Now that the files are open and accessible, it's up to

us to use them to write a fuller history of Japan's

wartime actions. It's an important task, and this book

is the place to begin. 

CAROL GLUCK, George Sansom 

Professor of History, Columbia University

This volume will be both essential reading and a

major reference tool for those interested in the war

in the Pacific, United States intelligence in and after

that conflict, and Japanese war crimes as known and

understood at the time.

GERHARD WEINBERG, Professor 

Emeritus of History, University of North Carolina

Finally, after sixty years, our records on Japan have

been indexed, and some documents that have been

hiding in plain sight can now be located with superb

finding aids. Pacific War veterans and their descendants will especially appreciate this roadmap to

America's very personal war. 

LINDA GOETZ HOLMES, author of Unjust Enrichment:

How Japan's Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs

and 4000 Bowls of Rice: A Prisoner of War Comes Home

$19.95
Introductory Essays

o

Researching Japanese War Crimes Records
Edward Drea 

Greg Bradsher

Robert Hanyok

James Lide

Michael Petersen

Daqing Yang

Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records 

Interagency Working Group

Washington, DC

Introductory Essays

o

Researching Japanese War Crimes Records
Published by the National Archives and Records Administration for the Nazi War Crimes and 

Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2006 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Researching Japanese war crimes records : introductory essays / Edward Drea ... [et al.].

 p. cm.

 Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN: 1-880875-28-4

 1. World War, 1939-1945—Atrocities — Japan--Sources. 2. World War, 1939-1945—

Destruction and pillage—Japan—Sources. 3. War crimes--Japan--Sources. 4. United States. 

National Archives and Records Administration. I. Drea, Edward J., 1944- II. United States. 

Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group. 

D804.J3R396 2006

940.54’05072—dc22

2006027580
“In a world of conflict, a world of victims and executioners, it is the job of 

thinking people not to be on the side of the executioners.” 

— Albert Camus
o

Contents

About the Cover: Diary of a Japanese Army Medical Doctor, 1937....................... ix

Daqing Yang 

1. Introduction .................................................................................................. 3

Edward Drea

2. Documentary Evidence and the Studies of Japanese War Crimes: An Interim 

Assessment.....................................................................................................21

Daqing Yang

3. Recently Declassified Records at the U.S. National Archives Relating to Japanese 

War Crimes....................................................................................................57

James Lide

4. Japanese War Crimes Records at the National Archives: Research Starting 

Points ............................................................................................................79

NARA staff

5. Wartime COMINT Records in the National Archives about Japanese War 

Crimes in the Asia and Pacific Theaters, 1978–1997 ...................................111

Robert Hanyok

6. The Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records Relating to War 

Crimes, 1942-1945......................................................................................151

Greg Bradsher

7. A “Constantly Recurring Irritant”: Returning Captured and Seized Japanese 

Records, 1946-1961.....................................................................................169

Greg Bradsher

8. The Intelligence that Wasn’t: CIA Name Files, the U.S. Army, and Intelligence 

Gathering in Occupied Japan ......................................................................197

Michael Petersen

About the Contributors ......................................................................................231
Diary of a Japanese Army Medical Doctor, 1937

Daqing Yang

About the cover

The diary was compact: a total of fifty-six pages in a 3x5” notebook that fit easily inside 

a pocket.* Its author, Hosaka Akira, was an army medical doctor attached to the 3rd 

Infantry Battalion, 20th Regiment, 16th Division in the Shanghai Expedition Army. 

The diary begins on August 24, 1937, when “mobilization was ordered at 4 pm.” It 

ends on December 7, a day when fighting lasted from morning till night, and soldiers 

became very tired. At that time, Hosaka’s unit was in the vicinity of Nanjing, the capital 

of China, which would fall a week later and subsequently draw world attention for the 

massive atrocities committed there by the Japanese troops, an event widely known as the 

“Rape of Nanking.” 

Roughly a week before the diary ended abruptly, Hosaka recorded the following:

At 10:00 on 29 November 1937 we left to clean out the enemy in Chang Chou and at 

noon we entered the town. An order was received to kill the residents and eighty (80) of 

them, men and women of all ages, were shot to death [at dusk]. I hope this will be the last 

time I’ll ever witness such a scene. The people were all gathered in one place. They were all 

praying, crying, and begging for help. I just couldn’t bear watching such a pitiful spectacle. 

Soon the heavy machine guns opened fire and the sight of those people screaming and 

falling to the ground is one I could not face even if I had had the heart of a monster. War 

is truly terrible. [Allied Translator and Interpreter Section translation.]

An examination of the original entry reveals that this page had been cut loose by a 

sharp object at some point. It is likely that the author removed this page when he returned 

to Japan during the war for fear that it might cause trouble with military censors. 

* The diary is found in NA, RG 153, entry 180, War Crimes Branch, China War Crimes File, 

1945-48, box 5, folder: Field Diary Kept by Member of Japanese Medical Corps. 
x I Researching Japanese War Crimes

In late 1945, Hosaka sent the diary by registered mail to Col. Alva C. Carpenter, head 

of the legal section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). He left 

his return address on the envelope. To make his handwriting legible, Hosaka copied the 

November 29 entry in clearer handwriting on a separate sheet of paper, which was then 

attached to the opposite page in the diary. 

The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal investigated atrocities committed by the Japanese 

Army in the Rape of Nanking. SCAP dispatched Col. Carpenter to China to gather 

evidence. Hosaka’s diary was apparently not included in the evidence for the prosecution. 

Despite his reference to a major atrocity against Chinese civilians a week before the battle 

of Nanjing and in the general vicinity, officially the Rape of Nanking began on December 

13th, the day the city fell, and was spatially confined to Nanjing and its immediate 

vicinity. 

In the early 1980s, Japanese journalist Honda Katsuichi claimed that the brutal 

behavior of Japanese troops in Nanjing was by no means an isolated incident as some in 

Japan claimed. Instead, it fit into a pattern of Japanese atrocities in the Lower Yangtze 

area against Chinese since the battle of Shanghai. Honda came to this conclusion after 

extensive interviews with Chinese survivors and examining existing Japanese records.

Hosaka’s diary of the Japanese atrocity in Changzhou has been corroborated by several 

Japanese sources that became available in recent years. The diary of Makihara Nobuo was 

discovered by a Japanese citizen group and published in 1988 together with the diaries 

of several other veterans. Makihara, a twenty-two year old private first class belonging 

to the 3rd Platoon of the Machine Gun Company of the 20th Infantry Regiment, 16th 

Division, wrote on November 29, 1937: 

Depart from the village at 9:00 a.m. Various units compete to enter the town. The tank 

unit also starts. In contrast with yesterday, there are no traces of the enemy at all. Enter 

the town magnificently, passing an impressive temple (even though there are many temples 

in China)...

Because Wu Jing is an anti-Japanese stronghold, we carry out “mopping up” [sōtō] 

operations in the entire town, killing all men and women without distinction. The enemy 

is nowhere to be seen, either because they have lost the will to fight after their defense line 

at Wu Xi was breached or they are holding strong positions further ahead. So far I haven’t 

seen a town so impressive as this one...

A squad leader in the Machine Gun Company of the 3rd Battalion (where Hosaka 

also served) named Kitayama also published his diary but did not record the massacre 

on that same day. This was probably due to the fact that he and another soldier went 
About the Cover I xi

sightseeing near the hills. However, Kitayama did write that “our comrades did something 

atrocious.” He then noted, “people of the enemy country are really pitiful. I don’t 

even want to hear such tales.” When Japanese journalist Shimozato Masaki interviewed 

Kitayama in 1987, he admitted that the machine gun company had killed several dozen 

Chinese civilians in Changzhou.

The diary of Hosaka Akira establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that a massacre 

of some eighty Chinese civilians was carried out by order by a Japanese unit equipped 

with heavy machine guns. The same unit almost certainly also took part in the battle 

of Nanjing. It reconfirms the argument, first advanced by Japanese journalist Honda 

Katsuichi, that the Rape of Nanking was not an isolated incident, but fit into a pattern 

of atrocities since the battle of Shanghai. 
Introductory Essays

Researching Japanese 

War Crimes Records
1

Introduction

Edward Drea

Japanese war crimes committed in Asia and the Pacific between 1931 and 1945 

concerned few Americans in the decades following World War II. Japan’s crimes against 

Asian peoples had never been a major issue in the postwar United States, and—with 

the notable exceptions of former U.S. prisoners of war held by the Japanese—even 

remembrance of Japanese wartime atrocities against Americans dimmed as years 

passed.1 

American attitudes about Japanese war crimes changed markedly following the 

1997 publication of Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking.

2

 Chang’s moving testament to 

the Chinese victims of the sack of Nanjing in 1937 graphically detailed the horror and 

scope of the crime and indicted the Japanese government and people for their collective 

amnesia about the wartime army’s atrocious conduct. The bestselling book spurred a 

tremendous amount of renewed interest in Japanese wartime conduct in China, Korea, 

the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. 

The Rape of Nanking raised many issues that demanded further explanation. Why 

were the Japanese not punished as severely as the Nazis for their crimes? Did the United 

States suppress evidence of the criminal responsibility of activity by the emperor to ensure 

a smoothly running occupation of Japan? Did the U.S. government protect Japanese 

medical officers in exchange for data on human experimentation? 

Chang also charged the U.S. government with “inexplicably and irresponsibly” 

returning confiscated wartime records to Japan before microfilming them, making it 

impossible to determine the extent of Japan’s guilt.3 Others were convinced that the U.S. 

government retained highly classified documents that would prove Japanese guilt beyond 

doubt and implicate the highest levels of Japanese government and society in the crimes. 

I am indebted to Carol Gluck and Gerhard Weinberg for their insightful comments on this essay.
4 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

These issues led concerned parties to investigate Japanese wartime records among the 

holdings at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College 

Park, Maryland, and at other U.S. government agencies. Thorough documentation of 

Japanese war crimes and criminal activities among these holdings seemed unavailable, 

leading to speculation of an official cover-up. Suspicions that the U.S. government was 

deliberately concealing dark secrets were fueled when, instead of finding the records 

they sought, researchers encountered a card stating the records had been “withdrawn for 

security reasons,” as well as when they received a notice that requested information could 

not be located. 

Motivated by Chang’s assertions, disparate groups who had struggled to raise 

awareness of Japanese crimes and win justice for the victims were galvanized in their 

pursuit of answers and documentation. Armed with this latest evidence and capitalizing 

on a heightened consciousness in the United States about Japanese wartime crimes, 

victims and advocates pressed their cases with more determination and with greater 

popular and political support than had been the case in years prior. 

American veterans who had been held captive by the Japanese renewed claims for 

justice and recompense, and wanted an official apology from the Japanese government 

for the institutionalized brutality under which they suffered during their long years 

in captivity. Others asserted that they had been the victims of diabolical human 

experiments conducted under the auspices of the Japanese Army’s notorious Unit 731, 

whose military medical doctors and specialists, under the command and direction of Lt. 

Gen. Ishii Shirō,4 carried out army-sponsored experiments on humans for the purpose of 

developing effective biological warfare weapons.5

The controversy over the Japanese Army’s system of coercing young women to 

work as prostitutes in army field brothels, the so-called “comfort women” issue, had 

been simmering, especially in South Korea. The 1994 publication of George Hicks’ The 

Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War

presented the issues in the English language and described the coerced women’s attempts 

to gain restitution from Japan.6 By the late 1990s, the plight of “comfort women” had 

erupted into front-page news in the United States and became a lodestone for women’s 

rights advocates and other groups demanding the Japanese government acknowledge 

responsibility for these wartime abuses of human rights. 

The People’s Republic of China, which unquestionably suffered the worst depredations 

during the Japanese occupation and war from 1937 to 1945, was a persistent critic of the 

Japanese government’s attitude toward the plunder, arson, and widespread killing that 

characterized Japan’s occupation of vast sections of China. In the 1990s, Chinese victims 

of Japanese experiments, American veterans held in Japanese prisoner-of-war camps in 
Introduction I 5

Manchuria, and Chinese-Americans also found their pent-up grievances expressed in 

Chang’s narrative. 

Japan was also called to account for its wartime use of slave labor or coerced workers. 

During the war years, the Japanese government forcibly removed workers from Korea, 

China, and elsewhere in Asia and shipped them to Japan as unpaid labor for dangerous 

work in coal mines and for heavy construction. American POWs were also subjected 

to brutal labor details that were illegal according to the Geneva Convention protocols 

governing the rights of prisoners. Filipino, Indonesian, and Dutch victims added their 

voices to a swelling protest against the Japanese government’s refusal to acknowledge 

these crimes. 

When confronted by advocacy and human rights groups, the Japanese government 

insisted these issues had been settled by stipulations of the peace treaty signed in San 

Francisco in September 1951.7 Nothing more needed to be said on the matter. Not only 

did Japanese authorities refuse to acknowledge any wartime responsibility, but several 

conservative politicians and senior bureaucrats went so far as to publicly denounce the 

accusations as groundless historical revisionism and Japan bashing. There was, of course, 

a domestic political dimension to the accusations (no candidate from the conservative 

ruling party could win an election by blaming Japan for a war of aggression), but the hardline official Japanese position created the impression in the United States that Japanese 

war crimes and related subjects such as war guilt or the role of Emperor Hirohito in the 

war were taboo subjects in Japan. 

Ian Buruma’s the Wages of Guilt (1994) compares responses to war crimes in postwar 

Germany and Japan.8 According to Buruma, Germany publicly accepted responsibility 

for the evils perpetrated by the Nazi regime and educated future generations by discussing 

its sordid Nazi history in school textbooks and classes. Germany apologized to various 

European nations and Israel. Conversely, Japan rejected responsibility, downplayed the 

historical evidence of aggression and atrocity in its schools with sophistry and euphemism, 

and apologized to no one. Worse yet, ultra-conservative Japanese commentators insisted 

the war crimes, if they happened at all, were exaggerated to embarrass the Japanese 

people. 

Although the Japanese have not confronted their wartime conduct as the Germans 

have, there has been a popular and an academic reaction to the Japanese government’s 

denials. As Daqing Yang points out in chapter 2, scholars and special interest groups in 

Japan have pursued the topic of Japanese war crimes with academic rigor, fervor, and 

commitment. Such views appear regularly in mainstream Japanese publications, although 

most of this work has had little impact in the West because it remains untranslated. 

A notable exception is Honda Katsuichi’s graphic and highly controversial description 
6 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

of Japanese Army atrocities in central China, which was published in 1972 in Japan, 

but not translated into English until 1999. Japanese writers, historians, and authors 

freely publish their work in mass circulation media where it is widely read and openly 

commented upon in a wide variety of opinion journals and the press. 

The rise of concern about Japanese war crimes in the 1990s reinforced the notion that 

most Japanese war criminals escaped punishment, either because the U.S. government 

needed their cooperation against the Soviet Union during the early days of the Cold War, 

or to appease current Japanese economic and commercial interests. Unfortunately, some 

Japanese war criminals were not punished. Perhaps the most notorious was Gen. Ishii 

of Unit 731, who escaped postwar prosecution in exchange, apparently, for supplying 

the U.S. government with details of his gruesome human experiments. Other suspected 

Japanese war criminals who were never indicted include three postwar prime ministers: 

Hatoyama Ichirō (1954–1956), Ikeda Hayato (1960–1964), and Kishi Nobusuke 

(1957). A convicted Class A war criminal, Shigemitsu Mamoru, a senior diplomat and 

foreign minister during the war years, regained the foreign minister portfolio in 1954. 

The controversial treatment of Emperor Hirohito by occupation authorities was a subject 

of debate in Japan and elsewhere since the late 1940s, and especially since the early 1990s 

in the United States. 

Although many notorious war criminals went unpunished and lived prosperous 

and prestigious lives, it is important to recognize that thousands of Japanese war crimes 

were prosecuted. Twenty-eight Class A war criminals accused of crimes against peace, 

conventional war crimes, and crimes against humanity included many of Japan’s wartime 

leaders, such as Prime Minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, 

the counterpart of Nuremberg, began in May 1946 and ended in November 1948 with 

the conviction of twenty-five of these defendants. Seven, including Tōjō, were hanged, 

sixteen were sentenced to life imprisonment (of whom four died in prison), and two 

received lesser terms. Of the three remaining, two died during the proceedings, and 

one was declared unfit for trial. The Japanese government paroled all those imprisoned 

by 1956 and the Foreign Ministry released them unconditionally in April 1958. Allied 

nations also held war crimes trials throughout Asia and the Pacific. Americans, British, 

Australians, Dutch, French, Filipinos, and Chinese held trials at forty-nine locations 

between October 1945 and April 1956. The British prosecuted numerous Japanese for 

war crimes in Southeast Asia, including those involved in the construction of the ThaiBurma railway of death, immortalized as the Bridge over the River Kwai. Australian 

prosecutors worked in conjunction with British and American courts to bring Japanese 

to justice and tried large numbers of Japanese at Amboina, Dutch East Indies, and at 

Rabaul, New Britain. China tried at least 800 defendants, including some involved in 
Introduction I 7

the Nanjing massacre. France and the Netherlands tried several hundred more. The 

French brought to justice a Japanese civilian on Java who forced dozens of women into 

prostitution for the military authorities, and the Dutch condemned Japanese to death 

for the murder of indigenous people and Dutch prisoners.9 In late 1949 at Khabarovsk, 

the Soviet Union also put twelve Japanese on trial for biological warfare crimes—six 

were members of Unit 731, two of Unit 100, an independent biological warfare entity, 

and four from elsewhere—and later transferred several hundred Japanese ex-servicemen 

suspected of war crimes to the People’s Republic of China, where Chinese authorities 

judged them in the mid-1950s. Of 5,379 Japanese, 173 Taiwanese, and 148 Koreans 

tried as class B and C war criminals for conventional crimes, violations of the laws of 

war, rape, murder, maltreatment of prisoners of war, about 4,300 were convicted, almost 

1,000 sentenced to death, and hundreds given life imprisonment.10 

Documentation of these trials has never been compiled into one source, or at one site. 

The Allied nations naturally gathered Japanese documents for their respective tribunals, 

resulting in the disbursement of Japanese records among the various nations of the Allied 

World War II coalition. Japanese unit records and documents held by the People’s 

Republic of China or the former Soviet Union were, with few exceptions, unobtainable 

in the West because of Cold War realities. Even the handful that reached the West 

during this period was so encumbered with communist Cold War propaganda that many 

questioned their veracity. For example, when the Soviets published the official court 

proceedings in 1950 of the December 1949 trials in Khabarovsk, they included Unit 731 

related documents, but many in the West dismissed the verdicts along with the evidence 

as another in a series of long-running Stalinist show trials.11 With the dissolution of the 

former Soviet Union in December 1991 and positive change in United States–China 

relations, information about war crimes became somewhat more accessible, but still very 

limited. Diligent efforts in Japan have uncovered extensive documentation related to 

Unit 731 and other war crimes, but the amount of material still remaining classified is 

unknown. By the late 1990s, many people focused on whether the U.S. government still 

had classified material about Japanese war crimes, and, if so, whether it would implicate 

other Japanese who had escaped justice.

Declassifying U.S. Documents on Japanese War Crimes

Responding to these concerns, on December 6, 2000, Congress passed the Japanese 

Imperial Government Disclosure Act (Public Law 106-567), which put to rest any 

doubt that U.S. records relating to Japanese war crimes were included under the aegis of 

the 1998 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act (Public Law 105-246). The implementing 

directive ordered the Interagency Working Group (IWG) “to locate and disclose, subject 
8 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

to the statute’s exceptions,” any classified U.S. government documents pertaining to 

Japanese war crimes and to recommend their declassification and release to the public. 

President Clinton appointed IWG members from the major government agencies holding 

classified records as well as three outside members to represent the public. The Japanese 

Imperial Government Records Disclosure Act provided for a fourth public member, but 

none was appointed. IWG public members, Thomas H. Baer, Richard Ben-Veniste, and 

Elizabeth Holtzman, gave willingly of their valuable time. Their shared characteristic was 

a determination to make the record available to the American people. It is in large measure 

thanks to their efforts that the work of the IWG met with cooperation and success. It was 

due to their persistence that the CIA redoubled its search efforts and released additional 

information on Japanese war criminals. Special acknowledgment is due to Senators Mike 

DeWine and Dianne Feinstein and Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, who supported 

the IWG’s work in Congress and worked with the IWG to elicit the full cooperation of 

the CIA in the search effort. The NARA staff members who worked on the Japanese 

portion of the IWG project under the able direction of David Van Tassel were responsive 

to authors’ queries, unfailingly provided requested materials, and searched collections 

meticulously to identify still-classified items. In particular, without the professional 

expertise of Senior Archivists William Cunliffe and Richard Myers and their superior 

working knowledge of the massive collections, the IWG could not have accomplished 

its goals. The distinguished IWG Historical Advisory Panel (HAP), chaired by Gerhard 

Weinberg, always provided sound guidance as the IWG navigated among record groups, 

constituencies, and politics. Professor Carol Gluck, a member of the HAP, provided 

insight into Japan’s wartime experience and also suggested the substantive approach of 

this volume. Steven Garfinkel, chair of the IWG, unfailingly identified sensitive issues 

during the search period, brought them to the attention of the public members and HAP, 

and acted to ensure they were expeditiously addressed. Larry Taylor, IWG executive 

director, skillfully managed the multiple day-to-day administrative responsibilities of the 

IWG, ensuring it functioned smoothly.

The government agencies that reviewed their classified record holdings for 

documents pertinent to Japanese war crimes were the CIA, the Department of the Army, 

the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the FBI, NARA, the 

Department of State, the National Security Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well 

as the non-FBI components of the Department of Justice, the U.S. Information Agency, 

and the National Security Council. 

An estimated 8 million pages of documents were declassified under the Nazi War 

Crimes Disclosure Act, whereas significantly fewer pages—100,000—were released 

under the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act. There are many reasons for this 
Introduction I 9

discrepancy, most of which fall under two overarching explanations. First, the United 

States originally confiscated fewer documents pertinent to Japanese war crimes than to 

Nazi war crimes. Second, by the time the disclosure laws were signed, far fewer World 

War II Japanese documents than Nazi documents remained classified by U.S. agencies. 

Factors Influencing the Number of Documents in U.S. Possession

U.S. government agencies held far fewer records pertaining to Japanese war crimes than to 

Nazi war crimes. A major reason is that at war’s end, the Japanese destroyed or concealed 

important documents, which dramatically reduced the amount of evidence available 

for confiscation by U.S. authorities. How could this happen? At the time the Third 

Reich surrendered in May 1945, Allied armies occupied almost every inch of Germany. 

Document collection teams and specialists were on the scene and already confiscating 

Nazi records for use in announced war crimes trials. While the Germans, beginning 

in 1943, did engage in substantial efforts to obliterate evidence of such crimes as mass 

murder, and they destroyed a great deal of potentially incriminating records in 1945, a 

great deal survived, in part because not each one of the multiple copies had been burned. 

The situation was different in Japan. Between the announcement of a ceasefire on August 

15, 1945, and the arrival of small advance parties of American troops in Japan on August 

28, Japanese military and civil authorities systematically destroyed military, naval, and 

government archives, much of which was from the period 1942–1945. Imperial General 

Headquarters in Tokyo dispatched enciphered messages to field commands throughout 

the Pacific and East Asia ordering units to burn incriminating evidence of war crimes, 

especially offenses against prisoners of war. The director of Japan’s Military History 

Archives of the National Institute for Defense Studies estimated in 2003 that as much as 

70 percent of the army’s wartime records were burned or otherwise destroyed.12 

A report filed by the 27th Marines, 

5th Marine Division, on September 

24, 1945, documents the systematic 

destruction of records by the Japanese 

after the initial surrender to the Allies 

but before Allied troops arrived. NA, 

RG 127, entry 1011, box 23, folder: 

Intelligence–Japanese. 
10 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Nevertheless, some important records survived by chance. Documents discovered in 

an old safe in the burned-out Navy Ministry turned out to be Imperial Navy planning 

and policy papers from the 1930s. The salvaged materials reposed with the Metropolitan 

Police Agency in Tokyo, which transferred them in 1955 to the cabinet archives. They 

remained there until 1968, when the Defense Agency’s National Institute for Defense 

Studies took control of the collection.13 

Japanese authorities also willfully concealed other wartime records. During the Allied 

occupation, former Col. Hattori Takushirō, a wartime senior staff officer at Imperial 

General Headquarters, ordered subordinates to conceal key policy and operational 

documents from occupation authorities. Once the occupiers departed, Hattori intended 

to write a factual history of Japan’s war based on the important concealed materials. 

Individuals also hid official documents or personal diaries, some of which came to light 

only decades later. For example, in 1989, Kaikōsha, the association of former Imperial 

Japanese Army officers, published a history of the Nanjing operations together with a 

two-volume collection of contemporary military documents pertinent to the campaign.14

These had not been previously available to the public. Disturbing excerpts from December 

1937 entries in the diary of Lt. Gen. Nakajima Kesago, commander of the 16th Division 

at Nanjing, were published in a mass circulation monthly magazine in the early 1980s, 

with permission of the family.15 These enormously valuable documents, however, had 

never been in the possession of U.S. authorities. 

The compartmentalization of the war in Asia also diminished the possibility that one 

nation would end up with the lion’s share of Japanese documentation. Unlike the German 

case, there was no one central repository for Asia-specific war crimes documentation. 

British Empire forces, for example, took charge of Japanese materials in Southeast Asia. 

Returning colonial authorities in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies gathered material 

for their war crimes trials. As many as 40,000 U.S. Marines garrisoned transportation 

centers in north China from October 1945 into 1947 and accepted the surrender of 

Japanese units, but otherwise there was little U.S. presence in the huge country, and U.S. 

units collected relatively few Japanese documents from China. The continuation of the 

civil war between the central government and the Communists complicated efforts to 

secure documentation in China. The Chinese central government confiscated Japanese 

material in 1945; the victorious Chinese Communists, in turn, seized it from them 

in 1949. The Soviet Union also captured important records about Unit 731 and the 

Japanese Army when it overran Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945. Sixty 

years later some of this documentation was still coming to light. In August 2005, for 

instance, the Chinese publicized detailed research findings based on previously unavailable 

Unit 731 documents, and in Japan two of Gen. Ishii’s notebooks with brief entries for 
Introduction I 11

August 1945 and January through November 1946 were made public.16 Thus, archival 

material remains fragmented, and while the United States might hold a large amount 

of Japanese navy or government archival material, many Japanese Army files apparently 

remained in the possession of other Allied nations or in Japanese hands concealed from 

the Occupation authorities. 

Factors Influencing the Number of Documents Still Classified

Many records relating to the war in Asia were declassified long before the Disclosure Acts 

were passed, leaving fewer classified records to review. Because much of the material from 

the European Theater dealt with the former Soviet Union or its eastern European satellites, 

it was regarded as useful after the War; records that concerned intelligence sources and 

methods were considered indispensable during the Cold War. As a result, an enormous 

number of these documents remained security classified until the IWG’s review. The case 

in the Asia-Pacific Theaters was different. The United States perceived no immediate 

threat from the region in 1945. By the time perceptions changed with the Chinese 

Communist victory on the mainland in 1949 and the North Korean invasion of South 

Korea in 1950, the great bulk of the Japanese records had already been declassified. 

A second reason is that declassification agreements with foreign governments affected 

the ease with which documents could be opened. The Office of Strategic Services 

(OSS) gathered intelligence in the European Theater, often in cooperation with Allied 

governments. Before declassifying these documents, the CIA, as successor to the OSS, 

had to obtain agreement from the nations that had equities in them. However, the U.S. 

military—not the OSS—had control of most of the Asian Theater records. It created, 

captured, or confiscated records without the involvement of Allied foreign governments, 

which enabled the United States to declassify documents unilaterally. Most of these 

Japan-related records, including wartime intelligence records, were routinely declassified 

in the 1970s and 1980s by the Army, Navy, and other Department of Defense entities in 

the course of their regular review programs. In short, the United States could declassify 

and release Japanese records much earlier than it could German records, but the quantity 

and quality of the Japanese cache was also inferior to the German. 

Furthermore, there were few still-classified postwar records relating to Japanese war 

criminals because there was not a continuing hunt for Japanese perpetrators as there was 

for Nazis; therefore, the Army Counterintelligence Corps, CIA, and FBI did not create 

dossiers on large numbers of Japanese individuals as possible intelligence assets, suspected 

spies, or prospective immigrants. This is not to say the U.S. Army did not employ unsavory 

characters in Japan, but for intelligence about the Soviet Union the U.S. government relied 

less on ex-Imperial Japanese Army officers than it did on former Nazis in Europe. 
12 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Finally, the United States focused on its war against Japan at the expense of other 

major combat theaters in Asia, especially China. This emphasis resulted in less scrutiny 

of Japan’s treatment of fellow Asians and the Imperial Army’s conduct on the Asian 

mainland. One might compare the situation to the attention given to the Holocaust, 

the genocidal campaign against Jews and other “undesirables.” The enormity of these 

Nazi crimes stamped an indelible mark on the collective consciousness, yet Americans 

displayed only vague awareness of the even larger scale of the Nazi barbarities inflicted 

on the people of the Soviet Union beginning in June 1941. Both the Chinese and the 

Soviets dealt with Nazi and Japanese war criminals as they saw fit, and the United States 

demonstrated little concern about how they did it, unless Washington complained that 

the tribunals were being used as propaganda forums to embarrass the West for complicity 

in Axis crimes. 

In sum, the U.S. government acted quickly to declassify Japanese wartime documents 

in its possession. By the time the IWG began its work, there were relatively few postwar 

records related to Japanese war criminals that remained classified.

Disposition of Japanese Documents

While the Japanese destroyed sensitive documents at the end of the war, during the first 

half of 1942 the Imperial Japanese Army relocated many of its records to an underground 

government storage facility in the Minami Tamagawa suburb of Tokyo. The purpose was 

to protect the documents from destruction by enemy air raids, but the unintended result 

was that the records cache of an estimated 7,000 cubic feet (18 million pages) fell intact 

into American hands. The bulk of these materials, however, predate the 1931–1945 

period specified in IWG guidelines. 

Elsewhere in the operational areas of the Pacific and Southwest Pacific Theaters, U.S. 

forces captured hundreds of thousands more pages of Japanese military materials. The 

U.S. government returned all of these documents to Japan beginning in the late 1950s. 

Once back in Japanese hands, the Japanese government returned the records to 

their respective ministries of origin; that is, the Defense Agency received confiscated 

Imperial Army and Navy documents, the Foreign Ministry diplomatic records, and so 

forth. Before returning the confiscated documents, 5–15 percent were microfilmed, at 

the expense of either the U.S. government or private foundations. At least six major 

collections of Japanese-language materials were microfilmed:

(1) The Archives of the Imperial Japanese Army, Navy, and other government 

agencies. This collection from the Tamagawa storage complex comprises 

163 reels of microfilm, roughly 400,000 pages. Many of the records (57 
Introduction I 13

reels) predate 1931; the material runs to mid-1942. Materials from “other 

government agencies” are mainly police records of the Interior Ministry. 

The original military records form the basis of the Defense Agency’s military 

archives in Tokyo, and are today open to public researchers, although this 

was not always the case. Microfilm sets are available at the U.S. Library of 

Congress and the Japan National Diet Library, among other institutions. 

Non-readers of Japanese may obtain a sense of the collection from James W. 

Morley, “Check List of Seized Japanese Records in the National Archives,” Far 

Eastern Quarterly, IX:3 (May 1950). There is an English-language finding aid 

to the collection, John Young, comp., Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of 

Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 

1868–1945 (Georgetown University Press, 1959).

 On behalf of the IWG, researchers with Japanese language proficiency 

examined documents in this collection with titles suggestive of possible war crimes. 

Among those investigated were archives relating to Jewish activity in Manchuria 

and to maintaining internal security in occupied zones, and a technical report on 

Soviet chemical warfare. One collection contains Japanese rules and regulations 

pertaining to prisoners of war captured in the Philippines, but it consists mainly 

of administrative instructions and has no evidence of war crimes. 

(2) The Japan Foreign Ministry Archives are more than 2 million pages on 2,116 

reels of microfilm. Included in this set is the complete file of documentary 

evidence produced for the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. The originals are 

available to the public at the Japan Foreign Ministry Archives in Tokyo. A 

microfilm edition is available at the U.S. Library of Congress and at the Japan 

National Diet Library. 

(3) Another collection is comprised of documents used to support the U.S. 

Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), documents related to the Pacific War 

(1941–1945), and records pertaining to the so-called Fifteen Years War 

(1931–1945) that U.S. government historians used to write the official account 

of the war in the Pacific. These Japanese-language documents were discovered 

in a warehouse in Alexandria, Virginia, in the early 1960s. The originals 

form the basis of the Japan National Archives in Tokyo and are available to 

researchers, subject to privacy restrictions. Microfilm copies of the USSBS 

(46 reels) and the Pacific War (34 reels) are available at the National Archives 

in College Park, Maryland, while the Fifteen Years War materials (138 reels) 

are available at the U.S. Library of Congress. The entire microfilm collection 

is also available in unexpurgated form at Waseda University in Tokyo.
14 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

(4) The South Manchurian Railway Company (SMRC) original documents 

were not returned to Japan, and about 70 percent of all SMRC records remain 

at the Library of Congress. Others are scattered among six American and fortyfour Japanese institutions.17 The Japan National Diet Library has microfilmed 

the Library of Congress holdings. These materials include Japanese studies of 

Manchurian terrain, natural resources, geography, geology, and so forth, as 

well as analytical papers on political and economic affairs.

(5) International [Military] Tribunal for the Far East (The Tokyo War Crimes 

Tribunal) exhibits are indexed. The Library of Congress Law Library has 

a microfilm copy of “Prosecution documents which were either not offered 

or were rejected” (1952) and “Rejected defense documents,” produced by 

Harvard University. In 1975, the National Archives and Records Service 

(predecessor of NARA) compiled “Preliminary inventory of the records of the 

International Military Tribunal Far East: record group 230,” a copy of which is 

available at the Library of Congress as well as at College Park. The documents 

themselves are found on microfilm in Record Group 331 at College Park. 

(6) Japanese documents seized by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section 

(ATIS) amounted to 350,000 captured documents of which 18,000 were 

fully translated. ATIS relied on Japanese-language documentation to produce 

Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s official report of his wartime operations in the 

Southwest Pacific. Some 13,800 files of original documents were returned to 

Japan by MacArthur’s headquarters via the Japanese Demobilization Bureaus, 

but the disposition of others, such as the original Japanese-language Unit 731 

reports of human experimentation that were translated into English, remains 

unknown. In addition, Japanese-language documents held by the Pacific 

Military Intelligence Research Service (PACMIRS) were returned to the 

Japanese government. For the most part, these were operational and technical 

reports. English-language translations of the originals are available in record 

group 165 (P-File) at College Park. The U.S. Navy also confiscated thousands 

of Japanese naval operational documents and reports. These are available on 

microfilm (about 230 reels) at the Naval Historical Center. The originals of 

all of the above military documents repose in the Defense Agency archives in 

Tokyo, Japan. 

Topics of Special Interest 

In addition to adhering to the IWG’s guidelines when conducting their searches for 

classified records pertinent to the Disclosure Acts, agencies also paid particular attention 
Introduction I 15

to records that might contain information about Japanese atrocities perpetrated on 

civilians, such as the Rape of Nanking, “comfort women,” the mistreatment of POWs and 

civilian internees, medical experimentation on humans, Unit 731, and records related to 

the U.S. decision not to prosecute Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal. It is important 

to note, however, that during World War II and its immediate aftermath, not all areas 

of Japanese war criminality were explored in depth. For example, while the “comfort 

women” issue is of great current importance, the U.S. government did not systematically 

collect or create records related to the topic during or after the war.18 As a consequence, 

there are very few documents pertaining to the topic in the archives. The same is true for 

records related to the Rape of Nanking.

The atrocities at Nanjing occurred four years before the United States entered the war. 

At that time, the U.S. government did not have a large military or diplomatic intelligence 

network in China. A handful of trained military or embassy personnel reported on 

events, sometimes second-hand; compared with the sensational press coverage, the official 

U.S. documentation was scant. As a result, with the exception of the records produced 

during the postwar Class A war crimes trial of the commanding general of Japanese forces 

deemed responsible for the Rape of Nanking, there are few materials on this subject at 

the National Archives. 

Immediately after the war, American attention focused on the Japanese responsible 

for the Pearl Harbor attack, those involved in mistreatment of U.S. prisoners of war, 

and Japanese military and civilian officials implicated in war crimes, including rape 

(especially of Filipina women) or forced prostitution of Caucasian women. There was 

also knowledge of the Imperial Japanese Army’s field brothel system, as shown in scattered 

reports declassified during the 1960s. However, the scope of the brothel network 

(particularly in China) and the Japanese Army’s official sponsorship of the system were 

not well understood. Licensed prostitution was legal in prewar Japan, and Allied officials 

viewed the small part of the overseas system they uncovered as an extension of homeland 

practices. Prosecuting Japanese soldiers for rape, a notorious crime everywhere the army 

set foot, took precedence over investigating the circumstances of “comfort women,” who 

were seen as professional prostitutes, not as unwilling victims coerced into brothels by 

employees of the Japanese military. For instance, a significant document that linked the 

Japanese government with the military field brothel system, “Amenities in the Japanese 

Armed Forces,” was translated in November 1945 by ATIS and declassified in the 1960s.19

Although available to the public for years, it received little attention until the “comfort 

women” issue focused attention on these wrongdoings in the 1990s.

As for Unit 731, researchers found no new classified evidence related to Gen. Ishii’s 

experiments or the unit’s treatment of POWs. The small amount of newly released 
16 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

material adds more evidence to the already well-documented facts about Japanese abuse 

of prisoners. As for the primary question of Unit 731’s alleged experimentation on 

captured American servicemen, multiple government agencies conducted exhaustive 

searches in intelligence, military, and diplomatic records but found no definitive evidence. 

This was not surprising, because repeated Congressional inquiries about Japan’s alleged 

use of American prisoners in experiments resulted in extensive examination of U.S. Army 

and other government agency records in the 1970s, 1980s, and again in early 1990s. In 

other words, Congressional interest in Japanese war crimes, especially those perpetrated 

against American POWs, had already opened the existing Unit 731 documents in the 

possession of the U.S. government and made them available to the public.

Finally, allegations arose that the U.S. government engaged in a cover-up to conceal 

incriminating documents pertaining to war crimes in order not to embarrass the Japanese 

government. Exhaustive searches by several agencies for classified materials, conducted 

independently of outside political interference of any sort, followed the guidelines 

imposed by the IWG. They found no evidence to support such assertions. There were 

miscarriages of justice—Ishii’s case being the most obvious and disturbing—and the 

question of Emperor Hirohito’s war responsibility remains a source of controversy in 

the United States and elsewhere. U.S. government archives, however, yielded no new 

information on these controversial topics. This result may not satisfy those who insist 

incriminating or embarrassing documents remain hidden, but disinterested parties will 

appreciate that the IWG has managed to open the remaining classified files pertinent to 

Japanese war crimes and to make that evidence available to the public. Archival holdings 

in Japan, China, and the former Soviet Union also offer the possibility of files that may 

clarify or lead to reinterpretation of our understanding of Japanese atrocities. 

Exploiting the Records

During the search for classified records, it soon became apparent that historians, 

researchers, and concerned parties have not fully exploited the many records about 

Japanese war crimes previously declassified and made available at the National 

Archives. The fault lies less with the public, however, than with the organization of the 

massive collection. Records came from more than a dozen U.S. government agencies, 

each of which employed diverse filing systems and exercised multiple functions 

between 1931 and 2005. This led to a divestiture of central records into smaller 

agency collections, a standard archival practice that unintentionally complicated the 

researcher’s task. Captured or seized Imperial Japanese military and naval records are 

found in at least twelve separate record groups at NARA and fill thousands of boxes. 

Furthermore, except for the records pertaining to war crimes trials (none of which 
Introduction I 17

remains classified), there was no one central finding aid to help researchers navigate 

the Japanese collection. 

Moreover, for whatever reasons, records reasonably expected to be at NARA are not 

there and turn up in unlikely places. Three important documents, translated from Japanese 

to English and each more than 100 pages long, detail Unit 731’s clinical observations 

of the day-by-day spread of various pathogens through the bodies of helpless prisoners 

whom Japanese doctors subjected to experiments. The U.S. government declassified 

these key documents, titled “The Report of A” (anthrax), “The Report of G” (glanders), 

and “The Report of Q” (bubonic plague) in 1960. They are available to the public at the 

U.S. Library of Congress. With relevant documents interfiled among a dozen record 

groups and others available—but not at the National Archives—the researcher’s task is 

a formidable one.

Greg Bradsher’s 1700-page finding aid on the CD that accompanies this volume 

remedies this problem. His searchable finding aid brings coherence to the collections, 

enables researchers to consult a single reference to begin their search, and introduces 

first-time users to the variety of materials available at NARA on Japanese war crimes. 

The hope of all those involved in this project is that introducing the available material 

and making it accessible will stimulate new interest in these underused collections and 

encourage historians, advocates, writers, researchers, and citizens with an interest in these 

important issues to make use of the collections. Study of the mass of unclassified material 

will undoubtedly turn up documents relevant to Japanese war crimes and perhaps resolve 

some outstanding issues.

The huge number of documents declassified under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure 

Act allowed the IWG’s first book on the records, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, to take 

the form of historical case studies based on the newly released documentary material. But 

the comparatively small number of Japanese documents declassified, coupled with the 

larger problem of open Japanese records being underused, mandated a different format. 

Contributors to this volume adopted an approach to make the enormous number of 

heretofore underused Japanese wartime documents more user friendly. Their purpose 

throughout the volume is to make us aware of how much is available by introducing 

these records to readers and explaining where the records are located. Their goal is to 

stimulate interest in these records in the hope that researchers will be encouraged to 

exploit them efficiently and produce a fuller record of the Asia-Pacific War. 

Daqing Yang’s interim assessment of documentary evidence and Japanese war crimes 

discusses the destruction of wartime Japanese documents and surveys the changing 

treatment of Japan’s war crimes in Chinese, English, and Japanese literature. He explains 

reasons for the heightened interest in crimes committed against POWs, the forced 
18 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

prostitution of “comfort women,” and Unit 731’s nefarious activities. Yang concludes 

with a plea for sustained and intense international collaboration to improve the level of 

research on Japanese war crimes. 

James Lide summarizes the war-crimes–related materials located in the recently 

declassified records at NARA. His focus is on the limited number of documents pertinent 

to war crimes and their often vague or incomplete information. No large corpus of 

documentation remained classified on the Nanjing massacre, the “comfort women” issue, 

or Unit 731, although scattered references to bacteriological/chemical warfare and the 

kidnapping of women and girls by Japanese troops were noted. 

NARA staff writers offer starting points for future research. The authors describe 

in general terms the availability of archival material spanning twelve record groups on 

the subject of Japanese war crimes, and then illustrate the scope of the collections by 

highlighting documents pertinent to their three case studies: Japanese treatment of Allied 

prisoners of war in Manchuria, Unit 731 activities, and Japanese atrocities committed 

against U.S. airmen on Chichi-Jima in 1945. 

Robert Hanyok’s illuminating essay explains the U.S. military communications 

intelligence system during World War II, noting its successes and limitations. He devotes 

most of his essay to National Security Agency materials available to the public at NARA 

and offers an explanation for their organization, detailing different types of records: 

army, navy, diplomatic, military attaché, and so forth. He pays special attention to 

communication intelligence attempts to discover the fate of American POWs held by 

the Japanese. He also describes how eavesdropping on Japanese military and naval radio 

communications unintentionally produced evidence of Japanese war crimes and hints of 

the biological and chemical warfare programs. 

Greg Bradsher’s two chapters are part of his larger study to be published separately. 

His first essay explains the wartime system for gathering documentation concerning 

alleged Japanese war crimes. Through the experience of the Southwest Pacific Area’s 

ATIS, he shows how the system developed and expanded, how it exploited captured 

Japanese documents, and how this material was employed during war crimes trials. His 

second essay examines the disposition of Japanese-language records in U.S. control. He 

describes the process for returning the confiscated or captured records, the extensive 

interagency cooperation to establish a policy for the return of records to Japan, and 

Congressional approval for the restitution of documents. Together with his finding aid 

on the enclosed CD, Bradsher has given unparalleled ease of access to those interested in 

serious historical research of U.S. records on Japan. 

The book concludes with a chapter by Michael Petersen on the topic of U.S. use of 

former Japanese enemies for intelligence purposes. Petersen’s chapter, based on recently 
Introduction I 19

declassified CIA material, provides an example of the kind of historical interpretation 

that can arise from a study of the new and previously released materials. 

The work of the IWG has made it possible for the public to access a wide variety of 

documents related to Japanese war crimes committed in Asia and the Pacific. Subsequent 

investigation and study of these materials will provide a clearer appreciation of the 

claims and allegations surrounding Japanese war crimes. Noteworthy is the fact that 

the previously declassified documents corroborate much that is already known about 

Japan’s wartime record. Furthermore, the material goes beyond the subject of war crimes 

and provides a wealth of historical information about the Axis nations. The range of 

Japanese-related documents, U.S. government as well as translated and original Japanese 

documents, merits extensive exploitation by academics, researchers, writers, veterans, 

and others interested in history. The files are filled with stories waiting to be told. 

Notes

1. A few researchers (such as Professor Sheldon Harris) investigated the activities of the Japanese 

Army’s Unit 731 during the 1980s.

2. Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: 

BasicBooks, 1997).

3. Chang, 177.

4. Japanese names are rendered as given name followed by surname.

5. Sheldon Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American 

Cover-up (New York: Routledge, 2002 rev ed). Harris published his original volume in 

1994.

6. George Hicks, The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the 

Second World War (New York: Norton, 1994). 

7. The treaty was formally implemented on April 28, 1952.

8. Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar 

Straus Giroux, 1994).

9. Robert Barr Smith, “Japanese War Crime Trials,” World War II (September 1996).

10. Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1979) 

covers the B- and C-class war crimes trials.

11. Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing 

and Employing Bacteriological Weapons (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 

1950).

12. Conversation with author, 2003. 

13. Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar 
20 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Japan (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1998), 19.

14. Kaikōsha, ed., Nankin senshi shiryō-shū (Nanjing campaign chronology primary source 

collection) (Kaikosha, 1989).

15. Kuninori Kimura, “Nankin kōryakusen ‘Nakajima dai 16 shidanchō nikki’” (The capture 

of Nanjing: Diary of 16th division commander Nakajima) (Zōkan Rekishi to jimbutsu, 

December 1984), 252–71.

16. “Identities of Unit 731 Victims Unearthed,” 3 August 2005, englishnews@chosun.com, 

http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news; “Nana san ichi butai chōmei no-to hakken,” 

(Unit 731 commander’s notebook discovered) Asahi shimbun, 4 August 2005. 

17. Sadao Asada, ed., Japan & The World, 1853–1952: A Bibliographic Guide to Japanese 

Scholarship in Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 41–42.

18. In February 1948, the Dutch tried twelve Japanese for the forced prostitution of Dutch 

women held in internment camps in the Dutch East Indies. Narrelle Morris, review of 

Yuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II 

and the U.S. Occupation” (New York: Routledge, 2002), http://wwwsshe.murdoch.edu.au/

intersections/issue9/morris_review.html/.

19. Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, 

“Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces,” Research Report 120, 15 Nov. 1945, 9–20, 

Formerly Security-Classified Intelligence Reference Publications (“P” File) Received from 

U.S. Military Attachés, Military and Civilian Agencies of the United States, Foreign 

Governments and Other Sources, 1940–1945, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department 

General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 342. 
2

Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War 

Crimes: An Interim Assessment

Daqing Yang 

How historians define and approach an issue is almost always affected by the political 

or intellectual climate in society. The type of evidence historians amass to a great extent 

determines the persuasiveness of their conclusions. The evidence and the problematique 

are the twin historiographical pillars of any historian’s work. Studies of Japanese war 

crimes in World War II are no exceptions. This chapter examines recent publications and 

places these works in such historiographical context.1 In particular, it explores factors 

affecting the availability of documentary evidence as well as the impact of new evidence 

on historical research. In doing so, it seeks to illuminate the current state of scholarship 

on several major historical topics that have garnered particular public interest in recent 

years. 

Defining War Crimes 

Although ancient Chinese, Greeks, and Indians all made efforts to codify behaviors in 

battle, the concept of war crimes is relatively recent. Over the last few centuries, western 

European nations produced sets of rules governing the conduct of warfare as a subset of 

international law. The Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, for instance, prohibited 

the “employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or 

render their death inevitable.” Landmark events such as the Hague Conventions of 1899 

and 1907 sought to establish rules and procedures that would eliminate unnecessary 

suffering by combatants and protect—to the extent possible—noncombatants and 

nonmilitary targets. Similarly, the 1925 Geneva Protocol repudiated poison gas as a 

I would like to thank the following for their generous help: Edward Drea, Eric Van Slander and 

other staff members of the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, and the IWG 

Historical Advisory Panel. The views expressed in this paper are my own and do not represent 

those of the IWG or The George Washington University.
22 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

legitimate weapon of war after its disastrous use in World War I.2 The Third Geneva 

Convention (1929) incorporated a separate convention on the rights and treatment of 

prisoners of war. Still other international conventions banned certain activities in time 

of military occupation. Although many of these conventions were sometimes ambiguous 

and not all governments signed or ratified them, by World War II it became clear that 

warfare was no longer an unregulated affair. 

After Japan ended its self-imposed isolation in the mid-nineteenth century, it not 

only embraced international law but sought to use it to its advantage. Internally, it 

also established a modern military penal system that punished criminal offences among 

its ranks. With some exceptions during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, Japanese 

armed forces at war seemed to abide by international standards. Japan signed the Hague 

Conventions and the 1929 Geneva Convention, but the Imperial Diet failed to approve 

the latter. When Japan invaded China in the 1930s and launched a full-scale war in 1937, 

neither country formally declared war, raising the question of whether they were obliged 

to abide by the international conventions of war. After Japan attacked the United States 

and its allies in December 1941, the Allies questioned Tokyo about the applicability of 

the 1929 Geneva Convention. The Japanese government responded that it would apply 

the provisions mutatis mutandis, which to some implied its compliance.3

Treaties and conventions, however, are not the only way war crimes are defined. As 

we shall see, what is considered a war crime—a prosecutable war crime, in particular—is 

as much a political issue as a legal one. 

After the war ended, the Allies tried Germans and Japanese accused of committing 

various degrees of war crimes. From early 1946 to late 1948, some two hundred top 

Japanese civilian and military leaders were designated as Class A war criminal suspects; 

twenty-eight of them were tried at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal from early 1946 to 

late 1948. Of the fifty-five counts of crime listed in the indictment, the overwhelming 

majority fell under “crimes against peace,” fifteen counts under “murder,” and three 

under “other conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Between 1946 

and 1951, the U.S. and other governments separately tried about 5,700 Japanese officers 

and enlisted men in some 2,240 separate trials throughout the Asia Pacific. Among 

them were over three hundred Koreans and Taiwanese employed by the Japanese. These 

so-called B- and C-class tribunals were concerned with those perpetrating or ordering 

“conventional war crimes.”4 

The Japanese were also put on trial by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 

China. The Soviet Union conducted a tribunal of twenty Japanese servicemen in the city 

of Khabarovsk in late 1949 and found twelve of them guilty of waging bacterial warfare. 

In the mid-1950s, China tried several hundred Japanese officers and civilians, many 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 23

of whom were transferred from the Soviet Union, while others were captured fighting 

alongside the Chinese Nationalists in China’s own civil war from 1946 to 1949. Most 

were given reduced sentences in return for admission of guilt, and none received the 

death penalty. 

Beyond revealing and punishing German and Japanese war crimes, the trials in 

Nuremberg and Tokyo established new standards for the future. The trials pose problems 

for those studying war crimes, however. As we shall see, not all war crimes committed 

by the Axis powers were tried. At the same time, Axis leaders were tried for “crimes 

against peace” established by the Nuremberg Principles, which did not exist at the time 

of war. Over the years, the war crime trials in Tokyo and elsewhere have come under 

criticism with regard to both legality and fairness. Since the trials did not try any Allied 

personnel for their violations of the laws of war, some critics argue, they constituted 

“victor’s justice.”5 Instead of accepting the definition of war crimes as adopted at these 

tribunals, this chapter embraces a broader concept of war crimes as activities of a state 

that violated international or humanitarian laws in time of war.6

Problem of Evidence 

It is true that wherever there is war, there are likely to be war crimes. It is not true, 

however, that wherever there are war crimes, there is always credible documentary 

evidence. Distinguishing actual events from propaganda can be one problem. For 

example, as public opinion began to play an important role in world affairs in the 

twentieth century, the use of wartime propaganda also increased, with nations spreading 

inflated or fabricated stories about enemy atrocities to win public support. World War I 

was notable for its use of such propaganda, and it was also a widespread problem in 

World War II. Even without such intentions, rumors of enemy atrocities often end up 

gaining credibility under the influence of wartime psychology and are reported as real 

events.7

Historians also confront the problem of missing war crimes evidence. The problem 

was particularly acute regarding Japan. Intensive Allied bombing and accidental fires 

destroyed many documents during World War II. Moreover, at the close of the war, 

Japanese authorities hid or destroyed much evidence of the country’s war crimes. On 

August 15, 1945, the Japanese government announced the decision to accept the Potsdam 

Declaration and surrender to the Allied forces, but the first Allied forces did not arrive in 

Japan until August 28. On August 16, Imperial Headquarters ordered Japanese military 

units to destroy all secret documents, many of which are believed to have contained 

evidence of war crimes. The orders themselves were to be destroyed, and no reports on 

the implementation of the orders were to be made except by secure telephone. While it is 
24 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

standard practice for governments to destroy evidence in times of defeat, in the two weeks 

before the Allies arrived in Japan, various Japanese agencies—the military in particular—

systematically destroyed sensitive documents to a degree perhaps unprecedented in 

history.8 Estimates of the impact of the destruction vary. Tanaka Hiromi, a professor at 

Japan’s National Defense Academy who has conducted extensive research into remaining 

Imperial Japanese Army and Navy documents in Japan and overseas, claims that less 

than 0.1 percent of the material ordered for destruction survived.9 Whether or not his 

estimate is entirely accurate, most historians agree that the vast majority of incriminating 

evidence was lost in the cover-up. 

The Japanese destroyed documents outside of Japan proper, as well. Having received 

similar orders from the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo, the Kwantung Army in 

Manchuria began the destruction of confidential files on August 16, 1945. Japanese 

personnel at the Kwantung Army headquarters burned documents in the boiler room in 

the basement but could not finish the job before the advance units of the Soviet forces 

arrived on August 18. As a result, the intelligence units of the Soviet Army captured 

some of the documents.10 Years later, the Chinese recovered some half-burned Japanese 

documents that had been buried underground elsewhere in Manchuria.11 

On the other hand, the Allies amassed a large body of intelligence about Japan. Its 

usefulness for identifying Japanese war crimes, however, varied. Some intelligence during 

the war came from interrogations of captured Japanese soldiers, although the number of 

Japanese prisoners was not large.12 The tons of Japanese documents captured in the 

South Pacific Theaters offered a wealth of information ranging from communications 

codes to training manuals, some of which the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section 

(ATIS) promptly translated and analyzed.13 Perhaps the most useful of all intelligence 

were intercepted Japanese signal communications. Because the Japanese destroyed so 

much incriminating evidence, these wartime decrypts often provide the only information 

on some Japanese war crimes.14 

The war crimes trials conducted by the victorious Allies after Japan’s surrender 

generated a massive quantity of documentary evidence. After landing in Japan, U.S. 

occupation forces located and seized large amounts of Japanese documents that were 

spared destruction.15 The International Prosecution Section in Tokyo, for instance, 

collected primary documents such as official records and, occasionally, personal diaries 

of important political figures. Many of these documents were translated into English 

and used as evidence at tribunals. Interrogations of war crime suspects and personal 

testimonies from victims and eyewitnesses produced still more evidence. After the 

Tokyo Trials, the U.S. government shipped trial records and some original documents 

to the United States. Since then, most of the trial records in the U.S. have long been 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 25

open to the public, and as a whole they constitute the single most important source for 

studying Japanese war crimes.16 However, critics of these war crimes trials have noted 

that witness accounts were often not subject to vigorous cross-examination, if there were 

such examinations at all. Whether or not such criticism is justified, it is necessary for 

historians to use these records with extra caution.

From Verdicts to Controversies

After the conclusion of these trials, neither Western nor Japanese governments seemed 

interested in further investigating Japan’s war crimes, in contrast to continued prosecution 

of Nazi war criminals in western Europe and by the Israeli government. The issue was 

largely left to former POWs and a small number of popular historians.17 While many 

academic historians referred to the brutality of Japanese forces, few actually examined 

the subject of Japanese atrocities in depth. Some exceptions did exist. Japanese historian 

Saburō Ienaga’s book on the war, first published in Japan in 1968 and translated into 

English in 1978, contained a chapter titled “Horrors of War.” Based almost entirely 

on recollections and secondary sources, it remained the most comprehensive scholarly 

discussion available in English until the late 1980s.18 

Early postwar Japan was caught up in mourning Japan’s own loss and suffering, 

although Japan’s war crimes in Asia, particularly in China, remained a topic of concern 

for some Japanese.19 In the mid-1950s, a group of Japanese veterans who had been 

incarcerated as war criminals in the People’s Republic of China returned to Japan. Some 

began to inform the Japanese public of Japan’s crimes against Chinese soldiers and 

civilians. In 1957, they published some of their affidavits, which, as the first postwar 

Japanese publication based on first-person accounts of brutalities in China, caused a 

minor sensation. The first run of 50,000 copies sold out in three weeks. Outcry from 

the Right and other veterans prevented the publishing of a second edition.20 The early 

1960s saw the publication of An Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War, marking 

the beginning of open challenges to the legality of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial that had 

branded Japan’s war as aggression.21 With that, Japan’s war crimes became a contested 

political issue in the country. 

The normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People’s Republic 

of China in 1972 provided the occasion for many Japanese to re-open the question 

of wartime Japanese atrocities in China. The most famous, Asahi Shimbun journalist 

Honda Katsuichi, introduced Chinese testimonies about Japanese atrocities in China, 

ranging from forced labor in Japanese factories and mines to biological experimentation 

and vivisection to massacres in Nanjing and elsewhere. Most Japanese were shocked, but 

a few Japanese openly questioned the veracity of the testimonies. In particular, Honda’s 
26 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

writings ignited a controversy in Japan over the so-called Rape of Nanking, which was 

featured at the trials in Tokyo and Nanjing after the war. The evidence presented at the 

war crimes trials and the verdicts would become increasingly contested.22

In 1982, Japanese newspapers reported government attempts to tone down descriptions 

of Japanese aggression in junior high school textbooks. Although the allegation was not 

entirely accurate, it escalated to a diplomatic incident between Japan and China (and 

a few other Asian governments). Three years later, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone 

Yasuhiro made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, where seven executed 

Japanese Class A war criminals are enshrined together with the country’s 2.5 million war 

dead. The Chinese and Koreans again loudly protested. 

These incidents once again placed Japan’s war record in the limelight and served as a 

catalyst for some of Japan’s academic historians to conduct an in-depth empirical study 

of Japan’s wartime behavior. 

The historians organized various research groups and began publishing collected 

documents in addition to their research. In 1993, a group of Japanese historians and 

activists established the Japan Center for Research on War Responsibility (Nihon sensō 

sekinin shiryō senta). Their quarterly journal, covering a range of research and often 

introducing new documentary evidence, became a premier journal in this field.23

Meanwhile, in China, a trickle of publications on Japanese war crimes became a torrent 

in part thanks to these controversies over World War II history. Once downplayed by the 

government though never forgotten by the public, Japanese war crimes in China came to 

be prominently featured in the country’s textbooks, local histories, and museums. In 1991, 

the Chinese Academy of Social Science—the country’s premier research institution—

established a quarterly journal devoted to the study of China’s war of resistance against 

Japan. Many of its articles specifically address Japanese war crimes.24 

The same trend can be seen in the English-language world in the 1990s, with a number 

of factors contributing to the outpouring of works on Japanese war crimes. First, public 

interest grew as the news media helped keep Japan’s World War II crimes in the limelight. 

Recurring controversies in East Asia received considerable coverage in the U.S. media 

and helped create the widely accepted belief that Japan had not faced up to its wartime 

past. Conflict and abuse of civilians in Kosovo and genocide in Rwanda suggested a reexamination of similar wrongdoings in the past. Hence, the rapporteur of the United 

Nations Human Rights Committee issued a special report on Japan’s wartime abuse of 

women in military sexual slavery in 1997.25 Second, with the end of the Cold War there 

was a worldwide attempt to re-examine the past wrongs of World War II, such as forced 

labor and looting of art and other property. Many victims became more outspoken 

and filed lawsuits seeking compensation, while aging veterans spurred another wave of 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 27

publications and commemorative activities. Finally, in the United States, the voice of 

Asian Americans, growing since the 1970s, became more pronounced in the 1990s. In 

the late 1980s, Japanese Americans won redress for their wartime internment, giving 

encouragement to other Asian-American groups to generate greater awareness of their 

wartime sufferings. In the early 1990s, a group of Chinese-American historians launched 

a journal devoted to the study of Japanese aggression in China and founded the Global 

Alliance for Preserving the History of World War II.26 Chinese- and Korean-Americans 

often took the lead in organizing photo exhibitions, issuing petitions, and publishing 

victims’ accounts.27 

Old Evidence and New 

Greater public interest in Japanese war crimes as well as the intensifying controversies 

created a demand for new evidence. For years, U.S. archives have been a major source 

of these records. As U.S. government documents concerning Japan were declassified and 

made available in the National Archives, Japanese scholars and journalists were often 

among the first to use them. Historians in Japan also used original Japanese documents 

that had been captured and microfilmed by the United States before being returned to 

Japan. In Japan, nearly all the returned Foreign Ministry documents have been open to 

the public since the 1970s at Japan’s Diplomatic Record Office. The Japanese Self-Defense 

Agency War History Department Library, which received the majority of these returned 

materials (amounting to some 23,313 items, according to one Japanese estimate), has 

allowed public access to most of them. A part of its general collection (which includes 

some returned materials) remains restricted: while most of these records are closed to 

protect privacy, records concerning mistreatment of POWs, looting, massacre, use of 

poison gas, and biological weapons experimentation have been known to be closed as a 

matter of policy or partially redacted before declassification. In 2003, the Japanese SelfDefense Agency released a Catalog of Classified Materials, listing some 2,000 items that 

remained restricted for privacy reasons.28 In addition, over two thousand documents 

returned from the United States are available to the public at Japan’s Public Record Office 

(Kokuritsu kōbun shokan).29

As many Japanese scholars acknowledge, institutional factors account for the fact 

that many official Japanese documents dating from the war years either are still closed 

or remain to be located. The lack of an archival tradition in the Western sense, as they 

point out, is partly to blame. Japan’s Public Record Office, the equivalent to the U.S. 

National Archives, was established in 1978. In practice, government ministries have 

tended to restrict access to all the important documents they generated partly because, 

until recently, Japanese bureaucrats have traditionally enjoyed enormous prestige and 
28 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

little accountability to the public.30 A few Japanese officials were accustomed to taking 

official documents home for safekeeping or for personal use. Ironically, such practices 

might have saved some documents from destruction at the end of the war. 

