alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 99.7



VERMILION
ENERGY INC.
CERTIFICATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER



Pursuant to Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code



In connection with the annual report of
Vermilion Energy Inc. (the “Corporation”) on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lorenzo Donadeo, Chief Executive Officer of
the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Corporation.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated at Calgary, Alberta, Canada this 8th
day of March 2013.



| | (“Lorenzo Donadeo”)                     
| | ----------------------------------------
| | ______________________________________  
| | [Signature]                             
| |                                         
| | Lorenzo Donadeo, Chief Executive Officer











EXHIBIT 99.7



VERMILION
ENERGY INC.
CERTIFICATE OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER



Pursuant to Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code



In connection with the annual report of
Vermilion Energy Inc. (the “Corporation”) on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Curtis Hicks, Chief Financial Officer of the
Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated at Calgary, Alberta, Canada this 8th
day of March 2013.



| | (“Curtis Hicks”)                      
| | --------------------------------------
| | ______________________________________
| | [Signature]                           
| |                                       
| | Curtis Hicks, Chief Financial Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

LENNY REID,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 104 MAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 12th day of August, 2020

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### § 213.278 Distribution of distributive share.

When the contract of insurance is terminated by reason of payment in full of the mortgage or by voluntary termination approved by the Commissioner, and at such time or times prior to such termination as the Commissioner may approve, the Commissioner may distribute to a mortgagor under a mortgage that is the obligation of the Cooperative Management Housing Insurance Fund a share of the Participating Reserve Account in such manner and amount as he shall determine to be equitable and in accordance with sound actuarial and accounting practice.
Editorial Note on Part 200
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 200 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

§ 200.925b Residential and institutional building code comparison items. HUD will review each local code submitted under this chapter to determine whether it regulates all of the following areas and subareas: ( a ) *Fire safety.* ( 1 ) Construction types permitted;
( 2 ) Allowable height and area;
( 3 ) Fire separations;
( 4 ) Fire resistance requirements;
( 5 ) Means of egress (number and distance);
( 6 ) Individual unit smoke detectors;
( 7 ) Building alarm systems;
( 8 ) Highrise criteria;
( b ) *Light and ventilation.* ( 1 ) Habitable rooms;
( 2 ) Bath and toilet rooms.
( c ) *Structural loads and seismic design.* ( 1 ) Design live loads;
( 2 ) Design dead loads;
( 3 ) Snow loads;
( 4 ) Wind loads.
( 5 ) Earthquake loads (in localities identified by ASCE 7-88 (formerly ANSI A58.1-82) as being in seismic zones 1, 2, 3, or 4, and Guam).
( 6 ) Special loads, i.e., soil pressure, railings, interior walls etc.
( d ) *Foundation systems.* ( 1 ) Soil tests;
( 2 ) Foundation depths;
( 3 ) Footings;
( 4 ) Foundation materials criteria;
( 5 ) Piles, i.e., materials, allowable stresses, design;
( 6 ) Excavation;
( e ) *Materials standards.*
( f ) *Construction components.* ( 1 ) Steel;
( 2 ) Masonry;
( 3 ) Concrete;
( 4 ) Gypsum;
( 5 ) Lumber;
( 6 ) Roof construction and covering;
( 7 ) Chimneys and fireplaces.
( g ) *Glass.* ( 1 ) Thickness/area requirements;
( 2 ) Safety glazing.
( h ) *Mechanical.* ( 1 ) Heating, cooling and ventilation systems;
( 2 ) Boilers and pressure vessels;
( 3 ) Gas, liquid and solid fuel piping and equipment;
( 4 ) Chimneys and vents;
( 5 ) Ventilation (air changes).
( i ) *Plumbing.* ( 1 ) Materials standards;
( 2 ) Sizing and installing drainage systems;
( 3 ) Vents and venting;
( 4 ) Traps;
( 5 ) Cleanouts;
( 6 ) Plumbing fixtures;
( 7 ) Water supply and distribution;
( 8 ) Storm drain systems.
( j ) *Electrical.* ( 1 ) Wiring design and protection;
( 2 ) Wiring methods and materials;
( 3 ) Equipment for general use;
( 4 ) Special equipment;
( 5 ) Special conditions;
( 6 ) Communication systems.
( k ) *Elevators.* ( 1 ) Reference ASME/ANSI Standard A 17.1-1987; and the ASME/ANSI A17.1b-1989 Addenda.
( 2 ) Acceptance tests and periodic tests.
[49 FR 18696, May 1, 1984, as amended at 51 FR 28699, Aug. 11, 1986; 58 FR 60248, Nov. 15, 1993; 59 FR 36695, July 19, 1994]
§ 9.13 Access to classified information by historical researchers and certain former government personnel. ( a ) The restriction in E.O. 13526 and predecessor orders on limiting access to classified information to individuals who have a need-to-know the information may be waived, under the conditions set forth below, for persons who: are engaged in historical research projects; have served as President or Vice President; have occupied senior policy-making positions in the Department of State or other U.S. government agencies to which they were appointed or designated by the President or the Vice President. It does not include former Foreign Service Officers as a class or persons who merely received assignment commissions as Foreign Service Officers, Foreign Service Reserve Officers, Foreign Service Staff Officers, and employees.
( b ) Requests by such persons must be submitted in writing to the Office of Information Programs and Services at the address set forth above and must include a general description of the records sought, the time period covered by the records that are the subject of the request, and an explanation why access is sought. Requests for access by such requesters may be granted if: ( 1 ) The Secretary or the Senior Agency Official determines in writing that access is consistent with the interests of national security;
( 2 ) The requester agrees in writing to safeguard the information from unauthorized disclosure or compromise;
( 3 ) The requester submits a statement in writing authorizing the Department to review any notes and manuscripts created as a result of access;
( 4 ) The requester submits a statement in writing that any information obtained from review of the records will not be disseminated without the express written permission of the Department;
( c ) If a requester uses a research assistant, the requester and the research assistant must both submit a statement in writing acknowledging that the same access conditions set forth in paragraphs (b)(2) through (b)(4) of this section apply to the research assistant. Such a research assistant must be working for the applicant and not gathering information for publication on his or her own behalf.
( d ) Access granted under this section shall be limited to items the official originated, reviewed, signed, or received while serving as a Presidential or Vice Presidential appointee or designee or as President or Vice President.
( e ) Such requesters may seek declassification and release of material to which they have been granted access under this section through either the FOIA or the mandatory declassification review provisions of E.O. 13526. Such requests shall be processed in the order received, along with other FOIA and mandatory declassification review requests, and shall be subject to the fees applicable to FOIA requests.
The Honorable Nancy C. Dreher, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of

