alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Uni

ted 

Stat

es D

istr

ict C

ourt

For t

he N

orth

ern 

Dis

trict

 of C

alifo

rnia

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHERRY LYNN MEANS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY & COUNTY OF SANFRANCISCO, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C09-0941 TEH

ORDER GRANTING REQUESTTO SUBSTITUTE REDACTEDEXHIBITS

With good cause appearing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ request to substitute

redacted exhibits for certain unredacted exhibits that Defendants inadvertently filed as

attachments to declarations on August 9, 2010.  Because the declarations at issue were filed

as single documents and not declarations with exhibits attached, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that the Clerk shall seal the declarations filed as Docket Nos. 26, 29, and 31 in their entirety. 

Defendants shall electronically file redacted versions of the sealed documents no later than

Friday, August 13, 2010.  Defendants shall ensure that the redacted documents fully comply

with the privacy provisions of Civil Local Rule 3-17.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:   08/11/10                                                                         THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGEUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:09-cv-00941-TEH   Document 40   Filed 08/11/10   Page 1 of 1

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2018-03-12T05:55:11-0400
      - US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
      - Superintendent of Documents
      - GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
§ 201.53 Disposition of manufactured home loan property. Where the lender obtains title to property securing a manufactured home loan by repossession or foreclosure, the property shall be sold for the best price obtainable before making an insurance claim. In the case of a combination loan, the manufactured home and lot shall be sold in a single transaction and the manufactured home may not be removed from the lot, unless the prior approval of the Secretary is obtained for a different procedure. The best price obtainable shall be the greater of: ( a ) The actual sales price of the property, after deducting the cost of repairs, furnishings, and equipment needed to make the property marketable, and after deducting the cost of transportation, set-up, and anchoring if the manufactured home is moved to a new homesite; or
( b ) The appraised value of the property before repairs (as determined by a HUD-approved appraisal obtained in accordance with § 201.51(b)(3)).
[50 FR 43523, Oct. 25, 1985, as amended at 61 FR 19799, May 2, 1996]
#### City of Chicago, appellee, v. Charles Navarra, appellant.

Gen. No. 28,685.

Suit' against City of Chicago. Judgment for city. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. A. G. Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in the first division of this court for the first district.

Affirmed for failure of appellant to file record.

See City v. Salmitsky, 210 Ill. App. 159.

Opinion filed June 25, 1923.

No appearance for appellant. No appearance for appellee.

Per Curiam.
30

U

NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Marilyn H. Patel

Case 3:09-cv-00440-EMC Document 59 Filed 03/30/10 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit (32b)




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350




In connection with the Quarterly Report of Emergent Group Inc. (the “registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “report”), I, William M. McKay, Chief Financial Officer of the registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:




(1) The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2) The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.




August 11, 2010/s/
William M. McKayWilliam M. McKayChief Financial Officer
Editorial Note on Part 42
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 42 appear at 71 FR 34522, June 15, 2006.

§ 42.22 Returning resident aliens. ( a ) *Requirements for returning resident status.* An alien shall be classifiable as a special immigrant under INA 101(a)(27)(A) if the consular officer is satisfied from the evidence presented that: ( 1 ) The alien had the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time of departure from the United States;
( 2 ) The alien departed from the United States with the intention of returning and has not abandoned this intention; and
( 3 ) The alien is returning to the United States from a temporary visit abroad and, if the stay abroad was protracted, this was caused by reasons beyond the alien's control and for which the alien was not responsible.
( b ) *Documentation needed.* Unless the consular officer has reason to question the legality of the alien's previous admission for permanent residence or the alien's eligibility to receive an immigrant visa, only those records and documents required under INA 222(b) which relate to the period of residence in the United States and the period of the temporary visit abroad shall be required. If any required record or document is unobtainable, the provisions of § 42.65(d) shall apply.
( c ) *Returning resident alien originally admitted under the Act of December 28, 1945.* An alien admitted into the United States under Section 1 of the Act of December 28, 1945 (“GI Brides Act”) shall not be refused an immigrant visa after a temporary absence abroad solely because of a mental or physical defect or defects that existed at the time of the original admission.
[56 FR 49676, Oct. 1, 1991, as amended at 63 FR 48578, Sept. 11, 1998]
Order entered February 15, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

