FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Dec. 22, 2009

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-13605

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 07-20939-CR-CMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE LOPEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(December 22, 2009)

Before BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER, District

*

Judge.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Court for the Middle District of *

Florida, sitting by designation. 
Jose Lopez appeals his convictions for (1) conspiring to encourage or induce

an alien to enter the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I)

(Count 1), (2) encouraging or inducing 17 aliens to enter the United States, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) (Counts 2-18), and (3) and knowingly

aiding or assisting an alien, who was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) due

to a prior aggravated felony conviction, to enter the United States, in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1327 (Count 19). After careful review and oral argument, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Lopez was indicted with two other codefendants, Jorge Carnet-Castro

(“Carnet-Castro”) and Carlos Monge (“Monge”), on a 19-count indictment alleging

the three defendants conspired to encourage or induce 17 aliens to unlawfully enter

the United States. The U.S. Coast Guard (“USCG”) intercepted the defendants

while they were traveling by a boat, driven by Lopez, from the Bahamas heading

westward towards Miami. A search of the vessel revealed 17 aliens in the boat’s

forward cabin.

Lopez initially pleaded not guilty. Lopez later attempted to change his plea

to guilty. During the plea colloquy, Lopez stated to the district court that when he

went to the Bahamas by boat with the other two codefendants he was unaware that

the purpose of their trip was to smuggle aliens to the United States, but that he

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became aware during the voyage that the aliens onboard were illegal. Based upon

these statements, the district court refused to accept Lopez’s guilty plea.

1

The case proceeded to trial, at which the following evidence was produced.

A. The Government’s Evidence

The government presented the testimony of USCG Bosun’s Mate First Class

Matthew Parker, who captained the USCG vessel that stopped the boat Lopez was

driving approximately a mile from Baker’s Haulover Inlet, Miami. Officer Parker

saw Lopez driving the boat, with approximately 8-10 people on the boat’s deck.

Upon being questioned in Spanish by another USCG officer, Lopez identified the

others on deck as his friends from Miami and that they had returned from a fishing

trip. USCG officers asked Lopez and the others to produce identification. Lopez

and his codefendants Carnet-Castro and Monge produced identification, but Lopez

stated that the other passengers had left their identifications at the boat ramp.

Officer Parker boarded the vessel Lopez was driving and, while conducting a

safety inspection, discovered approximately 10-12 people in the boat’s forward

cabin. Upon being asked who those individuals were, Lopez initially stated the

only people on the boat were the people on the boat’s main deck.

The government also presented the testimony of USCG officer Jonathan

Lopez makes no claim that the district court should have accepted his attempted plea.

1

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LaSalle, who was also on board the USCG vessel that stopped the boat Lopez was

piloting. Officer LaSalle testified consistent with Parker. Officer LaSalle also

stated he was told by Carnet-Castro that Lopez and his codefendants had picked

the aliens up from a vessel in the ocean.

Special Agent Eric Moreno, of U.S. Immigrations and Customs

Enforcement, testified that he questioned Lopez upon arriving at the scene. Lopez

stated to Agent Moreno that he was driving the boat, which he did not own, from

the Lucaya Freeport area in the Bahamas. Lopez stated they had gone to the

Bahamas to test the boat. Lopez stated he was taking the aliens on board the boat

to a marina in Miami, where two waiting vans were going to pick up the aliens, in

exchange for which he would receive a gift. In an interview conducted the

following day, Lopez told Moreno that he and the two other codefendants had met

with a Bahamian while in the Bahamas, who directed them to an abandoned hotel

to pick up the aliens. Moreno also testified that his investigation of the seventeen

aliens on board the boat revealed that none of them had legal status to enter the

United States and one, Pedro Valdez-Alvarado, had previously been deported for a

felony drug conviction.

The government also presented the testimony of codefendant Carnet-Castro,

who had pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government. Carnet-Castro

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testified that he met Lopez in connection with a business deal Lopez had made to

smuggle aliens to the United States from Cuba. Carnet-Castro testified that he had

made one previous alien-smuggling trip with Lopez from the Freeport area of the

Bahamas, in October 2007. Carnet-Castro testified Lopez earned $20,000 for his

participation in this previous smuggling trip.

Codefendant Carnet-Castro also testified about the events that culminated in

Lopez’s arrest. Carnet-Castro, Lopez, and Monge, Carnet-Castro’s nephew, left

Miami in the morning. Lopez piloted the boat to the Bahamas, where the three

defendants stayed in a hotel for the night. Carnet-Castro testified that they called

their contact in the Bahamas, who advised them to pick up the aliens at an

abandoned hotel in Port Lucaya. Carnet-Castro testified that he and Lopez were to

split the proceeds of the trip – about $4,000 per person smuggled – after deducting

expenses. Lopez drove the boat back from the Bahamas towards Miami, with the

exception of about fifteen minutes. Carnet-Castro explained that when they were

stopped by the USCG, he initially lied and said that the aliens were not illegal,

when he knew they were, but that he later told the truth after being arrested. On

cross-examination, Carnet-Castro testified that Lopez knew why they were going

to the Bahamas.

The parties stipulated that the 17 aliens on board the boat Lopez was driving

5
could not legally enter the United States, after which the government closed its

case. Lopez moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29,

which the district court denied.

B. Lopez’s Testimony

Lopez testified in his defense. Lopez testified that his brother-in-law

introduced him to codefendant Carnet-Castro as a fellow former inmate. Lopez

stated that the day before his arrest he had taken his brother-in-law to a clinic in

Miami. While there, Lopez spoke with Carnet-Castro, who asked him to help him

test a friend’s boat Carnet-Castro was repairing, because Lopez was an experienced

boater. Lopez agreed. Mechanics who had fixed the boat’s engine suggested that

Carnet-Castro test the boat thoroughly. Lopez, Carnet-Castro, and Monge, CarnetCastro’s nephew, left the marina to test the boat in a bay. After testing the boat in

the bay, the men returned to the marina, purchased fuel and water, and CarnetCastro suggested going out to the open ocean where there were waves. Once off

the Florida coast, codefendant Carnet-Castro suggested that they continue to the

Bahamas so that codefendant Monge could see the islands. Lopez agreed, stating

they would have to be quick so that he could retrieve his brother-in-law from the

clinic. They left at approximately 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, arriving in the

Bahamas around 3:00 p.m. Lopez telephoned his brother-in-law at the clinic and

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explained to him that he was going to the Bahamas and did not know if he would

be back in time to pick him up.

