1

V olu m e 2 N u m ber 1

Jan u ary 2001

by Major John D. Manley

eddy Roosevelt’s words from September 1901, “Speak softly

and carry a big stick,” crystallized much of America’s 20

t h

Century military policy. As we begin the 21

st

 Century,

however, it is clear that a variety of “sticks,” large and small,

are essential to succeed in the multifaceted missions assigned

to today’s military.

Because the nature of its deployment has dramatically

changed since the end of the Cold War, answering the call to

arms has become a more complex proposition to our nation’s 

military. Humanitarian operations, small-scale contingencies

and other operations other than war, coupled with an

increasing number of noncombatants and civilians on the

battlefield illustrate the necessity for an adaptable response to

crisis across the spectrum of conflict. A major effort is now

underway to develop the “sticks” a commander can call on to

face any contingency with appropriate force.

T

C on ten ts

M ov in g beyon d

 the Ru bber Bu llet......................1

N LW Resou rc es......................... 3

Red u c ed Lethality

 W eapon s........................................ 4

D irec tor’s C orn er ..................... 8

HEL W eapon s .............................9 

Sm art W eapon s 

Train in g Sem in ar......................10 

C alen d ar of 

Ev en ts ............................................ 11

W STIAC is a D oD In form ation 

An alysis C en ter Spon sored by the 

D efen se Tec hn ic al In form ation 

C en ter and Operated by IiT 

Researc h In stitu te

Continued on page 2

W EAPO N SY STE M S TE C H N OLO GY IN FOR M ATIO N A N ALY SIS C E N TER
The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate

(JNLWD) serves as the focal point for the research and

development of non-lethal weapons (NLW) for the

Department of Defense. The directorate, located at

Quantico, Virginia, was established in 1997 after the

Office of the Secretary of Defense designated the

Commandant of the Marine Corps as Executive Agent for 

the NLW Program.

In the three years since standing up, the

directorate has successfully guided several legacy

programs through a production decision. Basic nonlethal capability sets are being fielded in the Marine

Corps and the Army. In addition, it has coordinated and 

conducted rigorous testing and evaluation to weed out

initiatives that did not live up to initial expectations,

allowing the reallocation of resources to more promising 

programs. 

More recently, the directorate has conducted

major initiatives on several fronts to lay a solid

foundation on which to base the robust development of

NLW technology. These efforts include:

- Conducting a six-month Joint Mission Area

Analysis (JMAA) to reassess CINC needs for non-lethal 

capabilities. This effort has resulted in a draft Joint

Mission Need Statement.

- Funding and coordinating seven Concept

Exploration Programs to identify potential non-lethal 

technology to meet CINC needs as derived from the

JMAA. 

- Developing Operational and Strategic Level of

War technology by leveraging ongoing research in directed

energy to develop systems that will reduce collateral damage, 

deny areas to personnel and materiel and produce precision

strike and non-lethal engagements from a distance. 

Additionally, the JNLWD entered into exchange

agreements with the United Kingdom and Israel to

leverage NL research and technology advancements. 

Over the last year, the United States and the UK

conducted a series of war games that culminated in a

November 30, 2000 Executive Seminar of senior

leadership (general officer) in London. This meeting

allowed the leadership an opportunity to study

commonality in NLW programs, areas of divergence and 

to assess the course of action to develop NLW in concert 

with our allies.

 (Continued on page 3)

2
Finally, the JNLWD is beginning a two-year 

study to explore the measure of effectiveness of NLW for

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This study, under 

the auspices of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 

Science and Technology, will be a cornerstone in the

future development and acceptance of NLW throughout

the world. ♦

For more information, please contact: Major

John Manley at (703) 784-2951 x240 (DSN

278), or manleyjd@mcsc.usmc.mil.

N LW In tern et Resou rc es

This selected listing of internet sites provides additional resources about programs, activities, research, and products relating 

to various issues regarding nonlethal weapon technologies.

Note: An extensive bibliography of current publications (1996-2000) is available free of charge from WSTIAC. The 

bibliography is unclassified, limited distribution (DoD and DoD contractors only). An abridged, unclassified/unlimited version 

is also available. Please contact WSTIAC at 703.933.3363 or email: vvalaitis@iitri.org.

