April 20. 1987 

lionorable Jack Skeen, Jr. 

Criminal District Attorney 

Smith County Courthouse 

Tyler, Texas 75702 

Opinion No. JM-681 

Re: Determination of emergency 

service fee for a 9-l-l comunication district under article 1432e, 

V.T.C.S. 

Dear Mr. Skeen: 

You seek our opinion concerning the determination of the 9-l-l 

emergency service fee for an emergency communication district created 

pursuant to article 1432e. V,.T.C.S. The district was approved by the 

voters of Smith County in 1986. You ask three questions: 

1. If the principal service supplier charges 

different base rates for the same category of 

service in different participating jurisdictions 

within the district, then which base rate is 

determinative .for the purpose of applying the 

emergency serrrice fee uniformly within all 

participating jurisdictions within the district? 

2. If the principal service supplier charges 

different base rates for single party aad multiparty residential service, then which base rate is 

determinative for the purpose of applying the 

emergency service fee uniformly within all 

participating jurisdictions within the district? 

3. Does article 1432e require that each 

service user within a participating jurisdiction 

be provided with 9-l-l emergency service regardless of the cost or ocher impracticality of 

providing such service to the particular service 

user (assuming that the emergency service fee is 

not charged to the particular service user until 

such service is actually available)? 

Article 1432e was enacted for the purposes of establishing the 

number 9-l-l as the primary emergency telephone number for certain 

local government units and encouraging these units of government to 

p. 3137 
Honorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 2 (JM-681) 

develop and improve emergeucy comnmication procedures and facilities. 

V.T.C.S. art. 1432e, 02. Xc authorizes the creation of an emergency 

communication district to carry out the provisions of the act. Id. 

55. Voter approval must be secured at a confirmation and fee elect= 

before the district may exercise its public and essential governmental 

functions. Id. SPll, 12. - 

Section 11 of the act describes the procedures for creating the 

district. The board of managers of au emergency communication 

district is required to call an election for the purposes of securiug 

voter approval of the creation of the district and to authorize the 

district to charge and collect a 9-l-l emergency service fee. Id. 

Sll(c). The section also provides the method by which the emerge= 

service fee is calculated: 

The board may charge a 9-l-l emergency service 

fee at a rate not to exceed three percent of the 

base rate of the principal service supplier per 

service year per month in the participating jurisdictions. The jurisdiction of a county is the 

unincorporated. area of the county. The 9-l-l 

emergency service fee must have uniform applicacion and must be imposed within all participating 

jurisdictions. (Emphasis added). 

Id. 911(b). The underscored phrase "per service year" will be 

discussed later iu this opinion. The final sentence of section 11(b) 

is the source of your first two inquiries. 

The first question concerns a situation in which the telephone 

cowpauy which is designated the principal service supplier to the 

district charges different base rates to residential customers in 

different participating jurisdictions in the district who receive the 

same level of service. The second question concerns a situation in 

which the principal service supplier charges different base rates to 

single-party aud multiple-party residential customers within the 

district. Both may be treated together. 

Your first two questions essentially ask the same question -- 

specifically, whether the 9-l-l emergency service fee is intended 

to be (1) a fixed dollar amount to be charged to all residential 

telephone customers in the district regardless of the base rate they 

are charged. or (2) a uniform percentage rate applied to the various 

base rates charged by the principal service supplier to residential 

telephone customers. We believe the second alternative accurately 

reflects the intent of the legislature. 

In our opinion. the language of section 11(b) requiring uniform 

application of the emergency service fee throughout the district weans 

p. 3138 
Eonorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 3 (JM-681) 

that the percentage rate adopted by the board of managers must be 

uniformly applied to whatever base rate is charged co the service user 

by the principal service supplier. Article 1432e does not require a 

uniform base rate for all residential subscribers to telephone service 

within the district. Rather, it requires the emergency service fee to 

have uniform application. The only component of the emergency service 

fee over which the board is expressly granted the authority to fix is 

the percentage rate upon which the fee is calculated. It follows that 

the object of the language in section 11(b) is this percentage race. 

It is apparent from the language of article 1432e that the 

legislature anticipated the possibility that different base rates 

would be charged to subscribers in different jurisdictions of the 

district for the same level of service. The act defines "base rate" 

in the following terms: 

'Base rate' means the rate or rates billed by a 

service supplier, as stated in the service 

regulatory authority?~ede~~es% I%%%~ 

supplier's charges 

supplier's recurring charges for local exchange 

.access lines/trunks or their equivalent, exclusive 

of all taxes. fees, license costs, or similar 

charges. (Emphasis added). 

