genocidal acts that occur across Sudan? We 

took a certain commitment to put an end to genocide, and frankly, 

I think we got a rare victory the other day when Sudanese President Bashir’s planned trip to Turkey was canceled. 

10

But again, at the end of the day, we have got to ask ourselves 

the same question that we will hear in the testimony. The former 

Coordinator of the U.N. Panel of Experts on Sudan will testify this 

morning, ‘‘In contrast to that leadership of 2004 and 2005, the 

United States appears to have now joined the group of influential 

states who sit by quietly and do nothing to ensure that sanctions 

work to protect Darfurians.’’

I want to hear today why that is not the case. I think that is 

dead on. I think that has to change. And it is going to take more 

than just John Prendergast working 24/7 to make it change. It is 

going to take members of this committee committing themselves to 

getting back on offense and seeing justice done for the victims in 

Darfur. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have not been as involved in the issue of Sudan and Darfur in particular as other 

members of the committee. I did with Ms. Lee visit Darfur and 

southern Sudan and Khartoum on a Congressional delegation led 

by Majority Leader Hoyer in April 2007. 

But I am very troubled that we have not kept a promise, a promise that humanity made before I was born but that I feel bound by, 

never again. The promise was not never again in the Western 

world or never again in the developed world, it was never again. 

We could not put an end to all evil, but genocide was different and 

humanity everywhere would act together to prevent genocide anywhere. 

There may be some problems of definition. There may be, where 

does an atrocity leave off and genocide begin? But it is very clear 

that there have been genocides since the Holocaust, in Cambodia, 

in Rwanda and now in Darfur. So we have not kept the promise 

of never again to allow genocide. 

We have learned bitter lessons about how hard it is to shape 

events in various places in the world. We certainly can all criticize 

our Government’s failures to put an end to it, but the truth is that 

the world, all of humanity, has not acted in a way that we promised more than 60 years ago. 

I am pleased by the Obama administration’s new emphasis on 

ending the genocide in Darfur, ending the violence and the atrocities, implementing the comprehensive peace agreement that ended 

the brutal, deadly civil war in southern Sudan. I welcome Ambassador Rice’s comment that the strategy would be smart, tough and 

balanced. But the policy needs to be smart, tough and balanced in 

pursuit of a goal of ending genocide and ending the atrocities in the 

Sudan generally. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Congresswoman Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a direct result of 

our chairman’s responsible insistence that the Darfur genocide be 

identified before rather than after all these atrocities become history, the people in my district—I am from Petaluma, California—

started an effort called Dear Darfur, Love Petaluma. That effort 

has become an entire Bay Area effort. And they followed up after 

knowing that we stepped up to the plate and knew that genocide 

was occurring and we weren’t turning our heads and knew that 

11

they had to do something about it. I am so happy that I represent 

such great people and work with such great people. 

And they know as well as we know we are at a very important 

point in Sudan’s future right now. Their history is going to be written as we are Members of Congress, and we have such an important role to play, and I am truly concerned that so much attention 

is being placed on the logistics for the elections, which are very important, but these elections must have concern for the political environment in which they take place. And that is where I am unclear, because under the CPA, the government is supposed to revise 

laws governing freedom for the press, freedom for assembly and 

laws to limit the power of national security services. 

Well, I am hoping today that I am going to hear some information from you on if it is going to happen; if not, what we must do 

to ensure that we don’t have elections that just are meaningless, 

because as I said, the history for Sudan and for the Sudanese people is being written right here before us. So thank you very much, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I would like to invite Congressman Wolf if he would like to come up and be a part of the 

panel. As you know, Congressman Wolf has probably had the longest history of working on this issue of anyone in the Congress and 

preceding my time. He has said no. But I would certainly keep the 

offer open if there is any question you would like to ask. You are 

certainly welcome. 

And let me acknowledge also Ted Dagne, who has worked on this 

issue with Noelle LuSane, my staff director. But Mr. Dagne has 

been involved with the issue for quite some time and recently traveled to Juba with me 2 months ago—1 month ago. They told me 

it was 2 weeks ago. Time flies. And we had some very, very good 

meetings with government leaders in Juba and South Sudan, dealing with this whole issue of referendum elections. And so I would 

like to just acknowledge them. 

Also I would like to say that I appreciate the work done by Congresswoman Woolsey and Congresswoman Lee on this issue. I had 

the privilege to visit both of their districts over the course of the 

last year or so to meet with their residents who were so interested 

in following their leadership. And so I would like to really commend both of you for the work you do back in your districts as well 

as here. 

Well, let us turn to our principal witness on this first panel. We 

have Major General Scott Gration, U.S. Air Force, retired. Major 

General Scott Gration currently serves as the President’s Special 

Envoy to Sudan. He spent his childhood years in the now-Democratic Republic of Congo and in Kenya. 

General Gration graduated from Rutgers University in New Jersey with a B.S. in mechanical engineering before joining the United 

States Air Force, where he served from 1974 to 2006. During his 

time in the Air Force General Gration served a 2-year assignment 

with the Kenyan Air Force as an instructor. His staff positions included tours in the Pentagon and NATO and a White House fellowship. He was assistant deputy under secretary of the Air Force for 

international affairs. 

12

General Gration was a national security adviser to the Obama 

Presidential campaign and served as a special assistant to the 

President. General Gration speaks Swahili. He has an M.A. from 

Georgetown University in national security studies and is very 

committed to this issue at this time. 

Let me turn the floor over to our Special Envoy. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL SCOTT GRATION, USAF, RETIRED, UNITED STATES SPECIAL ENVOY TO SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

General GRATION. Thank you very much. Chairman Payne, members of the House Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health and 

distinguished guests, thank you very much for this opportunity to 

provide an update on the administration’s efforts in Sudan. 

Before I begin, let me add my heartfelt condolences to those who 

have been expressed by Chairman Payne this morning, to those 

who have suffered such a significant loss in the Mogadishu suicide 

attack. This event causes us all to think about how we must redouble our efforts to bring peace in all of Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to start by expressing my deep appreciation for your longstanding commitment to resolving the challenges associated with Sudan. We know that you traveled recently 

to the region, and we are thankful for your dedicated efforts to improve the lives of the Sudanese people, define lasting solutions to 

promote peace. We note that your commitment is widely shared by 

members of this committee, and we are also extremely grateful to 

each member for the deep interest in our efforts and for your continued support. 

As you know, the Secretary of State, Ambassador Rice and I presented the President’s strategy on Sudan in October. This strategy 

uses an integrated and comprehensive approach and is focused on 

three major objectives. 

The first goal is to definitively end the conflict in Darfur, the 

gross human rights abuses, the genocide. 

The second is to implement the North-South Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement in a manner that results in a peaceful post-2011 

Sudan, a united Sudan or two separate and viable states at peace 

with each other, at peace with their neighbors. 

The third objective is to ensure that Sudan does not again become a safe haven for international terrorists. I will spend the next 

few minutes reviewing some of my recent activities and explaining 

how the administration’s actions are helping to meet the goals outlined in the Sudan strategy. I will focus first on our efforts related 

to Darfur. 

In my travels to the Darfur region over the past 5 years. I have 

witnessed firsthand the devastation and destruction that conflict 

has inflicted on the people of Darfur, particularly on the women 

and children. In keeping with the first objective of our strategy, the 

administration remains committed to saving lives, to fostering 

meaningful and lasting reconciliation, to ensuring a durable peace 

for all the people of Darfur. We continue to support the Doha peace 

process, as the AU-U.N. Mediator, Djibril Bassole ́, seeks to negotiate an agreement that fully addresses the concerns of the Darfuri 

people. 

13

To give these negotiations the best possible chance of success, we 

have been working to unite the fragmented arm movements in 

Darfur so they can speak at a negotiating table with one voice. As 

a result of our efforts, eight rebel factions have formed a coalition 

and are committed to even a wider unification. 

In addition, we will continue to support and strengthen 

UNAMID. We will work with them and the Government of Sudan 

to improve local security conditions throughout Darfur and will 

strive to reduce tensions along Sudan’s western border with Chad. 

Finally, we are working with USAID and operational NGOs to 

improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur, to improve NGO access to populations in need. In my travels I have observed that 

while significant effort has been made to fill the gaps, to minimize 

the sufferings caused by the expulsion of 13 NGOs in March 2009, 

humanitarian agencies have only limited access to areas outside 

the major towns because of the continued widespread insecurity. 

We are working closely with the United Nations, Africa Union and 

Sudanese authorities to improve local security, to advance the rule 

of law, to help build a better life, a better future for the Darfuri 

people. 

In keeping with the second objective of our strategy, we are 

working to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 

To that end, we are deeply engaged with the National Congress 

Party and with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement to resolve 

the remaining CPA challenges, to fully implement the agreements 

reached between the two parties. 

I believe our involvement in this process has been crucial to helping the parties negotiate agreements on elections, on referenda for 

self-determination. Our involvement will also be critical in helping 

prepare for the post-CPA period. Issues such as citizenship, northsouth border demarcation, resource-sharing must be resolved soon 

to facilitate a long-term stability along the border and in the region. 

We are also focused on ensuring that the April 2010 elections are 

credible, that they further political transformation and the peace 

process. Voter registration will conclude next week, but far more 

work needs to be done in coordination with the Sudanese authorities and with our international partners to ensure that the will of 

the Sudanese citizens is clearly expressed and fully implemented. 

We continue to be deeply concerned about the increase in interethnic violence in the south and its devastating effect on local communities. We must all increase our efforts to mitigate these threats 

to security and stability, to create an environment for a peaceful 

referenda for a transition to the post-2011 period. 

In keeping with the third objective in our strategy, the United 

States continues to work with the Sudanese authorities and international community to keep non-state actors who might threaten 

our interests and terrorist organizations from developing a foothold 

in Sudan. We will ensure that U.S. efforts in Sudan enhance our 

capacity to protect American lives and American interests around 

the globe. 

Finally, as part of our U.S. strategy on Sudan, senior officials 

from the interagency will meet in early 2010 for the first in a series 

of quarterly interagency reviews designed to assess conditions on 

14

the ground, to determine whether progress or backsliding has occurred, to agree on whether incentives or pressures are warranted. 

The United States has a clear obligation and an interest to lead 

the international efforts for peace in Sudan. Failure to accomplish 

our objectives in Darfur between the north and the south and on 

the counterterrorism front could result in more suffering for the 

Sudanese people, further regional instability and in possible safe 

havens for international terrorists. We just can’t afford to fail. 

Together the United States and its partners are committed to 

creating an environment in which the parties themselves can bring 

peace to Sudan. We have no option but to succeed. And working together with all the parties, with our international partners, I believe we can succeed. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, distinguished guests, 

thank you again for your leadership and for your support. I look 

forward to answering your questions about the critical challenges 

that we all face in Sudan. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Gration follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Well, let me thank you very much, General Gration. 

Like I said, I appreciate the hard work that you are putting into 

this effort, and we appreciate your testimony. 

Let me begin by asking a couple of questions. First of all, the administration’s long-awaited Sudan policy is fully implemented and 

provides a framework to achieve a stable democracy and a lasting 

peace in Sudan. At the center of this strategy is a policy of engagement with necessary benchmarks and credible pressure to ensure 

accountability. However, implementation of the strategy will be 

critical in moving forward. 

So my question basically is, What are the specific indicators of 

progress being used in the U.S. policy and what are the precise criteria to be used for evaluating them? We have heard that there are 

incentives and also disincentives, and so we really would like to 

know the way that there will be a criteria for the evaluation of 

them since this is the center of the strategy. 

General GRATION. Yes, you put your finger on it in that implementation is the key. Agreements without implementation are really no good, and so this policy seeks to ensure that agreements 

made between parties are implemented fully. We started with the 

CPA. When I took on this job, we had 12 areas where we had differences of agreements between the parties. We have been able to 

close on 10 of those 12. The remaining one is the census and therefore the election and then the referendum, and we seek to get an 

agreement on those two. 

When we get agreements, we will turn those agreements into 

benchmarks. In other words, we have gone through all the decisions and all the agreements that we have been able to make and 

that are codified in the CPA and that we will continue to make in 

Darfur discussions that will come out of the Doha process, and we 

will turn these into objective statements: Who is doing it, what 

they are doing, when it needs to be done by and what are the performance standards. We have done that already with the CPA. It 

is in the form of a stoplight chart, but we are taking it to the next 

level. 

In other words, when suspenses are missed, these are identified 

on a weekly basis to both parties and to interested parties on the 

outside. We will continue to do this. But let me just explain that 

this strategy will not succeed unless we have those benchmarks 

and we are able to objectively track them with changes of behavior 

and changes of condition on the ground, and that is what we are 

doing right now. We are trying to ensure that through the U.N. 

and through other mechanisms that we are able to see verifiable, 

unreversible changes on the ground. 

We have a philosophy that is a little bit different than the Cold 

War when it was trust and verify. Ours is verify, then trust. We 

will take a look on the ground, we will verify the changes in behavior, verify the changes of condition. And then based on that, we will 

make a determination whether more pressures need to be applied 

or whether incentives need to be applied to encourage more of that 

kind of behavior if it is positive. 

And so that is what the policy does. It takes all the agreements, 

turns them into objective statements. It looks for measures and 

monitoring ways that we can verify the changes on the ground, 

22

whether positive or negative or even just standing still. And then 

we will work through the interagency process to ensure that senior 

leaders can make the determination whether we need to put pressures or incentives, and this will be done obviously as we do everything in consultation with Congress. 

