J-S50021-17

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CEDRIC DARNELL BOSWELL 

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2314 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 1, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0004801-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2018

Appellant, Cedric Darnell Boswell, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence of thirteen to twenty-six years of incarceration, imposed June 1, 

2016, following a jury trial resulting in his convictions for trafficking in 

individuals, promoting prostitution, simple assault, and criminal use of a 

communication facility.1 We affirm. 

Based on the trial court opinion and certified record, the relevant facts 

and procedural history of this case are as follows. See Trial Court Opinion 

(TCO), 8/22/16, at 1-15; Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 4/18/16, at 63-218; 

N.T., 4/19/16, at 60-61. 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3011(a)(2), 5902(b)(3), 2701(a)(1), and 7512(a)

respectively. 
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In June 2015, Pennsylvania State Troopers conducted an investigation 

into human trafficking and prostitution. To that end, the investigating team 

rented two rooms at the Staybridge Suites in Allentown, PA. During their 

investigation, the team found postings on backpage.com advertising escort 

services and providing phone numbers to contact for those services. 

Trooper O’Malley selected an ad and texted the phone number provided. 

Trooper O’Malley made contact with a woman, later identified as J.P.,

2 and 

asked her to come to room 209 at the hotel. 

When J.P. arrived at the room, Trooper O’Malley was in an adjacent 

room, listening. Inside room 209, J.P. offered Trooper Michael Acevedo 

sexual favors for money. J.P. was detained and interviewed by Trooper 

O’Malley. According to J.P., Appellant had arranged the prostitution 

appointment for her earlier in the day and was waiting for her outside in the 

parking lot in her car. J.P. suggested that Appellant received all of the 

money she earned by performing sexual acts. J.P. also informed Trooper 

O’Malley that she had observed Appellant strike another female prostitute in 

the face, knocking her to the floor. 

Other troopers went to the parking lot and arrested Appellant.

3 At the 

____________________________________________

2 We will refer to the women who are victims of sex crimes by their initials to 

protect their privacy. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3019(a).

3 Another woman, S.S., was also in the car with Appellant and was arrested 

on an outstanding bench warrant. 
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time of the arrest, Appellant had a cell phone in his hands. Appellant’s 

cellphone was seized, and a search warrant was obtained for its contents. 

Recovered from the phone were: provocative pictures of women, many of 

which had been posted on backpage.com; other ads placed on 

backpage.com; a video of a woman appearing drugged; various text 

messages related to the business of prostitution; and a text message in 

which the sender, Appellant, apologized for hitting the recipient, A.L. 

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude the 

admission of the responsive text messages recovered from his phone. 

According to Appellant, the responsive text messages from non-testifying 

witnesses was inadmissible hearsay that was not authenticated as to who 

was responding. N.T., 4/18/16, at 18, 33. The motion was denied because 

there was circumstantial evidence to authenticate the authors of the text 

messages and the messages were to give a “complete picture and the 

history of their relationship and the history of the case.” Id. at 35, 39-40.

In April 2016, trial commenced. In addition to providing evidence 

supporting the background set forth above, the Commonwealth presented 

expert testimony from Special Agent Stefanie Snyder who participated in the 

investigation.4 See N.T., 4/18/16, at 71, 79. According to Special Agent 

Snyder, human sex trafficking is the exchange of sex for anything of value

____________________________________________

4 Special Agent Snyder is employed as an investigative agent by the 

Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 65. 
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(i.e. drugs, money, or a place to stay) through the use of force, fraud or 

coercion. Id. at 69-70. Agent Snyder also testified that prostitution has 

become more anonymous with the use of the internet to advertise for 

services. Id. at 70. 

