U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General 

Report of Investigation 

into Mlegations Relating to tlhe 

Selection of athe U. S . Attorn.c:y 

for Guam and the 

Northern Mariana Islands 

Office of the Inspector General 

Oversight and Review Dbivision 

Ju.ne 2006 
This report describes the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG-) 

investigation regarding allegations raised by Frederick Black, the former 

interim U.S. Attorney for Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern 

Mariana Islands (CNMI). Black alleged that he was replaced as the interim 

U.S. Attorney because he called for an investigation of Washington, D.C., 

lobbyist Jack Abramoff and also because he supported applying federal 

immigration law to the CNMI, a position Abramoff opposed. 

Black had served as the interim United States Attorney for Guiml and the 

CNMI since 199 1. On November 19, 2002, President Bush nominatetd 

Leonardo Rapadas, a lawyer in the Guam Attorney General's office, to be the 

Presidentially appointed U.S. ~ttorne~ for that district. On May 22, 2003, 

Rapadas was sworn in as the U. S. Attorney and has remained in that position 

since then. 

The OIG learned of Black's allegations in July 2005 from Noel Hi:llman, at 

that time the Chief of the Public Integrity Section of the Department of 

Justice (DOJ). Hillman notified the OIG that Black had recently been 

interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agents assigned to 

DOJ's investigation into Abramoffs activities. In that interview, Black stated 

that he believed he had been replaced as the U.S. Attorney because of political 

controversy he caused in the fall of 2002 by calling for an investigation of 

lobbying fees that the Superior Court of Guam had paid t:o Abramoff. Black 

also alleged that he may have been replaced in order to prevent the 

implementation of a recommendation contained in a May 2002 security report 

prepared by a DOJ security specialist regarding the applicability of federal 

immigration law to the CNMI, which Black supported and Abramoff allegedly 

opposed. During the FBI interview, Black also raised various concerns 

regarding the appointment of Rapadas as the U.S. Attorney and the 

management of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Guam and the CNMI (USIAOGuam) after Rapadas's appointment. 

As a result, the OIG opened this investigation into Black's claims that he 

was replaced as the interim U.S. Attorney in retaliation for bringing allegations 

involving Abramoff to the attention of DOJ officials. We also investigated 

Black's suggestion that he was replaced because of his support for the security 

report recommendation urging that federal immigration law be applied in the 

CNMI. In addition, we examined Black's allegations that Rapadas's 

background investigation was insufficient and that his appointment as U.S. 

Attorney was inappropriate because his uncle was the subject of a public 

corruption case being investigated by the Guam U. S. Attorney's office. Finally, 

we briefly examined Black's more general allegations regarding the handling of 

public corruption cases and other management issues at the U.S. Attorney's 

office since Rapadas's appointment. 
In our investigation, we interviewed approximately 20 witnesses, 

including Black and current and former DOJ officials involved in the U .S. 

Attorney selection process, such as Associate Deputy Attorney General David 

Margolis, former DOJ White House Liaison David Higbee, and former Director 

of DOJ7s Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) Kenneth 

Wainstein. We also interviewed several former White House staff me.mibers 

involved in the U.S. Attorney selection process, including two members of the 

White House Counsel's office and a member of the White House Office (of 

Political Affairs. In addition, we interviewed current and former members of 

the Public Integrity Section and the USA0 in Guam who worked with Ellack 

and handled Guam's public corruption cases. We also interviewed Republican 

officials from Guam who participated in the decision to recommend Rapadas to 

the White House. Finally, we interviewed Abramoff and an associate who 

Abramoff said would know about work done on his behalf in connectioin with 

Rapadas's nomination. 

In addition, we reviewed documents relevant to Black's allegations, 

including documents related to the selection process for the Guam U.S. 

Attorney's position and Rapadas's background investigation, and several 

thousand pages of documents containing many of AbramofPs e-mails from the 

relevant time period. 

This report summarizes the results of our investigation. First, it provides 

a timeline of events related to the selection of the U1.S. Attorney for Guam. 

Part I1 provides background information on the Guam U.S. Attorney position 

(USA Guam) and the U.S. Attorney selection process. Part I11 describes, the 

factual chronology relevant to Black's allegations. Part IV contains our 

analysis of the allegations. Part V contains our conclusions. 

In sum, we concluded that the evidence does not support Black's) 

assertion that he was replaced as interim U.S. Attorney for Guam because of 

allegations he raised regarding Abramoff or because of his position on the . 

application of federal immigration law in the CNMI. Rather, we found that DOJ 

and White House officials selected Rapadas as the nominee for Presidlential 

appointment to the U.S. Attorney's position pursuant to the normal selection 

process, long before Black raised his allegations against Abramoff and well 

In early spring 2004, the DOJ opened an investigation into payments made by certain 

Indian tribes to Abramoff for lobbying services. That investigation eventually led, according to 

published reports, to other related inquiries regarding Abramoff, including his activities in the 

CNMI. In January 2006, Abramoff pled guilty in Washington and Florida to conspiracy, wire 

fraud, and tax evasion. As part of his plea agreements, Abramoff agreed to assist t:he 

government in its ongoing investigation. hrsuant to that agreement, OIG investigators 

interviewed Abramoff on two occasions. In addition, OIG investigators had access to e-mails 

and documents of Abramoff and his former colleagues at Greenberg 'rraurig. 
before issuance of the security report recommending the application of' federal 

immigration law in the CNMI. In addition, although the public announcement 

of Rapadas's nomination was made after Black first raised his allegations 

against Abramoff, the timing of the announcement was unrelated to those 

allegations and instead was determined by the completion of Rapada.s':s 

background investigation. 

In addition, the evidence did not support Black's allegation that 

Rapadas's backgrolund investigation was insufficient andl his appointlment 

inappropriate. We concluded that the background investigation was conducted 

by the FBI in. accord with its normal practices, and the concerns Black raised 

regarding Rapadas were adequately investigated. Moreover, the conflict of 

interest issue Black identified during Rapadas's background investigation 

concerning Rapada.s's relative resulted in Rapadas's reculsal, once he: became 

U.S. Attorney, from certain public corruption cases. The evidence also reflects 

that those cases were actively pursued by career p:rosecutors in the (ham U.S. 

Attorney's office after Rapadas became the U.S. Attorney. 

As United States Attorneys 

United States Attorneys serve as the nation's chief law enforcement 

officers in their districts. See U.S. Attorney's Manual (USAM) at 5 3-2.100. 

There are 93 U.S. Attorneys stationed t:hroughout the United States, Puerto 

Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the CNMI. One U.S. Attorney is assigned 

to each of the judicial districts, with the exception of Guam and the CNMI, 

where a single U.S. Attorney serves both districts. 

United States Attorneys are appointed by the President, with the advice 

and consent of the Senate, for 4-year terms. See 28 U.S.C. 5 541. Because 

they are Presidential appointees and not covered by standard civil service 

removal procedures, U.S. Attorneys are subject to removal at the will of the 

President. Upon expiration of the 4-year term, a U.S Attorney normally 

continues to perform the duties of the office until a successor is confirmed. 

USAM at 5 3-2.120. 

In the event a U.S. Attorney position becomes vacant, the Attorney 

General may appoint an interim U.S. Attorney'for that district. During the 

period under review in this investigation, a person appointed as interim U.S. 

Attorney could serve up to 120 days, uintil the nomination and confirmation of 

a Presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney for that district or until the 

appointment of another interim U.S. Attorney. If an interim U.S. Attorney 

appointment expired before a Presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney was 

nominated and confirmed, the federal district court for that district could 

appoint a U.S. Attorney to serve until the vacancy was filled. See 28 U. S.C. 

5 546; USAM at 5 3-2.160. However, Section 502 in the USA PATRIOIT 

Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, enacted in March 2006, 

removed the 120-day time limit and permits the interim U.S. Attorney 

appointed by the Attorney General to serve until the Presidentially appointed 

U . S. Attorney is qualified. 

Bs Selection Process br United States Attorneys 

After President George W. Bush was inaugurated in January 200 1, his 

administration sought to nominate new candidates to fill the U.S. Attorneys' 

positions. Kyle Sampson, who was President Bush's Associate Director for 

Presidential Personnel until late September 2001 and is riow the Chief of Staff 

to the Attorney General, described the selection process to the OIG. 

Sampson said the White House asked for recommendations from political 

leaders in the various districts for candidates to fill the U.S. Attorney positions. 

The recommendations generally were submitted by U.S. Senators of the: 

President's party to Sampson or to staff in the White House Office of ]Political 
Affairs (OPA). If no Republican Senator represented a pa-rticular judicial 

district, Sampson or OPA staff contacted whoever OPA designated as the 

"political lead" for that district. Sampson said the White House generally 

sought three names for each U.S. Attorney vacancy, although it did not always 

receive three. 

Sampson said the White House forwarded potential U.S. Attorne:~ 

candidates to the Executive Office for United States Attorney (EOUSA) in the 

DOJ, with a request that each person be sent an online application form and 

be scheduled for a panel interview. According to Associate Deputy Attorney 

General David Margolis, who participated in the U.S. Attorney selectio~i 

process, Sampson's request to EOUSA to send the application to an individual 

meant that the person had been "named as a candidate" by the White ]House. 

The candidates identified in this fashion would be interviewed by a parkel that 

normally consisted of Sampson; Margolis; David Higbee, Deputy Associate 

Attorney General and the DOJ liaison to the White House; the Director of 

EOUSA; and Christopher Bartolomucci of the White House Counsel's office. 

Sampson described the interview as similar to a regular job interview, with part 

of the interview focused on whether the candidate had any issues that might 

arise during the background investigation. After the interviews, the :lpanelists 

would rank the candidates in order of preference. According to Sampson, if 

there was.only a single candidate, the panel would determine whether the 

person "me[t] the bar," meaning that the candidate met the minimum level of 

qualifications for the position of U. S. Attorney. 

According to Sampson, the panell usually developed a consensus 

regarding the strongest candidate. After the panel agreed on a candidate, the 

panel would seek concurrence from the Deputy Attorney General and the 

Attorney General. If they concurred with the panel's recommendation, 

Sampson would seek approval for the nomination from the White House 

Counsel. Sampson stated that he could not recall any occasion when the 

Deputy Attorney General, Attorney General, and White House Counsel did not 

concur with the panel's recommendation for a U.S. Attorney. 

Sampson said that after the White House Counsel approved a 

nomination for U.S. Attorney, Sampson would send an e-mail to EOUSA asking 

it to prepare the paperwork regarding the candidate for inclusion in a binder 

submitted to the President containing names of candidates being recommended 

for appointments as federal judges, U. S. Attorneys, and U. S. Marshals. 

Sampson said he would then discuss the U.S. Attorney candidate 

recommendations with the President. Tf the President agreed with the 

recommendation, Sampson would inform EOUSA that the President had 

expressed his "intent to nominate" the candidate pending the successfill 

completion of the background investigation process. However, the "intent to 

nominate" would not be publicly announced until after the backgrou:ncl 
investigation process was completed and the candidate's background 

investigation was "cleared" by the White House Counsel, as described below. 

C. The Background Investigation and C:onfirmation 

After receivin.g notification that the President: intended to nomina~te a 

candidate, EOUSA would ask the candidate to complete the background 

investigation forms. The background investigation and confirmation portions 

of the process were overseen by EOUSA and the DOJ Office of Legal 

Policy (OLP) . 

Upon receiving the completed background forms frlom the candidbate, 

DOJ would request that the FBI initiate the background investigation. 

Background investigations for U.S. Attorneys included interviews of at least six 

federal, state, and local judges; three attorneys who are associates of the 

candidate; three opposing attorneys; six representatives from federal, state, 

and local government prosecutors' offices; and senators of the state where the 

candidate would serve. According to Higbee, the FBI generally s0ugh.t to 

complete the background investigations within two months. Upon its 

completion, EOUSA would review the FBI background investigation anti 

prepare a memorandum for Higbee summarizing the results and attaching 

interview summaries and other material from the background investigaltion file. 

