alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Michael Murphy et al., Appellants, v Bertha Demas, Respondent.

[716 NYS2d 672]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Sherwood, J.), dated» December 13, 1999, as granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Michael Murphy did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Orderéd that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

In support of her motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted the report of Dr. Marc A. Berezin, an orthopedic surgeon, evaluating a magnetic resonance image of the injured plaintiff’s lumbosacral spine which showed a disc herniation at L4-5 and disc bulges at L4-5 and L5-S1 *(see, Boehm v Estate of Mack,*255 AD2d 749; *Flanagan v Hoeg,*212 AD2d 756, 757). Dr. Berezin also examined the injured plaintiff and found some loss of range of motion in the injured plaintiff’s back. The defendant failed to adequately demonstrate that the herniation was not causally related to the subject accident. Accordingly, the defendant failed to make a prima facie case for *209judgment as a matter of law, and the Supreme Court should have denied the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint *(see, Thomas v Joyner,*237 AD2d 347; *Mendola v Demetres,*212 AD2d 515). O’Brien, J. P., Sullivan, Krausman, Goldstein and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
Notice of Exercise jointly issued by Venrock Associates V, L.P.



 Exhibit 10.6 
 NOTICE OF EXERCISE 
  

	To:	TUDOU HOLDINGS LIMITED (the “Company”) 

 Each of the undersigned hereby conditionally elects to purchase all Series E Preferred Shares issuable pursuant to the terms of the warrants to purchase Series E Preferred Shares issued by the Company in
the undersigned’s respective names (the “Warrants”), with such exercise (i) to be effective immediately prior to the closing of the IPO (as defined in the Warrants) of the Company and (ii) to be effective if and only
if the per share price at which ordinary shares (or ADS securities representing an ordinary share) are sold to the public in the IPO equals or exceeds the exercise price per share of the Warrants. For the avoidance of doubt, an aggregate of
147,693 Series E Preferred Shares are issuable under the Warrants. This election may be revoked by the undersigned at any time prior to the effective time of the exercise of the Warrants. 

If the conditions for exercise set forth above are satisfied, payment of the Exercise Price (as defined in the Warrant) required under
the Warrant will be paid by wire transfer to an account to be designated by the Company, and original Warrants will be delivered to the Company, each within ten (10) business days after the exercise of the Warrants, as provided by the terms ofthe
Warrants. 
 The undersigned hereby represents and warrants that the undersigned is acquiring such shares for its own account
for investment purposes only, and not for resale or with a view to distribution of such shares or any part thereof. 
  

			
	VENROCK ASSOCIATES V, L.P.
	By:	 	Venrock Management V, LLC
	Its:	 	General Partner
	
	VENROCK PARTNERS V, L.P.
	By:	 	Venrock Partners Management V, LLC
	Its:	 	General Partner
	
	VENROCK ENTREPRENEURS FUND V, L.P.
	By:	 	VEF Management V, LLC
	Its:	 	General Partner



			
		
	By:	 	 /s/ David L. Stepp

		
	Name:	 	David L. Stepp
		
	Title:	 	Authorized Signatory
		
	Address:  	 	3340 Hillview Avenue
		 	Palo Alto, California 94304
		 	USA
Atheron Inc.: Exhibit 10.1 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com






RELEASE 

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that Susanna Hilario,
(“Hilario”), for good and valuable consideration, including but not
limited to the consummation of a sale of her shares in Atheron, Inc.
(“ATHERON”), the receipt and sufficiency of which consideration is hereby
acknowledged, agrees as follows: 

1. Hilario hereby remises, releases and forever discharges
ATHERON and its assigns, employees and servants, and, where applicable, the
executors, administrators, successors and assigns from any and all manner of
action and actions, cause and causes of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of
money, claims, demands and obligations whatsoever, at law or in equity, which
Hilario may have had or now have or which her assigns, receivers,
receiver-managers, trustees, affiliates, and, where applicable, the heirs,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns of her hereafter can, shall or
may have existing up to the present time by reason of any matter cause or thing
whatsoever relating to or arising out of the relationship between the Hilario
and ATHERON relating to, arising out of or in connection with any and all
dealings between the parties to the date hereof. 

