alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 115.208 Procedures for renewal of certification. ( a ) If the Assistant Secretary affirmatively concludes that the agency's law and performance have complied with the requirements of this part in each of the five years of certification, the Assistant Secretary may renew the certification of the agency.
( b ) In determining whether to renew the certification of an agency, the Assistant Secretary's review may include, but is not limited to: ( 1 ) Performance assessments of the agency conducted by the Department during the five years of certification;
( 2 ) The agency's own certification that the state or local fair housing law continues to be substantially equivalent both “on its face” and “in operation;” (i.e., there have been no amendments to the state or local fair housing law, adoption of rules or procedures concerning the fair housing law, or judicial or other authoritative interpretations of the fair housing law that limit the effectiveness of the agency's fair housing law); and
( 3 ) Any and all public comments regarding the relevant state and local laws and the performance of the agency in enforcing the law.
( c ) If the Assistant Secretary decides to renew an agency's certification, the Assistant Secretary will offer the agency either a new MOU or an Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding (addendum). The new MOU or addendum will extend and update the MOU between HUD and the agency.
( d ) The new MOU or addendum, when signed by all appropriate signatories, will result in the agency's certification being renewed for five years from the date on which the previous MOU was to expire. Appropriate signatories include the Assistant Secretary, the FHEO regional director, and the authorized employee(s) of the agency.
( e ) The provisions of this section may be applied to an agency that has an expired MOU or an expired addendum.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v.

HIEU NGUYEN,

Defendant.

 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. CR 09-0347 MHP

[PROPOSED] PRELIMINARY

ORDER OF FORFEITURE

Having considered the application for a preliminary order of forfeiture filed by the United

States and the plea agreement entered on April 21, 2010, wherein the defendant admitted to the

forfeiture allegation, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following property is forfeited to the United States:

1. one .9mm caliber Llama pistol, bearing an obliterated serial number ,

1/

pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 924(d)(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States, through its appropriate agency, shall 

seize the forfeited property forthwith and publish on www.forfeiture.gov, a government website

for at least thirty days, notice of this Order, notice of the government’s intent to dispose of the

property in such manner as the Attorney General may direct and provide notice that any person,

other than the defendant, having or claiming a legal interest in the property must file a petition

One Llama .9mm Magazine and Win .9mm luger cartridges (8 rounds) are also subject to 1/

forfeiture as they were contained within the Firearm. 

Case 3:09-cr-00347-MHP Document 46 Filed 08/24/10 Page 1 of 2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

with the Court and serve a copy on government counsel within thirty (30) days of the final 

publication of notice or of receipt of actual notice, whichever is earlier.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 32.2(b)(3) of the Federal Criminal

Rules of Procedure, this Preliminary Order of Forfeiture became final as to the defendant at the

time of his sentencing on July 12, 2010 and as such, was made part of the sentence and included

in the judgment dated July 16, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED this day of 2010.

 

