alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §9123. Relinquishment or surrender of license

#### (a) Relinquishment or surrender authority; continuation of liability

Any licensee may at any time, without penalty, surrender to the Administrator a license issued to him, or relinquish to the Administrator, in whole or in part, any right to conduct construction or operation of an ocean thermal energy conversion facility or plantship, including part or all of any right of way which may have been granted in conjunction with such license: Provided, That such surrender or relinquishment shall not relieve the licensee of any obligation or liability established by this chapter, or any other Act, or of any obligation or liability for actions taken by him prior to such surrender or relinquishment, or during disposal or removal of any components required to be disposed of or removed pursuant to this chapter.

#### (b) Transfer of right of way

If part or all of a right of way which is relinquished, or for which the license is surrendered, to the Administrator pursuant to subsection (a) of this section contains an electric transmission cable or pipeline which is used in conjunction with another license for an ocean thermal energy conversion facility, the Administrator shall allow the other licensee an opportunity to add such right of way to his license before informing the Secretary of the Interior that the right of way has been vacated.

(Pub. L. 96–320, title I, §113, Aug. 3, 1980, 94 Stat. 989.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This chapter, referred to in subsec. (a), was in the original "this Act", meaning Pub. L. 96–320, Aug. 3, 1980, 94 Stat. 974, known as the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 9101 of this title and Tables.
### SUBCHAPTER XXIII—WASHITA RIVER BASIN PROJECT, OKLAHOMA
§ 1000.434 How will HUD allocate the availability of loan guarantee assistance? ( a ) Each fiscal year HUD may allocate a percentage of the total available loan guarantee assistance to each Area ONAP equal to the percentage of the total NAHASDA grant funds allocated to the Indian tribes in the geographic area of operation of that office.
( b ) These allocated amounts shall remain exclusively available for loan guarantee assistance for Indian tribes or TDHEs in the area of operation of that office until committed by HUD for loan guarantees or until the end of the second quarter of the fiscal year. At the beginning of the third quarter of the fiscal year, any residual loan guarantee commitment amount shall be made available to guarantee loans for Indian tribes or TDHEs regardless of their location. Applications for residual loan guarantee money must be submitted on or after April 1.
( c ) In approving applications for loan guarantee assistance, HUD shall seek to maximize the availability of such assistance to all interested Indian tribes or TDHEs. HUD may limit the proportional share approved to any one Indian tribe or TDHE to its proportional share of the block grant allocation based upon the annual plan submitted by the Indian tribe or TDHE indicating intent to participate in the loan guarantee allocation process.
#### In the Matter of Frederic Wohlfeld, an Attorney, Respondent. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Petitioner.

First Department,

December 15, 1960.

*George G. Hunter, Jr.,*of counsel *(Erie Nightingale,*attorney), for petitioner.

*Solomon A. Klein*of counsel *(Simon Rosensweig*with him on the brief), for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

In connection with the six charges of professional misconduct filed ag’ainst respondent, the Referee has sustained specifications charging five- separate instances of commingling clients’ funds and conversions thereof, that in a period of less than 9 months respondent gave 50 worthless checks, that as to the subject matter of Charge V he made false and misleading statements to the petitioner Bar Association and to another attorney, and that he failed to file closing statements after settling two personal injury cases. We confirm all of the Referee’s findings except the finding in connection with Charge V that respondent converted $100 received by him from a client to pay the amount of a settlement.

There appears to be no doubt that respondent’s misconduct, all of which occurred during a one-year period, was due to the financial and emotional strain under which he was laboring at the time. Nevertheless, respondent was not guilty of an isolated *83transgression that would indicate little likelihood of recurrence, but of a course of conduct covering a one-year period. A proper regard for the protection of the public dictates that we cannot hazard the risk of future misconduct on the part of respondent if again subjected to a similar period of stress.

The respondent should be disbarred.

Botkin, P. J., Bbeitel, Rabin, Valente and McNally, JJ., concur.