V.T.C.S. art. 1432e. 53(21). This definition acknowledges that the 

authority to regulate base rates is granted to agencies other than the 

emergency cowauuication district. It also recognizes that the 

appropriate regulatory authority 'may approve a number of different 

rates for local exchange access lines or trunks within the district. 

Our construction of section 11(b) is supported by the legislative 

histories of article 1432e and two virtually identical statutes. 

articles 1432~ and 1432d. V.T.C.S. See Jessen Associates v. Bullock, 

531 S.W.Zd 593 (Tex. 1975) (in conszing statutes. it is proper to 

look to construction given other acts pertaining to the same subject). 

Article 1432~. V.T.C.S.. was enacted in 1983 and authorizes the 

creation of a 9-l-l comunication district in counties having a 

population of more than 2 million according to the most recent federal 

census. See Acts 1983, 68th Leg.. ch. 97. at 465; V.T.C.S. art. 

1432~. 14(a). Section 10(b) of article 1432~ grants the board of 

managers of the district the authority 'to impose a fee for 9-l-l 

emergency service: 

The board, when so authorized by a majority of the 

votes cast in the election and by a majority vote 

of the governing body of each public agency to 

become a participating jurisdiction, may charge a 

p. 313,9 
Honorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 4 (JM-681) 

9-l-l emergency service fee at a rate not to exceed 

two percent of the base rate of the principal 

service supplier per service user per month in the 

participating jurisdictions. For the purposes of 

this vote of the governing body of each public 

agency, the jurisdiction of the county includes all 

unincorporated areas of the county. The 9-l-l 

emergency semice fee must have uniform applicstion 

and must be imposed within all participating jurisdictions. (Emphasis added). 

Article 1432d. V.T.C.S.. was enacted during the second called 

session of the 68th Legislature in 1984 and authorizes the creation of 

an emergency comaunication district in counties with a population of 

more than 860,000 according to the last federal census. Acts 1984, 

68th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 7. at 22; V.T.C.S. art. 1432d. 04. On its 

enactment, section 11(b) of that act contained the following language: 

The board may charge a 9-l-l emergency service fee 

at a rate not to exceed three percent of the base 

rate of the principal service supplier Per service 

year per month in the participating jurisdictions. 

The 9-l-l emergency service fee must have uniform 

application and must be imposed within all participating jurisdictions. (Emphasis added). 

The underscored phrase "per service year" was corrected in 1985 co 

read "per service user." Acts 1985. 69th Leg., ch. 820, 16. at 2878 

(effective June 15. 1985). Before the erroneous language was 

corrected by the legislature, however, the bill which contained 

article 1432e was passed by both houses of the legislature and signed 

by the governor containing the same defect. Acts 1985. 69th Leg., ch. 

288. at 1331 (effective June 6, 1985). 

We note the parallel provisions of articles 1432~ and 1432d 

because the legislative histories of the two earlier-enacted statutes 

are relevant to our construction of article 1432e. See Jessen Associates v. Bullock, aupta. With the exception of theprovisions concerning the appointment of board members, article 1432e was intended 

to be virtually identical in language and effect to article 1432d, 

which in turn was intended to mirror article 1432~ with minor changes. 

See Testimony of Mr. Russell S. Rau on Tex. S. B. No. 750 before House 

G. on Urban Affairs, 68th Leg., public hearing (May 8, 1985) (tape 

recording available from House Staff Services); Testimony of Sen. Sugh 

Parmer on Tex. S.B. No. 17 before Senate Come. on Intergovernmental 

Affairs, 68th Leg., 2nd C-S.. public hearing (June 25, 1984) (tape 

recording available from Senate Reproduction). 

p. 3140 
Honorable Jack Skeen. Jr. - Page 5 (JM-681) 

Testifying before the committees of the Senate and House of 

Representatives which considered the legislation which eventually 

became article 1432~. the sponsors of the legislation and representatives of telephone service suppliers said that the emergency service 

fee percentage rate adopted by the board of managers would be imposed 

equally on all subscribers of telephone services in the district. 

Testimony of Son. Chet Brooks and Hr. Clark B. Payne on Tex. S. B. No. 

606 before Seuate Cowm. on Intergovernmental Affairs, 68th Leg., public hearing (March 17. 1983) (tape recording available from Senate 

Reproduction); Testimony of Rep. Gene Green and Mr. Ken Queureaux on 

Tex. S. B. No. 606 before Eouse Cowa. on Urban Affairs, 68th Leg., 

public hearing (April 19, 1983) (tape recording available from House 

Staff Services). 

The parallel provisions of articles 1432~ and 1432d (as amended 

in 1985) also reveal the erroneous transcription of the phrase "per 

service yeat" in section 11(b) of article 1432e. Section 11(b) should 

read "per service user." 

838 (Tex. Civ. App. 

See Patterson v. City of Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 

- Dallas 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). appeal dism'd, 

372 U.S. 251 (1963) (words or phrases in a statute may be supplied, 

omitted, or transposed in order to arrive at legislative intentj: 

Rogers v. Dallas Railway and Terminal Co., 214 S.WT2d 160 (Tex. Civ; 

APP. - Da: llas 1948). aff'd. 218 S.W. 

iiate,. 

,2d 456 (Tex. 1949) (same). See 

also Chambers v. 25 Tex. 307 (1860) (phrase in statute 

vision substituted to carry out legislative intent); Davis v. 

=, 225 S.W. 532 (Tex. Grim. App. 1920) (words way be disregarded 

or eliminated to give effect to legislative intent).. The defiuition 

of "service user" ic all three statutes is "any person or entity who 

is provided local exchange access lines/trunks in the district." 

V.T.C.S. arts. 1432~. 63(17); 1432d. 53(17); 1432e. §3(17). The 

distinction between persons and entities in the definition of "service 

user" would be meaningless if the legislature intended the base rates 

for all telephone subscribers to be the same. Section 11(b) of 

article 1432e. then, mandates that the emergency service fee percentage rate be applied uniformly to all service users. individuals 

and entities alike. It requires the emergency service fee to be 

charged and collected on an individual basis according to the base 

rate charged to each customer. 

It is also clear that the legislature did not intend the 

emergency service fee to be a fixed dollar amount for all service 

users. Section 14(a) scares that the "9-l-l emergency service fee may 

be imposed only on the base rate charges or their equivalent," and 

"may not be imposed on more than 100 local exchange access lines/ 

trunks or their equivalent per entity per location." V.T.C.S. art. 

1432e. 514(a). Thus. the sum owed by multiple-line customers to the 

district for the emergency service fee is dependent upon the number of 

access lines or trunks the customer receives, up co 100 access lines 

or trunks. 

p. 3141 
Honorable Jack Skeen. Jr. - Page 6 (~~-681) 

Accordingly, we conclude that article 1432e. section 11(b), 

authorizes the board of managers of an emergency comunicarion 

district to impose a 9-l-l emergency service fee of up to three 

percent of the base rate charged to each customer of the principal 

service supplier, even where the principal service supplier charges 

different base rates .to customers of different participating jurisdictions of the district for the same level of service or where 

different base rates are charged to single-party and multiple-party 

customers. The percentage rate adopted by the board from which the 

emergency service fee is calculated must be unifonely applied 

throughout the district, regardless of the base rate charged by the 

service supplier. 

Rephrased, your third question is whether 9-l-l emergency service 

may be denied to a telephone service customer in the district when 

providing such service is deemed too costly or burdensome to the 

district and the customer is not charged the monthly emergency service 

fee. In view of the terms and purpose of article 1432e. we believe 

the answer to this question is "no." 

Section 8(a) of article 1432e decrees that the emergency communication district "shall provide 9-l-l service to all participating 

jurisdictions. . . ." Participating jurisdictions are "those public 

agencies that vote to be a part of a district." V.T.C.S. art. 1432e, 

53(3). A public agency is "any city or county that provides or has 

authority co provide fire-fighting, law enforcemenr. ambulance, 

medical. or other emergency services." Id. 13(2). The term "9-l-l 

service" is defined as a "telecommnicatio~service that will allow a 

user of the public telephone system to reach a public safety answering 

point by dialing the digits 9-l-l." - Id. 93(l) (emphasis added). 

The purpose of article 1432e is provided in section 2 of the act: 

It is the purpose of this Act to establish the 

number 9-l-l as the primary emergency telephone 

number for use by certain local governmoots in 

this state and co encourage units of local government and combinations of those units of local 

govermont to develop and improve emergency communication procedures and facilities in a manner 

that will make possible the quick response to any 

person calling the telephone number 9-l-l seeking 

police, fire, medical, rescue, and other emergency 

services. To this purpose the legislature finds 

and declares: 

(1) it is in the public interest to shorten 

the time required for a citizen to request and 

receive emergency aid; 

p. 3142 
Honorable Jack Skeen. Jr. - Page 7 (JM-681) 

(2) there exist thousands uf different 

emergency telephone numbers throughout the state, 

and telephone exchange boundaries and central 

office service areas do not necessarily correspond 

to public safety and political boundaries; 

(3) a dominant part of the state's population 

is located in rapidly expabding metropolitan areas 

that generally cross the boundary lines of local 

jurisdictions and often extend into two or more 

counties; and 

(4) provision of a single, primary three-digit 

emergency number through which emergency services 

can be quickly and efficiently obtained would 

provide a significant coatribution to law enforcement and other public safety efforts by making it 

less difficult to notify public safety personnel 

guickly. (Emphasis added). 

It is clear from both the ‘statement of purpose and the language of 

article 14320 that 9-l-l service is intended to be available to any 

person using any telephone in the district in time of emergency. The 

availability of 9-l-l service is not limited to persons or entities 

that receive local exchange access lines from the principal service 

supplier or that pay the monthly emergency service fee. It cannot be 

seriously argued.- then, that persons who. are not charged the monthly 

fee may, in the discretion of the board of managers, be excluded from 

the 9-l-l service system. See also Testimony on Tex. S. B. No. 606 

before Senate Comm. on Intergovernmental Affairs, supra (9-l-l service 

will be available to transients and to persons calling from any phone 

in the district); Testimony on Tex. S. B. No. 606 before House Come. 

on Urban Affairs, supta. 

In any case, the district may not, under the circumstances, 

decline to charge the emergency service fee to persons living in the 

district who receive local exchange access lines from the principal 

service supplier. The emergency communication district has only that 

authority which is clearly granted by the legislature. See Attorney 

General Opinion JM-674 (1987) and authorities cited thereK Section 

11(b) of article 1432e states that the emergency service fee must be 

imposed in all jurisdictions. Section ,14(a) states that the fee 

"shall be added to and shall be stated separately in the billing by 

the service supplier to the service user." A service user is "any 

person or entity that is provided local exchange access lines/trunks 

in the district." V.T.C.S. art. 1432e. §3(17). 

Finally, we believe that any attempt to limit the availability of 

9-l-l service in the jurisdictions which voted to become part of the 

p. 3143 
Eouorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 8 (JM-681) 

district would defeat the purpose for establishing an emergency 

coamnication district in the first place. The district is intended 

to be used by persons requiring emergency assistance as a conduit for 

rapid communication to the participating jurisdictions. It is 

intended to assist these jurisdictions in providing more efficient and 

timely emergency services, and to assist in coordinating the services 

of different emergency service units whose jurisdictions may conflict 

or overlap. To permit* the district to select which persons (or 

telephones) will be provided access to the 9-l-l system would invite 

confusion and disorder, a result which the legislature clearly did not 

intend. Accordingly, you are advised that the emergency communication 

district may not deny 9-l-l emergency service to a person receiving 

local telephone exchange access lines in the district on the basis of 

excessive cost or burden to the district. 

SUMMARY 

Article 1432e. section 11(b), V.T.C.S., 

authorizes the board of managers of an emergency 

communication district to impose a 9-l-l emergency 

service fee of up to three percent of the base 

rate charged to each customer of the principal 

service supplier, even where the principal service 

supplier charges different base rates to rustomers 

of different participating jurisdictions of the 

district for the same level of service or where 

different base rates are charged to single-party 

and multiple-party customers. The percentage rate 

adopted by the board from which the emergency 

service fee is calculated must be uniformly 

applied throughout the district, regardless of the 

base rate charged by the service supplier. 

An emergency communication district may not 

deny 9-l-l emergency service to a person receiving 

local telephone exchange access lines in the 

district on the basis of excessive cost or burden 

to the district. 

Very ruly yours, J-b I 

JIM HATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

JACK HIGHTOWER 

First Assiatant Attorney General 

p. 3144 

I 
Eonorable Jack Skeen, Jr. - Page 9 (JM-681) 

MARY KELLER 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLN 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Rick Gilpin 

Assistant Attorney General 

p. 3145