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RUSSIA: IN TRANSITION OR INTRANSIGENT? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 24, 2007 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 110–1–1] 

( 

Available via http://www.csce.gov 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida, 

Chairman 

LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, 

Co-Chairman 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

VACANT, Department of State 

VACANT, Department of Defense 

VACANT, Department of Commerce 

(II) 

RUSSIA: IN TRANSITION OR INTRANSIGENT? 

MAY 24, 2007 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 1 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe ...................................... 16 

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe ................................. 4 

Hon. G.K. Butterfield, Commissioner, Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe ...................................... 5 

WITNESSES 

Hon. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State .................. 6 

Sarah Mendelson, Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, The Center for Strategic and International Studies .. 20 

E. Wayne Merry, Senior Associate, American Foreign Policy 

Council ...................................................................................... 23 

Lilia Shevtsova, Senior Associate, Carnegie Moscow Center .. 26 

Jeffrey Hahn, Professor of Political Science, Villanova University ....................................................................................... 30 

APPENDICES 

Prepared statement of Hon. Alcee L. Hastings ........................ 40 

Prepared statement of Hon. Sam Brownback, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ... 43 

Prepared statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith ................. 45 

Prepared statement of Hon. Daniel Fried ................................. 47 

Prepared statement of Sarah Mendelson .................................. 55 

Prepared statement of E. Wayne Merry ................................... 61 

Prepared statement of Lilia Shevtsova ..................................... 66 

Prepared statement of Jeffrey Hahn ......................................... 76 

Material submitted for the record by: 

Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations, Lehigh University ............................... 83 

Igor Zevelev, Washington Bureau Chief of Ria Novosti, 

Russian News and Information Agency ............................. 90 

(III) 

(1) 

RUSSIA: IN TRANSITION OR INTRANSIGENT? 

May 24, 2007 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 10:13 a.m. in room B318 Rayburn 

House Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, 

Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Alcee L. Hastings, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Benjamin L. 

Cardin, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe; Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. G.K. Butterfield, 

Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Hon. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State; 

Sarah Mendelson, Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, The 

Center for Strategic and International Studies; E. Wayne Merry, 

Senior Associate, American Foreign Policy Council; Lilia Shevtsova, 

Senior Associate, Carnegie Moscow Center; and Jeffrey Hahn, Professor of Political Science, Villanova University. 

HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HASTINGS. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I’d like to 

call this hearing to order. 

And, ladies and gentlemen, invited guests, and members of the 

press and diplomatic corps, I’d like to welcome all of you here today 

for this hearing on Russia. 

I’d particularly like to welcome and thank the members of our 

distinguished panel for finding the time to share their expertise 

with us this morning. 

But before we begin, I’d just like to note that earlier today, near 

the Siberian city of Novokuznetsk, 35 miners were killed and others injured in a methane explosion in a coal mine. 

And according to the most recent news reports that I saw before 

coming over here, there are still three miners missing. 

Unfortunately, America is no stranger to such accidents, and our 

hearts and prayers go out to all those affected by this tragedy, and 

we’ll continue to hope against hope that those three miners may 

yet be found alive. 

This is the first hearing that the Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe is holding in the 110th Congress. And I felt 

2 

and feel that it is quite appropriate that Russia is the topic of discussion. 

As we all know, Russia is an increasingly important and influential member of the international community, playing a key, albeit 

not always constructive, role in organizations such as the United 

Nations, the Group of 8, the Council of Europe, the Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

And I’m the past president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and I’m fond 

of saying if anybody can say that, they ought to be elected. 

And in the not-too-distant future, I expect this list to include the 

World Trade Organization. It’s good that Russia is so involved in 

these international organizations and has so much potential to 

make positive contributions to global stability and prosperity. 

In the late ’80s and early ’90s, it appeared that Russia was making a sea change transition, however uneven and tumultuous, to 

representative governance and a society rooted in the rule of law. 

However, since the tragic shelling of the Russian White House in 

the fall of 1993, and particularly over the last seven years, the 

Kremlin has moved to recentralize authority and power that it had 

seen slip away in the wake of glasnost and perestroika. 

The result has been a significant limitation on the civil liberties 

that many of us associate with a legitimately open society. 

Despite President Putin’s lip service in support of democratic institutions and civil society, we now see a political agenda centrally 

planned in Moscow. 

Now, I fully understand that human rights not only include the 

ability to hold anti-government demonstrations or write op-eds critical of government policy, but human rights also have some relation to basic social justice concerns, such as having heat in the winter, getting paid on time, and having access to judicial process. 

In these areas, much progress has been made in Russia over the 

past decade or so, and particularly under President Putin’s leadership. And I commend him for working to improve the standard of 

living of the average Russian citizen. 

But these basic needs are also met in some of the world’s most 

repressive regimes, and it is my hope that a great nation like Russia can do better. 

A growing economy and the improved living conditions that have 

resulted, as well as a newfound influence on the world stage help 

to explain the popularity of the current Russian president. His 

sober, intelligent and macho image has also been well received by 

the populace. 

I’m also aware of a vocal and growing minority that is deeply 

concerned at the direction their country may be going in, and I’m 

thinking of the many people and organizations included in the 

Other Russia coalition as well as other opposition groups. 

Reports of the heavy-handedness and brutality that some of 

these individuals have faced while attempting to exercise their 

rights to free assembly and free speech, quite frankly, are alarming. 

These basic human freedoms are enshrined in many of the international agreements that Russia is, at least on paper, committed 

to. 

3 

It’s perplexing that the popular and powerful Russian government feels threatened by a few thousand people demonstrating in 

favor of an alternative point of view. Perhaps the authorities do not 

feel threatened but are simply used to dealing with protesters in 

a forceful manner. 

We politicians here in Washington are accustomed to such public 

displays of dissent, as our city is often the venue of marches and 

gatherings that sometimes number in the hundreds of thousands. 

And this is normal and desirable, and has been the catalyst for so 

much positive change in our great country and society. 

Concerning some elements of the Russian opposition to the Putin 

administration, I must note that common dislike for the Russian 

president may not be the strongest glue for a lasting alliance. 

In this case, the cliched phrase ‘‘the enemy of my enemy is my 

friend’’ does not hold true. I know of many distinguished NGOs and 

human rights activists that have chosen to participate in the Other 

Russia movement, but the past rhetoric and actions of some of 

those leaders involved give me pause. 

As we look to the future of U.S.-Russian relations, being best 

friends does not have to be the measure of successful cooperation. 

There’s a lot that we can accomplish despite hard feelings in 

some quarters, and we need to focus our efforts more on bolstering 

Russia’s nascent democratic institutions rather than on the rapidly 

changing faces of the Russian elite: In other words, principles before personality. 

If we are to improve relations, we must find new ways to have 

more frequent interaction at all levels and with all branches of government. 

Additionally, I recognize that a substantive and sustainable bilateral dialogue must also happen at the level of civil society. 

This is why I’m such a proponent of public diplomacy and exchange programs such as our own Library of Congress’ Open World 

Program and many other fine initiatives. 

These initiatives not only promote understanding, but they also 

enable us to identify future leaders at all levels of society. 

The central question before us today is what kind of leadership 

will Russia provide at home and abroad, and what can and should 

the United States be doing to participate and help Russia complete 

its transition to democracy, especially in the post-Putin era. 

I look forward to learning more on this from our truly expert and 

distinguished panel. 

And I’d like to ask staff. Did you pass out their biographies to 

people in the audience? That will cut down on the amount of time 

that I have to read about how famous they are, and they are that. 

I’d like to add that in the interest of a balanced hearing, I extended an invitation to Russian Ambassador Yuri Ushakov, and 

I’m sorry he wasn’t able to take part in this important dialogue. 

But in all future hearings that I intend to hold, I intend to continue to invite them to the dialogue. And at some point, I’m hopeful 

that that breakthrough will occur. 

I now turn the floor over to the ranking member from New Jersey, Mr. Smith. 

4 

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, RANKING MEMBER, 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, everybody. I, too, am deeply alarmed by many of 

the trends and setbacks, particularly the recent ones, occurring in 

Russia today. 

But I want to raise one very important issue right now: the unresolved murders of dozens of independent Russian journalists over 

the past decade. 

I have authored a congressional resolution, H.Con.Res. 151, calling upon President Putin to seek competent outside law enforcement assistance in the investigation of those unresolved murders. 

Only yesterday, H.Con.Res. 151, with over 30 co-sponsors, was 

approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee. Congress, it seems to 

me, needs to raise its voice very, very loud and with a great deal 

of emphasis on this important issue. 

Russia holds the worst position in the world—second-worst position in the world in the number of journalists killed in the last 10 

years, according to the International News Safety Institute. 

Reporters Without Borders counts 21 murdered journalists since 

March of 2000. This is a conservative number. It does include the 

murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya, but it does not 

include the murder or death under extremely suspicious circumstances of Ivan Safronov. 

Many observers think that government officials ordered most of 

these murders, or at least were complicit or part of a coverup, because these journalists were investigating government corruption 

or human rights abuses in Russia. 

There is good reason to think that people in very high places are 

protecting these murderers. We know this: Very few of these murder cases have been resolved. 

Journalists, as we all know, fulfill an essential role in every society, and none more than those who uncover the theft of a country’s 

assets by its elected officials or human rights outrages committed 

in its name. 

Journalists who do this do it at great risk of their lives, and they 

truly deserve to be called heroes. 

Make no mistake about it; these journalists knew that they were 

taking enormous risks, even risking their lives. It seems to me that 

we owe it to them to raise our voice, and to do it over and over 

again, to bring the killers to justice. Mr. Putin, sadly, seems not 

to be making any serious effort to do so. 

I am afraid Russia today may be slipping backwards. The Russian economy is booming, but Russian democracy seems to be falling below the level of many developing countries. 

Only when journalists can work without fear of intimidation and 

death will we be able to say honestly that the Government of Russia is truly a durable democratic government. 

We need to push—we need to encourage—we need to demand 

that the Government of Russia cease selling arms to the Sudanese 

Government that commits grave violations of human rights, the 

genocide in Darfur. 

We need a government that doesn’t look the other way when 

local officials harass minority religions and ethnic minorities, 

5 

which doesn’t embrace military brutality in Chechnya, maintain an 

occupying army in Moldova, and threaten Poland and the Czech 

Republic for cooperating with the United States in their military 

defense or foment unrest in Kosovo. 

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the great conscience of Russia, said in 

his Nobel Prize speech in 1970 that any man who has once proclaimed violence as his method is inevitably forced to take the lie 

as his principle. 

My resolution addresses the violence of the murder of independent journalists and the lie in the claim that their murders 

have been seriously investigated. 

Solzhenitsyn said of Communist Russia in our country. The lie 

has become not just a moral category but a pillar of the state. We 

have to ask ourselves and ask Mr. Putin: Will this terrible statement also be true of the post-Communist Russia? 

I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for convening this important 

hearing. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. 

At this time, I would yield the floor to Mr. Butterfield, a new 

member of the Helsinki Commission and my good friend. 

HON. G.K. BUTTERFIELD, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, to the 

Ranking Member. 

First, let me thank you for so warmly receiving me on this Commission. I’ve looked forward to it. This is actually my first meeting, 

and I’m very excited about it. 

I don’t have a prepared statement to give. 

I do want to thank the witnesses for participating today. I’ve 

read your written testimony and look forward to your testimony 

today. 

There is no question that we must reach out to Russia and to 

other countries around the world to make sure that we have good 

allies and good relationships. 

And so that’s one of the goals of this Commission, and it certainly is the goal of the Congress. And I thank you very much for 

coming today. 

I yield back. 

Mr. HASTINGS. At this time it gives me great pleasure to ask our 

first witness to make a presentation. 

And I indicated and the staff indicated that they passed out Ambassador Daniel Fried’s resume ́. I think most of you in the audience know that he is the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of 

European and Eurasian Affairs. 

But I part company from this prepared biography to add a personal note. Part of what government is about—it is about access 

and information. 

And I can truly say, as one who has interfaced with Ambassador 

Fried, with not constant regularity, but with unfailing responses to 

inquiries that I’ve made regarding visits that I’ve undertaken that 

fall within the ambit of his portfolio. 

6 

And then I just want to thank you for your advice and concerns 

and quick responses. 

And I think that that’s a better measure than me telling you all 

of the wonderful particulars of his curriculum vitae. 

Mr. Secretary? 

HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Sec. FRIED. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Hastings and members of the Commission, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear today. The subject today, Russia 

today, is critical to the United States and Europe. 

Whether Russia is in transition or intransigent—the other part 

of your question for this hearing—frames the challenge of working 

with Russia. 

Russia certainly remains in transition from its Communist past. 

Its growing assertiveness, spurred in part by high energy revenues, 

may have stimulated your use of the word intransigent. 

Russia does sometimes seem a difficult partner, but we also have 

important areas of common interests and cooperation. Ours may 

not be a full strategic partnership, but it includes partnership on 

many strategic issues. 

The administration wants Russia to be a partner in the world, 

and we want Russia to be strong, but strong in 21st century terms, 

with strong democratic and independent institutions in and out of 

government. 

We do not exempt Russia from our belief in the universal potential of freedom, and we also have Russia in mind when we say that 

we seek an open world characterized by partnerships with likeminded countries. 

Our preferred tactical approach is cooperation. We seek to work 

together wherever we can, and we push back where we must, privately when possible, but publicly when necessary, in defense of 

our values, our interests and friends. 

At all points, we seek to work with our European allies and 

friends to coordinate our approaches. 

The United States and Russia cooperate in nonproliferation and 

counterterrorism. We work closely with Russia to address the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. 

Even if Moscow has sometimes disagreed with our approach to 

sanctions and other measures, Russia has voted for U.N. Security 

Council resolutions calling for the denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula and imposing sanctions on North Korea, as well as resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran until it suspends its nuclear enrichment program. 

The United States and Russia also participate in the six-party 

talks on North Korea. We cooperate with Russia through the 

NATO-Russia Council. 

That cooperation can be enhanced through a Status of Forces 

Agreement, which the Duma ratified on May 23rd. We welcome 

this and look forward to the Federation Council following suit. 

7 

The April meeting of the NATO-Russia Council of foreign ministers in Oslo, Norway, however, demonstrated important differences between Russia and NATO. 

In his state of the nation address earlier that day, President 

Putin had suggested that he would consider suspending Russia’s 

obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the CFE Treaty, if no progress were made on ratification of 

the adapted CFE Treaty by NATO allies. 

At the NATO-Russia Council, NATO ministers universally responded that we regard the current CFE Treaty as a cornerstone 

of European security, and Russia’s fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments as an indispensable prerequisite to its ratification. 

We also seek to advance cooperation with Russia through the 

OSCE, an organization obviously of deep interest to this Commission. Russia’s critical attitude toward the OSCE remains a cause 

of concern. 

At a speech in February, President Putin branded the OSCE, 

quote, ‘‘a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy 

interests of one or a group of countries’’ end quote. 

Under the guise of demanding reforms, Russia has proposed 

changes to the OSCE, the effect of which, in our view, would be to 

cripple its democracy promotion efforts. 

The United States disagrees with this Russian approach and has 

defended the OSCE’s mandate to advance democratic reforms, including election monitoring. 

Indeed, these efforts embody commitments that Washington and 

Moscow and other OSCE states undertook when we signed the Helsinki Final Act decades ago. 

The United States continues to support the work of OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ODIHR. Its 

election monitoring mechanisms represent the international gold 

standard in this area. 

We also, Mr. Chairman, hope the ODIHR works well with the 

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. 

We look forward to the OSCE’s Office of Democratic Institutions 

and Human Rights’ involvement in Russia’s upcoming Duma elections in December of this year and presidential elections next 

March. 

We value highly, as I said, the contributions of the Parliamentary Assembly in this effort. And we also accept and welcome 

ODIHR monitoring of U.S. elections. 

Differences with Russia over the OSCE reflect broader negative 

trends on human rights and democracy in Russia itself. 

Russia is even today, of course, a vastly freer country than at 

any time in Soviet history and arguably freer than at any period 

in Russia’s history. But it would be an insult to Russia to hold that 

great country to such low standards. 

So the U.S. Government has publicly protested the recent police 

brutality employed to break up opposition marches in Moscow, St. 

Petersburg and Nizhny Novgorod. Authorities sought to prevent 

these marches from taking place at all. 

They denied permission to stage the events and harassed and detained Russians traveling to participate in these peaceful rallies as 

well as journalists reporting on these events. 

8 

Similar efforts were directed against members of the Russian opposition and Western journalists seeking to express their opinions 

ahead of the E.U.-Russia summit in Samara on May 18th. 

It is positive that the deputy press spokesman of the presidential 

administration, Dmitri Peskov, acknowledged that the police response to last month’s protests merits review. 

St. Petersburg Governor Matvienko and the Russian Federation’s 

human rights ombudsman, Ambassador Lukin, have both called for 

investigations. 

Ambassador Lukin, in reports, has said that his office has received and will investigate complaints about the government obstacles to the holding of these rallies. 

President Putin’s own chair of the Civil Society Institute and 

Human Rights Council, Ella Pamfilova, said that the interior minister of Russia should resign. 

Such calls show that even within official Russia, views differ on 

human rights. 

But we remain concerned about the increasingly narrow space 

within which Russian NGOs are forced to operate. The increasing 

pressure on Russian journalists is likewise troubling. 

In Russia today, unfortunately, almost all national broadcast 

media, the primary source of news, are in government hands or in 

the hands of entities allied with the Kremlin. 

Attacks on journalists, including the brutal and still unresolved 

murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna Politkovskaya, among others, 

chill and deter the press. 

Ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections, the Kremlin 

is shaping the legal and social environment to slant what should 

be a level playing field. 

Authorities have used electoral laws selectively to the advantage 

of pro-Kremlin forces or to weaken opposition forces. The refusal to 

re-register some parties appears to have been based on political instructions. 

Last year, the Duma redefined extremism so broadly and vaguely 

as to provide a weapon to wield against and intimidate opponents. 

And indeed, Dissenters’ leader Gary Kasparov has already been 

questioned by the FSB in its investigation into so-called extremist 

activity. 

Mr. Chairman, we are also concerned by some aspects of Russia’s 

relations with its neighbors, whom it seems to still approach often 

with a zero-sum mentality, particularly with regard to countries 

such as Georgia, which chose to pursue closer Euro-Atlantic ties. 

We and European countries have spoken out against Russia’s use 

of energy to apply pressure on its neighbors, and we’re concerned 

by apparent political interference with infrastructure to apply pressure on other neighbors. 

Russian-Georgian relations, after a period of extreme tension, 

show tentative signs of improvement. But Russia maintains the 

economic and transportation sanctions it imposed against Georgia 

last fall. 

Likewise, it continues to support separatist regimes in Georgia’s 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions and in Moldova’s Transnistria 

region. We hope Russia ends these policies. 

9 

In Transnistria, the United States and E.U. are official observers 

of the so-called Five-Plus-Two talks, which have been at an impasse for more than a year because of Transnistria’s unwillingness 

to engage. 

And we are sorry that Russia’s ban against Moldovan wine and 

agricultural goods remains in place. 

The United States and Russia, however, do work well together 

in attempting to facilitate a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 

conflict. 

Together with the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries, France 

and Russia, I travelled to that region last spring to push this process forward. 

We regret Russia’s so-far hostile attitude toward U.S. plans to 

place elements of a limited missile defense system in Poland and 

the Czech Republic intended to shield the U.S. and European allies 

against missile threats not from Russia but from the Middle East. 

Geography and geometry demonstrate that this very modest system—only 10 interceptors proposed—poses no threat to Russia. We 

and the Russians simply do not agree on this. 

But the United States will continue to work to advance understanding, transparency and greater cooperation on missile defense. 

Secretary Gates offered missile defense cooperation with Russia, 

and that offer stands. We have briefed Russia on our plans for over 

18 months. 

Mr. Chairman, as you said, Russia has made dramatic economic 

gains over the past few years. We welcome this economic revitalization, and you are correct that it means a better life for the Russian 

people. 

But we are concerned that Russia’s wealth remains more valueextracted than value-added. Russia’s economic gains may have 

fueled a certain assertiveness in Russia’s external agenda, but 

those gains are also fostering the growth of a middle class, whose 

emergence we hope in time will bring with it modern political reform. 

The United States supports Russia’s integration into rules-based 

international organizations such as the WTO as Russia meets WTO 

criteria. 

The range of U.S. and Russian interests are global, and so our 

countries must work together wherever possible, even in the face 

of differences. 

As I mentioned, Secretary Rice just completed a visit to Moscow 

last week. The president will meet with President Putin at the G8 summit in Germany in June. These and other opportunities will 

provide important moments to try to make progress on our agenda. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I’m grateful for the 

opportunity to speak before you today, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you very much, Ambassador. 

And I’ll be very brief in light of the fact that Mr. Smith and Mr. 

Butterfield may have other commitments. 

And I do use as a segue your mentioning the distinguished secretary’s visit recently to Russia. And I know, as do most of us, that 

part of the discussion had to do with plans for the missile defense 

in Europe. 

10 

Coincidentally, I leave for Warsaw tomorrow, and I have the 

good fortune of meeting with the President and the Foreign Minister, and I certainly will ask them what the climate is from a policy maker’s point of view. 

But in addition, she discussed the CFE Treaty and Kosovo and 

the U.S.-Russian relationship overall. 

Do you know or did the Secretary to your knowledge raise the 

issue of civil society in Russia and Moscow’s attempt to rein in political opposition through control of the media and legal limitations 

on the NGO activities? 

Sec. FRIED. Mr. Chairman, I had the honor of accompanying Secretary Rice to Moscow, and I can affirm to you that she did discuss 

issues of civil society, democratization and discussed the Russian 

political scene with both President Putin and Foreign Minister 

Lavrov. 

And these were extensive discussions. They weren’t, shall I say, 

the reading of prepared points. She knows the issue well, and she 

went into these issues in some depth with both leaders. 

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. And there’s been much talk lately of a 

new cold war. On the day that you and Secretary Rice were in Russia, I was speaking here on the Senate side, and I used the term 

‘‘cold peace’’ in my remarks. 

But even if a cold war doesn’t develop, it seems clear that we are 

entering an era of much competitive undertakings with our Russian friends. Would you agree? 

And if so, would you see a familiar stage in a long-established 

cycle or something new, Secretary Fried? 

Sec. FRIED. That’s a very fair question. I don’t have a one-line 

answer that can adequately answer it, not because I—— 

Mr. HASTINGS. Well, take two lines. 

Sec. FRIED. It’s not because I don’t think it’s important, but because a quick characterization is difficult. Our relations with Russia are complicated, which is to be expected, given the history of 

relations between Washington and Moscow. 

To answer your immediate question, we were certainly concerned 

by the, frankly, shrill tone coming out of Moscow, and one of Secretary Rice’s principal messages last week was that the tone needs 

to be lowered, and that needs to happen immediately. 

And it was gratifying to all of us that the Russians agreed and 

said so in public. I think the Russians understand that some of the 

more extravagant language used is counterproductive and will only 

lead to a cycle which makes it harder to cooperate in areas where 

we do have overlapping interests. 

The fact is U.S.-Russia relations are characterized by cooperation 

in some areas and by troubling differences in others. 

And the United States needs to find a policy which enables us 

to do both at the same time, to cooperate wherever we can, but to 

do so on the basis of a realistic appraisal of Russia and to push 

back when necessary in defense of our values, our interests and our 

friends, and to do both without tying ourselves in knots. 

Now, that is easier to say than to do in practice, but that’s the 

nature of the relationship as we see it. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Ambassador. 

11 

The agreement reached last weekend among Russia, Kazakhstan, 

and Turkmenistan, in my view, effectively guarantees that Russia 

will control Central Asian gas reserves for the foreseeable future. 

And we at one time backed the option of a Trans-Caspian gas 

pipeline, and I would gather that that’s flagging at this point, at 

the very least. 

But what is the United States doing? And are we working with 

our partners in the European Union to mitigate the economic and 

the political consequences of energy dependence on Russia? 

Sec. FRIED. Happily, Mr. Chairman, I’m able to tell you that we 

do not think that this agreement in principle reached recently between those countries means that all other sources of gas transport 

are precluded. 

I do not think it means that Russia has or will monopolize Central Asian gas exports. We believe that there is sufficient gas reserves in the Caspian, Western Turkmenistan, Western 

Kazakhstan to support multiple pipelines. 

Indeed, that is precisely the objective of American policy. We do 

not believe in monopoly. We do not believe in a closed energy system upstream or downstream. 

We believe that an open system is going to be better for the countries of Central Asia, better for the consumers in Europe and, 

frankly, in the long run, better for Russia itself, but certainly better for the Central Asians and the Europeans. 

We are working to open up the upstream gas markets. That does 

not mean that we wish to exclude Russia. Such a policy would be 

futile and unwise. 

Russia will, under the best circumstances, be a major source of 

investment and transit for Central Asian gas, and in our view, it 

should not be the only source. 

Open systems with multiple sources tend to be more stable, more 

subject to market forces, less subject to political manipulation. 

That’s what we favor, and we think we have a realistic opportunity 

of developing such a system, cooperating with the Europeans and 

the Central Asians. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Mr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your exemplary service 

on behalf of our Nation, and we’re grateful to have you here today. 

A couple of questions, if I could, on the journalist issue. We know 

one of the reasons why Putin remains popular is the fact that 

there’s virtually no criticism, constructive or otherwise, coming out 

of the media. 

When it does, very often those people are hunted down, particularly if it rises to the level of criticizing Chechnya or something 

else. 

So you might speak to the issue of the killed Russian journalists 

and what we are doing to try to assist and offer the FBI or some 

other investigative arm to assist in tracking down those murderers. 

And how high do you think it goes? 

Second, while we all know that China remains the enabler-inchief of the slaughter in Darfur—and I’ve been to the refugee 

12 

camps in Darfur and have seen the survivors of that genocide. But 

we know that Russia, too, is selling weapons. 

And I’m wondering how vigorously we’re raising that issue. 

What’s our assessment of their complicity in the genocide in 

Darfur? 

I’ve met with Bashir myself. The man is certifiable. He’s smart. 

He’s intelligent. But he reminds me of Milosevic and a lot of the 

other characters who have committed untold atrocities on humanity. And he’s right in that category. What are we doing on that? 

Third, on the issue of—I read the human rights report on Russia 

and was struck—it was buried in the report—by a comment about 

how the FSB routinely monitors the traffic on the Internet, especially e-mails. 

I held a hearing last year at which we had Cisco, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo testify. 