In recent years, various individuals in Japan have turned over government and private 

documents in their possession to historians or have had them published. Some Japanese 

documents were literally saved from waste paper recycling plants. In a notable example, 

a member of Japan’s wartime biological warfare unit had saved various documents on 

human experiments. After he died, his relatives sold them to a waste paper recycling 

merchant, who in turn sold them to a secondhand bookstore in Tokyo. Eventually, 

researchers at a university discovered these documents and had them published.31

Similarly, historians and citizen activists have been able to save many personal diaries from 

veterans. Ono Kenji, a worker at a chemical plant in Japan, began collecting veterans’ 

wartime diaries in his hometown area in 1988. Thanks to his efforts, nearly twenty 

diaries belonging to Japanese soldiers who fought in the battle of Nanjing in 1937 were 

published six years later, becoming a major source of evidence for that infamous Japanese 

atrocity.32 Because of the ongoing debate over this incident, Kaikōsha, an organization 

of graduates of the former army cadet academy, also published many of the official war 

journals as well as diaries of officers and men involved in the battle at Nanjing.33

Since the 1990s, there has been some important progress toward greater public access 

to government documents in Japan. Marking the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World 

War II, the Japanese government under the Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama 

established the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (Ajia rekishi shiryō senta) in 

1995. Since then, the center has continuously made available online a vast quantity of 

original official documents from the national, diplomatic, and military archives. Over 

530,000 titles and 7,400,000 images are available online.34 Although most of these 

documents have been available to the public for some time, easy access provided by the 

Internet will be welcomed by scholars, especially those outside Japan. Separate from 

this, Japan’s Diplomatic Record Office has been declassifying some of its postwar official 

documents, including a few related to the issues of war crimes and settlements. In 1999, 

the National Diet passed Japan’s first Freedom of Information Law. It is now possible for 

Japanese and foreign individuals to request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review and 

declassify documents pertaining to specific issues.

Beginning in the 1980s, the Chinese published various materials related to Japanese 

war crimes. For instance, several volumes of a document series on “Japanese imperialist 

aggression against China” published between 1988 and 1995 were devoted to Japanese 

atrocities as well as chemical and biological warfare in China. Typically, they include 

testimonies by Chinese victims and depositions by Japanese war crime suspects, as well 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 29

as some Japanese documents that have been discovered in Chinese archives.35 Some of 

these Chinese publications have been translated into Japanese. Since the 1980s, Chinese 

scholars have increasingly endeavored to make use of U.S. documents. For instance, 

a Chinese historian published some personal papers relating to Japanese atrocities in 

Nanjing from the Chinese Missions Collections at the Yale Divinity School.36 Chinese 

scholars studying Japanese war crimes have also begun to explore the collection at 

NARA. 

Revelation and Contention 

What does available documentary evidence reveal about Japan’s war crimes in World War 

II? How do discoveries of new evidence affect historians’ work? The vast majority of 

published works on Japanese war crimes tend to fall into several primary categories: (1) 

Japan’s war atrocities in Asia in general, (2) mistreatment of POWs and civilian laborers, 

(3) the wartime biological and chemical warfare program, and (4) the forced prostitution 

of the so-called “comfort women.” Recently, a number of historians have begun to study 

other criminal activities such as drug trafficking and property theft. Although these 

categories often overlap, they constitute the bulk of published histories of Japan’s war 

crimes and each deserves a closer look. 

War Atrocity or Asian Holocaust? 

Before the United States entered the war against Japan in December 1941, Americans 

were already familiar with stories of Japanese atrocities in China. Reports of rape, looting, 

bombing of civilian targets, and murder of surrendered Chinese soldiers and civilians by 

Japanese soldiers were often featured in the popular press and helped to turn public 

opinion against Japan. The six-week ordeal in the Chinese capital of Nanjing after the 

Japanese takeover was particularly notorious and has become the iconic Japanese atrocity 

in World War II. Yet, it was not until 1997 that Chinese-American writer Iris Chang 

published the first book-length study in English, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten 

Holocaust of World War II, which received glowing reviews in the U.S. press and became a 

New York Times best seller.37 While her book has been criticized for its numerous factual 

errors, it was the first popular work to focus extensively on the role of Westerners—

including several Americans but also John Rabe, a German member of the Nazi party—

who stayed in Nanjing to protect locals against Japanese troops.38 Chang was one of 

the first to make extensive use of unpublished American missionary papers stored at 

the Yale Divinity School. Chang also made use of newly declassified U.S. intelligence 

reports.39 The question of whether the Japanese massacre of Chinese in Nanjing should 

be described as an Asian Holocaust, as Chang and others claim, stirred up considerable 
30 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

debate. Masahiro Yamamoto, who was highly critical of Chang’s claim, as well as of 

her work, published Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity in 2000. Making extensive use of 

Japanese and Chinese documents, it remains one of the few in-depth works on the event 

in English.40 

In contrast to the relatively recent interest in the West, what is often referred to 

in Japan as the Nanjing Incident sparked a publishing industry in that country, with 

close to a hundred books and document collections published to date. Many of 

them point to newly discovered evidence. A sub-genre developed that was devoted to 

exposing fraudulent evidence—documentary and photographic—of alleged Japanese 

atrocities. Since the early 1980s, the Nanjing Massacre—the Chinese term for the Rape 

of Nanking—which had largely receded into obscurity after 1949, has also become a 

topic of popular interest among the Chinese and the subject of dozens of books. In 

addition to numerous historians in mainland China working on such topics, Li Enhan, a 

historian based in Taiwan, published many essays—half of which are devoted to the Rape 

of Nanking—in which he made use of some Japanese sources.41 In 2004, the Nanjing 

Normal University established a Center for Nanjing Massacre Studies, whose Web site 

became a hub of information on developments related to Japan’s war crimes in China.42 

The total number of Chinese deaths in Nanjing remains a subject of dispute. While 

the Chinese government and historians insist that some 300,000 Chinese were massacred 

by the Japanese in and around Nanjing—a figure from the postwar trials in Nanjing—

Japanese historians have offered different estimates ranging from thousands to over 

100,000. Significantly, newly discovered Japanese documents, which include the diaries 

of several key commanders as well as official war journals from one-third of all the Japanese 

regiments involved in that battle, indicate that at least tens of thousands of disarmed 

Chinese soldiers were executed by Japanese troops at the order of their commanders. 

As a result, in the mid-1980s, a representative of the veteran group Kaikōsha offered an 

apology to the Chinese people on its behalf.43

In addition to the Rape of Nanking, the “Three All” Campaign—for “Kill all, burn all, 

loot all,” the Chinese description of the Japanese Army’s tactics in attacking Communist 

guerrilla forces in north China—has long been central in Communist China’s history of 

the war against Japan. Many earlier studies relied solely on the testimonies of Chinese 

victims and survivors. Only recently have historians in Japan begun to systematically 

study anti-guerrilla operations in north China, including such practices as creating a “noman’s land” by corroborating Japanese sources with Chinese evidence.44 The Japanese use 

of biological and chemical weapons (to be discussed later) and the bombing of China’s 

wartime capital Chongqing have become an issue for Chinese historians and activists. 

While the majority of Japanese and Chinese works focus on war atrocities in China, 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 31

a few scholars have begun to examine Japanese atrocities in Southeast Asia. In many 

ways, Japanese atrocities in China were a precursor to those in Asia and the Pacific. 

The shooting of surrendered enemy soldiers was commonplace in China, and continued 

unabated during the Pacific War. Despite the Japanese government promise, however 

vague, to abide by international conventions, treatment of POWs and civilians by the 

Japanese military was often harsh. Due to poor logistics or planning, the Japanese 

Army often turned to the local population in China for supplies, producing further 

brutalities against civilians. The problem was also widespread in the Pacific Theater. In 

extreme cases, Japanese troops resorted to cannibalism after their supply lines were cut 

off. Japanese tactics used against Chinese guerrilla forces were also practiced in Southeast 

Asia. Perhaps the single most infamous incident was the Battle of Manila in early 1945, 

in which over 100,000 Filipino civilians were massacred by retreating Japanese troops 

or killed by the American bombardment.45 The massacre of ethnic Chinese in Malaya 

following the Japanese occupation in 1942 has been relatively well documented in 

Japanese and English.46 The Center for Nanjing Massacre Studies at the Nanjing Normal 

University published testimonies about Japanese massacres in Malaya and ethnic Chinese 

forced to work on the Thai-Burma railway, collected over a twenty-year period by a single 

individual.47

Mistreatment of POWs and Asian Laborers

By far the largest quantity of English publications about Japanese atrocities concerns the 

mistreatment of Allied POWs in Japanese captivity. Many were written by former POWs 

themselves.48 The judgment at the Tokyo Trial noted that whereas 4 percent of some 

235,000 American and British POWs in German and Italian captivity died, as many 

as 27 percent of the 132,000 American and British POWs lost their lives in Japanese 

captivity. Some put it in a starker way: 1 percent of American POWs died at German 

hands; thus, 9 out of 10 American POWs who died in captivity during World War II did 

so under the Japanese.49

The single most infamous instance of Japanese mistreatment of American POWs 

was the Bataan Death March, in which over 70,000 American and Filipino soldiers were 

forced to march for days without food or supplies. Some 750 Americans and 5,000 

Filipinos died en route from starvation, disease, or random execution.50 A crime more 

familiar to POWs from Britain and Australia concerns the Thai-Burma Railway, which 

was built under extremely harsh conditions by hundreds of thousands of Allied POWs 

and Asian laborers.51 The Japanese also transported over 30,000 POWs to Japan to 

work in coalmines, factories, and other locations. Many died en route under horrendous 

conditions on board “hell ships” or when their unmarked ships were sunk by Allied 
32 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

submarines. By the end of the war, 3,526 of the transported American POWs—

approximately 10 percent—had died.52 

In her book on the fate of Allied POWs, Unjust Enrichment, Linda Goetz Holmes 

examines large Japanese companies that employed Allied POWs as forced labor. Although 

it is difficult to prove how much Japanese companies profited by using American POWs, 

Unjust Enrichment is one of the few works that goes beyond merely documenting the 

plight of POWs. Using some previously untapped documents, Holmes delves into the 

complicated financial aspects of Allied relief funds and accuses the Japanese authorities 

of withholding them, which aggravated POWs’ suffering.53 Holmes also calls attention 

to a Japanese document captured in Taiwan, which ordered the execution of all Allied 

POWs when the situation became urgent and extremely grave. She argues that this 

piece of incriminating evidence was presented to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal but 

was largely ignored, leading to the downplaying of the immense criminal intent of the 

Japanese military. Dated August 1944, this particular document raises more questions. It 

is known that the Japanese military killed Allied POWs before or during its own retreat. 

On the Pacific island of Palawan, for instance, some 150 Allied prisoners had spent two 

and a half years working on the airstrip for the Japanese. After the Americans landed on 

nearby Mindoro on December 15, 1944, the Japanese executed all 150 prisoners, leaving 

only eleven who managed to escape.54 Whether there was an overall Japanese plan to kill 

all Allied POWs in their custody in case of defeat awaits further research. 

What explains Japan’s apparently brutal policy toward Allied POWs? Prisoners of the 

Japanese by Australian historian Gavan Daws is a scathing indictment of Japanese treatment 

of Allied POWs, placing great emphasis on the racial dimension. Although Daws noted 

that many Asians were forced to work in sometimes even worse conditions, he considered 

the racial tension between Japanese soldiers and white POWs as the single most important 

factor behind Japanese brutality.55 Indeed, as both the Japanese and Allies recognized at 

the time, the humiliation of white prisoners served to diminish their prestige in the eyes of 

native Asians. However, the treatment of surrendered Chinese soldiers in the conflict in 

China was no better. Japanese historian Hata Ikuhiko emphasizes the evolution of Japanese 

policy toward POWs since the Meiji era, which moved from consideration to contempt as 

Japan’s military came to prohibit its own troops from becoming POWs.56 Historian Yoichi 

Kibata believes that the Japanese military’s changing attitudes toward international law was 

another important factor in its brutal treatment of prisoners during World War II.57 

Others, however, caution against viewing brutality as uniquely Japanese.58 Recently, 

some Western scholars have also challenged the conventional perception of Japan’s POW 

camps as uniformly harsh. Using diaries and official documents from Australian and 

British archives, R.P.W. Havers showed that in the large camp at Changgi, Singapore, 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 33

the Japanese gave the Allied (mostly British and Australian) prisoners a high degree of 

autonomy, and the prison society was vigorous in contrast to other Japanese camps. 

Sibylla Jane Flower points out that the treatment of POWs also depended on whether 

they were officers or rank and file.59 

Asian civilians were often forced into labor beside POWs. For instance, there were 

more civilian laborers from Southeast Asia than Allied POWs working on the Thai-Burma 

Railway. It is estimated that at least 300,000—and perhaps as many as half a million—

Asian laborers were mobilized, often forcibly, by the Japanese for such construction 

projects. Rōmusha (the Japanese word for laborers that came to be widely known in 

Southeast Asia) suffered an even higher rate of death due to disease and exhaustion.60

Unlike Allied POWs, few, if any, forced laborers who survived the ordeal wrote about 

their experience, perhaps due to their low level of education and their postwar experience, 

making it extremely difficult to arrive at a precise picture of their suffering at the hands 

of the Japanese. 

In 1958, a Chinese man was discovered hiding in the mountains of Hokkaido in 

northern Japan. He was one of the tens of thousands of Chinese laborers who had been 

taken to Japan in the later years of the war, and did not know the war was over. This 

event helped draw attention in Japan to the plight of Asian laborers during the war. On 

June 30, 1945, over nine hundred Chinese laborers in a labor camp in Hanaoka staged 

a riot over maltreatment and were brutally put down by the Japanese. Four hundred 

Chinese died in the incident, which became one of the few cases tried by the Allies at 

the postwar military tribunals in Japan. In terms of numbers, Korean men and women 

constituted the largest group forced into labor in wartime Japan. Some were forcibly 

moved to Southern Sakhalin (then a Japanese colony) during the war and were unable to 

return to Korea afterwards. Japanese authorities also forced many Chinese to construct 

military facilities on the continent. From 1934 to 1938, for instance, between 10,000 

and 20,000 Chinese laborers were involved in building what the Japanese claimed to be 

the “best fortification in East Asia” in northern Manchuria along the Soviet border. Very 

little original documentation about this project exists. Whether the Chinese laborers had 

all been killed by the Japanese (as some claim) to keep the elaborate defense complex a 

secret has yet to be confirmed.61 

Thanks to efforts of activists and historians, there is now a relative abundance of official 

documents on Japanese wartime labor policy and practice from various government 

agencies as well as from such industrial councils as the Coal Control Association. Since 

the early 1990s, several multivolume collections of documents on the forced labor issue 

have been published in Japan.62 The most intriguing is a comprehensive report on 

Chinese laborers compiled by Japan’s Foreign Ministry shortly after the war. The Japanese 
34 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

government burned all copies except one for fear that it might become incriminating 

evidence at the war crimes trials; it later claimed the report was lost in order to avoid 

public inquiry into the matter. It was rediscovered in Japan in 1994 and published by 

a Japanese activist scholar. The report estimated that of some 40,000 Chinese laborers 

taken to Japan, nearly 7,000 had died by the end of the war.63 

Beginning in the late 1980s, Chinese scholars and university students conducted 

interviews with survivors or their kin in North China. The accounts of harsh conditions 

and inhumane treatment by the Japanese raised doubts about the veracity of the abovementioned Foreign Ministry report, which tended to play down some of the abuses. 

Some survivors also recalled resentment against Chinese team leaders—often captured 

KMT soldiers—for bullying their compatriots.64 In 2003, Chinese researchers also 

published a collection of documents relating to Japan’s recruitment of Chinese laborers 

from North China.65 Recently, a large-scale oral history project has been completed in 

China, leading to the publication of interviews with some 500 former Chinese forced 

laborers. 

The extent to which these Korean and Chinese workers were recruited by force 

remains in some dispute. The official Japanese position is that the recruitment was based 

on free will, although the government did note internally that forcible draft might have 

occurred. In 2003, a Japanese professor discovered wartime documents belonging to 

a private company in Hokkaido that reported “taking (Korean labor recruits) away in 

their sleep or while they were working in the field.” A document dated September 22, 

1944, recommended against recruiting Korean laborers by draft so as to pacify public 

sentiment.66 Whether the Japanese government should be held responsible for the fate 

of these laborers has been a contentious issue in the lawsuits filed by former laborers and 

their descendants. 

Chemical and Biological Warfare Programs 

During the war, the Chinese government made repeated allegations that Japanese forces 

deployed chemical and biological weapons, an allegation they repeated at the Tokyo War 

Crimes Tribunal but which was not prosecuted.67 The United States military was also 

interested in Japanese chemical and biological warfare efforts. Given the nature of the 

operation of such weapons, however, irrefutable evidence was often hard to come by. 

Although no Japanese were prosecuted at the Tokyo Trials for crimes related to chemical 

or biological weapons, some were tried elsewhere as B- or C-class criminals. For instance, 

Kajiura Ginjirō, Commander of the 231st Regiment, 39th Division, was tried and 

sentenced to life in prison by a military tribunal in China in 1947 for using poisonous 

gas in combat.68 From December 25 to 31, 1949, the Soviet government tried twelve 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 35

Japanese officers involved in biological warfare operations, and subsequently published 

the record of the trial in several languages, including Japanese, English, Chinese, and 

Korean.69 Even though the publication included photocopies of original Japanese 

documents captured in Manchuria, the trial failed to garner international attention, and 

its credibility was questioned in the West. Later, during the Korean War, China, North 

Korea, and the Soviet Union alleged that U.S. forces used the same kind of biological 

weapons as those developed by the Japanese. These charges were dismissed as Cold War 

propaganda.70 

The story of Japan’s biological weapons received little attention until 1980, when 

American journalist John Powell revealed the criminal activities of Unit 731, Japan’s 

main biological warfare program. Citing U.S. government documents obtained through 

the Freedom of Information Act, he also alleged that the U.S. government pardoned 

the Japanese involved in biological warfare from war crimes trials in exchange for their 

research data.71 Although there had long been allegations of Japan’s secret medical 

experiments using human subjects, the story did not get national attention in Japan until 

the early 1980s. In 1981, popular fiction writer Morimura Seiichi published The Devil’s 

Gluttony in the Japanese Communist Party newspaper Akahata and later in a bestselling 

book.72 Morimura interviewed several dozen former members of Unit 731, and in a 

sequel he traced the postwar activities of former members.73 Also in 1981, historian 

Tsuneishi Keiichi published the first scholarly assessment of Unit 731, making extensive 

use of the postwar Khabarovsk trial records and wartime publications in Japanese medical 

journals. Important as it was, as Tsuneishi later pointed out, that trial failed to reveal 

the extent of the connection between Unit 731 and the military medical establishment 

in Japan during the war. Tsuneishi argued that even without the postwar sources such 

as the Khabarovsk trial records, articles published by Lt. Gen. Ishii Shirō, the head of 

Unit 731, and others during the war provided sufficient evidence that the Japanese had 

experimented on live humans.74 One such example he cited is a study on hypothermia 

by Unit 731 member Yoshimura Toshihito.75

The issue soon became part of the long-running lawsuit by historian Ienaga Saburō. 

In 1983, the Japanese Ministry of Education asked Ienaga to remove a reference from 

his textbook that alleged Unit 731 conducted experiments on thousands of Chinese. 

The Japanese government justified its position by arguing that no academic research 

supported such a conclusion. In 1984, Japanese historian Tsuneishi Keiichi translated 

and published some 4,000 pages of U.S. documents on Japanese biological warfare 

housed at NARA.76 As new studies proliferated in Japan and important documentary 

evidence appeared in the United States, the Ministry finally backed down. Historian 

Hata Ikuhiko, who had served as the expert witness for the Ministry of Education during 
36 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

the lawsuit, later cited documents obtained from the United States, such as the Fell 

Report, as a major reason for his change of mind.77 More recently, Japanese journalist 

Kondo Shōji, who has pursued the subject of biological warfare for more than fifteen 

years, produced perhaps the most comprehensive collection of documents on Unit 731, 

including many that had been declassified in the United States.78

In the 1980s, Chinese archives began releasing some trial records and other accounts 

related to Unit 731, including testimony from a number of Chinese who had worked at 

its facilities. As it turns out, the Chinese government had conducted extensive surveys of 

victims of Japan’s biological warfare and produced a report in November 1952, perhaps 

in connection with China’s allegation that Americans used biological weapons in the 

Korean War. In 1997, a local Chinese television station discovered records belonging 

to the Kwantung Army military police (kenpeitai) concerning the so-called “special 

deliveries” of human subjects to Unit 731. Similar documents were found in another 

local archive.79

After Powell’s articles appeared, other Western authors also took up the topic and 

published book-length studies in English. British journalists Peter Williams and David 

Wallace produced a study in conjunction with a television documentary they produced 

in the United Kingdom.80 Sheldon Harris, a retired professor of American history who 

became interested in the subject while visiting China in the late 1980s, devoted the last 

years of his life to studying Unit 731 and published widely on the subject.81 

There is no doubt that Unit 731 conducted experiments on human subjects that 

included Chinese, Koreans, and Russians. The question of whether Allied POWs at 

Camp Hoten, in Mukden, Manchuria, were experimental subjects remains unresolved. 

Linda Goetz Holmes, Tanaka Toshiyuki, and some POWs themselves point to the 

fact that Japanese medical personnel from Unit 731 visited Camp Hoten in early 

1943 and conducted medical experiments on the POWs at a time when hundreds of 

American POWs were dying each month. The U.S. government denied having any 

evidence supporting such a conclusion.82 The Soviet trial records only briefly touch on 

the matter. Although there may not be a definitive answer to the question, Tsuneishi, 

the leading scholar on biological warfare in Japan, considers it unlikely that Unit 731 

used POWs at Camp Hoten as subjects, a view shared by Sheldon Harris.83 A Japanese 

document introduced by Matsumura Takao, another Japanese scholar who has studied 

the connection between Unit 731 and epidemics in China, may shed some light on 

the visit of Unit 731 personnel to the camp. Matusmura writes that in early 1943, 

Kwantung Army Commander Gen. Umezu Yoshijirō ordered Unit 731 to immediately 

dispatch a medical group to Camp Hoten “to strengthen hygiene and restore POWs’ 

health,” which suggests a medical visit, not an instance of experimentation.84 Indeed, a 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 37

Japanese document compiled immediately after the war, cited by Matsumura, seemed to 

corroborate this: the death toll of American POWs due to disease dropped significantly 

from several hundred to less than ten after the March 1943 visit. 

The issue of who should be held responsible for biological warfare also awaits a 

definitive answer. Given that the Kwantung Army provided human subjects and the 

entire operation was extremely costly (¥10 million; ¥9 billion in 2005 value), some argued 

the military high command in Tokyo and even the emperor should be held responsible, 

whether or not they knew about live experiments at the time.85 Japanese scholars such as 

Tsuneishi have long emphasized the complicity of the entire Japanese medical profession 

during the war, and criticized its silence after the war, which allowed those involved to 

assume prominent positions in Japan. 

Questions also remain about the details of the deal struck between Ishii and the United 

States after the war. Officially, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) 

thought it lacked definitive evidence to prosecute Ishii and his group at the War Crimes 

Tribunal. It is true that the American investigator Murray Sanders was initially misled 

by the Japanese interlocutor, Dr. Naito Yōichi—himself a member of Unit 731—into 

believing the unit operated only in Manchuria and engaged solely in defensive work. How 

Unit 731 members learned about the arrival of Murray Sanders is not yet clear. It was not 

until the Soviet authorities made requests for information about Ishii in early 1947 that 

Americans renewed their investigation. After repeated promises not to prosecute Ishii and 

other Unit 731 members, the Americans obtained medical data from Ishii, including those 

from human experiments. Professor Harris believed the final decision for the quid pro 

quo was approved not only by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby (G-2) and Gen. Douglas 

MacArthur in Tokyo, but by their superiors in Washington. What happened to the data 

produced by Unit 731 remains largely unanswered. As Kondo Shōji has noted, several 

key documents outlining U.S. acquisition of Unit 731 research data have not yet been 

located.86 

While the diabolical nature of Unit 731 still commands considerable attention, recent 

research has expanded to include the activities of other Japanese biological and chemical 

warfare units. Scholars have shown that Japanese units stationed in Beijing (Unit 1855), 

Nanjing (Unit 1644, or Tama Unit), and Canton (Unit 1688) also experimented on 

human subjects.87 Moreover, newly discovered documents such as Imoto Kumao’s 

wartime journal confirmed the Chinese allegations that biological weapons had been 

used in Central China between 1940-42, if on experimental basis. Chinese researchers 

have recently published investigations of the victims of Japan’s biological warfare. 

The case of poison gas is only somewhat different. The Geneva Conventions did 

not outlaw the stockpiling of chemical weapons, and major belligerents, including the 
38 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

United States and Soviet Union, possessed large quantities of such weapons during and 

after the war. While the Chinese had long alleged Japan’s use of poisonous gas in battle, 

it was only recently that historians were able to prove this definitively with Japanese 

documents. The Japanese Army’s Narashino Military Academy near Tokyo, for instance, 

had compiled a collection of fifty-six case studies of chemical weapons (including lethal 

agents like Yperite, also known as mustard gas) used by Japan in China during the war. 

The document was found at NARA by a Japanese historian among records collected 

by the International Prosecution Section in Tokyo, and was made public in Japan 

for the first time.88 The existence of such a document, as one Japanese Diet member 

noted, contradicted the claim by a senior Japanese government official that available 

documentation concerning the use of lethal chemical weapons was “inconclusive.” 

In 2004, Yoshimi Yoshiaki published the most comprehensive study of the Japanese 

military’s use of poisonous gas. In captured Japanese documents as well as other newly 

discovered sources, Yoshimi found evidence of Japan’s use of poison gas in China and 

also in Southeast Asia.In a separate article, Yoshimi introduced a battle report from the 

224th Infantry Brigade that detailed the use of mustard gas in a major operation against 

the Communist-led Eighth Route Army in Shanxi Province in the winter of 1942. Even 

the unit carrying out the operation noted its severity and remarked on the anti-Japanese 

sentiment among the civilian population affected. This report, captured by the United 

States and returned to Japan, was not made public by the Self-Defense Agency until May 

2004.89

In recent years, Chinese scholars have also published studies of Japan’s biological 

and chemical warfare in China.90 The 1995 Chemical Warfare of the Invading Japanese 

Troops alleged that the Japanese Army used poisonous gas in the China Theater over two 

thousand times. Based largely on contemporary Chinese evidence and some translated 

Japanese sources, including a document captured from Japan’s 106th Division in Jiangxi 

Province during the war, this book claims that well over 32,000 Chinese soldiers and 

9,000 civilians died as a result of poisonous gas.91 Bu Ping, a leading authority on 

Japanese chemical warfare, strove to corroborate Japanese and wartime Chinese records 

with Chinese testimony. In writing Japan’s Chemical Warfare During the Invasion of 

China, Bu and his coauthors visited the survivors of a well-known Japanese poison gas 

attack in Tongbei Village, Shanxi Province, in May and June 1942, which killed nearly 

800 Chinese guerrilla fighters and civilians. With the assistance of a Japanese colleague, 

Bu also located in the Japanese Self-Defense Agency’s War History Department Library a 

postwar memoir by a Japanese battalion commander involved in the operation.92

Bu’s book also contains extensive descriptions, often based on interviews with victims 

and survivors, of numerous instances in which chemical artillery shells hastily abandoned 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 39

by the Japanese military at the end of the war continued to harm Chinese residents. For 

the Japanese military, the ultimate target of its chemical warfare was to be the Soviet 

Union, as the huge stockpile of such weapons in Manchuria indicates. The main target 

of its biological warfare, however, is somewhat murkier. The Soviet Union remained on 

the list after the Japanese clash with Soviet and Mongolian forces at Nomonhan in 1939. 

Reminiscences by some Japanese officers indicate that the United States was also a target, 

especially after the war in the Pacific began to turn against Japan. When the Japanese 

military developed a secret program to use balloon bombs against the U.S. mainland, 

bacteriological agents were said to be the ultimate payload. Documentary evidence, 

however, is understandably scarce. 

Though not part of a formal chemical or biological weapons program, it was known 

even during the war in the Pacific that Japanese doctors carried out experiments on live 

POWs. In 1944, for example, ATIS published a research report on Japanese medical 

war crimes.93 The incident at the Kyūshū Imperial University in western Japan, where 

Japanese doctors dissected American pilots for medical experiments, received the most 

publicity, not the least in Endō Shusaku’s fiction The Sea and Poison.

94 Thirty people—

some military, others from Kyūshū University—were tried by the Allies for this crime in 

1948. Charges included vivisection, wrongful removal of body parts, and cannibalism. 

Twenty-three defendants were found guilty of various charges. (For lack of evidence, the 

charges of cannibalism were dismissed.)95 Testimony by Japanese veterans and Chinese 

witnesses also revealed that such medical experiments also took place in Manchuria and 

occupied areas in China.96

From Mass Rape to Military “Comfort Women”

The rape of Chinese women by Japanese soldiers has long been identified with Japan’s 

war atrocities in China. Reports by American missionaries during the Rape of Nanking 

in late 1937 provided a glimpse into the extent of sexual violence committed by the 

Japanese Army. Numerous other incidents in China and later in Southeast Asia further 

tarnished the reputation of the Japanese forces. The postwar trials, however, largely 

considered rape to be part of a more general violation of law or inhumane treatment, and 

not a war crime per se. 

Japanese authorities were aware of the problem during the war. In fact, Japanese 

records show that orders were issued to deal with the problem and that a small number 

of Japanese soldiers had been tried by Japan’s own military courts during the war for rape 

or other crimes against civilians.97 In part to reduce local resentment against Japan and 

in part to prevent the spread of venereal disease among its ranks, the Japanese military 

contracted private vendors to set up “comfort stations” for the troops as early as 1932. 
40 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Again, this practice was known to the Allies but no criminal charges were filed at the 

trials. There was one exception. After Japan occupied the Dutch East Indies (present-day 

Indonesia), the Japanese military forced many young women—including Dutch as well 

as Eurasian—into providing sexual service to the Japanese. Those Japanese responsible 

were punished by the Dutch authorities after the war on account of the abuse of the 

Dutch women. 

In the 1970s, a few writers in Japan began treating the subject as a crime committed 

by the Imperial Japanese Army.98 It was not until the early 1990s that the case of the 

military “comfort women” (ianfu) began to attract wide attention, following the first 

public testimony of a Korean woman who had been forced into military prostitution for 

the Japanese. Her account galvanized activists around the “comfort women” issue. Most 

publications on the subject initially appeared in Korean and Japanese. Numerous works 

have been also published in English.99 Gathering extensive oral histories, Su Zhiliang, a 

historian from Shanghai, published the most comprehensive work on this topic in China 

and set up a Center for the Study of Chinese Comfort Women at his university.100 In 

terms of scope and impact, perhaps no other Japanese war crime has reached the level 

of international publicity since the 1990s as that of the military “comfort women,” a 

phenomenon helped by new interest in human rights and standards regarding sexual 

violence toward women.101

Initially, the Japanese government denied official involvement in the operation. 

Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a leading Japanese scholar on Japanese war crimes, made headlines 

by discovering documents in the Japanese Self-Defense Agency’s library that suggested 

direct military involvement. He went on to publish them in a collection of primary 

documents, which included numerous ATIS reports from NARA.102 Under public 

pressure, the Japanese government admitted its complicity and set up the Asian Women’s 

Fund (AWF) to compensate former “comfort women” from private sources. AWF 

established a History Committee in 1996 to gather and examine relevant documents 

in archives in Japan, the United States, Holland, and Taiwan. Historians hired by the 

AWF also interviewed former “comfort women” in Indonesia and the Philippines. 

Their work resulted in a multi-volume collection of documents and a comprehensive 

bibliography on the subject.103 Many are not fully satisfied, however. As Yoshimi points 

out, numerous Japanese government documents were either lost or remain classified. 

Among them are police records belonging to the former Home Ministry that allegedly 

had been destroyed.104 Private records, such as the journal of army doctor Aso Tetsuo, 

contributed much to the understanding of conditions in the comfort stations in China, 

but many others held by the Self-Defense Agency War History Department Library 

remained closed to the public for privacy reasons.105 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 41

Many issues concerning the “comfort women” are still hotly disputed in Japan. 

The number of women victims remains a subject of disagreement; popular accounts 

frequently give the figure of 200,000. Takasaki Shōji, an expert on Korean history 

and chair of the AWF History Committee, emphasized the distinction between the 

Korean women’s volunteer corps (teishintai), who were sent to work in factories in 

Japan, and “comfort women.” As he noted, these two terms had been confused by 

many Korean activists and had led to an inflated estimate of the number of Korean 

“comfort women.”106 A bigger issue concerns the degrees of coercion and government 

involvement. Some also question the veracity of the testimony provided by former 

“comfort women” as well as their motivation to testify in public. Hata Ikuhiko, for 

one, has taken the lead and published many essays as well as a major work on this 

subject. Hata essentially equates the “comfort women” system with prostitution and 

finds similar practices during the war in other countries.107 He has been criticized by 

other Japanese scholars for downplaying the hardship of the “comfort women.”

Other Topics

In addition to the four main areas of research and publications on Japanese war crimes—

conventional war crimes in Asia, mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilians, chemical 

and biological warfare, and military “comfort women”—other subjects have received 

some attention in recent years.

Drug trafficking is one such issue. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial accused Japan of 

selling narcotics to raise money for its clandestine operations. In the late 1980s, Japanese 

historian Eguchi Keiichi published his studies of Japan’s opium policy in north China 

during the war after discovering a cache of original documents.108 Based on archival 

research in Japanese and English, John Jennings’ book introduced this topic to Western 

readers.109 A more recent and broader study is a conference volume, which placed 

Japanese practices in the historical context of opium management in Asia.110 

Compared with studies of the European Theater, a conspicuously underdeveloped 

issue for Asia is property crimes. It is known that not only Japanese soldiers but also 

some officers and newspaper reporters took part in looting after the Japanese takeover of 

Chinese cities like Nanjing. More recently, some Chinese scholars accused the Japanese 

military of systematically looting Chinese cultural property during the war, which 

amounted to what some called a “cultural holocaust.” Zhao Jianmin, a Chinese historian 

at Fudan University in Shanghai, claimed that as many as 897,178 books were looted by 

the Japanese military in the Shanghai-Nanjing area alone and taken to Japan. In a series 

of spirited rebuttals, however, a Japanese scholar accused Zhao of writing polemics, not 

history based on credible evidence.111 
42 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Economic issues in occupied areas in Asia belong to an area relatively well researched 

in Japan. Japan’s requisition of large amounts of rice from Vietnam in 1945 is known 

to have contributed to the great famine in the northern part of that country, leading to 

almost 2 million deaths.112 Japanese scholars have also pioneered the study of military 

scrip (gunpyō) operations, which siphoned off the savings of many local residents in 

occupied areas such as Hong Kong.113 What happened to secret funds allegedly amassed 

by the Japanese occupation authorities remains an intriguing question. This might not 

have been all loot, but a significant portion was. To this day in Southeast Asia, tales of 

hidden Japanese treasure still create a sensation. Popular history writers Sterling and 

Peggy Seagraves have alleged a plot (code named “Golden Lily”) by Japan’s Imperial 

family to loot occupied Asia of gold and other treasures. The authors, claiming to have 

obtained many secret documents, accused the U.S. government of refusing to declassify 

many key documents. 114 Their tendency to overstate their case and rely on the words of 

individuals, however, makes the book less than credible in the eyes of historians. 

In contrast to the voluminous writings on Japanese atrocities in the Asia Pacific, there 

is little awareness outside Japan of the Japanese Army’s brutality against its own people. 

The 1945 battle of Okinawa was one such instance. First raised during Ienaga Saburō’s 

textbook trial, it has been a controversial topic for Japanese researchers for many years. 

Hayashi Hirofumi, for instance, revealed that Japan’s military often forced Okinawan 

natives into so-called “collective suicide.” Hayashi used U.S. intelligence sources to show 

that the Japanese military had intended to use agents to infiltrate captured Japanese to 

kill those who cooperated with the American forces.115

Problems and Remedies

Thanks to the discovery of new evidence and the pioneering work of many historians, a 

lot more is known about Japanese war crimes in World War II now than in the immediate 

postwar period. A number of problems still confront scholars of Japanese war crimes of 

World War II, however. First, sixty years after the war ended, there are still some World 

War II-era documents to be discovered or declassified in a number of countries. While 

the IWG has accomplished a great deal by unearthing valuable documents under the 

Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act, the United States and other countries 

must continue a vigorous pursuit for all remaining records. This is especially true of 

Japan, where many World War II-era documents remain closed or forgotten. 

Second, historians must make better use of documents that are already open to the 

public. Whereas Japanese historians are perhaps the most frequent users of the Japanrelated materials at NARA, U.S.-based researchers would do well to consult more foreign 

documents, especially those in Japanese. Australian, British, and Dutch archives remain 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 43

to be fully exploited. As one example, Yamamoto Mayumi and William Bradley Horton, 

two historians employed by the Asia Women’s Fund History Committee in Japan, have 

presented their preliminary survey of documentary evidence related to “comfort women” 

in various Dutch Archives.116 

Third, while official documents are indispensable to historians studying World War II 

and war atrocities, historians must also use other types of evidence. This is all the more 

important since documentary evidence on certain subjects is likely to remain sketchy, 

in large part due to the large scale destruction after the war. Private records such as 

diaries and memoirs can help to fill the gap, as can interviews with the participants and 

survivors. As the number of survivors dwindles each day, conducting good oral histories 

is more urgent than ever. To be sure, caution is necessary when using such testimony, 

and every attempt must be made to confirm testimony with other types of evidence when 

possible.117 

Apart from the issue of evidence, current studies leave many areas to be examined. 

Japanese war crimes against the local populations in Asia and the Pacific, for instance, 

have not received as much attention in English as crimes committed against Allied 

POWs. Compared with the recent scholarship on the European Theater, professional 

historians of Asia have only begun to study such subjects as forced labor and wartime 

looting of art and property. 

A more challenging task for historians is to convincingly explain why these war 

crimes occurred. War crimes—as well as their repercussions—cannot be understood in 

isolation from the larger context of military, intellectual, or social-economic histories. 

A problem with some current work is the tendency to return to the wartime practice 

of demonizing the enemy. While it may be psychologically satisfying to some, such 

an approach contributes little to understanding the real causes of war crimes, let alone 

preventing them in the future. For one thing, war crimes in World War II were by no 

means limited to the Japanese troops. Comparative approaches, if used well, can provide 

a better understanding of wartime conditions and help highlight particular institutions 

and ideology. In this regard, John Dower’s 1985 work, War Without Mercy, remains an 

exemplary piece of scholarship. By highlighting race as a force that shaped perceptions 

and influenced behavior on both sides of the Pacific War, Dower illustrated how racism 

and dehumanization contributed to the brutality of war.118

In the popular realm, there are encouraging signs of such development. The National 

D-Day Museum in New Orleans has incorporated some of these perspectives into their 

permanent exhibition on World War II. For instance, in his essay on Japanese maltreatment 

of British POWs, Kibata Yoichi described racial prejudice on the part of the British 

toward Japanese prisoners in their captivity shortly after the war. Rather than trivializing 
44 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Japanese brutality toward Allied POWs, Kibata emphasized, it is necessary to take into 

account all the ramifications of changing power relations and shifting perspectives on 

race.119 Some studies of “comfort women” have taken a step in this direction. Historian 

Yuki Tanaka focused on Southeast Asia in his book, Japan’s Comfort Women, which broke 

new ground by placing the “comfort women” in comparative perspective, examining 

prostitution around U.S. military bases in South Korea and Southeast Asia to explore the 

wider ramification of the sexual exploitation of women.120 

Studying war crimes serves as a reminder that historians must build their cases on the 

basis of credible evidence. However, the issue of Japanese war crimes in World War II 

is likely to remain a contested subject that cannot be resolved by documentary evidence 

alone. In the final analysis, sustained and intense international collaboration is the most 

effective way to raise the level of research on war crimes, Japanese or otherwise. Though 

not widely known outside Japan, Japanese scholars often take the lead in studying the 

war crimes of the Japanese military. Already there are translations of their scholarship 

into English, which are likely to stimulate further research. The continued search for 

documentary evidence and a broadened perspective through cross-national collaboration 

offer the best hope for better understanding human behavior in war and Japan’s share of 

war crimes. 

Notes

1. I have limited my examination to English-, Japanese-, and Chinese-language publications. 

2. Richard A. Falk, Gabriel Kolko, and Robert J. Lifton, eds., Crimes of War: A Legal, PoliticalDocumentary and Psychological Inquiry into the Responsibility of Leaders, Citizens and Soldiers 

for Criminal Acts In War (New York: Vintage Books, 1971). For a convenient and more upto-date compendium, see Roy Gutman and David Rieff, eds., Crimes of War: What the Public 

Should Know (New York: Norton, 1999). 

3. The Japanese Diet did ratify the Red Cross Convention, thus obliging the government 

to cooperate with the Red Cross during the war. For a different understanding of this 

issue between Japanese and Allies, see Aiko Utsumi, “The Japanese Army and Its Prisoners: 

Relevant Documents and Bureaucratic Institutions,” Australia-Japan Research Project at the 

Australian War Memorial, March 1999. 

4. For a general survey, see Philip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese On Trial: Allied War Crimes 

Operations In The East, 1945–1951 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979). 

5. Criticism of the Tokyo Trials began with one of its own justices, who published a lengthy 

dissenting opinion. Radhabinod Pal, International Military Tribunal For The Far East: 

Dissentient Judgment (Calcutta: Sanyal, 1953). See also Richard Minear, Victor’s Justice: 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 45

The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Kei Ushimura, 

“Beyond The Judgment of Civilization:” The Intellectual Legacy of the Japanese War Crimes 

Trials, 1946–1949, trans. Steven J. Ericson (Tokyo: The International House of Japan, 

2003).

6. For a Japanese encyclopedia that adopts an even broader definition, see Ikuhiko Hata, 

Masamori Sase, and Keiichi Tsuneishi, eds., Sekai sensō hanzai jiten [An encyclopedia of war 

crimes in the modern world] (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 2002).

7. Harold D. Laswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (New York: P. Smith, 1938); 

Bruno Lasker and Agnes Roman, Propaganda from China and Japan: A Case Study in 

Propaganda Analysis (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1938); James Morgan Read, 

Atrocity Propaganda, 1914–19 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1941).

8. Yoshida Yutaka, “Gunji kankei shiryō no sengoshi” [A postwar history of military-related 

sources] Archives no kagaku Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2003): 26.

9. Tanaka Hiromi, Bei gikai toshokan shozo senryō sesshu kyū rikukaigun shiryō sōmokuroku [A 

catalog of captured former army and navy materials at the Library of Congress] (Tokyo: 

Tōyō shorin, 1995), x. See also Hiromi Tanaka, “Japanese Military Historical Sources after 

the War: A Brief Survey,” Australia-Japan Research Project at the Australian War Memorial, 

March 1999. 

10. On July 6, 1993, Japan’s Kyodo News Agency reported the discovery of these documents in 

the Russian Military Archives. For a discussion, see Rokurō Saitō, Siberia no banka [Eulogy 

of Siberia] (Tsuruoka: Shūsen shiryōkan shuppanbu, 1995), 128–215, esp. 139, 144–47. A 

partial list is included on pp. 529–37.

11. For example, see the Dalian Municipal Archive (in Chinese) at http://www.da.dl.gov.cn/

Arch/dazc/dazc_1.htm/. Some of these documents have been recently published in China 

as Jilin Dang’anguan comp., Guandong xianbingdui baogaoji [Reports of the Guandong 

Military Police] 84 vols. (Nanning: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2005-2006).

12. A study based on U.S. documents at NARA of what captured Japanese military personnel 

revealed to American interrogators is Yamamoto Taketoshi, Nihonhei horyō wa nani o shabetta 

ka [What did captured Japanese soldiers tell?] (Tokyo: Bunshun shinsho, 2001). 

13. Paul Kesaris, ed., The MAGIC Documents: Summaries and Transcripts of the Top Secret 

Diplomatic Communications of Japan, 1938–1945, 35mm microfilm, 14 reels (Washington, 

DC: University Publications of America, 1980). 

14. See, among others, Edward Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against 

Japan, 1942–1945 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992). Unfortunately, 

many original records of intercepted telegrams were lost, and the translations of them were 

not without mistakes. A conference of Japan’s highest leaders before the Emperor (gozen 

kaigi), for instance, was often translated as “morning meetings.” For a work that lists many 
46 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

of MAGIC’s mistranslations, see Keiichiro Komatsu, Origins of the Pacific War and the 

Importance of MAGIC (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).

15. Cecil H. Uyehara, comp., Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Tokyo, Japan, 1868–1945, (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1954). Japanese records 

collected by the International Prosecution Section, however, were not returned, but were 

later microfilmed by Japan’s Diet Library. See also John Young, Checklist of Microfilm 

Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 

1868–1945 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1959).

16. R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, eds. and comps., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 

22 vols. (New York: Garland, 1981), and The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: Index and Guide, 5 

vols. (New York: Garland, 1981–87). An earlier guide is Paul S. Dull and Michael Takaaki 

Umemura, The Tokyo Trials: A Functional Index to the Proceedings of the International Military 

Tribunal for the Far East (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957), which listed 

Japanese atrocities (“violation of laws and customs of warfare and laws of humanity”) 

primarily by location, but also by particular crime, such as “use of opium and narcotics,” 

“sea atrocities,” and the like. See also Yoshio Chaen, comp., B, C kyū senpan kankei shūsei

[Collected materials on B-, C-class war criminals], 15 vols. (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1984–

1992).

17. For instance, David Bergamini’s controversial book gave detailed accounts of events like the 

Rape of Nanking. David Bergamini, Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy (New York: Morrow, 1971). 

Historians have accused Bergamini of using evidence of dubious credibility, among other 

things.

18. Saburō Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931–1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan’s Role in World 

War II, trans. Frank Baldwin (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

19. On Japan’s war memory, see Robert Orr, Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National 

Identity in Postwar Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2001); and Yoshikuni Igarashi, 

Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Japanese Culture, 1945–1970 (Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 2000). In Japanese, the best survey remains Yoshida Yutaka, 

Nihonjin no sensōkan [Japanese views of the war] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995). See 

also George Hicks, Japan’s War Memories: Amnesia or Concealment? (Aldershot, Brookfield: 

Ashgate, 1997).

20. Chūgoku kikansha rengokai, Sankō [Three Alls] (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1957). 

21. Hayashi Fusao, Daitōa sensō koteiron [An affirmation of the Greater East Asia War] (Tokyo: 

Banchō shobō, 1964). A sequel was published in 1965.

22. Katsuichi Honda, The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National 

Shame, ed. Frank Gibney, trans. Karen Sandness (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). See 

also Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, “The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 47

Amid Fabricated Illusions,” Journal of Japanese Studies 26, no. 2, (Summer 2000): 307–40. 

23. Sensō sekinin kenkyū [Studies in war responsibility] (Tokyo, 1993— ).

24. Kang-Ri zhanzheng yanjiu [Studies of the war of resistance against Japan] (Beijing, 1991— ).

25. Radhika Coomaraswarmy, Violence against Women: Report Based on Research Visits to North 

and South Korea and Japan on Wartime Military Sexual Slavery (1997). 

26. Rijun qin-Hua yanjiu [Studies of Japanese invasion of China] (Carbondale, IL, 1990—). 

27. For instance, Shi Young, Margaret Stetz, and Bonnie Oh, eds., Legacies of the Comfort Women 

of World War II (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

28. Hikōkai shiryō mokuroku (kōshi monjo) [Catalog of classified materials (public and private 

documents)]. It includes two volumes of materials returned from the United States (Beikoku 

kara henkan o uketa shiryō mokuroku), which I was unable to see in July 2004. See also 

Yoshimi Yoshiaki, “Dokugasu mondai to shiryō kōkai” [The Issue of Poison Gas and 

Declassification of Documents] Sensō sekinin kenkyū 44 (Summer 2004), 10–13. 

29. There is a public catalog of returned documents (Henkan monjo mokuroku) in the Public 

Record Office reading room. 

30. Shōhei Muta, “The Lack of an Archives Tradition in Japan: Issues Surrounding the Planned 

Centre for Modern Japan-Asia Relations,” Australia-Japan Research Project at the Australian 

War Memorial, March 1999.

31. Tanaka Akira and Matsumura Takao, eds., 731 Butai sakusei shiryō [Materials created by 

Unit 731] (Tokyo: Fuji shobō, 1991).

32. Ono Kenji et al., comps., Nankin daigyakusatsu wo kirokushita kōgun heishi tachi [Imperial 

Army soldiers who recorded the Nanjing Massacre] (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1994). 

33. Nankin senshi hensaniinkai, Nankin senshi shiryōshū [Historical materials on the history of 

the Nanjing Battle] (Tokyo: Kaikōsha, 1993).

34. See http://www.jacar.go.jp/asia_en/index_en.html. The Web site is accessible in Japanese 

and English. These figures were valid in October 2004.

35. Zhongyang Dang’anguan et al., comps., Dongbei lici dacan’an [Great atrocities in Northeastern 

China] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989); Huabei lici dacan’an [Great atrocities in North 

China] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1995); Nanjing datusha (The Nanjing Massacre) (Beijing: 

Zhonghua shuju, 1995).

36. Zhang Kaiyuan, ed. and trans., Tianli nanrong: Meiguo chuanjiaoshi yanzhong de Nanjing 

datusha (1937–1938) [Unforgivable crimes: The Nanjing Massacre (1937–1938) in the eyes 

of American missionaries] (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1999).

37. Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: Basic 

Books, 1997). 

38. Rabe’s diary was later published as The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe, ed. 

Erwin Wickert, trans. John E. Woods (New York: Knopf, 2000). 
48 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

39. Unfortunately, both Wu and Chang mistakenly attributed a key telegram that mentioned 

the Chinese death figure 300,000 to Japan’s Foreign Minister, a mistake repeated in a 

Washington Post obituary of Chang. 

40. Masahiro Yamamoto, Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000). For 

a recent work that examines how the incident has been received in the world, see Takashi 

Yoshida, The Making of the Rape of Nanking (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

41. Enhan Li, Ribenjun zhanzheng baoxing zhi yanju [A study of Japan’s war atrocities] (Taipei: 

Taiwan shangwu chubanshe, 1994). 

42. The Web site is http://www.sjhistory.org. It publishes news, research and source materials 

relating to the Nanjing Massacre, military “comfort women,” biological warfare, forced 

labor, as well as other aspects of Sino-Japanese relations.

43. For a longer English survey of the historiography as well as leading works in Japan, China, 

and the United States, see Daqing Yang, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical 

Writings on the Rape of Nanjing,” American Historical Review 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 842–

65; Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, “The Nanjing Massacre: Now You See It...” Monumenta 

Nipponica 56, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 521–44. 

44. Lincoln Li’s Japanese Army in North China (Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1975) focused 

on Japanese military and political strategies and emphasized organizational conflicts among 

Japanese themselves. Masahiro Yamamoto, “Japan’s Anti-Guerrilla Warfare in North China, 

1939–45: Anatomy of Its Failure,” paper presented at the conference on the military history 

of the Sino-Japanese War, Maui, Hawaii, January 2004.

45. For a study based primarily on interviews, see Jose Ma. Bonifacio M. Escoda, Warsaw of Asia: 

The Rape of Manila, revised ed. (Quezon City, Philippines: Giraffe Books, 2001).

46. For a study in English, see Cheah Boon Kheng, “Japanese Army Policy toward the Chinese 

and Malay-Chinese Relations in Wartime Malaya,” in Paul Kratoska, ed., Southeast Asian 

Minorities in the Wartime Japanese Empire (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 97–110; 

Takashima Nobuyoshi et al., Maraya no Nihongun: Negurisenbiran shū ni okeru Kajin 

gyakusatsu [Japanese Army in Malaya] (Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1989); Hayashi Hirofumi, 

Kakyo gyakusatsu: Nihongun shihaika no Mare hanto [Massacre of overseas Chinese] (Tokyo: 

Suzusawa shobō, 1992).

47. Zhang Lianhong, ed., Riqin shiqi Xin-Ma Huaren shouhai diaocha [Survey of Malaysian 

Chinese victims during Japanese invasion] (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2004). 

It also includes testimonies concerning Japanese military scrip (currency issued by the 

military).

48. There are too many to name here. For a useful sampling, see Michale P. Onorato, ed., 

Forgotten Heroes: Japan’s Imprisonment of American Civilians in the Philippines, 1942–1945: 

An Oral History (Westport CT: Meckler, 1990); Robert S. La Forte et al., eds., With Only the 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 49

Will to Live: Accounts of Americans in Japanese Prison Camps, 1941–1945 (Wilmington, DE: 

Scholarly Resource, 1994); Charles G. Roland, “Allied POWs, Japanese Captors and the 

Geneva Convention,” War & Society IX (1991): 83–101. A useful summary is provided by 

Gary K. Reynolds, “The US Prisoners of War and Civilians Captured and Interned by Japan 

in World War II: The Issue of Compensation by Japan,” Report for Congress RL 30606 

(December 17, 2002). 

49. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial, 27. The death rate of Soviet POWs in German camps was 

much higher and comparable to those in Japanese camps. 

50. Stanley Falk, Bataan: The March of Death (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962); Donald Knox, 

Death March: The Survivors of Bataan (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981). Other 

estimates of American deaths range from 650 to over 2,000; estimates of Filipino deaths 

range from 9,000 to 16,500.

51. Gavan McCormack and Hank Nelson, eds., The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and 

History (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993). 

52. “POW list sheds light on deaths of Allied soldiers in Japan,” Mainichi Daily News (January 

12, 2005). A list of the victims was compiled by the POW Research Network Japan, a 

private group founded in 2002, and published on its Web site: http://homepage3.nifty.

com/pow-j/. 

53. Linda Goetz Holmes, Unjust Enrichment: How Japan’s Companies Built Postwar Fortunes 

Using American POWs (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001).

54. I’d like to thank Professor Gerhard Weinberg for alerting me to this incident. For the 

experience of one of those eleven survivors, see Bob Wilbanks, Last Man Out: Glenn McDole, 

USMC, Survivor of the Palawan Massacre in WW II (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2004).

55. Gavan Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific (New York: 

Morrow, 1994). See also E. Bartlett Kerr, Surrender and Survival: The Experience of American 

POWs in the Pacific, 1941–1945 (New York: Morrow, 1985).

56. Ikuhiko Hata, “From Consideration to Contempt: The Changing Nature of Japanese 

Military and Popular Perceptions of Prisoners of War through the Ages,” in Prisoners of War 

and Their Captors in World War II, eds. Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich (Washington, 

D.C.: Berg, 1996), 253–76.

57. Yoichi Kibata, “Japanese Treatment of British Prisoners: The Historical Context,” in Japanese 

Prisoners of War, eds. Philip Towle et al., (London: Hambledon and London, 2000), 137, 

144. 

58. Hank Nelson, “Measuring the Railway: From Individual Lives to National History,” in 

McCormack and Nelson, eds., The Burma-Thailand Railway, 21–22.

59. R.P.W. Havers, Reassessing the Japanese Prisoner of War Experience: The Changi POW Camp, 

Singapore, 1942–45 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Sibylla Jane Flower, “Captors and 
50 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

captives on the Burma-Thailand Railway,” in Building the Death Railway: The Ordeal of 

American POWs in Burma, 1942–1945, eds, Robert S. LaForte and Ronald E. Marcello, 

(Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1993).

60. Paul H. Kratoska, Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown History (Armonk, 

NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

61. For a report on a joint Sino-Japanese visit to one of these fortresses, see Kikuike Minoru et 

al., “Kyū-Kantōgun dai-4 (15) kokkyō shubitai Hutou yōsai no Nitchū kyōdō chōsa” [Joint 

Sino-Japanese investigation of the Hutou fortification of the Kwantung Army’s border unit 

4 (15)], Sensō sekinin kenkyū 4 (Summer 1994), 12–22. Of the some 2,500 Japanese soldiers 

and civilians known to be inside one complex at the end of the war, only fifty-three managed 

to make it back to Japan after eighteen days of fighting.

62. Rin Eita, Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū, 8 vols. [Collected materials on 

wartime foreign forced laborers] (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1990–91); Nagasawa Shigeru, 

Senjika Chōsenjin Chūgokujin, rengōgun horyō kyōsei renkō shiryōshū: Sekitan tōseikai kyokuhi 

bunsho, 4 vols. [Collected materials on wartime forced labor by Koreans, Chinese and Allied 

POWs] (Tokyo: Ryokuin shobō, 1992). 

63. Tanaka Hiroshi, Chūgokujin kyōsei renkō shiryō [Materials on Chinese forced laborers], 5 

vols., (Tokyo: Gendai shobō, 1995). 

64. He Tianyi, Huabei laogong xiehui zuie shi [A history of North China Labor Association’s 

criminal deeds] (Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe, 1995); Liu Baochen and Lin Fengsheng, Riben 

luyi Zhongguo zhanfu laogong diaocha yanjiu [Investigation into Japanese abuse of Chinese 

POW Laborers] (Baoding: Hebei daxue chubanshe, 2002). 

65. Ju Zhifen and Zhuang Jianping, comps., Riben lueduo huabei qiangzhi laogong dang’an 

zhiliao [Archival materials concerning Japanese abduction of Chinese forced laborers from 

North China], 2 vols. (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003).

66. “‘Chōsenjin kyōsei chōyō’ Nihon no tankō kaisha no shiryō ga hakken” (Documents of 

a Japanese mining company that “forcibly recruited Koreans” are found), Choson ilbo

(December 11, 2002) (Japanese edition). 

67. For example, “Japanese Use the Chinese as ‘Guinea Pigs’ to Test Germ Warfare,” Rocky 

Mountain Medical Journal 39, no. 8 (August 1942): 571–72. According to a U.S. document 

discovered by Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki at the MacArthur Memorial, the U.S. 

Army Chief of Staff informed the prosecutors at the Tokyo Trials of the Army position that 

the use of poison gas did not violate international law. Let’s 45 (December 2004): 23.

68. Zhongyang Dang’anguan et al., Xijunzhan yu duqizhan, 621–24.

69. Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army, Charged with Manufacturing 

and Employing Bacteriological Weapons (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 

1950).
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 51

70. Concerning this allegation, see Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, The United States 

and Biological Warfare: Secrets From The Early Cold War and Korea (Bloomington, Indiana: 

Indiana University Press, 1998). Others cite recently obtained Soviet documents to show 

the allegation was a Communist propaganda plot. See “New Evidence on the Korean War,” 

and Kathryn Weathersby, “Deceiving the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the 

Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons Use in Korea,” Cold War International History Project 

Bulletin 11 (Winter 1998): 176–99. 

71. John W. Powell, “Japan’s Germ Warfare: The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime,” Bulletin of 

Concerned Asian Scholars 12, no. 4 (October-December 1980): 2–17; “A Hidden Chapter in 

History,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 37, no. 8 (October 1981): 45–53. 

72. For instance, published before 1980 are Nagamatsu Asazō, “Sanzen’nin ga marutanbō ni natta 

saikinsakusen no zenbō” [Full picture of bacteriological warfare with 3,000 human Maruta], 

Nihon shuhō 456 (September 5, 1958); Yoshinaga Reiko, Jintai jikken no kōfu [Terror of 

human experiment] (Osaka: Naniwa shobō, 1963); Shimamura Kyō, 3000-nin no seitai 

jikken: Nihongun “Saikin Butai” no zaigo [Live experiments on 3,000 human beings] (Tokyo: 

Hara shobō, 1967, 1981); Morimura Seiichi, Akuma no hōshoku: “Kantōgun saikinsen butai” 

kofu no zenbō [Devil’s gluttony: The frightening whole picture of the “Kwantung Army’s 

bacteriological warfare unit”] (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1981).

73. Zoku Akuma no hōshoku: “Kantōgun saikinsen butai” nazo no sengoshi (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 

1982). Although Morimura used some original Japanese documents, the book contained 

no footnotes or bibliography. The second volume was criticized for its erroneous photos. 

74. Tsuneishi Keiichi, Kieta saikinsen butai: Kantogun Dai 731-butai [The bacteriological warfare 

unit that vanished] (Tokyo: Kaimeisha, 1981), 179; Tsuneishi Keiichi and Asano Tomizo, 

Saikinsen butai to jiketsushita futari no igakusha [Bacteriological warfare unit and two doctors 

who committed suicide] (Tokyo : Shinchōsha, 1982). 

75. This document, Tōshō ni tsuite (On hypothermia) was initially captured by the United States 

then returned to Japan, where it is now available at the National Record Office. 

76. Tsuneishi Keiichi, ed., Hyōteki Ishii: 731 butai to Beigun chōhō katsudō [Target Ishii: Unit 

731 and U.S. military intelligence activities] (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1984). 

77. Morimura Seiichi, ed., Sabakareta 731 Butai [Unit 731 on Trial] (Tokyo: Banseisha, 1991). 

78. Kondo Shōji, 731 butai sakinsen shiryō shūsei (Collection of materials on Unit 731 and 

bacteriological warfare), 8 CDs (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2003). Kondo’s essay on the state 

of research, published in December 2004, is very valuable. See “731 butai o meguru chōsa 

kenkyū no genjō” (State of research on Unit 731), Sensō sekinin kenkyū 46 (Winter 2004): 

38–43. 

79. Kondo, 731 butai sakinsen shiryō shūsei, 42. Many of these Japanese documents are 

reproduced in photo format in Jilinsheng Dang’anguan et al., comps., “731 budui” zuixin 
52 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

tiezheng: Tebie yisong, fangyi dang’an xuan [Iron proofs of the crimes of Unit 731: Selected 

archival materials on special deliveries and epidemic prevention], (Changchun: Jilin renmin 

chubanshe, 2003).

80. Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II

(New York: Free Press, 1989). Interestingly enough, when their book was published in the 

United States, the chapter on allegations of America’s use of chemical and biological warfare 

in the Korean War was dropped. 

81. Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the 

American Cover-Up, revised ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994, 2002). Harris was a contributor 

to the 1999 compendium Crimes of War and textbooks on medical ethics compiled by the 

US Army. See review by Richard Minear in Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 4 (1994): 

1265–66. 

82. U.S. House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Subcommittee on Compensation, Pension, and 

Insurance, Treatment of American Prisoners of War in Manchuria, 99th Congress, 2nd Session 

(September 17, 1986). (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).

83. Tsuneishi, 731 butai, 50. A Japanese Army doctor did draw blood from Allied POWs in 

Mukden in early 1943, he noted, for the purpose of studying their immune ability. However, 

he admits that the allegation concerning the use of American subjects for biological warfare 

experimentation during the Korean War, while lacking documentary evidence, cannot be 

entirely dismissed. See 731 butai, 171–74, 179–80, and Harris, Factory of Death, 170–71.

84. Matsumura Takao, “731 butai to Hoten horyō shūyōjo” [Unit 731 and the Mukden 

POW camp] Sensō sekinin kenkyū 13 (Autumn 1996): 74–76. The document was first 

submitted by the British prosecution at the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and translated back 

into Japanese. Matsumura notes some discrepancy between that earlier translation and the 

Japanese original in his possession. 

85. Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Toshiya Iko, 731 Butai to Tenno, Rikugun chūō [Unit 731 and the 

Emperor, Army High Command] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995); Awaya Kentarō and 

Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Dokugasusen kankei shiryō [Materials on poison gas warfare] (Tokyo: Fuji 

Shuppan, 1989); Yoshimi Yoshiaki and Matsuno Seiya, Dokugasusen kankei shiryō II (Tokyo: 

Fuji Shuppan, 1997).