J.P. testified at trial. She described the manner in which Appellant 

operated the prostitution business, including his reliance on text messaging 

and backpage.com. See N.T., 4/19/16, at 121, 125, 149-52. In addition, 

J.P. provided evidence concerning the assault victim in this case, A.L.5 

According to J.P., she initially met A.L. while admitted at an inpatient, 

rehabilitation facility in New Jersey. Id. at 108, 110. A.L. was a patient, 

seeking treatment for an addiction to heroin. Id. A couple of months later, 

J.P. saw A.L. again when A.L. was with Appellant, living together in a motel. 

Id. at 111-12. J.P. described the living conditions. According to J.P.’s 

observations: A.L. was not permitted to leave her room unless she was 

engaged in prostitution for Appellant. Id. at 118. A.L. was the primary 

person to answer calls for prostitution. Id. at 114. All of the money A.L. 

earned went to Appellant. Id. at 118. In exchange, Appellant provided A.L.

with room and board and supplied her with narcotics. Id. Finally, J.P. 

testified that in May 2015 J.P witnessed Appellant strike A.L., knocking her 

____________________________________________

5 A.L. was not present at trial to testify. During its opening statement, the 

Commonwealth suggested that A.L. was unavailable due to her fear of 

Appellant. N.T., 4/18/16, at 60-61. 
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to the ground. Id. at 121-22. 

Following the trial, a jury convicted Appellant of all charges. Appellant 

made an oral motion for acquittal, which was denied. In June 2016, 

Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate of thirteen to twenty-six years of 

incarceration, which includes consecutive, statutory maximum sentences for 

each of his convicted charges. Appellant timely filed a motion to modify his 

sentence, which the court denied in July 2016. 

On July 22, 2016, counsel for Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. 

In response, the trial court did not direct compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Nevertheless, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a),

addressing the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, as well as the court’s 

reasoning for the sentence imposed.6 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

A. Whether the trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion in 

limine and subsequent objection and permitted the Commonwealth 

to present testimonial, text message evidence from non-testifying 

witnesses? 

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6

It is clear from our review of the certified record that during the postsentence period, while represented by counsel, Appellant pro se filed several 

documents with the trial court. This included, for example, a pro se notice 

of appeal. See Pro se Notice of Appeal 6/30/16. Apparently in response, 

the trial court issued an order directing compliance with 1925(b). See 

Docket No. CP-39-CR-0004801-2015 at entry 7/22/16. This order does not 

appear in the certified record. Further, the docket indicates that the trial 

court did not serve this order upon counsel. Id. Finally, we note that the 

pro se notice of appeal filed on June 30, 2016, docketed in this Court at 

2211 EDA 2016, was discontinued on August 23, 2016, at the request of 

Appellant’s counsel. Id. at entry 8/23/16. 
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B. Whether the sentences as imposed were manifestly excessive and 

unduly punitive as they were beyond the aggravated range of the 

[Appellant’s] applicable sentencing guidelines and the result of ill–

will and bias toward the [Appellant]?

See Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Initially, we note that the Commonwealth asserts that Appellant has 

waived all issues on appeal for his failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. 

Where a trial court orders an Appellant to file a statement, the Appellant 

must comply in a timely manner. Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 

775, 780 (Pa. 2005). Failure to comply with a Rule 1925(b) order will result 

in waiver of all issues raised on appeal. Id.; see also Greater Erie Indus. 

Development Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. 

Super. 2014); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)(“Issues not included in the 

Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this 

paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”). 

However, it is the language of the trial court’s order that triggers an 

appellant’s obligation. See In Re Estate of Boyle, 7 A.3d 674, 676 (Pa. 

Super. 2013). Essentially, the court must advise an appellant that: (1) he 

has twenty-one days from the date of entry of the 1925(b) order to file the 

statement; (2) the statement must be filed of record; (3) the statement 

should be served on the trial judge pursuant to paragraph (b)(1); and (4) 

any issue not included in the statement timely filed and served will be 

deemed waived. Greater Erie Indus. Development Corp., 88 A.3d at 
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225-26. Additionally, the trial court must serve notice on an appellant’s 

counsel, or on the appellant if unrepresented, and note on the docket that 

notice was given. Id. at 226; Pa.R.Crim.P. 114. Failure to adhere to these 

requirements will preclude waiver. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 509-10 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (holding that the “strict application of the bright line rule in 

[Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306 (Pa. 1990),] necessitates strict 

interpretation of the rules regarding notice of Rule 1925(b) orders and a 

failure to give notice will prevent waiver” for timeliness pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)).

The trial docket reflects that the court issued a Rule 1925(b) order on 

July 22, 2016.7 See Docket No. CP-39-CR-0004801-2015 at entry 7/22/16. 

However, the court served this order upon Appellant only and not counsel of 

record. Id. Because Appellant was represented by counsel at the time the 

court issued its order, the court was required to serve counsel. In re L.M., 

923 A.2d at 510. Consequently, we decline to find that Appellant has 

waived his issues. Id. Thus, we will address the merits of Appellant’s issues 

raised on appeal. 

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7 The certified record does not contain a copy of the 1925(b) order. 

Therefore, this Court is not able to consider the sufficiency of the order 

itself. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 878 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. Super. 

2005); see also Commonwealth v. O’Black, 897 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Pa. 

2006) (“[Superior Court] cannot meaningfully review claims raised on appeal 

unless we are provided with a full and complete certified record.”). 
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First, Appellant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion 

in limine, which sought to preclude the admission of text messages from his 

cell phone.8 See Appellant’s Brief at 12. According to Appellant, certain text 

messages received by Appellant from individuals not testifying at trial were 

inadmissible as hearsay. Id. Moreover, according to Appellant, the trial 

court’s limiting instructions were insufficient to counteract the prejudice 

against him. Id. at 13, 16. Thus, he seeks a new trial. Id. at 16.

Appellant expressly challenges three text messages admitted into 

evidence. The messages reflect part of three, brief conversations between: 

(1) Appellant and an individual identified as “Scott $”; (2) Appellant and a 

customer; and (3) Appellant and a prostitute, A.L. See Appellant’s Brief at 

14-15; see also N.T., 4/19/16, at 63-65.9 

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8

In his motion in limine, Appellant sought to preclude the admission of all of 

the 5,500 text messages recovered from his phone. Although Appellant 

cites to a comprehensive list compiled in Commonwealth’s Exhibit 11, the 

exhibit was not included in the certified record to this Court. Appellant is 

responsible for ensuring the record is complete. See Pa.R.A.P., Rule 

1911(a); see also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 410 (Pa. Super 

2011) (noting that appellant and his lawyer have an obligation “to identify 

and order that which he deems necessary to prosecute his appeal.”). In his 

argument section, however, he references only six text messages, three sent 

by Appellant and three received by Appellant in response. Accordingly, to 

the extent Appellant challenges the admission of the text messages not 

mentioned here, he has waived those claims. See Commonwealth v. 

Harris, 979 A.2d 387, 393 (Pa. Super. 2009).

 

9 Appellant does not challenge the authentication or admissibility of those 

messages sent by Appellant. See Appellant’s Brief at 12. They include: (1) 

“Want me 2 come back babe [?] 2 hours?”; (2) “Are you coming? I will leave 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We note our standard of review: 

In evaluating the denial or grant of a motion in limine, our standard of 

review is the same as that utilized to analyze an evidentiary challenge. 

It is well settled that “[t]he admission of evidence is solely within the 

discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's evidentiary rulings will 

be reversed on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion. An abuse 

of discretion will not be found based on a mere error of judgment, but 

rather occurs where the court has reached a conclusion that overrides 

or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. The 

court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 

outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 224 (2016), appeal denied, 168 

A.3d 1287 (Pa. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible, and evidence is relevant 

if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the 

action.” See Pa.R.E. 401-02. However, the court may exclude evidence 

where its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice or is needlessly

 

the room.”; and (3) “I’m wrong for hittin u but u wrong for actin krazy 

[sic].” N.T., 4/19/16, at 63-65. We note, however, that they were admitted 

properly as statements of an opposing party. See Pa.R.E. 803(25). Rather, 

the three messages received by Appellant and whose admissibility he 

challenges on appeal are: (1) “Okay. Can you do a little better on the 

price?”; (2) “I think [it] was two pictures, right? Which girl are you [?] the 

pic on top or the pic on the bottom?”; and (3) “U cracked my tooth[;] I have 

to get it fixed now.” Appellant’s Brief at 14-15; N.T., 4/19/16, at 63-65. As 

noted by Appellant, the third message, A.L.’s response, was not read into

the record, but Appellant argues it was displayed in court and visible to 

jurors. See Appellant’s Brief at 15.
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cumulative. See Pa.R.E. 403. We further note that “hearsay is an out of 

court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and is 

inadmissible unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule.” 

Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1084 (Pa. Super. 2015); 

Pa.R.E. 801, 802. Such exceptions include statements by party-opponents. 

Pa.R.E. 803(25)(A). An exception has also been recognized where such 

statements would establish motive, the existence of a plan, or would 

similarly “complete the story.” See Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 639 A.2d 

421, 434 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Levanduski, 907 A.2d 3, 13 (Pa. 

Super. 2006). 

Text messages are considered electronic communications for 

evidentiary purposes. Mosley, 114 A.3d at 1081-82. “[S]uch messages 

are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as any other document to 

determine whether or not there has been an adequate foundational showing 

of their relevance and authenticity.” Id. at 1081. Where a text message is 

admitted solely to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is hearsay and 

subject, accordingly, to the rules and exceptions thereto. Mosley, 114 A.3d 

at 1084-85; Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005-06 (Pa. Super. 

2011). Further, where there is a paucity of other evidence to support a 

conviction, the admission of such hearsay constitutes an abuse of discretion

and warrants a new trial. Koch, 39 A.3d at 1006-07. However, where there 

is other evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant is guilty of the 
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crimes charged, its admission is harmless error. Mosley, 114 A.3d at 1085-

86. 

In Mosley, police seized text messages from the defendant’s two cell 

phones, which “were indicative of drug related sales/activity.” Mosley, 114 

A.3d at 1077. The defendant moved to suppress the messages, asserting 

authentication and hearsay grounds. Id. The court denied the motion, and 

thereafter, the defendant was convicted of several drug charges. Id. at 

1078. On appeal, this Court held that the Commonwealth had failed to 

authenticate the message and prove the defendant had sent the texts. Id. 

at 1084. Addressing the defendant’s hearsay argument, we concluded that 

the messages were admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that 

is, that the defendant possessed narcotics with the intent to deliver.10 For 

these reasons, the messages were inadmissible. Id. at 1086. Nevertheless, 

as there was ample, admissible evidence proving this crime, we deemed the 

trial court’s error harmless. Id.; but see Koch, 39 A.3d at 1007 (granting 

the appellant a new trial where text messages were admitted erroneously 

and where those messages “were a vital element of the Commonwealth's 

proof”).

Here, Appellant asserts that the sole purpose to present these text 

____________________________________________

10 Absent proper authentication, text messages found on a defendant’s 

cellular telephone are not subject to the party opponent exception. 

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.2d 996, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2015). 
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messages to the jury was to establish the truth of the matter asserted 

therein. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-15 (citing in support Mosley, supra). 

We agree. The content of the first two messages is clearly indicative of 

Appellant’s efforts to engage in the business of prostitution. See generally

18 Pa.C.S. § 5902. For example, in the brief conversation between 

Appellant and “Scott $,” Appellant inquires whether “Scott $” will return for 

additional sexual activity and specifically asks whether the person is 

interested in extending the appointment for two hours. See N.T., 4/19/16, 

at 63. In response, this person attempts to negotiate a lower price for this 

appointment. Id. Similarly, in the second message, a customer seeks 

clarification regarding which of two prostitutes will be attending the 

appointment. Id. at 64. Finally, in the third message, assault victim A.L. 

states that Appellant “cracked [her] tooth” and that this injury requires 

medical attention. Id. at 65; see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1) (defining 

simple assault to include intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing

bodily injury to another).

Moreover, we discern no other relevance in these messages. For 

example, the messages did not establish a motive for either prostitution or 

assault, and they fail to establish a scheme or plan similar to prior crimes 

allegedly committed by Appellant. See Levanduski, 907 A.3d at 20. Thus, 

we further agree with Appellant that the trial court’s limiting instructions 

were insufficient. 
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Nevertheless, we conclude that Appellant’s reliance upon Mosley is 

misplaced. As in Mosley, where the Commonwealth presented ample, 

admissible evidence that the defendant possessed narcotics with the intent 

to deliver, so too here, there was sufficient evidence establishing Appellant’s 

crimes. The independent testimony of J.P. established that Appellant was 

engaged in the business of prostitution, that he was guilty of trafficking in 

individuals, and that he assaulted A.L. Further, testimony from the 

investigating officers, as well as the admissible evidence seized from 

Appellant’s cell phone corroborated J.P.’s testimony. Accordingly, the 

admission of the text messages challenged by Appellant was harmless error, 

and a new trial is unwarranted. Mosley, 114 A.3d at 1080. 

Second, Appellant challenges discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

According to Appellant, the court’s sentence of thirteen to twenty-six years 

of incarceration was manifestly excessive and clearly unreasonable in that he 

was given consecutive, statutory maximum sentences for all charges. See

Appellant’s Brief at 11. Further, Appellant contends that his sentence was 

the result of the court’s bias against him. Id. 

A challenge to discretionary aspects of a sentence does not entitle an 

appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 

106 (Pa. Super. 2011). Prior to addressing a discretionary challenge, this 

Court engages in a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal 

is timely; (2) whether the appellant preserved his issue at sentencing, in a 
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motion to reconsider, or, in a motion to modify sentence; (3) whether the 

appellant’s brief contains a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is 

a substantial question raised that the sentence is inappropriate under the 

sentencing code. See Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. 

Super. 2013); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). 

Here, Appellant timely filed an appeal as well as a post-sentence 

motion. In the motion, Appellant preserved his claim of excessiveness but 

failed to assert trial court bias. Thus, Appellant’s latter claim is waived. See

Austin, 66 A.3d at 808. Finally, Appellant has included a separate Rule 

2119(f) statement in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 11. We must now 

determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial question that his 

sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code and, if so, review the 

merits. 

Whether an issue raises a “substantial question must be evaluated on 

a case by case basis.” Commonwealth v. Andrews, 720 A.2d 764, 766-

67 (Pa. Super 1998). A claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive may 

raise a substantial question if the appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement 

sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence was inconsistent 

with the Code or contrary to its norms. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 

812 A.2d 617, 627-28 (Pa. 2002). 

Appellant asserts that his aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive 
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because the court imposed consecutive, statutory maximum sentences for 

each of his convictions. In support of this assertion, however, Appellant 

relies on Commonwealth v. Simpson, 829 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

See Appellant’s Brief at 11. In Simpson, this Court recognized a 

substantial question based upon the appellant’s assertion that the 

sentencing court had failed to state sufficiently its reasons for the sentence 

on the record. Id. at 338. Thus, it is inapposite. Further, “a court’s 

exercise of discretion in imposing sentence concurrently or consecutively 

does not ordinarily raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. 

Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa. Super. 2015). Aside from the bald claim 

of excessiveness, Appellant has not articulated another reason that the 

sentence was contrary to the norms of the sentencing code. See Mouzon, 

812 A.2d at 627. Thus, Appellant has not raised a substantial question, and,

accordingly, we decline to review the merits of his claim. Id.; Simpson,

829 A.2d at 338. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Panella joins the memorandum.

Judge Platt concurs in the result. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/18