Higbee said he would review the memorandum and, if issues arose in the 

background investigation, discuss them with Margolis. Higbee woulcl then 

forward the memorandum to Sampson at the White House. 

According to Sampson, many background investigation memoranda 

stated that there were no issues with the candidate. Sampson told the OIG 

that in such cases ithe White House Couiisel's office would state that th~e 

candidate was "cleared." If the candidate had issues, Sampson said he would 

review the memorandum (and sometimes the file as well) before forwarding the 

memorandum to the Deputy White House Counsel, who would make the 

determination whether to clear the candidate. If the Deputy White House 

Counsel cleared the candidate, the White House informed EOUSA, and EOUSA 

sent nomination paperwork to the White House. The White House would then 

publicly announce the nomination or the President's "intent to nominate" the 

candidate and the White House would forward nomination paperwork to the 

Senate? 

Witnesses told the OIG that if the Senate was in session when the candidate was 

cleared and the White Ilouse received the nomination paperwork, then the nomination would 

be sent to the Senate and the White House press office would issue a release stating, "Today 

the President nominates" the candidate. If the Senate was out of session and not receiving 

nominations, or if the nominations paperwork was in progress but not quite ready, the White 

House would issue a press release stating the President "intends to nominate" the candidate, 

and the nomination papers would be sent to the Senate at a later date. 
While the amount of time varied with each candidate, the time from 

selection and the beginning of the background investigation to the President's 

public announcement of his intent to nominate could be substantial. 

111. FACTUAL CI:3RON(SLOGY RELASTED TO BLACK'S IPLLEGAT1O:NS. 

Guam and the Northern Mariana~s, which have a combined total 

population of approximately 250,000 people, are islands in the North Pacific 

Ocean located about three-quarters of the way from Hawaii to the Philippines. 

Guam is an unincorporated Territory of the United States, and the Northern 

Marianas is a Comimonwealth in political union with the United States., 

The USAO in Guam is both the smallest of the 93 U.S. Attorney's Offices 

and the one farthest from the mainland United States? I[t has a stafT of 

approximately 12 Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA). 

From 199 1 until 2003, Fred Black served as the interim U.S. Aktorney for 

Guam and CNMI. Black started his legal career in 1975 as a Public ]Defender 

in Guam and became an AUSA there in 1978. In 1981, he moved to Oregon 

and worked as the Deputy Federal Defender, then returned as an AUSA in the 

Guam USAO in 1984 to lead a federal public corruption investigation^. In 1989, 

Black became the First Assistant U.S. Attorney in Guam. In August 199 1, 

after the U.S. Attorney resigned, Black was appointed interim U.S. Attorney for 

Guam and CNMI and served in that capacity until replaced by Rapadlas in May 

2003. According to Black, his major prosecutorial focus in Guam wats public 

corruption cases. 

A. Potential Nominees from 169 1-2000 

Between 199 1 and 200 1, DOJ made repeated attempts to find a suitable 

candidate for the President to nominate as U.S. Attorney for Gum. Several 

DOJ officials told the OIG that, due to Guam's small population and remote 

location, it was difficult to find qualified candidates. The DOJ official 

responsible for handling U.S. Attorney nominations from June 1993 to January 

2001, Bernie Delia, told the OIG that the White House and DOJ made repeated 

attempts to find a candidate for the position. He said he could recall at least 

four potential nominees the White House suggested to DOJ who did not make 

it through the vetting process. 

3 The time difference between Guam and Washington, D.C., is 14 hours. 
Delia stated it was standard procedure for the person acting as the 

interim U.S. Attorney to be interviewed about potential nominees for that 

district. Delia said that in each instance, when the White House suggested a 

possible candidate for Guam, Black raised objections. In one or two instances, 

Black sent lengthy written objections stating why he believed the potential 

nominee was not suitable. Delia stated that Black's objections generally were 

based on the potential candidate's coninections to family members who were 

suspected of corruption. Delia said that in at least two of these cases, DOJ did 

not proceed with the potential nominee for reasons other than the objections 

Black raised. He also said that in no case were Black's concerns the sole 

reason for the decision not to proceed with a potential nominee. 

According to Margolis, who has been involved in the U.S. Attorney 

selection process for Guam since 1993, Black remained interim U.S. Attorney 

for over 11 years in part because it took that long to find a political appointee, 

since Black raised concerns about anyone who was considered as a candidate. 

Margolis told the OIG that after several failed attempts to appoint potential 

nominees suggested by the White House, DOJ officials sought a potential 

nominee from within the DOJ. He said that DOJ recruited a former 'U.S. 

Attorney from the mainland United States, but he declined to pursue the 

nomination after visiting Guam. In addition, DOJ recruited an official from the 

Deputy Attorney General's Office to be interim U.S. Attorney in place of Black, 

but the appointment process bogged down because of a disagreement between 

Margolis and the Chief Judge who held the appointment authority. According 

to Margolis, during the time he has been involved in the selection process the 

White House never named Black as a candidate and he was never considered 

for the Presidential appointment. 

Sampson told the OIG that once President Bush was inaugurated in 

200 1 there was a general decision to replace Clinton-era U.S. Attorneys and 

that the Bush Administration wanted to "get a fresh team in." Sampson said 

he was aware that all the territories had U.S. Attorneys who were "acti~~g." 

Sampson said, "In my mind, as the person who was running the se1ect:ion of 

U.S. Attorneys, I never considered Black a candidate. By virtue of the fact that 

he had been there 12 years . . . he was not going to be a candidate." Tlie fact 

that Black had been appointed interim U.S. Attorney by George H.W. Bush, as 

opposed to President Clinton, "didn't make a difference," according to 

Sampson. Although Sampson did not have a specific recollection of the 

conversation, he said he thought he an.d Margolis had a discussion to t.he effect 

that Black had been the acting U.S. Attorney for 12 years and the Bush 

Administration wanted to put its own team in office. 

Black told the OIG that he initially did not ta.ke any steps to become a 

Presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney because he was happy doing the: job as 

the interim U.S. Attorney and there was not any competition for the position. 

He also stated that he did not take immediate steps to obtain a Presidential 
appointment because "the kind of people that recommend the U.S. Attorney 

position are the very people we are investigating." In addition, Black stated 

that he was "getting the pay" and "doing the work" so he would rather not 

become the Presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney, given that "when the 

President leaves, you're out." He said that once others started expressing an 

interest in the position, however, he "tried to throw his hat in the ring." Black 

also told the OIG that once, in approximately 1993, he was considered for 

Presidential appointment as U.S. Attorney or for a federal judicial appointment 

on Guam (he could not recall which). He stated that he never learned -why his 

interview did not lead to a nomination. 

B. Rapadasps Name is Submitted to the White House and 

Forwa:rded to EOUSA 

In May 2003, Leonardo Rapadas was sworn in as the U.S. Attorney in 

Guam, replacing Black. Rapadas had worked for the Office of the Attoirney 

General of Guam from August 1989 until 2003. During his 13 years at the 

Attorney General's Office, Rapadas served as the head of the Violent Crime Unit 

for 18 months and as Chief Prosecutor for 3 years, in addition to working as a 

line attorney. 

We sought to determine how Rapadas came to be recommended to the 

White House as a candidate for the position of U.S. Attorney for Guam. 

Rapadas told the OIG that the Speaker of the Guam Legislature, Antonio 

Unpingco, first contacted him to discuss the U.S. Attorney position in the 

summer of 200 1. Unpingco told the OIG that after President George W. Bush 

was elected, he thought it would be a good time to recommend someone for the 

U.S. Attorney position. At the time, Unpingco was the highest ranking 

Republican in Guam because the Governor, Carl Gutierrez, was a Democrat. 

Unpingco also noted that there had never been someone from Guam who 

served as U.S. Attorney, and Black had been in the position for the "longest 

time." 

Unpingco stated that it was his idea to ask Rapadas to become a 

candidate for the U.S. Attorney position. Unpingco said he had known 

Rapadas since childhood. Unpingco stated that he approached Rapadas 

because he knew Rapadas was a successful prosecutor with the Attorney 

General's office who had handled high-profile prosecutions and was winning a 

lot of cases. Unpingco said that the fact that Rapadas was "local" was idso a 

factor. 

Unpingco told the OIG that when he asked if Rapadas was interested in 

pursuing the U.S. Attorney position, Rapadas said he was. Unpingco said he 

recalls telling Rapadas that he would have to be "Mr. Clean" because the FBI 

would do a background investigation. Unpingco said he told Rapadas that if he 
had any "dirty linen" he should let Unpingco know right away. Unpingco 

stated that Rapadas did not disclose to him any information of that na.ture. 

Unpingco stated that he did not ask Rapada-s any specific policy 

questions while discussing the U.S. Attorney position. He said he did not 

discuss with Rapadas issues relating to the application of federal immigration 

law in CNMI or a jurisdictional dispute between the Guam Superior and 

Supreme courts. Rapadas also stated that he did not discuss public 

corruption matters or immigration policy issues with Unpingco. In atddition, 

Rapadas told the OIG that he had never heard the name Jack Abramoff until 

Black later brought it up to Rapadas during a meeting shortly after Rapadas 

was confirmed as the U.S. Attorney in 2003. 

Unpingco stated that he concluded that Rapadas was the caliber of 

someone he could recommend, so he wrote a letter to the White House 

recommending him. Unpingco also told Rapadas that if he was interested in 

pursuing the position, he should contact David Sablan, the Guam Republican 

Party Chairman. lJnpingco stated that the only other action he took in 

connection with this nomination was that he contacted Sablan to recommend 

Rapadas. 

Unpingco said he did not recommend Rapadas in order to influe:nce any 

public corruption case Black was pursuing or to reduce public corruption 

prosecutions on Guam. Unpingco said that Black is a friend of his, but he did 

not know what investigations Black was conducting at that time. 

Unpingco said he was not contacted by anyone in Rapadas's family or by 

Abramoff about filling the U.S. Attorney position. Unpingco told the OIG that 

he has never had any dealings with Abramoff and has never been cointacted by 

Abramoff about anything. He said he would not recognize Abramoff artd does 

not think he has ever spoken to him or met him. The OIG's review of 

documents did not reveal any indication that Abramoff was in contact with 

Unpingco. 

Guam Republican Party Chairman David Sablan told the OIG that he 

looked to Unpingco for a recommendation for the U.S. Attorney appointment 

because Unpingco was the highest-ranking Republican official on Guam at that 

time. Sablan said he also sought the assistance of Fred Radewegan, a political 

consultant who lives in the Washington, D.C. area.4 After Unpingco 

In 1982, Radlewegan founded Pacific Islands Washington Clffice, Inc., a Waslhington, 

D.C-area governmental relations firm that specializes in strategic planning, international 

relations, and political affairs. Sablan told the OIG that when he was elected chair. of the Guam 

Republican Party in 200 1, Radewegan reachedl out to him and offered his assistanice in helping 

Sablan understand the national political system. Sablan said he accepted the offer. He told 

the OIG that Radewegan gave him guidance on Republican National Committee mattlers he was 

(continued) 
recommended Rapadas, Sablan spoke with Rapadas. Rapadas stated 1:hht he 

could not recall any discussion with Sablan about any in.dividua1 case, how 

Rapadas would handle any specific type of case, or Rapadas's views on 

immigration policy. Sablan subsequently forwarded his name to Radle~vegan. 

Sablan and Radewegan also received the concurrence of Republican Pa~rty 

officials in the CNMI and American Samoa regarding Rapadas.5 Radewegan ' 

then forwarded Rapadas's name to the White House as a candidate for the U.S. 

Attorney position. 

Sablan and Radewegan said that. they had no contact with Abramoff 

about this nomination and that they were not aware that Abramoff played any 

role in the nomination. In addition, the OIG's review of dlocuments did not 

reveal any indication that Sablan or Radewegan had contact with Abramoff 

regarding this matter? 

