IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Friends of Lackawanna, Joseph James :

and Mari May, Edward and Beverly :

Mizanty, and Katherine and Todd :

Spanish, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1586 C.D. 2018

: Argued: September 17, 2019

Dunmore Borough Zoning Hearing :

Board :

:

v. :

:

Dunmore Borough, Keystone Sanitary :

Landfill, Inc., F&L Realty Corporation, :

F&L Realty, Inc., Keystone Company :

and Keystone Landfill, Inc. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

OPINION 

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: February 18, 2020

The Friends of Lackawanna and individual objectors, Joseph James and 

Mari May, Edward and Beverly Mizanty, and Katherine and Todd Spanish 

(collectively, Objectors),

1

appeal an order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Lackawanna County (trial court) that affirmed a decision of the Dunmore Borough 

Zoning Hearing Board (Zoning Board). Objectors contend that the height 

restrictions for buildings set forth in the Borough of Dunmore Zoning Ordinance 

 

1 Friends of Lackawanna is a registered, non-profit organization committed to protecting the 

community’s property values, image, and the environment. Reproduced Record at 67a (R.R. __). 

The individual citizens own property abutting or in the immediate vicinity of Keystone Sanitary 

Landfill, Inc. 
2

(Zoning Ordinance)2apply to sanitary landfills and that the Zoning Board erred in 

otherwise holding. Concluding that the Zoning Board improvidently granted 

Objectors a hearing, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter to the 

trial court to vacate the Zoning Board’s decision. 

Background

Since 1972, Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc. (Keystone) has owned and 

operated a 714-acre sanitary landfill, which is divided between Dunmore Borough 

and neighboring Throop Borough. Keystone’s landfill in Dunmore Borough 

consists of 398 acres in the M-1 (Light Manufacturing) District. The landfill is 

regulated by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) 

pursuant to the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act3and 

the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA).

4

 It currently operates under a Phase II 

Major Permit Modification, with an existing elevation of 1573 feet. 

In 2014, Keystone submitted an application to DEP to use 216 acres

within the preexisting 714-acre permit area as a Phase III Major Permit Modification 

(Phase III). These 216 acres are in that part of the landfill located in the M-1 District 

in Dunmore Borough. Under Keystone’s requested permit modification, its landfill 

would accept new waste and excavated waste from an unlined site. Under the Phase 

III permit, Keystone intended to expand the landfill vertically, to a height of 1722 

feet.

In November 2014, Keystone requested a preliminary opinion from the 

Borough’s Zoning Officer on whether Phase III complied with the Zoning 

 

2 BOROUGH OF DUNMORE ZONING ORDINANCE (2000) (ZONING ORDINANCE).

3 Act of July 28, 1988, P.L. 556, as amended, 53 P.S. §§4000.101-4000.1904.

4 Act of July 7, 1980, P.L. 380, as amended, 35 P.S. §§6018.101-6018.1003.
3

Ordinance.5 Keystone made this request pursuant to its “Host Municipality Fee 

Agreement” with Dunmore Borough, which required Keystone to “make immediate 

application for an opinion to the Dunmore Borough Zoning Officer under, [inter 

alia] 53 P.S. [§]10916.2,[6]to confirm the landfill is a pre-existing use as a landfill, 

as that term is defined in [the SWMA]; and is not a building under the current zoning 

ordinance pertaining to maximum building height.” R.R. 112a-13a. The Zoning 

Officer responded that the terms “building” and “building height” pertain to 

structures with a roof supported by columns or walls. Noting that Keystone’slandfill 

“lacks walls and columns, and of particular note there is no roof,” the Zoning Officer 

concluded that the height requirement for buildings in the M-1 District was 

inapplicable to Keystone’s landfill. Preliminary Opinion at 11; R.R. 1166a. 

Objectors appealed the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion to the 

Zoning Board, asserting that the landfill constituted a structure that was subject to 

the 50-foot height limitation on buildings in the M-1 District. 

The Zoning Board conducted six days of hearings. Initially, Keystone 

moved to dismiss Objectors’ appeal, asserting that they lacked standing. The Zoning 

Board deferred ruling on its motion, and Objectors presented evidence.

