2024 UT App 111

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THOMAS WILLIAMSON AND JENNIFER WILLIAMSON,

Appellants,

v.

ANNE FARRELL, DAVE FARRELL, AND LAURA BLACK,

Appellees.

Opinion

No. 20221084-CA

Filed August 8, 2024

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Patrick Corum

No. 170902215

Erik A. Olson and Christopher D. Ballard,

Attorneys for Appellants

John R. Loftus, Christine E. Ellice, J. Mark Gibb, and 

Matthew J. Orme, Attorneys for Appellees

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Thomas and Jennifer Williamson (collectively, Plaintiffs)

brought an action against Anne Farrell, Dave Farrell, and Laura 

Black (collectively, Defendants) seeking a declaratory judgment 

that Plaintiffs did not commit elder abuse against Thomas, Anne,

and Laura’s mother, Ruth Williamson.1 By the time of trial, 

Plaintiffs’ action had been limited to five grounds of elder abuse 

under Utah statute. Of the five grounds, the trial court ruled that 

1. As is sometimes our practice, we refer to family members by 

their first names, with no disrespect intended by the apparent 

informality.
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20221084-CA 2 2024 UT App 111

Plaintiffs abused Ruth by causing her harm, but it concluded that 

they did not commit elder abuse under the remaining four 

statutory grounds it considered, including that of financial 

exploitation. Because we hold that the trial court only had 

jurisdiction to adjudicate whether Plaintiffs financially exploited 

Ruth—and not the other four grounds—we vacate the court’s 

judgment except for its ruling related to financial exploitation. 

And because our resolution of the jurisdictional issue raises new 

questions regarding whether Defendants are entitled to attorney 

fees under Utah’s bad faith statute, we remand this matter for the 

trial court to reconsider Defendants’ attorney fees request in light 

of our resolution of this appeal.

BACKGROUND

First Appeal

¶2 Ruth and George B. Williamson had six children: Thomas, 

George, Anne, Sue, Patricia, and Laura. During their lives, Ruth 

and George B. accumulated substantial assets, including 

income-producing real property in California and Utah. They

executed several estate planning documents, naming their 

children as beneficiaries in some of them. For over thirty years, 

Thomas’s income has come from his management of the family 

businesses and assets.

¶3 After George B. passed in 2009, Ruth continued to live in 

her home of fifty years located in Palos Verdes Estates, California.

In March 2016, Ruth moved to Utah, where she passed away that 

November at the age of ninety-one. At the time of her death, Ruth

was residing with Plaintiffs in their home.

¶4 In December 2016, Thomas filed a petition in Utah’s Fourth 

District Court (the Probate Action) seeking to formally administer

Ruth’s estate, of which he claimed to be the rightful personal 
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20221084-CA 3 2024 UT App 111

representative. In February 2017, Anne and Laura objected to the 

petition, alleging that Thomas was “unsuitable to serve as a 

personal representative” because he had, among other things,

engaged in self-dealing and elder abuse. Concerning the 

allegations of elder abuse, the objection stated that Anne and 

Laura were “compiling further evidence that reflects that 

[Thomas] engaged in elder abuse against [Ruth] while she was 

living under the laws of the State of California and [they were] 

addressing that issue with California counsel toward the end of 

pursuing a formal action in that regard.” Shortly afterward, in 

April 2017, Anne and her husband, Dave, filed declarations in the 

Probate Action alleging that Thomas had taken Ruth to Utah in 

March 2016 under false pretenses,isolated her, and prevented her 

return to California, causing Ruth to suffer from depression as 

well as mental and emotional anguish. Dave’s affidavit 

mentioned that Jennifer, Thomas’s wife, helped block Ruth’s 

communication with other family members.

¶5 Also in April 2017, Plaintiffs filed the current civil action

against Defendants in Utah’s Third District Court seeking “[a]

declaratory judgment that [they] did not commit elder abuse 

against Ruth Williamson, [they] did not violate any statutory or 

common law duties owed to Ruth Williamson, and [Defendants] 

have no actionable claim against [them] pertaining in any way to 

Ruth Williamson.”

¶6 Less than a week after Plaintiffs filed the current action, 

Defendants commenced an action in California against Plaintiffs 

and eleven others (the California Action). That complaint alleged, 

among other things, elder abuse, elder financial abuse, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress related to the care of 

Ruth and her estate. Jennifer was eventually dismissed as a 

defendant in the California Action for lack of personal

jurisdiction.
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 4 2024 UT App 111

¶7 Later, in the current action, the district court granted 

judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint based on 

common-law efficiency grounds and its determination that a

declaratory judgment “would not terminate the uncertainty or 

controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Utah Code Ann. 

§ 78B-6-404 (LexisNexis 2022).2 Specifically, the court stated that 

“a judgment in this case would not conclude the litigation in the 

other cases.” The court further noted that “there has been nothing 

presented in the complaint or the pleadings since as to whose 

definition or standard of ‘elder abuse’”—Utah’s or California’s—

Plaintiffs were “actually asking the court to apply.” The court 

stated that if Utah law applied, “then a declaratory judgment in 

this case would potentially have no bearing on the California 

actions” and that if California law applied, then “the California 

courts are in a far better position to interpret and apply their own 

laws.”