Respondent disbarred.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF HOMECOM COMMUNICATIONS, INC. FOR THE THREE-MONTH PERIOD
ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
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<RECEIVABLES>                                  701,283
<ALLOWANCES>                                   119,243
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,803,040
<PP&E>                                       1,133,420
<DEPRECIATION>                                 405,374
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,864,511
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,864,511
<SALES>                                        119,681
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               882,427
<CGS>                                           82,562
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  399,554
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,337,623
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 7,675
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             266,029
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (1,128,454)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (1,128,454)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                (1,128,454)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.51)
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</TABLE>
Order filed September 11, 2018

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 18

- 00549

- CV

____________ JOSE REYES , Appellant

V.
LINCAM INVESTMENTS L LC , Appellee

On Appeal from the Co unty Civil C our t at Law No

. 3

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1111166



### ORDER
This appeal is from a judgment signed June 25, 2018 . Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 29, 2018 . Appellant filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs in the trial court

.
No order requiring appellant to pay costs appears in the trial court’s record

.

“ A party who files a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs cannot be required to pay costs except by order of the court as provided by this rule .” SeeTex. R. Civ . P. 1 45(a)

. Appellant has not been ordered to pay costs pursuant to Rule

145.
Accordingly, the official court reporter for the County Civil Court at Law No.
3 is directed to file the reporter’s record within 30 days of the date of this order.

PER CURIAM
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**Certification Pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title18, United States Code)**

 

Pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350,Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), I, John W. Elias, ChiefExecutive Officer of Edge Petroleum Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”),hereby certify, to my knowledge, that:

 

(1)           theCompany’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30,2005 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)           theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Dated: | November 9, 2005 | /s/  John W. Elias |
|--------|-----------------------|--------------------|
|   |                  | Name:              | John W. Elias |
|   |                  |               | Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jacinto CARLOS-DE LA TORRE, also known as Jacinto Carlos, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 05-51635

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 25, 2007.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Western District of Texas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Judy Fulmer Madewell, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for DefendanL-Appel-lant.

Before REAVLEY, WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jacinto Carlos-De La Torre (Carlos) appeals the 46-month sentence imposed following his conviction for illegal reentry after deportation.

Carlos first argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court imposed a term of imprisonment greater than necessary to meet 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)’s objectives. We review the sentence imposed for reasonableness. *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 261-62, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). As Carlos was sentenced at the low end of the applicable guidelines range, and he identifies no error in the guidelines calculations, we give great deference to the sentence imposed. *See United, States v. Mares,*402 F.3d 511, 519-20 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*546 U.S. 828, 126 S.Ct. 43, 163 L.Ed.2d 76 (2005). Contrary to Carlos’s arguments, we find that the district court did not improperly balance the sentencing factors and the sentence imposed was not greater than necessary to satisfy the purposes of § 3553(a)(2). Therefore, we conclude that the 46-month sentence imposed was reasonable.

Carlos’s constitutional challenge to the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Although he contends that *Almendarez-Torres*was incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court now would overrule *Almendarez-Torres,*we have repeatedly rejected such arguments on the basis that *Almendarez-Torres*remains binding. *See United States v. Garza-Lopez,*410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S.—, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005). Carlos properly concedes that his argument is foreclosed in light of *AlmendarezTorres*and circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for further review.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
§ 203.666 Processing defaulted mortgages on property in Allegany Reservation of Seneca Nation of Indians. ( a ) *Applicability.* This section applies to mortgages authorized by section 203(q) of the National Housing Act (§ 203.43j) only if the default occurred before the mortgagor and the lessee execute a lease renewal or a new lease either with a term of not less than five years beyond the maturity date of the mortgage, or with a term established by an arbitration award.
( b ) *Claims through assignment.* Before a mortgagee requests the Secretary to accept assignment under § 203.350(d) the mortgagee must submit documents showing that the requirements of § 203.604 have been met.
[53 FR 13405, Apr. 25, 1988, as amended at 61 FR 35020, July 3, 1996]
### §6374b. Alternative fuels bus program

#### (a) Testing

The Secretary, in cooperation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, shall, beginning in the fiscal year ending September 30, 1990, assist State and local government agencies in the testing in urban settings of buses capable of operating on alternative fuels for the emissions levels, durability, safety, and fuel economy of such buses, comparing the different types with each other and with diesel powered buses, as such buses will be required to operate under Federal safety and environmental standards applicable to such buses for the model year 1991. To the extent practicable, testing assisted under this section shall apply to each of the various types of alternative fuel buses.

