United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

 

WORLD TRADE 

CENTER 

EPA’s Most Recent 

Test and Clean 

Program Raises 

Concerns That Need 

to Be Addressed to 

Better Prepare for 

Indoor Contamination 

Following Disasters

September 2007 

GAO-07-1091 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2007

WORLD TRADE CENTER 

EPA’s Most Recent Test and Clean 

Program Raises Concerns That Need to 

Be Addressed to Better Prepare for 

Indoor Contamination Following 

Disasters 

Highlights of GAO-07-1091, a report to 

congressional requesters 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist

attacks and World Trade Center

(WTC) collapse blanketed Lower 

Manhattan in dust from building

debris. In response, the 

Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) conducted an indoor clean

and test program from 2002 to

2003. In 2003, EPA’s Inspector 

General (IG) recommended 

improvements to the program and 

identified lessons learned for EPA’s 

preparedness for future disasters. 

In 2004, EPA formed an expert

panel to, among other goals, guide 

EPA in developing a second

voluntary program; EPA

announced this program in 2006. 

 

As requested, GAO’s report 

primarily addresses EPA’s second 

program, including the (1) extent to

which EPA incorporated IG and 

expert panel member

recommendations and input; (2)

factors, if any, limiting the expert 

panel’s ability to meet its goals; (3) 

completeness of information EPA 

provided to the public; (4) way

EPA estimated resources for the 

program; and (5) extent to which

EPA has acted upon lessons

learned regarding indoor 

contamination from disasters. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that EPA 

develop (1) guidance on crisis 

communication, (2) guidelines on 

cost estimates for disaster 

response, and (3) protocols

specific to indoor contamination.

EPA stated that it is taking actions

on these recommendations. 

EPA has incorporated some recommendations and input from the IG and expert 

panel members into its second program, but its decision not to include other 

items may limit the overall effectiveness of this program. For example, while 

EPA agreed to test for more contaminants, it did not agree to evaluate risks in 

areas north of Canal Street and in Brooklyn. EPA reported that it does not have 

a basis for expanding the boundaries of its program because it cannot 

distinguish between normal urban, or background, dust and WTC dust. 

The expert panel’s ability to meet its goals was limited by two factors: (1) EPA 

officials’ belief that some panel goals were more appropriately addressed by

other agencies, and (2) EPA’s approach to managing the panel process. 

Furthermore, the majority of expert panel members believe the panel did not 

meet any of its goals, and that EPA’s second program does not respond to the 

concerns of residents and workers affected by the disaster. 

EPA’s second plan does not fully inform the public about the results of its first 

program. EPA concluded that a “very small” number of samples from its first 

program exceeded risk levels for airborne asbestos. However, EPA did not 

provide information such as how representative the samples were of the 

affected area. Residents who could have participated in this voluntary second 

program might have opted not to do so because of EPA’s conclusion about its 

first program. 

EPA did not develop a comprehensive cost estimate to determine the resources 

needed to carry out its second program. EPA is implementing this program with 

$7 million remaining from its first program. 

While EPA has acted upon lessons learned following this disaster, some 

concerns remain about its preparedness to respond to indoor contamination 

following future disasters. Specifically, EPA has not developed protocols on 

how and when to collect data to determine the extent of indoor contamination, 

one of the concerns raised by panel members. 

 

View of WTC Towers Collapse between 10:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. on September 11, 2001 

Source: New York Police Department Photo Unit.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1091.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact John B. 

Stephenson at (202) 512-3841 or

stephensonj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5

Background 8

EPA Incorporated Some Recommendations, but It Did Not Adopt 

Other Input, Which May Limit the Second Program’s 

Effectiveness 15

Two Factors Limited the Expert Panel’s Ability to Meet Its Goals 20 

EPA Did Not Provide the Public with Complete Information to 

Make Fully Informed Decisions 24 

EPA Did Not Assess Resource Needs for the Second Program 25 

EPA Has Taken Preparedness Actions, but Some Concerns Remain 26 

Conclusions 31

Recommendations for Executive Action 32 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 32 

Appendix I Information Classified by the Environmental 

Protection Agency Does Not Address the World Trade 

Center 34 

Appendix II Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 36 

Appendix III Comparison of EPA’s First and Second Indoor 

Programs 39 

Appendix IV Questions and Responses to the Structured Interview 

Questions for the Expert Panel 41 

Appendix V Comments from the Environmental Protection 

Agency 43 

GAO Comments 69 

Appendix VI GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 79 

Page i GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Table 

Table 1: EPA Classification Decisions Pursuant to Executive Order 

1295835 

Figures 

Figure 1: Collapse of WTC Building 1 at Approximately 10:30 a.m. 

on September 11, 2001 9 

Figure 2: Collapsed WTC Towers on September 11, 2001 10 

Figure 3: EPA’s 2002-2003 Indoor Clean and Test Program 

Boundaries in Lower Manhattan 12 

Figure 4: Timeline of EPA’s WTC Indoor Contamination Activities 14 

Figure 5: Key Recommendations and Additional Input Regarding 

EPA’s Second WTC Indoor Test and Clean Program 16 

Figure 6: Expert Panel Members Who Viewed the Panel As 

Somewhat or Very Unsuccessful, or Neither Successful 

Nor Unsuccessful, at Meeting Its Goals 23 

Page ii GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Abbreviations 

AEGL acute exposure guideline level 

AHERA Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act 

ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 

CBR chemical, biological, and radiological

CEQ Council on Environmental Quality 

CLC Community-Labor Coalition 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

EBAM electronic beta attenuation monitor 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency 

EPIC Environmental Photographic Interpretation Center 

ERAMS environmental radiation ambient monitoring system 

ERT Environmental Response Team 

ESF emergency support function 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

HEPA high efficiency particulate air 

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

HVAC heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

MMVF man-made vitreous fibers 

NHSRC National Homeland Security Research Center

NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 

ORD Office of Research and Development 

OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

PAL provisional advisory level 

Stafford Act Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 

Assistance Act 

TSP total suspended particulate 

WTC World Trade Center 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

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Page iii GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 5, 2007 

The Honorable Hillary Clinton 

Chairman, Subcommittee on 

 Superfund and Environmental Health

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Carolyn Maloney 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler 

House of Representatives 

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 

turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster site on a scale the nation had 

never experienced. The World Trade Center was a complex of seven 

buildings on 16 acres surrounding a 5-acre plaza. The twin towers were at

the center of the complex. Each tower had 110 floors, with approximately 

43,200 square feet on each floor. As the towers collapsed, the area was 

blanketed in a mixture of building debris and combustible materials that 

coated building exteriors and streets, as well as the interiors of apartments 

and offices, with dust. This complex mixture gave rise to another major 

concern: that thousands of residents and workers in the area would now 

be exposed to known hazards in the air and in the dust, such as asbestos, 

lead, glass fibers, and pulverized concrete. 

On the day of the attacks, the President signed a major disaster 

declaration, which activated the Federal Response Plan. The Federal 

Response Plan, now replaced by the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) National Response Plan, established the process and structure for 

the federal government’s assistance to state and local governments when 

responding to any major disaster or emergency declared under the Robert

T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act).1

In May 2002, after numerous cleanup, dust collection, and air monitoring 

 1

42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq. The purpose of the Stafford Act is “to provide an orderly and 

continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments

in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from 

such disasters.” 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b). 

Page 1 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
activities were conducted outdoors by the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA), other federal agencies, New York City, and New York State, 

New York City formally requested that FEMA provide the necessary 

funding for the hiring of contractors to perform the cleaning and testing of 

exterior and interior spaces in the vicinity of the World Trade Center 

(WTC) site for asbestos that might be present. 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which administered 

the Federal Response Plan, provided such assistance, entering into an 

interagency agreement with EPA in 2002 to develop EPA’s first program. 

This voluntary program allowed residents of Lower Manhattan living south 

of Canal Street (representing over 20,000 residences) to elect to have their 

home professionally cleaned, followed by testing, or to have their home 

tested only.2

 Approximately 20 percent of the eligible residences 

participated in the program. As part of EPA’s first program, the majority of 

these residences were professionally cleaned before they were sampled 

for airborne asbestos because their owners selected the clean and test 

option rather than the test only option.3

 Even though samples were 

collected after cleaning in most cases, some residences (less than 1 

percent) were still found to have levels of asbestos exceeding EPA’s 

cleanup benchmark. 

Owing to concerns by members of the affected community regarding its 

first program, EPA developed a second program, which is the focus of our 

current work.

4

 This second program was influenced by a variety of 

individuals, including the EPA Inspector General and an expert panel that

EPA convened. In August 2003, EPA’s Inspector General made 

recommendations and provided additional input that addressed EPA’s first 

indoor WTC cleanup efforts, as well as EPA’s preparedness for future 

 2

In addition to using asbestos as a trigger for cleanup, in a small subset of residences, EPA 

conducted sampling for dioxin, mercury, and 22 metals to inform a study about the 

effectiveness of its cleaning techniques. 

3

EPA regional officials overseeing the program told us they assumed that some residents 

elected to have testing only because they had their residences cleaned before EPA’s 

program. 

4

A lawsuit was filed in March 2004 that, among other things, challenged the adequacy of 

EPA’s first program. The case is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit. Benzman v. Whitman, 2006 WL 250527 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006), appeal docketed, 

Nos. 06-1166-cv, 06-1346-cv, 06-1454-cv (2nd Cir. Mar. 10, 2006). Pursuant to its longstanding policy of not addressing issues in ongoing litigation, GAO has not addressed EPA’s

first program. 

Page 2 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
large-scale disasters resulting in indoor contamination. The Inspector 

General reported that “additional actions can be taken to provide greater 

assurances that the program is fully protective of human health.” For 

example, EPA’s first program did not require that entire buildings be 

systematically cleaned, and therefore, the Inspector General 

recommended that EPA implement a program to verify that apartments 

that had participated in the first program had not been recontaminated by 

uncleaned apartments through heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

(HVAC) systems. With regard to preparedness, the Inspector General 

identified lessons learned from the WTC disaster and recommended, 

among other things, that EPA develop protocols for determining how 

indoor environmental contamination would be handled in the event of a 

future disaster. 

The White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) indicated in

October 2003 that EPA would organize and lead an expert technical review 

panel to address the concerns of the Inspector General and others. In 

March 2004, EPA convened the World Trade Center Expert Technical 

Review Panel, which met periodically through December 2005. The panel 

included 18 individuals from academe and from city and federal health and 

science agencies, such as the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety

and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS). It also included two representatives from the 

Community-Labor Coalition (CLC)—a network of community, tenant, 

labor, and environmental organizations formed after September 11, 2001, 

to advocate for appropriate health and safety efforts in the recovery from 

the WTC attacks. The panel was chaired by an EPA official.5

 The expert 

panel’s broader goal or purpose, as outlined at the first panel meeting by 

the EPA chairman, was to advise EPA “on ongoing efforts to monitor the 

situation for New York City residents and workers potentially affected by 

the collapse of the WTC.” This purpose included providing advice on the 

development of EPA’s second program plan. The panel chairman also 

provided the following longer-term goals: (1) identify any remaining risks 

using exposure and health surveillance information, (2) identify unmet 

public health needs, and (3) determine steps to further minimize risks.6

Expert panel members, including the CLC representatives, submitted 

individual recommendations to EPA. 

 5

The first panel chairman retired and was replaced while the panel was ongoing. 

6

The panel was also given a number of requests for document reviews to be completed 

within 3 to 6 months. 

Page 3 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
After obtaining views from many sources, including the Inspector General,

members of the expert panel, and the CLC, EPA announced its plan for a 

second program in December 2006. In this 2006 plan, EPA indicates that it

will test residences for the presence of contaminants and clean residences 

if test results exceed EPA’s cleanup benchmarks. The plan targets 

residents and building owners in the same portion of Lower Manhattan as 

its first program. The plan also provides the results of EPA’s sampling 

from its first program. EPA told us that 272 residents and 25 building 

owners had enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,167 

residents and 144 building owners that participated in the first program. 