2. Notwithstanding the above provision and for greater
clarification, this Release does not apply to any claims that may arise after
the date of this Release. 

3. It is understood and agreed that Hilario shall not commence
or continue any claims or proceedings against anyone in respect of anything
hereby released which may result in a claim or proceedings against ATHERON. If
any such claim or proceeding results in any claim or proceeding against ATHERON,
then the party bringing such claim or proceeding shall indemnify and save
harmless the other party from all resulting liabilities, obligations and costs.


4. Hilario hereby represents that she is the only party
entitled to the consideration expressed in this Release, and has not assigned
any right of action released hereby to any other firm, corporation or person.


5. Hilario acknowledges that she has read this document and
fully understands the terms of this Release, and acknowledges that this Release
has been executed voluntarily after receiving independent legal advice. 

6. This Release is governed by the laws of Nevada, and the
parties attorn to the jurisdiction of the Courts of Nevada with regard to any
dispute arising out of this Release.

7. Execution and delivery of this document by fax shall
constitute effective execution and delivery. Execution of this document by a
corporation shall be effective notwithstanding that its corporate seal is not
affixed hereto. 

DATED for reference November 5, 2010. 

	 	/s/Susanna Hilario 
	 	SUSANNA HILARIO
### §292k. Participation by Federal credit unions in Federal, State, and private student loan insurance programs

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, Federal credit unions shall, pursuant to regulations of the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration, have power to make insured loans to eligible students in accordance with the provisions of this subpart relating to Federal insured loans.

(July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title VII, §712, as added Pub. L. 102–408, title I, §102, Oct. 13, 1992, 106 Stat. 2008.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

A prior section 292k, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title VII, §710, formerly §711, as added Oct. 12, 1976, Pub. L. 94–484, title II, §209, 90 Stat. 2253; renumbered §710 and amended Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. 97–35, title XXVII, §§2720(b), 2722, 95 Stat. 915, related to differential tuition and fees, prior to the general revision of this subchapter by Pub. L. 102–408.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Transfer of Functions

Functions vested in Administrator of National Credit Union Administration transferred and vested in National Credit Union Administration Board pursuant to section 1752a of Title 12, Banks and Banking.
#### The People of the State of New York v. Carl Edelson.

Motion for leave to appeal as a poor person denied. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, McNally, Stevens and Noonan, JJ.
#### Robert Eden, Appellant, v St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center et al., Respondents.

[833 NYS2d 433]

*216Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.), entered October 19, 2005, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied plaintiff’s cross motion for leave to amend the complaint, and order, same court and Justice, entered December 7, 2005, which granted plaintiffs motion for reargument and, upon reargument, adhered to the prior determination, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff was formerly employed by defendant hospital as an attending physician in its department of obstetrics and gynecology; the three individual defendants were the other members of the hospital’s maternal/fetal medicine group during the period of plaintiff’s employment. To the extent the complaint and proposed amended complaint assert claims based on the hospital’s allegedly wrongful termination of plaintiffs employment and withdrawal of his staff privileges, the motion court correctly concluded that, whether such claims seek damages or reinstatement, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain them since they had not yet been reviewed by the Public Health Council under the grievance procedure provided by Public Health Law § 2801-b *(see Indemini v Beth Israel Med. Ctr.,*4 NY3d 63 [2005]; *Gelbard v Genesee Hosp.,*87 NY2d 691 [1996]; *Moallem v Jamaica Hosp.,*264 AD2d 621 [1999]). To the extent plaintiffs pleadings assert claims to recover unpaid compensation allegedly earned while he was actually employed by the hospital (i.e., prior to his termination), such claims, even if not subject to Public Health Council review, are, in both the original complaint and the proposed amended complaint, intermingled with the claims barred by Public Health Law § 2801-b rather than separately pleaded. We decline to parse plaintiffs pleadings for the purpose of severing the cognizable claims, if any, from those that are premature. Concur—Friedman, J.E, Sullivan, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Form
10-Q for the fiscal quarter and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001021206
<NAME> DELPHOS CITIZENS BANCORP, INC.
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                       1,770,694
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                       8,683,064
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    745,328
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      18,219,280
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        18,426,407
<LOANS>                                     76,393,536
<ALLOWANCE>                                    100,360
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             107,071,594
<DEPOSITS>                                  76,003,516
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            717,355
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        20,387
<OTHER-SE>                                  30,330,336
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             107,071,594
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              2,844,507
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              590,821
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               251,808
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             3,687,136
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           1,887,663
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,887,663
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        1,799,473
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    6,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                925,852
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                966,820
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     966,820
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   694,745
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .31
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .31
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    3.67
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                   404,193
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               100,360
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              100,360
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           100,360
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Sergio Maldonado Facundo, Appellant