You might recall that, Mr. Chairman. 

And they gave very poor answers as to what their responsibility 

is in ensuring that dictatorships do not abuse this technology. We 

know that Cisco sold Policenet to China, giving them the ability to 

know where every human rights and religious dissident is. 

And I’m wondering as to whether or not the FSB has that kind 

of technology courtesy of U.S. technological corporations. 

And then also, if you could, two of our witnesses today speak of 

the issue of the demographic crisis in Russia. Ms. Mendelson 

makes the point that it’s a very severe problem that’s not likely to 

be solved by the baby bonus. 

And Wayne Merry talks about it as the imploding population of 

Russia. And we know that that leads to incredible dislocations of 

people. 

I mean, I watched Putin’s state of the union, the equivalent, on 

C-SPAN earlier this year and was struck by his talk in terms of 

the loss of population, and especially their juxtaposition of China, 

which is also a demographic nightmare, particularly with the missing girls, 100 million missing girls, as a result of their one-childper-couple policy. 

There is a book, as you probably know, called Barren Branches 

that has as its thesis that adventurism by China is almost inevitable because of its missing girls. They killed them by way of forced 

abortion since 1979, leading to, like I said, as many as 100 million 

missing girls. 

One demographer said that by 2020, 40 million Chinese men will 

not be able to find wives because they’ve been killed over the last 

three decades. 

So I raise that because their proximity, their shared border, their 

own imploding population raises very serious, I think, issues. 

And finally, Sarah Mendelson makes a comment which I find 

very intriguing and I’d appreciate your comment on that. 

She says U.S. foreign assistance is often driven by needs in 

Washington, with an almost obsessive preoccupation with outcomes. In part because of congressional hearings, assistance has 

sometimes unwittingly enabled civil society to be disconnected from 

local populations and instead focused on the donor. Indeed, this 

criticism has been leveled by President Putin himself. 

13 

And I would note that he—and I like this report that AID put 

out about democracy. But in a way, he sees it as an affront. 

It’s almost like in your district or mine, Mr. Chairman, you 

know, if all of a sudden a foreign NGO showed up and started organizing against us, we might say—you know, if they were pushing 

just for democracy, we’d say, ‘‘Go for it.’’ 

But if they were organizing opposition candidates, we might have 

a little bit of, you know, pause about their mission. 

So if you could address those issues, I’d deeply appreciate it. 

Sec. FRIED. I’ll do my best. With respect to the journalists, we 

have put a lot of resources into support for the investigation of 

Paul Klebnikov’s murder. 

That’s a special case. He was an American citizen. We have done 

what we could. Our ability to actually conduct an independent investigation is obviously limited. 

We follow these cases as much as we can. We were all horrified 

by the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. Many of us knew her. She 

was regarded as one of the best and most courageous Russian journalists. We honor her memory. 

We have looked into these. Frankly, our ability to penetrate the 

circumstances is very limited. But we are not silent about this, as 

you know. 

I cannot say how high the—who is responsible for the killing. We 

simply don’t know. It’s not that I know and can’t say, or delicacy 

or diplomacy forbids me. We really don’t know. 

But we would hope that Russia would create a climate in which 

journalists were not seen as quite as vulnerable. 

The Russian government has a responsibility, like all governments, to protect the press and see that the members of the press 

are entitled to the same protections that other citizens enjoy. 

With respect to Darfur, Congressman, I don’t know that it’s fair 

to say that Russia is complicit in genocide there. I think we look 

at them as a potential partner working to put pressure on the Sudanese regime. 

Mr. SMITH. With respect, are they selling them arms or are entities over which they could have control selling them arms? 

Sec. FRIED. I am not saying that I applaud—that we applaud all 

Russian actions. I can tell you that Secretary Rice raised the issue 

at length with Foreign Minister Lavrov last week in Moscow. That 

was one of the chief topics of their discussion over dinner. 

And we are urging that the Russians work with us to put pressure on the regime. It is an issue of great frustration for all of us. 

We have called it genocide. We feel an obligation to take action as 

best we can. 

The issue of the Internet is a complicated one, and you raise 

issues of corporate responsibility that I don’t feel myself able to answer. But they are fair questions. 

They are fair questions because the Internet is an arm of freedom, and governments that look to control the Internet or limit the 

Internet will use the technology against this instrument of freedom. 

We also are looking very closely at the cyber attacks on Estonia, 

so there’s another side to all of this. 

14 

What is the responsibility of governments with respect to selling 

Internet technology? To help a democratic government protect its 

infrastructure. 

But is there a responsibility with respect to more authoritarian 

governments repressing the Internet or managing, so-called, the 

Internet? I don’t have an answer, but those are fair questions, and 

they will be worked out, including through the process of hearings 

and public discussion. It’s a fair topic. 

The demographic crisis in Russia is well known, and it is an unprecedented rate of population decline in developed countries. I 

know Sarah Mendelson and Wayne Merry. We’ve known each other 

for years. And they’re right about the numbers. 

It’s particularly true in Siberia, where there are, I think, 15 million Russians facing, what, 150 million Chinese just across the border. 

It may be, and we hope it is, the case that as a new propertyowning middle class that has grown up in the relatively greater 

freedom of Russia, as opposed to the Soviet Union, achieves power 

and affluence, it will demand a different relationship between itself 

and the authorities, and that as Russian institutions stabilize in a 

democratic way, as we hope they do, that the demography will follow. 

That’s not a prediction. That’s a hope. But the demographic problem is a serious one, and we should keep it in mind. 

Demographic problems, I should add, developed in the late Soviet 

period, and it was, in fact, the demographers, such as the famous 

Murray Feshbach, who first understood the terminal decline of the 

Soviet system. And they did so better working with official statistics than many analysts working in more traditional ways. 

Finally, U.S. Government assistance and NGOs. We are far better now, 17 years after the end of Communism in Europe, than we 

were at the beginning. We have a better idea of what works and 

what doesn’t. 

We do have programs to support civil society. We do not try to 

make our support partisan. In this country, we are used to foreign 

NGOs who do operate here, who take very critical—foreign NGOs 

are very critical, often of the Bush administration. 

That’s part of life. It’s the price of doing business in a democracy. 

Foreigners take issue with American policy, and that’s life. That’s 

the way we are. 

And we have urged the Russians to show more confidence in 

themselves. NGOs are not revolutionary organizations. They are 

organizations that help societies grow strong. 

And a strong independent society will be good for Russia. That’s 

our founding philosophy. Our implementation has gotten better 

over time. 

We’ve had our successes. We’ve had areas where we could do better. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Ambassador, I’m going to take my leave for 30 

minutes and go open another hearing for the Florida delegation. I 

apologize for working. But I would like for Mr. Butterfield to put 

his questions. 

15 

We’ve been joined by the most able co-chair, in whose hands I’ll 

leave it, and I’m sure he will have a statement and questions for 

you as well. 

I do want you at some point, if you will, if the question isn’t 

raised, to talk to us about the budget process with reference to 

OSCE and the secondments. I’ve raised this with you in our personal visit, but I’d like for you to be prepared when I return, to— 

if you have not answered it or are not still here, then please follow 

up for me with that. 

Sec. FRIED. Very good. 

Mr. HASTINGS. All right. 

And, Chairman Cardin? 

Mr. Butterfield? 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Vice 

Chairman and Ranking Member. Again, I want to thank you, Ambassador, for coming today. Thank you very much for all that you 

do for our country. 

Ambassador, some of the scholars that we hear from from time 

to time argue that the people of Russia are either indifferent to democracy or they support the Kremlin’s campaign to curtail the dissemination of dissenting views on the airways. 

And then there are others that claim that Russians are much 

less enamored of a strong authoritarian hand and that is often supposed. 

Would you help me with those views, and tell me where you 

think the truth lies? 

Sec. FRIED. There is a lively debate among Russian experts as to 

the views of—as to the center of Russian public opinion. 

It is natural that the Russian public, after the decade of the ’90s 

which was for many Russians a very difficult period, would welcome the relative affluence and greater stability of this decade. 

Now, the ’90s were not a period entirely of chaos. It was also a 

period of democratic flourishing, especially in the beginning. But as 

the ’90s wore on, the problems accumulated. 

And many of the structural problems we see in Russia today 

have their roots in the rather questionable privatizations of the 

late 1990s. So there is a popular reaction in Russia against some 

of the problems of the ’90s, and that accounts for some of the popularity of the present government. 

It’s also true that had President Yeltsin enjoyed oil prices as high 

as they are today, he would have had more money and might have 

enjoyed greater popularity. So we have to keep this in mind. 

I think that President Putin’s relative popularity is not made up, 

but I don’t know whether it is sustainable or not. 

In any event, it is not the position of the United States government to make judgments about the popularity or lack of popularity 

of a Russian government. It’s our job to develop our relations with 

Russia, including based on principles of democracy. 

And I’ve expressed some of the concerns we have about the direction of Russia today. But it is true that the government enjoys a 

degree of popularity, and the causes are debated. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Well, we are hearing that Putin is going to 

step down next year, and with that announcement he also made a 

16 

promise that he’s going to stay involved to a significant degree in 

the political life of Russia. 

That’s different from what we see from time to time in the West. 

Would you comment on that? 

Sec. FRIED. Well, the Russian constitution says that you can’t 

serve more than two consecutive terms, so he is obligated to step 

down, and he said he will. 

I don’t know what he means about staying involved in the life 

of the country. Former Presidents in the United States are very active and sometimes quite successfully so. Whether he means this 

or something else, we will have to wait and see. 

Congressman, like you, I hear the stories, the rumors, and the 

only thing I know is that we don’t know. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Sec. FRIED. At least we don’t know yet. 

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ambassador, let me thank you for your leadership on this 

issue. And I’m sorry I missed your testimony, but I’ve read your 

written statement. 

And I concur in your observations that Russia today is a more 

open society than at any time in its modern history, and yet there 

are very, very troublesome developments in Russia that Russia 

should be concerned about. 

In your statement, you point to the suppression of genuine opposition, abridgement of the right to protest, constrictions of the 

space of a civil society, decline of media freedom, and then you talk 

about the imprisoned journalists. 

It really represents a dilemma for us. We cannot stand by and 

let Russia oppress human rights and do the things—make the type 

of statements they have about OSCE—Mr. Putin’s comments. 

Yet we need Russia if we’re going to have an effective diplomatic 

effort with Iran and North Korea, if we’re going to be able to move 

forward with the implementations in Darfur under the United Nations—Russia plays a critical role within the Security Council. 

If we’re going to be able to do a lot of our foreign policy initiatives, we truly need the Russians working with us, if OSCE’s going 

to be able to carry out its important missions. 

So I’m sort of at a dilemma to what to do about Russia. I feel 

I am obligated to speak out about their human rights atrocities and 

violations. 

And yet we need to have a constructive engagement if we’re 

going to be able to use diplomatic efforts to resolve some of the 

issues that are critically important to U.S. foreign policy. 

So what should we be? 

Sec. FRIED. Congressman, you’ve described the dilemma that we 

all share. We cannot be silent and indifferent to the larger problems of values. 

17 

This country rejected some time ago the notion that the internal 

workings of a government and a country were of no interest and 

no concern. We gave that up some time in the 1970s, and we were 

right to do so. 

And yet we do need to work with Russia on issues where we 

have common interests. The trick is to find a way to work with 

Russia wherever we can, and yet not to sacrifice our values and not 

to sacrifice our interests where we have differences with Russia. 

And American governments have found it easy to be enthusiastic 

about Russia or very angry with Russia. We have often found it 

challenging to be able to do both at the same time. And yet this 

is what is required. 

Secretary Rice, I think, has found the right balance of realism 

about Russia, outspokenness about the problems—which she has 

been—while being committed to a policy of cooperation with Russia 

wherever we can. 

We must not allow our interest in cooperation to deter us from 

speaking out, but we must not allow the problems we see to prevent us from working on issues where we have common interests— 

Iran, North Korea, perhaps the Middle East, Darfur—if we could. 

And to say it is simple. To do it is the challenge. And it is a problem that doesn’t lend itself to a simple answer. This is well debated 

in the Russian watcher community outside of government. 

And we will try to do all of these things and work with you as 

we do so, as we try to find that right spot. 

Mr. CARDIN. That seemed like a fairly diplomatic answer. 

Sec. FRIED. Oh, I’d hope so. 

Mr. CARDIN. All right. [Laughter.] 

I was at the United Nations this week with a delegation meeting 

with the Secretary General, meeting with the Permanent Council 

of Ambassadors, and we should be able to move forward, we think, 

with a Kosovo resolution, but we’re not sure Russia’s going to allow 

us to do it. 

And it’s just one issue after the next that Russia appears to be 

more aggressive than we are in leveraging their influence rather 

than us being effective in moving forward with an international 

agenda as well as reform within the Russian Federation. 

What can we expect after Mr. Putin? We don’t know what his 

role will be in the next government, but from what we hear, he’s 

popular. Are we likely to face a more nationalist leadership after 

the next elections? 

Sec. FRIED. Senator, you are right when you list some of the differences we have with Russia. We’re engaged in a very intense effort in New York on Kosovo, and Secretary Rice engaged on this 

with President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov at great length 

last week in Moscow. 

There are a number of issues where we have differences with 

Russia, and we will do the best we can to work this out. 

With respect to Putin’s successor, every Russian leader since 

Brezhnev—well, and Gorbachev, has been radically different than 

the previous one. 

It seems to me and seems to the administration that what President Putin is trying to do is create a kind of systemic continuity 

so that Russia’s newfound wealth, its greater assertiveness, parVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
18 

ticularly in its immediate neighborhood, is not reversed by whoever 

comes in after Putin. 

All of the leading contenders for the transition to the next Russian president seem to be well within the parameters of Putin’s 

general approach. I don’t have a reason to expect a major change. 

Now, you may conclude from that that there will be areas of real 

difference with Russia in the future, and that may well be the case. 

But our policy will remain as steady as we can make it. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you. Mr. Smith, any further questions? 

Mr. SMITH. One final question, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me just say to our next panel, I regret—Milorad Dodik 

from Srpska has asked to meet—he’s meeting with several of us 

during the course of his visit, and this was the only time, at 11:15, 

that he could meet, and so I apologize. I’ll have to take my leave. 

But let me ask you, Ambassador Fried, about human trafficking. 

It seems to me that there’s one area where the United States and 

Russia can collaborate even more than we have in years to date. 

I remember that the Duma—and John Finerty worked on this, 

a member of our staff, very, very effectively, to help provide the 

Russian Duma with what our legislation looked like here, and some 

of it was replicated by them, and they’ve done some other things 

as well. 

They’re still far short in the area of protection for the women, 

you know, as part of the three Ps, prevention, protection, and prosecution. That’s the real lagger in that list. 

But there are groups like MiraMed, and I would hope that the 

department would be much more favorable than it’s been in helping that NGO that has had incredible, extraordinary success in 

helping women who have been sold into slavery and then, thankfully, found freedom. 

They do a great job. I know Juliet Engel very well. But they have 

not had the kind of reception I think that they ought to get from 

USAID. And the TIP Office has been supportive but, frankly, the 

embassy has not been on some occasions. 

So I would make a plea to you, go look at their Web site if you 

just want to get a cursory look at what they do. But they are an 

extraordinary NGO doing great work. 

But what about collaboration further? I know that the FSB has 

worked with my U.S. attorney, Christopher Christie, on a Russian 

prosecution case of traffickers. The women were liberated. The traffickers have gone to prison. 

Can we do more? And what are your thoughts on that? 

Sec. FRIED. Cooperation with Russia against trafficking in persons is one of our top areas of cooperation. We support it. It’s going 

to continue. Obviously, we could do more. 

But I had heard about the success and I congratulate you on 

your role in supporting this. It helped people in an immediate—— 

Mr. SMITH. I’m not looking for that. I just want more collaboration and more—you know, put these people behind bars. 

Sec. FRIED. We will do what we can. I’m aware of the—MiraMed 

has been very active. I’m aware of this, and I will go ask the assistance people if there’s a particular problem right now. 

Mr. SMITH. I would appreciate it. I’d like to follow up. 

Sec. FRIED. I will do so. Yes, sir. 

19 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARDIN. One final point. I would like to get your response 

to Russian Minister Lavrov’s comments yesterday in Vienna where 

he indicated the U.S. concerns over the Istanbul commitments have 

nothing to do with European security. 

And it’s my understanding they also have announced that Russia 

has declared a moratorium on the CFE, the Conventional Forces 

Europe, Treaty. 

I’m just interested in your views as to whether there are modifications needed in that treaty or concerns about their statement. 

Sec. FRIED. The original CFE Treaty which is in force today was, 

in fact, a reflection of Cold War Europe. And the Russians are perfectly correct that it needed to be modified. 

It was modified, and a new treaty was signed in Istanbul in 1999 

which reflected the post-Cold War realities of Europe. 

When we signed that treaty, we made very clear that we would 

seek ratification of that treaty only when Russia had fulfilled side 

but related commitments it had made in Istanbul, so they’re known 

as the Istanbul commitments. 

Those commitments were to withdraw Russian troops and equipment from Georgia and Moldova. This was part of a package. The 

Russians knew it was part of a package. 

All the NATO countries agreed that when Russia fulfilled the 

Istanbul commitments, we would all ratify the new—the so-called 

adapted CFE Treaty. That remains our position. 

Russia has carried out many, even most, of its Istanbul commitments in Georgia—not all, but most. It has not done so in Moldova. 

Our view is that Russia knows what it has to do. 

We want to find whatever way is possible to help the Russians 

meet their Istanbul commitments, but these are commitments. 

They shouldn’t station troops in countries where the governments 

of these countries don’t want them. 

So we support the Istanbul commitments and we look forward to 

Russia fulfilling them so we can, in fact, ratify and bring into force 

the adapted CFE Treaty, which meets many of the Russians’ concerns. 

Mr. CARDIN. We will add it to our list of issues when we have 

bilaterals with the Russian Federation as parliamentarians. 

Sec. FRIED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much for your testimony here 

today. It has been very helpful to us. 

I think this is one of the principal challenges of OSCE, is how 

we improve the working relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States and between the Russian Federation 

and OSCE so that we can engage the problems of the region in a 

more constructive manner, with leadership rather—from Russia, 

rather than having to worry about what’s happening within Russia. 

Once again, thank you for your testimony. 

Sec. FRIED. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CARDIN. We will now turn to our second panel, and the first 

witness would be Dr. Sarah Mendelson, who’s the Director of 

Human Rights and Security Initiative as well as a senior fellow 

20 

with Russia programs at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies. 

Dr. Mendelson? 

SARAH MENDELSON, SENIOR FELLOW, RUSSIA AND EURASIA 

PROGRAM, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Dr. MENDELSON. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Thank you, Chairman Hastings and members of the Commission. 

It’s a pleasure to be here. Today I want to focus on three issues. 

First, how the decline of U.S. soft power and the increase of Russian influence is affecting human rights in the international arena. 

Second, I do want to touch on the disturbing trends inside Russia. 

And third, I want to talk about some specific recommendations 

for U.S. policy. 

At this time, I’d like to submit my prepared statement for the 

record, and for the remainder of my time I want to summarize the 

main points. 

During the Cold War, the United States represented an alternative for those oppressed by the Soviet Union. By 2007, the vision 

of the United States as a countervailing weight associated with 

human rights has been greatly damaged. 

Republicans and Democrats alike now recognize the United 

States has experienced a steep decline in what Joe Nye has termed 

soft power, the ability to persuade and inspire through non-military 

means. 

In Russia, this decline began back in the 1990s, but since 2001 

it has snowballed, until the United States has lost almost all leverage concerning abuses in Russia, and particularly in the North 

Caucuses. 

Why this is important is because what happened in and around 

Chechnya has had such an important impact on the rest of Russia. 

Now, internationally, Russia has increasingly taken advantage, 

as you’ve noted, of the leadership gap left by the decline in U.S. 

soft power. You’re well aware of the attempts to change the rules 

and norms governing OSCE election observations. 

In the U.N. Security Council, Russia, along with China, has 

blocked international responses to evidence of grave human rights 

violations in Darfur and Burma. 

If U.S. soft power continues to decline, or if there is no change 

in the current configuration over the next decade, Russia, together 

with China, can essentially set the table on human rights issues. 

Now, human rights abuses inside Russia are not news. I testified 

before this commission almost seven years ago to the day, and 

what I wrote then reads as if it were written for this hearing. 

The situation inside Russia is, however, in many ways more troubling today because the public demand for something different appears to be so muted. 

It’s important to understand why this is so, because it often leads 

outsiders erroneously to think there is nothing to be done or that 

we should, in fact, do nothing about it. 

21 

Putin is popular, and he continues to be seen as the un-Yeltsin: 

Sober, standing up to the West, presiding over a sort of order. The 

economy is doing well. 

And of course, as has been noted today, there is no critical reporting of politics within the Kremlin. There are no investigative 

reporters writing about corruption or botched counterterrorism operations, and the few that do risk their lives, and it’s important to 

honor them. 

Meanwhile, there is also no protest by the public of the media 

situation, and I think it’s because of how Russians viewed the 

media in the 1990s. In focus groups in Russia, I hear Russians say, 

‘‘Look, state control of the media is not ideal, but I trust the government more than I trust the oligarchs who seem to control the 

media back in the ’90s.’’ 

But Putin’s order is more fragile, I want to argue, when one 

looks closely inside of Russia. Important public institutions are not 

functioning as they should. I could be talking about the police or 

the army, but I want to spend a moment on health. 

Russia today has multiple health crises. The U.S. Government 

has tended to focus on HIV/AIDS. But we know from a CSIS survey that we did of 1,200 Russian doctors, all of whom have treated 

HIV-infected patients, that only 15 percent of them said HIV was 

the most important health crisis. 

I don’t mean to minimize what is going on in terms of HIV inside 

of Russia. But I think it’s important to listen to the Russian doctors. And there we see non-communicable diseases—alcoholism, 

cardiovascular ailments, cancer—as the top health threats. 

Elsewhere, in places like the North Caucuses, where we’ve also 

surveyed, we found the unemployment rate among young men to 

be three times the rest of the country. And we think that’s very 

disturbing, given the violence in that part of the region, and we 

also found very poor social services. 

I think it’s also important to point out that there is a particular 

kind of anti-American sentiment that we see developing inside Russia, and it’s quite disturbing. 

I was recently sent a brochure from a Kremlin-friendly youth 

group, Nashi, and it is truly frightening. It’s addressed to the Putin 

generation, the young people who’ve grown up in the last 7 years. 

And it’s filled with rhetoric of ‘‘traitors,’’ language about Georgia 

as an ‘‘American colony,’’ ‘‘American invaders’’ into Russia, ‘‘fascists 

and traitors getting ready to invade and break up Russia.’’ 

So what, if anything, can we do about this situation? The decline 

of U.S. soft power has enabled the authoritarian drift, and it has 

left human rights defenders inside Russia isolated. 

Now, reversing the decline is going to take some time. But there 

are three specific recommendations for U.S. policy. 

Let’s opt back into the international legal framework. Let’s reorient U.S. assistance to target local Russian needs. And let’s recognize the role that history plays in current political developments. 

If we want to see a human rights culture develop inside Russia 

or, frankly, anywhere, we must get our own house in order. 

Of late, policy makers have traded compliance with international 

human rights and humanitarian law for allegedly greater security 

22 

in their efforts to combat radical jihadists. This is a false and dangerous tradeoff. 

The United States has historically and in a bipartisan way 

played an enormous role as a generator of international law. In the 

coming years, all branches of the United States government, including Congress and members of civil society, need to do what we 

can to reclaim our role as generators of human rights norms. We 

need to opt back in. 

But we also need smarter assistance strategies. As noted, I believe our assistance is often driven by needs in Washington. Assistance has sometimes, it’s true, unwittingly enabled civil society to 

focus more on donors than on local populations. 

There is no intrinsic reason why this should be the case. Smart 

assistance can help stimulate demand for human rights when it is 

informed by public opinion and it’s targeted at local needs. 

And our work at CSIS suggests that despite the Kremlin campaign against assistance, Russians are not hostile to initiatives concerning health, the environment and human rights. 

And we certainly know there are great needs in these realms. 

And it has been my privilege to work with young human rights activists, who are quite brave, inside Russia. 

Now, unfortunately, the Bush administration seems less interested. Congress has a specific role right now to play in rejecting the 

administration’s drastic cuts to human rights funding for Russia. 

In FY ’08, the administration is poised to spend less than $1 million on human rights in Russia. 

In fact, worldwide, our colleagues from Freedom House have 

found that the administration has requested a decrease for support 

for human rights globally by 9 percent. 

The only message this sends the Kremlin is that the United 

States does not stand with human rights defenders. 

In closing, whether Russia is in transition or intransigent depends, at least in part, how Russia reconciles with its past. 

Among the many mistakes democracy assistance made in the 

1990s was the assumption that the past would be quickly forgotten, 

and instead, today we have much Soviet and even Stalinist nostalgia. 

The fact that there is no taboo concerning Stalin, as we discovered surveying young Russians in 2005, reveals a tremendous gap 

between young people in Russia and elsewhere. 

Now, absent memory is not in any way unique to Russia. Our 

own evolving democracy in the United States has only become more 

robust when we have addressed our abuses and crimes. 

How a country reconciles with its past seems to have a profound 

but often overlooked effect. Strikingly, this focus is almost completely absent in approaches to foreign assistance. I think the time 

to change that is now. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. CARDIN. Well, thank you for your testimony. 

We’ll now hear from Mr. Wayne Merry, who is a Senior Associate 

at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington. 

23 

E. WAYNE MERRY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN 

POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. MERRY. Thank you, Senator. And let me say it’s a pleasure 

to be able to call you that. 

And as a former Senior Adviser of this Commission, it’s a pleasure, always, to return to one of its functions. I see many of my 

former colleagues sitting behind you. 

Mr. Chairman, I think we do need to get out of the habit of 

thinking of Russia today as being a country in transition. The postSoviet transition has been over for a number of years. I would put 

it to you that in Russia what you see now is what you get and what 

we’re likely to get for a good, long while. 

This is not a matter of individual personalities but of a new 

generational ruling elite who have a considerable shared background and orientation and an idea of what they want their country to be. They also tend to be much healthier and more fit than 

their predecessors, and they think they’re going to be in charge of 

Russia for a good, long while. I see no reason why that should be 

wrong. 

These are people who tend to believe in a concept which is difficult to express in English, and Russians call derzhanost. It’s almost the cult of the state and of the greatness of the state to the 

exclusion of almost all other social and economic priorities. And 

most of these men, I think, are really derzhaniki. 