¶8 Plaintiffs appealed, resulting in our earlier decision in this 

matter, Williamson v. Farrell, 2019 UT App 123, 447 P.3d 131

(Williamson I). In that appeal, we reversed the district court’s 

dismissal of the current action and remanded for further 

proceedings. Id. ¶ 23. We held that “the district court took too 

broad a view of its statutory authority to abdicate,” id. ¶ 15, 

because the declaratory judgment statute’s use of the singular 

term “proceeding” indicates “that it refers to the specific 

declaratory judgment action at hand, and not to any larger web of 

disputes between the parties,” id. ¶ 14. We also held that the court 

improperly dismissed the action insofar as the dismissal was 

premised on the court’s common law discretion because Jennifer 

was not a party to the California Action or the Probate Action and 

2. Because the applicable provisions of the Utah Code in effect at 

the relevant times do not differ from those in the most current 

printed version in any way material to this appeal, we cite that

version of the Utah Code for convenience. 
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 5 2024 UT App 111

because the California Action was filed after the current action. Id.

¶¶ 20–21.

Remand

¶9 Shortly following remand, in response to the district

court’s request for clarification regarding the scope of their 

complaint, Plaintiffs submitted a letter stating that

the focus of [their] declaratory relief claim is to 

obtain a declaration from the Court that they did not 

commit elder abuse against Ruth Williamson in any 

way, including physical or financial elder abuse. 

Accordingly, the “statutory or common law duties 

owed to Ruth Williamson” referenced in the 

complaint refer to statutory and common law duties 

relating to elder abuse. These duties are outlined in 

Utah Code § 62A-3-314[3] as well as Utah common 

law governing claims for elder abuse, breach of 

fiduciary duty, and confidential relationships.

¶10 Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. In their motion, Plaintiffs argued, in relevant 

part, that Utah law—not California law—should be applied to the 

elder abuse allegations. In their opposition to Plaintiffs’ summary 

judgment motion, Defendants stated they did “not dispute that 

the substantive law of Utah should apply to the determination of 

Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claim as they have framed it in the 

pleadings and subsequently confirmed in discovery.”4 Later, in 

3. This statute has since been renumbered as Utah Code section 

26B-6-213.

4. Defendants did, however, maintain that California law should 

govern the allegations of elder abuse at issue in the California 

(continued...)
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 6 2024 UT App 111

their trial brief, Plaintiffs also argued that “the Court should apply 

Utah law and enter” a declaration “that Thomas and Jennifer 

never abused Ruth in Utah.”

¶11 As part of their summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs also 

argued that the claims of elder abuse at issue in the case were 

limited to the alleged financial exploitation of Ruth because that 

was the only relevant claim for which Utah law provided a private 

right of action.5 The parties also argued the issue of which side

bore the burden of proof regarding the elder abuse claims.

¶12 In an oral ruling, the court denied the cross-motions for 

summary judgment, concluding that disputed issues of material 

fact precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of either 

party. Also pretrial, the court ruled that Plaintiffs bore the burden 

of establishing the existence of a justiciable controversy, while 

Defendants bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Plaintiffs committed elder abuse against Ruth. The 

court further clarified that “[t]he scope of this case is related to 

solely acts committed after Ruth was brought to the state of Utah, 

acts committed wholly within the state of Utah, and under Utah 

law.” Thus, the court limited the presentation of evidence to the 

timeframe of Ruth’s relocation to Utah in March 2016 until her 

death in November 2016, and it expressly excluded any evidence 

related to Ruth’s estate planning or the validity of any of Ruth’s 

estate planning documents in part because that was already at 

issue in the Probate Action. The court also agreed with 

Defendants that the scope of the declaratory judgment action 

Action and that any declaratory judgment obtained in the current 

action cannot be used to “estop” the California Action.

5. Plaintiffs also argued that in the event California law applied, 

which provides broader private rights of action for elder abuse

than Utah law, see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 15610.07, 15657, there 

was no evidence to support claims of elder abuse.
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 7 2024 UT App 111

went “beyond” “conduct that gives rise to a private cause of 

action” under Utah’s elder abuse statute and should include “a 

real broad cross section of physical, financial elder abuse and 

exploitation.”

Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

¶13 In November 2021, the case proceeded to a three-day bench 

trial, during which the trial court considered whether Plaintiffs 

committed elder abuse under Utah statute against Ruth by 

(1) knowingly inflicting harm, (2) isolating her, (3) emotionally or 

psychologically abusing her, (4) neglecting her, or (5) financially 

exploiting her. See Utah Code Ann. § 26B-6-201(2)(a)–(c), (11), (15), 

(16), (20), (22) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023); id. § 76-5-111.4. The court 

found Defendants and many of their witnesses “to be extremely 

credible” but found Plaintiffs not “credible at all.” Among other 

things, the court pointed to an email Thomas sent prior to Ruth’s 

move to Utah that contradicted his trial testimony,6 and the court 

also stated that portions of Jennifer’s testimony “strain[ed]

credulity” and contradicted others’ testimony. The following is a 

summary of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

¶14 The court found that Plaintiffs and Ruth’s daughter, Sue,

conspired “to move Ruth to Utah as part of a scheme to physically 

separate her from the rest of the family and gain control of who 

Ruth saw and talked to, when she talked to or saw them and 

under what circumstances any such contact would occur” in 

order to “exert some level of influence over her related to her 

estate planning.” The court found they did so without informing 

6. At trial, Thomas testified that the initial plan was for Ruth to 

visit Utah only for a few days and that she decided to stay in Utah 

shortly after her arrival. But the email Thomas sent to Ruth’s 

estate planning attorney almost a week prior to the trip indicated 

that Ruth would be moving to Utah and living in an assisted 

living center near him.
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 8 2024 UT App 111

Ruth that she was essentially leaving California for good. The 

court further found that keeping Ruth “isolated to a significant 

degree from Defendants and other family and friends” was an 

integral part of their plan.

