# FILED

Au gust 16, 1996 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COU RT OF A PPEA LS OF TENN ESSEE WESTERN SECT ION A T NASHVILLE

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CONE OIL CO ., INC., ) Williamson Chancery N o. 23282 ) Plaintiff/Appellant ) Appeal No. 01A01- 9604-CH-00154 ) v. ) ) WILLIAMSON COUNTY REGI ONAL ) PLANNING COMMISSION, ) ) Defendant/Appellee )

APPEAL FROM THE CH ANCERY COU RT OF WILLIAM SON C OUNTY

AT FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE HENRY D ENMARK BELL, CHANCELLOR

THOMAS V. WHITE TUNE, ENTREKIN & WHITE, P.C. 21st Floor 315 Deaderick

Street Nashvil le, Tennessee 37219 Attorney for Appellant JAM ES D. PETERSE N PETERSEN, B UERGER, M OSELEY & C AR SON 306 Court Square Franklin, Tennessee 37064 Attorney for Appellee

AFFIRMED. WILLIA M H. INM AN , SENIOR JUD GE

CONCUR: W. FRA NK CRA

WFORD, JUD GE ALAN E. HIGHERS , JUDGE2 O P I N I O N The W illiamson County Regional Planning Commission [”W CRPC”] initially heard the application of Cone Oil , Inc. [”Cone ”] on January 12, 1995 for a condi tional use permit to ex pand an exist ing refuelingstation at the Goose Creek ex it, Interstat e 65. The station was previo usly ow ned and operated by Stuckey’ s; Cone intended to add a new f ueli ng fa cilit y. Cone’s appli cation trig gered administrative r eviews . It contrac

ted the professional ser

vices of Haw kins Development Company to evaluate t he impact of the proposed new

facility; the WCRPC also contracted the professional services of an exp ert, Tock nell & Asso c., t o eval uate the t raf fic i mpa ct of the p ropo sed f acili ty. The W CRPC i niti ally he ard t he ap plica tion on Ja nua ry 12, 1995 , as we have stated. The staff recommended a pproval; v arious resi dents opposed the appl ication, the thrust of their

objections bei ng directed essentially to traffic conge stion and general safety

conditions. An engineer for Cone explai ned that the site would be self-limiti ng, wi th no more than 50 tr ucks using it in a 24-h our period. The WCRPC declined to accept i ts staff’s recommendati on, citing as reasons the proximi ty of Interst ate 65, the lack of information about the impact of traffic on the area and the possi bility of increased traffic problems. Speci fically, i t raised nine issues inv

olving traffic safety w hich prevented approval . These issues were: (1) The thickness of th e pavement on Old Peytonsville Road as to whether it was adequate for heavy trucks. (2) Whether a vertical cur b would posea problem for vehicles usi ng the Goose Creek By-pass. (3) What is the anticipated peak tr affic on the By-pa ss and on site? (4) The estim ated num ber o f tru cks pe r day? (5) Is sta cking(tru cks i n line ) lik ely t o be a pr

oblem? (6) What are the turning radii at ingres s and egress of the site? (7) Are the ramps to the site too steep? (8) Is ther

e a sit e-distance p roble m? (9) Is there an adeq uate on-site maneuv ering area

for anticipated traffic?3 The second public meeting, and the one with w hich we ar e concerned, was held on March 9, 1995. In the i nterim, Cone contracted w ith RPM and Assoc., a traffic consultant, to evaluate the proposed location. RPM’s findin gs were that the traffic i mpact would n ot create a safety problem and would be manageable. Th e expert employed by W illiamson County concurred in this assessment

of RPM and, aga in, the staff of WCRPC recommended approval of the applicatio n and made specific r ecommendations resp ecting each of the nine cond itio ns la id do wn at t he Ja nua ry 199 5 me etin g, whic h Con e pro pose d to s atis fy. All of the expe rts for Cone and the County r ecommended approval , as did the staff, as we have shown. Local residents were ag ain allowed to air thei r view s, the first of whom was a county commissioner an d former truck d river who feared that t oo many trucks

would be bac ked up at the stat ion. Another resident expr essed the vi ew that trucks would not be able to stop on a ccount of road surf ace conditions; still another (ten, in all) expressed fears of congestion, stacking, turning radii. The thrust of all objectors was directed to perceived traff ic woes. Followi ng public comment, the WCRPC asked for a clar ification of standar ds required t o approve a conditional use permit. Speci fically, J oe Horne, Planni ng Director for W illiamson County, was asked if the site could be saf ely operated. He deferred to the opin ions of the exper ts who had studied the iss ue; thereupon the W CRPC inquired where they stood if they rejected the application, an d their counsel, Mr. Peterson, advised them that the application could not be rejecte d simply because the neighboring residents opposed it, explaining that the Ordinance itself mu st provide thereason to deny the applicati on. The WCRPC then voted to deny the conditional use permit for t he asserted reason the sit e could not be safel y operated as a refueling center. On certior