Joint Nonlethal Weapons Program

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program

http://iis.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/jnlwd/

Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons

http://www.concepts.quantico.usmc.mil/nonleth.htm

DOD Directive 3000.3 (Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons)

http://iis.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/jnlwd/

NLW database

http://iis.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/jnlwd/

Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program Newsletter

http://iis.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/jnlwd/

Army

Military Operations Concept For Nonlethal Capabilities In Army

Operations TRADOC Pamphlet 525-73 C1

http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/52573frm.htm

Non-Lethal Munitions

http://www.monmouth.army.mil/smc/pmpse/pages/forceprotection/nonlethm.html

Academic

The Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies

Pennsylvania State University

http://www.nldt.org/index.html

Full Text Resources

Nonlethal Technology And Airpower A Winning Combination for

Strategic Paralysis

Aerospace Power Chronicles, 1995

Maj Jonathan W. Klaaren, USAF, Maj Ronald S. Mitchell, USAF

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/mitchkla.html

Nonlethal Weapons Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies

Aerospace Power Chronicles, 1995

Maj Joseph W. Cook, III, Maj David P. Fiely, et. Al.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/mcgowan.html

Nonlethality And American Land Power: Strategic Context And

Operational Concepts 

US Army Strategic Studies Institute Publication, 1998

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Steven Metz 

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs98/nonlethl/nonlethl.htm

Nonlethal Weapons: A British View

Military Review, 1998

Robert Bunker

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/JulAug98/Review.htm

Nonlethality and American Land Power: Strategic Context and

Operational Concepts

The Air Land Sea Application Center Publication, 1998

http://www.dtic.mil/alsa/nonlethal.htm

Nonlethal Technology And Fourth Epoch War

Proceedings of the DTC Test Technology Symposium, 1997

T. Lindsay Moore and Robert J. Bunker

http://www.dtc.army.mil/tts/proceed/nonlethl.html

Setting Our Weapons To Stun:The Ethics of "Nonlethal" Combat

Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics XIX, 1997

Gordon L. Campbell 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE97/Gordon97.htm

WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 1st Quarter 2001

3
Warren H. Switzer, Ph.D.

In 1901, Mark Twain wrote of the American involvement in the Philippines:

"I thought we should act as their protector -- not try to get them under our heel.... But now -- why, we have got into a mess, a quagmire from 

which each fresh step renders the difficulty of extrication immensely greater." 

he same words could well apply to numerous situations in

which the US is currently involved. Public concern over

violence1 and the fear of becoming involved in protracted,

bloody, indecisive operations are heightened by a growing

awareness of increasing involvement in complex, murky affairs

wherein US national interests are not clearly defined. Less than fully 

satisfactory results have attended almost every major US

involvement in the past decade.2 Sadly, the US finds itself mired in 

places of grave danger, attempting to prop up or create

environments for the inhabitants3 wherein those same inhabitants

often are the problem and the solution. This situation promotes the 

conundrum of needing to control a populace through less coercive 

means so that it may learn, aspire, evolve and transform itself into 

those “stable, self-supporting free-market oriented, democracies” 

which we see as the base material for a safer, more humane world. 

If the philosophy is that of enlightening the masses to the value of

restraint,4 it is necessary for those doing the enlightening to

establish that environment with as little violence as possible and get 

on with their “enlightening”.

5

 

1

 In actuality, it is the images of violence wherein Americans are 

seen (in those images) to be the direct causal agents of suffering 

that causes concern. The American public has been very tolerant of 

such damage or suffering being done “at a distance” – i.e., where 

Americans are not seen in the same photograph or videotape as 

the destruction (as in air strikes). While illogical, such reactions are 

understandable as it allows the viewer to separate the perpetuator 

from the act and simultaneously to relieve a measure of fear that 

US lives were and continue to be at (undue) risk. 

2

 In fairness, this perception is, in part, a product of too many 

voices pronouncing what the US objectives are or ought to be (or 

have been) and then finding fault. The self-appointed umpires are 

many, the solvers of problems are few. Yet, there is a valid criticism 

that operations missing a clear articulation of objectives invite 

disparagement against which they are defenseless. 

3

 There has been the almost maniacal belief that the American 

experiment can be transplanted everywhere and that the conditions 

that brought forth the success in North America are immediately 

present everywhere else. There seems to have been little 

consideration that revolutions may change the political masters of 

a nation, but cultures – what the people are - undergo evolution, 

not revolution. And evolution takes time. 

4

 The examples of Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda 

remain relatively fresh.