In this context, you asked us to determine (1) the extent to which EPA 

incorporated recommendations and additional input from the expert panel 

members and its Inspector General in its second program; (2) what 

factors, if any, limited the expert panel’s ability to meet its goals; (3) the 

completeness of information EPA provided to the public in its second 

plan; (4) the way EPA estimated the resources needed to conduct the 

second program; and (5) the extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons 

learned to better prepare for indoor contamination that could result from 

future large-scale disasters. In June 2007, we testified on some of these 

issues before the Subcommittee on Superfund and Environmental Health, 

Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.7

 In addition, owing 

to concerns raised in the media about EPA’s use of classification authority, 

you asked that we determine the extent to which EPA has classified 

information, and, if so, whether any classified information discusses the 

environmental impact of the towers’ collapse. Appendix I provides the 

results of our analysis of EPA’s classification of information under this 

authority. 

In conducting our work, we reviewed, among other things, EPA’s 2002-

2003 indoor program plan, EPA’s planning leading to the December 2006 

program plan, the 2003 EPA Inspector General report, all 13 summaries of 

EPA’s WTC Expert Technical Review Panel meetings and conference calls, 

and funding data from EPA. We assessed the reliability of EPA’s funding 

data and determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. In addition, we interviewed officials from EPA 

headquarters, including the Office of Research and Development and the 

 7

GAO, World Trade Center: Preliminary Observations on EPA’s Second Program to 

Address Indoor Contamination Provide Lessons for the Future, GAO-07-806T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007). 

Page 4 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response; Region 2, which is 

responsible for New York City, and EPA’s National Homeland Security 

Research Center, among others; FEMA Region 2; and the New York City 

Department of Environmental Protection. We also attended a National 

Institute of Standards and Technology technical seminar on WTC 

materials and observed the disaster area with a FEMA official. In addition,

we conducted structured interviews with all 18 WTC Expert Technical 

Review Panel members and both EPA panel chairmen. A more detailed 

description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix II. We 

performed our work from June 2006 to September 2007 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

While EPA has taken some actions to incorporate recommendations and 

additional input from the Inspector General and expert panel members 

into its second program, it did not incorporate other items, which may 

limit the overall effectiveness of its program. For example, EPA’s second 

program expands the number of contaminants tested from only asbestos 

to three additional contaminants, and it includes tests of dust as well as 

the air. However, EPA’s program does not expand the boundaries of the 

cleanup to north of Canal Street and to Brooklyn. EPA reported it was 

unable to develop a method for distinguishing between normal urban dust 

and WTC dust; therefore, the agency reported it could not assess the 

extent of WTC contamination and had no basis for expanding the cleanup

effort. EPA did not begin examining methods for differentiating between 

normal urban, or background, dust and WTC dust until May 2004—nearly 3 

years after the disaster—making the process for distinguishing between 

the two types of dust more difficult. In addition, EPA’s second program 

does not include sampling in HVACs or “inaccessible” locations within 

apartments and common areas, such as behind dishwashers, because EPA 

only included these efforts when it planned to determine the extent of 

contamination. The agency’s second program plan notes that because EPA 

is not able to assess the extent of WTC contamination and because it is 

attempting to devote the maximum resources to testing requests, EPA will 

not test in these locations. Testing in such a restricted manner makes 

evaluating the adequacy of cleanup efforts difficult. Moreover, according 

to EPA officials, this program does not test workplaces because other 

federal agencies have procedures to address worker safety. 

Results in Brief 

Two factors limited the expert panel’s ability to meet its goals: (1) EPA 

officials’ belief that some panel goals were more appropriately addressed

by other agencies and (2) EPA’s approach to managing the panel process. 

With respect to the first issue, EPA was acting in response to a CEQ letter 

Page 5 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
indicating that EPA would convene a panel to identify unmet public health

needs. However, EPA believed that other federal agencies, such as the 

Department of Health and Human Services, were better equipped to 

address public health. Therefore, rather than having the expert panel 

members discuss and recommend actions to address this issue, EPA 

allowed time during panel meetings for public health presentations. EPA 

believed that these presentations allowed the panel to satisfy CEQ’s 

request. While the expert panel members listened to these presentations, 

the majority of them told us that the panel did not successfully identify 

unmet public health needs. As to the second issue, in the view of expert 

panel members, EPA’s management of the panel process was problematic 

in several ways. Specifically, EPA did not allow the panel to reach 

consensus on key issues and prepare a final report. Instead, EPA solicited 

individual recommendations and, according to the majority of panel 

members, did not have a fully transparent process for adopting or 

rejecting these recommendations. EPA did not have the panel reach 

consensus because this approach might limit individual contributions. In 

addition, several expert panel members told us that EPA dedicated half or

less of each daylong panel meeting to technical discussion, instead 

devoting the remainder of each day to public comment. As a result of these 

and other factors, the majority of expert panel members do not believe the 

panel successfully met any of its goals. Furthermore, all 10 panel members 

who responded to a follow-up inquiry believe that EPA’s second program 

is not responsive to the concerns of residents and workers impacted by 

the collapse of the WTC towers. 

EPA did not fully disclose in its second plan the limitations in the testing 

results from its first program. This more complete information would have 

allowed the public to make informed choices about participation in its 

most recent voluntary program. EPA concluded in its second plan that a 

“very small” number of samples from its first program exceeded risk levels 

for airborne asbestos but did not explain that over 80 percent of the 

samples were taken after residences were professionally cleaned as part of 

EPA’s program. In addition, EPA did not explain that its conclusion was 

based on participation from 20 percent of the eligible residences and that,

due to the voluntary nature of the program, the sample of apartments may 

not have been representative of all residences eligible for the program. 

Without this additional information, some eligible residents of Lower 

Manhattan may have concluded that they were not at risk from indoor 

contamination and therefore elected not to participate in the second 

program. 

Page 6 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Rather than estimate the resources needed to carry out its second 

program, EPA is implementing this program with the $7 million remaining 

from the first program. According to EPA officials, it would have been 

difficult to estimate program costs without knowing the number of 

participants as well as the size of apartments, which vary widely 

throughout Lower Manhattan. While EPA agreed to increase the number 

and type of contaminants being sampled in the second program, available 

funding is less than 20 percent of what was spent on the first program. In 

its final plan, EPA noted that it would prioritize requests for participation 

based on proximity to the WTC site.

EPA has acted upon lessons learned about its preparedness following the 

WTC disaster, but we are uncertain about how completely EPA has laid 

the groundwork for effective response to indoor contamination following 

future disasters. For example, EPA has identified likely threats and 

developed approaches to address them and has had an ongoing effort to 

clarify internal roles and responsibilities. EPA officials told us that they 

will use the National Response Plan in the future to guide their response 

actions following disasters and that they will develop site-specific 

responses; however, the National Response Plan does not explicitly 

address indoor contamination. Furthermore, EPA has not resolved some 

outstanding issues raised by expert panel members after the WTC disaster, 

such as how and when to collect data to determine the extent of indoor 

contamination, which we believe are important for addressing future 

disasters. Without clarifying actions that are appropriate for each federal 

agency in these scenarios, important public health needs, including 

resident and worker health, may not be promptly addressed. 

To enhance EPA’s ability to provide complete and clear information to the 

public and decision makers and to ensure that EPA is better prepared for 

future disasters that involve indoor contamination, we are recommending 

that EPA (1) facilitate the implementation of the agency’s recently issued 

Crisis Communication Plan by issuing guidance that ensures the 

presentation of environmental data, such as testing results, in an 

appropriate context, with appropriate technical caveats noted in plain 

language; (2) establish guidelines for developing program cost estimates 

for disaster response programs; and (3) develop protocols that specifically 

address indoor contamination. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for 

Research and Development and Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste 

and Emergency Response identified actions that EPA has begun taking 

that are responsive to these recommendations. EPA also provided 

Page 7 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
comments on aspects of the report it considered misleading or inaccurate,

such as the completeness of information EPA provided to the public. We 

continue to believe that EPA did not include appropriate caveats in its 

second program plan that articulated the limitations in the first program’s 

results. For example, EPA did not explain in its second plan that 20 

percent of eligible residents participated in its first program and, therefore, 

the results may not have been representative of all residences. We believe 

that the report offers a balanced portrayal of EPA’s development of its 

second program, the expert panel process, and its actions to better 

prepare for future disasters. EPA also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate. EPA’s letter and our detailed 

response to it appear in appendix V.

On the day of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the 

President’s declaration of a major disaster under the Stafford Act activated 

the Federal Response Plan (superseded by and incorporated into the 

National Response Plan). The Federal Response Plan established the 

process and structure for the federal government to provide assistance to 

state and local governments when responding to major disasters and 

emergencies declared under the Stafford Act. Under the Federal Response 

Plan, FEMA coordinated this assistance through mission assignments and 

interagency agreements, which assigned specific tasks to federal agencies 

with the expertise necessary to complete them. The Congress authorized 

$20 billion to respond to the attacks, of which $8.8 billion was provided 

through FEMA, for the New York City area. 

Background 

Under the Federal Response Plan (and the National Response Plan today), 

EPA served as coordinator during large-scale disasters for 1 of 15 

emergency support functions (ESF)—ESF 10, which addresses oil and 

hazardous material releases. ESF 10 encompasses various phases of 

hazardous material response, including assessment and cleanup. In the 

first 6 months after the WTC disaster, EPA responded to FEMA mission 

assignments to assist with the response efforts and, among other tasks, 

provided wash stations for responders and disposed of waste from the 

WTC site. 

There are an estimated 330 office buildings in Lower Manhattan below 

Canal Street and roughly 900 residential buildings with approximately 

20,000 apartments. In 2002, after initial efforts by the city of New York to 

advise New York residents how to clean the World Trade Center dust in 

their homes, FEMA and EPA entered into an interagency agreement to 

address indoor spaces affected by the disaster. While EPA has responded 

Page 8 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
to hazardous material releases for decades, the WTC disaster was the first 

large-scale emergency for which EPA provided testing and cleanup in 

indoor spaces. 

WTC dust is a fine mixture of materials that resulted from the collapse and 

subsequent burning of the twin towers and includes pulverized concrete, 

asbestos, and glass fibers. WTC dust entered homes and offices through 

open windows, was tracked in, or was picked up by air-conditioning 

system intakes. Figures 1 and 2 show the dust generated by the WTC 

disaster. 

Figure 1: Collapse of WTC Building 1 at Approximately 10:30 a.m. on September 11, 

2001 

West S

Chambers S treettreet

Warren Street

Source: New York Police Department Photo Unit.

Page 9 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Figure 2: Collapsed WTC Towers on September 11, 2001 

West Street

Chambers Street

Greenwich 

Warren Street

Street

Source: New York Police Department Photo Unit.

The amount of dust in indoor spaces in and around Lower Manhattan 

varied due to a variety of factors, including distance from the WTC site; 

weather conditions, such as wind; and damage to individual buildings. In 

the years since the disaster, the level of WTC dust in indoor spaces has 

varied, depending upon the cleaning performed by residents and other 

groups, including EPA and professional cleaning companies. 

In May 2002, EPA, New York City, and FEMA officials announced a 

program, to be overseen by EPA, offering a cleanup of residences in Lower 

Manhattan. Between September 2002 and May 2003, residences were 

cleaned and tested, or tested only, for airborne asbestos.8

 EPA analyzed 

samples from 4,167 apartments in 453 buildings and 793 common areas in 

144 buildings. This program cost $37.9 million—$30.4 million for indoor 

cleaning and testing by the New York City Department of Environmental 

 8

In addition to residents, building owners could ask EPA to evaluate common areas, such 

as lobbies, and HVAC systems. 

Page 10 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Protection and $7.5 million for EPA oversight and sample analysis. Figure 

3 shows the area in Lower Manhattan eligible for participation in EPA’s 

program. Residents could choose either an aggressive or modified 

aggressive testing method for providing samples of indoor air to EPA. For 

the modified aggressive method, the contractor ran a 20-inch fan for the 

duration of testing. For the aggressive method, a leaf blower was used, in 

addition to the 20-inch fan, to direct a jet of air toward corners, walls, 

fabric surfaces, and the ceiling to dislodge and resuspend dust. The 

contractors HEPA vacuumed and wet-wiped hard surfaces,9

 including 

floors, ceilings, ledges, trims, furnishings, appliances, and equipment; and 

they HEPA vacuumed soft surfaces, such as curtains, two times. In 

addition, in cases where there were still significant amounts of WTC dust 

and debris, contractors used asbestos abatement procedures such as the 

use of personal protective equipment, including respirators and a properly 

enclosed decontamination system; posting of warning signs; isolation 

barriers to seal off openings; and disposal of all waste generated during 

the cleaning in accordance with applicable rules and regulations for 

asbestos-containing waste. 