No. 06

- 17

- 00120

- CR v.
The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 336th District Court of Fannin County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. CR

- 16

- 25804 ). Opinion del ivered by Chief Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below

. We affirm the judgment of the tr ial court

. We note that the appellant, Sergio Maldonado Facundo, has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED FEBRUARY 1, 2018 BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### Columbia Banking Savings and Loan Association, Appellant, v 42nd Street Properties, Inc., et al., Respondents.

(Appeal No. 2.)

Judgment unanimously affirmed, without costs, on the original memorandum, and the memorandum denying the motion to renew, at Special Term, Lynch, J. (Appeal from judgment of Onondaga Supreme Court—summary judgment.) Present—Marsh, P. J., Cardamone, Hancock, Jr., Denman and Witmer, JJ.
Amendment to Compensation Schedule



  
 EXHIBIT 10.6

 AMENDMENT TO 
 COMPENSATION SCHEDULE FOR 
 NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTORS 

In September 2010, based in part upon advice received from the independent compensation consultant (Towers Watson) to the Compensation Committee (the
“Committee”) of the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Rural/Metro Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), the Board approved an amendment to the equity grant provisions of the Company’s compensation
policy for non-employee directors. 
 In view of the significant appreciation in the price of the Company’s Common Stock since the previous
equity grant to non-employee directors in December 2009, and to maintain consistency in the value of grants made to non-employee directors from year to year, the Board determined that grants will be made based upon a target value, rather than a
fixed number of shares. 
 Accordingly, effective in fiscal 2011, the compensation policy provides that the annual equity grants to continuing,
non-employee directors will continue to be made in the form of RSUs to be granted on or about the date of the annual meeting of stockholders, but the number of RSUs will be based upon a grant value of $60,000 (rather than the fixed amount of 6,500
RSUs, as previously granted). 
 Other terms and conditions of equity grants to non-employee directors remain unchanged. The maximum number of
RSUs that may be granted to any non-employee director each year remains capped at 7,500 RSUs. Further awards are subject to approval of the Committee.
#### Lewis K. Pearl, administrator of the estate of Mary Louise Pearl, deceased, defendant in error, v. William J. Jackson, receiver of the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company, plaintiff in error.

Action for causing death of child through collision at railroad crossing between automobile and train. Judgment for plaintiff. Error to the Circuit Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. Walter Brewer, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1922.

Reversed and remanded.

Opinion filed April 23, 1923.

H. M. Steely and H. M. Steely, Jr., for plaintiff in error. Brown, Hay & Stephens and Wilbur B. Wicks, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Shurtleff

delivered the opinion of the court.
J-S19022-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

DONALD JAMES STONE

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1657 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered September 13, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0001762-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E. and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 30, 2017

I respectfully dissent, as I would find Dr. Stone freely volunteered his 

self-incriminating statement to Captain Waltman during a break in his 

interrogation. No question had been put to Dr. Stone when he asked to add 

to his written statement, as Trooper Wool, who was conducting the 

investigation, was outside of the prison performing a consent search of 

Stone’s car at the time. In this regard, Trooper Wool’s request to search Dr. 

Stone’s vehicle and the consent search that followed were not the functional 

equivalent of an interrogation, as neither was likely to elicit an incriminating 

response from Stone. See United States v. Bustamante, 493 F.3d 879, 

892 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that “though all interrogation must cease once a 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S19022-17

- 2 -

defendant in custody has invoked his right to counsel, a request to search a 

vehicle or home is not likely to elicit an incriminating response and is 

therefore not interrogation.”). Without questioning, there could have been

no response, and Dr. Stone’s statement is, thus, better understood as a 

spontaneous, voluntary utterance outside the scope of Miranda than it is 

the product of an interrogation. 