5

 During the age if imperialism, some nations were accused of 

“civilizing” the indigenous peoples through violence – i.e., that the 

methods gave the lie to the officially expressed motive. 

The obvious problem is that many of these places where US

soldiers are posted for such duty have little remaining inclination

with respect to restraint. Were the situation stable, US troops would 

not have been inserted. Unsurprisingly, US soldiers find themselves 

confronted with violence - often lethal violence – yet required to

exercise considerable restraint. Moreover, since many of the issues 

generating distress lie at the core of the populace’s physical or

esoteric needs, desperation may impel the involvement of

otherwise peaceful persons. Simultaneously, the resolution of those 

issues is beyond the military charter, set aside within the

capabilities of the soldier or marine on the scene.

Over the past several years there has been a growing interest 

in so-called “non-lethal weapons.” The creation of the NLW

Program is unsurprising.6 Indeed, since January 1997 there has

been a Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate located at

Quantico, Virginia. The Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Program has

as its objective:

“ . . . to establish a joint program built upon the

Concepts-Based Requirements System (CBRS) and managed

according to the Joint Service Memorandum of Agreement

(MOA). The purpose of the NLW Program is to provide the

most current and accurate information available on relative

aspects of non-lethal technologies to the joint services and

other government activities requiring the sue of measured

response in the performance of their mission. In addition, the

program is to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other

responsible agencies with recommendations regarding the

application of non-lethal technologies on a global basis from 

a comprehensive perspective, including research,

development, tactics, training, and deployment of those

technologies.” 7

Clearly, such conditions call for the use of highly effective but 

low lethality tools. 

 

6

 Obviously, there is public concern about violence, politicians 

react to what they believe the public expresses, and the services 

have responded with that activity they believe will assuage “political 

reality.” The intrusion of the media, the so-called “CNN effect,” 

coupled to sundry pundits who make a career of second guessing 

and “Monday morning quarterbacking” have created an 

insufferably burdened operational environment largely due o the 

inability or unwillingness of elected and appointed officials to 

assert their authority and accept responsibility.

7

 Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program. “Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 

Program, 1997- A Year in Review,” US Department of Defense, 

February, 1998, p. 2.

T

4
However, the focus has been on non-lethal weapons, which

DoD Directive 3000.3 defines as:

“Weapons that are explicitly designed to and

primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel and

material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to

personnel, and undesired damage to property and the

environment. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy 

their targets principally through blast, penetration, and

fragmentation, non-lethal weapons employ means other than

gross physical destruction to prevent the target from

functioning. Non-lethal weapons are intended to have one or 

both of the following characteristics. They have relatively

reversible effect on personnel or material, They affect objects

differently within their area of influence.”

 Significantly, the word ‘weapon’ rather than ‘tool’ is used. This

suggests coercion, as the difference between the two is the

psychological frame of influence. This seemingly small difference is 

an indicator of a predetermined and unfortunate frame of

reference. 

Weapons are most effective in the psychological realm, but

their mode is in perceptions of the physical. It is more the

perception of what the weapon(s) could do (often demonstrated),

than what they have done, which forces a decision. That said, pain 

can cause a person to do, cease doing, or not do things from

which they otherwise would not be dissuaded. Similarly, fear of

death – perceived as the result of an opponent’s use of a weapon 

– can have the same effects.8

All weapons9 carry the risk of causing far more damage than

“ordinary use” might logically indicate. Not only do the physical

characteristics of individuals differ, the circumstances of the

situation might make persons far more vulnerable than would

otherwise be the case. For example, a rubber bullet or beanbag

projectile at 20 meters is far less likely to cause serious injury than 

at a range of two meters. Similarly, a beanbag projectile or

chemical agent of marginal stopping effectiveness when used

against a 22-year-old muscular male could be lethal to an aged or 

very young person or one with some pre-existing medical

condition. It is precisely the awareness of the danger of such

unforeseen, uncontrollable, and perhaps unendurable effects that

serves as a deterrent.10 In short, there often is far more

psychological “bang for the buck” with lethal than non-lethal 

weapons. The lack of such awareness can lead to unfortunate

misadventures.11

 

8

 In this, negative pressures win out over positive ones 

(inducements to pleasure) because the threat of death removes all 

possibility of future enjoyment. Only things valued more than death 

(e.g., protracted suffering followed inevitably by death, or in some 

cultures, shameful dishonor) makes death acceptable. 