No. 05
- 12
- 01330
- CV
IN THE MATTER AND IN TEREST OF MAURICE MU RPHY On Appeal from the 301st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF
- 12
- 04214 

### O RDER Both the clerk’s and reporter’s records in the case are overdue. By postcard dated November 1, 2012, we notified the Dallas County District Clerk and the court reporter for the 301st Judicial District Court regarding the respective record s. We directed the district clerk and the court reporter to file the records within thirty days. To date, neither the district clerk nor the court reporter have responded. Accordingly, we ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file the clerk’s record
within TEN DAYS of the date of this order.
We ORDER Kim Allen, official court reporter for the 301st Judicial District Court, to file, within FIFTEEN DAYS of the date of this order, either: (1) the reporter’s record; or (2)
written verification that no hearings were recorded.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic tranmission, to the following persons:Gary Fitzsimmons Dallas County District Clerk
Kim Allen Official Court Reporter, 301st Judicial District Court

/s/ CAROLYN WR IGHT CHIEF JUSTICE
From: "Higgins, Cortney" <Cortney_Higgins@omb.eop.gov>

To: Sharon Nizich/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA

Cc: Keith Barnett/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Charlotte Bertrand/DC/USEPA/US@EPA

Date: 06/11/2012 07:41 PM

Subject: RE: EO 12866 review - NESHAP Portland Cement

Hi Sharon and Keith,

Attached are interagency comments on the latest draft of the rule. Let’s talk about these tomorrow.

Regards,

Cortney

(See attached file: EO_12866_NESHAP_FOR_THE_PORTLAND_CEMENT_S_2060-AQ93_20120611 

InteragencyCommentsunderEO13563.docx)
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Pauline Lustgarten, Respondent, v Victor Plumbing Supply et al., Appellants. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Appeal from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, filed November 12, 1976, which reversed a referee finding that claimant’s decedent’s death did not result from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The board found that: "[Bjased upon the credible testimony, particularly that of Mr. Foreman, to the effect that claimant periodically, as much as 2 or 3 times a month, would deliver plumbing supplies to him, in a manner similar as on the day of assault, which resulted in his death, and, that this did constitute an accident arising out of and in the course of employment.” Substantial evidence supports this determination. Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board against the employer and its insurance carrier. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Staley, Jr., and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

M.B.,

Appellant,

v.

FLORIDA AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 2 02 3

- 1126

[ January 11, 2024 ]

Appeal from the F lorida Agency for Persons with Disabilities

, 20F

07349

.

Nancy E. Wright, Gainesville, for appellant.

Carrie B. McNamara, Deputy General Counsel of Agency for Persons

with Disabilities, Tallahassee, for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

C ONNER

, K UNTZ and A RTAU

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
### §7671i. Nonessential products containing chlorofluorocarbons

#### (a) Regulations

The Administrator shall promulgate regulations to carry out the requirements of this section within 1 year after November 15, 1990.

#### (b) Nonessential products

The regulations under this section shall identify nonessential products that release class I substances into the environment (including any release occurring during manufacture, use, storage, or disposal) and prohibit any person from selling or distributing any such product, or offering any such product for sale or distribution, in interstate commerce. At a minimum, such prohibition shall apply to—

(1) chlorofluorocarbon-propelled plastic party streamers and noise horns,

(2) chlorofluorocarbon-containing cleaning fluids for noncommercial electronic and photographic equipment, and

(3) other consumer products that are determined by the Administrator—

(A) to release class I substances into the environment (including any release occurring during manufacture, use, storage, or disposal), and

(B) to be nonessential.

In determining whether a product is nonessential, the Administrator shall consider the purpose or intended use of the product, the technological availability of substitutes for such product and for such class I substance, safety, health, and other relevant factors.

#### (c) Effective date

Effective 24 months after November 15, 1990, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell or distribute, or offer for sale or distribution, in interstate commerce any nonessential product to which regulations under subsection (a) implementing subsection (b) are applicable.

#### (d) Other products

(1) Effective January 1, 1994, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell or distribute, or offer for sale or distribution, in interstate commerce—

(A) any aerosol product or other pressurized dispenser which contains a class II substance; or

(B) any plastic foam product which contains, or is manufactured with, a class II substance.