 9

HEPA is an acronym for “high efficiency particulate air” filter. HEPA vacuums contain 

HEPA filters that can remove at least 99.97 percent of airborne particles 0.3 micrometers

(μm) in diameter. 

Page 11 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Figure 3: EPA’s 2002-2003 Indoor Clean and Test Program Boundaries in Lower 

Manhattan 

Brooklyn Queens Connecting Hwy

N

Manhattan

Brooklyn

Chambers St.

Brooklyn Br.

Chinatown

Manhattan Dr.

Allen-Pike 

St.

Broadway

Canal St.

West St.

Sampling area

WTC buildings

Major roads

Sampling area

Sources: EPA and GAO.

The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services’ Agency for Toxic Substances 

and Disease Registry (ATSDR) collected samples from in and around 30 

buildings in Lower Manhattan from November though December 2001. In 

Page 12 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
September 2002, these agencies released their assessment of the public’s 

exposure to contaminants in air and dust,10 recommended additional 

monitoring of residential spaces in Lower Manhattan, and referred 

residents to EPA’s program. 

Before EPA finalized its second indoor program plan, several assessments 

related to indoor contamination were conducted: an August 2003 EPA 

Inspector General report; an expert technical review panel that EPA 

conducted from March 2004 through December 2005; and three EPA 

studies. The studies identified background levels of contamination in New 

York City (“background study”); the WTC-related contaminants of 

potential concern, and associated cleanup benchmarks (“COPC study”); 

and the efficacy of various cleaning methods in eliminating WTC-related

contaminants of concern (“cleaning study”). 

During the time EPA met with the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel, 

some expert panel members encouraged EPA to develop a method for 

differentiating between contaminants found in the New York City urban 

environment and those found in WTC dust. This method would have 

served as the basis for determining the extent of WTC-related

contamination, and EPA officials believed it would have enabled the 

agency to limit its focus to contamination specific to the WTC disaster. 

Early in the panel process, EPA formed a subpanel of these experts to 

assist EPA’s Office of Research and Development in developing such a 

methodology. In August 2005, EPA released its final report describing its 

methodology, which was peer reviewed. In their October 2005 final report, 

the peer reviewers criticized the reliability of EPA’s method and provided 

suggestions on improving EPA’s approach. In a November 2005 letter, EPA 

officials told expert panel members that in the absence of a valid method,

EPA could not definitively distinguish between WTC contaminants in dust 

and levels of the same contaminants found in an urban environment. At 

the same time, 2 weeks before the final panel meeting, the EPA chairman 

informed the panel that it would be disbanded as of the final meeting and 

that EPA would not be implementing a plan that included determining the 

extent of WTC contamination. Experts that were a part of the subpanel 

addressing this method reported that the peer-review comments could be 

addressed and that EPA should perform additional sampling. Nonetheless, 

 10EPA officials told us that the results of this study were made available to them in 

February 2002. 

Page 13 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
EPA ultimately decided not to pursue developing this methodology. Figure 

4 shows the chronology of events preceding the second program. 

Figure 4: Timeline of EPA’s WTC Indoor Contamination Activities

9/17

• NYC residents begin

to reoccupy homes

• Wall Street is

reopened

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 

1 year WTC dust research 

EPA’s 1st

program EPA convenes expert panel

EPA’s 2nd

programa

EPA IG report 

EPA background study

EPA cleaning study and COPC study

EPA test/clean programs

Expert panel

9/11

•Terrorist attacks

Source: GAO analysis of EPA data; photos (top to bottom): NYPD Photo Unit; Federal Emergency Management Agency;

Dr. Lung Chi Chen, New York University. 

a

EPA’s registration period ended in March 2007, and on June 18, 2007, EPA began implementing the 

program. 

In January 2006, EPA formally requested funds from FEMA. EPA and 

FEMA signed an interagency agreement to conduct EPA’s second program 

in July 2006, and EPA announced the agency’s second program to test 

Page 14 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
indoor spaces in Lower Manhattan in December 2006. Appendix III 

provides information regarding EPA’s first and second indoor programs. 

In response to recommendations and additional input from the Inspector

General and expert panel members, EPA’s second program incorporates 

some additional testing elements. However, EPA’s second program does 

not incorporate other items. Figure 5 shows the key recommendations and 

additional input the EPA Inspector General and expert panel members 

provided to EPA. 

EPA Incorporated 

Some 

Recommendations, 

but It Did Not Adopt 

Other Input, Which 

May Limit the Second 

Program’s 

Effectiveness 

Page 15 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Figure 5: Key Recommendations and Additional Input Regarding EPA’s Second WTC Indoor Test and Clean Program

Adopted by EPA

Test in dust as well as in air.

Expand the list of contaminants tested for.

Address contamination of spaces, rather than 

re-contamination since EPA’s first program.

Evaluate potential health risks from pollutants for 

geographic areas north of Canal Street and in 

Brooklyn.

Test in HVACs.

Test in inaccessible areas.

Treat buildings as a system, rather than individual 

residential units.

Evaluate potential health risks from pollutants in 

workplaces.

a

Investigate a method to distinguish between 

normal urban, or background, dust and WTC dust.

Use a method for distinguishing between normal 

and WTC dust to determine the extent of 

contamination.

Key Recommendations and Additional Input

Provided by

EPA IG Panel members Yes No

Source: GAO.

Notes: Not all expert panel members made each recommendation.

a

The program allows commercial building owners to request testing, but it does not permit workers or

employers to do so. EPA officials noted that employees who have concerns about their working 

conditions could file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s National Institute of 

Occupational Safety and Health. 

EPA Expanded the 

Number of Contaminants 

It Will Evaluate in Testing 

While EPA tested solely for airborne asbestos in order to trigger cleanup 

in the first program, it agreed to test for three additional contaminants in 

its second program—man-made vitreous fibers, polycyclic aromatic 

hydrocarbons, and lead. These contaminants, as well as two additional 

ones—dioxin and silica, were identified as WTC contaminants of potential 

Page 16 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
concern in a May 2003 report issued by EPA and other federal, New York 

City, and New York state agencies.11 EPA did not include dioxin and silica 

in the second program for several reasons. Regarding dioxin, EPA noted 

that concentrations were elevated in the weeks following the disaster 

when fires were still burning, but concentrations returned to predisaster 

levels by December 2001. Furthermore, because “only eight” of 1,500 

dioxin samples exceeded cleanup benchmarks during tests in 2002 and 

2003, EPA decided not to sample for this contaminant in its second 

program. Regarding silica, EPA noted that in 2002 an ATSDR/New York 

City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene report stated that shortterm exposure to silica is unlikely to cause adverse health effects and that 

adverse health effects from chronic exposure are possible but unlikely if

recommended cleaning is conducted.12 EPA also explained that levels of 

silica are likely to have been reduced by cleaning activities over the past 3

years. 

EPA also agreed to test for contaminants in dust. To do so, EPA developed

site-specific cleanup benchmarks for asbestos and man-made vitreous 

fibers in dust over the course of nearly a year. In its second program plan, 

EPA explains that these benchmarks are not risk based but rather are 

based on, among other things, work by experts in the field as to what 

constitutes contamination and how it compares with site-specific 

background levels, and the benchmarks employed for cleanup at a 

Superfund site with asbestos-contaminated residences. 

World Trade Center

Though EPA expanded the number of contaminants tested for in its 

second program, it did not adopt recommendations and additional input 

from the EPA Inspector General or the expert panel that addressed the 

following issues: 

• Evaluating risks in geographic areas north of Canal Street and in 

Brooklyn. EPA did not expand the scope of testing north of Canal Street,

EPA Is Not Assessing the 

Extent of WTC 

Contamination, and It Did 

Not Agree to Evaluate Risk 

in Workplaces 

 11EPA, OSHA, ATSDR, New York State Department of Health, and New York City 

Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, World Trade Center Indoor Environment 

Assessment: Selecting Contaminants of Potential Concern and Setting Health-Based

Benchmarks (May 2003). 

12Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and New York City Department of

Health and Mental Hygiene, Final Report of the Public Health Investigation to Assess 

Potential Exposures to Airborne and Settled Surface Dust In Residential Areas of Lower

Manhattan (September 2002). 

Page 17 GAO-07-1091
or to Brooklyn, as advisory groups had advised. EPA reported it did not 

expand the scope of testing because it could not differentiate between 

normal urban dust and WTC dust; differentiating between the two would 

have enabled EPA to determine the geographic extent of WTC 

contamination. Some expert panel members had suggested that EPA 

investigate whether it was feasible to develop a method for distinguishing 

between normal urban dust and WTC dust. EPA initially agreed to do so. 

Beginning in 2004—almost 3 years after the disaster—EPA conducted this

investigation into developing a WTC dust signature. However, EPA 

officials told us that because so much time had passed since the terrorist 

attack, it was difficult to distinguish between WTC dust and urban dust.13

EPA ultimately abandoned this effort because peer reviewers questioned 

its methodology; EPA decided not to explore alternative methods that 

some of the peer reviewers had proposed. Instead, EPA will test only in an 

area where visible contamination has been confirmed by aerial 

photography conducted soon after the WTC attack, although aerial 

photography does not reveal indoor contamination.14 Furthermore, EPA 

officials told us that some WTC dust was found immediately after the 

terrorist attacks in areas, including Brooklyn, that are outside the area 

eligible for its first and second program. 

• Testing in HVACs and inaccessible areas. In its November 2005 draft plan

for the second program, EPA had proposed collecting samples from a 

number of locations in HVACs. In some buildings, HVACs are shared; in

others, each residence has its own system. In either case, contaminants in 

the HVAC could recontaminate the residence unless the system is also 

professionally cleaned. However, EPA’s second program will not provide 

for testing in HVACs under any circumstances but will offer cleaning in

HVACs if tests in common areas reveal that cleanup benchmarks for any of 

four contaminants have been exceeded. EPA officials told us that EPA will 

sample near HVAC outlets in common areas and will obtain dust samples 

in proximity to these locations. EPA explained in the second plan that it 

will not sample within HVACs because it is no longer assessing the extent

of contamination resulting from the WTC disaster and because it is 

attempting to devote the maximum resources to testing requests. 

 13In addition to the lack of a specific indicator for WTC dust, EPA officials also noted that a

sampling effort to identify additional areas whose cleanup would result in a reduction in

exposure to WTC contaminants is not feasible for the following reasons: the nature of the

contaminants; the widespread, low-level background contamination from other urban 

sources; and the large and varied nature of the spaces involved. 

14Appendix I of EPA’s December 2006 program plan states that EPA’s assessment of the

extent of contamination was also based on modeling and monitoring data. 

Page 18 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Similarly, EPA had proposed sampling for contaminants in “inaccessible”

locations, such as behind dishwashers and rarely moved furniture within 

apartments and common areas. Again, because it was unable to 

differentiate between normal urban dust and WTC dust, EPA stated that it

would not test in inaccessible locations in order to devote its resources to 

as many requests as possible. EPA told us that 272 residents and 25 

building owners had enrolled in the second program, compared with 4,167 

residents and 144 building owners that participated in the first program.15

• Evaluating risks to workers/workplaces. According to EPA, its second 

program plan is “the result of ongoing efforts to respond to concerns of 

residents and workers.” Workers were concerned that workplaces in 

Lower Manhattan experienced the same contamination as residences. In 

its second program, EPA will test and clean common areas in commercial 

buildings, but only if an individual owner or manager of the property 

requests the service. EPA stated that employees who believe their working 

conditions are unsafe as a result of WTC dust may file a complaint with 

OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s National Institute of

Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Concerns remain, however, 

because these other agencies do not have authority to conduct cleanup in

response to contaminant levels that exceed cleanup benchmarks. In 

addition, OSHA’s benchmarks are designed primarily to address airborne 

contamination, while EPA’s test and clean program is designed to address 

contamination in building spaces, whether the contamination is airborne 

or in settled dust. OSHA requires individual employers to adopt work 

practices to reduce employee exposure to airborne contaminants, whereas 

EPA’s test and clean program is designed to remove contaminants from 

affected spaces. 