Objectors’ only witness was Jeffrey Spaide, an environmental engineer 

who works for DEP and is assigned to the Northeast Region of the Commonwealth.

In that capacity, Spaide reviews permit applications for landfills, transfer stations, 

incinerators and waste processing facilities. In the course of his work, Spaide visited 

Keystone’s landfill on several occasions. 

 

5 Dunmore Borough first enacted a zoning regulation in 1942 to address “dumps.” R.R. 1093a. A 

1979 amendment authorized sanitary landfills as a permitted conditional use in the M-1 District. 

Id.

6 Section 916.2 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), Act of July 31, 1968, 

P.L. 805, as amended, added by Section 99 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329. 
4

Spaide testified that Keystone’s sanitary landfill was constructed using 

liners, anchor trenches, waste placement, gas collection systems, leachate collection 

systems and stormwater collection systems. There are manholes to access the 

landfill’s leachate collection system pipes. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 4/30/2015, 

at 33; R.R. 383a. These systems would be involved in the Phase III expansion. 

Additionally, Keystone’s sanitary landfill has wells that extract gas from the landfill 

and pipe it to a point onsite where the gas is flared. Spaide testified that as part of 

each cell construction, there is a capping layer once the landfill “reaches final 

elevations.” Id. at 28; R.R. 378a. The capping layer is similar to the liner at the 

bottom of the landfill.

Keystone presented testimony and documentary evidence, including 

expert testimony about the distances of homes from the Phase III expansion area and 

the extent to which residents within a three-mile radius of the landfill would be able 

to see the expansion. Keystone also presented testimony about landfill height and 

the building height restrictions in the Zoning Ordinance. 

The Zoning Board determined that Objectors lacked standing to file the 

appeal. Nevertheless, the Zoning Board addressed the merits of Objectors’ appeal. 

The Zoning Board began with the definitions in the Zoning Ordinance. 

The term “building” is defined as “[a]ny structure having a roof supported by 

columns or walls, used or intended to be used for the shelter or enclosure of persons, 

animals, or property....” ZONING ORDINANCE §11.115; R.R. 862a. The term 

“structure” means, “[a]nything constructed or erected, the use of which requires 

location on the ground or attachment to something having a fixed location on the 
5

ground.” ZONING ORDINANCE §11.201; R.R. 879a.7 The Zoning Ordinance defines

“Sanitary Land Fill” as

any facility devoted to the storage and/or disposal of solid 

wastes[8] pursuant to the regulations of the Pennsylvania 

Department of Environmental Protection governing sanitary land 

fills.... Sanitary landfills shall be subject to all regulations 

contained herein governing earth-moving activities.

ZONING ORDINANCE §11.185; R.R. 875a. The Zoning Ordinance defines “building 

height” as follows:

The vertical distance measured from the mean level of the ground 

surrounding the building to a point midway between the highest 

and lowest point of the roof, but not including chimneys, spires, 

towers, elevator penthouses, tanks, and similar projections.

ZONING ORDINANCE §11.117; R.R. 862a.

The Zoning Board held that a landfill is not a “structure” because it 

lacks an “attachment” or “fixed location on the ground.” ZONING ORDINANCE

§11.201. In support, the Zoning Board noted the testimony of Keystone’s expert, 

Joseph Zadlo, who described the landfill as “trash ... being dumped and earth 

moving equipment compressing and distributing the pile of trash after it came out of 

the truck.” Zoning Board Decision at 7; R.R. 73a. The Zoning Board reasoned that 

the landfill consisted of moveable materials that could not be attached to the ground

or have a fixed location on the ground. 

 

7 Section 11.201 contains a non-exhaustive list of examples of structures, which does not 

specifically include landfills.

8 The term “solid waste” is defined as “[a]ny garbage, refuse, industrial, lunchroom or office waste 

or other material including solid, liquid, semi-solid or contained gaseous materials, resulting from 

the operation of residential, municipal, commercial or institutional establishments and from 

community activities.” ZONING ORDINANCE §11.194; R.R. 876a.
6

Assuming, arguendo, the landfill was a structure, the Zoning Board 

concluded that the height restriction in the Zoning Ordinance did not apply to a

landfill. Section 4.210 of the Zoning Ordinance states that:

No building or structure shall have a greater number of stories 

than are permitted in Article 3 hereof, provided further that the 

aggregate height of such buildings or structures shall not exceed 

the number of feet permitted in Article 3, except as otherwise 

provided herein in Section 4.220.