MARILYN H. PATEL

United States District Judge

[PROPOSED] PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE 2

CR 09-0347 MHP

23rd August

U

NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Marilyn H. Patel

Case 3:09-cr-00347-MHP Document 46 Filed 08/24/10 Page 2 of 2
§ 2002.11 Agency review of records and aggregating requests. ( a ) *Review of records.* Only requesters who are seeking documents for commercial use may be charged for the time the OIG spends reviewing records to determine whether the records are exempt from mandatory disclosure. Charges will be assessed only for the initial review; *i.e.,* the review undertaken the first time the OIG reviews a particular record or portion of a record to apply an exemption. The OIG will not charge for review at the administrative appeal level of an exemption already applied. However, records or portions of records withheld under an exemption that is subsequently determined not to apply may be reviewed again to determine the applicability of other exemptions not previously considered. The costs for such a subsequent review would be properly assessable. Review time will be assessed at the same rates established for search time in §§ 2002.13 and 15.106 of this title.
( b ) *Aggregating requests.* ( 1 ) The OIG may aggregate multiple requests in cases where unusual circumstances exist and the OIG determines that: ( i ) Certain requests from the same requester or from a group of requesters acting in concert actually constitute a single request; and
( ii ) The requests involve clearly related matters.
( 2 ) Aggregation of requests for this purpose will be conducted independent of aggregation of requests for fee purposes under § 15.106(h) of this title.
§ 202.8 Sponsored third-party originators. ( a ) *Definitions* —*Sponsor.* ( 1 ) With respect to Title I programs, a sponsor is a lender that holds a valid Title I Contract of Insurance and meets the net worth requirement for the class of lender to which it belongs.
( 2 ) With respect to Title II programs, a sponsor is a mortgagee that holds a valid origination approval agreement, is approved to participate in the Direct Endorsement program, and meets the net worth requirement for the class of mortgagee to which it belongs.
( 3 ) Each sponsor shall be responsible to the Secretary for the actions of its sponsored third-party originators or mortgagees in originating loans or mortgages, unless applicable law or regulation requires specific knowledge on the part of the party to be held responsible. If specific knowledge is required, the Secretary will presume that a sponsor has knowledge of the actions of its sponsored third-party originators or mortgagees in originating loans or mortgages and the sponsor is responsible for those actions unless it can rebut the presumption with affirmative evidence. *Sponsored third-party originator.* A sponsored third-party originator may hold a Title I Contract of Insurance or Title II Origination Approval Agreement if it is an FHA-approved lender or mortgagee. If the sponsored third-party originator is not an FHA-approved lender or mortgagee, then the sponsored third-party originator may not hold a Title I Contract of Insurance or Title II Origination Approval Agreement. A sponsored third-party originator is authorized to originate Title I direct loans or Title II mortgage loans for sale or transfer to a sponsor or sponsors, as defined in this section, that holds a valid Title I Contract of Insurance or Title II Origination Approval Agreement and is not under suspension, subject to the sponsor determining that the third-party originator has met the eligibility criteria of paragraph (b) of this section.
( b ) *Eligibility to originate loans to be insured by FHA.* A sponsored third-party originator may originate loans to be insured by FHA, provided that: ( 1 ) The sponsored third-party originator is working with and through an FHA-approved lender or mortgagee; and
( 2 ) The sponsored third-party originator or an officer, partner, director, principal, manager, supervisor, loan processor, or loan originator of the sponsored third-party originator has not been subject to the sanctions or administrative actions listed in § 202.5(j), as determined and verified by the FHA-approved lender or mortgagee.
[75 FR 20734, Apr. 20, 2010, as amended at 77 FR 51468, Aug. 24, 2012]
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED September 14, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-30984 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. PHILLIP K. SIAS, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

No. 6:99-CR-60034

Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
Phillip Sias, federal prisoner # 10304-035, appeals the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion seeking reduction of sentence based on AmendmentNo. 06-30984

2 599 to the United States Sentencing Gui delines. Sias pleaded guilty of using and carrying a firearm during the commission of a crime ofviolence in violation of18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and was sentenced to 120 months ofimprisonment. Because he was not sentenced on his conviction under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) in conjunction with any other conviction, Amendment 599 is not applicable to him, and the denial ofhis § 3582(c)(2) motion was not an abuse ofdiscretion. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 599; United States v. Pardue , 36 F.3d 429, 430 (5th Cir. 1994). Sias’s appeal lacks arguable merit and is dismissed as frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); 5 TH C IR
. R. 42.2. Siasfiled a § 3582(c)(2) motion based on Amendment 598tothe guidelines, advancing essentially the same argument presented in his current motion. His appeal from the denial of that motion was dismissed as frivolous. Sias is cautioned that further frivolous filings may result in the imposition ofsanctions, including dismissal, monetary penalties, and restrictions on his ability to file appeals in this court and actions in any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction. APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EVERTH OSVALDO

- MARTINEZ, AKA

Euerth O. Martinez, AKA Everth Osvalso

Martinez,

Petitioner,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney

General,

Respondent. No. 13

- 74164

Agency No. A094

- 457

- 849

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

S ubmitted October 23, 2017 **

Before: LEAVY , WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

Everth Osvaldo

- Martinez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying special rule cancellation of removal under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 31 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 13

- 74164

the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”). We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the

agency ’ s factual findings , and we review de novo questions of law

. Najmabadi v.

Holder , 597 F.3d 983, 986 ( 9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review

.