• Addressing whole buildings. Between March 2004 and December 2005, 

when EPA met with expert panel members, officials discussed sampling a 

representative number of each buildings’ apartments in order to 

“characterize the building,” which would have allowed EPA to 

characterize areas in Lower Manhattan. This information would have been 

used to inform decision-making regarding the extent of indoor 

contamination. According to EPA officials, all residents from each building 

would need to volunteer their individual apartments, and EPA would 

select the units it then tested. The approach that EPA developed entailed

cleaning a building, including all units, common areas and HVACs, if there 

was a high degree of certainty that the average concentration of at least 

 15Of the 640 residents and building owners who registered for the second program, 272

residents and 25 building owners submitted the necessary access agreements. 

Page 19 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
one contaminant, across all apartments tested, exceeded the benchmark, 

and dust could be associated with the WTC.16 While this method addressed 

the Inspector General recommendation that buildings be treated as a 

system so that potentially contaminated apartments did not contaminate 

previously cleaned apartments, EPA did not ultimately include this 

particular methodology in its second program plan due to the lack of a 

method to identify WTC dust. Instead, EPA will clean whole common 

areas, such as lobbies, and HVACs in buildings. It will clean common areas 

when at least one contaminant is found to exceed the cleanup benchmark 

in that area. It will clean HVACs and common areas when there is a high 

degree of certainty that the mean contaminant level for accessible areas, 

infrequently accessed areas, or air samples in common areas exceeds one 

contaminant benchmark.

The expert panel’s ability to meet its goals was limited by two factors: (1) 

EPA officials’ belief that some panel goals were more appropriately 

addressed by other agencies and (2) EPA’s approach to managing the 

panel process. Furthermore, the majority of expert panel members do not 

believe the panel successfully met any of its goals. All of the panel 

members who responded to our follow-up inquiry regarding EPA’s second 

program (10 out of 10 members) told us the program is not responsive to

the concerns of residents and workers affected by the collapse of the WTC 

towers. Appendix IV provides the full range of responses from structured

interviews with expert panel members about EPA’s management of the 

panel process. 

According to EPA officials, some panel goals were more appropriately 

addressed by other agencies. We believe this view limited the panel’s 

ability to address these issues. In particular, one panel goal, as stated by 

CEQ, was to advance the identification of unmet public health needs. 

However, EPA officials believed that other federal agencies, such as HHS, 

were better equipped to address the issue of public health. Therefore, 

rather than having the expert panel members discuss and identify actions

to address this issue, EPA allowed time during panel meetings for public 

health presentations. EPA officials believe that the panel met CEQ’s 

Two Factors Limited 

the Expert Panel’s 

Ability to Meet Its 

Goals 

EPA Officials Believed 

That Some Panel Goals 

Were More Appropriate for 

Other Agencies 

 16According to EPA’s May 2005 draft plan, a building would be cleaned when the 95 percent

upper confidence limit on the mean concentration of at least one contaminant of potential 

concern in all units was above the cleanup benchmark. 

Page 20 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
charge by including health experts on the panel and by including health

presentations during panel meetings.

While the panel was provided with these presentations, the majority of 

expert panel members (16 out of 18) told us the panel did not successfully 

identify unmet public health needs. Outside of the panel, a multiagency

effort established a WTC health registry to assess the health impact of the

WTC collapse. The EPA panel chairman noted that panel member 

recommendations to maintain the WTC health registry for more than 20 

years and to link the results of subsequent indoor testing to the registry 

had been provided to the appropriate agencies. 

In addition, EPA officials believed that, despite the panel’s broader goal, 

which was to help guide EPA in its ongoing efforts to “monitor the 

situation for New York residents and workers impacted by the collapse of

the WTC towers,” OSHA should address the issue of workplace safety

because that is OSHA’s mission. Consequently, as noted earlier, the second 

program does not address workers’ concerns, and employers and workers 

are not eligible to request testing or cleaning.17 EPA stated that employees 

who believe their working conditions are unsafe as a result of WTC dust 

may file a complaint with OSHA or request an evaluation by HHS’s 

National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).

EPA’s management of the panel process limited the panel’s ability to 

successfully meet its goals. According to 9 or more of the 18 expert panel 

members we interviewed, problematic aspects of EPA’s management 

included (1) the lack of a consensus approach, (2) inadequate time for 

technical discussion, and (3) no fully transparent decision-making process. 

In addition, a number of expert panel members told us that failure to 

document recommendations created other concerns. 

EPA’s Management of the 

Panel Process Was 

Problematic, According to 

Expert Panel Members 

• Lack of a consensus approach. EPA did not allow the panel to reach 

consensus on key issues and prepare a final report; instead it obtained 

recommendations from each member of the expert panel. The majority of 

expert panel members (13 out of 18) told us that EPA’s approach was not 

appropriate, and one panel member noted that the lack of a consensus 

approach prevented the resolution of key issues. The EPA chairman told 

the panel that the panel would not be asked to reach consensus because 

 17Residential and commercial building owners may participate in this program. 

Page 21 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
this approach might limit the contribution of individual panel members. 

EPA officials also noted that it would have been difficult to reach 

consensus with such a diverse panel of experts and the technical nature of 

the discussion. 

• Inadequate time for technical discussion. The majority of expert panel 

members (14 out of 18) told us there was not adequate time on the agenda

for the panel to discuss issues. According to several panel members, EPA 

dedicated half or less of each daylong panel meeting to technical 

discussions, devoting the remainder of each day to public comment. 

• Lack of a fully transparent decision-making process. EPA’s reasons for 

accepting or rejecting expert panel members’ recommendations were not 

at all transparent, according to half of the panel members (9 out of 18). 

Furthermore, six panelists said that EPA did not respond to their 

recommendations or provide any explanation for rejecting 

recommendations. In contrast, the two EPA panel chairmen we 

interviewed told us they believed the decision-making process was 

completely transparent. 

• Failure to document recommendations. Although EPA stated in its 

operating principles that it would keep detailed minutes of each panel 

meeting, including all individual recommendations, whether oral or 

written, EPA did not maintain a list of recommendations. Instead, EPA 

provided “summaries” of each meeting that included an overview of issues 

raised, and, starting with the fifth meeting, EPA provided audio recordings 

of six of the remaining panel meetings. The majority of expert panel 

members (10 out of 18) said that having written transcripts of the meetings 

available would have been somewhat or very helpful. Some expert panel 

members told us the lack of transcripts presented a problem because they 

had no record of EPA agreement with several recommendations that were 

later not adopted. 

Page 22 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
The majority of expert panel members told us that the panel was unable to

meet its goals as outlined by EPA. As figure 6 shows, these included 

guiding EPA in: (1) developing the second program, (2) identifying unmet 

public health needs, (3) identifying any remaining risks using exposure 

and health surveillance information, and (4) determining steps to further 

minimize risks. 

Figure 6: Expert Panel Members Who Viewed the Panel As Somewhat or Very 

Unsuccessful, or Neither Successful Nor Unsuccessful, at Meeting Its Goals 

According to all expert panel members who responded to our follow-up 

inquiry regarding EPA’s second program (10 out of 10 members), this 

program does not respond to the concerns of residents and workers 

affected by the collapse of the WTC towers. At the final panel meeting, 

some expert panel members said publicly that they would discourage 

participation in EPA’s program and several expert panel members said 

Most Expert Panel 

Members Did Not Believe 

They Addressed the 

Panel’s Goals and 

Ultimately Did Not Agree 

with EPA’s Final Indoor 

Test and Clean Program 

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

 

Somewhat or very unsuccessful

Neither successful nor unsuccessful

Source: GAO.

Number of experts

Determine steps to further minimize 

risks

Develop EPA's 

second program

Identify remaining risks 

using exposure and 

health surveillance 

information

Identify unmet public health needs

Page 23 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
that the data yielded by the test and clean program will not be useful and 

the program is unlikely to adequately identify or clean up contaminants. In 

addition, the Community-Labor Coalition distributed information that also

discouraged participation, citing lack of expert panel member support. 

EPA did not provide complete information in its second plan to allow the 

public to make informed choices about their participation in its voluntary 

program. While EPA stated that the number of samples in its first program 

exceeding risk levels for airborne asbestos was “very small,” EPA did not 

provide the following additional information to help inform residents’ 

decisions regarding participation in the second program: 

• Voluntary program participation. Participation in the first program came 

from about 20 percent of the residences eligible for participation. In 

addition, participation was voluntary, which may suggest that the sample 

of apartments was not representative of all residences eligible for the 

program. 

EPA Did Not Provide 

the Public with 

Complete Information 

to Make Fully 

Informed Decisions 

• Only asbestos tested. EPA’s conclusions were based only on tests for 

asbestos, rather than other contaminants, and the conclusions focused on

airborne contamination rather than contamination in dust inside 

residences.

• Sampling protocols varied. EPA did not explain that over 80 percent of 

the samples were taken after professional cleaning was completed as a 

part of EPA’s program. In addition, EPA did not identify the portion of the 

samples that were collected following aggressive, as opposed to modified 

aggressive, techniques. In the first case, the air inside apartments was 

more actively circulated before sampling occurred. In these instances, 

about 6 percent of apartments tested were found to exceed EPA’s asbestos 

level, compared with roughly 1 percent that used the modified aggressive 

technique. Out of 4,167 apartments sampled, 276 were sampled using the 

aggressive method. 

• Discarded sample results. EPA also did not explain in its second program 

plan that its first program’s test results may have been affected by sample 

results that were discarded because they were “not cleared”—that is, they

could not be analyzed because the filter had too many dust particles to be

analyzed under a microscope. However, EPA’s final report on its first 

program stated that residences with more than one inconclusive result, 

such as filter overload, were encouraged to have their residences 

recleaned and retested.

Page 24 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Without complete explanations of EPA’s sampling data, residents who 

could have elected to participate might have decided not to do so. The 

number of participants declined from roughly 4,200 residents and 144 

building owners in the first program to 272 residents and 25 building 

owners in the second program. In addition, community leaders on the 

panel believed that allowing participants to choose between two sampling 

techniques, coupled with the voluntary nature of the program, had the 

effect of making the overall program appear unnecessary. 

EPA did not take steps to ensure that it would have adequate resources to 

effectively implement the second program. Instead, EPA is implementing 

this program with the approximately $7 million in Stafford Act funds 

remaining after its first program. Although this program increases the 

number and type of contaminants being sampled, the funds available are 

less than 20 percent of those used in the first program. 

EPA is implementing its second program with the funding remaining after 

completion of its first program—approximately $7 million—but EPA did 

not determine whether this amount would support the effective 

implementation of its second program. According to EPA officials, they 

could not estimate the cost of the second program without information on 

the number of program participants and the size of residences, which vary 

widely throughout Lower Manhattan. Nevertheless, the interagency 

agreement between FEMA and EPA for the first program included 

estimated costs, although EPA faced the same challenges. This first 

estimate of $19.6 million was based on projections for the number of 

eligible residents participating in the program—specifically, 10,000

residences requesting cleaning and 3,000 residences requesting testing 

only—and included, among other things, detailed estimates for sample 

analysis, equipment and supplies, and EPA salary and travel costs. 

In the first program, EPA spent $7.5 million—of $19.6 million obligated by

FEMA to EPA—on program oversight and analysis of air samples, while 

New York City spent approximately $30.4 million to collect air samples 

and clean residences. EPA returned $12.1 million in unspent funds to 

FEMA. According to FEMA officials, when the agency learned about the 

establishment of the expert panel, FEMA retained $7 million for additional 

EPA activities. EPA officials told us that in discussions with FEMA about 

whether the amount was appropriate, FEMA responded that only $7 

million was available. 

