alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### LATONE JAMES *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 25069)

Dranginis, DiPentima and Gruendel, Js.

Submitted on briefs February 24

officially released April 19, 2005

*Gennaro Bizzarro,*special public defender, filed a brief for the appellant (petitioner).

*John A. Connelly,*state’s attorney, *Lisa A. Riggione,*senior assistant state’s attorney, and *Maureen M. Kee-gan,*executive assistant state’s attorney, filed a brief for the appellee (respondent).

*Opinion*

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, LaTone James, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from *555the judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas coipus. We dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner was charged with the crimes of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2) and two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5). Those charges arose out of events that occurred at 5:15 a.m. on February 26, 1995, at an after-hours club in Waterbuiy. At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of robbery in the first degree, and the court declared a mistrial as to the remaining charges. The petitioner appealed from his conviction, and the state filed a substitute information charging the petitioner with felony murder. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the substitute information, which was denied. The petitioner filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss. Our Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and affirmed the judgment of conviction and the ruling denying the motion to dismiss in *State*v. *James,*247 Conn. 662, 725 A.2d 316 (1999). At the second trial of the felony murder charge, the jury found the petitioner guilty. He appealed from that second judgment of conviction, and this court upheld that conviction in *State*v. *James,*69 Conn. App. 130, 793 A.2d 1200, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 936, 802 A.2d 89 (2002).

Attorney Karen Diebolt represented the petitioner at both trials and on all appeals. By way of a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged that Diebolt provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the first trial and on the second appeal. Following a one day trial at which the petitioner was the only witness, the habeas court dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court also denied the petition for certification to appeal.

After a careful review of the record and briefs, we conclude that the petitioner has not demonstrated that *556the issues he raises are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the questions raised deserve encouragement to proceed further. See *Lozada*v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430, 431-32, 111 S. Ct. 860, 112 L. Ed. 2d 956 (1991); *Simms*v. *Warden,*230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126 (1994).

The appeal is dismissed.
#### Regina FITZGERALD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIRLOIN STOCKADE, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-1593.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Oct. 10, 1980.

*695Terry W. Tippens, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Margaret McMorrow-Love, Oklahoma City, Okl., with him on brief), of Fellers, Snider, Blankenship, Bailey & Tippens, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff-appellee.

Jim Ikard, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Robert Jemigan, Oklahoma City, Okl., with him on brief), for defendant-appellant.

Issie Jenkins, Acting Gen. Counsel, Joseph T. Eddins, Associate Gen. Counsel, Beatrice Rosenberg, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Phillip B. Sklover, Atty., E. E. O. C., Washington, D. C., filed an amicus curiae brief.

Before HOLLOWAY, BARRETT and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

DOYLE, Circuit Judge.

This court, acting through the undersigned and Judges Holloway and Barrett, rendered and filed an opinion generally affirming the judgment of the district court and did so on March 5, 1980, 624 F.2d 945. Reference in that opinion was made to a remark of the trial judge in his very thorough findings and conclusions which suggested that the plaintiff in the suit below, Regina Fitzgerald, was part of a training program conducted by Sirloin Stockade, Inc. The cause was remanded to the district court for the purpose of allowing the district court to consider whether it had indeed intended to find that the plaintiff had been involved in a formal training program. It was further ordered that after the trial court had completed its findings that it was directed to return a report to this court for final determination.

The trial court’s memorandum opinion clarifying its findings has now been received. In those findings the court explained that he was referring not to any formal training program but rather to an on the job training program which the plaintiff shared with certain male employees. The men were advanced at a much more meaningful and faster rate than was the plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that she had had about the same exposure as the men who were working with her at the time. The trial court has said that the reference to the training program was merely a reference to the activities of the Sirloin Stockade that served to prove discriminatory action on the part of the Sirloin Stockade toward the plaintiff-appellee. This court has examined the supplemental findings and is of the opinion that this fully clarifies any ambiguity which existed concerning the training program.

Accordingly the supplemental findings of the court are received and approved and that part of the judgment which was not affirmed previously is now affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2479 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2479

       To suspend temporarily the duty on certain bicycle parts.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 19, 2005

Mr. Blumenauer introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To suspend temporarily the duty on certain bicycle parts.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CERTAIN BICYCLE PARTS.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.87.12      Unicycles           Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         (provided for in                                                   31/2008
                         subheading
                         8712.00.50)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of Ann M. Goelkel, Appellant, v. Board of Appeals of the City of New Rochelle, Respondent.