(2) The Administrator is authorized to grant exceptions from the prohibition under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1) where—

(A) the use of the aerosol product or pressurized dispenser is determined by the Administrator to be essential as a result of flammability or worker safety concerns, and

(B) the only available alternative to use of a class II substance is use of a class I substance which legally could be substituted for such class II substance.

(3) Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) shall not apply to—

(A) a foam insulation product, or

(B) an integral skin, rigid, or semi-rigid foam utilized to provide for motor vehicle safety in accordance with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards where no adequate substitute substance (other than a class I or class II substance) is practicable for effectively meeting such Standards.

#### (e) Medical devices

Nothing in this section shall apply to any medical device as defined in section 7671(8) of this title.

(July 14, 1955, ch. 360, title VI, §610, as added Pub. L. 101–549, title VI, §602(a), Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2664.)
§ 107.60 Sanctions and penalties. ( a ) Failure or refusal to comply with E.O. 11063 or the requirements of this part shall be proper basis for applying sanctions. Violations of title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 or a state or local fair housing law, with respect to activities covered by the Executive order, or of the regulations and requirements under E.O. 11063 of other Federal Departments and agencies may also result in the imposition of sanctions by this Department.
( b ) Such sanctions as are specified by E.O. 11063, the contract through which federal assistance is provided, and such sanctions as are specified by the rules or regulations of the Department governing the program under which federal assistance to the project is provided shall be applied in accordance with the relevant regulations. Actions that may be taken include: cancellation or termination, in whole or in part, of the contract or agreement; refusal to approve a lender or withdrawal of approval; or a determination of ineligibility, suspension, or debarment from any further assistance or contracts; provided, however, that sanctions of debarment, suspension, and ineligibility are subject to the Department's regulations under 2 CFR part 2424, and, further, that no sanction under section 302 (a), (b), and (c) of Executive Order 11063 shall be applied by the Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity without the concurrence of the Secretary.
( c ) The Department shall use its good offices in order to promote the abandonment of discriminatory practices with regard to residential property and related facilities provided with assistance prior to the effective date of E.O. 11063 and take appropriate actions permitted by law including the institution of appropriate litigation to provide such equal housing opportunities.
( d ) In any case involving the failure of a lender to comply with the requirements of the Executive order or this part, the Assistant Secretary for FH&EO shall notify the Federal financial regulatory agency having jurisdiction over the lender of the findings in the case.
[45 FR 59514, Sept. 9, 1980, as amended at 72 FR 73493, Dec. 27, 2007]
July 30 , 2015

Mr. Jamie Hopkins

190 112 th Avenue N

Apartment 1212

Saint Petersburg, FL 33716

Dear Mr. Hopkins :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CF R). It explains why we can not process your

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can No t Process Your Request

We entered your May 12 , exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA

- 20 15

- 1619 ), but

we are unable to process your re quest any further. The information you sent does no t comply

with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further,

you must send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you se ek relief, the extent of the

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

 The reasons why the exemption would no t adversely aff ect safety or how the exemption

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you

seek an exemption.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

What You Should Do

If you wan t us to process your request any further, you must send the information described

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do No t Hear From You

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267

- 9677.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Aiye Robinson, Appellant.

[833 NYS2d 653]—

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Chun, J.), rendered February 3, 2006, convicting him of robbery in the second degree (two counts), robbery in the third degree, and assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50 (5).

The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his contention that the evidence with respect to the convictions of robbery in the second degree and robbery in the third degree was legally insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10, 20-21 [1995]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of robbery in the second degree and robbery in the third degree beyond a reasonable doubt.

Photographs depicting the victim of the crime taken shortly after it occurred by a police officer at the precinct were properly admitted into evidence, as they tended to establish a material element of the crimes charged *(see People v Wood,*79 NY2d 958, 960 [1992]; *People v Stevens,*76 NY2d 833 [1990]). Moreover, the trial court properly granted the prosecution’s application, pursuant to CPL 60.25, to permit police testimony regarding the victim’s showup identification of the defendant shortly after the crime occurred. The trial court properly determined that the victim was unable to make an in-court identification of the defendant based on the failure of his present recollection *(see People v Quevas,*81 NY2d 41, 45 [1993]; *People v Cwikla,*46 NY2d 434, 444 [1979]; *People v Harden,*6 AD3d 181, 182 [2004]; *People v Hernandez,*154 AD2d 197, 200 [1990]). The defendant’s contention that police testimony regarding the circumstances of his arrest should not have been admitted into evidence is unpreserved for appellate review, and in any event, is without *773merit *(see*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Vanier,*255 AD2d 610 [1998]).