However, the good news is that these are not extreme Russian 

nationalists, nor are they irresponsible gamblers on the global 

stage. In many respects, I see them as fundamentally conservative 

individuals in their approach to Russian power, which they wish to 

increase and husband, but not risk. The alternatives, I think, could 

be much worse. 

I don’t think Russia is an intransigent country or society. It is 

certainly a country marked by high degrees of frustration, humiliation, anger and alienation from the outside world, an outside world 

which it doesn’t really understand. But that doesn’t mean that it’s 

immune to rational self-interest or to reasonable compromise. 

I think Russia today is undergoing an experience that most other 

major European societies did during the 20th century, which is loss 

of empire and great power status. That’s something we Americans 

don’t have any experience of yet. It’s a very, very difficult national 

psychosis. It requires a long learning curve, and Russia is only at 

the beginning of it. 

However, I see absolutely no prospect of a new cold war. The 

Cold War was based on a Soviet Russia that was at the center of 

a vast, multinational empire. Even today, the best Putin could 

claim in his recent national speech was that Russia has entered 

the ranks of the world’s 10 largest countries economically. That 

means that it’s about the same size as Mexico. That is not the basis 

for a new cold war. 

I think there’s a common misperception that many of Russia’s 

problems today are the result of things that were the result of the 

breakup of the Soviet Union. With few exceptions, I think that’s totally wrong. Russia’s problems today result from precisely those 

phenomena which brought about the end of the Soviet Union and 

which were the product of seven decades of catastrophically bad 

24 

policies in a whole range of areas, including agriculture, industry, 

agarrison state economy, evisceration of civil society, destruction of 

natural resources and wasted investments but, above all, in health 

and demographics. 

And I want to emphasize that these are not new phenomena. The 

health crisis in Russia dates from at least the early 1960s, if not 

before. The demographic crisis started in the late Brezhnev era. 

Russia today is in the second generation of a downward demographic spiral, the result of the fact that children were not being 

born from the late 1980s up and through today. What this means 

is that women entering childbearing years now represent an artificially small group, and that with fertility rates at 1.1, which is only 

half of replacement rate, this will mean that the next generation 

of Russians will be yet smaller, and the generation after that 

smaller still. 

And this ignores even the fact that the health of many of this 

new generation of Russian parents is extremely poor because of the 

inheritance of childhood vitamin deficiency diseases, the common 

problems of tuberculosis, intravenous drug usage and, as Sarah already mentioned, the biggest killer in Russia, which is cardiovascular stress diseases related to nutrition and lifestyle. 

Now, Russia’s got a lot of money from oil and gas, but it’s not 

using this money to deal with these problems. Until now, the 

money has principally been used to pay off foreign debt, which is 

not a bad thing, and to create a series of centrally controlled 

vertical combines to ensure political dominance of the productive 

sectors of the economy. Up until now, we have not seen any serious 

resources devoted to the problems of the Russian people, only to 

the problems of the Russian state. 

In fact, all these oil and gas revenues have been something like 

an intoxicant. 

The analogy I use is that Russia’s like a gambler who’d been losing, losing, losing, losing, and then wins a couple of rounds at roulette and suddenly thinks he’s on top of the world again and is capable of anything. 

I think that the manipulation of Russian oil and gas and toward 

some of its principal customers will continue, but the real problem 

is that Russian oil and gas industries are themselves heading toward systemic crisis. And the likelihood is that Russia will have a 

hard time in years ahead even meeting its domestic commitments, 

let alone its expanding export commitments. 

Within the world in general, Russia is objectively dwarfed by the 

European Union to the west and China to the east. What Russia 

is seeking to do is what any post-imperial power tries to do, which 

is to punch above its weight using the legacy of its former status 

to enhance its current influence on world affairs. There’s nothing 

new about that. Many governments have done that in the past. 

But the problems that Russia has with Europe are the fact that 

the European Union is institutionally a whole which is significantly 

less than the sum of its parts, and that many European governments continue to behave with Russia separately from the European Union. For this, they have none but themselves to blame. 

The recent controversy over Estonia is a classic case where the 

message from every European government should be that Estonia 

25 

sacrificed some of its national sovereignty to enter the European 

Union and thereby gain the shared sovereignty of the Union, and 

that any threat to the sovereignty of Estonia is a threat to the sovereignty of all European Union member states. That should have 

been the message to Moscow, full stop, nothing else. It wasn’t, unfortunately. For this, Europeans have none but themselves to 

blame. 

China is a very different case. China is a whole somewhat greater than the sum of its parts, I would put to you. Even though some 

people in Moscow still like to talk about ‘‘playing the China card,’’ 

I’d say the card playing is rather in the opposite direction these 

days. While Russia and China have what they call a strategic partnership, it’s basically a reflection of a shared concern about the primacy of American power. They don’t have a broad, shared bilateral 

agenda. China today is one of the world’s greatest beneficiaries 

from globalization and from engagement with America. It’s quite 

different from the Russian approach, which is turning increasingly 

inward and autarchic. 

In dealing with the so-called near abroad, its neighboring states, 

I think we need to recognize that about half of those countries are 

really quite comfortable in their current relations with Russia, if 

only because the ruling regimes of those countries feel more comfortable to be within Russia’s sphere of influence than China’s or 

ours. There’s nothing unusual about that. Many ex-colonial countries feel a special sense of relationship with the former imperial 

metropole, if only because that’s where they were educated and because it’s the former imperial metropole that helps the new ruling 

elites in the ex-colony stay in power. 

Most of these countries are critically dependent on Russia, economically, particularly on the financial remittances from the many 

of their workers who are now working in Russia, a higher proportion of their workers than was true in the Soviet period itself. Only 

15 years have gone by since the beginning of decolonialization in 

the former Soviet Union. If you look at other decolonialized parts 

of the world, 15 years is not a long time. Real independence takes 

time. 

Let me address three specific questions. 

In the Baltic states, the basic issue between the Baltic states and 

Russia, although there is psychosis on both sides, is a refusal of 

people in Russia—even, I would say, among many of the so-called 

Westernizers—to candidly recognize the shameful history of the 

forced incorporation of the Baltic peoples into Stalin’s empire in 

1940 and what came after that. 

In the case of Ukraine, I actually happen to think that the peaceful independence of Ukraine and the history of Russian-Ukrainian 

relations over the past 15-odd years is one of the wonders of the 

world. It could have been much worse, as we saw in Yugoslavia. 

I think the reality of Ukraine is that it is the widest country in Europe, not just physically, but ethnically and culturally, and it must 

face both west and east at the same time. Any effort to impose a 

pro-Moscow or an anti-Moscow policy in Ukraine is doomed to fail. 

I think the Russians have learned a bit from their experience of the 

last two years that being too heavy-handed in trying to manipulate 

affairs in Kiev can redound to their own disadvantage. 

26 

In terms of Georgia, well, there’s certainly a good deal of mutual 

psychosis in the bad blood of Georgia’s current relations with Russia. And while there is no doubt that Moscow has sought to exploit 

the ethnic problems in Abkhazia and Ossetia, I think it’s worth 

pointing out that Russia didn’t create those problems. Georgian extreme nationalism did. The most effective policy Tbilisi could undertake to try to undercut Russian influence in those two areas 

would be to publicly and candidly acknowledge the shameful page 

in Georgia’s national history, which unfortunately no Georgian government has yet seen fit to do. 

Mr. Chairman, I don’t tend to see Russia, as some people do, as 

kind of a restored neo-imperial power. I see that, except for a few 

of its neighboring client states, Russia is a country without allies. 

For the most part, in international diplomacy, it is a second-tier 

player, often not even that. I think the surface glitter of Moscow 

and St. Petersburg doesn’t conceal the fact that much of the Russian economy is still in very dire shape, and that an economy that’s 

dominated by commodity exports and politically-dictated investments is more characteristic of the third world than of the first. 

The imploding population of Russia creates such problems that 

many Russian experts worry whether by mid century they will 

even be able to hold on to their current national territory, particularly in the far east. And an emerging middle class that is estimated to be 80 percent government employees strikes me as being 

not really a middle class, and certainly quite different than a true 

civil society. 

I happen to be somebody who thinks that the talent and the genius and the creativity of Russia as a nation and as a people are 

flourishing today. But I fear that in the future it will flourish increasingly in the diaspora outside of the country rather than at 

home. 

I think that we as Americans should not exaggerate Russia’s 

challenges. I think this is a society still defined more by its problems and its weaknesses than by tangible strengths. But I would 

urge that in our relations with Russia we not fall into our own habits of intransigence, something of which we are equally quite capable, and that we should look for opportunities for real engagement. 

My own Council has been quite successful recently in reaching 

out to various leading Russian individuals and organizations and 

finding that the avenues of communication are still open. 

I would hope people in the Congress would pursue them as well. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Dr. Lilia Shevtsova, who’s a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington and Moscow. 

LILIA SHEVTSOVA, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE MOSCOW 

CENTER. 

Dr. SHEVTSOVA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Co-Chairman. 

Well, it’s team leadership, I see. It’s a privilege to be here. I’m 

here for the first time and I am still excited. It’s an honor, also, 

and it’s fun to be here with the best Russia experts. 

27 

In fact, I will try to give you Russian liberal take on Russia’s developments and Russian situation. And in many aspects, my narrative will not contradict what we have heard already. 

Very short, in a very short one sentence, my presentation will be 

the following, responding to the question posed to the panel: Russia 

is lost in transition. 

And Russia has got stuck between past and future—very uncomfortable position for any political actor. I would use the metaphor. 

Russia resembles the skier with his skis pointing in opposite directions. 

Many people in Russia think and ponder how long Russia would 

keep balance in this rather strange and weird [sic] position. 

What is interesting [is that] Russia does not want [this]. It does 

not have any courage, any resources, no wish whatsoever to return 

to the past, which is a very optimistic conclusion to make. 

On the other hand, Russia has no guts, no courage, no energy to 

move forward to the future, which, of course, has to more than concern us all, first of all Russia. 

I would suggest several points, which it seems to me will be relevant to our discussion—and I will try also to follow up on what 

friends have said, and to [edge toward] follow up on what Ambassador Dan Fried has elaborated. 

First, what is important in Russian domestic situation? What is 

the crucial issue? Is it authoritarianism? Is it the Kremlin’s crackdown on human rights and democracy? Well, yes. These developments are important, but in my view, the most important thing is 

another key word, and this word is imitation. 

Russia survives through imitation. Russian authorities are imitating the parliament, the parties, civil society, even a position— 

even youth movements and rallies in the streets. Everything is 

fake. 

And when you scratch the surface, you’ll find an absolutely totally different, often alternative substance. That’s why for you folks 

and for the West to to build and to implement any coherent policy 

toward Russia is very difficult, because it is very difficult to respond to imitation. 

Russian imitation, by the way, is imitation not by default. This 

is the imitation by design. And Russian political class and President Putin are amazingly skillful and artful in imitating. 

But of course, there’s also one major trend. And this trend today, 

as my colleagues have just pointed out, is decentralization of power 

and crackdown on everything that moves on the political scene. 

Why [is] the Kremlin making this political cleansing? If they imitate, they can go ahead imitating, leaving some oppositional activity. But there is one law that regulates this type of system and situation. When you have a hammer in your hand, everything else 

looks like nails. 

And there is another law—the law of perpetuation of power. As 

Ambassador Dan Fried discussed, the issue [is that] we are on the 

verge of changing the boss of the Kremlin. 

That’s why not only President Putin, all the Russian political 

class is so nervous, is so scared, apprehensive, because they have 

to guarantee continuity of power, self-perpetuation of power. 

28 

You can do that only in one case and under one condition—if you 

control everything. That’s why they are [such] control freaks. 

Second issue: What about foreign policy? I essentially agree with 

the analysis of the foreign policy given by my American colleagues. 

I would add only maybe several brush strokes to this issue. 

After 16 years of retreat, Russia is back. Russia has regained its 

confidence and Russia wants to redefine its relationship with the 

West, and first of all with the only superpower, with the United 

States of America. 

Russia politically does not want any more [to] be the younger 

brother or to be the second tier international actor. Russia elite has 

offered you Americans and Europeans a kind of a Faustian bargain. 

Russia elite has succeeded to form at least for itself the formula 

which could be defined as ‘‘Russia, a partner of the West and opponent of the West.’’ So Russia wants to sit with you, within G–8, 

Russia-NATO Council, and on all boards in all international institutions. 

And at the same time, Russia wants to have the relationship on 

its own terms. That means that Russia does not want the West to 

meddle into its own affairs, and to meddle in the developments in 

the former Soviet states. These are the terms. 

And under these terms, Russia would welcome you, business corporations, and oil majors upstream. But of course, Russia will be 

waiting for the West to let Russia downstream. So these are the 

terms. 

Mr. Hastings, Mr. Chairman, your definition of Russia’s foreign 

policy and relationships with the West was interesting and worth 

emphasizing. You mentioned cold peace. I would agree. There is no 

Cold War between Russia and America. There are elements of cold 

peace. You are right. 

But there is an irony and paradox in the situation that Russian 

[the] political class, President Putin and all candidates for the presidency who will follow President Putin—they hate to be in confrontation with the West. 

They don’t want any kind of friction with United States of America, because they want—all of them want to be Mr. Abramovich to 

have their accounts abroad, to have their families abroad, even to 

rule Russia from abroad, and to have it both ways while leaving 

the Russian society consolidated on the anti-American platform. 

So this is the formula and the pattern—quite schizophrenic, I 

would say. This policy resembles—I would use the metaphor—driving horses in opposite direction, but Russians have succeeded to do. 

Unfortunately, the west and United States very often simply follow the Russian one. Western policy is very reactive, because it’s 

simply difficult to walk and chew the gum simultaneously, as Ambassador Fried has explained. 

One of the last points, what do Russians think about Russia and 

the west and United States of America? Sarah Mendelson—she’s 

got terrific surveys regarding Russia, and she will prove to you, if 

you would be interested, that Russian mentality—Russia’s political 

conscience—is a mess. 

It couldn’t be otherwise, as Wayne Merry said. We just [emerged] 

freshly from the totalitarian past. But it is very interesting that we 

29 

all underestimate Russians. Yes, 75 percent of Russians want 

order. 

But if you ask them about democracy, 44 percent will tell you 

that they think that human rights are much more important than 

the state. And even more important, last week, 65 percent of Russians said that they would like to have the real opposition. 

There is one more important factor that says a lot for me at least 

about Russia’s conscience and mentality—this is Russia’s attitude 

toward the United States. 

You’ll never believe how many Russians are saying the United 

States is a benevolent country. Five years ago, 65 percent of Russians thought that United States is a free, positive, benevolent [inaudible] for Russia; today, 45 percent of Russians believe that 

America is a friendly state. 

Despite all this really nasty anti-American climate in the political life, 45 percent of Russians consider United States as a benevolent factor comparing to—and here I’m giving you Pew Foundation 

results—comparing to 39 [percent of] French who like Americans, 

36 [percent of] German, and 23 percent of Spaniards. So Russia is 

a much more pro-American—benevolent toward American society 

than some European countries. 

Unfortunately, the trend is becoming worse. The Russian elite, 

having no other national ideas, tries to consolidate Russian society 

on the basis of the anti-American feelings. But still, Russians do 

resist. 

Well, and I have to skip over a lot of issues that I elaborated on 

in my written testimony. I have only one final comment. 

Being a Russian citizen, I am not in a position and I have no 

right to give advice to the U.S. Government. But at least tentatively I can tell you what Russian liberals would anticipate U.S. 

Government and legislature to do regarding Russia. 

We would anticipate the U.S. politicians to demonstrate patience 

and understanding, first. 

Second, we would anticipate that you remind Russia about commitments Russia [it] took when Russia [become a] member of the 

G–8, of the Council of Europe, of [the] Parliamentary Assembly, 

and when Russia signed the Helsinki Act. 

But at the same time, real liberals in Russia anticipate that you 

would stand by your own principles and practice what you preach, 

because when we listen to Vice President Cheney when he lectures 

Russia on democracy, and after that he embraces President 

Nazarbayev—when I read the comments of the representative of 

the State Department that, in fact, President Nazarbayev’s decision 

to stay forever means a correct move—well, we start to suspect 

that you folks have double standards. 

And finally, what we would anticipate you to do—more engagement—engagement not only with the Russian legislature, with 

Russian political leaders, but engagement on the level of society, 

society to society dialogue. 

There are a lot of stakeholders in Russia interested in benevolent 

partnership, cooperation and dialogue with American society. In 

terms of our transformation, of course, we Russians have to sort it 

out. 

30 

But in the end, it’s up to you to create benevolent atmosphere for 

Russia’s transformation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. CoChairman, both of you. 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much. 

And I would turn the chair back over to our Chairman. 

But let me introduce our last witness, Dr. Jeffrey Hahn, who is 

a Professor of Political Science at Villanova University and also 

serves as Director of the Russian Area Studies. 

Pleasure to have you here. 

JEFFREY HAHN, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 

VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY 

Dr. HAHN. Thank you. I have always tried to avoid speaking 

after my old friend Lilia Shevtsova. She is a tough act to follow, 

and for all of the right reasons. But I will try. 

I want to begin by thanking Chairman Hastings and Co-Chair 

Cardin for the invitation to testify before this Commission. I’m certainly honored to be here. 

I have prepared written remarks which I forwarded to Mr. 

Finerty of your staff and which I would ask to be submitted to the 

record. 

In my 10 minutes or so of testimony, I would like to raise and 

to try to briefly answer three questions which I believe may be 

helpful to the committee as it considers whether Russia is in transition or intransigent. 

The focus of my remarks is going to be on Russian foreign policy 

and its implications for relations with the United States, but I will 

be glad to address any questions that might be raised about internal political developments as well. 

The three questions are these. Why should we care about Russia? 

What are the underlying dynamics of Russian-American relations 

today? Why have these relations deteriorated to a point that the 

U.S. Secretary of State last week had to go to Moscow to deny that 

there is a new cold war? 

Why should we care about Russia? At a briefing by a National 

Security Council staff member for my students early in the Bush 

administration, I asked the NSC staffer—not Ambassador Fried, by 

the way—what about Russia, how they viewed Russia. 

The answer was that Russia really didn’t matter much anymore. 

It lacked the military or economic capability of the Soviet Union to 

project itself into world affairs. It could be largely ignored. At 

worst, Russia could be or would be a nuisance. 

This view is no longer valid. Whether we like it or not, Russia 

has again become a player in international relations and especially 

in the Eurasian continent, where Putin’s goal has been to make 

Russia a regional superpower. 

There are many reasons we cannot ignore Russia today. Let me 

itemize them. First, Russia can hurt us. They really do have weapons of mass destruction, more than any other country except our 

own. 

Second, they have vast energy resources. They have now surpassed Saudi Arabia in the production of oil. Forty percent of Europe’s gas supplies come from Russia. 

31 

Third, they are of strategic importance almost everywhere that 

is important to us. This includes Korea, where Russia is one of six 

countries trying to persuade North Korea to give up their nuclear 

bombs; in Israel, where they are a member of the quartet pursuing 

a road map to peace. 

They are an important part of the nonproliferation treaty process 

and are the key to resolving the standoff over nuclear power and 

nuclear weapons in Iran. 

Their continued support in the battle against the Taliban in Afghanistan is vital. And as a member of the G–8, they are important 

players in Europe. In all of these areas, and in many others, what 

Russia does or doesn’t do matters. 

Fourth, they hold a veto in the Security Council, which gives 

them the ability to thwart measures which might be in our interests but are not necessarily in theirs. 

This is likely to become very apparent very soon in the case of 

the U.N. resolution to make Kosovo independent. 

Russian cooperation is also essential to the resolution of important transnational issues like AIDS and environmental protection. 

In short, like it or not, Russia has reemerged under Putin’s leadership as a force to be reckoned with. 

Second, what are the underlying dynamics of Russian-American 

relations today? And this goes to a question which Senator Cardin 

asked earlier, I hope. 

What history suggests is that Russian and American relations 

have alternated between periods of cooperation and periods of competition. 

My own thesis is that whether these relations have been more 

characterized by cooperation or competition has depended upon the 

degree to which the leaders of both sides have perceived a common 

interest. 

This was true after 1933 when the two sides cooperated in the 

face of fascism in Europe and became allies in World War II. 

It was true in the late ’60s, early ’70s when detente emerged because the two countries found a common interest in putting a lid 

on the arms race and managing the strategic balance. 

It occurs in the ’80s when Gorbachev and Reagan sit down and 

found reducing the number of nuclear weapons and ending the division of Europe was a common interest. 

A similar situation would seem to be at work today. Once again, 

following 9/11, the Russians and the Americans have a telling common interest, this time in confronting Islamist terrorism that 

threatens the security of both sides. 

And initially, cooperation seemed to be forthcoming. Following 

the attack on the World Trace Center, Putin became the first world 

leader to call Bush to express sympathy. 

More important than sympathy, he followed it up a week later 

with a concrete five-point plan of assistance in fighting the Taliban 

in Afghanistan. Russia at that time had clearly become an important ally of the United States in the war on terror. 

Despite the continued apparent existence of this common threat, 

the close cooperation which was visible in 2001 has given way to 

tension and competition by 2007, by today. 

32 

The last question I wanted to address is what happened and 

what are the implications for American policy. 

What I would like to invite you all to do for a minute is to try 

to look over westward, to sit on the walls of the Kremlin and look 

to the west and imagine what you would see. 

From the Russian point of view, from the walls of the Kremlin, 

the benefits of cooperation with the United States have become increasingly uncertain, largely, in my view, because of the other policies pursued by the Bush administration. 

Among these, first of all, was the withdrawal of the United 

States from the ABM Treaty by May 2002. Then there was the expansion of NATO further eastward. 

Starting in November 2002, NATO invites seven more former Soviet allies to join NATO, including the three Balkan states that had 

been former Soviet republics, thereby putting NATO members directly on Russia’s borders for the first time. 

And what really alarms Russia today, I think, is the discussion 

in the west, in the NATO ally alliance, over a possible NATO accession by Ukraine. This is what made the competition between the 

Russians and the western powers so important in the Orange Revolution. 

Furthermore, a month after NATO expansion, the European 

Union invited applications to membership from 10 countries, eight 

former Soviet allies, again including the three Balkan republics. 

Gentlemen, if you are looking over the wall of the Kremlin, what 

do you see? You see a new division of Europe, only it’s further to 

the east. 

The most severe test and the main point, really, that I want to 

make today about this initially cooperative relationship was Russia’s unwillingness to back the United States in the war in Iraq. 

In March 2003, Putin made it clear that he would join France 

and China in casting a veto against any American resolution at the 

U.N. to use force against Saddam Hussein to comply with sanctions. 

But what really seems to have prompted Russian concern was 

that the Iraq invasion represented the first major application of the 

Bush doctrine to the conduct of American foreign policy. 

From the Russian point of view, again, this departure from the 

policies of containment accepted by previous American administrations, implied that the United States had essentially abrogated to 

itself the right of preemption. 

That is, from the Russian point of view, we would do what we 

wanted to do, when and where we wanted to do it, and how we 

wanted to do it, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure American interests abroad. 

For many countries, including Russia, that sounded like the assertion of the right to global hegemony. Recent events have accelerated Russia’s discontent. 

A shopping list includes American criticism of Russia’s assistance 

to Iran to develop nuclear energy. Another, the U.S. decision to install a missile defense shield in Poland and an early-warning radar 

system in the Czech Republic. 

From the Russian point of view, the Russians threw up their 

hands to say, ‘‘We didn’t realize that the revolution—there was 

33 

going to be a missile attack. Why Poland and the Czech Republic? 

Why would they be under a threat from Iran or from Iraq?’’ 

Another is disagreement over the implementation of the CFE 

Treaty, which has been discussed. 

Another thorn is this business of the U.N. Security Council on 

Kosovo establishing an independent province—what is currently a 

Serbian province—to establish independence there. 

When you add to these items, this long shopping list of what the 

Russians see when they look westward—when you add to them the 

Bush administration’s persistent and very public criticism of Russian democracy, notably in the summit of February 2005, criticism 

because Russia has somehow failed to meet American standards of 

democracy, then Putin’s harsh speech of February 10th earlier this 

year becomes more understandable. 

Concluding, where do we go from here? Despite continuing differences over specific issues, many I’ve mentioned today, the fact 

is that today, as in the past, Russian-American relations depend on 

the perception of common interests. 

For now, there remains a compelling common interest for both 

sides to cooperate. But this will not easily [be] achieved if the 

United States continues to insist on going it alone. 

The coming year may offer an opportunity for a fresh start. 

There will be new presidents elected in both countries next year. 

From the Russian point of view, it doesn’t matter whether the 

American president is a Democrat or a Republican; rather, whether 

that new president will continue to pursue a unilateral foreign policy. 

Thank you for your attention. 

Mr. HASTINGS. You’ve made it right at your noon deadline. I was 

told by Senator Cardin that you have to leave at noon, and I certainly understand that. 

Senator, do you have any questions? I know you have one—— 

Dr. HAHN. I’d be glad to answer for about—I can stay for a few 

minutes if you wish. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I’ll defer to the Senator because he has—— 

Mr. CARDIN. Let me just make a comment about the testimony. 

I found the testimony extremely helpful. 

It’s interesting. You give us the perspective from the concerns 

about our country but also the concerns among the Russian leaders 

and the Russian people, which I think is very helpful. 

There’s obviously a different emphasis in Russia with a concentration toward the state, whereas in the United States, our civil 

liberties we look at as fundamental, and there’s a—I thought that 

was an interesting observation. 

You’re not going to get any argument from the chairman or me 

about the unilateral nature of the foreign policy under this administration and the impact it’s having on our relationships not just 

with Russia but with many of our critical countries around the 

world. 

We pay a price for that type of attitude in foreign policy, which 

looks more to be unilateral than it does to be a real effort to consult and work with other countries around the world. 

Having said all that, the challenges are there. As I said to the 

ambassador, we need to have a constructive relationship with RusVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
34 

sia if we’re going to be able to accomplish objectives that are extremely important to this country, and the most recent being 

Kosovo. 

And we’ve invested an awful lot into Kosovo, and we run the real 

risk of a veto within the United Nations today. I know that we’re 

working very hard to avoid that, and I hope we’re successful, but 

it just points out the challenges and the stakes that are involved 

in this relationship. 

I’m not yet convinced that Russia is the great economic power 

that it’s claiming to be today. When I look at the future of the 

United States and economic growth internationally, I look more toward what’s happening in China, what’s happening in India, what’s 

happening in South Korea. 