9

 Including the “non-lethals” of information operations, 

psychological warfare, electronic warfare, etc.

10 The deterring effect initially is manifest on the rioters, but there 

also is an effect on those projecting the force. These effects are 

uneven at the individual level (usually reluctance on both parts) but 

generally polarizing at higher levels of organizations (such as there 

may be). 

11 The riot at Kent State, Ohio in the 1960’s wherein naïve students 

egged on by radicals generated a lethal response from National 

Guardsmen sent to maintain order, is only one example of many. 

The so-called “Boston Massacre” (1770) is another. In both cases 

there seems to have been a belief that, “They wouldn’t shoot.” 

The current emphasis has been at the tactical level – the level 

at which US soldiers are in direct contact with the people. Core

capabilities are built around two themes, counterpersonnel and

countermaterial. Yet, we should remember that so-called “nonlethal weapons” (actually tools) have been used for a very long

time. However, most of these “non-lethals” were designed to

enhance the effectiveness of lethal weapons or to reduce the

effectiveness of enemy systems.12 Indeed, drawing the line between 

weapons and non-weapons is very difficult. 

For example, a night vision system can be used to aim a

weapon or disclose an enemy attempt to conduct a surprise attack 

at night. And there are the negative applications. Jamming, and by 

that denying an enemy the use of information operations in a

portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, can be crucial, yet the RF 

energy expended hardly is noticeable. More blunt are denial

operations like blockades, particularly of foodstuffs, and passive

denial operations such as embargoes, which often have similar

effect. 

Nor should any discussion of “non-lethal weapons” omit 

mention of their effectiveness in those complex operations lying

below the threshold of general war. Ironically, many of these tools 

and the techniques for their use have been largely ignored despite 

a long history of effectiveness. Much of the current debate centers

on low-level tactical tools and ignores larger, broader and

demonstrably more effective applications. 13 The situation is 

analogous ring the development of better navigation and warning

systems (which would remove many of the proximate causes for the 

need of such pumps). 

In addition to mis-proportionate emphasis on the least

effective tools, the lower the level of application the more the “nonlethal weapons” resembles and must function as a “weapon,” i.e., 

must use coercive force to accomplish its end. Thus, the chance of 

misadventure is greater at the lower levels and the effectiveness,

both for that incident and in terms of cascade effects, is reduced.

Essentially, this means that the core reason for using reduced

lethality weapons has the highest probability of being undone by

focus at the lowest level of application. In short, it begs the

question as to whether the current emphasis and proportionality of 

effort has been thought through, or is merely a knee-jerk reaction

to political fear of the media. 

It becomes even more puzzling given the growing awareness

of the need to conduct military operation in urban terrain (MOUT), 

wherein large numbers of non and semi- or irregular combatants 

(Continued on page 6)

 

And, in both cases, the second order “cascade” effects were 

profound.

12 A secret code, the management of intelligence, the use of 

information operations/warfare, the realm of electronic warfare all 

are themselves virtually devoid of being the direct physiological 

cause of death in the sense that are a bullet or bomb. Yet, no one 

would discount the value of these “non-lethal” tools in combat.

13 For example, psychological operations undertaken by Allied 

forces in WW II were markedly effective in reducing German will to 

fight in certain cities and towns (e.g., Munich). Where such 

psychological operations were not attempted (e.g., Aachen) the 

results were very different. Similarly, if a defender is insensible to 

inducements to cease resistance because of his own propaganda, 

culture, or belief that to surrender is to be exterminated, resistance 

can be bitter and protracted, even if the eventual outcome is not in 

doubt (e.g., Warsaw and Manila).

WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 1st Quarter 2001

5
In tern In tern et Resou rc es...

(cont from page 3)

Conferences

NDIA Proceedings Non-Lethal Defense III

February 25-26, 1998

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/nld3.html

NDIA Proceedings Non-Lethal Defense III

March 20-22, 2000

 http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/nld4/index.html

Department of Justice

National Institute of Justice Less than lethal program

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/sciencetech/lessthan.htm

JUSTNET Justice Technology Information Network

http://www.nlectc.org/

United Kingdom

Centre for Conflict Resolution

Nonlethal Weapons Research Project

http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/

Bibliographies

Nonlethal Weapons

Compiled by Joan Hyatt, Bibliographer

Air University Library Maxwell AFB, AL

http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/soft/softkill.htm

Manufacturers and Suppliers

(The listing of a site does not constitute endorsement of the site or 

of the accuracy, adequacy, efficacy, or applicability of its content

by the U.S. Government, IITRI, or WSTIAC. Users assume

responsibility for the use, misuse, inability to use, or reliance on the 

information contained herein.)

