Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-122| August 20, 2020 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kurt A. Young

Nashville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin J. Shoptaw

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James Colyer

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 20, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-CR-122

Appeal from the

Brown Circuit Court

The Honorable

Mary H. Wertz, Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

07C01-1907-CM-248

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-122| August 20, 2020 Page 2 of 9

[1] James Colyer (“Colyer”) was convicted of criminal trespass1 as a Class A 

misdemeanor following a jury trial and was sentenced to sixty days executed. 

Colyer now appeals and raises the following issue for our review: whether the 

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction for criminal 

trespass.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Joe McGlothlin (“McGlothlin”) was the director of operations at a wood 

framing business called The Beamery in Brown County, Indiana. Tr. Vol. 2 at 

65, 166. On June 24, 2019, McGlothlin saw a man (whom he identified as 

Colyer at trial) and a woman walking around the storage yard where The 

Beamery’s trucks and trailers were parked. Id. at 71-72, 84, 90. McGlothlin 

knew that they were not employees of The Beamery and noticed that the man 

was wearing an ankle monitor. Id. at 88. Being concerned about the two 

strangers, McGlothlin watched them and made his presence known by standing

at a door. Id. at 71-72. Colyer and the woman walked off when they saw 

McGlothlin. Id. About an hour later, McGlothlin saw Colyer and the woman

lingering on the property again and told them to leave. Id. at 73. As Colyer 

was walking away, he approached a storage facility where The Beamery kept its 

inventory and pulled on the door. Id. The door did not open. Id. McGlothin 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b).
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approached Colyer and the woman and told them again that they had to leave. 

Id. Colyer and the woman walked away while laughing. Id. at 74.

[4] The Beamery shares a building on the property with a wood flooring company 

named Quarter-Sawn Flooring (“Quarter-Sawn”), owned by Steve Edwards 

(“Edwards”). Id. at 68-71. On June 24, 2019, when Edwards arrived on the 

property, he saw Colyer coming from the shared property. Id. at 135. Edwards 

inquired as to why Colyer was there, but Colyer expressed to Edwards that he

did not want to talk. Id. at 135-36. 

[5] Later in the day, McGlothlin and Edwards told each other about their

interactions with Colyer. Id. at 136-37. McGlothlin called the Sheriff’s 

Department, reporting Colyer’s trespassing on the property of The Beamery and 

Quarter-Sawn. Id. at 88. Brown County Sheriff’s Deputy Nicholson Briles 

(“Deputy Briles”) was dispatched to The Beamery’s address. Id. at 99. 

Edwards spoke with Deputy Briles and told him that a person wearing black 

shorts, a black tee shirt, and an ankle monitor had trespassed on the property of 

the The Beamery and Quarter-Sawn. Id. at 100. Edwards told Deputy Briles 

that the person had left the property and walked west on State Road 45. Id. at 

101. Deputy Briles then drove in that direction and found a man who matched 

Edwards’s description of the trespasser. Id. at 101. Deputy Briles approached 

the man and confirmed his identity as Coyler. Id. at 102. Coyler admitted that 

he had been on The Beamery and Quart-Sawn’s property. Id. Coyler said that 

he was on home detention and was trying to get a signal for his ankle monitor 

there. Id. Deputy Briles explained to Coyler that it was not his property and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-122| August 20, 2020 Page 4 of 9

that “if he wasn’t welcome there he shouldn’t be on . . . the property.” Id. at 

103. After confirming back with Edwards that he wanted to have Colyer 

trespassed, Deputy Briles told Coyler that he was “no longer welcome on that 

property” and if he returned there, he “could be arrested for trespassing.” Id. at 

103, 105. 

[6] However, Colyer continued coming to the property of The Beamery and 

Quarter-Sawn even after being warned by Deputy Briles about the potential 

consequence of an arrest. Id. at 89, 138. At trial, Edwards testified that 

between June 24 and July 13, 2019, he saw Colyer on the property between five 

to seven times; McGlothlin saw Colyer on the property three or four times in 

the same time period. Id. Two Quarter-Sawn employees also observed Colyer 

on the property on multiple occasions. Id. at 112, 149. Both Edwards and 

McGlothin told Colyer that he was not allowed on the property and not to 

come back. Id. at 90, 138. Multiple signs were on the property that prohibited 

entry onto the property by non-employees, and Colyer had never asked for 

permission to be on the property. Id. at 73, 81, 89, 133, 140-41. 

[7] On July 13, 2019, Edwards saw Colyer on the property of The Beamery and 

Quarter-Sawn again and asked him what he was doing. Id. at 138. Colyer 

claimed that “Mike Horn” said he could be there. Id. Edwards did not know 

anyone named Mike Horn and called the Sheriff’s Department. Id. at 139. 

Deputy William Pool (“Deputy Pool”) was dispatched to the scene. Id. at 155. 

Colyer told Deputy Pool that Deputy Horn, whose first name is Mike, from the 

Brown County Sheriff’s Department had given him permission to be on the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-122| August 20, 2020 Page 5 of 9

property of The Beamery and Quarter-Sawn. Id. at 157. Deputy Pool made a 

phone call while at the scene and confirmed that Deputy Horn had never 

spoken with Colyer. Id. Colyer was then arrested. Id. at 139. On July 22, 

2019, Colyer was charged with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 13. 