86. He mentions the report and other research data, which had been allegedly destroyed by the 

United States.

87. Concerning Unit 1644, see Mizutani Naoko, “Moto 1644 butai’in no shōgen” [Testimonies 

of former members of Unit 1644], Sensō sekinin kenkyū 10 (Winter 1995): 56–65.

88. This document was titled Shina jihen ni okeru kagakusen reishō shū [Cases of chemical warfare 

during the China incident] (Narashino: Rikugun Narashino Gakkō, 1942). The official 

history of the Narashino Military Academy is Rikugun Narashino Gakkō kōshi hensan iinkai, 
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 53

Rikugun Narashino Gakkō [The Army Narashino Academy] (Tokyo, 1987). 

89. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Dokugasu sen to Nihongun [Chemical warfare and the Japanese military] 

(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2004). He introduced the document in Sensō sekinin kenkyū 45 

(Autumn 2004). Yoshimi has surveyed U.S. documents relating to the Japanese use of 

poison gas in China and the Pacific Theater in “Nihongun no dokugasu sen to Amerika” 

[Japanese Army’s poison gas warfare and the U.S.], Sensō sekinin kenkyū 40 (Summer 2003): 

4–11.

90. Zhongyang Danganguan, Zhongguo Dier Lishi Danganguan, and Jilinsheng Shehui 

Kexueyuan, Xijunzhan yu duqi zhan [Bacteriological warfare and chemical warfare] (Beijing: 

Zhonghua shuju, 1989); Zuie di “731””100”: Qin-Hua Rijun xijun budui dang’an ziliao 

xuan bian [The evils of Unit 731 and Unit 100] (Shenyang: Liaoning minzu chubanshe, 

1995).

91. Zhongguo Kangri Zhangzhen Shixuehui and Zhongguo Renmin Kangri Zhangzhen 

Jinianguan, Ji Daozhuan, eds., Qinhua Rijun de duqizhan [Poison gas warfare by the 

invading Japanese troops] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1995]. For an annual breakdown of 

alleged use, casualty figures, and geographical distribution, see pp. 69–73. For a Chinese 

study of a Japanese CBW unit stationed in southern China, see Sha Dongxun, Jie kai “8604” 

zhi mi: Qin Hua Rijun zai Yue mimi jinxing xijunzhan dapuguang [Demystifying Unit 

8604] (Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, 1995). Reports on victims of biological warfare 

include Qiu Mingxuan comp., Zuizheng: Qin-Hua Rijun Quzhou xijunzhan jishi [Criminal 

evidence: A truthful record of Japanese biological warfare in Quzhou] (Beijing: Sanxia 

chubanshe, 1999); Li Xiaofang comp., Qixue kongsu: Qin-Hua Rijun xijunzhan tanju, biju 

shouhai xincunzhe shilu [Blood-weeping accusations: Records of anthrax victims] (Beijing: 

Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005). The latter is a bilingual publication. 

92. Bu Ping et al., Ribeng qin-Hua zhanzheng shiqi de huaxuezhan [Japan’s chemical warfare 

during the invasion of China] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2004).

93. I thank Greg Brasher of NARA for alerting me to this fact. 

94. Shusaku Endō, The Sea and Poison: A Novel, trans. Michael Gallagher (Tokyo: Tuttle, 

1973).

95. Timothy Lang Francis, “‘To Dispose of the Prisoners’: The Japanese Executions of American 

Aircrew at Fukuoka, Japan, during 1945,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 4 

(Nov. 1997): 484–86. See also Thomas Easton, “A Quiet Honesty Records a World War II 

Atrocity,” The Baltimore Sun (May 28, 1995), A1.

96. Zhongyang Dang’anguan et al., Xijunzhan yu duqizhan, 747–817.

97. See, for example, the diary of Ogawa Sekijirō, Aru gun hōmukan no nikki [Diary of a military 

legal affairs officer] (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 2000).

98. Senda Kakō, Jūgun ianfu [Military comfort women] (Tokyo: Futabasha, 1973; San’ ichi 
54 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

shobō, 1978); Kim Il-myon, Tenno no guntai to Chōsenjin ianfu [Emperor’s army and Korean 

comfort women] (Tokyo: Sanichi shobō, 1976).

99. In English, see George Hicks, Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution 

in the Second World War (New York: Norton, 1997); Keith Howard and Korean Council 

for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, True Stories of the Korean Comfort 

Women (New York: Cassell, 1995); David Andrew Schmidt, Ianfu–The Comfort Women of 

the Japanese Imperial Army of the Pacific War: Broken Silence (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen 

Press, 2000); Sangmie Choi Schellstede and Soon Mi Yu, Comfort Women Speak: Testimony 

by Sex Slaves of the Japanese Military (New York: Holmes & Meier, 2001).

100. Su Zhiliang, Weianfu yanjiu [A study of comfort women] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 

chubanshe, 2001).

101. See Chapter 4: “Why did the US forces ignore the comfort women issue?” in Yuki Tanaka, 

Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution During World War II and the U.S. 

Occupation (London: Routledge, 2001), 84–109. 

102. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Jugun ianfu shiryōshū [Historical materials on the military comfort women] 

(Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1992).

103. Ajia Josei Kikin (AWF) comp., “Ianfu” mondai kankei bunken mokuroku [Bibliography 

of materials on the “comfort women” issue] (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997). It also published a 

collection of reports of investigation by commissioned historians into documents relating 

to “comfort women” in 1999. In addition, an updated version of the bibliography can be 

found online at http://www.awf.or.jp/. See also Ōnuma Yasuaki, ed., “Ianfu” mondai to Ajia 

Josei Kikin [The “comfort women” issue and the Asian Women’s Fund] (Tokyo: Tōshindo, 

1998).

104. Yoshimi Yoshiaki, “Sensō no kioku, sensō no kiroku: ‘Jugun ianfu’ kankei kiroku no mondai 

o reitoshite,” (Memory of war, records of war) Archives no kagaku (1) (Tokyo, 2003): 276–96. 

A Japanese newspaper reported, however, that large quantities of Home Ministry materials 

were discovered in a building marked for demolition. Mainichi shimbun (Nov. 16, 1994). 

Some of these documents were included in AWF, Seifu chōsa: “Jugun ianfu” mondai shiryō 

shūsei [Compilation of government-collected documentary materials relating to wartime 

“comfort women”] (Tokyo: Ryūkei shosha, 1997–1998). According to Professor Nagai 

Kazu, these documents revealed that even Japan’s local police were shocked by the operation 

to recruit “comfort women,” which was ordered by the military. 

105. Tetsuo Aso, From Shanghai To Shanghai: The War Diary of an Imperial Japanese Army Medical 

Officer, 1937–1941, trans. Hal Gold (Norwalk: EastBridge Books, 2004).

106. Takasaki Sōji, “’Hantō jōshi teishintai’ ni tsuite” [Concerning the “peninsula women’s 

volunteer corps] in “Ianfu” mondai chōsa hōkoku [Reports of investigation into documents 

relating to “comfort women,”] (1999): 41–60.
Documentary Evidence and Studies of Japanese War Crimes I 55

107. Hata Ikuhiko, Ianfu to senjo no sei [Comfort women and sex in the battlefield] (Tokyo: 

Shinchōsha, 1999). A shorter essay of his has been translated into English and published as 

“The Flawed UN Report,” Japan Echo (Autumn 1996), 66–73.

108. Eguchi Keiichi, comp., Shiryō Nitchu sensōki ahen seisaku: Mōkyō seiken shiryō o chūshin 

ni [Sources on the Sino-Japanese Opium War: Mainly sources from the Inner Mongolia 

regime] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1985).

109. John Jennings, The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895–

1945 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).

110. See Motohiro Kobayashi, “Drug Operations by Resident Japanese in Tianjin,” in Opium 

Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952, eds. Timothy Brook and Bob Wakabayashi, 

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).

111. In English, see Jianmin Zhao, “The Looting of Books in Nanjing,” in Japanese War Crimes: 

The Search for Justice, ed. Peter Li (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003). Zhao 

cited Matsumoto Tsuyoshi, Ryakudatsu shita bunka (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993). Zhao’s research 

has been vigorously criticized by Japanese historian Yuichi Kanemaru. See “Cultural Policies 

and Rule of Occupied China,” paper presented at “Wartime China: Regional Regimes and 

Conditions, 1937–1945,” June 2002, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/sino-japanese/

session7.htm.

112. Paul H. Kratoska, ed., Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in South-East Asia (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).

113. Kobayashi Hideo, Nihon gunsei ka no Ajia: Daitōa kyoeiken to gunpyō (Asia under Japanese 

military administration: The Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and military scrip) 

(Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993); Nakamura Takafusa and Kobayashi Hideo, eds., Senji kachū no 

busshi doin to gunpyō [Material mobilization and military scrip in wartime central China] 

(Tokyo: Taga shuppan, 1994). 

114. They claim that Emperor Hirohito not only systematically removed hundreds of billions 

of dollars’ worth of gold, platinum, diamonds, art, religious artifacts, and other treasures 

from a dozen occupied countries during World War II, but also colluded with former U.S. 

President Herbert Hoover and Gen. Douglas MacArthur to deceive the world into thinking 

the war had bankrupted Japan in order to exonerate Tokyo from paying reparations, thus 

protecting American investments. Sterling Seagrave and Peggy Seagrave, The Yamato 

Dynasty: The Secret History of Japan’s Imperial Family (New York: Broadway Books, 1999); 

and Gold Warriors: America’s Secret Recovery of Yamashita’s Gold (London: Verso, 2003). Two 

CD-ROMs containing 900 megabytes of documents and other evidence are available for 

purchase.

115. For example, Hayashi Hirofumi, Okinawa sen to minshū [The people and the battle of 

Okinawa] (Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 2001).
56 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

116. Mayumi Yamamoto and William Bradley Horton, “‘Comfort Women’ in Indonesia: A Report 

on Dutch Archival Materials,” in “Ianfu” mondai chōsa hōkoku [Reports of investigation into 

documents relating to “comfort women,”] (1999): 107–41. 

117. For a Japanese feminist view critical of positivist history that privileges official documents, 

see Chizuko Ueno, “Historian and Public Memory in Japan: The ‘Comfort Women’ 

Controversy,” trans. Jordan Sand, History and Memory 11, no. 2 (1999).

118. John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 

1985).

119. Yoichi Kibata, “Japanese Treatment of British POWs,” 147.

120. Yuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women. 
3

Recently Declassified Records at the U.S. National Archives 

Relating to Japanese War Crimes 

James Lide

In May 2003, the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records 

Interagency Working Group (IWG) began a systematic survey of the approximately 

100,000 pages declassified and released under the Japanese Imperial Government 

Disclosure Act (JIGDA). In particular, the survey focused on identifying documents 

pertaining to the following issues:

• Japanese treatment of Allied prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian internees, 

including any references to forced and slave labor

• Development and use of Japanese biological and chemical weapons during 

the war, particularly the work of Gen. Ishii Shirō and biological warfare 

experiments conducted by Unit 731

• The Japanese military’s use of “comfort women” conscripted from occupied 

territories and forced to become prostitutes

• Allied policies regarding war crimes trials and, later, decisions to grant 

clemency to convicted Japanese war criminals

This chapter summarizes the findings of this survey, provides an overall assessment of 

the records released under JIGDA, and highlights some of the more important documents 

relating to the issues listed above. 

Overview of Declassified Records

The records released by the IWG under JIGDA fall into two broad categories: those 

that were already in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA), and those still held by other government agencies. Although the vast majority 

of World War II-era files had long since been declassified and open to researchers, some 
58 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

records that had been transferred to NARA in the past could not be publicly released 

under existing declassification regulations. These records, for the most part, contained 

information on U.S. intelligence-gathering methods or, in some cases, identified former 

agents and informants. Some files included documents from Allied governments that 

could not be released without the permission of the originating countries. 

Some of the NARA collections initially reviewed under the Nazi War Crimes 

Disclosure Act contained materials potentially relating to Japanese war crimes. For 

example, intelligence records from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) included many 

files from OSS stations in China and Southeast Asia. Likewise, some of the U.S. Army’s 

Investigative Records Repository (IRR) files contained records on leading Japanese 

politicians and military figures, including several convicted war criminals. 

During its review of NARA holdings, the IWG also identified a collection of Navy 

Judge Advocate General files dealing with war crimes investigations in the South Pacific. 

Though these records were actually released in 1997, they have not yet been widely used 

by researchers. 

The second category of records released under JIGDA comprises records still held by 

government agencies. The largest group of these records consists of a series of FBI case files 

containing intelligence reports on Japan before and during the war, counterintelligence 

records relating to Japanese espionage, and postwar files on suspected American traitors 

and collaborators. Newly released U.S. Department of State materials include records 

dealing with postwar discussions between the United States and its former wartime allies 

regarding clemency proceedings for convicted Japanese war criminals. In addition, the 

new State Department records also contain a large volume of more recent materials 

concerning groups of former POWs, civilian internees, and “comfort women,” and their 

efforts to claim compensation from the Japanese government in the 1980s and 1990s. 

Finally, the National Security Agency released a collection of intelligence intercept 

files dating August–December 1945 to complement earlier intercept materials already 

transferred to NARA.

The records declassified under JIGDA include a range of materials covering many 

aspects of the Pacific conflict and postwar relations between the United States and Japan. 

In general, however, only a small portion of these records specifically pertains to Japanese 

war crimes. With the exception of a few files described in more detail below, most of 

the materials were not created in the context of any kind of war crimes investigation. 

Moreover, the majority of documents that do contain information on Japanese war crimes 

include only brief and often general references buried within longer reports. While the 

new documents certainly supplement the existing historical record, and in some cases 

provide additional details on events already known to historians, these records are not 
Recently Declassified Records I 59

likely to lead to any significant reinterpretations regarding the nature of Japanese war 

crimes. 

Researchers should not assume that all documents released under the Disclosure Acts 

constitute new sources. Since reports were often shared among different government 

agencies, some of the records declassified under the acts may have already been available in 

existing collections at NARA or other repositories. For example, many of the declassified 

records from the State Department Special War Problems Division files consist of copies 

of OSS reports that have long been open to researchers working with the original OSS 

records. Likewise, some of the British intelligence records released by the IWG may have 

been available at the British National Archives. In other cases, while the declassified 

records themselves may now be available for the first time, the relevant information they 

contain may have been previously available in other sources. 

Nonetheless, the materials released under JIGDA provide some new information 

relating to Japanese war crimes or, at the very least, will serve to draw more attention 

to documentation already available on these issues. In addition to scattered reports 

on individual Japanese atrocities, primarily in China, the newly declassified records 

will be most useful for additional details regarding Japanese treatment of Allied POWs 

and civilian internees. The released documents include interviews with former civilian 

internees and escaped POWs describing general conditions in various camps operated by 

the Japanese throughout its occupied territories. There are also some records relating to 

camps in Japan itself, though far fewer than those dealing with other parts of the Pacific 

Theatre. 

The declassified records also include some new documents relating to Japanese 

biological and chemical warfare. For the most part, these consist of intelligence reports 

on suspected Japanese use of chemical and biological weapons in China. There are also 

several technical studies assessing Japanese chemical weapons captured by Allied forces 

toward the end of the war. However, only a handful of the new materials contains any 

details on the biological warfare experiments conducted by Gen. Ishii and Unit 731.

There is relatively little documentation in the newly released records regarding the 

various Japanese war crimes trials conducted at the end of the war. Though there are some 

individual records that generally describe Allied efforts to collect war crimes evidence, 

few of the new documents contain any significant details. However, newly released State 

Department records include several valuable documents that help illuminate postwar 

policies regarding clemency granted to convicted Japanese war criminals in the 1950s. 

In addition to records documenting discussions between Japan and the United States 

regarding procedural issues, the new State Department materials also include memos 

relating to conversations between the United States and its wartime allies. 
60 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

The new IWG records will be least useful for researchers exploring the Japanese 

military’s use of “comfort women” during the war. Other than a handful of documents 

that record individual accounts of Japanese troops kidnapping women and girls, none 

of the declassified materials contains any references to this issue. However, more recent 

State Department records released by the IWG contain a collection of news clippings 

and press summaries from the 1980s and 1990s, some of which discuss compensation 

claims pressed by groups representing former victims of Japanese enforced prostitution. 

Though these materials are not new records in the strictest sense, they provide some 

insight into how contemporary Japanese society has come to wrestle with the “comfort 

women” issue.

Survey Methodology

The survey of declassified IWG material aimed to provide a systematic and thorough 

review of all records likely to contain new information on Japanese war crimes. The 

specific methodology used to identify such records varied according to the nature of the 

document collection. In some cases, the total volume of records released in response to 

JIGDA was small enough that every document could be examined. Such collections 

included materials from the State Department, CIA, National Security Agency (NSA,) 

Air Force, Navy, and Office of the Pardon Attorney.

However, the process of reviewing other newly released records unavoidably involved 

using indices and guides to focus on the most potentially useful documents. This was 

especially true in surveying the huge number of recently declassified OSS records, which 

were not easily segregated into files dealing with Europe and those pertaining to the 

Pacific Theatre. Moreover, their volume (over 1 million pages) precluded any effort 

to examine every document. Investigating these documents proved to be especially 

challenging because the order of the records is not linked to subject matter or country. 

Accordingly, the only way to examine this collection is by using a rough index prepared 

by NARA that provides general information on subjects and geography. The survey 

targeted all documents listed under geographical headings such as Japan, China, Burma, 

Chinkiang, Chongqing, Korea, Indochina, Kunming, Malaysia, and other sites in the 

Far East. In addition, records listed under a variety of relevant subject headings were also 

examined. These included documents relating to chemical warfare, toxins and biological 

warfare, POWs, and war crimes. 

This approach unavoidably entailed examining large numbers of documents unrelated 

to Japanese war crimes. Only a few documents listed as dealing with sites in the Far East 

include information on Japanese atrocities. Likewise, many of the records pertaining to 

POWs or war crimes deal solely with the European Theatre, while some of the chemical 
Recently Declassified Records I 61

and biological warfare records actually relate to U.S. programs. Nonetheless, this strategy 

offered the best hope for locating most documents from this collection that contained 

references to Japanese war crimes.

The survey followed a similar methodology whether dealing with whole record series 

that had been previously withheld in full or with sets of individual documents that had 

been withheld from previously open record series. In the second case, these declassified 

records have been refiled in their original folders found in a variety of OSS collections. 

Accordingly, the survey of the previously partially opened records also targeted all 

declassified records that originated from OSS stations based in China and other parts 

of southeast Asia, including Burma, Chinkiang, Chongqing, Hsian, Kandy, Kunming, 

Shanghai, and Singapore. In addition, the survey used indices prepared by NARA staff 

that provided general descriptions of the refiled documents and examined any records 

listed as pertaining to the Far East or war crimes issues. Again, this approach involved 

reviewing many nonrelevant documents with the aim of locating as much Japanese war 

crimes material as possible. 

In two other cases, the survey used a combined sampling and targeted research 

approach to review the records. These cases were the collection of FBI case files 

transferred to NARA and the newly declassified name files from the Army’s Investigative 

Records Repository. Both collections were too large to review in their entirety and 

are only partially indexed. The FBI case files, for example, are arranged according to 

an FBI filing scheme that organizes the records into broad categories (treason, foreign 

counterintelligence, etc.) and thereafter by individual name. Accordingly, the survey 

first targeted all files that seemed most likely to contain information on Japanese war 

crimes and then supplemented this research with a random sampling of the remaining 

files. Similarly, the newly declassified name files from the Army IRR are organized solely 

by individual name. In this case, the survey first searched for any new files on known 

Japanese war criminals and then examined a small group of newly released records in 

their entirety. This initial effort was followed by a random sampling of a much larger 

group of files containing information on unknown Japanese individuals to see how many 

of these contained war crimes information. 

Guide to Specific Collections

Office of Strategic Services Records–RG 226

Because Gen. Douglas MacArthur actively sought to limit OSS operations in the Far 

East, OSS records released under the Disclosure Acts include material covering many 

different aspects of OSS operations in Asia during World War II, but mostly in areas 

outside of MacArthur’s control. Much of the new material is very general in nature and 
62 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

remained classified up to this point only because the documents include information 

on intelligence sources and methods. In particular, the U.S. intelligence agencies 

interviewed hundreds of professionals and missionaries who had visited or lived in China 

and Japan before the conflict. Their reports typically provide information on industrial 

facilities, brief accounts of political figures, or descriptions of local geography, and they 

lack direct information about Japanese war crimes. These reports remained classified not 

because they contained sensitive information but because the informants are identified 

by name. (Before their review under the Disclosure Acts, declassification reviewers 

had previously withheld whole documents rather than follow the onerous practice of 

redacting the names.) The newly declassified materials also contain many OSS cables 

and radio messages sent from OSS field stations in the Far East, but rarely do these 

documents provide information on war criminality. 

Only a few such documents contain any information on Japanese war crimes other 

than occasional references to Japanese atrocities. For example, a 1944 OSS intelligence 

report on the Filipino guerrilla movement on Negros Island indicated that Japanese 

troops were routinely torturing and killing any guerrillas they captured and had begun 

to retaliate against the civilian population as well.1 Similarly, a June 1945 OSS cable 

from Hsian noted that Japanese forces had begun shooting all civilians on the roads near 

Loning after Chinese guerrillas destroyed a bridge.2 One newly declassified document 

includes information on atrocities that took place after the formal end of the war. An 

OSS situation report from Nanjing dated September 22, 1945, reported that elements 

of the Japanese 23rd and 27th Divisions had raped over a thousand women and killed 

several hundred civilians as they retreated through central China (see facing page).3

In most cases, the documents do not provide any further details beyond these general 

accounts, though a few identify individual victims.4 

The newly released OSS records also include many copies of reports prepared by 

U.S. Allies during the war. Most of these are from British sources, although there are 

a few Dutch and French documents as well. Some of these records, which remained 

classified because they originated from foreign governments, also include information on 

individual Japanese atrocities. For example, an escaped Malaysian soldier interrogated by 

the British described the torture and murder of an elderly Dutch couple shortly after the 

Japanese occupation, while another British interrogation report recounts the execution 

of several hundred civilians in Malaysia in retaliation for the death of a Japanese officer.5

Similar documents include a British press release from November 1945 that describes the 

killing of several hundred civilians in the South Andaman Islands only a few days before 

the Japanese surrender.6
Recently Declassified Records I 63

Nanking Sitrep, 22 September 1945, no. 32, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 274, WN 10676, p.1, (location: 

190/64/26/6). 
64 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

New OSS Records Relating to Treatment of POWs and Civilian Internees

Beyond these scattered references to Japanese atrocities, the newly released OSS files 

include many records containing information on Japanese-run POW and civilian internee 

camps. One useful group of records consists of questionnaires filled out by former 

internees who were repatriated during the war in a series of exchanges between the United 

States and Japan. The questionnaires include questions on camp conditions.7 Another 

valuable document released by the IWG is a Netherlands Intelligence Service report 

on POW and civilian internee camps throughout the Dutch East Indies that includes 

descriptions of each camp along with a map showing their locations (see below).8 The 

new materials also include a general 1944 report on American POW camps in Formosa 

(Taiwan) based on visits by Swiss representatives of the Red Cross.9 

Some new OSS documents contain references to brutal conditions at Japanese camps, 

although only a few provide any further details of specific atrocities or events. For example, 

a British interrogation report relates that six British POWs at a camp in Thailand were 

shot after their guards saw them clapping when British bombers attacked the railway line 
Recently Declassified Records I 65

they were helping to construct.10 A postwar OSS report on Jewish refugees in Shanghai 

includes information on eight internees who died in Japanese custody after they were 

arrested for helping escaped American POWs.11 Likewise, another postwar report based 

on an interview with a former internee describes his torture at the hands of the Japanese 

police in Shanghai.12 The new materials also include a longer list of incidents at various 

British and Australian POW camps based on postwar interviews with former Korean 

guards.13 

Many of the new documents relating to Allied POWs held in Japanese occupied 

territories indicate that they were often put to work on road and railway construction 

projects, although most of the documents do not include any previously unknown 

details. However, there are a handful of records relating to POW forced labor in Japanese 

shipyards or factories. These include a November 1944 British interrogation summary 

indicating that three hundred British POWs were working at the Mitsubishi plant in 

Nagasaki. According to an interrogated Japanese soldier, the British POWs were being 

treated well and worked only five hours a day.14 A related document is a translation of 

Report MI-1299, Netherlands Intelligence Service, 25 November 1944, POW and Internment Camps in the 

N.E.I., NA, RG 226, entry 154, box 97, folder 1838 (location: 190/8/32/4).
66 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

a 1943 Japanese news account reporting on comments made by Lt. Gen. Nemura, head 

of the Prisoner’s Information Bureau in Japan. Nemura said that Allied POWs were 

helping to increase Japanese industrial production and claimed that all were well treated. 

He added that most Allied POWs could not match the efficiency of Japanese workmen, 

but described one unnamed site at a shipyard in Kyushu, where the employer had done 

such a good job providing leadership that the Allied POWs had almost reached the 

productivity of Japanese workers at the same facility (see facing page).15 Finally, a 1943 

Dutch intelligence report based on information supplied by the East Indian Red Cross 

suggested that Dutch POWs held at camps in Japan and Formosa were poorly fed and 

forced to work in shipyards, docks, factories, and mines.16

New OSS Documents Relating to Japanese Chemical and Biological Warfare

For the most part, the recently released OSS documents dealing with Japanese chemical 

and biological warfare consist of technical studies and reports on various Japanese chemical 

weapons. One important group of files consists of a set of British reports that analyzed 

captured Japanese weapons left behind during the retreat from Burma in early 1945.17 The 

new documents also include more general studies, including a June 1944 report prepared 

by the U.S. Army Chemical Weapons Service (CWS) that discusses chemical weapons 

used by both Germany and Japan. The report describes two suspected poison gas facilities 

in Japan: the Aichi Tokei Denki Kabushiki Kaisha in Nagoya and a munitions and gas 

plant built at Ogaki on Honshu. It also refers to two suspected chemical weapons attacks 

against U.S. troops in the South Pacific.18 A similar document is a summary of enemy 

biological warfare programs prepared by the OSS Research and Development Branch 

in September 1945. The summary provides an overview of the German and Japanese 

biological warfare programs, noting that the Japanese efforts were probably the most 

developed. The document also refers to several incidents of reported use of biological 

weapons by the Japanese in China, although it suggests that the evidence of these attacks is 

inconclusive.19 Finally, the new records also include a May 1945 intelligence report based 

on a CWS mission to China to investigate Japanese biological and chemical activities. The 

document describes several reported incidents of biological and chemical attacks, although 

it noted that no Americans had personally seen any of these.20 

In addition to these more general reports and studies, the new OSS records include 

several documents that make individual references to Japanese chemical or biological 

weapons. These include: 

• a 1941 account from an American official traveling in China stating that he 

had seen “10 authentic gas patients” during a visit to a hospital.21
Recently Declassified Records I 67

Japanese Tr. Series 35, 30 May 1943, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 695, report 57702 (location: 190/3/25/5). 
68 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

• a translated December 1941 report from a Chinese medical team sent 

to investigate a plague outbreak in Chengde after a Japanese plane was 

seen dropping materials on the city. The document describes the team’s 

investigation, which included efforts to assess other possible sources for the 

outbreak before concluding that the Japanese were probably the cause.22

• a copy of a Chinese interrogation report of a Japanese POW that describes 

work done by the Japanese Bacteriological Warfare Section and provides 

information on its organization and operations in China.23

• a December 1944 interrogation report of a Chinese soldier who claimed he 

had previously worked for the Japanese Department of Epidemic Defense and 

Water Supply at its branch in Kiukiang. The soldier reported that during the 

first period of the Chekiang-Kiangai battle, the Japanese used planes to spread 

typhoid, cholera, and dysentery in pools and streams along communication 

lines between Kiahwa and Lan-ch’i.24

• a January 1945 interview with a Canadian Red Cross doctor based in China 

who reported that medical personnel had “almost conclusively” established 

that the Japanese had caused a spring 1943 plague outbreak in northern 

Kiangsi by dropping infected rice on the region by plane.25

• a June 1945 report from the OSS Far East Division that mentions possible 

Japanese military plans to use chemical weapons to prevent Allied landings in 

China.26

• a postwar interrogation of a Japanese soldier who reported that he had dumped 

poison gas into the sea before the arrival of Allied troops to destroy evidence 

of chemical weapons.27

• several files describing Japanese work on atomic research. Under what was 

known as the Ramona Project, the OSS launched an investigation after the 

war to collect information about the Japanese program, especially regarding 

uranium mining in Manchuria. The investigation also examined efforts by 

the Chinese KMT government to develop its own atomic program using 

Japanese scientists.28

New OSS Documents Relating to War Crimes Investigations

Only a few new OSS records pertain to war crimes investigations or trials. These include 

a series of cables and reports from OSS stations in China relating to the death of three 

American airmen killed by Japanese forces in Hankow. A U.S. war crimes investigator 

requested the arrest of the Japanese commanding officer, Gen. Okabe. However, 

Japanese Army officials requested that Okabe not be arrested until he had received 
Recently Declassified Records I 69

proper representation. Local U.S. Army officials accepted the Japanese request after 

contacting the Occupation Government headquarters in Japan.29 Another postwar cable 

refers to a Japanese Army court-martial in China of Maj. Nakamura, who was accused of 

mistreating Allied POWs.30

New OSS Documents Relating to “Comfort Women”

There is very little in the new OSS records relating to forced prostitution, with the 

exception of a few documents that report the kidnapping of women and girls. These 

include a translation of a 1943 Chinese newspaper describing the Japanese occupation 

in Singapore that reports Japanese forces had taken four hundred Chinese women.31

However, one newly released document, a postwar interrogation report of a Japanese 

officer in Indochina, contains a brief mention that Japanese soldiers may have threatened 

local women if they did not agree to become prostitutes for Japanese staff officers.32

U.S Department of State Records–RG 59 

The volume of new State Department records released by the IWG is considerably 

smaller than the OSS files described above. These records include a set of files from the 

State Department Special War Problems Division relating to American POWs held in 

Thailand. The records provide information on POW camps and include many references 

to POWs being moved in the last months of the war. However, many of these new 

documents consist of OSS reports that are already available in the RG 226 records.33

New State Department records also include a set of records from the State Department 

Legal Advisor Relating to War Crimes. These include a large collection of several hundred 

individual reports on mistreatment of American POWs that were filed with the UN 

Commission on War Crimes. These reports, dated between October 1945 and February 

1946, in some cases identify individual Japanese soldiers accused of the crimes, and 

include lists of witnesses and other supporting evidence.34 New records in these files also 

include lists of Japanese war criminals reported by the UN Commission on War Crimes, 

Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-commission. These documents are essentially identical to 

lists already available in these records. One list is especially intriguing in that it includes 

a reference to Ishii Shirō, identified as a colonel with the 18th Regiment, who is charged 

with using “deleterious and asphyxiating gases” at Changshen, China, in January 1941. 

From the brief description provided, it is not clear whether this Ishii is the same individual 

who directed the biological warfare experiments conducted by Unit 731.35 These records 

contain another document that mentions Ishii. A State Department review of the Soviet 

press for June 1950 includes a summary of an article taken from the journal Soviet State 

and Law (No. 3, 1950) relating to the Khabarovsk war crimes trial. The article describes 
70 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Ishii’s role in developing the Japanese biological warfare program, including the human 

experiments, and charges the United States with protecting Ishii as part of an effort to 

develop its own offensive biological warfare capability.36

Finally, the Special Advisor Relating to War Crimes records also include several 

documents that discuss clemency for convicted Japanese war criminals in the 1950s. For 

the most part these consist of memoranda of conversation related to meetings between 

U.S. State Department officials and representatives from other members of the Tokyo War 

Crimes Tribunal, or in some cases Japanese officials. One such document is a February 

1950 memorandum summarizing talks with Australian diplomats on how to deal with a 

Soviet proposal that Emperor Hirohito and four leading generals be charged as Class C 

war criminals. Both the Americans and the Australians expressed a desire to let the war 

crimes issue drop, and the bulk of the discussion focused on how the Tokyo War Crimes 

Tribunal could sidestep the Soviet proposal without examining whatever new evidence 

the Soviets might introduce.37 

Another related set of records is a series of memos summarizing conversations 

between Japanese and American officials during a visit by Japanese Prime Minister 

Kishi to Washington in June 1957. During his meeting with Eisenhower, Kishi noted 

that Australia had recently agreed to allow Japan to parole war criminals who had been 

imprisoned at Australia’s request. This left the United States as the only country that still 

required Japan to keep war criminals incarcerated. U.S. officials expressed a desire to 

find a way to grant parole to the remaining war criminals, although they noted that this 

would have to be handled delicately to avoid arousing public indignation.38 Additional 

documents from January and February 1958 describe conversations with British and 

Canadian diplomats over the best way to proceed with the idea of paroling the remaining 

Japanese war criminals. All countries agreed in principle, although the British wanted to 

make sure that the status of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal was not undermined.39

Other new State Department records transferred to NARA also contain documents 

relating to the postwar clemency issue. These include an October 1957 memo on 

conversations between U.S. Embassy officials in Tokyo and the Japanese government 

in which the United States indicated that it would not accept a Japanese proposal that 

the Japanese National Offenders Prevention and Rehabilitation Committee (NOPAR) 

be given responsibility to review the cases of Class B and C war criminals. Instead, 

the United States proposed that the review board be made up of a representative from 

NOPAR, a representative from the Ministry of Justice, and the warden of Sugamo 

Prison.40 In addition, these new records contain a September 1958 memorandum of 

conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama 

relating to a Japanese request that paroled Class B and C war criminals have their parole 
Recently Declassified Records I 71

restrictions lifted. Dulles indicated that the United States would waive further parole 

requirements beginning in 1959.41

These new records also contain a handful of documents relating to discussions 

between Japan and China in the 1990s regarding disposal of Japanese chemical weapons 

left in China at the end of the war. The documents include some information on those 

chemical munitions.42 Estimates on the total number of chemical weapons munitions 

range from 700,000 (Japanese estimate) to 2 million (Chinese estimate), although the 

reports indicate that developing these estimates proved to be difficult. In 1991, China 

requested U.S. help in identifying Japanese chemical weapons dumps after Japanese 

negotiators reported they did not have access to such information because U.S. authorities 

had confiscated all related documentation during the military occupation.43 However, 

a 1997 State Department memorandum of conversation suggests that the Japanese 

did manage to locate additional information after reviewing Imperial Army records in 

Japanese archives.44

The vast majority of new State Department records transferred to NARA consists of 

correspondence, newspaper clippings, and press accounts relating to the increased public 

interest in Japanese war crimes issues during the 1980s and 1990s. The new documents 

contain information on all principal war crimes issues, including reports on the Japanese 

biological warfare experiments, treatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees, and 

“comfort women.” Correspondence from groups representing former POWs and civilian 

internees often describe their brutal treatment at the hands of the Japanese. 

Army Intelligence Records–RG 319

The Investigative Records Repository collection contains a large volume of individual 

name files created by the Army Counterintelligence Corps after World War II. Although 

much of the IRR collection has long been declassified and available to researchers, two 

new groups of records from this series were declassified as part of the IWG effort. The 

first group consists of a batch of name files, most of which are European names, though 

there are also files on two Japanese Americans suspected of being Soviet agents.45 

The second group consists of files that either had not been formally declassified 

or had been declassified earlier but were used infrequently by researchers. Moreover, 

in some cases, portions of files may have been previously released but have now been 

supplemented by additional material. The majority of these records pertain to European 

individuals, though there are several files on known Japanese war criminals. The most 

important of these include Ishii Shirō, head of Japan’s biological warfare program, and 

Tsuji Masanobu, a Japanese Army officer who was accused of war crimes by the Chinese 

for his activities in Singapore during the Japanese occupation. Both these files include 
72 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

some information on the suspected crimes of these individuals, though much of this 

material consists of copies of documents already available from other sources. 

The IRR collection also contains several files pertaining to postwar activities of 

suspected Japanese war criminals, such as Kishi Nobusuke, a former official in the Japanese 

occupation government in Manchuria. Likewise, there are several files containing 

information on the activities of convicted war criminals like Shigemitsu Mamoru and 

Kaya Okinori, who took up political positions after their release from prison in the 1950s. 

While these files contain scant details on the crimes they were accused of, the records do 

shed light on the development of clemency policies toward former war criminals. 

Other than such files, however, little of the newly released material from the IRR 

relates to Japanese war criminals. In fact, most of the Japanese individuals described in 

these records were suspected of being communist sympathizers or actual Soviet agents. In 

particular, there are numerous files containing investigations of former Japanese POWs 

captured by Soviet forces towards the end of the war who were repatriated to Japan in the 

late 1940s and early 1950s. 

FBI Records–RG 65

The collection of newly released FBI case files covers a wide assortment of topics; however, 

very few of these records directly pertain to Japanese war crimes. There is only one file 

that deals specially with Japanese atrocities; primarily, it contains copies of general reports 

drawn from other sources, including press clippings.46

One large group of files in the collection consists of general information on Japan 

collected by the FBI from other intelligence agencies. These records, which cover the 

period from the late 1930s through the early 1950s, include translations of foreign 

publications, copies of intelligence reports, and other materials gathered as part of the 

FBI’s general counterintelligence efforts. For example, one large case file contains reports 

on leading Japanese individuals whom the FBI considered either potential intelligence 

assets or potential security threats.47 Likewise, there are numerous files on suspected 

Japanese spies operating in the United States, Latin America, or Europe.48 Other files 

contain more general records on Japanese security organizations such as the Tokkōtai 

(Special Higher Police) or the Tokumu-kikan (a political liaison agency that operated in 

many of the occupied areas).49

A significant number of these FBI files relate to investigations of individuals suspected 

of collaborating with the Japanese during the war, particularly in the Philippines. Many 

of these investigations were launched by the FBI in response to accusations they received 

after the liberation of the Philippines. Such files often include nothing more than a short 

report summarizing the allegations. However, there are some much larger files relating 
Recently Declassified Records I 73

to Americans accused of treason for their wartime cooperation with the Japanese. These 

include individuals such as Tokyo Rose (Iva Ikuko Toguri d’Aquino), Wallace Ince, and 

Mark Lewis Streeter, all of whom made propaganda radio broadcasts. These records 

often include interviews with former POWs and civilian internees, which sometimes 

include general information about camp conditions and treatment by the Japanese.50

Two of these treason investigation files include more detailed information relating 

to Japanese treatment of POWs. The first file pertains to the investigation of Tomoya 

Kawakita, a Japanese American who served as an interpreter and guard at a POW camp 

in Oeyama, Japan. Kawakita was accused and convicted of treating American POWs 

brutally, and the case files include many interviews with the POWs at the camp. Some 

of these interviews also describe working conditions at a nearby nickel smelting plant 

owned by the Mitsubishi Corporation that employed POWs from the neighboring camp 

(Kawakita also acted as foreman at the plant).51 The second treason investigation file 

covers John David Provoo, an American soldier captured in the Philippines who was 

accused of collaborating with the Japanese and being involved in the murder of another 

POW shot by a Japanese guard.52

National Security Agency Records–RG 457 

The NSA records transferred to NARA by the IWG include several different types of 

documents. The first includes paraphrases of intelligence intercepts covering the period 

from August to December 1945. Prepared by the NSA from the original documents, the 

paraphrases provide a general summary of the records but do not include any details on 

the source of the intercepts or other specific information. These records include several 

references to Japanese atrocities, including one October 1945 report about the killing 

of 700 Chinese soldiers on the islands of New Britain and Labuan.53 There are also 

several records relating to atrocities committed against Swiss citizens, as well as one report 

describing the difficulties encountered by Swiss representatives in their efforts to inspect 

Allied POW camps in Japan during the war. The report notes that these representatives 

inspected only 36 of the 102 camps that were in Japan. Apparently, they were never 

informed about the others.54 

Another group of records contains copies of Japanese POW interrogations and 

translations of captured Japanese documents. Most of this material appears to be similar to 

records found in other collections, but some of the documents do contain information on 

Japanese atrocities. Such documents include translated portions of a diary from a Japanese 

soldier, which describes the beating of American airmen captured when their plane was 

shot down near the Kwajalein Atoll. There are also translations of Japanese judicial reports 

describing two cases of soldiers convicted of rape and looting in the Philippines.55 
74 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

The NSA records also include copies of messages intercepted from Japanese sources 

from August to December 1945. Many of these records come from Japanese diplomatic 

sources and deal with financial issues related to the operation of Japanese embassies and 

consulates in this period. Others summarize local press reports on Allied efforts to capture 

Japanese war criminals. There are also reports from Japanese military sources in China 

describing the effort to coordinate with American military teams that parachuted in to 

take over the administration of POW and civilian internee camps. Few of these reports 

include much detailed information. However, the collection does include one intercepted 

message from the Japanese Embassy in Switzerland relating to Swiss complaints about 

the execution of Dr. Fisher, the International Committee of the Red Cross representative 

in Binaniu who was killed by the Japanese in 1943.56

Finally, these records also contain a large batch of index cards on Japanese war 

criminals, war crimes trials, and general war crimes issues. The cards provide a brief 

biographical or topical summary and include a source reference. For the most part, the 

source for these cards appears to be either press reports from the New York Times or the 

Foreign Broadcast Information Service or War Department correspondence.57

Miscellaneous Collections

There are several other smaller collections of records released under JIGDA that have been 

transferred to NARA. These include approximately one thousand pages of Navy records, 

none of which relates specifically to Japanese war crimes. The Air Force also provided 

a small number of documents relating to manuals on evasion strategies for the crew of 

aircraft shot down over Japanese-occupied territory. CIA materials include a slim name file 

on Ishii Shirō and a small set of index cards from China listing Japanese war criminals. 

In addition, the CIA has released a collection of name files relating to contacts between 

the CIA and postwar political and business leaders in Japan. In some cases, these involve 

individuals formerly accused or convicted of war crimes after the war, including both 

military officers and former members of the Japanese Imperial government. Key figures 

in these files include Arisue Seizo, Kawabe Torashirō, Hattori Takushirō, Kodama Yoshio, 

Tsuji Masanobu, and Kaya Okinori.58 For the most part, the CIA name files include 

information about postwar contacts with these individuals, especially regarding CIA 

intelligence gathering activities in Japan and Asia after the war. While the files often 

mention the fact that these individuals were either accused or convicted of war crimes, the 

materials contain little additional detailed information about their wartime activities. 

Finally, there are two small collections relating to postwar clemency policies. The 

first consists of a single file from the Office of the Pardon Attorney describing clemency 

proceedings for Japanese war criminals in the 1950s. The file includes a 1957 report 
Recently Declassified Records I 75

identifying convicted war criminals and their current parole status along with a summary 

of their crimes. In addition, there are several clemency hearing files from the Ford and 

Eisenhower presidential libraries relating to Tokyo Rose and Tomoya Kawakita. 

Notes

1. Report 90920, 9 August 1944, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 1046 (location: 190/3/32/6). 

2. Cable 32, Lion to Taper, 25 June 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 88, box 113, file 683 (location: 

190/5/11/7). 

3. Nanking Sitrep, 22 September 1945, no. 32, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 274, WN 10676, 

22.9.45, p.1, last full paragraph (location: 190/64/26/6). 

4. See, for example, Z.A. Report 215, 10 May 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 125, WN 

4613 (location: 250/64/23/5). The report is based on the interview of the brother of an OSS 

operative in Burma who was killed by the Japanese. 

5. Interrogation Report Y196, 15 March 1945, p. 6, and Interrogation Report Y194/2, 15 

February 1945, pp. 3 and 5, NA, RG 226, entry 154, box 108, folder: POW INT EIF 

((location: 190/8/32/6). 

6. Report ZM-5024, p. 3, 8 November 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 108, box 401, file ZM 5000 

(location: 190/6/26/5).

7. There are many copies of these questionnaires in the new materials. See Report 51782, NA, 

RG 226, entry 16, box 618 (location: 190/3/11/04); and WN 2492 and WN 2493, NA, RG 

226, entry 210, box 148 (location: 250/64/24/01). A general summary of interviews with 

civilian internees who returned on the S. S. Gripsholm can be found in NA, RG 226, entry 

148, box 12, file: Gripsholm (location: 190/8/27/02). A similar British record is in Report 

24081, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 213 (location: 190/3/15/06). 

8. Report MI-1299, Netherlands Intelligence Service, 25 November 1944, POW and Internment 

Camps in the N.E.I., NA, RG 226, entry 154, box 97, folder 1838 (location: 190/8/32/4).

9. Report, 30 September 1944, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 481, WN 17128 (location: 

250/64/31/1).

10. Interrogation Report Y320/1, 27 April 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 154, box 108, file: POW 

INT EIF (location: 190/8/32/6).

11. Report, 29 October 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 504 WN #18102.

12. Report from Hilaire du Berrier, 13 October 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 211, box 23, WN 

24214 (location: 250/64/33/1).

13. MX 964, Southeast Asian Translation and Interrogation Center, Intelligence Bulletin 225, 4 

January 1946, NA, RG 226, entry 108B, box 208, file: MX 960-979 (location: 190/7/3/2).

14. CSDIC (India) Report 204/3, 4 November 1944, p. 3, item 10, NA, RG 226, entry 154, 
76 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

box 88, file: CSDIC 204/1 Mitsubishi, Zospnsho Shipyards (location: 190/8/32/3).

15. Japanese Tr. Series 35, 30 May 1943, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 695, report 57702 

(location: 190/3/25/5). 

16. Report, 9 December 1943, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 84, folder: Job 79-332A, f. 4, WN 

2928 (location: 250/64/22/6).

17. See C.I.D.R. 5, Enemy C.W. and Smoke Intelligence Summary 81, pp. 693–94, NA, RG 

226, entry 145, box 15, folder 174 (location: 190/8/19/1).

18. CWS Field Lab Memo 4-7-1, “Possible Chemical Warfare Agents and Gas Munitions of 

the Axis Powers,” 3 June 1944, pp. 16 & 91, NA, RG 226, entry 145, box 22, folder 257 

(location: 190/8/19/2).

19. Final Summary Report on BW, 27 September 1945, pp. A1-A2, NA, RG 226, entry 211, 

box 21, WN 24155 (location: 250/64/32/7). 

20. Report 130170, JICA report, 8 May 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 1499, folder 130170 

(location: 190/4/7/1).

21. Trip Report from Edgar Mowrer ca. autumn 1941, p. 29, n. 4, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 

340, WN 13146 (location: 250/64/28/2).

22. Report 18261, 12 December 1941, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 111, folder 18259-18287 

(location: 190/3/13/5).

23. Report YKB-695: Helliwell fr. Cox, 25 July 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 179, WN 

7701, folder: Chihchiang (location: 250/64/24/6). 

24. Report Y-2167, 9 December 1944, NA, RG 226, entry 108, box 373, folder Y-2150 

(location: 190/6/26/2).

25. Report 115, 112, Det 202, Intelligence Note 1, 28 January 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 16, 

box 1313, folder 115 (location: 190/4/3/2).

26. Far East Division Outpost Letter #63, 8 June 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 54, box 1, folder 1, 

(location: 190/5/5/20).

27. WN 2098, Situation Report, 7 September 1945, p. 2, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 184, last 

item (location: 250/64/24/7).

28. See, in particular, the Ramona files, NA, RG 226, entry 211, box 34, WN 20131 (location: 

250/64/33/2). However, there are many other scattered documents relating to this issue, 

including: WN 010842, X-2 report, 24 June 1946, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 329, 

(location: 190/64/21/01) and WN 010844, Memo, 30 May 1946, NA, RG 226, entry 210, 

box 329 (location: 190/64/21/01).

29. Cable Seagull to Indiv, 27 October 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 154, folder 4, WN 

6034 (location: 250/64/24/2).

30. Cable Clark to Indiv, 6 November 1945, NA, RG 226, entry 210, box 154, folder 1, WN 

5968 (location: 250/64/24/2).
Recently Declassified Records I 77

31. Report 57663, Chinese Tr. Series No. 3, p. 3, translation of extracts from the Kukong 

Press, ca. Feb. 1943, NA, RG 226, entry 16, box 694, folder 57659-57667 (location: 

190/3/25/5).

32. MX 925, Interrogation Report of Capt. Konishi, Dec. 1945, p. 1, NA, RG 226, entry 108B, 

box 207, folder MX 920-39 (location: 190/7/3/2).

33. See, for example, OSS reports on Thai railroad traffic in NA, RG 59, lot file 58D7, box 89, 

folder: Americans in Thailand (location: 250/49/22/1).

34. See reports in NA, RG 59, lot file 61D33, entry1369, boxes 6–7 (location: 250/49/25/03). 

35. United Nations Commission on War Crimes, Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-commission, List 

No. 5 of War Criminals and Material Witnesses (Japanese), Jan. 1946, attached to Minutes 

of 12th Meeting, Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-commission of the United Nations War 

Crimes Commission, 25 January 1946, (Ishii is listed as Charge No. 522), NA, RG 59, lot 

file 61D33, entry 1369, box 12, folder: Far East Subcommission (location: 250/49/25/4). 

Note that a similar list that also contains this same information has been open to researchers 

in RG 59, entry 1370, box 17 (location: 250/49/25/4).

36. Review of Soviet Press, June 1950, pp. 10–14, NA, RG 59, entry 1370, box 23, folder: War 

crimes–Emperor (Japanese) (location: 250/49/25/5). 

37. Memorandum of Conversation re: Soviet War Criminals Proposal, 8 February 1950, 

NA, RG 59, lot file 61D33, box 23, folder: War crimes–Emperor (Japanese) (location: 

250/49/25/5). 

38. See Memorandum of Conversation re: Kishi visit with the President, 20 June 1957, and 

Memorandum of Conversation re: Prime Minister Kishi, 19 June 1957, NA, RG 59, lot 

file 61D33, box 23, folder: Japanese War Criminals–Disposition 1954–1957 (location: 

250/49/25/5).

39. See Letter from de la Mare to Parsons, 16 January 1958; SD Tokyo telegram no. 1896, 

23 January 1958; and Memorandum of Conversation re: Canadian agreement to reduce 

sentence of 10 Class A war criminals, 27 February 1958; all in NA, RG 59, lot file 61D33, 

box 23, folder: Class A war criminals (location: 250/49/25/5). 

40. Memorandum of Conversation re: Review Board for Class B and C War Prisoners, 14 

October 1957, lot file 88D259, box 1, folder: Chron Memos of Conversation, State 

Department Records Released in Response to the IWG (location: 631/44/58/5).

41. Memorandum of Conversation re: meeting between Dulles and Fujiyama in Washington, 

11 September 1958, document R40, p. 9, State Department Records Released in Response 

to the IWG, NA, RG 59, entry A1-5697, box 4, folder R (location: 250/C/31/3). 

42. See, for example, Tokyo Embassy Message 1545, 28 June 1991, document J09, State 

Department Records Released to the IWG, NA, RG 59, entry A1-5697, box 3, folder J 

(location: 250/C/31/3). 
78 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

43. State Department Message 289595, 2 September 1991, document J010, State Department 

Records Released in Response to the IWG, NA, RG 59, entry A1-5697, box 3, folder J 

(location: 250/C/31/3). 

44. Memorandum of Conversation, ca. 1997, document Q9, pp 1–2, State Department Records 

Released in Response to the IWG, NA, RG 59, entry A1-5967, box 4, folder Q (location: 

250/C/31/3). Note: the document says that a review of Imperial Army records indicates 

70,000 chemical munitions were left in China; however, this is probably a misprint as 

other documents in the same file indicate that Japanese government officials were reporting 

700,000 munitions. See Tokyo Embassy Message 006135, Jul. 1997, Doc Q2, ibid. 

45. See files on Isami Tateishi in NA, RG 319, box 654 and file on Sydney Sako in NA, RG 319, 

box 655.

46. See NA, RG 59, FBI Records Released under the IWG, classification 100, box 80, file 100-

75874 (location: 230/86/12/7). 

47. See case file 64-175-234, FBI Records Released under the IWG, NA, RG 59, classification 

64, boxes 31–35, folder 64-175-234 (location: 230/86/5/5). 

48. See case files under classification 65 (Espionage) and classification 105 (Foreign 

Counterintelligence).

49. See case file 65-40048, FBI Records Released under the IWG, NA, RG 59, classification 65, 

box 235–37 (location: 230/86/10/4), and case file 105-9162, classification 105, box 185 

(location: 230/86/17/2).

50. For Tokyo Rose, see case file 61-11000, classification 61, boxes 39–52; for Ince see case file 

65-46128, classification 65, box 237-240; for Streeter see case file 61-11249, box 9-18, FBI 

Records Released under the IWG, NA, RG 59 (location: 230/86/3/3–4).

51. The Kawakita investigation records are in case file 61-11398, NA, RG 59, classification 61, 

box 33-38; on the nickel plant, see in particular FBI report by Sawtelle, 7 January 1947, box 

33, folder 61-11398, Sec 1 (location: 230/86/3/7). 

52. See case file 61-11342, NA, RG 59, classification 61, box 19-33 (location: 230/863/4-6).

53. Serial L-5300, 10/45, NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 1 (location: 190/C/80/03).

54. Serial H-211548, 10/45, NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 1(location: 190/C/80/03). 

55. See records in NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 2 (location: 190/C/80/03).

56. Memo from Bern to Tokyo, 29 September 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 2, (location: 

190/C/80/03).

57. See records in NA, RG 457, entry 9035, box 3 (location: 190/C/80/03).

58. See Japanese name files in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File.
4

Japanese War Crimes Records at the National Archives: 

Research Starting Points

Compiled by NARA staff

This chapter provides starting points for those interested in conducting research at 

the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland, 

on Japanese war crimes in World War II. The chapter has three parts. First, we focus on 

records about Japanese mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees. Next, we 

look at Japanese development and use of chemical and biological weapons. Lastly, we 

concentrate on atrocities committed by Imperial Japanese forces against Allied military 

personnel and civilians. In each section we offer a general description of the record 

groups that will prove most fruitful to researchers interested in the particular topic, and 

we end with a case study that highlights particular files within those record groups. Some 

of the records discussed in this chapter have been used extensively by researchers, and 

others have remained largely unexploited. This chapter is designed to provide researchers 

with an overview of certain record groups that contain information about Japanese war 

crimes and to offer examples of the kinds of topics that can be fruitfully explored using 

those record groups. We make no claim to comprehensiveness in each case study, and 

interpretation of the documents is minimal. Rather, we emphasize the nature of the 

records within each record group and the ways in which the information contained in 

the sometimes under-exploited records can be used. 

Since this chapter deals only with those records created, collected, or retrieved by the 

U.S. government and now held by NARA, we do not discuss many areas of Japanese war 

criminality. For example, the Japanese military used sex slaves, or “comfort women,” 

during World War II, and while this important issue has received much attention in 

recent years, the U.S. government did not systematically collect or create records related 

William H. Cunliffe, Senior Archivist at the National Archives, provided extensive assistance 

with this chapter. NARA student interns Sean Morris and Whitney Noland Zimmer conducted 

research and wrote portions of this chapter. 
80 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

to the topic during or after the war. As a result, there are very few records about “comfort 

women” in NARA. This is also true for records related to the Rape of Nanking, the 

collective name for the widespread atrocities committed against Chinese civilians and 

POWs in and around Nanjing, China, after its fall to Japanese forces in mid-December 

1937. Because the atrocities at Nanjing took place almost four years before U.S. 

involvement in the Asia-Pacific War, most of the contemporary documents at NARA are 

third-hand accounts from diplomatic, military, and naval attachés reporting from China, 

and records produced during the postwar Class A war crimes trial of the commanding 

general of Japanese forces deemed responsible for the Rape of Nanking. 

Nevertheless, NARA holds millions of pages of records related to World War II. 

To find pertinent documents among these holdings, researchers must understand how 

NARA organizes federal records. World War II records are considered permanently 

valuable (in contrast to disposable records), and are organized into numbered record 

groups representing the primary offices of the government. Within a record group, 

the holdings are organized according to the lower offices and departments that created 

the files. The records are further divided into subordinate administrative units and 

chronological blocks of records. In general, NARA maintains its permanently valuable 

records in the manner they were kept by each agency. Most researchers must consult 

finding aids, created by NARA staff, to navigate the files of each record group. 

Part 1: Records Regarding Mistreatment of Allied POWs and Civilian 

Internees 

NARA holds a large number of records dealing with Japanese mistreatment of Allied 

POWs and civilian internees during World War II. At the end of the war in the AsiaPacific Theater, U.S. forces engaged in a number of missions to liberate and safeguard 

POWs and civilian internees still in captivity. NARA also has extensive records of these 

missions scattered throughout many record groups. 

General Records of the Department of State (RG 59)

Two U.S. Department of State series have the largest number of documents regarding 

American POWs and civilian internees held during World War II: the Special War 

Problems Division (SWPD), and the Central Decimal File. 

SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54 contains many reports regarding the mistreatment of 

Americans in POW and civilian internment camps.1 These reports are arranged by camp 

name and number, with Japanese camps followed by German camps. Documents are 

arranged chronologically within each camp file. The subject files also contain a list of 

Americans who were held captive in Japan and elsewhere in Japanese-controlled territory. 
Research Starting Points I 81

The nearly 3,000 names on the list are grouped into sixteen sections according to location 

or camp. Within each section the names are listed in approximate alphabetical order. 

Another important set of SWPD documents is the Inspection Reports on War Relocation 

Centers, 1942–46.

2

 Although these records deal mostly with civilian internment camps in 

the United States, they also contain information about Americans held by the Japanese in the 

Philippine Islands, including a list of names, correspondence, and descriptions of conditions 

and mistreatment in various POW and civilian internment camps in the Philippines. 

The State Department Central Decimal File (which includes correspondence with U.S. 

diplomatic and consular offices in foreign countries, as well as correspondence with foreign 

diplomatic and consular offices in the United States) contains many documents related 

to the topic of Japanese-held American POWs and civilian internees. The collection is 

divided into seven periods: 1910–29, 1930–39, 1940–44, 1945–49, 1950–54, 1955–59, 

and 1960–63. Within each time frame, the records are arranged by decimal file numbers 

reflecting the subject of each document. Most documents pertaining to Americans held 

captive by the Japanese are filed under 1940–44 and 1945–49.3 

Records of the Office of the Navy Judge Advocate General (RG 125)

During World War II, the Navy Judge Advocate General (Navy JAG) administered 

military justice and a legal assistance program, enforced court-martial sentences, initiated 

corrective legal actions, handled matters relating to international and admiralty law and 

claims against the Navy, and drafted departmental legislation. Navy JAG also investigated 

war crimes committed at sea and those for which the primary sources were naval as well 

as cases involving personnel or civilians under naval jurisdiction. The great majority 

of Navy JAG investigations dealt with war crimes committed in the Pacific Theater, 

and these files contain a large number of documents pertaining to the mistreatment of 

Japanese-held American POWs. 

The main body of records produced by Navy JAG during its war crimes investigations 

is in the Records of the Navy War Crimes Branch collection, which has numerous entries 

with information on war crimes committed against Americans held captive by the Japanese. 

For example, Case Files of Pacific Area War Crimes Trials, 1944–49 has many documents 

pertaining to the U.S. Navy trials of 123 Japanese military personnel tried on Guam and 

Kwajalein between 1945 and 1949, primarily for alleged mistreatment of POWs and 

the unlawful executions of captured Navy airmen.4 Records Relating to Prisoners of War, 

1944–49 also has a variety of documents on Allied military personnel and civilians held 

by the Japanese.5 Files include lists of liberated POWs and affidavits by U.S. Navy and 

Marine Corps POWs (searchable by last name) on living conditions in POW camps and 

the malicious treatment they received from prison guards and other officials. 
82 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (RG 153)

During World War II, the Army Judge Advocate General (Army JAG) supervised the 

system of military justice throughout the Army, performed appellate review of courtmartial records, and provided the Army with legal services. Additionally, Army JAG 

served as legal adviser to the Secretary of War and to all Army offices and agencies. 

Army JAG was also responsible for preparing war crimes cases against Axis leaders, and 

it represented the U.S. Army on the United Nations War Crimes Commission, formed 

in late 1943. 

Numerous series within this record group, such as the Records of the War Crimes Branch, 

contain information gathered by Army JAG investigators about war crimes committed 

against American POWs and civilian internees by Japanese perpetrators. Reports of 

Interviews with American Servicemen Who Were Prisoners of War, 1943–47 includes vivid 

descriptions of conditions in Japanese POW camps, as well as eyewitness accounts of 

atrocities.6 Persons and Places Case File contains information on suspected German and 

Japanese war criminals, as well as information on Axis-controlled POW camps.7 The 

files in this entry are arranged according to type of war crime or related war crimes. 

The documents in the files include correspondence, investigative reports, trial records, 

photographs, and published materials such as newspaper clippings and pamphlets. 

Records of the Office of Strategic Services (RG 226)

President Roosevelt established the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to conduct overt 

and covert intelligence activities in support of the war against the Axis powers, to analyze 

raw intelligence and disseminate finished intelligence to appropriate government agencies, 

and to engage in clandestine operations in support of planned military operations. The 

OSS also had responsibility for relief and rescue operations at various POW and civilian 

internment camps in German- and Japanese-controlled territories. For this reason, OSS 

records hold a wealth of information about American POWs and civilian internees held 

captive by Germany and Japan. 

Numerous entries contain documents dealing specifically with the issue of war crimes 

committed against Americans by their Japanese captors. The entry OSS Records of the 

Director includes reports and correspondence that describe in great detail the Japanese 

mistreatment of American POWs and civilian internees, as well as atrocities committed 

against captured Allied soldiers by Japanese forces in the Asia-Pacific Theaters.8 Records 

of the Research and Analysis Branch, Intelligence Reports (“Regular” Series), 1941–45 has 

thousands of intelligence reports on a wide range of matters, such as living conditions 

in POW and civilian internment camps in the Philippines and occupied China, and 

the forced labor of American POWs in mines on the Japanese main islands. It also 
Research Starting Points I 83

includes many reports on Japanese-held American POWs and civilian internees.9 Records 

of the Research and Analysis Branch, Formerly Security-Classified Intelligence Reports ("XL" 

Series), 1941–46 also includes a large number of reports pertaining to this topic.10 One 

report surveys Japanese POW and civilian internee camps, for example, and another 

explores Japanese violations of the laws of war, including the illegal treatment of captured 

airmen. 

General Records of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied 

Powers Operational (RG 331) 

General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) was 

established in October 1945, as agreed to by the governments of the United States, 

United Kingdom, Republic of China, and Soviet Union, to carry out the terms of the 

Japanese surrender. SCAP produced a massive amount of records, which continue to be 

maintained roughly according to SCAP’s original organizational structure. 

Numerous entries within SCAP Records of the Legal Section contain general 

information about American POWs and civilian internees and specific information on 

abuses they suffered at the hands of their Japanese captors. Records of the Administrative 

Division, Area Case Files contains statements made by former POWs.11 The Records of the 

Investigation Division entry has a large number of questionnaires completed by former 

Allied POWs who had been mistreated by their Japanese captors.12 In addition, Record 

of Trial File, 1945–49 has the case dockets of Japanese prisoner and civilian camp guards 

and other officials convicted of abusing Allied POWs and civilian internees.13

Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General (RG 389)

During World War II, the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) engaged 

in protective and law enforcement activities for the Army and maintained security in 

privately owned industrial facilities important to national defense. OPMG's Prisoner of 

War Division served as the central source of information regarding Axis and American 

POWs from all branches of the military as well as from the Coast Guard, the Merchant 

Marine, and American civilian internees. The Prisoner of War Division collected and 

organized information regarding captured individuals, making its records a good source 

for those conducting research on American military personnel and civilians held by 

Japan. 