There is no merit to the defendant’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to pursue a defense addressed to whether the defendant intended to commit the crime of robbery. The defense asserted at trial was a reasonable one, and the defendant’s claim constitutes a mere disagreement with trial strategy and tactics that failed *(see People v Henry,*95 NY2d 563, 565 [2000]; *People v Benn,*68 NY2d 941, 942 [1986]; *People v Lane,*60 NY2d 748, 750 [1983]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Schmidt, J.E, Spolzino, Florio and Skelos, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2769 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2769

 To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 2 amino 5 sulfobenzoic 
                                 acid.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 7, 2005

   Mr. Clay introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To extend the temporary suspension of duty on 2 amino 5 sulfobenzoic 
                                 acid.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. 2 AMINO 5 SULFOBENZOIC ACID.

    (a) In General.--Heading 9902.02.38 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (relating to 2 amino 5 sulfobenzoic acid) 
is amended by striking ``12/31/2006'' and inserting ``12/31/2009''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
§ 19.5-2 Notification to Department from former spouses. A former spouse is obligated to notify the Department of the following on a timely basis: ( a ) A divorce from a participant or former participant when the former spouse is notified by the court of the divorce before the participant is notified;
( b ) Any change in address; and
( c ) Any remarriage.
Notices shall be sent to the Department of State, Attention PER/ER/RET, Washington, DC 20520.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

August 1, 2019

No. 04-18-00823-CR

Jake Eric ALVARADO,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 18-04-12822-CR

Honorable Camile Glasscock Dubose, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Appellee’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief is hereby GRANTED.

_________________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 1st day of August, 2019.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
#### Stuyvesant Insurance Company, Respondent, v United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Appellant.

(Appeal No. 2.)

Order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: Petitioner-respondent, Stuyvesant Insurance Company (hereinafter Stuyvesant), the insurer of a motorcycle operated by Fleming, has obtained a permanent stay of an arbitration proceeding commenced pursuant to section 674 of the Insurance Law by respondent-appellant United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (hereinafter USF&G), the insurer of an automobile operated by Eisenhauer. Eisenhauer was seriously injured in a collision with Fleming’s motorcycle. USF&G, after paying first-party benefits to Eisenhauer commenced the proceeding under section 674 of the Insurance Law to recover the amount of such benefits from Stuyvesant as "the insurer of [Fleming, a] covered person if and to the extent that such other covered person would have been liable, but for the provisions of this article, to pay damages in an action at law.” (Insurance Law, § 674, subd 1.) The stay of arbitration was properly granted. Because motorcycles are exempt from mandatory no-fault coverage (Insurance Law, § 671, subd 6), Fleming was not covered for no-fault protection under the Stuyvesant standard policy and he was, therefore, not a "covered person” as the term is used in subdivision 1 of section 674 of the Insurance *1124Law. That Fleming, had he been injured, would have been a “covered person” entitled to receive no-fault benefits from USF&G under subdivision 10 of section 671 and section 672 (subd 1, par [a]) of the Insurance Law, does not make him a “covered person” within the meaning of section 674 of the Insurance Law. The two terms refer to two different groups. One group consists of "those required to provide the 'no fault’ coverage *from*which benefits are to be paid [and] The other is made up of those who, as a result of sustaining recoverable losses, are persons *to*whom those benefits are to be paid.” *(Perkins v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.,*41 NY2d 394, 396; see, also, *Cole v Lord,*91 Misc 2d 178.) There was, therefore, no right to reimbursement or arbitration under section 674 of the Insurance Law. (Appeal from order of Erie Supreme Court—stay arbitration.) Present—Cardamone, J. P., Simons, Dillon, Hancock, Jr. and Denman, JJ.