Mr. PAYNE. All right. My time has expired. Let me just ask one 

quick question: Is there any plan for the IDPs in Darfur and in 

Chad? Is the government discussing any plan of return? Because 

I have heard a lot of things, but no one has ever talked about when 

we will start to have people return home. 

General GRATION. We have heard discussions about planning for 

return, but our position is, and it is a position that we have worked 

in conjunction with IOM, with U.N. agencies that are in the field 

that are working on a day-to-day basis with the 2.7 million people 

in IDP camps, we will only support a return when it is voluntary, 

when the conditions in the places that they want to return to, 

whether it be their homes or whether it be another location, that 

the conditions are stable and secure and safe enough for them to 

return in a sustainable way. 

We also want to make sure that it is done where their human 

rights are protected and with dignity. And we also want to make 

sure that it is done in a compassionate way. As many people have 

to return to places where they lost their families, where they lost 

their crops, where they lost their cattle, where they had their 

houses burned down, there is going to be an emotional element, a 

psychological element that we have to consider. We want to make 

sure that as they go back that they can do it voluntarily and in 

conditions that will be sustainable and conditions that will allow 

them to live a life that is significantly better than they are living 

today. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. At this time, we will ask Senator Brownback for questions. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, 

again thank you for this extraordinary privilege to be here with 

you on this panel. 

General Gration, thank you for joining us, and it is a tough job 

that you have, but I am terribly troubled by the situation. President Bashir, I guess I should ask you, he has participated in a 

genocide in Sudan, is that correct? 

General GRATION. Yes, sir. He was the President of the country 

during the time that genocide took place and therefore, he would 

have participated. 

Senator BROWNBACK. And so he has led the genocide in Darfur. 

General GRATION. His government was responsible for that, and 

he was the leader of the government. Therefore, he would have led 

it. 

Senator BROWNBACK. And President Bashir is an indicted war 

criminal by the ICC? 

General GRATION. He is. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Has the United States Government been 

negotiating, dealing or otherwise associating with any individual 

from Sudan who has been directly implicated in committing genocides or crimes against humanity? 

23

General GRATION. Do I understand that you are asking, are we 

dealing with people that have been involved in the genocide or 

crimes against humanity? 

Senator BROWNBACK. Have we been negotiating, dealing or otherwise associating with any individual from Sudan who has been directly implicated in committing genocide or crimes against humanity? 

General GRATION. I have never met with President Bashir and 

we don’t have plans to meet with President Bashir. There are people that we negotiate with that are part of the NCP that are part 

of that government. That is the only way that we have been able 

to reach agreements on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It is 

the only way we have been able to reach agreements on humanitarian assistance in Darfur. It is the only way we have been able 

to reach agreements on the Chad-Sudan border conflict, agreements in Doha. And we are going to have to continue to have engagement not for engagement’s sake but to save lives and to move 

the ball forward in Sudan. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Have any of those individuals been involved directly or indirectly in committing genocides or crimes 

against humanity? 

General GRATION. I don’t know that directly. I understand that 

some of the people were in the government at the time, especially 

between 2003 and 2005. But I have no direct knowledge of their 

direct involvement in it. 

Senator BROWNBACK. They are in the leadership in the government in Sudan? Individuals you are negotiating with or dealing 

with? 

General GRATION. I am negotiating with individuals that are in 

high-level positions in the Government of Sudan. 

Senator BROWNBACK. You are dealing with a government that is 

conducting an ongoing genocide, is that correct? 

General GRATION. I am dealing with the government. 

Senator BROWNBACK. That is conducting an ongoing genocide in 

Sudan? 

General GRATION. I am dealing with the government in an effort 

to end the conflict, in an effort to end gross human rights abuses. 

Senator BROWNBACK. I understand the objective. I am asking 

you, are you dealing with a government that has conducted an ongoing genocide in Sudan? 

General GRATION. I am dealing with, as I said, I am dealing with 

the government in Khartoum of Sudan. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Which is currently conducting a genocide in 

Sudan, is that correct? 

General GRATION. That is correct. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Should we have dealt with Charles Taylor? 

He was an indicted war criminal. 

General GRATION. I have not been involved with Charles Taylor. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Should we have negotiated with Serbian 

leader Karadzic, the Butcher of Bosnia? 

General GRATION. I have not been involved in that situation. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Let me get to the specifics then in this, and 

this will be my last question. I think it is obvious what is taking 

place. Despite U.S. efforts to broker a settlement on key outVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
24

standing issues regarding CPA implementation, the process appears deadlocked, due in no small part to the National Congress 

Party’s obstructionism. At what point would the United States follow through on its promises to increase pressure on the NCP to 

make the necessary concessions to pass the Southern Sudan Referendum law, reform the National Security law, fully implement 

the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s decision on Abyei and fully 

implement other elements of the CPA? 

General GRATION. I have been involved in discussions and negotiations with the parties, and it is very clear that they both have 

positions that they are maintaining to both in the south and in the 

north. And we have been helping both sides come to a compromise 

on those issues so that they can get a solution on the elections, 

they can get a solution on the referendum, they can get a solution 

on public consultations and on the Abyei issue and in addition to 

the National Security law. 

I anticipate that these will be resolved in the near future so we 

can move on and start working on the post-CPA issues of citizenship, the north-south border and resource-sharing, things like grazing rights, water rights and oil. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Senator. Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much. General Gration, I am somewhat 

encouraged by your new policy that places a special emphasis on 

international cooperation and multilateral action in solving Sudan’s 

pressing humanitarian and political issues. However, as it relates 

to genocide, I think those are the issues that are paramount and 

foremost in all of our minds. And I think we have talked a little 

bit about this in terms of China being one of the key players in 

that regard at least in Sudan and the leverage that China holds. 

Given that China holds unparalleled really economic and political 

leverage over the Government of Sudan, I took the opportunity to 

write to President Obama in advance of his recent trip to China, 

encouraging him to secure the Chinese Government’s full support 

and assistance in accomplishing the goals of this new Sudan policy. 

I haven’t heard any reports, however, that indicated whether or not 

the issue was discussed on the President’s visit. 

Can you tell me whether or not and to what extent the United 

States has reached out to China for support in terms of our policy 

in Sudan and also in support of helping us in the genocide in 

Sudan? Also the League of Arab States in seeking their support in 

not only implementing the new policy but also ending the genocide. 

I have had the opportunity like many members here to meet with 

President Mubarak. We met with the President of Algeria and 

other leaders and raised this concern in terms of them taking a 

hard stand against what is taking place in the Sudan. So far we 

have seen some results only in the humanitarian needs. I know 

that Egypt is helping in a tremendous way with the hospital and 

clinics and what-have-you. But I haven’t seen the kind of response 

by China or any of the League of Arab States saying look, this 

genocide must end or else we are going to also impose sanctions 

and do some other things that may make it even more difficult for 

them to continue, for the Sudanese to continue with their disastrous efforts in killing people and in committing genocide. 

25

General GRATION. Right. As you know, the centerpiece or one of 

the pieces of the strategy is the multilateral commitment and 

working with our international partners to achieve our collective 

goals in Sudan, and we have set up many different mechanisms to 

allow us to do that more efficiently. 

The first is what we call the Envoy Six. It is the P–5 countries 

that have special envoys in addition to the European Union, who 

has a special envoy. We started meeting together. We said we were 

going to meet every 6 months. We are now meeting about every 2 

months, and it is probably going to go down to every 1 month. As 

part of that group, Russia and China, along with France, the UK, 

the United States and the AU, we get together. 

In terms of China specifically, Ambassador Li Chengwen is their 

representative or their envoy on Sudan issues. We go back to the 

time when I was flying with the Kenya Air Force and he was assigned to the embassy in Kenya. We have had a relationship that 

allows us to have frank and open conversations on issues. 

The interesting thing is that China and the United States share 

the same objectives when it comes to security, when it comes to 

stability. They need security and stability to protect their investment of $4.5 billion in the oil industry. We need the security and 

stability to protect the Sudanese people and the future of Sudan. 

And so we have been able to work together in ways to help promote stability and security. We have been able to work together on 

humanitarian projects, to synchronize these better so that we don’t 

build two roads next to each other a hundred miles but we put 

those end to end. 

Ms. LEE. Sure. General Gration, let me just ask you before my 

time is up, though, have you communicated to the Chinese Government the fact that this cooperation that you are listing is wonderful, it should happen, it should have happened a long time ago, but 

if the carnage doesn’t stop, if the genocide doesn’t stop, have you 

communicated to the Chinese Government that they should join us 

in imposing sanctions and take a hard line against what is taking 

place as a next step? 

General GRATION. We have. We have indeed. And the President 

did bring it up with President Hu. They discussed Sudan, they discussed areas of cooperation. I don’t have all the details, but I do 

know that it was a centerpiece of the discussions in Beijing. 

I have also traveled to Beijing and had discussions with the people over there, and we have made these points very clear. And 

while there are significant areas of strategic cooperation, there are 

areas where we differ on the tactical level, on arms and those kinds 

of things. And we are continuing to work through those issues. But 

as you know, these are bilateral issues, and we will continue to influence them as we can. 

But I will tell you that the spirit of cooperation is significant, and 

we are doing the same thing with periphery states and Arab states. 

In addition to the Troika and the contact group, we have frequent 

meetings with the Arab League, with Tripoli, Libya, with Chad, 

Egypt, Ethiopia, EGAD countries. I am leaving possibly tomorrow 

to attend the ministerials with the EGAD countries. I will be going 

to Egypt and to Libya before Christmas holiday. 

26

These things we continue to do because, like you, we know that 

this solution is not one that involves just America. It is one that 

involves the international community and the broad international 

community. Everybody has to be part of the solution to end the 

conflicts and to promote peace and development. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith, our ranking member. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for 

convening this very important hearing. I just want the record to 

show the only reason I was late, was because Sudan is one of the 

highest priorities for me, the head of the Central Authority for 

Brazil, which is the agency or entity that adjudicates Hague cases 

where children have been abducted, was in town. Yesterday we had 

a hearing on that, chaired very ably by Mr. Wolf on the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission. And I have been working on that 

issue with David Goldman, a man we both know very well, from 

New Jersey, whose son, Sean, was kidnapped 5 years ago, over 5 

years ago. We are hopefully coming to a positive conclusion soon. 

But this is the person who is in charge of that government entity 

that adjudicates those cases, so what was a 1⁄2-hour meeting turned 

into 11⁄2-hours. So I do apologize, General, for not being here for 

your opening, but that in no way reflects my deep and abiding concern for Sudan, having been to Mukjar and Kalma Camp myself, 

and having met with Bashir for the better part of almost 2 hours 

in a very real argument with that man, this is before he was indicted for war crimes. Sudan is at the top of my list, as it is the 

chairman’s, in trying to bring some peace, reconciliation and justice. 

Just as you may know, General, as ranking member, I have 

asked no less than four times for a classified briefing about the 

annex of the menu of incentives and disincentives that were announced as part of the new strategy on October 19. We asked on 

October 21, 22, 29 and November 4 and again on the 30th, so that 

would be five times, to have a classified briefing to weigh what it 

is that this new policy really entails. 

As the Secretary of State pointed out, this is classified. But it 

seems to me the fact that the ranking member still can’t get this 

information, I don’t think our distinguished chairman has received 

it either, is very, very troubling, because like Mr. Brownback, like 

Mr. Wolf, like my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, this is not 

a passing concern. This is a deep and passionate concern for each 

of us. And we want to know what the strategy is, in a closed session or in a classified briefing here or downtown, we will do it anywhere, anytime. 

So I reiterate that request. I really want to hear what is being 

contemplated here. So please honor that request as soon as possible, today, tomorrow, any day. Just name the day, I will be there 

and my colleagues will be there as well. 

Likewise, we made multiple requests for detailed briefings on the 

reported arms transfers from the regime in Khartoum to militias 

in southern Sudan. We held a hearing that Mr. Payne will remember so well, where we heard about very troubling numbers of AK–

47s and other weapons that are being deployed south, raising the 

specter of perhaps renewed hostilities that we need to get a better 

27

handle on at least as policymakers. We don’t know the numbers. 

So I reiterate that request as well. 

Finally, I would ask unanimous consent that my statement be 

made a part of the record, I don’t think it would be appropriate to 

go back and go through that. 

Mr. PAYNE. Without objection. 

Mr. SMITH. But I would join with my colleague, Ms. Lee, in—I 

was a signer of the letter that went down to the President before 

his trip to Beijing, and we have had hearings in this room time and 

again about, remember, we were calling it the genocide olympics. 

And in the run-up there was leverage that was not used with regards to China’s singular role in the genocide first in southern 

Sudan where 2 million people were butchered and killed and the 

upwards of 450,000 or whatever the current number of atrocity is 

of dead in Darfur. And to the best of my knowledge, we saw nothing about that information being conveyed to Hu Jintao or anyone 

else during that Beijing visit—and maybe you can tell us and 

elaborate on whether or not the President raised that. 

It seems to me that the arms supplier makes it all possible to 

wage genocide, if you want to stop it, you go to the source. It is 

not just in Khartoum where all of this is emanating. It is being 

aided and abetted by the Chinese Government. 