EPA Did Not Assess 

Resource Needs for 

the Second Program 

EPA Is Implementing the 

Second Program with 

$7 Million and Did Not 

Complete a Cost Estimate 

to Determine Whether This 

Was an Appropriate 

Amount 

Page 25 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
In July 2006, an interagency agreement was signed by EPA and FEMA for 

the second program that describes EPA’s role as developing and 

implementing a program to test and clean in the specified area. After EPA 

entered into this agreement, EPA officials told us that if the number of 

registrants for the program exceeded the number that could be covered by 

the $7 million, they were unsure where additional funds could be obtained. 

EPA did not provide information to FEMA in the agreement about how 

many residents and building owners could potentially be served under the 

program. Thirteen of the 18 expert panel members told us they did not 

believe the $7 million for the sampling and cleanup was sufficient. 

According to one of the expert panel’s chairmen, the $7 million was 

sufficient for initial sampling in the second program but not for sampling 

and cleanup. In its final plan, EPA noted that requests for participation 

from eligible residents and building owners would be prioritized based on

proximity to the WTC site. 

Although EPA’s second program increases the number and type of 

contaminants being sampled, the $7 million available is less than 20 

percent of the $37.9 million spent on the first program. While only 1 

percent of roughly 20,000 eligible residences are participating in the 

second program, compared with 20 percent who participated in the first 

program, it is not clear whether funding for the second program will be 

adequate without a cost estimate. 

EPA has acted upon lessons learned from the WTC disaster to prepare for 

future disasters, such as clarifying internal roles and responsibilities and 

improving health-related cleanup benchmarks. Nevertheless, we are 

uncertain about how completely these activities address EPA’s ability to 

respond to contamination in indoor environments in the face of future 

disasters. For example, EPA has not yet addressed certain methodological

challenges raised by expert panel members regarding the WTC disaster, 

such as how it will determine the extent of contamination, which we 

believe are important for addressing future disasters. Without addressing 

this and other challenges, it is uncertain whether people in affected areas 

will be protected adequately from risks posed by indoor contamination 

stemming from future disasters. 

EPA Has Taken 

Preparedness Actions, 

but Some Concerns 

Remain 

Page 26 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Since the WTC disaster, EPA has taken actions to improve its ability to 

respond to future disasters. However, EPA’s approach to emergency 

response does not differentiate between indoor and outdoor 

contamination, and therefore it is difficult to determine how EPA’s 

preparedness actions have improved EPA’s readiness to respond 

specifically to indoor contamination. EPA’s actions are consistent with 

several Inspector General recommendations, as the following examples of 

EPA’s preparedness actions illustrate: 

EPA Has Taken 

Preparedness Actions 

Following the WTC 

Disaster 

• Clarified roles and responsibilities. EPA has completed response 

policies, established various specialized response teams, and conducted

training. Though not specific to indoor contamination, EPA’s June 2003

National Approach to Response policy outlines EPA roles and 

responsibilities in the event of future large-scale disasters. Its October 

2004 Homeland Security Strategy also notes that in the event of a national

incident, EPA has the lead responsibility for decontaminating affected 

buildings and neighborhoods and for advising and assisting public health 

authorities on when it is safe to return to these areas and on what the 

safest disposal options for contaminants are. EPA’s National 

Decontamination Team provides general scientific support and technical

expertise for identifying technologies and methods for decontaminating 

buildings and other infrastructure. EPA also expanded the capabilities of 

its existing Environmental Response Team (ERT), which is responsible for 

technological support and training through the establishment of an 

additional ERT office in Las Vegas, Nevada. Along with the Radiological 

Emergency Response Team and the National Decontamination Team, 

these teams provide support during emergencies. In addition, EPA officials 

noted that they have developed and delivered a training course on the 

Incident Command System, to be used under the National Response Plan,

to 2,000 staff as well as senior managers in all regions to provide additional 

guidance on roles and responsibilities. Finally, in its newly developed 

Crisis Communication Plan, EPA outlines the responsibilities of agency 

staff in providing the public with information during disasters. EPA 

officials told us they have added 50 on-scene coordinators to their 

emergency response staff to improve preparedness and response 

capabilities. 

• Shared information on likely targets and threats and developed 

approaches to address them. EPA’s Office of Research and Development 

(ORD) has several efforts to develop approaches to address future threats, 

including research on building decontamination, and EPA’s Office of Solid 

Waste and Emergency Response has begun to establish a network of 

environmental laboratories. In 2003, EPA created the National Homeland 

Security Research Center (NHSRC), part of ORD, to develop expertise and 

Page 27 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
products to prevent, prepare for, and recover from public health and

environmental emergencies arising from terrorist threats and incidents. Its 

research focuses on five areas: threat assessment, decontamination, water 

infrastructure protection, response capability, and technology evaluation. 

In November 2004, NHSRC reported on several threat scenarios for 

buildings and water systems;18 these threat scenarios guide NHSRC’s 

research, which is focused heavily on chemical, biological, and 

radiological (CBR) agents. EPA also participates on a number of 

interagency workgroups, including policy coordination committees 

formed by the White House Homeland Security Council; DHS work groups 

addressing sampling and other issues; and FEMA work groups that 

address various aspects of the National Response Plan. Although an 

interagency team, including EPA, has developed tabletop exercises to 

respond to nationally significant incidents, these exercises have not yet 

included residential contamination. EPA has also developed standardized 

analytical methods that environmental laboratories can use to analyze 

biological and chemical samples during disasters caused by terrorist 

attacks, and the agency has begun to establish a network of environmental 

laboratories capable of analyzing CBR agents, which would benefit from 

these methods. 

• Improved health-related benchmarks for assessing health risks in 

emergencies. According to EPA officials, EPA’s Office of Prevention, 

Pesticides and Toxic Substances is leading the agency’s participation in 

developing acute exposure guideline levels (AEGL), an international effort

aimed at describing the risk resulting from rare exposure to airborne 

chemicals. The AEGLs focus on exposures of 10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 

hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours. To date, AEGLs have not been developed under 

emergency situations; however, EPA officials told us the availability of 

methodologies such as those used to derive AEGLs make it possible to 

develop emergency benchmarks quickly, if necessary. EPA is also 

developing subchronic exposure guidance—provisional advisory levels 

(PAL)—to bridge the gap between acute exposure durations addressed by 

AEGLs and the chronic lifetime exposure guidance. EPA officials told us 

that NHSRC is developing this guidance for contaminants in air and water, 

and it will focus on exposure periods of 1 day, 30 days, and 2 years. EPA 

officials noted that, to date, it has developed PALs for over 20 chemical 

 18EPA, Office of Research and Development, National Homeland Security Research Center,

Threat Scenario for Buildings and Water Systems Report (November 2004).

Page 28 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
agents.19 In addition, EPA officials told us that the agency has completed a 

method to assess risk from exposure to contaminated building surfaces 

and that it is also completing guidance on how to address future incidents 

involving asbestos. 

• Additional monitoring capabilities. The Deputy Director of EPA’s Office 

of Emergency Management told us the agency has five total suspended 

particulate (TSP) monitors in each region; however, these are not realtime monitors. For real-time data monitoring, each region has portable air

monitors—Data-Rams—to provide approximate measures of ambient 

particulate matter concentrations. EPA officials told us they also have

mobile monitoring labs, as well as specialized vans and aircraft, that can 

be deployed during disasters to conduct monitoring. EPA officials said 

they are evaluating other monitors—electronic beta attenuation monitors 

(EBAM)—that have the capability to work with higher dust loads. The 

Deputy Director of EPA’s Office of Emergency Management also told us 

that fixed near real-time radiation monitors, part of the environmental 

radiation ambient monitoring system (ERAMS), are currently being 

deployed at a rate of five per month at cities across the United States. 

While EPA has taken actions since the WTC disaster to prepare for future 

incidents, it has not demonstrated how it will overcome several 

methodological challenges that expert panel members identified. These 

challenges include determining the extent of contamination; developing

appropriate cleanup benchmarks; and testing for contaminants that cause 

acute or short-term health effects. In addition, some expert panel members 

questioned EPA’s reliance on visual evidence, rather than sample data, as

the primary basis for its actions, as well as its use of the modified 

aggressive sampling technique. 

EPA Has Not 

Demonstrated How It Will 

Overcome Methodological 

Challenges Identified by 

Expert Panel Members to 

Better Respond to Future 

Disasters 

• Assessing extent of contamination. Some expert panel members 

recommended that EPA reconsider its decision to abandon its efforts to 

develop a method for differentiating between normal, urban dust, and 

WTC dust, which would have allowed EPA to determine the extent of WTC 

contamination. Several panel members encouraged EPA to continue to 

refine the method and collect applicable sample data, saying that 

collecting data now could provide critical information for future 

 19Each PAL has three exposure durations, three levels of severity, and two media (water 

and air) for which it is to be applied, and therefore EPA has developed over 360 different

values for these chemicals. 

Page 29 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
responses. EPA was unable to develop a WTC dust signature that would

have allowed it to determine the extent of WTC contamination, in part, 

because of the limited number of dust samples taken immediately after the 

disaster, and the length of time that elapsed between the event and 

development of the signature. EPA officials told us they would need to 

identify contamination signatures in responding to future disasters. 

• Developing cleanup benchmarks. Some expert panel members also 

expressed concerns regarding the cleanup benchmarks that EPA 

developed in response to the WTC disaster. Some expert panel members 

agreed with the concept of dividing sampled spaces into categories, such 

as accessible and inaccessible areas, with associated cleanup benchmarks; 

however, these panel members disagreed with how EPA defined the 

categories. For example, an expert panel member noted that children 

access areas under beds, which were not considered “accessible” by EPA’s 

definitions, and workers such as telecommunications technicians and 

housing inspectors access areas defined by EPA as “inaccessible” on a 

daily basis. In addition, expert panel members disagreed with some 

cleanup benchmarks that EPA developed for the various categories. For 

example, two panel members asserted that EPA’s proposed cleanup 

benchmark for man-made vitreous fibers was not stringent enough. While 

EPA then changed the benchmark for man-made vitreous fibers in 

inaccessible areas from 100,000 fibers/cm2

 to 50,000 fibers/cm2, EPA has 

not demonstrated how it will determine appropriate cleanup benchmarks 

for future indoor contamination events. 

• Testing for contaminants with acute effects. An expert panel member 

questioned whether it was appropriate for EPA to focus on contaminants 

that could cause future long-term health problems, rather than those that 

could cause immediate problems. At a subsequent meeting, an expert 

panel member also noted that it would be useful to identify the 

contaminants causing acute health effects in the affected population. 

• Relying on visual evidence. Some expert panel members questioned 

EPA’s reliance on visual evidence rather than on sample data during its 

two programs. For example, during the first program, in response to 

requests from building owners, EPA “visually” evaluated some HVAC 

systems rather than obtaining wipe samples. When EPA decided to clean 

28 of the 116 HVACs, the reinspection was also visual. In addition, some 

expert panel members questioned EPA’s reliance on aerial photos as 

primary support for assigning boundaries to its first and second program 

because not all contaminants are visible. 

Page 30 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
• Using the modified aggressive sampling technique. Some expert panel 

members questioned EPA’s use of the modified aggressive sampling 

technique. The number of samples exceeding cleanup benchmarks was 

greater when the aggressive sampling technique was used. EPA’s rationale 

for departing from the technique specified by the Asbestos Hazard 

Emergency Response Act (AHERA) is that the aggressive technique does 

not appropriately represent conditions of human exposure in a residence.

EPA has not identified in its protocols how these methodological concerns 

can be overcome, such as how and when data collection will occur, in 

order to facilitate determining the extent of contamination. Without 

clarifying actions that are appropriate for EPA and other federal agencies 

in these scenarios, important determinations about risk from disasterrelated contamination may not be promptly addressed. 

Shortcomings in EPA’s second program to test and clean residences for 

WTC contamination raise questions about the agency’s preparedness for 

addressing indoor contamination resulting from future disasters. With 

respect to communication, the public relies on EPA to provide accurate 

and complete information about environmental hazards that may affect 

them. However, in announcing its plan for the second program, EPA did 

not fully disclose the limitations of its earlier test results. Consequently, 

some eligible residents of Lower Manhattan may have concluded that they

were not at risk from contaminated dust and therefore elected not to 

participate in the second program. 