We also sought to determine what happened with t.he U.S. Attorney 

recommendation once it reached the White House. We determined that, at the 

time, White House Office of Political Affairs (OPA) staff member Leonard 

Rodriguez was assigned to handle appointment issues involving the t.erritories, 

including the Guann U. S. Attorney's position. Rodriguez said that because 

there are no U.S. Senators for Guam, it was unclear who would suggest 

potential nominees. He said he discussed the nomination with people -who 

were "trusted sources" regarding Guam, including Sablan and Radewegan. 

Rodriguez received an e-mail from Radewegan on December 1 1, 200 1, 

recommending Rapadas as the candidate for U. S. Attorney.7 Rodriguez said 

that he forwarded the e-mail the same day to Sampson, the White Hou:se 

Associate Director for Presidential Personnel. E-mail records show that 

Sampson received the e-mail and forwarded it to EOUSA, also on December 11. 

handling in his positiorl as Guam Republican Party chairman, and gave him information about 

how to make recomme~~dations for federal positions. 

5 Sablan statedl that one of the things t.hat Radewegan advised him was that a oneperson recommendation does not carry enough clout, so Sablan might want to submiit 

recommendations for federal appointments that have the backing of several Republican Party 

officials in the CNMI and American Samoa, which would carry more weight. 

ti Radewegan also said he did not have any contact with White House advisor Karl Rove 

in connection with this matter. Radewegan stated that his involvement in the nomination was 

limited to his discussions with Sablan and the submission of Rapadas's name to the 'White 

House, as described above. 

7 The e-mail states, "Here is another copy of the resume of Leonardo Rapactas, the 

candidate of the Republican and Bus[iness] leadership on Guam for U.S. Attorney for 

Guam/CNMI, which has the full backing of the parties in CNMI and American Sarr~oa~. 

Originally transmitted to Clay Johnson's shop [the White House Personnel Office] hy .Amata 

[Radewegan's wife] on Sept. 12 but no acknowledgement ever was received." 
EOUSA subsequently sent the online application to Rapadas, who completed 

the application on December 17, 200 1. 

When we asked Rodriguez why Rapadas was recommended to the White 

House by Guam officials and why he forwarded the name: to EOUSA as a 

candidate, Rodriguez said he could not specifically recall the discussions he 

had with the people he consulted about the nomination, but that in general the 

discussions concerined whether a candidate would fall in line with the 

President's philosophy. Rodriguez stated'that Rapadas was viewed as someone 

who would be strong on law enforcement. Rodriguez said that he was not 

aware at the time of any allegations about Abramoffs relationship with the 

government of Guam, and that he did not recall any disciussion of a Gu.am or 

CNMI security report during the process of soliciting recommendations for a 

U.S. Attorney candidate for Guam. 

Rodriguez denied that Abramoff or the CNMI immigration issue played 

any role in his decision to forward Rapadas's name to EOUSA as a candidate 

for the U.S. Attorney position. However, Rodriguez told the OIG that he kept 

Abramoff aware of information relevant. to Guam, including potential nominees 

for the U.S. Attorney position. Rodriguez said he did so at the behest of Ken 

Mehlman, the White House Political Director, who "recommended or suggested 

that I reach out to ]make Jack aware" of issues related to Guam. 

Rodriguez estimated that he exchanged a total of five e-mails with 

Abramoff regarding Guam. Rodriguez said he recalled sending one e--mdl to 

Abrarnoff stating that Rodriguez would be the point person on the U.S. 

Attorney nomination and if Abramoff had any issues or concerns that tie 

should bring those to Rodriguez's attention. However, Rodriguez statecl that 

Abramoff did not supply any candidate names or provide him with any input 

into the Guam U.S. Attorney nomination. Rodriguez said he does not recall 

Abramoff ever contacting him regarding the U. S. Attorney position. Rodriguez 

stated that when he contacted Abramoff, it was generally to pass on 

information relevant to Guam, such as the name or names of people under 

consideration for U.S. Attorney, although not all the e-mails he sent t:o 

Abramoff related to the U.S. Attorney position. Rodriguez said that the 

communications with Abramoff about Guam issues was one-sided. Rodriguez 

description of these communications was confirmed by our review of Abramoffs 

e-mails? 

Abramoffs e-mails show that Rodriguez's earliest e-mail co:mmunication with him 

about any positions in Guam occurred well after Rodriguez received .Rapadas's narrie and the 

White House had named Rapadas as a candidate to EOUSA. On October 23,2002, Rodriguez 

sent an e-mail to Abramoff, with a copy to Ken Mehlman, in which Rodriguez stateti that he 

had tried to reach Abramoff by telephone to introduce himself. Rodriguez also stated that he 

oversaw the U.S. territories for OPA and invited Abramoff to "feel free to contact me directly for 

any requests from Guam." The OIG found only one e-mail, dated November 19, 2002, between 

(continued) 
C. Int~rdiew Panel's Decision to Propose Rapbadas for Nolmination 

DOJ records reflect that the DOJ panel interviewed Rapadas on 

December 18, 200 1, one week after Sampson sent his name to EOUSA as a 

candidate for the Guam U.S. Attorney's position. These records also show that 

DOJ seriously considered one other candidate for the Guam position, an 

Assistant United States Attorney who had worked in Hawaii. That prosecutor 

was interviewed by the panel on January 15, 2002. However, according to 

Sampson, the prosecutor declined to pursue the position after the interview. 

The interview panel for Rapadas consisted of Sampson, Margolis, Higbee, 

Bartolomucci, and Ken Wainstein, then the Director of EOUSA. The 0I:G 

interviewed all of these panel members. Although they said they could not 

recall the specific details of the interview, all stated that they did not remember 

any discussion regarding Abramoff or a security report when considerirlg 

Rapadas's candidacy. 

In addition, although Black did not make his allegations against 

Abramoff until November 2002, and the CNMI security report was not issued 

until May 2002, both well after the panel interview, we asked the interviewers 

whether Rapadas's position on public c:orruption prosecutions or the 

applicability of immigration law to Guam and the CNMI played any role: in his 

selection. They all said they did not recall any discussion of either issue during 

the interview or subsequent discussions. The panel members all denied 

selecting Rapadas in order to diminish public corruption prosecutions (or to 

affect federal immigration policy in Guam or the CNMI. 

Although the interviewers could not recall their specific discussions 

about Rapadas's qualifications after his interview, they told the OIG that they 

believed they developed a consensus that Rapadas "met the bar" and that it 

would be appropriate to propose him for nomination. 

We also sought to determine whether Abramoff had any role in this part 

of the selection process, and found that he did not. We asked the interviewing 

officials whether Abramoff contacted them about the nomination, ant1 none 

recalled any contac:t with Abramoff about the nomination^. Higbee told the OIG 

that Abramoff did not contact him in connection with the Rapadas nomination. 

Wainstein stated that he sometimes received calls from people outside DOJ 

recommending a particular candidate, but that he had no recollectio~l of any 

- - 

Rodriguez and Abrarnoff regarding the Rapadas nomination. As described below, ckn 

November 19, 2002, the White House publicly announced the President's intent to nominate 

Rapadas as U.S. Attoniey for Guam. In a November 19 e-mail to Abrarnoff, Rodriguez 

inaccurately stated tha.t the President would "nominate Leonardo Rapadas for U.S. Marshal in 

Guam today" (the nomination was for the U.S. Attorney position, not U.S. Marshal). 
such call from Abramoff. Margolis said that Abramoff never contacted him. 

Sampson said he h~ad no recollection of being contacted by anyone outside the 

government or of anyone mentioning Abramoff in connection with the 

nomination. Margolis, Higbee, Wainstein, and Sampson added that Abramoffs 

name would not have meant anything to them at the time. Bartolomucci said 

he had trouble recollecting the Rapadas interview and told us that he may have 

interviewed as many as 100 U.S. Attorney and U.S. Marshal candidates. 

However, he said he did not recollect any contact from Abramoff about 

Rapadas. 

In addition, all of the interviewers said they did not recall being contacted 

by anyone outside government regarding the selection. Higbee added t.hat 

there was not really a "push" for Rapadas from anyone. He said that when 

Rapadas's name came in, the candidate went through the normal selec:tion 

process. 

D. The President's Decision to Nominate Rapadas 

The interviewers told us they had no specific recollection of any 

subsequent discussions about the nomination with the Deputy Attorney 

General, the Attorney General, or the White House. However, Sampson said 

that he believes the normal procedures were followed in this case - that is, 

after the interview panel had agreed to propose Rapadas, the interview panel 

obtained concurrence from the Deputy Attorney ~kneral and the Attorney 

General? 

9 Black has also cited press reports which state that Abramoff sent an e-mail to a client ' 

in the CNMI in October 200 1 in which he discussed his concerns about a federal takeover of 

immigration law in CNIMI, and in which he claimed to have access to Attorney General Ashcroft 

and his Chief of Staff, David Ayres. Black speculated that Abramoff or his colleagues may have 

asked Ayres or Ashcroft to take action against Black. 

However, Abrannoff denied taking any actions to have Black replaced until February 

2002, as discussed in Section 1II.F of this report, and Abramoff stated that the contacts with 

DOJ officials related to Black that took place at that time were undertaken by his collleagues, 

not by him personally. In addition, other OIG interviews did not revleal any effort by ;my 

Abramoff associate to cliscuss the Rapadas nomination with Ayres or Ashcroft. Moreover, we 

did not find any indication in the documents we reviewed that Ashcroft took any action in 

connection with the Rapadas nomination, beyond approving the nomination. 

Moreover, we found no evidence to indicate that Ayres was involved in any decision 

regarding the Guam U.S. Attorney nomination. Ayres told the OIG that he sometimes 

participated in meetings at which the Deputy Attorney General and others discussed progress 

on U.S. Attorney nominations, and Ayres said that these meetings constituted his onlly 

involvement in the U.S. Attorney selection process. However, Ayres stated that the only 

memory he had in connection with the Guam U.S. Attorney riominat.ion was that it w<as 

"difficult finding" nominees for the islands outside the continental United States - U.S. Virgin 

Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam. He said he thought these nominations were completed 

towards the end of the U.S. Attorney selections due to the difficulties finding nomi11ee:s for the 

islands. Ayres also said that he did not recall either Abramoff or aqr of his colleaguers 

(continued) 
Sampson said that he believes that after the Deputy Attorney General 

and Attorney General concurred, he then obtained approval for the R!apadas 

nomination from the White House Counsel, pursuant to the normal pri3ctice.lo 

Sampson said he believes he then asked EOUSA to prepare paperwork 

consisting of a one--page data sheet, a resume, and a picture of the candidate. 

Sampson said he believes he presented1 Rapadas's candidacy to the President, 

and the President approved the nomination, pending successful completion of a 

. background investigation. 

E-mail records provided to the OIG by Rapadas suggest that thiose who 

submitted Rapadas's name to the White House were kept apprised of the 

progress on his nomination. An e-mail. Sablan sent to Rapadas on February 6, 

2002, stated that "word has come back that so far the background 

investigation on you is going along fine."" On February 17, 2002, Sablan 

wrote an e-mail to JRodriguez and Mehlrnan stating that Radewegan had 

informed him that Rapadas "got the nold from all concerned." 

Other documbents reflect that the White House approved the nom.ination 

of Rapadas, pending the successful completion of the background investigation 

process, on March 8, 200'2. On March 11, 2002, EOUSA sent the background 

investigation forms to Rapadas. 

E. Black Requests the Presidential Appointment 

During this process, Black expressed interest in being considered for the 

U.S. Attorney's position. On November 21, 2001, he wrote to Sablan aslung to 

be considered for the position. Sablan told the OIG'that he let Black know that 

the Republican Party leaders of Guam had already decided to submit: 

Rapadas's name. However, Sablan also stated that he told Black tha.t, if 

Rapadas was unsuccessful in getting the nomination and being confirmed, 

Sablan would have tried to pursue the nomination for Black. 

attempting to contact him in connection with the removal of Black or the selection of Rapadas. 