¶15 Prior to the move, Ruth loved living in Palos Verdes 

Estates, had an active social life, and frequently participated in 

church activities. Family members, including her sister and many

of her children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren,

frequently visited her. The trial court found that “Ruth was an 

integral part of her community in California, she was loved in that 

community and she loved that community.” In California, Ruth 

was largely self-sufficient, needing only occasional help. She was 

also looking forward to attending a large Easter get-together

planned for the end of March 2016.

¶16 In mid-March 2016, Ruth’s daughter, Laura, took Ruth to 

Ruth’s California bank in an unsuccessful attempt to add herself

to Ruth’s personal account and possibly to remove Thomas from 

that account. The next day, Sue drove Ruth to Utah with only “the 

equivalent of an overnight bag.” Ruth believed that her Utah visit 

would last only a few days. After the fact, Sue told one of Ruth’s 

granddaughters, Katie, that she was concerned Ruth had suffered 

a stroke and she had taken Ruth to see a neurologist in Utah. Katie 

called Ruth, who told her that Sue had traveled to Utah to 

accompany her son to a doctor’s appointment and Ruth had taken 

the opportunity to travel with her to visit Ruth’s Park City home. 

There was no evidence that Ruth said goodbye to her friends or 

church community before leaving or that she told anyone that she 

was moving to Utah.

7 The court found that Plaintiffs and Sue 

7. In April 2016, Sue brought Ruth back to California for a short

visit with Ruth’s sister. None of the other family members were 

informed that Ruth was back in California, although she did see 

Laura and Katie because they also happened to pay Ruth’s sister

a visit at that time.
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 9 2024 UT App 111

fabricated the story in order to get Ruth to agree to leave 

California and that they did not tell Ruth that they intended to 

move her to Utah permanently.

¶17 In Utah, Ruth was initially placed in an assisted living 

facility for a short while but was later moved into Plaintiffs’ home. 

There, Ruth stayed in Jennifer’s former yoga studio. The entrance 

to the room had no door, and Ruth slept on a narrow bed that had 

previously been used for yoga-based healing. Plaintiffs made it a

point to be physically present with Ruth as much as possible in 

order to closely monitor and limit Ruth’s contact with her other 

family, particularly Defendants and Katie. Phone calls, although 

not altogether prohibited, were rare, short, and of limited subject 

matter. 

¶18 Katie was able to visit Ruth in or around May. Although 

Ruth seemed to be doing well physically, she told Katie that “she 

had never been so homesick” and she wanted to return with Katie 

to California. Ruth’s sister passed away shortly after Katie’s visit.

Ruth did not attend the funeral even though Ruth was 

“extraordinarily close” with her sister, she “desired very much to 

attend [the] funeral,” and there was no medical or logistical 

reason that prevented her from doing so.

¶19 In June, Anne and two of her sons visited Ruth, but 

Thomas refused to allow Ruth to leave his home, claiming to have 

guardianship over her. This resulted in an argument and the 

police being called. The trial court found that Anne credibly 

testified that Ruth appeared “terrified” during the confrontation 

and that Plaintiffs “were screaming and yelling and Ruth was in 

a panic” and “looked like a caged animal.” Ruth told Anne that 

she felt lonely and isolated and that she missed her friends and 

her home. Anne subsequently reported to Adult Protective 

Services that Ruth was not residing with Plaintiffs willingly.
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 10 2024 UT App 111

¶20 In late June or early July, Anne, Dave, and Katie visited 

Utah, but Plaintiffs would not allow Ruth to spend time with them 

in the Park City home. Katie was able to visit Ruth twice during 

the trip but had to schedule the visits in advance with Plaintiffs. 

Following that trip, Katie tried to schedule phone calls with Ruth, 

frequently to no avail.

¶21 In October, Anne and Dave again visited Ruth at Plaintiffs’ 

home after hearing from Katie that Ruth was not doing well. 

Jennifer, who was the only one home with Ruth at the time, again 

refused to allow Anne and Dave to take Ruth to the Park City 

home. Another argument ensued, and the police were again 

called.

¶22 In November, concerned that Ruth would soon die, Katie 

returned to Utah. She and her children were forced to wait outside 

of Plaintiffs’ home for hours, and they were ultimately unable to 

see Ruth. Katie found out the following day that Ruth had passed 

away.

¶23 Based on these findings of fact, the trial court entered 

conclusions of law. The court first ruled that it had jurisdiction to 

adjudicate the declaratory judgment action and specifically 

determined that Plaintiffs had a legally protectible interest in the 

matter. In so concluding, the court distinguished Miller v. Weaver,

2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592, stating that in Miller “the statute relied 

upon by plaintiffs did not give rise to an express or implied cause 

of action,” whereas in the current action, “while Plaintiffs have 

not pointed to any statute or concrete theory under which they 

have a legally protectible interest, they have been accused by 

Defendants of elder abuse in two separate courts.” The court 

stated that it therefore followed that “in consideration of the fact 

that the declaratory relief statute is to be liberally interpreted and 

administered, Plaintiffs do have a legally protectible interest in a 

declaration that they have not committed elder abuse.”
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 11 2024 UT App 111

