alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.81
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO
SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED PREFERRED VENDOR AGREEMENT
  WHEREAS,
 NOW, THEREFORE,
  Exhibit 1.03A
 B. Calculation of Amount Due USPG
  a.)
    
    [* * *]b.)
    
    Less: [* * *]c.)
    
    Plus: [* * *]d.)
    
    Less: [* * *]e.)
    
    Less: [* * *]commencing for [* * *]and continuing through (i) [* * *]in
the event that the Transition Date occurs by [* * *]; or (ii) such time as the
Transition Date occurs in the event that it occurs after [* * *]; or (iii) the
termination or expiration of this Agreement in the event that the Transition Date
does not occur while this Agreement is in effect.f.)
    
    Less: [* * *]commencing for [* * *]and continuing through (i) such time
as the Transition Date occurs in the event that it occurs after [* * *]; or (ii) the
termination or expiration of this Agreement in the event that the Transition Date
does not occur while this Agreement is in effect.
  The activities and responsibilities set forth in Section 1.03A to be undertaken
until the Transition Date, which is defined as the later of (i) October 1, 2008; or
(ii) the date identified in a written notice from CIGNA to USPG as the date on which
USPG shall commence the activities and undertake the
responsibilities set forth in Exhibit 1.03B, which date must be [* * *] after CIGNA
has provided the written notice.




---



##### 



Exhibit 1.03B
 [* * *] [* * *] [* * *]
   UNITED STATES PHARMACEUTICAL GROUP, LLCBy:
    
    /s/ Glenn M. ParkerTitle:
    
    CEODate:
    
    February 25, 2009NATIONSHEALTH, INC.By:
    
    /s/ Glenn M. ParkerTitle:
    
    CEODate:
    
    February 25, 2009CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANYBy:
    
    /s/ Kenneth L. SperlingTitle:
    
    Senior Vice PresidentDate:
    
    March 6, 2009
### §9835a. Repealed. Pub. L. 103–252, title I, §106, May 18, 1994, 108 Stat. 629

Section, Pub. L. 97–35, title VI, §640A, as added Pub. L. 101–501, title I, §106, Nov. 3, 1990, 104 Stat. 1229; amended Pub. L. 102–401, §2(k)(2), Oct. 7, 1992, 106 Stat. 1958, directed Secretary to prepare both interim and final comprehensive reports to Congress on administration, funding, and demographics of Head Start programs.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective May 18, 1994, but not applicable to Head Start agencies and other recipients of financial assistance under the Head Start Act (42 U.S.C. 9831 et seq.) until Oct. 1, 1994, see section 127 of Pub. L. 103–252, set out as an Effective Date of 1994 Amendment note under section 9832 of this title.
§ 203.678 Conveyance of vacant property. ( a ) HUD will require that the property be conveyed vacant if the occupant fails to request permission to continue to occupy within the time period specified in § 203.676, or fails to request a conference or to appeal a decision to deny occupied conveyance within the time period specified in § 203.677(a).
( b ) If the mortgagee has not been notified by HUD, within 45 days of the date of the mortgagee's notification of pending acquisition, that a request for continued occupancy is under consideration, the mortgagee shall convey the property vacant, unless otherwise directed by HUD.
[53 FR 875, Jan. 14, 1988, and 53 FR 8626, Mar. 16, 1988]
Editorial Note on Part 17
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 17 appear at 87 FR 8196, Feb. 14, 2022.