In trying to repair some of our relationships with Europe, and 

building our own areas in South America and Central America, and 

developing new ties to Africa, Russia doesn’t look like much of a 

real opportunity for the United States as far as an economic power 

is concerned. 

So you’ve helped, I think, give us the perspective that we need 

in trying to carry out our foreign policy with improving the effectiveness of our relationship with Russia. That’s what we want to 

do. Every country wants to be effective in its international relations. 

Within OSCE we have a real opportunity to improve that. The 

parliamentary participation both by the United States and Russia 

have been very positive. And I hope that we can build upon that. 

Our chairman, Mr. Hastings, has been a real champion and a 

real trooper as far as traveling around the entire region and has 

personally, I think, helped to improve the effectiveness of the relationship between Russia and the United States. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your patience in allowing me 

to just make few observations. And I do apologize. We have a vote 

starting just about now on the Senate floor. Thank you. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate it very much. 

And, ladies and gentlemen, honestly, I apologize to you, Dr. 

Mendelson, for being away, and, Mr. Merry, for hearing only a portion of your remarks. 

But I can say to you that the level of comprehensiveness from a 

substantive standpoint that you all presented is helpful. 

I’m hopeful—and if you will just permit me an observation beyond one or two questions I will put to you. 

I know that the hour is late, but I would like to say to those that 

are participating in the audience that I’ve always tried to be a creative person, and I think congressional hearings—I’m not talking 

about the substance from the witnesses, but the fact that there is 

so little in the way of real meaningful input from people who take 

up their time to come and sit and listen to these hearings, and that 

includes staff and interested members of the public. 

I’m going to try to figure out some kind of way to have more 

interactive dialogue with the audience participants. 

I also lay my bona fides on the table for our witnesses. I would 

like for you to know that I think that it would be more informative 

if we had an opportunity to sit and listen to you exchange your 

views with each other, rather than us put scripted questions to 

35 

you. And I’m hopeful of arranging for that kind of dialogue as well. 

I just offer those. 

One very quick observation. It occurred to me as Senator Cardin 

was speaking. And Dr. Shevtsova had mentioned my observation 

regarding the possible way of characterizing the present status of 

Russian-United States relations as cold peace. 

It would seem to me that cold peace would require hot diplomacy. And in that regard, I applaud the Secretary of State for visiting. But I do urge that all of the U.S. Government’s institutions 

should have coordinated efforts and be often in dialogue with Russia. 

And again, I want to lay a little bit of bona fides on the table. 

I’m not an expert about Russia. But what I do intend as chair for 

the 1.5 years that I have remaining as the chair of the Helsinki 

Commission—the emphasis has been here, rightly, in human rights 

issues, with great intensity. 

That has caused the component of the Helsinki Accords having 

to do with economic security to, at least in the Helsinki Commission, not have as high a priority. 

And I’m going to flip the priority and make the economic component be a focus as it pertains to the 55 countries that we interface 

with. And that will be my great hope. 

So you all have helped kick off for me a very good beginning in 

that regard. And I might add, I am OSCE-centered in light of having been President of the Parliamentary Assembly, and so my very 

brief questions likely will touch on that, if you would permit me 

just 5 more minutes or 10 more minutes of your time. 

Dr. Shevtsova, you write the temptation to demand free and fair 

elections in Russia in ’07 and ’08 could prove to be another trap 

and that the Russian leadership has perfected the art of managing 

elections. And I was fascinated with your display of them and their 

imitation factor. 

But you also have profoundly said that no amount of western 

monitoring is going to alter the result. And my question, after I lay 

out other bona fides—I’ve witnessed two Russian elections. 

And I had the distinct privilege of witnessing the Russian election at the same time that the Florida elections had just occurred 

here in the United States. 

And a lot of folks were offended when I said, after being an observer of the Russian elections, that their elections on election day 

are more open and fair than the elections on election day in Florida. 

Example: I can walk in the polling place and sit down and talk 

with the—if you walk in a Florida polling place and ask a whole 

lot of questions like we do, you get put in jail. And I found that 

to be fascinating. 

But what I also knew, because I got there a week earlier—and 

I also knew that the elections were cooked, and therefore, you 

know, it was easy to have a fair election when you knew what the 

result was going to be. 

But I would ask you, would you then say, for example, in the 

run-up to ’08, that there’d be no use for ODIHR and the Parliamentary Assembly or the OSCE to do electoral monitoring in that election? What’s the benefit if it isn’t going to make a difference? 

36 

Dr. SHEVTSOVA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do believe that—well, nobody’s perfect, first of all. Second, it seems to me that Russian 

forthcoming parliamentary elections will be several Floridas. 

Third, we always have to try. But according to the new legislature, election legislature, I don’t believe that, according to the Russian law, monitoring, foreign monitors, will be allowed to monitor 

closely the elections. 

But all the same, do come, and your presence will be appreciated 

by the teeny, teeny, tiny minority in Russian society that I represent, but which, in fact, accounts for 30 percent of the population. 

Mr. HASTINGS. I follow you clearly. 

And I had some fascinating sidebar conversations with a number 

of people there. I was just absolutely fascinated with that. 

But I also want to go back to my history. When I was elected 

president of the Parliamentary Assembly, the first place that I 

chose to visit was Russia. And I met with Foreign Minister Lavrov, 

the very first meeting that I had. 

And in that meeting, I knew that I went there to listen, but I 

also went there to say to him that my belief is that there should 

be mutual respect. And I think just the use of that tone struck a 

fair enough chord for me to receive invitations to return to Russia 

from time to time. 

But then there was a disappointment. I had established, as did 

others in the Parliamentary Assembly, a fairly good relationship 

with Gennady Seleznev when he was Speaker of the Duma. And 

he came regularly. He was an elected officer in the Parliamentary 

Assembly. 

So after meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov, I met with Mr. 

Gryzlov, the new Speaker of the Duma, and invited him personally 

as president to come to our meeting in Denmark, which he attended. And then he never came again since that time. 

And the Russian delegation, albeit wonderful people, had been a 

powerful force in the organization and were developing camaraderie and rapprochement, and they reduced the Russian delegation 

substantially. 

I’m sorry I’m taking so much time, but only minor players rather 

than the people that were on the move started to come to the Parliamentary Assembly. 

If I could change the subject and ask either of you, when I was 

here I asked Secretary Fried about his assessment of the recent 

Russia-Kazakh-Turkmenistan pipeline deal, and I said that it 

would monopolize Central Asian gas reserves for Russia, and he 

said that multiple pipelines could be built. 

Perhaps, Mr. Merry, your thoughts on that. 

I understand you have to go, Doctor. 

Dr. HAHN. I also have comments on it, if you would—— 

Mr. HASTINGS. Please. 

Dr. HAHN. I think I would probably respectfully perhaps disagree 

with the Ambassador about the—I think his expectation may be 

sanguine with respect to the fact that the deals which have been 

cut in the last week between Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan regarding gas—that these are not going to have an impact 

in terms of precluding the shipment of gas through other channels. 

37 

I think that the Russians are delighted with this deal precisely 

because it gives them a handle on the control of the flow of gas 

that they didn’t have before. 

And I do think that it’s the first step in the direction of something that’s been under discussion for the past year, which was an 

initiative from Iran, actually, to create a gas cartel, which would 

enable them in the long run to exercise much greater control over 

the price of gas abroad. 

So I’m not sanguine, and it’s about what’s called the Prikaspisky 

Pipeline, I believe, if I’m correct. And I think that the short- and 

long-run effects of these agreements are going to be to increase dependency of these five, especially the three gas countries in Central 

Asia, on Russia, and they will depend on Russia for getting their 

gas out. 

Russia gives them concessionary prices for that gas, but in return they get to use the pipeline. So as long as that kind of arrangement remains in place, it’s hard for me to see that these 

countries are going to have more flexibility in developing other 

ways of getting gas. I think they’re going to have less. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Right. 

I personally was stunned at Russia’s actions with reference to 

Belarus, getting away from this. I had been the lead monitor of the 

elections in Belarus, and when they manipulated the pipelines or 

oil in that area, it really did surprise me. 

I’d ask, Mr. Merry, if you had comments on that same subject. 

Do you? 

Mr. MERRY. Yes, sir. Let me just say three things about pipelines. First, since the Central Asian countries—Central Asia is the 

most geographically landlocked region on earth. 

Hydrocarbon exports are going to have to transit somebody. 

That’s reality. What the countries themselves and the major international companies originally wanted to do with Caspian oil and 

gas was to take it south through Iran to the existing international 

infrastructure of transport. 

The United States government prevented that. The fact that the 

primary routes to the western markets are now going through Russia is largely a result of that. 

The alternative pipeline route the United States sponsored was 

never going to be commercially competitive with what the Russians 

could offer. 

The second point is that most of the hydrocarbons from Central 

Asia over the decades of their exploitation, I believe, are not going 

to go west. They’re going to go east. The primary market’s going 

to be China. 

And the size of the deals that Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, increasingly Uzbekistan are already making with the Chinese indicate that. And that’s partly because the Chinese market does not 

require them to transit any third country. 

And the third point about Russia’s own export pipelines—people 

forget that when Russia became a major exporter in the post-Soviet 

period, it looked around and saw that it was the only major hydrocarbon exporting country in the world that was dependent on transit pipelines through other countries. 

38 

Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Norway, Algeria, Nigeria, all the 

Gulf states, Indonesia could all, either with pipelines or tankers or 

some combination of the two, export directly to their principal customers and didn’t have to depend on transit pipelines. 

The Russians, because of the series of pipelines that had been 

built in the Soviet period through the former Soviet Union and the 

Warsaw Pact countries, was so dependent. 

What they have been trying to do in building pipelines and export routes through the Black Sea and the Baltic is to give themselves the kind of export independence that every other major hydrocarbon exporting country in the world had enjoyed. 

Now, are they using those also for political purposes? Yes, they 

are. But I find it difficult to believe that any other commodity exporting country in a similar situation would not have done so. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Yes. I thank you so much. 

Dr. Mendelson, one of the areas in the humanitarian sphere 

where the Russian government appears to be working in a cooperative spirit is in the campaign against human trafficking. Do you 

agree with that assessment? 

Dr. MENDELSON. I think it’s tremendously important that U.S. 

and Russia work together on trafficking. I think that there is a lot 

more that could be done. 

We are engaged in a survey, actually, of young Russian females 

to understand what they know about human trafficking. It’s my experience, working with very experienced human rights activists, 

that they don’t know very much about trafficking. 

So while I would say that the efforts that have been done to support NGO work in Russia to date—we have much more to do. 

We need to listen to the most vulnerable communities and organize our prevention campaign around what they know and what 

they don’t know, and really get at root causes that have to do with 

education, and how people think about what their opportunities 

are, and whether or not they feel that the risk of moving abroad 

for employment is worth it, because that’s when they get into vulnerability. 

Mr. HASTINGS. Right. 

I’m not going to keep you all any longer, but I do want to share 

a little bit more anecdotal information. 

I also monitored the elections in Montenegro, and welcomed and 

swore in Montenegro to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. I guess you all say 

well, when do I work in the U.S. Congress. 

But while there, I took a car ride to the capital, and I just looked 

at all of the land, and I began to make inquiries about the cost of 

the land and who was purchasing it. 

I wasn’t at all surprised—I think I knew the answer in advance—that Russians were buying significant parts of the land in 

Montenegro. But now I come to home and why I think that there 

will always be, as you pointed, Doctor, that group of people that 

have positive views of America. 

I’m too old to do much nightclubbing, but every now and again 

I go to South Beach with my daughter and son and girlfriend, and 

when I do, what I find there is some of those nightclubs and resVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
39 

taurants are owned by Russians. And that’s increasingly more the 

case. 

So they like South Beach, at least, and Montenegro, so I suspect 

that we will have opportunities for real, meaningful dialogue. 

You all have been most gracious with your time and informative, 

and I thank you so much, and I hope that you will receive our invitations in the future in a favorable way. Thank you so very much. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

40 

A P P E N D I C E S 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, 

CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION 

IN EUROPE 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, invited guests, and members of the press and diplomatic corps. I would like to welcome you 

all to today’s hearing on Russia. I would particularly like to welcome and thank the members of our distinguished panel for finding 

the time to share their expertise with us this morning. 

But before we begin I would just like to note that earlier today 

near the Siberian city of Novokuznetsk 35 miners were killed and 

others injured in a methane explosion in the Yubileinaya coal 

mine. According to the most recent news reports that I saw before 

coming over here, there are still three miners missing. Unfortunately, America is no stranger to such accidents and our hearts 

and prayers go out to all those affected by this tragedy. We will 

continue to hope against hope that those three miners may yet be 

found alive. 

This is the first hearing that the Commission on Security and 

Cooperation on Europe is holding in the 110th Congress and I feel 

that it is quite appropriate that Russia is the topic of discussion. 

As we all know, Russia is an increasingly important and influential 

member of the international community, playing a key, albeit not 

always constructive, role in organizations such as the United Nations, the Group of Eight, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. And in the not too distant future I expect this list to include the World Trade Organization. It is good that Russia is so involved in these international organizations and has so much potential to make positive contributions to global stability and prosperity. 

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it appeared that Russia was 

making a sea-change transition, however uneven and tumultuous, 

to representative governance and a society rooted in the rule of 

law. However, since the tragic shelling of the Russian White House 

in the fall of 1993 and particularly over the last seven years, the 

Kremlin has moved to recentralize the authority and power that it 

had seen slip away in the wake of glasnost and perestroika. The 

result has been a significant limitation on the civil liberties that 

many of us associate with a legitimately open society. Despite Mr. 

Putin’s lip service in support of democratic institutions and civil society, we now see a political agenda centrally planned in Moscow. 

Now I fully understand that human rights not only include the 

ability to hold anti-government demonstrations or write op-eds critical of government policy. But human rights also have some relation to basic social justice concerns such as having heat in the winter, getting paid on time, and having access to healthcare. In these 

areas, much progress has been made in Russia over the past decade or so and particularly under President Putin’s leadership—I 

commend him for working to improve the standard of living of the 

average Russian citizen. But these basic needs are also met in 

41 

some of the world’s more repressive re ́gimes and it is my hope that 

a great nation like Russia can do better. 

A growing economy and the improved living conditions that have 

resulted as well as a newfound influence on the world stage help 

to explain the popularity of the current Russian president. His 

sober, intelligent, and macho image has also been well received by 

the populace. I am also aware of a vocal and growing minority that 

is deeply concerned at the direction their country may be going. I 

am thinking of the many people and organizations included in the 

‘‘Other Russia’’ coalition as well as other opposition groups. 

Reports of the heavy-handedness and brutality that these individuals have faced while attempting to exercise their rights to free 

assembly and free speech are alarming. These basic human freedoms are enshrined in many of the international agreements that 

Russia is, at least on paper, committed to. 

It is perplexing that the popular and powerful Russian government feels threatened by a few thousand people demonstrating in 

favor of an alternative viewpoint. Perhaps the authorities do not 

feel threatened, but are simply used to dealing with protestors in 

a forceful manner. We politicians here in Washington are accustomed to such public displays of dissent as our city is often the 

venue of marches and gatherings that sometimes number in the 

hundreds of thousands—this is normal and desirable and has been 

the catalyst for so much positive change in our society. 

Concerning some elements of the Russian opposition to the Putin 

Administration, I must note that common dislike for the Russian 

president may not be the strongest glue for a lasting alliance. In 

this case, the cliche ́ phrase ‘‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend,’’ 

does not hold true. I know of many distinguished NGOs and 

human rights activists that have chosen to participate in the 

‘‘Other Russia’’ movement, but the past rhetoric and actions of 

some of the leaders involved give me pause. 

As we look to the future of U.S.-Russian relations, being best 

friends does not have to be the measure of successful cooperation. 

There is a lot that we can accomplish despite hard feelings in some 

quarters. And we need to focus our efforts more on bolstering Russia’s nascent democratic institutions rather than on the rapidly 

changing faces of the Russian elite—in other words, principles before personalities. 

If we are to improve relations, we must find new ways to have 

more frequent interaction at all levels and with all branches of government. Additionally, I recognize that a substantive and sustainable bi-lateral dialogue must also happen at the level of civil society. This is why I am such a proponent of public diplomacy and exchange programs such as our own Library of Congress’ Open World 

program and many other fine initiatives. These initiatives not only 

promote understanding, but they also enable us to identify future 

leaders at all levels of society. 

The central question before us today is what kind of leadership 

will Russia provide at home and abroad and what can and should 

the United States be doing to help Russia complete its transition 

to democracy, especially in the post-Putin era. I look forward to 

learning more on this from our expert panel. I would like to add 

that, in the interest of a balanced hearing, I extended an invitation 

42 

to Russian Ambassador Yuri Ushakov and am sorry that he was 

not able to take part in this important dialogue. 

43 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, RANKING 

MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN 

EUROPE 

Mr. Chairman, 

I want to commend you for organizing this hearing on Russia. As 

someone who has been following events in that country for many 

years, I am very disturbed by the general trend of political development there. 

Over the last seven years, we have witnessed the emergence of 

a super-presidency in Russia, which has overwhelmed the legislature and judiciary. In successfully recentralizing power, President 

Vladimir Putin has turned the Duma, which once seemed on the 

road to becoming a legislature that could demand accountability 

from the executive, into a virtual rubber stamp. 

As a legislator, I find this especially troubling. I believe deeply 

in the obligation of Congress to act as an independent branch of 

government and oversee the executive. But I do not see anything 

like that in Russia today and I fear I will not in the foreseeable 

future. 

At the same time, opposition movements and civil society have 

been cowed. The Kremlin has made every effort to keep criticism 

or even dissenting views off the airwaves and now one-half of all 

reportage about Russia on the nation’s largest independent radio 

news network must be ‘‘positive.’’ Moreover, Putin’s political opponents cannot be mentioned on the air and the United States is to 

be portrayed as an enemy. Meanwhile, demonstrations are swiftly, 

sometimes brutally, dispersed. 

Russian officials often get irritated when they hear the terms 

‘‘managed democracy’’ or ‘‘sham democracy.’’ But I see in Russia a 

system in which the public is essentially called on to ratify decisions already taken by the Kremlin, and where people are increasingly afraid to speak out or exercise their rights to freedom of assembly and association. 

Even issues that could easily be resolved have been turned into 

problems. For example, the Russian authorities have refused to return to Chabad the library and archive of Rabbi Shneerson, despite 

the obvious primacy of the claim by his heirs in America and repeated requests by the executive and judicial branches of the U.S. 

Government. I sometimes think that spitefulness has become an 

operating principle of Russian policy. 

In the international arena, Russia’s behavior has been no less 

troubling. For years, Moscow has sought to intimidate much smaller neighbors, such as Georgia or Estonia. But I am particularly 

struck by Moscow’s treatment of Belarus—no favorite of the United 

States and run by a man who is practically an international pariah. Yet even this faithful subject has been bullied by Russia into 

giving up control of key energy infrastructure to Gazprom. Not for 

nothing have European states grown increasingly dubious about 

Russia as a reliable supplier of oil and gas. The deal reached last 

weekend among Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which essentially guaranteed long-term Russian control of Central Asian 

gas reserves, has struck a serious blow to our joint hopes for alternative pipeline routes—and provided additional reasons to worry 

about the political implications of energy dependence. 

44 

So I watch events in Russia with growing concern. I do not think 

we are in a Cold War and I do not think one is inevitable. But it 

is clear to me that in many critical areas, our interests are diverging or already divergent. Perhaps our expert witnesses can suggest 

ways to smooth over these rifts. 

45 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to everybody. 

I am alarmed by many things going on in Russia today but I 

want to raise one issue right now: the unsolved murders of dozens 

of independent Russian journalists over the past decade. I have authored a Congressional resolution, H. Con. Res. 151, calling upon 

President Putin to seek competent, outside law enforcement assistance in the investigation of these unsolved murders. Only yesterday this resolution, with over 30 cosponsors, was approved by the 

Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Congress needs to raise its voice on this issue. Russia holds the 

second worst position in the world in the number of journalists 

killed in the last ten years, according to the International News 

Safety Institute. Reporters Without Borders counts 21 murdered 

journalists since March of 2000. This is a conservative number; it 

does include the murders of Paul Klebnikov, Anna Politkovskaya, 

but not the death under extremely suspicious circumstances of Ivan 

Safronov. Many observers think government officials have ordered 

most of these murders, or at least connived at them, because these 

journalists investigated government corruption or human rights 

abuses in Russia. There is good reason to think that people in very 

high places are protecting the murderers. We know this: very few 

of these murder cases have been resolved. 

Journalists fulfill an essential role in every society, and none 

more than those who uncover the theft of a country’s assets by its 

elected officials, or human rights outrages committed in its name. 

Journalists who do this at risk to their lives fully deserve to be 

called heroes. 

Make no mistake about it, these journalists knew they were risking their lives. We owe it to them to raise our voice, and to do so 

over and over again, to bring the killers to justice. Mr. Putin, sadly, 

does not seem to be making a serious effort to do so. 

I am afraid Russia today may be slipping backward. The Russian 

economy is booming, but Russian democracy seems to be falling 

below the level of many developing countries. 

Only when journalists can work without fear of intimidation and 

death will we be able to say that we have a truly democratic Russian government. That will also be a government which doesn’t sell 

arms to the Sudanese government to commit genocide in Darfur, 

which doesn’t look the other way when local officials harass minority religions and ethnic minorities, which doesn’t embrace military 

brutality in Chechnya, maintain an occupying army in Moldova, 

and threaten Poland and the Czech Republic for cooperating with 

the United States in their military defense, or foment unrest in 

Kosovo. 

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the great conscience of Russia, said in 

his Nobel Prize speech in 1970 that, ‘‘Any man who has once proclaimed violence as his method is inevitably forced to take the lie 

as his principle.’’ My resolution addresses the violence of the murder of independent journalists, and the lie in the claim that their 

murders have been seriously investigated. 

46 

Solzhenitsyn said of Communist Russia, ‘‘In our country the lie 

has become not just a moral category but a pillar of the State.’’ We 

have to ask ourselves, and to ask Mr. Putin, will this terrible statement also be true of post-communist Russia? 

47 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN 

AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT 

Chairman Hastings and members of the Commission, thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you. Today’s subject, ‘‘Russia 

Today,’’ is critical to the United States and our partners, particularly in Europe. Whether Russia is ‘‘in transition or intransigent’’— 

the other part of your question for this hearing—is a useful if provocative way to frame the challenge of working with Russia, which 

remains in our interest. 

Russia certainly remains ‘‘in transition’’ from its communist past. 

Its growing assertiveness in tone and perhaps in action, spurred in 

part by high energy revenues, may have stimulated your use of the 

word ‘‘intransigent.’’ In no case, however, can Russia be presented 

in such stark terms: while Russia does sometimes seem a difficult 

partner to work with, we also have many important areas of cooperation through which we pursue common interests. Although 

ours may not be a strategic partnership, it includes partnership on 

many strategic issues. U.S.-Russia relations are complicated. Given 

the legacy of U.S.-Soviet relations, this is no surprise. In Moscow 

on May 15, Secretary Rice pointed out that we need to differentiate 

between discrete disagreements and our overall intention to work 

together whenever possible. ‘‘There are going to be times when we 

disagree, but it is true that sometimes the rhetoric makes it sound 

as if the relationship itself is in question, rather than . . . the specific differences that we have.’’ 

The Administration’s analysis of Russia is realistic, and our objectives with Russia reflect this. We want Russia to be a partner 

in the world, and we want Russia to be strong, but strong in 21st 

century terms: with strong, democratic and independent institutions in and out of government; with a strong civil society, free 

press and active opposition; with strong and independent middle 

and entrepreneurial classes. We do not exempt Russia from our belief in the universal potential of freedom, and we also have Russia 

in mind when we say that we seek an open world characterized by 

partnerships with like-minded countries. 

Our preferred tactical approach is cooperation—we work together 

wherever we can, always seeking to expand the scope of that collaboration where our interests overlap—but we push back when we 

must, privately when possible but publicly when necessary, in defense of our values, interests and friends. At all points, we also 

seek to work with our European allies and friends to coordinate our 

approaches and articulate the common values underlying our policies. 

Given the media preoccupation (in both countries) with the problems, I wish to first mention the areas of cooperation in relations. 

The United States and Russia continue to cooperate in critical 

areas, including counterterrorism and nonproliferation. The U.S.- 

Russia Counterterrorism Working Group last met in September 

2006, and will meet again in a few months, to continue and deepen 

cooperation on intelligence, law enforcement, WMD, terrorist financing, counternarcotics, Afghanistan, UN issues, MANPADS, 

and transportation security. 

48 

Our strategic cooperation is intensifying. Last year, together with 

Moscow, we renewed until 2013 the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

(CTR) program, which was launched in 1992 to facilitate dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet 

Union. As this program marks 15 years, we and Russia have 

agreed to accelerate some elements under the Bratislava Nuclear 

Security Initiative; nuclear security upgrades are on track for completion by the end of 2008. At the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Presidents Bush and Putin announced the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which seeks to prevent nuclear 

materials falling into terrorists’ hands. We and Russia are both 

working toward enhancing nuclear fuel cycle security, through the 

Global Nuclear Energy Policy and the fuel center initiative, respectively, and we are negotiating with Russia an agreement on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Agreement (Section ‘‘123’’ of the Atomic 

Energy Act) as well as one on Defense Technology Cooperation. The 

United States has presented a proposal for substantive cooperation 

on missile defense, and, with the expiration of the START Treaty 

in 2009, we have begun positive discussions about a post-START 

arrangement. There have been several high-level visits in recent 

months, including those of Secretary Rice and Defense Secretary 

Gates. We share with Russia many common global nonproliferation 

goals. We work closely with Russia and others to address the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, although Moscow has 

sometimes voiced disagreement with our approach to sanctions and 

other measures. Russia voted for UN Security Council Resolutions 

1718 (North Korea), 1737, and 1747 (Iran), calling respectively for 

the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and imposing Chapter VII sanctions on North Korea, as well as imposing sanctions 

against Iran until Tehran suspends its nuclear enrichment program and comes into compliance with its NPT obligations. We look 

forward to the full implementation of those resolutions. The United 

States and Russia, along with China, Japan, South Korea, and 

North Korea participate in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea, 

and Russia chairs the Six-Party Talks Working Group on a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism. 