And we have raised this, Mr. Payne and I, over and over again 

in every fora we could possibly think of and especially with the 

Chinese. Mr. Wolf and I were in Beijing right before the Olympics, 

and that was a major part of our dialogue with our Chinese interlocutors. But if it is not backed up by the President of the United 

States, it seems to me our thoughts ring a bit hollow. 

And I would add on human rights in general, and I don’t care 

if it is a Democrat or a Republican in the White House, human 

rights transcend all parties. They have no party. When you are 

being victimized, it doesn’t matter if you are a Democrat or Republican in terms of who is advocating or not. 

We had had a hearing right before the President left about the 

horrific one-child-per-couple policy, and we had a lawyer, Jiang, 

who bravely testified at that hearing and another hearing about 

due process rights and about this crime against women called 

forced abortion. We asked the President on that case as well to 

raise the issue and to provide protection for the lawyers, the 

human rights defenders like Jiang who were arrested, were interrogated. We believe that now he is under very, very tight surveillance. 

But it is part of a seamless lack of intervention. What happened 

on Darfur? Did the President raise the issue? And I mean robustly. 

Hopefully he did it in some way, hopefully he did it in a very profound way, because China can turn off the spigot of funds and monies that is enabling this terrible killing field. 

General GRATION. Thank you. In terms of the classified briefing, 

I am available any time to do that. And I don’t know of the 

‘‘annex,’’ but I do know that there are working papers that we used 

as we deliberated, as we came up with a menu of things that we 

could consider in tiers of options on the political, economic, military 

side, and I would be happy to share those with you. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, I mentioned the annex. If I could interrupt. 

28

General GRATION. But there is no annex. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, the Secretary of State had said that. 

General GRATION. Okay. 

Mr. SMITH. She said they are part in fact of a classified annex 

to our strategy and we are now seeing the outline of today. 

General GRATION. Well, I am telling you that I have never seen 

one. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General GRATION. The only thing I have seen is the classified 

working papers that are part of the NSC. But I would be happy 

to tell you anything that is in those documents. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. 

General GRATION. That is no problem at all. 

Mr. SMITH. On the China? 

General GRATION. On the China, I was not with the President on 

this trip. All I know is that the issue was raised, that the two 

Presidents had in-depth discussions on Sudan and on the issues 

surrounding Sudan. I don’t know specifically about what was 

raised in terms of the moral issues and that kind of thing, but I 

can try to find out. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, with respect, and asking the indulgence of the 

chairman, I read the joint statements that were made by President 

Obama and Hu Jintao. I read them very carefully. And my concern 

is, where was Darfur? Where was human rights in general other 

than an oblique mention buried in the body of the text? If you 

could get back with specifics about what was raised and in what 

manner, that would be very, very helpful, because private diplomacy can only go so far when there is a genocide occurring. I hope 

he did mention it, but I hope he mentioned it in a way that was 

really significant. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER. Thank you. General, it should not be a great surprise that there are continuing disagreements about the preparations for the national election in April, about polling procedures, 

voter registration, but more broadly about whether there are going 

to be real elections. 

Do you think the elections, the 2010 elections, are going to take 

place? Do you think that they are going to be credible, that they 

are going to be free, fair and transparent? What are we doing to 

make sure that happens? What are we doing to prepare for the 

very distinctly possible outcome of elections that are not credible, 

that are a fraud, that are a sham? What are we doing to make sure 

that those are not treated as legitimizing a genocidal government? 

General GRATION. Yes. We believe that the spirit of the CPA, the 

letter of the CPA tells us and gives us our mandate to have elections in Sudan. This is part of the political transformation that we 

are seeking, that the CPA sought. 

The first step was to get an election law that allowed us to proceed. We have been able to do the registration piece, and as you 

probably know, we are up to 60 percent, 7.4 million people overall 

in the north in Darfur, just under 50 percent, with 1.79 million 

people registered, and in the south we have achieved 60 percent, 

with 2.5 million people registered. That allows these Sudanese the 

29

option of expressing their will in the election, and I think that is 

very important. 

We have seen that while there have been irregularities and while 

there have been things that we don’t like, we have seen that the 

government has been responsive in trying to help the situation get 

better. In the very beginning there were only 1,500 people that 

were registrars. There weren’t enough books. When the international community pointed that out, they increased the number of 

registrars, increased the number of books, to help more people get 

registered. 

And while it is not perfect, we have to remember that this is the 

first time in 24 years that they have had elections. We also have 

to remember that in the last election only 5 million people were 

registered as opposed to the numbers that we have already, 11.96 

million people registered already for this election. 

So yes, I think that there is an opportunity for us to work on political transformation through this election. There are a lot of 

things that have to continue, though. We have to get sorted out the 

census so we can get an agreement between the two parties about 

the legislature, because it is only by having the elections down to 

the legislative level that we can, number one, have a legislature 

that has been elected by the people as to one that has been appointed. 

Number two, we have to make sure that all the other pieces that 

go into an election to help make it free and fair, that we help with 

instituting these processes. So it is not only the law, it is not only 

this registration piece, but it is voter education. It is making sure 

that there is security. It is making sure that there are all the administrative pieces of putting the ballots and getting them to the 

right places at the right time. And then there is the whole piece 

about tabulation and in a way that is clear. 

And so what we want to do is work with the international community to have monitors at the right place. And the Carter Center 

has increased its people from 12 to 30 already for the registration, 

and we are working together with the international community to 

bring in more. 

We are also working with the National Election Commission to 

ensure that they are bringing in their monitors and that this system is as free and as fair, as credible as we can get it. Why? Because it is part of the transformation process. But number two, we 

will start next year in July to start registering people—I shouldn’t 

say we, but the Sudanese will in the south and in Abyei for the 

referendum, in the south for self-determination and in Abyei to decide whether they stay with the north or go with the south if the 

south chooses independence. 

Many of these same procedures in terms of the law, in terms of 

the preparation, in terms of free, fair and credible, in terms of 

counting and security, are the same things that we are going 

through the processes now for, we are going to have to go through 

it again. And the worst thing that I can think of is at the end, in 

January 2011, we say to the people of southern Sudan this 

referenda wasn’t free, it wasn’t fair, it wasn’t credible, therefore it 

is invalidated. 

30

We need to do everything we can now and then to ensure the 

people of Sudan not only get to elect their leaders, not only get to 

elect their legislators, but the people in the south have an opportunity to express their will in a way that is free, fair and credible. 

We are working that process. This is a process. 

And if you take a look at each of the post-conflict countries as 

they have tried to do elections, this has been tough. And when you 

don’t have a history of legislative process, election process, as 

Sudan doesn’t in that we have had a break since 1986 until now 

and we have had all the conflict and we are just coming together, 

this is a tough process. 

But I have got to tell you the United States and the international 

community is committed to doing everything they can to ensure 

that the process will result in a situation where individuals can express their will and that their will is fully counted and implemented. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. We have a vote coming up. 

We have three members who have not asked questions. We will 

give each of them 4 minutes. That will take 12 minutes. That will 

give us plenty of time to get over to this 15-minute vote. So at this 

time, Dr. Boozman. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Gration, what 

benchmarks is the administration using to measure the success of 

the new Sudan strategy? What are the incentives and disincentives? If you can’t divulge them now, will you allow Congress access 

to the classified annex of the policy review? 

General GRATION. Yes. I am happy to come over here any time 

at a time that is convenient for you all to discuss the working papers and the policy deliberations that we went through, recognizing 

that this is just a menu of options that are available to decision 

makers as we take a look at what we can do to pressure and what 

we can do to incentivize actions on the ground. As I explained earlier, we are looking at conditions changing on the ground. We are 

trying to do this in an objective way, and we will continue to work 

through this process so we have objective benchmarks that we can 

present. 

The first meeting that we have planned is going to be shortly 

after the New Year where we will be able to present these conditions on the ground, that it will be up to policymakers in the executive branch, and we will also do this in consultations with Congress 

to make sure that we either increase pressures in those areas 

where there has been backsliding or no progress and incentivize in 

those areas where we made progress. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. I am sorry, I don’t mean to interrupt, but we have 

just got a second. You mentioned progress, and I guess what I 

would like to know is what specific progress that we have to show 

that the engagement policy is working. The situation on the ground 

in Darfur has not substantially changed since the administration 

took office. Insecurity in the south is rising and there is no sign of 

an imminent peace deal. What has the NCP given us? 

General GRATION. I would take issue with all those. I think we 

have made a lot of changes. When I took over, there were 1.2 million people that faced a crisis because of 13 NGOs being thrown 

31

out. We have been able to fix that. We made it through the rainy 

season without having those losses. 

We have been having significant movement in terms of armed 

group unification. The Chad-Sudan border issue has gone from 

where we had rebel groups in N’Djamena, proxy people in 

Omdurman, we are now in a situation where Kamal Harazi is 

going over to N’Djamena, and we are expecting the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Faki, to come to the Sudan. 

These are significant changes. If you just take a look at the numbers in June of this last year, and I recognize that they are low, 

there were 16 excess deaths. None of them were Fur people. It was 

Arab-on-Arab, plus two policemen and two others. 

My point is that things are changing significantly, things are improving, but there is still an awful long ways to go. We have 2.7 

million people living in abhorrent conditions. We have insecurity. 

We have gender-based violence. This has to change, but we are 

making progress. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Ms. Woolsey. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you. General Gration, when the Sudanese 

Government unilaterally kicked the humanitarian NGOs out of the 

country, the situation disintegrated rapidly for the people in need. 

The situation was already dire for women and children. So what 

is the situation now regarding women and children, regarding 

health, regarding delivery of emergency food sources? 

General GRATION. By working with the U.N., existing NGOs and 

by the Sudanese Government allowing four major new NGOs to return to Darfur, we have actually gotten up to the capacity we had 

before. That said, we are doing it with emergency conditions, we 

are doing it with stopgap measures. It is not sustainable. We are 

working on fixing that. 

You are exactly correct in that there were gaps before the NGOs 

were pushed out; there are still those gaps. There are certain areas 

where we have not gotten up to speed, and these include the protection aspects and some of the aspects that you have talked about 

where we are really taking care of the women and the children. 

But in terms of health, in terms of food, water and sanitation, 

we are meeting the basic needs. But you are exactly right; we need 

to push a lot harder to work on protection and some of these other 

issues. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Will that push depend upon the free, fair, credible 

elections, or can it happen as part of that? 

General GRATION. It is happening right now, ma’am. We are 

working on an ongoing basis to try to fix this problem. And I would 

say it is unrelated to the election. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. So regarding the election, I guess this is more of 

a rhetorical question: What if it doesn’t turn out to be fair, free and 

credible? Where will the United States draw the line? Or will we 

compromise, thinking we have put in all the effort that we possibly 

could, did the best we could and tried but failed? I mean, will we 

accept a criminal government? 

General GRATION. We are now working with our international 

partners on these very same issues. The envoys, the contact group, 

we are discussing what is going to be our approach because we are 

32

going to have to be doing a lot of the funding. And the question 

is, When do you stop funding something that is not going to be 

working out? We are committed, though, to doing everything we 

can to ensure we put in these processes. And ma’am, it may not 

only be for this election, but it may be for subsequent elections. 

And so what we are trying to do is put into place processes and 

procedures and a way of doing things now so people understand 

that they can vote, that they can make a change, that they can express their will through democratic means. And this political transformation is going to be a process. And it may not be something 

we can do between now and April, but it is certainly something 

that we have to try to do, and then it is something that we have 

to continue to build on through the referendum and through subsequent elections. 

Ms. WOOLSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just going to quickly 

make the observation here that when you have a manufactured crisis and you run, as Bashir did, you run all the aid groups out and 

then you let a handful of them back in with a set of new conditions, 

as the group Enough did, what to do about Sudan now? They say 

they don’t have access to large areas of Darfur anymore and those 

that do have access to vulnerable populations no longer publicize 

their assessments for fear of expulsion. So I just want to get that 

into the record in terms of the other side of this argument. 

I wanted to make the point and come back to the fact that the 

Lord’s Resistance Army is on the run. We have a commander who 

recently surrendered. In interviews he has noted that Joseph Kony 

has the intention to move his forces into Darfur to link up with the 

Sudan armed forces. He wants those armed forces to give him 

logistical support. In the past they have. I remember when they 

were patching up his soldiers in hospitals and sending them south 

and giving munitions to them. So the Islamist government in 

Sudan is really the last lifeline, as it has been the lifeline for years, 

but it is now the last lifeline for Kony. 

Let us cut this off and end Kony’s terror across Africa. I just ask 

you, how involved today is the Sudanese Government and how do 

you intend to bring pressure to get that lifeline cut off? 

General GRATION. First of all, I would say that in terms of the 

NGOs moving around Darfur, I meet with them all the time, I just 

met with them last week in N’Djamena and Al Fashir, and it is 

really a security issue as opposed to a restriction issue. And if we 

could fix the security issue, which we are working on right now 

very hard to do at the local level with the Bandistri, with the 

Janjaweed autonomous with our militia groups, if we can get these 

things fixed, that will solve a lot of the NGO problems. 

In terms of the LRA, we agree with you. There is no reason that 

Joseph Kony should be allowed to be wandering around and be 

alive and continuing the Lord’s Resistance. It is abhorrent. I used 

to live in that area between Aba and Adi-Faraj, and the number 

of people that are being raped and houses being burned down and 

that kind of thing is unbelievable. And the fact that it is not an 

absolutely international outrage is disgusting to me. 