¶24 Turning next to the merits of the action, the court ruled that 

Plaintiffs committed elder abuse by knowingly harming Ruth, 

which they did by moving her to Utah and effectively cutting off 

contact between her and the rest of her family, resulting in 

emotional distress, mental anguish, hurt, and suffering. See Utah 

Code Ann. § 26B-6-201(2)(a), (17) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023). But the 

court further concluded that Plaintiffs did not commit elder abuse 

by isolating Ruth because their actions did not satisfy the strict 

statutory definition of that term, see id. § 26B-6-201(2)(b), (20), nor 

did they commit elder abuse by emotionally or psychologically 

abusing Ruth, see id. § 26B-6-201(2)(c), nor by neglecting her, see

id. § 26B-6-201(11), (22). Lastly, the court concluded that there was 

insufficient evidence to support a finding that Plaintiffs 

financially exploited Ruth, see id. § 26B-6-201(16); id. § 76-5-111.4,

but the court “expressly except[ed] from its determination at trial 

any issues pertaining to Ruth’s estate planning.”

Attorney Fees

¶25 Following the trial court’s decision, Defendants filed a 

motion seeking attorney fees and costs. The court granted the 

motion, ruling that this case satisfied the elements of Utah’s bad 

faith statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825(1) (LexisNexis 2022). 

First, the court found that Defendants were the prevailing parties 

because Plaintiffs did not obtain the declaratory judgment they

sought. Second, the court concluded that the action was without 

merit because some of Plaintiffs’ testimony, specifically regarding 

the circumstances of Ruth’s move to Utah and extended stay, 

“was not just incredible, but was actual perjured testimony.” See 

supra ¶ 13 & note 6. Third, the court found that Plaintiffs brought 

the action in bad faith. The court again pointed to the perjured 

testimony, and it also found that “Plaintiffs did not bring this 

action to clear their names” but rather as “part of a strategy of 

piecemeal litigation, the purpose of which was to hinder, delay, 

and defraud Defendants, and which was premised in part on the 

provision of false testimony.” Accordingly, the court ordered 
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 12 2024 UT App 111

Plaintiffs to pay $876,295.55 in attorney fees and costs to 

Defendants. 

¶26 Plaintiffs appeal. 

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶27 Plaintiffs raise two issues that we consider in this appeal. 

First, they argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter 

declaratory judgment on any statutory ground for elder abuse 

other than that of financial exploitation. “Whether a district court 

has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law” that we review 

for correctness.8 Summerhaze Co. v. FDIC, 2014 UT 28, ¶ 8, 332 P.3d 

908 (quotation simplified).

¶28 Second, Plaintiffs challenge the court’s award of attorney 

fees and costs to Defendants under the bad faith statute. “A 

[prevailing] party is entitled to attorney fees under the bad faith 

statute when an action or defense is both (1) without merit, and 

(2) not brought or asserted in good faith.” Kelly v. Timber Lakes

Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 24, 507 P.3d 357 (quotation 

simplified). The trial court’s “without merit determination is a 

question of law” that we review for correctness. Id. (quotation 

simplified). But we review the court’s factual finding that the 

action was not brought in good faith for clear error. Id.

“Furthermore, because the good faith element implicates 

fact-intensive questions about the losing party’s subjective intent, 

8. Plaintiffs also directly challenge the trial court’s ruling that they 

committed elder abuse under Utah Code section 26B-6-201(2)(a) 

by knowingly harming Ruth. Because our resolution of the 

jurisdictional issue is dispositive, we do not reach this additional 

argument. 
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 13 2024 UT App 111

a lower court’s finding on this element typically will be afforded 

a substantial measure of discretion.” Id. (quotation simplified).

ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

¶29 Utah’s Declaratory Judgment Act grants district courts 

“the power to issue declaratory judgments determining rights, 

status, and other legal relations within its respective jurisdiction” 

and provides that “[a]n action or proceeding may not be open to 

objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is 

prayed for.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-401(1) (LexisNexis 2022). See 

Bleazard v. City of Erda, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 39 (“The Declaratory 

Judgment Act grants a district court jurisdiction to determine any 

question of construction or validity of a statute that affects the 

rights, status, or other legal relations of any person and to declare 

that person’s rights, status, or legal relations under the statute.”) 

(quotation simplified). Nevertheless, “the courts are not a forum 

for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions, 

and therefore all actions must meet the requisite justiciable and 

jurisdictional requirements of any action.” Williamson I, 2019 UT 

App 123, ¶ 11, 447 P.3d 131 (quotation simplified). See Summit

County v. Town of Hideout, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 32 (“The statutory 

creation of relief in the form of a declaratory judgment does not 

create a cause of action or grant jurisdiction to the court where it 

would not otherwise exist.”) (quotation simplified). That is, before 

an action seeking declaratory judgment may proceed, “(1) there 

must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the parties 

must be adverse; (3) the parties seeking relief must have a legally 

protectible interest in the controversy; and (4) the issues between 

the parties must be ripe for judicial determination.” Bleazard, 2024 

UT 17, ¶ 40 (quotation simplified). All four requirements must be 

satisfied before an action for declaratory judgment may move 

forward. See Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 15, 66 P.3d 592. 
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 14 2024 UT App 111

¶30 Only the third requirement concerning the parties’ legally 

protectible interests, which goes toward standing, is at issue in 

this appeal. See Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) 

(stating that the second and third requirements a plaintiff must 

satisfy before obtaining declaratory judgment “represent the 

traditional test for standing”). “Standing is a jurisdictional

requirement that must be satisfied before a court may entertain a 

controversy between two parties.” Kemp v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2013 

UT App 88, ¶ 4, 301 P.3d 23 (quotation simplified). And 

“generally speaking, a party has an interest that is legally 

protectible for purposes of standing if it has a claim for relief that 

emanates from the common law, a statute, or the constitution.” 