A good starting point in this record group is the American POW Information Bureau 

Records Branch, General Subject File, 1942–46, which constitutes the most significant 

collection of records about Americans held by Japan.14 Documents include lists of 

POWs and civilian internees and descriptions of conditions (often with photographs) 
84 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

in camps in Europe and East Asia. Many of the files contain letters, notes, diagrams, 

maps, photographs, and forms produced by American POWs and civilian internees and 

by military personnel who liberated camps at the end of the war. 

Records of The Adjutant-General's Office (RG 407)

During World War II, The Adjutant-General’s Office (TAGO) provided administrative 

and support services to the War Department, maintained personnel records, developed 

data processing systems, and administered the non-unit reserve components of the U.S. 

Army. It also oversaw the army personnel statistical and accounting system, records 

management program, publications, postal services, historical activities, and special and 

heraldic services. TAGO’s role as the primary record keeper for the War Department 

makes its records an excellent source for those conducting research on Japanese-held 

American POWs and civilian internees. 

Several entries within this record group contain general information about American 

POWs and civilian internees, as well as specific details on war crimes committed against 

them. The entries Records Maintained by the Communications Branch and Records of the 

Administrative Services Division have the largest number of documents on the topic.15 

TAGO records also encompass the very large Philippine Archives Collection. The 

Army's Recovered Personnel Division, which was responsible for the recovery, repatriation, 

and restitution of U.S. and Philippine military personnel and civilians interned by the 

Japanese during World War II, created the collection. Records include the experiences 

of Allied POWs and civilian internees in camps in the Philippine Islands, in Japan, and 

on the Asian mainland, as well as investigation reports, affidavits, trial transcripts, and 

other documents describing Japanese beating, torture, and executions of captives. Other 

records concern food, clothing, health, discipline, pay, and the routine administration of 

camp life. Particularly useful entries in this collection are: 

• POW General Correspondence Files, 1941–45; 

• Diaries and Historical Narratives, 1940–45; 

• Sunken POW Transport Files, 1942, 1944–48; 

• Records of Atrocities against POWs, 1942–45; 

• POW Recovery Team Reports, 1944–45; and 

• General Correspondence Files Pertaining to Civilian Internees, 1943–45.16

Case Study: American POWs in Mukden

In November 1942, nearly 1,100 American prisoners who had survived the Philippines 

campaign, the Bataan Death March, and imprisonment on Luzon and Formosa, arrived 
Research Starting Points I 85

in Camp Hoten, a POW facility located three miles northeast of Mukden (presentday Shenyang), Manchuria. Among the Americans held in Manchuria was Lt. Gen. 

Jonathan Wainwright, commander of the American defense of Bataan and Corregidor. 

The Japanese sent Wainwright to a prison camp in Hsian (present-day Liaoyuan), 120 

miles north of Mukden, where they held several dozen prominent British, Dutch, and 

Americans.17 U.S. officials knew virtually nothing about Camp Hoten or other Japanese 

POW camps; for several months, the U.S. government had little knowledge of the 

conditions in which its soldiers were held by the Japanese in Manchuria. 

However, the State Department Special War Problems Division, which had been 

tasked in part with ensuring the humane treatment of U.S. POWs and civilian internees, 

attempted through diplomatic channels to learn more about American prisoners held 

throughout the Japanese Empire. For the prisoners at Camp Hoten, these efforts began 

to bear fruit in mid-1943. Neutral Swiss officials from the International Committee of 

the Red Cross (ICRC) pressed the Japanese on SWPD requests to collect intelligence 

on the health of Allied POWs held there. Acting as liaisons between Japan and the 

United States, the ICRC’s personnel gained permission from the Japanese to learn more 

about the POWs and were eventually able to forward reports of the camp’s conditions to 

SWPD.18 With their assistance, SWPD began to gain a sense of the conditions of POWs 

held in Manchuria. 

The two key figures in ICRC efforts to assess conditions at the camp were Dr. 

Frederick Paravicini, an ICRC representative, and Max Pestalozzi, a well-connected 

businessman who worked in Yokohama. Paravicini received information about Mukden 

from the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau in July 1943. His information 

was forwarded to SWPD that month. Pestalozzi visited Camp Hoten in November 

1943. SWPD received his report in December. In addition to allowing them to carry 

out a regular inspection, the Japanese government permitted Pestalozzi to interview 

two senior Allied officers held at Camp Hoten regarding conditions and the general 

treatment of the POWs held there. Their reports described the barracks arrangements, 

medical care, living conditions, work performed by the prisoners, and food situation at 

the camp. They were central to the U.S. government’s understanding of the plight of 

U.S. POWs held at Hoten.19 

By mid-1945, SWPD had gathered a great deal of information not only about 

Hoten, but also about other camps in the Asia-Pacific Theaters. Its files on Hoten 

include lists of POWs and civilian internees, specific allegations of abuse by Japanese 

camp administrators, and copies of official diplomatic protests lodged by the United 

States through Swiss intermediaries. Armed with information obtained from sources 

like Paravicini and Pestalozzi about the prisoners, the conditions they endured, and the 
86 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

location of the camp, U.S. officials laid plans to reach the POWs in the last days of the 

war. On August 10, 1945, four days after the United States dropped the first atomic 

bomb on Japan and two days after the Soviets commenced their invasion of Manchuria, 

the OSS informed its operatives in China about its plans to launch rescue missions to 

the scattered POW camps. The cables that the OSS dispatched to its field stations at this 

stage outline the planning and goals for several POW rescue missions, including the one 

to Mukden.20 

On August 16, 1945, just after President Harry Truman announced Japan’s surrender, 

a team of five OSS operatives and their Chinese civilian interpreter flew from their 

headquarters in Hsian (present-day Xi’an), China, and parachuted into Mukden on a 

mission code named “Cardinal.” Commanded by Maj. James T. Hennessy, their orders 

were to make contact with POWs in Camp Hoten and its subsidiary camps, provide 

emergency medical aid, and secure an operational airstrip for the delivery of supplies 

and the arrival of additional support personnel. In addition, anticipating that the Soviet 

Union would occupy Mukden after the initial invasion of Manchuria on August 9, OSS 

planners directed the Cardinal group to collect as many Japanese documents as they 

could, begin establishing a network of agents in Mukden, and make attempts to gather 

intelligence on Soviet activities there.21 

The Cardinal team arrived in Mukden at 10:45 a.m., and, after some difficulties, 

contacted the prisoners at Camp Hoten. On August 19, two members of the Cardinal 

mission traveled to Hsian to liberate Wainwright from his prison camp. Meanwhile, 

the Cardinal team in Mukden provided the former prisoners with what aid they could 

and attempted to gather intelligence in a city filled with Soviet soldiers, newly liberated 

Chinese civilians, and recently interned Japanese POWs. Though they successfully cared 

for the liberated POWs, the intelligence they gathered on local conditions and the Soviet 

Army was only rudimentary. In late August, the entire team began evacuating the former 

American prisoners, including the American general, who departed on the 27th.22 

Two weeks after the OSS team’s arrival, U.S. Army Prisoner of War Recovery Team #1, 

made up of nineteen men led by Lt. Col. James Donovan, arrived at the Mukden POW 

camp to continue processing and evacuating the former prisoners. Donovan’s sole task 

was to prepare the POWs for evacuation; his team did not receive specific orders to gather 

intelligence. His team’s work generated a great deal of useful documentation, including 

POW identification forms and reports of potential criminal activities perpetrated by the 

Japanese during the war, all of which is available at NARA.23 In addition, Donovan’s 

account of the operation itself is also available at the National Archives. Wide ranging 

in scope, the forty-one page report covers the activities of the Cardinal group (including 

the mission to Hsian to liberate Wainwright), his own recovery team’s efforts, and a 
Research Starting Points I 87

POW cemetery at Hoten. NA, RG 226, Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Field Station Files, 

Shanghai, entry 168, box 90. 
88 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

number of general observations about the political and military situation in the city of 

Mukden. In addition, the cable correspondence in these records between Donovan’s 

team to various administrative groups, the lists of prisoners liberated at Mukden, and the 

detailed information on the evacuation of POWs are particularly valuable for research 

on this subject. The file also contains operational directives issued by headquarters and 

recommendations for awards for individual members of the program. By the middle 

of September, the Cardinal mission and Donovan’s POW Recovery Team managed to 

evacuate all of the Americans held in and around Mukden.24 Taken as a whole, the 

documentation generated by Donovan’s POW Recovery Team offers unparalleled insight 

into the liberation of the U.S. POWs in Manchuria, the conditions endured by prisoners 

of the Japanese, and the state of relations between U.S. and Soviet soldiers on the ground 

in Mukden. It is essential yet underexploited material for any investigation of this 

topic.

In the course of carrying out his work, Donovan suggested to his superiors that a 

narrative history of Camp Hoten be written. Accordingly, Captain William Thompson, 

a former prisoner in Mukden, agreed to write this history. Thompson’s narrative made 

it into Donovan’s report to the War Department, and in February 1946, Thompson 

obtained permission from the War Department to publish the work separately.25 

Thompson based his ninety-four–page narrative, “History of the Mukden Group,” on 

notes that he surreptitiously kept in his diary during his incarceration. An extraordinary 

source, it offers an account of daily life in the camp and the conditions that prisoners 

had to endure while there. Thompson’s sharply detailed work describes the prisoners’ 

initial passage from the Philippines to Mukden, the military and social structure that 

developed within the prisoner community, the behavior of camp officials toward their 

inmates, and the camp’s liberation at the hands of the American POW teams. It is 

important to note, however, that Thompson’s status as a commissioned officer meant 

that he was segregated from the enlisted men and received marginally better treatment 

from the Japanese.26 

Other documents drawn from the Hoten prisoners’ experiences are also available. 

After their liberation, former POWs at the camp completed questionnaires that 

documented the atrocities they suffered or witnessed. Though not all POWs held at 

Camp Hoten were aware of the atrocities committed against other captives, some were 

eyewitnesses to the executions of comrades, and the majority claimed to have either 

experienced or observed beatings by Japanese guards. Many testimonies and affidavits, 

collected in part by Donovan’s recovery team, describe the behavior of Lt. Miki Toru 

and Corporal—later Sergeant—Noda Eiichi, two of the most infamous of Camp Hoten 

officials. The testimonies of American POWs led to the prosecution of Miki in 1946 
Research Starting Points I 89

and Noda in 1947. Both Miki’s and Noda’s trial records are also available in the SCAP 

records (RG 331).27

Because of his background, Noda’s case is particularly interesting. A secondgeneration Japanese American, Noda was one of the most notorious abusers of Allied 

POWs at Camp Hoten.28 Affidavits and transcripts of U.S. POW testimonies can be 

found in his prosecution file.29 Based on evidence gathered from former U.S. POWs, 

he was tried as a Japanese war criminal in Yokohama, Japan, in September 1947. Citing 

his participation in the unlawful killing of at least four men and the beating of countless 

others, prosecutors charged Noda with violating the laws and customs of war. The court 

found Noda guilty on all ten counts of abusing prisoners, though not of participating 

in certain activities that led to the death of four of them. It sentenced him to twenty 

years’ imprisonment.30 One of the more interesting documents in Noda’s legal file is a 

clemency petition that is supported by remarks from an American POW whom Noda 

befriended in Hoten.31

Part 2: Records Regarding Japanese Chemical and Biological Warfare

While the quantity of records held at NARA pertaining to Japanese development and 

use of chemical and biological weapons during World War II is not nearly as voluminous 

as those pertaining to Japanese mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees, 

there are documents on this topic scattered throughout various modern military record 

groups. 

Records of the Office of the Army Surgeon General (RG 112) 

The Office of the Army Surgeon General provides advice and assistance on medical 

matters to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. Likewise, it exercises 

general oversight and control of all aspects of Army health services. In addition to its 

normal duties, during World War II the Office of the Army Surgeon General monitored 

intelligence about German and Japanese biological weapons research. Record group 112 

is a good starting point for researchers interested in exploring Japanese wartime use and 

development of chemical and biological weapons. 

The records produced by the Army Surgeon General’s Preventive Medicine Division 

contain information on Japanese use of and research on biological weapons. In particular, 

Biological Warfare Specialized Files, 1941–47 includes items such as translations of 

Japanese-language documents concerning biological warfare measures taken by Imperial 

Japanese Army forces in northern China and Manchuria, interrogation reports of Japanese 

medical officers involved in chemical and biological warfare, and reports discussing 

suspected Japanese use of biological weapons in China.32
90 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (RG 153)

The records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (Army JAG) have a limited 

number of documents pertaining to Japanese biological warfare. General Records, 1944–

49 includes Soviet requests to interrogate certain Japanese biological warfare specialists 

during the early postwar period.33 Other folders include State-War-Navy Coordinating 

Committee (SWNCC) memos discussing the rationale behind the decision not to 

pursue war crimes prosecution of Japanese scientists (including the head of Unit 731, Lt. 

Gen. Ishii Shirō) who conducted biological warfare experiments at secret laboratories in 

Manchuria during the late 1930s and early 1940s using human and animal subjects. The 

entry also contains several interrogations of former Unit 731 members. 

Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165) 

During World War II, the War Department General and Special Staffs prepared plans for 

national defense and wartime mobilization; investigated and reported on Army efficiency 

and preparedness; provided advice to the Secretary of War, the War Department, and 

the officer corps of the Army; and exercised general supervision over the Army. Entries 

within this record group contain documents about Japanese biological weapons use and 

research. For example, New Developments Division, Security-Classified Correspondence 

File of Dr. G.W. Merck, Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, 1942–46 has reports 

that evaluate the intentions and capabilities of the Japanese biological warfare program 

and explore how U.S. researchers could use the findings.34 The reports include maps 

of Japanese biological warfare research facilities, interviews with Japanese biological 

weapon researchers, and diagrams of Japanese bacterial bombs. Documents in the 

Security-Classified Office File of Gen. W.A. Borden, Director of New Developments Division 

include U.S. Army intelligence reports evaluating Japan’s biological warfare intentions 

and capabilities as well as extracts and summaries of captured Japanese documents 

related to biological warfare.35 Likewise, Civil Affairs Division, Security-Classified Papers 

of the Army Member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), 1942–June 1949

has numerous documents pertaining to the investigation of Unit 731 and the U.S. 

decision not to prosecute Ishii and other members of the now notorious biological 

warfare unit.36 

Records of the Chemical Warfare Service (RG 175)

This record group has papers documenting U.S. Army development and testing of 

offensive weapons and information on enemy development and use of chemical and 

biological weapons. The records contain a few documents pertaining to Japanese biological 

weapons use and research, including a report by U.S. biological weapon researchers based 
Research Starting Points I 91

upon early postwar interviews conducted with Japanese scientists (including Ishii) who 

recount experiments on humans in great detail.37 

Records of the Office of Strategic Services (RG 226)

OSS records include intelligence reports dealing with Japanese biological weapons use 

and research (particularly in China and Manchuria). A few are found in various entries 

in the Field Station Files, the Research and Analysis Branch Chief Files, and the OSS 

Classified Sources and Methods File. 

Records of the Army Staff (RG 319)

The Records of the Army Staff contain some documents pertaining to Japanese biological 

weapons research and use, such as the files of four Japanese researchers who engaged in 

biological warfare experimentation: Ishii Shirō, Kamei Kanichiro, Masuda Shigeharu, 

and Kikuchi Norimitsu.38 Several folders have reports on Japanese biological warfare 

activities (drawn mainly from interrogations of Ishii), descriptions of Japanese biological 

and chemical weapons, defensive measures, and reports of Japanese balloon bombs used 

to attack the United States.39 Likewise, the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Intelligence 

Administrative Division, Intelligence Document File contains several files on Japanese 

biological and chemical weapons and research, including reports of interrogations of 

Japanese medical officers engaged in biological weapons research.40

General Records of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied 

Powers (RG 331) 

SCAP files have a limited amount of information on Japanese biological warfare. 

Specifically, records produced by the SCAP Legal Section during the course of its 

early postwar investigations of suspected Japanese war criminals include a number of 

interrogations and investigation reports (dated during 1946 and 1947) that pertain to 

Japanese biological weapons researchers.41 A number of documents regarding the Soviet 

Union’s requests to arrest and interrogate Japanese biological warfare experts in U.S. 

custody can also be found in this record group.42 

Case Study: The Hunt for Knowledge about Japanese Biological 

Warfare Programs

From Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1932 until its surrender in 1945, Japanese 

scientists conducted chemical and biological warfare experiments on animals and 

humans. Working at isolated, ultra-secret military bases in the region, they received 

a great deal of high-level support from the Imperial government. Under the yoke of a 
92 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

powerful occupation authority, Manchuria offered Japanese researchers isolation from 

prying eyes as well as an abundance of subjects on which to experiment. 

Spearheading this work was Lt. Gen. Ishii Shirō, the head of the notorious Unit 

731, who held both medical and Ph.D. degrees from the prestigious Kyoto Imperial 

University. Ishii conducted experiments on humans with plague bacteria, cholera, 

glanders, and other pathogens, first at the Zhong Ma camp in Harbin, then at Pingfan, 

the large biological warfare research and development facility south of Harbin. Japanese 

scientists vivisected the infected bodies of their victims to record the day-by-day progress 

of pathogens through the system. In the final weeks of the war, to conceal the evidence 

of his and other units’ atrocities, Ishii ordered the demolition of the experiment facilities 

and the killing of experiment subjects.43 

There is no question that Japanese scientists conducted experiments on Chinese, 

Mongolian, and Russian prisoners at Pingfan. In the years after the war, many others have 

claimed that American POWs were the victims of biological warfare experimentation, as 

well. For example, in December 1945, Japanese communists alleged that Ishii conducted 

medical experiments on Chinese and American POWs from Mukden. These allegations 

are some of the earliest intimations that U.S. soldiers may have been subjected to such 

experiments.44 More recently, former American POWs themselves have claimed that 

they too were the victims of human biological and chemical warfare experimentation 

at the hands of their Japanese captors. In her important research on the abuse of U.S. 

POWs in Asia and the failure of Japanese officials to properly care for prisoners, Linda 

Goetz Holmes has called attention to this issue.45 While the topic has justifiably received 

more interest because of her work, no documentary evidence of experimentation on 

American POWs has been found to date in the collections at NARA.

Nevertheless, the National Archives does contain a great deal of material on the 

Japanese biological warfare and chemical warfare research.46 These documents also trace 

the evolution of official U.S. knowledge of the program during and after the war. In 

the early years of the war, the United States, not surprisingly, knew very little. The 

State Department and the fledgling OSS had virtually no information about Japanese 

developments in biological and chemical warfare. In 1941, one of the few pieces of 

evidence about Japanese chemical warfare was an account by an American reporter who 

claimed to have seen at least ten gas victims in a military hospital in Chongqing. The 

reporter suspected that the Japanese were responsible, but neither he nor the OSS could 

confirm it.47 This report is one of the only intelligence leads that the OSS had early in 

the war.

As the war progressed, the Army Surgeon General received a variety of intelligence 

reports from a number of different organizations about foreign biological and chemical 
Research Starting Points I 93

warfare developments. It found much of the information about Axis capabilities difficult 

to confirm. The utter secrecy of Japan’s biological and chemical warfare programs, 

combined with the remoteness of Pingfan and the difficulty of establishing an intelligence 

network in the far-flung location, limited the information coming out of Manchuria and 

made the little intelligence that did emerge suspect. Useful intelligence only began to 

appear in the middle stages of the war. 

In January 1943, U.S. intelligence officials gathered the information they held 

on enemy biological and chemical warfare development into one concise report. The 

Army Surgeon General received a copy of this summary, which contains information on 

Japanese tactics and strategy, military hardware, and the state of technical and scientific 

development. The summary reports an outbreak of bubonic plague in China that likely 

had its origins in a Japanese biological attack. Notably absent, however, is any report on 

the development of biological weapons in Manchuria or elsewhere. At the time, U.S. 

intelligence still had virtually no information about the Pingfan facility or Unit 731. 

Nevertheless, the report remains a telling indication of the state of Allied information on 

Japanese biological and chemical warfare in early 1943.48 

U.S. intelligence began amassing concrete evidence of Japanese biological warfare 

activity in 1944. In March of that year, Chinese guerrillas captured a Japanese scientist 

involved in Ishii’s biological warfare project. The scientist’s interrogation revealed 

evidence of a peacetime and wartime research program to develop typhoid, cholera, and 

dysentery bacilli under the cover of the so-called Anti-Epidemic and Water Supply Section 

of the Japanese Army in Kiukiang. OSS officials also learned more about biological 

warfare activities in Nanjing, where Japanese scientists were also working to produce 

bacteriological weapons. The file containing this report includes the names of Japanese 

scientists involved in the work as well as the location of major biological warfare research 

and experimental facilities.49

General MacArthur’s staff also obtained intelligence about Japanese biological and 

chemical warfare activities. A July 1944 Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) 

research report confirmed the use of bacteriological warfare by the Japanese in China 

and Manchuria. The report includes extracts and summaries of captured documents 

that detail Japanese progress in bacteriological warfare, confirming that the Japanese 

had developed a so-called “bacillus bomb.” Another ATIS report details activity at the 

Tagajo Arsenal since its origin in October 1944 and describes the materials required to 

manufacture incendiary products and other components needed to build a chemical 

bomb.50 

In August 1944, U.S. intelligence began receiving even more specific information 

about the development of the bacillus bomb at Pingfan. The information remained 
94 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

unclear until October, when intelligence officials were able to confirm it through an 

interrogation of a Japanese POW. However, the United States did not form a clearer 

picture of the workings of Pingfan until March 1945, when interrogations of two 

Japanese medical officers uncovered a wealth of information indicating that, among 

other things, Ishii was in charge of the bacteriological laboratory in Harbin and that 

the “nature and types of experiments being carried on [there were] extremely secret ...” 

Interrogations of other Japanese medical officers led U.S. intelligence officials to conclude 

that the Japanese biological and chemical warfare program centered in Harbin was quite 

advanced.51 Persistent U.S. intelligence efforts had begun to pay dividends. 

U.S. attempts to determine Japanese biological warfare capabilities and intentions 

reached a fever pitch in the last year of the war as officials became increasingly concerned 

that Japanese troops might employ chemical and biological weapons as a last resort. A 

1944 War Department summary report warned that Japan was capable of easily massproducing these weapons. The same file containing this summary report also holds 

translations of letters and witness statements given by Chinese and Westerners who 

confirmed the presence of bubonic plague in China and alleged Japanese involvement in 

its spread, which only strengthened official suspicion of Japanese willingness to employ 

biological warfare.52 In 1945, U.S. experts systematically examined the use of bubonic 

plague by the Japanese in China. They focused on an outbreak that occurred in 1941. In 

November of that year, a Japanese plane allegedly dropped rice grains, wheat, paper, and 

other particles embedded with bubonic plague bacilli over Chengde, in China’s Hunan 

province. Shortly afterwards, an outbreak of plague swept over the province. Chinese 

studies were inconclusive, but the epidemic raised a great deal of suspicion among 

residents and local medical workers. The 1945 U.S. Army study “Report on the Plague 

in Changteh, Hunan” describes the circumstances leading to the suspicion of plague and 

other information gathered from several investigations. It also contains copies of several 

communiqués and other messages describing the plague outbreak. Moreover, British 

officials offered a study of Japanese biological warfare intentions. Their May 1945 report 

covers allegations of the use of biological warfare by both Allied and Japanese forces, 

including the incident at Chengde.53 

The Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the War Department General Staff also 

took part in the hunt for knowledge of Japanese biological and chemical warfare activities. 

In July 1945, it published “Japanese Biological Warfare,” a report distributed to several 

U.S. agencies, including the OSS. Compiled from ATIS reports, War Department 

intelligence reports, and other U.S. publications, it indicates that Hsinking and Harbin 

were centers of biological warfare research in China and notes that Ishii was in charge 

of the program at Harbin. However, details about the program remained vague. The 
Research Starting Points I 95

report concludes that the Japanese would use biological and chemical warfare if their 

military leadership deemed it appropriate, and, in an acknowledgement of the Chengde 

incident, noted that the Japanese had indeed already deployed plague bacteria in China 

at least once.54 

With Japan’s impending surrender, Ishii’s men disposed of much of the evidence of 

biological warfare experimentation and destroyed the Pingfan facility in early August 

1945. By that time, thousands of men, women, and children had died in experiments at 

Pingfan and elsewhere. In the immediate postwar years, Allied officials made extensive 

efforts to uncover and exploit the information gleaned from their work. 

After the war ended, Ishii went into hiding. He planted a story in a local newspaper 

that he had been shot to death, and enlisted his friends to stage his funeral. U.S. 

intelligence authorities finally located him in January 1946, and interrogated him 

and other members of Unit 731 many times over the next year in an effort to gather 

information on Japanese biological and chemical warfare.55

The first detailed postwar study of the Japanese biological warfare program, 

completed on November 1, 1945, by Lt. Col. Murray Sanders, notes that the Japanese 

Army embarked upon large-scale biological warfare experimentation in the early 1930s 

under Ishii’s direction. Sanders also wrote that the Japanese feared that the Soviet 

Union, after having allegedly used biological warfare against the Japanese in Manchuria 

in 1935, would use it again if the two countries went to war. He based his report 

solely on interviews with Japanese participants and laboratory examinations, not on any 

documentary evidence, which purportedly was destroyed during the war. In so doing, 

he hewed closely to the official Japanese position and played into the hands of those 

who wished to protect the Emperor by asserting that Hirohito had no knowledge of the 

research. His report also contains a history of Japanese biological warfare efforts, the 

types of experiments carried out—with no mention of human experimentation—and 

the varieties of weapons the Japanese developed.56 

Sanders’ initial investigation did not reflect the realities of the state of the Japanese 

biological warfare program. At the end of December 1945, Army officials at Fort 

Detrick, Maryland, ordered Lt. Col. Arvo Thompson to follow up on Sanders’ flawed 

findings. Thompson conducted his investigation from January to March 1946. His 

report is drawn mainly from interviews with Ishii himself. Ishii proved evasive and 

sometimes uncooperative in his interviews, but he did provide Thompson with enough 

information to sketch out Ishii’s personal biography, a history of the Pingfan facility, 

its organization, and most importantly, a lengthy summary of its work. With the 

completion of Thompson’s report, U.S. officials were finally able to begin to arrive at a 

better assessment of the scope of Japanese biological warfare research.57 
96 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Intelligence on chemical warfare also began to flow in after the close of hostilities. 

“Intelligence Report on Japanese Chemical Warfare,” compiled and disseminated by 

the Chief Chemical Officer in U.S. Army Forces Pacific, highlights Japanese research 

and production of chemical weapons and the training of troops in the use of chemical 

warfare. The report is based on interviews with participants in Japan’s chemical warfare 

development program, many of whom were not readily willing to divulge their knowledge, 

for fear of prosecution.58 

While Murray Sanders was submitting his report and Arvo Thompson was preparing 

to scrutinize the Japanese biological warfare program, Army intelligence officials in Japan 

were conducting their own investigation of Ishii. In December 1945, the CounterIntelligence Services received a letter from tipster Imaji Setsu, who claimed that Ishii and 

his colleagues had experimented upon humans in the course of their work. According to 

Imaji, among the human subjects were Manchurian criminals, farmers, members of the 

Chinese Communist Army, a Russian interpreter, and women and children. Another 

document anonymously sent to SCAP headquarters contained information about Ishii’s 

activities and expressed the sender’s desire to participate in a clandestine investigation of 

Ishii. These and other letters made their way into the hands of the Investigative Division 

of SCAP’s Legal Section. The Investigative Division compiled them with eyewitness 

interviews about Ishii’s atrocities, and the Legal Section developed numerous leads on 

Japanese biological warfare experimentation during the war. The spotty and incomplete 

wartime intelligence was beginning to coalesce into more meaningful information for 

both scientific and legal investigators.59 Nevertheless, U.S. prosecutors’ efforts to punish 

Ishii would fail, while military efforts to glean information from him would prove to be 

more successful. 

In accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, in January 1946, SCAP organized the 

Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal to bring to justice to major Japanese civilian and military 

leaders who had initiated and participated in a war of aggression and committed 

crimes against peace and humanity. Trials of lesser war criminals in Japan, China, 

Australia, the Soviet Union, and other locations involved over two thousand additional 

legal proceedings against several thousand Japanese nationals and their collaborators. 

Conspicuously absent from the ranks of individuals tried in hundreds of international 

war crimes cases in the Asia-Pacific Theaters were the former scientists involved in Unit 

731, including Ishii.60 

Nevertheless, over the course of 1946 and into 1947, as trials of other Japanese 

multiplied throughout the Far East, Ishii’s fear of prosecution for war criminal activities 

likely increased. Occupation authorities interrogated several former members of Unit 

731 and compiled increasingly damning allegations against him. By the end of 1947, 
Research Starting Points I 97

war crimes investigating authorities had amassed a considerable amount of evidence 

suggesting that, with Ishii’s consent, a number of Japanese scientists had conducted 

biological warfare experiments on humans.61 U.S. investigators had numerous 

interrogation reports from Japanese scientists who worked under Ishii in Manchuria, who 

alternately confirmed and denied Unit 731’s use of humans for experimentation. For 

example, according to a confidential informant of the Army Counterintelligence Corps, 

Ishii injected residents of Canton (present-day Guangzhou), China, with bubonic plague 

bacilli, causing a devastating plague. An informant named Nishimura provided more 

incriminating information by detailing Ishii’s human experiments with glanders bacteria. 

However, other witnesses denied any knowledge of Unit 731 and its activities.62 

Japanese scientists proved to be cagey and evasive with American interrogators, even 

while Ishii tacitly confirmed the use of human subjects in experiments. Over the course 

of the interviews, Ishii hinted that he would be willing to provide more information if 

he were granted immunity from war crimes prosecution. Few dissenters in the U.S. 

government emerged, though some agencies, such as the State Department, sought to 

limit the commitment that the United States would make to a criminal as notorious as 

Ishii. For the most part, however, U.S. military and intelligence officials were receptive to 

a deal with Ishii in which the general would avoid prosecution in return for information 

about his work.63 

In early 1947, the Soviet Union began to gather its own evidence on the results 

of Japanese biological and chemical warfare research. This was a project that gave rise 

to considerable consternation in U.S. military and foreign policy circles. The concern 

was that Japanese scientists would reveal too much to the Soviets about their work and 

compromise the advantageous strategic position held by the United States concerning 

biological warfare. They also feared that a furor might develop over the appearance that 

U.S. officials were actively exploiting Japanese expertise in exchange for the Japanese 

scientists’ immunity from prosecution. SCAP, the War Department Civil Affairs Division, 

SWNCC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department all attempted, to one 

degree or another, to shield Ishii and his colleagues from prosecution in order to keep the 

Japanese biological warfare program from exploding into the public domain while they 

gleaned more information about it for themselves. The Russian request to interrogate Ishii 

only added to U.S. difficulties. NARA holds a great deal of correspondence and meetingrelated materials that document U.S. efforts in 1947 to discourage the prosecution of 

prominent Unit 731 members, and equivocation over Soviet efforts to prosecute.64 After 

much delay and hand-wringing, SWNCC side-stepped these worries by allowing the 

Soviets to interrogate Japanese biological warfare specialists held by SCAP, but only on 

the condition that an American official be present during the interrogation, and after 
98 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

U.S. authorities told the Japanese precisely what responses they were to give their Russian 

interrogators.65

Meanwhile, the body of U.S. knowledge of Japanese biological warfare capabilities and 

criminal behavior continued to grow. In August 1947, the Technical Intelligence Center 

of the Office of Naval Intelligence compiled a report titled “Naval Aspects of Biological 

Warfare,” which claimed that the Japanese had experimented upon Chinese subjects 

during immunization and bacterial research conducted at Pingfan. Notably, this report 

asserted that American and Russian POWs were used to provide blood samples, while 

the more odious experimentation on humans was inflicted upon Manchurian criminals 

already condemned to death. Contrary to some postwar SCAP records claiming that the 

Japanese Emperor advocated Ishii’s biological warfare research, this report states that the 

Emperor had forbidden Ishii’s projects.66

In the autumn of 1947, two scientists from Fort Detrick, Maryland, Edwin Hill and 

Joseph Victor, carried out their own investigation of Japanese biological warfare activities 

with the full support of Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s G-2 Intelligence 

Chief. They interviewed Ishii and several other scientists and pathologists regarding 

their studies of plague, typhus, tick encephalitis, botulism, cholera, and other diseases. 

While Hill and Victor noted that “no question of immunity guarantee from war crimes 

prosecution was ever raised during these interviews,” they also voiced their concern that 

the Japanese scientists were withholding information, intimating that they could be more 

usefully exploited if they were guaranteed protection from prosecution. Despite Japanese 

evasions, they did learn more details about the effects of these diseases on both human 

subjects and crops. They noted that, from the scientific perspective, the Japanese had 

done a great deal of work to advance the field: 

Evidence gathered in this investigation has greatly supplemented and amplified previous 

aspects of this field. It represents data which have been obtained by Japanese scientists at 

the expenditure of many millions of dollars and years of work. Information has accrued 

with respect to human susceptibility to these diseases as indicated by specific infectious 

doses of bacteria. Such information could not be obtained in our own laboratories because 

of scruples attached to human experimentation. These data were secured with a total 

outlay of ¥250,000 to date, a mere pittance by comparison with the actual cost of the 

studies. It is hoped that individuals who voluntarily contributed this information will 

be spared embarrassment because of it and that every effort will be taken to prevent this 

information from falling into other hands.67

By early 1948, with Cold War tensions mounting rapidly, the issue of prosecution 
Research Starting Points I 99

of Japanese war criminals faded. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal was ending its 

proceedings, and trials of Class B and C war criminals were also winding down. The 

fear of repercussions stemming from the protection of Ishii and others by United States 

officials began to abate. With the help of the U.S. scientific and intelligence communities, 

key members of Unit 731 had avoided prosecution for their use of humans in biological 

and chemical warfare experimentation. 

Part 3: Records with Information on Atrocities

A significant number of documents at NARA pertain to atrocities committed by Imperial 

Japanese forces against Allied military personnel and civilians of various nationalities in 

the areas invaded and occupied by Japan during the Asia-Pacific War. 

Records of the Office of the Navy Judge Advocate General (RG 125)

Several entries within the Navy JAG War Crimes Branch series contain documents 

pertaining to atrocities committed in the Pacific. For example, Case Files of Pacific 

Area War Crimes Trials, 1944–49 includes the trial records of Japanese military and 

naval personnel, as well as the trial records of Pacific Islanders who collaborated with 

them.68 Records Regarding Pacific Area War Crimes Cases, 1944–49 has reports on the 

massacre of ninety-eight civilian employees of Pan American Airways on Wake Island 

accused of maintaining secret radio communication with U.S. naval forces following 

the island’s occupation by Japanese forces, as well as a number of cases involving 

torture and murder (including beheading and cannibalism) of downed U.S. flyers, and 

the executions of Catholic priests and other civilians suspected of spying or engaging 

in other anti-Japanese activity.69 Records Regarding War Crimes Investigations and 

Trials, 1944–49 includes affidavits filed by American POWs who had been beaten 

and tortured; interrogations of Japanese defendants, witnesses, and collaborators; 

death notices of convicted war criminals; and transfer lists of convicted war criminals 

between Guam and Japan.70 

Records of the Office of the Army Judge Advocate General (RG 153)

Army JAG War Crimes Branch records also include a number of entries with information 

on Japanese atrocities. One such entry, Reports on War Crimes in the Philippines, 1945, 

contains a large number of reports filed by Army JAG personnel charged with investigating 

atrocities and other war crimes committed by Imperial Japanese Army and Navy forces 

against civilians during Japan's iron-fisted and often brutal occupation of the Philippine 

Islands, from May 1942 to October 1944.71 The investigation reports describe numerous 

incidents of beating, torture, rape, and murder. 
100 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

General Records of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied 

Powers Operational (RG 331)

SCAP records contain a large number of documents that deal with atrocities committed 

by Japanese forces against civilians and Allied POWs. 

For example, Legal Section, Administrative Division, Area Case Files, 1945–48 has 

hundreds of case files, organized by location, that contain death certificates, affidavits, 

investigation and interrogation reports, and photographs.72 These documents pertain to 

various war crimes committed against Allied military personnel and civilians in Japan 

and elsewhere. The war crimes mentioned include cannibalism, beheadings of downed 

airmen, bayoneting of wounded soldiers, massacres of villagers suspected of spying, 

intentional bombardment of field hospitals, and torture of captured seamen aboard 

Japanese vessels. 

The entry Legal Section, Investigation Division, Investigation Reports contains hundreds 

of reports produced by U.S. war crimes investigators during the immediate postwar 

period.73 The reports, many of which concern atrocities, are often voluminous and 

include very detailed testimonies from victims and witnesses, as well as interrogations of 

suspected war criminals.

The Manila Branch files contain numerous documents about atrocities committed 

against Allied POWs and civilians in the Philippine Islands.74 Documents in this collection 

include the trial transcripts and exhibits of famous defendants as well as the records of 

less well-known individuals. One famous defendant was Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki, 

the so-called "Tiger of Malaya," who was found guilty and hanged in early 1946 for 

atrocities committed by soldiers under his command in the Philippines. Testimonies 

from war crimes suspects, statements and affidavits filed by victims and witnesses, files 

for individual Japanese POWs, investigation and interrogation reports, and photographs 

of victims and suspected war criminals comprise the remainder of the series. 

Record of Trial File, 1945–49 has trial records of hundreds of accused Class B and 

C war criminals tried by military commissions for torture, murder, and mistreatment 

of civilians and POWs in Japan and Japanese-occupied areas.75 The records contain 

testimonies, affidavits, exhibits, legal reviews, personal data of the accused, synopses of 

charges, findings, appeals, and clemency petitions. 

The International Prosecution Section (IPS) contains documents produced by the 

SCAP section responsible for prosecuting Japanese leaders accused of Class A war crimes 

before the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. A few entries include documents pertaining to 

atrocities. 

Numerical Case Files is the IPS Investigative Division record of its investigation of 

Gen. Matsui Iwane, the commanding officer of the Japanese expeditionary force judged 
Research Starting Points I 101

responsible for the “Rape of Nanking.” The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal found Matsui 

guilty, and he was hanged in late 1948.76 

Rules, Procedures, and Background Investigations on War Crimes and Atrocities 

Committed Against Chinese Laborers, ca. 1947 contains a number of documents on the 

mistreatment of Chinese slave laborers forcibly shipped to Japan during the latter part 

of World War II to work in mines and ports.77 Lists of Chinese laborers in work camps, 

statements by former laborers, interrogations of Japanese overseers, investigation reports, 

death reports and monthly listings of deceased laborers, and photographs of labor camps 

make this a useful source. 

U.S. Forces in the China-Burma-India Theaters of Operations (RG 493)

This record group has some references to atrocities and other war crimes committed 

by Japanese forces in China and Southeast Asia. For example, Records Relating to War 

Crimes, 1945–48 has a number of documents about atrocities against Allied POWs, 

such as OSS intelligence reports, Army JAG investigation reports from the early postwar 

period, and copies of secret diaries kept by Allied POWs that vividly describe brutal 

beatings, torture, and murder.78 There are also several reports regarding the unlawful 

execution of downed U.S. airmen (some of whom were allegedly cannibalized) and the 

murder of U.S. seamen. This entry also has miscellaneous documents about the Rape of 

Hong Kong, which occurred in the wake of the Japanese conquest of the colony in late 

December 1941, including testimonies given by people who had witnessed the rape and 

murder of civilians. 

Case Study: Difficulties in Amassing Credible Evidence of War 

Crimes

Between August 1944 and March 1945, on Chichi-Jima, the largest of the Bonin Islands, 

Japanese forces executed eight downed U.S. airmen. In four of these instances, the 

prisoners were cannibalized after their executions.79

The investigation into the Japanese treatment of Allied POWs on Chichi-Jima began 

on December 21, 1945, under the authority of Col. P.M. Rixey. In eight months, Rixey’s 

board of investigators interviewed over 120 witnesses and produced nearly a thousand 

pages of testimony. Many of the people they interviewed claimed to know nothing at all 

of atrocities, or to know about them only through hearsay.80

Later, investigators discovered why they had little firsthand testimony. One witness, 

Maj. Horie Yoshitaka, gave Col. Rixey a statement concerning the four cannibalized airmen’s 

deaths, claiming they were killed in U.S. air raids. Later, he admitted that his statement was 

false, explaining that “a few days after the end of the war, an order was put out by [Lt.] Gen. 
102 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

[Yoshio] Tachibana ... that all records [were to] be destroyed about American flyers, and 

no one was to say anything to the Americans about the flyers that were up here.”81 Horie 

acknowledged that the idea to give false reports about the airmen’s deaths was his own 

and that evidence had to be hidden from investigators in order to make the false reports 

convincing. Horie claimed that he was motivated by bushido, the warrior code of honor, 

but he also believed that, as Tachibana’s chief of staff, he would share responsibility for the 

crimes on Chichi-Jima. His false testimony was meant to protect his own life. 

According to Horie, he had asked Maj. Matoba Sueo to help fabricate a plausible 

story and to instruct the 308th Battalion to provide supporting testimony for such a 

story.82 Horie’s account was later confirmed by 1st Lt. Enomoto Bunji, platoon leader 

of the 308th Battalion. Enomoto explained that Matoba chose the men to play the role 

of the guards for the POWs supposedly killed during the U.S. air raid. Enomoto said, 

“Major Matoba ... had everything mapped out to the smallest detail, right down to how 

the men were laid out near the area when the bombing happened and all the rest.” Bunji 

confirmed that, in fact, no POWs were killed during the U.S. air raid.83

Matoba himself failed to stick to the story he had concocted to conceal the Japanese 

executions of the U.S. airmen. Matoba admitted, almost immediately, that POWs on 

Chichi-Jima were executed. However, the investigation board was not interested merely 

in whether the Japanese had executed POWs on the island, but whether the remains of 

the flyers had then been cannibalized. According to accounts of cannibalism on ChichiJima already in the board’s possession, Matoba was a central figure in these atrocities. 

But Matoba retorted that such stories were false and resulted from jealousies among the 

battalions and attempts to blame him for crimes committed by others on Chichi-Jima. 

The board believed he was lying.84 

During Matoba’s second interview with the board, he again willingly provided details 

of the airmen’s capture and execution on Chichi-Jima, and this time he admitted that the 

bodies were cannibalized. Matoba estimated that Japanese forces executed between eight 

and ten POWs on Chichi-Jima, and confessed that on three of these occasions he had 

participated in the cannibalization of the bodies. Asked whether he considered himself 

a cannibal, Matoba replied, “Yes, I was a madman due to the war and that is the only 

reason I can give for being a cannibal.”85 Despite the false testimony prearranged by the 

Japanese military leaders on Chichi-Jima, Col. Rixey’s investigation board was able to 

draw fairly accurate conclusions about Japanese atrocities on the island. 

In early August 1946, Lt. Gen. Tachibana Yoshio and thirteen other Japanese military 

personnel were tried on Guam for the unlawful executions of the eight downed U.S. airmen 

on Chichi-Jima.86 Navy JAG prosecutors brought three charges: murder, violation of the 

laws of war, and neglect of duty in violation of the laws and customs of war. There were 
Research Starting Points I 103

thirty-eight specifications under the charges, one of which was “prevention of honorable 

burial.” Charges of cannibalism had to be brought under this specification, since military 

and international law at the time lacked provisions to punish cannibalism. 

The court found thirteen of the fourteen defendants guilty of the charges brought 

against them. Tachibana and two officers received death sentences. The remaining ten 

defendants received prison sentences, ranging from five years to life. 

Investigation of the atrocities committed on Chichi-Jima did not end with the trial 

of Gen. Tachibana and his accomplices because some of the perpetrators were yet to be 

apprehended. One was Teraki Tadashi, a medical officer who reportedly removed the 

flesh and organs from three cannibalized bodies. A request for his arrest was initially 

issued on January 23, 1946. However, on March 27 of that year, Teraki left a suicide 

note intended for his wife. The Japanese government was unable to discover any clue 

as to his whereabouts until early August 1948, when they learned that his wife had sent 

some of his personal effects to a “Maeda Tadashi” in Tokyo. Police found Teraki at this 

address running a small dispensary, and they arrested him on August 7, 1948.87

Teraki’s trial began on March 4, 1949. SCAP charged him with violation of the law 

and customs of war. Four of the specifications were for mutilating the bodies of executed 

POWs by removing their livers and portions of their flesh, which were then cooked and 

eaten by other Japanese military personnel on the island. The fifth specification accused 

him of beheading a POW. The court found Teraki guilty of the first four specifications 

and not guilty of the fifth. On March 17, 1949, Teraki was sentenced to four years in 

prison.88 Like many of the Chichi-Jima personnel convicted of war crimes, Teraki was 

paroled and left Sugamo Prison on January 25, 1951, having served approximately twothirds of his sentence.89 

Conclusion

In this chapter we have provided researchers with an introduction to records held at 

NARA in College Park, Maryland, that deal with three areas of Japanese war criminality 

during World War II: mistreatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees, Japanese 

development and use of chemical and biological weapons, and atrocities committed by 

Imperial Japanese forces against Allied personnel and civilians. In doing so, we made 

no attempt to provide researchers with a comprehensive guide to all of the records at 

NARA regarding Japanese war crimes; instead, it was our intention to provide those 

interested in the topic with starting points by focusing on specific instances of criminal 

behavior and illustrating how specific records can be used. Our emphasis in some cases 

has been on those files in record groups that have been declassified for years but have 

been underexploited by researchers. These cases can be a useful place to start.
104 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Notes

1. NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 1357, SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54, boxes 65–

199 (location: 250/49/21/5–250/49/24/3). 

2. NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 1352, SWPD Inspection Reports on War Relocation 

Centers, 1942–46, boxes 19–21 (location: 250/49/20/5–250/49/20/6).

3. See NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 205-E, Central Decimal File, 1940–44, boxes 

1–5930, 711.94114 (location: 250/30/20/6–250/34/23/4); and ibid., entry 205-H, Central 

Decimal File, 1945–49, boxes 1–7446, 794.00114, and 794.4114 (location: 250/34/24/1–

250/38/28/1). 

4. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 2, Case Files of Pacific Area War Crimes Trials, 1944–49, 

boxes 1–20 (location: 370/21/29/1–370/21/29/3). 

5. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 8, Records Relating to Prisoners of War, 1944–49, boxes 1–3 

(location: 290/C/69/2).

6. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 137, War Crimes Branch, Reports of Interviews with 

American Servicemen Who Were Prisoners of War, 1943–47, boxes 1–180 (location: 

270/1/8/4–270/1/12/1).

7. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 144, War Crimes Branch, Persons and Places Case File 

(Dossier File), boxes 1–140 (location: 270/2/9/4–270/2/12/3).

8. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 116, Records of the Director, boxes 1–7 (location: 190/7/11/1–

190/7/11/2).

9. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 16, Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Intelligence 

Reports (“Regular” Series), 1941–45, boxes 1–1685 (location: 190/3/11/4–190/4/10/6).

10. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 19-A, Records of the Research and Analysis Branch, Formerly 

Security-Classified Intelligence Reports ("XL" Series), 1941–46, boxes 1–7 (location: 

190/4/12/6–190/4/22/5). 

11. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1189, Records of the Administrative Division, Area Case Files, 

boxes 919–960A (location: 290/11/9/3–290/11/12/7).

12. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1330, Records of the Investigation Division, Investigation 

Reports, 1945–49, boxes 1732–1752 (location: 290/12/24/1–290/12/25/2).

13. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Records of the Judge Advocate, Records of the War 

Crimes Division, Record of Trial File, 1945–49, boxes 9494–9893 (location: 290/23/6/2–

290/23/25/2).

14. NA, RG 389, OPMG, entry 460-A, American POW Information Bureau Records Branch, 

General Subject File, 1942–46, boxes 2069–2281 (location: 290/34/17/3–290/34/22/4).

15. See NA, RG 407, TAGO, entry 360-A, Records Maintained by the Communications 

Branch, boxes 1–3850 (location: 270/39/2/4–270/41/11/12); and ibid., entry 371, Records 

of the Administrative Services Division, boxes 1–4 (location: 270/48/14/4–270/48/14/5). 
Research Starting Points I 105

Most documents pertaining to Americans held captive by the Japanese are filed under the 

decimals 000.5 (War Crimes and Criminals) and 383.6 (Prisoners of War).

16. NA, RG 407, TAGO, Philippine Archives Collection, POWs/Civilian Internees, entry 1063, 

POW General Correspondence Files, 1941–45, boxes 37–52 (location: 270/49/24/03–

270/49/24/06); ibid., entry 1067, Diaries and Historical Narratives, 1940–45, boxes 123–

145 (location: 270/49/26/04–270/49/27/02); ibid., entry 1069, Sunken POW Transport 

Files, 1942, 1944–48, boxes 146–148 (location: 270/49/27/02); ibid., entry 1070, Records 

of Atrocities Against POWs, 1942–45, boxes 148–49 (location: 270/49/27/02); ibid., entry 

1073, POW Recovery Team Reports, 1944–45, boxes 191–95 (location: 270/49/28/02–

270/49/28/03); and ibid., entry 1075, General Correspondence Files Pertaining to Civilian 

Internees, 1943–45, boxes 196–200 (location: 270/49/28/03–270/49/28/04). 

17. Among the prisoners was British Lt. Gen. Sir Arthur E. Percival, commander of the disastrous 

defense of Singapore.

18. NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 1357, SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54, box 89, 

folders: “Mukden [19]43–44” and “Mukden [19]45” (location: 250/49/22/1).

19. Both of their reports are in RG 59, Department of State, entry 1357, SWPD Subject Files, 

1939–54, box 89. This box also holds an untranslated report (written in French) filed by 

ICRC delegate Marcel Junod in August 1945. A copy of the diary kept by British Maj. 

Robert Peaty (one of the Allied officers interviewed by Pestalozzi), which can provide some 

insights regarding day-to-day life at Camp Hoten, can be found in NA, RG 153, Army 

JAG, entry 180, War Crimes Branch, China War Crimes File, 1945–48, box 2, folder: 

Master Index VI-N: Major Peaty, Diary Whilst a P.O.W. at Mukden, Manchuria (location: 

270/2/23/7). 

20. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 90, Records of the Washington Radio and Cables and Field Photo 

Branch, box 3, folder 30 (location: 190/5/24/4). 

21. NA, RG 59, Department of State, entry 1357, SWPD Subject Files, 1939–54, box 90, 

folder: “Manchuria” (location: 250/49/22/1). 

22. Ibid.

23. NA, RG 407, TAGO, entry 360-A, Army-AG Classified Decimal File, 1943–45, box 2437 

(location: 270/40/17/3).

24. Ibid. 

25. NA, RG 407, TAGO, entry 427, World War II Operations Reports, 1940–48, Pacific 

Theater 98-USF1 U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, box 1598 (location: 270/51/27/5).

26. Ibid.

27. For Miki’s trial, see NA, RG 331, entry 1321, USA versus Japanese War Criminals Case File, 

1945–49, box 1662 (location: 290/12/18/06). For Noda’s trial, see NA, RG 331, SCAP, 

entry 1865, Records of the Judge Advocate, Records of the War Crimes Division, Record of 
106 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Trial File, 1945–49, box 9640 (location: 290/27/13/01). 

28. Noda was conscripted into the Imperial Japanese Army after his parents sent him to school 

in Japan.

29. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1189, Legal Section, Administrative Division, Area Case Files, 

box 938 (location: 290/11/10/3).

30. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Judge Advocate Section, War Crimes Division, Record of 

Trial, 1945–49, box 9696, folder: “Eiichi Noda–Case #235” (location: 290/23/15/6).

31. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Judge Advocate Section, War Crimes Division, Record of 

Trial, 1945–49, box 9580, folder: “U.S. vs. Eiichi Noda” (location: 290/23/10/2).

32. NA, RG 112, Office of the Army Surgeon General, entry 295-A, Biological Warfare 

Specialized Files, 1941–47, boxes 1–13 (location: 390/18/24/1–390/18/24/3).

33. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 145, General Records (Set-up Files), 1944–49, boxes 1–241 

(location: 270/2/12/3–270/2/17/3).

34. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 488, New 

Developments Division, Security-Classified Correspondence File of Dr. G.W. Merck, 

Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, 1942–46, boxes 180–188 (location: 390/40/1/5–

390/40/1/6).

35. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 487, SecurityClassified Office File of Gen. W.A. Borden, Director of New Developments Division, boxes 

151–169 (location: 390/40/1/1–390/40/1/3).

36. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 468, Civil 

Affairs Division, Security-Classified Papers of the Army Member of the Combined Civil 

Affairs Committee (CCAC), 1942–June 1949, boxes 548–638 (location: 390/39/12/5–

390/39/14/4).

37. NA, RG 175, Records of the Chemical Warfare Service, General Administrative Files, 1945–

54, (WNRC Accession #67A4900), boxes 1–591 (location: 290/3/17/6–290/3/23/5). 

38. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 134-B, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 

(Intelligence) Army Intelligence and Security Command; Records of the Investigative 

Records Repository; Security Classified Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers; Personal 

Name File, boxes 1–694 (location: 270/84/1/1–270/84/19/5).

39. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 82, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Intelligence 

Administrative Division Publications (“P” files), boxes 1–3816 (location: 270/7/34/6–

270/10/7/5). 

40. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85-A, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), 

Intelligence Administrative Division, Intelligence Document ("ID") File, boxes 1–10, 140 

(location: 270/10/33/1–270/15/1/4).

41. These documents can be found in NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1294, Legal Section, 
Research Starting Points I 107

Law Division, Miscellaneous Classified File, 1945–52, boxes 1434–1435 (location: 

290/12/4/6).

42. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1901, Legal Section, Administrative Division, Administrative 

Correspondence, 1945 to June 13, 1952 (Formerly Top Secret Files), box 1 (location: 

290/24/2/3).

43. The most thorough English-language scholarly work on the subject is Sheldon Harris, 

Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–45, and the American Cover-up (New 

York: Routledge, 1994).

44. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 134-B, Records of the Office of the Assistant 

Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), Records of the Investigative Records Repository, Security 

Classified Intelligence and Investigative Dossiers, 1939–76, Personal Name Files, box 549, 

file 441: Shiro, Ishii (location: 270/84/16/4).

45. See Linda Goetz Holmes, Unjust Enrichment: How Japan’s Companies Built Postwar Fortunes 

Using American POWs (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001). Holmes has also begun 

work on the Japanese circumvention of U.S. and ICRC wartime efforts to help prisoners. 

46. “Select Japanese War Crimes Documents,” a list of NARA documents primarily related to 

biological warfare, was compiled by William Cunliffe and is found on the CD accompanying 

this book.

47. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 210, OSS Classified Sources and Methods Files, box 340, folder 

4: “Far East Report Edgar Mowrer 1941” (location: 250/64/28/3). 

48. NA, RG 112, Office of the Army Surgeon General, entry 295A, Records of the Preventative 

Medicine Division: Biological Warfare Specialized Files, 1941–47, box 9, file: “Current 

Intelligence, Gen.” (location: 390/18/24/2).

49. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 210, OSS Classified Sources and Methods Files, box 179, folder: 

“Chihchiang” (location: 250/64/24/6).

50. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1129, Assistant to the Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), Intelligence 

Division, Library Section, subject file, 1945–50, box 242 (location: 290/10/6/7). 

51. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85, Intelligence Document (“ID”) File, 

box 7264, ID #919284, Targets BW: Japan (location: 270/13/31/5). This invaluable file 

contains interrogations of Japanese POWs and other efforts to learn more about the Empire’s 

biological and chemical warfare programs. 

52. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 489, 

Security-Classified Correspondence of a Special Committee on Secret Weapons, 1943–45, 

box 176, files 86 and 86-1 (location: 390/40/1/4).

53. NA, RG 112, Office of the Army Surgeon General, entry 295A, Records of the Preventative 

Medicine Division: Biological Warfare Specialized Files, 1941–47, box 11, file 55: “Plague 

Incident in China” (location: 390/18/24/2).
108 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

54. NA, RG 226, OSS, entry 134, Washington Registry Office Radio and Cable Files, box 42, 

file “M/8 Japan” (location: 190/7/28/5). 

55. Ibid. 

56. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 488, New 

Developments Division, Security-Classified Correspondence, File of Dr. G.W. Merck, 

Special Consultant to the Secretary of War, 1942–46, box 181, file “Final Board Report” 

(location: 390/40/1/5).

57. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 82, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Intelligence 

Administrative Division, Document Library Branch, Publications (“P”) Files, 1946–51, 

box 2097, file “Japanese Biological Warfare Activities, Army Service Forces” (location: 

270/9/7/4). 

58. NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 82, Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2); Intelligence 

Administrative Division; Document Library Branch; Publications (“P”) Files, 1946–51, box 

2098, file “Japanese Chemical Warfare Policies and Intentions” (location: 270/9/7/5).

59. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1294, Legal Section, Law Division, Miscellaneous Classified File, 

1945–52, box 1434, folder 18: "Case 330" (location: 290/12/4/6).

60. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1294, Legal Section, Law Division, Miscellaneous Classified File, 

1945–52, box 1434, folder 18: "Case 330" (location: 290/12/4/6).

61. Ibid.

62. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1294, Legal Section; Law Division, Miscellaneous Classified File, 

1945–52, box 1434, folder 13 (location: 290/12/4/6).

63. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 145, War Crimes Branch, General Records (Set-up Files), 

1944–49, box 73, folders 107-0 (location: 270/2/13/7). These folders contain a great deal of 

correspondence and memoranda generated throughout 1947 by various interested agencies, 

especially SWNCC subcommittees in which the debate over immunity played out. The 

policy memoranda and meeting protocols in which these decisions were made, including the 

final SWNCC decision recommending that Ishii not be tried, can be found in this file.

64. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 468, Security 

Classified Papers of the Army Member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCAC), 

Jan. 1942–June 1949, box 628, file “SANACC 351/3” (location: 390/39/14/3).

65. Ibid. 

66. NA, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Central Decimal Files, 

1943–53, Confidential through Top Secret Subject Correspondence File, entry 199, box 

103, folder CD 23-1-4 (3 of 7) (location: 190/25/17/7).

67. “Summary Report of B.W. Investigations,” 12 Dec. 1947, p. 4, NA, RG 175, Records of 

the Chemical Warfare Services, WNRC Accession #67A4900, General Administrative Files, 

1945–54, Confidential, box 217, folder: “Decimal 385, July–December 1954 Biological 
Research Starting Points I 109

Warfare Investigations Summary report” (location: 290/3/19/3). 

68. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 2, Case Files of Pacific Area War Crimes Trials, 1944–49, 

boxes 1–20 (location: 370/21/29/1–370/21/29/3).

69. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 3, Records Regarding Pacific Area War Crimes Cases, 1944–

49, boxes 1–3 (location: 290/C/68/4).

70. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 21, Records Originated by Liaison Officer for War Crimes, 

Naval Forces Marianas; Records Regarding War Crimes Investigations and Trials, 1944–49, 

boxes 1–8 (location: 290/C/69/6–290/C/69/7).

71. NA, RG 153, Army JAG, entry 176, War Crimes Branch, Reports on War Crimes in the 

Philippines, 1945, boxes 1–2 (location: 270/2/23/6).

72. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1189, Legal Section, Administrative Division, Area Case Files, 

1945–48, boxes 919–960A (location: 290/11/9/3–290/11/12/7).

73. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1330, Legal Section, Investigation Division, Investigation 

Reports, boxes 1732–1757 (location: 290/12/24/1–290/12/25/2).

74. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entries 1336–1364, Legal Section, Investigation Division, Manila 

Branch, boxes 1853–2029 (location: 290/12/31/4–290/13/4/7).

75. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1865, Judge Advocate Section, War Crimes Division, Record of 

Trial File, 1945–49, boxes 9494–9893 (location: 290/23/6/2–290/23/25/2).

76. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 319, Numerical Case Files, boxes 1–64 (location: 290/9/7/4–

290/9/8/6).

77. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 292, Rules, Procedures, and Background Investigations on War 

Crimes and Atrocities Committed Against Chinese Laborers, ca. 1947, boxes 1–18 (location: 

290/9/3/7–290/9/4/2).

78. NA, RG 493, U.S. Forces in the China-Burma-India Theaters of Operations, Records of 

the Judge Advocate General, entry 117, Records Relating to War Crimes, 1945–48, boxes 

679–685 (location: 290/41/18/5).

79. Records held by the National Archives relating to Japanese atrocities against Allied POWs 

on Chichi-Jima are found primarily in two record groups: RG 125, Navy JAG, and RG 331, 

SCAP.

80. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 23C, War Crimes Branch, Correspondence, Records 

Originated by the Director of War Crimes, Pacific Fleet, box 10, folder A17–25: “ChichiJima, Proceedings of the Board of Investigation re: Deaths of Allied Prisoners in Japanese 

Custody, 1946” (3 vols.) (location: 370/21/29/4), Colonel P.M. Rixey to Major Robert D. 

Shaffer, December 21, 1945, vol. I.

81. Ibid., Testimony of Major Yoshitaka Horie, Ninth Day, 7 Jan. 1946, vol. I, 140.

82. Ibid., Testimony of Major Yoshitaka Horie, Ninth Day, 7 Jan. 1946, vol. I, 140A. 

83. Ibid., Testimony of First Lieutenant Enomoto Bunji, Eighteenth Day, 7 Jan. 1946, vol. I, 346–47. 
110 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

84. Ibid., Testimony of Major Sueo Matoba, Fifteenth Day, 14 Jan. 1946, vol. I, 286–91; 

Testimony of Major Sueo Matoba, Thirty-Ninth Day, 6 March 1946, vol. II, 676. 

85. Ibid., Testimony of Sueo Matoba, Thirty-Ninth and Fortieth Day, 6 March and 8 March 

1946, vol. II, 694.

86. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1321, Legal Section, Prosecution Division, USA versus Japanese 

War Criminals Case File, 1945–49, box 1654, folders: “Yoshio Tachibana, et al., vol. I (Record 

of Proceedings), 1945–49” and “Yoshio Tachibana, et al., vol. II (Record of Proceedings), 

1945–49” (location 290/12/18/5).

87. NA, RG 125, Navy JAG, entry 21, War Crimes Branch, Records Originated by Liaison Officer 

for War Crimes, Naval Forces Mariana; Records Relating to War Crimes Investigations and 

Trials, 1944–49, box 7, folder 402: “Teraki, Tadashi, June 1946–Mar. 1949” (location: 290/

C/69/7). A more detailed account of the search for Teraki can be found in NA, RG 331, 

SCAP, entry 1221, Legal Section, Administrative Division, POW 201 File, 1945–52, box 

1209, folder: “Teraki, Tadashi”; Chief, Investigative Division, Gumma-Ken Headquarters 

to Chief, Investigative Division, National Police Headquarters, 7 August 1948 (location: 

290/11/26/05).

88. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1321, Legal Section, Prosecution Division, USA versus Japanese 

War Criminals Case File, 1945–49, box 1658, folders: "Case of Teraki, Tadashi, vol. I and 

Case of Teraki, Tadashi, vol. II" (location: 290/12/18/6). 