EPA did not develop a cost estimate to support its use of available Stafford

Act funds for its second program. Without this information, EPA and other 

decision makers could not know how many residents and building owners 

could potentially be served by the program. Given limited federal disaster 

response funds and competing priorities, the federal government must 

carefully consider how best to allocate these monies to be sure that these

funds are used most cost effectively. In the future, unless officials justify 

the Stafford Act funds necessary for achieving program objectives prior to 

implementation, EPA will not have a sound basis for securing needed 

funds and, as a result, may be forced to scale back its programs in ways 

that limit their effectiveness. 

Moreover, EPA has reported that it faced several challenges in addressing 

WTC indoor contamination, including limited indoor sampling protocols, 

health benchmarks, and background data for urban areas. In addition, 

since the National Response Plan does not explicitly address indoor 

Conclusions 

Page 31 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
contamination, it is unclear how EPA, in concert with other agencies—

including the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human 

Services, and Labor—will address these challenges. Unless these agencies

establish an approach for responding to indoor contamination, the nation

may face the same challenges after future disasters. 

To enhance EPA’s ability to provide environmental health risk information 

to the public that is complete and readily understandable, we recommend 

that the Administrator of EPA facilitate the implementation of the recently 

issued Crisis Communication Plan by issuing guidance that, among other 

things, ensures the presentation of environmental data in an appropriate 

context, with appropriate technical caveats noted in plain language. 

To provide decision makers with a sound basis for the Stafford Act funds 

needed for future disaster response programs, we recommend that the 

Administrator of EPA establish guidelines for developing program cost 

estimates. These cost estimates should support the programs’ objectives 

and promote the efficient and effective use of government resources. 

To ensure that EPA is better prepared for future disasters that involve 

indoor contamination and that it captures important information that 

could guide future cleanup decisions, we recommend that the 

Administrator of EPA, in concert with the Departments of Homeland 

Security, Health and Human Services, and Labor, and other appropriate 

federal agencies, develop protocols or memorandums of understanding 

under the National Response Plan that specifically address indoor 

contamination. These protocols should define when the extent of 

contamination is to be determined, as well as how and when indoor 

cleanups are to be conducted. EPA should seek additional statutory 

authority if it determines that such additional authority is necessary. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, EPA’s Assistant Administrator for 

Research and Development and Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste 

and Emergency Response identified actions that EPA has begun taking 

that are responsive to these recommendations. EPA also provided 

comments on aspects of the report it considered misleading or inaccurate,

such as our characterization of the Expert Technical Review Panel 

process, including the panel’s goals. Though EPA preferred that we 

present the charges identified by CEQ, we reported the goals that EPA 

provided directly to the expert panel at its first meeting, and we believe

this accurately characterizes the priorities that EPA established for the 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 32 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
panel. In addition, EPA asserted that the report creates a misleading 

impression that EPA did not fully disclose the limitations of test results 

from its first program. EPA refers to an appendix in its second plan, which 

includes a discussion of EPA’s methodology; raw data, such as the total 

number of samples taken; and the results of sampling efforts, but does not 

include a discussion of the factors that may have influenced these results. 

We continue to believe that EPA did not include appropriate caveats that 

clearly articulated the limitations in the results in its discussion, such as 

that 20 percent of eligible residents participated and, therefore, the results

may not have been representative of all residences. We believe that the 

report offers a balanced portrayal of EPA’s development of its second 

program, the expert panel process, and EPA’s actions to better prepare for 

future disasters. EPA also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. EPA’s letter and our detailed response to it 

appear in appendix V. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator, EPA; 

appropriate congressional committees; and other interested parties. In 

addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and of Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 

listed in appendix VI. 

John B. Stephenson 

Director, Natural Resources 

 and Environment 

Page 33 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix

Environ

Address the Wo

 I: Information Classified by the 

mental Protection Agency Does Not 

rld Trade Center 

Page 34 GAO-07-1091

Appendix I: Information Classified by the 

Environmental Protection Agency Does Not 

Address the World Trade Center 

Since the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given the authority 

to classify information in May 2002, it has classified information in three 

documents. However, none of these documents address the World Trade 

Center (WTC) or the environmental impact of its destruction.

In May 2002, through Executive Order 12958, the President gave the EPA 

Administrator the authority to classify information as “Secret.”1

 Section 1.4 

of the executive order, as amended,2 prescribes a uniform system for 

classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information, 

including information relating to defense against transnational terrorism. 

It also identifies the types of information that should be considered for 

classification: military plans, weapon systems, and operations; foreign 

government information; intelligence activities, sources, and methods, and 

cryptology; scientific, technological, and economic matters relating to the 

national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism; 

U.S. programs for safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities; 

vulnerabilities and capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, 

projects, plans, and protection services relating to the national security, 

which includes defense against transnational terrorism; and weapons of 

mass destruction. 

The executive order also describes several different classification types 

and levels. Original classification refers to the classification of information 

that has not already been classified by another authority. Derivative 

classification refers to the classification of a document that uses 

information that has already been classified. The levels of classification—

“Top Secret,” “Secret,” or “Confidential”—refer to the severity of national

security damage that disclosure of the information would result in. 

Since it received its classification authority in May 2002, EPA has 

originally classified information in three documents, according to EPA’s 

review of classified information, and identified 51 documents with 

derivative classification. This assessment concurs with our review of 

National Archives program data, as table 2 shows. 

EPA Received Authority to 

Classify Information 

Related to National 

Security in May 2002 

EPA Originally Classified 

Information in Three 

Documents 

 1

Delegation of this authority is in accordance with section 1.4 of Executive Order 12958, 

“Classified National Security Information.” 

2

Amended by Executive Order 13292 (March 2003). 

World Trade Center
Appendix I: Information Classified by the 

Environmental Protection Agency Does Not 

Address the World Trade Center 

Table 1: EPA Classification Decisions Pursuant to Executive Order 12958

Fiscal year 

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total

Original classification 0 0 0 1 2 0 3

Top secret 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Secret 0 0 0 0 1 0 1

Confidential 0 0 0 1 1 0 2

Derivative classification 0 0 0 0 5 46 51

Top secret 0 0 0 0 0 8 8

Secret 0 0 0 0 3 21 24

Confidential 0 0 0 0 2 17 19

Source: National Archives. 

In information that EPA submitted to the National Archives, it explained 

that, although EPA did not originally classify information in any 

documents in fiscal year 2006, the three documents containing originally

classified information significantly increased the number of derivative

classification decisions made by EPA because subsequent documents 

included the originally classified information. 

EPA has not classified any WTC information, including environmental 

information, according to our review of the three documents that EPA has 

classified. According to nonclassified portions of these three documents, 

they discuss threat scenarios for buildings, water systems and drinking 

water infrastructure, and water decontamination. 

Information EPA Originally 

Classified Does Not 

Concern the 

Environmental Impact of 

the WTC Collapse 

Page 35 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

We were asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) incorporated recommendations and additional 

input from the expert panel and its Inspector General in its second 

program; (2) what factors, if any, limited the expert panel’s ability to meet 

its goals; (3) the completeness of information EPA provided to the public

in its second plan; (4) the way EPA estimated the resources needed to

conduct the second program; and (5) the extent to which EPA has acted 

upon lessons learned to better prepare for indoor contamination that 

could result from future large-scale disasters. In addition, owing to 

concerns raised in the media about EPA’s use of classification authority, 

we were asked to determine the extent to which EPA has classified 

information, and, if so, whether any classified information discusses the 

environmental impact of the towers’ collapse. 

To examine EPA’s actions to incorporate recommendations and additional 

input from the expert panel and its Inspector General, we reviewed four 

Inspector General recommendations on EPA’s test and clean program; all 

13 WTC Expert Technical Review Panel meeting summaries, which 

included input from the WTC Community-Labor Coalition representatives 

to the panel and other panel members; and EPA’s 2002-2003 indoor test 

and clean program plan and all drafts leading to the 2006 program plan. 

We analyzed the December 2006 Final Test and Clean Plan to determine 

whether EPA had incorporated individual panel member and Inspector 

General input. We relied upon EPA’s summaries of the panel meetings to 

obtain information on individual panel member input because EPA did not 

have a comprehensive list of panel recommendations. We also conducted

interviews with EPA officials from headquarters (Washington, D.C.) and 

Region 2 (New York City) to identify actions EPA took to incorporate the 

expert panel and Inspector General input into the test and clean program 

plan. Finally, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 expert panel

members, as well as the two chairs of the WTC Expert Technical Review 

Panel. The expert panel members included community representatives, 

local and federal government officials from the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Labor’s Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration, the New York City’s Department of 

Environmental Protection and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,

and nongovernment members. 

To determine the factors that affected the expert panel’s ability to meet its 

goals, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 WTC expert panel 

members, as well as the two former EPA Assistant Administrators for the 

Office of Research and Development who chaired the panel. We analyzed

expert panel member and panel chair responses to both qualitative and 

Page 36 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology 

quantitative questions in order to describe the panel process and obtain 

information on EPA’s management of the process. In follow-up 

correspondence, we asked panel members whether EPA’s second program 

was responsive to the concerns of residents and workers; we were only 

able to obtain 10 panel member responses. We also reviewed all 13 panel 

meeting summaries and reviewed selected video or audio recordings of 

meetings. 

To evaluate the completeness of information EPA provided to the public in 

its second plan, we reviewed EPA’s 2002-2003 program plan and all drafts 

leading to the December 2006 program plan, information on testing data 

included on EPA’s Web site, the 2003 EPA Inspector General report, and 

all 13 summaries of EPA’s Expert Technical Review Panel meetings. 

To examine EPA efforts to estimate the resources needed to conduct the 

second program, we obtained and analyzed funding documentation, 

including interagency agreements between FEMA and EPA, as well as 

documentation related to funding and expenditure data for the WTC 

indoor test and clean program. We found discrepancies in the data EPA 

and FEMA provided. We assessed the reliability of expenditure data 

received from EPA but were unable to assess the reliability of expenditure 

data provided by FEMA. We assessed the reliability of the EPA

expenditure data by interviewing officials knowledgeable about the data 

and reviewing existing information about the data and the system that 

produced them. We determined that EPA’s funding data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of our review. We also interviewed agency

officials to gather information on EPA’s expenditures, its plans to spend 

funding, and whether EPA plans to seek additional funds. 

To examine the extent to which EPA has acted upon lessons learned for 

addressing indoor contamination resulting from future large-scale 

disasters, we interviewed officials from EPA headquarters, including the

Office of Research and Development and the Office of Solid Waste and 

Emergency Response; from Region 2, which is responsible for New York 

City; and from EPA’s National Homeland Security Research Center, among 

others. We compared EPA’s activities with the Inspector General’s 

recommendations on preparedness and with recommendations in EPA’s 

Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001.1

 We also 

attended a National Institute of Standards and Technology technical 

 1

EPA, Lessons Learned in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001 (February 2002). 

Page 37 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology 

seminar on WTC materials and observed the disaster area with a FEMA 

official. 

To determine the extent to which EPA has classified information, and, if 

so, whether any classified information discusses the environmental impact

of the towers’ collapse, we requested a statement from EPA on (1) 

whether any EPA officials, including former EPA Administrators, 

authorized by Executive Order 12958 to classify information as secret have

done so since the executive order was promulgated; and (2) whether any 

of the classified information pertains to the environmental impact of the

WTC collapse, including the indoor test and clean program, contaminants 

of potential concern, or geographic boundaries, that are relevant to EPA’s 

approach to addressing indoor contamination. After EPA responded, we 

requested access to and we reviewed all classified information to 

determine whether it was related to the WTC disaster. In addition, we 

obtained and reviewed data from the National Archives to determine the 

number of documents EPA has classified since receiving authority to do 

so. Appendix I provides the results of our analysis of EPA’s classification 

of information under this authority. 