While the better practice may have been to provide Dr. Stone with 

Miranda warnings, the setting was not so inherently coercive to require 

them. Dr. Stone had been advised that his status as a contracting physician 

placed him beyond the reach of a Department of Corrections policy 

subjecting employees to adverse employment decisions if they failed to 

comply with investigations. Captain Waltman also told Stone he was not 

under arrest and would probably be free to go home by the end of the day. 

Furthermore, Dr. Stone was an educated person, a physician who was at his 

place of employment at the time in question, and there is no evidence that 

Captain Waltman or Trooper Wool engaged in misleading or intimidating 

tactics designed to elicit an incriminating statement.

The facts, therefore, indicate that Dr. Stone offered his selfincriminating statement independently of official questioning or conduct such 

that it should not be subject to suppression. Accordingly, I respectfully 

dissent.
§ 1007.25 Eligible lenders. ( a ) *In general.* To qualify for a guarantee under this part, a loan shall be made only by a lender meeting qualifications established in this part and approved by HUD, including any lender described in paragraph (b), of this section, except that a loan otherwise insured or guaranteed by an agency of the Federal Government or made by the DHHL from amounts borrowed from the United States shall not be eligible for a guarantee under this part.
( b ) *Approval.* The following lenders shall be considered to be lenders that have been approved by HUD: ( 1 ) Any mortgagee approved by HUD for participation in the single family mortgage insurance program under title II of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.A. 1707 *et seq.*);
( 2 ) Any lender that makes housing loans under chapter 37 of title 38, United States Code, that are automatically guaranteed under section 3702(d) of title 38, United States Code;
( 3 ) Any lender approved by the Secretary of Agriculture to make guaranteed loans for single family housing under the Housing Act of 1949 (42 U.S.C.A. 1441 *et seq.*);
( 4 ) Any other lender that is supervised, approved, regulated, or insured by any agency of the Federal Government; and
( 5 ) Any other lender approved by HUD under this part.
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BARRY J. PORTMAN

Federal Public Defender

SHAWN HALBERT

Assistant Federal Public Defender

450 Golden Gate Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102

Telephone: (415) 436-7700

Counsel for Defendant Saul Pinon-Villa

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAUL PINON-VILLA,

Defendant.

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No. CR 09-001125 MMC

STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED]

ORDER CONTINUING STATUS

DATE EXCLUDING TIME UNDER 18

U.S.C. § 3161

The parties are scheduled to appear before this Court for status on January 13, 2010 at 2:30

p.m. The parties request that the matter be continued by one week so that defense counsel can

convey the government’s offer and defendant can decide how to proceed. 

The parties also agree that the time between January 13, 2010 and January 20, 2010 should be

excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. The continuance is necessary for effective preparation of

counsel, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (h)(7)(B)(iv), and the ends of justice served by granting

such a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18

U.S.C.

/ / /

STIP. & ORDER

No. CR 09-001125 MMC - 1 -

;

Case 3:09-cr-01125-MMC Document 11 Filed 01/12/10 Page 1 of 2
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§ 3161(h)(7)(A).

SO STIPULATED:

JOSEPH P. RUSSONIELLO 

United States Attorney

DATED: January 12, 2010 /s/ 

DARYL EREMIN

Special Assistant United States Attorney 

DATED: January 12, 2010 /s/ 

SHAWN HALBERT

Assistant Federal Public Defender

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the continuance of time for the next hearing

before this court from January 13, 2010 to January 20, 2010 is warranted because the failure to grant

the requested continuance would deny the defense effective preparation of counsel; thus, the ends of

justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a

speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(iv).

SO ORDERED.

DATED:______________ _______________________________________

 THE HONORABLE MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Court

STIP. & ORDER

No. CR 09-001125 MMC - 3 -

January 13, 2010

Case 3:09-cr-01125-MMC Document 11 Filed 01/12/10 Page 2 of 2