89. NA, RG 331, SCAP, entry 1221, Legal Section, Administrative Division, POW 201 File, 

1945–52, box 1209, folder: Teraki, Tadashi. Information on other war criminals involved 

in Chichi-Jima atrocities recommended for or obtaining their parole, including Hayashi 

Minoru, Isogai Gunji, Kido Matsutaro, Masutani Shinichi, Matsushita Kanehisa, Mori 

Yasumasa, and Sasaki Mitsuyoshi, can be found in RG 331, SCAP, entry 1221, Legal 

Section, Administrative Division, POW 201 File, 1945–52, boxes 1164, 1170, 1176, 1182, 

1183, 1186, and 1199 (location: 290/11/24/1–11/27/1). 
5

Wartime COMINT Records in the National Archives about 

Japanese War Crimes in the Asia and Pacific Theaters, 

1978–1997 

Robert Hanyok

Of the 100,000 pages of U.S. government records declassified under the Japanese 

Imperial Government Disclosure Act, about 2,200 are cryptologic records from the 

National Security Agency (NSA). NSA released a relatively small number of records 

under the act because the overwhelming majority of wartime cryptologic records have 

been available to the public for several years. In a series of releases from 1978 through 

1997, the NSA released to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 

more than 2 million pages of cryptologic records from World War II, the majority of 

them relating to Japan. The U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) created most of 

these records. In 1998, the Naval Security Group, the cryptologic element of the United 

States Navy, transferred to NARA over a million pages of records created by its wartime 

predecessor, OP-20-G. The NSG had held these records in its own records storage area 

for several decades before sending them to NARA. Like the material transferred by NSA, 

a large portion of the records dealt with the war against Japan. 

The NSA and Naval Security Group records consist of translations, finished reports, 

technical studies, and administrative papers. Translations of intercepted messages of 

Japanese diplomatic, military, naval, and commercial entities constitute a contemporary, 

first-person record of Japanese plans and actions during the war in Asia and the Pacific. 

Other significant records include the translations of diplomatic messages of countries that 

corresponded with Japan during the war: Switzerland, Vichy France, Thailand, Portugal, 

Spain, and the Axis countries. 

Besides providing information about war crimes, these translations offer a range of 

information about the planning and execution of Japanese military and naval campaigns; 

Allied plans and actions; diplomatic relations; political, economic, and cultural policies 

in occupied territories; relations with Asian nationalist movements in India, Indochina, 

Burma, and the Dutch East Indies; commercial ventures throughout the Greater East 
112 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; and other matters. 

Despite the public availability of these translations, most scholars and researchers 

of the war against Japan have made very limited use of them.1 A major impediment to 

using the translations has been a lack of indices to aid research. With various collections 

holding anywhere from 3,500–300,000 individual translations, researching these 

collections has meant reviewing each page—not a feasible option for researchers limited 

by time or finances. 

This chapter will introduce these sets of translations and related reports, bulletins, 

and summaries by addressing three issues: (1) how the translations and other reports 

were created by the cryptologic agencies during the war and eventually came to reside at 

NARA, (2) how these records are organized, and (3) what information about Japanese 

war crimes and atrocities they contain. 

How the Translations and Other Records Were Created

During World War II, the Allied communications intelligence (COMINT) system 

employed several thousands of men and women to intercept communications, decrypt 

and translate them, and disseminate the resulting intelligence to Allied political, 

diplomatic, military, and intelligence officials. 

Allied cryptologic organizations underwent tremendous expansion during the 

war, resulting in a cooperative venture among the United States, Great Britain and its 

Commonwealth partners, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. 

Before December 7, 1941, the Allied COMINT capability against Japan was very 

limited. A handful of intercept stations across the Pacific region and small analytic 

centers in Hawaii, Singapore, London, and Washington employed 300–400 people. 

The rapid conquest of East Asia and the Pacific by Japan’s army and navy after 

December 7 forced the Allies to abandon many of these stations for more secure sites 

in Australia, India, Ceylon, and Kenya. Slowly, they rebuilt a cryptologic structure, 

constructing large intercept and processing facilities in New Delhi to support the 

India-Burma front; in Brisbane, Australia, for the Southwest Pacific; and in Hawaii for 

the Central Pacific. Concurrently, the U.S. military built a constellation of intercept 

and direction-finding stations in the western United States and the newly conquered 

islands in the Pacific. 

Much of the capability that emerged later in the war was due to the cooperative 

nature of the Allied COMINT effort. Contingents from the United States and 

Commonwealth countries operated two of the three major processing centers, Brisbane 

and New Delhi. These sites exchanged all intelligence that they produced. This virtually 

complete cooperative venture in communications intelligence, unparalleled in military 
Wartime COMINT Records I 113

history, broadened the scope and effectiveness of the Allied COMINT contribution to 

the defeat of Japan. 

Besides targeting Japanese military communications, Allied COMINT personnel 

targeted the diplomatic and commercial communications of Japan and other countries 

with interests in the region: Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Nationalist China, France, and 

the collaborationist regimes of Burma, the Philippines, and Nanjing, China. These 

communications provided valuable intelligence on internal social and economic 

conditions, Tokyo’s policy towards occupied territories, treatment of POWs and civilian 

internees, and atrocities committed by Japan. 

Despite COMINT’s many successes, the Allies were never able to break all of Japan’s 

codes. Several of Tokyo’s codes and ciphers resisted exploitation throughout the war, 

some took years to break into, and others were readable for only a limited time. The 

ongoing struggle between the Allied codebreakers and Tokyo’s cryptographers was a 

dynamic contest with wins and losses on both sides. The Allies did not win every battle, 

but ultimately they won the codebreaking war.

The Communications Intelligence Process

The COMINT process had four steps: setting priorities, collecting communications, 

processing intercepts, and disseminating the resulting intelligence.2 

Step One: Setting Priorities

By March 1942, Japanese military and naval forces had won a string of victories, driving 

U.S. and Commonwealth forces back into India, Australia, the South Pacific, the Hawaiian 

Islands, and the West Coast of the United States. At the same time, organizationally and 

structurally, COMINT was in flux. The United States and Britain were scrambling to 

establish new bases in India, Australia, and other places, replacing the ones lost in Manila 

and Singapore. In this demanding situation, Allied COMINT lacked the personnel, 

facilities, technology, experience, and technical knowledge to intercept and analyze the 

estimated 2–3 million Japanese Army messages sent that year on the airwaves throughout 

the operational theaters.3 Against this formidable output, the Allies at first could muster 

only a few hundred intercept operators to staff several score monitoring positions. 

This disparity meant that COMINT had to establish a system of priorities that met 

current Allied military and political requirements. In 1942–43, major combat occurred 

only on the periphery of the territory recently conquered by Japan, so Allied COMINT 

concentrated its efforts against Japanese military and naval communications in these areas. 

Regions deeper within the Japanese Empire, such as China, Korea, French Indochina, 

the Dutch East Indies, Formosa, Malaya, and the Japanese home islands received far less 
114 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

attention until much later in the war. Allied COMINT rarely covered the Philippines—

an area of intense interest for Gen. MacArthur—until mid-1944, when planning for the 

recovery of those islands already was underway. 

Unlike the European Theater of Operations, where the British were the principal 

COMINT authority and the Americans played a secondary role, in the Pacific the 

Americans commanded the principal analytic centers in Hawaii and Australia. In the 

Burma-India Theater (later renamed the Southeast Asia Command, or SEAC), the 

Commonwealth took the lead and supervised Allied COMINT from its major site, the 

Wireless Experimental Center near New Delhi, India. 

As the war shifted against Japan, intelligence priorities changed. An increased ability 

to exploit Japanese messages meant that the Allies could target many more radio nets 

in Japan and its occupied territories. By mid-1944, Allies had expanded their ability 

to extract more usable intelligence from the intercepts. With radio traffic from within 

regional command areas now accessible, even areas outside immediate Allied military 

interest such as the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, Thailand, British Malaya, 

the Celebes, Borneo, and elsewhere became productive intelligence targets. By the 

end of 1944, with the beginning of the invasion of Luzon, Japanese communications 

from Manila and Singapore topped the priority lists for U.S. Army monitors. But there 

was little intercept from areas of secondary military importance to the American and 

Commonwealth forces—China, Manchuria, Korea, and the Dutch East Indies.4

Step Two: Intercepting Japanese Messages 

Three factors defined the ultimate success of the collection of radio traffic: geography, 

operational priorities, and the development and expansion of the collection system. 

Geography greatly affected the structure and operations of Allied collection. First, 

the absolute distances across the various theaters in Asia and the Pacific were daunting: 

more than 8,700 miles separated Singapore from San Francisco. The war against Japan 

spanned eleven time zones. The high-frequency communications of the era traveled 

quickly over water, but many radio terminals were located in tropical locations that 

attenuated signals propagation. In addition, the vast landmass of Asia, its mountain 

ranges and jungles, severely hampered radio reception. Only in the last year of the war 

did the Allies have enough stations and personnel to cover the important Japanese radio 

terminals in the major regions of the remaining Japanese Empire. In the last two months 

of the war, the Allies intercepted close to 400,000 Japanese messages.5

The intercept effort was anchored in a string of large monitoring stations located 

in India, Ceylon, Australia, China, Hawaii, and the western United States. Smaller 

sites sprung up as the Allies advanced across Asia and the Pacific islands. Mobile 
Wartime COMINT Records I 115

intercept units—ship-based, airborne, and motorized—intercepted tactical Japanese 

communications in combat zones in places such as the Philippines and Okinawa. 

Eventually, the Allies had over three dozen intercept and direction-finding stations 

targeting Japanese communications. 

Another factor in the effectiveness of Allied intercept was their ability to greatly 

expand the corps of personnel who did the actual monitoring. By the last year of the 

war, the Allied intercept effort against Japan had expanded to twenty-four hour coverage 

of important terminals such as Tokyo, Manila, and Saigon.6 In the last three months of 

the war, the entire complex of Allied monitoring stations was being redirected to cover 

communications emanating from the remaining Japanese Empire. Much of the Allies’ 

information on war crimes, atrocities, and economic exploitation came as a result of this 

increased intercept capacity. 

Step Three: Processing the Intercept

At the beginning of the war, most intercept was sent to the processing centers in 

Washington by courier, mail, or by Pan-American Clipper across the Pacific. On 

December 6, 1941, Army sites on the U.S. west coast were finally able to send their 

intercept by secure teleprinter to SIS headquarters. Slowly, this capability, along with 

secure radio, expanded to America and British Commonwealth countries. By mid-1943, 

the majority of intercepted traffic reached processing centers by encrypted radio and cable, 

and by the end of the war, almost every major intercept site and theater processing center 

was connected with the major processing headquarters in Washington and London. By 

war’s end, intercepted messages reached a codebreaker’s hands in a day, a journey that had 

once taken weeks. 

Once intercepts reached the processing centers, analysts reviewed them and extracted 

information such as the recipient, priority, and type of cryptographic system used. 

Next, cryptanalysts attacked the ciphers and codes. It was a slow process, and success 

often relied on the capture of enemy codebooks and other cryptographic materials. In 

September 1943, a survey of work against all Japanese cryptographic systems by the SIS 

cryptanalytic B Branch showed that of 25 diplomatic systems, 14 (55 percent) were 

totally solved or readable to some degree. Meanwhile, of 64 Japanese Army systems, only 

9 (14 percent) were readable to any degree, and 2 were in the process of being solved. 

The SIS could not read at all any of the rest of the army systems.7 

Beginning in late 1942, the Allies consistently exploited Japan’s main operational 

naval code, known as JN-25. In the spring of 1943, Allies broke the Japanese Army’s 

Water Transport Code. Merchant ships employed by the Japanese Army for resupply 

and troop transport used this code. Later, the Japanese passed information about human 
116 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

cargo—American POWs—using this code. The Allies were able to read the code for 

about a year before the Japanese changed it. In early 1944, Allies broke the main Japanese 

Army administration code following the capture of a library of army codes. Thereafter, 

codebreakers solved many other cryptographic systems of the Japanese Army and Air 

Force. 

Once cryptanalysts decoded the messages, they passed the texts to linguists to 

translate. Producing a translation was also a slow process. The translation had to be 

written on a work sheet, reworked, checked by senior linguists, approved for release 

by section chiefs, and, finally, typed and reproduced. Sometimes translations could 

be produced within a day or two, but it often took two to three months. It was not 

uncommon for a translation to be produced after the intelligence it contained had 

lost its usefulness. 

Also, the percentage of translated intercepts produced by the Allies was not large. 

Though complete statistics for the entire Allied effort are lacking, some examples from 

various missions suggest that, overall, the completion rate was 8–15 percent. For 

example, a July 1945 OP-20-G report noted that only 10 percent of all intercepted 

Japanese naval messages were processed fully and disseminated.8 In another case, in 

July 1945, Arlington Hall (headquarters for the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Services) 

received over 380,000 intercepted messages, but managed in the same month to produce 

little over 32,000 translations, approximately 8.5 percent.9 Similarly, in 1944, Arlington 

Hall received 576,000 diplomatic intercepts, decrypted about 89,000 (15 percent), and 

translated about 50,000 (8.6 percent).10 

Step Four: Dissemination 

The British and Americans created special staffs to assess the intelligence and securely 

distribute it. The British adapted a system of control using a group of officers known as 

the Special Liaison Unit (SLU). In 1943, the United States created a version of the SLU, 

the Special Security Office (SSO), which first operated in the Pacific commands. Every 

major overseas Allied command acquired these units, which assumed complete control of 

the handling, dissemination, control, and destruction of COMINT. At every command 

headquarters, SLU and SSO personnel hand delivered or briefed the intelligence to the 

commanders and select parts of their staffs, and then destroyed it. 

In Washington, the COMINT was circulated by summary reports and personal 

briefings, primarily the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary, which contained digests of 

translations based largely on diplomatic sources.11 President Franklin D. Roosevelt 

also received personal daily briefings based on selected diplomatic and military 

translations. 
Wartime COMINT Records I 117

How Cryptologic Records Came to the National Archives

It is difficult to reconstruct in much detail how the wartime cryptologic records got from 

the shelves of the National Security Agency to NARA. Various factors affected the way 

the records were handled and accounted for over the last sixty years, including (1) the 

postwar contraction of wartime cryptologic agencies, (2) the numerous organizational 

changes from 1945 through the formation of the NSA in 1952, (3) the methods of 

preserving the records, and (4) the classification of these records. The last factor especially 

influenced their release and format. 

For U.S. signals intelligence agencies, the immediate postwar period was marked by 

drastic reductions in personnel and resources similar to those experienced by the U.S. 

military in general. Staffing was reduced to 20–30 percent of wartime levels, and many 

overseas facilities closed or reduced their operations. 

The end of the war also marked the end of the COMINT missions against the 

former Axis nations, principally Germany and Japan. But in the immediate postwar 

period, there were four exceptions: (1) OP-20-G decrypted and translated Japanese navy 

messages intercepted before Pearl Harbor;12 (2) the SIS decrypted and translated wartime 

German diplomatic and attaché messages exchanged between Berlin and Tokyo for 

information on technology and intelligence on the Soviet Union; (3) the Army processed 

wartime Soviet espionage messages known later as Venona into the early 1980s; and (4) 

the Army and Navy monitored and translated postwar Japanese diplomatic and military 

communications that dealt with disarmament and the repatriation of Japanese military 

personnel and civilian administrators and colonists. On this latter item, the U.S. allowed 

Japan to use its communication networks to facilitate the return of Japanese soldiers, 

but it was not allowed to use ciphers or codes. The Allies monitored these plain text 

communications to verify Japanese compliance with the terms of its surrender. 

After the war, except for a handful of messages used for training (and those mentioned 

above), the rest of the unprocessed Japanese radio messages from the war were destroyed 

by the cryptologic agencies, most likely burned. These agencies had no systematic 

records disposition guide that specified the timelines for records retention or destruction. 

Records that had already been processed, such as translations, reports, and administrative 

files, were retained. Accounting for and protecting those records retained after the war 

was not an easy task. Storage space was at a premium, and it appears that in most cases 

agencies destroyed duplicate paper copies of records such as the translations. 

In 1949, the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) was created as the single U.S. 

cryptologic agency. The Army and Navy transferred some of their personnel and records 

to AFSA. In the late 1940s, AFSA began to microfilm some of the wartime records it had 

received. When the National Security Agency was formed in 1952, it inherited AFSA’s 
118 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

records. NSA continued to microfilm the wartime records, and it retained over a million 

pages of administrative, technical, and operational records, as well. Some paper records 

duplicated the microfilm. 

In the early 1960s, the Naval Security Group (formerly OP-20-G) stored its wartime 

records, which were a blend of paper and microfilm, at Crane, Indiana. Occasionally 

there were efforts by scholars to have them released, but national security restrictions 

prohibited their release. 

This situation changed in the mid-1970s, when new legislation mandated their 

release. Title 32 specified a 30-year mandatory declassification review for all classified 

records, including records from World War II. NSA had to release its wartime records 

or demonstrate why specific series of such records should remain classified in the interest 

of national security. In addition, there was growing public clamor for release of these 

records following the publication of F.W. Winterbotham’s The Ultra Secret.

13 Subsequent 

books and media stories reinforced the public demand for the release of the material. In 

addition, NSA had received a number of Freedom of Information Act requests for the 

wartime records. In the summer of 1977, NSA and NARA held a series of meetings 

regarding the release of the records. NSA offered to release redacted copies of the 

original records. In essence, this created two sets of records: the original set at NSA and 

a redacted copy at NARA. NSA did not indicate when it would declassify and release 

the originals. 

The Defense Department confused the issue when, in 1977, it released The Magic

Background to Pearl Harbor, which contained redacted versions of the Japanese diplomatic 

messages intercepted, decrypted, and translated by U.S. cryptologists in 1941.14 These 

translations were not new to the public; the Joint Congressional Committee Inquiry 

into Pearl Harbor had released many of the same translations in 1946.15 In both cases, 

however, the collections contained only Japanese diplomatic translations related to the 

six-month period leading up to and immediately following Pearl Harbor. 

Beginning in 1978, NSA released the redacted copies of wartime Axis translations, as 

well as other selected records. This release included wartime Japanese military, diplomatic, 

and commercial translations. In addition, it released over three hundred Special Research 

History (SRH) and special wartime topical studies and collections, including a set of 

the MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries. Again, all of these records were redacted copies 

of the original records still held by NSA. Within a few years, NSA released copies the 

translations of intercepted wartime Vichy messages. 

NSA finally released many of the original records to NARA in the 1990s. This 

transfer happened in large part because the wartime records had reached a fifty-year 

declassification review and NSA could no longer justify their continued withholding. 
Wartime COMINT Records I 119

In 1993, NSA turned over the original MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries to the National 

Archives. In 1996, the largest release of unredacted records occurred when NSA shipped 

to NARA the so-called Historical Cryptographic Collection (HCC), numbering some 

1.3 million pages. In 1998, the Naval Security Group turned over to NARA its wartime 

records, totaling 1.5 million pages. 

How the Records Are Organized

There are three major types of NSA records containing intelligence on Japanese war 

crimes and other atrocities: translations, translation summaries, and summary or special 

research reports, such as the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary. Table 1 highlights the 

information that will be discussed in this chapter. 

Translations

The various translation series constitute the largest portion of NSA’s cryptologic records. 

The main value of the translations for researchers is their contemporaneous account of 

the events they reference. The translations are primary sources: they lack the additions, 

omissions, or later perspectives that distort memoirs, histories, or postwar interviews or 

interrogations. 

That much said in their favor, the translations also present researchers with a set 

of technical difficulties that can limit their effective use. First, translations suffer from 

substantial gaps caused by poor, missed, or garbled intercept; incompleteness or errors in 

recovered Japanese codes or ciphers; and difficulties with the language itself. In addition, 

all translations contain technical processing information that is obscure to those unfamiliar 

with the wartime system. Finally, the translations are filled with mentions of Japanese 

equipment and base locations for which there are no easily available references. 

In addition to these textual challenges, there are two formidable problems regarding 

the organization of the collections. The first is that there was sometimes a significant 

lag between the time a message was intercepted and the time it was formally assigned 

a serial number and officially released. The Army or Navy cryptologic service assigned 

translations a serial number and placed them in a series in the order of their release, 

not in the order of the date on which the message was actually sent by the originating 

country. While a number of translations were issued within a day or so of their intercept, 

many others were disseminated weeks and even months later. This means that many are 

chronologically out of order, forcing scholars to search for information about a particular 

event sometimes well beyond the date it occurred. The translations of Japanese Army 

messages sent on September 22, 1944, that reported the sinking of the prison ship Rakuyu 

Maru, for example, were not released until February and March 1945.16 
120 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Table 1. Summary of COMINT records at the National Archives

Record 

Group Entry Entry title NSA serial

Army/

Navy serial

Number of 

translations 

or boxes Date

457 9006 MAGIC Diplomatic 

Summarya SRS N/A 20 1942–45

457 9005 Army SR J 136,800 1943–45

457 9004 Army Attaché SRA JMA/D 18,500 1941–45b

457 9011 Diplomatic SRDJ JD-# Hc 126,800 1939–45

457 9012 Air Force SRF F 40,900 1943–44

457 9014 Navy SRN JN-#, Gd 290,900 1941–45

457 9013 Naval Attaché SRNA JNA 5,300 1941–45e

457 9018 Water Transportf SRR JR 44,300 1943–44

457 9021 Vichy Diplomatic SRDV N/A 19 boxes 1941–43

457 9027 RED Machine Translations N/A N/A 3,500 1934–38

457 9030 MAGIC Diplomatic 

Summary SRS N/A 19 boxes 1942–45

457 9032 Multinational Diplomatic N/Ag Hh 201,571 1939–45

457 9032 Summary of Japanese N/A SJM 9 boxes 1942–45

457 9032 Summary of Multinational N/A SMM 7 boxes 1942–45

457 9032 Army N/A J, JXi 125 boxes 1943–45

457 9032 Air Force N/A F, FX 48 boxes 1943–44

457 9001 MAGIC Far East Summary SRS N/A 11 boxes 1942–45

38 CNSG Navy N/A JN 1800+ boxes 1941–45

a This is the redacted version of the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary.

b

 The Japanese Military Attaché traffic was not broken until 1943. Translations of messages from prior years 

were done at the end of the war and afterwards.

c

 From September-July 1940, translations of intercepted and decrypted multinational diplomatic translations 

carried both Army and Navy serial numbers.

d This numbering system was maintained even after the war. Japanese naval messages encrypted in the main 

operational code, jn-25, prior to Pearl Harbor were finally decrypted and translated after the war. They carried 

the series prefix jn-5 for 1945.

e

 The Japanese Naval Attaché messages were not exploited until mid-1943. Near the end of the war, messages 

prior to the exploitation were then decrypted and translated.

f

 The “Water Transport” messages were sent by the various regional Japanese shipping centers of the Imperial 

Army’s Shipping Transport Command. The Japanese Army maintained its own shipping to assure supply and 

transport support of its garrisons.

g

 Only a redacted version of these summaries was available prior to the 1996 release.

h h was the last in a number of serial designators used by the SIS to identify diplomatic translations.

i

 Military serial designator with an x indicates that the translation is a synopsis or extract. 
Wartime COMINT Records I 121

A second problem for researchers is the lack of a cross-reference system between the 

originally assigned wartime serial numbers and the serialization scheme NSA assigned 

when it released the translations to NARA. The two serialization systems do not match. 

The SIS or OP-20-G assigned a serial number to a complete individual translation, 

regardless of the number of pages, whereas NSA assigned a consecutive number for 

each page in a translation series regardless of whether a page belonged to a multipart 

translation. The original serialization provides a count of translations in a series; the 

NSA serialization provides a page count of the series. For researchers the problem is 

exacerbated because in the margins of MAGIC Diplomatic and Far East Summaries 

there are citations for the Army and Navy translations used, but these citations refer 

to the original serial numbers, not the later NSA serials. Neither NSA nor NARA has 

produced an index that cross-references the two systems.

A final problem is the lack of a topical index for any of the translation series in NSA 

or Naval Security Group record groups, leaving researchers unable to retrieve the relevant 

single translation or the set of them that they may want. Unless one can use the results 

of previous searches by others, the only strategy short of reviewing every translation in a 

series or entry is to rely on the fortunate selection of an entry point. 

The following are brief descriptions of the translation series that deal with the war 

against Japan. Each section lists the title of the translation collection, the originator and 

NSA series designator, entry number(s), and box numbers where the translations can be 

found. 

Japanese Service Translations 

Japanese Army, j-series/sr, Entries 9006 and 9032, Boxes 1149–1273

The Japanese Army employed numerous codes and ciphers, as well as other cryptographic 

aids, cipher additives, encrypted address lists, and the like to secure its communications 

from the lowest level to the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo. The codes of the Japanese 

Army—specifically those that encoded the messages passed on the high-level administrative 

networks between Tokyo and the area army commands—were not exploited by the Allies 

until early 1944. As a result, prior to this time, there are very few translations available. 

There are two entries that contain Japanese Army translations. The first, entry 9006, 

consists of the NSA-redacted versions of the original U.S. Army translations. The deleted 

information was almost exclusively technical in nature; message contents were seldom 

edited. The second, entry 9032, consists of the original versions of the translations. These 

are found in boxes 1149 to 1273. There are nearly 106,000 translations in both entries. 

The original translations carry the serialization scheme with the prefix j followed by the 

serial number. Multi-page translations have a suffix for each additional page, beginning 
122 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

with the letter a. Some translations have a jx prefix, indicating that the translation is an 

extract or synopsis. Below is an example of such a translation of a September 14, 1945, 

message from the Southern Area Army Headquarters in Singapore to Imperial Army 

Headquarters in Tokyo listing internees in Japanese camps who are sick. It lists them by 

illness, nationality, and sex. 

Japanese Army Translation, J104512-A-E, 14 September 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1272.
Wartime COMINT Records I 123

In accordance with the Allied exchange agreement, SIS received numerous Japanese 

Army translations from Commonwealth sites. These translations can be identified by 

the presence of a special trigraph in the upper right side of the page, xbt for exchanged 

British translation, xat for exchanged Australian translation, and xit for exchanged India 

translation (probably referring to translations issued by the Wireless Experimental Center 

at New Delhi, India). 

The translations cover a number of general topics that one might expect from army 

messages: intelligence reports, unit status, logistics and transport issues, and personnel 

actions such as officer postings and casualty notices. Combat reports are numerous, 

occasionally quite detailed. There are also translations about postwar concerns such as the 

location of POW and civilian internee camps, the accounting of prisoners, the surrender 

of Japanese troops and high-profile collaborators, and early nationalist agitation and 

conflict in Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. 

Japanese Air Force, f-series/srf, Entries 9012 and 9032, Boxes 628–676 

The Japanese Army and navy both had aviation arms. Messages of the army’s air force 

are contained in entries 9012 and 9032. The earliest translations date from February 

1943. Almost all of these translations are messages between Japanese air bases and air 

force commands. Air-to-ground communications, which were intercepted and exploited 

from the first days of the war, were considered tactical and appear not to have been 

disseminated in a translation series. Forward-deployed Allied monitoring units copied 

these transmissions but issued no formal translations, though excerpts of some intercepts 

appear in Allied command summaries. 

Air Force translations are found in two entries. The first, entry 9012, is the set of 

NSA-redacted translations. The second, entry 9032, contains the unredacted original 

translations. There are 40,980 translations in this series dating from February 1943 to 

August 1944. The original translations carry the serialization scheme with the prefix f

followed by the serial number. Here, too, multi-section translations have a suffix for each 

additional page, beginning with the letter a. There are some translations with the prefix 

fx, which indicates that they are extracts or synopses. 

The Japanese air force translations tend to concern technical aspects of its daily activity: 

logistics such as fuel, spare parts, repairs, and modifications to aircraft. A perennial topic 

was the availability of pilots and aircraft for each of the subordinate units of the air 

forces. The translations also contain reports of the damage caused by Allied air attacks 

on various airfields. Towards the end of the war, many pilots and aircraft were diverted 

from regular air units to form tokubetsu kogekitai, special attack or kamikaze formations. 

These intercepted messages allowed the United States to track the deployment of these 
124 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

units and their strength. Air force translations also contained several reports on Allied 

POWs, their locations, and their transfer to other camps. 

Japanese Navy, jn-series/srn, RG 457, Entry 9014, Boxes 1–358; and RG 38, Entry Japanese 

Navy Translations, Boxes 232–2391 

The United States Navy’s OP-20-G produced the translations in these collections almost 

exclusively, though Commonwealth cryptologists generated a small number dealing with 

operations in the Indian Ocean and waters around western Dutch East Indies and Malaya. 

These translations begin shortly before the war in the Pacific started and end with the 

continued disarmament of the Japanese Navy in early 1946. Both entries contain the 

translations of messages encrypted in the main Japanese naval operational code, jn-25. 

Users should note that translations prior to March 1942, the month that the first real 

exploitation of jn-25 occurred, are often fragmentary. Translations of jn-25 messages 

dealing with the Pearl Harbor Striking Force (Kido Butai) were produced from September 

1945 through January 1946. The translations were not released to the hearings of the 

Joint Congressional Committee inquiry into Pearl Harbor, but were withheld from the 

committee on the order of Admiral Chester Nimitz.17 The Kido Butai translations are 

found in entry 9014, boxes 144–147. 

The translations generally are not in chronological order. For example, boxes 

142–144 cover the January-April 1946 demobilization of the Imperial Japanese navy 

installations and resources. There is a 51-page index of translation serials with associated 

box numbers, but there is no topical index. 

Most of the naval translations in record group 38 can be found in entry “xa List, Mixed 

Files, Translations of the Japanese Naval Messages.” This series of unredacted translations 

contains more than 2,600 boxes, referred to as “Japanese Orange Translations.” About 10 

percent of the boxes do not contain translations. The translations are organized by topic, 

such as Japanese airbases, place names, Japanese ships, air and naval units, and chemical 

warfare. There is no topical entry for prisoners, internees, or general atrocities. 

Within each topical section, the translations are arranged in reverse chronological 

order. These topical collections include translations of messages from other sources 

such as diplomatic intercept, summary reports, and captured documents. An index 

delineates box ranges of translations dealing with a particular topic. For example, 

translations pertaining to specific Japanese maru (merchant ships) can be found in boxes 

1156 to 1355. The translations are grouped by maru listed in alphabetic order, enabling 

a researcher to locate all translations dealing with individual ships such as the Arisan 

Maru and the Brazil Maru. Other topics include warships and Japanese naval shore 

installations.
Wartime COMINT Records I 125

Japanese Army Water Transport Code, jr-series/srr, Entries 9018 and 9032, Boxes 626–7, 

531–575

During the war, the Imperial Japanese Army controlled a number of merchant ships through 

the management of various shipping agencies associated with the area armies. Messages 

about the activities of these ships cover loading and offloading; embarkation of troops, 

passengers, or prisoners; convoy routes and locations; attacks and incidents at sea; and 

arrival at port. These messages were encoded in a cryptographic system the Allies called the 

“Water Transport Code.” The code was exploited by the Americans and Commonwealth 

cryptanalysts from April 6, 1943, to July 17, 1944, when the Japanese switched to a new 

code system. During that period, Allies issued some 44,000 translations, though many 

more messages may have been exploited informally.18 Allies used the information in these 

messages to target convoys for attack by submarines and aircraft.19 Through these records, 

researchers can track the activities of Japanese merchant ships that may have been used to 

transport prisoners and internees from 1943 to 1944. 

The translations found in entry 9018 are redacted. Those in entry 9032 are not 

redacted, though there are some gaps in the series near the beginning and at the end. Like 

most of the other series, the translations themselves were issued long after the original 

message was intercepted. 

Japanese Diplomatic Translations

There are six series of translations of Japanese and other nations’ diplomatic messages 

available to researchers that are relevant to war crimes and atrocities in the Pacific. Two 

of these series are translations of the messages of Japanese Naval Attachés (srna) and 

Military Attachés (srma) that contain only incidental information about Japanese war 

crimes. The most relevant series is the “Multinational Diplomatic Translations,” which 

can be considered the “master set” of diplomatic translations. It contains the messages of 

Japan, Portugal, Spain, France (Vichy and Free French regimes), Thailand, Switzerland, 

China (Nationalist, Communist, and the collaborationist Nanjing regimes), and of 

numerous other nations. There are two additional sets of diplomatic translations drawn 

exclusively from the multinational collection, the diplomatic messages of Japan (srdj) and 

Vichy France (srdv). These are redacted versions of originals found in the multinational 

collection. The final set of consists of the so-called RED machine messages, translations 

of Japanese diplomatic messages encrypted with the M-2 cipher machine. 

Japanese Military and Naval Attaché Translations, d-series/sra, Entries 9004 and 9032, 

Boxes 677–698; jna-series/srna, Entries 9013 and 9032, Boxes 1441–1456

Allied intelligence officers and cryptologists were interested in messages sent from 
126 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Japanese military and navy attachés, especially those in Nazi Germany, but also those in 

minor Axis powers, such as Hungary and Finland. Like their counterparts everywhere, 

Japanese attachés observed their host country’s naval and military services, reported on 

intelligence and technical matters, and in some cases, performed liaison duties. Tokyo’s 

attachés reported on Nazi technological advances in military optics, radars, armored 

fighting vehicles, advanced aircraft design—especially the Luftwaffe’s jet prototypes and 

operational aircraft—and the development of the V-series rockets. There is very little in 

these records about the war in the Pacific and Asia, except for occasional information 

about Japanese Americans, whose capture and subsequent interrogations by the Germans 

evoked much interest from Tokyo.20 

Entry 9004 holds over 18,500 military attaché translations dating 1941–45. However, 

the Allies could not read these attaché messages until 1943, so messages from the early 

years of the war were deciphered after the war, some as late as 1946. The collection 

begins with number 1001, but there is no explanation for the missing translations. Some 

of the translations are redacted. NARA has indexed the collection, and the finding aid 

is available for researchers. 

Entry 9013 has over 5,300 naval attaché translations. Allies began to decipher these 

messages in mid-1943, but could not fully exploit them until March 1944.21 Translations 

range from 1941–45; much of the material preceding 1944 was completed in the early 

postwar period. These translations are not in chronological order, and some are redacted. 

Translations in entry 9032 are not redacted, but in some boxes they are mixed in with 

Japanese naval translations. 

Multinational Diplomatic Translations, h-series, RG 457, Entry 9032, Boxes 286–516

This is the largest collection of diplomatic translations, with 201,571 unredacted 

translations totaling more than 225,000 pages. The translations date from November 

1938 to August 1945. The translations are located in entry 9032, known as the Historical 

Cryptographic Collection (HCC). The set includes original ditto copies produced during 

the war. Some translations are missing, and some portions of the collection are out of 

serial order because NSA preparers rearranged some bunches of translations by country 

instead of by serial number. Translations from 1938 to 1940 are predominantly Japanese 

diplomatic messages. Tokyo’s diplomatic messages account for approximately 55 percent 

of all translations in this collection. 

The SIS assigned a serial number to these translations, and from mid-1941 to March 

1942, OP-20-G also assigned a separate serial notation to them, the jd-series. During 

this time, both the Army and the Navy worked on Japanese diplomatic messages: the 

SIS processed all intercepted messages on even days, and OP-20-G did the same on odd 
Wartime COMINT Records I 127

days. This practice of assigning double serialization ended in April 1942, when the SIS 

took exclusive responsibility for the records. From 1942, the SIS used different prefixes 

for the diplomatic series, ssd followed by ssb. From November 1944 through the end of 

the war, the SIS assigned the prefix h to the diplomatic series. 

Allied cryptologists produced a small number of the translations in this series and 

exchanged them with the Americans as part of the British-American exchange agreement 

concluded in July 1943. These exchanged translations carry the trigraph xbt, for 

exchanged British translation, on the upper left hand side of the page. Occasionally, the 

original British serial number, noted by the prefix bj, can be seen on the upper right hand 

side of the translation.22 

During the war, the Allies collected, processed, and translated the diplomatic radio 

or cable traffic of almost every nation in the world.23 Early in the war, the SIS translated 

mostly Japanese, Vichy French, or Latin American messages. By 1943, the United States 

was also exploiting diplomatic messages of China, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Thailand, 

and the French administration in Indochina. Many of their messages were concerned 

with atrocities, plundering, and POWs (such as the one shown on page 128–29). 

Japanese and Vichy French Diplomatic Translations, srdj, Entry 9011; srdv, Entry 9021

NSA released these two special collections of diplomatic translations in 1983 and 1984, 

respectively. Both collections were extracted from the “master” Multinational Diplomatic 

series and were part of NSA’s early release of Axis wartime cryptologic material. Entry 

9011 contains some 126,800 pages of redacted Japanese diplomatic translations from 

1939 to 1945. Entry 9021 contains about 18,000 pages of redacted Vichy French 

diplomatic translations and includes messages from 1941 to 1945, although there are 

very few from the last two years of the war. Both of these entries, while composed of 

redacted translations, have the advantage of containing all of the Japanese and Vichy 

messages found in the larger multinational collection. 

Japanese red Diplomatic Machine Translations, Entry 9027 

Before introducing the purple Machine, the Japanese used the M-2 cipher machine 

that the SIS code named red. red was operational in the early 1930s. By late 1934, 

the SIS could exploit it and continued to do so right up to its replacement by purple

during 1938–1939. The translations of the red messages are located in entry 9027. 

There are four boxes containing about 3,400 unredacted translations from July 1934 

to November 1939. About 200–300 translations are not numbered. There is a small 

overlap with the Multinational Diplomatic series. Generally, these translations cover 

issues of Japanese foreign policy during the mid- to late-1930s: relations with the United 
128 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Spanish Diplomatic Message, 12 April 1945, reporting 12 February attack on Spanish Consul in Manila by 

Japanese troops, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 482, H-177899. 
Wartime COMINT Records I 129
130 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

States, the increasingly close relationship with Nazi Germany, and Japan’s aggression 

against China that began in 1937. NARA is currently developing an index to the red

translations.

Summaries of Messages, Summaries of Japanese Messages (sjm) and Summaries of 

Multinational Messages (smm)

American cryptologists translated numerous intercepted messages from Japan and other 

countries that did not warrant a separate, serialized translation. These unserialized 

messages were placed in compendiums of complete translations, and should not be 

confused with the more recognizable MAGIC Summaries (discussed below). SIS 

generally did not serialize unencrypted messages or those encrypted in low-level or 

commercial code. There is no clear set of factors that explains why some translations 

were placed in serialized collections and others were not. 

Many of these summaries, however, contained intelligence or information of interest, 

some of it important enough to be featured in MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries. SIS 

published three to six separate summaries per page. Each page carried a consecutive 

serial number. The Summary of Japanese Messages (sjm), Summary of German Messages 

(sgm), Summary of French Messages (sfm), and Summary of Multinational Messages 

(smm) were all started during the war. An illustration of such a summary is shown on 

the facing page. It is a translation of a Swiss diplomatic message from Bern to Bangkok 

detailing the expenditures for the relief of British prisoners in Thailand, as well as further 

Swiss requests for relief of British prisoners in Burma.

Generally, these four series comprised translations of diplomatic or commercial 

messages. The smm also contains messages from nongovernmental organizations, most 

notably the International Committee of the Red Cross. The smm and the sjm, both 

located in entry 9032, are the most interesting. The sjm comprises more than 20,000 

pages of summaries, and the smm collection totals more than 8,000 pages. 

MAGIC and Other Summary-type Collections 

By the last year of the war, the War Department’s Special Branch alone was receiving 

intelligence from over 800 separate sources including cryptology, foreign news sources, 

exchanges with numerous Allied governments, photographic intelligence, POW 

interrogation, and so on.24 To help leaders in Washington and in the field manage the 

deluge of information available, intelligence staffs published bulletins that highlighted 

particularly important pieces of information. The War Department’s Special Branch 

developed the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary and the MAGIC Far East Summary. 

Other commands developed their own summaries. In the central Pacific, there were 
Wartime COMINT Records I 131

SMM 12072, Bern to Bangkok, 18 April 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 891. 
132 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA) Summary of Ultra Traffic 

and CINCPAC (Commander in Chief Pacific) Intelligence Bulletins. In the Southwest 

Pacific, Gen. MacArthur’s staff issued the SWPA Intelligence Bulletin. 

MAGIC Diplomatic and Far East Summaries 

The MAGIC Diplomatic Summary first appeared in March 1942 and continued 

throughout the war. Initially, it relied almost exclusively on COMINT, but later 

incorporated limited information from other sources. The MAGIC Diplomatic 

Summary had five sections: Political, Military, Economic, Morale-Psychological, and 

Miscellaneous, and often contained extensive quotes from translations and occasional 

attachments with significant extracts. Each section cites its sources, which is a help to 

researchers who wish to see the original reports. 

Sets of the MAGIC Diplomatic Summary are located in two entries. Entry 9006 

holds 1,800 pages of the Diplomatic Summary initially transfer to NARA in 1983. This 

set covers material from January 1943 to August 1945. The Summaries in entry 9006 

are redacted and many are missing substantial portions of text. In 1995, NSA turned 

over the record set of Diplomatic Summaries to NARA, which became entry 9030. 

Summaries in this entry date from March 1942 to August 1945.25

The Special Branch’s MAGIC Far East Summary highlighted intelligence from 

all sources that was relevant to the war against Japan. Like the MAGIC Diplomatic 

Summary, the Far East Summary began in March 1942, but it ran only through December 

1943. The series restarted in February 1944 and continued until October 1945. The 

823 redacted summaries are located in entry 9001. The original, unedited record set of 

Far East Summaries may be found in entry 9032. This collection runs from February 

1944 to October 1945. The sample summary on the next page highlights a Japanese 

Southern Area Army directive regarding the handling of prisoners and internees in the 

post-hostilities period leading up to the arrival of Allied troops. The first three items in 

this particular summary deal with prisoner issues. 

Other Command Summaries and Bulletins 

U.S. commands in the war against Japan also issued their own intelligence summaries 

that contained much COMINT. These summaries, like the CINCPAC and Southwest 

Pacific Area Intelligence Bulletins, were oriented toward military interests and were used to 

inform various subordinate commands of Japanese activities, plans, and intelligence about 

Allied operations. Only rarely during the war did messages that contained information 

relating to Japanese war crimes and atrocities appear in the Summaries and Bulletins, 

and these references were oblique. On October 24, 1944, for example, U.S. submarines 
Wartime COMINT Records I 133

MAGIC Far East Summary, No. 520, 23 August 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9001.
134 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

attacked a Japanese convoy sailing out of the Philippines and sank the prison ship Arisan 

Maru. The CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletin for November 5, 1944, mentioned that the 

convoy’s escort, the destroyer Harukaze, was torpedoed, but it made no mention of the 

POWs aboard the Arisan Maru.

26 It is not altogether clear how much intelligence was 

available about the prisoners aboard the ship. In another example, Southwest Pacific 

Special Intelligence Bulletins in February 1944 carried information intercepted from 

Japanese messages about the intelligence gained from an American POW pilot, but the 

Bulletin made no mention of the treatment or fate of the pilot (see facing page).27 

What Is and Is Not in the Records

The intelligence contained in the translations and summary reports that relate to war 

crimes and atrocities committed by Japan during from 1931 to 1945 may be divided into 

four general categories: (1) the treatment of Allied POWs and civilian internees, including 

their roundup, conditions during captivity, transfer, and release; (2) the treatment of 

noncombatants, including suppression of indigenous populations and any punitive 

actions taken against them; (3) Japanese looting or exploitation of natural resources, 

national, cultural, or personal assets, and the use of forced labor; and (4) Japanese 

involvement in the research, development, or use of chemical or biological weapons. 

Much of the intelligence often concerned more than one category of war crimes. For 

example, in their efforts to exploit the industry of conquered areas, the Japanese worked 

laborers to death. 

Treatment of Allied POWs and Civilian Internees

Early in the war in the Pacific, Japanese forces had captured or interned thousands of 

Allied soldiers and civilians. Although Japan signed the July 1929 Geneva Convention, 

it had never formally ratified the accompanying Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. 

During the Japanese war in China, COMINT revealed, Japanese had abused prisoners. 

In one case, the Japanese acknowledged shooting Chinese prisoners on Amoy.28 

On December 18, 1941, the United States, through a Swiss intermediary, asked Japan 

its intentions regarding the treatment of prisoners. On February 4, 1942, Japan replied 

that while not bound by the Convention’s rules on the treatment of prisoners, Japan 

would apply mutatis mutandis provisions to every American POW in its control.29

By April 1942, well over 220,000 Allied POWs were in Japanese hands. This 

included about 170,000 troops of the Commonwealth countries, 15,000 Americans, 

30,000 Dutch, over 30,000 Filipinos, and smaller contingents of Burmese and other 

native colonial service personnel. Intercepts throughout the remainder of the war 

often provided scattered mentions of other sailors, airmen, and soldiers being captured. 
Wartime COMINT Records I 135

Special Intelligence Bulletin, # 293, 24 February 1944, and # 296, 27 February 1944, General Headquarters, 

Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, NA, RG 457, entry 9002, SRH-203.
136 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Sometimes, especially with the capture of pilots, Japanese messages would give the 

prisoner’s name or nationality, or both.30 

Whatever the Japanese may have meant by their February 1942 reply to the Americans, 

COMINT soon intercepted diplomatic messages that suggested that the Japanese were 

sensitive to charges about the mistreatment of Allied prisoners. In March 1942, the 

Japanese Foreign Office informed its Berlin embassy that it was sending out material 

to rebut “false British propaganda.” It wanted Berlin to know that all wounded or sick 

soldiers and civilians interned in Hong Kong were being treated well and that no one 

was suffering any “inconvenience.” This cable was likely a response to a speech by British 

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who had reported to Parliament the mistreatment of 

Commonwealth troops captured in Hong Kong.31 In June 1942, the Japanese Foreign 

Office reported from Shanghai that the army was finally going to allow the International 

Committee of the Red Cross to visit POWs in Hong Kong. This move, it hoped, would 

deny the Allies material for propaganda against Japan.32

During the first two years of the war, COMINT did not provide much detail 

about the capture of Allied servicemen or the conditions in which Allied POWs lived. 

Atrocities like the Bataan Death March and the massacres of Dutch soldiers and civilians 

went virtually unreported. In the case of the construction of the Bangkok to Rangoon 

railroad, only a passing reference to the forced use of British prisoners for construction 

was included in the January 4, 1943, MAGIC Diplomatic Summary. Not until April 

1944 did an intercepted Japanese air force message admit that the Allies were aware of the 

fact and that “strict measure[s] had to be taken to hide this information.”33

While the intelligence about POWs and civilian internees from Japanese sources was 

sparse, French colonial and diplomatic codes revealed much about the transport of 2,000 

Allied POWs to French Indochina in March 1942. 

Vichy France was officially neutral in the war against Japan and did not want to antagonize 

the Japanese, who had occupied Indochina since September 1940. The French were under 

no illusions about Japanese treatment of prisoners: they had experienced Japanese atrocities 

firsthand in 1940, when Japanese troops executed a number of officers and enlisted men 

stationed in border posts like Dong Dang and Mon Cai who had opposed their advance. 

The Swiss consul in Saigon had sought permission to visit POW camps. The French 

administration, disgruntled that more POWs would be sent to Indochina, nevertheless 

assisted the Swiss representatives in securing visits to the camps. As the war progressed, 

the French colonial administration took the position that any Allied pilots shot down over 

Indochina and interned by the French would not be turned over to Japanese authorities. 

This practice became a point of friction with the Japanese, and was later cited as a reason 

for Japan’s March 1945 takeover of Indochina.34
Wartime COMINT Records I 137

In early 1944, Allies obtained intelligence about the Japanese plan to transport large 

numbers of POWs to the home islands to work in factories, mines, and elsewhere (see 

below). Messages between Tokyo and Batavia, Dutch East Indies; Singapore; Bangkok, 

Thailand; Rangoon, Burma; and Manila mentioned the number of prisoners to be shipped 

back: at least 10,000 were from Thailand; over 5,500 had already been shipped or were at 

sea.35 In September, Tokyo reminded Manila that if it was sending prisoners, it also had 

to ship sufficient medicine for them, since medical supplies were scarce in Japan.36

Kanchanaburi, Thailand to Tokyo, F-35497, 25 October, 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1703.
138 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Not all POWs were sent to Japan. In May 1944, at least 1,000 POWs were still 

working on the Thailand-Burma railroad.37 In January 1945, another 5,000 prisoners in 

Thailand were organized into yasen kimmutai (Field Duty Units) to build an airfield.38 In 

December 1944, the Japanese POW Authority in the Philippines sent a message to Tokyo 

discussing the advantages of shipping some 3,150 civilian internees to Japan. Their 

transfer to the home islands would be “profitable,” according to the message, because 

the internees were 18–40 years old, and some were technicians, lawyers, and corporate 

leaders and managers. However, the United States was invading the Philippines, making 

transport of the internees difficult.39 But orders were issued to ship them anyway.40

The prison ships that transported the POWs were notorious for their inhumane 

conditions. The Japanese starved and mistreated prisoners. In addition, the United 

States targeted the shipping lanes and convoys to Japan and torpedoed several of these 

ships, such as the Rakuyu Maru and the Kenwa Maru, with significant, sometimes almost 

total, loss of life. Intercepted messages provided some details on the losses. The Rakuyu 

Maru was carrying 950 prisoners when it was hit by a U.S. torpedo; the Japanese escort 

ships picked up many survivors, but 431 POWs remained missing.41

During the war, the Allied powers, principally the United States and Great Britain, 

tried to provide physical relief for their POWs held by the Japanese. The Allies’ most 

significant act was to arrange to transfer funds through the Swiss National Bank to the 

Yokohama Specie Bank. A number of Japanese and Swiss diplomatic translations tell of 

the negotiations, management, and outcome of this effort (see facing page).42 A special 

account was established in the Yokohama Specie Bank in August 1944 to hold funds that 

the Japanese were to spend on supplies for prisoners. Eventually, the United States, Great 

Britain, and the Dutch contributed several million dollars that were to be transferred into 

this account. But the Japanese withheld most funds, and, possibly as a result, the Swiss 

representatives in the Far East found it difficult to purchase supplies because of scarce 

supplies and rising expenses.43 

As the war moved closer to Japan, the fate of the prisoners became increasingly 

important to the Allies. The Allies were aware that the Japanese had plans to execute 

prisoners under their control at the end of the war.44 They also knew that the Japanese 

had issued standing orders to punish captured Allied commandos and combat pilots 

under such rules as the “Southern Army Military Law, Punishment of the Crews of 

Enemy Aircraft.”45 The Japanese had set a precedent for this behavior during the trial and 

subsequent execution of three captured crew from the April 1942 Doolittle Raid. After 

the war, the Japanese local commands were ordered to forward information to senior area 

headquarters about the judgments rendered on captured pilots and crewmembers, as well 

as about the executions of all POWs who had been under their control.46
Wartime COMINT Records I 139

Japanese Diplomatic Translation, 13 November 1944, SRDJ 81496/H-155528, NA, RG 457, entry 9011, also 

entry 9032, box 453.
140 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

After the Japanese accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies monitored 

their compliance with instructions regarding the treatment of POWs and civilian 

internees. A message from the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army to all army commands 

ordered the release of POWs and civilian internees. The Army would transport them 

safely to the transfer points specified by the Allies and provide proper food, clothing, 

accommodations, and health care. Senior POW officers were given jurisdiction over all 

materials, records, arms, and ammunition at the prison camps. Japanese commanders 

also had to provide complete lists that accounted for all prisoners and internees who were 

in their commands. All supplies air dropped by the Allies had to be delivered to the 

prisoners “without fail.” Finally, all camps had to be marked by the letters “PW” 20-feet 

high, oriented south to north, and written in yellow on a black background.47

Many Japanese military and naval commands followed the instructions from Tokyo, 

although, on occasion, some disobeyed. For example, a Japanese Navy directive of the 

command in the Dutch East Indies ordered that any records concerned with the treatment 

of natives or prisoners that were “disadvantageous” from a “diplomatic standpoint” were 

to be destroyed.48

Atrocities and War Crimes Committed against Noncombatants

By early 1942, Japan had over 200 million conquered people under its control. Official 

Japanese policy towards these people was hakko ichiu, “all the world under a single roof.” 

On the ground in the various theaters, however, policies varied from place to place. In 

northern China, military policy toward recalcitrant populations was sanko sakusen, or 

“kill all, burn all, loot all.” 

There are more than a dozen translations dealing with the Japanese seizure of Nanjing 

in late December 1937 and the subsequent atrocities committed there by Japanese troops. 

Because the source of this information is diplomatic, not military, the messages concern 

the protection of foreign diplomatic facilities in the city and the establishment of a socalled “safety zone” that Japanese forces would honor. The Japanese were aware that some 

150,000 Chinese civilians had taken refuge in this area, but on December 10, 1937, the 

Japanese ambassador in Washington admitted that Japan could not assure the safety 

of any Chinese in the zone.49 Eventually, after reports of looting, murder, and rape at 

diplomatic compounds and other facilities run by foreigners reached Tokyo, the Japanese 

dispatched their General Consul in Shanghai to report. His cables from December 1937 

and January 1938 contained a report of a number of “incidents” that he blamed on the 

lack of the presence of sufficient Japanese officers and military police.50

After the outbreak of the war between Japan and the West in December 1941, the 

opportunities for significant reportage of Japanese atrocities faded because there were no 
Wartime COMINT Records I 141

longer Western sources such as newspaper reporters actively chronicling such incidents. 

During the war, the Japanese conscripted over a million indigenous people into labor 

battalions to work in industrial mining or construction projects such as the infamous 

Thailand to Burma railway, but only a handful of decrypted messages deal with this issue. 

For example, in September 1944, a Japanese command in Thailand organized a tokushu 

romutai (special labor unit) using former Indian soldiers. A July 1945 message from 

Singapore requests supplies and medicine for some 3,000 “sick and mutilated” Indian 

nationals from Malaya involved in the Thailand railway construction. In May 1944, the 

Southern Area Army in Rabaul reported to Tokyo that they were receiving two groups of 

Chinese and Formosans organized in Special Labor Groups.51

As for individual atrocities committed against indigenous populations, there is little 

information. However, in one instance, such a report was intercepted. On November 

26, 1944, the 42nd Independent Regiment (Hohei Rentai) reported that one of its units 

had landed on Babar Island, a small island group in the eastern Banda Sea, east of Timor 

Island, to suppress a rebellion by natives. Ironically, the army unit suggested that the 

“oppressive discipline” by an Imperial navy unit of the 4th Expeditionary Fleet may have 

caused the uprising. The message noted that almost 600 of the rebels had been rounded 

up, and most of them had been executed. Another 100 or so were being “hunted down 

right now.” The Japanese reported that the revolt had not been caused by the Allies.52

Economic Exploitation and Looting of Assets by Japan 

Under the provisions of international agreements, Japan, as a conquering nation, had 

certain rights to the assets of countries it seized that could be applied to the prosecution 

of the war. One of Japan’s major purposes in its conquest of China and the rest of eastern 

Asia was to economically dominate the region. Under the aegis of the Greater East Asia 

Ministry, Japan would incorporate all conquered territories under the larger East Asia 

Co-Prosperity Sphere and control the economic bloc. 

After the initial tide of conquests in early 1942, the Japanese government under Prime 

Minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki announced the formation of the Greater East Asia Ministry 

(GEAM). This organization transmitted messages on regular diplomatic radio networks, 

as did joint commercial enterprises and Japanese corporations. Many corporations, such 

as mining companies, industrial complexes, and export firms, reported their activities 

from places like Formosa, China, and Malaya. Much of their traffic was translated and 

disseminated in the sjm series. This series also includes the messages of many firms, such as 

Mitsui, Nissan, and Kawakishi, the trade associations, and the Yokohama Specie Bank. 

GEAM traffic also contained political, military, and intelligence information. Much 

economic information that was reported also had military implications. For example, a 
142 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

February 19, 1944, message to the Ministry headquarters in Tokyo from Hanoi contained 

a short report on the collapse of the north-south railway system in Indochina. To get 

around the lack of rail transit, the message said, the local East Asia Marine Transport 

Company was trying to arrange for the use of “junks” and small steamers to send goods 

along the coast.53 An April 6, 1944, message from Hanoi to the Vice Director of the 

Formosa Development Company contained instructions about where along the northeast 

coast of Tonkin to safely load manganese ore to avoid air attacks.54 

Throughout the war, Allies gathered intelligence about Japanese exploitation of 

Indochina, including figures for the annual costs charged to the French by the Japanese 

for maintaining their defense forces there. (The same arrangement was forced on 

Thailand.) These charges, paid in the “special yen” currency converted at a rate favorable 

to the Japanese, led to steep inflation in Indochina. The cost of staple items, such as rice, 

climbed to three to four times their prewar costs. Inflation caused a serious disruption 

in the local economy. 

At the same time, the Japanese exported extraordinarily high levels of rice and other 

foodstuffs from Indochina to Japan and territories in the Empire, leaving Indochina 

bereft of any surplus for emergencies.55 By late 1944, a combination of wetter than usual 

winters, the breakdown of the internal transportation system due to Allied bombing, 

and the Japanese rice export quotas created a famine in the Tonkin and northern part 

of Annam. By conservative estimates, from late 1944 to mid-1945, about one million 

Vietnamese starved to death or died from disease caused by malnutrition. The Japanese 

had realized by late 1944 that conditions brought on by exporting so much rice from 

Indochina was leading to significant shortages.56

Near the end of the war, the Japanese revealed that they had been looting the banks 

and treasuries of the countries and foreign colonies that they had overrun. In June 1945, 

the Area Army command in Moulmein queried Saigon about where it was to “drop” 

packages of rupee notes and other currencies, some weighing over 12,000 kilograms.57 A 

June 15 message from Hanoi to Saigon asked for instructions concerning three tons of 

silver taken from the customs house in Qui Nhon.58 

Chemical and Biological Warfare

During its long war against China, 1937–1945, Japan used chemical weapons, notably 

poison and irritant gas, against Chinese troops and civilians, a practice the League of 

Nations condemned in May 1938. There is also evidence that Japan used germ warfare 

against China and that a special organization, Unit 731, conducted experiments on 

Chinese prisoners at special camps in Manchuria. Throughout the war, the Chinese 

continued to report chemical attacks by the Japanese.59
Wartime COMINT Records I 143

Allied COMINT has little direct information on Japanese chemical or bacterial 

warfare. Any messages dealing with Japanese chemical attacks usually contained secondhand reports or discussions about how to refute Western or Chinese newspaper stories 

about the incidents, such as one message from Tokyo to London that suggested a Daily 

Telegraph news report about a gas attack near the Soochow River against Chinese troops 

was written by an “unreliable” reporter.60

Intercepted radio traffic also contained hints of Japanese interest in bacterial warfare, 

but it was difficult for Allies to discern whether the ambiguous references in the messages 

were about legitimate research into treatment of tropical diseases such as the plague, cholera, 

and typhus, or were about research into biological warfare. COMINT revealed that the 

Japanese Army Medical Corps maintained an instructional staff in bacterial research.61 

There were more intercepts concerning chemical weapons, but no clear conclusions 

can be drawn from the intelligence. Japan was aware of the threat voiced by America’s 

leaders early in the war that any use of such weapons would bring retaliation. In July 

1944, the Southern Area Army staff sent a message to commands reminding them that 

in “view of the enemy’s recent actions in preparation for chemical warfare, be very careful 

not to give them any excuse for using gas and not to do anything that might lead to 

chemical warfare. This is an order.”62 In August 1944, the Japanese Army command 

in Burma notified its subordinates that it had obtained intelligence from intercepted 

Chinese Army communications that the Americans were warning the Chinese that the 

Japanese were planning to use bacteriological weapons.63

During the war, Japan exchanged information with Germany on research into poison 

gases, as well as on chemical protection methods and equipment.64 Japan also sought 

intelligence about U.S. chemical warfare capabilities and plans. It was common for 

Japanese intelligence officers to interrogate captured Americans about the latest U.S. 

developments in this field. In April 1944, one interrogation yielded information about the 

capabilities of U.S. bombers to deliver gas, the colors used to distinguish various poison 

gases, and even locations of chemical warfare plants in Utah, Texas, and Maryland.65

As the war progressed, the Japanese became convinced that the United States would 

use chemical weapons against them. In March 1944, major Japanese commands in 

Singapore and Rangoon were urging local commanders to complete all defensive 

preparations and training as soon as possible. Their intelligence reported the presence of 

Allied chemical weapons stockpiles in Hawaii, New Guinea, and Guadalcanal. They may 

have even consulted their own report on chemical warfare in China, titled “Chemical 

Warfare Learned in the China Incident.”66

By 1945, full-scale preparations were underway in Japan for chemical warfare. In the 

Southern Fleet and army commands in the Dutch East Indies, commands were urged to 
144 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

prepare for Allied chemical attacks. The Japanese feared U.S. chemical warfare capability 

even though their examination of captured Allied equipment and the interrogation of 

POWs suggested the United States was not preparing to use such weapons.67 In June 

1945, the navy in the Southern Fleet completed an inventory of equipment. The Imperial 

navy had on hand over 32,000 gas masks and 3,000 sets of protective suits for 40,000 

sailors and civilians.68 COMINT indicated that the Japanese military had a limited 

number of mortar-propelled gas shells available.

Tokyo ordered naval commands to prepare to secure from chemical attack all 

underground operational bunkers, airbases, Kamikaze bases, gun emplacements, 

observations posts, storage areas, and depots. Defensive measures included special 

rollup curtains and ventilation systems. All troops were to be trained in the use of the 

equipment.69

After Japan surrendered, some Japanese units were ordered by senior commands 

to destroy all chemical warfare materials, even including gas masks, “without a trace.” 

Some commands were even ordered by their superiors to “burn this telegram once 

you understand it.”70 On August 24, 1945, the Navy Ministry ordered various navy 

units and installations to make an inventory of all types of defensive equipment such as 

masks, detectors, and decontamination sets. The 2nd China Fleet responded that it had 

some 55,000 pieces of such gear on hand.71 However, from the COMINT, the Allies 

could not determine the nature and inventory of Japan’s chemical warfare stockpiles and 

capabilities. 

Notes

1. For example, Ronald Spector’s Eagle against the Sun (New York: Vintage Books, 1985) refers 

to translation series, but does not use them. Ronald Lewin’s The American Magic: Codes 

Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1982) relies on the 

MAGIC Diplomatic Summaries. The Invasion of Japan by John Skates (Columbia: University 

of South Carolina Press, 1994) uses Southwest Pacific and Ultra Summaries. Edward Drea 

used summaries and the specialized research histories (srh) based on translations in his 

MacArthur’s Ultra: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942–45 (Lawrence, KS: 

University Press of Kansas, 1992). Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida used mainly srhs and 

record collections known as srmns in their study of Japanese submarines, The Japanese 

Submarine Force and World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute press, 1995). 

On the other hand, some histories have utilized individual translations. These include 

Gerhard Weinberg’s A World at Arms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), the 

late Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), John Winton’s 
Wartime COMINT Records I 145

Ultra in the Pacific (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), Linda Goetz Holmes’ Unjust Enrichment: 

How Japan’s Companies Built Postwar Fortunes Using American POWs (Mechanicsburg, 

PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), and Carl Boyd’s Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima 

Hirsohi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945 (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 

1993). John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: A Secret History of American Intelligence and 

the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995), makes very limited 

use of translations.