We performed our work between June 2006 and September 2007 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 38 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix III: Comparison of EPA’s First and Appendix III: Comparison of EP Second Indoor Programs A’s First and 

Second Indoor Programs 

Activity 

World Trade Center residential dust cleanup 

program (2002-2003) 

Lower Manhattan indoor dust test and clean

program (December 2006) 

Agency roles New York City Department of Environmental

Protection 

• entered into contracts for cleaning and monitoring, 

as well as for a hotline to register residents for the 

program 

EPA 

• provided oversight of cleaning and testing and 

contracted for the analysis of samples collected by 

cleaning and monitoring contractors 

EPA only 

Contaminants tested Aira

• asbestos 

Air 

• asbestos 

• man-made vitreous fibers (MMVF)

Dust 

• asbestos 

• MMVF 

• polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 

• lead 

Sampling Air samples taken 

• 4,167 residential unitsb

• 28,702 total samples 

• 22,497 residential samples 

• 6,205 common area samples

Registrants 

• 272 residents and 25 building owners registered 

and filled out necessary paperwork to have 

sampling and, if necessary, cleanup conducted 

Cleaning Residents were offered a choice of services: either to 

have their residence professionally cleaned, followed

by confirmatory testing, or to have testing only. 

• 3,403 residential units cleaned

• 144 buildings’ common areas cleaned 

In general, a cleanup will be offered if a benchmark for 

any contaminant is exceeded in any unit or building 

common area tested. EPA will conduct surveys to 

determine if contamination levels exceeding 

benchmarks may be attributed to sources within or 

adjacent to the place of business or residence. This 

information will be considered with information on 

building cleaning history to determine whether 

additional sampling or further cleaning will be offered. 

Program boundaries • below Canal Street and west of Allen and Pike 

Streets based on the EPIC visualc

• below Canal Street and west of Allen and Pike 

Streets based on the EPIC visualc

Eligibility • residents: owners or renters 

• residential buildings: common areas, as well as 

evaluation of HVAC systems 

• residents: owners or renters 

• buildings: residential or commercial building 

common areas

• employees and employers not eligible 

Source: GAO.

a

Air samples were also analyzed for total fibers, including MMVF; however, this did not affect cleanup 

decisions. In a subset of residences, pre- and post-cleanup dust wipe samples were collected and 

analyzed for dioxin, mercury, lead, and 21 other metals. This included over 1,500 samples from 263 

residences and 157 buildings. 

Page 39 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix III: Comparison of EPA’s First and 

Second Indoor Programs 

b

Depending on the size of the residence, three to five air samples were collected. 

c

The targeted area was based, in part, on an analysis conducted by EPA’s Environmental 

Photographic Interpretation Center (EPIC) to determine the geographic extent of the dust and debris

produced by the collapse. 

Page 40 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix IV: Questions and Responses to the

Structured Interview Questions for the 

Expert Panel 

The body of this report generally identifies expert responses to our 

questions about EPA’s management of the panel process. The following 

tables include the full range of experts (out of 18) who responded to these 

questions. The tables also indicate the number of experts who provided no

response. 

Question: Was EPA’s decision to obtain individual recommendations 

rather than have the panel arrive at consensus appropriate? 

 Yes No

No 

response 

Lack of consensus approach 

was appropriate 2 13 3

Question: Did expert panel members have adequate agenda time for panel

discussion of issues? 

 Yes No

No 

response 

Adequate agenda time 4 14 0

Question: How transparent was EPA’s decision-making process behind 

changes in the test and clean plan versions? 

 

Completely 

transparent

Mostly 

transparent

Somewhat 

transparent 

Not at all 

transparent 

No 

response

Transparency of 

EPA’s decisionmaking process 

behind changes 

in the test and 

clean plan 1 4 4 9 0

Question: How helpful would it have been to have written transcripts of 

the meetings available? 

 

Very 

helpful 

Somewhat 

helpful 

Not helpful 

at all 

No 

response 

Helpfulness of written 

transcripts 6 4 7 1

Appendix IV: Questions and Responses to the 

Structured Interview Questions for the 

Expert Panel 

Page 41 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix IV: Questions and Responses to the

Structured Interview Questions for the 

Expert Panel 

Question: How successful do you think the panel was in meeting each of 

the following panel goals? 

Success meeting goals 

Goals

Very 

successful

Somewhat 

successful

Neither successful

nor unsuccessful

Somewhat 

unsuccessful

Very 

unsuccessful No response

Identify unmet public 

health needs 0 1 1 2 13 1

Identify any remaining 

risks using exposure 

and health surveillance 

information 0 3 4 2 9 0

Develop EPA’s second 

program 1 4 1 6 5 1

Determine steps to 

further minimize risks 2 4 2 1 7 2

Follow-up question: Is the Lower Manhattan Indoor Dust Test and Clean

Program Plan responsive to the concerns of residents and workers 

impacted by the collapse of the World Trade Center towers? 

 Yes No No response 

Responsiveness of EPA’s second program 0 10 8 

Source: GAO.

Note: Tables give the number of experts (out of 18) who indicated each rating. 

Page 42 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the Appendix V Environmental Protection Agency : Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 

See comment 1. 

See comments 2, 3, and 

4. 

Page 43 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comments 5 and 6. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 8. 

See comment 9. 

See comment 9. 

See comment 4. 

Page 44 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 10. 

See comment 11. 

See comment 12. 

Page 45 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 8. 

See comment 13. 

Page 46 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 14. 

Page 47 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 15. 

See comment 8. 

See comment 16. 

Page 48 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 17. 

See comment 18. 

Page 49 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency

See comment 19. 

See comment 10. 

Page 50 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 20. 

See comment 21. 

See comment 6. 

See comment 22. 

Page 51 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 23. 

See comment 7. 

See comment 24. 

Page 52 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 25. 

See comment 3. 

See comment 12. 

See comment 8. 

Page 53 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 26. 

See comment 27. 

See comment 28. 

Page 54 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 29. 

See comment 21. 

See comment 29. 

Page 55 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 9. 

Page 56 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Page 57 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Page 58 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 30. 

Page 59 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 21. 

See comment 6. 

Page 60 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 31. 

See comment 32. 

Page 61 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 3. 

See comment 4. 

See comment 4. 

See comment 33. 

Page 62 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 34. 

See comment 8. 

See comment 35. 

Page 63 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 36 

See comment 37. 

See comment 38. 

Page 64 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 13. 

See comment 13. 

Page 65 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 13. 

See comment 13. 

Page 66 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comment 6. 

See comment 33. 

Page 67 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

See comments 27 

and 39. 

Page 68 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

The following are GAO’s comments on the Environmental Protection 

Agency’s letter dated August 21, 2007.

1. We believe that the report offers a balanced portrayal of EPA’s 

development of its second program, the WTC Expert Technical Review 

Panel process, and EPA’s actions to better prepare for future disasters. 

In several cases we have clarified the language in the draft report to 

address EPA concerns.

GAO Comments 

2. In regard to EPA’s comments about the transparency of the WTC 

Expert Technical Review Panel process, we reported on the factors 

that limited the panel’s ability to meet its goals and not on the overall 

transparency of the process. We stated that two factors limited the 

panel’s ability to meet its goals: (1) EPA officials’ assertion that other 

agencies were better equipped to address public health and (2) EPA’s 

approach for managing the panel process. Regarding EPA’s 

management of the panel process, however, expert panel members told 

us that EPA did not have a transparent process for adopting or 

rejecting their recommendations, as we stated in the draft report. 

3. Regarding panel members’ views on the responsiveness of EPA’s 

second program to concerns of residents and workers, we clarified our 

report to note that the source of the views included all of the expert 

panel members who responded to a follow-up inquiry regarding this 

question. 

4. We disagree that the draft report provided panel member views in a 

misleading manner. However, we clarified the report language to 

indicate that 9 of 18 panel members reported that the decision-making 

process behind EPA’s changes to its plan were not at all transparent. 

In doing so, we reported the category with the largest number of 

responses and, as indicated in the draft report, the full range of 

responses can be found in appendix IV. As stated in the draft report, in 

order to determine the factors that affected the expert panel’s ability to 

meet its goals, we conducted structured interviews with all 18 expert 

panel members. We analyzed these responses in order to describe the 

panel process, including EPA’s management of the panel process. We 

reported the views that panel members provided to us during 

structured interviews and included the full range of responses to these 

questions in an appendix, as stated above. Regarding comments 

supporting inadequate time for decision making, panel members 

requested at the final panel meeting that EPA allow time for additional 

Page 69 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

discussion. According to the December 2005 meeting summary, the 

panel co-chair “summarized that the overall sense of the panel 

members is that there is a need for additional discussion.” 

5. We acknowledge that EPA would have preferred for us to include more 

detailed information in our discussion of the agency’s second WTC 

program, the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel process, and its 

programs for responding to disasters. However, the purpose of our 

report was not to reiterate the technical details of EPA’s efforts but to 

summarize specific findings related to our key objectives. 

6. EPA asserts that it conducted extensive monitoring and modeling after 

September 11, 2001, in order to determine the extent of contamination. 

We acknowledge that appendix I in EPA’s December 2006 plan states, 

“the plumes resulting from the collapse of the towers and subsequent 

fires were modeled by EPA” and that “EPA and many other agencies 

collected and analyzed environmental samples after the September 11, 

2001, attack on the WTC,” and we incorporated these facts in the 

report. However, when we asked EPA to identify which samples were 

taken indoors, EPA officials told us they did not have this information. 

Furthermore, in the body of EPA’s December 2006 program plan, EPA 

acknowledges that it is no longer attempting to assess the extent of 

WTC contamination. We maintain that the challenge of identifying the 

extent of WTC contamination in indoor spaces remains. 

7. We agree that neither EPA nor panel members suggested testing in 

inaccessible areas as a means of determining the adequacy of its 

cleanups. However, our statement was intended to convey our belief 

that if EPA had information about these areas, a more complete picture 

of both the extent of contamination and the adequacy of overall efforts 

directed toward cleaning and testing could be assessed. 

8. EPA takes issue with our assertion that EPA did not estimate the 

resources needed to carry out its second program. We believe that 

EPA did not conduct a cost estimate that identified the resources 

needed to effectively implement the second program. As EPA stated in 

comments, it provided information for potential contract costs for the 

second program; however, we continue to believe that the information 

was limited as it related to only one program component—sampling—

and it was unclear how the sampling costs related to an overall cost 

estimate. In EPA’s comments, it states that cost data provided in its 

interagency agreement constituted a cost estimate; however, 

information on key assumptions such as estimated participation rates 

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Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

as well as key program elements, including the cost of sampling, were 

not included. Further, the information provided in the interagency 

agreement was not the basis for determining whether $7 million in 

funding would be adequate for implementing the second program—as 

this amount had already been established as the remaining funds 

FEMA set aside for EPA’s use. In contrast, for its first program, EPA 

provided information in the interagency agreement with FEMA that 

included details associated with individual cost elements, such as 

sample analysis, equipment and supplies, and salary and travel costs. 

For example, EPA provided detailed estimates for analytical services 

based on key assumptions related to participation, samples per unit, 

and the testing for specific contaminants. EPA did not provide this 

information in the second interagency agreement to support its 

identification of resources needed for analytical activities. We note 

that the interagency agreement for EPA’s first program identified over 

$9 million for sampling and analysis of asbestos. While the second 

program is addressing three additional contaminants, the interagency

agreement has limited detail on the associated sampling and analysis 

costs or how these relate to the total funding of $7 million. 

9. EPA asserts that table 1 in the draft report (figure 5 in the final report) 

does not accurately characterize the IG recommendations and the 

relationship between them and the CEQ charges. As the draft report 

stated, table 1 in the draft report (figure 5 in the final report) showed 

key recommendations and additional input that the IG and panel 

members provided to EPA. We believe that the figure accurately 

presents both recommendations such as those found in Chapter 6 of 

the IG report, as well as input the IG provided in other sections of the 

report that supports these specific recommendations. The figure also 

presents input provided by panel members, which we believe is not 

documented comprehensively in other locations. 

10. In EPA’s comments, it notes that panel members were free to refocus 

issues, and our draft report acknowledged that EPA adopted panel 

members’ input to address contamination, rather than 

recontamination, of spaces. On page 8 of its comments, EPA took 

issue with our description of the panel’s goals. EPA provided the 

charges identified by CEQ in its October 27, 2003, letter to the agency. 

In our report, rather than present these charges, we instead reported 

goals that EPA directly provided to the expert panel at its first meeting 

on March 31, 2004. We believe this is an accurate characterization of 

the priorities EPA established for the panel. 

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Environmental Protection Agency 

11. In its comments, EPA states that the agency decided to implement a 

voluntary program to test and clean residences and whole buildings. In 

fact, when requested by building owners, the December 2006 program 

plan offers testing and cleaning in residential and commercial 

buildings’ common areas, but does not use the term “whole buildings.” 

12. EPA takes issue with our assessment that EPA failed to disclose the 

limitations in testing results. EPA refers to appendix I of its second 

plan and notes that it contains an “extensive discussion” of the results 

of the first program. The appendix includes a discussion of EPA’s 

methodology, raw data such as the total number of samples taken, and 

the results of sampling efforts but does not include a discussion of the 

limitations that may have influenced these results. EPA also notes that 

discussion of its first program’s test results were available in panel 

meeting summaries and on EPA’s WTC Web site; however, these 

sources summarized presentations made to the panel and responses to 

panel member comments but lacked the same discussion of limitations 

as EPA’s second program plan. We continue to believe that EPA did 

not include appropriate caveats that clearly articulated the limitations 

in the results in its discussion, such as that 20 percent of eligible 

residents participated and, therefore, the results may not have been 

representative of all spaces. Finally, GAO did not conclude that EPA 

withheld data, as EPA suggested in its comments. 

13. In EPA’s comments, EPA disagrees with our assessment that EPA has 

not demonstrated how it will overcome certain challenges identified by 

expert panel members. We acknowledge EPA’s analytical capabilities 

and the acute exposure guideline levels and other benchmarks that are 

available to EPA. We continue to believe that expert panel members 

raised valid issues regarding EPA’s second program following the WTC 

disaster, including what cleanup benchmarks EPA used, what 

contaminants EPA tested for, and EPA’s reliance on visual evidence. 

We believe these issues point to the need for protocols or interagency

agreements that clarify how EPA, along with other agencies, is to 

address indoor contamination in the future. Further, after reviewing 

the summary that EPA provided on pages 24 and 25 of its comments of 

the HVAC system evaluation process it employed, we continue to 

believe that this process is primarily a visual assessment and that we 

accurately portrayed panel member concerns with EPA’s reliance on

visual evidence rather than sample data for HVAC evaluations. 

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Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

14. We encourage EPA to complete and implement its Crisis 

Communication Plan’s companion resource guide, described in its 

comments, in a timely fashion. The public relies on EPA to provide 

accurate and complete information about environmental hazards that 

may affect them. Assuring that environmental data are presented in 

language that is easily understood and in easily accessible formats will 

improve the public’s ability to make informed decisions. 

15. We note that EPA’s comments indicated that since the WTC disaster, 

EPA has developed more detailed cost estimates to help plan the 

agency’s Stafford Act activities and that the agency is working to 

establish more specific reporting requirements. In order to more fully 

inform planning and to allow for the efficient allocation of disaster 

funds, we encourage the agency to continue these efforts. 

16. We recognized in our recommendation the role that DHS and other 

federal agencies would play in developing protocols and 

memorandums of understanding under the National Response Plan 

that specifically address indoor contamination. We acknowledge that 

EPA plays a critical role under Emergency Support Function 10 for 

addressing oil and hazardous waste releases. It is encouraging that 

EPA is pursuing a number of efforts related to chemical, biological, and 

radiological incidents, including the development of protocols that 

specifically address indoor contamination involving these types of 

agents. In addition to these areas, we believe that protocols specific to 

indoor contamination, which define when the extent of contamination 

is to be determined, as well as how and when indoor cleanups are to be 

conducted, should be priorities. 

17. We edited the sentence as suggested, but we note that the May 3, 2002,

letter from Christopher Ward, New York City Department of 

Environmental Protection, to Brad Gair, FEMA, refers specifically to 

asbestos. It states, “The City of New York believes that it is in the 

public’s interest to remove this material from buildings in the vicinity 

of the WTC site. Samples collected during the inspections indicate that 

asbestos [italics added] may be present in some of the debris. The 

removal of this material will assure that it will not become re-entrained 

in the air in the future, thereby protecting against any adverse affects 

on air quality or public health and safety.” 

18. We edited the sentence on residential sampling as suggested. 

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Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

19. EPA is concerned that we provided additional detail beyond the 

specific statement of IG recommendation 6-3. We believe our 

statement accurately characterizes the recommendation by taking into 

consideration other information in the IG report. Specifically, 

preceding this recommendation, the IG provides details that support 

this recommendation. The IG states on page 51 of its August 2003

report that “in the case of centralized HVAC systems, selective cleaning 

does not ensure that cleaned apartments will not be recontaminated by 

uncleaned apartments through the HVAC system. Consequently, the 

cleaning of contaminated buildings should proceed by treating the 

building as a system.” 

20. We included this information in our final report. 

21. EPA asserts that our discussions of EPA’s efforts to develop a WTC 

dust screening method are incorrect. We recognize that additional 

development would have been necessary to improve the precision and 

accuracy of the method and, in doing so, render the method usable as a 

WTC dust screening tool. Our draft report described the subpanel’s 

work to help EPA develop such a methodology and provided 

information about the peer review of the methodology. As indicated 

on page 18 of its comments, EPA suggested that its method was never 

intended to distinguish “WTC contaminants in dust.” Our draft report 

asserted that EPA was unable to develop a method for differentiating 

between normal background dust and WTC dust and therefore EPA 

was unable to determine the extent of WTC contamination. We believe 

the phrase “WTC contaminants in dust” is synonymous with dust 

contaminated with “WTC residue.” 

22. We included this information in our final report. 

23. EPA disagrees with our statement that EPA did not begin examining 

methods for differentiating between normal urban dust and WTC dust 

until May 2004. While multiagency workgroup and task force activities 

were related, EPA initiated its specific effort to develop a method for 

identifying a WTC dust signature after individual expert panel members 

recommended that it do so at its May 12, 2004, meeting. This decision 

is documented in a September 8, 2006, letter from the EPA Region 2 

Administrator to a Member of Congress that states, “As a result of 

these [panel] discussions, EPA decided to explore whether a WTC 

signature exists in dust.” We continue to believe that our statement is 

accurate. 

Page 74 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

24. We disagree that our statement regarding workplaces is misleading. 

Despite OSHA and NIOSH presentations made at panel meetings, we 

continue to have concerns because these agencies do not have 

authority to conduct cleanup in response to contaminant levels that 

exceed EPA’s site-specific cleanup benchmarks. Furthermore, our 

draft report stated that OSHA’s standards are designed primarily to 

address airborne contamination, while EPA’s test and clean program 

is designed to address contamination in building spaces, whether it is 

airborne or in settled dust. 

25. We disagree with EPA’s assertion that this statement creates the 

impression that other agencies were not addressing health-related 

issues. Our comments were limited to the panel’s ability to meet its 

goals, one of which was to identify unmet public health needs. While 

EPA’s facilitation of public health presentations may have provided 

information about health issues, all but two expert panel members 

told us that the panel did not successfully identify unmet public health 

needs. We did not address the quality of the WTC Health Registry or 

other agencies’ public health activities. 

26. The source of the office and residential building data is the May 12, 

2004, panel meeting summary posted on EPA’s Web site. The

summary identifies a New York City Department of Buildings 

database from which EPA drew this information. 

27. The draft report provided basic facts and background information 

about EPA’s first program that were derived from EPA’s December 

2006 program plan and other EPA reports in order to provide context

for the development of the second program. 

28. EPA takes issue with our draft regarding our characterization of the 

availability of sample results from the New York City Department of 

Health and Mental Hygiene and the Agency for Toxic Substances and

Disease Registry’s study. In fact, our draft report provided a footnote 

pointing out the results of the study were made available to EPA in 

February 2002. 

29. EPA said the dates we provided in a timeline of events did not 

accurately portray when the results of agency studies were available 

for its use. We provided publication dates for three EPA studies in 

our timeline to illustrate the range of activities that EPA engaged in 

prior to its second program. EPA also asserted that there was no 

single date for reoccupation of residences. In fact, our timeline 

Page 75 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

specifically includes the date, 9/17/2001, that New York City residents 

began to reoccupy homes and Wall Street was reopened. 

30. As suggested, we replaced the term “cleanup standards” with “cleanup

benchmarks” and we expanded our discussion of how these 

benchmarks were developed. 

31. EPA asserts that our statement is incorrect because it omits 

discussion of cleaning in common areas. We acknowledge that EPA 

will clean in common areas under certain circumstances; however, 

the context of this discussion was the panel members’ 

recommendations that EPA clean in HVACs. 

32. We believe that the draft report correctly presents the IG 

recommendation, what EPA considered, and the agency’s rationale 

for not electing to pursue a sampling approach that would have 

addressed whole buildings; however, we clarified the report’s 

language to include more detail regarding EPA’s proposed approach. 

The July 26, 2004, panel meeting summary supports our description of 

how EPA considered various approaches. While EPA said that its 

intent was not to characterize buildings but rather to use the 

information from buildings “to characterize areas,” the meeting 

summary includes a presentation by an EPA official on a sampling 

approach that involved “...conducting air and dust sampling in several 

units within the building to characterize the building.” Further, we 

disagree with EPA’s explanation of why its proposal to do so was 

rejected by panel members and the public. Panel members rejected 

the aspect of the plan that would have limited the sampling to the 

same residences that participated in EPA’s first program, as panel 

members wanted the plan to allow for sampling in residences that had 

not participated previously. Thus, EPA’s assertion in its comments 

that the panel members rejected EPA’s approach because it was 

addressing whole buildings is not accurate. 

33. We clarified this statement in the report, noting that EPA did not 

maintain a list of recommendations; however, we continue to believe

that the meeting summaries maintained by EPA did not constitute 

comprehensive documentation of recommendations made by expert 

panel members. 

34. We disagree that our discussion of overloaded samples is incorrect; 

however, we clarified report language to indicate that sample results, 

rather than samples, were discarded and that dust particles, rather 

Page 76 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

than fibers, obscured analysis. In EPA’s final report from its first 

program, the agency states, “there were a number of outcomes that 

resulted in inconclusive results. Filter overload was the most 

common. Filter overload occurs when too many dust particles are 

captured on the filter. The filter becomes obscured so technicians 

examining it under a microscope cannot separate out individual 

fibers. This causes an inconclusive result, which is discarded.” In its 

second program plan, EPA does not present this information in its 

description of its first program’s test results. We continue to believe 

that this information would have provided additional context to the 

public. 

35. EPA disagrees with our assessment that EPA guidance has not yet 

addressed how the agency will determine the extent of contamination 

resulting from disasters. We acknowledge that EPA has built its 

capacity to address contamination since the WTC disaster and that it 

continues to work to develop additional sampling methods. In fact, 

the draft report provided examples of research EPA is conducting, 

benchmarks EPA is developing, and other preparedness activities that 

EPA has undertaken. However, we do not believe that existing 

guidance or protocols have provided additional assurances that EPA 

has addressed the challenges it faced from 2004 to 2005 when working 

to develop a reliable screening method for WTC dust. 

36. As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding the Environmental 

Response Team. 

37. As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding environmental 

laboratory networks. 

38. As suggested, we edited the sentence regarding acute exposure 

guideline levels. 

39. EPA noted matters for correction in an appendix that provides 

background information on EPA’s first and second programs. We 

edited the statement regarding EPA’s role in the first program, as 

suggested. However, we note that in its final report on its first 

program EPA states, “contractors cleaned and tested homes, under 

the direction of the EPA.” In addition, our draft report included a 

table note referring to the subset of 263 residences that EPA tested for 

additional contaminants, and we have added detail regarding total 

fibers. For common areas, the draft report included the number of 

samples taken from common areas, and it also notes that 144 

Page 77 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix V: Comments from the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

buildings had common areas cleaned. We clarified the appendix III 

language regarding geographic extent to note that the appendix

provides program boundaries. 

Page 78 GAO-07-1091 World Trade Center
Appendix VI: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 79 GAO-07-1091

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

John B. Stephenson, (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Diane B. Raynes, Assistant 

Director; Janice Ceperich; Michele Fejfar; Brandon H. Haller; Katheryn 

Summers Hubbell; Karen Keegan; Omari Norman; Carol Herrnstadt 

Shulman; and Sandra Tasic made major contributions to this report. 

Additional assistance was provided by Katherine M. Raheb. 

World Trade Center

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360865) 
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