1

Minnesota.

United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________

98-6026MN

____________

In re: David A. Russ *

*

Debtor *

*

Kevin J. Lamson *

*

Appellant * Appeal from the United States

* Bankruptcy Court for the

* District of Minnesota

v. *

*

David A. Russ *

*

Appellee *

____________

Submitted: June 9, 1998

Filed: July 7, 1998

____________

Before KOGER, Chief Judge, SCHERMER and SCOTT, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Kevin J. Lamson timely appeals from a bankruptcy court order that denied his

1

motion seeking sanctions against the debtor, David A. Russ, and the debtor’s attorneys, Faye
2

Knowles and David Marshall, under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011 and requesting an order directing

the debtor and his attorneys to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court,

and that ordered Lamson to pay the reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the

debtor and his attorneys in opposing his motion. We affirm based on the thorough and wellreasoned opinion of the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court’s order is based on findings

of fact that are not clearly erroneous and no error of law appears. See 8 Cir. R. 47B; 8 Cir. th th

BAP Local R. 8001A(b)(4).

Affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL, EIGHTH

CIRCUIT
#### Isaac Elliason, appellant, v. Phillip Paskind, appellee.

Gen. No. 28,084.

Suit for dissolution of mercantile partnership and for an accounting. Decree dissolving partnership and finding that profits amount to $7260.73. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar M. Torrison, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1922.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed May 28, 1923.

Teller, Levit, Silvertrust & Levi and Fred S. Loomis, for appellant. Frisch & Frisch, for appellee; Morris Frisch and Douglas C. Gregg, of counsel.