In the Bahamas, the men attempted to purchase gas at a marina because they

did not have enough fuel for the return trip, but the marina was out of gas. Lopez

tied up the boat and left it to get some food. Lopez purchased sandwiches with

money from Carnet-Castro and returned to the boat, where he saw Carnet-Castro

conversing with a man, who left as soon as Lopez returned. Lopez used a satellite

phone to call his wife and inform her that he would be home late and for her to call

his brother-in-law at the clinic. Lopez did not tell his wife he was in the Bahamas.

The men agreed to stay at a hotel in the Bahamas. While there, Carnet-Castro met

up at a nearby bar with the same man Lopez had seen before. Carnet-Castro stated

to Lopez that the man would provide gas to them in the morning and that CarnetCastro had agreed as a favor to transport some people to Miami. Lopez asked

Carnet-Castro if the people to be transported had papers to enter the United States.

Carnet-Castro stated they did. Lopez agreed to transport the people, because

Carnet-Castro was in charge of the boat.

The next morning, the same man Lopez had seen the night before led them

to a marina with gas and gave Carnet-Castro approximately $400.00. The man

then directed Carnet-Castro to an abandoned hotel. They met the aliens at this

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hotel. As the aliens boarded, Lopez intended to check their immigration status, but

Carnet-Castro told him to take the boat’s helm. Lopez was the driver of the boat

during the entire voyage back to the United States, except for about ten minutes

while he was changing his shirt.

During the voyage, but before being stopped by the USCG, codefendants

Carnet-Castro and Monge spoke on the phone with the man they had met in the

Bahamas, and Carnet-Castro informed Lopez that the aliens were illegal. Lopez

stated that he and Carnet-Castro argued about the aliens’ status. Lopez stopped the

boat, but he did not know what to do because he was in the middle of the sea and

was concerned Carnet-Castro, Monge, and the aliens might go against him. Lopez

resumed driving the boat towards the United States and was eventually stopped by

the USCG.

On cross-examination, Lopez admitted to knowing codefendant CarnetCastro for 3 to 4 years. Lopez denied ever smuggling aliens with Carnet-Castro

before. Lopez admitted that he did not tell the same story he had testified to at trial

when he was interviewed by Agent Moreno after his arrest. Lopez originally told

USCG officers that he had picked up the aliens during a pleasure cruise, but he

admitted at trial that this statement was false. Lopez admitted that he did not

inquire if gas was available elsewhere after the first marina in the Bahamas advised

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them it was out of gas. Lopez claimed that he was not suspicious about picking up

the aliens, that he did not know the hotel was abandoned, and that he did not

believe the boat was overcrowded. Although Lopez admitted he was concerned

about bringing back so many people, he never asked them for their immigration

documentation.

At the close of evidence, Lopez moved for judgment of acquittal pursuant to

Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 as to Counts 1-18, but not 19. Lopez argued the government

had failed to prove that he had “encouraged or induced” aliens to enter the United

States, and that the government had instead shown only that Lopez attempted to

smuggle aliens, a crime not charged. The district court denied Lopez’s motion.

C. Closing Arguments and Jury Instructions

Lopez did not file proposed jury instructions. During the charge conference,

the government proposed that two dictionary definitions be given for the

definitions of “encourage” and “induce.” Lopez objected. The district court did

2

not instruct the jury using the government’s definitions, but permitted the parties to

argue their positions on the common meanings of “encourage” and “induce” in

The government originally proposed the following definition for encourage: “To 2

‘encourage’ means to instigate, to incite to action, to give courage to, to inspirit, to embolden, to

raise confidence, to help, to forward, and/or to advise.” The government cited Black’s Law

Dictionary in support of this proposed definition. Lopez and the government agreed that the

definition proposed by the government was taken from Black’s Law Dictionary.

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closing arguments without referring to specific dictionaries.

During closing arguments, the prosecutor argued twice that Carnet-Castro

and Monge had pled guilty and “accepted responsibility,” while Lopez was “the

only person in this case who has not accepted responsibility.” After both

comments, the district court sustained Lopez’s counsel’s objection, struck the

statements, and denied Lopez’s motions for a mistrial. After the second comment,

the district court also instructed the jury not to consider the government’s last

argument.

During deliberations, the jurors sent a note to the court asking this question

about “encourage” or “induce” with respect to Counts 2-18:

Does the first element “Defendant knowingly encouraged

and induced persons named in the indictment to come to

or enter the United States in violation of law” require that

the Defendant communicate with persons named in the

indictment, orally or by gesture, in order to “encourage”

or “induce” such persons?

The government again requested that the court instruct the jury using the dictionary

definitions already suggested by the government. Lopez objected to this, arguing

that the proposed definition of “encourage” included “to help” and the term

“encourage” as it was commonly understood required more than just “helping.”

3

Lopez only specifically objected to the inclusion of “to help” in the government’s 3

proposed definition of “encourage.” On appeal, Lopez does not contest any other specific

portion of the district court’s supplemental definition of “encourage” other than the inclusion of

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The district court, over Lopez’s objection, gave the jury these dictionary

definitions of “encourage” and “induce:”

In response to your question concerning “encourage” and

“induce,” I instruct you on the below dictionary

definitions in conjunction with all of the Court’s

instructions in your deliberations.

To “encourage” means to knowingly instigate, to incite to

action, to give courage to, to inspirit, to embolden, to

raise confidence, to help, to forward, and/or to advise.

To “induce” means to knowingly bring on or about, to

affect, cause to influence an act or course of conduct,

lead by persuasion or reasoning, incite by motives, and/or

to prevail on.

The jury also asked this question pertaining to the knowledge required as to

the § 1327 offense in Count 19:

Does the second element of the crime, “that the

Defendant knew the alien was inadmissible in the United

States,” require that the defendant had personal

knowledge that the alien was inadmissible in the United

States at the time the alien boarded the boat outside of, or

before it entered the United States?

After discussing the issue with counsel and over Lopez’s objection, the district

court sent back its written answer that: “Section 1327 does not contain a temporal

requirement.”

After the jury submitted another note indicating that they were deadlocked

“to help.”

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on all but one count, the district court, over Lopez’s objection and motion for a

mistrial, gave a modified Allen charge. Two hours later, the jury returned with a

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unanimous verdict of guilty on all counts. Lopez’s counsel orally sought a

judgment of acquittal and a new trial based upon the government’s failure to prove

encouragement and inducement; the district court denied both motions.