33

That said, I have been working with the Sudanese Government 

in Khartoum, and I think that they would agree with you that Joseph Kony has to stop. We cannot find links, and it has been reported to me, and if you have the links that we can go in, I cannot 

find any links right now of the Sudanese Government to Joseph 

Kony. And if we can find them, obviously those will be things that 

we will put pressures in, but there is nothing that we can find 

right now. 

Mr. ROYCE. I would just point out that his commander who surrendered says they were backing us in the past. So I don’t know 

about the moment, but he is telling his troops if you get out of the 

encirclement, this is who you surrender to, this is who will work 

with you. I just bring it up. 

I am the ranking member of the Terrorism Nonproliferation and 

Trade Subcommittee. We had a hearing 2 weeks ago in which one 

witness testified, and I am going to use his words here, ‘‘The 

Jihadist aim is to thwart the international community in Darfur 

and reignite a holy war in southern Sudan.’’ I would ask if you 

share any concerns about the reputed ambitions of Khartoum. 

From my standpoint, I remember pretty vividly Khartoum’s backing some years ago of Osama bin Laden, so I don’t give the benefit 

of the doubt to Bashir. So give me your assessment, General, if you 

would on that. 

General GRATION. Yes. Obviously we have our eyes wide open. 

We are looking for any indications that would lead us to believe 

that that is happening. Right now, though, our mandate is to save 

lives, to implement the CPA, to ensure that the conflict stops in 

Darfur and that we reset the picture on the CT front. We are trying to do that. And if we have indications that there is a jihadist 

movement that is disrupting the south, obviously we are going to 

apply a lot of pressure and speak out very forcefully against it. 

This cannot be tolerated, and we won’t. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Our ranking member will 

have 30 seconds to intervene. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. General Gration, let me ask you, at our 

July 29 hearing, SPLM, Secretary General Pagan Amum, testified 

that it had been documented that the NCP had supplied 79,000 

AK–47s to the civilian population in the south. The next day, at a 

Tom Lantos hearing, we heard that it was indeed 79,000 that had 

been distributed, but a total of 200,000 additional AK–47s had 

been ordered. 

Do those numbers comport with our assessment and how many 

of those 200,000 have been distributed since the 79,000, if that 

number is accurate? 

General GRATION. These are questions that I continue to ask 

UNMIS, and we are continuing to try to get our arms around this 

issue. There are reports of increased ammunitions. There are these 

reports of guns coming through. We have not found linkages to the 

Khartoum Government at this time. 

Mr. PAYNE. Senator, we have about 1 minute more if you would 

like to make a concluding statement. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Just that I hope we can work with the administration and stop this complete loss of moral authority if we 

34

negotiate with a genocidal government. And I appreciate very much 

the chance here to work, but I more would appreciate the chance 

for the administration to reconsider what steps it has taken here. 

It is a massive step that I think undermines a great deal of our 

authority that we have had around the world in dealing with genocidal-type regimes or people that conduct war crimes. I really think 

I would hope you would reconsider that. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to be here today. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, let me thank our witness. We have been in session now for, in our 12th month. That is one-half of a congressional 

term, and this has been frustrating, as you know, an issue that 

many of us feel very deeply about, very emotional about. And so 

we first of all appreciate you getting here. We would hope it would 

have been sooner than later, and that is where a lot of pent-up 

frustration is. 

You can see this is an issue that is bipartisan and both Houses 

take very seriously. I know that the President and you take it very 

seriously. But when you are kept in the dark so to speak, you really don’t know. And we knew you were working hard. It is just we 

didn’t know what you were doing. Now we have gotten some light, 

now we can have some evaluation. As you can see, there is still a 

lot of skepticism and a lot of us that want to see Sudan come into 

the 21st century, and we don’t see it yet. 

But let me once again thank you for coming. We will adjourn, recess this hearing. There is no time left, but we will be back. There 

are four votes. We should be back in 1⁄2-half hour or less. 

With that, I would like to thank our Special Envoy for coming. 

And this portion of the hearing is complete. Thank you. 

The next three witnesses will be part of the official hearing, and 

our fourth and final witness, we will then turn the hearing into a 

briefing since, as you know, House Rules indicate that official hearing, you may not have officials of governments. However, they can 

brief the Congress. And so it is just a technicality. They will all remain at the desk and they will all be questioned at the completion 

of the testimony. 

Our panel of witnesses here will begin with Dr. Randy Newcomb. 

Randy Newcomb is the president and CEO of Humanity United, 

one of the world’s largest private donors in the field of international human rights. Dr. Newcomb leads the organization’s longterm strategy to stop and prevent mass atrocities and modern-day 

slavery. 

He is a regular speaker on international human rights issues 

and has appeared as an expert commentator in the media. Previously Dr. Newcomb was vice president of the Omidyar Network, 

a philanthropic investment firm. He was a fellow at the Center for 

Social Innovation at Stanford University and an international development fellow at the University of Bath in England. He holds 

a doctorate degree from the University of San Francisco, a master’s 

degree in development and economics and cross-cultural studies at 

the University of Bath in England. 

Our next witness is Mr. Enrico Carisch. Mr. Carisch, former coordinator for the United Nations Panel on Experts on Sudan. He 

has served on expert panels of the United Nations Security Council 

on Somalia, Liberia, DRCN and Sudan, where he has investigated 

35

financial aspects of arms embargo violations, money laundering 

and natural resource diversions for conflict funding. 

He has advised the Central Africa member states of the ICGLR 

in their effort to establish effective certification and control mechanisms for their precious and semiprecious metals and their timber 

resources. Prior to his work in Africa, Mr. Carisch worked as an 

investigative print and TV journalist. 

Last but certainly no stranger and not least, we have Mr. John 

Prendergast. Mr. Prendergast is the co-founder of the Enough 

Project, an initiative here to end genocide and crimes against humanity. 

During the Clinton administration, Mr. Prendergast was involved in a number of peace processes in Africa while he was director of African affairs for the National Security Council and special 

advisor at the Department of State. Mr. Prendergast has also 

worked for Members of Congress, the United Nations, human 

rights organizations and think tanks. He has authored eight books 

on Africa, including ‘‘Not on Our Watch,’’ which he co-authored 

with actor Don Cheadle. 

With NBA stars he co-founded the Darfur Dream Team Sister 

Schools Program, which connects schools in the United States with 

schools in the Darfurian refugee camps. Mr. Prendergast travels 

regularly to Africa. He is a visiting professor at the University of 

San Diego and the American University in Nairobi, and he has 

done extensive work and continues to do so throughout Africa. 

We will begin with our next panelist, Dr. Newcomb. 

STATEMENT OF RANDY NEWCOMB, PH.D., PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HUMANITY UNITED 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member 

Smith, members of the committee for inviting me to testify at this 

critically important moment for the people of Sudan. 

Before I begin my remarks, I wanted to ask that my full written 

statement be made a part of the record if you wouldn’t mind. 

Mr. PAYNE. Without objection. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. I would also like to bring greetings, Mr. Chairman, from Pam Omidyar. You have met with her several times, 

and she is disappointed to not be with you today but was traveling 

and was not able to make it. But you have been an inspiration to 

her and to all of our philanthropic work, so thank you so much. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. Let me first commend the committee for holding 

this hearing. As you know, Mr. Chairman, there has never been a 

more critical time in Sudan’s history than the present while the 

parties in Sudan and those in the international community use the 

next 18 months may make the difference between a hard-won 

peace or a return to large-scale war. 

Humanity United, the organization that I run, was founded in 

2005 on a simple premise. More than just representing the challenge to peace and security, we believe that egregious forms of violence and injustice, including those taking place in Sudan, threaten 

the very foundation of our common humanity. 

As a private philanthropic organization whose mission is to help 

in mass atrocities and modern-day slavery, our work on Sudan inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
36

cludes supporting advocacy efforts globally, providing grants to 

those working on to advance peace, as well as engaging in a range 

of other activities focused on conflict both inside and outside of 

Sudan. 

But as requested by the committee, I will focus my remarks 

today specifically on how the United States can support conflict 

resolution in Sudan by working with marginalized communities in 

the country and concentrating on the issues that the various parties within Sudan need to be resolving now at this moment in time. 

It is clear that the U.S. and international attention is focused on 

resolving the immediate issues. These issues are important, and 

yet settling them will address only some parts of the complex mosaic of center-periphery conflict in Sudan. Several high-risk flash 

points will still threaten a return to conflict. Time and energy 

should be devoted now to identifying such potential flash points 

and to promoting peace-building activities meant to reduce those 

local tensions which could trigger a wider conflict. 

Essential to these discussions are the transitional areas of Southern Kordufan, Blue Nile and Abyei, the so-called three areas, regions along the north-south border that fought with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army during the civil war. The U.S.-backed 2005 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement contained separate protocols for 

these fragile and high-risk areas, including establishing a parallel 

referendum for Abyei and a popular consultation process for the 

states of Southern Kordufan and Blue Nile, both of which will remain in northern Sudan beyond 2011. 

These processes are meant to allow local communities to express 

their views on the CPA and to enter into discussions with Khartoum on persisting grievances. While the popular consultations in 

Southern Kordufan and Blue Nile represent a potentially important step toward an inclusive governance arrangement, little has 

been done to prepare for the consultations thus far. 

Abyei itself is a microcosm of the issues facing both north and 

south with regard to the 2011 referendum. Abyei, as you know, sits 

on large deposits of oil, includes traditional grazing areas for northern pastoralist communities and was the scene of the most serious 

post-CPA violence to date. 

As you know, in May 2008, local tensions fueled by failure to implement the CPA led to violent clashes between government forces 

from the north and south, leading to widespread destruction and 

many deaths. I think the Abyei incident underscores the case with 

which a local conflict could trigger a broader war between north 

and south, collapsing the CPA altogether and with it any hope at 

all for peace. 

Work with the local communities in Abyei to prevent precisely 

this kind of violence has lagged dangerously behind other efforts. 

As the country that drafted the Abyei Protocol, the United States 

has a special responsibility here to ensure that agreements for 

Abyei are not just upheld but that they are successful. 

The need for local civil society engagement in a power is also dire 

in Darfur itself, as you know. As the member of the committee 

knows all too well, the terrible suffering in Darfur has led to displacement and fragmentation, with millions of Darfuris either in 

37

refugee camps in Chad or displaced from their homes. Sudan today 

boasts more displaced persons than any nation on Earth. 

Efforts to negotiate a Darfur peace deal have left critical local 

voices out of the process, making consensus among refugees and internally displaced persons outside of any part of that peace process. 

If we believe that we can achieve peace there, this can only be 

achieved if we help support and sustain the civil society actors that 

exist in Darfur and help give them a voice in this critical process. 

Mr. Chairman, before I conclude, I do want to raise the critical 

importance of thinking today about the challenges of tomorrow. 

Working for peace in Sudan must also remain focused on the 2011 

referendum. If the choice for southern independence—and I think 

everybody would agree that all indications suggest that it might 

lead toward independence—there are a number of issues that demand urgent attention. The risk of conflict I believe can be reduced. But in order for peace to prevail, international attention, coordination and diligence by the United States Government is needed on four pressing issues. 

The first, cross-border oil revenue sharing. Southern oil revenue 

is currently split 50/50 between Khartoum and Juba. Should the 

south vote for secession, the bulk of the oil would remain in the 

south, but the pipeline to support Sudan, the only means for the 

north to get their oil to market, runs through the north. Northsouth cooperation in the oil sector will require international support, guarantees and capacity-building in the south. 

Number two, cross-border population movements. As mentioned 

in my previous comments on Abyei, there are populations on both 

sides of the border whose livelihoods depend on continued crossborder access either for grazing herds or for trade. Early agreement 

on continued cross-border access will reduce the likelihood of tensions, local violence and manipulation by outside forces. 

Number three, water rights. The White Nile flows through the 

south before meeting with the Blue Nile in Khartoum and flowing 

north to Egypt. Regional concerns about the implications of southern independence for the Nile River Treaty need to be addressed. 

Such discussions will also require robust international engagement 

to ensure that neighboring countries are confident in this outcome. 

And number four, status of the southern populations in the 

north. I think one of the most worrying scenarios around the secession of the south is the status of southern populations in the north, 

estimated to be between 1.5–2 million people. Most were displaced 

during the decades-long civil war and would be forcefully displaced 

back to the south or maybe subjected to violence. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of the committee, these are complex and delicate issues. Yet we ignore these 

issues raised here at the peril of the Sudanese people and all those 

who care about the advancement of peace. Serious work must commence on these four issues right away. I urge each of you to push 

the administration to address these issues and to make sure that 

continued Congressional oversight is exercised as the 2011 referendum approaches. 

Thank you again for allowing me to appear today, and I look forward to addressing your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Newcomb follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Mr. Carisch. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ENRICO CARISCH, FORMER COORDINATOR, UNITED NATIONS PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE 

SUDAN 

Mr. CARISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. 

I am particularly gratified by your continuing interest in Darfur, 

which is unfortunately not matched by much of the world even in 

places that talked of little else 2 or 3 years ago. 