§ 17.91 Request for a hearing. ( a ) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, an employee must file a petition for a hearing that is received by the Office of Hearings and Appeals not later than 20 calendar days from the date of the Department's notice described in § 17.89 if an employee wants a hearing concerning— ( 1 ) The existence or amount of the debt; or
( 2 ) The Secretary's proposed offset schedule.
( b ) The petition must be signed by the employee, must include a copy of HUD's Notice of Intent to Offset Salary, and should admit or deny the existence of or the amount of the debt, or any part of the debt, briefly setting forth any basis for a denial. If the employee objects to the percentage of disposable pay to be deducted from each check, the petition should state the objection and the reasons for it. The petition should identify and explain with reasonable specificity and brevity the facts, evidence, and witnesses that the employee believes support his or her position.
( c ) Upon receipt of the petition, the Office of Hearings and Appeals will send the employee a copy of the Salary Offset Hearing Procedures Manual of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
( d ) If the employee files a petition for hearing later than the 20 calendar days as described in paragraph (a) of this section, the hearing officer may accept the request if the employee can show that the delay was because of circumstances beyond his or her control or because of failure to receive notice of the filing deadline (unless the employee has actual notice of the filing deadline).
### **CHAPTER 26—ABANDONED MILITARY RESERVATIONS**
#### § 203.295 Voluntary termination.

Upon request by the mortgagor and mortgagee the Commissioner may terminate the insurance contract on any mortgage under this part covering a 1-to-4 family residence. The mortgagee shall cancel the insurance endorsement on the mortgage insurance certificate or note upon receipt of notice from the Commissioner that the contract of insurance is terminated. Notwithstanding any provision in a mortgage instrument, there shall be no voluntary termination charge due the Commissioner on account of the voluntary termination of any mortgage insurance contract where the request for termination is received by the Commissioner on or after May 1, 1972.

[37 FR 8662, Apr. 29, 1972]
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
 

REGION IX
 

75 Hawthorne Street
 

San Francisco. CA 94105·3901
 

June 21, 2012 

Mr. Eric Massey, Division Director 

Air Quality Division 

Arizona Department of Environmental Quality 

1110 West Washington Street 

Phoenix,Arizona 85007 

Re: EPA comments on the Proposed State Implementation Plan (SIP) for the Nogales PM10 

Nonattainment Area 

Dear Mr. Massey: 

On June 20, 2012, Regional Administrator Blumenfeld signed a Federal Register Notice proposing 

approval of Arizona's "Proposed State Implementation Plan for the Nogales PM10 Nonattainment 

Area." As described in this notice, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) proposed 

approval of the plan's motor vehicle emissions budget (MVEB) is contingent on the submittal of a 

revised MVEB that includes road construction dust (see generally, 40 CFR 93.122(e)). We, therefore, 

request that the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) submit a revised MVEB for the 

Nogales PM I0 SIP that includes road construction dust, following the State's procedures for submitting 

a SIP revision to EPA. We request that the revised MVEB be submitted to EPA expeditiously, so we 

can resolve this issue in our final action which we expect to take in late July. 

We regret our contribution to the omission of road constructi<m dust from the MVEB and appreciate the 

extra time and effort it will take from your staff to make this correction. We look forward to continued 

collaboration with ADEQ. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at (415) 972-3854, 

or Jerry Wamsley at (415) 947-4111. 

Lisa Hanf, Manager 

Planning Office, Air Division 

Printed (HI Recvcled Paper
#### Ellen Long, Appellant, v. James Savino, Respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries arising out of the collision of two motor vehicles, plaintiff appeals: (1) from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, entered May 19, 1960, denying her motion for a preference pursuant to rule 9 of the Queens County Supreme Court Rules; and (2) from an order of said court, entered June 9, 1960, denying her motion for reconsideration of her prior motion. The second motion, being based on additional facts and papers, was in effect a new motion. Order entered June 9, 1960, reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and application for a preference pursuant to rule 9 of the Queens County Supreme Court Rules, granted. Order entered May 19, 1960, dismissed, without costs, as academic. Though we ordinarily are reluctant to disturb Special Term’s exercise of discretion in preference matters, it is our opinion that on the record in this ease, plaintiff should have been granted a preference under rule 9 (see *Jacobs*v. *Milazzo,*9 A D 2d 950). Nolan, P. J., Ughetta, Kleinfeld and Christ, JJ., concur; Beldock, J., concurs in the dismissal of the appeal from the first order; but he dissents as to the reversal of the second order and as to the granting of the preference, and votes to affirm such order.
### §7385e. Certification of treatment of payments under other laws

Compensation or benefits provided to an individual under this subchapter—

(1) shall be treated for purposes of the internal revenue laws of the United States as damages for human suffering; and

(2) shall not be included as income or resources for purposes of determining eligibility to receive benefits described in section 3803(c)(2)(C) of title 31 or the amount of such benefits.