[8] A jury trial was held on November 6, 2019. Tr. Vol. 2 at 38. At trial, there was 

testimony that, during the time period when Colyer was coming to The 

Beamery and Quarter-Sawn’s property, he was living with his father John 

Colyer (“Father”) in Brown County and was on home detention ordered by 

Marion County Community Corrections (“MCCC”). Id. at 192, 232-33. 

Colyer testified that he understood that under the MCCC rules he was required 

to stay in Father’s house. Id. at 235. He also testified that he had been unable 

to get a signal for his ankle monitor at Father’s house since the first night of 

moving in. Id. at 239. Colyer said that MCCC called him on the first night 

about a signal issue and asked him to step outside. Id. He then walked around 

while continuing the phone call and eventually got signal on Quarter-Sawn’s 

property. Id. 240, 245. Colyer admitted at trial that he could get the signal at 

two other locations, but the signal at those locations was intermittent. Id. at 

241. 

[9] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Colyer guilty of Class A 

misdemeanor criminal trespass. Tr. Vol. 3 at 109. The trial court sentenced 

Colyer to sixty days executed. Id. at 129. Colyer now appeals. 
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Discussion and Decision

[10] Colyer contends the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his 

conviction. When we review the sufficiency of evidence to support a 

conviction, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the 

witnesses. Lehman v. State, 55 N.E.3d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. 

denied. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling 

and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Lock v. 

State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012). We also consider conflicting evidence in 

the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Oster v. State, 992 N.E.2d 871, 

875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. A conviction will be affirmed if there is 

substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could 

have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Wolf v. 

State, 76 N.E.3d 911, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

[11] In order to convict Colyer of Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, the State 

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Colyer, (1) not having a 

contractual interest in the property, (2) knowingly or intentionally entered the 

real property of another person, (3) after having been denied entry by the other 

person or that person’s agents. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1). On appeal, Colyer 

does not dispute that he had trespassed on Quarter-Sawn and The Beamery’s 

property. Appellant’s Br. at 12. Instead, he argues that he did so because of 

necessity and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his

defense of necessity. Id. This court has set forth the following requirements to 

establish a necessity defense:
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(1) the act charged as criminal must have been done to prevent a 

significant evil;

(2) there must have been no adequate alternative to the 

commission of the act;

(3) the harm caused by the act must not be disproportionate to 

the harm avoided;

(4) the accused must entertain a good faith belief that his act was 

necessary to prevent greater harm;

(5) such belief must be objectively reasonable under all the 

circumstances; and

(6) the accused must not have substantially contributed to the 

creation of the emergency.

Clemons v. State, 996 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations 

omitted), trans. denied. In order to negate a necessity defense, the State must 

disprove at least one of the six elements beyond reasonable doubt. Clemons, 996 

N.E.2d at 1285. The State may refute a claim of the defense of necessity by 

direct rebuttal, or by relying upon the sufficiency of the evidence in its case-inchief. Id. The decision whether a claim of necessity has been disproved is 

entrusted to the fact-finder. Id. Where a defendant is convicted despite his 

claim of necessity, this court will reverse the conviction only if no reasonable 

person could find that the defense was negated by the State beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. 
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[12] Colyer contends that his trespassing was necessary to prevent his potential 

incarceration if he could not get a signal for his ankle monitor. Appellant’s Br. at 

14. Colyer argues that the fear of incarceration qualifies as the “significant evil” 

set out in the first of the elements and that there was “no adequate alternative” 

because The Beamery and Quarter-Sawn’s property was the only place where 

he could get stable signal that was within his walking distance. Id.

[13] However, our review of the record shows that, Colyer could in fact get a signal 

from at least two other locations. He never sought permission to be on the 

property of The Beamery and Quarter-Sawn or talked to MCCC about 

accommodating his trouble getting signal at Father’s house. Therefore, a 

reasonable jury could have found that his trespassing on The Beamery and 

Quarter-Sawn’s property was not “necessary.” See Clemons, 996 N.E.2d at

1285. Furthermore, while on home detention, Colyer knew that he was not 

allowed to leave Father’s house. Although Coyler claimed at trial that MCCC 

told him to step out of the house to get signal, the jury was not required to 

credit his testimony. Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004). He 

had also been warned multiple times by Deputy Briles, Edwards, and 

McGlothlin that he was not welcome on the property, and if he continued to 

trespass, he could be arrested for criminal trespass. Colyer could not have 

believed in good faith that he could avoid incarceration by committing criminal 

trespass in addition to violating the home detention order by leaving Father’s 

house. See Clemons, 996 N.E.2d at 1285. Moreover, Colyer’s belief was not

“objectively reasonable” even if he had honestly thought so, because the 
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aggregate harm of the two trespassing offenses was “disproportionate” to the 

harm he was trying to avoid. See id.

[14] Based on this, we determine that a reasonable jury could have concluded 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Colyer’s claim of necessity had been disproved. 

We, therefore, conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

Colyer’s conviction for criminal trespass.

[15] Affirmed.

Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.