I want to bring you the perspective from the broader community, 

from the broader international community and the multilateral efforts in bringing peace and security to Darfur. And there I think 

it is important to notice that many member states of the U.N. Security Council that 4 or 5 years ago have advocated and helped to 

impose certain coercive measures on those who have responsibility 

for the violence in Darfur now seem to be backing away to continue 

to fight back against those who abuse the Darfurians. 

Increasingly it looks like the poorly understood and underenforced U.N. sanctions are being sold out in favor of mediation, 

whose success is at any rate far from ensured. And that is the core 

of my concern which brings me here. 

I had the honor of serving as the coordinator of the most recent 

panel of experts on Sudan. For those who don’t know, the U.N. has 

imposed an arms embargo in 2004. In 2005 it revisited the issue 

and expanded the embargo in order to affect all the parties belligerent and the government and the formulation used most. The embargo is for all the signatories of the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement. That is in place since 2005. 

That same resolution, 1591, also created a Sanction Committee 

and with that the panel of experts, which acts essentially as the 

eyes and ears of the Security Council in Darfur and in the region. 

Another important element of this resolution was that it provided a mandate to the panel to monitor compliance with the International Humanitarian Human Rights Law to report those who 

violate such laws, to report on those who impede the peace process, 

constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region and are responsible for military, offensive military overflights. 

We have tried to fulfill all these obligations and duties in our 

most recent report, a summary of which I would like to have inserted into your report with your permission along with the full 

written testimony. 

Mr. PAYNE. Without objection. 

Mr. CARISCH. But I would like to just hit on the most important 

findings of the report that basically breaks down in eight areas or 

categories of abuses that we have found. 

First, most of the armed actors in Darfur continue to violate the 

arms embargo. The Government of Sudan and the combatants of 

JEM, the Justice and Equality Movement, are the worst offenders. 

Second, many of the arms and most of the ammunition we find 

in Darfur originates from China. We have attempted to cooperate 

with the Chinese Government and in some instances even with 

Chinese manufacturers of these arms in order to assist, to obtain 

their assistance in the tracing of these items to the actual violators 

44

of the arms embargo. It is very critical that we get full cooperation. 

We have gotten far from satisfactory cooperation so far. 

Without that cooperation, we will not be able to conclusively 

identify the embargo violators, and we will not be able to help with 

stopping the violence or the violations of the arms embargo. 

Third, international humanitarian and human rights laws continue to be abused and not respected. 

Fourth, too frequently, indiscriminate force, disproportionate and 

indiscriminate force is applied, which leads to massive killings, injuries and mass displacements of civilians. This past year we have 

seen that in several places. Misseriya was probably the most brutal 

one. 

Fifth, the panel has made special efforts to listen to the half of 

the population that usually is never listened to, which are the 

women. Every one of the ones we interacted with told us that the 

biggest and greatest threat to them continues to be sexual and gender-based violence. 

Sixth, almost all parties to the conflict continue to use child soldiers. 

Seventh, Darfurians are still illegally and legally detained according to Sudanese law or arbitrary arrests are carried out by the 

National Intelligence and Security Services of the Sudan. The detainees are interrogated and subjected to torture and physical 

abuse, which includes but is not limited to severe beatings and hitting with hands, fists and boots as well as other objects, flogging 

with rubber hoses, burning with coal heaters and other electric instruments, forced swallowing of extremely hot water, sleep deprivation and being suspended by ropes in stretched positions. These 

findings are from our direct interactions with such victims. We 

have medical testimonies as well. After they were released finally, 

they obviously needed medical help. 

Eighth, while the Government of Sudan has been claiming that 

the Janjaweed are disarmed, that of course again goes back to Resolution 1556 passed in 2004. We see no official accounting for that, 

and we have however in the context of the Misseriya battle found 

written evidence, battlefield orders that instruct an Arab tribe to 

participate, interact in the actions by the Sudanese Government 

forces. 

The following acts by the Government of Sudan and others have 

not been met with possibly the necessary counteractions by the 

international community. The panel of experts had one of its members not be allowed into Sudan; visa was simply denied by the Sudanese Government. Once in Darfur, the panel had difficulties to 

travel to places it needs to go, for example, where the most egregious violence occurred. Of a total of 70 issues raised with the Government of Sudan in writing, 55 have been ignored. 

There is a spin-off effect of the Government of Sudan’s position. 

It affects very deeply the international community’s deployment. 

U.N., the U.N. Peacekeeping Force, UNAMID, is in charge of our 

security. They denied us security clearance, preventing us for 21⁄2

months to work in Sudan and Darfur, alleging security issues. But 

we then found out that there were other issues, pressure from the 

Government of Sudan, the true reasons. 

45

We have also the fact that the group of the experts from the 

Human Rights Council was not extended in November 2007, and 

U.N. rapporteur of the human rights situation in Sudan, Ms. Sima 

Samar, that post was abolished on demand of the Sudanese Government and its political allies at the Human Rights Council. 

A mandate was replaced with another function, a U.N. independent expert, who has a very narrow mandate that actually allows him only to focus on the human rights forum, which is a joint 

function, a joint operation by the government and UNAMID. And 

then of course we also see that UNAMID is not able to even maintain and protect its own national Darfurian employees, and we 

have testimonies of those being abused by the National Intelligence 

and Security Services. 

The U.N. must accept responsibility for some of these problems. 

The government has overwhelmed the weakened management of 

UNAMID, and something must be done about this. 

Back to the work of the panel. We have since its inception in 

2005 submitted close to 100 recommendations, all designed to improve the U.N. sanctions. None of them in terms of the substantive 

proposals have been taken up by the Security Council. 

For this particular mandate, we were deliberately coming up 

with only three very narrowly defined recommendations in order to 

provide something that is conducive to this very fractured Security 

Council, allowing it maybe to let these recommendations be adopted more easily. 

The first recommendation basically encompasses a reporting obligation that we would like to see imposed on the Government of 

Sudan on essentially the steps that they are required to do anyway 

based on the resolutions that have been adopted years ago. One 

would be identifying exactly what they are doing in terms of disarming the Janjaweed. The other would be identifying when they 

want to move their own soldiers and troops into Darfur, which in 

effect they could if they only would obtain permission from the 

Sanction Committee. They have never done that. 

Finally, we also want to see some kind of progress report in 

terms of preparations to secure the humanitarian situation in 

Darfur and in particular what they are doing to protect women, 

who suffer now much more since the eviction of the NGOs in 

March this year. 

The second recommendation pertains to an idea that has been 

floating around that has been supported already by a Presidential 

statement of the Security Council in May as well as the regional 

forces. This is about the establishment of a Chad-Sudan joint border monitoring mechanism. 

Finally, the third one, recommendation, we were trying to close 

the gap between the international community and globally operating companies, private sector members who knowingly or unknowingly end up being involved in the problems of Darfur. We 

need to develop due diligence standards that help them to understand when to make business and when not to do business with 

certain parties. We are not there. We need to develop a solution to 

this. 

Finally, there is a confidential annex about which I cannot really 

talk to you here because it is a confidential annex. But anyway, 

46

this brief description is that we are trying to list in there those individuals we feel are deserving of targeted sanctions. That is an 

asset freeze as well as a travel ban. 

Now, in terms of the reaction in the Security Council; I think it 

is noteworthy that of course you always have opposition when you 

come in, particularly with a hard-hitting report. It is quite normal 

that people don’t want to discuss recommendations and basically 

just would like the thing to go away. 

What is new this time around, however, is that those states who 

used to be the original sponsors of the U.N. presence, particularly 

the arms embargo and other coercive measures, are not speaking 

up. At least that is the conclusion you have to take when you look 

at the public record. We have already the new resolution, 1591, 

that is basically the response to our report. It is literally the same 

as the one from a year ago, which was virtually the same as the 

one the year before. 

The lack of adjustment to new emergencies and to the inability 

to stand on the principles previously decided and adopted is sending a very loud signal to the Darfurians. The Security Council and 

member states, including the United States, are not going to come 

to help. And I think there is a larger issue here. 

Imposing sanctions only to fail to enforce them is destructive and 

counterproductive to the policy goals that motivated the sanctions 

in the first place. Making such empty threats endangers the lives 

of those who need protection and tends to escalate violence because 

the perpetrators feel emboldened by the very apparent paralysis of 

the international community. Failing to enforce sanctions also jeopardizes peacekeepers and other members of the international community who are deployed in the conflict area. It makes a mockery 

of everyone associated with sanctions, including the U.S. Government, whose firm leadership made those sanctions possible in the 

first place. And of course we contrast that with the leadership provided in 2004 and 2005. 

We see of course also the need that maybe a policy adjustment 

has to be made and that it is good and helpful to have China now 

more actively participate in the dialogue, in the international dialogue. But I don’t think that the fundamental principles that are 

at the bottom, at the heart of the sanctions can be just disregarded. 

Sanctions need to be supported by the international community, 

and then they can also be an integral part and an important part 

in fact of mediation. And I think that is an important element that 

should be considered in the U.S. policy toward Sudan. 

If applied properly, U.N. sanctions we know can have a very, 

very beneficial effect. We have seen it in Angola. I have been involved in Liberia with the financial sanctions against the people 

around Charles Taylor and Charles Taylor himself. We have done 

it in the Congo. There is undeniably a positive effect if the sanctions are properly designed and then also properly enforced. 

I think the same has come clear. There is a report from OFAC 

that explains how the sanctions that you are imposing unilaterally 

have a very good coercive effect. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that this testimony helps to maybe illuminate a little bit the role that the U.S. is now playing on the 

international scene. But I would like to bring this to specifics beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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cause I feel very much that the belligerents and the Government 

of Sudan should not be given an opportunity to play enforcement, 

sanction enforcement against mediation, and I think that we need 

to develop very concrete ideas how mediation can be supportive of 

sanctions. 

And therefore, I propose that you consider four points that the 

U.S. Government could maybe insist on, for example, the full cooperation by the Government of Sudan with the sanction-monitoring efforts by the coming next panel, including of course a timely 

and immediate issuance of entry visas. 

Secondly, that all the parties to the conflict, in particular the 

Government of Sudan, are pressed that they reply comprehensively 

and transparently to all the issues that are being raised by the 

panel. 

Number three, that the Government of the United States is insisting with the Government of Sudan to provide safe access to all 

locations, that the panel must be able to inspect and provide unfettered access. 

And the fourth proposition is that your government encourages 

and works much more closely with the Government of China to ensure that China too is becoming a full partner in the enforcement 

of sanctions. 

By adhering to these benchmarks, the U.S. Government can 

begin to demonstrate that while the world may suffer from Darfur 

sanction fatigue, it will not surrender the Darfurians and the mediation process. 

Thank you for your interest, Mr. Chairman, in this problem and 

the efforts of the Panel of Experts to provide hopefully in the future again useful information to you. Thanks. 

[NOTE: The following submissions for the record by Mr. Carisch 

are not reprinted here but are available in committee records: U.N. 

Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 

1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan and Vol. 5, Issue 47, of The CPA 

Monitor. The CPA Monitor may also be accessed via the Web at 

http://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=2213.] 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carisch follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much for your very comprehensive 

report, and we appreciate the work that you have done on the 

Panel of Experts. 

Mr. Prendergast. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN PRENDERGAST, CO-FOUNDER, 

ENOUGH PROJECT 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thank you, Chairman Payne. And I would 

like to add my voice to the chorus this morning of praise for you 

and Congressman Smith, particularly for being such extraordinary 

upstanders for peace and human rights in the world’s forgotten 

places and for the world’s forgotten issues. 

This moment in Sudan’s history requires utter clarity. It is crucial I think that we admit particularly after this morning that the 

existing strategy of the United States and the broader international community to end the genocide in Darfur and prevent allout war in Sudan is failing. And it is time to alter our course and 

our policy in bold and specific ways in order to avert what could 

be the deadliest conflagration in Sudan’s war torn postcolonial history. 

As we all know, two of the pillars, two of the principal pillars of 

the CPA are the elections and the referendum. But it is critical to 

note that the CPA also calls clearly for conditions that must exist 

for the holding of a credible election, including, as has been articulated this morning, a new security law to reduce the kind of harassment and intimidation of opposition, media access and freedom 

of assembly for opposition parties and then of course unrestricted 

access for the international observation. 

Not one of these preconditions has been met to date. I think we 

have to stand up and particularly this subcommittee has to stand 

up and say that the emperor is as naked as he ever was in the last 


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20 years of this rule of this ruling party and blow the whistle now 

on this deadly charade. Why? Well, I think the risks of ignoring the 

prerequisites that are called for in the CPA for holding an election 

and the risks of holding a noncredible election are enormous. 

Why? Noncredible elections are going to do the following things. 

They are going to fuel violence and divisions throughout the country but particularly in the south. And from my time living in southern Sudan in the 1990s and your frequent visits, as you well know, 

that was the deadliest time in Sudan’s history because the ruling 

party in Khartoum was able to divide and destroy the south. It was 

able to rip the south to pieces using these strategies of pulling opposition figures and arming them and having them attack and create intercommunal conflict. 

The second thing that noncredible elections will do is to undermine the fundamental aim of the CPA, which is a transformation, 

a democratic transformation of the country. You don’t start a process out of transforming a country with a nonfree and a nonfair 

election. That sets the trend in the opposite direction. 

The third thing a noncredible election will do is to disenfranchise 

millions of Darfuris and fuel further violence there in Darfur as the 

contest erupts and the divisions that occur will be used by the National Congress Party and others who want to undermine stability 

and peace in Darfur, to further the instability. 