(Pub. L. 106–398, §1 [div. C, title XXXVI, §3646], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–510; Pub. L. 108–375, div. C, title XXXI, §3162(e), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 2186.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2004—Pub. L. 108–375 substituted "this subchapter" for "part B".
### §§8601 to 8612. Repealed. Pub. L. 97–35, title XXVI, §2611, Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 902

Section 8601, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §302, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 288, set forth Congressional findings and declaration of purpose for low-income energy assistance program.

Section 8602, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §303, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 288, defined "household", "home energy", "lower living standard income level", "Secretary", and "State".

Section 8603, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §304, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 289, related to authorizations for home energy grants.

Section 8604, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §305, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 289, set forth eligibility requirements for households.

Section 8605, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §306, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 289, set forth provisions respecting allotments for grants.

Section 8606, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §307, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 293, set forth limitations on uses of home energy grants for fiscal year 1981.

Section 8607, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §308, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 294, set forth provisions respecting submission, contents, etc., for State plans.

Section 8608, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §309, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 298, related to uniform collection data.

Section 8609, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §310, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 298, related to amount and methods of payment.

Section 8610, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §311, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 298, related to withholding of payments.

Section 8611, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §312, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 298, set forth criminal penalties for violations of provisions.

Section 8612, Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §313(a)–(c)(1), (d)–(g), Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 298, 299, related to administration and implementation of energy assistance programs.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Pub. L. 97–35, title XXVI, §2611, Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 902, provided that the repeal made by that section is effective Oct. 1, 1981.

#### Short Title

Pub. L. 96–223, title III, §301, Apr. 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 288, provided that title III of Pub. L. 96–223, which enacted sections 8601 to 8612 of this title, and amended section 2014(d) of Title 7, Agriculture, was to be cited as the "Home Energy Assistance Act of 1980", prior to repeal by Pub. L. 97–35, title XXVI, §2611, Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 902.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DANIEL YAPP

, 1

Petitioner Below, Appellant,

v.

TINA VALDEZ

,

Respondent Below

, Appellee. §
§ No. 333 , 2020
§
§ Court Below

— Family Court
§ of the State of Delaware
§
§ File No. C K10

- 02177
§ Pet ition Nos. 20

- 06209
§ 20

- 08000
§
§

Submitted: May 28 , 202 1

Decided: July 13 , 202 1

Before SEITZ

, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY

- REEVES

, Justices

.

O R D E R

After careful consideration of the opening brief and the record on appeal , we

conclude that the judgment below should be affirmed on the basis o f the Family

Court’s order dated September 3 , 2020

. The appellant (“Father”) has not

demonstrated that the Family Court abused its discretion when it determined that

Father shall have (i) monthly in

- person contact with the children at the correctional

facility where he is incarcerated if he can arrange for the children’s transportation to

and from the facility, (ii) telephone contact with the children twice weekly, and (iii)

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d).2

video contact with the children once weekly. 2 The Family Court considered the

applicable factors under 13 Del. C. § 728(d), and it appears that the court’s findings

o f fact, inferences, and deductions are the product of an orderly and logical deductive

process. 3 The Family Court also did not abuse its discretion by admitting into

evidence, over Father’s objection, copies of text messages that Father sent to the

appel lee, where Father could not demonstrate how he was prejudiced by their late

production

. 4 Finally, we find no reversible error in the Family Court’s conclusion

that the appellee demonstrated just cause for her failure to transport the children to

visits w ith Father at the correctional facility in January and February 2020, in

violation of a consent order that required her to do so. 5

N OW, TH EREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family

Court is AFFIRMED

.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery

- Reeves

Justice

2 See Scott v. Kraft , 2015 WL 5451697 , at *2 (Del. Sept. 15, 2015) (reviewing Family Court’s order regarding visitation in a correctional facility for abuse of discretion).