Similarly, no other witrlesses we interviewed recalled any discussions with Ayres, Attorney 

General Ashcroft, or the Deputy Attorney General relating to Rapadas. 

lo As noted above, Sampson stated tha.t he could not recall any occasion when the 

Deputy Attorney General, Attorney General, and White House Counsel did not conrcur with the 

interview panel's reconlmendation for a U. S. Attorney candidate. 

l1 Sablan told the OIG that his reference to "background investigation" in this e-mail 

was a reference to the general vetting process, rather than the portion of the process in which 

the FBI conducts interviews for a formal background investigation. As discussed i:n section H, 

it was not until June 3, 2002, that DOJ and the White House Counsel's office requested the 

FBI to begin its backpound investigation work on the Rapadas nomination. 
On January 16, 2002, Margolis sent Black an e-mail stating that DOJ 

was considering two "very serious candidates" for the Guam U.S. Atborney 

position. Margolis told the OIG that he wanted to find out early on what 

Black's position would be with respect to the potential candidates, given 

Black's repeated, strong opposition to previous candidates. Margolis stated in 

the e-mail to Black that the two candidlates were Rapadas and a prosec:utor 

from Hawaii (who slubsequently withdrew his name from consideration for the 

position). Black responded to Margolis that Rapadas was "unsuitable* and that 

he had had only limited contact with the other candidate. Black also a.ttached 

to his response a letter dated January 7, 2002. In the letter, which was 

addressed to the Attorney General, Black asserted that "the local power 

brokers" had propolsed Rapadas in an "attempt to neutralize" the U.S. 

Attorney's office regarding public corruption matters. He raised conc:erns 

about Rapadas's family connections and raised the likelihood of a recusal of 

Rapadas or the entire office from a major corruption investigation if Hapadas 

was appointed. Black also stated that the Guam Attorney General's Office, 

where Rapadas worked, had "impeded federal investigations." 

In a second letter, dated January 17, 2002, which was also addressed to 

the Attorney General, Black stated that he was a Republ.ican Party mlernber 

and "would like to iapply to be the Presidentially appointed United States 

Attorney" for Guam and the CNMI. 

Margolis told the OIG that DOJ did not take action on Black's request to 

be considered as the U.S. Attorney because it was not the manner in which 

candidates for the U.S. Attorney position entered the selection process. As 

noted above, candidates for political appointments were determined by the 

White House, not tlhe DOJ. DOJ's role was to participate in interviews and the 

decision as to whether or not a candidate put forward by the White H[ouse was 

qualified and likely to successfully complete the background investigat:ion 

process. 

The DOJ did not provide a written response to Black's January 17 letter. 

Rather, according to DOJ records, the matter was "handled via telephone" by 

an EOUSA official. 

On Novembeir 8, 2002, the Governor-elect of Guam., Felix Camaclho, 

wrote to the White House to seek the President's "favorable consideraltion in 

continuing the appointment of Attorney Fred Black for the position ol United 

States Attorney for Guam and the Northern Marianas." However, as noted 

above, at this point. Rapadas had already been selected as the nominee. 
F. Abram,offs Invo~ement with the Guam U.S. Attorney 

Nomination 

We also attempted to determine independently, through interviews with 

Abramoff and review of his e-mails, whether he was involved with any attempt 

to influence the nomination for the Guam U.S. Attorney position. We 

determined that by the time Abramoff became involved in trying to irlfliuence 

the nomination, Ra~padas had already been selected. Then, when Abramoff was 

informed of the White House's decision., he attempted to take credit wiih his 

Guam contacts for the selection of Rapadas, even though he played no role in 

it. 

Abramoff had represented the CNMI government since 1995 and worked 

to prevent federal immigration and minimum wage laws from being aplplied in 

the CNMI.12 Abrannoff told the OIG, and documents confirm, that prior to 2002 

Abramoff was aware that Black, as the interim U.S. Attorney for Gua~m. and the 

CNMI, took the position that federal immigration law should apply in the CNMI. 

However, Abrarnoff told us that he did not recall attempting to influence who 

held the position of U.S. Attorney in Guam prior to 2002, and we found no 

evidence to the cor~trary. 13 

Abramoff told the OIG that he recalled becoming involved in attempts to 

influence the Guarn U.S. Attorney nomination beginning in February 2002. At 

that time, Abramoff was pursuing a $1.3 million contract with the govc:rnment 

of Guam to represent its interests, including attempting to increase airplane 

flights to and from Guam. As part of his efforts to obtain the contract, 

Abramoff met with the Democratic Governor of Guam, Carl Gutierrez, at a 

dinner in Washington, D.C. Abramoff, who had previously worked on behalf of 

Gutierrez's Republican opponents, said he was aware at that time that. 

Gutierrez wanted Black removed from his position in part because of an 

ongoing corruption investigation B1ack:'s office was pursuing into the activities 

l2 Abramoff told the OIG that one of his primary strategies in representing the CNMI 

involved bringing members of Congress and Congressional staff on trips to the CNMI. Abramoff 

stated that he wanted them to see first-hand the island and its businesses, and in. p;xticular 

the conditions of those working on CNMI. He stated that these trips were successful. in helping 

to prevent Congress from imposing federal im~nigration laws or the federal minimum wage on 

CNMI. 

'3 Abramoff told the OIG that, in connection with this work on the CNMI niiruimum 

wage issue, he had talcen some action that could have affected the jurisdiction of 1:hr: U.S. 

Attorney in Guam. Hr: said that in 1998 he learned that money had been appropriated by 

Congress to fund an office that would handle complaints from garm.ent workers on C:NMI. 

Abramoff said he opposed this appropriation as harmful to the economy in the CN'MI. 

Abramoff said that because it was too late in the appropriations process to remdve tlie funds 

from the bill, he sougl-it to have them designat.ed instead for a separate U.S. Attoriiejr for the 

CNMI, a position that did not exist. However, that legislation was never enacted. 
of certain members of the Gutierrez administration. Abramoff told us that, at 

the dinner, Gutierrez mentioned a letter he had written many years earlier on 

Black's behalf in which he had stated that Black was a "good Democrai:." 

Gutierrez and Abramoff discussed using this letter to assist in removing Black 

from his position. 

Abramoffs e-mails confirm that in late February 2002 he became 

involved on Gutierrez's behalf in a plan to oust Black from the interim 'U.S. 

Attorney position. According to the e-mails, on February 25, 2002, A,bramoff 

obtained the Gutiel-rez letter, which was addressed to President Clinton and 

dated January 12, 1995. In the letter, Gutierrez had referred to Black as a 

good Democrat andl recommended that he be "re-appointed" to the position of 

U.S. Attorney for Guam.14 

Upon receiving the letter, Abramoff sent it by e-mail to four members of 

his lobbying team at the Greenberg Traurig law firm who handled Guam and 

CNMI issues: Mich~ael Williams, Tony Rudy, Kevin Ring, and Todd Boulanger. 

Abramoff stated in the e-mail that Black was a "total commie and has been 

bashing the CNMI non-stop in the past. . . . We need to get this guy sniped out 

of there." In subsequent e-mails, Abramoffs collea-gues ciiscussed using the 

Gutierrez letter to "stop [Black's] nomination." On February 26, 2002, Williams 

sent Abramoff an e-mail stating that Rudy was ready to speak to the White 

House about "killing the US Attorney candidate [Black]," but that Willlkuns 

thought they should be prepared to suggest a good. Republican alternaltive. 

Abramoff told the 016 that it took some time for Williams to obtain the 

name of a candidate who was favored by both Gutierrez and Abramoffs main 

contact on Guam, Guam Democratic Senator Mark Charfouros.15 Abramoffs 

e-mails reflect that by March 4, 2002, Williams had learned that Gutiejrrez and 

Charfouros favored. an attorney from the Washington, D.C. law firm Patton, 

Boggs for the Guann U.S. Attorney position. Abrarnoff told the OIG that the 

attorney had worked with Gutierrez's son-in-law on a business matter. 

On March 4, 2002, Williams reported to Abramoff in an e-mail that he 

had spoken with the attorney and the attorney was on the candidate lilst but 

l4 Black told tl-ie OIG that Gutierrez previously had shown him such a letter, possibly 

in 1995. Black stated that he did not request the letter from Gutienrez, and did not know if it 

was ever sent to the White House. Black stated that he believed the letter was an ,attempt by 

Gutierrez to curry favor with him due to his palsition as interim U.S. Attorney. 

15 We found one January 2001 e-mail from Charfouros to Abramoff stating that 

Governor Guiterrez would be unofficially "funneling" his candidates for U.S. Attorney and 

judiciary appointments through Abramoffs office. However, Abramoff s February 2002 e-mails 

were the earliest we found indicating that Abramoff or his colleagues took any action in 

connection with the U.S. Attorney position. 
had yet to be interviewed. However, the OIG found no record this attorney's 

name was forwarded to EOUSA as a candidate and there is no record that he 

was ever interviewed for the position. 

On March 6, 2002, Williams sent a follow-up e-mail to Ring and Rudy 

stating that he needed them to "talk with the political folks" at DOJ anfd the 

White House to make sure that Black was ousted as soon as possible a~nd to 

push the Patton, Boggs attorney for the position. Williams wrote that Black 

was "an enemy of the Governor" and was using his office to "harass" Gutierrez. 

Williams also wrote that Gutierrez and Charfouros favored the Patton, Boggs 

attorney for the position, and that "the other two" candidates were Rapadas 

and an Assistant U.S. Attorney from Hawaii. In the e-mail, Williams laid out 

arguments in favor of the Patton, Boggs attorney, including that he could 

"clean up the corrulption in Guam and return respect to the Guam U.S. 

Attorney's office." Williams reminded Ring and Rudy to provide a copy of the 

Gutierrez letter to I30 J officials. 

Ring responded in an e-mail on March 6, 2002, to Abramoff, Williams, 

Rudy, and Boulanger: "Just to be clear, we are lobbying in favor of the: 

Dem[ocratic] Gov[ernor]'s choice against the White House's and local GOP's 

pick?" Abramoff responded, "We are opposed to Black. He has been screwing 

us for years on the CNMI, so this is good payback. I don't care if they appoint 

bozo the clown, we need to get rid of Fred Black." 

Yet, as described above, unbeknownst to Abramoff and his colleagues, by 

this time the White House had already made the decision to nominate 

Rapadas. On Marc:h 8, the same day EOUSA was informed by the White House 

that the President had made the decision to nominate Rapadas, Williams sent 

an e-mail to Abramoff reporting that he had just learned about Rapadas's 

nomination from Rudy, who had spoken to Carl Thorson, then Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General in the DOJ Office of Legislative Affairs. Williams 

stated that although the "good news" was that Black would be out soon, the 

"bad news" was that the Patton, Boggs attorney did not make the final cut. 

Williams said that Thorson told Rudy that Rapadas was "the pick" and that 

unless something came up in the completion of his background check, he 

would be formally nominated. In addition, Williams stated that Thorson said 

they were "too late" to affect the process. 

In response to Williams's March 8 e-mail, Abramoff instructed W'illiams 

to tell their c0ntact.s in Guam the "good news" that "Black is gone." He told 

Williams that he should "play it" as though Black had been under 

consideration for the position but their lobbying efforts had "lulled" Rlack's 

nomination. Abrarnoff also told Williams he should say that Black andl 

Rapadas had been the final two candidlates when they "killed Black," s(o 

Rapadas would probably get the nomination. Abramoff added in the e--mail 
that they should tell them that the Patton, Boggs attorney was "out of the 

process already. Spin spin spin." 

Abramoff told the OIG that he did not recall taking any further action l:o 

influence the selection of the U.S. Attorney for Guam because they u.nderstood 

that the process had concluded.16 Abramoff told us that he did not provide any 

direct input to Rodriguez, the White House, or DOJ regarding the USA-Guam 

position. However, he said another associate might know more about any work 

done on his behalf in connection with Rapadas's nomina-tion. The OIGr 

contacted that person, and was able to corroborate the description given by 

Abramoff of his firm's failed attempt to influence the U. S. Attorney nomination. 

Neither Abramoff nor any other witness interviewed by the OIG recalled any 

efforts to affect the Guam U.S. Attorney nomination prior to February 2002, 

and the OIG has not found evidence to suggest that they made any other 

efforts. 