ALS Technologies - Less lethal munitions

http://www.ozarkmtns.com/less-lethal/riot.htm

Guardian Protective Devices, Inc. - Riot control agents 

http://www.guardpd.com/

Jaycor Less Than Lethal Technologies - Auto-ArrestorTM ultrasound

imaging sensor; Sticky Shocker® Nonlethal Projectiles

http://www.jaycor.com/eme/ltlt.htm

Foster Miller, Inc. - Nonlethal Entanglement Technology Systems

http://www.foster-miller.com/policfr.htm

Tasertron - Electronic Immobilization Weapons

http://www.tasertron.com/

Combined Tactical Systems - Less lethal munitions

http://www.less-lethal.com/

MK Ballistic Systems - Less lethal ammunition

http://www.mkballisticsystems.com/index.htm

Hydro-Force Inc. - Less-lethal and non-lethal weaponry

http://www.hydroforceinc.com/

Chalen Enterprise - Air Taser

http://www.chalen.com/ch00023.htm

The Aqueous Foam Book

http://www.aquafoam.com/fb06.html ♦

Red u c ed Lethality W eapon s....

D r. Sw itzer (cont from page 5)

will be involved.14 Given the shrinkage of military force structure

and budgets and the simultaneous expansion of missions, it seems 

doubtful that the expenditure of resources, especially time, at the

lower levels of effectiveness is well proportioned. This is not to say

that reduced lethality weapons are not needed, rather that there

has been an overly great and mis-proportionate emphasis placed

on developing them.15

And, even more basic that these considerations, there remains 

the open question of whether such development and general use

belongs in the hands of civil law enforcement rather than in the

military.16 Certainly the pattern of success indicates that sustainable 

stability and the furthering of economic, political and social 

 

14 The lessons learned from Sarajevo, Chechnya, and Somalia 

apply here. 

15 Indeed, the services have been reluctant to venture into an arena 

they see of marginal operational effectiveness and for which there 

likely will be an inordinate expenditure of energy and resources 

better invested/expended elsewhere. 

16 In many areas of the world, the US use of its soldiers in what US 

officials term “stability operations” is perceived as imperialistic 

intrusion. US assertions to the contrary are debunked by the 

uniforms, demeanor and weapons seen by the locals and 

throughout the world in media coverage. 

development has been better accomplished by other than military

elements. 17 Those instances of protracted military presence and

authority have not enjoyed success commensurate with protracted

civil-centric programs. 18 Thus, the chief drawback to “non-lethal 

weapons” may not lie in their development, the mal-apportionment 

of resources, or their use, but in the questionable notion of who

uses them. Again it begs the question of “Why the military?” 

In sum, whatever means are used, the effect to be achieved is 

and can only be in the mind of the recipient. It seems the whole

notion of “non-lethal weapons” should be rethought in terms of

“reduced lethality tools,” and, perhaps, a more fulsome appraisal

of scale, emphasis and mission appropriateness is in order.♦

 

17 For example, the Marshall Plan implemented in Europe (and 

elsewhere) after WW II was highly successful. The plan followed the 

pattern, after a short initial period of military government, of the 

rapid transition of authority and governmental process to US civil 

and local governmental entities. In short, after a period of restoring 

order, it was no longer a military mission. 

18 This has been the case for the US and virtually every other nation 

that adopted the military-centric pattern for another country. 

About the author: Dr Switzer is with 

IITRI/AB Technologies Group. He may be 

reached at 703.575.3281 or Email: 

wswitzer@msosa.dmso.mil

6
The WSTIAC Newsletter is the current awareness 

publication of the Weapon Systems Technology

Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC). WSTIAC, 

a Department of Defense (DoD) Information

Analysis Center (IAC), is administratively 

managed by the Defense Information Systems

Agency (DISA), Defense Technical Information

Center (DTIC) under the DoD IAC Program. The 

Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative

(COTR) for WSTIAC is Mr. H. Jack Taylor,

ODUSD (S&T), Defense Pentagon, Washington,

D.C. 20301-3080, (703) 588-7405. IIT

Research Institute operates WSTIAC, which

services Government, industry, and academia as 

a Center of Excellence in Weapon Systems

Technology.