The fourth thing a noncredible election will do is to provide false 

legitimacy to an indicted war criminal and to the party that he represents. And that is the last thing we need to be doing. 

And that rolls right into the fifth thing, which is let us not waste tens of millions, I think the number is $96 million, of U.S. taxpayers’ money underwriting a noncredible election that is going to 

legitimize that war criminal. 

So what is the bottom line on this then? Until the parties agree 

to conditions that are in the CPA that will allow a credible election, 

I think the United States and the broader international community, but the United States has to lead it, we need to suspend all 

of our electoral assistance, the tens of millions of our taxpayers’ 

dollars that are being spent on this thing. And the noncredible elections simply shouldn’t be funded. 

We need to live by the principle. Noncredible elections shouldn’t 

be financed by the United States taxpayers. And the parties, I 

think we should encourage them to agree to delay these elections 

until the CPA-mandated conditions for free and fair elections, for 

democratic transformation exist, because we can’t be party to recognizing the results of any election that doesn’t meet basic standards. We have done it too many times around Africa, and this furthers problems and deepens problems rather than resolves them. 

However, we have to equally vigorously continue to press for 

those conditions for free and fair elections and press for the conditions, the necessary preconditions for holding the referendum on 

time. If we don’t hold that referendum, if the referendum is not 

held on time in January 2011, that is probably the most certain 

trigger for a return to full-scale national war. 

Now, to be clear, we are not demanding a postponement of the 

election per se. But what we are doing here, and there is a reason 

for it, is pushing for the conditions for a free and fair election as 

55

spelled out by the CPA, in other words, total adherence to the CPA, 

not selective adherence to the CPA. 

If the international community lets then the National Congress 

Party just gloss over the provisions that would create a fair election 

without any consequences, this will demonstrate—and this is the 

crucial point—this will demonstrate once again that we, the international community, lack the will to enforce the basic elements of 

the CPA. And what does that do? That signals to the CPA that it 

can wriggle out of further CPA requirements going down the road, 

which further imperils the fragile peace that exists today in the 

south. 

So that is why we are calling for the full implementation of the 

CPA. And we think rushing toward elections, which are 5 months 

away, without the proper conditions in place will end badly, particularly for the people of the south and the people of Darfur. And 

it will further embolden—this is the punchline—it will further embolden the National Congress Party to undermine the next major 

CPA process, which is the referendum. So we have to hold the line 

here. It is not a future benchmark we are looking at, it is a present 

one. 

But there is an even more important point from our perspective 

at the Enough Project. There is a reason Sudan is facing this 10-

minutes-til-midnight, make-or-break scenario that we are facing 

today. 

Until now—and this is for me the most important point the advocacy community can make—because there has been no cost for nonimplementation of key parts of the CPA, because there has been no 

cost for the commission of genocide, because there has been no cost 

for the commission of another genocide in the south, which wasn’t 

called a genocide for 20 years, the parties, but particularly the National Congress Party, continue to trample on any agreement that 

is signed because there is no consequence for nonimplementation. 

It is very obvious and basic human nature. 

So it is time, and this is why the Congress is so crucial, it is time 

for President Obama to decide to implement his own administration’s benchmark-based policy, because flouting the establishment 

of conditions for a credible election and the referendum, that 

should trigger immediate consequences now. The U.S. should work 

within the United Nations Security Council and outside of it because a lot of things are simply not going to be able to move, as 

we all know, because of the membership there, and we should work 

to build that coalition of countries that are willing to introduce 

some of these consequences. 

Sometimes we will have to go it alone, but let us at least do the 

diplomatic work to build the coalition to try to go multilaterally on 

some of these things and impose these consequences as soon as 

possible on the National Congress Party for its obstruction of basic 

conditions for peace. And the consequences, everyone always says 

oh, we already tried pressure. This is what General Gration has 

said a number of times publicly: We have tried pressure, it doesn’t 

work. 

We haven’t. We haven’t tried credible pressures. And we list a 

few here, and they are incredibly important, valuable points that 

Mr. Carisch has raised in the Panel of Experts report about the efVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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fectiveness of sanctions when they are actually implemented and 

the ineffect of sanctions when you pass them, but then you don’t 

implement them and don’t execute them. 

So first and foremost, we need to ratchet up and actually impose 

some of the targeted sanctions on the people listed in that confidential annex and do it in a sequential way so people can see the tidal 

wave is coming at their head, so they can see you are working up 

through the chain of command on the basis of empirical evidence 

that these people are either obstructing implementation of agreements or are actually responsible for grave human rights abuses. 

So we can do those multilateral sanctions, the travel bans and 

asset freezes. They are scarlet letters. There are political impacts 

for economic measures. 

Secondly, we can deny multilateral debt relief. The Sudanese 

Government is on a mission right now. They want debt relief. They 

have got a serious economic problem even though they are making 

money hand over fist from the oil, going into private accounts. So 

publicly the coffers are bare. They need multilateral debt relief. We 

need to be in every forum they are in asking for debt relief saying 

sorry, not today. 

Third, we can be pushing for enforcement of this arms embargo 

that has been talked about. And I will just refer you back to the 

previous testimony. 

And then fourth, we can provide as the United States now that 

the conclusion of the process, the interagency process of examining 

what the Obama administration’s policy should be toward the 

International Criminal Court is finished, we ought to be providing 

more robust support for the ICC investigations and indictments for 

ongoing atrocities. 

And all that word game, wordsmithing that was going on there 

about whether genocide is occurring or not in Darfur obscures the 

fact just because 16 or 18 people according to General Gration died 

in Darfur in whatever month he was referring to, let us count the 

number—but we can’t because we have no access—let us count the 

number of women who have been raped, let us count the number 

of children who are malnourished directly as a result of policies 

that are aimed at destroying in whole or in part a particular group 

of people. Call it genocide or don’t call it genocide, it doesn’t just 

mean gas chambers or village-burning. Genocide has many different forms. Let us look at that. 

Now these consequences in this confidential annex that General 

Gration says doesn’t exist, which concerns me greatly, these are 

the instruments if we are to believe Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Rice in their elaboration of this confidential annex, these are 

the consequences and the instruments that I think can help prevent an all-out war in Sudan. 

In conclusion then, in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, 

you made a very important point about engagement. When we are 

talking about increasing consequences, we are not talking about 

cutting off negotiations engagement. You have to engage to get 

your priorities advanced. But you use the consequences to back up 

and give leverage to the engagement. 

And we think, not to leave Darfur out of the equation here, we 

think it is time for a real diplomatic surge in Darfur. Let us not 

57

forget Darfur as we become obsessed with our efforts to try to prevent a return of the north-south war. And we think a surge, a diplomatic surge by the United States and its allies on Darfur should 

include the immediate drafting of a proposal, a peace proposal, that 

addresses the root cause in Sudan and put that draft down and 

start the debate and the dialogue between the Darfurians and 

amongst the broader Sudanese public about what the basic elements of a peace agreement will look like in Darfur. 

After 6 years of this nightmare for the people of Darfur, we have 

yet to have seen one document laid down by the United States and 

the broader international community that addresses the core 

issues, the core issues that every Darfuri knows, lives and 

breathes. It is a stunning failure of international diplomacy. 

There is nothing preventing us from going to Bassole ́, the United 

Nations African Union representative, working with him to put the 

draft together. How many consultations more does one need to say 

these are the basic issues, put those positions down and get people 

negotiating over an actual text? That will move the ball forward. 

Thanks very much for having me, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 

Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast follows:]

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Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. Thank you very much. This ends the 

hearing phase, and we will now move into the briefing. 

[Whereupon, the subcommittee proceeded to an off-record briefing.] 

Mr. PAYNE. Let me thank you very much. Let me thank all of 

you. We have another series of votes. I wonder if the ranking member wanted to make any concluding remarks. I intend to come back 

for a few minutes to ask several questions if the panel will indulge. 

We have three votes, three to four votes. They are 5-minute votes 

each. Normally it should be 20 minutes for the duration of the 

votes. So at that time, we will——

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I have several questions that I will 

reduce to just a few. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. 

Mr. SMITH. But I hope our panelists, I know they hopefully will 

understand. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay, great. Well, we will recess. We will probably 

readjourn at about 2 o’clock. We have to be out of this room at 2:30 

anyway, so we will be evicted if we are not finished. The meeting 

stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you once again for your patience, and we 

apologize for the interruptions, but that is a day on Capitol Hill. 

At this time, reconvene, and we will have a few questions for the 

panel. 

John Prendergast, you recommended a delay and suspension of 

U.S. assistance for the 2010 agreement. I certainly completely 

agree that the CPA must be fully implemented, but I have always 

had a problem with the delaying of elections or referendums, because sometimes the delay, then you have another delay, and many 

times we have a difficulty really biting the bullet and moving forward. 

So I wonder how we can address both issues. That is, can the 

conditions that you mentioned be met in time to delay elections 

and hold a referendum in 2011? I know they are two separate 

issues; the election is coming up next year, the referendum coming 


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up in 2011. We know that the month of November was the month 

for registration. Like I said, I was there 2 weeks ago. Registration 

started late; there was a concern. 

However, once the process began, there was more excitement 

about registering. I went to sites, went to a training site, I went 

to an actual registration site. And I understand that registration 

has increased. Of course I think that the 1 month of November was 

not long enough, and I do believe that registration has been extended. So why don’t you give me further clarification on your 

statement. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Thanks for asking for the clarification, Congressman Payne. Ultimately, at the end of the day, any delay will 

have to be a result of the agreement of the parties. So I wanted 

to reinforce that we are not calling for a delay or a postponement; 

we are calling on the parties to consider, particularly of course the 

SPLM as the party that has been more forward-leaning in the negotiations, to consider what their options are going forward in the 

negotiations with respect to the holding of the election on time. 

What I guess we are getting at as outsiders is we don’t want to 

provide international validation to the process. We know if it is not 

a free and fair election that we won’t recognize it, we won’t provide 

a validation of the results. We shouldn’t along that same line provide validation to the process by providing all kinds of resources 

and support to it if the preexisting conditions, the various laws and 

conditions of freedom of assembly and others, and the security laws 

are not in place to allow for a free and fair election. 

So in other words, they can have the election; let us just not underwrite it and support and go through the charade of supporting 

what is going to be an unfree and an unfair election. I guess that 

is the distinction we are making. And stay on time and stay on 

track for the referendum. 

The referendum doesn’t have the kind of wiggle room that the 

elections have. The referendum has to occur in January 2011. I 

think it is the ultimate trigger for a return to war. Everyone’s focus 

has to be, that cares about southern Sudan and cares about the 

transitional areas and cares about the country, has to focus on 

making sure that referendum occurs in January 2011. 

So the elections, it is more important to have a free and fair, a 

credible election, than it is to have just any old election. So that 

is why we are saying at least suspend the assistance. It is up to 

the parties whether they are going to delay or not delay, postpone 

or not postpone, but at least the international community doesn’t 

have to be perceived to be supporting an electoral process in which 

the very conditions in which that electoral process is being conducted are designed to create a noncredible result. 

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Carisch, do you have any feelings on the election 

and the referendum? You have spent a lot of time with your panel 

of experts. 

Mr. CARISCH. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, for asking. I generally 

would like to refrain from commenting on territories that I didn’t 

have responsibility to monitor, but maybe I can add something to 

the general issue. 

Up to the very late, the last days when we still were in Sudan, 

we would quite frequently ask the Darfurians and the government 

64

in Khartoum, What are you doing to ensure that fair elections are 

being held in Darfur, that the Darfurians are able to fully participate? And one of the things I wanted to know is, are you translating all the material into Masalitfur and Sagaba? A lot of people 

don’t speak Arabic in Darfur. I have not found anybody who could 

affirm this, that they actually are doing an effort. Sorry I can’t add 

more to this. 

Mr. PAYNE. No problem. Dr. Newcomb? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. It is an interesting question, and it is one that 

we have struggled with. And it is from a different perspective. 

Since we are a philanthropy, we have been approached by many of 

the NGOs and private sector groups that are looking to monitor. 

And we have taken the position that until the international community signals sort of thresholds and benchmarks that would ensure legitimacy within the election that we can’t move capital in 

that direction. And the capital remains locked up because the ways 

in which that capital could be used to actually legitimize a faulty 

election would be a tragedy. 

And so our position has been to not move capital toward elections 

until somebody begins to signal what those thresholds will be. 

Mr. PAYNE. And also a follow-on, since you are involved in assisting in the funding and election observers, I am just wondering 

what your feeling is on the countries that—and then I might ask 

the others of you to comment if you would like. As you know, the 

government of the National Congress Party identified certain areas 

or countries or areas of countries where ex-Sudanese living abroad 

can vote. 

Now, as we know, there were just two sites in the U.S. I think, 

one in Canada, Egypt, a couple of Gulf countries. But countries 

around, close to Sudan, were all excluded. And I just wonder 

whether that has been brought to your organization’s attention, 

and do you have any comment on that? 

Mr. NEWCOMB. In fact, it has. And a part of our work has been 

around working among Sudanese diaspora globally and have funded quite a bit of work to help organize and support. And this is a 

message that we are hearing from a number of these civil society 

gatherings is that it is a highly selective identification of who is 

able to participate in a vote outside, among the members of the diaspora. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. You can take right here, Congressman Payne, 

in the United States where thousands and thousands of southern 

Sudanese here living here in the United States can’t register because they don’t have either a valid passport or a birth certificate. 