ari to the Ch ancery Co urt, the Chance llor rul ed that the Zoning Ordinance deleg ates to the WCRPC discret ion in rev iewing applications for conditional us e permits, and t hat material ev idence supported the denial of the permit.4 Cone appeals and pr

esents two issues for rev iew: (1) Whether the W CRPC exceeded its authority as a quasi-judicial body when it denied approval of Cone Oil’s cond itio nal u se pe rmit , and (2) W heth er it a cted arbit raril y. Much of the briefs a nd arguments are given over to di stinguishi ng the function and authority

of a Regional Planning Co mmission as cont rasted to a Boar d of Zoning Appeals. The essent ial thrust of the appellee’s ar gument is that it is a q uasi-judic ial body and is vested w ith wide discretion, unlike Boards of Zoning Appeal s. We see no need to expl icate this poi nt; the real i ssue is - -measured agai nst the appropri ate standard of rev iew - -whether th e WCRPC acted arbitrari ly or i n excess of i ts authority, and whether there is material evidence to sup port its denial of Cone’s application. The zoning ordinance, as pertinent here, provides: “SECTION 9 310. GENERAL S TANDARDS FOR CONDITIONAL USE S No application for a condition al use permit shall be approved unl ess the Planning Commission sh all specifically find th e proposed condit i ona l use appr opri ate i n theloc atio n fo r whi ch it is pr oposed. This finding shall be based o n the followi ng criter ia: A. The proposed use sha ll be in har mony wi th the general pur pose, goals , obj ecti ves, a nd st and ards of t he W illia mson Coun ty Comprehensive Plan, this O rdinance, and any other plan, progr am, or ordinance adopted, o r under cons ideration pur suant to of fici al no tice by the Coun ty. B. The proposed location of the proposed use shall be consistent with policies, map, or prov isions of the Comp rehe nsive Plan, this Ordin ance , or ot her p lans or pro gram s of the C oun ty. C. The proposed use at the proposed location shal l not result in a substantial or undue adver se effect on adja cent property , the character

of the neighborhoo d, traffic conditions, parking, public improvements, public sites or rights-of-way, or other matters affecting the publi c health, safety , and general welfare, . . .” Clearly mandated by the or

dinance is the requirement that the Planning Commission find, a s a condition precedent to appr oval of a condi tional use per mit, that the proposed use will not unduly, adversely affect traffic condition s or the public saf ety.
The Planning C ommission denied t he permit for the r eason the “sit e could not be safely operated as a semi (truck) re fueling center .” If there is material ev idence to5

support the deci sion of the Plannin g Commissi on, it was the duty of the C hancellor to uphold it, and our concom itant duty to uphold the Chance llor. “Material evidence” in this contex

t has been defined to be “such relev ant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to s upport a ratio nal conclusi on and such as to furnish a reasonably sound basis for the action under consideration.” Sexton v. Anderson County, 587 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tenn. App. 1979). Al lied wi th this pri nciple is t he caveat that be liefs, opinions , and fears of neighb orhood resident s are not materi al evidence. Mullins v

. City of Kno

xville, 665 S.W .2d 393 (Tenn. App . 1983); Sexton at 666. As we have shown, the Planning Co mmission conduct ed two publi c hearings

. Because of the opposit ion presented by residents upon the first heari ng - - or perhaps for other reasons not cl early ar ticulated in the record -- the initi al action of the Commission i n disapprov ing the si te plan wi thout a traffic study and other data involved some indicia

that if Cone sati sfied the nine cr iteria, it s applicatio n would be approved. Thi s is a troubl esome point, since Cone accepted th e invitati on essentially tendered and appa rently expended much time, labor and money in complying , or attempting to comply, with the conditions. But a careful rev iew of the minutes does not reveal any thing more tha n an indicatio n that approval might be forthcoming if the criteria were sati sfied. Traffic and safety data concerned t he Commis sion, which resolved t hese iss ues at th e secon d hearin g. The experts empl oyed by t he Commission and by Cone test ified that the proposed locati on posed no traffic pr oblems and woul d create no safety factors. Cone argues that the material evidence - - all of it - - is therefore posited in its favor, because the opini ons of local ci tizenry cannot intrude upon the fact-finding process. It is true t hat most of the ten res idents who spoke in opposi tion to the gr anting of the perm it me rel y ex pres sed t heir opi nion s, b ut w e know of no reaso n wh y th e vi ews of concerned residents whose experiences are relevant, i.e., the former truck driver, cannot be considered con comitantly with those of experts. Finally, and probably most impo rtan tly, a cour t can not s ubst itut e its j udgm ent f or th at of an ad mini stra tive body. Pace v. Garbage Disp. Dis trict, 390 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965)

.6 The appellee arg ues that it weighed all of the evidence an d applied the Ordinance as r

equired by

law. We cannot find that there is no materi al evidenc e to support the Commi ssion’s findi ng or that i t acted ille gally or in exc ess of its jurisdict ion. The judgment is affirmed at the costs of the appellant.

_______________________________ W illiam H. I nman, Senior Ju dge CONCUR:

_____________________________ W . Frank Cra wford, Ju dge

_____________________________ Alan E. Hi ghers, Ju dge