2. For a description of these steps and how they applied to the war in Europe, see Robert 

Hanyok, “Western Communications Intelligence System and the Holocaust” in U.S. 

Intelligence and the Nazis (Washington, DC: National Archives Trust Fund Board for the 

Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, 

2004), 443–53.

3. Drea, MacArthur’s Ultra, 52–53.

4. SIS, “Allocation of Japanese Army Traffic Analysis Studies,” March 1944 “Agenda and 

Minutes of Second Conference on Japanese Army Communications,” NA, RG 457, entry 

9032, box 1130, folder 3633. 

5. ACSI, The Achievements of the Signal Security Service in World War II (Washington, DC: G-2, 

WDGS, 1946), 13

6. “Proposed Revision of Japanese Army Monitoring Assignments,” 12 December 1944. 

7. Memorandum, “Short Statement on the Survey of Schedules of all Cryptographic Systems 

Available for Analysis in B Branch,” 3 September 1943, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1018, 

F3229, Coordination Section Correspondence and Reports.

8. Memorandum, From: Naval Inspector General, To: Secretary of the Navy, Serial 001971, 

“Survey of OP-20-G Section of Naval Communications Division of the Bureau of Naval 

Personnel which Procures Uniformed Naval Personnel,” 13 July 1945, NA, RG 457, HCC, 

box 1286, Item 23 (d).

9. ACSI, The Achievements of the Signal Security Service, p. 13 and Appendix “Bulletin 

production.”

10. Frank Rowlett, The Story of Magic: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer (Laguna 

Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1998), 253–54.

11. “MAGIC” was the covername applied to translations of Japanese diplomatic messages 

encrypted by the PURPLE cipher machine. The summaries acquired the title MAGIC 

because of the preponderance of digests of MAGIC translations in the early summaries. 

Sometimes, these translations made up 100 percent of the summary. In most cases, they 

accounted for 75–90 percent of all digested items. 

12. These translations were completed from about September 1945 through January 1946. 

Interestingly, these translations were completed at the same time as the Joint Congressional 
146 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Committee held hearings investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor. But the translations were 

not entered as evidence. 

13. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

14. Department of Defense, The MAGIC Background to Pearl Harbor, 8 vols. (Washington, DC: 

USGPO, 1977).

15. Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 

Congress of the United States, 79th Congress pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution 

no. 27 authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, 

and events and circumstances relating thereto (Washington DC: GPO, 1946), 39 vols. and 

report. 

16. Keelung to Manila and Singapore, J-24909A-P, 22 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 

9032, box 1178.

17. Michael Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), 

208–9.

18. SRH 280, An Exhibit of the Important Types of Intelligence Recovered through Reading Japanese 

Cryptograms (Fort George G. Meade: National Security Agency, 1983), 1–2.

19. Drea, MacArthur’s Ultra, 76, 106–7. 

20. For example, Berlin (Oshima) to Tokyo, 12 March 1944, SIS # 114434, NA, RG 457, entry 

9032, box 402.

21. Frank Raven and H. Campaigne, “Japan, Naval Attaché Cryptosystem JNA-20 (Coral) 

History,” OP-20-G. 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1355, folder 4155.

22. “BJ” stood for either “black jumbo,” or “blue jacket.” The British also used the term 

“composition” or “composite” (shortened to “C”) to describe a translation. On many 

intelligence bulletins the notation “BJC” can be found denoting that this was a British 

translation.

23. Who was not targeted? Small states like San Marino and Andorra. Interestingly, messages of 

nongovernmental organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and 

the Jewish Agency for Palestine were intercepted because they were carried on the circuits of 

countries such as Switzerland. 

24. “Sources of Titles of Reports Received in Document Section of I&L Branch, SPSIR-7,” 

19 February 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1432, folder: “Sources of Titles and 

Reports.”

25. That entry 9030, the original versions of the Diplomatic Summaries, is kept in fewer boxes 

(18) than the redacted versions in 9006 (19) is not a surprise. The redacted versions were 

copies made on thicker paper. The originals were on thinner carbon paper. 

26. CINCPAC Intelligence Bulletin, 5 November 1944, 050255, NA, RG 457, entry 9002, 

SRMN-013. 
Wartime COMINT Records I 147

27. Special Intelligence Bulletin, # 293, 24 February 1944, and # 296, 27 February 1944, 

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, 

NA, RG 457, entry 9002, SRH-203.

28. RED Machine Translations, Tokyo to Washington, 24 May 1938, NA, RG 457, entry 9027, 

box 3, No. 2030.

29. The terms referenced in the provision usually were translated to mean “as the situation 

arises.” In a later statement, the Japanese stated that any situation that might occur 

regarding prisoners would be observed without any “effect [on] Japanese law in force.” U.S. 

Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. 1, General, British 

Commonwealth, the Far East (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1960), 792, 796.

30. Navy Translation, JN-3: 2317, 30 December 1942, and Menado To Pinrang, J-5257A-C, 29 

November 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1154.

31. ACSI, G-2, MAGIC Diplomatic Summary (hereafter referred to as “DS”), 20 March 1942, 

NA, RG 457, entry 9030, box 1.

32. DS, 2 June 1942, NA, RG 457, entry 9030, box 1.

33. Japanese Air Force translation, F-15121-C, Kanchanburi to Taihoku, 7 April 1944, NA, RG 

457, entry 9032, box 646.

34. MND (Multinational Diplomatic) Translations, Tokyo To Saigon, 15 February 1945, H167851, and Saigon to Tokyo, 23 February 1945, H-168856, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, 

boxes 469 and 470.

35. Kanburi to Tokyo, J-26099A, 26 August 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1179.

36. Tokyo to Manila, J-24500A-B, 9 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1177.

37. Singapore to Tokyo, F-36346, 3 May 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 672.

38. Saigon to Tokyo, J-79202A-B, 15 January 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1242.

39. Manila to Tokyo, J-79210A-B, 29 December 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1242.

40. Manila to Tokyo, J-83042, 31 December 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1246.

41. Keelung to Manila and Singapore, J-24909A-O, 22 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 

9032, box 1178.

42. Some of these include: MND Translations, Bangkok to Bern, 6 October 1944, SIS 

#1466190, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 442; Tokyo to Saigon, 13 November 1944, SIS 

#155528, box 453; and Bern to Tokyo, 17 February 1945, H-168286, box 469. 

43. Bangkok to Bern (Political Interests), SMM 8142, 9 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 

9032, box 888. For more on this episode, see Holmes, Unjust Enrichment, 98–112. 

44. For more on this order and excerpts see Holmes, Unjust Enrichment, 115–17.

45. Tacloban, Philippines, JC-14618 (JMCA 7519 XAT), 19 May 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 

9032, box 1166.

46. Singapore to Saigon, J-104299, 1 September 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1271; 
148 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Singapore to Batavia, J-105770A-B, 21 October 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 

1273.

47. Tokyo to Singapore, J-102444A-D, 30 August 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1269.

48. Far East MAGIC Summary, No. 517, 20 August 1945, Item 9, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, 

box 760.

49. RED Machine Translation, Washington to New York, 10 December 1937, SIS #1105, NA, 

RG 457, entry 9027, box 2.

50. RED Machine Translations, Tokyo to Washington, 23 December 1937, SIS #1185, and 17 

January 1938, SIS #1263, inter alia, NA, RG 457, entry 9027, box 2.

51. Don Muang to Manila, J-28886, 8 September 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1182; 

Singapore to Bangkok, J-84808A, 8 July 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1248; and 

Rabaul to Tokyo, F-15948A, E, 3 May 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 646.

52. Piru to Pinrang, F-39654A-D, 26 November 1944, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 675.

53. Multinational Diplomatic Translation, Hanoi to Tokyo (GEA), 19 February 1944, SIS 

#111803, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 398.

54. Multinational Diplomatic Translation, Hanoi to Tokyo, 6 April 1944, SIS #156467, NA, 

RG 457, entry 9032, box 455.

55. MND Translations, Saigon to Tokyo, 8 December 1944, H-157032, and Tokyo to Saigon, 

9 December 1944, H-156819, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 455.

56. MND Translation, Saigon to Tokyo, 23 November 1944, H-153457, NA, RG 457, entry 

9032, box 451.

57. Moulmein To Saigon, 7 June 1945, J-96533C-d, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1263.

58. Hanoi to Saigon, J-102448, 15 June 1945, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1269.

59. Chungking to Stockholm, 17 November 1944, H-153947, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 

451.

60. RED Machine Translation, Tokyo to London, 11 November 1937, SIS #1013-A, NA, RG 

457, entry 9027, box 2.

61. Tokyo to Rabaul, 6 March 1945, J-97280, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1265.

62. Manila to Salup, 15 July 1944, NA, RG 38, #2, “Translations of Intercepted Enemy Radio 

Traffic and Miscellaneous World War II Documentation, 1940–1946,” box 915. Also, see 

Manila to Menado, 15 July 1944, F-39760A-B, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 675.

63. Burma to Hankow, J-64269, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1224.

64. Tokyo to Berlin, 4 October 1944, NA, RG 457, #2, “Translations,” box 914.

65. Tokyo to Berlin, 22 April 1944, H-186143, NA, RG 38, #2, “Translations,” box 915.

66. Pinrang to Saigon, 15 January 1945, J-26479, NA, RG 457, entry 9032, box 1180.

67. Commander 13th Base Force to CINC 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 22 June 1945, 

FRUPAC 221702-DISC-DI, NA RG 38, #2, “Translations,” box 914.
Wartime COMINT Records I 149

68. CINC 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet to CINC 10th Area Fleet, 7 June 1945, NA, RG 

38, #2. “Translations,” box 914.

69. Tokyo Communications Unit to Circular, 17 June 1945, GZ #3540-H-DI, NA, RG 38, #2. 

“Translations,” box 914.

70. Commander 23rd Base Force to Menado Detachment, 23rd Special Base Force, 17 August 

1944, and 24 August 1944, NA, RG 38, #2, “Translations,” box 914.

71. Matsushima Base to Navy Ministry, 1 September 1945, NA, RG 38, #2, “Translations,” box 

914.
150 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Operations of The 

Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHA, SWPA, Volume V, Intelligence Series, 1948, pp 55, 64.
6

The Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records 

Relating to War Crimes, 1942–1945

Greg Bradsher

On the morning of September 3, 1945, Col. Sidney Mashbir, chief of the U.S. Army’s 

Allied Translator and Interpretor Section (ATIS), confronted Okazaki Katsuo from Japan’s 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs with grisly and compelling evidence of extensive Japanese war 

crimes against civilians and POWs.1 Mashbir produced Japanese military orders to burn 

to death Filipino men, women, and children, and showed Okazaki photographs of the 

horrors of Manila. Okazaki, pale and shaken, asked Mashbir if the United States had the 

names of the Japanese soldiers responsible for the atrocities. 

“You’re damn right,” replied Mashbir. “Depend on it: you will be very shortly called 

upon to turn them over to us for punishment.”2 

How the United States was able to produce such evidence the day after Japan’s formal 

surrender is the topic of this chapter. 

From early in the war, the U.S. military was prepared to collect, analyze, interpret, 

and disseminate captured documentation. Information from captured Japanese records 

supported intelligence and other military purposes during the war, and it was compiled 

with an eye toward postwar prosecution of war criminals.3 As a result, by the end of the 

war, ATIS had processed over 350,000 captured documents, thousands of which related 

to war crimes (see facing page for the cover of one such report). 

Established in Australia by Gen. Douglas MacArthur in September 1942, ATIS was 

the largest translation and interrogation operation in the Pacific and Far East Theaters. 

By war’s end, its Translation Section employed over 780 personnel. Similar operations 

included the Sino Translation and Interrogation Center in China; the Southeast 

Asia Translation and Interrogation Center in India, Burma, and Thailand; the Joint 

Intelligence Center/Pacific Ocean Areas; the Alaska Defense Command; the Combat 

Intelligence Center/South Pacific; and the United States Army Forces in the South 

Pacific Area (SWPA). Because most of the war-crimes–related records were captured 
152 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

in the Southwest Pacific Area and in Japan, this chapter will concentrate on the work 

of ATIS. 

ATIS and War Crimes Documentation 1942–1944

In August 1942, not long after the Americans began operations in New Guinea and 

the Solomon Islands, they began to capture numerous Japanese military orders, diaries, 

and field notebooks that contained evidence of Japanese atrocities. ATIS, as well as 

the Combat Intelligence Center and the U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, 

began translating and publishing these documents, making them widely available to U.S. 

military and intelligence organizations. 

On December 25, 1942, ATIS received the diary of a Japanese commander who was 

captured south of Gorari, New Guinea. In his October 19, 1942, entry, the commander 

documented the gradual starvation of his platoon and their frantic efforts to get food. He 

then noted that meat had been carved from a dead American prisoner. He concluded, 

“This is the first time I have ever tasted human flesh—and it was very tasty.” ATIS 

quickly published this first documentary evidence of cannibalism.4 Similar reports soon 

followed. 

In February 1943, MacArthur asked Brig. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, his G2 (Intelligence) chief, to provide him with materials relevant to Japanese war crimes. 

Willoughby turned to Mashbir for this information. Mashbir produced several ATIS 

reports and preliminary interrogative material related to cannibalism, torture, and other 

war crimes.5 During 1943 and 1944, ATIS continued to receive evidence of Japanese 

atrocities such as beheadings, vivisection, and cannibalism. ATIS published all of it. 

During 1942 and early 1943, the Australian government received numerous reports 

of Japanese breaches of the rules of warfare. In response to these reports, the Australians 

created the Commission of Inquiry into Japanese Forces Atrocities. In early March 1944, 

the Commission asked the Americans to compile all references to atrocities committed 

by the Japanese Armed Forces. In response, ATIS produced “Japanese Violations of the 

Laws of War” (published originally as ATIS Information Bulletin No. 14).6 

During April and early May 1944, ATIS received extensive evidence of Japanese 

atrocities against American POWs, Philippine civilians, and others, including a report 

that Japanese forces massacred seventeen Americans at Panay and two Filipinos captured 

in the Hollandia area. Some victims were decapitated. On May 11, 1944, Willoughby 

asked the Staff Judge Advocate, United States Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE) to 

recommend procedures for accumulating evidence for war crimes prosecutions. Two 

days later, the Acting Staff Judge Advocate suggested creating a board to conduct quasijudicial investigations of the war crimes cases.7

 
Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records I 153

With this response, Willoughby wrote the Adjutant General that atrocity cases and 

reports were accumulating in such numbers that there needed to be an agency specially 

charged with handling them. “Otherwise,” he informed Col. Bonner Fellers, Army G3 Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, “evidence available now or at some future 

date will not be discovered or will be lost ... before trial will be held.” Willoughby 

recommended that the atrocity file and responsibility for developing atrocity cases for 

trial be charged to the Judge Advocate General, USAFFE, under the supervision of the 

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.8 

On May 18, 1944, Fellers wrote to Gen. Sutherland, Chief of Staff GHQ/SWPA, 

that ATIS had already examined evidence sufficient to support the charges of war crimes 

against certain Japanese POWs and asked the Judge Advocate, USAFFE, to draft an 

order establishing a War Crimes Board to investigate and develop atrocity cases. The 

Judge Advocate drafted the order very quickly, and the War Crimes Board was formally 

established in August 1944.9

ATIS provided the Board with information about the identification of Japanese war 

criminals and furnished the Board with approximately 1,200 pages of translations. In 

addition, ATIS officers helped gather evidence from prisoners, and they testified before 

the Board about war crimes.10

In October 1943, seventeen Allied nations created the United Nations Commission 

for the Investigation of War Crimes (subsequently called the United Nations War 

Crimes Commission, or UNWCC) to help identify war criminals, coordinate the war 

crimes investigations, and determine if there was sufficient evidence available to bring 

individuals to trial for war crimes. Member nations reported all crimes committed 

against any United Nations national, decided which war crimes should be brought 

before the Commission, and supplied the Commission with the evidence required for 

prosecution. If the Commission found that there was a prima facie case against any 

individual, it published his name on a list of alleged war criminals, thereby preparing 

for his apprehension and prosecution by one of the National War Crimes Offices of the 

member states. The Commission’s Far Eastern Subcommission investigated Japanese war 

crimes. The Commission itself was not empowered to prefer charges. 

ATIS and War-Crimes–Related Publications 1944–1945

Because many Japanese units had served in China and elsewhere in Asia before coming 

to the Southwest Pacific Area, it is not surprising that some of the documents acquired 

by ATIS pertained to war crimes on the Asian mainland. One such document explained 

Japanese methods for obtaining intelligence in southern China: Soldiers were instructed to 

use threatening methods when rounding up Chinese, to secretly kill recalcitrant captives, 
154 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

and to intimidate village chiefs or other influential villagers until they cooperated. 

Soldiers were also instructed to bring 14- to 15-year-old boys to view corpses, threatening 

them with death if they did not cooperate. “These measures,” the instructions noted, 

“will make the necessary intelligence more accurate.”11

During late 1944 and early 1945, ATIS published Research Reports on Japanese 

tactics. For example, it published Research Report No. 84, “The Japanese and Bacterial 

Warfare,” in July 1944, and in January 1945 published Research Report No. 117, 

“Infringement of the Laws of War and Ethics by the Japanese Medical Corps,” which 

contained information on violations of the Geneva Conventions on the rules of warfare. 

Research Report No. 119, “Japanese Military Police Service,” published in February 

1945, included excerpts from captured documents on Japanese research and on use of 

bacterial warfare.12

Records and Reports Relating to Philippine Atrocities 1945

Just seven days after landing on Leyte Island in the Philippines in October 1944, American 

forces captured a file of Japanese documents classified Most Secret. One document 

instructed Japanese forces to kill POWs in an isolated area, “taking adequate precautions 

to ensure that no police or civilian eye-witnesses are present” and to “leave no evidence.” 

Furthermore, “undesirables among surrendered persons will be ... secretly [killed].”13

In late February 1945, Willoughby wrote to G-2 USAFFE that U.S. troops in Manila 

were capturing considerable documentary evidence of Japanese atrocities. In March 

1945, Willoughby received a memorandum about “the desperate and destructive defense 

of Manila,” which included brief descriptions of captured documents dating from January 

23 to February 15 that called for the destruction of the city,14 and contained photographs 

of atrocities in Manila.15 

Also in March 1945, MacArthur requested a formal report on the destruction of 

Manila and other Japanese atrocities.16 Willoughby again turned to ATIS for information 

on Japanese atrocities and violations of the rules of warfare. On March 24, Mashbir sent 

Willoughby a copy of ATIS Research Report No. 72, “Japanese Violations of the Laws 

of War,” Supplement No. 1, and a copy of Research Report No. 117, “Infringement of 

the Laws of War and Ethics by the Japanese Medical Corps.” Mashbir had already sent 

Willoughby a copy of “Japanese Atrocities on Prisoners and Civilians.”17 At the end of 

March, Willoughby sent copies of these publications to the War Department, the War 

Crimes Commission, and the Resident High Commissioner of the Philippines.18 

Willoughby produced for MacArthur a “Report on the Destruction of Manila and 

Japanese Atrocities, February 1945.” The report stated that the direct responsibility for 

the destruction of Manila “rests with the Japanese High Command and the government 
Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records I 155

of Japan, represented by the Emperor, while the people of Japan itself cannot ultimately 

escape the awful weight of moral participation and moral guilt.”19 The report included 

extracts from captured documents. One was a diary, presumably belonging to a member 

of Akatsuki 16709 Force, with entries from July 31, 1944, to February 21, 1945. The 

diary contained numerous accounts of the murder of Filipino guerrillas. 

The report also included extracts from the Manila Navy Defense Force and 

Southwestern Area Fleet Operation Orders, dated December 23, 1944, to February 14, 

1945. Among them was a February 8 battalion order that described the approved method 

of killing Filipino prisoners. These documents also contained a message book with orders 

and other documents of the Kobayashi Brigade. A February 13 entry noted that all 

people on the battlefield, with the exception of Japanese military personnel, Japanese 

civilians, and Special Construction Units, were to be killed.20

In early April 1945, Willoughby informed the G-2 of the 6th and 8th Armies that 

the original Japanese orders for the destruction of individuals and property, including 

diary extracts, should be carefully handled because they might become evidence for War 

Department claims.21 He asked the G-2 and ATIS to make copies of original captured 

Japanese documents relating to atrocities.22 ATIS complied. 

On April 10, 1945, MacArthur established a War Crimes Branch in the Judge 

Advocate General Section of HQ, USAFFE. By the end of April, the War Crimes Branch 

had taken charge of all ATIS material concerning atrocities. 

The War Crimes Branch used ATIS materials for a variety of purposes during the 

summer of 1945, such as to compile lists of names of suspected and identified war 

criminals, which the Army CIC used to apprehend these individuals.23

The State Department Confronts Japan

The Department of State also relied on ATIS information in its dealings with the Japanese 

government. In December 1941, the United States began confronting the Japanese (via 

the Swiss government) about the treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees.24

During the next four years, the United States sent Japan some 240 such messages.25 The 

State Department frequently cited “reliable sources,” which, in many instances, appear 

to be eyewitness accounts. Although the State Department was aware of documentary 

evidence of atrocities and mistreatment, it was disinclined to use it, possibly fearing it 

might compromise intelligence sources and methods. 

By mid-1944, the State Department, no longer hesitant to divulge the fact that the 

United States had captured Japanese documents, confronted the Japanese (through the 

Swiss) with information contained in the captured records. For example, in August 

1944, the United States informed Japan that it had conclusive evidence that an American 
156 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

airman captured by the Japanese in the Aitape area was tortured and decapitated by a 

Japanese civilian in the presence of three Japanese officers and fifteen Japanese soldiers. 

The United States charged the officers in charge with responsibility for the atrocity. Even 

though the names and location of the officers were included in the U.S. protest, the 

Japanese maintained that no units were in the area. 

The United States continued to pursue the issues. In September 1944, the State 

Department informed the Japanese government that it knew of an Imperial Japanese 

Army order, dated February 11, 1944, indicating that “captured enemy air personnel are 

not to be treated as prisoners of war, that they are to be separated from other prisoners, 

that after being searched they are to be handed over to the gendarmerie, and that they are 

to be severely punished excepting those who can be put to some special use.”26

The Japanese government denied the existence of the order.27 A February 8, 1945, 

Domei news report from Tokyo acknowledged numerous reports of neglect and 

mistreatment of American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese hands but 

dismissed them as “without foundation.”28 In response to continuing denials from Japan, 

the State Department gave Japan the full names of three Japanese officers whom the 

United States government charged with the murder of the American flier.29 On May 12, 

1945, the State Department conveyed to the Japanese that it had concrete evidence that 

the government of Japan was responsible for the murder of the airman: it possessed the 

order itself. 

Postwar Efforts to Acquire War-Crimes–Related Records 

Early in August 1945, when it appeared that Japan would soon surrender, the U.S. Army 

developed plans to seize and exploit Japanese records. However, once the Japanese emperor 

announced the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese military began a 

somewhat systematic effort to conceal or destroy documentation, especially incriminating 

evidence of war crimes.30 On August 14 and 15, 1945, high military and naval officials in 

Tokyo ordered units to destroy records.31 Additional instructions were issued in the days 

that followed. For example, on August 19, the Japanese Navy commander in the BorneoJava area issued a directive indicating that “anything concerned with natives which is 

disadvantageous from a diplomatic standpoint” was to be burned.32 Messages concerning 

the destruction of documents continued to be sent through August 21.33

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) reported in early September that Japanese military 

and business firms in Shanghai, China, had been systematically burning documents since 

August 12; and observers reorted that 108 sacks of papers were removed from Central 

Police Headquarters to be burned.34 In Bangkok, Thailand, the OSS was hampered in 

its investigation of war crimes during August 1945 because the Japanese had destroyed 
Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records I 157

records. According to an OSS report, “Copies of orders issued by Japanese Army pertaining 

to control of [POW] camps, photographs, and written accounts of atrocities recorded 

at the time of their occurrences are not available, because the Japanese in 1944, when 

the war was turning against them, ordered that all written material be destroyed.”35 On 

August 17, the 88th Division on Karafuto (Sakhalin Island) reported that “all confidential 

documents have been burned.”36 Many records, including those relating to biological 

warfare, were destroyed the second week of August in Manchuria.37 A U.S. Navy war 

crimes investigation on Wake Island resulted in a report that noted that “no written records 

concerning the American prisoners on Wake Island now exist on Wake Island. The report 

recommended searching the Japanese naval records at the Navy Ministry in Tokyo for 

reports concerning the death of American prisoners on the island.38

U.S. military authorities reported in September 1945 that Japanese officials had 

destroyed all documents at Sasebo Naval Air Station and aircraft factory before Allied 

landings. They reported that the Air General Army Headquarters had taken similar 

action, and that documents had also been destroyed at Yokosuka Naval Air Station on 

August 15. The Chief Inspector at Nagasaki stated that he was ordered to destroy all 

classified information on August 15.39 In October, the 6th Army noted that original 

records relating to pre-demobilization and current strengths had in some cases been 

destroyed by order of the Japanese Navy and Army authorities.40 Other records were 

destroyed in the Hiroshima atomic bomb attack, and Maj. Gen. Miyoshi Yasuyuki, chief 

of Staff, Central Army, believed that subordinates destroyed all other records, but he could 

not obtain information about records due to “the deplorable state of communications in 

the Japanese Army at present.”41 Some records had been destroyed during the war, often 

from air raids, such as was the case with some Japanese Foreign Ministry Records and 

those of the Indian National Army stored in Tokyo.42

While many documents were destroyed, others remained to be captured. Immediately 

upon occupying Japan, China, and other areas held by the Japanese, Allied forces began 

securing records vital for war crimes investigations and intelligence. In Shanghai, China, 

U.S. military forces found the court-martial records relating to Doolittle flyers executed 

by the Japanese.43 Southeast Asia Command Field Security Sections in September 

1945 in Singapore seized important documentary evidence of war crimes, including 

photographs showing captured Indian soldiers being executed for refusing to join with 

Subhas Chandra Bose, who sought to free India from British imperialism by working 

with the Japanese to build the Indian National Army.44 OSS Counter Intelligence (X-2) 

personnel in Rangoon, Burma, confiscated from the former Japanese Embassy a mass of 

documentation on the kenpeitai (Japanese military police), Japanese political intelligence 

organizations, spy schools, and other political and intelligence organizations.45 In 
158 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Baguio, on Luzon, Allies found records of Japanese military courts on the arrest and 

trial of Filipinos, Chinese, and a few Japanese soldiers and civilians that “throw a sharp 

light on Japanese military practices in occupied territories, their military courts, and the 

heavy and often merciless sentences.”46 OSS teams captured Japanese records secured in 

Mukden, Manchuria, including those of the Hoten Prisoner of War Camp.47 

Many of the records found during the fall of 1945 by the U.S. military in Japan had 

been hidden.48 Among those more readily available were records of the Japanese Prisoner 

of War Information Bureau. ATIS quickly began translating the records, and many that 

concerned the mistreatment of POWs and civilian internees were turned over to the 

International Prosecution Section (IPS) of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 

(SCAP).49 

The Washington Document Center (WDC), which was established by the Navy in 

1942 to translate captured Japanese documents, sent a 100-person unit to Japan in late 

1945. This WDC unit worked closely with ATIS to search for and seize specific records 

at each Japanese Ministry. During the winter of 1945–1946, it seized hundreds of 

thousands of documents; by the end of March 1946, it had sent over 419,000 documents 

back to Washington for intelligence exploitation.50 U.S. occupation authorities continued 

to seize and ship tens of thousands of documents, books, magazines, periodicals, and 

newspapers to the WDC in the following years, but the most important documentation 

was screened, processed, packed, and shipped early in 1946. Before shipping any 

documents to the WDC, the IPS and the SCAP legal staff were allowed to review and 

take records needed for their work. 51 

Willoughby established a document library in Tokyo to insure that Japanese documents 

requested by SCAP staff and others were readily available in a central depository. The 

library also housed selected Foreign Ministry documents that the Japanese wanted to 

remain in the theater. 

Initially, SCAP turned over many Foreign Ministry documents to the IPS for possible 

use as evidence in the war crimes trials in Asia. SCAP later shipped 1,500 of these 

documents to the WDC, including original texts of international treaties, agreements, 

and conventions with related correspondence and secret clauses; official Ministry studies 

on a variety of Japanese foreign and domestic issues; diplomatic histories; periodic 

reports; and information on international organizations such as the Red Cross, League of 

Nations, and the Communist Party.52 

PACMIRS and War Crimes Records 1945–1946

During the fall of 1945, the Pacific Military Intelligence Research Service (PACMIRS), 

located at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, translated and published captured documents it 
Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records I 159

had received from both the WDC and directly from American units in Asia. PACMIRS 

was flooded with documentation, much of which had no practical intelligence value in 

the postwar period. For example, by the end of August 1945, PACMIRS had received 

118,969 documents totaling 7,947,710 pages, of which 7,678,654 pages were found 

to have no value.53 Therefore, in September 1945, PACMIRS withdrew many current 

documents from processing and sent others to the Military Intelligence Service Language 

School at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, for translation and publication.

In late 1945, PACMIRS received a collection of captured Japanese records from 

Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center (SEATIC) Headquarters in 

Singapore, via the WDC. PACMIRS destroyed approximately 95 percent of these 

SEATIC documents, most likely during the first couple of months of 1946. It brought 

the remaining 5 percent to the WDC when it merged with the WDC in April 1946.54

A significant body of captured Japanese records that had come to PACMIRS from ATIS 

and other sources was also destroyed during 1945 and 1946.55

PACMIRS still had much valuable material left. From August through October 

1945, PACMIRS provided documents and translations, and undertook several special 

projects, including sending personnel to the Library of Congress to conduct research 

on Japanese ultra-nationalist organizations.56 It provided war crimes information to the 

Eastern Division of the War Department’s War Crimes Office. At the behest of the 

Division, PACMIRS officers looked for certain types of documentary evidence needed in 

the preparation for war crimes trials and obtained documents on short notice in response 

to specific requests.57 

Beginning in mid-November 1945, PACMIRS published the PACMIRS War Crimes 

Information Series, which contained translations of one or more documents, grouped 

together by topic, that might have some bearing on war crimes investigations. By April 

9, 1946, PACMIRS had published twenty issues. Seven of the first eight publications in 

this series related to the Philippines. These were published between November 13, 1945, 

and March 8, 1946.58 Two publications of this series dealt with views of Japanese leaders 

as expressed in magazine articles and speeches.59 One publication dealt with nationalist 

organizations and their leaders.60 

In some instances, translation and publication were undertaken at the request of 

the War Crimes Office, established by the War Department in 1944 to support U.S. 

participation on the United Nations War Crimes Commission. The War Crimes Office 

had a particular interest in the Japanese military police. In August 1945, it asked 

PACMIRS to provide it with all copies of all ATIS reports or other documents pertaining 

to the Japanese Military Police, especially regarding its organization structure and staff 

names.61 
160 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

The War Crimes Office was also interested in obtaining information about Allied 

POWs (especially those held at Mukden) and civilian internees. PACMIRS published 

three War Crimes Information Series reports relating to these topics. The first, published 

in early March 1946, consisted of translations of four documents dated 1943 to 1945 

from the Medical Office at Mukden Prisoner of War Camp.62 The second publication 

provided information on the death of 184 Allied prisoners (all but three were American) 

at Mukden between 1942 and 1945.63 The third was a list of Japanese military and 

civilian personnel at Mukden Prisoner of War Camp. PACMIRS also published several 

Technical Service Translations, some of which addressed Japanese biological warfare.64

PACMIRS Bulletin 80A, published in March 1946, identified documents that PACMIRS 

acquired after the war ended.65

ATIS and War-Crimes–Related Work in the Philippines and Japan 

1945 

The American trials began in the Philippines in the fall of 1945. To prepare for these trials, 

ATIS organized and disseminated evidence for war crimes trials.66 In September 1945, 

USAFFE Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Marshall instructed ATIS and intelligence 

agencies operating in the theater to turn over to the USAFFE War Crimes Branch all 

material pertinent to war crimes. Shortly afterward, Willoughby informed Marshall that 

“ATIS cooperation and records are proving invaluable to War Crimes in the completion 

of its mission.”67 Mashbir reported on September 22 that the United Nations War 

Crimes Commission had a representative with ATIS for ten days, and that every possible 

aid had been given the Commission in its research. Copies of all ATIS Research Reports 

dealing with atrocities, including Research Report No. 72, Supplement No. 3, were in 

the possession of the Commission.68

Based on documents seized in Japan and documents captured earlier in the war, ATIS 

continued publishing Research Reports on various war-crimes–related topics during the 

occupation. On November 15, 1945, it published ATIS Research Report No. 120, 

“Amenities in the Japanese Armed Forces.” The report contained a lengthy section on 

Japanese field brothels.69

Trials began in the Philippines in the fall of 1945. Many Japanese who participated 

in or witnessed war crimes were dead. Therefore, the number of trials was not as large as 

it might have been. Nevertheless, more than five thousand Japanese were tried for war 

crimes. 

Although documents were submitted as evidence during the trials, documents were 

not used as extensively as they could have been because the prosecutors in most trials 

preferred statements and affidavits from eyewitnesses to or victims of Japanese war 
Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records I 161

crimes. But without the documents, the Allies would not have known about many 

specific crimes, criminals, and witnesses. The captured documents provided hard 

evidence for both Allied investigators establishing facts and for prosecutors preparing for 

and presenting their cases. 

General Willoughby acknowledged the accomplishments of ATIS and the Nisei 

translators, noting they “... saved over 1,000,000 American lives and shortened the 

war by two years ... they collected information on the battlefield, they shared death in 

battle ... in all they handled between two and three million Japanese documents. The 

information received through their special skills proved invaluable to our battle forces.” 

Notes

1. Greg Bradsher is preparing a comprehensive account of the capture, seizure, exploitation, 

and ultimate return of Japanese documents from World War II. This and the following 

chapter provide a summary of his preliminary findings.

2. Sidney F. Mashbir, I Was an American Spy (New York: Vantage Press, 1953), 333–34. 

3. The products of this thorough exploitation of the records—original documents, reports, 

analyses, descriptions, and investigative dossiers—remain among U.S. government records, 

only a small number of which are cited in the footnotes to this chapter. All of these records 

are available to researchers.

4. ATIS Spot Report No. 37, 25 December 1942, NA, RG 496, Records of General 

Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 134, 

box 650, folder: F.E.L.O. (location: 290/46/12/05).

5. Mashbir, 234; “Stories of Cannibalism Among Japanese Soldiers Appear Periodically in 

Documents and PW Statements,” No. 53, 31 January 1945, p. 19, NA, RG 165, Records 

of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 608, folder: Counter 

Intelligence Bulletin, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, Issue no. 49–55 (location: 

390/33/33/04); NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area 

and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 134, box 651, ATIS Documents Nos. 12595–

12596, folder: ATIS Significant Items 1–75 (location: 290/46/12/05); ATIS Bulletin No. 

1172, p. 10, ibid. 

6. Operations of the Intelligence Service SWPA, Vol. 5, Intelligence Series, 1948, pp. 55 and 64, 

NA, RG 200, National Archives Gift Collection Records, entry 23310, box 91 (location: 

130/76/5/3). Supplements Nos. I and II were published on 19 March 1945, and 23 June 

1945, respectively. 

7. Check Sheet, C.A. McV., G-2 to Judge Advocate General (Thru G-2 USAFFE), 11 May 

1944, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United 
162 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 186, box 860, folder 000.5 (location: 290/46/16/7); Check 

Sheet, Lt. Col. J.A. Myatt, JA, USAFFE to G-2, GHQ, 13 May 1944, ibid.; Memorandum, 

E.O.B.R, GHQ, SWPA to General Fitch, 21 December 1944, ibid.

8. Check Sheet, C.A.W. to G-1, Chief of Staff, 16 May 1944, NA, RG 496, Records of General 

Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 186, 

box 860, folder 000.5 (location: 290/46/16/07). 

9. Check Sheet, B.F.F., G-1 to Chief of Staff, 18 May 1944, NA, RG 496, Records of General 

Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 186, 

box 860, folder 000.5 (location: 290/46/16/07); Check Sheet, B.F.F., G-1 to Deputy Chief 

of Staff and Judge Advocate, USAFFE, 26 May 1944, ibid.; Check Sheet, Lt. Col. J.A. 

Myatt, Acting Staff Judge Advocate, JG, USAFFE to G-1, GHQ, 29 May 1944, ibid.; 

Memorandum, E.O.B.R, GHQ, SWPA to General Fitch, 21 December 1944, ibid. 

10. Operations of the Intelligence Service SWPA, Vol. 5, Intelligence Series, 1948, pp. 64, NA, 

RG 200, National Archives Gift Collection Records, entry 23310, box 91 (location: 

130/76/5/3). 

11. ATIS Enemy Publication No. 169 Intelligence Work and “Rounding Up,” 13 August 1944, 

pp. 12–15, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and 

United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 134, box 651, folder: ATIS Significant Items 1–75 

(location: 290/46/12/05).

12. NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 341, 

folder: ATIS Research Reports 82–85, Security-Classified Intelligence Reference Publications 

(“P” File), 1940–1945. 

13. In the original document, certain words were omitted and represented by an “o” or “oo” 

and were translated with an “x.” In the context of the document, it is clear that the omitted 

words were “kill,” “killed,” and “killing.” ATIS Bulletin No. 1703, pp. 24 and 25, NA, RG 

496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army 

Forces, Pacific, entry 134, box 651, folder: ATIS Significant Items 151–275 (location: 

290/46/12/5). 

14. Memorandum, [name illegible] to General Willoughby, 11 March 1945, NA, RG 496, 

Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, 

Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).

15. Memorandum, F.M.B., G-2 Advon to G-2, USAFEE, 7 March 1945, NA, RG 496, Records 

of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, 

entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).

16. Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA to G-1, G-3, G-4, C.Sig.O, O.C.E., 29 

March 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and 

United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).
Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records I 163

17. Memorandum, S.F.M., ATIS GHQ SWPA to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, 24 March 

1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United 

States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).

18. Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2 Section, GHQ SWPA to G-1, G-3, G-4, C.Sig.O, O.C.E., 29 

March 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and 

United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).

19. Report on the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities, p. 4, NA, RG 153, Records 

of the Judge Advocate General (Army), War Crimes Branch, JAG Law Library, 1944–1949, 

entry 135, box 64, folder FI l-376 (location: 270/1/16/7). 

20. Ibid., 55. 

21. Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2 Advon to G-2 6th and 8th Armies, 8 April 1945, NA, RG 496, 

Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, 

Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.9 (location: 290/46/5/7).

22. Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2, SWPA to G-2 6th Army, G-2 XIV Corps, ATIS, 19 April 

1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United 

States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.9 (location: 290/46/5/7).

23. Memorandum, Col. A.C.C., Acting Theater Judge Advocate thru G-2 to CIC, 18 August 

1945, NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United 

States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.9 (location: 290/46/5/7); 

Memorandum, C.A.McV., G-2 to OCCIO, 20 August 1945, ibid.; Memorandum, Lt. Col. 

C.A. McVittie, G-2, AFPAC to War Crimes Branch, Attn: Col. Carpenter, 21 August 1945, 

ibid.

24. Copies of many of these communications are contained in Letters Received, 1944–1951, 

NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Branch, 

entry 132, box 6 (location: 270/1/4/3).

25. “Japanese Atrocities: Report of the Department of State,” Department of State Bulletin, vol. 

13, no. 324, 9 September 1945, 347. 

26. NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, entry 132, box 6, folder: 

Charges and Documentary Evidence (location: 270/1/4/4).

27. Copy, Incoming Telegram, Huddle, American Legation, Bern to Secretary of State, No. 

8221, 19 December 1944, Letters Received, 1944–1951, NA, RG 153, Records of the 

Office of the Judge Advocate General, entry 132, box 6 (location: 270/1/4/3).

28. Copy, Telegram Sent, Secretary of State to American Legation, Bern No. 463, 11 February 

1944, Letters Received, 1944–1951, NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge 

Advocate General, entry 132, box 6 (location: 270/1/4/3).

29. Copy, Telegram, Secretary of State to American Legation, Bern, No. 1296, 31 March 1945, 

Letters Received, 1944–1951, NA, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate 
164 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

General, entry 132, box 6 (location: 270/1/4/3).

30. Incoming Telegram, Atcheson, Tokyo to Secretary of State, 28 September 1946, NA, 

RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, entry 205-H, box 7357 (location: 

250/38/26/2); Incoming Telegram, Atcheson, Tokyo to Secretary of State, 27 March 1947, 

ibid; Incoming Telegram, Sebald, Tokyo to Secretary of State, 21 January 1948, ibid; 

Incoming Airgram, Sebald, Tokyo to Secretary of State for Noble, 26 February 1948, ibid.; 

“History and Accomplishments of the Japanese Government Prisoner of War Information 

Bureau,” n.d., ca. 1 March 1953, p. 1, NA, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General’s 

Office, entry 363D, box 367, folder 314.4, Captured Records 1/1/51–12/31/52 (location: 

270/45/33/5). 

31. MAGIC Far East Summary, 16 August 1945, SRS 513, NA, RG 457, Records of the 

National Security Agency, entry 9001, box 7, file 17 (location: 190/36/13/5); MAGIC Far 

East Summary, 17 August 1945, SRS 514, ibid; General Headquarters, United States Army 

Forces in the Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, Staff, Ultra Intelligence Summary No. 

125, 15/17 August 1945, p. 1, NA, RG 457, Records of the National Security Agency, entry 

9002, SRH-203 Part 6 No. 1–137 (location: 190/36/10/5); General Headquarters, United 

States Army Forces in the Pacific, Military Intelligence Section, Staff, Ultra Intelligence 

Summary No. 126, 17/18 August 1945, p. 1, ibid. 

32. MAGIC Far East Summary, 20 August 1945, SRS 517, NA, RG 457, Records of the 

National Security Agency, entry 9001, box 7, file 17 (location: 190/36/13/5).

33. MAGIC Far East Summary, 21 August 1945, SRS 518, NA, RG 457, Records of the 

National Security Agency, entry 9001, box 7, file 17 (location: 190/36/13/5). 

34. OSS Report on the postwar situation in Kiangsu and Kwangtung, China, ID 197182, 4 

September 1945, Classified Numerical Series of Intelligence Documents (“ID” File), NA, 

RG 319, entry 85, box 1285 (location: 270/11/28/04). 

35. X-2 Branch Report, Subject: War Crimes, R.W. Lawson, Bangkok, 5 September 1945, NA, 

RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General (Army), entry 135, box 66, folder: Vol. I 

L-384 (report continues in folder: Vol. II L-384) (location: 270/1/7/1). 

36. MAGIC Far East Summary, 16 August 1945, SRS 513, NA, RG 457, Records of the 

National Security Agency, entry 9001, box 7, file 17 (location: 190/36/13/5).

37. Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the 

American Cover-up (revised edition) (New York: Routledge, 2002), 245. Despite the 

destruction of records in Manchuria, the Soviet Army seized most of the records of the 

Kwantung Army and some records of Gen. Ishii Shirō’s Epidemic and Portable Water Supply 

Unit (Unit 731). Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New 

York: Random House, 1999), 325. 

38. Lt. J.D. Phillips, USNR, Report of Investigation of Alleged War Crimes, p. 8, n.d., NA, 
Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records I 165

RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General (Army), entry 135, box 51, folder L-326 

(location: 270/1/6/6).

39. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 28 September 

1945, NA, RG 319 Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1344, folder MIS # 205421–

205430 (location: 270/11/31/2); Memorandum, W.R. Collins, Commanding General 

to the Commanding General, Fifth Marine Division, Subject: Destruction of Japanese 

Documents, Investigation of, 27 September 1945, NA, RG 127, Records of the U.S. Marine 

Corps, entry 1011, box 23, folder: Intelligence-Japanese (1 of 2) (location: 370/b/18/5).

40. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 15 October 1945, 

NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1377, folder MIS 209931–209940 

(location: 270/31/11/6).

41. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 21 October 1945, 

NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1386, folder MIS 21121–21130 

(location: 270/11/31/1).

42. Incoming Telegram, Tokyo to Secretary of State, 22 March 1947, NA, RG 59, General 

Records of the Department of State, entry 205-H, box 7357 (location: 250/38/26/2); 

Memorandum, Central Liaison Office, Tokyo to General Headquarters of the Supreme 

Commander for the Allied Powers, 5 January 1946, NA, RG 331, Records of the Allied 

Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Documents of the Indian 

National Army, entry 1150, box 440, folder 314-4 SCAP (location: 290/10/17/6). 

43. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 30 September 

1945, NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1357, folder MIS 207241–

207250 (location: 270/11/31/03).

44. Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan (Cambridge, England: Cambridge 

University Press, 2000), 370.

45. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War against Japan, 370–71.

46. GHQ SCAP and U.S. Army Forces Pacific, Summary of Daily Messages, 15 October 1945, 

NA, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff, entry 85A, box 1377, folder MIS 209931–209940 

(location: 270/11/31/06). 

47. Memorandum, Lt. Col. Harry M. Manser, Adjutant General, HQ Shanghai Base Command 

to Commanding General, United States Force, Manila, P.I., 25 October 25 1945, NA, RG 

496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army 

Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (290/46/7/7); Memorandum, C.A.W., G-2 

to Recovered Personnel (AFWESPAC), 21 November 1945, ibid.; PACMIRS Bulletin No. 

80A, 8 March 1946, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General, entry 135, box 

48, folder L-311 (location: 270/1/6/5).

48. Memorandum, Lt. Col. R.V. Smith, Chief, WDC (Adv) thru ATIS and WDIT to Assistant 
166 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Chief of Staff, G-2, SCAP, 22 December 1945, NA, RG 331, Records of the Allied 

Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, entry 1150, box 440, folder 

314.44 (location: 290/10/17/6). 

49. “History and Accomplishments of the Japanese Government Prisoner of War Information 

Bureau,” ca. 1 March 1953, p. 1, NA, RG 407, Records of the Adjutant General, entry 

363D, box 367, folder 314.4 Captured Records (location: 270/45/33/5); Memorandum, 

Adjutant General’s Office to Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP, 15 December 1945, NA, RG 

331, Records of the Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, entry 

1237, box 1262A, folder 313 (location: 290/11/30/6); Memorandum, Legal Section, GHQ, 

SCAP to Adjutant General’s Office, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, 26 December 1945, ibid. 

50. Included in the shipments to the WDC were medical reports relating to bacteriological 

research prepared between 1934 and 1944 by Japanese Army medical personnel, including 

Gen. Iishi. General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section,

Operations of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, GHQ, SWPA, Vol. 5, Intelligence 

Series (Tokyo: GHQ, FEC, 1948) in NA, RG 200, General Charles A. Willoughby Files, 

box 91 (location: 130/76/5/3). Foreign Documents Branch, CIA, Translation 102, 12 

January 1948 (2 vols.), “Reports on Japanese Bacteriological Research”, NA RG 38, Chief of 

Naval Operations, entry 182, box 69 (location: 370/15/22/6). 

51. In December 1945, the International Prosecution Section was established as a staff section 

of SCAP, under the direction of Joseph B. Keenan, to handle the prosecution before the 

International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

52. Memorandum, I. Ota to General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 

26 May 1949, NA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, entry 1220, box 1, 

folder D-1.1 (Documents-Japanese [captured]) (location: 250/49/8/4).

53. Military Intelligence Service, Pacific MIRS Monthly Report for March 1945, p. 4, AGAR-S1444, NA, RG 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, entry 282BB, 

box 4 (location: 190/19/33/04); Military Intelligence Service, Pacific MIRS Monthly Report 

for August 1945, p. 4, AGAR-S-1455A, ibid.

54. Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Sibert, CIA to Chief, Division of Foreign Activity 

Correlation, 30 December 1947, NA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 

entry 205-H, box 7357 (location: 250/38/26/2). 

55. NA, RG 319, Army Staff, Intelligence (G-2), entry 47D, box 240, folder MIS 314.4 

Japan, [1] memo Lash for Ennis, 10 October 1947, with added comment [2] Willoughby 

Attn Ennis, 30 October 30 1947 and [3] Ennis to CINCFE, 8 January 1948 (location: 

270/6/15/1).

56. Memorandum, Lt. Col. B.E. Sackett, War Crimes Branch, Manila, GHQ US Army Forces, 

Pacific to Brig. John W. Weir, and others, Subject: Coordination of War Crimes Activities 
Exploitation of Captured and Seized Japanese Records I 167

Between Washington and Manila, 18 October 1945, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge 

Advocate General (Army), entry 145, box 12, folder: book-1 103-B (location: 270/2/12/4); 

Memorandum, C.B. Warren, Jr., to Director, War Crimes Office, Subject: Facilities and 

Personnel Available for War Crimes Assistance in Pacific Theaters, 29 November 1945, ibid.; 

Military Intelligence Service, Pacific MIRS Monthly Reports, Aug., Sept., & Oct. 1945, 

NA, RG 242, Foreign Records Seized, entry 282BB, box 12 (location: 190/19/33/4).

57. Originally organized as the War Crimes Office in October 1944 under the Judge Advocate 

General, its functions were transferred to the Civil Affairs Division in March 1946 and the 

name changed to the War Crimes Branch. On 1 January 1949, the function returned to the 

JAG and the name reverted to War Crimes Office. 

58. PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series No. 1, Monthly Reports on Military Internment 

and Prisoners of War in the Philippines, 13 November 1945; No. 2, Roster of the Japanese 

Fourteenth Army Military Police Unit [Philippines], 6 December 1945; No. 4, Combat 

Reports: Third Phase of Philippine Mopping-Up Operations [first six months of 1943], 

10 December 1945; No. 5, The Philippine Press and Government in March 1942, 11 

December 1945, all in NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special 

Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, nos. 1–5 

(location: 390/34/23/2); No. 6, Field Military Police Duties and Situation Problems and 

Names of Japanese Military Police in the Philippines, 13 December 1945; No. 7, Names 

of Philippine Officials and Mayors, 4 January 1946; No. 8, Report on the Activities of 

Indians Living in the Philippines, 8 March 1946, all in NA, RG 165, Records of the War 

Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes 

Information Series, nos. 6–9 (location: 390/34/23/2). 

59. PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series No. 3, Articles by Prominent Japanese on the 

Greater East Asia War, 7 December 1945; PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series No. 12, 

Speeches by Prominent Japanese on the Greater East Asia War, 15 March 1946; NA, RG 

165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: 

PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, nos. 1–5 (location: 390/34/23/2); PACMIRS 

War Crimes Information Series No. 12, Speeches by Prominent Japanese on the Greater East 

Asia War, 15 March 1946, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and 

Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, nos. 

13–20 (location: 390/34/23/2).

60. PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series No. 10, Japanese Nationalist Organizations and 

Their Leaders, 8 March 1946, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and 

Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1821, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, no. 

10 (location: 390/34/23/2);

61. Memorandum, Col. Abe McGregor Goff, Assistant Director, War Crimes Office to Chief, 
168 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

PACMIRS, Subject: Japanese Military Police, 20 August 1945, NA, RG 153, Records 

of the Judge Advocate General (Army), entry 145, box 110, folder 116-11 (location: 

270/2/14/5).

62. PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series No. 9, Medical Records, Mukden Prisoner of War 

Camp, 8 March 1946, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special 

Staffs, entry 79, box 1820, folder: PACMIRS: War Crimes Information Series, nos. 6–9 

(location: 390/34/23/2).

63. PACMIRS War Crimes Information Series No. 11, Death of Allied Prisoners in Mukden 

Prisoner of War Camp, 8 March 1946, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General 

(Army), entry 135, box 49 (location: 270/1/6/5).

64. PACMIRS Technical Service Translations, NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department 

General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 1819, folders: PACMIRS Technical Service 

Translations 1–34 (location: 270/34/23/2). 

65. PACMIRS Bulletin No. 80A, 8 March 1946, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate 

General (Army), entry 135, box 48, folder 4 (location: 270/1/6/5); Memorandum, Maj. 

Gen. O.P. Nichols, Director, Civil Affairs Division, to Col. Joseph V. Hodgson, US 

Commission, United Nations War Crimes Commission, Subject: PACMIRS Bulletin No. 

80A, 25 March 1946, NA, RG 153, Records of the Judge Advocate General (Army), entry 

145, box 110, folder 116-11 (location: 270/2/14/5).

66. Memorandum, W.C.H., Executive Officer, ATIS to Coordinator, ATIS, 8 September 1945, 

NA, RG 496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States 

Army Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7). 

67. Memorandum, Lt. Col. Kenneth C. Schwartz, Acting Executive Officer, War Crimes 

Branch, Thru G-2 to Deputy Chief of Staff, 19 September 1945, NA, RG 496, Records of 

General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army Forces, Pacific, entry 

40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7). 

68. Memorandum, S.F.M, ATIS GHQ to Col. F.T. Armstrong, 22 September 1945, NA, RG 

496, Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area and United States Army 

Forces, Pacific, entry 40, box 310, folder 319.1 (location: 290/46/5/7).

69. ATIS Research Report no. 120, 15 November 1945, NA, RG 165, Records of the War 

Department General and Special Staffs, entry 79, box 342, folder: ATIS Research Reports 

117–121 (location: 390/33/28/1). 
7

A “Constantly Recurring Irritant”: Returning Captured 

and Seized Japanese Records, 1946–1961

Greg Bradsher

Many Americans believe that the United States indiscriminately returned to the 

Japanese government incriminating records confiscated from Japan during World War 

II and the subsequent Allied occupation. The documentation, however, shows that the 

decisions regarding the return of the records to Japan were debated and coordinated at 

the responsible levels of government. This chapter outlines the complex story.1 

Captured and seized Japanese documents in U.S. government custody were held by 

several government agencies at locations in Washington and in Japan that changed during 

the fifteen years after the war. Some of the Japanese documents were returned early in 

the 1950s, some not until the 1960s, and some were integrated into U.S. records and 

are retained in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The 

body of “captured” records usually referred to when discussing the returned documents 

is the largest single body of materials, those held by the Washington Document Center 

(WDC), which it transferred to the National Archives in the late 1940s and which the 

government returned to Japan beginning in 1958. 

In addition, however, the U.S. government held other records that were returned 

to Japan after being used in Japan for administrative, intelligence, and war crimes 

prosecution purposes. The records in this second category were administered and 

returned in a more ad hoc fashion than the more formal treatment of the main body of 

captured records. It is possible here only to touch on the highlights of administration of 

these records, namely certain of the Japanese Foreign Ministry records, records gathered 

by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and the Prisoner of War Information Bureau 

records. 
170 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

The Central Intelligence Group and the Transfer of Captured Japanese 

Records to the National Archives 

The Central Intelligence Group (CIG), which began administering the Washington 

Document Center (WDC) in late 1946, took custody of most captured and seized 

Japanese records that had been shipped to the United States. By mid-1947, the CIG 

had finished reviewing and extracting information from most of these Japanese records. 

The completion of exploitation of the records, combined with budget cuts, government 

reorganization, and a shortage of storage space, prompted CIG to consider what to do 

with its captured Japanese records. 

In the late summer of 1947, the CIG contacted the National Archives about housing 

its WDC holdings, and asked Lee L. Gerald, Chief of the Army Branch of the National 

Archives, to inspect the records. Gerald reported that the records appeared to be divided 

into four major groups: records of the Japanese Navy Ministry, records of the Japanese 

War Ministry, organizational and operational records of several Japanese armies, and 

blueprints and plans of Japanese vessels and ordnance. Gerald estimated that there 

were 3,500 cubic feet of records packed in large wooden boxes that were “haphazardly 

stacked in a room approximately 20x40 feet” that lacked proper climate controls and fire 

safeguards. In addition to these, he reported, there were about 500 cubic feet of records 

in a building occupied by the WDC. He concluded that it was in the government’s 

interest to preserve the records indefinitely.2 On September 18, 1947, the CIG became 

the CIA; the CIA’s General Counsel soon agreed that the Japanese documents should be 

preserved, although not necessarily by the CIA.3

Later that month, the CIA notified the intelligence chiefs at the Departments of State, 

Army, Navy, and Air Force that, in accordance with Executive Order 9784, it desired to 

dispose of these records, which had been examined and screened for intelligence purposes 

and were no longer of any value to the CIA. The agency briefly described the records and 

gave the chiefs an opportunity to request any of them; otherwise, they would all be sent to the 

National Archives.4 Having received no request for the records, on January 9, 1948, the CIA 

offered the National Archives its Japanese records, stating that the records were open and “not 

subject to any restrictions.”5 The CIA promised to furnish the Archives with a descriptive list 

of the individual documents, volumes, or packages, if the documents were accepted.6 

The National Archives agreed to the offer, and in May and June 1948 the CIA turned 

over 1,478,611 items (7,097 cubic feet of records). In September 1948, the CIA gave 

another 157,685 items, largely books and periodicals, to the Library of Congress.7 On 

July 7, 1949, the CIA transferred to the National Archives another 47 cubic feet of 

records, for a total 7,144 cubic feet of records, or about 17,860,000 pages, significantly 

more than originally estimated.8 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 171

Developing a Policy on Return of Captured Enemy Records

Because of the volume of captured records, by 1949 the State Department recognized 

the need for a general policy to deal with issues of administration and possible restitution 

of the records. In November of that year, the Department initiated the Interagency 

Conference on Captured Enemy Documentation (ICCED), which ultimately consisted 

of representatives from the National Archives, Library of Congress, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (JCS), the CIA, and the Departments of Justice, Commerce, Navy, Army, and 

Air Force.9 At the first ICCED meeting in January 1950, the consensus was that the 

captured Japanese records were now of historical—not operational—value and could be 

returned to Japan.10

At a May 17, 1950, ICCED meeting, National Archives representatives pointed out 

that the Japanese materials in their possession would probably be governed by Department 

of Defense (DOD) decisions, and noted that a Presidential or Congressional directive 

would be required to move the records out of the National Archives.11 Because the Korean 

War started the following month, the ICCED did not meet again until February 1951.

The State Department believed the main issue facing the U.S. government was the 

need for an orderly and efficient program of restitution that considered the legitimate 

needs of both former Allied and enemy governments. G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the 

State Department’s Division of Historical Policy Research, felt it inappropriate to restore 

all captured enemy documents, and proposed instead to determine “what categories of 

materials can and should be returned and under what conditions.”12 

At the February 1951 ICCED meeting, the Army argued that former enemy 

governments had no recognized rights, moral or legal, to any captured military records 

and that the Army was not considering any general restitution of military records except 

to further U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives. At this meeting, the 

consensus was that any policy decisions on restitution had to be made at the highest level 

in joint consultation with the United Kingdom.13

The next day, Noble wrote the Army requesting further information about the 

safeguards to be inserted in the forthcoming peace treaties respecting captured enemy 

documents, and categories of enemy documents eligible or ineligible for restitution. 

The Army responded that the Adjutant General had recommended to the Chief of Staff 

that the Army review its policy on the matter, but that the Army’s position remained as 

outlined at the last meeting.14 Similarly, the JCS believed it was neither desirable nor 

appropriate to return all categories of captured enemy documents to ex-enemy countries, 

and advised that the United States retain documents containing information about 

certain intelligence activities, cryptographic matters, and information likely to prejudice 

the U.S. national interest.15 In September 1951, however, the State Department became 
172 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

responsible for drafting a policy for the restitution of captured records that the ICCED 

would implement.16 

That same month, the United States signed a peace treaty with Japan. The treaty 

did not address specifically the issue of the return of the captured Japanese records, 

but it stipulated that, with certain exceptions, the Allied Powers had “the right to seize, 

retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests” of the Japanese 

government and Japanese nationals “which on the first coming into force of the present 

Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction.”17

By July 1952, the State Department had drafted a preliminary restitution policy. 

After several years of coordination with other agencies and the British, in October 1955 

the U.S. and British governments adopted a policy for return of the German records, 

which served as a model for the return of the Japanese records. The policy recognized 

the right of a nation to the restitution of the records necessary to its basic functioning 

and allowed for three phases: declassification of records, microfilming of selected records, 

and actual return of both microfilmed originals and those originals not deemed worthy 

of microfilming. 18

Return of Captured Japanese Foreign Ministry Records Held in Japan 

and the United States

Immediately following the conclusion of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in November 

1948, the Japanese began to press for the return of their captured records used by the 

International Prosecution Section (IPS) for its work in the Tribunal. 

In December 1948, the Japanese Foreign Ministry requested the return of records, 

asserting to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) that the Ministry’s 

official documents, which had been submitted to the IPS in early 1946, were indispensable 

for the transaction of the Ministry’s business. The request reappeared in February 1949.19

In May, the Foreign Ministry again asked that SCAP return the Ministry’s records, this 

time citing a SCAP memorandum of February 5, 1946, which stated that the WDC 

could hold the records only “temporarily.”20 The issue of the return of Japanese Foreign 

Ministry records became an abiding source of irritation between the two nations.

Beyond asking generally for the return of records, the Foreign Ministry began lodging 

requests for specific documentation that it needed for daily business. Some of these 

requests were met with disappointing replies. For instance, in early September 1950, the 

Foreign Ministry asked SCAP to return material pertaining to the China Incident, which 

had been lent to the IPS on the condition that it would be returned as soon as it served 

its purposes.21 A month later, SCAP replied that they could not find the records “alleged 

to have been loaned” among their Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal holdings.22 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 173

In mid-September 1950, the Japanese Foreign Ministry asked the U.S. Mission 

in Tokyo to assist it in recovering certain documents that were requisitioned from the 

Ministry in 1946, such as signed texts of old and revised treaties and agreements, copies 

of telegrams, and other important records that had been forwarded to the WDC. The 

U.S. Mission asked the State Department in Washington for permission to return the 

records, noting that favorable action by the United States on the matter “would be 

appreciated by the Japanese Government and would appear particularly appropriate at 

this time. Should it be deemed advisable to have copies of the documents and records 

permanently available to the United States Government, the original materials could 

readily be microfilmed.”23 The State Department agreed, and on October 30, 1950, 

SCAP informed the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that the documents would 

be returned as soon as it was determined that there was no further need for them in 

Washington.24 

In early August 1951, the Foreign Ministry informed SCAP that in order to prepare 

for the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and other countries, it required 

access to its records and asked to borrow those in U.S. custody. The State Department 

and the Army approved Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) and SCAP’s 

recommendations that the United States microfilm all seized or borrowed documents 

before returning them.25 Microfilming had in fact begun in the summer 1949 and was 

completed two years later. Some 2.1 million pages were reproduced on 2,116 reels of 

microfilm. Included were records from the Foreign Ministry and documentary evidence 

from the IPS.26 IPS documentation alone filled 500 2x2x4 boxes. In a letter to Noble 

dated May 18, 1951, Glenn Shaw, who was working in Tokyo on the Foreign Ministry 

Microfilming, stated: 

What we have here now is the entire file of IMT documentary evidence that I was told all 

along was in the Adjutant General’s storage space in Virginia. It was really locked up in 

a basement room in the NYK Building in Tokyo. It includes a great mixture of material 

from Washington, Berlin and Japan, including some that perhaps once made the trip from 

Tokyo to the Washington Document Center and back again. Because of lack of space 

here, we have so far brought over only half (18) of the four-drawer filing cabinets and the 

boxes. I am told that there are some papers in a safe in the ATIS offices upstairs in the NYK 

Building, and these and the rest of the filing cabinets I intend to crowd into the middle of 

this room next week. 