I mean, what I fear and many fear is that if these elections go 

forward without any alteration of the existing terms of reference 

that hundreds of thousands of Sudanese in the diaspora around the 

world and millions inside Sudan, particularly in Darfur, are going 

to be disenfranchised by this process. And these are just part and 

parcel of the way the National Congress Party does business again. 

And if they are not challenged at each and every one of these junctures with consequences for these kinds of obstructions, then does 

anyone in this room really think there is going to be a referendum 

in January 2011? They are going to allow it? 

65

If they see that they can get away with these smaller things, 

these little nickel-and-dime things, one after the other, when it is 

time for the dollar store cash-in, they are going to be like no, I am 

sorry, can’t have it. There is this problem or that problem or whatever other issue undermines the process. 

We have got to stand up now to each one of these things and ensure that the administration imposes the consequences that the 

Secretary and the President said that they were going to impose 

if certain benchmarks are met. I think these are the kind of things 

we should be saying, hey, some of your benchmarks are being met. 

And when you get that confidential briefing, if you ever get it, you 

know, you are going to find that it is inescapable. There are all 

these issues that have already passed time, where there should 

have been international pressure that the United States leads to 

make sure that there is some movement on the part of the NCP. 

And it is not just a vilification of the NCP. If it is the Darfur parties, rebel groups that are the problem, then you have got to hit 

them with consequences. If it is SPLM, hit them with consequences. But right now, the preponderance of obstruction, the 

preponderance of warmongering is coming from the usual source 

that it has over the last 20 years, which is the ruling party. 

Mr. PAYNE. Just say, for example, all things worked well. Elections were held fair and free, the referendum was held fair and 

free, and the south decided to secede. Have there been any, have 

you had any discussion, or have you heard from any of our U.S. officials? And then if, in fact, the National Congress Party refuses to 

respect the outcome, have you heard anything from U.S. officials 

about any kind of mechanisms to enforce the referendum? Use your 

mike, your mike is off. 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. I appreciate that. This is the essence of the 

policy review that occurred over the last 9 months, and I think was 

the essence of the debate. 

General Gration very publicly—I mean, this was an unusually 

public internal policy debate, because he was so public in his position, which was we ought to provide an incentive-laden strategy 

that gets the National Congress Party to change its behavior. Others inside the administration, who we all know who they are, 

fought the other way for much more pressures and consequencebased strategy. 

But the end of the day, what they came out with and what they 

announced is well, we will give rewards for better behavior, and 

consequences for negative ones. The enchilada, the big enchilada at 

the end of the January 2011 is whether the NCP allows a referendum, and then respects its result. And one assumes, but none 

of us know, because there isn’t transparency around the policy, 

that there would be significant and serious consequences for nonrespect or for not respecting the results of that referendum, if all 

of the things happen that you outlined, Congressman Payne, happen. 

And that is where I really think in terms of, for our role as advocates and your role as oversight of the executive branch, we need 

to know, even if it is not publicized, that there are significant and 

serious consequences now for nonimplementation of things that 

need to be done now, and much more serious ratcheting up of the 

66

consequences in January 2011 if the National Congress Party either obstructs the referendum or doesn’t respect its result. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Just finally I note, Mr. 

Carisch, you have to leave. But let me just ask one question regarding your panel of experts. 

The latest report of the U.N. Panel of Experts on Sudan mentioned sexual and gender-based violence as one of the critical issues 

facing Darfur women and children. What assessment have you 

made of the provision of sexual and gender-based violence services? 

What specific steps should the U.S. be taking to ensure their restoration? And by what benchmark should we measure the progress 

of the gender-based and sexual violence services? 

Mr. CARISCH. Thank you. Well, the expulsion of the NGOs in 

March has contributed a great deal of diffusing and obscuring this 

subject. We know that a substantial amount of the organizations 

that were involved, and now are no longer there, had an important 

role in addressing these problems, and did so with some success. 

I think that the principal problem that we are facing now, expressed in all of these various things that we have been looking at, 

the forms of abuses and problems that you are looking at in Darfur 

comes to the forefront even more prominently in the gender and 

sexual-based violence issue, that we have no longer a solid, good 

reporting mechanism, or a monitoring mechanism. 

We are getting incredibly frivolous statements from the Government of Sudan to prove that they have overcome the issues; that 

they have been able, with a few additional, a few new NGOs that 

they let in, and some of their own resources that they put into 

place, that they have overcome these problems. 

I was in Salingee myself, and talking to the staffs of the various 

medical facilities that used to be there, and now it is just national 

staff there. And they told me well, yes, we had actually some doctors that were sent from Khartoum. They were here a few weeks, 

and they didn’t get paid. And they didn’t like the fact that this 

wasn’t really that secure. So they packed up and went home. 

And that is now the balance of this whole situation in Salingee, 

which is a relatively large area. It has four IDP camps, with tens 

of thousands of people. They have now far less medical care facilities, doctors, et cetera, and absolutely no attention any more to the 

whole issues pertaining to the women. 

So not only we know just from the anecdotal and empirical 

knowledge that we were able to gather, which is by no means a 

systematic overview, that the situation has gotten significantly 

worse. But worse than that is that we don’t have a mechanism to 

exactly determine what needs to be done. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, thank you. Thank you very much. I yield to the 

ranking member. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to 

thank all four of our very distinguished presenters for the work 

that you have done, and for sharing your valuable insights with the 

subcommittee. 

I have a number of questions, but I will narrow it to just a few, 

given the lateness of the hour. Let me start, first of all, with Mr. 

Prendergast. I mean, your testimony couldn’t be more clear, that 

the CPA preconditions have not been met. And you go through 

67

them. And you know, from my work with the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, for years—I have been 

on that since my second term in 1983—a free and fair election isn’t 

just the day of the balloting; it is the access to the media, the harassment or worse of opposition figures, all the points that you point 

out that the CPA covers that appear to be falling by the wayside. 

And then I read, you know, juxtapose the testimony from General Gration, and he spends one paragraph on the elections. And 

he says, ‘‘We are also focused on ensuring the April 2010 elections 

are credible,’’ and he talks about voter registration very briefly. But 

he makes it sound like everything is just moving along without 

much concern. 

And I find that very disturbing. And you might want to comment 

on that. 

And the second thing—maybe I will lay all my questions out 

again in the interest of time—the idea of having confidential benchmarks, you know, wittingly or unwittingly, could very quickly lead 

to no action, subterfuge, and all kinds of other nasty outcomes. Because where is the accountability? I can’t even get a secret, what 

do you call it, I can’t think of the word. I can’t even be apprised 

of the——

Mr. PRENDERGAST. A briefing? 

Mr. SMITH. A briefing. Can’t even get it. And I was told I would 

get it today, so I will work on getting that. 

But it seems to me you want these kinds of benchmarks in neon 

lights, rather than somewhere in an annex somewhere in the table. 

Because that, to me, makes it much easier for the offensive and the 

offending individuals to violate, and then it gets brushed over. 

So I am very concerned about that. Human rights always suffer 

when they are done or focused upon behind closed doors. Sometimes it helps a little bit; often, it does not. 

So I would ask you if you would speak to that. The coalition of 

the willing you talked about, is anything like that being put together? And I know that, Mr. Carisch, you make a point that we 

have sat on the sideline. We joined the chorus who do nothing. And 

I remember in 2005, we tried very hard as a country, our negotiating team, to get at the U.N. a resolution that had further teeth, 

that would have not just focused on the Janjaweed and others getting weapons, but also on the government itself in Khartoum. 

We also, you point out in your testimony, and if you could—and 

I think your testimony was outstanding. When you talk about the 

eight categories of abuse, you testified that some arms and a majority of ammunition originate from Chinese manufacturers; that 

there is minimal cooperation and response to requests to the Chinese authorities. 

If you could define some arms. Where are the other arms coming 

from? And minimal cooperation. Are they really cooperating at all? 

Are they, I mean, you mentioned also in your testimony the dialogue. Very often human rights dialogue, or even dialogue with regards to Sudan, becomes a facade for further mischief. Because 

after all, we are dialoguing, but the Chinese Government meanwhile is providing all these munitions. 

Because again, you also point out that the material that was 

manufactured in China may have been legally delivered to the terVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ritory of Sudan not under the embargo. I know that was attempted 

to be covered, and did not get covered. 

It would seem to me that our negotiators should be saying wait 

a minute. You know, it is where the weapons end up that really 

matters the most, obviously. And if it is in the hands of killers and 

people committing genocide, that is what it is all about. 

But to use a deadly loophole, like you know, they are coming 

ashore somewhere where this doesn’t apply, I mean, that is a deadly loophole. You might want to speak to that. 

Let me also ask briefly, if I could, in the time remaining, What 

would you recommend to the United States in particular, and to 

other countries who do care? But talk to us. When you talked about 

that the new resolution, 1891, is almost identical to previous ones, 

has no lack of adjustment to new emergencies, and the inability to 

stand on the principles previously decided and adopted, and is 

sending a loud signal to Darfurians the Security Council members, 

including the United States, are not coming to help. 

I think that is very profound, that they are taking their cue that, 

you know, been there, done that, and we are not going to update 

the resolution. The mandate stays status quo. And you even get 

even stronger in your statement—and the others might want to 

speak to this, as well—that when you impose sanctions and don’t 

enforce them, empty threats leads to more violence. And again, we 

are standing, as the United States, on the sidelines and not doing 

all that much. I am very, very concerned about that, and you might 

want to speak to that, as well. 

And I think, and finally, we heard earlier from General Gration 

that regarding the arms to southern Sudan, the 79,000 AK–47s we 

have heard about, and I am sure there is a lot of other materiel 

making its way south, that we have not found linkages to Khartoum. I mean, can you say that with a straight face? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. Who gets to go first? To deal quickly with 

each of the excellent points, first, I am really worried about the 

mixed messages that are coming out of the U.S. Government, that 

have been coming out of the U.S. Government for the last 7 or 8 

months. 

There is a strange disconnect between General Gration and what 

he says about the elections, as you read in his testimony. But then 

the State Department issued a very negative assessment of their 

take on where the electoral process was just a few days after he 

got back, as if they hadn’t coordinated. And then there is this exchange today about whether there is a confidential annex or not. 

I mean, that is incredible. The Secretary of State said there was 

a confidential annex. To me, you don’t contradict that in public; 

that is a story. You are making, you are generating controversy for 

no reason. 

And I don’t know what it means. Does it mean we don’t have a 

confidential annex, or is he just calling it something else? It is 

worth investigating, worth asking about. 

Third, you know, this genocide or not genocide; this just ongoing 

difficulty with being able to just simply say what the policy of the 

President of the United States is, who has said it is an ongoing 

genocide. Where is the controversy? 

69

Second point there is that about the issue of having these benchmarks not be public. I think the reason why, having worked in the 

White House before, is that the executive branch is generally—Republican, Democrat, anything—don’t like to be pinned down on 

what they are going to do. In other words, if they said publicly a 

benchmark for us doing something is, you know, something about 

the elections, then if that thing happens, then they have got to do 

something. They would rather leave it somewhat vague so they can 

make a week-to-week, day-to-day assessment of their options, and 

so they keep it deliberately vague. 

That is why it is so important for you to demand the briefings, 

and get these briefings, so that you can at least have something to 

hold them to it in an oversight capacity. We don’t, sadly, have the 

capacity, as advocates, to have a confidential briefing. We have just 

got to trust that they are telling the truth, that in fact there is a, 

you know, a set of benchmarks with real consequences or real incentives in that package, but who knows? 

So third, I do want to make a very strong point, at least strongly 

felt point, about why we are talking so much about consequences. 

We are not looking to punish the NCP; we are looking at the empirical evidence of the last 20 years. When the National Congress 

Party has changed its position and compromised, it has been when 

there has been concerted multilateral pressure. 

They booted bin Laden out when there was concerted multilateral pressure through the United Nations Security Council. They 

stopped, remember, the slave rating support to the Misseriyan militia. You guys, this subcommittee and you two in particular were so 

important in that happening, because they feared that Congress 

was going to provide aid to the SPLM. That is why they stopped. 

There was no other reason. There was a potential serious consequence, so they said whoa, wait a minute. 

Same thing with the aerial bombing. Remember Franklin 

Graham and all that stuff. And they worried that the Christian Coalition and conservative Christian groups were going to tell President Bush to do something more. So they stopped it because it became untenable for them to do it. 

The counterterrorism cooperation after 9/11. Before 9/11 they 

didn’t help us with anything. After 9/11, they helped real fast, after 

Wolfowitz said maybe we ought to look at Sudan as the next one 

to invade. 

And then finally, the CPA itself. There was real, you know, there 

was frustration on Capitol Hill, maybe we should be supporting the 

SPLM more strongly, and Darfur was building. So there was real 

pressure, multilateral pressure, and that led to the compromises 

necessary to have a CPA. That is real evidence that this kind of 

approach or policy works. 

That is what is so distressing, to see the current Special Envoy, 

who doesn’t seem to at least acknowledge the history, a 20-year 

history, where previous policy has actually succeeded when the 

United States led multilaterally to achieve a human rights objective in Sudan, and succeeded because we stuck to our principles, 

and then worked the pressures route, and actually was able to accomplish what our particular objectives were. 