We continue to pursue cooperation through the NATO-Russia 

Council [NRC], which this year marks its fifth anniversary. We 

have a broad menu of cooperative NATO-Russia initiatives involving diverse experts on both sides: these range from Russian participation in Operation Active Endeavor to counternarcotics program 

in Afghanistan. We look forward to greater opportunities for cooperation once Russia ratifies a Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) 

with NATO: we welcome the Duma’s ratification on May 23, and 

look forward to the Federation Council following suit. That said, 

the April 26 meeting of NRC Foreign Ministers in Oslo, Norway, 

showcased some important differences between Russia on the one 

hand and most NATO Allies on the other in light of President 

Putin’s ‘‘State of the Nation’’ Address (‘‘poslaniye’’) earlier that day. 

In that speech, President Putin suggested he would consider suspending Russia’s implementation of the Treaty on Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) if no progress was made on 

ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by NATO Allies. At the 

NRC, NATO Ministers universally responded that we continue to 

49 

regard the current CFE Treaty as a cornerstone of the European 

security, and that we are ready to seek ratification of the Adapted 

CFE Treaty after Russia fulfills its 1999 Istanbul commitments on 

withdrawal of forces for Moldova and Georgia. The Administration 

and NATO Allies are very serious about our support for Adapted 

CFE: the Adapted Treaty, signed in 1999, replaces the bloc-to-bloc 

structure of the original Treaty with a more flexible system of national and territorial equipment limits. It allows accession by new 

members, and provides for enhanced information on military forces 

and more inspection opportunities than the original Treaty. Adapted CFE also contains specific provisions relating to host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces that are very important to our 

GUAM partners. There should be no question about NATO Allies’ 

support for CFE and Adapted CFE—neither of which represent efforts by NATO to take advantage of Russia—and no question about 

NATO Allies’ insistence on fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments 

as the basis for ratification of the Adapted Treaty. 

We also seek to advance cooperation with Russia through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an organization, obviously, of deep interest to this Commission. Russia’s 

critical attitude toward the OSCE remains a cause for concern. 

Speaking on February 10, 2007, to the Munich Security Conference, President Putin branded the OSCE a ‘‘vulgar instrument 

designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group 

of countries.’’ Under the guise of demanding reforms, Russia has 

proposed changes to the OSCE, the effect of which would be to cripple its democracy promotion efforts. The United States disagrees 

strongly with this Russian approach and has defended the OSCE’s 

mandate to advance democratic reforms, including election monitoring. Indeed, these efforts embody commitments that Washington 

and Moscow undertook when we signed the Helsinki Final Act. The 

United States continues strongly to support the work of the OSCE’s 

Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); its 

elections monitoring mechanisms represent the international ‘‘gold 

standard’’ in this area. 

We applaud the long and distinguished track record ODIHR has 

accumulated in electoral monitoring throughout the OSCE region, 

and look forward to its involvement in Russia’s upcoming Duma 

elections in December 2007 and Presidential elections in March 

2008. We also value highly the contributions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to the OSCE’s election monitoring work, and 

the PA’s joint efforts with ODIHR. I should add that the United 

States accepts and welcomes ODIHR monitoring of U.S. elections. 

While every organization can be improved, we believe there is 

wisdom in the aphorism ‘‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.’’ The OSCE 

is working well and doing important work, and we will continue to 

support it against ‘‘reform’’ efforts calculated to circumscribe its activities or debilitate its democracy promotion work. 

Differences with Russia over the OSCE reflect broader, negative 

trends on human rights and democracy in Russia itself. We hope 

that the situation will not deteriorate further over the coming year, 

in conjunction with upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections cycles and issues connected to succession. 

50 

Let us be clear: Russia is even today a vastly freer country than 

at any time in Soviet history and arguably freer than at any period 

in Russia’s history. It is also true that post-communist transitions 

take time. But it would be an insult to Russia to hold that great 

country to low standards. Suppression of genuine opposition, 

abridgement of the right to protest, constriction of the space of civil 

society, and the decline of media freedom all represent serious setbacks that are inconsistent with Russia’s professed commitment to 

building and preserving the foundations of a democratic state. The 

unsolved murders of journalists and critics are equally disturbing. 

The State Department has publicly protested, including at the 

OSCE Permanent Council, the recent police brutality employed to 

break up opposition marches in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and 

Nizhny Novgorod. The EU also protested those actions. Authorities 

sought to prevent the marches from taking place at all: they denied 

permission to stage the events or tried to marginalize them by 

changing their venues; they harassed and detained Russians traveling to participate in these peaceful rallies; on the day of the 

events, disproportionate police presence wielded undue force 

against the protestors as well as journalists reporting on the 

events. Some of the same efforts were directed against members of 

the Russian opposition seeking to express their opinions ahead of 

the EU-Russia Summit in Samara May 18. The fact that the authorities allowed pro-Kremlin youth groups to engage in activity 

from which opposition activists were prohibited demonstrated selective use of the law. Nonetheless, it is encouraging that independent 

groups, despite harassment, were able to gather, garner supporters, and attract public attention. 

Interestingly, Presidential Administration deputy press spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged that the police response to last 

month’s protests merits review, and St. Petersburg Governor 

Matviyenko and the Russian Federation’s Human Rights Ombudsman, Vladimir Lukin, have both called for investigations. In his annual report on human rights in Russia, presented April 24 to the 

Duma and May 4 to the Federation Council, Ombudsman Lukin reiterated that his office had received and would investigate increased numbers of citizens’ complaints about government obstacles 

to holding rallies. 

President Putin’s own chairperson of the Civil Society Institution 

and Human Rights Council, Ella Pamfilova, has said that Interior 

Minister Nurgaliyev should resign in connection with the police 

break-up of those demonstrations. Such calls indicate that, even 

within official Russia, views differ on human rights. 

We are likewise concerned about the increasingly narrow and 

controlled space within which Russian NGOs are forced to operate, 

and continue to monitor the implementation of the new NGO law 

enacted in April 2006. The record is mixed thus far. While the 

process for re-registration of foreign NGOs was cumbersome, and 

require paperwork and reporting requirements that many Russian 

and foreign NGOs find onerous, the fact remains that the vast majority of foreign NGOs did succeed in re-registering, although some 

suffered disruptions in the continuity of their program operations. 

We are also heartened by the ability of some NGOs to effect change 

in the law, as when religious groups, concerned that the reporting 

51 

requirements could be construed to require listing congregants or 

accounting for collections among the faithful, successfully lobbied 

the Kremlin to exempt ecclesiastical organizations from those 

rules. 

The increasing pressure on Russian journalists is likewise troubling. Vigorous and investigatory media independent of officialdom 

are essential to dynamic, healthy processes in all democracies. In 

Russia today, unfortunately, most national television networks 

media—the primary source of news for most Russians—are in government hands or the hands of individuals and entities allied with 

the Kremlin. The growing agglomeration of print media in the 

hands of government officials or those allied with them likewise 

undercuts press freedom. Attacks on journalists, including the brutal and still unsolved murders of Paul Klebnikov and Anna 

Politkovskaya, among others, chill and deter the fourth estate. Selfcensorship remains a growing problem. Some space for free discussion remains, particularly on the Internet, as the vigorous and 

sometimes sympathetic coverage in the print media of recent opposition marches indicates, but it still appears to be shrinking. 

Ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections, the Kremlin 

is bringing its full weight to bear in shaping the legal and social 

environment to preclude a level playing field. There have been 

many instances in which the authorities have used electoral laws 

selectively to the advantage of pro-Kremlin forces or to hamstring 

opposition forces. The refusal to re-register Yabloko in St. Petersburg and difficulties encountered by other parties, appear to have 

been based on political instructions, rather than an objective judgment of whether these parties met registration requirements. 

Last year, the Duma enacted amendments to the criminal and 

administrative codes redefining ‘‘extremism’’ so broadly and vaguely as to provide a potent weapon to wield against and intimidate 

opponents; greater self-censorship appears to be a major goal in 

this effort. We note, for example, that Dissenters’ March leader 

Garry Kasparov has already been questioned by the FSB in its investigation into ‘‘extremist’’ activity. Even the most cursory analysis of Russian national broadcast media shows news reporting 

skewed decisively in favor of Kremlin-approved parties and groups. 

Against this background, the U.S. and its European Allies and 

friends continue to support Russian democracy and civil society. 

These issues are regular parts of our bilateral and multilateral consultations. President Bush, when he was in St. Petersburg last 

summer, hosted an event with NGO and civil society leaders, sending a powerful message of American support and solidarity. Just 

last week, the Secretary took part in Moscow in a roundtable discussion with leaders of civil society and other figures. She also has 

regularly and candidly articulated our concerns with Russia’s leadership, as she did last week. The Secretary, my colleague Assistant 

Secretary Lowenkron of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, and I have participated in NGO events in Russia to 

showcase our support for independent media and civil society. The 

OSCE also remains an important forum for the United States and 

others to remind Russia that its commitments to democracy and 

human rights are not just ‘‘internal matters,’’ but commitments 

52 

that all State Parties to the Helsinki Final Act have undertaken 

to observe and protect. 

Russia’s relations with its neighbors and with Europe remain an 

issue of considerable concern. Moscow often still approaches its 

neighbors with a zero-sum mentality, particularly when it comes to 

those countries, such as Georgia and Ukraine, which choose to pursue closer Euro-Atlantic ties. We and European countries have spoken out against Russia’s use of energy to apply political and/or economic pressure on neighbors, such as in the case of Ukraine in 

2006. We are concerned by apparently political interference with 

infrastructures, as in the case of claimed structural deficiencies 

that restricted traffic on a bridge to Estonia this month, prolonged 

‘‘repairs’’ to an oil pipeline to Lithuania, or the closing of Russia’s 

only legal border crossing with Georgia last year. 

Russian-Georgian relations, after a period of extreme tension, 

have shown tentative signs of limited improvement, but Moscow 

could do much more to normalize relations. Russia maintains the 

economic and transportation sanctions it imposed against Georgia 

last fall. Likewise, it continues to take actions that call into question its professed support for Georgia’s territorial integrity by supporting separatist regimes in Georgia’s South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia regions; it provides the same support to the separatist regime in Moldova’s Transnistria region. The United States continues 

to call on Russia to end these policies and work with our European 

partners to implement confidence-building measures designed to 

bring the sides in each conflict closer together. At the same time, 

we encourage Russia to play a more constructive role and to use 

its influence with the separatists to advance a peaceful resolution 

of each conflict in Georgia. The United States has had productive 

high-level discussions with Russia on these issues. Russia recently 

sent officials to Tbilisi to discuss reducing tensions in South 

Ossetia, and publicly scolded South Ossetian de facto authorities 

for violations of existing agreements. We have also encouraged both 

sides to ameliorate their relationship and understand that Russian 

and Georgian officials are scheduled to meet soon for this purpose. 

The United States is also working to advance a resolution in the 

separatist conflict in Moldova’s Transnistria region. The United 

States and EU are official observers at the 5 + 2 Talks, negotiations that have been at an impasse for more than a year because 

of the Transnistrian side’s unwillingness to engage. The Russian 

and Moldovan governments have recently called for a resumption 

of the 5 + 2 process, although Russia has to date failed to use its 

heft to bring the Transnistrians back to the negotiating table, and 

we hope that all parties will engage seriously. Russia’s recent 

statements calling for resumption of the 5 + 2 process have also 

made mention of the principle of Moldova’s territorial integrity. Finally, despite promises by President Putin himself last fall that the 

ban against Moldovan wine and agricultural goods would be lifted, 

the ban is still in place. 

On one separatist conflict, in Nagorno-Karabakh, the United 

States and Russia work well together in trying to facilitate a resolution. Together with OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair country counterparts from Russia and France, I traveled to the region last 

spring to push the peace process forward by presenting to the 

53 

Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia a set of proposed basic principles for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

These principles remain the centerpiece of negotiations between 

the two sides even today. While recognizing that the burden for resolving the conflict lies with Armenia and Azerbaijan, we nevertheless continue to show that the United States and Russia can work 

together to facilitate a peace process that could bring greater stability and security to the South Caucasus, which is in our mutual 

best interest. 

We regret Russia’s so far hostile attitude toward U.S. plans for 

placing elements of a limited missile defense system in Poland and 

the Czech Republic (intended to shield the United States and its 

European allies against missile threats from the Middle East) and 

President Putin’s announcement on April 26 that Russia would 

consider a moratorium on implementation of the Adapted Treaty on 

Conventional Forces in Europe. 

We have held numerous briefings and consultations with Russia 

on our missile defense plans for more than a year (both bilaterally 

and in the NATO-Russia Council), and geography and geometry 

both demonstrate that the very modest system proposed in Poland 

and the Czech Republic poses no threat whatsoever to Russia. 

Speaking at the NATO Ministerial in Oslo April 26, Secretary Rice 

described as ‘‘purely ludicrous’’ the idea that somehow 10 interceptors and a few radars in Eastern Europe are going to threaten Russia. We and the Russians simply do not agree here, but we will 

continue to work to reach a better understanding between our two 

countries on this important issue. Both the State and Defense Departments, including Secretaries Rice and Gates, have briefed Russia on our missile defense plans for more than eighteen months. 

We have kept—and will continue to keep—Russia fully informed 

about those plans. We are committed, as we have been in the past, 

to consulting with Russia and being transparent with it about missile defense. We have offered to cooperate with Russia across the 

full spectrum of missile defense activities, an offer that the Russians themselves have described as ‘‘serious,’’ and that offer remains on the table. But Russia does not have a veto over our missile defense plans. 

Regarding the Adapted CFE Treaty, it isn’t clear to us exactly 

what Russia’s concerns are. The Russians have made it clear that 

they want NATO Allies to ratify the Adapted Treaty, among other 

reasons because they would like some of our new NATO members, 

particularly the Baltic states, to be able to join. The United States 

and its NATO Allies are prepared to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty after Russia fulfills its outstanding Istanbul Commitments, dating from 1999, in Moldova and Georgia. Under the provisions of the 

adapted CFE treaty signed in Istanbul in 1999, Russia made three 

sets of commitments. First, it pledged to reduce its forces in the 

CFE flank area to the level specified by the Adapted Treaty, and 

has done so. Second, there’s been important progress in Georgia, 

where the commitments are almost fulfilled, except for the need for 

Russia to reach agreement with Georgia on the status or withdrawal of the Russian presence at the Gudauta base. On the third 

set of commitments, concerning Moldova, Russian forces were supposed to have been withdrawn by the end of 2002; that deadline 

54 

was extended by agreement of the OSCE to the end of 2003. In 

fact, there has been a stalemate on Russian withdrawal since early 

2004. Russian forces, some designated as peacekeepers, remain in 

the separatist area of Transnistria, along with some 20,000 tons of 

stored munitions. Moldova wants all Russian munitions and forces, 

including the peacekeeping force (PKF), to be withdrawn. However, 

Moldovan authorities have said that they would be willing to accept Russian participation in a genuinely multinational PKF, under 

an OSCE umbrella. We are urging Russia and others to negotiate 

seriously on a transformed PKF. A decision to field such a force 

would be a major step toward solving this conflict and toward fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments. 

Russia has made dramatic economic gains over the past few 

years. We welcome Russia’s economic revival, particularly after difficult economic transitions in the 1990s. Prosperity and peace is in 

everyone’s interests. We welcome Russia’s economic revitalization, 

but are concerned that this revival is built upon certain 

vulnerabilities: Russia’s wealth remains more value-extracted than 

value-added. Russia’s economic gains have fueled a certain bravado 

in Russia’s external agenda. But those gains are also fostering the 

growth of a nascent middle class whose emergence, over time, we 

hope will bring with it modern political reforms, including greater 

accountability and governmental responsiveness. The United States 

supports Russia’s integration into rules-based international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, consonant with 

Russia’s commitment to those organizations’ principles. An important step towards Russia’s integration into the norms of the global 

economy was reached last fall with the closure of the U.S.-Russia 

bilateral WTO agreement—arguably the biggest single step forward in our economic relationship in the past decade. While not a 

miracle cure for either of us, it very much serves the interest of 

both our countries. 

The range of both U.S. and Russian interests are clearly global. 

Given that reach, it is imperative that both our countries seek to 

work together wherever possible, even when such cooperation may 

prove challenging. At the same time, we are committed to defending our principles, pushing back wherever we must. U.S.-Russia relations require ongoing dialogue. As I mentioned, Secretary Rice 

just completed a good visit to Moscow last week, and the President 

will meet with President Putin during the G8 Summit in Germany 

in June. This and other opportunities in the coming months will 

provide important moments to try to narrow our differences on 

issues that matter to us while pressing forward on elements of our 

constructive engagement with Russia as well. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, I am grateful for the 

opportunity to speak before you today, and look forward to your 

questions. 

55 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SARAH E. MENDELSON, DIRECTOR 

OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY INITIATIVE, AND SENIOR 

FELLOW, RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Chairman Hastings and Members of the Commission: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in this hearing on Russia and the implications for U.S. policy. My name is Sarah 

Mendelson. I direct the Human Rights and Security Initiative at 

the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where I am also 

a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program. It is an honor 

to be here. 

My comments today focus on both the international and national 

contexts surrounding Russia’s authoritarian drift. I address how 

the decline in the U.S. position in the world has enabled Russian 

policies, particularly on human rights issues. I then discuss trends 

inside Russia with attention to poorly functioning state institutions. I conclude with specific recommendations for U.S. foreign 

and assistance policies. 

I. DECLINE OF U.S. INFLUENCE: INCREASE IN RUSSIAN INFLUENCE? 

For over a decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy barely existed and influence beyond its borders 

was minimal. The Putin era can be characterized in part by the reemergence of foreign policy and influence, mainly through energy 

resources. Today, I want to suggest, however, that there are additional important issues outside of Russia’s borders about which 

Russia has influence, e.g. those relating to human rights. 

Russia’s political trajectory has long been a U.S. national security concern, but U.S. influence and ability to affect this trajectory 

have greatly declined over time. During the Cold War, the United 

States represented an alternative, bolstered by the rule of law and 

notions of hope and justice for those oppressed by the Soviet Union. 

By 2007, the vision of the United States as a countervailing weight 

associated with human rights has been greatly damaged. 

Today, Republicans and Democrats alike recognize what so many 

beyond our borders have noticed: in recent years, the United States 

has experienced a steep decline in what Harvard Professor Joe Nye 

has termed ‘‘Soft Power’’—the ability to persuade and inspire 

through non-military means. This decline has had a hugely negative effect on the ability of the United States to promote democracy 

and human rights. 

In the Russian context, the beginning of the decline predates 

both Presidents Putin and Bush. It was a by-product of perceived 

hypocrisy over U.S. support for elements of faux democracy in Russia dating back to the mid 1990s. Whatever the source, the consequence has been to enable the authoritarian trend and isolate 

human rights defenders inside Russia. 

Much damage has occurred however since 2001. Current and 

former senior U.S. government officials claim that because of U.S. 

counterterrorism policies adopted since 2001 and also abuses related to the war in Iraq, the United States has lost much leverage 

concerning the systematic and wide-spread abuses by Russian authorities in Chechnya. One senior American diplomat lamented, 

56 

‘‘Abu Ghraib has had an effect. And certainly the Russians love to 

say we told you so. They talk a lot about how Iraq is exactly what 

‘we had in Chechnya.’ ’’ That loss of leverage is important because 

what happened in and around Chechnya has been used as a pretext by the Russian government to control many of the institutions 

we associate with democracy, including critical, independent television, transparency in elections, accountability of law enforcement 

and the army. 

Over time, as U.S. soft power declined, the Putin administration 

has embraced a conception of the state that is both hyper-sovereign 

and threatened by democratic and human rights norms. Russia’s 

hyper-sovereign mode drives Russian administration officials, and 

Putin himself, to regularly invoke anxiety among the population 

concerning the ‘‘dangers’’ of foreign influence, suggesting that Russia is becoming encircled by enemies. For the public and especially 

the elite, the United States has become a negative force, a view reflected clearly in Putin’s February 2007 Munich speech as well as 

more recent pronouncements. 

The Russian government, in addition to others, has increasingly 

taken advantage of the leadership gap left by the decline in U.S. 

soft power. How this translates to Russia’s engagement with the 

world and specifically with international organizations is considerable. This Commission is well aware of how the Russian government has attempted to change the rules and norms governing 

OSCE election observation. As symptomatic and perhaps more disturbing is a recent trend in the UN Security Council by the Russian Federation, along with China, to block international responses 

to evidence of gross human rights violations in Darfur and in 

Burma. At least one human rights organization claims the Russian 

and Chinese governments appear to have supplied Sudan with 

arms or dual use technologies that were diverted to Darfur despite 

the arms embargo in place since 2005. 

If U.S. soft power continues to decline, or if there is no change 

in the current configuration over the next decade, Russia (together 

with China) can essentially ‘‘set the table’’ on human rights issues 

in ways that favors hyper-sovereign interpretations of international 

legal frameworks and noncompliance by states concerning human 

rights. This trend bodes very badly not only for the international 

human rights machinery, in place in no small part to past U.S. 

leadership, but for peace and security in the international system. 

II. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY INSIDE RUSSIA: ORDER OR FRAGILITY? 

Human rights abuses inside Russia are not news. Since the summer of 1999, there has been credible evidence linking Vladimir 

Putin to the steady shrinking of civil society in Russia, the shutting 

down of independent media outlets, and general suppression of critical speech. A climate of fear among activists has grown under his 

leadership. I testified before this Commission almost seven years 

ago to the day, and sadly much of what I wrote then reads as if 

it were written for this hearing. At that time, however, President 

Putin was talking to the West with one voice while doing at home 

what he could to gain control over any critical voices. The West 

was slow to take notice. Today, he has stopped speaking in soothVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
57 

ing tones to the West, and there is considerable alarm among 

friends and allies. 

The situation inside Russia is more troubling today than several 

years ago because the public demand for something different—for 

more freedoms—appears quite muted. Aside from a few hundred 

people in Moscow and St. Petersburg demonstrating in recent 

weeks, there does not appear to be wide-spread public unhappiness 

with Putin’s policies. The reasons are complex but important to understand because they often lead outsiders erroneously to think 

there is nothing to be done or that we should in fact do nothing. 

In focus groups in various Russian cities, I have observed participants explain why state control of the media seems a better arrangement to them than what they perceived as oligarchic control 

over the media in the 1990s. Trust in political parties has been extremely low for several years so it is no surprise that the fact that 

parties have all but disappeared does not generate any sort of protest. Some NGOs, such as the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, are 

seen as very positive by majorities of respondents in CSIS surveys, 

and if the government were to move against that organization, 

there is the possibility of public response; this Russian organization 

provides much welcomed counseling concerning conscription to families with draft-age young men. 

Putin is popular, but it is important to remember his popularity 

derives in part from the complete lack of critical reporting on television of any activities inside the Kremlin. There are no investigative reporters writing of corruption, poor intelligence gathering and 

botched counterterrorism operations. The few that do, such as 

Anna Politkovskaya, risk (or lose) their lives. Moreover, Putin continues to be seen as the anti-Yeltsin. He is not drunk at meetings 

with international leaders. He stands up to the West. The economy 

has done well, in contrast to the collapse of the ruble. In short, 

there is some semblance of order in contrast to what many experienced in the 1990s as chaos. This ‘‘order’’ I want to suggest is more 

fragile when one looks closely inside Russia. 

Important public institutions in Russia are not functioning as 

they should. Russia is currently experiencing multiple health crises. We in the West tend to focus on HIV/AIDs, but in a survey 

that I co-authored of 1,200 Russian doctors, all of whom had treated HIV-infected patients, only 15 percent said HIV was the most 

important health crisis. Instead, they report non-communicable diseases such as alcoholism, cardiovascular ailments and cancer as 

the top health threats. Russia’s demographic crisis is unlikely to be 

solved by the baby bonus the Putin administration has put in 

place. In focus groups I observed a few weeks ago with young 

women in St. Petersburg, this policy was met with smirks and 

laughter. 

The story of the health crises could be repeated when speaking 

of the police and the army. In one survey we conducted, over 40% 

feared arbitrary arrest by the police. The recent disproportionate 

use of force by the special police, the OMON, against the demonstrations in Moscow and others cities also speaks to fragility of 

public institutions and the fear that the authorities have of protest. 

Moreover, because the media have been gutted and the judiciary is 

not independent, the normal recourse for fighting and routing out 

58 

corruption simply do not exist. In other words, the system has lost 

whatever internal fail-safe mechanisms it had. 

I am especially concerned about the trends toward nationalism 

and xenophobia, where increasingly, foreigners are viewed as enemies, and Russia is viewed as encircled by enemies. Specific policies as of spring 2007 make it illegal for non-Russians, even those 

legally registered, to sell food in markets. Anti-American sentiment 

is part of this larger trend. A spring 2007 brochure from the Kremlin-friendly youth group ‘‘Nashi’’ is a frightening example. Addressed to the ‘‘pokolenie Putina’’ (Generation Putin), it is filled 

with the rhetoric of ‘‘betrayal,’’ ‘‘traitors,’’ discussion of Georgia as 

an ‘‘American colony,’’ ‘‘American invaders’’ into Russia, ‘‘fascists 

and traitors getting ready’’ to invade and break Russia up. While 

Kremlin authorities went back and forth about whether Putin’s 

May 9 (2007) speech actually contained comparisons of the United 

States to the Third Reich, this brochure and many other speeches 

suggest that at a minimum, the authorities are highly permissive 

of language that increases nationalism. 

Finally, in addition to the fragility of important public institutions, and the increase in nationalism, the potential for instability 

inside the North Caucasus region of Russia deserves special mention. The conventional wisdom articulated by the Kremlin and 

other experts that the president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, is 

the provider of order is deeply worrisome, not to mention misleading. There is credible evidence of on-going disappearances and 

torture. Chechnya experiences the rule of man, not the rule of law. 

Elsewhere in the North Caucasus, a 2006 CSIS survey of 1,200 

males found three times the unemployment rates in this largely Islamic portion of Russia, while social services are poor to nonexistent. The men in the survey were neutral or indifferent to assistance from outside. Whoever gets there first—whether it is the 

Russian government, the West, or salafi jihadists—will shape what 

happens next. The answer bears on the future trajectory of the region. 

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY: RUSSIA AND BEYOND

The decline of U.S. soft power has enabled the authoritarian 

trend and left human rights defenders inside Russia isolated. Reversing the decline will take some time. Here are three specific recommendations for changes in U.S. policy: 

• Reposition U.S. foreign policy, including counterterrorism policies, to be compliant with human rights laws and norms; 

• Reorient U.S. assistance to target local needs; 

• Recognize the role that history plays in current political developments. 