The agency did not err in determining that Osvaldo

- Martinez was statutorily

barred from establishing the good moral character required for special rule

cancellation under NACARA , where substantial evidence supports the agency’s

finding that he provided false testimony about the details of the incident leading to

his 2005 arrest in order to obtain immigration benefits

. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6);

8 C.F.R. § 1240.66(b)(3); Ramos v . INS , 246 F.3d 1264, 1266 (9th Cir. 2001) (“For

a witness’s false testimony to preclude a finding of good moral character, the

testimony must have been made orally and under oath, and the witness must have

had a subjective intent to deceive for the purpose of obtaining immigration

benefits.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
Editorial Note on Part 200
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 200 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

§ 200.425 Exemptions. ( a ) *Transactions of $10,000 or under.* Contracts and subcontracts not exceeding $10,000 are exempt from the requirements of the equal opportunity clause. No contractor or subcontractor shall procure supplies or services in less than usual quantities to avoid applicability of the equal opportunity clause.
( b ) *Contracts and subcontracts for indefinite quantities.* Contracts and subcontracts for indefinite quantities are exempt from the requirements of the equal opportunity clause if the amount to be ordered in a single year under any such contract will not exceed $10,000.
( c ) *Work outside the United States.* Contracts and subcontracts with regard to work performed outside the United States by employees who were not recruited within the United States are exempt from the requirements of the equal opportunity clause.
( d ) *Others.* Other exemptions set forth in the regulations of the Secretary of Labor at 41 CFR 60-1.5 apply to transactions under this subpart.
# The Attorney General of Texas September 1, 1978 JOHN L. HILL Attorney General
Honorable Thomas H.Haynie, Chairman Texas Private Employment Agency Regulatory Board Sam Houston State Office Building Austin, Texas Opinion No. H- 1236 Re: Whether an advance fee resume service is a private employment agency under article 5221a-6, V.T.C.S. Dear Mr.Haynie: You have requested our opinion as to whether an advance fee resume service isaprivate employment agency under article 5221a-6, V.T.C.S. You state that a company commonly referred to as an ‘advance fee resume service” furnishes to individuals seeking employment “a prepared resume and a list or pre-addressed mailing labels of potential employers.” The resume service charges a flat fee for its service, payable in advance. The names of prospective employers are ordinarily obtained from trade journals and governmental sources, and there isno direct contact between the resume service and the prospective employer on behalf of a particular employee or with respect to a particular job opening. The resume service frequently advertises its services through the broadcast and print media, with a specific disclaimer that it isaprivate employment agency. A“private employment agency” is defined by statute as any person, place or establishment within this state who for a fee or without a fee offers or attempts, either directly or indirectly, to procure employment for employees or procures or attempts to procure employees for employers, except as hereinafter exempted from the provisions hereof. V.T.C.S. art. 5221a-6, Sl(e) (emphasis added). Onthe basis ofthe description you have furnished us, we believe it is clear that an advance fee resume service is not within the definition ofa “private employment agency,” for the reason that it neither “offers

... to procure employment for employees” nor “procures or attempts to procure employees for employers.” See Miller v. Eldridge, 286S.W.999(Tex. Civ. App.- Amarillo 1926,writ dism’d).

p. 4932Honorable Thomas H.Haynie - Page 2 (H-1236)

In the situation you describe, an advance fee resume service does not contact an employer on behalf of a prospective employee. Nor does it locate prospective employees for employers, as does a “management search consultant” under section l(b) of the statute. See Attorney General Opinion H-699 (1975). Wedonot believe that the regulatory scope of article 5221a-6 may ordinarily be extended to include those entities which maintain contact with only the prospective employee. Since there is no direct contact between the resume service and the employer or his agent, we believe Texas courts would hold that the service is not a “private employment agency” for purposes ofarticle 5221a-6. SU.MMARY Where there isnodirect contact between the resume service and a prospective employer or his agent, an advance fee resume service, as described, is not a “private employment agency” for purposes ofarticle 5221a-6, V.T.C.S. Very truly yours,

APPROVED: Attorney General of Texas

Opinion Committee

p. 4933
#### § 203.432 Effect of sale of insured mortgage.

When an insured mortgage is sold to another approved mortgagee, the buyer shall thereupon succeed to all the rights and become bound by all the obligations of the seller under the contract of insurance and the seller shall be released from its obligations under the contract, provided that the seller shall not be relieved of its obligation to pay mortgage insurance premiums until the notice required by § 203.431 is received by HUD.