Summit County, 2024 UT 16, ¶ 34 (quotation simplified). Here, by 

the time of trial, the sole basis for the trial court’s exercise of 

jurisdiction was Utah’s elder abuse statute—the court did not 

address any common law or constitutional considerations.

¶31 “[W]hen a party’s declaratory judgment claim is rooted in 

statute, not the constitution or common law, a legally protectible 

interest comes from an express or implied statutory right of 

action.” Id. ¶ 35. “A private statutory right of action exists when a 

private party can bring a lawsuit for relief from injuries caused by 

another’s violation of a statute.” Bleazard, 2024 UT 17, ¶ 45 

(quotation simplified). Whether a private statutory right of action 

exists presents “a question of statutory interpretation,” for which 

“we look first to the plain language of the statute for an express 

indication that a private right of action was intended.” Id. ¶ 46 

(quotation simplified). “Such an indication is made clear by 

explicit language that does not require anyone to add language or 

make inferences to impart the full meaning of the statute.” Id.

(quotation simplified). 

¶32 Furthermore, absent express statutory language granting a 

private right of action, Utah courts “are reluctant to imply a 

private right of action based on state law.” Id. ¶ 47 (quotation 

simplified). Indeed, “Utah courts have rarely, if ever, found a 
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20221084-CA 15 2024 UT App 111

Utah statute to grant an implied private right of action.” Id.

(quotation simplified). This reluctance is elevated when an 

implied private right of action would require courts “to infer 

language and meaning that does not appear on the face of the 

statute or when doing so would be inconsistent with the 

Legislature’s statutory scheme,” id. (quotation simplified), or 

“when the Legislature has already designated a method of 

resolution through an administrative agency specifically 

empowered to handle issues,” Miller, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 20. 

¶33 Utah Code section 26B-6-201 generally defines elder abuse 

as “abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an elder adult,” Utah Code 

Ann. § 26B-6-201(11) (LexisNexis Supp. 2023), and further divides

each of these three categories of elder abuse into subcategories, id.

§ 26B-6-201(2), (16), (22). As relevant here, the “abuse” category 

includes a subcategory of “knowingly or intentionally” “causing 

harm.” Id. § 26B-6-201(2)(a)(ii). Harm, in turn, is defined as “pain, 

mental anguish, emotional distress, hurt, physical or 

psychological damage, physical injury, serious physical injury, 

suffering, or distress inflicted knowingly or intentionally.” Id.

§ 26B-6-201(17). Additionally, the “exploitation” category of elder 

abuse includes three subcategories. Id. § 26B-6-201(16). These are 

personal dignity exploitation of a vulnerable adult, see id.

§ 76-5-111.3, financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult, see id.

§ 76-5-111.4, and sexual exploitation of a vulnerable adult, see id.

§ 76-5b-202. See also id. § 26B-6-201(12), (30) (defining 

“[v]ulnerable adult” as, among other things, an “elder adult,” 

which, in turn, is defined as “an individual 65 years or older”).

¶34 Utah Code section 26B-6-213 provides that “[a] vulnerable 

adult who suffers harm or financial loss as a result of exploitation has 

a private right of action against the perpetrator,” and in the event 

of the vulnerable adult’s death, “any cause of action under this 

section shall constitute an asset of the estate of the vulnerable 

adult.” Id. § 26B-6-213(1)–(2) (emphasis added). At issue here is 

whether the modifier “as a result of exploitation” applies to both 
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20221084-CA 16 2024 UT App 111

“harm” and “financial loss”—or merely to “financial loss.” If the 

former, then an express private right of action exists only as to 

elder abuse arising from exploitation that results in harm or 

financial loss. If the latter, then a private right of action also exists 

when the victim of elder abuse suffers harm more generally and 

is not then limited to the exploitation category of elder abuse. 

¶35 “Our primary task when interpreting these provisions is to 

give effect to the intent of the legislature,” Downs v. Thompson, 

2019 UT 63, ¶ 17, 452 P.3d 1101, the “best indication” of which “is 

the statute’s plain language,” Flowell Elec. Ass’n v. Rhodes Pump,

LLC, 2015 UT 87, ¶ 34, 361 P.3d 91. “When looking at the plain 

language, we presume that the Legislature used each word 

advisedly, and deem all omissions to be purposeful.” Zilleruelo v. 

Commodity Transporters, Inc., 2022 UT 1, ¶ 19, 506 P.3d 509 

(quotation simplified). We also “consider the entire [statutory] 

text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation 

of its many parts.” Salt Lake City Corp. v. Haik, 2020 UT 29, ¶ 15, 

466 P.3d 178 (quotation simplified).

¶36 Given the context of the statute at issue, the series-qualifier 

canon of statutory interpretation is most helpful in resolving this 

dispute.9 See Downs, 2019 UT 63, ¶¶ 18, 21. It provides that 

9. The series-qualifier canon is often in competition with the 

last-antecedent canon. Downs v. Thompson, 2019 UT 63, ¶ 18, 452 

P.3d 1101. Under the last antecedent canon, “a limiting clause or 

phrase should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or 

phrase that it immediately follows.” Id. ¶ 19 (quotation 

simplified). See LPI Services v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 15, 215 P.3d 

135 (“Under the rule of the last antecedent, qualifying words and 

phrases are generally regarded as applying to the immediately 

preceding words, rather than to more remote ones.”) (quotation 

simplified). But “this rule does not prevent us from deciding that 

qualifying words and phrases apply to several preceding terms of 

(continued...)
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20221084-CA 17 2024 UT App 111

“[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that 

involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or 

postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.” Id.