Lopez’s counsel filed a written motion for a new trial, predicated upon the

argument that the district court’s supplemental instruction on the definition of

“encourage” impaired the effectiveness of defense counsel’s arguments and that

Lopez was prejudiced and entitled to have his convictions reversed. The district

court denied Lopez’s motion for a new trial. The district court sentenced Lopez to

63 months’ concurrent imprisonment on Counts 1 and 19 and 60 months’

concurrent imprisonment on Counts 2-18, followed by 2 years of supervised

release. Lopez timely appealed his convictions.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review for Jury Instructions

On appeal, Lopez raises several issues regarding the district court’s jury

instructions. We review a district court’s response to a jury question for an abuse

Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02, 17 S. Ct. 154, 157 (1896). 4

On appeal, Lopez raises no issues as to the advisory guidelines calculations or the 5

legality of his sentences.

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of discretion. United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004).

While the district court has considerable discretion regarding the extent and

character of supplemental jury instructions, it does not have discretion to misstate

the law or confuse the jury. See United States v. Sanfilippo, 581 F.2d 1152, 1154

(5th Cir. 1978) (holding that no reversible error exists if the district court’s original

and supplemental instructions accurately present the substantive law). “A

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challenged supplemental jury instruction is reviewed as part of the entire jury

charge, in light of the indictment, evidence presented and argument of counsel to

determine whether the jury was misled and whether the jury understood the

issues.” United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal

quotation marks omitted). A district court’s refusal to give a requested jury

instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and “[w]e reverse when we are left

with a substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly

guided in its deliberations.” United States v. Grisby, 111 F.3d 806, 814 (11th Cir.

1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).

7

B. Supplemental Jury Instruction Defining Encourage in 8 U.S.C. §

1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)

This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 6

1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

We review the correctness of jury instructions de novo to determine if they misstate the 7

law or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party. Id.

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Lopez argues that his convictions under Counts 1-18 should be vacated and

the case remanded for a new trial because the district court’s supplemental

instruction, providing a definition of the term “encourage” in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv),

was erroneous as a matter of law. Lopez first argues that the supplemental

8

instruction was erroneous because “encourage” should have been accorded its

“ordinary” meaning and the definition was not necessary.

To establish violations of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) in Counts 1-18, the

government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

“encourag[ed] or induc[ed] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United

States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or

residence is or will be in violation of law[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). It is

undisputed that the terms “encourage” and “induce” are undefined in the statute.

When a statutory term is undefined, courts give it its “ordinary meaning” or

“common usage.” United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2024 (2008); CBS Inc.

v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001). To

ascertain ordinary meaning, courts often turn to dictionary definitions for guidance.

The jury’s note requested clarification of the district court’s instructions as to Counts 2- 8

18, charging violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Count 1 charges conspiracy to violate §

1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v). Count 1 thus incorporates the

district court’s definition of encourage, and Lopez’s argument is properly considered for all of

Counts 1-18.

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Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2024 (noting the term “proceeds” can be defined through

dictionary definitions as either “receipts” or “profits”); United States v. Murrell,

368 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing The American Heritage Dictionary of

the English Language for the plain and ordinary meaning of “induce”); United

States v. McNab, 331 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Black’s Law

Dictionary and Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary for definitions of “law”);

CBS, 245 F.3d at 1223 (using the American Heritage College Dictionary to

confirm the common usage of “termination”). Thus the district court did not err in

using dictionary definitions of encourage.

Even if the district court’s use of dictionary definitions is permissible, Lopez

argues the district court should not have included “to help” in the definition of

“encourage.” This argument lacks merit, however, as multiple dictionaries include

“to help” in the definition of “encourage.” For example, in Black’s Law

Dictionary, “encourage” means “[t]o instigate; to incite to action; to give courage

to; to inspirit; to embolden; to raise confidence; to make confident; to help; to

forward; to advise.” Black’s Law Dictionary 620 (4th ed. 1968); see also Black’s

Law Dictionary 568 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “encourage” as “[t]o instigate; to

incite to action; to embolden; to help.”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 747

(1993) (defining “encourage” as “to give courage to: inspire with courage, spirit, or

15
hope: to spur on: to give help or patronage to”). The dictionary definitions of

“encourage” are internally consistent and also consistent with the district court’s

supplemental instruction.

9

In addition, at least one of our sister circuits has considered the definition of

“encourage” in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and reached the same conclusion to use

dictionary definitions, including “to help,” in formulating jury instructions. In

United States v. He, 245 F.3d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit

affirmed the district court’s usage of a dictionary in defining the term “encourage”

in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as “to knowingly instigate, help or advise.” The Seventh

Circuit reasoned: “[t]he supplemental instruction was a correct statement of the law

. . . . These definitions were taken directly from Black’s Law Dictionary and

conform to other dictionary definitions of those words. See, e.g., Merriam

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 381 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “encourage” as “to

inspire with courage, spirit, or hope . . . to spur on . . . to give help or patronage

to”).” He, 245 F.3d at 959-60.

Lopez argues the district court should have used “ordinary” dictionaries, such as 9

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, and not Black’s Law Dictionary, to determine the

ordinary meaning. The only “ordinary” dictionary definition cited by Lopez is to an online

dictionary listing “help” as a synonym for “encourage.” See

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/encourage. Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary includes “to give help” as part of its definition of “encourage.” Supra. Lopez’s

argument thus is not persuasive considering that both “ordinary” dictionaries and Black’s Law

Dictionary include “to help” as a potential definition of “encourage.”

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Lopez alternatively argues that “encourage” cannot mean “to help” in §

1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) because construing “encourage” that broadly would render at

least two other provisions of § 1324 superfluous – namely, 8 U.S.C. §§

1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II).

A dictionary definition of an undefined statutory term is not always

dispositive, and we still may consider the statutory term as it is used in the context

of the statute as a whole. Santos, 128 S. Ct. at 2024 (“Since context gives

meaning, we cannot say [a statute] is truly ambiguous until we consider [the

disputed statutory term] not in isolation but as it is used in the [statute].”); see also

Murrell, 368 F.3d at 1287 (construing “induce” in 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) as the

second of two different dictionary definitions because, when viewed in context, the

first dictionary definition would render another term in § 2422(b), “persuade,” as

superfluous); CBS, 245 F.3d at 1225-26 (“One canon recognized by the Supreme

Court is that where Congress includes particular language in one section of a

statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that

Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

However, an examination of §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II)

shows that the definition of “to help” for “encourage” in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) does

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not render superfluous these other two subsections of § 1324.

First, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), with which Lopez was charged, criminalizes

“encouraging or inducing” an alien to come to the United States knowing or in

reckless disregard that the alien’s coming to the United States is in violation of

law. The elements of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) are: (1) encouraging or inducing; (2) an

alien; (3) to come to, enter, or reside in the United States; and (4) knowing or in

reckless disregard that the alien’s coming to, entering, or residing in the United

States is illegal. The fourth element requires that the alien’s coming to, entry, or

residence in the United States is illegal and that the defendant knew or recklessly

disregarded that.

In contrast, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) makes it a crime to knowingly bring or

attempt to bring an alien to the United States at a place other than a designated port

of entry, regardless of whether the alien can legally be admitted into the United

States. The elements of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) are: (1) knowing that a person is an

10

Subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) provides: 10

(1)(A) Any person who –

(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or attempts to bring

to the United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a

place other than a designated port of entry or place other than as

designated by the Commissioner, regardless of whether such alien

has received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside

in the United States and regardless of any future official action

which may be taken with respect to such alien; 

. . . 

shall be punished as provided in subparagraph (B).

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alien; (2) bringing or attempting to bring; (3) an alien; (4) to the United States; (5)

at a place other than a designated port of entry or other authorized place; and (6)

regardless of whether the alien has received prior official authorization to come to,

enter, or reside in the United States and regardless of any future action that may be

taken with respect to the alien.

An examination of the elements of these two subsections shows that defining

“encourage” as “to help” does not turn an offense under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) into

an offense under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i). Subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) criminalizes

more than the mere act of bringing an alien to the United States because it also

requires that the alien be brought to a place other than a port of entry, which is

different conduct than what is covered by § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). And §

1324(a)(1)(A)(i) applies to aliens with prior official authorization to enter, whereas

§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) applies to aliens whose entry is illegal. Accordingly, we do

not agree with Lopez that his conviction under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) renders §

1324(a)(1)(A)(i) superfluous.

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8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i).

The dissent focuses on § 1324(a)(2), which criminalizes “bring[ing] or attempting to 11

bring” an alien into the United States; but § 1324(a)(2) further requires that the violator act with

knowledge or reckless disregard of the specific fact that “an alien has not received prior official

authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). Lopez

did not raise this subsection in his appellate brief, and thus any argument with respect to it is

deemed waived. Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C. v. Fayette County, 451 F.3d 777, 785 (11th Cir.

2006). In any event, § 1324(a)(2) is violated only if the defendant acts with knowledge or

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In turn, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) criminalizes aiding or abetting the

commission of any of the preceding acts in subsection 1324(a)(1)(A), including

both 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II)

cannot be superfluous on its own without reference to the underlying subsections,

and since subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) is not rendered superfluous by the district

court’s interpretation of subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), neither is subsection

1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II).

12

In any event, in other decisions in this circuit, the act of “helping” aliens

come to, enter, or remain in the United States were deemed violations of

subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th

Cir. 2006); United States v. Kuku, 129 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1997). In Ndiaye, this

Court affirmed a conviction under subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) for “assist[ing]

over seventy Indonesian aliens in securing Social Security numbers.” The

defendant had argued his actions could not constitute a violation of the statute

reckless disregard of “the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization” to enter

the United States, which is a different requirement than § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)’s lesser requirement

that the alien be in violation of law for any reason. And as detailed throughout this opinion,

Lopez’s conduct was not merely piloting a boat as the dissent asserts.

Which isn’t to say the conduct proven in this case might not also violate portions of 12

Section 1324 other than what was charged. Lopez’s argument seems to be that his conduct can

only lawfully violate one subsection of a statute. Nothing in our precedent compels this

conclusion. See United States v. Cespedes, 151 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Indeed, the

federal courts have long recognized that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the

Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of

defendants.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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because “[a] Social Security card did not change anyone’s status, and there was no

evidence that anyone was ‘induced’ to live here by obtaining such a card.” Ndiaye,

434 F.3d at 1296. This Court affirmed Ndiaye’s conviction because, “[a] jury

could find that [the defendant’s] assistance in helping [an alien] obtain a Social

Security card, which the evidence established he is not entitled to have, encouraged

or induced him to reside in this country in violation of the statute.” Id. at 1298

(emphasis added). Similarly, in Kuku, we affirmed a conviction under subsection

1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) for approving applications for social security cards without

proper documentation filed on behalf of illegal aliens. Kuku, 129 F.3d at 1437; see

also Ndiaye, 434 F.3d at 1298 (“[I]n Kuku, this Court has implicitly recognized

that conduct which involved helping an illegal alien obtain a Social Security card

to which he was not entitled so that he could work and live in this country was

sufficient to support a conviction under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).”).

Lopez argues that his conduct was not as extensive as the defendant in

United States v. Hanna, 639 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. Unit B 1980), another decision

where we affirmed a defendant boat captain’s conviction for encouraging or

inducing the unlawful entry of 148 Haitian aliens. In Hanna, the government

proved at trial that the defendant was captain of a vessel that picked up 148

Haitians from two ports in Haiti, that he was employed to take the boat to Miami,

21
that he assisted aliens in boarding the boat, that during the voyage the defendant

acquired provisions for the passengers, and that he constructed an alibi to give

police upon his arrival with the aliens in the United States. Id.

13

The trial evidence established that Lopez was more than a mere passive boat

driver in this endeavor. That evidence showed that: (1) Lopez and Carnet-Castro

made a previous alien-smuggling trip from the Bahamas shortly before the

incidents in this case, for which Lopez earned $20,000; (2) Lopez and CarnetCastro were to split the proceeds of this trip, and Lopez knew why they were going

to the Bahamas; (3) Lopez lied to USCG officers when he was initially stopped,

concocted a story about being out on a fishing trip, lied about whether the aliens

had residency documentation, and pretended the only aliens on board were those

up on deck; and (4) Lopez participated in picking up the aliens from an abandoned

Similar to the current version of Section 1324, the previous version of Section 1324 13

considered in the Hanna decision criminalized encouraging or inducing illegal aliens to enter the

United States. The previous version of Section 1324 provided:

(a) Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master,

commanding officer, agent, or cosignee of any means of

transportation who –

. . . .

(4) willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to

encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the

United States of – 

any alien . . . not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not

lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States under

the terms of this chapter or any other law relating to the

immigration or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony . . . .

8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(4) (1976 & Supp. IV 1981).

22
hotel, and he acquiesced in accepting money from an unidentified man in the

Bahamas for doing so. Contrary to Lopez’s characterization, this is not a case

where he merely drove a boat full of aliens from the Bahamas to the United States.

Rather, Lopez first had to take a boat to the Bahamas, refuel it, spend the night,

pick up the aliens from an abandoned hotel, and then go to the marina and come

back to the United States. Simply put, Lopez’s conduct in this case was more

14

than adequate to convict him under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).

C. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30

Lopez asserts a corollary argument that the district court’s supplemental jury

instruction violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 because the district

court contradicted its earlier decision not to define “encourage” as “to help,” and

therefore Lopez’s counsel could not respond to the definition instruction during

closing argument.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 requires a district court, when

requested, to inform counsel of its proposed action upon requested jury instructions

prior to closing arguments. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30. “This Court has only required

substantial compliance with Rule 30 and a defendant must show prejudice before

his conviction will be reversed.” United States v. Clark, 732 F.2d 1536, 1541

To say, as the dissent argues, that Lopez is being convicted of the mere act of driving a 14

boat is to ignore the record in this case.

23
(11th Cir. 1984). “Such prejudice occurs when the change in the instructions is

substantial, when the instructions repudiate counsel’s arguments, or when the

instructions impair the effectiveness of those arguments.” United States v.

Descent, 292 F.3d 703, 707 (11th Cir. 2002).

However, our precedent also affords district courts discretion to expand

upon initial jury instructions when a jury question arises. United States v.

McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212, 1222 (11th Cir. 1991) (“A trial court’s response to a

jury’s question is entrusted to its own sound discretion and a conviction will not be

reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”); see also Bollenbach v. United

States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S. Ct. 402, 405 (1946) (“When a jury makes

explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete

accuracy.”); United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A

trial judge has some obligation to make reasonable efforts to answer a question

from the jury.”). This is particularly true here where the district court determined

during the charge conference that the parties could argue their positions on the

common meanings of “encourage” and “induce.” Moreover, the supplemental

instruction contained a correct definition of “encourage.” Thus the fact that the

district court acceded to Lopez’s initial request not to define “encourage” did not

bind or preclude the district court from expanding upon its instructions when the

24
jury had questions.

In any event, we cannot say Lopez has shown that the district court’s

supplemental jury instruction repudiated Lopez’s arguments or impaired their

effectiveness. During closing arguments, before the supplemental instruction,

Lopez’s counsel argued that Lopez was guilty only of attempting to bring the

aliens into the United States and not guilty of encouraging or inducing them to

enter the United States, as follows:

The charge is encouraging or inducing someone to come

to the United States. That’s very, very important in this

case, encouraging or inducing someone to come to the

United States. You heard all the evidence. What

evidence is there that Mr. Lopez, in fact, Mr. CarnetCastro or Mr. Castro’s nephew, or anyone, encouraged or

induced someone to come here who wasn’t coming here

anyway?

. . . .

So, there has been no evidence, none, that either Mr.

Lopez or Mr. Carnet-Castro or his nephew encouraged or

induced anybody . . . .

Now, if you believe all the Government’s evidence, they

should have charged him or them with attempting to

bring aliens into the United States. That’s a crime.

That’s what they call it, attempting to bring aliens into

the United States. That’s a different crime. They didn’t

charge these people with that, for whatever reason. This

is what they chose to do, encourage or induce, and

there’s simply no evidence of any of that.

Lopez’s closing argument makes clear that even without the district court’s

supplemental jury instruction containing “to help,” he argued to the jury precisely

25
what he now argues should have prevented his conviction – that the act of piloting

a boat full of aliens was only attempting to bring the aliens to the United States,

which was another crime and was not a violation of subsection 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).

Since Lopez presented essentially the same argument before the district court’s

supplemental instruction as he makes now, we cannot say the supplemental

instruction prejudiced his defense.

15

D. Supplemental Jury Instruction on Temporal Requirement in 8 U.S.C. §

1327

Lopez next argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury that

there is no temporal requirement in § 1327, which required proof that Lopez knew

that the alien was inadmissible in the United States. Specifically, Lopez contends

that § 1327’s intent element requires that a defendant know that the alien was

inadmissible at the time he boarded the boat. Lopez also claims that the absence of

an express temporal requirement renders the statute ambiguous such that the rule of

lenity should apply.

Section 1327 provides:

We also reject Lopez’s argument that the district court’s supplemental instruction 15

constructively amended the indictment. Because the district court’s supplemental jury

instruction did not misstate the definition of “encourage,” the supplemental instruction did not

modify the elements of the offense charged as to in effect charge Lopez with a different crime. 

See United States v. Edwards, 526 F.3d 747, 760 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A constructive amendment

occurs when the essential elements of the offense are altered to broaden the possible bases for

conviction beyond what is contained in the indictment.”) (citations omitted); United States

v. Behety, 32 F.3d 503, 508-09 (11th Cir. 1994). 

26
Any person who knowingly aids or assists any alien

inadmissible under section 1182(a)(2) (insofar as an alien

inadmissible under such section has been convicted of an

aggravated felony) or 1182(a)(3) (other than

subparagraph (E) thereof) of this title to enter the United

States, or who connives or conspires with any person or

persons to allow, procure, or permit any such alien to

enter the United States, shall be fined under Title 18, or

imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

8 U.S.C. § 1327. The district court originally instructed that “[t]he defendant’s

knowledge of an alien’s prior felony conviction is not an element of 8 U.S. Code §

1327. The Government need only prove that the defendant knew that the alien he

aided or assisted was inadmissible to the United States.” During deliberations, the

jury asked if the knowledge requirement meant that the defendant had to know the

alien was inadmissible in the United States at the time the alien boarded the boat

outside of, or before it entered the United States. Lopez’s counsel argued that the

government had to prove Lopez knew at the time the aliens boarded the vessel that

they were inadmissible. The district court rejected Lopez’s counsel’s argument

and instructed the jury that § 1327 had no temporal requirement.

We first conclude that the district court properly instructed the jury that §

1327 did not require Lopez to know that the alien on board had a prior felony

conviction but only that the alien he aided or assisted in entering the United States

was inadmissible. United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1998);

27
United States v. Flores-Garcia, 198 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000). There is also

no temporal requirement in § 1327. Rather, § 1327 requires only that Lopez knew

the alien he aided or assisted was inadmissible at some point before the alien

sought to enter the United States.