ZONING ORDINANCE §4.210; R.R. 754a.9 Article 3, entitled “District Regulations,” 

sets forth height restrictions by zoning district. ZONING ORDINANCE, art. 3, Table 

No. 4; R.R. 742a, 751a. Table No. 4 governs building size restrictions for

“nonresidential zones,” including the M-1 District where Keystone’s landfill is 

located. Table 4 states: 

Maximum Building Height – Feet 50

Maximum Building Height – Stories 2 

Id., R.R. 751a. The Zoning Ordinance sets the precise methodology for measuring 

building height as follows:

The vertical distance measured from the mean level of the ground

surrounding the building to a point midway between the highest 

and lowest point of the roof, but not including chimneys, spires, 

towers, elevator penthouses, tanks, and similar projections.

 

9 The Zoning Ordinance establishes exceptions to the height limitations:

Height limitations stipulated elsewhere in this Ordinance shall not apply to open 

amusement areas, barns, silos, schools, church spires, belfries, cupolas and domes, 

monuments, water towers, utility poles, chimneys, smokestacks, flagpoles, 

residential telecommunications facilities; or to parapet walls extending not more 

than four (4) feet above the limiting height of the building.

ZONING ORDINANCE §4.220; R.R. 754a. Landfills are not included in this list.
7

ZONING ORDINANCE §11.117; R.R. 862a. (emphasis added). 

Keystone’s landfill does not have a roof, let alone a spire or an elevator 

penthouse. Accordingly, the Zoning Board held that it was impossible to apply the 

prescribed method for measuring a building’s height to Phase III of Keystone’s 

landfill.

The Zoning Board concluded that a sanitary landfill was not a 

“structure” or a “building” and that its “height” was impossible of measurement

under the prescribed methodology. Thus, Keystone’s landfill was not limited to a 

height of 50 feet or 2 stories. The Zoning Board affirmed the Zoning Officer’s 

preliminary opinion, and Objectors appealed to the trial court. 

Trial Court’s Decision

Without taking any additional evidence, the trial court affirmed the 

Zoning Board.

10

 The trial court agreed that the height restrictions in the Zoning 

Ordinance did not apply to a landfill. Additionally, the trial court observed that the 

Zoning Ordinance contained provisions specific to sanitary landfills, subjecting 

them “to all regulations contained herein governing earth-moving activities.” 

ZONING ORDINANCE §11.185. The Zoning Ordinance sets height restrictions for

fencessurrounding landfills, but it does not impose a height restriction on the landfill 

itself.

The trial court agreed that Keystone’s landfill was not a “structure,” 

i.e., “[a]nything constructed or erected, the use of which requires location on the 

ground or attachment to something having a fixed location on the ground.” ZONING 

 

10 Initially, the trial court dismissed Objectors’ appeal on the basis that Objectors lacked standing. 

Our Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case to the trial court to decide the 

merits of Objectors’ appeal. See Friends of Lackawanna v. Dunmore Borough Zoning Hearing 

Board and Dunmore Borough (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 656 C.D. 2017, filed May 7, 2018). 
8

ORDINANCE §11.201. It also agreed that even if the landfill was considered a 

“structure,” the formula for measuring the height of a building was written in such a 

way that it was impossible to apply to a landfill. Further, the Zoning Ordinance did 

not provide an alternative method to measure the height of a landfill.

Objectors appealed to this Court. 

Appeal

On appeal,11 Objectors raise one issue. They contend that the Zoning 

Board abused its discretion and erred in holding that Keystone’s landfill was not a 

structure and that the landfill was not subject to the height restrictions in the Zoning 

Ordinance. 