Mr. Justice Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court,
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE HAND PROMOTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MALAYTHONG BUSH a/k/a

MALAYTHONG SINGH, individually

and d/b/a LUCKY PIZZA,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-00454 WHA

ORDER VACATING HEARING

AND DENYING AS MOOT

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO SET

ASIDE SETTLEMENT AND

REOPEN ACTION

Plaintiff Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. has sued defendant Malaythong Bush for allegedly

exhibiting at a commercial establishment a pay-per-view fight telecast to which plaintiff claims

to have owned the exclusive domestic commercial exhibition rights. On September 17, 2009,

plaintiff filed a “notice of settlement” stating that the parties had reached a settlement of this

action and would file a stipulation of dismissal on or before March 1, 2010 (Dkt. No. 36). Now

plaintiff has filed a “motion to set aside settlement and reopen action” on the grounds that

defendants have allegedly failed to honor the terms of the settlement agreement. However, no

fully executed and final version of a stipulation of settlement or dismissal was ever filed and the 

Case 3:09-cv-00454-WHA Document 38 Filed 02/17/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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action was accordingly never closed. Plaintiff’s motion is therefore DENIED AS MOOT. All

deadlines set by the case management order (Dkt. No. 33) remain in effect. The hearing

scheduled for February 25, 2010, is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 17, 2010. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-00454-WHA Document 38 Filed 02/17/10 Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 32.1
  SYNUTRA INTERNATIONAL, INC.
  Certification
  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned, Liang Zhang, Chief Executive Officer of Synutra International, Inc. (the “Registrant”), hereby certifies, to his knowledge, that the Registrant’s annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended March 31, 2010 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.
  Date: June 9, 2010By:
/s/ Liang ZhangName:
Liang ZhangTitle:
Chief Executive Officer
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Registrant and will be retained by the Registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
 The foregoing certification is being furnished with the Registrant’s Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350. It is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and it is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Registrant, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
§ 202.2 Definitions. *Act* means the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1702 *et seq.*).
*Claim* means a single family insured mortgage for which the Secretary pays an insurance claim within 24 months after the mortgage is insured.
*Default* means a single family insured mortgage in default for 90 or more days within 24 months after the mortgage is insured.
Lender or Title I lender means a financial institution that: ( a ) Holds a valid Title I Contract of Insurance and is approved by the Secretary under this part as a supervised lender under § 202.6, a nonsupervised lender under § 202.7, an investing lender under § 202.9, or a governmental or similar institution under § 202.10; or
( b ) Is under suspension or held a Title I contract that has been terminated but remains responsible for servicing or selling Title I loans that it holds and is authorized to file insurance claims on such loans.
Loan or Title I loan means a loan authorized for insurance under Title I of the Act.
*Mortgage, Title II mortgage or insured mortgage* means a mortgage or loan insured under Title II or Title XI of the Act.
Mortgagee or Title II mortgagee means a mortgage lender that is approved to participate in the Title II programs as a supervised mortgagee under § 202.6, a nonsupervised mortgagee under § 202.7, an investing mortgagee under § 202.9, or a governmental or similar institution under 202.10.
*Multifamily mortgagee* means a mortgagee approved to participate only in multifamily Title II programs, except that for purposes of § 202.8(b)(1) the term also means a mortgagee approved to participate in both single family and multifamily Title II programs.
*Normal rate* means the rate of defaults and claims on insured mortgages for the geographic area served by a HUD field office, or other area designated by the Secretary, in which a mortgagee originates mortgages.
*Origination approval agreement* means the Secretary's agreement that a mortgagee is approved to originate single family insured mortgages.
*Title I program(s)* means an insurance program or programs authorized by Title I of the Act.
*Title II program(s)* means an insurance program or programs authorized by Title II or Title XI of the Act.
[62 FR 20082, Apr. 24, 1997, as amended at 62 FR 65181, Dec. 10, 1997; 75 FR 20731, Apr. 20, 2010]
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

ANTHONY MICHAEL BOWDEN

,

Appellant

,

v.

T HE STATE OF TEXAS

,

State

. §

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 9

- 00 0 5 7

- C R

Appeal from the

384 th District Court

of El Paso County , Texas

(TC# 20160D05559 )

O R D E R

The Court Grudgingly GRANTS the Appellant ’ s fourth motion for extension of time

within which to file the b rief until December 1 4

, 201 9

. NO FURTHER MOTIONS FOR

EXTENSION OF TIME TO F ILE THE APPELLANT ’ S B R IEF WILL BE CONSIDERED BY

THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that the Hon. William R. Cox

, the Appellant ’ s attorney, prepare

the Appellant ’ s brief and forward the same to this Court on or before December 1 4, 201 9

.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 1 8 th day of November

, 20 1 9

.

PER CURIAM

Before Alley , C.J., Rodriguez and Palafox , JJ.
#### Anna Zorger, appellee, v. Charles M. Wood, appellant.

Action for accounting against executor of a will. Decree for complainant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Edward Barry, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1SS2.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed January 17, 1923.