#### (b) Funding

There are authorized to be appropriated for the period encompassing the fiscal years ending September 30, 1990, September 30, 1991, and September 30, 1992, a total of $2,000,000 to carry out the purposes of this section.

#### (c) "Bus" defined

For purposes of this section, the term "bus" means a vehicle which is designed to transport 30 individuals or more.

(Pub. L. 94–163, title III, §400CC, as added Pub. L. 100–494, §4(a), Oct. 14, 1988, 102 Stat. 2445; amended Pub. L. 102–486, title IV, §402(1), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 2875.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1992—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102–486 substituted "alternative fuels" for "alcohol and buses capable of operating on natural gas" and "each of the various types of alternative fuel buses" for "both buses capable of operating on alcohol and buses capable of operating on natural gas".
###### Editorial Note on Part 40

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 40 appear at 71 FR 34520 and 34521, June 15, 2006.

#### § 40.203 Alien entitled to A, E, or G nonimmigrant classification.

An alien entitled to nonimmigrant classification under INA 101(a)(15) (A), (E), or (G) who is applying for an immigrant visa and who intends to continue the activities required for such nonimmigrant classification in the United States is not eligible to receive an immigrant visa until the alien executes a written waiver of all rights, privileges, exemptions and immunities which would accrue by reason of such occupational status.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-6805

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

HAROLD SMITH, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District

Judge. (CR-85-166, CA-99-800-13)

Submitted: November 4, 1999 Decided: November 29, 1999

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Harold Smith, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. William Corley Lucius, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Harold Smith, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.

1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of

the district court. See United States v. Smith, Nos. CR-85-166;

CA-99-800-13 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 1999). We deny Smith leave to proceed

in forma pauperis and also deny Smith’s motion for transcript at

government expense. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
DISMISSED; Opinion Filed June 7, 2019

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 18
- 01191
- CV JULIE JONES , Appellant

V. DAN WILLEMS , Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC
- 18
- 04952
- E 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Nowell Opinion by Justice Nowell This is an appeal from a judgment of possession in a forcible detainer suit. Because a review of the clerk’s record revealed a writ of possession had been served on appellant , it appeared appellant was no longer in possession of the premises and the appeal had become moot. See Olley v. HVM, LLC , 449 S.W.3d 572, 575 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 4 th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) ( generally, appeal in forcible detainer action becomes moot when appellant i s no longer in possession of premises ). We questioned our jurisdiction over the appeal and directed appellant to file a letter brief addressing our c oncern . See id

. (appellate courts lack jurisdiction over moot controversies) . Although we cautioned appellant that failure to comply could result in dismissal of the appeal without further notice , more than a month has passed and appellant has not responded

. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a),(c).– 2

–

When, as here, an appeal has become moot, an appellate court must vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case. See Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio , 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006). Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment of possession and dismiss
the case

. See id

.

181191F.P05 /Erin A. Nowell/ ERIN A. NOWELL JUSTICE– 3

– 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT
JULIE JONES, Appellant
No. 05