In response, Keystone raises a procedural challenge to Objectors’ 

appeal. It argues that the Zoning Board lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of 

the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion. It contends that the Zoning Board’s 

jurisdiction was limited to a substantive validity challenge to the Zoning Ordinance, 

and Objectors presented no such challenge. Keystone also contends that Objectors’ 

appeal is moot because it has eliminated the height increase from the Phase III 

expansion. On the merits, Keystone contends that the Zoning Board and trial court 

correctly construed the Zoning Ordinance. 

Zoning Board Jurisdiction

We begin with Keystone’s challenge to the Zoning Board’s jurisdiction 

to rule on Objectors’ appeal of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion. Keystone 

 

11 Where the trial court does not take any additional evidence, this Court’s scope of review 

determines whether the zoning board committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Dore 

v. Zoning Hearing Board of West Norriton Township, 587 A.2d 367, 368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). 

This Court may only conclude that the zoning board abused its discretion “if its findings are not 

supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Valley View Civic Association v. Zoning Board 

of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983)). 
9

argues that under the MPC, the only issue properly before the Zoning Board in 

Objectors’ appeal of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion was the substantive 

validity of the Zoning Ordinance. Keystone contends that we must dismiss 

Objectors’ appeal because the Zoning Board lacked jurisdiction to consider the 

merits of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion. 

Objectors respond that their appeal was authorized by Section 909.1(a) 

of the MPC, which provides for a review of any determination of a zoning officer. 

See Section 909.1(a) of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10909.1(a).12 Objectors contend that this 

Court specifically remanded this matter to the trial court for a decision on the merits 

of their appeal. Objectors’ Reply Brief at 3.

As this Court has explained, Section 916.2 of the MPC “provides a 

mechanism whereby a landowner wishing to take advantage of an ordinance or map 

may foreclose challenge to such ordinance or map by requesting a preliminary 

opinion” from the zoning officer. MCM Ventures, Ltd. v. Zoning Hearing Board of

the Borough of Sewickley (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 759 C.D. 2011, filed August 10, 2012), 

slip op. at 3-4 (unreported).

13

 Section 916.2 states, in relevant part, as follows:

In order not to unreasonably delay the time when a landowner 

may secure assurance that the ordinance or map under which he 

proposed to build is free from challenge, and recognizing that the 

procedure for preliminary approval of his development may be 

too cumbersome or may be unavailable, the landowner may 

advance the date from which time for any challenge to the 

ordinance or map will run under section 914.1[14] by the 

following procedure:

 

12 Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.

13 An unreported panel decision of this Court, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited “for 

its persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating 

Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).

14 Section 914.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
10

(1) The landowner may submit plans and other 

materials describing his proposed use or 

development to the zoning officer for a preliminary 

opinion as to their compliance with the applicable 

ordinances and maps. Such plans and other 

materials shall not be required to meet the standards 

prescribed for preliminary, tentative or final 

approval or for the issuance of a building permit so 

long as they provide reasonable notice of the 

proposed use or development and a sufficient basis 

for a preliminary opinion as to its compliance.

(2) If the zoning officer’s preliminary opinion is 

that the use or development complies with the 

ordinance or map, notice thereof shall be published 

once each week for two successive weeks in a 

newspaper of general circulation in the 

municipality.... The favorable preliminary 

approval under section 914.1 and the time therein 

specified for commencing a proceeding with the 

board shall run from the time when the second 

notice thereof has been published.

 

(a) No person shall be allowed to file any proceeding with the board later than 30 

days after an application for development, preliminary or final, has been approved 

by an appropriate municipal officer, agency or body if such proceeding is designed 

to secure reversal or to limit the approval in any manner unless such person alleges 

and proves that he had no notice, knowledge, or reason to believe that such approval 

had been given. If such person has succeeded to his interest after such approval, he 

shall be bound by the knowledge of his predecessor in interest. The failure of 

anyone other than the landowner to appeal from an adverse decision on a tentative 

plan pursuant to section 709 or from an adverse decision by a zoning officer on a 

challenge to the validity of an ordinance or map pursuant to section 916.2 shall 

preclude an appeal from a final approval except in the case where the final 

submission substantially deviates from the approved tentative approval.