70

And I think again, in the oversight capacity and in the watchdog 

capacity that Congress and civil society has, we ought to be really 

hammering on them as much as we can. 

Mr. CARISCH. Thank you, Congressman Smith. Just very briefly, 

then—I think we are running out of time—the arms embargo that 

was imposed, 1591 in 2005, I think did a good thing by expanding 

it to all the signatories of the germane ceasefire agreement. 

What it failed to do is to make sure that it puts into, this is of 

course still this kind of regional limitation just on the three to four 

states. 

When you look at the topography of Sudan, of course immediately it becomes apparent that to monitor those borders, a substantial part within Sudan, and then you have international borders, is a difficult thing to do. Correctly, they addressed this a little 

bit by giving UNAMIN actually an arms embargo monitoring mandate as well. 

Well, they have never reported a line about it. So that needs to 

be addressed. 

Mr. SMITH. Can you touch on those other points, too, briefly? I 

know we have got to go soon. 

Mr. CARISCH. Sorry? 

Mr. SMITH. Could you touch on some of those other points, too? 

Mr. CARISCH. Right. So then regarding China. Look, I mean, in 

the U.N., when you sign a letter, and you get the letter back acknowledging that they have received the letter, that is cooperation. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. So now that is the extent of it? That is important to 

know, because minimal cooperation means exchange of letters. 

Mr. CARISCH. There are maybe some little incremental bits and 

pieces. But by and large, if you look in our report we have a table 

where we say how many issues we raised per country, and what 

has been answered. I mean, it is just——

Mr. SMITH. And some of the other munitions and some arms, but 

where are those other arms coming from that——

Mr. CARISCH. Some we are still tracing. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Mr. CARISCH. But there is, of course, a fair amount of really old 

stock, particularly in terms of arms, firearms, that is circulating 

the region. Some of it has probably come from the various, neighboring conflicts have come in. It is a laborious process, and member 

states need to participate in this tracing process in order for us to 

succeed. Unfortunately, I don’t. 

Mr. SMITH. Does anybody want to take a stab at whether or not, 

how credible the statement was that AK–47s are making their way 

down 79,000 strong, and maybe more? And it doesn’t have 

Khartoum’s fingerprints all over it? 

[Off-record response from briefer.] 

Mr. SMITH. Well, again, General Gration pretty much, it was 

kind of a boast. And if it is true, it would be, and if it was truly 

a registration it could be verified. But he talked about the 12 main 

Sudanese who have signed up. 

Do you have any idea how many of those might be just carried 

by lists by the—okay, that is very disturbing. 

71

I want to thank you very much for this hearing, and I will send 

additional questions to our distinguished panel. And I thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. We are on a—Dr. Newcomb has to leave. 

But we do have, and if you have to leave, we won’t say it is an affront to our Congresswoman. 

But Congresswoman Jackson Lee has joined us, and we appreciate it. I know you have been in other markups all day. And so 

if you have any questions you want to ask. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will try to go directly to Dr. Newcomb, but 

let me just thank you, Mr. Chairman, one for having the envoy 

here. We were in a Homeland Security hearing on the White House 

breach. I wish I didn’t have to be in that hearing; I wish that 

breach of security did not occur. I wish it was not taken in the light 

format that it was, but it was a serious consideration. I thank you 

for your patience for my absence. 

I am committed to victory in Sudan, and everyone has a different 

interpretation of that. I missed the envoy, but I understand that 

he is steadfastly looking to define the conflict, or a definitive into 

the conflict, to implement the North-South Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement and ensure that Sudan does not provide safe haven for 

terrorists. 

Dr. Newcomb, can you—I am just going to go down the row here 

until I get to the Lieutenant General. First, what do you want? 

And two, do we have the right posture now, as the United States 

postures itself, in bringing about the solution as articulated by the 

envoy? And is he on the right track? 

And this is not speaking on someone who is absent. All of this 

will be on the record. And I look forward to engaging with the 

envoy, as well. Dr. Newcomb. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. I appreciate that question. You know this phrase, 

you campaign in poetry, and you manage in prose. And I have 

often felt that once the campaign was over, that the expectations 

that were set by the poetry during the campaign don’t meet the 

management of the prose in the policy. 

And I represent the private sector, where we are engaged philanthropically to support the good efforts of the United States Government, as well as others. And this lack of signaling, this lack of 

leadership role overall has really led to just keep a lot of the philanthropic efforts on the margins. 

And so I think the liberation and the significant moral authority, 

if you will, that the U.S. plays here to signal and to play that leadership role is so important, at least for my organization and many 

others that I work with. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So we should be more vocal, and we should 

denounce actions and be clear about our position. 

Mr. NEWCOMB. I think we have a leadership role to play in the 

international community, that is not being played at this moment. 

And that we should step into that vacuum, and play a far more deliberate role there. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Carisch, if I could? Thank you. Thank 

you, Doctor. Just, same question. 

Mr. CARISCH. Well, thank you for asking the question. Well, as 

I have pointed out hopefully with my testimony, there is a definite 

72

need for leadership. And maybe this allows us to come back to a 

question that Congressman Smith had asked; What can be done? 

The central point that I was trying to make today is that the 

leadership now I think that the U.S. can demonstrate to the world 

is by finding a way how to combine mediation and the sanction 

process. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Combine the what? 

Mr. CARISCH. Combining the mediation efforts that you are undertaking with the ongoing and existing sanction mechanisms that 

are in place, and to which obviously the United States is part of. 

I think that needs now some work to develop this, in terms of practical steps that can be implemented. But I think that is now a realistic approach to the situation we are encountering there. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mediation and sanctions should go hand in 

hand. 

Mr. CARISCH. That is true. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The last two witnesses, Mr. Prendergast and 

Lieutenant General, if you would add to your comments. Are there 

still killings going on in the region? And what does our position 

that we are taking as Americans with the envoy do to the, the idea 

that killings are going on, and our efforts may not equate to that 

intensity? 

Mr. PRENDERGAST. This is not, in the last 20 years, Congresswoman, this isn’t one of those times, one of those moments, if you 

take a snapshot, where mortality rates are spiking. You know, 2 

years ago in Darfur, they were spiking. Six years, 8 years ago in 

southern Sudan they were spiking. 

But we see different manifestations of the same policy of dividing 

and destroying the communities, from which political opposition 

emerges. So in Darfur, people hemmed in camps, a policy of rape 

as a tool of war, turning aid on and off, throwing out NGOs. General Gration misses the point about throwing those 13 NGOs out. 

Those 13 NGOs, the majority of them were focusing on violence 

against women. 

It is hard enough to replace the humanitarian capacity. He is absolutely right, we desperately worked to barely replace the humanitarian capacity over the last 6 months. But we haven’t replaced the 

capacity to treat the survivors of horrific sexual violence. And violence is a tool of war. That is a grossly negligent position on the 

part of this administration, not standing up for the women and the 

girls in Darfur who are being targeted. 

In the south we are seeing the beginnings of what we saw in 

Darfur in 2002, the year before the genocide began. And what we 

saw during the 20-year war, from 1983 on. And that is the use of 

militias in the south to destabilize. And you see what are sometimes called inter-communal violence, or tribal violence, or cattle 

raiding or things like that. Suddenly, hundreds and hundreds of 

people are being executed in the context of a cattle raid? Well, I 

mean, as Congressman Smith just said, can you credibly argue that 

this isn’t an escalation? No, I don’t think so. 

So the approach, now to answer the first question, the approach 

that has been taken so far I think is marked by four elements. 

Quiet engagement by the Special Envoy. Incentivizing the path to 

behavior change. So offering incentives in the form of better relaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:07 Apr 12, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AGH\120309\53830 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tions with the United States, or continuing engagement, playing 

nice publicly even is an incentive. 

Then the third aspect is moral equivalency, never blaming one 

side or the other, just saying this thing isn’t happening, or this 

thing is wrong, without saying somebody is actually responsible for 

it. 

And then fourth, a total lack of consequences for the violence 

that we have just described, and for undermining peace efforts. 

The alternative that I think some of us on the outside within the 

various coalitions of activists are saying should be marked by a 

very different set of four approaches. 

The first one is higher-level engagement. We do need the President, we do need the Secretary of State to occasionally engage on 

these kinds of things. We know Ambassador Rice is, but we need 

to see that higher-level engagement, so that it is clear to the world 

that this is an issue that matters. 

It was disappointing to all of us that, when President Obama and 

President Hu rolled out their, whatever you call it, communique ́ at 

the end of their meetings. There was no mention of Sudan, even 

though we were told that he raised it privately. It would have been 

good even just to say, Hey, we pledged to work together to end violence or something. You know, anything. So higher-level engagement, number one. 

Number two, instead of the incentivizing, instead of incentivizing 

the path to better behavior, pressure. Because that has worked. 

And that is what I was talking about when you came in. 

The third element is, stop the moral equivalency. When one of 

the parties is undermining, dramatically undermining forward 

progress on implementation of the CPA, dramatically undermining 

security in Darfur, we ought to say publicly, very clearly, that that 

party is doing it, and that is why we have a problem with what 

is happening. At least stand up for the people who are suffering the 

results. 

And then finally in the fourth element of an alternative strategy 

to the one that is being pursued presently by the Special Envoy, 

and the most important one, is we have got to introduce consequences. If you are going to commit genocide, if you are going to 

undermine peace deals, if you are going to mar the preparations for 

a credible election, then there should be some form of multilateral 

consequence that the United States needs to lead the building of 

and imposition of around the world. 

And we talked a lot during the hearing about what kinds of 

things can be done. Those that argue we have tried everything, and 

they didn’t work, are incorrect. There are many other things that 

can be done to ratchet up the pressure and work multilaterally to 

bring about change. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Lieutenant General? Thank you very much, 

Mr. Prendergast. 

[Off-record response from briefer.] 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. If I may just conclude, and just say something, Mr. Chairman. If you would just yield. 

74

Mr. PAYNE. Yes, go right ahead. Because we have to leave the 

room. They have a big reception coming up here in about 10 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I do want to accommodate. Let me just 

thank you again. 

In his absence, let me thank Major General Gration for his love 

of Africa, and his concern. Mr. Chairman, however, I would offer 

to say that we are getting a potential roadmap here of these very 

fine leaders that may be the road to nowhere. And I thank the 

committee for bringing to our attention this crisis that does not get 

the attention that I think it deserves. 

Mr. Prendergast, I am going to want to work with you directly 

on this whole question of sexual violence. When I was in Darfur it 

was occurring. It is not murder and death, as you note, but for 

some it is the death of their lives in terms of how they lived it. 

Lieutenant General, I think the pitting one against another 

leaves us in the condition and predicament that southern Sudan 

needs help, and Darfurians are still in camps. It is our commitment 

that we must not abandon this cause. 

I yield back. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. And thank you for coming. 

Let me certainly thank the panel. This has been extremely informative. 

We have a very serious situation here. We know, because we 

have been watching the Government of Sudan for several decades. 

And as has been indicated, they only respond to pressure. 

I think that John Prendergast really hit the nail on the head. I 

think this current administration is trying to come up with a policy, but time is moving on. As I indicated before, half of our current 

term as Congressmen are up. As a matter of fact, after May or 

June, you are into campaign mode, and so almost two-thirds of 

your term is up. 

Now, the administration doesn’t necessarily have to gauge their 

progress, or lack of it, on our terms. However, we do look at what 

are we going to accomplish in a term. And it has taken quite a 

while for the team dealing with Africa in general, and Darfur, I 

mean Sudan in particular, some time to assemble itself. And we 

have been patient. This was the first hearing we have had with the 

Special Envoy, and we are almost going into a new year, having 

1 year already pass. 

And so there has been a level of frustration. I think that this has 

been a very good airing. I think that the administration is attempting to come up with policies. Afghanistan has taken some time to 

try to come up with a so-called policy, but it has been all this time 

deciding what the policy is. 

We have seen China, whether we are going to be in love or at 

war, or angry or friendly. And they are still coming up with a policy on Tibet or Burma, et cetera. 

So we have been giving, we know it is a new administration. And 

there are many, many issues on the table. Many of the problems 

have been exacerbated by the fact that they were denied things like 

climate change, dealing with some of these other tough issues that 

have been, that have been postponed or delayed. So there are a lot 

of things on the table. 

75

I think that we, though, need to step up with some affirmative 

action. I do believe there may be several points of view in the administration, and that is one of the reasons why it is grappling 

with a Sudan policy, as it has grappled with an Afghanistan policy, 

trying to come up with a policy. Things that happened in the past, 

cattle raids and inter-communal violence years ago was not as 

deadly as it is now, because AK–47s were not that available. And 

so violence was in a different manner. You had few deaths, perhaps. With AK–47s you can’t predict the number of casualties you 

will have. With these same kinds of issues, now they can be escalated. 

And so we are going to certainly urge the administration to really kind of fine-tune its policy. And we are going to keep the pressure on. We feel that there must be a solution. Time is running 

out. We have been patient, but we must, as I mentioned before, 

make some strong affirmative actions in the right direction. 

So I would like to once again thank all of you here, and also our 

Special Envoy who was here. I would like to say that I ask unanimous consent that statements from the Save Darfur Coalition be 

made a part of the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

And I ask unanimous consent for our members to have 5 days 

to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, so ordered. 

Once again, thank you, and the meeting stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:34 p.m., subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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