In sum, the (OIG has not uncovered any evidence to suggest th.at. 

Abramoff or his colleagues had any knowledge of or involvement in the 

Rapadas nomination until after February 2002, by which time it was too late to 

affect the selection. 

O. May 2003 Security Report 

Black also alleged that he may have been replaced as interim U.S. 

Attorney in order to prevent the implementation of a recommendation 

contained in a May 2002 security report regarding the applicability of federal 

immigration law to the CNMI, which Black supported and Abrarnoff opposed. 

In this section of the report, we address the question of whether Black was 

replaced in order to prevent implementation of this recornmendati~n..l:~ 

l6 However, Abramoff and Williams continued to track the nomination of Rapadas'as it 

proceeded through the confirmation process. In addition, in one e-mail to a Senate staffer in 

April 2003, Williams offered to provide the Gutierrez letter about Black to the staffer. Another 

e-mail reflects that Williams was told on May 7, 2003, by his congressional contacts that 

Rapadas was on the Judiciary committee docket the next day and was expected to be "reported 

favorably" by the com~mittee. Williams told Abramoff that he would inform Gutienrez's 

son-in-law of the development. On May 9, after the full Senate voted to confirm Rapladas, 

Williams e-mailed the news to the Governor's son-in-law and asked that the Governor be 

notified. 

l7 In addition, Black has alleged that the security report was improperly leaked to 

Abrarnoff, that the author of the report (Meissner) was re-assigned :in retaliation for his work on 

the report, and that the contents of the report were suppressed because of Abramoff7s 

opposition and influence- As noted above, in early spring 2004 the DOJ opened a.n 

investigation into Abr'moff s lobbying activities. Charges filed in that investigation confirm 

that the investigation eventually led to other related inquiries regarding Abramoff, including his 

activities in the CNMI. We have referred to the FBI and the Department of Interior OIG the 

allegations of unauthorized disclosure of this report to Abramoff and other relatedl matters, 

(continued) 
The CNMI security report was written in early 2002 by Robert Meissner, 

a DOJ Regional Sec:urity Specialist who advised the Guam U.S. Attorney's 

Office regarding building security and other security-related issues.18 I:n 

February 200 1 ,. Black wrote to EOUSA requesting i3 "security assistance visit" 

due to a recent security incident and other threats to his district. 

On May 6, 2002, Meissner sent a letter to Black attaching a 34--page 

report summarking the results of his security review. In the report, Meissner 

wrote that the federal government did not maintain control of customs and 

immigration on Guam and the CNMI. He stated that the lack of such control, 

"coupled with a long history of deliberate territorial indifference to corrective 

action," fostered "criminal activity and public corruption . . ." Meissrie~r also 

stated that a complete, in-depth review of policies concerning the relationships 

between the U.S., Guam, and the CNMI governments was urgently needed. 

Meissner's report made 28 recommendations covering a broad ralnge of 

issues, including extending federal control over im:migrat,ion in the CNEVII, 

increasing federal jurisdiction over customs on Guam and the CNMI, 

establishing effective Coast Guard patrol and interdiction capability, creating a 

multi-use federal compound that meets specific security requirements, 

establishing an on--island detachment of the Department of Homeland Security, 

opening U.S. Customs and Internal Revenue Service offices in the CNNII, 

expanding "passenger verification" by Customs officers, and other major 

security initiatives. 

Abramoffs e--mail records indicate that by late June 2002 he bad 

obtained a copy of the report from an official at the Department of the 

Interior.19 However, as described above, by the time Abramoff received the 

report he had already been told that a decision had been made to replace Black 

as U.S. Attorney. 

On July 11, 2002, Black wrote to the Deputy Attorney General. stating 

that he was "recently informed" of congressional interest in the Meissner 

report. Black stated that he recently provided the report to the Department of 

including whether any government officials took actions at Abramoffs behest in connection 

with that report or whether Abramoff had an impact on the handling of the May 28012 security 

report by government (officials. 

l8 Regional Secxrity Specialists are EOUSA employees who evaluate and integrate 

information security, communications security, physical security and personnel security 

programs at U.S. Attorney's offices. 

19 As noted above, we have referred issues relating to the urlauthorized disclosure of 

the report to the FBI and the Department of Interior OIG. 
Justice and Department of the Interior (DOI). He summarized the issues in the 

report that he believed should be addressed, and he requested working-level 

meetings to address short- and long-term solutions to th.e security i., sues . 

DOJ records reflect that in August and September 2002 EOUSA 

attempted to determine what actions had been taken on the recommertdations, 

and the director of EOUSA met with DO1 officials to discuss the report. 

Abramoffs e-mails reflect that in September 2002, he received ain e-mail 

from a DO1 official stating that Meissner's report, which the official noted had 

been requested by Black, was being used to promote the application of' federal 

immigration law in the CNMI. The e-mail also mentioned that Black would be 

traveling to Washington, D.C., in October 2002 to promote the expansi.on of 

federal immigration law to CNMI. Abramoff sent an e-mail to a Greenberg 

Traurig colleague on September 6, 2002, stating that they would have to 

"activate" on the CNMI very soon. Abramoff also told the colleague in t:he 

e-mail that he would be "leading the charge" to "assault" Black in the press, 

and that Black was a "villain" who was hated by "our Guam friend" Charfouros. 

In a separate e-mail that same day, Abrarnoff stated, "r~e have to ma~ke sure 

this Black guy is s~neared into the ground." In response, the colleague stated 

that he would get someone on it right away. 

However, while it is evident that Abramoff was angry about the CNMI 

security report and wanted to attack Black because of it, we found that neither 

the report nor Abramoff affected the selection of Rapadas as Guam U.S. 

Attorney, an issue that had been determined months earlier. 

H. Rapadasps Background Investigation 

On May 2, 2002, Rapadas sent a. letter to EOUSA enclosing a copy of the 

forms he had been asked to complete in connection with his backgroul;d 

investigation. On June 3, 2002, the DOJ and the White House Counsel's office 

both sent paperwork to the FBI requesting that the background investigation 

be initiated. Because of Black's allegations that the Rapadas background 

investigation was insufficient, we examined the background investigation 

process in detail. 

FBI records reflect that Rapadas's initial FBI interview took place on 

June 18, 2002. The FBI interviewed Black in connection with the Rapadas 

background investigation on June 22, 2002. In the interview, Black provided 

his assessment of liapadas's qualifications. According to FBI records, Black 

stated that if the issue does not involve local politics, then Rapadas can be fair. 

However, Black said that politics in Guam is controlled by essentially :I 

criminal enterprise. He said that the Guam Attorney General's Office is the 

facilitator for much of the procurement fraud on the island, which makes 

Rapadas a witness to almost all public corruption cases being investigated. 
Black said that the appointment of Rapadas would hinder the only "effi:ctiven 

prosecutors on Guam, namely the federal prosecut.ors. 

Black also provided a harsh assessment of Rapadas's legal and personal 

qualifications. He described Rapadas as "lazy and incom.petent," laclti~lg 

integrity, of "weak character" and "not to be trusted." He asserted that 

Rapadas was "easily influenced by local political forces." Black also idleged to 

the FBI that Rapadas had "very close ties" with Tommy Tanaka, the subject of 

an ongoing public corruption investigation by the Guam USAO. Black stated 

that he thought Tanaka had used his political influence to get Rapadas the 

nomination so that Tanaka's criminal matter would "disappear."20 Black stated 

that he had never watched Rapadas try a case and had never read any of 

Rapadas's legal submissions, although he stated that Rapadas had "won cases" 

in the local Guam courts. 

As mentioned previously, DOJ policy requires that U.S. Attorney or highlevel DOJ candidate background investigations must include interviews of at 

least six federal, state, and local judges; three associate attorneys; three 

opposing attorneys; six representatives from federal, state, and local 

government prosecutors' offices; and U.S. Senators of the state where the 

candidate will serve. By August 28, 2002, the FBI had completed most of this 

background investigation work, and on that date, the FBI's Office of Special 

Investigations and General Backgrountl Unit (SIGBU), the unit responsible for 

coordinating FBI background investigations, sent a memorandum to DOJ 

enclosing the partial results of the background investigation on Rapadas. 

The FBI's August 28 memorandum summarized the "derogatory" 

information revealed by the investigation up to that point. The memorandum 

noted that, as Black had said, Rapadas's uncle Tommy Tanaka was one of the 

subjects of a broad public corruption investigation by the Guam USAOYs office. 

The memorandum also stated that the FBI intended to conduct furth~erinterviews in connection with an allegation relating to Rapadas's personal 

conduct, the alleged conflict of interest involving Tanaka, and an allegation 

that Rapadas knew of alleged "cover-ups" at the Guam Attorney General's office 

related to Tanaka and Gutierrez. 

On September 20, 2002, the FBI field office in Honolulu, which handled 

part of the background investigation, sent a memorandum to SIGBU describing 

the interviews of Rapadas's co-workers and other investigative steps taken to 

resolve the outstan.ding issues. The memorandum. stated that the investigation 

had concluded that the allegations regarding Rapadas's personal conduct 

"could not be used to coerce" Rapadas. The FBI's memoranda of witness 

20 During the course of our investigation we found no evidence that Tanakia vvas 

involved in the Rapadas nomination. 
interviews reflect that agents interviewed all the relevant parties relaited to the 

personal conduct allegation, including those identified as likely witnesses, and 

were unable to corroborate the allegations. The memorandum also sltated that 

the FBI's investigat.ion revealed no evidence that Rapadas was involved in the 

public corruption allegations related to Tanaka. After receiving this 

information from the Honolulu field office, SIGBU forwarded the information to 

the DOJ and closed the background investigation. 

On September 24, 2002, EOUSA submitted a memorandum to DlOJ 

White House Liaison Higbee summarizing the Rapadas background 

investigation. The memorandum stated that all the law enforcement agencies 

recommended appointment, flagged the derogatory information contained in 

the background investigation, and summarized other results of the 

investigation. 

In his interview with the OIG, Higbee said that he would describe the 

background investigation as "marginal" from a clearance standpoint, meaning 

that it raised some issues of concern. However, Higbee stated that he thought 

it contained nothing that precluded the Rapadas nomination from going 

forward. All the law enforcement agencies recommended. appointment,, which 

Higbee said he viewed as very important. With respect to Rapadas's 

professional qualifications, Higbee told the OIG that one way of addressing any 

concerns about a U.S. Attorney's abilities was to require that EOUSA a.ppoint a 

strong First Assistant United States Attorney (FAUSA) for the office. Similarly, 

Sampson told the OIG that nothing in the September 24, 2002, summiq of the 

background investigation would have led Sampson to conclude that Rsipadas 

should not be nominated. 

DOJ records reflect that on November 12, 2002, DOJ or White House 

staff requested addlitional information regarding Rapadas's personal finances, 

including one closed bank account and the status of a rn-ortgage. Th.e 

background investigation was re-opened by the FBI and Rapadas and the FBI 

provided the necessary information to address those questions by 

November 15, 2002. That information was forwarded to the White House by 

DOJ that same day and the FBI then closed the background investigation for 

the second time. 

On November 19, 2002, the White House issued a press release 

announcing the Priesident's intent to nominate Rapadas as U.S. Attorney. 

However, after the President's announcement, Black continued to 

express concerns a~bout Rapadas. For example, on November 19, 2002, Black 

sent an e-mail to EiOUSA stating that he received the "unexpected" message 

that Rapadas would be nominated. In the e-mail, Black stated that Ratpadas 

had a conflict of interest with regard to his uncle, Tanaka. In response to these 

concerns, the FBI again re-opened the background investigation. During 
another interview with the FBI on December 17, 2002, Black stated that 

Gutierrez attempted to corruptly influence Rapadas by asking one of Rapadas's 

relatives to speak to Rapadas about the public corruption case involving the 

Gutierrez Administration. That same day, Black sent an e-mail to Margolis 

noting that Congress had adjourned without acting on the nomination and 

requesting that the President be informed of Black's objections to Rapaldas's 

nomination. On January 7, 2003, Black sent another letter to the Attorney 

General regarding Rapadas's selection of the U.S. Attorney for Guam. In the 

letter, Black outlined his reasons why :Rapadas was not the best candidate for 

the position, including Black's c0ncern.s about Rapadas's competence, conflicts 

of interest, and additional allegations a~bout Rapadas's personal conduct.21 

On January 9, 2003, the FBI field office forwarded the summary of the 

December 17, 2002, interview of Black to SIGBU, and SIGBU closed the 

background investigation for the third time. However, that same day the FBI 

received a memorandum from DOJ stating that Black had reported that 

another individual had something to add to Rapadas's background 

investigation. Based on this memorandum and additional information about 

individuals who might have pertinent information, on January 13, 2002, the 

FBI re-opened the Rapadas background investigation again. 

After conducting further interviews, the FBI agent assigned to this matter 

stated in an e-mail that "there are no new revelations which have not allready 

been addressed. Just new people repeating the same old rumors." The 

background investigation was closed for the fourth. and final time on 

January 22, 2003. 

Rapadas was re-nominated on January 28, 2003 (shortly after a new 

Congressional session began). In March 2003, the Senate Judiciary Committee 

requested a letter from Rapadas outlining how he would deal with the conflict 

of interest issue raised in his background investigation. In April 2003, 

Rapadas and Margolis each sent a letter to the Judiciary Committee discussing 

the conflict issue and the plan to recuse Rapadas from certain investigations if 

Rapadas was confirmed. 

On May 9, 2003, the Senate voted to confirm Rapa.das, and he was sworn 

in as U.S. Attorney on May 23, 2003. 

21 Black sent a second, similar, letter t.o the Attorney General on March 28, 2'003. 

26 
I. Black's Allegations Regarding Abramoffs Relationship with the 

Superior Court of Guam 

Black has also alleged that he was replaced ias U.S. Attorney for Guam in 

retaliation for allegations he raised to the DOJ regarding lobbying fees 

Abramoff received from the Superior Court of Guam. In addition, Black made 

more general allegations that he was replaced as the interim U.S. Attorney to 

prevent a full investigation of these and other public corruption matters in 

Guam and the CNMI. In this section, we discuss in more detail the allegations 

Black raised about the lobbying fees and the DOJ7s investigation of tholse 

allegations. 

Black first brought allegations regarding Abramoff to the attention of 

DOJ officials in November 2002, as Rapadas was undergoing final review by 

DOJ and White House officials. On November 1, 2002, Black sent an €:-mail to 

DOJ Public Integrity Section Chief Noel Hillman and other DOJ officials, 

including Associatr: Deputy Attorney General Margolis, requesting su~pport from 

the Public Integrity Section regarding an investigation of Alberto Lammol-ena, the 

Presiding Judge of the Superior Court of Guam. Black attached documents 

which he alleged demonstrated that Lamorena was involved in a $500,000 

'smurfing" scheme with Abramoff. Black alleged the scheme involved a series 

of payments from the Superior Court of Guam to attorney Howard Hiills in 

$9,000 increments? Black also stated that Lamorena was one of several local 

judges who sat on the federal bench when Guam's sole federal district court 

judge, John Unpingco (Antonio Unpingco's relative), was off the island. 

Black stated in the November 1 e-mail that legislation pending in the 

U.S. Congress would place the Supreme Court of Guam in charge of the entire 

court system in Gulam, including the Superior Court. He stated that the bill 

had "bipartisan support" but that due to Abramoff's influence, it was never 

voted on. Black all.eged that the press spokesman for the Superior Court first 

denied knowing about payments to Abramoff, then said that the money was 

used to hire Hills, who then hired Abramoff.23 Black also said that although 

the press spokesman claimed that Hills and Abramoff worked to obtain 

$9 million in federal grants for the Superior Court, Abrarnoff said he received 

$400,000 to lobby against the bill that would have placed the Supreme Court 

22 "Smurfingn is a slang term for making a series of small transactions to escape the 

regulatory notice a single larger transaction might attract. Investigators call "hopping from 

bank to bank" with cash amounts just under the $10,000 limit "smurfing" after the c:hildrenJs 

cartoon in which little blue characters hop around. 

23 Abramoff told the OIG that in the spring of 2002, after a Congressional hearing was 

scheduled on the Guam court legislation, he was contacted by Hills, met with Hills aind Judge 

Lamorena, and agreed to lobby against the bill. Larnorena had testified at the hearing in 

opposition to the bill. 
of Guam in charge of the Superior Court. Black said he did not know whether 

federal funds were used to hire Abramoff. 

Black also alleged in the e-mail that Abramoff worked for Governor 

Gutierrez. Black said his office had "major corruption in.vestigations" ongoing 

regarding certain Gutierrez Administration officials, including one that was 

linked legislatively to a bil that kept the Superior Court of Guam in charge of 

its own administrative affairs. In the e-mail, Black also mentioned other 

corruption cases ongoing in his office. 

Margolis said that after he received the November 1, 2002, e-mail from 

Black, he contacted Hillman to ensure that Black would get the support from 

the Public Integrity Section that Black requested. Margolis also forwarded the 

e-mail to the section's Principal Deputy Chief, Stuart Goldberg, who handled 

allegations related to federal judges. Willman told us that he discussed the 

matter with Goldberg, who had spoken with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Guam 

in the past. Goldberg told the OIG that Margolis was concerned there might be 

a recusal issue since Black's e-mail suggested that Lamorena might be called 

to sit on federal cases while the investigation of his conduct was pending. 

According to Goldberg, on several occasions Black contacted him, 

Hillman, or others to seek help from the Public 1nt.egrity Section. Goldberg told 

the OIG that it was often hard to determine whether Black wanted help with a 

specific case or help with general corruption problems in Guam. ~old.ber~ said 

Black often mentioned pieces of different cases in the same conversattion and it 

was hard for a Guam outsider to see tlie connection between the cas,ez;. 

Goldberg said that Black's allegations were very general and broad, which 

made it hard for Goldberg to figure out what assistance to provide. Goldberg 

stated that the Public Integrity Section is a small section with limited resources 

and that he needed specific details in order to decide when and what help to 

send. Nevertheless, Goldberg said that on two previous occasions the Public 

Integrity Section had sent experienced trial attorneys to meet with the 

prosecutors and agents in Guam to help assess the public corruption situation 

and to provide advice about how to deal with it. 

Goldberg said that in this instance he first tried to answer Margolis's 

question regarding the recusal issue. Goldberg told the OIG that he spoke with 

Joseph Wilson, who was then the Criminal Chief of the Guam USAOl. Their 

conversation took place on November 14, 2002, according to Goldberg's 

contemporaneous notes. Goldberg and Wilson decided that the Gua.m USA0 

could avoid using Lamorena for federal matters while the investigation. was 

pending. Goldberg sent Margolis an e-mail the next day informing hlinl of this 

decision. 

Goldberg and Wilson also talked about the "smurfing" a1legation.s raised 

by Black. Goldberg described the conversation with Wilson as a brainstorming 
session. Goldberg said he did not think the facts described by Black 

constituted a "smurfingn scheme because all the money was going into one 

account and consequently there was a paper trail. He said he thouglht there 

might be an administrative procurement violation if the person writing the 

checks was authorized only to sign checks under $10,000 and was structuring 

the payments to avoid the procurement regulations. Goldberg said h~e also told 

Wilson that Wilson should try to figure out what funds were being expended to 

determine if there was a federal crime. He said he and Wilson discussed a 

possible violation of 18 U.S.C. 5 666, which applies to funds stolen or rnisused 

from a program receiving federal funds. Goldberg told the OIG that he believed 

at the time that the participants may have been trying to avoid some kind of 

Guam procurement regulation rather than a federal statute.24 

In an e-mail to Margolis the next day, Goldberg said that the G.um 

USAO would do some preliminary investigation regarding the Superior Court 

checks. Goldberg added, "If it appears there is some there there, they will 

contact us, and we will get actively involved at that point. I made clear, 

however, we were available to consult at any time on the prelim. or any other 

matter . . . . 

n 

Documents reflect that the Guam USAO began looking into the: 

allegations and took investigative steps to gather relevant information. 

As part of the OIG's investigation, we requested that the Guam USAO 

and the FBI produce any documents obtained in connection with the 

investigation into this allegation. However, the USAO and the FBI tolld the OIG 

that they were unable to locate any responsive document:s.25 

24 A December 2005 audit of these payments by the Office of the Public Auditor of 

Guam found that the Superior Court used monies from its local "general fund" appropriation to 

pay the lobbying fees for Hills. The audit found that the Guam judicial procuremeint 

regulations did not provide guidelines for the procurement of' professional services, making 

such procurements discretionary, and it recommended that the rules be changed to ensure 

competitive procurement for all supplies and services. See www.guamopa.com, audit. entitled 

"Superior Court of Guam Judicial Building Fund Performance Audit October 1, 1999 through 

September 30, 2004 013A Report No. 05-08" at pages 20, 27-28. 

25 The Guam USAO reported that copies of the documents received in conn.ection with 

this matter were not retained by the USAO-Guam. 

The FBI office in Guam said it was unable to provide any documents reflecting any 

investigation into this rnatter for the period 1999 through 2004. The FBI also searched its 

electronic database for any references to the relevant parties, such as the Superior Court of 

Guam, Howard Hills, and Alberto Lamorena. FBI employees also memually searched the 

general public corruption case file for Guam open at that time. In addition to searching the 

main investigative file, the FBI searched the subfiles, which vvere created to store investigative 

efforts regarding particular individuals such as the Governor's associates. Nothing was found 

through any of these searches. 
An April 2003 e-mail from Black to Hillman reflects that the Guam USAO 

and the FBI did not continue to investigate the Superior Court checks 

allegation. At the time he wrote the April 2003 e-mail, Black was stil.1 serving 

as interim U. S. Attorney pending Rapadas's Senate confirmation. In the 

e-mail, Black stated, "Supposedly, the money was used to lobby against the 

planned bill to place Guam's Supreme Court in control over the lesser Superior 

Court. This mattes is on the back burner for now." Black also described in the 

e-mail other USAO and FBI investigative priorities that prevented the FBI from 

focusing on this matter. 

We asked Wilson why the investigation into the Superior Court checks 

was put on the "back burner," as characterized by Black. Wilson stated that at 

the time the Guam Public Corruption Task Force was investigating al1e:gations 

of corruption by certain officials within the Gutierrez Adrninistration.26 The 

investigation included allegations regarding Tommy Tanaka and Gutiel-reds 

chief of staff, Gil Shinohara. 

Wilson told the OIG that he tried to find out something about thi: 

"smurfing" allegations without straying too far from the rnain focus of t:he 

Gutierrez Administration investigation. Wilson said that Black generally 

wanted more to be done about the srnurfing allegation and appeared to believe 

that there was something to the allegations. However, Wilson said that he and 

Goldberg did not want to pursue this matter further because of the press of 

cases regarding the Gutierrez Administration and concerns about a 1ac:k of 

federal nexus or readily apparent federal felony offense. 

Black told the OIG that at the time he did not press for additional 

investigation into the matter because he did not want to get "sidetracked" on a 

case that was a misdemeanor. However, he said that he wanted to cortduct 

some investigation so that information relevant to these allegations would be 

available at some point in the future. 

All of the witnesses we interviewed about the matter told us they could 

not recall any conrlection between the allegations regarding Abramof'f's 

involvement with the Superior Court payments and the nomination of Rapadas. 

For example, Margolis said that at the time Black initially made his allegations 

about the smurfing scheme, the name Abramoff "meant nothing" to him. 

Similarly, Goldberg told the OIG that before receiving a copy of Black's 

26 According to Black, the task force, which was created in the early 1980':s to combat 

public corruption in Guam, was comprised of a variety of federal law enforcement agencies. 