Section 914.1(a), added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. §10914.1(a)

(emphasis added).
11

53 P.S. §10916.2 (emphasis added). In short, Section 916.2 sets up a procedure “to 

advance the date from which time for any challenge to the ordinance or map will 

run under [S]ection 914.1 [of the MPC].” Id.

Section 909.1 of the MPC sets forth the categories of appeals over 

which a zoning board has jurisdiction. Section 909.1(a) states, in pertinent part, as 

follows:

(a) The zoning hearing board shall have exclusive jurisdiction 

to hear and render final adjudications in the following matters:

* * *

(3) Appeals from the determination of the zoning 

officer, including, but not limited to, the granting or 

denial of any permit, or failure to act on the 

application therefor, the issuance of any cease and 

desist order or the registration or refusal to register 

any nonconforming use, structure or lot.

* * *

(8) Appeals from the zoning officer’s 

determination under section 916.2. 

53 P.S. §10909.1(a)(3), (8) (emphasis added). 

In an appeal of “a zoning officer’s determination under Section 916.2,”

the issue before the zoning board is the substantive validity of the zoning ordinance. 

This Court so held in Susquehanna Rheems Holdings, LLC v. West Donegal 

Township Zoning Hearing Board (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1394 C.D. 2017, filed July 23, 

2018) (unreported), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 207 A.3d 906 (Pa. 

2019). 

In Susquehanna Rheems Holdings, LLC, the landowner sought a 

preliminary opinion under Section 916.2 that its proposed land development plan 
12

complied with the township’s zoning ordinance, which had recently rezoned the 

land in question from commercial to agricultural. The zoning officer issued a 

favorable preliminary opinion. The objectors filed a substantive validity challenge 

and appealed the merits of the zoning officer’s preliminary opinion. The zoning 

board concluded that the only issue before it was the validity of the ordinance, not 

the merits of the preliminary opinion. The zoning board explained that the sole 

purpose of a preliminary opinion is to advance the date by which a challenge to the 

underlying ordinance or map begins to run; it is not a binding determination on 

whether the proposed land use complies with the zoning ordinance. Susquehanna 

Rheems Holdings, LLC, slip op. at 13. The trial court affirmed, as did this Court. 

We held the only issue before the Court was the substantive validity of the zoning 

ordinance.15

Keystone argues that the Zoning Board lacked jurisdiction over the 

merits of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion. Objectors respond that Section 

909.1(a) authorizes an appeal of the merits of any determination of a zoning officer, 

including a preliminary opinion issued pursuant to Section 916.2 of the MPC. We 

agree with Keystone.

On December 22, 2014, the Zoning Officer issued a preliminary 

opinion that Keystone’s proposed landfill expansion complied with the Zoning 

Ordinance. On January 20, 2015, Objectors appealed this preliminary opinion to the 

Zoning Board raising 14 issues, including a challenge to the substantive validity of 

 

15 On appeal to the trial court, the objectors also raised the issue that the zoning officer’s 

preliminary opinion was invalid; however, they did not brief this issue or raise it at oral argument. 

Therefore, the trial court determined that the objectors waived this issue. Susquehanna Rheems 

Holdings, LLC, slip op. at 49, n.15. 
13

the Ordinance.16 However, by the time of the hearing before the Zoning Board, 

Objectors limited their challenge to “whether the height limitation under the ... 

Zoning Ordinance applies to [Keystone].” Zoning Board Decision at 3, Finding of 

Fact No. 25; R.R. 69a. Thereby, Objectors abandoned their substantive challenge to 

the Zoning Ordinance. 

Section 916.2 of MPC allows a land developer to “advance the date 

from which time for any challenge to the ordinance or map will run under Section 

914.1.” 53 P.S. §10916.2 (emphasis added). Section 916.2 does not confer broad 

authority upon a zoning officer to issue an advisory determination on the validity 

of a land use proposal. A favorable preliminary opinion does not give the 

landowner a substantive land use approval. See Keystone’s Brief at 14 

(acknowledging that a preliminary opinion “creates no vested rights in the 

landowner”). 

The Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion reduced the period of time

Objectors had to challenge the substantive validity of the Zoning Ordinance. Once

Objectors abandoned their substantive validity challenge to the Zoning Ordinance, 

the Zoning Board was deprived of jurisdiction to consider the other 13 issues raised 

by Objectors in their appeal. 

Objectors maintain that a zoning hearing board can always consider

the merits of a preliminary opinion of a zoning officer. It relies on Section 

909.1(a)(3) of the MPC, which permits “[a]ppeals from the determination of the 

 

16 Specifically, Objectors argued that the Zoning Ordinance is substantively invalid if it fails “to 

state a height limit or other zoning restrictions applicable to landfills and the proposed [Keystone 

landfill] expansion.” R.R. 103a.
14

zoning officer.” 53 P.S. §10909.1(a)(3) (emphasis added).17 Notably, Objectors 

did not appeal the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion under Section 909.1(a)(3) 

but, rather, under Section 909.1(a)(8), which relates only to appeals arising from 

Section 916.2. We reject Objectors’ argument.

Section 909.1(a)(3) does not confer jurisdiction on a zoning hearing 

board to consider the merits of a preliminary opinion issued under Section 916.2 of 

the MPC. Simply, a preliminary opinion is not a “determination” for purposes of 

Section 909.1(a)(3). When interpreting a statute, courts must give full effect to each 

provision of the statute if at all possible. East Lampeter Township v. Pennsylvania 

State Horse Racing Commission, 704 A.2d 703, 708 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). Section 

909.1(a)(3) and Section 909.1(a)(8) provide for different categories of appeals. To

hold that Section 909.1(a)(3) provides for an appeal from the zoning officer’s 

preliminary opinion issued pursuant to Section 916.2 would render the language of 

Section 909.1(a)(8) as surplusage. 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(a) (“Every statute shall be 

construed, if possible, to give effect to all [of] its provisions.”).

We also reject Objectors’ contention that this Court’s decision in North 

Codorus Township v. North Codorus Township Zoning Hearing Board, 873 A.2d 

845 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), supports their interpretation of Section 909.1(a)(3). There, 

a land development plan was filed after the enactment of a zoning ordinance 

amendment but before its effective date. The land developer requested a 

determination as to which version of the ordinance applied, and the zoning officer 

informed the developer that the amended zoning ordinance applied. The developer

appealed, and the zoning hearing board revised the decision of the zoning officer. 

 

17 The term “determination” is defined as a “final action by an officer, body or agency charged 

with the administration of any land use ordinance or applications thereunder[.]” Section 107 of the 

MPC, 53 P.S. §10107.
15

The township appealed, arguing that the zoning hearing board lacked jurisdiction 

because the zoning officer’s oral statement was not a “determination.” The trial 

court held that the zoning officer’s non-written opinion constituted a 

“determination” for purposes of Section 909.1(a)(3). This Court agreed and held that 

the zoning officer’s oral “determination” was reviewable by the zoning hearing 

board. 

In contrast to North Codorus, Keystone had not submitted a

development plan or zoning permit application to Dunmore Borough. The zoning 

officer’s preliminary opinion is, by definition, limited in scope to the procedure

described in Section 916.2 of the MPC. That preliminary opinion has no bearing on 

any zoning permit application yet to be made by Keystone, if any is needed. 

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the Zoning Board

lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion. 

Accordingly, the trial court should have vacated the decision of the Zoning Board. 

Therefore, we will vacate the order of the trial court and remand the matter to the 

trial court to vacate the decision of the Zoning Board.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Friends of Lackawanna, Joseph James :

and Mari May, Edward and Beverly :

Mizanty, and Katherine and Todd :

Spanish, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1586 C.D. 2018

:

Dunmore Borough Zoning Hearing :

Board :

:

v. :

:

Dunmore Borough, Keystone Sanitary :

Landfill, Inc., F&L Realty Corporation, :

F&L Realty, Inc., Keystone Company :

and Keystone Landfill, Inc. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18th day of February, 2020, the order of the Common 

Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court) dated October 26, 2018, in the abovecaptioned matter is hereby VACATED, and this matter is REMANDED to the trial 

court with instructions to vacate the September 28, 2015, decision of the Dunmore 

Borough Zoning Hearing Board.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge