The Iraq Study Group Report

The Iraq

Study Group

Report

James A. Baker, III, and 

Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, 

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, 

Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta,

William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, 

Alan K. Simpson

vintage books

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FIRST VINTAGE BOOKS EDITION: DECEMBER 2006

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First Edition
Contents

Letter from the Co-Chairs ix

Executive Summary xiii

I. Assessment

A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq 3

1. Security 3

2. Politics 12

3. Economics 22

4. International Support 27

5. Conclusions 32

B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq 33

C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq 37

1. Precipitate Withdrawal 37

2. Staying the Course 38

v
3. More Troops for Iraq 38

4. Devolution to Three Regions 39

D. Achieving Our Goals 40

II. The Way Forward—A New Approach

A. The External Approach: Building an 

International Consensus 43

1. The New Diplomatic Offensive 44

2. The Iraq International Support Group 46

3. Dealing with Iran and Syria 50

4. The Wider Regional Context 54

B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help 

Themselves 59

1. Performance on Milestones 59

2. National Reconciliation 64

3. Security and Military Forces 70

4. Police and Criminal Justice 78

5. The Oil Sector 83

6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction 

Assistance 86

7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, 

and Review 90

8. U.S. Personnel 92

9. Intelligence 93

vi

Contents
Appendices

Overview Map of the Region 99

Overview Map of Iraq 100

Administrative Divisions 101

Distribution of Religious Groups 102

Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations 103

Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions 106

Iraq Study Group Consultations 107

Expert Working Groups and Military 

Senior Advisor Panel 117

The Iraq Study Group 124

Iraq Study Group Support 142

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Contents

Letter from the Co-Chairs

There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and protect American interests.

Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq but with the state of our political debate regarding

Iraq. Our political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to

bring a responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and

costly war. Our country deserves a debate that prizes substance

over rhetoric, and a policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and Congress must work together. Our

leaders must be candid and forthright with the American people in order to win their support.

No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at

this point will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a

slide toward chaos. If current trends continue, the potential

consequences are severe. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States has special obligations.

Our country must address as best it can Iraq’s many problems.

ix
The United States has long-term relationships and interests at

stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged.

In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq

Study Group present a new approach because we believe there

is a better way forward. All options have not been exhausted.

We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that

can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a critical region of the world, and protect America’s credibility, interests, and values. Our report makes it clear

that the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people also must act to

achieve a stable and hopeful future.

What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount of political will and cooperation by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It

demands skillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by

government agencies. And its success depends on the unity of

the American people in a time of political polarization. Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate within a

democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure—as is

any course of action in Iraq—if it is not supported by a broad,

sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our

country toward such a consensus.

We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who

have contributed information and assisted the Study Group,

both inside and outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and

around the world. We thank the members of the expert working

groups, and staff from the sponsoring organizations. We especially thank our colleagues on the Study Group, who have

worked with us on these difficult issues in a spirit of generosity

and bipartisanship.

x

Letter from the Co-Chairs
In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and

the American people, we dedicate it to the men and women—

military and civilian—who have served and are serving in Iraq,

and to their families back home. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage and made difficult sacrifices. Every American is indebted to them.

We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf of their country, and the members of the Coalition Forces

who have stood with us and with the people of Iraq.

James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton

xi

Letter from the Co-Chairs

Executive Summary

The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no

path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved.

In this report, we make a number of recommendations

for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. Our most important recommendations call for new and

enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq

that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat

forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another.

If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government

moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an

opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow,

stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and

America’s credibility, interests, and values will be protected.

The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing

in scope and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability.

xiii
The Iraqi people have a democratically elected government, yet

it is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing

basic security, or delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive.

If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences

could be severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse

of Iraq’s government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could

spread. Al Qaeda could win a propaganda victory and expand

its base of operations. The global standing of the United States

could be diminished. Americans could become more polarized.

During the past nine months we have considered a full

range of approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our

recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe

that it includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and the region.

External Approach

The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect its

stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in

the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not

doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability.

The United States should immediately launch a new

diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should include every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic

Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors. Iraq’s neighbors and key

states in and outside the region should form a support group to

reinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its own.

xiv

Executive Summary
Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events

within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the

United States should try to engage them constructively. In

seeking to influence the behavior of both countries, the United

States has disincentives and incentives available. Iran should

stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use its influence over Iraqi

Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of

Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the

five permanent members of the United Nations Security

Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with

Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in

and out of Iraq.

The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle

East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and

regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained

commitment by the United States to a comprehensive ArabIsraeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s

June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and

Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by,

and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept

Israel’s right to exist), and Syria.

As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq

and the Middle East, the United States should provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan,

including resources that might become available as combat

forces are moved out of Iraq.

Internal Approach

The most important questions about Iraq’s future are now the

responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role

xv

Executive Summary
in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their

own destiny.

The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and

quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way,

and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As

these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move

out of Iraq.

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve

to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter

of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security

situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for

force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat

forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with

Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams,

and in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and

search and rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in

Iraq.

It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance

from the United States for some time to come, especially in

carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States

must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United

States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not implement their

planned changes. The United States must not make an openended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops

deployed in Iraq.

xvi

Executive Summary
As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training and education of forces that have returned to

the United States in order to restore the force to full combat

capability. As equipment returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment over the next five years.

The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders

to support the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones—on national reconciliation, security, and governance.

Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the

right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government

needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United

States and other countries—that it deserves continued support.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the

United States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for

Iraq. His list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include

milestones that can strengthen the government and benefit the

Iraqi people. President Bush and his national security team

should remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi

leadership to convey a clear message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones.

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and

makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the

United States should make clear its willingness to continue

training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to

continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi

government does not make substantial progress toward the

achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security,

and governance, the United States should reduce its political,

military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

xvii

Executive Summary
Our report makes recommendations in several other areas.

They include improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq,

the U.S. budget process, the training of U.S. government personnel, and U.S. intelligence capabilities.

Conclusion

It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these

recommendations offer a new way forward for the United

States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and

need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should

not be separated or carried out in isolation. The dynamics of

the region are as important to Iraq as events within Iraq.

The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days

ahead. But by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region,

and the United States of America can emerge stronger.

xviii

Executive Summary
I

Assessment

There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in

Baghdad and several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has

been removed from power and the Iraqi people have a democratically elected government that is broadly representative of

Iraq’s population, yet the government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The level of violence is high and

growing. There is great suffering, and the daily lives of many

Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is pervasive.

U.S. military and civilian personnel, and our coalition

partners, are making exceptional and dedicated efforts—and

sacrifices—to help Iraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinary efforts and sacrifices for a better future. However, the

ability of the United States to influence events within Iraq is diminishing. Many Iraqis are embracing sectarian identities. The

lack of security impedes economic development. Most countries in the region are not playing a constructive role in support

of Iraq, and some are undercutting stability.

Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is

critical to U.S. interests. It runs along the sectarian fault lines of
Shia and Sunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. It

has the world’s second-largest known oil reserves. It is now a

base of operations for international terrorism, including al

Qaeda.

Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the United States is viewed in the region and around

the world. Because of the gravity of Iraq’s condition and the

country’s vital importance, the United States is facing one of its

most difficult and significant international challenges in

decades. Because events in Iraq have been set in motion by

American decisions and actions, the United States has both a

national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give Iraqis

an opportunity to avert anarchy.

An assessment of the security, political, economic, and regional situation follows (all figures current as of publication),

along with an assessment of the consequences if Iraq continues

to deteriorate, and an analysis of some possible courses of

action.

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the iraq study group report
A. Assessment of the Current 

Situation in Iraq

1. Security

Attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are persistent and growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for

U.S. forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed. Total

attacks in October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per

day in January 2006. Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in

October were more than double the level in January. Attacks

against civilians in October were four times higher than in January. Some 3,000 Iraqi civilians are killed every month.

Sources of Violence

Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. There

are multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias

and death squads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence—particularly in and around Baghdad—has become the

principal challenge to stability.

Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni

Arab insurgency. The insurgency comprises former elements

of the Saddam Hussein regime, disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis,

3
and common criminals. It has significant support within the

Sunni Arab community. The insurgency has no single leadership but is a network of networks. It benefits from participants’

detailed knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure, and arms and financing are supplied primarily from within Iraq. The insurgents have different goals, although nearly all oppose the

presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Most wish to restore Sunni

Arab rule in the country. Some aim at winning local power and

control.

Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence

in Iraq, but that includes some of the more spectacular acts:

suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks on significant

religious or political targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely

Iraqi-run and composed of Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters—

numbering an estimated 1,300—play a supporting role or carry

out suicide operations. Al Qaeda’s goals include instigating a

wider sectarian war between Iraq’s Sunni and Shia, and driving

the United States out of Iraq.

Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi

civilian casualties. Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgent attacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa.

Groups of Iraqis are often found bound and executed, their

bodies dumped in rivers or fields. The perception of unchecked violence emboldens militias, shakes confidence in the

government, and leads Iraqis to flee to places where their sect

is the majority and where they feel they are in less danger. In

some parts of Iraq—notably in Baghdad—sectarian cleansing

is taking place. The United Nations estimates that 1.6 million

are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 million Iraqis have fled

the country.

Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial threat to immediate and long-term stability. These mili4

the iraq study group report
tias are diverse. Some are affiliated with the government, some

are highly localized, and some are wholly outside the law. They

are fragmenting, with an increasing breakdown in command

structure. The militias target Sunni Arab civilians, and some

struggle for power in clashes with one another. Some even target government ministries. They undermine the authority of

the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as the ability

of Sunnis to join a peaceful political process. The prevalence of

militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserve and expand their power only if backed by armed force.

The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number

as many as 60,000 fighters. It has directly challenged U.S. and

Iraqi government forces, and it is widely believed to engage in

regular violence against Sunni Arab civilians. Mahdi fighters

patrol certain Shia enclaves, notably northeast Baghdad’s teeming neighborhood of 2.5 million known as “Sadr City.” As the

Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, some elements

have moved beyond Sadr’s control.

The Badr Brigade is affiliated with the Supreme Council

for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is led by

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. The Badr Brigade has long-standing ties

with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Many Badr members have become integrated into the Iraqi police, and others

play policing roles in southern Iraqi cities. While wearing the

uniform of the security services, Badr fighters have targeted

Sunni Arab civilians. Badr fighters have also clashed with the

Mahdi Army, particularly in southern Iraq.

Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many

Iraqis. Robberies, kidnappings, and murder are commonplace

in much of the country. Organized criminal rackets thrive, particularly in unstable areas like Anbar province. Some criminal

gangs cooperate with, finance, or purport to be part of the

5

Assessment
Sunni insurgency or a Shiite militia in order to gain legitimacy.

As one knowledgeable American official put it, “If there were

foreign forces in New Jersey, Tony Soprano would be an insurgent leader.”

Four of Iraq’s eighteen provinces are highly insecure—

Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These provinces account for about 40 percent of Iraq’s population of 26 million. In

Baghdad, the violence is largely between Sunni and Shia. In

Anbar, the violence is attributable to the Sunni insurgency and

to al Qaeda, and the situation is deteriorating.

In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and

Turkmen. In Basra and the south, the violence is largely an

intra-Shia power struggle. The most stable parts of the country

are the three provinces of the Kurdish north and parts of the

Shia south. However, most of Iraq’s cities have a sectarian mix

and are plagued by persistent violence.

U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi Forces

Confronting this violence are the Multi-National Forces–Iraq

under U.S. command, working in concert with Iraq’s security

forces. The Multi-National Forces–Iraq were authorized by

UN Security Council Resolution 1546 in 2004, and the mandate was extended in November 2006 for another year.

Approximately 141,000 U.S. military personnel are serving in Iraq, together with approximately 16,500 military personnel from twenty-seven coalition partners, the largest contingent

being 7,200 from the United Kingdom. The U.S. Army has

principal responsibility for Baghdad and the north. The U.S.

Marine Corps takes the lead in Anbar province. The United

Kingdom has responsibility in the southeast, chiefly in Basra.

Along with this military presence, the United States is

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the iraq study group report
building its largest embassy in Baghdad. The current U.S. embassy in Baghdad totals about 1,000 U.S. government employees. There are roughly 5,000 civilian contractors in the country.

Currently, the U.S. military rarely engages in large-scale

combat operations. Instead, counterinsurgency efforts focus

on a strategy of “clear, hold, and build”—“clearing” areas of

insurgents and death squads, “holding” those areas with Iraqi

security forces, and “building” areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects.

Nearly every U.S. Army and Marine combat unit, and

several National Guard and Reserve units, have been to Iraq at

least once. Many are on their second or even third rotations;

rotations are typically one year for Army units, seven months

for Marine units. Regular rotations, in and out of Iraq or within

the country, complicate brigade and battalion efforts to get to

know the local scene, earn the trust of the population, and

build a sense of cooperation.

Many military units are under significant strain. Because

the harsh conditions in Iraq are wearing out equipment more

quickly than anticipated, many units do not have fully functional equipment for training when they redeploy to the United

States. An extraordinary amount of sacrifice has been asked of

our men and women in uniform, and of their families. The

American military has little reserve force to call on if it needs

ground forces to respond to other crises around the world.

A primary mission of U.S. military strategy in Iraq is the

training of competent Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2006,

the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq under

American leadership is expected to have trained and equipped

a target number of approximately 326,000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes 138,000 members of the Iraqi Army

and 188,000 Iraqi police. Iraqis have operational control over

7

Assessment
roughly one-third of Iraqi security forces; the U.S. has operational control over most of the rest. No U.S. forces are under

Iraqi command.

The Iraqi Army

The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government. By the end of 2006, the Iraqi Army is expected to

comprise 118 battalions formed into 36 brigades under the

command of 10 divisions. Although the Army is one of the

more professional Iraqi institutions, its performance has been

uneven. The training numbers are impressive, but they represent only part of the story.

Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and loyalties of some Iraqi units—specifically, whether

they will carry out missions on behalf of national goals instead

of a sectarian agenda. Of Iraq’s 10 planned divisions, those that

are even-numbered are made up of Iraqis who signed up to

serve in a specific area, and they have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. As a result, elements of the

Army have refused to carry out missions.

The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significant challenges:

• Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together

and perform at higher levels of organization—the brigade and

division level. Leadership training and the experience of leadership are the essential elements to improve performance.

• Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions

without adequate equipment. Congress has been generous

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the iraq study group report
in funding requests for U.S. troops, but it has resisted fully

funding Iraqi forces. The entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion) is less than the United

States currently spends in Iraq every two weeks.

• Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a

month so that they can visit their families and take them

their pay. Soldiers are paid in cash because there is no banking system. Soldiers are given leave liberally and face no

penalties for absence without leave. Unit readiness rates are

low, often at 50 percent or less.

• Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain their operations, the capability to transport supplies and

troops, and the capacity to provide their own indirect fire

support, close-air support, technical intelligence, and medical evacuation. They will depend on the United States for

logistics and support through at least 2007.

The Iraqi Police

The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that

of the Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers

roughly 135,000 and is responsible for local policing. It has

neither the training nor legal authority to conduct criminal

investigations, nor the firepower to take on organized crime,

insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi National Police numbers

roughly 25,000 and its officers have been trained in counterinsurgency operations, not police work. The Border Enforcement Department numbers roughly 28,000.

Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention,

9

Assessment
torture, and targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police are organized under the Ministry of the Interior, which is

confronted by corruption and militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the provinces.

The United States and the Iraqi government recognize

the importance of reform. The current Minister of the Interior

has called for purging militia members and criminals from the

police. But he has little police experience or base of support.

There is no clear Iraqi or U.S. agreement on the character and

mission of the police. U.S. authorities do not know with precision the composition and membership of the various police

forces, nor the disposition of their funds and equipment. There

are ample reports of Iraqi police officers participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and ammunition for

use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but don’t

show up for work. In the words of a senior American general,

“2006 was supposed to be ‘the year of the police’ but it hasn’t

materialized that way.”

Facilities Protection Services

The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems.

Each Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the

ministry’s infrastructure. All together, these units total roughly

145,000 uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units

have questionable loyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of

Health, Agriculture, and Transportation—controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr—the Facilities Protection Service is a source of

funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army. One senior U.S. official

described the Facilities Protection Service as “incompetent,

dysfunctional, or subversive.” Several Iraqis simply referred to

them as militias.

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the iraq study group report
The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities

Protection Service under the control of the Interior Ministry.

The intention is to identify and register Facilities Protection

personnel, standardize their treatment, and provide some

training. Though the approach is reasonable, this effort may exceed the current capability of the Interior Ministry.

11

Assessment

Operation Together Forward II

In a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U.S. military forces joined with Iraqi forces to establish security in

Baghdad with an operation called “Operation Together

Forward II,” which began in August 2006. Under Operation Together Forward II, U.S. forces are working with

members of the Iraqi Army and police to “clear, hold, and

build” in Baghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood. There are roughly 15,000 U.S. troops in Baghdad.

This operation—and the security of Baghdad—is

crucial to security in Iraq more generally. A capital city of

more than 6 million, Baghdad contains some 25 percent

of the country’s population. It is the largest Sunni and

Shia city in Iraq. It has high concentrations of both Sunni

insurgents and Shiite militias. Both Iraqi and American

leaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq.

The results of Operation Together Forward II are

disheartening. Violence in Baghdad—already at high levels—jumped more than 43 percent between the summer

and October 2006. U.S. forces continue to suffer high casualties. Perpetrators of violence leave neighborhoods in

advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi
2. Politics

Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council

of Representatives. A government of national unity was formed

in May 2006 that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people.

Iraq has ratified a constitution, and—per agreement with

Sunni Arab leaders—has initiated a process of review to determine if the constitution needs amendment.

The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and key players within the government too often act in

their sectarian interest. Iraq’s Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders

frequently fail to demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq’s

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the iraq study group report

police have been unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration and continuing violence. The Iraqi Army has provided only two out of the six battalions that it promised in

August would join American forces in Baghdad. The Iraqi

government has rejected sustained security operations in

Sadr City.

Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both

the capability to hold areas that have been cleared and

the will to clear neighborhoods that are home to Shiite

militias. U.S. forces can “clear” any neighborhood, but

there are neither enough U.S. troops present nor enough

support from Iraqi security forces to “hold” neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq.

Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and

Iraqi military forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the sectarian violence, U.S. forces

seem to be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end.
national interest, and too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The result is an even weaker central

government than the constitution provides.

There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international

agreement on the key issues confronting the Iraqi government:

national reconciliation, including the negotiation of a “political

deal” among Iraq’s sectarian groups on Constitution review, deBaathification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, the future of Kirkuk, and amnesty; security, particularly curbing

militias and reducing the violence in Baghdad; and governance,

including the provision of basic services and the rollback of

pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi leaders view issues through

a sectarian prism, we will summarize the differing perspectives

of Iraq’s main sectarian groups.

Sectarian Viewpoints

The Shia, the majority of Iraq’s population, have gained power

for the first time in more than 1,300 years. Above all, many Shia

are interested in preserving that power. However, fissures have

emerged within the broad Shia coalition, known as the United

Iraqi Alliance. Shia factions are struggling for power—over regions, ministries, and Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad and fractious coalition have led several

observers in Baghdad to comment that Shia leaders are held

“hostage to extremes.” Within the coalition as a whole, there is

a reluctance to reach a political accommodation with the Sunnis or to disarm Shiite militias.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding of the key issues facing Iraq, notably the need for

national reconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains

have emerged between Maliki’s government and the United

13

Assessment
States. Maliki has publicly rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve

certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of blockades around

Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and

resisted U.S. requests to move forward on reconciliation or on

disbanding Shiite militias.

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Sistani, Sadr, Hakim

The U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but

the most powerful Shia figures in Iraq do not hold national office. Of the following three vital power brokers in

the Shia community, the United States is unable to talk

directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani) and

does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr).

grand ayatollah ali al-sistani: Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. Despite staying out of day-to-day

politics, he has been the most influential leader in the

country: all major Shia leaders have sought his approval

or guidance. Sistani has encouraged a unified Shia bloc

with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani’s influence may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in

preventing intra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis.

abdul aziz al-hakim: Hakim is a cleric and the leader

of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in

Iraq (SCIRI), the largest and most organized Shia political party. It seeks the creation of an autonomous Shia

region comprising nine provinces in the south. Hakim has

consistently protected and advanced his party’s position.

SCIRI has close ties with Iran.
Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional position of power in Iraq. They are torn, unsure whether

to seek their aims through political participation or through violent insurgency. They remain angry about U.S. decisions to

dissolve Iraqi security forces and to pursue the “de-Baathification” of Iraq’s government and society. Sunnis are confronted

by paradoxes: they have opposed the presence of U.S. forces in

Iraq but need those forces to protect them against Shia militias;

they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia administration

but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see a Sunni

autonomous region as feasible for themselves.

15

Assessment

Hashimi and Dhari

The influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government is questionable. The leadership of the Sunni Arab

insurgency is murky, but the following two key Sunni

Arab figures have broad support.

moqtada al-sadr: Sadr has a large following among

impoverished Shia, particularly in Baghdad. He has joined

Maliki’s governing coalition, but his Mahdi Army has

clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with Iraqi, U.S.,

and U.K. forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist.

Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following

the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political

party that controls basic services within the government

and an armed militia outside of the government.
Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two

main political blocs—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)

and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have

secured a largely autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and

have achieved a prominent role for Kurds within the national

government. Barzani leads the Kurdish regional government,

and Talabani is president of Iraq.

Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be

within a democratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent Kurdistan would be surrounded by hostile neighbors. However, a majority of Kurds favor independence. The Kurds have

their own security forces—the peshmerga—which number

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tariq al-hashimi: Hashimi is one of two vice presidents of Iraq and the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the

largest Sunni Muslim bloc in parliament. Hashimi opposes the formation of autonomous regions and has advocated the distribution of oil revenues based on population,

a reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite

militia fighters from the Iraqi security forces. Shiite death

squads have recently killed three of his siblings.

sheik harith al-dhari: Dhari is the head of the

Muslim Scholars Association, the most influential Sunni

organization in Iraq. Dhari has condemned the American

occupation and spoken out against the Iraqi government.

His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arab insurgency and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant was recently issued for his arrest for inciting violence

and terrorism, an act that sparked bitter Sunni protests

across Iraq.
Key Issues

national reconciliation. Prime Minister Maliki outlined

a commendable program of national reconciliation soon after

he entered office. However, the Iraqi government has not taken

action on the key elements of national reconciliation: revising

17

Assessment

Barzani and Talabani

Kurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures who have long-standing ties in movements for Kurdish independence and self-government.

massoud barzani: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the President of the Kurdish

regional government. Barzani has cooperated with his

longtime rival, Jalal Talabani, in securing an empowered,

autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Barzani has

ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish

flags in Kurdish-controlled areas.

jalal talabani: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic

Union of Kurdistan and the President of Iraq. Whereas

Barzani has focused his efforts in Kurdistan, Talabani has

secured power in Baghdad, and several important PUK

government ministers are loyal to him. Talabani strongly

supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to

bring real power to the office of the presidency.

roughly 100,000. They believe they could accommodate themselves to either a unified or a fractured Iraq.
de-Baathification, which prevents many Sunni Arabs from participating in governance and society; providing amnesty for those

who have fought against the government; sharing the country’s

oil revenues; demobilizing militias; amending the constitution;

and settling the future of Kirkuk.

One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution,

which created a largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows

other such regions to be established later, perhaps including a

“Shi’astan” comprising nine southern provinces. This highly

decentralized structure is favored by the Kurds and many Shia

(particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim), but it is

anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe they

should govern. Second, because Iraq’s energy resources are in

the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible

“Sunni region.” Particularly contentious is a provision in the

constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the

future to go to the regions.

The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting process, and acceded to entering the government

only on the condition that the constitution be amended. In

September, the parliament agreed to initiate a constitutional

review commission slated to complete its work within one year;

it delayed considering the question of forming a federalized region in southern Iraq for eighteen months.

Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an

oil-rich city in northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that

the constitution require a popular referendum by December

2007 to determine whether Kirkuk can formally join the Kurdish administered region, an outcome that Arabs and Turkmen

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the iraq study group report
in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violence

sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great.

Iraq’s leaders often claim that they do not want a division

of the country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders

have little commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent Shia leader told us pointedly that the current government

has the support of 80 percent of the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought for independence for

decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, the leader of

the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and the

raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general commented that the Iraqis “still do not know what kind of country

they want to have.” Yet many of Iraq’s most powerful and wellpositioned leaders are not working toward a united Iraq.

security. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of national reconciliation. Shiite leaders must

make the decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must

make the decision to seek their aims through a peaceful political process, not through violent revolt. The Iraqi government

and Sunni Arab tribes must aggressively pursue al Qaeda.

Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political action. Shia political leaders make distinctions between the

Sunni insurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government)

and Shia militias (which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods, and maximize power within the government). Though

Prime Minister Maliki has said he will address the problem of

militias, he has taken little meaningful action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to Sadr and has shown

little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi Army.

Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent insurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni

19

Assessment
politicians within the government have a limited level of support

and influence among their own population, and questionable

influence over the insurgency. Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation against Sunni leaders—assassinating the family members of those who do participate in the government. Too often,

insurgents tolerate and cooperate with al Qaeda, as they share a

mutual interest in attacking U.S. and Shia forces. However, Sunni

Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently took the positive

step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreign fighters in their

midst, and have started to take action on those commitments.

Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take

on the militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has

to help them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each

side watches the other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms

unless the Shia militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply:

there are many armed groups within Iraq, and very little will to

lay down arms.

governance. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its people with basic services: electricity, drinking water,

sewage, health care, and education. In many sectors, production is below or hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and

other unstable areas, the situation is much worse. There are

five major reasons for this problem.

First, the government sometimes provides services on a

sectarian basis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of

Shia-governed Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity each day and trash piles are waist-high. One American

official told us that Baghdad is run like a “Shia dictatorship” because Sunnis boycotted provincial elections in 2005, and therefore are not represented in local government.

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the iraq study group report
Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. For instance, electricity transmission towers are

downed by explosives, and then sniper attacks prevent repairs

from being made.

Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated that official corruption costs Iraq $5–7 billion per year.

Notable steps have been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit

board and inspectors general in the ministries, and senior leaders including the Prime Minister have identified rooting out

corruption as a national priority. But too many political leaders

still pursue their personal, sectarian, or party interests. There

are still no examples of senior officials who have been brought

before a court of law and convicted on corruption charges.

Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq’s technocratic

class was pushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification. Other skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has

risen. Too often, Iraq’s elected representatives treat the ministries

as political spoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay

salaries, spending as little as 10–15 percent of their capital

budget. They lack technical expertise and suffer from corruption,

inefficiency, a banking system that does not permit the transfer of

moneys, extensive red tape put in place in part to deter corruption, and a Ministry of Finance reluctant to disburse funds.

Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish an Iraqi judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has

some dedicated judges. But criminal investigations are conducted by magistrates, and they are too few and inadequately

trained to perform this function. Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless. As one senior U.S. official said to us,

“We can protect judges, but not their families, their extended

families, their friends.” Many Iraqis feel that crime not only is

unpunished, it is rewarded.

21

Assessment
3. Economics

There has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has

tremendous potential for growth. But economic development

is hobbled by insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated infrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U.S. official observed to us, Iraq’s economy has been badly shocked and is

dysfunctional after suffering decades of problems: Iraq had a

police state economy in the 1970s, a war economy in the 1980s,

and a sanctions economy in the 1990s. Immediate and longterm growth depends predominantly on the oil sector.

Economic Performance

There are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are

stable and growing at $12 billion. Consumer imports of computers, cell phones, and other appliances have increased dramatically. New businesses are opening, and construction is

moving forward in secure areas. Because of Iraq’s ample oil reserves, water resources, and fertile lands, significant growth is

possible if violence is reduced and the capacity of government

improves. For example, wheat yields increased more than 40

percent in Kurdistan during this past year.

The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting

benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund. Most

prominently, subsidies have been reduced—for instance, the

price per liter of gas has increased from roughly 1.7 cents to 23

cents (a figure far closer to regional prices). However, energy

and food subsidies generally remain a burden, costing Iraq $11

billion per year.

Despite the positive signs, many leading economic in22

the iraq study group report
dicators are negative. Instead of meeting a target of 10

percent, growth in Iraq is at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation

is above 50 percent. Unemployment estimates range widely from

20 to 60 percent. The investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not

see tangible improvements in their daily economic situation.

Oil Sector

Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq’s

GDP, and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq

produces around 2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about

1.5 million barrels per day. This is below both prewar production levels and the Iraqi government’s target of 2.5 million barrels per day, and far short of the vast potential of the Iraqi oil

sector. Fortunately for the government, global energy prices

have been higher than projected, making it possible for Iraq to

meet its budget revenue targets.

Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security, lack of investment, and lack of technical capacity. Insurgents with a detailed knowledge of Iraq’s infrastructure target

pipelines and oil facilities. There is no metering system for the

oil. There is poor maintenance at pumping stations, pipelines,

and port facilities, as well as inadequate investment in modern

technology. Iraq had a cadre of experts in the oil sector, but intimidation and an extended migration of experts to other countries have eroded technical capacity. Foreign companies have

been reluctant to invest, and Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has been unable to spend more than 15 percent of its capital budget.

Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that

150,000 to 200,000—and perhaps as many as 500,000—barrels

of oil per day are being stolen. Controlled prices for refined

23

Assessment
products result in shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers to the thriving black market. One senior U.S. official

told us that corruption is more responsible than insurgents for

breakdowns in the oil sector.

The Politics of Oil

The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country’s already fragile efforts to create a unified central government. The Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions

to take the lead in developing new oil resources. Article 108

states that “oil and gas are the ownership of all the peoples of

Iraq in all the regions and governorates,” while Article 109

tasks the federal government with “the management of oil and

gas extracted from current fields.” This language has led to

contention over what constitutes a “new” or an “existing” resource, a question that has profound ramifications for the ultimate control of future oil revenue.

Senior members of Iraq’s oil industry argue that a national

oil company could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues and reducing regional or local claims to a percentage of

the revenue derived from production. However, regional leaders are suspicious and resist this proposal, affirming the rights of

local communities to have direct access to the inflow of oil revenue. Kurdish leaders have been particularly aggressive in asserting independent control of their oil assets, signing and

implementing investment deals with foreign oil companies in

northern Iraq. Shia politicians are also reported to be negotiating oil investment contracts with foreign companies.

There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues directly to the population on a per capita basis. These

proposals have the potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in

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the iraq study group report
the nation’s chief natural resource, but it would take time to develop a fair distribution system. Oil revenues have been incorporated into state budget projections for the next several years.

There is no institution in Iraq at present that could properly

implement such a distribution system. It would take substantial

time to establish, and would have to be based on a well-developed

state census and income tax system, which Iraq currently lacks.

U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts

The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion

to support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion has been appropriated for the “Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.” Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost

all the funds have been committed. The administration requested $1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The administration requested $750

million for FY 2007. The trend line for economic assistance in

FY 2008 also appears downward.

Congress has little appetite for appropriating more funds

for reconstruction. There is a substantial need for continued

reconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about the

capacity of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.

The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense

Department, State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and other agencies has been ineffective. There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of

reconstruction.

As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is

changing its focus, shifting from infrastructure, education, and

health to smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some

degree managed by local communities. A major attempt is also

25

Assessment
being made to improve the capacity of government bureaucracies at the national, regional, and provincial levels to provide

services to the population as well as to select and manage infrastructure projects.

The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi

ministries, but it confronts problems with access and sustainability. Moqtada al-Sadr objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq,

and therefore the ministries he controls—Health, Agriculture,

and Transportation—will not work with Americans. It is not

clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and operate reconstruction projects launched by the United States.

Several senior military officers commented to us that the

Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which funds

quick-impact projects such as the clearing of sewage and the

restoration of basic services, is vital. The U.S. Agency for International Development, in contrast, is focused on long-term

economic development and capacity building, but funds have

not been committed to support these efforts into the future.

The State Department leads seven Provincial Reconstruction

Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a

positive effect in secure areas, but not in areas where their

work is hampered by significant security constraints.

Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided

to contractors, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction has documented numerous instances of waste and

abuse. They have not all been put right. Contracting has gradually improved, as more oversight has been exercised and fewer

cost-plus contracts have been granted; in addition, the use of

Iraqi contractors has enabled the employment of more Iraqis

in reconstruction projects.

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4. International Support

International support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid.

International donors pledged $13.5 billion to support reconstruction, but less than $4 billion has been delivered.

An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a

significant amount of Iraq’s government debt and put the country on firmer financial footing. But the Gulf States, including

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that

they have not forgiven.

The United States is currently working with the United Nations and other partners to fashion the “International Compact”

on Iraq. The goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and

credits from the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid

from international donors. In return, the Iraqi government will

agree to achieve certain economic reform milestones, such as

building anticorruption measures into Iraqi institutions, adopting

a fair legal framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic self-sufficiency by 2012. Several U.S. and international officials told us that the compact could be an opportunity to seek

greater international engagement in the country.

The Region

The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly influence its

stability and prosperity. No country in the region wants a

chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are doing little to help it, and

some are undercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors are meddling in their affairs. When asked which of Iraq’s

neighbors are intervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official

replied, “All of them.”

27

Assessment
The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region.

U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding focus of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq. Several

Iraqi, U.S., and international officials commented to us that

Iraqi opposition to the United States—and support for Sadr—

spiked in the aftermath of Israel’s bombing campaign in

Lebanon. The actions of Syria and Iran in Iraq are often tied to

their broader concerns with the United States. Many Sunni

Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence in Iraq

and the region. Most of the region’s countries are wary of U.S.

efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East.

Neighboring States

iran. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq.

Iran has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many

of whom were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein

regime. Iran has provided arms, financial support, and training

for Shiite militias within Iraq, as well as political support for

Shia parties. There are also reports that Iran has supplied improvised explosive devices to groups—including Sunni Arab insurgents—that attack U.S. forces. The Iranian border with Iraq

is porous, and millions of Iranians travel to Iraq each year to

visit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranian meddling,

and Sunnis took a particularly alarmist view. One leading Sunni

politician told us, “If you turn over any stone in Iraq today, you

will find Iran underneath.”

U.S., Iraqi, and international officials also commented on

the range of tensions between the United States and Iran, including Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism,

Iran’s influence in Lebanon and the region, and Iran’s influence

in Iraq. Iran appears content for the U.S. military to be tied

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the iraq study group report
down in Iraq, a position that limits U.S. options in addressing

Iran’s nuclear program and allows Iran leverage over stability in

Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran and the United States about

the situation in Iraq have not taken place. One Iraqi official

told us: “Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets

of Baghdad.”

syria. Syria is also playing a counterproductive role. Iraqis

are upset about what they perceive as Syrian support for efforts

to undermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is not so

much to take active measures as to countenance malign neglect: the Syrians look the other way as arms and foreign fighters

flow across their border into Iraq, and former Baathist leaders

find a safe haven within Syria. Like Iran, Syria is content to see

the United States tied down in Iraq. That said, the Syrians have

indicated that they want a dialogue with the United States, and

in November 2006 agreed to restore diplomatic relations with

Iraq after a 24-year break.

saudi arabia and the gulf states. These countries for

the most part have been passive and disengaged. They have declined to provide debt relief or substantial economic assistance

to the Iraqi government. Several Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians

complained that Saudi Arabia has not provided political support for their fellow Sunnis within Iraq. One observed that

Saudi Arabia did not even send a letter when the Iraqi government was formed, whereas Iran has an ambassador in Iraq.

Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments help facilitate U.S. military operations in Iraq by

providing basing and overflight rights and by cooperating on intelligence issues.

29

Assessment
As worries about Iraq increase, the Gulf States are becoming more active. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have

hosted meetings in support of the International Compact. Saudi

Arabia recently took the positive step of hosting a conference of

Iraqi religious leaders in Mecca. Several Gulf States have helped

foster dialogue with Iraq’s Sunni Arab population. While the Gulf

States are not proponents of democracy in Iraq, they worry about

the direction of events: battle-hardened insurgents from Iraq

could pose a threat to their own internal stability, and the growth

of Iranian influence in the region is deeply troubling to them.

turkey. Turkish policy toward Iraq is focused on discouraging Kurdish nationalism, which is seen as an existential threat

to Turkey’s own internal stability. The Turks have supported the

Turkmen minority within Iraq and have used their influence to

try to block the incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At

the same time, Turkish companies have invested in Kurdish

areas in northern Iraq, and Turkish and Kurdish leaders have

sought constructive engagement on political, security, and economic issues.

The Turks are deeply concerned about the operations of the

Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)—a terrorist group based in northern Iraq that has killed thousands of Turks. They are upset that

the United States and Iraq have not targeted the PKK more aggressively. The Turks have threatened to go after the PKK themselves, and have made several forays across the border into Iraq.

jordan and egypt. Both Jordan and Egypt have provided

some assistance for the Iraqi government. Jordan has trained

thousands of Iraqi police, has an ambassador in Baghdad, and

King Abdullah recently hosted a meeting in Amman between

President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki. Egypt has provided

30

the iraq study group report
some limited Iraqi army training. Both Jordan and Egypt have

facilitated U.S. military operations—Jordan by allowing overflight and search-and-rescue operations, Egypt by allowing

overflight and Suez Canal transits; both provide important cooperation on intelligence. Jordan is currently home to 700,000

Iraqi refugees (equal to 10 percent of its population) and fears

a flood of many more. Both Jordan and Egypt are concerned

about the position of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs and want constitutional

reforms in Iraq to bolster the Sunni community. They also fear

the return of insurgents to their countries.

The International Community

The international community beyond the United Kingdom and

our other coalition partners has played a limited role in Iraq.

The United Nations—acting under Security Council Resolution

1546—has a small presence in Iraq; it has assisted in holding

elections, drafting the constitution, organizing the government,

and building institutions. The World Bank, which has committed a limited number of resources, has one and sometimes two

staff in Iraq. The European Union has a representative there.

Several U.S.-based and international nongovernmental

organizations have done excellent work within Iraq, operating

under great hardship. Both Iraqi and international nongovernmental organizations play an important role in reaching across

sectarian lines to enhance dialogue and understanding, and

several U.S.-based organizations have employed substantial resources to help Iraqis develop their democracy. However, the

participation of international nongovernmental organizations is

constrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts

face a cumbersome and often politicized process of registration

with the government.

31

Assessment
The United Kingdom has dedicated an extraordinary

amount of resources to Iraq and has made great sacrifices. In

addition to 7,200 troops, the United Kingdom has a substantial

diplomatic presence, particularly in Basra and the Iraqi southeast. The United Kingdom has been an active and key player at

every stage of Iraq’s political development. U.K. officials told

us that they remain committed to working for stability in Iraq,

and will reduce their commitment of troops and resources in

response to the situation on the ground.

5. Conclusions

The United States has made a massive commitment to the future of Iraq in both blood and treasure. As of December 2006,

nearly 2,900 Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another 21,000 Americans have been wounded, many severely.

To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion

on the Iraq War, and costs are running about $8 billion per

month. In addition, the United States must expect significant

“tail costs” to come. Caring for veterans and replacing lost

equipment will run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Estimates run as high as $2 trillion for the final cost of the U.S. involvement in Iraq.

Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive

and the situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot

now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of

the United States. Iraqis have not been convinced that they

must take responsibility for their own future. Iraq’s neighbors

and much of the international community have not been persuaded to play an active and constructive role in supporting

Iraq. The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out.

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B. Consequences of Continued 

Decline in Iraq

If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region,

and the world.

Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and

inflict greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of

Iraq’s government and economy would further cripple a country already unable to meet its people’s needs. Iraq’s security

forces could split along sectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more refugees are forced to relocate

across the country and the region. Ethnic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjected to another strongman

who flexes the political and military muscle required to impose

order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost.

Other countries in the region fear significant violence

crossing their borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries

to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps

sparking a broader regional war. Turkey could send troops into

northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops to restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil fields. The regional

33
influence of Iran could rise at a time when that country is on a

path to producing nuclear weapons.

Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that

they fear the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across

the Islamic world. Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections—perhaps fomented by Iran—in Sunni-ruled states. Such

a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandora’s box of problems—including the radicalization of populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes—that might take

decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to the

other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could

lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm

the global economy.

Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, “Al

Qaeda is now a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald’s.” Left

unchecked, al Qaeda in Iraq could continue to incite violence

between Sunnis and Shia. A chaotic Iraq could provide a still

stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda will portray any failure by

the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region

and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to Osama

bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will

seek to expel the Americans and then spread “the jihad wave to

the secular countries neighboring Iraq.” A senior European official told us that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks

within his country.

The global standing of the United States could suffer if

Iraq descends further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and

strain on, U.S. military, diplomatic, and financial capacities.

Perceived failure there could diminish America’s credibility

and influence in a region that is the center of the Islamic world

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the iraq study group report
and vital to the world’s energy supply. This loss would reduce

America’s global influence at a time when pressing issues in

North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand our full attention

and strong U.S. leadership of international alliances. And the

longer that U.S. political and military resources are tied down

in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in

Afghanistan increase.

Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans

disapprove of the government’s handling of the war, and more

than 60 percent feel that there is no clear plan for moving forward. The November elections were largely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. Arguments about continuing to

provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall on deaf ears if

Americans become disillusioned with the government that the

United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy

cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of

the American people.

Continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater

Iraqi opposition to the United States. Recent polling indicates

that only 36 percent of Iraqis feel their country is heading in

the right direction, and 79 percent of Iraqis have a “mostly negative” view of the influence that the United States has in their

country. Sixty-one percent of Iraqis approve of attacks on U.S.-

led forces. If Iraqis continue to perceive Americans as representing an occupying force, the United States could become its

own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny.

These and other predictions of dire consequences in Iraq

and the region are by no means a certainty. Iraq has taken several positive steps since Saddam Hussein was overthrown:

Iraqis restored full sovereignty, conducted open national elections, drafted a permanent constitution, ratified that constitu35

Assessment
tion, and elected a new government pursuant to that constitution. Iraqis may become so sobered by the prospect of an unfolding civil war and intervention by their regional neighbors

that they take the steps necessary to avert catastrophe. But at

the moment, such a scenario seems implausible because the

Iraqi people and their leaders have been slow to demonstrate

the capacity or will to act.

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C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq

Because of the gravity of the situation in Iraq and of its consequences for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world,

the Iraq Study Group has carefully considered the full range of

alternative approaches for moving forward. We recognize that

there is no perfect solution and that all that have been suggested have flaws. The following are some of the more notable

possibilities that we have considered.

1. Precipitate Withdrawal

Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and the role and commitments of the United States in initiating events that have led to the current situation, we believe

it would be wrong for the United States to abandon the country

through a precipitate withdrawal of troops and support. A premature American departure from Iraq would almost certainly

produce greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of

conditions, leading to a number of the adverse consequences

outlined above. The near-term results would be a significant

power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional destabilization,

37
and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda would depict our

withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraq descends

into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually require the United States to return.

2. Staying the Course

Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in

Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay

the day of reckoning at a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are

dying every month. The United States is spending $2 billion a

week. Our ability to respond to other international crises is

constrained. A majority of the American people are soured on

the war. This level of expense is not sustainable over an extended period, especially when progress is not being made.

The longer the United States remains in Iraq without progress,

the more resentment will grow among Iraqis who believe they

are subjects of a repressive American occupation. As one U.S.

official said to us, “Our leaving would make it worse. . . . The

current approach without modification will not make it better.”

3. More Troops for Iraq

Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the

fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of

national reconciliation. A senior American general told us that

adding U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a

highly localized area. However, past experience indicates that

the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are

moved to another area. As another American general told us, if

the Iraqi government does not make political progress, “all the

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troops in the world will not provide security.” Meanwhile,

America’s military capacity is stretched thin: we do not have the

troops or equipment to make a substantial, sustained increase

in our troop presence. Increased deployments to Iraq would also

necessarily hamper our ability to provide adequate resources

for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond to crises around the

world.

4. Devolution to Three Regions

The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central control would be too high.

Because Iraq’s population is not neatly separated, regional

boundaries cannot be easily drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces

have mixed populations, as do Baghdad and most other major

cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could result in mass population

movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening

of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neighboring

states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions. Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the

United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state.

While such devolution is a possible consequence of continued instability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States

should support this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome on the Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in

this direction, the United States should manage the situation to

ameliorate humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of

violence, and minimize regional instability. The United States

should support as much as possible central control by governmental authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of

oil revenues.

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Assessment
D. Achieving Our Goals

We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the

President: an Iraq that can “govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself.” In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a

broadly representative government that maintains its territorial

integrity, is at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn’t brutalize its own people. Given the current

situation in Iraq, achieving this goal will require much time and

will depend primarily on the actions of the Iraqi people.

In our judgment, there is a new way forward for the

United States to support this objective, and it will offer people

of Iraq a reasonable opportunity to lead a better life than they

did under Saddam Hussein. Our recommended course has

shortcomings, as does each of the policy alternatives we have

reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it includes the best

strategies and tactics available to us to positively influence the

outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it could enable

a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a chance

to pursue a better future, as well as serving America’s interests

and values in the years ahead.

40
II

The Way Forward—

A New Approach

Progress in Iraq is still possible if new approaches are taken

promptly by Iraq, the United States, and other countries that

have a stake in the Middle East.

To attain the goals we have outlined, changes in course

must be made both outside and inside Iraq. Our report offers a

comprehensive strategy to build regional and international

support for stability in Iraq, as it encourages the Iraqi people to

assume control of their own destiny. It offers a responsible

transition.

Externally, the United States should immediately begin to

employ all elements of American power to construct a regional

mechanism that can support, rather than retard, progress in

Iraq. Internally, the Iraqi government must take the steps required to achieve national reconciliation, reduce violence, and

improve the daily lives of Iraqis. Efforts to implement these external and internal strategies must begin now and must be undertaken in concert with one another.

This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in

the U.S. presence in Iraq over time.

A. The External Approach: Building 

an International Consensus

The United States must build a new international consensus

for stability in Iraq and the region.

In order to foster such consensus, the United States should

embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international

support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in

other countries in the region. This support structure should include every country that has an interest in averting a chaotic

Iraq, including all of Iraq’s neighbors—Iran and Syria among

them. Despite the well-known differences between many of

these countries, they all share an interest in avoiding the horrific

consequences that would flow from a chaotic Iraq, particularly a

humanitarian catastrophe and regional destabilization.

A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is

clear that the Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing,

defending, and sustaining itself by relying on U.S. military and

economic support alone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed by relying only on U.S. military support in conjunction

with Iraqi military and police capabilities. Some states have

been withholding commitments they could make to support

Iraq’s stabilization and reconstruction. Some states have been

43
actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve a political solution within Iraq, a broader international support structure is

needed.

1. The New Diplomatic Offensive

Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other

major regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To

put it simply, all key issues in the Middle East—the ArabIsraeli conflict, Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic

reforms, and extremism and terrorism—are inextricably linked.

In addition to supporting stability in Iraq, a comprehensive

diplomatic offensive—the New Diplomatic Offensive—should

address these key regional issues. By doing so, it would help

marginalize extremists and terrorists, promote U.S. values and

interests, and improve America’s global image.

Under the diplomatic offensive, we propose regional and

international initiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government

in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones. Achieving these milestones will require at least the acquiescence of Iraq’s neighbors, and their active and timely

cooperation would be highly desirable.

The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily economic “Compact for Iraq” by also emphasizing political, diplomatic, and security issues. At the same time, it would

be coordinated with the goals of the Compact for Iraq. The

diplomatic offensive would also be broader and more farreaching than the “Gulf Plus Two” efforts currently being conducted, and those efforts should be folded into and become

part of the diplomatic offensive.

States included within the diplomatic offensive can play a

major role in reinforcing national reconciliation efforts be44

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tween Iraqi Sunnis and Shia. Such reinforcement would contribute substantially to legitimizing of the political process in

Iraq. Iraq’s leaders may not be able to come together unless

they receive the necessary signals and support from abroad.

This backing will not materialize of its own accord, and must be

encouraged urgently by the United States.

In order to advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution,

the Study Group recommends as follows:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with

the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive New

Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and

of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be

launched before December 31, 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates to regional players should be to:

i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.

ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s

neighbors.

iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols

with neighboring countries.

iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders.

v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political

support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi

government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq.

vii. Validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in

Baghdad.

viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key

capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).

ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on

Kirkuk.

x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security,

political, and economic milestones, including better

performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of

militias.

RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic

offensive, and in addition to the Support Group discussed

below, the United States and the Iraqi government should

support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of

the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab

League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic presence in Iraq.

2. The Iraq International Support Group

This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes the active participation of those countries that have a crit46

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ical stake in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage their participation, the United States should immediately

seek the creation of the Iraq International Support Group. The

Support Group should also include all countries that border Iraq

as well as other key countries in the region and the world.

The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations

or undertakings on the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group would assist Iraq in ways the government of Iraq

would desire, attempting to strengthen Iraq’s sovereignty—not

diminish it.

It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq’s

neighbors are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a

unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None

favors the breakup of the Iraqi state. Each country in the region views the situation in Iraq through the filter of its particular set of interests. For example:

• Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous

Kurdistan because of its own national security considerations.

• Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in

Iraq, but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its

influence and hedge its bets on possible outcomes.

• Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups,

would be threatened by the impact that the breakup of Iraq

would have on its own multiethnic and multiconfessional

society.

• Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim of Iraqi irredentism and aggression.

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
• Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy in Iraq and the region as a whole.

• The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an

outcome in Iraq that does not destabilize the region and exacerbate Shia-Sunni tensions.

• None of Iraq’s neighbors—especially major countries such as

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel—see it in their interest for

the situation in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence

by Iran. Indeed, they may take active steps to limit Iran’s influence, steps that could lead to an intraregional conflict.

Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to

reinforce ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi

society. But if the Support Group takes a systematic and active

approach toward considering the concerns of each country, we

believe that each can be encouraged to play a positive role in

Iraq and the region.

saudi arabia. Saudi Arabia’s agreement not to intervene

with assistance to Sunni Arab Iraqis could be an essential quid

pro quo for similar forbearance on the part of other neighbors,

especially Iran. The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials

to help reconcile differences between Iraqi factions and build

broader support in the Islamic world for a stabilization agreement, as their recent hosting of a meeting of Islamic religious

leaders in Mecca suggests. If the government in Baghdad pursues a path of national reconciliation with the Sunnis, the Saudis

could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda in Iraq. They

could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, the

Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate.

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the iraq study group report
turkey. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq’s borders,

Turkey can be a partner in supporting the national reconciliation process in Iraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpful

given Turkey’s interest in Kurdistan remaining an integral part

of a unified Iraq and its interest in preventing a safe haven for

Kurdish terrorists (the PKK).

egypt. Because of its important role in the Arab world,

Egypt should be encouraged to foster the national reconciliation process in Iraq with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. At the same time, Egypt has the means, and indeed has

offered, to train groups of Iraqi military and security forces in

Egypt on a rotational basis.

jordan. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliation process in Iraq with the Sunnis. It too has the professional

capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces.

RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New

Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International Support Group

should be organized immediately following the launch of the

New Diplomatic Offensive.

RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist

of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and

Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf

States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries—for instance, Germany, Japan and

South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting

Iraq could also become members.

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive

and the work of the Support Group should be carried out

with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized at

the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State,

if not the President, should lead the U.S. effort. That effort

should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstances

require.

RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on

the participation of the office of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral in its work. The United Nations Secretary-General

should designate a Special Envoy as his representative.

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the

New Diplomatic Offensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries that take into account the

interests, perspectives, and potential contributions as suggested above.

3. Dealing with Iran and Syria

Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is

our view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its

adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its

diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions.

The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with

Iran and Syria involve difficult issues that must be resolved.

Diplomatic talks should be extensive and substantive, and they

will require a balancing of interests. The United States has

diplomatic, economic, and military disincentives available in

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the iraq study group report
approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, the United States

should also consider incentives to try to engage them constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya.

Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include:

i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors and the region.

ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the

Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan.

iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World

Trade Organization.

iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United

States.

v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and

economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating regime change.

vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement

as part of a broader initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined below.

RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and the Support Group, the United States

should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to

obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq

and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and Iran, the

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
United States should consider incentives, as well as disincentives, in seeking constructive results.

iran. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state

of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran

cooperated in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore

whether this model can be replicated in the case of Iraq.

Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United

States bogged down in Iraq, Iran’s interests would not be

served by a failure of U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and

the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran’s population

is slightly more than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri

minority (24 percent of the population) as well as Kurdish and

Arab minorities. Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame

sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for

Iranian national security interests.

Our limited contacts with Iran’s government lead us to

believe that its leaders are likely to say they will not participate

in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute

this reluctance to their belief that the United States seeks

regime change in Iran.

Nevertheless, as one of Iraq’s neighbors Iran should be

asked to assume its responsibility to participate in the Support

Group. An Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq

and the rest of the world Iran’s rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to its isolation. Further, Iran’s refusal

to cooperate on this matter would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in the broader dialogue it seeks.

RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran’s nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the United Nations

Security Council and its five permanent members (i.e., the

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United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China)

plus Germany.

RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the

Support Group should seek to persuade Iran that it should

take specific steps to improve the situation in Iraq.

Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following:

• Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and

training to any group resorting to violence in Iraq.

• Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity

of Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its government.

• Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq,

to encourage national reconciliation.

• Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic reconstruction of Iraq.

syria. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point,

both countries have important interests in the region that could

be enhanced if they were able to establish some common

ground on how to move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s. In this context, Syria’s national interests

in the Arab-Israeli dispute are important and can be brought

into play.

Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq’s stability in

several ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the

following:

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support Group should encourage and persuade Syria of the

merit of such contributions as the following:

• Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of

funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.

• Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with

the Iraqis.

• Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation

with Iraq.

4. The Wider Regional Context

The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the

Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the

Arab-Israeli conflict.

There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by

the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all

fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This

commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between

Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to

exist), and particularly Syria—which is the principal transit

point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, and which supports radical Palestinian groups.

The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding

direct involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, we should act boldly:

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• There is no military solution to this conflict.

• The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a

nation perpetually at war.

• No American administration—Democratic or Republican—

will ever abandon Israel.

• Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the ArabIsraeli dispute because it is an axiom that when the political

process breaks down there will be violence on the ground.

• The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set

forth in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and

in the principle of “land for peace.”

• The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace

such as Israel has achieved with Egypt and Jordan.

This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments in the region, especially the democratically elected

government of Lebanon, and the Palestinian Authority under

President Mahmoud Abbas.

RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and

sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and

President Bush’s June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.

RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include—as

soon as possible—the unconditional calling and holding of

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
meetings, under the auspices of the United States or the

Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, European Union, and

the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon and Syria

on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who acknowledge Israel’s right to exist) on the other. The purpose of these

meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the

Madrid Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks—

one Syrian/Lebanese, and the other Palestinian.

RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements

of that negotiated peace should be:

• Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution

1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for

Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.

• Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik

Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.

• A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use

of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons

and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel’s problem with Hezbollah.)

• Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah

for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force

soldiers.

• A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the

democratically elected government of Lebanon.

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• A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting

through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian

groups.

• A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.

• Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and

in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis

should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the

border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.

RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue,

elements of that negotiated peace should include:

• Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and

338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the

only bases for achieving peace.

• Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas

and the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing

the way for negotiations with Israel.

• A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians

and the Israelis in November 2006.

• Support for a Palestinian national unity government.

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
• Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement

along the lines of President Bush’s two-state solution, which

would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.

Afghanistan

At the same time, we must not lose sight of the importance of

the situation inside Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed

by the Taliban. Afghanistan’s borders are porous. If the Taliban

were to control more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda

the political space to conduct terrorist operations. This development would destabilize the region and have national security

implications for the United States and other countries around

the world. Also, the significant increase in poppy production in

Afghanistan fuels the illegal drug trade and narco-terrorism.

The huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic

support on Iraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan. As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq

and the Middle East, it must also give priority to the situation

in Afghanistan. Doing so may require increased political, security, and military measures.

RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States

to provide additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might become

available as combat forces are moved from Iraq.

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B.The Internal Approach: 

Helping Iraqis Help Themselves

The New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper external environment and support for the difficult internal steps that

the Iraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation, establish security, and make progress on governance.

The most important issues facing Iraq’s future are now

the responsibility of Iraq’s elected leaders. Because of the security and assistance it provides, the United States has a significant role to play. Yet only the government and people of Iraq

can make and sustain certain decisions critical to Iraq’s future.

1. Performance on Milestones

The United States should work closely with Iraq’s leaders to

support the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones—on national reconciliation, security, and governance.

Miracles cannot be expected, but the people of Iraq have the

right to expect action and progress. The Iraqi government

needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens of the United

States and other countries—that it deserves continued support.

59
The U.S. government must make clear that it expects

action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward these milestones. Such a message can be sent only at the

level of our national leaders, and only in person, during direct

consultation.

As President Bush’s meeting with Prime Minister Maliki

in Amman, Jordan demonstrates, it is important for the President to remain in close and frequent contact with the Iraqi

leadership. There is no substitute for sustained dialogue at the

highest levels of government.

During these high-level exchanges, the United States

should lay out an agenda for continued support to help Iraq

achieve milestones, as well as underscoring the consequences

if Iraq does not act. It should be unambiguous that continued

U.S. political, military, and economic support for Iraq depends

on the Iraqi government’s demonstrating political will and

making substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance.

The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces

units from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by

Iraq’s performance on milestones.

The United States should also signal that it is seeking broad

international support for Iraq on behalf of achieving these milestones. The United States can begin to shape a positive climate

for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq,

through public statements by President Bush that reject the notion that the United States seeks to control Iraq’s oil, or seeks

permanent military bases within Iraq. However, the United

States could consider a request from Iraq for temporary bases.

RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership

of his national security team should remain in close and fre60

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quent contact with the Iraqi leadership. These contacts must

convey a clear message: there must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the President should

convey as much detail as possible about the substance of these

exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi

people, and the countries in the region well informed.

RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward

the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its

willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for

Iraq’s security forces, and to continue political, military, and

economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq becomes

more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself,

the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced.

RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not

make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance,

the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that

the United States does not seek permanent military bases in

Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary

base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that

request as it would in the case of any other government.

RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that

the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.

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Milestones for Iraq

The government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are

necessary to avert a downward spiral and make progress. Prime

Minister Maliki has worked closely in consultation with the

United States and has put forward the following milestones in

the key areas of national reconciliation, security and governance:

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

By the end of 2006–early 2007:

➤ Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an

election date

➤ Approval of the Petroleum Law

➤ Approval of the De-Baathification Law

➤ Approval of the Militia Law

By March 2007:

➤ A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary)

By May 2007:

➤ Completion of Militia Law implementation

➤ Approval of amnesty agreement

➤ Completion of reconciliation efforts

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By June 2007:

➤ Provincial elections

SECURITY (pending joint U.S.-Iraqi review)

By the end of 2006:

➤ Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levels

By April 2007:

➤ Iraqi control of the Army

By September 2007:

➤ Iraqi control of provinces

By December 2007:

➤ Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support)

GOVERNANCE

By the end of 2006:

➤ The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20

percent and appreciate the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to

combat accelerating inflation.

➤ Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum products and sell imported fuel at market prices.

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RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion

dates of the end of 2006 or early 2007 for some milestones

may not be realistic. These should be completed by the first

quarter of 2007.

RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good

start. The United States should consult closely with the Iraqi

government and develop additional milestones in three

areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As with

the current milestones, these additional milestones should be

tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible.

2. National Reconciliation

National reconciliation is essential to reduce further violence

and maintain the unity of Iraq.

U.S. forces can help provide stability for a time to enable

Iraqi leaders to negotiate political solutions, but they cannot

stop the violence—or even contain it—if there is no underlying

political agreement among Iraqis about the future of their

country.

The Iraqi government must send a clear signal to Sunnis

that there is a place for them in national life. The government

needs to act now, to give a signal of hope. Unless Sunnis believe

they can get a fair deal in Iraq through the political process,

there is no prospect that the insurgency will end. To strike this

fair deal, the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people must address several issues that are critical to the success of national

reconciliation and thus to the future of Iraq.

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Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf of 

National Reconciliation

RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of

the constitution is essential to national reconciliation and

should be pursued on an urgent basis. The United Nations has

expertise in this field, and should play a role in this process.

RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab

nationalists into national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein’s regime excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified Iraqi professionals—Sunni or

Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd or Turkmen or Christian or Arab—into the government.

RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to the central government and be shared

on the basis of population. No formula that gives control over

revenues from future fields to the regions or gives control of

oil fields to the regions is compatible with national reconciliation.

RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial

elections should be held at the earliest possible date. Under

the constitution, new provincial elections should have been

held already. They are necessary to restore representative

government.

RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary

to avert communal violence. Kirkuk’s mix of Kurdish, Arab,

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and Turkmen populations could make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as required by the Iraqi

Constitution before the end of 2007) would be explosive and

should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the agenda

of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New

Diplomatic Offensive.

RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals

must be far-reaching. Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in the government finding ways

and means to reconcile with former bitter enemies.

RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women

and the rights of all minority communities in Iraq, including

Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected.

RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a tool for politicizing or stopping

their activities. Registration should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for government censorship and interference.

Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of 

National Reconciliation

The United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq’s reconciliation process.

The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in a national reconciliation dialogue. The point is not for the

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United States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an

approach that we oppose. The point is for the United States

and Iraq to make clear their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi forces take on the security mission. A successful national reconciliation dialogue will advance

that departure date.

RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S.

force presence must be on the table for discussion as the

national reconciliation dialogue takes place. Its inclusion will

increase the likelihood of participation by insurgents and

militia leaders, and thereby increase the possibilities for

success.

Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue

must involve those who wield power, not simply those who hold

political office. The United States must try to talk directly to

Grand Ayatollah Sistani and must consider appointing a highlevel American Shia Muslim to serve as an emissary to him.

The United States must also try to talk directly to Moqtada alSadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent leaders. The United

Nations can help facilitate contacts.

RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of

al Qaeda. The United States must find a way to talk to Grand

Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders.

The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also

presents opportunities to seek broader support for a national

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reconciliation dialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, the international community and religious leaders can play an important

role in fostering dialogue and reconciliation across the sectarian divide. The United States should actively encourage the

constructive participation of all who can take part in advancing

national reconciliation within Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between sectarian communities, as outlined in

the New Diplomatic Offensive above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to speak out on behalf

of peace and reconciliation.

Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an

important incentive in reconciliation talks and they need to be

generous. Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be

difficult for the United States to accept, just as they will be difficult for the Iraqis to make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the Iraqis, not by Americans. Despite being

politically unpopular—in the United States as well as in Iraq—

amnesty is essential if progress is to take place. Iraqi leaders

need to be certain that they have U.S. support as they move

forward with this critical element of national reconciliation.

RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must

not be undercut in Washington by either the executive or the

legislative branch.

Militias and National Reconciliation

The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and

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lence against institutions of the state. However, solving the

problem of militias requires national reconciliation.

Dealing with Iraq’s militias will require long-term attention, and substantial funding will be needed to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members into civilian society.

Around the world, this process of transitioning members of irregular military forces from civil conflict to new lives once a

peace settlement takes hold is familiar. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militias depends on national

reconciliation and on confidence-building measures among the

parties to that reconciliation.

Both the United Nations and expert and experienced

nongovernmental organizations, especially the International

Organization for Migration, must be on the ground with appropriate personnel months before any program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members begins. Because the

United States is a party to the conflict, the U.S. military should

not be involved in implementing such a program. Yet U.S. financial and technical support is crucial.

RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of neutral international experts as advisors

to the Iraqi government on the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide

financial and technical support and establish a single office in

Iraq to coordinate assistance to the Iraqi government and its

expert advisors to aid a program to disarm, demobilize, and

reintegrate militia members.

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3. Security and Military Forces

A Military Strategy for Iraq

There is no action the American military can take that, by itself,

can bring about success in Iraq. But there are actions that the

U.S. and Iraqi governments, working together, can and should

take to increase the probability of avoiding disaster there, and

increase the chance of success.

The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently

needed national reconciliation program to which it has already

committed. And it should accelerate assuming responsibility

for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi

Army brigades. As the Iraqi Army increases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should be able to take real responsibility for governance.

While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the

United States should significantly increase the number of U.S.

military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and

supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, we could

begin to move combat forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of

U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi

army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat

operations. We should continue to maintain support forces,

rapid-reaction forces, special operations forces, intelligence

units, search-and-rescue units, and force protection units.

While the size and composition of the Iraqi Army is ultimately a matter for the Iraqi government to determine, we

should be firm on the urgent near-term need for significant additional trained Army brigades, since this is the key to Iraqis

taking over full responsibility for their own security, which they

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want to do and which we need them to do. It is clear that they

will still need security assistance from the United States for

some time to come as they work to achieve political and security changes.

One of the most important elements of our support

would be the imbedding of substantially more U.S. military

personnel in all Iraqi Army battalions and brigades, as well as

within Iraqi companies. U.S. personnel would provide advice,

combat assistance, and staff assistance. The training of Iraqi

units by the United States has improved and should continue

for the coming year. In addition to this training, Iraqi combat

units need supervised on-the-job training as they move to field

operations. This on-the-job training could be best done by

imbedding more U.S. military personnel in Iraqi deployed

units. The number of imbedded personnel would be based on

the recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it

should be large enough to accelerate the development of a real

combat capability in Iraqi Army units. Such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 American troops instead of the 3,000 to

4,000 now in this role. This increase in imbedded troops could

be carried out without an aggregate increase over time in the

total number of troops in Iraq by making a corresponding decrease in troops assigned to U.S. combat brigades.

Another mission of the U.S. military would be to assist

Iraqi deployed brigades with intelligence, transportation, air

support, and logistics support, as well as providing some key

equipment.

A vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain

rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These

teams would be available to undertake strike missions against al

Qaeda in Iraq when the opportunity arises, as well as for other

missions considered vital by the U.S. commander in Iraq.

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The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be significantly improved if it had improved equipment. One source

could be equipment left behind by departing U.S. units. The

quickest and most effective way for the Iraqi Army to get the

bulk of their equipment would be through our Foreign Military

Sales program, which they have already begun to use.

While these efforts are building up, and as additional

Iraqi brigades are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could

begin to move out of Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject

to unexpected developments in the security situation on the

ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection

could be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq

could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in

rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and in training,

equipping, advising, force protection, and search and rescue.

Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after the

United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we

would maintain a considerable military presence in the region,

with our still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air,

ground, and naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar,

as well as an increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces

would be sufficiently robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, to accomplish four missions:

• Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order

to avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country.

• Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq

using special operations teams.

• Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces.

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• Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria

and Iran.

Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security

goals and to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered

proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000)

in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course

because we do not believe that the needed levels are available

for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American

troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security

problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended to be a long-term “occupation.” We could, however,

support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and

equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines

that such steps would be effective.

We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops,

because we believe that so much is at stake.

We believe that our recommended actions will give the

Iraqi Army the support it needs to have a reasonable chance to

take responsibility for Iraq’s security. Given the ongoing deterioration in the security situation, it is urgent to move as quickly

as possible to have that security role taken over by Iraqi security forces.

The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed

in Iraq for three compelling reasons.

First, and most importantly, the United States faces other

security dangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment of American ground forces at present levels will leave no

reserve available to meet other contingencies. On September

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7, 2006, General James Jones, our NATO commander, called

for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces

are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban forces. The

United States should respond positively to that request, and be

prepared for other security contingencies, including those in

Iran and North Korea.

Second, the long-term commitment of American ground

forces to Iraq at current levels is adversely affecting Army

readiness, with less than a third of the Army units currently at

high readiness levels. The Army is unlikely to be able to meet

the next rotation of troops in Iraq without undesirable changes

in its deployment practices. The Army is now considering

breaking its compact with the National Guard and Reserves

that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers can

be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term

risk that the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will

take years to reverse.

And finally, an open-ended commitment of American

forces would not provide the Iraqi government the incentive it

needs to take the political actions that give Iraq the best chance

of quelling sectarian violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government might continue to delay taking those

difficult actions.

While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is

moderating the violence, there is little evidence that the longterm deployment of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead to

fundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important to recognize that there are no risk-free alternatives

available to the United States at this time. Reducing our combat troop commitments in Iraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably creates risks, but leaving those forces tied down in Iraq

indefinitely creates its own set of security risks.

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RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not

make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of

American troops deployed in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it

clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could

carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if

Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s

other security needs and the future of our military cannot be

made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government.

RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the

training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008,

as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must

change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism

operations.

RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military personnel should be assigned to the

imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with

Iraqi units down to the company level. The U.S. military

should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for

these officers and personnel.

RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign

Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades

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move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment for Iraqi forces.

Restoring the U.S. Military

We recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that

have great consequence for our nation. One consequence has

been the stress and uncertainty imposed on our military—the

most professional and proficient military in history. The United

States will need its military to protect U.S. security regardless

of what happens in Iraq. We therefore considered how to limit

the adverse consequences of the strain imposed on our military

by the Iraq war.

U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have

been stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments in Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead

and more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and accelerated wear on equipment.

Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of

disarray, as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs

become clear. It will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements for other current and future security threats that

need to be accommodated together with spending for operations and maintenance, reset, personnel, and benefits for active

duty and retired personnel. Restoring the capability of our military forces should be a high priority for the United States at

this time.

The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership between the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the uniformed services. Both have long benefited

from a relationship in which the civilian leadership exercises

control with the advantage of fully candid professional advice,

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and the military serves loyally with the understanding that its

advice has been heard and valued. That tradition has frayed,

and civil-military relations need to be repaired.

RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense

should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the

civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President

and the National Security Council, as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.

RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the

Pentagon leadership should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that have returned to the continental United States in order to “reset” the force and restore

the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for global contingencies.

RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the

United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds

to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next

five years.

RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with the relevant committees of Congress, should

assess the full future budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and

its potential impact on the future readiness of the force, the

ability to recruit and retain high-quality personnel, needed

investments in procurement and in research and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies involved in the stability and reconstruction effort.

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4. Police and Criminal Justice

The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system

are profound.

The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support

the mission to “protect and serve” all Iraqis. Today, far too

many Iraqi police do not embrace that mission, in part because

of problems in how reforms were organized and implemented

by the Iraqi and U.S. governments.

Recommended Iraqi Actions

Within Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent militia infiltration is due, in part, to the poor organization

of Iraq’s component police forces: the Iraqi National Police,

the Iraqi Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service.

The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more

military than domestic in nature—involving commando-style

operations—and is thus ill-suited to the Ministry of the Interior.

The more natural home for the National Police is within the

Ministry of Defense, which should be the authority for counterinsurgency operations and heavily armed forces. Though depriving the Ministry of the Interior of operational forces, this

move will place the Iraqi National Police under better and more

rigorous Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will enable these units

to better perform their counterinsurgency mission.

RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police

should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando units will become part of the new Iraqi Army.

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Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that

bears little resemblance to ordinary policing, especially in light

of the current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and

weaponry across Iraq’s borders and the need for joint patrols of

the border with foreign militaries. Thus the natural home for

the Border Police is within the Ministry of Defense, which

should be the authority for controlling Iraq’s borders.

RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police

should be transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which

would have total responsibility for border control and external security.

The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and

provides local policing, needs to become a true police force. It

needs legal authority, training, and equipment to control crime

and protect Iraqi citizens. Accomplishing those goals will not

be easy, and the presence of American advisors will be required

to help the Iraqis determine a new role for the police.

RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should

be given greater responsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand its cooperation with other elements

in the Iraqi judicial system in order to better control crime

and protect Iraqi civilians.

In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service, the Ministry of the Interior needs to undertake substantial

reforms to purge bad elements and highlight best practices.

Once the ministry begins to function effectively, it can exert

a positive influence over the provinces and take back some

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of the authority that was lost to local governments through

decentralization. To reduce corruption and militia infiltration,

the Ministry of the Interior should take authority from the local

governments for the handling of policing funds. Doing so will

improve accountability and organizational discipline, limit the

authority of provincial police officials, and identify police officers with the central government.

RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior

should undergo a process of organizational transformation,

including efforts to expand the capability and reach of the

current major crime unit (or Criminal Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over local police forces. The

sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse financial

support to local police should be transferred to the Ministry

of the Interior.

Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities Protection Service under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Simply disbanding these units is not an option, as the

members will take their weapons and become full-time militiamen or insurgents. All should be brought under the authority

of a reformed Ministry of the Interior. They will need to be vetted, retrained, and closely supervised. Those who are no longer

part of the Facilities Protection Service need to participate in a

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (outlined above).

RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior

should proceed with current efforts to identify, register, and

control the Facilities Protection Service.

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U.S. Actions

The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training

mission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity. It

has not always been clear who is in charge of the police training

mission, and the U.S. military lacks expertise in certain areas

pertaining to police and the rule of law. The United States has

been more successful in training the Iraqi Army than it has the

police. The U.S. Department of Justice has the expertise and

capacity to carry out the police training mission. The U.S. Department of Defense is already bearing too much of the burden

in Iraq. Meanwhile, the pool of expertise in the United States

on policing and the rule of law has been underutilized.

The United States should adjust its training mission in

Iraq to match the recommended changes in the Iraqi government—the movement of the National and Border Police to the

Ministry of Defense and the new emphasis on the Iraqi Police

Service within the Ministry of the Interior. To reflect the reorganization, the Department of Defense would continue to train

the Iraqi National and Border Police, and the Department of

Justice would become responsible for training the Iraqi Police

Service.

RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense

should continue its mission to train the Iraqi National Police

and the Iraqi Border Police, which should be placed within

the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.

RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice

should direct the training mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry of the Interior.

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RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training

teams are imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current

practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded

and the numbers of civilian training officers increased so that

teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should be obtained

from among experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace

the military police personnel currently assigned to training

teams.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to

train the Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the

Interior, which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded

a large team within Iraq for counterterrorism activities.

Building on this experience, the training programs should

be expanded and should include the development of forensic

investigation training and facilities that could apply scientific

and technical investigative methods to counterterrorism as well

as to ordinary criminal activity.

RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity.

One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its

lack of equipment, particularly in the area of communications

and motor transport.

RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should

provide funds to expand and upgrade communications

equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi Police Service.

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The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department of Defense to carry out the mission of reforming

Iraq’s Ministry of the Interior and Iraq’s judicial system. Iraq

needs more than training for cops on the beat: it needs courts,

trained prosecutors and investigators, and the ability to protect

Iraqi judicial officials.

RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice

should lead the work of organizational transformation in the

Ministry of the Interior. This approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and moving down, to create a

strategic plan and work out standard administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures that

Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in

partnership.

RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors,

and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to

fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New

and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security,

secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection

facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts

of a secure and functioning system of justice.

5. The Oil Sector

Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the

Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help

Iraq maximize its capability.

Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore

oil production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
day over a three- to five-year period, depending on evolving

conditions in key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil production would decline unless current problems in

the oil sector were addressed.

Short Term

RECOMMENDATION 62:

• As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that defines the rights of regional and

local governments and creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential to attract

investment.

• The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well

work-overs in the southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States should no longer fund such

infrastructure projects.

• The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military

and with private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. Protective measures could include a

program to improve pipeline security by paying local

tribes solely on the basis of throughput (rather than fixed

amounts).

• Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector.

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the iraq study group report
• In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the

U.S. government should press Iraq to continue reducing

subsidies in the energy sector, instead of providing grant

assistance. Until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products,

drastic fuel shortages will remain.

Long Term

Expanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will require creating corporate structures, establishing management

systems, and installing competent managers to plan and oversee an ambitious list of major oil-field investment projects.

To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts

forward the following recommendations.

RECOMMENDATION 63:

• The United States should encourage investment in Iraq’s

oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies.

• The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize

the national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order

to enhance efficiency, transparency, and accountability.

• To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge

the Iraqi government to post all oil contracts, volumes,

and prices on the Web so that Iraqis and outside observers

can track exports and export revenues.

• The United States should support the World Bank’s efforts

to ensure that best practices are used in contracting. This

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
support involves providing Iraqi officials with contracting

templates and training them in contracting, auditing, and

reviewing audits.

• The United States should provide technical assistance to

the Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving

the payments process, managing cash flows, contracting

and auditing, and updating professional training programs

for management and technical personnel.

6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction 

Assistance

Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the

heart of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands additional U.S. resources.

Progress in providing essential government services is

necessary to sustain any progress on the political or security

front. The period of large U.S.-funded reconstruction projects

is over, yet the Iraqi government is still in great need of technical assistance and advice to build the capacity of its institutions.

The Iraqi government needs help with all aspects of its operations, including improved procedures, greater delegation of authority, and better internal controls. The strong emphasis on

building capable central ministries must be accompanied by efforts to develop functioning, effective provincial government

institutions with local citizen participation.

Job creation is also essential. There is no substitute for

private-sector job generation, but the Commander’s Emergency Response Program is a necessary transitional mechanism

until security and the economic climate improve. It provides

immediate economic assistance for trash pickup, water, sewers,

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the iraq study group report
and electricity in conjunction with clear, hold, and build operations, and it should be funded generously. A total of $753 million was appropriated for this program in FY 2006.

RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should

be increased to a level of $5 billion per year rather than being

permitted to decline. The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work hard to win the support of

Congress. Capacity building and job creation, including reliance on the Commander’s Emergency Response Program,

should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be provided on a nonsectarian basis.

The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more international partners to assist with the reconstruction mission. The

United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and

some Arab League members need to become hands-on participants in Iraq’s reconstruction.

RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq should be greater involvement by and

with international partners, who should do more than just

contribute money. They should also actively participate in

the design and construction of projects.

The number of refugees and internally displaced persons

within Iraq is increasing dramatically. If this situation is not

addressed, Iraq and the region could be further destabilized,

and the humanitarian suffering could be severe. Funding for

international relief efforts is insufficient, and should be increased.

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take

the lead in funding assistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian agencies.

Coordination of Economic and 

Reconstruction Assistance

A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington

still hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq’s reconstruction.

Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in

short supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held

accountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives of key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have

also spoken to us directly and specifically about the need for a

point of contact that can coordinate their efforts with the U.S.

government.

A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies

continuing to follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer

dollars on duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste

will further undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq.

A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is

required. He or she should report to the President, be given a

staff and funding, and chair a National Security Council interagency group consisting of senior principals at the undersecretary level from all relevant U.S. government departments and

agencies. The Senior Advisor’s responsibility must be to bring

unity of effort to the policy, budget, and implementation of

economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. The Senior Advisor

must act as the principal point of contact with U.S. partners in

the overall reconstruction effort.

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the iraq study group report
He or she must have close and constant interaction with

senior U.S. officials and military commanders in Iraq, especially the Director of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office, so that the realities on the ground are brought

directly and fully into the policy-making process. In order to

maximize the effectiveness of assistance, all involved must be

on the same page at all times.

RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a

Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq.

Improving the Effectiveness of 

Assistance Programs

Congress should work with the administration to improve its

ability to implement assistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly, and effectively.

As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq

should have the authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to

promote national reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding

from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is

not demonstrating effective partnership. These are important

tools to improve performance and accountability—as is the

work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq

should have the authority to spend significant funds through a

program structured along the lines of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and projects in which the

government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership.

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed

for the duration of assistance programs in Iraq.

U.S. security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably by the differing requirements of State and Defense Department programs and of their respective congressional

oversight committees. Since Iraqi forces must be trained and

equipped, streamlining the provision of training and equipment to Iraq is critical. Security assistance should be delivered

promptly, within weeks of a decision to provide it.

RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance

program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, should be authorized and implemented.

The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage U.S. partnerships with international donors and Iraqi

participants to promote reconstruction. The ability of the

United States to form such partnerships will encourage greater

international participation in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds

with those from international donors and Iraqi participants

on behalf of assistance projects should be provided.

7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, 

and Review

The public interest is not well served by the government’s

preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war

in Iraq.

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the iraq study group report
First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budget request but in requests for emergency supplemental appropriations. This means that funding requests are drawn

up outside the normal budget process, are not offset by budgetary reductions elsewhere, and move quickly to the White

House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the normal review

erodes budget discipline and accountability.

Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in

a confusing manner, making it difficult for both the general

public and members of Congress to understand the request or

to differentiate it from counterterrorism operations around the

world or operations in Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget

experts are needed to answer what should be a simple question: “How much money is the President requesting for the war

in Iraq?”

Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive branch erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing committees (including the House and Senate Armed

Services committees) spend the better part of a year reviewing

the President’s annual budget request. When the President

submits an emergency supplemental request, the authorizing

committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the appropriations committees, and they are pressured by the need to

act quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds.

The result is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory review. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes loaded with special spending projects that would not

survive the normal review process.

RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should

be included in the President’s annual budget request, starting

in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to

Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out

its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for

the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.

8. U.S. Personnel

The United States can take several steps to ensure that it has

personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq.

All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans’ lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six

of whom are at the level of fluency. In a conflict that demands

effective and efficient communication with Iraqis, we are often

at a disadvantage. There are still far too few Arab language–

proficient military and civilian officers in Iraq, to the detriment

of the U.S. mission.

Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex

overseas interventions to restore and maintain order—stability

operations—outside of the normal embassy setting. The nature

of the mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the

United States has had great difficulty filling civilian assignments in Iraq with sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel at the appropriate rank.

RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence

should accord the highest possible priority to professional

language proficiency and cultural training, in general and

specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be assigned to Iraq.

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RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough

civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps

should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships

posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in

Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United

States government needs to improve how its constituent

agencies—Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others—respond to a complex stability operation like that

represented by this decade’s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and

the previous decade’s operations in the Balkans. They need to

train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has

proved so successful in the U.S. armed services.

RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should

train personnel to carry out civilian tasks associated with a

complex stability operation outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve

Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity

for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including

Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar

technical assistance capabilities.

9. Intelligence

While the United States has been able to acquire good and

sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
government still does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias.

A senior commander told us that human intelligence in

Iraq has improved from 10 percent to 30 percent. Clearly, U.S.

intelligence agencies can and must do better. As mentioned

above, an essential part of better intelligence must be improved language and cultural skills. As an intelligence analyst

told us, “We rely too much on others to bring information to us,

and too often don’t understand what is reported back because

we do not understand the context of what we are told.”

The Defense Department and the intelligence community have not invested sufficient people and resources to understand the political and military threat to American men and

women in the armed forces. Congress has appropriated almost

$2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in

Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant,

and explode those devices.

We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the

job at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two

years’ experience in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts

are rotated to new assignments, and on-the-job training begins

anew. Agencies must have a better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the insurgency. They are not doing

enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a

national and provincial level. The analytic community’s knowledge of the organization, leadership, financing, and operations

of militias, as well as their relationship to government security

forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to know.

In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter

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to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an

Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that assault does not

make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn’t hurt U.S. personnel doesn’t count. For

example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence.

Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.

RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic resources to the task of understanding

the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and

the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate

picture of events on the ground.

Recommended Iraqi Actions

The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability,

initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take

full responsibility for this intelligence function.

To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the

CIA should increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel. The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorism intelligence center for the all-source

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The Way Forward—A New Approach
fusion of information on the various sources of terrorism within

Iraq. This center would analyze data concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and support groups involved in

terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate intelligence-led

police and military actions against them.

RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence

center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism

efforts.

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Appendices

99

N Red Sea

EGYPT

ISRAEL

Cairo

SUDAN

Jerusalem

Kabul

Beirut

Ankara

LEBANON

SYRIA

Damascus

Amman

JORDAN

SAUDI ARABIA

Kuwait City

Baghdad

KUWAIT

IRAQ

TURKEY

Tehran

IRAN

Riyadh UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

OMAN

PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN

TURKMENISTAN

Caspian

Sea

Mediterranean 

Sea

Arabian

Sea 

Persian Gulf

Tigris R.

Euphrates R.

Overview Map

of the Region

0

0

100

100

200

200

STATUTE MILES

KILOMETERS
100

Kuwait

City

BAGHDAD

Basrah

Safwan

Faw Peninsula

Umm

Qasr

Nasiriyah

Tallil

Samawah

Najaf Diwaniyah

Hillah

Karbala

Ramadi

Hit

Samarra

Tikrit

Baqubah

Fallujah

Airport

Kirkuk Sulaymaniyah

Halabjah

Irbil

Mosul

Kut

Amarah

Qurnah

Jalibah

Numaniyah

Euphrates R.

Tigris R.

Tigris R.

SYRIA

TURKEY

IRAN

SAUDI

ARABIA

KUWAIT

IRAQ

Hwy. 27

Hwy. 7

Hwy. 1

Hwy. 1

Hwy. 6

Hwy. 8

Hwy. 17

Kurdish-controlled

Area

 Euphrates R.

N

Overview Map of Iraq

0

0

100

100

200

200

STATUTE MILES

KILOMETERS

Kurdish Major oilfield

region

Major road Marsh
101

AL ANBAR

NINAWA

DAHUK

ARBIL

AT

TA’MIM

SALAH

AD DIN

DIYALA

WASIT

AN NAJAF

AL MUTHANNA AL

BASRAH

MAYSAN

BABIL

DHI

QAR

1

2

4

3 IRAQ

S YRIA

S AUDI ARABIA

TURKEY

IRAN

K U WAIT

N

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

Iraq has 18 provinces

(muhafazat, singular muhafazah).

0

0

100

100

200

200

STATUTE MILES

KILOMETERS

Province capital

1. As Sulaymaniyah

2. Baghdad

3. Karbala

4. Al Qadisiyah
102

BAGHDAD

Basrah

Nasiriyah

Najaf Diwaniyah

Hillah Karbala

Ramadi

Samarra

Tikrit

Sulaymaniyah

Halabjah

Arbil Mosul

Al Kut

Amarah

Mandali

Tigris R.

S YRIA

TURKEY

IRAN

S AUDI

ARABIA

K U WAIT

IRAQ

Euphrates R.

Kirkuk

Rawanduz Tall Kayt

Dahuk

Zakhu

Sinjar

Ar Rutbah

N

Distribution of Religious and Ethnic Groups

Majority Groups Minority Groups

0

0

100

100

200

200

STATUTE MILES

KILOMETERS

Sunni Arab

Sunni Kurd

Shia Arab

Sunni Arab and 

 Sunni Kurd

Sunni Arab and

 Shia Arab

Yezidi

Turkoman

Iranian

Christian

Mandaean

Jewish

Christians represent different sects and ethnic groups.

Yezidis, Mandaeans, and Jews, although shown as religious

 groups, may also be considered as separate ethnic entities.
Letter from the Sponsoring 

Organizations

The initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking

“fresh-eyes” assessment of Iraq emerged from conversations

U.S. House Appropriations Committee Member Frank Wolf

had with us. In late 2005, Congressman Wolf asked the United

States Institute of Peace, a bipartisan federal entity, to facilitate

the assessment, in collaboration with the James A. Baker III

Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, the Center for the

Study of the Presidency, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Interested members of Congress, in consultation with the

sponsoring organizations and the administration, agreed that

former Republican U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III

and former Democratic Congressman Lee H. Hamilton had

the breadth of knowledge of foreign affairs required to co-chair

this bipartisan effort. The co-chairs subsequently selected the

other members of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, all senior

individuals with distinguished records of public service. Democrats included former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry,

former Governor and U.S. Senator Charles S. Robb, former

Congressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta,

103
and Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., advisor to President Bill Clinton.

Republicans included former Associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court Sandra Day O’Connor, former U.S. Senator Alan

K. Simpson, former Attorney General Edwin Meese III, and

former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. Former

CIA Director Robert Gates was an active member for a period

of months until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. 

The Iraq Study Group was launched on March 15, 2006,

in a Capitol Hill meeting hosted by U.S. Senator John Warner

and attended by congressional leaders from both sides of the

aisle. 

To support the Study Group, the sponsoring organizations created four expert working groups consisting of 44 leading foreign policy analysts and specialists on Iraq. The working

groups, led by staff of the United States Institute of Peace,

focused on the Strategic Environment, Military and Security

Issues, Political Development, and the Economy and Reconstruction. Every effort was made to ensure the participation of

experts across a wide span of the political spectrum. Additionally, a panel of retired military officers was consulted.

We are grateful to all those who have assisted the Study

Group, especially the supporting experts and staff. Our thanks

go to Daniel P. Serwer of the Institute of Peace, who served as

executive director; Christopher Kojm, advisor to the Study

Group; John Williams, Policy Assistant to Mr. Baker; and Ben

Rhodes, Special Assistant to Mr. Hamilton.

Richard H. Solomon, President

United States Institute of Peace

Edward P. Djerejian, Founding Director

James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 

Rice University

104

Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations
David M. Abshire, President

Center for the Study of the Presidency

John J. Hamre, President

Center for Strategic and International Studies

105

Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations
Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions

March 15, 2006

April 11–12, 2006

May 18–19, 2005

June 13–14, 2006

August 2–3, 2006

August 30–September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad)

September 18–19, 2006

November 13–14, 2006

November 27–29, 2006

106
Iraq Study Group Consultations

(* denotes a meeting that took place in Iraq)

Iraqi Officials and Representatives

*Jalal Talabani—President

*Tariq al-Hashimi—Vice President

*Adil Abd al-Mahdi—Vice President

*Nouri Kamal al-Maliki—Prime Minister

*Salaam al-Zawbai—Deputy Prime Minister

*Barham Salih—Deputy Prime Minister

*Mahmoud al-Mashhadani—Speaker of the Parliament

*Mowaffak al-Rubaie—National Security Advisor

*Jawad Kadem al-Bolani—Minister of Interior

*Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi—Minister of Defense

*Hoshyar Zebari—Minister of Foreign Affairs

*Bayan Jabr—Minister of Finance

*Hussein al-Shahristani—Minster of Oil

*Karim Waheed—Minister of Electricity

*Akram al-Hakim—Minister of State for National

Reconciliation Affairs

*Mithal al-Alusi—Member, High Commission on National

Reconciliation

107
*Ayad Jamal al-Din—Member, High Commission on National

Reconciliation

*Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi—Member, High Commission on

National Reconciliation

*Sami al-Ma’ajoon—Member, High Commission on National

Reconciliation

*Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud—Member, Commission on

National Reconciliation

*Wijdan Mikhael—Member, High Commission on National

Reconciliation

Lt. General Nasir Abadi—Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi

Joint Forces

*Adnan al-Dulaimi—Head of the Tawafuq list

Ali Allawi—Former Minister of Finance

*Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi—representative of Moqtada al-Sadr

*Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim—Shia Coalition Leader

*Sheik Maher al-Hamraa—Ayat Allah Said Sussein Al

Sadar

*Hajim al-Hassani—Member of the Parliament on the Iraqiya

list

*Hunain Mahmood Ahmed Al-Kaddo—President of the Iraqi

Minorities Council

*Abid al-Gufhoor Abid al-Razaq al-Kaisi—Dean of the Islamic

University of the Imam Al-Atham

*Ali Neema Mohammed Aifan al-Mahawili—Rafiday Al-Iraq

Al-Jaded Foundation

*Saleh al-Mutlaq—Leader of the Iraqi Front for National

Dialogue

*Ayyad al-Sammara’l—Member of the Parliament

*Yonadim Kenna—Member of the Parliament and Secretary

General of Assyrian Movement

*Shahla Wali Mohammed—Iraqi Counterpart International

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
*Hamid Majid Musa—Secretary of the Iraqi Communist

Party

*Raid Khyutab Muhemeed—Humanitarian, Cultural, and

Social Foundation

Sinan Shabibi—Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq

Samir Shakir M. Sumaidaie—Ambassador of Iraq to the

United States

Current U.S. Administration Officials

Senior Administration Officials

George W. Bush—President

Richard B. Cheney—Vice President

Condoleezza Rice—Secretary of State

Donald H. Rumsfeld—Secretary of Defense

Stephen J. Hadley—National Security Advisor

Joshua B. Bolten—White House Chief of Staff

Department of Defense/Military

civilian:

Gordon England—Deputy Secretary of Defense

Stephen Cambone—Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

Eric Edelman—Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

military:

General Peter Pace—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani—Vice-Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff

General John Abizaid—Commander, United States Central

Command

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
*General George W. Casey, Jr.—Commanding General, 

Multi-National Forces–Iraq

Lt. General James T. Conway—Director of Operations, J-3,

on the Joint Staff

*Lt. General Peter Chiarelli—Commander, Multi-National

Forces–Iraq

Lt. General David H. Petraeus—Commanding General, U.S.

Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth

*Lt. General Martin Dempsey—Commander Multi-National

Security Transition Command–Iraq

*Maj. General Joseph Peterson—Coalition Police Assistance

Training Team

*Maj. General Richard Zilmer—Commander, 1st Marine

Expeditionary Force

Colonel Derek Harvey—Senior Intelligence Officer for Iraq,

Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. Colonel Richard Bowyer—National War College (recently

served in Iraq)

Lt. Colonel Justin Gubler—National War College (recently

served in Iraq)

Lt. Colonel David Haight—National War College (recently

served in Iraq)

Lt. Colonel Russell Smith—National War College (recently

served in Iraq)

Department of State/Civilian Embassy Personnel

R. Nicholas Burns—Under Secretary of State for Political

Affairs

Philip Zelikow—Counselor to the Department of State

C. David Welch—Assistant Secretary of State for Near

Eastern Affairs

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
James Jeffrey—Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and

Coordinator for Iraq Policy

David Satterfield—Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and

Coordinator for Iraq Policy

Zalmay Khalilzad—U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

*Dan Speckhard—Charge D’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Iraq

*Joseph Saloom—Director, Iraq Reconstruction and

Management Office

*Hilda Arellano—U.S. Agency for International Development

Director in Iraq

*Terrance Kelly—Director, Office of Strategic Plans and

Assessments

*Randall Bennett—Regional Security Officer of the U.S.

Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq

Intelligence Community

John D. Negroponte—Director of National Intelligence

General Michael V. Hayden—Director, Central Intelligence

Agency

Thomas Fingar—Deputy Director of National Intelligence for

Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council

John Sherman—Deputy National Intelligence Officer for

Military Issues

Steve Ward—Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the

Middle East

Jeff Wickham—Iraq Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency

Other Senior Officials

David Walker—Comptroller General of the United States

*Stuart Bowen—Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
Members of Congress

United States Senate

Senator William Frist (R-TN)—Majority Leader

Senators Harry Reid (D-NV)—Minority Leader

Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)—Majority Whip

Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL)—Minority Whip

Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—Chair, Foreign Relations

Committee

Senators John Warner (R-VA)—Chair, Armed Services

Committee

Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)—Ranking Member, Foreign

Relations Committee

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)—Ranking Member, Armed

Services Committee

Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)—Ranking Member, Energy

and Resources Committee

Senator Kit Bond (R-MO)—Member, Intelligence 

Committee

Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)—Member, Armed Services

Committee

Senator John Kerry (D-MA)—Member, Foreign Relations

Committee

Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)—Member, Armed 

Services Committee

Senator John McCain (R-AZ)—Member, Armed Services

Committee

Senator Jack Reed (D-RI)—Member, Armed Services

Committee

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
United States House of Representatives

Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)—Minority Leader

Representative Tom Davis (R-VA)—Chair, Government

Reform Committee

Representative Jane Harman (D-CA)—Ranking Member,

Intelligence Committee

Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO)—Ranking Member,

Armed Services Committee

Representative John Murtha (D-PA)—Ranking Member,

Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense

Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN)—Member, Armed

Services Committee

Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX)—Member,

International Relations Committee

Representative Alan Mollohan (D-WV)—Member,

Appropriations Committee

Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT)—Member,

Government Reform Committee

Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA)—Member, Appropriations

Committee

Foreign Officials

Sheikh Salem al-Abdullah al-Sabah—Ambassador of Kuwait

to the United States

David Abramovich—Director General of the Israeli Ministry

of Foreign Affairs

Michael Ambuhl—Secretary of State of Switzerland

Kofi Annan—Secretary-General of the United Nations

*Dominic Asquith—British Ambassador to Iraq

Tony Blair—Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
Prince Turki al-Faisal—Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the

United States

Nabil Fahmy—Ambassador of Egypt to the United States

Karim Kawar—Ambassador of Jordan to the United States

Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa—Ambassador of Qatar to the

United States

*Mukhtar Lamani—Arab League envoy to Iraq

Sir David Manning—British Ambassador to the United 

States

Imad Moustapha—Ambassador of Syria to the United States

Walid Muallem—Foreign Minister of Syria

Romano Prodi—Prime Minister of Italy

*Ashraf Qazi—Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral for Iraq

Anders Fogh Rasmussen—Prime Minister of Denmark

Nabi Sensoy—Ambassador of Turkey to the United States

Ephraim Sneh—Deputy Minister of Defense of the State of

Israel

Javad Zarif—Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayad—Minister of Foreign Affairs of the

United Arab Emirates

Former Officials and Experts

William J. Clinton—former President of the United States

Walter Mondale—former Vice President of the United States

Madeleine K. Albright—former United States Secretary of

State

Warren Christopher—former United States Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger—former United States Secretary of State

Colin Powell—former United States Secretary of State

George P. Schultz—former United States Secretary of State

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
Samuel R. Berger—former United States National Security

Advisor

Zbigniew Brzezinski—former United States National Security

Advisor

Anthony Lake—former United States National Security

Advisor

General Brent Scowcroft—former United States National

Security Advisor

General Eric Shinseki—former Chief of Staff of the United

States Army

General Anthony Zinni—former Commander, United States

Central Command

General John Keane—former Vice Chief of Staff of the United

States Army

Admiral Jim Ellis—former Commander of United States

Strategic Command

General Joe Ralston—former Supreme Allied Commander of

NATO

Lt. General Roger C. Schultz—former Director of the United

States Army National Guard

Douglas Feith—former United States Under Secretary of

Defense for Policy

Mark Danner—The New York Review of Books

Larry Diamond—Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution,

Stanford University

Thomas Friedman—New York Times

Leslie Gelb—President Emeritus, Council on Foreign

Relations

Richard Hill—Director, Office of Strategic Initiatives and

Analysis, CHF International

Richard C. Holbrooke—former Ambassador of the United

States to the United Nations

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
Martin S. Indyk—Director, Saban Center for Middle East

Policy, The Brookings Institution

Ronald Johnson—Executive Vice President for International

Development, RTI International

Frederick Kagan—The American Enterprise Institute

Arthur Keys, Jr.—President and CEO, International Relief and

Development

William Kristol—The Weekly Standard

*Guy Laboa—Kellogg, Brown & Root

Nancy Lindborg—President, Mercy Corps

Michael O’Hanlon—Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies,

The Brookings Institution

George Packer—The New Yorker

Carlos Pascual—Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy

Studies, The Brookings Institution

Robert Perito—Senior Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace

*Col. Jack Petri, USA (Ret.)—advisor to the Iraqi Ministry

of Interior

Kenneth Pollack—Director of Research, Saban Center for

Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution

Thomas Ricks—The Washington Post

Zainab Salbi—Founder and CEO, Women for Women

International

Matt Sherman—former Deputy Senior Advisor and Director

of Policy, Iraqi Ministry of Interior

Strobe Talbott—President, The Brookings Institution

Rabih Torbay—Vice President for International Operations,

International Medical Corps

George Will—The Washington Post

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Iraq Study Group Consultations
Expert Working Groups and 

Military Senior Advisor Panel

Economy and Reconstruction

Gary Matthews, USIP Secretariat

Director, Task Force on the United Nations and Special

Projects, United States Institute of Peace

Raad Alkadiri

Director, Country Strategies Group, PFC Energy

Frederick D. Barton

Senior Adviser and Co-Director, International Security

Program, Center for Strategic & International Studies

Jay Collins

Chief Executive Officer, Public Sector Group, Citigroup, Inc.

Jock P. Covey

Senior Vice President, External Affairs, Corporate Security

and Sustainability Services, Bechtel Corporation

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Keith Crane

Senior Economist, RAND Corporation

Amy Myers Jaffe

Associate Director for Energy Studies, James A. Baker III

Institute for Public Policy, Rice University

K. Riva Levinson

Managing Director, BKSH & Associates

David A. Lipton

Managing Director and Head of Global Country Risk

Management, Citigroup, Inc

Michael E. O’Hanlon

Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings

Institution

James A. Placke

Senior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates

James A. Schear

Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies,

National Defense University

Military and Security

Paul Hughes, USIP Secretariat

Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and

Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace

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Expert Working Groups
Hans A. Binnendijk

Director & Theodore Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology

& National Security Policy, National Defense University

James Carafano

Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security,

Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies,

The Heritage Foundation

Michael Eisenstadt

Director, Military & Security Program, The Washington

Institute for Near East Policy

Michèle A. Flournoy

Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for

Strategic & International Studies

Bruce Hoffman

Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School

of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

Clifford May

President, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

Robert M. Perito

Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and

Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace

Kalev I. Sepp

Assistant Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Center

on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School

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Expert Working Groups
John F. Sigler

Adjunct Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center

for Strategic Studies, National Defense University

W. Andrew Terrill

Research Professor, National Security Affairs, Strategic

Studies Institute

Jeffrey A. White

Berrie Defense Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East

Policy

Political Development

Daniel P. Serwer, USIP Secretariat

Vice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability

Operations, United States Institute of Peace

Raymond H. Close

Freelance Analyst and Commentator on Middle East Politics

Larry Diamond

Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University,

and Co-Editor, Journal of Democracy

Andrew P. N. Erdmann

Former Director for Iran, Iraq and Strategic Planning,

National Security Council

Reuel Marc Gerecht

Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

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Expert Working Groups
David L. Mack

Vice President, The Middle East Institute

Phebe A. Marr

Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace

Hassan Mneimneh

Director, Documentation Program, The Iraq Memory

Foundation

Augustus Richard Norton

Professor of International Relations and Anthropology,

Department of International Relations, Boston University

Marina S. Ottaway

Senior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Project,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Judy Van Rest

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute

Judith S. Yaphe

Distinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East, 

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 

University

Strategic Environment

Paul Stares, USIP Secretariat

Vice President, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention,

United States Institute of Peace

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Expert Working Groups
Jon B. Alterman

Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic &

International Studies

Steven A. Cook

Douglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

James F. Dobbins

Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center,

RAND Corporation

Hillel Fradkin

Director, Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the

Muslim World, Hudson Institute

Chas W. Freeman

Chairman, Projects International and President, Middle East

Policy Council

Geoffrey Kemp

Director, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center

Daniel C. Kurtzer

S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor, Middle East Policy

Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

Ellen Laipson

President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center

William B. Quandt

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Professor of Government and Foreign

Affairs, University of Virginia, and Nonresident Senior Fellow,

Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution

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Expert Working Groups
Shibley Telhami

Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department

of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy,

The Brookings Institution

Wayne White

Adjunct Scholar, Public Policy Center, Middle East Institute

Military Senior Advisor Panel

Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr.

United States Navy, Retired

General John M. Keane

United States Army, Retired

General Edward C. Meyer

United States Army, Retired

General Joseph W. Ralston

United States Air Force, Retired

Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Sr.

United States Army, Retired

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Expert Working Groups
The Iraq Study Group

James A. Baker, III—Co-Chair

James A. Baker, III, has served in senior government positions

under three United States presidents. He served as the nation’s

61st Secretary of State from January 1989 through August 1992

under President George H. W. Bush. During his tenure at the

State Department, Mr. Baker traveled to 90 foreign countries

as the United States confronted the unprecedented challenges

and opportunities of the post–Cold War era. Mr. Baker’s reflections on those years of revolution, war, and peace—The Politics

of Diplomacy—was published in 1995.

Mr. Baker served as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury

from 1985 to 1988 under President Ronald Reagan. As Treasury Secretary, he was also Chairman of the President’s Economic Policy Council. From 1981 to 1985, he served as White

House Chief of Staff to President Reagan. Mr. Baker’s record

of public service began in 1975 as Under Secretary of Commerce to President Gerald Ford. It concluded with his service

as White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush from August 1992 to January 1993.

Long active in American presidential politics, Mr. Baker

led presidential campaigns for Presidents Ford, Reagan, and

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Bush over the course of five consecutive presidential elections

from 1976 to 1992.

A native Houstonian, Mr. Baker graduated from Princeton University in 1952. After two years of active duty as a lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps, he entered the

University of Texas School of Law at Austin. He received his

J.D. with honors in 1957 and practiced law with the Houston

firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975.

Mr. Baker’s memoir—Work Hard, Study... and Keep

Out of Politics! Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected

Public Life—was published in October 2006.

Mr. Baker received the Presidential Medal of Freedom

in 1991 and has been the recipient of many other awards for

distinguished public service, including Princeton University’s

Woodrow Wilson Award, the American Institute for Public

Service’s Jefferson Award, Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government Award, the Hans J. Morgenthau

Award, the George F. Kennan Award, the Department of the

Treasury’s Alexander Hamilton Award, the Department of

State’s Distinguished Service Award, and numerous honorary

academic degrees.

Mr. Baker is presently a senior partner in the law firm of

Baker Botts. He is Honorary Chairman of the James A. Baker

III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and serves on

the board of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. From 1997

to 2004, Mr. Baker served as the Personal Envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seek a political solution

to the conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr. Baker was appointed Special Presidential Envoy for President George W.

Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt. In 2005, he was co-chair, with

former President Jimmy Carter, of the Commission on Federal

Election Reform. Since March 2006, Mr. Baker and former

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The Iraq Study Group
U.S. Congressman Lee H. Hamilton have served as the cochairs of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan blue-ribbon panel

on Iraq.

Mr. Baker was born in Houston, Texas, in 1930. He and

his wife, the former Susan Garrett, currently reside in Houston,

and have eight children and seventeen grandchildren.

Lee H. Hamilton—Co-Chair

Lee H. Hamilton became Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in January 1999. Previously, Mr.

Hamilton served for thirty-four years as a United States Congressman from Indiana. During his tenure, he served as Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Foreign

Affairs (now the Committee on International Relations) and

chaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East from

the early 1970s until 1993. He was Chairman of the Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee to

Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran.

Also a leading figure on economic policy and congressional organization, he served as Chair of the Joint Economic

Committee as well as the Joint Committee on the Organization

of Congress, and was a member of the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee. In his home state of Indiana, Mr.

Hamilton worked hard to improve education, job training, and

infrastructure. Currently, Mr. Hamilton serves as Director of

the Center on Congress at Indiana University, which seeks to

educate citizens on the importance of Congress and on how

Congress operates within our government.

Mr. Hamilton remains an important and active voice on

matters of international relations and American national secu126

The Iraq Study Group
rity. He served as a Commissioner on the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (better known

as the Hart-Rudman Commission), was Co-Chair with former

Senator Howard Baker of the Baker-Hamilton Commission to

Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos, and was ViceChairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), which issued

its report in July 2004. He is currently a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the President’s

Homeland Security Advisory Council, as well as the Director of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Advisory Board.

Born in Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Hamilton relocated

with his family to Tennessee and then to Evansville, Indiana.

Mr. Hamilton is a graduate of DePauw University and the Indiana University School of Law, and studied for a year at Goethe

University in Germany. Before his election to Congress, he

practiced law in Chicago and in Columbus, Indiana. A former

high school and college basketball star, he has been inducted

into the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame.

Mr. Hamilton’s distinguished service in government has

been honored through numerous awards in public service and

human rights as well as honorary degrees. He is the author of A

Creative Tension—The Foreign Policy Roles of the President

and Congress (2002) and How Congress Works and Why You

Should Care (2004), and the coauthor of Without Precedent:

The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (2006).

Lee and his wife, the former Nancy Ann Nelson, have

three children—Tracy Lynn Souza, Deborah Hamilton Kremer, and Douglas Nelson Hamilton—and five grandchildren:

Christina, Maria, McLouis and Patricia Souza and Lina Ying

Kremer.

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The Iraq Study Group
Lawrence S. Eagleburger—Member

Lawrence S. Eagleburger was sworn in as the 62nd U.S. Secretary of State by President George H. W. Bush on December 8,

1992, and as Deputy Secretary of State on March 20, 1989.

After his entry into the Foreign Service in 1957, Mr. Eagleburger served in the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and

Research, in the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, and the U.S. Mission to NATO in Belgium. In 1963, after a severe earthquake in

Macedonia, he led the U.S. government effort to provide medical and other assistance. He was then assigned to Washington,

D.C., where he served on the Secretariat staff and as special assistant to Dean Acheson, advisor to the President on FrancoNATO issues. In August 1966, he became acting director of the

Secretariat staff.

In October 1966, Mr. Eagleburger joined the National

Security Council staff. In October 1967, he was assigned as

special assistant to Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. In November 1968, he was appointed Dr. Henry

Kissinger’s assistant, and in January 1969, he became executive

assistant to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. In September

1969, he was assigned as political advisor and chief of the political section of the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels.

Mr. Eagleburger became Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense in August 1971. Two years later, he became Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

The same year he returned to the White House as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Operations. He

subsequently followed Dr. Kissinger to the State Department,

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becoming Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In

1975, he was made Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management.

In June 1977, Mr. Eagleburger was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia, and in 1981 he was nominated as Assistant

Secretary of State for European Affairs. In February 1982, he

was appointed Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Mr. Eagleburger has received numerous awards, including

an honorary knighthood from Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II

(1994); the Distinguished Service Award (1992), the Wilbur J.

Carr Award (1984), and the Distinguished Honor Award (1984)

from the Department of State; the Distinguished Civilian Service

Medal from the Department of Defense (1978); and the President’s Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service (1976).

After retiring from the Department of State in May 1984,

Mr. Eagleburger was named president of Kissinger Associates,

Inc. Following his resignation as Secretary of State on January

19, 1993, he joined the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman

and Caldwell as Senior Foreign Policy Advisor. He joined the

boards of Halliburton Company, Phillips Petroleum Company,

and Universal Corporation. Mr. Eagleburger currently serves

as Chairman of the International Commission on Holocaust

Era Insurance Claims.

He received his B.S. degree in 1952 and his M.S. degree

in 1957, both from the University of Wisconsin, and served as

first lieutenant in the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1954. Mr. Eagleburger is married to the former Marlene Ann Heinemann. He

is the father of three sons, Lawrence Scott, Lawrence Andrew,

and Lawrence Jason.

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Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.—Member

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., is a Senior Managing Director of Lazard

Frères & Co, LLC in New York. He works with a diverse group

of clients across a broad range of industries.

Prior to joining Lazard, Mr. Jordan was a Senior Executive Partner with the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &

Feld, LLP, where he remains Senior Counsel. While there Mr.

Jordan practiced general, corporate, legislative, and international law in Washington, D.C.

Before Akin Gump, Mr. Jordan held the following positions: President and Chief Executive Officer of the National

Urban League, Inc.; Executive Director of the United Negro

College Fund, Inc.; Director of the Voter Education Project of

the Southern Regional Council; Attorney-Consultant, U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity; Assistant to the Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council; Georgia Field Director of

the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People; and an attorney in private practice in Arkansas and Georgia.

Mr. Jordan’s presidential appointments include the President’s Advisory Committee for the Points of Light Initiative

Foundation, the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on

South Africa, the Advisory Council on Social Security, the Presidential Clemency Board, the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, the National Advisory Committee on

Selective Service, and the Council of the White House Conference “To Fulfill These Rights.” In 1992, Mr. Jordan served as

the Chairman of the Clinton Presidential Transition Team.

Mr. Jordan’s corporate and other directorships include

American Express Company; Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.;

Howard University (Trustee); J. C. Penney Company, Inc.;

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The Iraq Study Group
Lazard Ltd.; Xerox Corporation; and the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold.

Mr. Jordan is a graduate of DePauw University and the

Howard University Law School. He holds honorary degrees from

more than 60 colleges and universities in America. He is a member of the bars of Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia,

and the U.S. Supreme Court. He is a member of the American

Bar Association, the National Bar Association, the Council on

Foreign Relations, and the Bilderberg Meetings and he is President of the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. Mr. Jordan is the

author of Vernon Can Read! A Memoir (Public Affairs, 2001).

Edwin Meese III—Member

Edwin Meese III holds the Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington, D.C.–based

public policy research and education institution. He is also the

Chairman of Heritage’s Center for Legal and Judicial Studies

and a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution,

Stanford University. In addition, Meese lectures, writes, and

consults throughout the United States on a variety of subjects.

Meese is the author of With Reagan: The Inside Story,

which was published by Regnery Gateway in June 1992; co-editor of Making America Safer, published in 1997 by the Heritage Foundation; and coauthor of Leadership, Ethics and

Policing, published by Prentice Hall in 2004.

Meese served as the 75th Attorney General of the United

States from February 1985 to August 1988. As the nation’s chief

law enforcement officer, he directed the Department of Justice

and led international efforts to combat terrorism, drug trafficking,

and organized crime. In 1985 he received Government Executive

magazine’s annual award for excellence in management.

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From January 1981 to February 1985, Meese held the position of Counsellor to the President, the senior position on the

White House staff, where he functioned as the President’s

chief policy advisor. As Attorney General and as Counsellor,

Meese was a member of the President’s cabinet and the National Security Council. He served as Chairman of the Domestic Policy Council and of the National Drug Policy Board.

Meese headed the President-elect’s transition effort following

the November 1980 election. During the presidential campaign, he served as chief of staff and senior issues advisor for

the Reagan-Bush Committee.

Formerly, Meese served as Governor Reagan’s executive

assistant and chief of staff in California from 1969 through

1974 and as legal affairs secretary from 1967 through 1968. Before joining Governor Reagan’s staff in 1967, Meese served as

deputy district attorney in Alameda County, California. From

1977 to 1981, Meese was a professor of law at the University of

San Diego, where he also was Director of the Center for Criminal Justice Policy and Management.

In addition to his background as a lawyer, educator, and

public official, Meese has been a business executive in the

aerospace and transportation industry, serving as vice president for administration of Rohr Industries, Inc., in Chula Vista,

California. He left Rohr to return to the practice of law, engaging in corporate and general legal work in San Diego

County.

Meese is a graduate of Yale University, Class of 1953, and

holds a law degree from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a retired colonel in the United States Army Reserve.

He is active in numerous civic and educational organizations.

Meese is married, has two grown children, and resides in

McLean, Virginia.

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The Iraq Study Group
Sandra Day O’Connor—Member

Sandra Day O’Connor was nominated by President Reagan as

Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court on July 7,

1981, and took the oath of office on September 25. O’Connor

previously served on the Arizona Court of Appeals (1979–81)

and as judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court in

Phoenix, Arizona (1975–79). She was appointed as Arizona state

senator in 1969 and was subsequently elected to two two-year

terms from 1969 to 1975. During her tenure, she was Arizona

Senate Majority Leader and Chairman of the State, County, and

Municipal Affairs Committee, and she served on the Legislative

Council, on the Probate Code Commission, and on the Arizona

Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations.

From 1965 to 1969, O’Connor was assistant attorney general in Arizona. She practiced law at a private firm in Maryvale,

Arizona, from 1958 to 1960 and prior to that was civilian attorney for Quartermaster Market Center in Frankfurt, Germany

(1954–57), and deputy county attorney in San Mateo County,

California (1952–53)

She was previously Chairman of the Arizona Supreme

Court Committee to Reorganize Lower Courts (1974–75), Vice

Chairman of the Arizona Select Law Enforcement Review

Commission (1979–80), and, in Maricopa County, Chairman of

the Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service (1960–62), the Juvenile Detention Home Visiting Board (1963–64), and the Superior Court Judges’ Training and Education Committee

(1977–79) and a member of the Board of Adjustments and Appeals (1963–64).

O’Connor currently serves as Chancellor of the College

of William and Mary and on the Board of Trustees of the

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Rockefeller Foundation, the Executive Board of the Central

European and Eurasian Law Initiative, the Advisory Board of

the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History, and the

Advisory Committee of the American Society of International

Law, Judicial. She is an honorary member of the Advisory

Committee for the Judiciary Leadership Development Council, an honorary chair of America’s 400th Anniversary: Jamestown 2007, a co-chair of the National Advisory Council of the

Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools, a member of the

Selection Committee of the Oklahoma City National Memorial

& Museum, and a member of the Advisory Board of the Stanford Center on Ethics. She also serves on several bodies of the

American Bar Association, including the Museum of Law Executive Committee, the Commission on Civic Education and

Separation of Powers, and the Advisory Commission of the

Standing Committee on the Law Library of Congress.

O’Connor previously served as a member of the AngloAmerican Exchange (1980); the State Bar of Arizona Committees on Legal Aid, Public Relations, Lower Court Reorganization,

and Continuing Legal Education; the National Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (1974–76); the Arizona State Personnel Commission (1968–69); the Arizona

Criminal Code Commission (1974–76); and the Cathedral

Chapter of the Washington National Cathedral (1991–99).

O’Connor is a member of the American Bar Association,

the State Bar of Arizona, the State Bar of California, the Maricopa County Bar Association, the Arizona Judges’ Association,

the National Association of Women Judges, and the Arizona

Women Lawyers’ Association. She holds a B.A. (with Great

Distinction) and an LL.B. (Order of the Coif) from Stanford

University, where she was also a member of the board of editors of the Stanford Law Review.

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The Iraq Study Group
Leon E. Panetta—Member

Leon E. Panetta currently co-directs the Leon & Sylvia Panetta

Institute for Public Policy, a nonpartisan study center for the

advancement of public policy based at California State University, Monterey Bay. He serves as distinguished scholar to the

chancellor of the California State University system, teaches a

Master’s in Public Policy course at the Panetta Institute, is a

presidential professor at Santa Clara University, and created

the Leon Panetta Lecture Series.

Panetta first went to Washington in 1966, when he served

as a legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of

California. In 1969, he became Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and then Director of the

U.S. Office for Civil Rights. His book Bring Us Together (published in 1971) is an account of that experience. In 1970, he

went to New York City, where he served as Executive Assistant

to Mayor John Lindsay. Then, in 1971, Panetta returned to California, where he practiced law in the Monterey firm of Panetta,

Thompson & Panetta until he was elected to Congress in 1976.

Panetta was a U.S. Representative from California’s 16th

(now 17th) district from 1977 to 1993. He authored the

Hunger Prevention Act of 1988, the Fair Employment Practices Resolution, legislation that established Medicare and

Medicaid reimbursement for hospice care for the terminally ill,

and other legislation on a variety of education, health, agriculture, and defense issues.

From 1989 to 1993, Panetta was Chairman of the House

Committee on the Budget. He also served on that committee

from 1979 to 1985. He chaired the House Agriculture Committee’s Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer

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Relations and Nutrition; the House Administration Committee’s Subcommittee on Personnel and Police; and the Select

Committee on Hunger’s Task Force on Domestic Hunger. He

also served as Vice Chairman of the Caucus of Vietnam Era

Veterans in Congress and as a member of the President’s Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies.

Panetta left Congress in 1993 to become Director of the

Office of Management and Budget for the incoming Clinton

administration. Panetta was appointed Chief of Staff to the

President of the United States on July 17, 1994, and served in

that position until January 20, 1997.

In addition, Panetta served a six-year term on the Board

of Directors of the New York Stock Exchange beginning in

1997. He currently serves on many public policy and organizational boards, including as Chair of the Pew Oceans Commission and Co-Chair of the California Council on Base Support

and Retention.

Panetta has received many awards and honors, including

the Smithsonian Paul Peck Award for Service to the Presidency, the John H. Chafee Coastal Stewardship Award, the

Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal Leadership, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Center for the Study

of the Presidency.

He earned a B.A. magna cum laude from Santa Clara

University in 1960, and in 1963 received his J.D. from Santa

Clara University Law School, where he was an editor of the

Santa Clara Law Review. He served as a first lieutenant in the

Army from 1964 to 1966 and received the Army Commendation Medal. Panetta is married to the former Sylvia Marie

Varni. They have three grown sons and five grandchildren.

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The Iraq Study Group
William J. Perry—Member

William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor

at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School

of Engineering. He is a senior fellow at FSI and serves as co-director of the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard universities.

Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense of the United

States, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as Deputy Secretary of Defense (1993–94) and as

Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

(1977–81). He is on the board of directors of several emerging

high-tech companies and is Chairman of Global Technology

Partners.

His previous business experience includes serving as a

laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics

(1954–64) and as founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964–77),

executive vice president of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981–85),

and founder and chairman of Technology Strategies & Alliances

(1985–93). He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the

Army Corps of Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in

1948 and was a second lieutenant in the Army Reserves from

1950 to 1955. He has received a number of awards, including

the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the Department of

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and

Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and

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1997), the Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency (1977 and 1997), NASA (1981), and the

Coast Guard (1997). He received the American Electronic Association’s Medal of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower

Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal Medal

(1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National

Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche

Medal in 1996. He has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea,

Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. He received a B.S. and M.S. from Stanford University and a Ph.D.

from Penn State, all in mathematics.

Charles S. Robb—Member

Charles S. Robb joined the faculty of George Mason University

as a Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy in 2001.

Previously he served as Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, from

1978 to 1982; as Virginia’s 64th Governor, from 1982 to 1986;

and as a United States Senator, from 1989 to 2001.

While in the Senate he became the only member ever to

serve simultaneously on all three national security committees

(Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations). He also

served on the Finance, Commerce, and Budget committees.

Before becoming a member of Congress he chaired the

Southern Governors’ Association, the Democratic Governors’

Association, the Education Commission of the States, the Democratic Leadership Council, Jobs for America’s Graduates,

the National Conference of Lieutenant Governors, and the Vir138

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ginia Forum on Education, and was President of the Council of

State Governments.

During the 1960s he served on active duty with the United

States Marine Corps, retiring from the Marine Corps Reserve in

1991. He began as the Class Honor Graduate from Marine Officers Basic School in 1961 and ended up as head of the principal

recruiting program for Marine officers in 1970. In between, he

served in both the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions and his assignments included duty as a Military Social Aide at the White House

and command of an infantry company in combat in Vietnam.

He received his law degree from the University of Virginia in 1973, clerked for Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., on the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and practiced law

with Williams and Connolly prior to his election to state office.

Between his state and federal service he was a partner at

Hunton and Williams.

Since leaving the Senate in 2001 he has served as Chairman of the Board of Visitors at the United States Naval Academy, Co-Chairman (with Senior Judge Laurence Silberman of

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit) of the President’s

Commission on Intelligence Capabilities of the United States

Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Co-Chairman

(with former Governor Linwood Holton) of a major landowner’s

alliance that created a special tax district to finance the extension

of Metrorail to Tyson’s Corner, Reston, and Dulles Airport. He

has also been a Fellow at the Institute of Politics at Harvard and

at the Marshall Wythe School of Law at William and Mary.

He is currently on the President’s Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board, the Secretary of State’s International Security

Advisory Board (Chairman of the WMD-Terrorism Task Force),

the FBI Director’s Advisory Board, the National Intelligence

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Council’s Strategic Analysis Advisory Board, the Iraq Study Group,

and the MITRE Corp. Board of Trustees (Vice Chairman). He

also serves on the boards of the Space Foundation, the Thomas

Jefferson Program in Public Policy, the Concord Coalition, the

National Museum of Americans at War, Strategic Partnerships

LLC, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency—and he

works on occasional projects with the Center for Strategic and

International Studies. He is married to Lynda Johnson Robb and

they have three grown daughters and one granddaughter.

Alan K. Simpson—Member

Alan K. Simpson served from 1979 to 1997 as a United States

Senator from Wyoming. Following his first term in the Senate,

Al was elected by his peers to the position of the Assistant Majority Leader in 1984—and served in that capacity until 1994.

He completed his final term on January 3, 1997.

Simpson is currently a partner in the Cody firm of Simpson, Kepler and Edwards, the Cody division of the Denver firm

of Burg Simpson Eldredge, Hersh and Jardine, and also a consultant in the Washington, D.C., government relations firm

The Tongour, Simpson, Holsclaw Group. He continues to serve

on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards and travels the

country giving speeches. His book published by William Morrow Company, Right in the Old Gazoo: A Lifetime of Scrapping

with the Press (1997), chronicles his personal experiences and

views of the Fourth Estate.

From January of 1997 until June of 2000, Simpson was a

Visiting Lecturer and for two years the Director of the Institute

of Politics at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of

Government. During the fall of 2000 he returned to his alma

mater, the University of Wyoming, as a Visiting Lecturer in the

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Political Science Department and he continues to team teach a

class part-time with his brother, Peter, titled “Wyoming’s Political Identity: Its History and Its Politics,” which is proving to be

one of the most popular classes offered at UW.

A member of a political family—his father served both as

Governor of Wyoming from 1954 to 1958 and as United States

Senator from Wyoming from 1962 to 1966—Al chose to follow

in his father’s footsteps and began his own political career in

1964 when he was elected to the Wyoming State Legislature as

a state representative of his native Park County. He served for

the next thirteen years in the Wyoming House of Representatives, holding the offices of Majority Whip, Majority Floor

Leader, and Speaker Pro-Tem. His only brother, Peter, also

served as a member of the Wyoming State Legislature.

Prior to entering politics, Simpson was admitted to the

Wyoming bar and the United States District Court in 1958 and

served for a short time as a Wyoming assistant attorney general.

Simpson then joined his father, Milward L. Simpson, and later

Charles G. Kepler in the law firm of Simpson, Kepler and

Simpson in his hometown of Cody. He would practice law

there for the next eighteen years. During that time, Simpson

was very active in all civic, community, and state activities. He

also served ten years as City Attorney.

Simpson earned a B.S. in law from the University of

Wyoming in 1954. Upon graduation from college, he joined the

Army, serving overseas in the 5th Infantry Division and in the

2nd Armored Division in the final months of the Army of Occupation in Germany. Following his honorable discharge in 1956,

Simpson returned to the University of Wyoming to complete

his study of law, earning his J.D. degree in 1958. He and his

wife Ann have three children and six grandchildren, who all reside in Cody, Wyoming.

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Iraq Study Group Support

Edward P. Djerejian

Senior Advisor to the Study Group

Christopher A. Kojm

Senior Advisor to the Study Group

John B. Williams Benjamin J. Rhodes

Special Assistant to the Study Group Special Assistant to the Study Group

United States Institute of Peace Support

Daniel P. Serwer

ISG Executive Director and Political Development Secretariat

Paul Hughes

Military and Security Secretariat

Gary Matthews

Economy and Reconstruction Secretariat

Paul Stares

Strategic Environment Secretariat

Courtney Rusin

Assistant to the Study Group

Anne Hingeley

Congressional Relations

Ian Larsen

Outreach and Communications

Center for the Study of the Presidency Support

Jay M. Parker

Advisor

Ysbrant A. Marcelis

Advisor

Center for Strategic & International Studies Support

Kay King

Advisor

142