3 Id.

4 See Delong v. Stanley , 1997 WL 673713 , at *2 (Del. Oct. 9, 1997) (“We review a trial court’s decision regarding the adm ission of evidence for abuse of discretion.”).

5 See generally Walton v. Walton , 2003 WL 22992210 (Del. Dec. 17, 2003) (affirming Family Court’s denial of father’s request to hold mother in contempt because mother’s lack of compliance “appeared to stem fro m a lack of communication between the parties, responsibility for which lies equally with [mother and father]”).
#### § 309.12 Purpose.

This subpart provides Peace Corps' policies and procedures for the collection by salary offset of a Federal employee's pay to satisfy certain past due debts owed the United States Government.
Case 3:08-cv-05716-NJV Document 31 Filed 03/18/10 Page 1 of 2
Case 3:08-cv-05716-NJV Document 31 Filed 03/18/10 Page 2 of 2
### §2245. Excess storage and carrying capacity

The Secretary is authorized to enter into contracts with municipalities, public water districts and agencies, other Federal agencies, State agencies, and private entities, pursuant to the Act of February 21, 1911 (43 U.S.C. 523), for the impounding, storage, and carriage of nonproject water for domestic, municipal, fish and wildlife, industrial, and other beneficial purposes using any facilities associated with the Central Valley Project, Cachuma Project, and the Ventura River Project, California, the Truckee Storage Project, and the Washoe Project, California and Nevada. The Secretary is further authorized to enter into contracts for the exchange of water for the aforementioned purposes using facilities associated with the Cachuma Project, California.

(Pub. L. 102–250, title III, §305, Mar. 5, 1992, 106 Stat. 59.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Act of February 21, 1911, referred to in text, is act Feb. 21, 1911, ch. 141, 36 Stat. 925, popularly known as the Warren Act, which enacted sections 523 to 525 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 523 of this title and Tables.
### SUBCHAPTER VIII—ALASKA HOMESTEADS
#### Richard L. Vining, Appellant, v. Marston La France et al., Respondents.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Broome County entered upon a decision which dismissed the complaint in an action for specific performance of an alleged contract for the purchase and sale of realty owned by defendants La France, who are mother and son. A series of letters passed between plaintiff and Marston La France. Those written by the latter were received in evidence and plaintiff testified as to the substance of those written by him. He contends that the agreement was to sell him the property in consideration of his assumption of two existing mortgages and his execution to *852Marston La France of an additional mortgage for $5,000. Of crucial importance were the contents of a letter from Mrs. La France to her son, which the latter forwarded to plaintiff with a letter stating that his mother had “ consented to our deal ”. Plaintiff testified that he returned the letter to the son. It was not produced on the trial. Mrs. La France testified that in this letter she wrote that she would approve the sale if plaintiff met her “ specifications ”, which she said included a partial payment in cash in accordance with a previous conversation with him. Recalled, plaintiff was asked whether he had any discussion in which Mrs. La France said she wanted $2,000 down and replied, “I don’t remember anything about that.” The Trial Judge accepted Mrs. La France’s version and we perceive no basis upon which his determination may be disturbed. It follows that, as the court found, there was no meeting of the minds as to this essential element and no contract came into existence. Judgment unanimously affirmed, with one bill of costs to respondents. Present — Bergan, P. J., Coon, Gibson, Herlihy and Reynolds, JJ.
#### § 219.101 Purpose.

This part effectuates section 119 of the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, which amended section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs or activities conducted by Executive agencies or the United States Postal Service.
Order entered October 7, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-00610-CR

No. 05-16-00611-CR

JITENDER SINGH, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 219-81690-2014, 219-82997-2014

ORDER

We GRANT Official Court Reporter Indu A. Bailey’s September 30, 2016 request for an 

extension of time to file the reporter’s record. The time to file the reporter’s record is extended 

to October 7, 2016.