¶ 20 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 147 (2012)). The “classic 

example” of this canon is the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution, which protects “against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” Downs, 2019 UT 63, ¶ 20 (quotation 

simplified). “Applying the series-qualifier canon, we and others 

read this text as barring both unreasonable searches and 

unreasonable seizures,” that is to say, “both nouns in the series 

are qualified by the preceding adjective ‘unreasonable.’” Id. The 

same principle can apply when the modifier comes after the 

series. Id. When applied to section 26B-6-213(1), the modifier “as 

a result of exploitation” would thus modify both “harm” and 

“financial loss,” meaning that the private right of action granted 

under the statute is limited to the exploitation category of elder 

abuse, more specifically to when the victim suffers harm or 

financial loss as a result.

¶37 The series-qualifier canon is properly applied to section 

26B-6-213(1) because if the modifier “as a result of exploitation” 

was limited to “financial loss,” the modifier would be rendered 

wholly superfluous, an outcome typically avoided. See Turner v. 

the same character.” LPI Services, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 15 (quotation 

simplified). Rather, “context guides which canons we apply.” 

Downs, 2019 UT 63, ¶ 18. See LPI Services, 2009 UT 41, ¶ 15 (“Rules 

of statutory construction, such as the rule of the last antecedent, 

are useful guides, but poor masters, and they should not be 

regarded as having any such rigidity as to have the force of law, 

or distort an otherwise natural meaning or intent.”) (quotation 

simplified). For reasons discussed in greater detail below, the 

series-qualifier canon is more appropriately applied to the statute 

at issue in this appeal.
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 18 2024 UT App 111

Staker & Parson Cos., 2012 UT 30, ¶ 12, 284 P.3d 600 (“Wherever 

possible, we give effect to every word of a statute, avoiding any 

interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute

inoperative or superfluous.”) (quotation simplified). Of the three 

categories of elder abuse, only that of exploitation contemplates 

financial loss, see Utah Code Ann. § 26B-6-201(16); id. § 76-5-111.4, 

thereby rendering the clarification that the financial loss must 

result from exploitation entirely unnecessary. Conversely, 

“harm”—which is the knowing or intentional infliction of “pain, 

mental anguish, emotional distress, hurt, physical or 

psychological damage, physical injury, serious physical injury, 

suffering, or distress,” id. § 26B-6-201(17)—is not expressly limited 

to any of the three categories of elder abuse, see id. It is also entirely 

possible for an individual to knowingly or intentionally inflict 

harm on a vulnerable adult by means of any of the three 

subcategories of exploitation (personal dignity exploitation, 

financial exploitation, or sexual exploitation). The modifier “as a 

result of exploitation” thus serves a purpose only if it applies to 

both “harm” and “financial loss” and is superfluous if applied 

only to “financial loss.”

¶38 Additionally, the Utah Code provides alternative means to 

address the other two categories of elder abuse. Adult Protective 

Services, a unit of the Division of Aging and Adult Services, is 

statutorily granted the power “to investigate abuse, neglect, and 

exploitation of vulnerable adults and provide appropriate 

protective services.” Id. § 26B-6-201(5). See id. §§ 26B-6-202, -205. 

And it is the duty of the county or district attorney, and in some 

situations of the attorney general, to assist Adult Protective 

Services in “initiat[ing] legal proceedings to protect vulnerable 

adults” and in “tak[ing] appropriate action to prosecute the 

alleged offenders.” Id. § 26B-6-208. Accordingly, our 

interpretation of section 26B-6-213(1) would not leave victims of 

the abuse or neglect categories of elder abuse without means of 
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20221084-CA 19 2024 UT App 111

relief—which would clearly be against our Legislature’s intent.10

For these reasons, we hold that the express statutory language of 

section 26B-6-213(1) limits the private right of action to instances 

of “harm or financial loss” that were caused “as a result of 

exploitation.”

¶39 Here, following a bench trial, the trial court found that 

Plaintiffs had committed one form of elder abuse as defined under 

section 26B-6-201. Specifically, the court determined that 

Plaintiffs’ actions satisfied subsection 201(2)(a) (harm—a 

subcategory of abuse), but it also determined that their actions did 

not constitute elder abuse under subsections 201(2)(b) (isolation—

also a subcategory of abuse), 201(2)(c) (emotional or psychological 

abuse—also a subcategory of abuse), 201(22) (neglect), or 201(16) 

(financial exploitation). As discussed above, of these five variants 

of elder abuse the court considered, only that of financial 

exploitation fell under the exploitation category of elder abuse, 

and thus only that allegation carried with it a private right of 

action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs had a legally protectible interest

only as to the determination of whether they financially exploited 

Ruth between March and November 2016—and the court held 

that Plaintiffs did not. The court thus exceeded its jurisdiction 

when it adjudicated the remaining four allegations of elder abuse

for which there is no private right of action. 