*Certiorari*denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).

Homer English, Martin A. Brennan and Livingston & Whitmore, for appellant; Sigmund Livingston, of counsel. Stone & Dick, Donnelly & Donnelly and Thomas Kennedy, guardian *act litem,*for appellee.

Mr. Justice Heard

delivered the opinion of the court.
#### CARR v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.

March 21, 1905.)

Cashiers—Diverting Cabs from Destination—Right of Shippeb.

A shipper of freight has no right to have a car diverted en route from the destination provided in the bill of lading to *another, without*paying a reasonable charge therefor.

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Eleventh District.

Action by Charles Herbert Carr against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Argued before SCOTT, O’GORMAN, and BLANCHARD, JJ.

Cornelius Doremus, for appellant.

Robinson, Biddle & Ward, for respondent.

BLANCHARD, J.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment dismissing the complaint. The pleadings were verified in June, 1903. The plaintiff delivered to a southern railroad several car loads of lumber consigned to himself at Philadelphia. In due course the cars containing the lumber came into the hands of defendant, and arrived at Philadelphia. Prior to their arrival the plaintiff had sold the lumber to one Lear, and notified the defendant by mail to change the destination of the cars, and deliver the lumber to Lear. The change of destination necessitated a diversion of the cars to another station. The defendant, in its answer, denies that it received any notice of change of destination; but the lumber was finally delivered to Lear, who was compelled to pay charges upon it for demurrage and other freight and charges, amounting to $95.28, in addition to the regular charges. It was to recover this sum of $95.28 that this action was brought. The plaintiff contends that the defendant should have obeyed his notice to divert the cars when they were en route, and thereby avoided the extra expense. It appears that Lear paid the extra expenses without protest, but, when he came to settle with the plaintiff for the lumber, he charged the amount so paid to the plaintiff.

We are of opinion that the plaintiff failed to show that he is entitled to recover. Lear paid the amount to the defendant which the plaintiff seeks to recover, and there is nothing in the record to show the assignment of the claim from Lear to the plaintiff, nor is it alleged in the complaint. The defendant was under no duty to divert the cars, as the terms of shipment were expressed in the bill of lading. The performance of the contract contained in the bill of lading was all the plaintiff could exact from the defendant. A right on the part of a shipper to divert traffic at will might seriously inconvenience the carrier, and to uphold it would be to force a different contract upon the carrier from that which it had made. Carriers are in business for gain, and, when a shipper wishes to have traffic diverted, as in this case, the law implies an agreement to pay a reasonable charge *800for the diversion. There is no claim that the charge made by the defendant is unreasonable in amount, nor any evidence that the charge made was excessive.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
§ 207.256 Notice to the Commissioner of default. ( a ) If a default as defined in § 207.255(a) or (b) is not cured within the grace period of 30 days provided under § 207.255(a)(3) or (b)(3), the mortgagee must, within 30 days after the date of the end of the grace period, notify the Commissioner of the default, in the manner prescribed in 24 CFR part 200, subpart B.
( b ) The mortgagee must give notice to the Commissioner, in the manner prescribed in 24 CFR part 200, subpart B, of the mortgagor's violation of any covenant, whether or not the mortgagee has accelerated the debt.
[76 FR 24370, May 2, 2011]
#### In the Matter of Charles E. Steinberg, an Attorney.

Fourth Department,

February 23, 1961.

*Max Cohen*for petitioner.

*Samuel Croog*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

Respondent was charged with professional misconduct in that he issued three checks, two of which were unpaid because of insufficient funds. The third check was returned with a notation that the account was closed. All three checks were drawn upon special accounts — one was an attorney account and the other an office account. It is not disputed that the moneys therein were not respondent’s personal funds.

These charges have been admitted by respondent. In addition the attorney has admitted that he accepted a retainer fee in the sum of $200 and thereafter failed to perform the services for which the fee was paid. After the passing of two years and the filing of charges the fee was repaid. Similarly, the amounts of the unpaid checks were repaid after charges had' been filed in this court.

We find respondent guilty of professional misconduct. In fixing punishment we have considered the extensive testimony of doctors and psychiatrists submitted to the Bar Association and the Referee appointed by this court to explore this subsidiary issue and the findings made upon such testimony.

Respondent should be suspended for a period of two years, and thereafter until the further order of this court.

Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Halpern, MoClhsky and Henry, JJ.

Charles E. Steinberg suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years and until the further order of this court.