REVERSE and REMAND and Opinion Filed August 28, 2019 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-01017-CV 

LISA HAWKINS, Appellant 

V. 

MICHAEL JENKINS AND WANDA JENKINS, Appellees 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-18-01539-D 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Reichek 

Opinion by Justice Reichek 

Lisa Hawkins appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her suit for eviction brought against her 

uncle, Michael Jenkins, and his wife, Wanda. In two issues, Hawkins contends the trial court erred 

in dismissing her case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because we conclude the right to 

immediate possession may be determined separately from any issue of title in this case, we reverse 

the trial court’s dismissal order and remand the cause for further proceedings. 

Factual Background

 Hawkins owned and resided in a house in DeSoto, Texas for over twenty years. In the 

summer of 2015, Hawkins was in Chapter 13 bankruptcy and living with her mother while 

recovering from a hospital stay. At that time, Michael Jenkins expressed an interest in acquiring 

the DeSoto house because he and his wife wanted to relocate closer to her work. After some 
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negotiation, Hawkins agreed to sell the house to her uncle for $160,000 and she obtained 

permission from the bankruptcy court to do so. Hawkins allowed Jenkins and his wife to move 

into the house while they attempted to obtain financing for the purchase. Jenkins paid Hawkins 

$1,500 per month, which was roughly the amount of Hawkins’s mortgage payment. The parties 

dispute whether these payments were rental payments or “house payments.” 

 To effectuate the purchase, Jenkins filled out a form real estate purchase agreement he 

obtained online. All three parties signed the contract. By its terms, the contract was made subject 

to Jenkins being approved for third-party financing. The closing date of the sale was set for 

February 19, 2016 and title to the property was to be transferred to Jenkins at that time. The 

contract stated that the cash portion of the sales price payable to Hawkins at closing was $159,990. 

There is no mention in the contract of the monthly payments made by Jenkins going towards the 

purchase price. In addition, the contract stated that, 

 Possession of the Property in its current or required state, ordinary wear and 

tear excepted, will be delivered by the Seller to the Buyer pursuant to a temporary 

residential lease form or any written lease as required by the parties. A tenancy at 

sufferance relationship will be created between the Parties where there is no 

authorized written lease agreement and either the Buyer has possession prior to 

closing or the Seller has possession after closing. 

 It is undisputed that Jenkins was unable to obtain financing to purchase the house and the 

written contract expired under its own terms. The Jenkinses continued to live in the house, 

however, and pay Hawkins $1,500 per month. According to Jenkins, he and Hawkins had a “verbal 

contract” because she “told me that she was going to work with me and sign any papers necessary 

[to] get transfer of the title once we . . . secured financing.” Jenkins testified he made significant 

improvements to the house including installing a new air conditioning system and building a patio. 

Over the next year and a half, Hawkins was able to negotiate a reduction in the amount she 

owed on a second lien on the home from $14,000 to $3,000 and Jenkins gave her the money to pay 
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off that lien. Additionally, Hawkins obtained debt forgiveness for some of what she owed on the 

first lien mortgage, reducing the amount owed from approximately $152,000 to $84,000. 

In July 2017, Hawkins agreed to provide Jenkins with an $11,500 “Gift of Equity to Fund 

a Loan” that allowed Jenkins to obtain third-party financing. After the Jenkinses were approved 

for a 95% loan, a dispute arose regarding the final purchase price. An email from the loan officer 

stated that the price had to be adjusted to $175,000 for the credits and closing costs to work and 

for Hawkins to be paid the amount she expected to realize from the original $160,000 purchase 

price. Jenkins refused to pay a higher sales price claiming he had already paid Hawkins $7,500, 

which was the amount of profit she would have received from the $160,000 sale price based on 

the original mortgage amount. He also did not believe the house was worth what Hawkins was 

asking and wanted credit for the improvements he had made to the house. Hawkins stated she 

never asked for the higher sales price and she denied receiving a $7,500 payment from Jenkins. 

After the second closing did not occur, Hawkins and Jenkins discussed signing a lease 

agreement. Jenkins testified that Hawkins told him she would give him credit for the repairs he 

had done to the house in the lease. But, according to Jenkins, the lease did not reflect what they 

had discussed, so he refused to sign it. Jenkins then stopped making monthly payments for the 

house. 

 Hawkins brought this forcible entry and detainer action to evict the Jenkinses from the 

house asserting they were in the house pursuant to a month-to-month tenancy and they continued 

to reside in the house after failing to pay the rent owed. The case was originally brought in the 

justice of the peace court and then appealed to the county court at law. After the case was appealed 

to the county court, the Jenkinses filed a suit to quiet title to the house in district court asserting 

equitable title to the property. The Jenkinses then filed a plea to the jurisdiction in this case 

asserting that the title issue rendered the county court without jurisdiction to render judgment. A 
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hearing was conducted at which both Hawkins and Jenkins testified. After considering the 

pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel, the county court granted the plea and dismissed 

the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This appeal followed. 