[45 FR 27929, Apr. 25, 1980]
§ 180.625 Record of hearing. ( a ) All oral hearings shall be recorded and transcribed by a reporter designated and supervised by the ALJ. The original transcript shall be a part of the record and shall constitute the sole official transcript. All exhibits introduced as evidence shall be incorporated into the record. The parties and the public may obtain transcripts from the official reporter at rates not to exceed the applicable rates fixed by the contract with the reporter.
( b ) Corrections to the official transcript will be permitted upon motion of a party. Motions for correction must be submitted within five days after receipt of the transcript. Corrections of the official transcript will be permitted only where errors of substance are involved and upon the ALJ's approval.
§ 224.22 Exchange of witness lists, statements, and exhibits. ( a ) At least 15 days before the hearing or at such other time as may be ordered by the ALJ, the parties shall exchange witness lists, copies of prior statements of proposed witnesses, copies of proposed hearing exhibits, including copies of any written statements that the party intends to offer in lieu of live testimony in accordance with § 224.33(b). At the time the above documents are exchanged, any party that intends to rely on the transcript of deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony at the hearing, if permitted by the ALJ, shall provide each party with a copy of the specific pages of the transcript it intends to introduce into evidence.
( b ) If a party objects, the ALJ shall not admit into evidence the testimony of any witness whose name does not appear on the witness list or any exhibit not provided to the opposing party as provided above unless the ALJ finds good cause for the failure or that there is no prejudice to the objecting party.
( c ) Unless another party objects within the time set by the ALJ, documents exchanged in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section shall be deemed to be authentic for the purpose of admissibility at the hearing.
#### § 203.427 Statute of limitations on payment of distributive shares.

The Commissioner shall not distribute any distributive share to an eligible mortgagor under § 203.423 beginning on the date which is six years after the date the Commissioner first transmitted written notification of eligibility to the last known address of the mortgagor, unless the mortgagor has applied in accordance with procedures prescribed by the Commissioner for payment of the share within the six-year period. The Commissioner shall transfer any amounts no longer eligible for distribution under this section from the Participating Reserve Account to the General Surplus Account.

[59 FR 49816, Sept. 30, 1994]
### §282d. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, act July 1, 1944, ch. 373, title IV, §402C, as added Pub. L. 111–148, title X, §10409(d), Mar. 23, 2010, 124 Stat. 978, which related to the Cures Acceleration Network, was renumbered section 480 of act July 1, 1944, by Pub. L. 112–74, div. F, title II, §221(c)(1)(A), Dec. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 1089, and transferred to section 287a of this title.
Exhibit 10.2



AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT



This amendment is made and entered into as of this 7thday of July 2005 by and between Allin Corporation, a Delaware corporation (Employer) and Richard W. Talarico (Employee), a resident of
Pennsylvania.



WHEREAS, Employer and Employee entered into an
employment agreement (the Agreement) as of January 10, 2002 and as amended on February 5, 2004 and December 8, 2004 and now desire to amend that Agreement by mutual consent.



NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and agreements herein contained and intending to be legally bound
hereby the parties do hereby agree as follows:



Section 3(e)
of the Agreement is hereby amended and restated as follows:



(e) Stock Option Plan. Employee will be entitled to participate in Employers stock option plans. All options to purchase stock of Employer granted to Employee shall vest upon the earlier to occur of the date on
which (i) the termination of this Agreement without cause occurs, (ii) Employer sells all or substantially all of its assets, (iii) Employer merges with another entity in a transaction in which Employer is not the surviving corporation, or (iv) any
person (as that term is used in Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act)) other than the shareholders of Employer (as existing on January 1, 2001) becomes the Beneficial Owner (as that term is used
in Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act) directly or indirectly of 40% or more of the common stock of Employer (collectively, an event described in (ii), (iii) or (iv) is referred to as a Change in Control). Notwithstanding the foregoing,
vested options granted to Employee will be immediately forfeited, and will no longer be exercisable, upon the termination of the Employee for cause, as defined in Section 2.



In all other respects, the terms and conditions of the Agreement are ratified and confirmed.



|                     |  |                   |  |                           
|-------------------- |  | ----------------- |  | --------------------------
|                     |  | ALLIN CORPORATION
|                     |  |                  
|                     |  |                   |  | /s/ Dean Praskach         
|                     |  | By:               |  | Dean Praskach             
|                     |  |                  
|WITNESS:             |  |                   |  |                           
|                     |  |                  
|/s/ Robert V. Fulton |  |                   |  | /s/ Richard Talarico      
|Robert V. Fulton     |  |                   |  | Richard Talarico, Chairman