Filed 2/19/14 In re A.M. CA1/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

A.M., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 A138040 

 (Contra Costa County 

 Super. Ct. No. J12-01489) 

 Following a combined motion to suppress evidence and jurisdictional hearing, the 

juvenile court sustained a petition alleging appellant possessed a weapon on school 

grounds. Appellant contends the court erred in denying his suppression motion. We 

disagree and affirm the judgment. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

1. Prosecution 

 On October 22, 2012 at approximately 11:30 a.m., Andre Walker, a campus 

supervisor assigned to provide security and ensure classroom attendance at Antioch High 

School, was located at the front of the school. At that time, he noticed appellant entering 

the campus. Walker asked appellant why he was so late for an 11:00 a.m. class. 

Appellant did not respond. As appellant approached, Walker “picked up a scent of 

marijuana on him, and that’s the time when I immediately asked him could he join me 
2

into the vice principal’s office [sic].” Walker took appellant to the vice-principal’s office 

because he was late to school, smelled of marijuana, and to determine if he had on him 

any “drug substance.” 

 In the office of the vice-principal, Jarrod Bordi, the vice-principal also noticed the 

odor of marijuana emanating from appellant. Nonetheless, when Walker asked appellant 

if he possessed anything they “should be aware of,” appellant responded he did not. 

Appellant admitted, however, he had smoked marijuana off campus. 

 Because appellant smelled of marijuana, Bordi assumed he possessed marijuana or 

paraphernalia, and he authorized Walker to search appellant. Walker in turn conducted a 

pat search, felt an object, and removed a knife from appellant’s front pocket. According 

to Bordi, the knife had blades “coming out of it at both ends.” Appellant told Bordi he 

found the knife off campus and carried it for protection. Following the discovery of the 

knife and appellant’s admission, Bordi informed him he was under suspension, and called 

the police. 

 Antioch Police Office Christopher Kidd was dispatched to the high school where 

he met with Bordi. Bordi gave him a knife taken from appellant. The knife had “dual 

blades on each side” that locked into position. After being advised of his Miranda

rights,1

 appellant said he found the knife about three or four days previously, and carried 

it for protection. 

 2. Defense

 Appellant testified he was searched by Timothy Manly, site safety coordinator for 

Antioch High School, in front of the school near the parking lot. Appellant denied he 

was ever searched by Walker in the vice-principal’s office, but indicated Walker was 

present when Manly searched him. 

 Officer Kidd testified that when he arrived at the vice-principal’s office, Bordi told 

him Manly had contacted him to advise that a student was in possession of a knife. Kidd 

was “under the impression that he [the vice-principal] was just contacted” by Manly and 

 1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 
3

had not actually witnessed the search. Officer Kidd, however, did not speak to Manly 

about the search. According to Kidd, while he was present, Bordi used a walkie-talkie 

device and contacted Manly who described the circumstances of the search. 

 3. Rebuttal 

 Safety Coordinator Manly testified that he had no contact with and did not search 

appellant on October 22, 2012, or at any other time.2

 He also did not remember speaking 

with Officer Kidd on October 22, 2012, nor talking to Bordi over the radio about the 

search of appellant. 

B. Procedural Background 

On October 24, 2012, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was 

filed alleging appellant committed a misdemeanor, possession of a knife on school 

grounds. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a).) Thereafter, appellant filed a motion to 

suppress evidence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1.) Following a combined 

suppression/jurisdictional hearing on February 21, 2013, the court found Walker, Manly, 

and Bordi gave credible testimony, but did not “necessarily find” appellant gave credible 

testimony. It denied the suppression motion, sustained the petition, and declared 

appellant a ward of the court. Appellant was placed on probation subject to various terms 

and conditions. 

II. DISCUSSION

 Appellant contends the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress because 

the court’s factual finding that school officials had a reasonable suspicion to search was 

not supported by substantial evidence and the search was unreasonable even if school 

officials smelled marijuana. 

 “The standard of review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well 

established and is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings.” (In re Lennies H. 

(2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.) “ ‘On appeal from the denial of a suppression 

 2

 Walker testified that after he searched appellant, he left the vice-principal’s 

office and passed Manly, who was about to enter. Bordi recalled that Manly entered the 

vice-principal’s office after the knife was discovered. 
4

motion, the court reviews the evidence in a light favorable to the trial court’s ruling. 

[Citation.] We must uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court 

which are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the 

facts support the court’s legal conclusions.’ ” (In re William V. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 

1464, 1468.) 

 We begin by setting forth the general legal principles that govern searches and 

seizures of students. The Fourth Amendment3

 protects students on a public school 

campus against unreasonable searches and seizures. (In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

556, 566; In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 561.) The school setting, however, 

“ ‘requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify 

a search.’ ” (Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding (2009) 557 U.S. 364, 370.) 

Greater flexibility is required in applying the principles of the Fourth Amendment to 

searches of a student because teachers’ and administrations’ substantial interests in 

maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds must be balanced against 

the student’s interest in privacy. (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 339 

(T.L.O.).) “[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the 

reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” (Id. at p. 341.) 