The Second Circuit directly addressed the question of “how much a

defendant must know in order to be convicted” under § 1327. Figueroa, 165 F.3d

at 114. The Second Circuit noted that “§ 1327 does not indicate whether the word

‘knowingly’ was meant to modify only the verbs ‘aid or assist’ or some or all of

the characteristics of the alien described in the statute.” Id. After applying

principles of statutory construction and inference of congressional intent, the

Second Circuit concluded that “defendants can be found guilty under § 1327

provided they have sufficient knowledge to recognize that they have done

something culpable.” Id. at 118. The Second Circuit reasoned that knowledge that

the alien was excludable “should put any reasonable person on notice that it would

be illegal to aid that person’s entry into the country.” Id. Thus, the Second Circuit

concluded “that a defendant can be convicted under § 1327 for aiding an alien who

is excludable because of a prior aggravated felony conviction if the defendant

knows only that the alien is excludable.” Id. at 119.

The Ninth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s conclusion in Figueroa that

28
“the defendant’s knowledge of an alien’s prior felony conviction is not an element

of section 1327.” Flores-Garcia, 198 F.3d at 1121. The Ninth Circuit concluded

that “[t]he government need prove only that the defendant knew that the alien he

was aiding or assisting was inadmissible to the United States.” Id. at 1122. The

Ninth Circuit explained that the rule of lenity did not apply because the statute’s

structure and its placement in the scheme of immigration law indicate that the

defendant’s knowledge of an alien’s prior felony conviction is not an element of

the offense. Id. at 1122.

Turning to this case, it is undisputed that Lopez knew at some point in the

journey that his passengers were undocumented aliens seeking entry to the United

States. Although the evidence did not show Lopez was aware that Pedro ValdezAlvarado had a prior aggravated felony conviction, Lopez knew that ValdezAlvarado was undocumented and sought illegal entry into the United States. The

supplemental jury instruction correctly explained that there was no temporal

requirement; Lopez’s knowledge, regardless of when acquired, would suffice. See

Figueroa, 165 F.3d at 119 (“[Section] 1327 thus places persons who would

otherwise violate § 1324 at an increased risk if they happen to aid an alien who is

excludable because of a conviction for an aggravated felony.”). Accordingly, the

district court’s jury instruction regarding the lack of a temporal requirement in 8

29
U.S.C. § 1327 correctly stated the law and is not a basis for reversal.

E. Prosecutor’s Comments During Closing Arguments

Lopez contends that the prosecutor impermissibly asked the jury to draw an

adverse inference from Lopez’s assertion of his constitutional right to trial, by

improperly suggesting that Lopez should have pled guilty like Carnet-Castro,

Monge, and the aliens who had all “accepted responsibility” and “admitted their

involvement.” Lopez also claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for its

witnesses, warranting a new trial.

16

The Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to a speedy and

public trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Improper suggestions,

insinuations, and assertions calculated to mislead or inflame the jury’s passions are

forbidden in the presentation of closing arguments. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d at 1560

(affirming conviction where the government commented on defendant’s lack of

patriotism). To establish prosecutorial misconduct:

(1) the remarks must be improper, and (2) the remarks

must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the

defendant. A defendant’s substantial rights are

prejudicially affected when a reasonable probability

arises that, but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial

would have been different. When the record contains

sufficient independent evidence of guilt, any error is

We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct de novo because it is a mixed question 16

of law and fact. United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 947 (11th Cir. 2006). 

30
harmless.

Eckhardt, 466 F.3d at 947 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This Court

has identified four factors to consider in determining whether a prosecutor’s

conduct had a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of a trial:

(1) the degree to which the challenged remarks have a

tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the

accused;

(2) whether they are isolated or extensive;

(3) whether they were deliberately or accidentally placed

before the jury; and

(4) the strength of the competent proof to establish the

guilt of the accused.

Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1546 (11th Cir. 1994).

Prosecutorial misconduct must be considered in the context of the entire

trial, along with any curative instruction. United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381,

1400 (11th Cir. 1997). “Because statements and arguments of counsel are not

evidence, improper statements can be rectified by the district court’s instruction to

the jury that only the evidence in the case be considered.” United States v. Smith,

918 F.2d 1551, 1562 (11th Cir. 1990). If the district court takes a curative

measure, we will reverse only if the evidence is so prejudicial as to be incurable by

that measure. United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 845 (11th Cir. 1998). We

presume that the jury followed the district court’s curative instructions. United

States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005).

31
A prosecutor’s remarks are improper if they attempt to bolster the credibility

of a witness based on the government’s reputation or through alluding to evidence

not admitted at trial. United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1094 (11th Cir.

1993). To determine if the government improperly vouched for a witness, the

court must decide whether a “jury could reasonably believe that the prosecutor was

indicating a personal belief in the witness’ credibility.” United States v. Sims, 719

F.2d 375, 377 (11th Cir. 1983). This prohibition against vouching does not,

however, forbid prosecutors from arguing credibility; rather, it forbids arguing

credibility based on the reputation of the government office or on evidence not

before the jury. United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1207 (11th Cir. 1991).

“[We] ha[ve] recognized an exception to this prohibition, the so-called ‘fair

response’ rule, that entitles a prosecutor to respond to arguments advanced by

defense counsel in his or her statement to the jury.” United States v. Smith, 700

F.2d 627, 634 (11th Cir. 1983).

Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments and applying the

above principles, we find no reversible error from the government’s comments

during closing argument.

During closing argument, Lopez’s counsel challenged Carnet-Castro’s

credibility due to his prior felony conviction, his inconsistent statements to

32
government officials, and his plea agreement with the government, which provided

an incentive for Carnet-Castro to testify favorably in order for a possible sentence

reduction. Lopez’s counsel argued that Lopez’s version of events was truthful and

that Carnet-Castro had not accepted responsibility for his actions and had lied

extensively.

In rebuttal closing, the government sought to counter Lopez’s counsel’s

contentions that Carnet-Castro did not accept responsibility for his actions and was

not credible, and challenged the arguments that Lopez testified truthfully:

Carnet-Castro has pled guilty. Carnet-Castro has

accepted responsibility . . . .

The only person in this case who has not accepted

responsibility is the defendant –

. . . .

I submit to you everyone involved in this case has come

clean and admitted their involvement. Even the poor

people who were paying thousands of dollars to come

into the United States.