In a proceeding under article 78 of the Civil Practice Act, to review and annul a determination of the Board of Appeals of the City of New Rochelle, dated July 25, 1960, affirming the local building official’s decision denying petitioner’s application for a certificate of partial change of occupancy of her one-family private dwelling from exclusively residential use to a combined residential and private school use, and for *973a variance if necessary, petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, dated November 13, 196.1, which denied her petition to set aside the board’s determination. Order affirmed, without costs. No opinion. Beldock, P. J., Christ and Rabin, JJ., concur; Kleinfeld and Brennan, JJ., dissent and vote to reverse the order; to annul the board’s determination; and to grant the petition, with the following memorandum: Petitioner has been denied relief primarily because of her alleged failure to comply with a 60-foot side yard requirement of the local zoning ordinance. Generally, the purpose of a side yard requirement is to protect the adjoining owner’s light and air. In this case the requirement may, perhaps, have the additional purpose of keeping a nonresidential use at least 60 feet from the adjoining property. As petitioner plans to use her building, the nonresidential use will be actually more than 60 feet from the adjoining property. Under a practical construction of the side yard requirement, in keeping with its intended purpose, petitioner’s use of her building is therefore permitted as of right; she needs no variance. If it be assumed, *arguendo,*that petitioner does need a variance, she made the requisite showing of “ practical difficulty ” which entitled her to a variance. The record shows that she could not use her present building for a school unless she demolished most of it; and that the only alternative to such destruction would be to erect a new building at a cost which would make the whole school project economically unfeasible. No showing of hardship is required, as the variance sought was an area variance. Nor was there any basis for the board’s finding that the variance sought by petitioner would be detrimental to the public welfare or out of harmony with the improvements in the district, since: (a) the city has already permitted nine other kindergarten schools in residential zones and has thus construed its own ordinance as permitting such use; and (b) petitioner’s property is just across the road from a country club.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-6910

MICHAEL RANKINS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

GREGORY BONNER; STOP SHOP STORE; JOHN

SOTIROPOLOS; BRENDA K. SPRUILL,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, Chief

District Judge. (CA-02-303-5-BO)

Submitted: August 15, 2002 Decided: August 26, 2002

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Rankins, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Michael Rankins appeals the district court’s order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001) complaint. We

have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find

no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. See Rankins v. Bonner, No. CA-02-303-5-BO (E.D.N.C.

June 10, 2002). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### § 9b.4 Department of State building press pass for technical crews.

Department of State press building passes are issued to members of television and radio technical crews who provide technical support on a daily basis for media correspondents assigned to the Department of State. Members of technical crews who do not possess press passes, but who provide technical support for media correspondents assigned to the Department of State, may apply to the Office of Press Relations for a visitor's pass valid for one day.

[54 FR 1687, Jan. 17, 1989]
§ 14.120 Eligibility of applicants. ( a ) To be eligible for an award of attorney fees and other expenses under the Act, the applicant must be a party to the adversary adjudication for which it seeks an award. The term *party* is defined in 5 U.S.C. 551(3). The applicant must show that it meets all conditions of eligibility set out in this subpart and in subpart B.
( b ) The types of eligible applicants are as follows: ( 1 ) An individual with a net worth of not more than $2 million;
( 2 ) The sole owner of an unincorporated business who has a net worth of not more than $7 million, including both personal and business interests, and not more than 500 employees;
( 3 ) A charitable or other tax-exempt organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), with not more than 500 employees;
( 4 ) A cooperative association as defined in section 15(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, 12 U.S.C. 1141j(a), with not more than 500 employees; or
( 5 ) Any other partnership, corporation, association, unit of local government, or organization with a net worth of not more than $7 million and not more than 500 employees.
( c ) For the purpose of eligibility, the net worth and number of employees of an applicant shall be determined as of the date the proceeding was initiated. For the purpose of eligibility of applicants before the HUD Board of Contract Appeals, the net worth and number of employees of an applicant shall be determined as of the date the applicant filed its appeal under 41 U.S.C. 606.
( d ) An applicant who owns an unincorporated business will be considered as an *individual* rather than a *sole owner of an unincorporated business* if the issues on which the application prevails are related primarily to personal interests rather than to business interests.
( e ) The employees of an applicant include all persons who regularly perform services for remuneration for the applicant, under the applicant's direction and control. Part-time employees shall be included on a proportional basis.
( f ) The net worth and number of employees of the applicant and all of its affiliates shall be aggregated to determine eligibility. Any individual, corporation or other entity that directly or indirectly controls or owns a majority of the voting shares or other interests of the applicant, or any corporation or other entity of which the applicant directly or indirectly owns or controls a majority of the voting shares or other interest, will be considered an affiliate for purposes of this part, unless the adjudicative officer determines that such treatment would be unjust and contrary to the purposes of the Act in light of the actual relationship between the affiliated entities. In addition, the adjudicative officer may determine that financial relationships of the applicant other than those described in this paragraph constitute special circumstances that would make an award unjust.
( g ) An applicant that participates in a proceeding primarily on behalf of one or more other persons or entities that would be ineligible is not itself eligible for an award.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT EZ M AILING SER