We note that the clerk’s record has not been filed in cause no. 05-16-00611-CR. By letter 

dated August 26, 2016, the Collin County District Clerk informed the Court that the clerk’s 

record in cause no. 05-16-00611-CR had not been transmitted to the Court because appellant’s 

retained counsel had not paid the fee for the clerk’s record to be prepared. By letter dated 

September 23, 2016, the Clerk of the Court directed appellant’s counsel to inform the Court 

within ten days of the status of the clerk’s record and reporter’s record or the Court would take 
whatever action was necessary, including abating the appeals for hearing in the trial court. To 

date, counsel has not responded to the Clerk of the Court’s September 23, 2016 letter. Court 

reporter Bailey’s request for an extension of time to file the reporter’s record indicated that one 

reason the reporter’s record was untimely was that counsel had not yet completed payment for 

the reporter’s record. 

We ORDER the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine why the clerk’s record has 

not been filed in cause no. 05-16-00611-CR. In this regard, the trial court shall make appropriate 

findings and recommendations and determine whether appellant desires to prosecute the appeal, 

whether appellant is indigent, or if not indigent, whether retained counsel has abandoned the 

appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(b). If the trial court cannot obtain appellant’s presence at the 

hearing, the trial court shall conduct the hearing in appellant’s absence. See Meza v. State, 742 

S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no pet.) (per curiam). If appellant is indigent, the 

trial court is ORDERED to take such measures as may be necessary to obtain the clerk’s record 

and assure effective representation, which may include appointment of new counsel.

We ORDER the trial court to transmit a record of the proceedings, which shall include 

written findings and recommendations, to this Court within THIRTY DAYS of the date of this 

order.

These appeals are ABATED to allow the trial court to comply with the above order. The 

appeals shall be reinstated thirty days from the date of this order or when the findings are 

received, whichever is earlier.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
#### Charles B. Ripley et al. v. International Railways of Central America et al.

Motion for an order expunging Point III of the brief on behalf of T. Roland Berner, Esq., and for other relief denied, with $10 costs. Motion to dismiss appeal denied, without costs. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Valente, McNally and Stevens, JJ.
### §6710. Authorization of appropriations

There is authorized to be appropriated not to exceed $6,000,000,000 for the period ending December 31, 1978, to carry out this chapter.

(Pub. L. 94–369, title I, §111, July 22, 1976, 90 Stat. 1002; Pub. L. 95–28, title I, §109, May 13, 1977, 91 Stat. 119.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1977—Pub. L. 95–28 substituted "$6,000,000,000 for the period ending December 31, 1978" for "$2,000,000,000 for the period ending September 30, 1977".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Immediate Initiation of Construction on Certain Projects

Pub. L. 95–28, title I, §111, May 13, 1977, 91 Stat. 120, directed Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of the Interior to immediately initiate construction of those Federal public works projects which are responsibility of their respective departments, which have been authorized, and which can be commenced within 60 days of May 13, 1977, and completed no later than 180th day after commencement of construction, with no funds authorized by this section used to carry out such works.
CARLTON WAYNE KEY

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 5399

______ _______________________/

Opinion filed March 1, 2017.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Jackson County

. Shonna Young Gay , Judge

.

Carlton Wayne Key, pro se , Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

WETHERELL, BILBREY, and JAY, JJ., CONCUR.
#### Ralph A. Drain and Charles Benson, appellees, v. Courtney R. Gleason et al., on appeal of Courtney R. Gleason and Georgia S. Gleason, appellants.

Gen. No. 27,993.

Action for breach of covenant of warranty on real estate. Judgment for plaintiffs. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Joel C. Fitch, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district at the October term, 1922.

Affirmed.

Opinion filed May 28, 1923.

*Certiorari*denied by Supreme Court (making opinion final).

G. A. Buresh, for appellants. Sinden & Hassell, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Matchett

delivered the opinion of the court.