Lopez’s counsel objected to both statements and moved for mistrials; the

district court sustained both objections, struck the government’s statements, and

denied the mistrial requests. In response to Lopez’s second objection, the district

court instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s last argument.

Examining the prosecutor’s challenged comments in context, it is clear that

she did not engage in reversible misconduct. Lopez’s counsel had argued that

33
Lopez’s version of events was truthful and that Carnet-Castro had not accepted

responsibility for his actions and had lied extensively. The government was

permitted to demonstrate not only that Carnet-Castro had accepted responsibility

(by discussing his plea agreement), but also to call into question Lopez’s

credibility, which had been put at issue by his counsel. In any event, even if we

were to assume the prosecutor’s comments were improper, when examined in the

context of the entire trial Lopez has not shown “a reasonable probability . . . that,

but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Eckhardt,

466 F.3d at 947.

The district court also took adequate curative measures. It sustained Lopez’s

objections to the two prosecutor comments and struck them from the record. In

addition, the district court explained that what the lawyers said was not evidence in

the case three separate times during the trial – during the initial instructions at the

beginning of trial, immediately before the parties gave their closing arguments, and

during the jury instructions. The court also advised the jury that “every defendant

is presumed by law to be innocent” and “[t]he law does not require a defendant to

prove innocence or to produce any evidence at all.” The court also instructed the

jury that Lopez “ha[d] a right not to testify,” but because he did, the jury “should

decide in the same way as that of any other witness whether you believe the

34
defendant’s testimony.”

Further, the prosecutor’s comments were not improper witness vouching.

The prosecutor was permitted to comment on the credibility of her own witnesses

without personally vouching for the witness’s credibility or bolstering the

witness’s credibility through the government’s reputation. The prosecutor properly

referenced Carnet-Castro’s guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility for his

actions in the context of a larger discussion about the evidence and the credibility

of the government’s witnesses, as compared to Lopez’s evidence and credibility.

The record demonstrates that the prosecutor’s challenged comments were a “fair

response” to Lopez’s counsel’s attacks on the government and its witnesses.

Taken in context, these two comments were a minor portion of a lengthy

trial in which there was substantial evidence against Lopez from multiple

eyewitnesses, and we find no reversible error from the government’s comments.

F. Cumulative Error

Lopez lastly argues his conviction must be reversed because the cumulative

effects of the district court’s erroneous supplemental instructions and the

prosecutor’s misconduct denied him a fair trial.

Even where individual judicial errors or prosecutorial misconduct may not

be sufficient to warrant reversal alone, we may consider the cumulative effects of

35
errors to determine if the defendant has been denied a fair trial. United States v.

McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1462 (11th Cir. 1987). “In addressing a claim of

cumulative error, we must examine the trial as a whole to determine whether the

appellant was afforded a fundamentally fair trial.” United States v. Calderon, 127

F.3d 1314, 1333 (11th Cir. 1997).

Having already determined that the district court did not err in instructing

the jury with the two supplemental instructions and that the government’s closing

argument did not violate Lopez’s Sixth Amendment rights, we also conclude, from

our review of the trial as a whole, that the cumulative effects of those alleged errors

did not deny Lopez a fair trial.

For all of these reasons, we affirm Lopez’s convictions.

AFFIRMED.

36
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

While I concur with the majority that the district court did not err in

instructing the jury that there is no temporal requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1327, I

dissent because I believe the district court’s supplemental instruction on 8 U.S.C. §

1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is per se reversible error. By defining “encourage” so generally

to mean “help,” the district court rendered at least one other statutory subsection

superfluous and also constructively amended the indictment.

Jose Lopez drove the boat in which seventeen aliens were being smuggled

into the United States. This conduct appears to violate another provision of the

same statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), which prohibits the knowing transportation of

an alien who has not received prior official authorization to enter the United States.

However, Lopez was not charged with violating this subsection. Rather, he was

charged with violating § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which prohibits the “encouragement”

or “inducement” of an alien to come to the United States with the knowledge or

reckless disregard of the fact that the alien’s entry into the United States is in

violation of the law.

The majority’s decision eschews the ordinary and common sense meaning of

the word “encourage” in favor of the most general and least meaningful possible

interpretation, namely, “to help.” The majority reasons that one form of “help” is

37
mere transportation. The majority’s interpretation thus criminalizes not, as it

suggests, two aspects of the same conduct but rather the same aspect of the same

conduct. That is, if “encourage” as applied to bringing aliens into the United States

subsection (a)(1) means “help” and “help” includes transportation, then subsection

(a)(2) (transportation) must likewise means exactly the same thing as subsection

(a)(1) (“encouraging” or “inducing”— or, in the majority’s terms, “helping” an

illegal entry). But surely “encouragement” or “inducement” under (a)(1) must

criminalize something different than mere transportation, otherwise (a)(2) would

be redundant. “A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be

interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or

mere surplusage.” United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th

Cir. 1991).

Reading the statute as a whole — with “encouragement” or “inducement” in

context — demonstrates that “encourage” must be read to mean something more

than mere “help” in order to avoid rendering (a)(2) redundant. See United States

1

 The majority’s cited support for its position is not persuasive. See United States v. 1

Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kuku, 129 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1997).

Ndiaye and Kuku did not present the possibility that those defendants, who were charged with

“encouraging” aliens to reside or remain in the United States, could be convicted of the separate

but uncharged crime of transporting an alien into the United States because those cases involved

aliens who were already present in the United States. Further, United States v. Hanna is

inapposite because while the defendant in Hanna drove the boat like Lopez, he also planned the

smuggling and made preparations for the journey. 639 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. Unit B 1980). In

Hanna, the defendant was the captain of the boat; had been employed specifically to take the

38
v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (disfavoring interpretation of

“induce” as synonymous with “persuade” because to do otherwise would render

other portions of the statute superfluous). The majority’s expansive interpretation

of “encourage” most clearly renders subsection (a)(2) — transportation of an alien

into the United States — superfluous but the problem applies more broadly as well.

The ordinary and common sense meaning of “encourage” implies an

affirmative act that serves as a catalyst or trigger that drives, motivates, or spurs

another individual to embark on a course of action that he might not have

otherwise. Indeed, dictionaries define “encourage” as “[t]o instigate; to incite to

action; to give courage to; to inspirit; to embolden; to raise confidence; to make

confident; to help; to forward; to advise.” Black’s Law Dictionary 620 (4th ed.

