COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Coleman and Overton 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

DEBORAH LILLIAN WHITE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2773-96-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III 

 DECEMBER 23, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William N. Alexander, II, Judge 

 Jon Ian Davey (Law Office of Jon I. Davey, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Deborah Lillian White was convicted in a bench trial on two 

counts of malicious wounding, one count of attempted malicious 

wounding and one count of threatening to burn a dwelling. The 

issues on appeal are (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to 

prove that White acted with malice, and (2) whether the evidence 

established as a matter of law that White was intoxicated and 

could not form the requisite intent to commit malicious wounding. 

 Upon review, we affirm the malicious wounding convictions. 

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

 To support a conviction for malicious wounding under Code 

§ 18.2-51, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant 

inflicted the victim's injuries "maliciously and with the intent 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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to maim, disfigure, disable or kill." Campbell v. Commonwealth, 

12 Va. App. 476, 483, 405 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1991) (en banc). "Malice 

inheres in the doing of a wrongful act intentionally, or without 

just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will. It may be 

directly evidenced by words, or inferred from acts and conduct 

which necessarily result in injury." Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 

15 Va. App. 626, 631, 426 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1993) (citations 

omitted). Intent must often be proven by circumstantial 

evidence, and the fact finder may "infer that a person intends 

the natural and probable consequences of his acts." Campbell, 12 

Va. App. at 483, 405 S.E.2d at 4. Whether the appellant acted 

with the requisite mens rea was a question of fact to be 

determined by the fact finder. See Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 

Va. App. 836, 841, 419 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1992). 

 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). So viewed, the 

Commonwealth's evidence proved that the appellant's mother, 

Odella Witcher, was driving her automobile from Chatham to 

Danville accompanied by two of her friends and the appellant. 

During the drive, the appellant demanded that Witcher stop at a 

Chatham bank, cash her Social Security check, and give the 

appellant money. When Witcher refused, the appellant stood up in 

the back seat and said: "All you mother fuckers gonna die." She 
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then reached over Witcher's right shoulder and grabbed the 

steering wheel causing the car to lose control and strike a tree. 

 At the time, the car was traveling at about twenty miles per 

hour. Witcher suffered fractured ribs and a bruised heart, and 

another passenger suffered a lacerated mouth requiring several 

stitches. After the crash, the appellant exited the vehicle and 

told her mother, "you ain't dead yet, but you will be." She fled 

the scene and did not attempt to help the injured persons. 

 On this evidence, we cannot say that the trial court's 

judgment was "plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." 

Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 99, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497 

(1990) (en banc). The Commonwealth's evidence was competent, not 

inherently incredible, and sufficient to prove that the appellant 

acted maliciously and with intent to personally maim, disable, 

disfigure or kill Witcher and the other passengers in the car. 

The car was traveling at a sufficient rate of speed that the fact 

finder could conclude that the appellant intended to permanently 

disable or disfigure or to kill the occupants of the car. In 

fact, she specifically expressed her intent to kill her mother. 

The evidence is sufficient to prove the counts of malicious 

wounding. 

 II. INTOXICATION DEFENSE - RULE 5A:18

 The appellant next asserts that she was too intoxicated to 

form the requisite intent to commit malicious wounding. Our 

consideration of this claim is precluded by Rule 5A:18. Rule 
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5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was 

stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the 

ruling, except for good cause shown or . . . to attain the ends 

of justice." The appellant did not raise an intoxication defense 

before the trial court. In fact, she testified that she was not 

intoxicated and she made no claim to the trial judge that she was 

too intoxicated to be able to form a specific intent. Because 

the record demonstrates neither good cause nor a miscarriage of 

justice, we may not consider her intoxication defense. Mounce v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987). 

 For these reasons, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.