The FBI was the lead agency, and the U.S. Attorney's office participated as well. At various 

times, DOI, the IRS, and Federal Emergency Management Agency personnel participated in the 

task force. 
November 1, 2002, e-mail to Hillman, he was not aware of any public: 

corruption issue concerning Abramoff and the Superior Court of Gua.m, and 

Goldberg said he had not yet heard of Abram0ff.2~ 

Moreover, Wilson told the OIG that he does not believe that the: 

announcement of the Rapadas appointment had any impact on the 

investigation of the smurfing allegations. Wilson said that after the Rapadas 

appointment, the Guam investigative team continued to be focused on the case 

against certain Gutierrez Administration officials and others connected to 

Gutierrez, including Tanaka. The Gutierrez Administration investigation 

ultimately led to the Shinohara's conviction for conspiracy, bank fraud, and 

money laundering, and Tanaka's conviction for misprision of a felony. 

Margolis and other officials involved with the selection process also told 

the OIG that the tirning of the November 19, 2002, public announcement of 

Rapadas's nomination was determined by the completion of the background 

investigation, not by any allegations Black raised involving Abramoff. 

J. Discussions of Interim Appointment and Recusal 

Soon after the President's intent to nominate Rapadas was announced in 

November 2002, DOJ officials discussed whether Rapadas should be appointed 

as interim U.S. Attorney. As noted above, interim appointments by the 

Attorney General expire after 120 days. At that time, if the person had not 

been confirmed by the Senate, the local federal court could appoint someone to 

serve in an interim capacity. 

DOJ decided not to appoint Rapadas as interim U.S. Attorney. Margolis 

stated that on a prior occasion the Guam District Judge had declined to 

appoint someone to be interim U.S. Attorney in place of Black. In addition, 

Margolis said that he planned to pursue a recusal of Rapadas from the 

investigation concerning Tanaka because of Black's allegation that Rapladas's 

relationship to Tanaka created a conflict of interest. Margolis said th.at. for 

these reasons Rapadas was not given an interim appointment. 

During the early part of December 2002, DOJ officials discussed the 

potential need to have Rapadas recused from the Tanaka. investigatioln. On 

December 3, 2002, Margolis, the DOJ's deciding official on conflict mat-ters, 

sent an e-mail with.in DOJ discussing t:he potential recusal issue. In addition, 

27 Goldberg stated that although he knew Black was serving as the interim U.S. 

Attorney, he was not aware that DOJ was selecting a Presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney for 

Guam. Goldberg also told the OIG that he learned about Black's concerns regardiing Rapadas's 

nomination when he received an e-mail from Black objecting to the nomination, after Rapadas 

was nominated. 
Margolis sought Black's input in these discussions. For example, on 

December 12, 2002, Margolis sent an e-mail to Black asking if the Tanaka 

portion of the investigation could be severdd from the rest of the case so that 

Rapadas could be recused from that portion rather than the whole case. In a 

December 3, 2002, e-mail to other DOJr officials about the recusal, Margolis 

stated that he wanted to make sure that the overall investigation did not suffer 

and the office did not make any prosecutorial decision regarding Rapadlas's 

uncle. 

In a memorandum he sent to Margolis on December 23, Black described 

the Guam USAO's ongoing public corruption investigations in detail, including 

alleged connections between Rapadas and persons within the scope of the 

investigations. In his memorandum, Black recommended that control (of the 

entire Gutierrez Administration investigation go to Public Integrity, but that 

Guam prosecutors remain on the case. He also rec:ommended that R.apadas be 

recused and a "Chinese wall" be put in place so that Rapadas would not receive 

any information ablout or have any supervisory con.trol over the investigation. 

Public Integrity Section Deputy Chief Goldberg stated that he concurred with 

this resolution of the conflict. Margolis approved the recusal. 

In March 2003, as a result of sonne of these concerns, the Sena~te 

Judiciary Committee requested a letter from Rapadas outlining how he would 

deal with the conflict of interest issues. Rapadas provided the letter on April 7. 

Later that month, Margolis also wrote a letter to the committee addressing the 

conflict question. 

As noted above, on May 9, 2003, the Senate voted to confirm Rapadas's 

nomination, and he was sworn in as U.S. Attorney on May 22, 2003. Since 

then, he has been recused from cases involving Tanaka olr the investigs~tion 

involving the Gutie~rrez Administration. 

K. Effect of Rapadas's Appointment on Public Corruption Cases 

in the District of Guam 

Black also alleged that Rapadas imd First Assistant United States 

Attorney Russell Stoddard were selected to end Bla.ck's pursuit of pulbljc 

corruption cases in Guam and the CNMI. Black stated that after Rapadas was 

appointed and Stoddard arrived on Guam, Black was removed from handling 

public corruption cases. 28 

28 Black also raised concerns about the manner in which Stoddard has bee:n paid for 

his "temporary duty assignmentn in Guam over- the last three years. In addition, Black said 

that Stoddard has not managed the office well, causing several qualified attorneys to leave. 

These allegations are discussed in the next section of this report. 
Black claimed that, as a result of these actions, the investigation into 

certain officials in Governor Gutierrez's Administration and other pulbljc 

corruption matters have not been pursued to the d.egree they should hiave. 

Black said that yearly statistics reflect that public corruption prosecuti.ons are 

declining on Guam. Black also asserted to the OIG that "Prior to May of 2003 

we had five attorneys working public corruption in Guam. Now we have only 

one." In addition, Black has asserted that there have been "no new c:omption 

investigations in three years." 

The OIG examined Black's allegations that Rapadas and Stoddard were 

selected in order to curtail the Guam USAO's pursuit of public corrupt:ion 

cases. We found no evidence to support this assertion. 

First, as noted above, we did not find any evidence that the individuals in 

the Rapadas selection process discussed Rapadas's views on or intentions 

relating to public corruption matters during that process. Second, Stoddard's 

selection was handled by EOUSA and Rapadas. Margolis told the OIG that 

given Black's reluctance to relinquish his position to the new U.S. Attorney, 

and given Margolis's assessment that Rapadas was competent but not 

exceptional, Margo'lis believed that a top-notch First Assistant United States 

Attorney would be needed in Guam. He said he asked EOUSA to find one for 

Guam. The Director of EOUSA suggested two people to Rapadas, and Rapadas 

told the OIG that he ultimately selected one of the recommended candidates, 

Stoddard, an AUSA from the U.S. Attorney's office for the Middle District of 

Florida. Stoddard is a career prosecutor with no significant prior ties to Guam. 

During our investigation, we found no evidence that Stoddard was selected 

based on any particular views he held regarding public corruption cams. 

The OIG also examined Black's allegations regarding a reduction in 

public corruption investigations by the Guam USAO after Rapadas because 

U.S. Attorney. 

First, USAO statistics provided by Guam to the Public Integrity Section 

do not demonstrate that during the time that Rapadas has served as the Guam 

U.S. Attorney and Stoddard has served. as First Assistant they failed to pursue 
public corruption nnatters.29 While the number of public corruption 

convictions for 2004 (9) reflect a reduction from 2003 (16), the numbers for 

2004 are significantly higher than the number of convictions by the Guam U.S. 

Attorney's office in 1995 (1) through 1999 (7), a time when Black was the U.S. 

Attorney. While the numbers are highest between 2000 (19 cases) to 2003 

(16 cases), Goldberg explained that it may take 2 to 3 years to bring a case to 

fruition, so the number of convictions can vary dramatically from year to year. 

He stated that he would become concerned only if he saw no cases, or (only a 

few, for several years. Goldberg stated that since former Guam USAO criminal 

chief Wilson left Guam in 2005, Goldberg has had no direct contact with the 

USAO so he is not aware of the specific cases they are pursuing. He said, 

however, that the change from 16 to 9 cases would not cause him conc:ern that 

there was a lack of focus or willingness to investigate public corruption. cases 

in Guam. 

Second, we found that after Rapadas was appointed, the USA0 

continued to pursu.e the investigation into the Gutierrez Administration under 

the direction of Public Integrity Section Chief Hillman, who acted as U.S. 

Attorney for Guam due to Rapadas's recusal from the case. As previously 

mentioned, those investigations resulted in the conviction of both Shinlohara 

and Tanaka in 2003. 

Third, the FBI Special Agent who has led the public corruption task force 

on Guam since 1999 told the OIG that the U.S. Attorney's office on Gt~am has 

not shifted its focus away from public corruption matters since Rapadais's 

appointment. He said that the only major change that occurred when Rapadas 

was appointed was that there was increased paperwork for Wilson due to the 

involvement of the Public Integrity Section in Washington, D.C. However, he 

said he does not believe anything else changed in the way of investigative 

priorities. He said that while the number cases have gone down, that is due to 

29 The Public Integrity Section's annual Report to Congress cln its Activities and 

Operations for 2004 shows the following number of Guam putblic cornption convictions (by 

year) : 

YEAR 

1995 

1996 

1997 

1998 

1999 

2000 

2001 

2002 

2003 

2004 

Number of 

Convictions 

1 

3 

7 

6 

7 

19 

19 

13 

16 

9 
the normal "cycle" of cases. The Special Agent stated that the task force 

focused its energy on the Gutierrez Administration cases, and had now reached 

the end of that road so it was necessary to build up some new cases. 

The FBI Special Agent also provided several reasons why the conviction 

rate had declined that had nothing to do with Black. For example, he noted 

that the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of the 

Interior no longer have agents assigned to the task force, which means that the 

FBI and Internal Revenue Service agents must handle all investigations. He 

also stated that when there was a change in the gubernatorial administration 

on Guam, the number of public corruption referrals went down. 

The FBI Special Agent told the OIG that the appointment of Rapadas has 

not had any effect on the pursuit of public corruption matters. He told the OIG 

that Stoddard is the individual with the authority t;o approve or decliine new 

public corruption matters, and Stoddard has never said "no" to a pul~lic 

corruption matter brought to him by the task force. The FBI Special Agent said 

he believes the U.S. Attorney's office has re-opened some old public c:or*ruption 

matters and has also opened some new ones. He also stated that he believes 

Stoddard is trying to open more public corruption matters. The Spec:ial Agent 

added that while he believes that Black: was a "valuable" part of the task force 

team, he also believes Black wanted to keep the job of U.S. Attorney and is now 

"flinging mud" at those in charge of the office. 

Fourth, Stoddard denies refocusing resources away from public 

corruption, as alleged by Black. Stoddard stated that public corruption is still 

the "most significant thing we do" and is the type of case that has the "greatest 

impact" on the District. He told the OIG that during the first year and a half he 

served as First AUSA in Guam, public corruption resources were focused 

primarily on the Gutierrez Administration cases. Given that two of the trials in 

that investigation took place in San Francisco, the task force was unable 

during that time to focus on other matters. 

Stoddard denied that the Guam USA0 has only one person assigned to 

public corruption matters on a full-time basis, as alleged by Black. He stated 

that all three attorneys assigned to the Saipan office work on public corruption 

cases full time, that another AUSA in the Guam office spends over half his time 

on public corruption, and that the other public corruption cases are spread out 

among some of the remaining attorneys. In addition, Stoddard stated that he 

expects a new Criminal Chief will be hired soon to replace Wilson, which will 

increase the number of attorneys available to handle public corruption matters. 

Stoddard stated that he believes the U.S. Attorneys office in Guam has 

opened a total of 29 matters involving public corruption since Rapadas's 
appointment.30 Stoddard told the OIG that he has never "turned down" a 

public corruption matter "brought to the door." He stated that he has held 

meetings with law enforcement officials to try to increase the number olf public 

corruption matters they pursue. Similar to the FBI Special Agent, he noted 

that there has been a reduction in the number of investigative agents assigned 

to the task force. 

Stoddard told the OIG that his decision to remove 13lack from the task 

force was based on his belief that Black's lack of focus was not helpful to other 

task force members. Stoddard told the OIG that this re-assignment wais made 

in order to improve the functioning of the task force, not to hamper its progress 

on the Gutierrez Administration investigations. Stoddarcl stated that prior to 

his arrival in Guam he was not directed by anyone as to how he should nun the 

office. He stated th.at he believes, based on his discussions with others on the 

task force, that he ]made the right decision about Black's involvement on the 

task force. 