V IC ES, INC ., a

Ne w Je rse y c orporation, AKA EZ W orldwide Expre ss, Plaintiff - Appe lla nt, v. OR AC LE TR

A NSPOR TATION SOLUTIONS, INC ., a

C a lifornia C orporation, De fe nda

nt, And GENC O TR

ANSPOR TATION M ANAGEM ENT, LLC , a W isc onsin lim i te d lia bility c om pa ny , De fe nda

nt - Appe lle e . No. 14-55798 D.C . No. 2:12-c v-09313-C B M JEM M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia C onsue lo B . M arsha ll, Se nior Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d M arc h

11, 2016 

# FIL ED APR 05 2016 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.Pa sa de n a , C a l ifornia

B e fore : PREGER SON, PAEZ, a nd NGUYEN, C irc u i t Judge s. EZ M a iling Se rvic e s, Inc . (“ EZ M a iling” ) a ppe a ls the distric t c o urt’ s grant of sum m a ry judgm e nt in fa

v o r of Ge nc o Tra

nsporta tion (“ Ge nc o” ) for bre a c h of ora l c ontra c t. W e have jurisdic tion pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 1291. W e a ffirm . EZ M a iling fa ile d to pre se nt e vide nc e tha t it e nte re d into a

n ora l a gre e m e nt with Ge nc o tha

t re quire d Ge nc o to (1) loc ate a c om pe te nt c arrie r, a

nd (2) e nsure that the c arrie r m a inta ine d suffic ie nt a nd a pplic a ble c argo insura

n c e . The e vide nc e that EZ M a iling subm

itte d doe s not prove tha

t suc h a n ora l a g re e m e nt e xiste d. First, the April 2011 e m a ils be t we e n EZ M a iling a

nd Ge nc o do not indic ate tha t a n ora l a gre e m e nt of a

ny sort wa s form e d be twe e n EZ M a iling a nd Ge nc o. Ne xt, the Loa d C onfirm ation a

nd M a s te r Transporta

tion Se rvic e Agre e m e nt a re proof of a c ontra c t be twe e n Ge nc o a nd Ora c le Transporta

t ion Solutions, Inc ., not be twe e n EZ M a i ling a nd Ge nc o. The sta

te m e nt from

Vija y Agga rwa l’ s de c l ara tion is too va gue to indic a te tha

t Ge nc o c o nse nte d to loc at ing a qua lifie d c arrie r, or tha

t the c arrie r would ha

ve a de quate c argo insura

n c e . Sim ila

rly , Sandra

Lope z ’ s de position allude s only

to a n ora l c o ntra c t a

bout c argo insura

nc e in the am ount of $100,000, a

nd not to the spe c ific re quire m e nts of finding a c om pe te nt c a rrie r with suffic i e nt c argo insura

nc e . 2For the se re a sons, thedistric t c ourt prope rly gran te d Ge nc o’ s m otion for

sum m ary judgm e nt. AFFIRM E D.

3
### §704a. Omitted

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section, Pub. L. 92–80, title II, Aug. 10, 1971, 85 Stat. 290, which provided that certain allotments to States were not to be included in computing amounts expended or estimated to be expended by the State under subsecs. (a) and (b) of section 706 of this title, was not repeated in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1973. Similar provisions were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:

Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. 91–667, 84 Stat. 2006.