Opt Back Into the International Legal Community 

If we want to see the development of a human rights culture in 

Russia (or elsewhere for that matter), we must focus on getting our 

own house in order. Over the last several years, the transatlantic 

community has increasingly appeared not only ambivalent about 

human rights violations inside Russia but ambivalent about human 

rights in general. In the United States, policy makers have often 

59 

traded compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law for allegedly greater security in their efforts to combat 

radical jihadists. This is a false and dangerous trade-off. 

The United States has a particular historical, bipartisan legacy 

as a generator of international human rights and humanitarian 

laws. The current administration has done considerable damage to 

this substantial legacy. In the coming years, all branches of the 

United States government and members of civil society need to do 

what we can to reclaim our role as generators of human rights 

norms, not as abusers. We need to stop enabling authoritarians by 

opting out of long-standing international human rights and humanitarian laws and opt back in. 

My expectations that an ‘‘opt in’’ strategy will be adopted during 

the remainder of the Bush administration are low. The next administration, however, whatever its party affiliation should make this 

a central part of its campaign and show serious movement on this 

issue within the first 100 days in office. Before we can reclaim 

credibility, we must show the world that we are re-embracing 

international human rights and humanitarian law, not only because it is the right thing to do but also because it makes us safer. 

Our credibility and ability to stand together with other democracies 

against authoritarian trends, including ones that threaten international peace and stability, depend on it. The world with the 

United States as a positive legal force is a safer one. The world 

where the United States is a norms violator puts us at a greater 

risk. 

Get Smart on U.S. Assistance 

U.S. foreign assistance is often driven by needs in Washington. 

With an almost obsessive preoccupation with outcomes—in part, 

because of Congressional hearings—assistance has sometimes unwittingly enabled civil society to be disconnected from local populations and instead focused on the donor. Indeed this is a criticism 

leveled by President Putin himself. 

There is no intrinsic reason why this should be the effect of assistance. Foreign assistance can help stimulate and nurture demand for human rights and democracy when it is informed by public opinion and when resources are used to help local organizations 

target local needs. While no one has approached the U.S. public 

about developing assistance strategies that are based on listening 

and responding to local needs rather than to Washington’s needs, 

my guess is that Americans will support this shift to improve U.S. 

foreign policy. 

In fact, the times demand radically different approaches to democracy and human rights work in Russia than have been used 

since the early 1990s. Smart assistance should be comprised of programs informed by public opinion addressing what the local population wants supported. It also can help local NGOs orient toward 

the public and away from a preoccupation with its own members 

or the government. Our work at CSIS suggests that despite the 

Kremlin campaign against foreign assistance, Russians are not hostile to initiatives concerning health, the environment, and human 

rights. We certainly know there are great needs in these realms. 

60 

Right now, Congress has a specific role to play in rejecting the 

Bush administration’s drastic cuts to human rights funding for 

Russia. The amounts requested are utterly insufficient, and the 

strategies are inappropriate given the worsening human rights situation in Russia today. Freedom House has found that the Bush 

administration has requested a decrease worldwide for support of 

human rights by 9%. In FY 08, the administration is poised to 

spend less than $1 million on human rights in Russia, or 1.62% of 

human rights funding globally. The only message that sends to the 

Kremlin is that the United States does not in fact stand with Russian human rights defenders. 

Don’t Forget: Memory Affects Political Developments 

In closing, the theme of today’s hearing—whether Russia is in 

transition or intransigent—depends at least in part how Russia 

reconciles with its past, and how we outside of Russia help or 

hinder that process. Among the many mistakes characterizing democracy assistance in the 1990s was the assumption that the past 

could be quickly forgotten or overcome. Instead, the economic hardships of the 1990s coupled with Russia’s unfinished reconciliation 

with its past—a history in which millions were deported, countries 

occupied, slave labor institutionalized, secret police mobilized, and 

tens of millions disappeared—have been fertile ground for Soviet 

and Stalinist nostalgia. 

Misperceptions are not surprising given the lack of critical texts 

taught in Russian schools but the fact that there is no taboo surrounding the issue of Stalin, as we discovered surveying young 

Russians in 2005, reveals a tremendous gap between young people 

in Russia and elsewhere. A majority of young Russians in the survey believed that Stalin had done more good than bad. About 20% 

would vote for him if he ran for president. His name often comes 

up in positive terms in our focus groups. As long as young Russians 

remain uneducated, mildly supportive, or even just ambivalent 

about a dictator who institutionalized terror, disappearances, slavery, and had millions killed, they are unlikely to protest disappearances in parts of Russia today or join young people in other countries in the struggle for justice and human rights. 

Absent memory is not in any way unique to Russia. Democracy 

in the United States has become more robust only when we have 

addressed our abuses and crimes. In fact, how a country reconciles 

or not with its past—especially with episodes of gross human rights 

violations—seems to have a profound but often overlooked effect on 

political and social development. Strikingly, this focus is almost 

completely absent in U.S. government approaches to democracy assistance and human rights. The time to change that is now. 

Thank you. 

61 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF E. WAYNE MERRY, SENIOR 

ASSOCIATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. Chairman, 

Thank you for the opportunity to evaluate Russia for the Commission. 

Russia is no longer in a post-Soviet transition; that process is 

pretty much complete. The transition lasted from the Mid Eighties 

till the late Nineties, roughly the period of Mikhail Gorbachev and 

Boris Yeltsin. It produced the fairly stable governing system we see 

today, which is likely to endure for several decades. This is a recurrent pattern in Russian history: stagnation, crisis, collapse, transition, restoration. It occurred twice in the Twentieth Century. Some 

in this room may live to see it happen again. 

Russia today has a ruling elite of shared formative background, 

generation, political orientation and convictions, plus control of the 

instruments of state power and dominance of the country’s productive economic sectors. This is a prescription for longevity in power, 

but no guarantee of enlightened governance. What we see in Russia is certainly a disappointment to many, including Russians, who 

had hoped for better. The reversal of momentum toward 

participatory and pluralist government, growth of genuine civil society, and rule of law is not good for Russia. However, the alternative to the present ruling system could be something worse. 

Much worse. The men in charge of Russia today are not extreme 

nationalists nor irresponsible gamblers on the world stage. Count 

our blessings. 

Russia’s ruling elite—today as so often in the past—are believers 

in derzhavnost, a term difficult to translate into English. It is 

something like the French etatism on steroids, almost the cult of 

the great state. In derzhavnost the state and its greatness command all loyalties and resources, including the people, who are not 

truly citizens but servants of the state. I view this pursuit of state 

greatness as an inversion of the requirements of a country with 

myriad problems and limited resources, but I am not Russian. 

However, Russia is not intransigent. Frustrated with its place in 

the world, humiliated by its recent history of imperial collapse, and 

angry that it has not achieved acceptance by the West: Russia is 

all these things, but not immune to rational self interest and reasonable compromise. Russia today is undergoing the aftermath of 

loss of empire and of great power status. In the past century, this 

was the experience of Spain, Turkey, Germany, Austria-Hungary, 

Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain and Portugal. Russia came comparatively late to this difficult process and 

has so far made relatively little progress on a long learning curve. 

This is a reality requiring some American understanding and patience. 

I see no prospect of a new Cold War. If Gorbachev understood 

the Soviet system of the Eighties could not manage the competition, Russia’s leaders today know they cannot. In his recent national speech, President Putin proudly noted the country’s progress 

has lifted it into the ranks of the world’s ten largest economies. I 

recall a similar assertion thirty years ago by Erich Honecker about 

the former East Germany. Thus, with all Russia’s oil and gas reveVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
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nues, it today has the ranking in the global economic league tables 

aspired to by the old GDR. Not a basis for a new Cold War. 

Russia’s internal problems remain immense, and should be the 

focus of state policy, even if the ultimate goal is restoration of 

greatness. Many people think Russia’s domestic difficulties are the 

result of the Soviet collapse. This is wrong. The multiple crises 

which themselves produced the Soviet collapse—the result of decades of wrong policies—plague Russia today. These include the catastrophic legacies of collectivized agriculture, a garrison-state economy, fantastic waste and mismanagement of natural resources and 

investment, environmental depredation on a huge scale, and the 

evisceration of civil society and national spiritual life. 

Most serious is the combination of the health crisis and demographic decline. I must emphasize these are not new problems. The 

health crisis dates from at least the 1960s, when infant mortality 

rates started going up and life expectancy down. The decline in fertility rates in Russia began in 1981, reaching crisis proportions by 

the end of that decade. Today, Russia is in the second generation 

of a downward demographic spiral, reducing the country’s population in ways which bear no parallel to the ‘‘greying’’ of Western 

societies. The consequences are dire. For example, the conscription 

pool for the armed forces peaked about four years ago and will decline at least till the mid-Twenties. The same is true of young 

women reaching childbearing age, creating the inevitability that 

the next generation of Russians will be smaller than the current 

one, and the one after still smaller, unless something systematic is 

done to slow the spiral. Political rhetoric is inadequate to restore 

fertility rates now at only half of replacement levels or to rectify 

chronic bad health across the entire population, but especially critical among Russia’s potential parents. 

Cannot Russia’s revenues from oil and gas be applied to the 

problems inherited from Soviet misrule? In principle, yes, but it 

has not happened to a significant degree yet. Thus far, the money 

has been used to rid Russia of external debt (not a bad thing) and 

to create a series of vertically-structured economic combines to ensure centralized political control of productive sources of national 

wealth. President Putin recently announced some ambitious programs to address the country’s housing, infrastructure and other 

physical deficiencies. Hopefully, these will be real programs but, as 

an experienced Moscow veteran, I remain skeptical. We have yet 

to see adequate resources devoted to vitamin deficiency childhood 

diseases, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, intravenous 

drug usage, or the biggest killer, cardiovascular stress diseases. 

These failures are more a threat to Russia than potential external 

adversaries. 

The oil and gas revenues are unfortunately a political intoxicant. 

Russia resembles a gambler who wins a few rounds after a long 

losing streak and suddenly imagines he is on top of the world. This 

is a source of great concern to Russia’s trade partners, especially 

its energy customers. Moscow tends to see its control of hydrocarbons and of some key pipelines as instruments of national greatness rather than as commercial assets. Moscow’s clumsy manipulation of oil and gas supplies will likely continue, and may inspire 

its major customers to diversify their future sources. However, the 

63 

looming problem is that there may not be enough oil and gas to 

meet Russia’s growing domestic requirements plus fulfilling its expanding list of export commitments. Many Russian oil fields are seriously depleted, while investment in new gas supplies and pipelines is woefully deficient. Europe, in particular, might worry less 

about Russian political manipulation of its energy exports than 

about eroding supplies. 

Objectively, Russia is dwarfed by the European Union to its west 

and China to the east. Russian policy is to punch above the country’s actual weight by using its residual roles and influence in selected areas of international relations and to seek primacy among 

its near neighbors. This is similar to what London and Paris have 

done in the past half century, with considerable success. Russia 

benefits in its western policies because the European Union remains a political whole much less than the sum of its economic 

parts and because major European governments themselves play 

the game of separate bilateral relationships with Moscow rather 

than telling their Russian counterparts to talk to Brussels on key 

issues. For this, the Europeans have none but themselves to blame. 

China is a very different case, where the whole is rather greater 

than the sum of the parts. Some in Russia still speak of ‘‘playing 

the China card’’, but anyone can see that the locus of power in Eurasia has shifted from Moscow to Beijing, with the latter playing a 

‘‘Russia card’’ on occasion (but not often). Russia’s supposed strategic partnership with China is based on a shared concern about 

the primacy of American power rather than on a broad common 

agenda. After decades of Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, 

China today enjoys a northern frontier which poses no security 

threat, but Beijing certainly does not view Russia as a model to 

emulate. China is among the world’s leading beneficiaries of 

globalization and of engagement with America, while Russia is 

turning increasingly inward and autarchic in its attitudes and policies. 

Like other former imperial powers, Russia seeks influence and 

even primacy within its previous domains. We should recognize 

that about half the states of the former Soviet Union are themselves fairly comfortable in their current relations with Russia or, 

at least, more comfortable being subject to Moscow’s influence than 

to that of an alternative, such as Beijing or Washington. This is not 

unusual, as ex-colonies often maintain privileged relations with the 

former imperial metropole, not least to maintain the ruling elite of 

the new state. Many of these countries depend critically on favorable economic ties with Russia, and especially on the financial remittances of millions of their citizens working, legally and not, in 

Russia. Most of these countries are in no position to pursue true 

independence, even if they really wanted to. These governments 

have enjoyed statehood for little more than fifteen years, about 

where post-colonial Africa was in the mid-Seventies. Real independence takes time. 

Three aspects of Russian external policy warrant special comment. 

The Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are small 

nations seeking to maintain their identities among much larger 

and more powerful states. They are indeed fortunate that the EuroVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
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pean Union provides a venue in which small countries can both 

survive and prosper. The essence of their tensions with Russia lies 

in the unwillingness or inability of Russian elites—including many 

of the supposed Westernizers—to face candidly a shameful page of 

Russia’s recent history, that of the forced incorporation of the Baltic states into Stalin’s empire. That history, like many other dark 

episodes of many countries, will remain an impediment to normal 

ties until it is acknowledged. 

Post-Soviet Ukraine emerged as by far the widest country in Europe, geographically, ethnically and culturally. The essence of 

Ukrainian politics at the national level is always to reconcile or at 

least accommodate the country’s western and eastern regional identities. Any effort to impose in Kiev a pro-Russian or anti-Russian 

policy is doomed to fail, especially if such a policy is directed from 

outside the country. Short of changing Ukraine’s borders—an expedient of extremists—the country must face both east and west at 

all times. While it remains difficult for many Russians to think of 

Ukraine as truly independent of Russia, I believe Moscow has 

learned from recent events that an effort to manipulate Kiev too 

overtly is counter-productive, both by inflaming resistance from 

much of the Ukrainian populace and by encouraging economic 

elites in the eastern region to adopt a more national identity. I 

tend to view the peaceful character of Russian-Ukrainian relations 

over the past sixteen years as one of the wonders of the world. It 

could have been much different, as Yugoslavia showed. Despite 

their mutual difficulties, Russia and Ukraine are gradually finding 

a modus vivendi likely to endure. 

Georgia’s current bad blood with Russia is something of an historical anomaly, as for many generations Georgians enjoyed as 

privileged a position in the Russian imperium as did the Armenians, who today have the most cordial relations with Russia of 

any of the former Soviet states. However, the bad blood between 

Georgia and Russia is quite real on both sides. Moscow without 

doubt has sought to exploit the issues of Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia, sometimes without carefully considering the potential consequences within the nationalities on Russia’s side of the Caucasus. 

Nonetheless, it bears pointing out that Russia did not create these 

two ethnic disputes, whose origins lie with extremist Georgian nationalist policies in the waning days of the Soviet Union, which led 

the Ossets and Abkhaz to believe (whether correctly or not) that 

they faced ethnic cleansing or worse. The most effective policy 

Tbilisi could take to counter Russian meddling in these two regions 

is to acknowledge candidly, and publicly, this shameful page of 

Georgia’s recent history. Sadly, neither the Shevardnadze nor 

Saakashvili governments has been prepared to do so. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that some people in this country tend to 

view contemporary Russia as many Russians might like to be 

viewed: as a restored neo-imperial power able to have its wicked 

way on the world stage. I cannot agree. Russia claims a number 

of supposed ‘‘strategic partners’’—all of them in reality tactical relationships—but has no allies beyond its neighboring client states. 

Russia is welcome in various international venues as a second-tier 

player to balance some (but not much) of the predominance of the 

United States. When countries share a policy objective with WashVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
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ington, Moscow drops to third tier. Russia’s transitory hydrocarbon 

wealth and the surface glitter of its largest cities are not the stuff 

of real power. An economy dominated by commodity exports and 

politically-dictated investment decisions is characteristic of the 

Third World, not the First. Given its imploding population, some 

Russian experts worry about their country’s ability to hold on to its 

present territory by mid-century, especially in the Far East and 

northern Caucasus. An expanding middle class largely composed of 

government employees is not the same as a true civil society. A political culture obsessed with the pursuit of state greatness rather 

than with the well-being and health of its inhabitants is more of 

a danger to them than to us. I firmly believe Russian culture, talent and individual genius will continue to flourish, but perhaps increasingly within the large and growing Russian diaspora. 

Mr. Chairman, twenty-five years ago my colleagues and I of the 

American Embassy in Moscow sat arguing with a team of analysts 

from Washington who told us the Soviet Union was an economic 

superpower with living standards equal to those of Great Britain. 

They had the statistics, while we had the evidence of our daily 

lives. Within less than a decade, the entire edifice of Soviet power 

had collapsed. Today, Russian policies are often difficult and even 

obnoxious for the United States, but I believe we should not exaggerate the challenge Russia poses. Russia remains a country more 

defined by its problems and weaknesses than by tangible strengths. 

In pursuit of our national self interest, the United States should 

be calm and patient in dealing with Russia, and avoid intransigence of our own. There will be opportunities for mutual cooperation with Russia and we should build on them. Our relations are 

now poor but can, and should, improve. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear again before the Helsinki Commission. 

66 

1 Richard Pipes, ‘‘Why the Bear Growls,’’ The Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2006 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LILIA SHEVTSOVA, SENIOR 

ASSOCIATE, MOSCOW CARNEGIE CENTER 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission. 

Thank you for inviting me to take part in this hearing on Russia. 

It’s a great honor to be here. 

My comments will focus on key domestic and foreign policy drivers and challenges Russia is facing today. 

The Vladimir Putin era is nearing the end of the line, and the 

Russian political class is now preparing to jump aboard a new 

train. Before the new election frenzy begins, we ought to reflect on 

the framework of the Russian political system, its potential in domestic and foreign policy, and where it will take Russia in the future. 

GRASPING A MOVING TARGET

Studying Russia is sometimes a thankless task. How can one 

possibly grasp this moving target—this hybrid society that combines incompatible trends and interests and sees itself with intentionally blurred vision? Understandably, both Russian and Western 

observers simplify the situation, gathering only the facts that fit 

their preconceptions and ignoring inconvenient truths. The result, 

of course, is a dangerously incomplete picture. 

The observers generally break down into two camps. First are 

the ‘‘pessimists’’ and critics of President Vladimir Putin. In the mythology of the critics, Boris Yeltsin’s tenure was a success story of 

liberal reform, a legacy that Putin betrayed. Taking up the mantle 

of the doomsayer, some pessimists contend that Russia’s long history of autocratic rule has left its people incapable of living in a 

democratic system. As Richard Pipes puts it, ‘‘Russians tend to 

view one another as enemies. . . . They are not only depoliticized 

but also desocialized.’’ 1 If Pipes and the others in this camp are 

correct, the West would do well to protect itself by throwing up a 

new iron curtain. 

In the other camp are the ‘‘optimists,’’ mostly crowding around 

the Kremlin, who praise the current regime. This praise, however, 

is a thin disguise for a condescending belief that Russians have got 

what they deserve and are not mature enough to live in a free society. This school of ‘‘optimists’’ includes those who maintain that 

authoritarianism is Russia’s only path to modernization (despite 

the fact that the increasingly powerful Russian regime has abandoned reforms altogether.) There are also analysts who counsel patience, arguing that a healthy market and middle class must arise 

before Russians can begin to think about an open and independent 

civil society. (This group struggles to explain why the Russian 

economy grows even as political freedoms shrink, or why the middle class doesn’t feel very ‘‘middle’’ these days and dreams about 

being ruled by an ‘‘iron hand.’’) 

These opposing camps of Russia analysts contend over three 

issues. The first concerns where Russia is headed (boom or doom) 

and what role Putin is playing (Jekyll or Hyde). The second issue 

concerns how Russia’s recent history should be divided: the good 

67 

years (or bad, depending on the analyst) of the Boris Yeltsin and 

early Putin administration, followed by the bad years (or good) of 

the late Putin administration. On the third battleground, the contending camps compare today’s Russia with that of the Soviet era 

in an attempt to determine whether or not Russia is in fact freer 

now than it was back then. 

None of these points of contention get to the essence of the Russian political system, however. They offer no insight into Putin’s 

reasons for backsliding on democracy, no analysis of the Russian 

people’s preparedness for life in the free world, and no predictions 

about which path to modernization Russia will take. 

Analyses of Russia are notoriously impervious to reality. Thus, 

some intellectuals in Russia and the West have called for an end 

to Russia-bashing, arguing that Western society itself has difficulty 

managing democracy. Quite often political correctness replaces objective analysis, as demonstrated by the statements of a number of 

Western participants of the Valdai forum, a series of meetings organized by the Kremlin to woo Western pundits. Many of these 

pundits are now toning down their criticism of Russia after having 

hobnobbed with Putin. Understandably, it is harder to criticize a 

leader with whom you have shaken hands. 

Does the inadequacy of analysis mean that Russia defies explanation? Fortunately, that is not the case. I believe that today there 

is a better sense of the fundamental challenges Russia faces, and 

a clear understanding of the capacity of the Russian elite to cope 

with them. Armed with this insight, we must seek to answer two 

major questions: What will happen when the factors currently holding Russia together stop working? And how far off is this moment 

of truth? 

BUREAUCRACY’S VICTORIES OVER THE LEADERSHIP AND THE STATE

Those who argue that Putin made a sharp break with the Yeltsin 

era have a hard time proving it. To be sure, Putin has torn down 

some elements of Yeltsin’s rule. But by doing so, he bolstered the 

principle of personified power, a principle which Yeltsin set in motion with the 1993 Constitution. Thus Putin showed himself truly 

to be Yeltsin’s successor: Both leaders contributed to maintaining 

a system that survives by succeeding one set of arbitrary rules with 

another, each accompanied with a new rhetoric substituting for a 

nonexistent ideology. 

Under Putin, personified power has assumed the form of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. Yeltsin’s 1993 Constitution was 

more instrumental in setting this development in motion than any 

personal convictions Putin might have held. That does not mean 

that Putin couldn’t change Russia’s trajectory with a 70–75 percent 

approval rating, he could risk it, but he never tried. The concentration of power in the hands of a president has led many to conclude 

that the current regime is autocratic. Appearances are deceiving, 

however: The Russian president is increasingly dependent on his 

base, which is comprised of the apparatchiki, the so-called siloviki, 

i.e. power structures (military, law enforcement and security services), big business and liberal technocrats. These disparate groups 

have congealed into a bureaucratic corporation. Personified power 

merely provides the means for the corporation to pursue its interVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
68 

ests. Its core, however, is not siloviki, who have failed to govern, 

but the apparatchiki (federal and local) who have restored control 

over the state they lost in the 1990s. 

Ironically, liberal technocrats constitute a vital element of the 

corporation, by injecting a spirit of dynamism and by discrediting 

liberalism by the very fact of being part of the non-liberal political 

regime. 

The Russian political system has devoted all its resources to 

maintaining the status quo during the next election cycle in 2007– 

08. It will succeed in doing so, as long as it manages to prevent 

a schism from developing within the elite. Putin’s successor will 

most likely have to follow in his footsteps, consolidating the new 

rule by denouncing his predecessor and forcing today’s Kremlin 

team into early retirement. It would be a gross underestimation of 

Putin’s intelligence to assume that he intends to remain in the 

Kremlin beyond the end of his second term. He surely understands 

that, if he were to stay on, he would become a puppet of the new 

administration, thereby undermining its legitimacy and destabilizing the political system. It is unclear, however, whether Putin 

will successfully avoid this trap and guarantee a smooth succession. The experiment with two presidential hopefuls, Dmitri 

Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov, has not been convincing so far, but 

the real game will start in 2007. It remains to be seen how inventive the Kremlin team is and how it will choose to perpetuate itself. 

BUREAUCRACY’S VICTORIES OVER THE MARKET

Having gained a sense of self-confidence, the bureaucracy no 

longer requires intermediaries to run the economy. This does not 

necessarily imply nationalization or redemption of property, as 

happened with Yuganskneftegaz and Sibneft. The bureaucratic corporation has devised several ways to control assets, particularly by 

installing its representatives on the boards of private companies. 

The ruling elite will undoubtedly tighten its grip on the economy, 

although some private companies under Kremlin control—the telecommunications sector, for example—will be preserved. There are 

signs that the recent redistribution of assets from the oligarchs to 

the bureaucracy could be followed by a fresh round of privatization, 

creating a new oligarchy. (Some staunch liberals even recommend 

re-nationalization as the best way to bring about and legitimize a 

new round of privatization.) The regime has jeopardized itself, however. By redistributing assets and undermining property rights, it 

has left itself with no guarantee that the new ruling team will not 

start the cycle again and do the same thing to them. 

Some pundits point to the development of state capitalism in 

Southeast Asia to justify Russia’s bureaucratic capitalism. Is this 

naivete ́ or an intentional misreading of history? State capitalism in 

Southeast Asia was intended to create a level of industrialization 

that Russia had achieved under Stalin. And furthermore, at a certain point state capitalism begins to degrade the state itself, as the 

experience of South Korea’s chaebols show. No country attempting 

to marry state power and business has ever been able to meet the 

challenges of the post-industrial world. The limits of Russian bureaucratic capitalism are now becoming clear too. Despite extremely favorable global economic conditions, economic growth in 

69 

Russia slowed from 7.3 percent in 2003 to just 6.3 percent in 2005; 

industrial production in 2005 increased 4 percent after growing 8.3 

percent in 2004; mineral resources extraction grew just 1.3 percent 

in 2005 compared with 6.8 percent in 2004; oil output has grown 

by 47 percent in the private sector since 2000, whereas public-sector growth was just 14 percent; independent producers of natural 

gas have doubled their output, whereas state-owned Gazprom has 

increased output by just 2 percent. 

As the Russian economy loses steam, the government is torn by 

internal rivalries, a search for scapegoats, and vain attempts to 

imitate genuine self-confidence. Meanwhile, arbitrary, interventionist state behavior is scaring off potential investors. Foreign investment is still coming in, to be sure, but Russian cash is getting 

out. The state that makes a show of being mighty and powerful has 

proven too weak to keep its commitments to business and society, 

and too feeble to maintain a rule-based order. 

THE NUCLEAR PETROSTATE

As bureaucratic capitalism has no interest in diversifying the 

economy, Russia is beginning to resemble a petrostate. Natural resources account for 80 percent of total Russian exports, and energy 

accounts for 60 percent of resource exports. More than 50 percent 

of investment flows into the natural resources sector. Other characteristics of the petrostate are becoming increasingly pronounced in 

Russia: the fusion of business and power; the emergence of a rentier class that lives on revenue from the sale of natural resources; 

endemic corruption; the dominion of large monopolies; the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks; the threat of a ‘‘Dutch 

disease’’; and a large gap between rich and poor. 