- 18

- 01191

- CV V. DAN WILLEMS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC

- 18

- 04952

- E. Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell, Justices Bridges and Brown participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we VACATE the trial court’s judgment and DISMSS the case.
Judgment entered this 7 th day of June, 2019.
§ 711.170 Compliance procedures. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this section applies to all allegations of discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs and activities conducted by the agency.
( b ) The agency shall process complaints alleging violations of section 504 with respect to employment according to the procedures established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 29 CFR part 1613 pursuant to section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791).
( c ) The Director of Personnel shall be responsible for coordinating implementation of this section. Complaints may be sent to Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 1100 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20527, Attention: Director of Human Resources Management.
( d ) The agency shall accept and investigate all complete complaints for which it has jurisdiction. All complete complaints must be filed within 180 days of the alleged act of discrimination. The agency may extend this time period for good cause.
( e ) If the agency receives a complaint over which it does not have jurisdiction, it shall promptly notify the complainant and shall make reasonable efforts to refer the complaint to the appropriate Government entity.
( f ) The agency shall notify the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board upon receipt of any complaint alleging that a building or facility that is subject to the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4151-4157), is not readily accessible to and usable by individuals with handicaps.
( g ) Within 180 days of the receipt of a complete complaint for which it has jurisdiction, the agency shall notify the complainant of the results of the investigation in a letter containing— ( 1 ) Findings of fact and conclusions of law;
( 2 ) A description of a remedy for each violation found; and
( 3 ) A notice of the right to appeal.
( h ) Appeals of the findings of fact and conclusions of law or remedies must be filed by the complainant within 90 days of receipt from the agency of the letter required by § 711.170(g). The agency may extend this time for good cause.
( i ) Timely appeals shall be accepted and processed by the head of the agency.
( j ) The head of the agency shall notify the complainant of the results of the appeal within 60 days of the receipt of the request. If the head of the agency determines that additional information is needed from the complainant, he or she shall have 60 days from the date of receipt of the additional information to make his or her determination on the appeal.
( k ) The time limits cited in paragraphs (g) and (j) of this section may be extended with the permission of the Assistant Attorney General.
( l ) The agency may delegate its authority for conducting complaint investigations to other Federal agencies, except that the authority for making the final determination may not be delegated to another agency.
[53 FR 25882, 25885, July 8, 1988, as amended 53 FR 25883, July 8, 1988; 84 FR 37752, Aug. 2, 2019]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles Wilson and Edward Gossling, Appellants.

Motion granted and order dismissing appeal vacated; respondent directed to file and serve a printed brief *1088oil or before October 21, 1960 and case added to calendar for argument at October 1960 Term.
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK FAHY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ORPHEOS TARBOX, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-09-1420 MMC

ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF’S APRIL

27, 2010 AND APRIL 29, 2010 FILINGS

By order filed February 18, 2010, the Court deferred ruling on plaintiff Frank Fahy’s

“Notice of Motion and Motion for Order Vacating Settlement With Defendant Alec Steiner,”

and stated therein that following the lifting of the stay imposed by the Court’s February 17,

2010 order, the Court, if necessary, would set a further briefing schedule and hearing on

said motion.

The stay of proceedings was lifted on April 15, 2010. Thereafter, plaintiff, without

leave of court, filed (1) on April 27, 2010, a document titled “Renewed Motion of the Plaintiff

for an Order Vacating Settlement with Defendant Alec Steiner,” and (2) on April 29, 2010, a

document titled “Notice of Renewal of Motion and Motion for Order Vacating Settlement

with Defendant Alec Steiner,” along with a “Declaration of Frank Fahy” in support thereof. 

By such filings, plaintiff seeks, in essence, to supplement with additional arguments his

previously filed motion to vacate the settlement.

Case 3:09-cv-01420-MMC Document 110 Filed 05/04/10 Page 1 of 2
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The Court has not set a further briefing schedule on plaintiff’s motion. Accordingly,

plaintiff’s filings of April 27, 2010 and April 29, 2010 are hereby STRICKEN, and no

defendant need file a response thereto.

Any need for further briefing on plaintiff’s motion to vacate may be raised by the

parties at the Case Management Conference scheduled for May 28, 2010. In the interim,

no party shall file any further documents in support of or in opposition to such motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 4, 2010 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01420-MMC Document 110 Filed 05/04/10 Page 2 of 2
#### Edward A. Grannas et al. v. Charles E. McCarthy.

Motion for resettlement denied. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, McNally and Noonan, JJ.