In sum, our interviews and review of documents did not reveal evidence 

that would support a conclusion that Rapadas or Stoddard were selected in 

order to diminish public corruption prosecutions on Guam. 

L. Wegations Involving the First Assistant U.8. Attorney for 

Guam 

Black has also raised questions about the propriety of Stoddard's per 

diem arrangement. He also alleged that Stoddard has mismanaged the office, 

including by causing talented public corruption prosecutors to leave the Guam 

USAO, further diminishing the office's ability to pursue public corruptic~n 

cases. Documents relating to Stoddard's per diem arrangement reflect that 

DOJ continued to pay Stoddard's meals and incidental expenses during the 

second year of his assignment. This practice was contrary to EOUSA general 

policy to pay meals and incidental expenses for temporary assignments for one 

year, absent specific justification. However, when the error was discovered at 

the end of the second year of Stoddard's assignment, EOUSA notified the U.S. 

Attorney's Office in Guam. Rapadas provided a letter requesting that EOUSA 

continue to pay for Stoddard's meals and incidental expenses for a third year, 

and EOUSA agreed.. The request letter did not contain a specific justification 

for those payments. 

While paying per diem for more than a year is not unprecedented in the 

DOJ, we have referred the issue of Stoddard's per diem to EOUSA for its review 

and appropriate act-ion. While we did not conduct a formal audit of all EOUSA 

30 Stoddard stated that some of the matters to which :he referred involve public 

corruption but may not be categorized as such in EOUSA's computer database. 
payments to Stoddard, we did not find other evidence of errors or 

overpayments in th.e paperwork we reviewed. We also referred Black's more 

general allegation that Stoddard has mismanaged the office to EOUSA for its 

review. 

IV. OIG ANALYSLIS 

A. Alleged Connection Between Rapadas's Selection andl Ellack's 

Allegations to DOJ Officials about Abramoff 

We found no evidence to support a conclusion that the selection of 

Rapadas to be the lJnited States Attorney for the District of Guam and CNMI 

was the result of any retaliation against Black for raising allegations ag,ainst 

Abramoff. 

First, our review of how Rapadas's name was recommended to the White 

House revealed no involvement by Abratmoff, and we found no evidence that the 

individuals who recommended Rapadas to the White House did so to prevent 

any investigation of Abramoff. Moreover, when Rapadas .was interviewed by the 

DOJ interview panel, it determined in December 2001 that Rapadas wa~s 

qualified. Sampson stated that he could not recall any occasion when the 

Deputy Attorney General, Attorney Gen.era1, and White House Counsel did not 

concur with the panel's recommendation for a U.S. Attorney. Thus, it appears 

for practical purposes the decision to select Rapadas was made by the 

interview panel prior to February 2002. In addition, the President ha.d decided 

to nominate Rapadas, pending the completion of a background invesltigation, 

on March 8, 2002, well before Black raised any allegations about Abramoff to 

the DOJ. 

The OIG's investigation revealed that Black first raised his allegations to 

DOJ officials regarding payments by the Superior Court of Guam to Hills and 

Abramoff by e-mail to Public Integrity Slection Chief Hillman dated November 1, 

2002. Although the Rapadas nomination was not publicly announced until 

November 19, 2002, we found no evidence to suggest that Black's e-mail 

affected the nominattion or the public announcement of the nomination. 

Rather, the timing of the nomination was determined by the completi~onl of the 

FBI background investigation and the review of that investigation by DOJ 

officials. 

We also found that in response to Black's e-mail requesting assistance 

with regard to a pot.ential investigation related to Abramolf, DOJ provided the 

assistance that Black requested. In his November 1, 2002, e-mail describing 

the "smurfing" allegation involving Abratmoff, Black requested support from the 

DOJ Public Integrity Section. Specifically, Black requested that Hillman 

"designate an attorney we can consult with" and suggested that Guam 
Criminal Chief Wilson would be an appropriate contact person for the matter. 

Contemporaneous notes reflect that as a result of Black's request, Publlic 

Integrity Deputy Chief Stuart Goldberg consulted with Wilson. Goldberg told 

the OIG that as a result of Black's e-mail he suggested that the Guam USAO 

conduct further investigation and contact him again if there was somle "there 

there." Wilson confirmed that the Guam USAO conducted further investigation 

and then decided not to pursue the ma.tter for reasons having nothing to do 

with Rapadas or Abramoff. 

We found that the allegations of improper payments by the Superior 

Court of Guam to Hills and Abrarnoff were not pursued in late 2002 and early 

2003 for two main reasons. First, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Guam was at 

that time focusing on other pressing matters involving the Administration of 

Governor Gutierrez. Indeed, Black himself wrote to Public Integrity Section 

Chief Hillman in April 2003 and stated that because of other investigative 

priorities, the question of the $9,000 checks to Hills was on the "back burner." 

Second, Wilson and Goldberg believed the allegations did not present facts. 

easily susceptible to a federal corruption charge. In fact, a December 2005 

audit conducted by the Office of the Public Auditor for Guam concluded that 

the payments to Hills came from local appropriations rather than from federal 

funds? 

We also note that the DOJ has demonstrated. no reluctance to pursue 

allegations against Abramoff. Indeed, to date the investigation of Abrarnoff and 

his colleagues has resulted in four guilty pleas, including pleas by Ablramoff to 

conspiracy, wire fraud, and tax evasion. 

The evidence does show that Abramoff and his colleagues wanted. Black 

removed from his position as interim U.S. Attorney. However, the evidence 

demonstrates that by the time Abrarnoff became involved in an effort to remove 

Black, neither Blaclk nor the candidate Abramoff was supporting were under 

consideration for th.e presidential appointment, and that Rapadas had already 

been selected. When Abramoffs colleague contacted DOJ official Thorson 

about the matter, Abramoffs colleague was informed that: the President had 

already made the decision to nominate Rapadas pending completion of the 

background investigation. According to Abramoffs e-mails, Thorson told 

Abrarnoffs colleague that they were "too late" to affect the process and that 

3l Although the audit revealed that the Superior Court did not issue a requ:ireld IRS 

form to Hills for paymeilts and neither Mills noi- Abrarnoff filed a lobblying registration on behalf 

of the Superior Court, the money paid by the Siuperior Court ito Mills was from local 

appropriations. See ziw.guamopa.com, audit entitled "Superior Court of Guam Judicial 

Building Fund Performance Audit October 1, 1999 through September 30, 2004 OF'A Report 

No. 05-08" at 27. Therefore, Goldberg's suspicion that the case might not be easily susceptible 

to a federal charge turned out, in our judgment, to be reasonable. 
Rapadas was "the pick." In response, Abramoff attempted to "spin" that he had 

something to do with the selection, when he clearly understood that he: had no 

involvement. 

Given Abrarn.off's instruction to his subordinates to claim credit for 

Black's replacemenut, Black's belief that Abramoff had influenced the 

nomination is not unreasonable. However, Abramoffs e-mails - and th~e other 

evidence - makes clear that he was attempting to take credit for a decision he 

played no role in influencing. 

B. The May 2002 Security Report 

The evidence also does not support Black's allegation that the selection 

of Rapadas was linked in any way to the recommendation in a security report 

that federal immigration laws be applied in the CNMI. The report was not 

provided to Black until May 6, 2002, and the President had already sta.ted his 

intent to nominate Rapadas by March 8, 2002, pending successful conlpletion 

of the background investigation. Thus, the security report and its contents did 

not affect the decision of DOJ officials to recommend Rapadas or the 

President's decision to nominate Rapadas upon SUCC~SS~IJ~ completion (of a 

background investigation. While the documents indicate that in Septe~nber 

2002, Abramoff lobbied against the report and the legislation supported by the 

report, that was after Rapadas already had been selected. As noted above, the 

OIG has referred the allegations relating to how Abramoff obtained the security 

report and how that report was handled, including any corrupt influence 

brought to bear on the issue by Abramoff or others in association with 

Abramoff, to the Department of the Interior OIG and the FBI.32 

However, we concluded that the evidence does not support Black's more 

general allegation that Rapadas was selected to undercut support for 

application of federal immigration laws in Guam and CNMI. The DOJ and 

White House officials who interviewed Rapadas denied ch~oosing Rapadius 

because of his position on that issue and said they did not recall any 

discussion of the issue during the selection process. In addition, we found no 

documents suggesting that those involved in the selection of Rapada., C- were 

focused on this immigration issue. 

32 In addition, the question of whether federal immigration law should app1.y in the 

CNMI is a contentious jpolicy issue that is beyond the scope of the 01G7s investigation. While 

Black strongly supports such legislation, witnesses and documents reflect that the issue has 

been the subject of much debate and proposed legislation on multiple occasions. A,ltIiough 

Black has a strong view on the merits of this issue, we have not in this report examined the 

that policy or the variolls efforts to influence that policy 
C. Public Corruption 

We also concluded that the evidence does not support Black's more 

general allegation t:hat Rapadas was sedected to end Black's pursuit of public 

corruption cases. The person who initiated Rapadas's candidacy, Antonio 

Unpingco, and the members of the panel who recommended Rapadas for the 

position said they could not recall any specific discussioi~ of public corruption 

matters during the interview or selection discussions. Further, they denied 

selecting Rapadas in order to diminish public corruption prosecutions in 

Guam, and the evidence showed that DOJ continued public corruption 

investigations after Rapadas's appointment. 

Black's allegation that the U.S. Attorney's Office on Guam is no longer 

focused on public corruption matters is not supported by the evidence. The 

FBI Special Agent in charge of the public corruption task force for the last six 

years told the OIG that he does not know of any public corruption matter . 

declined by the U.S. Attorney's office since Rapadas was appointed. He stated 

that the fluctuations in the number of public corruption convictions is due to 

the normal cycle of cases. Similarly, Stoddard told the OIG that he is zictively 

seeking public corruption matters, and that he believes 29 new matters which 

have public corruption aspects have been opened since Rapadas became the 

U. S. Attorney. 

In sum, we did not find sufficient evidence to support Black's allegations 

that there has beer1 any intentional effort to diminish public corruption cases 

by appointing Rapadas or Stoddard. 

D. Rapadas's Background Investigation and Recusal 

Finally, we concluded that the Rapadas background investigatiorl was 

conducted in an appropriate and methodical manner by the FBI. At each point 

where Black raised additional concerns, they were investigated by the FBI and 

addressed by DOJ officials. Furthermore, the recusal of Rapadas from the 

investigation into the Gutierrez Administration was ultim~ately resolved in the 

manner consistent with Black's recommendations. In addition, the conflict of 

interest issue was raised to and evaluated by the Senate Judiciary Committee 

before it voted to confirm Rapadas. Based on the forgoing, we did not find 

evidence to conclude that the background investigation was insufficient or was 

handled inappropriately. 
I7 CONCLUSION 

In sum, we found that DOJ and White House officials selected Rapadas 

as the nominee for Presidential appointment to the U.S. Attorney's position 

pursuant to its normal selection process, long before Black raised his 

allegations against Abramoff and well before issuance of the security report 

recommending the application of federal immigration law in the CNMI. The 

evidence does not support Black's assertion that he was replaced as interim 

U.S. Attorney for Guam because of allegations he raised regarding Abr;3moff or 

because of his position on the application of federal immigration law in. the 

CNMI. Although the public announcement of the nomination was m<adle after 

Black first raised his allegations against Abramoff, the timing of the 

announcement was unrelated to those allegations and instead was determined 

by the successful completion of Rapadas's background investigation. 

We also concluded that the background investigation was ~ondu~cted in 

accord with normal practices, and the concerns Black raised regarding 

Rapadas were investigated. Moreover, conflict of interest issues Black 

identified during Rapadas's background investigation concerning Rapadas's 

uncle resulted in Rapadas's recusal, once he becarne U.S. Attorney, fi-om 

certain public corruption cases. The evidence also reflects that those cases 

were pursued by career prosecutors in the Guam U.S. Attorney's office after 

Rapadas became the U.S. Attorney. In addition, the evidence did not support 

Black's allegation that Rapadas's background investigation was insufficient.