A new phenomenon, the ‘‘nuclear petrostate,’’ that is the state relying on commodities and at the same time having the ambitions 

of the nuclear superpower, may yet surprise the world. 

Until recently the Russian elite considered overreliance on natural resource exports to be a weakness. Not anymore. Today, the 

Kremlin is attempting to turn this liability into a strength by 

transforming Russia into the ‘‘energy superpower.’’ It is a strategy 

that testifies to the government’s failure to develop a competitive, 

high-tech economy, such as the one India is forging. It also raises 

difficult questions. How can Russia aspire to become the world’s 

energy supplier when Gazprom’s output grew by just 0.8 percent in 

2005; when oil output growth is not expected to exceed 2 percent 

this year, the smallest increase in five years; when half of Russia’s 

gas pipelines are more than 25 years old and 80 percent of the 

equipment used by the oil industry is out of date; when the average 

age of equipment in the electrical grid is 25 years; when 75 percent 

of Russia’s proven oil and gas reserves are already in production; 

and when the most of the country’s oil reserves are expected to run 

dry in 25 years? 

By ignoring these questions and making Russia the peddler of 

natural resources to more developed countries, the ruling elite consigns Russia to a future of obsolescence. 

70 

2Sergei Ivanov, ‘‘Russia Must Be Strong,’’ The Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2006 

RUSSIA IN THE GLOBAL ARENA

After 15 years of retreat in its foreign policy, Russia is regaining 

confidence. This confidence stems not only from high oil prices and 

the Kremlin’s attempt to overcome the humiliation of the 1990s, 

but also from purely external factors: the confusion surrounding 

European integration; U.S. difficulties in Iraq; and world resentment to U.S. hegemony. However, the most powerful factor explaining Russia’s new assertiveness is necessity. The Russian system 

can’t consolidate itself without a global presence. Russia’s ability to 

flex its muscles internationally has always proven to be a powerful 

instrument for domestic control. Maintaining Russia’s superpower 

ambitions and its domination of the former Soviet space are crucial 

to the reproduction of its current political system and self-perpetuation of power. Hence Russia’s message to the world: ‘‘We’re 

back!’’ 

During Putin’s first term, the Kremlin developed a multi-vector 

approach to foreign policy, which amounted to simultaneously moving west and east, but refusing to make a final commitment to either direction. Until recently, this multi-vector approach, a substitute for the old geopolitical agenda, was essential for Russia’s 

survival in light of its diminished power and failure to integrate 

with the West. 

For the first time since perestroika, the Kremlin has publicly declared through its foreign affairs minister, Sergei Lavrov, that Russia cannot take sides in global conflicts, that it must act as a mediator. In other words, Russia is not going to join the West. 

So far, Moscow’s attempts to mediate between the West and 

North Korea, not to mention the West and Iraq, have met with little success. Nor can Moscow boast of much success in resolving conflicts in the former Soviet republics (Transdniester, South Ossetia, 

Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh). The manner of the Kremlin’s intervention in the West’s dispute with Hamas illustrates that the Russian leadership is more interested in showing off its regained 

strength than in producing results. The case of Iran is far more serious, showing the extent to which the Russian elite is willing to 

sacrifice its national security and partnership with the West in 

order to pursue the agendas of its interest groups that stand to 

profit from nuclear contracts and arms deals with Iran. It also 

demon strates the Kremlin’s concern that Iran may become a repetition of the Iraqi debacle. Regardless of how it might be spun, 

Russia’s relationship with the West is now one of 

‘‘partneropponent’’—cooperation in certain areas and obstruction in 

others. On the one hand, Russia participates in the NATO-Russia 

Council, undertakes joint military exercises with NATO troops, and 

cooperates with Western leaders within the framework of the G– 

8. On the other hand, the Kremlin works to eliminate Western influence in the former Soviet republics and consolidate Russian society around an anti-Western sentiment. Russian defense minister 

Sergei Ivanov stated that the main threat to Russian national security is ‘‘interference in Russia’s internal affairs by foreign states— 

either directly or through structures that they support.’’ 2 There is 

no mistaking the intended target of these remarks. 

71 

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution has proved to be a watershed in the 

evolution of Russia’s post-Soviet identity and foreign policy by provoking the Kremlin’s desire to recover lost ground. The Russian 

elite now seeks to persuade the West to endorse a new ‘‘Yalta 

agreement,’’ under which the West would recognize the former Soviet space as Russia’s area of influence, and its role as the energy 

superpower. Regarding the latter role, Vladimir Putin has offered 

the world an energy security bargain—a trade off between ‘‘security 

of demand’’ and ‘‘security of supply.’’ There are two parts to the 

bargain: First, Russia would give foreign investors access to its 

major deposits in exchange for allowing Russian companies access 

to foreign pipelines and retail networks. Second, the West would legitimize the fusion of state power and business in Russia by letting 

state companies like Gazprom act as transnational majors. Both 

parts of the bargain undermine key liberal principles. From now 

on, its elite has made clear, Russia will only cooperate with the 

West on its own terms. 

This gambit immediately alarmed Western governments, raising 

concerns regarding Russia’s expansionism. It has accelerated a 

split within the Commonwealth of Independent States and drove 

some of these states to hide under the Western roof. Putin’s energy 

bargain has triggered a dispute between the European Union and 

Gazprom that has sent shock waves around Europe. 

How far is Russia ready to go to pursue this ambitious, neoGaullist agenda? Is the Russian elite ready for confrontation with 

the West? A significant portion of the Russian elite is trying to 

have it both ways: integration with the West for themselves and 

their families, but not for the rest of society. These representatives 

of the ruling class, such as the oligarch and governor Roman 

Abramovich, live in the West with their families, hold accounts in 

Western banks and even manage their Russian assets and perform 

their jobs from abroad. Yet they make a big show of nationalism 

when back in Russia. There is a logic to this seemingly schizophrenic behavior. The Russian elite can only maintain its privileged status in a society that is hostile to the West, but not too hostile, lest their personal fortunes be threatened. That means that a 

major portion of the Russian elite are not ready for serious conflict 

with the West over any of the above mentioned goals. And they will 

be ready to soften their assertiveness to strike a deal with the 

West, including on energy issues. At the same time, another portion of the Russian elite who lack similar personal connections with 

the West may be prepared—may even long for—a conflict they 

could use to oust the pragmatists of Putin’s type from the Kremlin. 

This faction has not yet emerged as a major political force in Russia, but the balance of power might shift in the future, especially 

in times of crisis, for which the elite has shown little inclination 

to prepare. 

It would be wrong to assume that the only reason for suspicion 

between Russia and the West is the ‘‘value gap’’. Their differences 

on terrorism and energy security prove growing divergence in their 

geopolitical interests. Though, Russia and the U.S. are expanding 

their cooperation on protection and control of nuclear materials. In 

any case, new situation creates tough challenges for pragmatists on 

both sides who understand the consequences of Russia and the 

72 

3http://www.levada.ru/russia.html 

West drifting too far apart. Russia’s tougher line, designed to secure greater leverage on the international arena, and especially in 

the energy field, could set in motion a process over which both Russia and the West would loose control. 

WHAT DO THE PEOPLE THINK? 

Russian society supports Putin, but this does not mean that people are happy with his policies. According to polling by the Levada 

Center, 72 percent of Russians say they approve of the president’s 

actions, yet only 19 percent consider him a successful leader. 75 

percent say ‘‘order’’ is Russia’s most important priority, while just 

13 percent opt for ‘‘democracy’’ above all. However, it would be 

wrong to make any conclusions about the state of Russian society 

on the basis of this poll alone. Only 12 percent of those polled believe that the interests of the state outweigh human rights; 15 percent say that human rights could be sacrificed to the state’s interests; 44 percent insist that people have the right to stand up for 

their rights, even if these conflict with the state’s interests; and 21 

percent hold that the rights of the individual are more important 

than the interests of the state. When asked about Russia’s relations with the West, 52 percent of those polled expressed a favorable view of the United States (39 percent expressed a negative 

view). 66 percent expressed a favorable view of the European 

Union, versus 17 percent unfavorable.3 As these results suggest, a 

solid majority is favorably disposed to the West. 

Russian society is subject to manipulation, like any society that 

has not yet learned to live in freedom, but for the first time in its 

history there are no insurmountable barriers preventing its 

progress toward liberal democracy. Russia has never elected a nationalist or communist president; it has elected pro-Western leaders—Yeltsin and Putin—who declared their intention to modernize 

the country. Russia’s ruling elite, by contrast, continues to live in 

the past. The possibility cannot be excluded that a crisis will 

prompt the elite to turn to nationalism and xenophobia, and that 

a part of society will follow. 

AN UNEASY BALANCE

Situational factors help explain the lethargic state of Russian society. High oil prices keep the economy stable. Continued economic 

growth contributes to a positive outlook in society. The Russian 

people are still recovering from the turmoil of the Yeltsin years, 

and they remain disenchanted with the political opposition. Political strategists have managed to fill the vacuum left by the opposition with virtual political forces that leave little room for genuine 

social movements. The current regime strengthens itself by coopting popular ideas from the opposition. The ruling regime has also 

caught the favorable end of the political cycle: stabilization and restoration always follow periods of revolutionary upheaval. 

Russia’s present stability is slowly being undermined by conflicts 

embedded in the system, however. Among these are the inherent 

conflicts between personified power and the democratic source of its 

73 

legitimacy, and between the regime’s attempt to preserve the status quo even as it redistributes the country’s wealth. Moreover, the 

situational factors providing stability today could have the opposite 

effect tomorrow. Those who rest their hopes on oil to stabilize Russia forget that the collapse of the Soviet Union began with a steep 

decline in the price of oil in 1986. 

The law of unintended consequences also applies to Russia. The 

more the regime attempts to create a loyal ‘‘civil society,’’ the more 

likely it is to push the disenchanted and disenfranchised members 

of society onto the streets in protest. The regime’s efforts to ghettoize the opposition will only increase its unpredictability and hostility to the system as a whole. A strong majority of Russians—61 

percent—would welcome a real political opposition, against just 25 

percent who would not. And one more example of how the Kremlin 

has been shooting itself in the foot: Its effort to flex its muscles by 

pressuring Ukraine during the ‘‘gas conflict’’ only undermined its 

reputation as a responsible partner and forced Europe to look for 

alternative sources of energy. 

No one can predict how long stability can be maintained in such 

a closed system. At present Russia’s stability seems secure, but all 

bets are off if the price of oil falls dramatically, or if the president’s 

approval ratings take a nose dive. 

IS THERE A PATH TO MODERNIZATION FOR RUSSIA? 

War and the militarization of everyday life were the engines of 

Russia’s two periods of modernization under Peter the Great and 

Stalin. By bringing the standoff between the Soviet Union and the 

West to an end, Mikhail Gorbachev shut these engines down. The 

Russian elite, failing to find a new impulse to spur reforms, has 

fallen back on the spirit of militarism. The regime now attempts 

to preserve the rudiments of a militarist mindset in society by reviving a fortress mentality. On occasion, the Russian elite borrows 

language used by the Bush Administration to justify its emphasis 

on military might and its role as ‘‘the only sovereign’’ on the postSoviet space. 

If Russia is not moving forward, does this mean that it is slipping back into the ‘‘pre-modernity’’ of the Soviet or pre-Soviet era? 

Not quite. Not having the resources (or even the political will) to 

fully resurrect the old traditions, the political class is attempting 

something new in Russian history by instead reviving fragments of 

it. Russia today is sewing together a hybrid combining elements of 

traditionalism with elements of modernism, a process which fortunately weakens the former but unfortunately undermines the latter. 

Understanding that the old phantoms have lost their 

attractiveness, the Russian political class has tried to create new 

myths, among them the belief that Russia can modernize by 

distancing itself from the West, even as it still relies on the West’s 

economic and technological resources. 

Russia’s bureaucratic-authoritarian system can create the illusion of development—and many people are prepared to believe in 

illusions—but can do nothing more. There is no doubt that if the 

system remains in place, Russia will face an unfortunate crisis that 

could result in a far more brutal regime or a slow process of rot. 

74 

Will the elite consider reforming the system before it is too late? 

This would require political will and a transformational leadership, 

neither of which seems quite plausible at present. In any case, the 

elite is unlikely to dispel the illusion as long as the price of oil remains high and as long it can preserve the status quo. It seems 

more likely that the political class will begin to look for a way out 

when the oil starts to dry up. The business community will no 

doubt be the first to realize that the current model leads to a dead 

end, but only if societal discontent threatens to spin out of control. 

Clearly, any further modernization will have to be preceded by the 

reform of the state. 

A WORD OF ADVICE FOR THE WEST: DO NO HARM

The West can not do much to aid Russia’s transformation, but it 

can exert a limited influence on the members of the elite interested 

in personal integration with the West. What could the Western 

states do to prevent Russia from further backsliding? • Practice what you preach. The success of a liberal alternative 

in Russia depends on the extent to which the West is prepared to 

reject double standards, abide by its own principles, and find the 

balance between freedom and justice. • Pay attention. If the West wants to avoid being surprised by 

every twist and turn of events in Russia, it will have to invest in 

preparing a new generation of analysts who can understand the 

complexities of the post-communist reality. • Consolidate the stakeholders. There has long been a need to 

move from state-to-state dialogue to society-to-society dialogue, as 

well as a need to include in the conversation the parties on both 

sides who have a stake in Russia’s integration into Western civilization. • Integrate Russia. The West must avoid isolating Russia at all 

costs, despite the inherent difficulty in engaging Russia without legitimizing bureaucratic authoritarianism. This task will require a 

great deal of diplomatic finesse and political will. And while Western politicians are figuring out how to proceed, the Kremlin will no 

doubt attempt to further co-opt its representatives, as it has done 

in the case of former German Chancellor Gerhard Schro ̈der. • Don’t let Russia confuse personal friendship with tacit approval. Western leaders have ample opportunities to remind their 

Russian counterparts about the standards Russia committed to uphold when it joined various international organizations, and they 

can do so privately without humiliating the Kremlin. • Make Ukraine a Success Story. The integration of Ukraine (and 

if possible, Belarus) into Europe would draw the ire of the Russian 

elite, yet in the end, such a success would help Russians discard 

the belief that they are genetically unsuited to democracy. 

The time is coming when the Russian authorities will pay even 

less heed to Western counsel. Once the self-perpetuation of power 

has begun, no one in the Kremlin will be terribly concerned about 

how this process is regarded outside of Russia. The West will also 

have a difficult time finding the right approach to Russia during 

this period. Appeasement of the Kremlin policy and attempts to 

avoid criticism out of concerns to damage relations with Russia 

would strengthen bureaucratic authoritarianism, but a hard line 

75 

would most likely contribute to the rise of anti-Western feelings 

among the Russian people. 

The temptation to demand free and fair elections in Russia in 

2007 and 2008 could prove to be another trap. Western leaders 

must take into account the fact that the Russian leadership has 

perfected the art of ‘‘managing’’ elections. No amount of Western 

monitoring will alter the result. It is also worth considering that, 

in the absence of a powerful liberal-democratic opposition, truly 

free elections in Russia could bring a new group of nationalist, populist leaders to power. 

If the West can avoid these pitfalls, it could make a genuine contribution to Russia’s benevolent transformation by working to convince the elite that it should be interested in establishing the rule 

of law for the sake of its own survival. True, it is far more likely 

that Russia will have to reach the end of its rope before it will retrace its steps and begin again. The only real question that remains, then, is what price Russia and the world will have to pay 

for this epiphany. 

76 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY HAHN, PH.D., 

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY 

I. PURPOSE 

The purpose of this testimony is to raise the following three 

questions about Russia today and then to offer brief answers to 

each. The focus here is on Russian foreign policy and its implications for relations with the United States, but I will be glad to address any questions on internal political developments as well. 

—Should we care about what Russia does? 

—What are the underlying dynamics of Russian-American relations today? 

—Why have these relations deteriorated to the point that the 

U.S. Secretary of State has to travel to Moscow to deny that there 

is a ‘new cold war’? 

II. THESIS 

Since the USSR came into existence in 1917, relations between 

Russia and the United States have alternated between periods of 

competition and cooperation. My thesis is that whether relations 

have been cooperative or competitive has depended on the degree 

to which the leaders of the two sides have perceived that they have 

a common interest. Following 9/11, Presidents Putin and Bush 

found such a common cause in confronting Islamist terrorism 

which threatens the security of both sides. Despite the continued 

existence of this threat, the close cooperation which was evident in 

2001 has given way to competition and tension by 2007. What happened and what are the implications for American policy? 

III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 

Initial American reaction to Soviet Russia was hostile. In 1917 

the USA joined other European countries in efforts to weaken the 

Bolshevik regime. They originally supported a ‘‘cordon sanitaire’’ 

intended to isolate the Bolshevik government diplomatically. In 

fact, they refused to recognize the Communist government in Russia until 1933. In the nineteen thirties, however, both countries increasingly found a common interest in opposing the emergence of 

fascism in Europe. From 1941 to 1945 they entered into an alliance 

against Nazi Germany. 

After 1945, relations between the Russia and the United State 

continued to alternate between cooperation and competition. The 

period from 1945 to about 1965 was a time of great hostility known 

as the ‘‘cold war,’’ cold only because actual military conflict did not 

occur. The American policy was one of ‘‘containment’’ and was 

based on a perception of Soviet Russia as an expansionary power. 

Soviet Russia was seen as an imperialistic power whose global ambitions were justified by communist ideology. Soviet expansion 

could only be deterred by the threat of countervailing power. Containment theory received practical expression in Europe in the 

NATO alliance, the Marshall Plan, and the Truman Doctrine. It 

was later extended to alliances in Asia and the Middle East including Japan, Korea, SEATO and CENTO. By 1965, Soviet Russia was 

encircled by hostile alliances. 

77 

The initial phase of the cold war was replaced by a new period 

of cooperation known as de ́tente. Again, cooperation was a result 

of a common interest, this time to control the growth of nuclear 

weapons. Although the recognition of this common interest can be 

seen in the 1967 Non Proliferation Treaty, de ́tente reached its zenith with the SALT agreements of 1972. The ABM Treaty in particular was evidence that both sides accepted the concept of mutual 

assured destruction (MAD) which is based on the assumption that 

the security of each side depends on their continued ability to destroy each other. The other important result of de ́tente, of course, 

was the political settlement in Europe known as the Helsinki 

agreement which was signed in 1975 and which signaled an acceptance by all parties of a territorial status quo in Europe. 

By the late nineteen seventies, however, cooperation was replaced once again by competition. First, The Carter administration 

(1976–1980) made human rights issues a priority in its foreign policy and accused Soviet Russia of violating them by placing limits 

on Jewish emigration in particular. It was when Ronald Reagan became President in 1980, however, that relations became so 

confrontational that one can speak of a new ‘‘cold war.’’ Going beyond human rights issues, Reagan condemned communist Russia 

as an ‘‘evil empire’’ and abandoned the SALT process of limiting 

arms, arguing instead that nuclear arms must be reduced (START). 

Furthermore, Reagan insisted that the Soviet Union had forsaken 

de ́tente by increasing its nuclear and conventional military forces 

and by seeking to export communism to other countries, notably in 

Afghanistan and in Central America. His response was to deploy 

a new generation of medium range missiles in Europe and to propose a comprehensive missile defense system known as SDI or 

‘‘star wars.’’ By 1985, all negotiations between Russia and the 

United States had ended. 

IV. PERESTROIKA: THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The relations between Soviet Russia and the United States entered a new period of cooperation after Mikhail Gorbachev became 

General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985. This did not happen immediately. The first negotiations about nuclear weapons in Reykjavik, 

Iceland in 1986 ended in failure because President Reagan refused 

to give up his missile defense proposals. Gorbachev, however, 

adopted a new approach to Soviet foreign policy which he called 

‘‘novoye mishlenie’’ or ‘‘new thinking.’’ New thinking was part of 

the broader program known a perestroika, the central goal of which 

was to modernize the economy and stimulate economic growth in 

the Soviet Union. According to new thinking, the division of the 

world into capitalist and socialist nations was no longer the most 

important characteristic of international relations; that was ‘‘old 

thinking’’. In contrast to Brezhnev’s balance of power politics, 

Gorbachev’s vision of the world was global. For him, the principle 

fact of international relations in the late twentieth century is that 

all nations are interdependent. The great problems of the world 

such as security, economic growth, health, and ecology etc., could 

only be solved cooperatively, not by trying to gain a unilateral advantage. Economic growth would best be promoted not by a competition of systems but by economic integration, National security 

78 

could best be achieved not by increasing military power, but by reducing armaments. 

The application of new thinking to Soviet Russia’s relations with 

Europe meant that, in place of a Europe divided into East and 

West, Russia would seek to create an ‘‘common European home’’ 

(obshe Evropeskii dom). Such an integrated Europe would enable 

Russia, and the other socialist countries of Europe, to participate 

in the rapid economic expansion which was taking place in the 

West. For Russian-American relations, new thinking applied to security meant that under Gorbachev’s leadership important agreements on reducing weapons could be achieved. The first breakthrough on this issue came in 1987 when the two countries signed 

the Intermediate Nuclear Force Agreement (INF) eliminating all 

medium range missiles in Europe. This was followed by the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement (CFE) in 1990 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991 along with other 

agreements on weapons. 

Along with these remarkable achievements in the area of military relations, other issues that had been sources of conflict between Soviet Russia and the United States were also resolved. By 

1989, the USSR had withdrawn from Afghanistan. The Berlin wall 

came down in the same year and free elections in the communist 

nations of East Europe brought non communist governments to 

power, for the most part, without violence. Perhaps the most compelling evidence for the emergence of a new world order in which 

Russia would cooperate with the United States to preserve world 

peace was Soviet support at the United Nations for the use of force 

against Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. 

In short, by 1991, all the major issues of contention between Russia and the United States were ended. It seemed that a new era 

of cooperation was in place. By the end of 1991, however, the reforms initiated under perestroika had the unintended consequence 

of destabilizing the Soviet Federation and, and as we all know the 

USSR disintegrated into its fifteen constituent republics. By January 1 1992, Russia had emerged independently as the successor 

state to the Soviet Union. What would this mean for relations between our countries? 

V. POST COMMUNIST RUSSIA: THE YELTSIN YEARS

At first, the cooperative relationship that had developed under 

perestroika continued to characterize relations between post communist Russia and the United States. President Yeltsin and his 

foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, seemed committed to a pro- western orientation. To become more western, the Russian government 

under the leadership of Yegor Gaidar began to replace the centrally 

planned economy with a free market, capitalist one. This was 

matched in the political sphere by efforts to build and strengthen 

democratic institutions. 

There was other hard evidence of Russia’s willingness to cooperate with the United States. For one thing, they continued to support UN sanctions against Iraq. In the area of nuclear arms reduction, they joined with the USA and the former republics of 

Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to sign a protocol to START I in 

Lisbon Portugal in 1992 which would enable START I to be impleVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
79 

mented by returning all nuclear weapons in the former republics 

to Russia. In January 1993, shortly before he left office, President 

Bush signed the START II agreement with President Yeltsin which 

called for reducing nuclear weapons to half of their previous levels. 

To convince the Ukrainian Rada to ratify the Lisbon protocols, 

Yeltsin and Clinton negotiated the Trilateral Agreement of January 1994 so that Ukraine would transfer its nuclear missiles and 

fuel to Russia. Russian policy was so pro-western that initially, in 

early 1994, Kozyrev indicated that Russia would join in NATO’s 

Partnership for Peace Program, a prelude to NATO expansion. 

By the end of 1994, however, relations between our countries 

begin to change. Elections to the State Duma, the newly created 

Russian parliament, in December 1993 demonstrated that many 

people were dissatisfied with the transition to capitalism. There 

was increasing skepticism about whether democracy had improved 

their lives or not. For many, it seemed that although the collapse 

of the Soviet Union had been good for the West, the benefits for 

Russia were less clear. In foreign policy, this dissatisfaction gave 

rise to a growing debate over whether continued cooperation with 

the West served Russian national interests or not. Politicians like 

Gennadi Ziuganov and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, journalists like Pavel 

Felengauer and academics such as Andranik Migranian, took an 

increasingly nationalistic view, rejecting the ‘‘Atlanticist’’ policies of 

Kozyrev and urging Russia to look after her own national interests 

regardless of what the West wanted. Because the pro-western orientation had become so unpopular, in Janaury 1996 Yeltsin felt 

compelled to replace Kozyrev with Yevgeny Primakov, an Arab specialist and someone regarded as a realist in foreign policy. 

The argument that American and Russian interests no longer coincided seems to me understandable from the Russian point of 

view. American criticism of Russia’s actions in Chechnya in 1995 

because of human rights issues echoed earlier American criticism 

during the Carter and Reagan years. By 1996 it was clear that 

NATO would expand to the East, and despite Russian objections, 

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to join in 

1997. The use of NATO military forces against Serbia, first over 

Bosnia in 1994, but even more importantly over Kosovo in 1999 

made Russia uneasy over the growing American willingness to use 

its superpower status regardless of Russian interests. So did growing differences over Russian relations with Iraq and Iran. As a result, although START II was ratified in the USA in 1995, the Russian State Duma refused to do so. Perhaps nothing made Russia 

more concerned about American intentions than the growing debate in the USA over developing a ballistic missile defense system 

in violation of the 1972 ABM treaty that had served as the basis 

of Russian American nuclear stability. By the time he left office on 

December 31, 1999, Yeltsin could accurately describe relations between East and West as a ‘‘cold peace.’’ 

VI. PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION: PUTIN AND BUSH

When Vladimir Putin became acting President of Russia on January 1, 2000, little was known in the United States about him or 

his views on foreign policy. What was known was that he was a 

former KGB officer who had been anointed by Yeltsin to be his sucVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
80 

cessor and who had made his reputation while Prime Minister by 

invading Chechnya and taking the capitol city of Grozny. The first 

sense of what direction he might take in foreign policy came even 

before his inauguration as President in May 2000 when he managed to achieve what Yeltsin could not: Duma ratification of 

START II, although with the condition that the ABM Treaty remain in force. This, coupled with his inaugural speech emphasizing 

the importance of economic growth and the need to integrate Russia’s economy into the global economy, suggested a return to a 

more pro-western orientation. On the question of NATO expansion, 

he was pragmatic. 