In a later report to Noble, Shaw wrote that he had been trying to get Army G-2 to return 

all Foreign Ministry documents to the Ministry, but G-2 claimed that directives from 
174 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

the Pentagon were stalling the process. The Library of Congress sent Shaw thirty-seven 

folders of material belonging to the Ministry, which the WDC had forwarded to them 

sometime in 1948.27

William N. Stokes, at SCAP’s Office of the U.S. Political Adviser for Japan, wrote to 

State on December 13 that confusion arose because the Foreign Ministry documents sent 

to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal were not co-extensive with the bulk of Foreign Ministry 

files seized. Most of the Ministry documents that the WDC (Advanced Echelon) and 

ATIS confiscated in 1946 dealt primarily with intelligence matters, and only a handful 

were later loaned to the Tribunal. Of the 1,280 records the Japanese Foreign Ministry 

listed, ATIS was microfilming 420 and would return them when finished. According to 

ATIS records, it shipped nearly 700 other records to Washington, and Stokes believed 

that most of the missing records would be found among the Tribunal documents then 

en route to Washington.28

In January 1952, Stokes informed Army G-2 that certain documents seized by 

ATIS had not been located in a preliminary survey of ATIS records, although there was 

no indication that the missing documents had ever left Tokyo. Because the Foreign 

Ministry had receipts from ATIS and WDC for the documents, their general character 

was known, and it was likely that CINCFE agencies were exploiting them for intelligence 

purposes.29

In mid-January 1952, the State Department asked the CIA to ship all its Foreign 

Ministry documents to Stokes in Tokyo.30 The first week of February, the CIA sent 49 

Foreign Ministry documents and informed Stokes that the remaining documents would 

be sent after microfilming.31 By the end of September 1952, the CIA had sent 102 

documents to Japan. 

Earlier in January, State had asked the Army Adjutant General’s Office to return 

106 Foreign Ministry records, which were used as evidence at the War Crimes Trials. 

The Adjutant General’s Departmental Records Branch (DRB) found twenty-nine of the 

requested documents, twenty-seven being official Tribunal exhibits, and the remaining two 

a miscellany assembled by the prosecution staff but not introduced into evidence.32 The 

Chief Archivist cited the Nuremburg trials as a precedent for not restoring original court 

evidence to the Foreign Ministry, explaining that the United States had a responsibility 

to the other nations represented on the Tribunal to maintain the integrity of the trial 

records. He insisted that photostating or microfilming the originals would not achieve 

the same integrity, so the originals had to stay in U.S. possession.33

In March 1952, the State Department told Stokes of the difficulties in returning “all 

the documents that were ‘borrowed or seized’ from the Gaimusho [Foreign Ministry] 

back to it.”34 Although the Ministry had received no signed statement from a U.S. 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 175

authority specifically acknowledging taking the records, it had a copy of the WDC-ATIS 

shipping advice that accompanied the transfer from Tokyo to Washington. The Ministry 

felt that an unsigned copy of a U.S. government bill of lading did constitute sufficient 

evidence between friendly nations that the United States had duly accepted custody of 

the Japanese records. 

Contrary to the Archivist, Stokes believed the records remained the property of the 

Japanese government. He cited provisions of the Rules of Land Warfare, which could be 

interpreted as giving the occupying power the right to custody and use of the property, 

but not to title. Since the Tribunal records were no longer intact—SCAP had returned 

Swiss documents from the official Tribunal records—once the Japanese Peace Treaty 

became effective, the Japanese government could cite the Swiss example to reacquire 

custody of official government records.35

Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director, Office of North East Asian Affairs, believed that since 

the U.S. government could not return all original records, to promote good relations the 

United States should assume the cost of microfilming the records that were used as court 

evidence by the Tribunal and give a copy to the Japanese.36

The Army agreed to pay for the project, and the microfilming began in the summer 

of 1952. However, the project took longer than expected both because several agencies 

shared the microfilming facilities at Alexandria, Virginia, and because sorting Foreign 

Ministry records used as Tribunal exhibits from the other ministry documents was slow 

work.37 

In early December 1952, the Adjutant General sent to the Japanese government, 

via the State Department, seven microfilm reels with fifty Foreign Ministry documents 

accepted as exhibits at the Tribunal, but noted that some of the requested documents 

could not be located on the basis of information the Japanese had furnished.38 

About the same time, John Steeves, the First Secretary of the Embassy in Tokyo, 

confirmed that the Embassy had received from the CIA several shipments of documents, 

and 102 volumes had been returned to the Foreign Ministry.39 There was still “a 

discouragingly long list” of records not received, which the American Embassy in Tokyo 

determined had not been returned.40 In late March 1953, Steeves learned that copies of 

the outstanding materials would not be returned anytime soon because the records could 

not be located. The records may have been shipped to Kansas City, or they may have 

been stored somewhere in Tokyo.41

Meanwhile, Franklin Hawley, from the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, investigated 

the matter of some 64,000 Japanese books seized by SCAP.42 The Library of Congress had 

several thousand volumes or pieces of Japanese publications that it had received from the 

WDC. Some of the material had been already incorporated into the Library’s collections, 
176 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

and duplicates of others had been transferred to other libraries. In addition, certain 

archival material that had been identified among the collections had been transferred to 

the National Archives “with a view to restoration to their original sources.”43

In late August 1953, Japan informed the U.S. Embassy that it disagreed with the 

U.S. position that the original documents accepted as evidence by the Tribunal could 

not be returned; Japan as a sovereign state should hold its own important state papers.44

J. Graham Parsons at the Tokyo embassy brought the ongoing problem of returning the 

Foreign Ministry records to the attention of the Acting Director of the State Department’s 

Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. Parsons indicated that the embassy had been trying to 

settle the issue and his intention to contact the Far East Command to ask it to make one 

last effort to turn up whatever books “they can shake loose, and then to close the matter.” 

With respect to returning original documents, he acknowledged the return of seized 

state papers was “a tiny part of our relations with the Japanese, but it is one which, if 

satisfactorily settled, will remove one more irritation and contribute to the better relations 

which we seek to establish.” Parsons recommended that the U.S. government inform the 

Japanese that the U.S. seized the records “as a matter of right,” had no obligation to 

return them, and had returned as many as possible. 

State’s Legal Division still focused on whether the United States was obliged to retain 

documents that were part of the Tribunal record. It cited Rule 6(a) of the Rules of 

Procedure of the Tribunal promulgated April 25, 1946, which stated that

in cases where original documents are submitted by the prosecution or the defense in 

evidence, and upon showing (1) that because of historical interest or for any other reason 

one of the signatories to the Instrument of Surrender of Japan or any other government 

which has received the consent of all the said signatories desires to withdraw from the 

records of the Tribunal and preserve any particular original document, and (2) that no 

substantial injustice will result, the Tribunal shall permit photostatic copies of the said 

original documents certified by the General Secretary, to be substituted for the originals in 

the records of the court, and shall deliver the said original documents to the applicants. 

Because the Tribunal no longer existed, it was impossible to obtain its permission to 

withdraw the original documents in question.

In lieu of the Tribunal’s permission, the Legal Division suggested that State might 

informally convince associated governments to consent to the United States’ returning 

the originals to the Japanese government and substituting certified photostats in the 

record to satisfy the Chief Archivist. This issue was never resolved. Thus some originals 

were retained in the Tribunal files and some were replaced with certified copies. 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 177

On February 25, 1954, the Japanese Embassy again asked the Secretary of State for 

the return of original Foreign Ministry documents used as evidence by the Tribunal 

and for the Ministry’s important state papers, such as treaties and diplomatic records.45

Wanting to resolve this issue and remove what was constantly termed “a minor irritation,” 

in April the State Department contacted seven countries (a majority of the governments 

participating under Article XI of the Japanese Peace Treaty in decisions with respect to 

persons sentenced by the Tribunal) and requested their concurrence in the return of those 

documents. While the United States had already microfilmed and returned most of the 

documents in question, it still retained the original Foreign Ministry documents that 

were part of the Tribunal records.46 

In August 1954, the originals reposed in the Adjutant General’s Departmental Records 

Branch (DRB), in Alexandria, Virginia. The Army intended to microfilm the records 

before sending them to the State Department to return to Japan.47 Before the microfilming 

began, the Acting DRB Chief notified his colleagues of two complications. First, the 

DRB had kept no copy of microfilm previously sent to the Japanese government, and it 

had been necessary to reconstruct the list of documents filmed. Second, he assumed that 

the Japanese would protest any discrepancy between the number of original documents 

returned and the amount of microfilm previously furnished to the Japanese. He was 

concerned that the Japanese may have received more than microfilms of originals. They 

may have received, for example, the record copy of translations, notes, or other materials 

that were also in the Tribunal exhibit folder.48

In mid-October, the Secretary of State notified the Japanese Embassy that State 

would return the documents presented as evidence to the Tribunal as well as additional 

Foreign Ministry documents stored at the Records Center at Alexandria. The United 

States shipped these records to Japan on January 7, 1955.49 The Department of Defense, 

however, retained war crimes documents that were not submitted as evidence to the 

Tribunal. 

Although State wished to return these materials in late April 1955, DOD argued that 

the huge volume of these records delayed any response to the Japanese. Furthermore, 

the Clemency and Parole Board for War Criminals was still using trial records when 

considering appeals from convicted Japanese war criminals. In August, the State 

Department informed the Japanese Embassy of the situation.50 

The Return of Additional Captured and Seized Japanese Records Held 

in Japan

Meanwhile, Japanese records were surfacing at other locations. In June 1955, at a regular 

weekly staff conference at the American Embassy in Tokyo, the military attaché arrived 
178 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

with an “imposing set of documents replete with tape and wax seals,” which turned out 

to be the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow on 

April 13, 1941. The documents consisted of the Japanese and Russian texts of the Pact, 

the Japanese original of the instrument of ratification in English dated May 20, 1941, 

and a “strictly confidential” note dated Moscow April 13, 1941, from Soviet Foreign 

Minister V.M. Molotov to Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, agreeing with a Japanese 

proposal to establish commissions to settle boundary questions and border incidents and 

disputes. The U.S. Army had discovered the documents at its language school in Tokyo, 

presumably during a spring cleaning of their files. 

Because the Neutrality Pact documents were among those listed as still missing by the 

Foreign Ministry, the Embassy wanted to return the documents to Japan, but worried 

that the Japanese would suspect an ulterior political motive at a time when “neutrality” 

was very much in the public eye as a result of the current Russo-Japanese talks in London. 

A discreet return, without publicity, could avoid that problem but would encourage the 

Foreign Office to ask for more documents, which, if possible, the United States should 

also return. 51

CINCFE also wanted to return Japanese ordnance drawings and documents 

confiscated by the Occupation Forces, but learned that the return of the material required 

negotiations between the State Department and the Japanese government. The Army let 

State take the lead.52 In late June 1955, State’s Director of the Office of Northeast Asian 

Affairs told the Acting Deputy Chief of Mission to return the Neutrality Pact documents 

to the Japanese. With respect to the general release of all Japanese documents, prospects 

appeared favorable, but the agencies were reluctant to approve any returns until they 

knew the contents of the material.53

The Return of Prisoner of War Information Bureau Records 

In September 1945, American forces took legal custody of the records of the Japanese 

Prisoner of War Information Bureau (POWIB), which consisted of 1,470 volumes of 

material, many translated into English. POWIB records included cards on 171,898 

POWs and 108,034 civilian internees. 

Early in 1953, the Foreign Ministry notified the American Embassy that, under 

the terms of the 1929 General Convention relating to POWs, Japan was obliged to 

deliver its POW records to the respective government each POW served. To accomplish 

this requirement, it needed POW documents released from the United States. In midFebruary 1953, USAFFE recommended to the Adjutant General’s Office that the POWIB 

Japanese language source records and documents be released to the Japanese government, 

while the United States would retain the translated records.54
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 179

There were delays in obtaining the concurrences of the Provost Marshal General’s 

Office, the Adjutant General’s Office, Department of State, the National Archives, and a 

Congressional Committee, but at the end of May, Congress approved the return of the 

records.55 Immediately, the Adjutant General’s Office asked USAFFE to release Japanese 

language POWIB documents to the Japanese government and to retire the English 

translations to the Military Personnel Records Center (MPRC) in St. Louis, Missouri.56

In the process of disposing of the records as required, in the spring of 1954, Japan 

asked the United States if it desired the identification cards of Japanese-held American 

POWs. After much internal discussion, the United States accepted the offer in April 

1955 and on May 31, 1955, the POWIB delivered the cards to the American Embassy. 

The cards were immediately shipped to the MPRC.57 

Return of the Main Body of Captured and Seized Japanese Records 

Held in the United States

On October 25, 1954, the First Secretary of the American Embassy in Japan proposed 

to liquidate all outstanding World War II issues between the United States and Japan.58 

Around the same time, the Japanese displayed renewed interest in securing the return 

of any remaining captured records and again asked for State’s assistance. Return of the 

records would end a longstanding, but minor, problem that “proved a constantly recurring 

irritant in United States–Japan relations.”59 Assistant Archivist Robert Bahmer and Noble 

discussed the matter. The National Archives raised no objections to returning the records 

if other government agencies agreed, so Noble contacted interested agencies.60 

In June 1955, the CIA informed Noble that the Agency had no objection to the 

return of the records because they had been thoroughly exploited six years earlier.61

On July 1, the Army’s DRB concurred, provided that due consideration was given 

to the interests of American scholars, the Allies, and the potential interest of Defense 

contract agencies.62 The Navy also agreed, suggesting that the return of the records 

be governed by a joint policy allowing U.S. retention of records that had historical, 

security, or counterintelligence value. The Navy also desired an agreement with the 

Japanese government allowing it free access to the returned documents for research or 

microfilming.63

The Army contacted Noble in early August asking for a policy statement consistent 

with the one governing the return of captured German records. Noble answered: 

In the German case, a few qualifications were made of the principle of returning captured 

papers. The most important, in so far [sic] as they are applicable to Japan, were: (a) 

Documents which might, if returned, jeopardize the national security interests of our 
180 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

country, or of our allies, would be retained indefinitely, though time and circumstances 

might change conditions; (b) Documents required for the time being for purposes of 

official study would be returned when the official need for them was at an end. These 

statements of principle are equally applicable to the holdings of Japanese documents.” 

He added that the State Department and CIA had agreed to return the records and the 

National Archives was “anxious to be rid of the papers.”64

In October the Army informed Noble that DOD agencies concurred in the return, 

subject to explicit rights to future access. Noble in turn notified the National Archives 

and suggested assuring future reference to the documents by inserting an ‘access clause’ 

in the receipt that accompanied the actual transfer of the records. He also recommended 

that the National Archives obtain Congressional approval for the transfer. The National 

Archives agreed.65 

Congressional Approval for the Return of the Records

The National Archives requested Congressional approval for the return of the records on 

March 23, 1956. The confiscated records had been seized largely for purposes of military 

and foreign intelligence and more than a decade later few had any value for military or 

foreign intelligence. Those that did had already been or were being used by the appropriate 

federal agencies which would return them to Japan at a later date. The Archives assured 

Congress that documents needed for intelligence or other research purposes would not be 

sent back. Congress approved the return on April 24, exempting “military, intelligence, 

cryptographic, technological or other military documents, that would, if returned, 

jeopardize the national security interests of the United States or its Allies” and “materials 

concerned primarily with Japanese occupation of other states, the return of which would 

jeopardize the national security interests of the United States or its Allies.” 66

During the spring of 1956, the Clemency and Parole Board insisted that there was 

no legal or moral obligation to make background material used in preparation of the 

war crimes trials available to the Japanese, and felt Japan could use the documentation 

to make the United States “look bad.” All of the evidentiary documents accepted by the 

Tribunal had already been returned to the Japanese in January 1955 and it would be a 

costly and time-consuming affair to locate additional backup documents.67

The Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Intelligence Division contacted the State 

Department in the early summer of 1956 asking to retain about 2,500 linear feet of 

cartographic (terrain-intelligence) records for scientific use. These records, largely created 

by the Kwantung Army between 1931 and 1941, covered Manchuria, North China, a 

75-mile strip in Siberia along the Manchurian border, and Sakhalin and Korea. Given 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 181

that the United States had already made a commitment to Japan, the State Department 

was reluctant to withhold them, and asked the Corps to prepare a detailed memorandum 

justifying their proposal to withhold terrain-intelligence material.68

On July 3, the Corps’ Acting Division Chief replied that the records had not yet been 

fully exploited because of insufficient time, and asked that the material be permanently 

retained for intelligence purposes. Given the oversize of maps and cartographic studies, 

much of the material could not be easily microfilmed. He wanted six months to study 

the material and make lists of non-returnable items.69 By August, however, upon 

review the Corps had reduced its request from 2,500 to 350 cubic feet of records.70 Air 

Force Intelligence was interested in about 50 cubic feet scattered randomly among the 

7,000 cubic feet of its holdings. On July 20, the records center allowed two Air Force 

intelligence experts until January 1, 1957, to identify pertinent items.71

In mid-August, the State Department approved making the records available to the 

Engineers for any remaining intelligence exploitation, with the caveat that excessive delay 

would prove “embarrassing to our political relations with the Japanese Government.”72

The Intelligence Division of the Corps of Engineers agreed to complete its review by 

early 1957 and coordinate with the National Archives to identify files quickly in which 

they had no interest that could therefore be prepared for selective shipment to Japan.73 

Noble and the National Archives worked out the logistic and cost estimates for packing 

and transporting the records to the Baltimore harbor for overseas shipment.74

Plans for the shipment of the records to Japan moved smoothly in early 1957. In 

February, the U.S. Air Force notified the National Archives that it considered the project 

closed because further exploitation was not justified, and all files were being returned. 

That same month, the Corps of Engineers notified the National Archives that it would 

return its Japanese materials no later than October 1.75 

Academic Interest in the Records

In the fall of 1955, the American Committee for the Study of War Documents, organized 

to coordinate the scholarly use of captured German records, visited the National Archives 

to discuss the exploitation of the German records. At that time, Bahmer suggested that 

there might also be an interest in the Japanese records, explaining that the Japanese 

records would most likely be returned before the German records. Later that year, 

Professor Ardath Burks inspected the Japanese Army and Navy records at the Franconia 

records center on behalf of the Far Eastern Association, an academic society of Asian 

specialists. Two Library of Congress representatives accompanied Burks, and all agreed 

that any large-scale screening and microfilming operation would be almost prohibitively 

expensive and difficult.76 
182 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

During the first week of December 1956, Sidney Wallach, Executive Secretary of 

the American Committee for the Study of War Documents, questioned the National 

Archives about the nature of the Japanese records, their extent and scope, the amount 

microfilmed, and whether a date had been set for the return of the material. Bahmer 

quickly informed Wallach that the records had been approved for return to Japan and 

that the actual transfer should begin early in 1957.77

In April 1957, Professor C. Martin Wilbur of Columbia University, who had served in 

Office of Strategic Services in China, contacted the State Department about the pending 

return of the records. State responded that the Historical Division believed that most of 

the material of historical value had been copied, and suggested that Wilbur contact the 

National Archives about the matter. A week later, James William Morley, then a visiting 

professor at Columbia University, wrote to Bahmer about the records, noting that several 

scholars who had been using the Japanese Army and Navy records had expressed their 

concern about the records being returned to Japan and no longer available for scholarly 

research. Morley asked if there was any merit in conducting a preliminary search of the 

documents to determine which items might be of sufficient historical value to warrant 

microfilming. He also inquired if the National Archives knew exactly which documents 

had been microfilmed previously, and by whom, and whether copies were or could be 

made available for use or purchase. He also asked for specific information regarding 

additional documents still being held by the governments.78

Bahmer replied that the greater portion of the Japanese records were in the custody of 

the National Archives, and that he did not know if isolated papers or technical materials 

were in the hands of other government agencies.79 Since Morley had published his 

“Check List of Seized Japanese Records in the National Archives” in 1950, the volume of 

the collection had grown to over 7,000 cubic feet.80 Apparently few had been copied. 

Bahmer told him that the return of the captured and seized Japanese records would 

likely take place later in 1957, and he mentioned that, in their 1955 review of the records, 

experts agreed that microfilming was impractical.81 

Bahmer sent a copy of this letter to Edwin G. Beal, Jr., then Acting Head of the Japanese 

Section at the Library of Congress, who clarified the situation. The microfilming project 

done in Japan between 1949–1951 had copied the archives of the Foreign Ministry on 

2,116 reels of negative film, which the Library of Congress had in its custody with an 

index. There were another 72 reels of microfilm gathered from various Washington 

agencies now held in the Library of Congress, but without an index. Beal concluded 

by noting that if American scholars were going to do anything about the records, they 

should do it soon. “The archives,” he wrote, “have now been here for almost 12 years, 

and, in so far as I know, American scholars have made comparatively little use of them. 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 183

The Japanese Government wants them back, and the American Government would like 

to use the space for other material.”82 (By early January 1955, the National Archives 

had sent approximately 7,848 cubic feet of captured and seized Japanese records to 

the records center in Alexandria, Virginia, in order to free space in its main downtown 

building).83 

In June, the Ford Foundation awarded a grant of $18,000 for a microfilming project. 

Professors Edwin Reischauer of Harvard University, C. Martin Wilbur of Columbia 

University, James Morley of Columbia University, John Young of Georgetown University, 

and Chitoshi Yanaga of Yale University, and Edwin Beal of the Library of Congress, 

oversaw the project.84 In early July, Yanaga, with Warren M. Tsuneishi of Hamden, 

Connecticut, and Tatsuro Tanabe from Columbia University, began a ten-week project 

to select appropriate documents for microfilming.85 They aimed specifically to find 

material showing how Japanese military thought influenced Japan’s national policy, 

and how domestic problems affected the thinking of Japanese military officials. Other 

research areas focused on information that would reveal how much Japanese intelligence 

units knew of communist influence in China and the part the Japanese Army played in 

promoting the use of opium by the Chinese. At that point, no one had determined who 

would do the microfilming or where it would be done.86

Yanaga and his team found a great deal of material, including reports on the Mukden 

Incident of 1931 and subsequent events in Manchuria and documents on the Nomonhan 

Incident, when Japanese and Russian troops fought a small scale war in 1939. Other 

documents were confidential reports on activities of the Japanese Army and Navy during 

various wars, on work of the Home Ministry pertaining to Japanese internal security, 

and data on the government’s conduct of World War II, particularly on the domestic 

front.87 

In September, Yanaga suggested that the only way to accomplish the project was to 

use Library of Congress equipment (under their strict supervision and on its premises) in 

exchange for the services already rendered. The Ford Foundation would pay for the cost 

of the film, processing, and inspection, as well as for supervisory time spent by Library 

of Congress employees. Yanaga and his colleagues prepared the documents and operated 

the microfilm camera. With the $7,000 left from the Ford grant, they expected to film 

about 100,000 frames, but that many might not even be needed. This amount was far 

below the original estimate of 500,000 “which was pulled out of the air.”88

Microfilming began in October 1957 and ended in February 1958, when funds were 

exhausted and the documents were packed for return to Japan. In all, some 400,000 

pages (about 160 cubic feet) were reproduced on 163 reels of microfilm; positive prints 

were given to the Library of Congress and to the National Diet Library in Tokyo.89
184 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

The Records Returned to Japan

During mid-February 1958, the Army moved the Japanese records from the records center 

in Alexandria, Virginia, to the Baltimore harbor, and from there a Japanese ship carried 

them to Japan. Packing the records, trucking them to Baltimore, and loading them on the 

ship cost $5,089.57, paid for by the U.S. Army.90 Intensive searches have discovered no 

evidence that any provision was made for future U.S. government access. This apparently 

resulted from an oversight by officials involved in the transfer, and it is possible that those 

involved in the logistics were not informed about any access clause agreement. 

In February 1960, the Corps of Engineers completed its study of the Japanese records 

in its custody, and a few months later91 the Army shipped the documents to Japan, 

along with captured Japanese embassy, consulate, and legation files that had been seized 

in Europe (microfilmed copies had been provided to the National Archives).92 These 

records, about 95 cubic feet, were turned over to Japanese officials on June 24, 1960. The 

receipt does not mention future access to the records.93 In 1961, the U.S. Navy arranged 

to return some 650 cubic feet of captured Japanese hydrographic documents94 to the 

Japanese Maritime Safety Board’s Hydrographic Division. These records were returned 

in November 1961, and turned over to the Chief Hydrographer in mid-November.95

Conclusion

The U.S. government returned the captured and seized Japanese records because of 

political considerations and generally accepted conventions regarding restitution of 

captured archives. 

Critics have suggested that the records were returned to Japan without having been 

exploited for war crimes purposes, but the administration of the materials shows that 

this was not the case. The records were thoroughly exploited for war crimes purposes 

before coming to the National Archives in 1948 and also for historical and intelligence 

uses prior to their return to Japan. There is virtually no likelihood that captured Japanese 

records relating directly to war crimes were returned to Japan without having been copied 

or explored. 

Even after the return of large bodies of original Japanese language records, NARA 

holds a substantial body of Japanese documents and information derived from them.96

These records are originals, hundreds of thousands of pages of copies and translations, 

microfilm copies, and many reports and other derivative materials. Some are exhibits 

in war-crimes–related files and others are integrated into agency files. These records are 

open to researchers and have been for many decades. If Americans and the Japanese are 

to fully extract lessons from World War II, then archival records need to be not only 

accessible, but used. 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 185

Notes

1. A fuller treatment of the collection, exploitation, administration, and return of these records 

is contained in Greg Bradsher, World War II Japanese Records: History of their Capture, 

Exploitation, and Disposition (forthcoming). 

2. Lee L. Gerald, Report on the captured Japanese documents, 21 August 1947, NA, Captured 

Japanese Records Retain File, Modern Military Records. 

3. Memorandum, General Counsel, CIA to Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, 

CIA, undated ca. 1 December 1947, pp. 1–2, Copy in NA, Retain File, Captured Japanese 

Records, Modern Military Records.

4. Memorandum, Capt. C.E. Olsen, USN, Assistant Director for Collection and 

Dissemination to Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, Department of State; 

Director of Intelligence, General Staff, Department of the Army; Chief of Naval Intelligence, 

Department of the Navy; and, Assistant Chief of Air Staff-2, Department of the Air Force, 

26 September 1947, Decimal 894.414/9-2647, Central Decimal File 1945–1949, NA, RG 

59. 

5. The Army and the State Department replied that they had no need for the records. 

Memorandum, Col. R.F. Ennis, Chief, Intelligence Group to Assistant Director of Collection 

and Dissemination, CIA, 8 October 1947, Decimal 314.4, Japan, Army Intelligence Project 

Decimal File 1946–1948, entry 47D, Records of the Administrative Division, Records 

of the Army Chief of Staff, Intelligence (G-2), Records of the Army Chief of Staff, NA, 

RG 319. At the bottom of the document are the concurrences of the Far Eastern Branch 

(Lt. Col. Mellnik), Historical Division (Lt. Col. Clark), and Adjutant General’s Office 

(Dr. Bahmer); Letter, W. Park Armstrong, Jr. Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary for 

Research and Intelligence to Capt. C.E. Olsen, USN, Assistant Director for Collection and 

Dissemination, CIA, 23 October 1947, Decimal 894.414/10-2347, Central Decimal File 

1945–1949, NA, RG 59. 

6. Memorandum, William J. Marston, Records Administrator, CIA to Archivist of the United 

States, 9 January 1948, Job No. 448-145, Copy in NA, Captured Japanese Records Retain 

File, Modern Military Records. 

7. When books gathered by the WDC in Japan arrived in Washington in 1946, the WDC 

sorted the material and distributed some of it to the Army, Navy, and other departmental 

libraries in Washington. Only material “of a purely cultural nature and of no interest to the 

Army or Navy” was sent to the Library of Congress at that time. Later, when the WDC 

no longer existed, several thousand volumes remaining in the collection were transferred to 

the Library of Congress. Letter, Verner Clapp, Acting Librarian of Congress to G. Bernard 

Noble, Chief of the Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, 22 January 

1954, NA, RG 59, Decimal 894.423/1-2254, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, .
186 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

8. The original figures were probably based, in part, on Gerald’s estimates from 1946–1947. At 

that time, most of the records were packed in large, wooden, haphazardly stacked boxes. 

9. Maj. Gen. S. LeRoy Irwin to G. Bernard Noble, 29 November 1949, AGAR-S-1327A, 

AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, RG 242. Membership 

list is based on a list of attendees at the 15 March and 17 May 1950 meetings, Minutes of 

the Meetings of the Interagency Conference on Captured Enemy Documentation, AGARS-1316 and AGAR-S-1319, AGAR-S Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 

282BB, NA, RG 242.

10. Minutes and Agenda, 25 January 1950 meeting of the ICCED, AGAR-S-1322, AGAR-S 

Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242.

11. Minutes and Agenda, 15 March 1950 meeting of the ICCED, AGAR-S-1319, AGAR-S 

Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242; Minutes of Meeting, 

27 May 1950, AGAR-S-1316, ibid.

12. Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Sherrod East, 7 February 1951, AGAR-S-1339, AGAR-S 

Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242.

13. Minutes, Meeting of ICCED, 14 February 1951, AGAR-S-1339, AGAR-S Captured 

Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242, Letter, Sherrod East to G. 

Bernard Noble, 27 February 1951, AGAR-S-1306, ibid.

14. Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Sherrod East, 15 February 1951, AGAR-S-1339, AGAR-S 

Captured Records Policies and Procedures, entry 282BB, NA, RG 242; Letter, Sherrod East 

to G. Bernard Noble, 27 February 1951, AGAR-S-1306, ibid. 

15. Various JCS Documents February-June 1951, file 40.6 Records of the Branch Archivist 

(“Archival Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative 

Services Division, NA, RG 407.

16. Letter, Robert A. Lovett to Secretary of State, 14 September 1951, file 40.6, Records of 

the Branch Archivist (“Archival Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental Records 

Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407.

17. Treaty of Peace, 8 September 1951, Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950–

1955 Vol. 1. Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117 

(Washington, USGPO 1957), 432.

18. Letter, Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Director, Executive Office, Department of Defense 

to the Secretary of State, 4 June 1952, file 40.6 Records of the Branch Archivist (“Archival 

Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 371 Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services 

Division, RG 407; Letter, Ollen D. McCool to G. Bernard Noble, 11 October 1955, 

Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized 

Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64. See also Seymour J. Pomrenze, 

“Policies and Procedures for the Protection, Use, and Return of Captured German Records,” 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 187

in Robert Wolfe, ed., Captured German and Related Records: A National Archives Conference

(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), 27. 

19. Memorandum, Giichi Maekawa to G-2 Section, GHQ, SCAP, 13 December 1948, file 

D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118 

entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memorandum, K. Yoshida to General Headquarters, SCAP, 15 

December 1948, ibid.; Memorandum, K. Yoshida to General Headquarters, SCAP, 21 

February 1949, ibid.

20. Memorandum, I. Ota to General Headquarters, SCAP, 26 May 1949, file D-1.1, Japan 

Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, 

NA, RG 59. 

21. This was volume 5 of the Diplomatic Data Series, Circumstances attending the formation of 

the Provisional Government, the Renovation Government and the Mongol Government, with 

records concerning other local governments appended. 

22. Memorandum, Kijiro Miyake to General Headquarters, SCAP, Attn: G-2, 2 September 

1950, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot 

file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memorandum, Lt. Col. David S. Tait to Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, 3 October 1950, ibid.

23. Air Pouch Memorandum, Charles N. Spinks, First Secretary of Mission to Department 

of State, Tokyo 467, 22 September 1950, Decimal 894.423/9-2250, Central Decimal File 

1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

24. Copy, Cable to the Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, No. 60, 11 

October 1950, Decimal 894.423/9-2250, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, RG 59; Letter, 

WJ. Sebald to Ichiro Ohta, 30 October 1950, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, 

Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59. 

25. Memorandum, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to G-2, General Headquarters of the 

SCAP, 2 August 1951, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian 

Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memo for Record, [Sherrod East, Chief 

Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General], 6 June 1952, Decimal 314.4 

, Army Adjutant General Classified Decimal File 1951–1952, box 3794, NA, RG 407; 

Check Note, Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCAP, W.J.S. to G-2, 3 January 1952, Request 

for Search of SCAP and CINCFE Records for Japanese Foreign Office of Documents, 3 

January 1952, an enclosure to Letter, William N. Stokes to Gerald Warner, 31 December 

1951, with enclosures listing Foreign Ministry documents among Tribunal records and 

unaccounted documents, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast 

Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118 entry 1220, NA, RG 59. References given for approval are 

CINCFE message C-51343 to DEPTAR 21 Sept 1951, DEPTAR reply DA 83154 4 Oct 

1951, and State message 571 (MCN 78708) 11 Oct 1951. 
188 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

26. Uyehara, Cecil H. Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 

Japan, 1868–1945, microfilmed for the Library of Congress, 1949–1951. 

27. Letter, Gerald Warner to Alfred T. Wellborn, 2 November 1951, Decimal 894.423/11-251, 

Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

28. Letter, William N. Stokes to Gerald Warner, 13 December 1951, Decimal 894.423/12-

1351, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

29. Check Note, Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCAP, W.J.S. to G-2, 3 January 1952, Request for 

Search of SCAP and CINCFE Records for Japanese Foreign Office of Documents, 3 January 

1952, an enclosure to Letter, William N. Stokes to Gerald Warner, 31 December 1951, with 

enclosures listing Foreign Ministry documents among Tribunal records and unaccounted 

documents, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 

lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.

30. Memorandum, Mr. Warner to Mr. Bagnell, CIA, 15 January 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject 

Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, RG 59.

31. Memorandum James M. Andrews, Assistant Director, Collection and Dissemination, to 

United States Political Advisor for Japan, Attn: William N. Stokes, 5 February 1952, file 

D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, 

entry 1220, NA, RG 59; Memorandums, James M. Andrews to United States Political 

Advisor for Japan, Attn: William N. Stokes, 9 April, 2 July, and 29 September, 1952, ibid.; 

Memorandum, A.C. Malbouef, CIA, to Leonore Burmaster, 15 January 1953, ibid.

32. Memo for Record, (Brower) S. East, 8 December 1952, Classified Chronological File, 

1947–1952, entry 371F, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, 

NA, RG 407. 

33. Letter, Gerald Warner to William N. Stokes, 11 March 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 

1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59; 

Memorandum: “Records Seized from the Foreign Office,” Attachment No. 1 to Letter, J. 

Graham Parsons, American Embassy, Tokyo to Robert J.G. McClurkin, Acting Director, 

Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 21 October 1953, Decimal 894.423/10-2153, Central 

Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59

34. Letter, Gerald Warner to William N. Stokes, 11 March 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 

1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59.

35. Letter, William N. Stokes to Gerald Warner, 29 March 1952, Decimal 894.423/3-2952, 

Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

36. Memorandum, Mr. Young (Office of Northeast Asian Affairs) to Mr. Allison (FE), 14 May 

1952, Decimal 894.423/5-1452, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

37. Letter, Franklin Hawley to John M. Steeves, 13 October 1952, Decimal 894.423/10-1352, 

Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 189

38. Letter, Maj. Gen. Wm. E. Bergin to John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern 

Affairs, 11 December 1952, Decimal 894.423/12-1152, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, 

NA, RG 59.

39. Letter, Shigezo Yoshikawa, Chief of Archives Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to John M. 

Steeves, 11 December 1952, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast 

Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59. 

40. Letter, John M. Steeves to Franklin Hawley, 18 December 1952, Decimal 894.423/12-

1852, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

41. Letter, Franklin Hawley to John M. Steeves, 30 March 1953, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 

1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59. 

42. Letter, Samuel D. Berger to Franklin Hawley, 24 November 1953, Decimal 894.423/11-

2453, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

43. Letter, Verner Clapp, Acting Librarian of Congress to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the 

Division of Historical Policy Research, Department of State, 22 January 1954, Decimal 

894.423/1-2254, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59; Note, Marjorie McMullen 

to Mr. Franklin, n.d., and handwritten note to Noble, n.d., both attached to Letter, Verner 

Clapp, Acting Librarian of Congress to G. Bernard Noble, Chief of the Division of Historical 

Policy Research, Department of State, 22 January 1954, ibid.

44. Letter, J. Graham Parsons, American Embassy, Tokyo to Robert J.G. McClurkin, Acting 

Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 21 October 1953, Decimal 894.423/10-2153, 

Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59; Copy of Letter, Tatsuo Susana to Mr. Berger, 

20 August 1953, attached to ibid.

45. Diplomatic Note, Charge daffier ad interim, Embassy of Japan to the Secretary of State, 25 

February 1954, Decimal 894.423/2-2554, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

46. Letter, Everett F. Drumright, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs to Robert T. 

Stevens, Secretary of the Army, 23 July 1954, Decimal 894.423/2-2554, Central Decimal 

File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59; copies of the correspondence between the State Department 

and the various governments can be found in the various 894.423 decimal files for April, 

May, June, and July 1954, ibid.

47. Memorandum, Maj. Gen. John A. Klein, The Adjutant General to Mr. Pomrenze, 5 August 

1954, file 40.6, Records of the Branch Archivist (“Archival Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 

371, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407; 

Memorandum for the Record, no author, 5 August 1954, ibid.; Letter, George H. Roderick, 

Assistant Secretary of the Army to Everett F. Drumright, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far 

Eastern Affairs, 11 August 1954, Decimal 894.423/8-1154, Central Decimal File 1950–

1954, NA, RG 59.

48. Routing Note, Ken Munden to Mr. East and Mr. Brower, 27 August 1954, file 40.6, Records 
190 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

of the Branch Archivist (“Archival Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental 

Records Branch, Administrative Services Division, NA, RG 407.

49. Diplomatic Note, Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Japan, 18 October 1954, Decimal 

894.423/10-654, Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59; handwritten note on 

Letter, George H. Roderick, Assistant Secretary of the Army to Everett F. Drumright, Acting 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, 11 August 1954, Decimal 894.423/8-1154, 

ibid. 

50. Letter, Vice Adm. A.C. Davis to Walter S. Robertson, 27 July 1955, file D-1.1, Japan 

Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, 

NA, RG 59; Letter, Richard S. Finn, Acting Officer in Charge, Japanese Affairs to Yasuhiro 

Matsuoka, 16 August 1955, ibid.

51. Letter, George A. Morgan to Robert J.G. McClurkin, 8 June 1955, file 12.3, Captured 

Japanese Documents, Subject Files Relating to Japan, 1954–1959, Miscellaneous lot Files, 

lot 61D68, entry 1341, NA, RG 59.

52. Letter, Maj. Gen. Elmer J. Rogers, Jr., USAF to George A. Morgan, 10 June 1955, file 12.3, 

Captured Japanese Documents, Subject Files Relating to Japan, 1954–1959, Miscellaneous 

Lot Files, lot 61D68, entry 1341, NA, RG 59; Letter, George A. Morgan to Robert J.G. 

McClurkin, 15 June 1955, ibid.

53. Letter, Robert J.G. McClurkin to Georg A. Morgan, 24 June 1955, file 12.3, Captured 

Japanese Documents, Subject Files Relating to Japan, 1954–1959, Miscellaneous Lot Files, 

lot 61D68, entry 1341, NA, RG 59; Letter, J. Graham Parsons to Maj. Gen. Elmer J. 

Rogers, 11 July 1955, ibid. 

54. Memorandum, Col. C.C.B. Warden, Adjutant General, HQ, US Army Forces, Far East 

to The Adjutant General, Attn: Ollen D. McCool, Records Management Branch, Subject: 

Records of the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau, Decimal 313.3, 13 February 

1953, Decimal 314.4, Disposition–Japanese Captured Records II NNA, box 367, Army AG 

Decimal File 1951–1952, NA, RG 407. Most of these translated records reside among NA, 

RG 389, Records of the Office of the Provost Marshal General. See in particular Japanese 

POW Information Bureau Files 1946–1958, box 1530 (location: 270/50/21/06).

55. Correspondence relating to the delay can be found in Decimal 314.4, Disposition – Japanese 

Captured Records II NNA, box 367, Army AG Decimal File 1951–1952, NA, RG 407, 28 

May 1953, the Congress approval was received in The Adjutant General’s Office, NA Job IINNA-572 (H.R. No. 454, 25 May 1953). Decimal 314.4, Disposition – Japanese Captured 

Records II NNA, box 367, Army AG Decimal File 1951–1952, NA, RG 407.

56. Memorandum, Col. R.H. Shell, Chief, Management Branch, Office of the Adjutant General 

to Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East, Attn: Records Administrator, Subject: 

Records of the Japanese Prisoner of War Information Bureau, 29 May 1953, Decimal 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 191

314.4, Disposition – Japanese Captured Records II NNA, box 367, Army AG Decimal File 

1951–1952, NA, RG 407. In July the translations were sent to the MPRC. Memorandum 

Capt. C.M. Shugart, Adjutant, AG Administrative Center, 8234th Army Unit, APO 503 to 

Commanding General, US Army Forces, Far East, 11 July 1953, Decimal 314.4, Disposition 

– Japanese Captured Records II NNA, ibid.

57. Letter, W. Kenneth Hoover, Acting Records Management Officer, Department of State, 

to Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin, The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, 18 

March 1954, Army Adjutant General Decimal File 1953–1954 box 144 Decimal 314.4 

Captured Records-Japanese Identification Cards on American POWs, NA, RG 407; Letter, 

Maj. Gen. John A. Klein, The Adjutant General to Homer L. Calkin, Records Officer, 

Department of State, 27 April 1955, Army Adjutant General Decimal File 1953–1954, box 

144, Decimal 314.4 Captured Records-Japanese Identification Cards on American POWs, 

NA, RG 407; Memorandum, Col. Ward W. Conquest, Chief, Comptroller Division, The 

Adjutant General’s Office to Commanding Officer, Military Personnel Records Center, 

Subject: Japanese Identification Cards on American Prisoners of War, 27 April 1955, 

ibid.; Department of State Instruction A-732, Hoover to The American Embassy, Tokyo, 

10 May 1955, ibid; Offer and acceptance signed by H. Maruo, Director of War Prisoners 

Information Bureau and Rudolph Soldan, May 31, 1955, Army Adjutant General Decimal 

File 1953–1954 box 144 Decimal 314.4; DD Form 111, Records Shipment List, 2 June 

1955 and Army Shipping Document, DA Form 450-5-D, 7 June 1955, Army Adjutant 

General Decimal File 1953–1954, box 144, Decimal 314.4, Captured Records-Japanese 

Identification Cards on American POWs, NA, RG 407.

58. This report, “A Preliminary Reappraisal of United States Policy With Respect to Japan,” is 

the enclosure to despatch 516 from Tokyo, 25 October 1954, Decimal 611.94/10-2554, 

Central Decimal File 1950–1954, NA, RG 59.

59. Letter, Robert J.G. McClurkin to E.O. Alldredge, Director, Records and Management 

Division, National Archives and Records Service, 10 January 1955, Decimal 894.423/1-

1055, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.

60. Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to Robert J.G. McClurkin, 2 February 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-

2455, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Memorandum, Mr. McClurkin to G. 

Bernard Noble, 17 February 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-2455, ibid. Bahmer provided Noble 

in late May with a very brief description of the records, citing Morely’s article and mentioning 

additional accessions of records from the LC (413 cu. ft.) and from the CIA (230 cu. ft.). 

Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to G. Bernard Noble, 24 May 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-2455, 

ibid.

61. Letter, Paul W. Howerton to G. Bernard Noble, 28 June 1955, Decimal 894.423/5-2455, 

Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.
192 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

62. Memorandum, Chief, Departmental Records Branch to Chief, Records Administration 

Branch, The Adjutant General’s Office, 1 July 1955, file 40.6 Records of the Branch Archivist 

(“Archival Policy File”) 1954–1957, entry 371, Departmental Records Branch, Administrative 

Services Division, NA, RG 407; Letter, Ollen D. McCool to G. Bernard Noble, 1 July 1955, 

Decimal 894.423/5-2455, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.

63. Memorandum, John D. Dillon to The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, 3 August 

1955, Copy in Retain File, Modern Military Records, NA.

64. Letter, Ollon D. McCool to G. Bernard Noble, 9 August 1955, Decimal 894.423/8-955, 

Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Ollen D. 

McCool, 29 September 1955, ibid.

65. Letter, Ollon D. McCool to G. Bernard Noble, 11 October 1955, Transaction Dossier, 

050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II 

Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Robert H. Bahmer, 15 November 

1955, Decimal 894.423/11-1555, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Letter, 

Robert H. Bahmer to G. Bernard Noble, 21 November 1955, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 

Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese 

Records, NA, RG 64.

66. Robert H. Bahmer to the Congress of the States, Report of the Archivist of the United States 

on records proposed for disposal, Disposal Report No. 56-10, 23 March 1956, Transaction 

Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records 

Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64. 

67. Memorandum, Mr. Hemmendinger, NA, to Mr. Sebald, FE, 20 April 1956, Decimal 

894.423/4-2056, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.

68. Letter, Merritt W. Matthews, Acting Chief, Engineer Intelligence Division, Office of the 

Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army to G. Bernard Noble, 3 July 1956, Decimal 

894.423/8-1756, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Letter, G. Bernard Noble 

to Robert H. Bahmer, 28 June 1956, Decimal 894.423/6-2856, ibid; Memorandum of 

Conversation, Subject: The Return of Captured Japanese Document, Meeting Held in 

Mr. Noble’s Office, 20 June 1956, file D-1.1, Japan Subject Files, 1947–1956, Office of 

Northeast Asian Affairs, lot file 58D118, entry 1220, NA, RG 59. 

69. Letter, Merritt W. Matthews, Acting Chief, Engineer Intelligence Division, Office of the 

Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army to G. Bernard Noble, 3 July 1956, Decimal 

894.423/8-1756, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59. 

70. Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Robert H. Bahmer, 1 August 1956, Decimal 894.423/8-156, 

Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.

71. Memorandum, Arthur E. Young, Deputy Regional Director, Records Management Service 

to Assistant Archivist of the United States, Subject: Seized Japanese Records in Custody of 
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 193

Federal Records Center, 9 August 1956, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of 

Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 

64.

72. Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Merritt W. Matthews, 17 August 1956, Decimal 894.423/8-

1756, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59.

73. Letters, Merritt W. Matthews to G. Bernard Noble, 17 August 1956, Transaction Dossier, 

050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II 

Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; G. Bernard Noble to Robert H. Bahmer, 31 August 1956, 

Decimal 894.423/8-2356, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; G. Bernard 

Noble to Gordon Williams, Chief of the General Service Administration, Federal Records 

Center, 31 August 1945, ibid; G. Bernard Noble to Merritt W. Matthews, 5 September 

1956, ibid; Merritt W. Matthews to G. Bernard Noble, 23 August 1956, ibid.

74. Memorandum, G. Bernard Noble to Marjorie McMullen, 20 September 1956, Decimal 

894.423/9-1456, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Letter, Arthur E. Young, 

Deputy Regional Director, Records Management Service to G. Bernard Noble, 25 September 

1956, ibid; Letter, G. Bernard Noble to Arthur E. Young, 24 September 1956, ibid; Letter, 

Arthur E. Young to G. Bernard Noble, 14 September 1956, ibid. Letter, Arthur E. Young 

to G. Bernard Noble, 25 September 1956, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of 

Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 

64. 

75. Letter, W.F. Zimmerman, Assistant Chief, Reference Service Branch, Federal Records Center 

to G. Bernard Noble, 11 March 1957, Decimal 894.423/3-1157, Central Decimal File, 

1955–1959, NA, RG 59; Memorandum, Merritt W. Matthews to Federal Records Center, 

Attn: William F. Zimmerman, 12 February 1957, ibid; Memorandum, Col. James T. Bull, 

D/Intelligence, HQ, USAF to Federal Records Center, Attn: Mr. Zimmerman, 26 February 

1957, ibid.

76. Letter, Hans Kohn to Wayne Grover, 27 September 1955, Transaction Dossier P & C 056-

102, American Committee for the Study of the War Documents, NA, RG 64; Letter, Robert 

H. Bahmer to Sidney Wallach, 10 December 1956, ibid; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to James 

William Morley, 10 May 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and 

Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; Letter, 

Edwin G. Beal, Jr. to James W. Morley, 15 May 1957, ibid. 

77. Letter, Sidney Wallach to Albert H. Leisinger, Jr., 5 December 1956, Transaction Dossier 

P & C 056-102, American Committee for the Study of the War Documents, NA, RG 64; 

Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to Sidney Wallach, 10 December 1956, ibid.

78. Letter, James William Morley to Robert H. Bahmer, May 6, 1957, Transaction Dossier, 

050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part 
194 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.

79. This is certainly evidenced by the textual and non-textual records holdings of the National 

Archives.

80. James William Morley, “Check List of Seized Japanese Records in the National Archives,” 

The Far Eastern Quarterly Vol. 9 No. 3 (May 1950).

81. Robert H. Bahmer to James William Morley, 10 May 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 

Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese 

Records, NA, RG 64.

82. Letter, Edwin G. Beal, Jr. to James W. Morley, 15 May 1957, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 

Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese 

Records, NA, RG 64. For storage space concerns facing the National Archives in the mid1950s, see my articles “An Administrative History of the Disposal of Federal Records, 

1950–1985,” Provenance: Journal of the Society of Georgia Archivists 4 No. 2 (Fall 1986), and 

“The National Archives: Serving Government, the Public and Scholarship, 1950–1965,” 

in Timothy Walch, ed., Guardian of Heritage: Essays on the History of the National Archives 

(Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, 1985).

83. GSA Form 397, Transmittal of Government Records, 1 December 1954. Indicated 

transferred were approximately 250 FRC containers and 14,890 archives containers 

(including those loaned to the Navy) for a total of 7,205 cubic feet of records. Transaction 

Dossier, III-NWR-153, NA, RG 64. 

84. John Young, comp., Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese 

Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945 (Washington, DC: Georgetown 

University Press, 1959), vi.

85. They were also joined by Mr. Kay Kitagawa, who may have been the same Kitagawa with the 

USGS mentioned previously.

86. Memorandum, Chief, Reference Service Branch to Chief, Federal Records Center, 10 July 

1957 and note at the bottom of the document by Art Young on 11 July 1957, Transaction 

Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records 

Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; Letter, Chitoshi Yanaga to Robert H. Bahmer, 12 

September 1957, ibid.

87. John Young, comp., Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese 

Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945 (Washington, DC: Georgetown 

University Press, 1959), vi-vii. 

88. Letter, Chitoshi Yanaga to Robert H. Bahmer, 12 September 1957, Transaction Dossier, 

050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II 

Japanese Records, NA, RG 64; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to Chitoshi Yanaga, 13 September 

1957, ibid.
A “Constantly Recurring Irritant” I 195

89. John Young, comp., Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese 

Army, Navy, and Other Government Agencies, 1868–1945 (Washington, DC: Georgetown 

University Press, 1959), vii. 

90. Memorandum, Regional Director to Deputy Archivist, 10 March 1958, Transaction Dossier, 

050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part 

II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.

91. Letter, G. Bernard Noble, the Director, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs to Robert 

H. Bahmer, 13 February 1960, Decimal 894.423/2-1360, Central Decimal File 1960–

1963, NA, RG 59; Letter, Robert H. Bahmer to G. Bernard Noble, 3 March 1960, Decimal 

894.423/3-360, ibid. On March 2, 1960, an internal National Archives routing slip noted 

that the Army Departmental Records Branch had 40 cubic feet and the Army Map Service 

had 30 cubic feet (the records Noble had written about) and that Map Service would send 

the records to the DRB, which would pack the whole collection. Routing Slip, to Dr. 

Bahmer, 2 March 1960, Transaction Dossier, 050-104 Determination of Policy and Plans 

for the Return of Seized Enemy Records Part II Japanese Records, NA, RG 64.

92. Cable, Herter to American Embassy, Tokyo, 12 April 1960, Decimal 894.423/4-1260, 

Central Decimal File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59; Letter, Maj. Gen. R.V. Lee, The Adjutant 

General to G. Bernard Noble, 23 May 1950, Decimal 894.423/5-2360, Central Decimal 

File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59; Cable, Herter to American Embassy, Tokyo, 26 May 1960, 

Decimal 894.423/5-2660, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, NA, RG 59. 

93. Despatch, Robert A. Fearey, First Secret, American Embassy, Tokyo, to State Department, 

1 July 1960, with attachments, Decimal 894.423/7-160, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, 

NA, RG 59.

94. These included mainly old tide record books, bottom-sediment survey journals, sailing 

direction volumes, and air weather data. The charts returned consisted principally of tissue 

paper tracings of Japanese nautical charts.

95. Despatch, American Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, Subject: Japanese Hydrographic 

Materials, 1 December 1961, Decimal 894.423/12-161, Central Decimal File 1960–1963, 

NA, RG 59.

96. It should be noted also that the Library of Congress has custody of not only original seized 

Japanese material, but also copies of microfilm of Foreign Ministry records that the Library 

of Congress microfilmed in Japan as well as microfilm of captured and seized Japanese 

records that were microfilmed by scholars in 1957. 

8

The Intelligence That Wasn’t: CIA Name Files, the U.S. 

Army, and Intelligence Gathering in Occupied Japan

Michael Petersen

In early 2005, the CIA declassified and released its files pertaining to World War 

II-era Japanese figures, revealing details of a large, widespread intelligence operation in 

the Far East that was supervised by the highest authorities in U.S. Army intelligence in 

Japan. Headed by a cadre of former officers from the Japanese Army and navy, loosely 

affiliated and constantly changing intelligence groups worked on behalf of the Supreme 

Commander for the Allied Powers’ (SCAP’s) intelligence arm, G-2, GHQ, under the 

command of Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby. United States intelligence personnel put 

unrepentant Japanese nationalists and military officers, some of whom had planned and 

conducted a pitiless war against Western influence in Asia, to work on projects designed 

to enhance U.S. security in the region and resist the spread of communism. In so doing, 

the United States offered material and financial support to a group that shared only the 

vaguest of anti-communist goals with U.S. officials and actively pursued its own often 

varying and conflicting—but primarily ultra-nationalist—agendas. Moreover, many 

Japanese agents directly or indirectly employed by military intelligence had criminal or 

suspected criminal pasts. 

Before the Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure Act, there was only fragmentary 

evidence of G-2’s involvement with Japanese Army and navy officers, while documentary 

evidence of G-2’s activities in operations associated with prominent right-wing figures 

was spotty and incomplete. Documentation regarding these operations in the SCAP 

records at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) is virtually 

nonexistent. Lacking documentary evidence, historians were forced to depend on 

memoirs and interviews with participants—which told only half the story and tended to 

whitewash the embarrassing details—as well as on professional hunches about military 

intelligence activities. Although they were able to draw some broad and accurate 

conclusions, the inaccessibility of documentation meant that their findings could be 
198 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

described as only speculative. Detailed discussions about many personalities in the socalled “underground” organizations, their funding sources, covert operational details, 

or the deeply duplicitous nature of the Japanese figures involved remained out of reach. 

Their work also contained virtually no assessment of U.S. use of suspected or convicted 

war criminals to gather intelligence, a practice that has received great attention in the case 

of Nazi war criminals.1 

Definitions of war criminality have been the subject of controversy for some Japanese. 

In this chapter, Japanese war criminals are defined as those found guilty by the Tokyo War 

Crimes Tribunal and in other trials of Class B and C defendants.2 A second grouping is 

more nebulous: those who had conspicuously criminal pasts or were suspected criminals 

held for a time by Allied authorities. Occupation authorities often detained members of 

this second group on the suspicion of crimes, sometimes with documented evidence, but 

in many cases did not indict the detainees. The reasons for this are varied and complex, 

but they relate less to legal considerations than to postwar geopolitics, a shortage of 

resources at the disposal of SCAP’s Legal Section, and domestic U.S. opinion, which 

was eager to move beyond the war years. As Cold War concerns drew the attention of 

American policymakers, targeting individuals for legal justice was set aside while the 

trail of evidence grew colder and potential defendants died. A final related category 

involves individuals who were members of organizations that became notorious for war 

crimes, such as the kenpeitai (the Japanese military police), or were influential people 

who worked closely with and supported the major war criminals found guilty of Class 

A war crimes.3 The majority of these people were not charged. In one way or another, 

the U.S. supported questionable postwar activities of Japanese in all three categories. All 

are considered relevant individuals under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial 

Government Disclosure Acts.

The CIA documents are also noteworthy because they open the door to a better 

understanding of the growth of CIA operations in Japan in the early Cold War. Gen.

Douglas MacArthur famously despised the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and its 

eventual successor, the CIA. With MacArthur’s full backing, SCAP’s Civil Intelligence 

Division, an arm of G-2, was able to keep the CIA from operating freely in Japan until 

1950.4 However, by the beginning of that year, the CIA had begun to assemble an 

intelligence-gathering organization that maintained surveillance not only of Japanese and 

other foreign organizations, but also of G-2’s own activities. The CIA’s presence in Japan 

rapidly strengthened and deepened as the Cold War progressed, and by 1952, when the 

occupation officially ended, the CIA was the preeminent intelligence organization in 

Japan. Some of the important details of this growth can now be better traced.

The institutional rivalry between SCAP and the CIA strongly influenced the 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 199

relationship between the two organizations. The story that follows, based as it is on 

information gathered by the CIA, is told from the agency’s perspective and does not reflect 

G-2’s concerns, rationale, and decision-making processes. Nevertheless, this collection 

of documents provides the fullest information available on this subject. This chapter is 

a preliminary assessment of some of the CIA’s recently declassified documents and the 

story they reveal about the U.S. occupation authorities’ intelligence relationship with 

right-wing Japanese ex-military officers and politicians—many of whom had criminal 

pasts—as well as with some of Japan’s well-known gangsters. The documents offer a 

detailed look into the tangled, morally ambiguous world of intelligence gathering in 

Japan in the earliest days of the Cold War and reveal the suspect sources used by G-2 in 

the Far East. 

Willoughby, Japanese Intelligence, and Operation Takematsu

In the wake of World War II, Japanese ex-military officers and ardent nationalists formed 

a loosely knit network to preserve the prewar Imperial system (insofar as possible under 

the yoke of the U.S. occupation) and eventually to reconstitute the Japanese Army. This 

network was established in part by Arisue Seizo, chief of the intelligence department at 

Imperial General Headquarters at the end of the war. The energetic and shrewd Arisue 

received his officer’s commission in 1917. He attended courses at the War College in 

Turin, Italy, from 1929 to 1931 and spent time attached to various Italian infantry 

regiments. From 1936 to 1939, Arisue, by then a Colonel, served as the military attaché 

to Italy. Between 1939 and 1945, Arisue held a number of different posts, including 

staff positions in the North China Area Army and army ministry. He advanced to the 

rank of Lieutenant General and eventually served as the Chief of Intelligence at Imperial 

General Headquarters.5 

In June and July 1945, Arisue came to the conclusion that the war was irrevocably 

lost and began hiding intelligence documents that he deemed would be valuable to 

occupying forces. He planned to use the documents as a bargaining chip for himself 

and others, and felt that handing over such valuable information would help mollify 

any potential enemies within the occupation administration. However, in conjunction 

with other officers, he also laid plans to resist the U.S. forces should the occupation 

prove excessively punitive. The core of this resistance was to be a network of former 

classmates and students from the Nakano intelligence school who, among other things, 

buried secret caches of weapons across Japan and quietly maintained loose contact with 

one other.6 Many former Japanese Army and navy officers, who were purged during 

the occupation, maintained close ties with one another, their subordinates, and their 

superiors, in effect creating networks composed of former military and intelligence 
200 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

specialists. In September 1945, Willoughby, MacArthur’s devoutly conservative and 

anti-communist chief of intelligence (G-2) for the Far East Command, quietly enlisted 

Arisue to set up a clandestine intelligence section inside G-2.7 Tellingly, G-2 officials 

found it necessary to reassure Arisue that they did not wish him to gather information 

about potential war criminals.8 

SCAP officials outside G-2 briefly considered Arisue himself a notable prospect for 

indictment as a Class A war criminal. As military attaché to Italy, he was an important 

figure in the negotiations leading up the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and 

Japan. Indeed, U.S. Army documents in the recently released CIA Name Files reveal that 

after the war, some Japanese openly wondered why Arisue, “who was deeply involved in 

Japan’s progress toward war,” was not arrested and charged as a war criminal.9 According 

to these documents, Arisue was very much a part of the group of aggressive military 

officers around the Emperor who pushed Japan into its catastrophic war. Major General 

Tanaka Ryukichi, the prosecution’s star witness at the Tokyo Trials, stated in his pretrial 

deposition that “Arisue was the driving force behind [Prime Minister] Hiranuma’s desire 

for this Tri-partite Pact.”10 

After the war, Arisue continued to be a strong supporter of the ultranationalist groups 

and individuals that brought war to the Far East. For example, he was deeply concerned 

about the fate of former Prime Minister Gen. Tōjō Hideki. During the Tokyo war crimes 

trial, Arisue was convinced that a guilty verdict against Tōjō was preordained and that 

Tōjō would be hanged. He strove to introduce defense witnesses who would discredit the 

prosecution’s case and vindicate Tōjō, which would, he reasoned, effectively clear Japan’s 

entire military establishment, including himself, of war guilt. If Tōjō were found guilty, 

then Arisue hoped that his efforts would at least cast the legitimacy of the Tribunal in 

doubt.11 According to historian Stephen Mercado, Arisue also withheld information 

from the prosecution at the trial in the Philippines of Lt. Gen. Homma Masaharu. 

Arisue’s information purportedly would have implicated his friend and colleague, the 

notorious Col. Tsuji Masanobu, as the instigator behind the Bataan Death March.12

The court found Homma guilty and he was executed, while Tsuji, whose whereabouts 

were unknown at this time, escaped indictment even in absentia.13 For whatever reason, 

international prosecutors never charged Arisue with any crimes.14 

With the exception of Arisue and a few others, most of the links established by U.S. 

authorities to the Japanese “underground” groups, as the CIA called them, were to highranking officers with operational and combat experience. Most lacked strong intelligence 

backgrounds. One of the most prominent military leaders of these groups was army Lt. 

Gen. Kawabe Torashirō, who had been head of intelligence for the Kwantung Army in 

1935–36, later served as military attaché to Berlin in 1938–39, and ended the war as 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 201

deputy chief of staff for Imperial GHQ.15 Kawabe, like his friend and colleague Arisue, 

fell within the circle of suspicion for the commission of Class A war crimes, though he 

was never charged. In August 1945, Kawabe led the Japanese delegation to Manila in 

order to discuss surrender terms with the Americans. While there, he met and established 

a friendly relationship with Willoughby.16 Upon his return to Japan, Kawabe joined 

Arisue in laying plans against a U.S. occupation they thought might turn harsh.17 Their 

efforts would prove unnecessary, and the leaders of Japan’s military establishment found 

in Willoughby a kindred spirit who would encourage and support the resurgence of 

a strong Japanese military and intelligence establishment with the disbanded Imperial 

officer corps as its cornerstone. 

In September 1945, Willoughby asked Arisue to set up a covert communications 

intelligence gathering group within G-2 to target communist elements in Japan in order 

to forestall a potential revolution. Kawabe joined the former intelligence chief’s efforts, 

providing the services of former Japanese Army personnel to occupation authorities, 

particularly G-2.18 Because of Kawabe’s senior position on the army general staff at the 

end of the war, he had the authority to order many groups and individuals within the 

army to cooperate in the endeavor.19 His network was made up primarily of former 

high-ranking army general staff members and their subordinates. These individuals 

were connected to a network of subordinate organizations (kikan) that conducted actual 

operations. 

The use of Japanese personnel by G-2 corresponded to the general occupation 

practice that each division within SCAP recruited its own group of Japanese experts. The 

problem with this arrangement was that SCAP officials lacked the resources to maintain 

thorough oversight of many of their initiatives and reforms. Instead, they relied on 

their Japanese interlocutors to implement and supervise larger policy-related decisions. 