1968); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 568 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “encourage”

as “[t]o instigate; to incite to action; to embolden; to help”); Webster’s Third New

Int’l Dictionary 747 (1993) (defining “encourage” as “to give courage to; inspire

with courage, spirit, or hope; to spur on; to give help or patronage to.”). “Help” is

the least preferred definition for “encourage.” It appears last (or towards the end of

the list) and, unlike the more preferred meanings of “encourage,” “help” is vague

boat to Miami; assisted the aliens in boarding the boat; left the boat in a smaller boat to go to an

island to procure food and water for the aliens during the twelve-day boat trip from Haiti;

instructed the aliens to use the alibi that he had concocted for them; and used that same alibi with

the police. Id.

39
and provides the least descriptive context for the meaning of “encourage.”

Applying the ordinary and most preferred meanings of “encourage” (i.e. not

“help”), there is no evidence that Lopez incited the aliens to action or even spoke

to or otherwise communicated with them prior to or during the voyage. He did not

“encourage” or “induce” them to come. By no stretch of the facts did Lopez’s

mere act of driving the boat “instigate” or “incite to action” the passengers, who

had already decided to illegally enter the United States before they met him and

had undertaken the journey. A taxi driver who takes a passenger to the address

2

supplied by the passenger has engaged in different conduct than a taxi driver who

approaches a potential passenger on the street and touts a specific tourist attraction

urging the potential passenger to let the taxi driver take him there. In the former

scenario, the taxi driver has merely transported the passenger. In the latter, the taxi

driver has “encouraged” or “induced” that passenger to go to a specific destination.

 The majority relies heavily on Carnet-Castro’s testimony that Lopez (1) had made a 2

previous smuggling trip with him; (2) knew that this trip was a smuggling one; (3) intended to

share the proceeds with Carnet-Castro; (4) drove the boat to the abandoned hotel where the

aliens boarded; and (5) lied to Coast Guard officials when he was initially stopped. What is

notable about the majority’s characterization of the facts is that they do not address Lopez’s

interactions with the aliens themselves. When Lopez drove the boat to the abandoned hotel

where the aliens boarded, the aliens had already formed their intent to board the boat and to enter

the United States illegally. Lopez was not a catalyst for their intent to come to or enter the

United States nor did his actions “incite to action” the aliens. Rather, their intention to enter the

United States illegally was already formed prior to their embarkation, which itself was not

brought about by Lopez’s actions. Accordingly, Lopez’s pilotage of the boat was nothing more

than mere transportation of the aliens. 

40
Under the facts of this case, the government chose the wrong statutory

provision under which to prosecute Lopez and then attempted to cure this defect by

broadening the basis of the indictment by defining “encourage” in a way that

swallows the other subsections. The majority tries to explain the government’s

3

mistake by asserting that when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the

government may decide upon which statutory provision it will base its prosecution,

and that the same conduct may violate more than one statutory provision. These

legal principles are not in dispute. What I take issue with is that the majority’s

 The government’s failure to draft a comprehensive indictment or its failure to present 3

evidence in support of the indicted charge cannot justify the constructive amendment of the

indictment. This Court takes seriously the constitutional mandate that charges must be presented

to a grand jury for an indictment to issue and that any conviction is based upon evidence

supporting those charges only—and no others. This Court strictly construes charges contained

in an indictment and holds both district courts and the government accountable for jury

instructions and evidence that do not support the charged offense. See United States v. Narog,

372 F.3d 1243, 1248-50 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that district court’s supplemental jury

instruction that the government need only prove that the defendant knew he was manufacturing a

controlled substance constructively amended the indictment because indictment charged that

defendant knew he was manufacturing methamphetamine and government’s evidence supported

methamphetamine production only). 

As the Supreme Court has emphasized, after an indictment has been returned, its charges

may be broadened only by the grand jury itself. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16

(1960). This is because 

if it lies within the province of a court to change the charging part of an

indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to have been, or what the grand

jury would probably have made it if their attention had been called to suggested

changes, the great importance which the common law attaches to an indictment

by a grand jury, as a prerequisite to a prisoner's trial for a crime, and without

which the constitution says ‘no person shall be held to answer,’ may be frittered

away until its value is almost destroyed. 

Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10 (1887). 

41
interpretation of the statute, when applied in the context of transportation, renders

two statutory provisions coterminous. The majority’s adoption of “help” as a

definition of “encourage” is problematic for any of the subsections that have

transportation as an element. This is because mere transportation is a form of

“help” (as are many types of conduct given the broad-based meaning of the word

“help”) which the majority now claims is synonymous with “encouragement.” But

as I stated earlier, encouragement must mean more than mere transportation.

However, the government’s error does not change the fact that the

undisputed evidence is that Lopez followed Carnet-Castro and Monge’s directions

regarding where to drive the boat. There is no evidence that Lopez ever

approached or communicated with the aliens prior to or even during the voyage.

The jury recognized the inherent and critical difference between encouragement or

inducement and mere transportation when it sent its note to the district judge,

asking whether Lopez had to communicate with the aliens either “orally or by

gesture” in order to be convicted of “encouraging” or “inducing” them. To give

4

 The majority’s reliance on United States v. He, 245 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2001) is 4

misplaced as He is distinguishable in several material respects. Most importantly for our

purposes, the continuing viability of He is questionable in light of the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Santos. The Seventh Circuit decided He seven years prior to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Santos and thus the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, which focuses almost exclusively on

the dictionary definitions to the exclusion of any holistic analysis of the statute, is lacking under

the prescribed method of interpretation that now is binding on it and this Circuit. Second, as a

decision of our sister circuit, He is not binding on this Court and is, at best, persuasive. Third, in

He, the argument that the supplemental instruction provided an improper definition of

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the supplemental instruction defining “encourage” as “help” in response was

erroneous.

“encourage” as it renders other statutory provisions redundant was not advanced before the

district court or the Seventh Circuit. 245 F.3d at 959. By contrast, in this case, it was vigorously

argued by defense counsel before the district court and before this Court. Thus, the precise

question before this Court was never before the Seventh Circuit and, as such, the resolution of it

did not form the basis for the He decision. More to the point, the jury in He explicitly requested

a “better definition” of the undefined statutory terms, 245 F.3d at 957, while in Lopez’s case, the

jury did not request any definition of the undefined statutory term. Finally, the defendant in He

also provided much more than mere transportation while Lopez was merely the pilot of the boat

in this case.

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