From the American side, the year 2000 was dominated by the 

race for President. Relations with Russia were not an important 

issue in the campaign, although there was some criticism directed 

by Bush towards Russian policies in Chechnya. After taking office 

in January 2001, the initial attitude of the Bush administration towards Russia was cool. Whereas the Clinton administration had 

sought to promote internal changes in Russia, Bush and his advisors, notably National Security Chair Condoleezza Rice, were interested only in Russia’s external policies. By and large the attitude 

was that what Russia does didn’t really matter very much. Russia 

lacked the economic and military ability to influence world affairs. 

At most, Russia could be a nuisance, but little more. 

The general indifference towards Russia changed even before the 

events of September 11. During their first meeting in Slovenia in 

June 2001, Bush and Putin appeared to establish a warm personal 

relationship. According to Bush, ‘‘I looked the man in the eye. I 

found him to be very straight forward and trustworthy . . . I was 

able to get a sense of his soul.’’ It was after September 11, however, 

that the dynamics of Russian-American relations completely 

changed. Once again, it is because of the perception of leaders on 

both sides that they have a common interest, this time in defeating 

the terrorism associated with radical Islamic fundamentalism. 

Following the attack on the World Trade Center, Putin was the 

first foreign leader to call Bush to offer sympathy. Moreover, he 

went beyond expressions of sympathy and despite criticism at 

home, he offered the USA support in five areas which were critical 

to American interests. On 24 September 2001 he announced a five 

part plan of assistance in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Russia would share intelligence with the USA, allow the USA to use 

Russian airspace, provide military assistance to the Northern Alliance, make bases available in Central Asia, and fly missions to rescue American soldiers if needed. Russia had clearly become an important ally of America in the war on terror. 

Recognition of this new relationship could be seen in several 

ways. For one thing, the Bush administration became less publicly 

critical of the Russian version of the conflict in Chechnya. Bush 

also promised to get Congress to repeal the Jackson-Vanick amendment, a relic of the cold war, although it is something he has so 

far been unable to do. The growing friendship, personal as well as 

political, between the leaders of the two countries was apparent at 

the November 2001 summit in Texas during which the two leaders 

agreed in principle on a reduction of nuclear warheads to between 

1700 and 2100 each. Despite Bush’s desire to do this by a handVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
81 

shake, a more prudent Putin insisted on a written agreement. It 

was forthcoming in May 2002 when the two leaders signed the 

Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in Moscow. 

However, from the Russian point of view, the benefits of cooperation with the USA have become increasingly uncertain because of 

other policies pursued by the Bush administration. Foremost 

among these was the withdrawal of the USA from the 1972 ABM 

treaty by May 2002 (thereby invalidating START II) and the 

planned expansion of NATO eastward. In November 2002, NATO 

invited seven former Soviet allies to join, including the three Baltic 

states which had formerly been Soviet republics and whose membership put NATO directly on Russia’s borders for the first time. 

What really alarms Russia is discussion over possible NATO accession by Ukraine. A month after the NATO expansion, the European 

Union invited applications for membership from ten countries, 

eight of which were former Soviet allies, again including the Baltic 

states. 

The most severe test of the new friendship, however, was Russia’s unwillingness to back the USA in the war on Iraq in 2003. In 

March 2003, Putin indicated he would join France and China in 

casting a veto against an American resolution at the UN to use 

force to make Saddam Hussein comply with UN sanctions. What 

really seems to have prompted Russian concern was that Iraq represented the first major application of the Bush doctrine to the conduct of American foreign policy. From the Russian point of view, 

this departure from the policies of containment accepted by previous American administrations implied that the United States had 

abrogated to itself the right of pre-emption; that is, we would do 

what we wanted to, where and when we wanted to, and how we 

wanted to, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure American interests 

abroad. For many, countries, including Russia, this sounded like 

the assertion of the right to global hegemony. 

In an angry speech at the 43rd annual Munich Conference on Security Policy in February of this year, Putin made his frustration 

with American policy abundantly clear. ‘‘Everything that is going 

on in the world today is the consequence of attempts to implement 

a unipolar concept of the world. And what is the result? Unilateral, 

often illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. On the 

contrary, they have caused new human tragedies and more tension’’ He went on to mention the United States directly: ‘‘Some 

norms—in fact almost the entire legal system of one country, primarily the United States, have crossed their national borders and 

are being imposed on other countries in all areas, economic, political, humanitarian. Who is going to like that?’’ 

By taking the side of those who opposed American action in Iraq, 

Putin seriously risked rupturing the new cooperative relationship 

between the two countries. While this did not happen overnight— 

Bush and Putin exchanged reassurances about their cooperation 

during their meeting in St. Petersburg during that city’s 300th anniversary in 2003—events since then have accelerated the spiral of 

discontent. Among them is American criticism of Russia’s willingness to help Iran develop a nuclear energy plant in the face of 

American concern that it will enable Iran to build nuclear weapons. 

Another is the US decision to install a missile defense shield in PoVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
82 

land and an early warning radar system in the Czech Republic 

which the Russians feel does nothing to protect Europe from missile fired by Iran or Korea, but are intended to undermine Russia’s 

deterrent capability. Yet another thorn is the backing by the US, 

France, Britain and Germany for a UN Security Council resolution 

that would give independence to Serbia’s Kosovo province. When 

you add to this the Bush administration’s persistent criticism of 

Russian democracy—notably at their summit in February 2005— 

because it fails to meet American standards, Putin’s harsh speech 

in Munich of February 10 of this year becomes more understandable. 

Where do we go from here? Despite continuing differences over 

specific issues, the fact is that today, as in the past, Russian-American relations depend on the perception of common interests. For 

now, there remains a compelling common interest for both sides to 

cooperate, but this will not be easily achieved if the United States 

insists on going it alone. The coming year may offer the opportunity for a fresh start. There will be new presidents elected in 

both countries. From the Russian point of view, it doesn’t matter 

whether the American president is a Republican or a Democrat, 

but on whether the new President continues to pursue a unilateral 

foreign policy. 

83 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY RAJAN MENON, 

MONROE J. RATHBONE PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL 

RELATIONS, LEHIGH UNIVERSITY 

Chairman Hastings and distinguished members of this Committee: Thank you for inviting me to share my assessment of the 

US-Russian relationship and of Russia’s overall trajectory. 

This is an opportune, though not particularly pleasant, time to 

address this topic given the barbed exchanges between Moscow and 

Washington in recent days, which in turn reflect a larger trend, 

one I will explain presently. We are now witnessing a low-point in 

our relationship with Russia, and while I would be happy to proven 

wrong, in my estimation the situation could get worse. I can make 

no firm prognosis, but there are many more reasons to expect deterioration rather than improvement. 

A new pathway is not impossible. But if Moscow and Washington 

truly wish to take it, each must think strategically (as opposed to 

tactically), employ creative diplomacy to prevent short-term setbacks from defining the long-term relationship, and resist the 

temptation to engage in tit-for-tat exchanges. Only then can the US 

and Russia build a stable relationship that is sustained by robust 

cooperation in areas where there are converging interests. 

Our current troubles with Russia are getting plenty of coverage 

these days. But they must be placed in perspective. Contrary to the 

intermittent attention-grabbing media hype, we are not embarking 

on a ‘‘new Cold War.’’ That phase of history was defined by an ideologically-driven global competition between two mighty states who, 

like Athens and Sparta in the 5th century BCE, sought to reshape 

the world, assuming in the process that one side’s gain was, by definition, the other’s loss. But there was one big difference between 

the Peloponnesian War and the Cold War: During the latter, one 

could reasonable assume that if the titans clashed, especially using 

nuclear arms, civilization itself would be extinguished. 

Whatever may be said of the prickly US-Russian relationship 

today, it has none of these characteristics. No serious American expert on Russia believes that it does; happily, the same is true of 

credible Russian experts on the United States. 

Yet there is considerable antipathy toward the United States in 

Russia—not only within the Russian leadership, but among Russians more generally. In part this is because Russia has few effective means to assert its interests in what it sees as a unipolar 

world defined by unrivaled American primacy. 

This amalgam of resentment and near-resignation was evident in 

President Vladimir Putin’s 4,000-word attack on US policy, delivered on February 10th at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security 

Policy. So unexpected and bare-knuckled was Putin’s speech that 

senior American political figures in the audience—among them 

Senator John McCain and the newly-appointed Defense Secretary, 

Robert Gates—were taken aback, with Gates being forced to revise 

the text of his speech to issue a rebuttal, albeit one with a far lighter touch than Putin’s. 

Putin’s Munich speech summarizes every serious grievance that 

the Russian leadership and political establishment have toward the 

United States. If one reads between the lines, it is not the manifesto of a Russia on the ascendance; the frustration over the lack 

84 

of means to counter what Russians see as high-handed American 

policies is also evident in the text. In both respects, Putin’s address 

bore an uncanny similarity to the statements made by a Russian 

delegation with which I met, along with other Americans, not long 

before the Munich conference. The Munich speech, however much 

one may reject its content and tone, accurately represents Russia’s 

current view of the world and, in particular, of the United States. 

Putin’s bill of indictment contains several interconnected elements: • The United States is a veritable rogue state. Intoxicated by its 

unprecedented military superiority, America is romping through 

the international landscape, acting unilaterally, heedless of international law and the United Nations, and full of hubris given the 

lack of centers of countervailing power. The result, as Putin put it, 

is a world with ‘‘one center of authority, one center of power, one 

center of decision making.’’ • Because of its preponderance and lack of self-restraint, the 

United States is a constant threat to international peace and security, particularly given its unilateral use of force, or ‘‘hyper use of 

force,’’ in Putin’s colorful words. Counterbalancing centers of 

power—including Russia—are emerging, but, in the meantime, the 

United States endangers global equilibrium. • Washington continually lectures others on democratic niceties, 

but consistently and hypocritically flouts those same principles. 

Russia in particular receives sermons on democracy. But these are 

not well-meant; they represent an ideological offensive to discredit 

Russia and to interfere in its internal affairs, perhaps even an effort to spark the equivalent of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. • Washington’s willingness to use military power without international accountability ‘‘inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction’’ and contradicts its 

declared policy of checking the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). • The United States (joined in instances by its allies) is backtracking on, or scrapping, important arms control agreements, 

among them the 1972 ABM Treaty; the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, as revised in 1999 (which only four parties, including Russia but excluding the US, have ratified), and the BushPutin framework agreement to cut each side’s stock of operational 

strategic nuclear warheads to between 1700 and 2000 by the end 

of 2012. 

• The United States has violated the 1990 commitment that 

NATO forces would not be stationed east of Germany. Indeed, 

Washington has led the charge to expand NATO, a symbol of the 

very Cold War it claims is over, by admitting not only states from 

Central Europe, but former Soviet republics as well. This has 

brought NATO to Russia’s doorstep, and for no compelling reason. 

• Washington invokes the nuclear threat posed by Iran and 

North Korea to emplace ballistic missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland. Yet neither the Iranians nor the North Koreans 

are able to strike these NATO members; nor, Putin implied, do 

they have reason to. The bottom line is that this initiative is a gratuitous provocation aimed at Russia. 

• Moscow and Washington, face common problems despite the 

dangers posed by these American policies and must act in concert. 

85 

Among these problems is the spread of WMD, especially into the 

hands of terrorists. Russia stands ready to cooperate. 

There is no monochrome view of Russia within the United 

States. Still, there is an overwhelming consensus that the euphoria 

of the 1990s—hope abounded then about the rise of a democratic 

Russian polity and of a US-Russian partnership of solidarity and 

cooperation—has dissipated. 

Regardless of how they apportion blame for the state of the USRussian relations, American experts agree that it is bad and that 

any improvement in the near term is unlikely. Most also believe 

that democracy in Putin’s Russia is eroding steadily and that a bellicose, even xenophobic, nationalism is gaining ground. This tends 

to be the assessment of even those who believe that the United 

States shares most of the blame for the poor condition of US-Russian relations. The evidence is simply too obvious and ample to dismiss. 

The Bush administration’s assessment has also become pessimistic and those within it who have always been wary of Russia 

now have the upper hand. This is in sharp contrast to the days 

when Presidents Bush and Putin seemed to have struck a friendship, with Bush claiming to have seen good in Putin’s soul. Secretary of State Rice’s public characterization of Russia’s claims that 

the deployment of ballistic missiles on NATO’s eastern flank constituted a threat to its security as ‘‘preposterous’’ is emblematic of 

the change and was also notable because, while it waved off Moscow’s concerns, it failed to give any credence to Russia’s skepticism 

about the alleged threats posed to the alliance by the Iranian and 

North Korean nuclear programs. 

So what where does this leave us? A look back at Weimar Germany helps answer the question. While no two periods in history 

are identical, there are some parallels between Russia today and 

Germany after 1918. Both lost a war and were humiliated as a result: World War I in German’s case, the Cold War in Russia’s. 

What followed was a loss of prestige and the forfeiture of great 

power status. Both states were preoccupied by their co-ethnics and 

their fate in nearby countries. Both suffered a catastrophe economic collapse (Germany in the 1930s, Russia in the 1990s). Both 

experienced bouts of political instability, which were followed the 

emergence of a strong leader. 

My point is not that Russia today bears any resemblance to Nazi 

Germany. But the wounded nationalism that followed the loss of 

prestige and great power status is striking, the yearning for order, 

the erosion of democracy, and the growing salience of ideologies 

that scapegoat ethnic and religious minorities is evident in both 

cases. Putin’s Russia is certainly not an expansionist power, but it 

is determined to regain lost respect, secure predominance in its 

neighborhood, and—with high oil prices having filled its coffers and 

spurred rapid economic growth—confident enough to stake its 

claims. 

It would be mistaken to attribute the political trends in Russia 

principally to Putin’s tough personality, KGB background, or control over television (and, recent events would suggest, also to an extent over radio programming); they reflect Russian public opinion, 

which is why Putin has sky-high approval ratings. Portrayals of 

86 

Putin in the American press these days focus nowadays on his 

authoritarianism, but Russians applaud him as a strong leader 

who stands up to their country’s adversaries and has restored national dignity. They see this as a welcome contrast to the Yeltsin 

years, which featured a leader with a penchant for buffoonish and 

inebriated behavior, a political order marked by cronyism and instability, and an economy crisis that pushed millions into penury. 

Now Russia seems to be on the comeback trail—with a strong 

economy and a decisive leader. Russians like that. They have paid 

a price to be sure. Television is now controlled by the state, radio 

news stations are now coming under pressure, and print journalists 

work in a more restrictive environment. There are restrictions on 

rallies and demonstrations, which risk being broken up by police 

using rough tactics. Former KGB officers occupy high position in 

the political system. The toothless parliament is dominated by the 

pro-Putin United Russia party and does his bidding. There is no 

political opposition to speak of form opposition political parties and 

civic organizations. 

But Russians seem to quite willing to pay this price, seems not 

to matter terribly much. Even were the regime to cease unleashing 

Interior Ministry troops against meetings supporting opposition 

leader Gary Kasparov—which do not draw many Russians in any 

event—his political message would gain little resonance within 

Russian society. 

But just how strong is Putin’s Russia? The commonplace view is 

that Russia has reemerging as a great power. But I believe this interpretation skates over many continuing sources of Russia’s weakness and conflates Russia’s rising rhetoric with reality. 

In fact, Russia’s anger derives substantially from the gap between its aspirations and self image on the one hand and the 

power it possesses on the other. Despite all that one hears these 

days about Russian resurgence, Russia continues to be encumbered 

by a number of weaknesses, which, moreover, will not be overcome 

for the foreseeable future. Consider some examples: 

• Political weakness lies beneath the fac ̧ade of a strong authoritarian state. The 1993 Yeltsin constitution paved the way for a 

super-presidency which overshadowed the parliament and the judiciary, which now have little independent power. Putin has used the 

1993 political design to concentrate power in his hands. As a result, 

the polity is over-personalized and under-institutionalized. Too 

much depends on one man; hence the anxiety created by the next 

presidential election and the speculation over whether the constitution will be amended to give Putin a third term or, if not, whom 

he will anoint as his successor. Despite the lack of any organized 

political opposition, the regime is insecure and uses force to disband marches by Kasparov’s supporters, who are completely ineffectual as a political force. These are not signs of a consolidated 

and stable political system. 

• Russia remains economically weak. True, economic growth that 

has averaged 6 percent per annum since 2000. A sizeable middle 

class has emerged; malls, fancy restaurants, and foreign cars are 

a common sight in Russia’s big cities; and high oil prices have produced foreign exchange reserves in excess of $250 billion. Nevertheless, the Russian economy, calculated using exchange rates, is the 

87 

size of that of the Netherlands. Its per capita income is comparable 

to Botswana’s. Russia is the odd man out in the G-8, the club of 

the world’s largest economies (which excludes China and India, 

both of which have much larger economies than Russia’s). • Standard measures used to compare countries’ economic 

strength highlight Russia’s weakness. Its economy is the world’s 

10th largest—about the size of the Netherlands’—but it is much 

smaller than those of the leading Western and Asian economies 

with which Russia hopes to compete in the global marketplace. 

Russia places 13th in a list of 50 countries ranked by the value of 

their exports, trailing Belgium, which has a population only onetenth as large as Russia’s and GDP with half the value. Moreover, 

energy, other raw materials, and arms account for over 70 percent 

of Russia’s exports—energy alone for two-thirds. Russia’s share of 

global exports is 2.4 percent and imports 1.2 percent. Of the $648 

billion in worldwide foreign direct investment in 2004, only 1.7 percent went to Russia. An annual ranking of 62 countries on key indices of globalization by a well known consultancy placed Russia in 

47th place for 2005. • The Russian army is a shadow of its mighty Soviet Union 

counterpart. The main weapons platforms are aging, 40 percent of 

draftees were declared physically or mentally unfit, the frequency 

and scale of major exercises is down, and draft evasion is pervasive 

given the terrible life of the enlisted man, who is subjected to deeprooted and brutal hazing. The government has increased defense 

spending massively since 2004, but the military’s problems are so 

severe that it will take years to overcome them. • Russia’s human capital is being eroded by cardiovascular disease, rising HIV/AIDS infection rates, high levels of suicide, and alcoholism and drug addiction. Russia is the only industrialized country in which male life expectancy is declining. (Russia was the sole 

European country in a recent WHO list of countries with the highest incidence of tuberculosis per 100,00 people; and it topped the 

WHO’s list for suicide rates.) The population shrinking by 750,000 

annually; it stands at 148 million now, but is expected to be 121 

million by 2050. Moreover, it is graying as it shrinks, making for 

a less productive workforce and increasing costs to support the 

aged. There were six people of working age for every retiree in 

1995; by 2010 the ratio is expected to be 2:1. 

• Oil and gas are Russia’s strong suits, but the wealth they 

bring have strengthened the state’s political power, weakened democracy, increased governmental control over the energy sector, 

and boosted already rampant corruption. Russia is, in this respect, 

similar to many hydrocarbon economies. But there are problems 

even in the energy sector. The pipeline system is shopworn and existing levels of investments are insufficient to keep oil production 

rising. 

• The lands of the former Soviet Union aside, it is hard to find 

a place where Russia exercises major influence. For its poor and 

weak neighbors, Russia is a power to be reckoned with. In Georgia 

and Moldova, Russian support sustains breakaway statelets. Moscow has used energy supplies to exert pressure on Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine. But the result has been to increase anti-Russian 

sentiment in these countries. 

88 

• Russia is not looked upon by other states as a model, the use 

of the Russian language in science, technology, and commerce is on 

the decline (even within the states of the former Soviet Union), and 

China and India are the emerging new centers of global power. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, allow me to specify the implications of 

my analysis for American policy toward Russia: 

1) There is no alternative to engaging Russia, a country with 148 

million people, 11 time zones, a landmass larger than the US and 

Canada combined, vast deposits of oil and gas, and thousands of 

nuclear weapons. Yet we must not let alarmist ideas about the resurgence of Russian power shape our policies. The best way to 

make Russia an adversary is to treat it as one. 

2) We may certainly wish for a democratic Russia and must use 

our soft power (trade, student exchanges, cultural contact, and the 

like) to that end. But we must not delude ourselves into thinking 

that we can play a substantial role in determining what sort of society emerges in Russia. We cannot, and efforts to do so will only 

make bilateral relations worse, while making anti-democratic 

forces stronger by allowing them to play the ultranationalist card. 

Moreover, it will make cooperation on matters of common interest 

even harder by creating a backlash against what will be perceived 

as arrogant American meddling in Russia’s internal affairs. 

3) We must identify key areas of common interest—terrorism, Islamic radicalism, the drug trade, the proliferation of WMD, and nuclear arms control—and insulate them from the ups and downs in 

bilateral relations. The way to do so is by ensuring that day-to-day 

institutionalized cooperation between our two countries proceeds on 

these fronts so that each side gets used to the process of cooperation and keeps in mind that, our differences notwithstanding, we 

have important interests in common. 

4) We must never concede Russia’s primacy in the former Soviet 

states and must engage them on all fronts (political, economic, and 

cultural) or make our policies toward them a function of our relationship with Russia. But we must also not—however inadvertently—encourage recklessness in their leaders by leading to believe 

that their close relationship with us absolves them of responsibility 

of forge a stable relationship with Russia. To do so would be to increase the risk of conflict and to assume responsibilities we cannot 

shoulder. 

5) While Russia cannot be allowed to decide NATO’s policies, we 

must ask ourselves whether the plans to enlarge it further and to 

build anti-ballistic missile defenses in countries on NATO’s eastern 

flank are worth the price of alienating Russia. The expansion of 

NATO has already cost us a high political price in Russia and additional decisions concerning NATO cannot be separated from the 

likely consequences for our relationship with Russia. 

6) We must encourage our allies to reduce their dependence on 

Russian energy and continue to help oil- and gas-producing states 

in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea zone to find pipeline routes 

that bypass Russia. 

7) We must look at Putin’s Munich performance as an example 

of how not to conduct diplomacy. No matter how troubled our relationship with Russia, no matter how hard it is to win Russian cooperation on important global problems, public hectoring and posVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:22 Nov 08, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 E:\WORK\052407 HAROLD PsN: HAROLD
89 

turing will only strengthen the forces within Russia that oppose democracy, civil liberties, and openness toward the outside world. 

That is not in the American interest. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, 

thank you for your time and attention. 

90 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY IGOR ZEVELEV, 

WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF OF RIA NOVOSTI, RUSSIAN 

NEWS AND INFORMATION AGENCY 

Members of the Senate, House, and the Commission, I’d like to 

thank you for inviting me to speak about Russia today. 

The views I am going to express are entirely my own and do not 

necessarily represent the position of the Russian Government, the 

Russian Embassy, or RIA Novosti. 

As Russian parliamentary and presidential elections approach in 

2007–2008, many analysts will call for Washington to make democratization a central component of its policy toward Russia. 

Democratic institutions lie at the core of American identity, and 

U.S. foreign policy reasserts this fact by promoting these values in 

foreign lands. Such efforts may work if applied in the right place 

at the right time. Russia today may be a difficult place to promote 

democracy from outside. There are two major reasons for this. The 

first one is the nature of American-Russian relations these days. 

The second reason is domestic political climate and the attitudes of 

the Russian people. 

Russia considers itself an independent center of power and would 

hate to be treated like a student. In my opinion, the main driving 

force of the changes in the nature of the Russian-American interaction is President Putin’s desire to renegotiate Russia’s relationship with the West. This aspiration reflects the attitudes of both 

the Russian elite and the general public and their dissatisfaction 

with Russia’s role as a junior partner of the West in the 90s. 

President Putin’s speech in Munich on February 10 caught many 

by surprise, but it was not unexpected for those who followed the 

evolution of Russian foreign policy in 2006–2007 closely. This 

speech was a reflection of Russia’s growing assertiveness on the 

international arena. The president’s message to the US was very 

blunt: We are back as a global player and you need to talk to us 

as equals. President Putin’s critique was not aimed at US policy towards Russia. Putin expressed the growing displeasure with the 

whole system of international relations that the US was trying to 

shape. 

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has set 

the agenda and the rules of the game in many interactions with 

Russia. But America has had much less leverage in affecting Russia’s preferences, desires and thoughts in those areas where the 

two countries’ fundamental beliefs about the world differed. 

Unlike Western Europe after World War II, or Central Europe 

after the Cold War, Russia questions the habitual American assertion that it was the United States who won these wars. American 

preponderance is not seen in Russia as a source of legitimate authority. 

In this context, any attempt to encourage faster democratization 

will be seen as yet another instrument to dominate through helping pro-Western leaders come to power, or simply as a tool to weaken Russia. This is not only the view of the Russian elite, but is also 

a very popular attitude. With Russia striving to restore its status 

in the world arena, its confidence strengthened and its economy 

booming, criticism of Russia’s democratic record will inevitably be 

91 

seen as rhetoric designed to conceal American concerns about Russia’s revival under President Putin. 

It is unrealistic to think that Russian democracy, human rights 

and civil society will improve if the United States applies pressure. 

Russian perceptions have changed dramatically; for mainstream 

domestic Russian discourse, political stability and order have greater value than democracy. Democracy is often associated with the 

chaos, the collapse of the state and the material gains of the very 

few that occurred in the ’90s. 

Excessive U.S. pressure could cause the Russian public to shift 

toward seeing the universal values of democracy and human rights 

as merely instruments of foreign political influence. If that happens, the future of Russian democracy may indeed become bleak. 

Having said all this, I would like to suggest a cautiously optimistic view on the future of democracy in Russia. The middle class 

is growing rapidly. It cherishes many freedoms that exist in Russia: freedom to earn money, to buy property, to travel. This is remarkable progress in comparison with Soviet times. Gradually, the 

middle class will demand a better and more independent judiciary 

to protect newly acquired property and freedoms. The Russian people will also insist on a real struggle against corruption. Combating 

corruption is impossible without a competitive political arena. Finally, there will be more demand for democratic institutions. All 

this has to grow from below. 

In conclusion, let me address the question of what would be the 

best US policy towards Russia under the given circumstances. I 

think Russia would be encouraged to cooperate with advanced democracies through a consistent policy of keeping Russia ‘‘in.’’ In the 

G8, in the Russia-NATO Council, in the OSCE, in the 

antiterrorism coalition, in the Six-party talks on North Korea, in 

the emerging coalition that tries to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran, 

in the Middle East Quartet, eventually—in the WTO, and so on. 

It would be counterproductive to view these institutions as merely instruments of hard pressure on Russia. Russia must become a 

real stakeholder in these institutions, as well as in all other global, 

political and economic arrangements. Russia can be a valuable 

partner of the United States in the areas of shared or overlapping 

interests. Mutually advantageous cooperation with the United 

States and other democracies will create a favorable international 

environment for positive developments in Russia. 

Thank you very much. 

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