¶40 Defendants resist this conclusion, arguing that “even if 

Plaintiffs’ arguments were to be indulged, it begs the question as 

to the point of the bench trial.”11 Defendants point to Plaintiffs’ 

10. For this same reason, there is no implied private right of action 

for elder abuse committed by means of abuse or neglect. Cf. Miller 

v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 20, 66 P.3d 592. 

11. Defendants also argue that our holding in this appeal 

contradicts our prior decision in Williamson I, 2019 UT App 123, 

(continued...)
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 20 2024 UT App 111

complaint, in which Plaintiffs sought a broad declaratory 

judgment that they “did not commit elder abuse against Ruth,” 

that they “did not violate any statutory or common law duties 

owed to Ruth,” and that Defendants “have no actionable claim 

against [them] pertaining in any way to Ruth.” Defendants also 

assert that if the trial court had jurisdiction to consider only the 

issue of financial exploitation, given the court’s determination 

that the question of whether Plaintiffs exerted undue influence in 

Ruth’s estate planning should be reserved for the Probate Action, 

447 P.3d 131. Specifically, they point to the statement that “the 

requested declaratory judgment would indeed completely 

resolve the controversy giving rise to the specific ‘proceeding’ 

pending before the court.” Id. ¶ 16. At issue in Williamson I was 

whether the district court properly dismissed the action under 

Utah Code section 78B-6-404 and under its common law 

authority. Id. ¶ 13. And in Williamson I, we expressly presumed 

for purposes of that appeal that all four of the threshold 

requirements for declaratory judgments were met. See id. ¶ 12. 

 Defendants also point to the statement in Williamson I that the 

“judicial power to issue declaratory judgments is broad, and is not 

constitutionally restricted to cases and controversies.” Id. ¶ 10 

(quotation simplified). However, this argument overlooks the 

discussion that followed of the four threshold requirements that 

must nevertheless be met before a court may proceed to 

adjudicate an action for declaratory judgment. See id. ¶ 11. And 

here, we hold that at least one of those requirements was not met 

as to four of the five statutory grounds of elder abuse the court 

considered at trial. Furthermore, as discussed in greater detail 

below, at the time Williamson I was decided, the California elder 

abuse statute, which provides broader private rights of action 

than its Utah counterpart, was still potentially in play in the 

underlying litigation.
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 21 2024 UT App 111

“that would have left essentially nothing for the trial court [in the 

current action] to adjudicate.”

¶41 Although Plaintiffs’ complaint sought a declaratory 

judgment that they generally did not commit elder abuse in 

various forms, by the time of trial those claims had been limited 

to five statutory grounds of elder abuse under Utah law. Indeed, 

at the time of the Williamson I decision, the potential of California 

law being applied was still in play. California law, unlike its Utah 

counterpart, expressly allows private actions against defendants 

for abuse, neglect, or financial abuse of the elderly where the 

defendant is also guilty of “recklessness, oppression, fraud, or 

malice in the commission of [the] abuse.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 15657. Thus, a private right of action likely existed for certain

claims of elder abuse that might have been adjudicated under 

California law. But post-remand, Plaintiffs argued in their motion 

for summary judgment that Utah law—not California law—

should be applied in this case, and Defendants did “not dispute 

that the substantive law of Utah should apply to the 

determination of Plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claim as they have 

framed it in the pleadings and subsequently confirmed in 

discovery.” The trial court agreed, and by the time of trial, the 

court had limited the current action to deciding five alleged 

statutory grounds of elder abuse under Utah law, and it did not 

consider whether Plaintiffs breached any duties they owed to 

Ruth under Utah common law. Thus, as the action progressed to 

trial, the allegations of elder abuse were specifically identified—

four of which the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate.

¶42 Furthermore, on summary judgment, Plaintiffs argued that 

because the financial exploitation allegation was the sole claim 

that carried with it a private right of action, the court was limited 

to considering only that claim at trial. But Defendants convinced 

the court that the scope of the declaratory judgment action went 

“beyond” “conduct that gives rise to a private cause of action” 

under Utah’s elder abuse statute and should include “a real broad 
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 22 2024 UT App 111

cross section of physical, financial elder abuse and exploitation.” 

Thus, while Plaintiffs certainly bear their share of responsibility 

for some of the inefficiencies in the way this lengthy litigation 

proceeded, it is Defendants who ultimately prevailed upon the 

trial court to try claims that we now hold were jurisdictionally 

infirm.

¶43 In sum, because no private right of action exists for the 

allegations that Plaintiffs committed elder abuse by harming, 

neglecting, isolating, or emotionally or psychologically abusing 

Ruth while she was in Utah, the court exceeded its jurisdiction 

when it adjudicated those allegations. Accordingly, we vacate the 

court’s rulings on those points. But because a private right of 

action exists for the allegation that Plaintiffs financially exploited 

Ruth, the court’s ruling that Plaintiffs did not commit that form of 

elder abuse still stands because Defendants have not challenged 

it in a cross-appeal.

II. Attorney Fees

¶44 Under the bad faith statute, “[i]n civil actions, the court 

shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing party if the 

court determines that the action or defense to the action was 

without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith[.]” Utah 

Code Ann. § 78B-5-825(1) (LexisNexis 2022). Thus, in addition to 

determining whether the party requesting attorney fees under the 

bad faith statute is the “prevailing party,” Utah Associated Mun.