 The reasonableness of a search under this standard generally depends on 

(1) whether the search was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the scope of the 

search, as actually conducted, was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the 

initial search. (T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 341.) Ordinarily, a search of a student by a 

school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for 

 3

 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches . . . .” (U.S. Const., 

4th Amend.) This guarantee has been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, and 

is applicable to states. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 655.) The state Constitution 

contains a similar guarantee against unreasonable government searches (Cal. Const., 

art. I, § 13); but, since voter approval of Proposition 8 in June 1982, state and federal 

claims relating to exclusion of evidence on grounds of unreasonable searches are 

measured by the same standard. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886–887.) 
5

suspecting the search will disclose evidence the student has violated or is violating the 

law or school rules. (Id. at pp. 341–342.) To justify a search, “[t]here must be articulable 

facts supporting that reasonable suspicion. . . . Respect for privacy is the rule—a search is 

the exception.” (In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 564.) “[T]his standard requires 

articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, warranting an 

objectively reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched are violating 

or have violated a rule, regulation, or statute.” (Ibid.) A search is permissible in its scope 

when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 

excessively intrusive in the context of the age and sex of the student. (Ibid.) 

 Applying the foregoing principles to the facts of this case, we reject appellant’s 

contention the search was unreasonable. While appellant’s truancy from class, standing 

alone is not a sufficiently reasonable basis for conducting a search of any kind (see In re 

William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 566), as we shall explain, there was an additional fact, 

the odor of marijuana emanating from appellant, giving rise to reasonable suspicion. 

 We first address appellant’s claim that substantial evidence does not support the 

court’s factual finding that school officials had reasonable suspicion to search. As noted 

above, the court found Walker, Bordi, and Manly were credible witnesses, however, it 

did not “necessarily find” appellant credible. Appellant disputes the court’s findings 

based on “material contradictions” among the three witnesses’ testimony and with 

Officer Kidd’s testimony, arguing we should view the trial court’s findings with 

“skepticism.” According to appellant, “[i]n addition to appellant’s testimony that 

Manly[, not Walker,] searched him in the parking lot without consent and that Walker 

was present but did not speak to him, Manly contradicted the testimonies of Walker and 

Bordi by denying that he had any contact with appellant on the day of this incident, and 

by testifying that he does not think or is not sure if he was even working that day.” He 

also focuses on Manly’s testimony that he did not speak to Bordi over the radio in 

contradiction of Officer Kidd’s testimony he recognized Manly’s voice on Bordi’s 

walkie-talkie, and Kidd’s testimony Bordi had told him Manly contacted Bordi about a 
6

student in possession a knife. Lastly, appellant claims Officer Kidd contradicted 

Walker’s and Bordi’s testimony when he testified Bordi did not witness the search. 

 We find no merit in appellant’s contention that the court’s credibility findings 

were not supported by substantial evidence. When a superior court rules on a motion to 

suppress it must first find the facts relating to the challenged search or seizure. In other 

words, “it must decide what the officer actually perceived, or knew, or believed, and what 

action he took in response.” (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596–597, 

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Trujillo (1990) 

217 Cal.App.3d 1219, 1223–1224.) These are traditional questions of fact, and Penal 

Code section 1538.5 vests the superior court with the power to decide them. (Pen. Code, 

§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) Accordingly, the power to judge the credibility of the witness, 

resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences is 

vested in the trial court. “ ‘On appeal all presumptions favor the exercise of that power, 

and the trial court’s findings on such matters whether express or implied, must be upheld 

if they are supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Leyba, at pp. 596–597.) 

 The trial court was also in the best position to determine the credibility of the 

witnesses. The court found Walker, Bordi, and Manly credible and appellant not 

“necessarily” credible. We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s credibility findings. 

The discrepancies in Manly’s testimony relate primarily to his uncertainty about his 

activity on the day of the incident and have no bearing on the credibility of Walker and 

Bordi. While appellant claims it was Manly, not Walker who searched him, the trial 

court evidently discredited appellant’s testimony. The court also gave little if any weight 

to Officer Kidd’s testimony he heard Manly’s voice on the walkie-talkie or Kidd’s 

hearsay testimony Bordi told him Manly contacted Bordi about a student in possession of 

a knife. This assessment was reasonable because Officer Kidd had no personal 

knowledge of who conducted the search, not having been present when the knife was 

discovered, and was only “under the impression” that Bordi did not witness the search. 

In the absence of a compelling circumstance which is not presented here, we are bound 

by the trial court’s credibility determinations. 
7

 Equally without merit is appellant’s contention that even if school officials 

smelled marijuana, they lacked reasonable suspicion to search him because Officer Kidd 

did not notice any objective symptoms of appellant being under the influence of 

marijuana and neither Walker nor Bordi observed “anything else suspicious” or “any kind 

of bulge.” 

 Generally, the odor of marijuana emanating from a particular place provides 

cause to believe more is present. In People v. Cook (1975) 13 Cal.3d 663, disapproved 

on other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421 and footnote 22, the 

Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the odor of marijuana did not 

furnish probable cause to search a car. Relying on People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 778, 

the court held “that a police officer having made a lawful entry into an automobile could 

rely on a strong aroma of fresh marijuana as giving him ‘ “probable cause to believe . . . 

that contraband may be present.” ’ ” (People v. Cook, at p. 668; see also People v. 

Strasburg (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1059.) Here, both Walker and Bordi smelled 

the odor of marijuana emanating from appellant, who admitted he had been smoking 

marijuana earlier off campus. “ ‘It requires no perspicacious intellect to reason the 

person smoking one marijuana cigarette may well want another and will carry sufficient 

marijuana to satisfy his appetite of the moment.’ ” (People v. Coleman (1991) 229 

Cal.App.3d 321, 327.) Clearly there was reasonable suspicion to believe appellant 

possessed more marijuana on his person. The search was reasonable. 

III. DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 
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 _________________________ 

 Margulies, Acting P.J. 

We concur: 

_________________________ 

Banke, J. 

_________________________ 

Becton, J.*

 

*

 Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.