Analysis

 In her second issue, Hawkins contends the trial court erred in dismissing her suit for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions is expressly 

given to the justice courts and, on appeal, to the county courts at law de novo. See Rice v. Pinney, 

51 S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). The county court has no jurisdiction over 

the appeal unless the justice court had jurisdiction below. Id. The sole issue in a forcible entry 

and detainer action is who has the right to immediate possession of the premises. Id. at 709. Where 

the right to immediate possession necessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, the justice court, 

and consequently the county court, has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment and the case must be 

dismissed. Id. 

To defeat the county court’s jurisdiction, the defendant must provide “specific evidence” 

of a genuine title dispute that is intertwined with the issue of immediate possession. See Yarto v. 

Gilliland, 287 S.W.3d 83, 93 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.). Specific evidence of a 

title dispute exists if a party asserts a basis for title ownership that is not patently ineffective under 

the law. Id. Filing a separate suit in district court to determine the question of title does not 

automatically remove the issue of the right to immediate possession from the jurisdiction of the 

justice court or county court. Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710. Indeed, in most cases the issues of title and 

right to immediate possession can be determined separately. Id. 

The Jenkinses contend there is a genuine title dispute in this case because they are claiming 

equitable title pursuant to an oral agreement. For an oral contract for sale of property to be 

enforceable, the legal obligations and liabilities of the parties must be sufficiently definite. 
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Gutierrez v. Gonzalez, No. 05-16-00631-CV, 2017 WL 2729901, *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 26, 

2017, pet. denied)(mem. op.). The contract must be certain and clear as to all essential terms. Id. 

In this case, the only specific evidence of an oral agreement produced at the hearing was Jenkins’s 

testimony that Hawkins told him she would “work with him” to transfer title once he secured 

financing to pay for the property. Although it is undisputed the parties originally agreed to a 

purchase price of $160,000, and they signed a written contract to this effect, there is no evidence 

of any agreement regarding the sales price, or any other terms other than the identity of the 

property, after the first attempted sale failed to close and the written contract expired. It is because 

the parties actively disagreed about the sales price that the second attempted closing did not occur. 

Even if the evidence showed the existence of an oral contract, the Jenkinses produced no 

evidence that they fully performed under the alleged contract such that they became vested with 

equitable title to the property. See Yarto, 287 S.W.3d at 89–90; see also, Siddiq v. Hawkins, No. 

05-09-00581-CV, 2011 WL 3211254, *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 29, 2011, pet. denied)(mem. 

op.). Until the purchaser fully performs, he has only an equitable right to acquire title in the future 

by carrying out the agreement. Siddiq, 2011 WL 3211254, *4; see also, Lugo v. Ross, 378 S.W.3d 

620, 623 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.). A claim based on an equitable right to complete 

performance of the agreement is not the same as present, equitable title and does not defeat the 

county court’s jurisdiction to render a judgment of immediate possession. Gober v. Bulkley Props., 

LLC, No. 06-18-00031-CV, 2019 WL 321326, *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 25, 2019, pet. 

denied)(mem. op.). 

Although the Jenkinses assert in their brief that they “fully performed their obligations 

under the contract,” all of the evidence showed the parties did not intend for title to be conveyed 

until the entire purchase price was paid. There is no evidence this occurred. Absent full payment, 

the Jenkinses have, at most, an equitable right to enforce the sale and not equitable title that creates 
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a genuine title dispute. See Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 

The Jenkinses rely heavily on case law regarding the enforceability of oral agreements for 

the purchase of property to support their title claim. See Boyert v. Tauber, 834 S.W.2d 60, 63 

(Tex. 1992). An oral contract for the purchase of real property is enforceable if the purchaser: (1) 

pays the consideration; (2) takes possession of the property; and (3) makes permanent and valuable 

improvements on the property with the consent of the seller, or, without such improvements, other 

facts are shown that would make the transaction a fraud on the purchaser if the oral contract was 

not enforced. Id. As stated above, however, the fact that the alleged oral contract may be 

enforceable only vests the Jenkinses with an equitable right to complete performance of the 

agreement. Until they have completed performance, they do not have a claim of equitable title 

that would defeat the county court’s jurisdiction. See Haith, 596 S.W.2d at 197. 

We conclude the trial court erred in determining there was title dispute in this case that 

rendered it without subject matter jurisdiction. We resolve Hawkins’s second issue in her favor. 

In her first issue, Hawkins contends the trial court erred in “deciding the issue of equitable 

title.” The court’s order makes no title determination, but only dismisses the cause for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. Although the trial judge discussed the arguments being made by the 

parties during the hearing, we do not read these comments as “deciding the issue” of title. To the 

extent the comments could be understood differently, Hawkins correctly notes that the county 

court had no jurisdiction to decide the title dispute. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709. 

 
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Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand the cause 

for further proceedings. 

 

 

 

181017F.P05 

 

/Amanda L. Reichek/ 

AMANDA L. REICHEK 

JUSTICE 
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S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

LISA HAWKINS, Appellant 

No. 05-18-01017-CV V. 

MICHAEL JENKINS AND WANDA 

JENKINS, Appellees 

 On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 4, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-18-01539-D. 

Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek. 

Justices Schenck and Osborne participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s Order of Dismissal is 

REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

 It is ORDERED that appellant LISA HAWKINS recover her costs of this appeal from 

appellees MICHAEL JENKINS AND WANDA JENKINS. 

Judgment entered August 28, 2019