Mar. 5, 1970, Pub. L. 91–204, title II, 84 Stat. 39.

Oct. 11, 1968, Pub. L. 90–557, title II, 82 Stat. 987.

Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. 90–132, title II, 81 Stat. 403.

Nov. 7, 1966, Pub. L. 89–787, title II, 80 Stat. 1396.

Aug. 31, 1965, Pub. L. 89–156, title II, 79 Stat. 605.

Sept. 10, 1964, Pub. L. 88–605, title II, 78 Stat. 975.

Oct. 11, 1963, Pub. L. 88–136, title II, 77 Stat. 240.

Aug. 14, 1962, Pub. L. 87–582, title II, 76 Stat. 376.

Sept. 22, 1961, Pub. L. 87–290, title II, 75 Stat. 605.

Sept. 2, 1960, Pub. L. 86–703, title II, 74 Stat. 770.

Aug. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86–158, title II, 73 Stat. 353.

Aug. 1, 1958, Pub. L. 85–580, title II, 72 Stat. 472.

June 29, 1957, Pub. L. 85–67, title II, 71 Stat. 222.

June 29, 1956, ch. 477, title II, 70 Stat. 434.

Aug. 1, 1955, ch. 437, title II, 69 Stat. 409.

July 2, 1954, ch. 457, title II, 68 Stat. 444.

July 31, 1953, ch. 296, title II, 67 Stat. 255.

July 5, 1952, ch. 575, title II, 66 Stat. 368.

Aug. 31, 1951, ch. 373, title II, 65 Stat. 219.

Sept. 6, 1950, ch. 896, ch. V, title II, 64 Stat. 653.

June 29, 1949, ch. 275, title II, 63 Stat. 284.

June 16, 1948, ch. 472, title I, 62 Stat. 447.

July 8, 1947, ch. 210, title II, 61 Stat. 273.

July 26, 1946, ch. 672, title I, 60 Stat. 681.

July 3, 1945, ch. 263, title I, 59 Stat. 364.

June 28, 1944, ch. 302, title I, 58 Stat. 550.

July 12, 1943, ch. 221, title I, 57 Stat. 497.

July 2, 1942, ch. 475, title I, 56 Stat. 565.

July 1, 1941, ch. 269, title I, 55 Stat. 469.

June 26, 1940, ch. 428, title I, 54 Stat. 578.

June 29, 1939, ch. 249, 53 Stat. 924.

Aug. 9, 1939, ch. 633, title I, 53 Stat. 1320.

Apr. 27, 1938, ch. 180, title IV, 52 Stat. 288.

June 16, 1937, ch. 359, title IV, 50 Stat. 301.

May 15, 1936, ch. 405, 49 Stat. 1350.
Case 3:08-cv-04135-MMC Document 38 Filed 02/04/10 Page 1 of 2
February 4, 2010

Case 3:08-cv-04135-MMC Document 38 Filed 02/04/10 Page 2 of 2
1The Honorable G. Thomas Eisele, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-2577

___________

Allen Lee Lampkin, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Stroman’s, Inc., *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: January 12, 2001

 Filed: January 18, 2001 

___________

Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Allen Lampkin appeals from the district court’s1 adverse grant of summary

judgment in his employment discrimination lawsuit against his former employer. Upon

de novo review, we agree with the district court, for the reasons expressed in its order,

that Lampkin failed to demonstrate Stroman’s stated reasons for his termination were

a pretext for discrimination, or Stroman’s engaged in retaliatory behavior. See Whitley

v. Peer Review Systems, Inc., 221 F.3d 1053, 1055 (8th Cir. 2000).
-2-

Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B. We deny Stroman’s pending

motions on appeal.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### James Bennerman, Appellant, v General Motors Corporation, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[832 NYS2d 811]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Brands, J), dated October 21, 2005, which granted the motion of the defendant General Motors Corporation pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order striking the plaintiffs notice of deposition and document request served upon it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court properly struck the discovery demands at issue *(see Harris v Jim’s Proclean Serv., Inc.,*34 AD3d 1009, 1012 [2006]). Schmidt, J.P., Krausman, Goldstein, Covello and Angiolillo, JJ., concur.