Power Sys. v. 3 Dimensional Contractors Inc., 2024 UT App 35, ¶ 74, 

547 P.3d 829, the trial court must also make findings regarding

whether the other party’s claim or defense was without merit and 

not brought or asserted in good faith, id.; Pinder v. Duchesne

County Sheriff, 2020 UT 68, ¶ 100, 478 P.3d 610. “A claim [or 

defense] is without merit if it is frivolous, is of little weight or 

importance having no basis in law or fact, or clearly lacks a legal 

basis for recovery.” Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon,

2002 UT 99, ¶ 30, 61 P.3d 1009 (quotation simplified). And a party 
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 23 2024 UT App 111

does not bring a claim or defense in good faith if the party either 

“(1) lacks an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in 

question, (2) intends to take unconscionable advantage of others, 

or (3) intends to or has knowledge of the fact that his actions will 

hinder, delay, or defraud others.” Id. ¶ 29.

¶45 Here, the trial court ruled that Defendants were the 

prevailing parties because Plaintiffs did not obtain the declaratory 

judgment they sought. The court further ruled that the action was 

without merit because some of Plaintiffs’ testimony was perjured 

and that Plaintiffs brought the action in bad faith because they did 

so as “part of a strategy of piecemeal litigation, the purpose of 

which was to hinder, delay, and defraud Defendants, and which 

was premised in part on the provision of false testimony.” But, as 

discussed in Part I, of the five statutory grounds for elder abuse 

that the trial court considered at trial, the court had jurisdiction to 

adjudicate only whether Plaintiffs financially exploited Ruth, 

which it addressed in a limited way. Specifically, it considered 

evidence only from the time Ruth moved to Utah in March 2016 

until her death in November 2016, and it “expressly except[ed] 

from its determination at trial any issues pertaining to Ruth’s 

estate planning.” Ultimately, the court ruled in Plaintiffs’ favor on 

that issue, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to find

that Plaintiffs financially exploited Ruth during that time. So, on 

that issue at least, Plaintiffs were the prevailing party. And while 

we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the 

claims that did not give rise to a private right of action, the trial 

court had determined on the record before it that Plaintiffs had 

not committed three other variants of elder abuse.

¶46 Given our resolution of the jurisdiction issue in Part I, new 

issues arise regarding the trial court’s award of attorney fees

under the bad faith statute. To name a few: whether Defendants 

are still the prevailing party in the action considered as a whole; 

whether, given that Plaintiffs prevailed on the only claim that the 

court had jurisdiction to decide, Plaintiffs’ action lacked merit;
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 24 2024 UT App 111

and whether Plaintiffs’ false testimony, which does not seem to 

relate to the financial exploitation claim but which did relate to 

their defense against at least some of the four other claims,

12 can 

still serve as a basis for the court’s findings regarding merit and 

bad faith.13 Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to consider 

anew Defendants’ request for attorney fees under the bad faith 

statute.14

12. The trial court ruled that Defendants carried the burden of 

proof at trial on all elder abuse claims, which ruling has not been 

challenged by either party on appeal. Thus, although Plaintiffs 

argued on summary judgment that a private right of action 

existed only as to the financial exploitation claim, it is conceivable 

that Plaintiffs’ defense at trial against the claims to which the false 

testimony related may nonetheless have been meritless or in bad 

faith.

13. We express no opinion on the resolution of these questions. 

Indeed, questions relating to which side prevailed and good faith 

are generally left to the discretion of the trial court. See Maxwell

Masonry Restoration & Cleaning LLC v. North Ridge Constr. Inc., 2022 

UT App 109, ¶ 28, 518 P.3d 164 (“Whether a party is the prevailing 

party in an action is a decision left to the sound discretion of the 

trial court and reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”) (quotation 

simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1265 (Utah 2023); Kelly v. Timber

Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2022 UT App 23, ¶ 24, 507 P.3d 357 

(“Because the good faith element implicates fact-intensive 

questions about the losing party’s subjective intent, a lower 

court’s finding on this element typically will be afforded a 

substantial measure of discretion.”) (quotation simplified).

14. Defendants also seek an award of attorney fees incurred on 

appeal. “Generally, when a party who received attorney fees 

below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees 

(continued...)
Williamson v. Farrell

20221084-CA 25 2024 UT App 111

CONCLUSION

¶47 Because, by the time of trial, the remaining allegations of 

elder abuse were based solely on Utah statute, the trial court had 

jurisdiction to adjudicate only the claims that carried a statutory 

private right of action. And the only relevant claim with such a 

private right of action was that of financial exploitation, which the 

court determined Plaintiffs did not commit. We therefore vacate 

the court’s judgment, except for its financial exploitation ruling in 

Plaintiffs’ favor. We also vacate the court’s award of attorney fees 

to Defendants under the bad faith statute and remand for the trial 

court to reconsider Defendants’ request in light of our resolution 

of this appeal.

reasonably incurred on appeal.” Fadel v. Deseret First Credit Union, 

2017 UT App 165, ¶ 38, 405 P.3d 807 (quotation simplified), cert. 

denied, 409 P.3d 1047 (Utah 2017). This principle likewise “applies 

when the basis for attorney fees in the trial court is the bad faith 

statute.” Id. (quotation simplified). But because we remand the 

issue of attorney fees for the trial court to consider anew, 

Defendants’ entitlement to attorney fees at the trial court level is 

yet to be determined. “Thus, any appropriate award of attorney 

fees on appeal is dependent upon that determination and should 

be assessed by the district court on remand.” Crank v. Utah Jud.

Council, 2001 UT 8, ¶ 44 n.18, 20 P.3d 307.