According to Michael Schaller, “This lack of oversight allowed the Japanese to ignore 

or defy many unpleasant demands or, more important, to distort the information on 

which SCAP relied.”20 The CIA files confirm the accuracy of this general observation 

in the more specific case of intelligence work and indicate that misrepresentation and 

distortion were serious problems in intelligence circles. By the middle of 1947, G-2 

officials increasingly sought Japanese military and intelligence personnel for work against 

the Soviet Union and Japanese Communist Party. They valued these ex-military officers 

because they believed that the police and government officials were poorly equipped 

to handle such responsibilities. For the Japanese, however, this connection with G-2 

provided a smokescreen for high-ranking nationalist and militarist officers to maintain 

their networks, enhance their standing among the informal intelligence groups, and gain 

resources for further operations, all while failing to fulfill their duties to G-2. 
202 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

The picture of Japanese intelligence organizations during the occupation as portrayed 

by the CIA is unflattering. Previously, the nature of these networks remained mysterious, 

but it is now clear that employing former Japanese officers created numerous specific 

and fundamental problems. For the Japanese who built the networks, the dominant 

considerations were expediency and opportunity. An ex-officer might form a group from 

among former wartime associates or others who were willing and able to participate. 

As a result, many untrained, nonprofessional intelligence operatives jeopardized both 

operational security and the chances of a successful mission. Moreover, this ad hoc growth 

of intelligence networks resulted in a tangle of decentralized, thoroughly uncoordinated 

and fragmented groups that often worked at odds with one other. Japanese intelligence 

operations, which during the war were staffed by poorly trained personnel who were 

susceptible to outside political interference, became more disorganized after the war. 

In the words of one CIA report on the subject, the Japanese intelligence establishment 

was “mixed and confused as never before” during the occupation.21 As the likelihood of 

being punished for war crimes gradually diminished in the late 1940s, more and more 

individuals with questionable pasts and little professional training joined these networks, 

assuming prominent roles that were not always consistent with their G-2 advisor’s 

guidance and weakening the security of intelligence-related activities. 

Indeed, the major pursuit of most of these networks during the occupation was 

not intelligence. Rather, they were engaged in independent operations to bring about 

a right-wing nationalist resurgence. Their early work centered on propaganda and 

political work, but later shifted to rearmament. Individuals within these networks often 

viewed these activities simply as a way to make money in a ruined economy. A CIA 

report on the subject stated that “to the leaders of the Rightist underground the rebirth 

of the J.I.S. [Japanese Intelligence Services] was a secondary objective, the conduct 

of pure intelligence operations a subordinate activity except for when such operations 

have served since 1946 as a natural outlet for clandestine activity and a valuable means 

of livelihood.”22 Further complicating matters, individuals in these networks, while 

generally agreeing on goals, did not always agree on methods, and fierce rivalries 

developed. Associations within the networks were extremely fluid, with some former 

officers supporting many different and competing subgroups simultaneously or changing 

allegiances without notice. Moreover, there were many personal and professional clashes 

as ideological loyalty to outside organizations drove the decisions of separate groups, 

interservice rivalries ignited conflicts, and animosity between individuals sparked larger 

doctrinal and ideological disagreements. As a result, the loyalties of those participating 

in any given intelligence-gathering activity were vague, covert action was often ad hoc, 

and operational security continued to be deeply flawed. When these networks worked 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 203

for the U.S. occupying authorities, these deficiencies likely had an adverse effect on U.S. 

interests. 

Specific planning for larger-scale intelligence cooperation between G-2 and Japanese 

military figures began in late 1948, around the time when the risk of prosecution for 

war crimes began to abate. Conversations about planning for a new program took place 

between September of that year and January 1949. G-2 code named the operation 

“Takematsu” and agreed to finance Japanese agents who in turn would provide 

intelligence on foreign targets (the “Take” program) and gather domestic intelligence 

primarily on communist elements in Japan (the “Matsu” program). Kawabe and Arisue 

would run the program, and a strictly limited circle of U.S. Army intelligence personnel 

under Willoughby’s direct supervision would be involved only at the highest policy 

level. In other words, the Japanese involved in Takematsu would have a great deal of 

autonomy. At the end of September 1948, Kawabe requested ¥87,000 (approximately 

$250 in 1949—the average annual per capita income in Japan in 1951, after the onset of 

economic recovery, was approximately $146) for initial startup funds from Col. Arthur 

Lacey of G-2, who would supervise Take and later become the head of SCAP’s Civil 

Intelligence Division.23 According to CIA documents, less than two weeks later, on 

October 9, G-2 representatives personally handed Kawabe an initial payment of ¥37,000 

so that he could assemble the basic plan for the long-term operation.24

On November 25, Kawabe met again with Lacey and other representatives of G-2, 

this time with operational plans for Take in hand. Kawabe recommended a two-pronged 

approach, basing operations in southern Japan against North Korea and Communist 

China, while also operating in northern Japan against Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In both 

places, Kawabe proposed using established smuggling routes to insert agents into hostile 

territory to collect both military and economic intelligence. In line with Willoughby’s 

desire to establish a communications intelligence network, Kawabe also requested U.S. 

radio equipment to monitor Chinese, Korean, and Russian communications. In addition, 

Kawabe planned to recruit fishermen and sailors to observe Soviet shipping between 

Port Arthur, Vladivostok, and Dairen (present-day Dalian). Kawabe also asked that G2 issue special credentials for all Japanese involved to protect them against interference 

by other occupation personnel and Japanese government authorities. By January 1949, 

Kawabe estimated that the expense of these operations would exceed ¥10 million (almost 

$28,000 in 1949), 4 million of which would aid in setting up a smuggling ring for agents 

in northern Japan. He disingenuously claimed that the smuggling carried out as a cover 

for these operations meant that, over time, Takematsu would begin to pay for itself.25

Willoughby approved Kawabe’s plans almost in their entirety. He ordered that 

the operations focus on Sakhalin and the Kuriles, but he approved the infiltration of 
204 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

agents into North Korea and Manchuria. Willoughby also promised to provide the 

Japanese Takematsu leaders with specific intelligence and as much of G-2’s information 

as possible on potential target areas. If the cost of the operation, negligible at best, 

upset Willoughby, he did not indicate it, merely informing Kawabe to prepare separate 

budgets for the Take and Matsu elements of the operation. Willoughby did, however, 

wish to know how Japanese agents would use any intercepted radio messages, and the 

request for special credentials was a red flag to other G-2 observers. They recognized 

it as a bald attempt to allow former Japanese Army personnel to operate unmolested 

across international borders, conducting criminal activities. In the end, Willoughby’s 

representatives brushed this issue under the carpet, informing Kawabe that the issue of 

credentials “would be studied,” and thereafter ignored it.26 By and large, however, G-2 

officials in Tokyo embraced Kawabe’s bold intelligence operation.

Some Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) members in the field voiced strong 

suspicions about Kawabe’s and Arisue’s intentions. They directed much of their criticism 

at Kawabe and his colleagues for obscuring the size of their own networks while also 

exaggerating their ability to run effective operations, all in a bid to gain both resources 

and influence from their occupiers. One officer in the Headquarters of the Sixth CIC 

District on Hokkaido, the point of origin for missions to Sakhalin and the Kuriles, stated, 

“I believe that most of the organization shown in the attached plan as ‘proposed’ already 

exists. I feel that the authors of the plan cannot be as uninformed about the target 

area as their draft would indicate.” Worse, he argued, was that this was nothing more 

than an elaborate scam set up by Japanese ex-officers to bilk resources from occupation 

authorities. CIC in Hokkaido believed that the Japanese did not have the ability or 

intention of conducting such complicated operations. The U.S. officer stated flatly, “I 

feel that the whole operation is nothing more than a high level shakedown,” and suggested 

that, as a test of Takematsu’s utility, U.S. authorities provide support and funding only 

after Kawabe carried out a trial operation, complete with documented results and useful 

intelligence, at his own expense.27

Despite field objections, Takematsu went forward in the winter and spring of 1949. 

Initial CIA reports about the operation were confused. From one perspective, Takematsu 

almost immediately ran into trouble—operations in northern Japan bogged down as 

early as May 1949. High budget requirements, a dearth of available Japanese agents, and 

a shortage of good case officers reportedly forced the complete cancellation of operations 

into North Korea. Matsu activities in Japan were likewise dramatically reduced.28

However, other, more numerous and authoritative reports that emerged in late 1950 

make it clear that Takematsu continued, backed with large contributions of financial and 

material aid that G-2 provided to the Arisue and Kawabe kikan. 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 205

Covert operations run by Japanese ex-officers and intelligence specialists ranged far 

and wide across Asia, but yielded mixed results at best. For example, supposedly under 

the direction of a former Maj. Gen. Kimura, the Arisue kikan scored a notable victory by 

placing agents (posing as technical advisors) in the Indian and Pakistani governments.29

Of more dubious intelligence value were Arisue’s efforts to set up a spy ring in North 

Korea.30 Finally, Japanese intelligence networks headed by Kawabe and Arisue 

surreptitiously shipped Japanese volunteers to Taiwan in order to defend the island from 

the Communist Chinese and plan an eventual invasion of the Chinese mainland, an 

operation that, in the CIA’s eyes, produced questionable results.31 Interestingly, Japanese 

operatives never devoted serious effort to Willoughby’s primary focus, the plan to move 

agents north into Sakhalin and Kuriles.

CIA documents reveal little about the penetration of the Indian and Pakistani 

governments, but offer more details about activities in North Korea and Taiwan. 

Operations into North Korea began shortly after Kawabe and Willoughby finalized their 

planning in the spring of 1949. By the middle of that year, Arisue’s subordinate, Maj. 

Gen. Watanabe Wataru, a close friend and supporter of the general, was the central 

figure in Japanese operations into Korea. During World War II, the hard-line Watanabe 

directed the Japanese military administration of Malaya. His administration proved to be 

especially harsh on the Chinese residents there, forcibly seizing their money and property 

and impoverishing them at a rate that concerned even the Japanese.32 

A common method of operations among Japanese intelligence personnel, one 

utilized by Watanabe, involved the creation of corporations to act as legitimate or semilegitimate (these companies often engaged in illegal smuggling) business fronts while 

the employees, almost exclusively intelligence operatives, conducted covert operations. 

Watanabe created the Mitsuboshi Trading Company, staffed it with former subordinates, 

including former kenpeitai officers, and tried to make contact with Japanese officers either 

serving in the North Korean Army or hiding out across the border in Manchuria. Most 

of the information that these operations produced was fabricated, and the few activities 

that yielded information were poorly exploited by G-2.33 This reflected a pattern in 

the general Japan-U.S. intelligence relationship in which, despite major G-2 support, 

Japanese operators regularly deceived their U.S. paymasters in an effort to enhance 

the standing and influence of former Japanese military officials, while simultaneously 

providing generally worthless returns on the U.S. investment. 

From the U.S. perspective, results of the Taiwan operations were not much better. 

Many of the Japanese ex-officers had strong relationships with Nationalist Chinese leaders 

and supported the Kuomintang’s efforts against the Chinese Communists. Some in 

Arisue’s and Kawabe’s organizations, such as Nemoto Hiroshi, former Commander of the 
206 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

North China Area Army, successfully placed Japanese volunteer troops (including some 

high-ranking members of the kenpeitai) on Taiwan in exchange for sugar and bananas, 

which were shipped back to Japan for sale at a huge profit. At least four expeditions of 

Japanese troops arrived in Taiwan, all on the strength of G-2 funding and support.34

However, Japanese operatives kept tight control over what little intelligence information 

emerged from this work, shielding information they had gathered elsewhere from the 

Kuomintang and the results of missions to Taiwan from G-2.35 Arisue and Kawabe did 

not allow their hopes for the success of these operations or G-2’s backing to interfere 

with their contacts with Chinese Communist intelligence operatives. According to CIA 

sources, both officers felt very strongly that they needed to develop “satisfactory future 

relations with whatever force and intelligence service controls China, which, realistically 

speaking, means the Chinese People’s Government.”36 At the same time as they supplied 

anti-Communist troops to the Chinese Nationalists, elements of Arisue’s network built 

covert links with Communist Chinese intelligence agents operating in Tokyo. Unknown 

to G-2, former Japanese officers who were already acting purely in their own interest had 

quietly created a situation in which they could, at a moment’s notice, funnel high-level 

information about U.S. military interests to Communist intelligence services if it suited 

their needs.37

Covert intelligence gathering operations under the guidance of G-2 were badly 

compromised between 1945 and 1952, though it is uncertain to what extent Willoughby 

realized this. One of the primary reasons was that most Japanese operatives had little 

interest in helping their U.S. occupiers and were instead more concerned with pursuing 

their own interests. Both Arisue and Kawabe used their connections to Willoughby to 

funnel high-level information about U.S. military interests not only to the Chinese, but 

also back into the Japanese underground. 

In his 1982 memoir Seiji to gunji to jinji: Sanbo honbu daini bucho no shuki (Politics, 

Military Affairs, and Personnel: Memoirs of AGS Second Bureau Chief), Arisue 

described himself as Willoughby’s confidant, a man who understood the G-2 chief’s 

problems better than Willoughby’s own staff. The American general, suspicious and 

jealous of many of his SCAP colleagues, told Arisue about the bitter interservice rivalries 

between the U.S. Army and Navy and the thorny relations between the U.S. Army’s 

operations and intelligence branches.38 Arisue apparently funneled this information back 

to Japanese intelligence circles throughout the late 1940s, a fact conveniently neglected 

in his memoirs. In addition, the CIA learned that Willoughby had a Japanese mistress, 

Araki Mitsuko, who was the wife of a former professor at Tokyo Imperial University and 

one of the Japanese government’s principal sources of information on GHQ early in the 

occupation.39 Worst of all, by the early 1950s Chinese Communist agents had penetrated 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 207

Arisue’s group at several levels.40 Until the present release of CIA documentation, such 

information has been unavailable in primary or secondary sources. 

According to the CIA, most Japanese groups supplied inaccurate or useless 

information to G-2 authorities. The information commonly included outright 

fabrications, the assessments they made were usually incorrect, and their attempts to run 

operations for the United States often degenerated into nothing more than theft from 

U.S. authorities. For example, in the autumn of 1950, Kawabe accepted a G-2 request to 

recruit Japanese repatriates from Soviet prisoner-of-war camps and run them as agents on 

Sakhalin. For this purpose, members of Kawabe’s group were to purchase a fifteen-ton 

ship with ¥500,000 ($1388 in 1949, which was well over ten times the average annual 

per capita income and a huge sum on the black market) provided by G-2. After the 

money had been transferred to the Japanese, however, U.S. officials never again heard 

anything of either the ship or any personnel involved in the operation. The money and 

the operatives simply vanished, again illustrating that Kawabe and Arisue had no interest 

in Willoughby’s primary objective of establishing an intelligence foothold for operations 

into the Soviet Union.41 The Japanese intelligence chiefs viewed their relationship with 

G-2 as a one-sided marriage of convenience. Reliability problems plagued U.S.-financed 

Japanese intelligence operations throughout the occupation. 

Taken as a whole, the recently released CIA Name Files also illustrate other significant 

reasons why the attempt to gather intelligence through Japanese networks was a dismal 

failure that endangered U.S. interests. The fluidity and disorganization of the Japanese 

networks was one important factor. The few competent professionals, such as Arisue, were 

surrounded by charlatans and hacks who were included in the work because of prewar 

and wartime political and ideological loyalties. Moreover, both foreign and domestic 

communists were able to quickly and definitively identify rightists who attempted 

counterintelligence activities, making any attempts at cover useless and the spread of 

misinformation far easier. Finally, in a pointed criticism of its rivals in G-2, the CIA 

noted that part of the problem was caused by the “American need for information and 

American gullibility. The lack of familiarity of most Americans with Japanese language, 

traditions, psychology, and internal affairs made them easy to fool for a time.”42

War Criminals and Intelligence Gathering

The operational problems associated with using Japanese intelligence and military figures 

in a covert capacity were legion. Worse (in terms of concerns over war crimes) were 

the connections that developed from these operations. The Arisue and Kawabe kikan

had extensive contact with many individuals whose wartime records were tarnished by 

allegations of major criminal activity, and many of them went to work on operations 
208 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

financed by G-2. The CIA Name Files identify numerous occasions when G-2-funded 

or supported operations conducted by several prominent war criminals or suspected war 

criminals. They make it clear that G-2 was willing to overlook the tainted pasts of 

Japanese who directly or indirectly supported its anti-communist efforts. Kodama Yoshio 

and Tsuji Masanobu are two of several prominent examples of G-2’s willful disregard of 

the backgrounds of Japanese agents.

Kodama Yoshio

Arisue recruited and employed several infamous individuals for intelligence work. Among 

the worst was the ultra right-wing gangster and backroom political fixer Kodama Yoshio. 

Born in Fukushima Prefecture in 1911, Kodama spent much of his childhood in Korea. 

When he was sixteen he came to Tokyo, where he worked as a laborer and sales clerk. In 

1931, Kodama began serving a six-month prison sentence for threatening to assassinate 

members of the Imperial Diet. By twenty-three, he had accumulated a lengthy criminal 

record. The CIA claimed that, in 1934, Kodama founded the Tengyo Society, a rightwing fringe group that sought to bring about a reactionary government by intimidating 

and murdering leading businessmen and politicians. That same year, he was a key actor 

in a failed plot to murder several government officials in a series of bombings. Arrested 

before the plan could be carried out, Kodama was sentenced to three and half years in 

prison, during which time he attempted suicide. After release from prison, Kodama 

started the Japan Youth Movement and quickly gained the attention of many influential 

arch-conservatives in government and military circles.43

In December 1941, after ingratiating himself with high-ranking naval officers, in 

particular Vice-Admiral Yamagata Seisho, Kodama went to Shanghai and set up what 

came to be known as the Kodama kikan, a purchasing and procurement organization for 

the Japanese Naval Air Forces. He received millions of yen from the navy to start this work. 

Eventually, Kodama employed hundreds of operatives, primarily professional criminals, 

right-wing thugs, and members of the kenpeitai. Originally tasked with delivering copper 

and airplane parts to the navy, Kodama rapidly expanded and diversified his activities. 

He established contacts with army officials in China and expanded his organization from 

its base in Shanghai to the Amur River in Manchuria and the Irrawaddi and Salween 

Rivers in Burma. In addition to war supplies, Kodama procured raw material, food, 

clothing, vehicles, and many other goods necessary for the Japanese war machine.44 He 

also allegedly engaged in drug trafficking, setting up a large opium ring in China which 

he ran out of Shanghai.45 In early 1944, the Kodama kikan received the navy’s permission 

to acquire and operate mines in China. It worked at least four of these mines, which 

provided the navy with a large supply of rare metals such as tungsten and molybdenum. 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 209

According to the CIA, the navy paid handsomely for his work, sending Kodama’s group 

approximately ¥3.5 billion between 1941 and 1945.46 As the war was reaching its end 

in mid-summer 1945, Kodama transferred vast sums of money from Shanghai to Japan, 

even managing to bring more than a thousand gold bars back from China.47 By the end 

of the war, Kodama had allegedly amassed a fortune worth over $175 million. After 

serving briefly as an advisor to Prince Naruhiko Higashkuni’s “Surrender Cabinet,” 

Kodama was arrested and held in Sugamo prison for one year. U.S. authorities dropped 

the charges against him and released him in December 1948.48

Allied prosecutors had missed an opportunity to try a dangerous gangster who made 

his fortune at the expense of the Chinese. Several CIC and CIA reports stated that most 

of the material supplied by Kodama’s kikan to the Japanese armed forces was obtained 

illegally. His henchmen simply expropriated and stole whatever material they thought 

might be useful for the Japanese war machine, including food and clothing, from the 

Chinese. They often traveled into central China and held community leaders ransom 

until the local populace gave them the goods they sought. Kenpeitai members, whose 

operations Kodama supported financially, frequently provided the muscle for such forays. 

When Kodama’s brigands actually paid for the acquisition of large amounts of goods, 

they usually forced the Chinese to sell for well below the market value and pocketed the 

balance of the money provided by the navy, profiteering at a rate that quickly impoverished 

many desperate Chinese.49 According to CIA reporting, even many Japanese in occupied 

China viewed Kodama as “one of the worst profiteers.”50 The same report indicated that 

Kodama also organized slave labor during the war, but corroborating documentation has 

not been discovered. 

The Japanese government was well aware of Kodama’s activities, but did nothing to 

stop them. A CIA report on the subject stated that “The Japanese government, including 

the Foreign Office, the War Ministry, the Navy Ministry, and the Special Higher Bureau 

paid him well for everything he brought them, but turned a blind and almost condoning 

eye on his methods of operation. The army and navy are said to have profited well from 

the resale of looted articles ‘procured’ by Kodama and his strange consortium.”51 Many 

Japanese made money because of Kodama’s crimes, and since the only ones suffering 

in the bargain were the Chinese, few paid much attention to his methods. Although 

some details of Kodama’s activities in occupied China remain clouded, he did head a 

vast operation dealing in drugs, thievery, looting, and illegal expropriation of property to 

exploit the Chinese resources and population, all with the tacit support of the Japanese 

government. 

The Kodama kikan also handled an item of major attraction to U.S. forces in the 

immediate postwar period: intelligence. A 1952 CIA report describing Kodama’s 
210 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

operations in China gave a positive assessment of his resources and stated that “the 

item in which traffic was especially heavy, and of signal interest to Allied censorship 

in Japan, is intelligence. Kodama supervised a group of talented and persistent 

spies.”52 Populated as they were with smugglers, black marketers, and former kenpeitai

officers, Kodama’s extensive networks of contacts across China made him an excellent 

potential source of intelligence information. This was especially true after the Chinese 

Communist Party seized control of mainland China in 1949, precisely when G-2 began 

concretely exploring the possibilities of sponsoring Japanese covert action as part of 

Operation Takematsu. Indeed, according to the CIA, it was rather widely known in 

intelligence circles that Kodama had offered his services to occupation authorities.53

Given the lack of documentation in the recently released CIA files attesting to direct 

conversations between Kodama’s representatives and G-2, a reasonable assumption is that 

Willoughby’s staff ignored Kodama’s overtures. Arisue, however, seized this opportunity 

and made extensive use of the Kodama kikan for his operations on behalf of Willoughby’s 

intelligence service.54 

Indeed, Kodama’s network was deeply involved in some of Arisue’s most ambitious 

covert actions. In 1949, Arisue began laying plans to exploit Japanese commercial 

connections on mainland China in order to gather intelligence. He planned to use 

the Daiko Trade Company (a front company established by Kodama) to conceal illegal 

smuggling activities, as the route by which Japanese covert agents would get into China. 

The CIA—not to mention many Japanese—thought little of this plan: 

Arisue intends to give some of the product to American GHQ agents in return for financial 

support, but will so disguise the means and methods of operation that GHQ will believe 

that it is completely the work of his own unit. The entire plan is considered by most of 

the other groups to be highly dangerous in view of the looseness of operations security 

that the two operating kikan have demonstrated in the past and particularly in view of the 

tight surveillance and close watchfulness of the Chinese People’s Government regarding 

Japanese shipping to their ports.55 

The CIA foresaw an intelligence disaster. Moreover, Kodama’s agents—including exkenpeitai Col. Kawai, who helped catch Soviet spymaster Richard Sorge in 1942—also 

began cooperating with Watanabe Wataru’s efforts to develop a covert intelligence net in 

North Korea and Manchuria in 1950.56 This relationship may have developed because 

one of Watanabe’s chief assistants was Otsuka Kenzo, another former colonel in the 

kenpeitai.

57 How much G-2 knew about what amounted to Arisue’s subcontracting of 

Kodama’s services is not revealed in the CIA documents, but there is little indication 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 211

that Willoughby’s staff took any time to investigate how its money was being spent. If 

they did, they would have also discovered that at the same time Arisue was shelling out 

cash for Kodama’s assistance, Kodama was also involved in blackmail, including allegedly 

swindling the Mitsui Corporation out of ¥1 billion by threatening to flood the stock 

exchange with counterfeit Mitsui stock certificates.58 The CIA claimed that members of 

the Kodama kikan had also infiltrated the CIC and were supplying information back to 

Kodama personally.59 If this claim is correct, the influential power broker stood to profit 

handsomely at U.S. expense.

By 1953, the CIA had changed its assessment of Kodama. Agency analysts recognized 

that, despite the size and scope of Kodama’s network, his greed made him a horrendous 

liability. One report (see next page) stated that 

Kodama Yoshio’s value as an intelligence operative is virtually nil. He is a professional liar, 

gangster, charlatan, and outright thief. His main objective throughout all his career was 

to get wealth and personal power for himself, regardless of consequences to his country ... 

The truth is that Kodama is completely incapable of intelligence operations, and has no 

interest in anything but the profits.60

When the occupation ended in 1952 and the CIA took greater responsibility for 

intelligence gathering in Japan, the agency steadfastly refused to deal with him.61

Kodama’s money and connections ensured that he would remain a player in Japanese 

politics, always operating backstage, and as an important go-between in restoring 

diplomatic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.62 After surviving the 

Lockheed-Martin bribery scandal and a rather theatrical assassination attempt in the 

1970s, Kodama died of cancer on January 17, 1984.63 

Tsuji Masanobu

CIA documents indicate that Arisue was also responsible for recruiting into U.S. service 

one of the most notorious, unindicted war criminals in the Asia-Pacific War. Colonel 

Tsuji Masanobu, described by one historian as “a fanatical ideologue and pathologically 

brutal staff officer,” was born in Ishikawa Prefecture in 1903.64 He graduated from the 

Imperial War College in 1931, and was a staff officer in the Kwantung Army during 

the disastrous Nomonhan Incident in 1939.65 He first met Arisue at Imperial GHQ 

before the Pacific war.66 Tsuji later was reputed to have ordered the Bataan Death 

March, massacres of civilians in China, the Philippines, and Singapore—the infamous 

Sook Ching Massacre—and is alleged to have cannibalized an American flyer who was 

executed during the Japanese occupation of Singapore. CIA documents offer more 
212 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Background on J.I.S. and Japanese Military Personalities, 10 September 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA 

Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I, page 1 of 2. 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 213

evidence of Tsuji’s participation in the expansion of the Sook Ching Massacre, noting 

that he countersigned an order to murder Chinese merchants in Malaya.67 U.S. officials 

also investigated the possibility that, late in the war, the Japanese Army expropriated 

three tons of gold from French Indochina with the idea that it would be used at a later 

date to finance the resurgence of the Japanese military establishment. Reports indicated 

that Tsuji, who spent a great deal of time in Southeast Asia, had distributed part of this 

haul to his officers and told them to hide it away from Allied hands.68 

After the war, according to the agency’s reporting, many Japanese wondered why he 

was never charged for these crimes and brought to trial “since others have been convicted 

and executed for the same crimes.”69 Tsuji remained a person of interest to war crimes 

investigators, especially the British, but was never arrested because his whereabouts were 

unknown.70 He avoided capture first by hiding in Southeast Asia and was later sheltered 

by Chang Kai-shek on mainland China. In 1948, he quietly slipped back into Japan and 

lived in hiding, staying for a time in a residence owned by Kodama, who had befriended 

the officer in Shanghai during the war.71 The United States dropped its war crimes 

charges against him in 1950, and soon afterward Tsuji burst back on the public scene, 

publishing two books about his wartime and postwar experiences that quickly became 

best sellers.72 

Even before U.S. authorities rescinded his status as a war criminal, however, Tsuji 

became involved in covert activities backed by U.S. military intelligence. Documents 

suggest that he was initially involved in the scheme to recruit Japanese soldiers for 

service in Taiwan. Though the CIA’s early reporting on the details of the operation was 

sketchy and contradictory, Tsuji dispatched former Japanese Army personnel to assist 

Chinese Nationalist forces on the island.73 Moreover, in 1950, after Allied authorities 

dropped criminal charges, Arisue asked Tsuji to expand Japanese intelligence operations 

into Southeast Asia. Tsuji had met many of the former Imperial Japanese Army officers 

associated with this operation while he was in Singapore. Most of the officers thoroughly 

detested Tsuji and successfully demanded that Arisue remove him. He was replaced by 

former Shanghai kenpeitai Chief Tomita Bunichi.74 

Tsuji was not finished, however. He had also re-established contact with an ultraconservative circle of former military officers who sought, illegally, to recreate the Imperial 

Japanese Army. Many were directly employed by G-2, and through them, Tsuji’s covert 

activities also received U.S. support. G-2’s Historical Branch in the Nippon Yusen Kaisha 

Building (NYK) was the hub of this activity. Through Arisue, G-2 recruited and employed 

some 200 former Japanese officers to assist historian Gordon Prange’s work on the 

history of MacArthur’s Pacific campaign.75 A central figure in this effort was Col. Hattori 

Takushirō, who, along with his friend Tsuji, had served as a senior operations staff officer 
214 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

in the Kwantung Army during the Nomonhan Incident. Shortly afterwards, Hattori, a 

disciplined, reticent officer, became Chief of the Army General Staff Operations Branch, 

making him one of the principal planners of the successful Japanese Army offensives 

of 1941–42. After the war, Hattori believed that the rearmament of Japan could not 

be achieved “through democratic methods,” and advocated a revival of the disbanded 

army, in which he would be Chief of Staff. He concealed these convictions from G-2, 

“accepting from them material aid and pretending to cooperate fully.”76 Nevertheless, 

spearheaded by Hattori, many former officers in G-2’s Historical Branch carried out 

anti-communist covert operations both within and outside of Japan with Willoughby’s 

approval. One of the most important members of the Hattori kikan, known in some 

CIA documents as “Willoughby’s Stable,” was Hattori’s close friend Tsuji Masanobu.77

Through Hattori, Tsuji became involved in planning one of Willoughby’s most 

ambitious operations, a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland China. In January 

1951, G-2 began toying with the notion of encouraging Chang Kai-shek’s forces to 

invade south China and establish contact with Chinese anti-communist resistance forces. 

Willoughby’s subordinates approached Hattori and requested that he and Tsuji prepare 

the operational details of such a plan. Hattori, whom the CIA believed was a key figure 

in getting the war crimes charges against Tsuji dropped, now sought to put Tsuji’s military 

expertise to work for G-2.78 Planning proceeded through early March, with Tsuji taking 

the lead. From the CIA’s perspective, however, Willoughby’s trust in the two officers 

was misplaced because Tsuji, who had himself become enmeshed in rearmament plans, 

purportedly stated in 1951 that it was necessary to “deceive the ally prior to the enemy.”79

The agency’s analysts also saw “a serious danger that American military personnel in G-2, 

GHQ will be taken in by [Hattori’s group].”80 In any event, the planning came to very 

little, as Willoughby learned in March 1951 that news of the preparations leaked to the 

Communist Chinese, and the idea was shelved.81 

By 1952, Tsuji was convinced that cooperation with the Americans was the best way 

to rapidly rearm Japan, a stance that earned him the opprobrium of many of his former 

colleagues in the army.82 Hattori was not one of them. The two officers, backed by 

Kodama and others, were increasingly unhappy with Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s 

policy of exclusively relying on U.S. military protection instead of rebuilding Japan’s own 

army. Hattori had long loathed Yoshida for the Prime Minister’s purported hostility 

toward purgees and nationalists. In July 1952, Hattori hatched a plot to conduct a coup 

by murdering Yoshida and replacing him either with the more sympathetic Hatoyama 

Ichirō or Ogata Taketora. Despite his initial enthusiasm, Tsuji convinced Hattori to 

hold off his coup d’etat as long as the conservative Liberal Party was in power, leaving 

posterity with the irony of America’s staunchest political ally in Japan being protected 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 215

by one of Japan’s most well-known alleged war criminals. Nevertheless, the group did 

consider murdering other government figures to send a message to Yoshida (see pages 

216–17).83 Hatoyama succeeded in deposing Yoshida in 1954, but it is unclear what 

role, if any, Hattori and Tsuji played in this. In 1952, Tsuji was elected to the Diet and 

began a flamboyant career in politics. 

Tsuji’s disappearance in 1961 is commonly attributed to his death in Laos. Less likely, 

he is reputed to have secretly worked for Vo Nguyen Giap as an operations staff officer 

through 1968. Although CIA documents indicate that in April 1961 Tsuji traveled to 

North Vietnam, they cast further doubt on any work he might have done for the North 

Vietnamese Army. A CIA report placed Tsuji in Laos in June, where he was traveling 

to meet members of the Pathet Lao. Thereafter, reporting becomes confused, placing 

Tsuji alternately in Indonesia, Nepal, and China. It appears likely that Tsuji traveled 

from North Vietnam through Laos to China, where he was imprisoned by the Chinese 

Communists in January 1963, possibly in Yunan Province. One unconfirmed report 

claimed that the Chinese executed Tsuji. Unfortunately, much of what is reported in 

these documents is hearsay and supposition, and the documents offer no firm conclusions 

as to the circumstances of Tsuji’s death.84 

After the Occupation: The CIA and Japanese Assets

In 1950 and 1951, the Japanese intelligence networks, already badly decentralized, 

splintered further. Most of the leaders in the influential Japanese intelligence circles 

broke with Arisue, whose pompous, self-serving personality alienated many, while his 

extensive contacts with G-2, which he lorded over others, only made matters worse. 

As his support gradually withered, Arisue hoped to maintain his influence by openly 

advocating that Japan rearm in close cooperation with the United States, thereby gaining 

more influence with G-2. This plan backfired, estranging even Kawabe. Only Kodama 

and Watanabe Wataru stood by the old intelligence hand. 

By the spring of 1951, Arisue found himself almost totally excluded from any plans 

for revival of the Japanese Army and intelligence services and had lost the support of 

several of his subordinates, thereby dramatically reducing his utility to G-2.85 Finally, 

rising animosity between Kawabe’s faction and an increasingly influential cadre of former 

field officers around Hattori and Tsuji splintered the Japanese intelligence groups further 

still. This friction was the result of Kawabe’s over-reliance on his former staff officers to 

the exclusion of experienced field officers from the nascent central Japanese intelligence 

service that he would presumably head after Arisue was discredited.86 

Moreover, according to the CIA, G-2 cut funding for its Japanese-led operations in 

1952 in anticipation of the end of the occupation. In April, GHQ informed Hattori that 
216 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Coup d’etat Allegedly Being Planned by Ex-Militarists and Ultranationalists, 31 October 1952, NA, RG 263, 

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 217
218 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

his position as Chief of the Historical Records Department in G-2 would be terminated 

when the peace treaty took effect, a move that cut off his operational funds and left his 

organization with little money to carry out its domestic intelligence-gathering activities. 

By late in the year, the Hattori kikan ceased to exist.87 CIA reports note that in December, 

G-2 informed Kawabe that he too would have to reduce his personnel roster because of 

a lack of funding. Rather than acquiesce to this diminished position, Kawabe rejected 

G-2’s terms and dissolved his group, a melodramatic and unnecessary step since Kawabe 

had been anticipating this move for months and had placed his personnel throughout the 

nascent government intelligence services and in the National Safety Force.88 

Finally, the CIA reported that as the occupation began winding down, a “feverish 

scramble for power” to lead the Japanese intelligence community was developing among 

leaders of the various kikan. In the amorphous world of backroom Japanese politics, 

kikan chiefs broke with former allies, struck temporary alliances, and bargained their 

assets all in a bid for increased power under a newly independent Japanese government. 

Japanese operatives increasingly jockeyed for power by using their connections with G2 as leverage to enhance their own individual prestige, but the sloppy tradecraft this 

involved created yet another major security problem. The CIA noted that 

in most cases, groups are separated only by shades of opinion or personal ambitions; 

therefore, when circumstances favor a merger, the differences are forgotten and the assets 

of both sides are reviewed. Often, at such times security is ignored and the discussion 

of the assets might include the description of an intelligence target or a connection with 

American G-2 or CIC.89 

Intelligence relationships were fluidly established and then broken as the occupation 

came to an end, creating a situation in which U.S. intelligence links with the Japanese 

became an open secret and exposed U.S. interests to further exploitation. 

Meanwhile, the CIA was evaluating the Japanese intelligence groups to determine 

which kikan were the most likely to be involved in a central Japanese Intelligence Service 

in the future. The CIA would use G-2’s old networks, but did not know which ones 

were trustworthy. If their operatives contacted some kikan chieftain, this connection 

might instantly be exposed to the rest of the Japanese networks and, given their leaky 

security, possibly to foreign enemies. Complicating matters, many of these intelligence 

operators would likely become important members in the nascent Japanese Intelligence 

Service. Then, analysts noted, “there will be files, security, and perhaps some sort of a 

directed attempt to play their operation back into us.”90 In evaluating the security of 

Japanese intelligence operations, the CIA was usually more cautious than the G-2 officers 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 219

supervising Operation Takematsu and other U.S.-sponsored Japanese operations. 

The CIA used networks controlled by influential Japanese, but was more selective 

than G-2 about specific organizations and individuals. Agency analysts accepted that, 

in order to be successful in East Asia, they would need Japanese resources, but they 

attempted to evaluate the usefulness of such networks on the bases of cost, the quality 

of operatives involved, and the potential returns on investments, not merely on Japanese 

assessments of their own worth, which had been G-2’s standard.91 Their knowledge of 

the problems associated with G-2’s lax oversight also shaped their dealings with the 

potential Japanese agents. For example, in October 1958, Arisue tried to rekindle 

an intelligence relationship with the CIA by contacting an agent in Tokyo who was 

posing as an embassy employee monitoring political events. The single instruction 

the CIA official received from his superiors was to “let [the idea] die on a well-known 

vine ...”92 

U.S. employment of Japanese war criminals was not limited to G-2 GHQ, nor did 

the United States exploit only well-connected Japanese ex-military figures. The example 

of Kaya Okinori, who established contact with the CIA in the late 1950s, is a case in 

point. Kaya was the Finance Minister, first in Konoye Fumimaro’s 1937 cabinet and 

again in Tōjō’s wartime cabinet. He accepted the correctness of Japanese hegemony in 

the Far East, proclaiming shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor that it was Japan’s 

goal “to force Britain and the U.S. to retreat from East Asia.”93 After the war, the Tribunal 

found him guilty on count one of the indictment for Class A criminals (conspiracy to 

wage war) as well as on several counts of waging aggressive war, and it sentenced him to 

life in prison. He was paroled in September 1955 and pardoned in 1957.94 In 1958, 

Kaya, esteemed by conservative Japanese, was elected to the Diet and became a wellrespected leader of the fractious Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In addition, he was 

also one of future Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke’s most trusted advisors. Shortly after 

he was elected, he joined the LDP’s Internal Security Committee. Kaya, a dedicated anticommunist, appeared perfect for the position. He was deeply concerned and well versed 

in issues pertaining to Japan’s national security, and after his release from prison, argued 

forcefully for strengthening the alliance between the U.S. and Japan.95

To this end, in February 1959, Kaya traveled to the United States to discuss Japanese 

security with representatives from several government agencies, including the State 

Department and Navy Policy Planning Board. Most notably, Kaya wanted to meet 

with CIA Director Allen Dulles. His trip took place at a sensitive point in U.S.-Japan 

relations because it coincided with a groundswell of opinion in Japan to revise the U.S.-

Japan Security Treaty. In the CIA’s eyes, Kaya, who was well versed in international 

affairs, who publicly favored cooperation with the United States, and who was one of 
220 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

the most influential politicians in the LDP, was potentially a first-rate intelligence source. 

The CIA was, however, understandably nervous about a convicted Class A war criminal 

conferring with the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). They decided that they had 

little to fear, noting in part that “Kaya has been behaving admirably since his return to 

public life.”96 After interviewing him directly in January 1959, CIA agents in Japan 

noted that Kaya “is highly influential and, being able and vigorous, probably will become 

more so. His present professed pro-American orientation, whatever its motivation, seems 

real enough.”97 

On February 6, 1959, Kaya, accompanied by Japanese Embassy Secretary Omori 

Sei’ichi, visited the DCI’s office, where he told Dulles that Japan was especially vulnerable 

to Communist infiltration and viewed it as his task to ensure that Japan was able to 

successfully resist Communist influence. Kaya asked Dulles to authorize intelligence 

sharing between the CIA and the LDP’s Internal Security Committee. Dulles demurred, 

but noted that the CIA could be helpful in preventing Communist infiltration in Japan. 

The minutes of the meeting reflect that “everyone agreed that cooperation between CIA 

and the Japanese regarding countersubversion was most desirable and that the subject was 

one of major interest to CIA.” Both sides also agreed that the details of their cooperation 

should be worked out in the field, and that CIA operatives in Japan would be informed 

accordingly.98 Kaya had scored a major victory in his efforts to deter any communist 

threat and strengthen U.S.-Japan relations.

Dulles personally took the lead in attempting to establish Kaya as a CIA source. Six 

months later, in August, he sent a letter to Kaya, classified secret, that reaffirmed the 

CIA’s commitment to the Japanese politician. In it, Dulles stated in part that he was 

“anxious to do anything” he could to keep U.S.-Japanese relations in good standing. 

More specifically, he wrote, “I am most interested in learning your views both in 

international affairs affecting relations between our countries and on the situation within 

Japan...”99 In November, CIA headquarters followed up Dulles’ letter with a request 

for information about any progress that had been made with Kaya and whether or not 

the agents on the ground were interested in working with the politician.100 However, in 

the period between August and November 1959, CIA personnel in Japan began having 

second thoughts about Kaya.

By early 1960, the agency operatives in Japan concluded that Kaya was not as reliable 

as they had previously thought. During the summer and fall of 1959, they observed 

Kaya closely through their established intelligence contacts, discovering that he was not 

as influential as his reputation indicated and that he might even be a serious liability. 

They had the uncomfortable task of explaining to their superiors, including the legendary 

DCI, why they did not want to exploit Kaya: 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 221

In the Station’s recent contact with [Kaya], we found that [he] has a distinct tendency to 

“blow his own trumpet” too loudly and consistently[,] trying to impress the American side 

with how well he understand[s] the East-West tensions and how he “single-handedly” was 

able to get the whole LDP in line behind revision of the Security Treaty. [He] is too staid 

in his ways as a politician of the “old school” we believe, to be willing or even capable of 

understanding the subtleties of modern-day [parliamentary politics] and political action 

methods ... As of this writing we are not very optimistic that anything further will result 

from this relationship.

The agents in Japan determined that contact with Kaya would continue only at his 

initiative and they that would not pursue him as a source.101

After this episode, the CIA only had one casual meeting with Kaya —in Hong Kong 

in 1961—and had no further interest in him until the middle of 1964. That summer, 

the agency contacted him through an intermediary in order to discuss what it saw as a 

growing leftist threat in Japan. At this point, the CIA agent evaluating Kaya claimed that 

Kaya was “extremely reliable and security conscious. The basic evidence to this nature is 

to be found in the leading role he has played in his country’s political scheme of things 

since prior to World War II.”102 CIA Headquarters accepted this evaluation and granted 

operational authority to exploit him in December 1965.103 Three years later, the CIA 

reported that Kaya, then Prime Minister Sato Eisaku’s chief LDP advisor, was amenable 

to covert action directed against the Okinawa elections as well as gathering information 

on his own party, and that contact with him was being maintained for these purposes.104

Unfortunately, there is no further documentation available as to Kaya’s activities in this 

regard. In 1975, the CIA cancelled its operational authority to utilize Kaya because his 

case had become inactive. He died two years later.

The Lessons of Intelligence Gathering in Japan

The Name and Subject Files released by the CIA reveal a great deal about intelligence 

gathering in the earliest days of the Cold War in East Asia while confirming the 

conclusions of historians who have written on the subject. It is no surprise that the 

Japanese who performed these tasks had their own motives that had nothing to do with 

U.S. interests. Unfortunately, it also comes as little surprise that U.S. Army intelligence, 

which employed Klaus Barbie, Otto von Bolschwing, and Reinhard Gehlen in Europe, 

would attempt to gather information in the Far East using individuals who were suspected 

of war crimes or who were outright criminals during the war. There is no evidence of 

conscious, coordinated policy between Europe and the Far East, but it is clear that in 

both theaters, the fear of communist expansion trumped moral and political concerns. 
222 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Above all, GHQ sought stability. In employing the intelligence operatives it did, G-2 

turned to the Japanese nationalist establishment, the only group Willoughby and others 

assumed could provide it. Japanese assets were of course indispensable for intelligence 

work, but from the CIA’s perspective, G-2 officials appear to have been willing to exploit 

any potential intelligence asset, regardless of value or risks to operational security. The 

widespread use of such people presented a number of problems for U.S. intelligence, not 

all of which appear to have been clearly understood at the time. 

The CIA’s Name Files related to Japan also highlight the agency’s own thinking 

about intelligence sources with questionable pasts. CIA analysts were concerned 

about the intelligence product, as well as about the varied motivations that led the 

Japanese to produce such poor or fallacious results insofar as they ran counter to U.S. 

interests. The CIA’s criticism of G-2’s Japanese sources was not that the individuals 

involved were supposedly criminals or suspected criminals, but only that they passed 

bad intelligence. CIA analysts quickly identified larger political, ideological, and even 

personal considerations among the Japanese that were antithetical to U.S. interests, but 

were only mildly concerned about the criminal pasts of active or potential informants. 

Indeed, they gave scant consideration at all to the potential criminality of the sources 

in their evaluations. The possible security risks posed by ignoring the pasts of Japanese 

operatives still remain subjects worthy of further study. 

Despite this new information, some fundamental questions in the areas of policy, 

intelligence, and criminality remain unanswered. It is not yet clear how this relationship 

affected SCAP’s long-term intelligence strategy vis-à-vis the Japanese government 

or during peace treaty negotiations. Circumstantial evidence in these documents 

also suggests that Willoughby’s office kept important Japanese from being arrested as 

war criminals. If Willoughby did indeed stonewall war crimes investigators, what, if 

anything, did the CIA know about it?105 The CIA Name Files reveal very little about the 

agency’s connections to well-known rightists such as suspected war criminal turned Prime 

Minister Kishi Nobusuke in the 1950s and 1960s.106 The extent of the agency’s contacts 

with individuals who had criminal or quasi-criminal backgrounds remains shrouded, 

as do the intelligence benefits of this alleged relationship. The documents also do not 

reveal how the Korean War might have affected the CIA’s attitudes regarding alleged war 

criminals. Nevertheless, while questions about these issues remain, the records released 

by the CIA under the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Disclosure 

Acts have suggested broader avenues of inquiry and a fruitful new path on which to 

approach the subject of the Japan-U.S. relationship in the early years of the Cold War. 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 223

Notes

1. See, for example, Stephen Mercado, The Shadow Warriors of Nakano: A History of the Imperial 

Japanese Army’s Elite Intelligence School (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002); Michael Schaller,

The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1985); Eiji Takemae, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its 

Legacy, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum Books, 2002); 

John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan and the Postwar American Alliance System, A Study 

in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone 

Press, 1985); and Richard Breitman, et al., U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis (Washington, 

DC: National Archives Trust Fund Board for the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial 

Government Records Interagency Working Group, 2004).

2. Definitions of war crimes in the wake of the trials conducted by the Tokyo War Crimes 

Tribunal and other trials throughout the Pacific and China Theaters remain controversial 

for some. This is true in the particular cases of Class A war criminals tried in Tokyo by the 

Tribunal. Historical controversy has justifiably swirled around the indictments submitted to 

the Tribunal, especially count one, charging a conspiracy to wage aggressive war. Admittedly, 

the selection of defendants was in some cases controversial and arbitrary, but the decisions 

made by the Tribunal were, in the context of the times, agreed upon on the basis of accepted 

standards of evidence for a military tribunal, following the model of the Nuremberg Tribunal 

in Germany. The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal may have been fraught with problems, but as 

a legal matter, the results were legitimate insofar as the evidence indicated guilt based solely 

on the indictment. Trials of Class B and C defendants, whose illegal acts had vastly better 

case precedent and were more easily identifiable as criminal, did not provoke the same level 

of criticism. See John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New 

York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 461–69.

3. Certainly, most crimes committed by the Japanese in the Asia-Pacific Theaters were 

perpetrated by the regular Army personnel, but the kenpeitai gained notoriety for abetting 

and participating in criminal activity in China and Malaya. Many American prisoners of war 

also recall the kenpeitai members who treated them with special contempt. Though there 

are many studies of the kenpeitai in Japanese, an English-language scholarly monograph is 

unavailable. 

4. Takemae, Inside GHQ, 167.

5. Arisue Biographical Sketch, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: 

Arisue, Seizo. 

6. Mercado, Shadow Warriors of Nakano, 174.

7. Takemae, Inside GHQ, 165. Arisue and others had offices literally inside a SCAP building, 

the Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) Building in Tokyo. 
224 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

8. Mercado, Shadow Warriors of Nakano, 192.

9. G-2 Intelligence Section Notes, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: 

Arisue, Seizo.

10. Tanaka Ryukichi Statement, NA, RG 331, International Prosecution Section, entry 319, 

numerical case files, box 31, folder: Cases 155–159. Tanaka also believed that Arisue had 

connections with the opium trade in China. Ironically, Tanaka worked closely with Arisue 

to gather intelligence after the war.

11. G-2 Intelligence Section Notes, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: 

Arisue, Seizo.

12. Mercado, Shadow Warriors of Nakano, 197.

13. Phillip R. Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–

1951 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 63–66.

14. See Arisue’s interrogations in NA, RG 331, International Prosecution Section, entry 319, 

numerical case files, box 31, folder: Cases 155–159. 

15. Torashiro Kawabe Biographical Sketch, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, 

folder: Kawabe, Torashiro.

16. Mercado, Shadow Warriors of Nakano, 181–86. According to Mercado, Willoughby sent 

Kawabe back to Japan loaded with cigarettes and whiskey. 

17. Immediately after the war, Kawabe also received financial help from Arisue. CIA Report 

ZJJA-383, undated, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, 

Seizo.

18. See Takemae, Inside GHQ, 165; Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 66.

19. CIA. Report, “J.I.S. Underground Groups and Japanese National Revival,” 11 May 1951, 

NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. 1.

20. Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 29.

21. “J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival,” 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, 

CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.

22. Ibid. Emphasis in original. 

23. Takemae, Inside GHQ, 167.

24. CIA Memo, names redacted, 20 May 1949, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 

7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

25. See the series of CIA memos written on 20 May 1949 in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA 

Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

26. Ibid.

27. Draft Memo, author unknown (HQ of 6th CIC District, 441st CIC Detachment) to Lacey, 

5 February 1949, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

28. CIA Memo, names redacted, 20 May 1949, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 225

7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

29. “Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups,” 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, 

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo. A later CIA report describes 

Kimura as “a former Major General From Burma,” but this is almost certainly in error. 

Major General Heitaro Kimura served in Burma as Commander of the Burma Area Army in 

late 1944, but he was executed in 1948 after being found guilty of war crimes by the Tokyo 

War Crimes Tribunal. It is possible that the Kimura referred to in the document is either 

Maj. Gen.Kimura Naoki, who served in the Philippines and Japan, or Lt. Gen. Kimura 

Matsujiro, who served in Thailand at the end of the war. 

30. “Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups,” 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, 

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

31. “Secret Shipping Plans and Activities of the JIS Groups,” 14 September 1950, NA, RG 263, 

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

32. Akashi Yoji, “Watanabe Wataru: The Architect of the Malaya Military Administration, 

December 1941–March 1943,” in Mohd Hazim Shah, Jomo K.S., and Phua Kai Lit, eds., 

New Perspectives in Malaysian Studies (Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 

2002), 123.

33. “Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups,” 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, 

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

34. CIA Report ZJL-446, 14 September 1950, and “Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the 

JIS Groups,” 9/13/50, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, 

Seizo.

35. CIA Report ZJL-446, 14 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 

7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

36. Ibid.

37. Former Kwantung Army Major Sato, who was instrumental in establishing the troopsfor-bananas trade, established contact in Tokyo with the Overseas Democratic Chinese 

Cooperative Association, a front organization for Communist Chinese intelligence. The 

CIA stated, “This liaison is definitely an attempted doubling operation from both sides, with 

Kumamoto probably giving more than he gets.” “Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the 

JIS Groups,” 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: 

Arisue, Seizo.

38. Mercado, Shadow Warriors of Nakano, 197.

39. CIA Report ZJL734A, 12 October 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 

6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.

40. CIA Report ZJL-390-C, 3 August 1950, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, 

folder: Arisue, Seizo.
226 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

41. CIA Report ZJL-788, 22 January 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, 

folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.

42. “J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival,” 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, 

CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I. 

43. CIA Biographical Sketch, “Kodama, Yoshio,” NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, 

box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

44. “1948 Press Censorship Reports,” 11 February 1952, NA, RG 263, CIA Name File, box 7, 

folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

45. “Kodama, Yoshio,” USAFPAC, Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence, 18 October 

1945, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

46. Undated CIA Report, partial copy, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, 

folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I. According to the CIA, the Japanese navy helped establish 

the Kodama kikan to circumvent the zaibatsu. It provided business and financial backing to 

Kodama in exchange for the promise of quick delivery of supplies and material. 

47. Undated CIA Report, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, 

Yoshio, Vol. I.

48. CIA Biographical Sketch, “Kodama, Yoshio,” NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, 

box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

49. CIC Intelligence Summary, “Kodama (War Criminal),” NA, RG 331, Records of Allied 

Operational and Occupation Headquarters, box 1178, folder: Kodama, Yoshio.

50. G-2 Summary Report, Kodama, Yoshio, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, 

folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

51. 1948 Press Censorship Reports, 11 February 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name 

File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

52. Ibid.

53. Counter Intelligence Review #8, Kodama Yoshio, 15 April 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

54. CIA Report ZJL-604, 19 April 1951 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, 

folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

55. Plans and Activities of the J.I.S and Rightist Groups, 13 November 1950 NA, RG 263, entry 

ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

56. Organization of Rightist and J.I.S. Groups Under Ugaki, 8 September 1950, NA, RG 263, 

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I. 

57. J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival, 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, 

CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I. 

58. Recent Activities of Kodama Yoshio, 25 January 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA 

Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I. 
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 227

59. Japanese Intelligence Service, 24 January 1950 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, 

box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

60. Background on J.I.S. and Japanese Military Personalities, 10 September 1953, NA, RG 263, 

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I.

61. Whether or not Kodama had a relationship with the CIA later in the 1950s remains 

unknown.

62. Japanese and South Korean operatives communicated with each other through a Japanese 

company, Kinoshita & Company, in which Kodama owned a majority interest. A 1963 CIA 

cable noted that “It would appear that a conspiratorial group consisting of Kim Chong-p’il 

[founder of South Korea’s KCIA] with their operational base in Tokyo where they are closely 

linked to Kodama Yoshio, are maintaining clandestine communications to Kim Chon-nak 

and Pak Chong-hui in Seoul through the facilities of this firm associated with Kodama.” 

CIA cable, sender and recipient redacted, Kodama Yoshio Relationship with Kinoshita and 

Company, Ltd., 17 May 1963, in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: 

Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I. 

63. The documents in Kodama’s CIA file do not reveal whether the CIA was aware of LockheedMartin’s payoffs to Kodama and others.

64. Dower, Embracing Defeat, 511–12.

65. Saburo Hayashi and Alvin Coox, Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, Va: 

The Marine Corps Association, 1959), 238.

66. Dower, Embracing Defeat, 511–12.

67. CIA Report, date unclear (likely April 1952), in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name 

File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I. Between 5,000 and 25,000 supposedly antiJapanese Chinese and Malayans were murdered in the Sook Ching Massacre.

68. Gold, 22 May 1946, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, 

Masanobu Vol. I.

69. Undated CIA Report, in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, 

Masanobu, Vol. I.

70. CIA Report, date unclear (likely April 1952), in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, 

box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.

71. Tsuji Masanobu Activities During April 1952, 16 March 1953, in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Kodama, Yoshio, Vol. I. Kodama was also instrumental 

in getting Tsuji’s bestselling memoir, Senko sanzenri (Underground Escape), published.

72. Dower, Embracing Defeat, 511–13.

73. J.I.S., 1 December 1949, NA, RG 263, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, 

folder: Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. I. 

74. Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the J.I.S. Groups, 13 September 1950, NA, RG 263, 
228 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo. In line with their desire to 

establish themselves as a third major force in the Far East, Japanese officers involved in 

this operation planned to play both sides of the ongoing colonial conflict in an effort to 

establish covert connections with the Communist Chinese through the Viet Minh. Little 

information is known about Tomita.

75. Takemae, Inside GHQ, 165–66. 

76. Japanese Rearmament Attempt by Former Japanese Army Officers to Gain Control, 3 May 

1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I. 

77. The CIA successfully penetrated the Hattori kikan and reported in great detail on its 

activities. The documents in the CIA Name File for Hattori are a rich source for researchers 

seeking information about Japanese rearmament efforts during the occupation. They reveal 

the depth and complexity of G-2’s involvement in such efforts. Kawabe Torashirō also 

cooperated in this work.

78. Hattori Takushiro, 18 April 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: 

Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. I. The details of Hattori’s efforts on Tsuji’s behalf are still unclear. 

79. Former Japanese Army Officers Engaged in Rearmament Activities, 21 May 1951, NA, RG 

263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 9, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. I. 

80. Japanese Rearmament Attempt by Former Japanese Army Officers to Gain Control, 3 May 

1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. 

I. 

81. Japanese I.S. Personalities, 6 March 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 

6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.

82. Japanese I.S. Personalities, 9 March 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 

9, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu.

83. Coup d’etat Allegedly Being Planned by Ex-Militarists and Ultranationalists, 31 October 

1952, Activities of Hattori Takushiro, 10 December 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA 

Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori, Takushiro, Vol. I.

84. See collection of reports on Tsuji’s whereabouts in NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name 

File, box 10, folder: Tsuji, Masanobu, Vol. II.

85. FBI Memo, Deputy Director, Plans to Director, FBI, Arisue, Seizo, 16 March 1961, NA, 

RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, Seizo.

86. J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival, 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA 

Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I.

87. Hattori Takushiro’s Position, 9 May 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, 

box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I. Hattori went to work for a short time at the 

Demobilization Bureau, but resigned in early 1953 to open the Historical Facts Research 

Institute, a thinly veiled anti-communist intelligence operation that was funded by right-
The Intelligence That Wasn’t I 229

wing businessmen and politicians. His benefactors probably would have been apoplectic 

had they known that six months earlier Hattori had sold many of his intelligence assets to 

Minami Kiichi, the former head of the Japanese Communist Party. See Purchase of the 

Hattori Takushiro Organization by Minami Kiichi, 29 May 1952, and Activities of Hattori 

Takushiro, 10 December 1953, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: 

Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I. 

88. Dissolution of the Kawabe Intelligence Organization, 16 January 1953 in folder: Kawabe, 

Torashiro, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kawabe, Torashiro. 

89. J.I.S. Groups and Japanese National Revival, 11 May 1951, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA 

Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I.

90. Ibid.

91. See, for example, CIA Report ZJL-801, 5 February 1952, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA 

Name File, box 6, folder: Hattori Takushiro, Vol. I.

92. CIA Memo, Contact with Ex Lt. General Arisue, 8 October 1958, and Instructions from 

C/IOB, 21 October 1958, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 7, folder: Arisue, 

Seizo.

93. Intelligence Summary, 20 April 1944, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, 

folder: Kaya, Okinori.

94. Okinori Kaya Personal Record Questionnaire, undated, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA 

Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori. 

95. CIA Cable 7082, 22 January 1959, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, 

folder: Kaya, Okinori. Kishi had been imprisoned from 1945 through 1948 on suspicion of 

war crimes. 

96. CIA Cable 26893, 22 December 1958, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, 

folder: Kaya, Okinori.

97. CIA Cable 7144, 27 January 1959, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, 

folder: Kaya, Okinori.

98. Memorandum for the Record, Visit of Mr. Kaya Okinori, 6 February 1959, NA, RG 263, 

entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.

99. Dulles to Kaya, 13 August 1959, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: 

Kaya, Okinori. The CIA requested that Kaya return the letter to them for fear of adverse 

political repercussions should Kaya’s political enemies discover the relationship.

100. Dispatch, Acting Chief Far East to Chief of Station [redacted], 10 November 1959, 

Posonnet/1 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.

101. Dispatch, Chief of Station [redacted] to Chief, Far East Section, Posonnet/1, 12 January 

1960, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.

102. CIA Personal Record Questionnaire (PRQ), 22 November 1965, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-
230 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

18, CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.

103. CIA Memorandum, Chief, Far East Division, 6 December 1965 NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, 

CIA Name File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori.

104. CIA Report FJTA 55122, 25 September 1968, NA, RG 263, entry ZZ-18, CIA Name 

File, box 6, folder: Kaya, Okinori. At that time, Okinawa, which had been an important 

staging area for B-52 missions against North Vietnam, was embroiled in a furious debate 

over reversion back to Japanese territory. 

105. Indeed, on Willoughby’s orders, G-2 put up a spirited defense of suspected war criminal 

Sadamu Shimomura, who allegedly signed the execution order for the Doolittle flyers and was 

a cooperative intelligence asset after the war. G-2 stonewalled attempts by army investigators 

in the China Theater to have Shimomura arrested in Japan, argued for his release after he was 

briefly imprisoned, and quietly set him free shortly thereafter. See Shimomura’s file in NA, 

RG 319, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, Records of the Investigative Records 

Repository Personal Name File, entry 134B, box 211, folder: Shimomura, Sadamu. 

106. News of this alleged relationship became public in the U.S. in late 1994. See “C.I.A. Spent 

Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50s and 60s,” New York Times, 9 October 1994. 

Though former CIA and State Department officials have acknowledged a relationship 

between the CIA and the LDP, thorough documentary proof remains absent.
About the Contributors

Greg Bradsher has worked for the National Archives since 1977, during which time 

he spent a year on the agency’s FBI Records Appraisal Task Force and two years as the 

agengy’s representative on the Interagency Working Group on Nazi Assets. Among his 

published articles are those on Nazi gold, the World War II spy Fritz Kolbe, the capture 

and exploitation of the Japanese “Z” Plan, a FBI counterintelligence program, privacy act 

expungements, and access to Federal records. 

Edward Drea graduated from Canisius College in Buffalo, New York. After military 

service in Japan and Vietnam, he received his M.A. in international relations from 

Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan, and his Ph.D. in Modern Japanese History from the 

University of Kansas. He taught at the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College 

and the U.S. Army War College and was Chief, Research and Analysis Division, at the 

U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. His published works include 

MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War Against Japan, 1942-1945 and In the 

Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army.

Robert Hanyok is a historian with the Center for Cryptologic History at the National 

Security Agency. He received his M.A. in history from the University of Maryland, 

Baltimore County. He has been a special technical advisor to the Nazi War Crimes and 

Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group since 2001. His 

most recent work was Eavesdropping on Hell: Historical Guide to Western Communications 

Intelligence and the Holocaust, 1939-1945, which was published in 2005.

James H. Lide is a senior historian and director of the International Division of History 

Associates, Inc., a historical consulting firm based in Rockville, Maryland.
232 I Researching Japanese War Crimes

Michael Petersen is a historian and staff member of the Nazi War Crimes and Japanese 

Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group. He received his Ph.D. from 

the University of Maryland in 2005.

Daqing Yang is an Associate Professor of History and International Affairs at George 

Washington University, where he teaches modern Japanese history and is a co-director of 

the Memory and Reconciliation in Asia Pacific project. His forthcoming book, Technology 

of Empire, examines telecommunications networks and prewar Japanese expansion. A 

native of Nanjing, China, he received his Ph.D. from Harvard University and has twice 

studied at Keio University in Tokyo.