WSTIAC Director: Dr. Wes Kitchens

703.933.3317, Email: wkitchens@iitri.org

Database Inquiries: Vakare Valaitis

703.933.3362 Email: vvalaitis@iitri.org

Internet: http://iac.dtic.mil/wstiac/

All data and information herein reported are

believed to be reliable; however, no warrant,

expressed or implied, is to be construed as to the 

accuracy or the completeness of the information

presented. The view, opinion, and findings

contained in this publication are those of the

author(s) and should not be construed as an

official Agency position, policy, or decision, 

unless so designated by other official

documentation.

High En ergy Laser W eapon s

he Department of Defense announced that it would award $8.6

million in fiscal 2001 funds to support research into technologies

that will advance the development of high-energy-laser weapons.

The recipients were selected by the High Energy Laser Joint Technology

Office, a new organization formed in June 2000 to manage a DoD-wide 

program to revitalize high-energy-laser science and technology research. 

The announcement by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for

Science and Technology Delores Etter is the result of a highly competitive

review of 56 proposals submitted by a diverse set of contractor

organizations and academic institutions. The proposals were evaluated by

a U.S. government team comprising technical experts from the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, the military Services, and Defense agencies. The

team selected 19 proposals for funding. 

Project awards are being presented to the following investigators

and organizations: 

• Alexander A. Betin from Raytheon, El Segundo, Calif. 

• Gon-Yen Shen from Raytheon, Danbury, Conn., (2 projects) 

• Lloyd C. Brown from General Atomics, San Diego, Calif. 

• Charles Clendening from TRW, Redondo Beach, Calif. 

• Stephen C. Gottschalk from STI Optronics, Bellevue, Wash. 

• Olga Kocharovskaya from Texas Engineering Experiment

Station, College Station, Texas 

• George R. Neil from the Department of Energy's Jefferson

Laboratory, Newport News, Va. 

• Rodney Petr from Science Research Laboratory, Somerville,

Mass. 

• David N. Plummer from Logicon, Albuquerque, N.M. 

• Thomas Price from Xinetics, Devens, Mass. 

• Fred Rigby from SAIC, Albuquerque, N.M. 

• Wolfgang Rudolf from the University of New Mexico,

Albuquerque, N.M. 

• John Russell from the Directed Energy Professional Society,

Albuqerque, N.M. 

• Richard Schlecht from Lasergenics, San Jose, Calif. 

• Peter Vorobieff from the University of New Mexico,

Albuqerque, N.M. 

• Robert E. Waldo from TRW, Redondo Beach, Calif. 

• Michael Wickham from TRW, Redondo Beach, Calif. 

• Luis E. Zapata from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 

Livermore, Calif. 

(Continued on page 10)

T

WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 1st Quarter 2001

7
D irec tor/C hief Sc ien tist’s C orn er

n the last issue of the WSTIC Newsletter I discussed Joint Vision 2020 and its four operational 

concepts: dominate maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full-dimensional 

protection. These are powerful operational concepts, but unfortunately, our potential

adversaries can also adopt them and use them against us. We are already seeing this happen as threat missiles and longrange guns are being made highly mobile. This trend will undoubtedly continue since fixed weapon systems make relatively 

easy targets for modern U.S. precision-guided weapons that rely on inertial navigation and global positioning systems. The 

set of targets we will face in future conflicts is expected to be capable of breaking down and relocating in minutes. Finding, 

identifying and tracking time critical and mobile targets, planning strikes against them, and attacking and destroying them 

will require timely intelligence, as well as new types of weapon systems that are better suited for this very stressing mission.

The DoD currently has a number of time critical targeting initiatives underway to improve our capability to

successfully engage time critical and mobile targets. Two conferences held in October 2000 in the Washington, DC area: 

“Time Critical Targeting Conference,” sponsored by the Association of Old Crows and ASD(C3I), and “Precision Strike

Technology Symposium - Integrating Technology for Time Critical Operations,” sponsored by the Precision Strike

Association and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International - Capital Chapter, highlighted some of the

complex issues associated with locating, identifying, tracking, attacking and defeating time-critical and mobile targets.

(Continued on page 9) 

I

by Dr. Wes Kitchens

Time to Address 

Targets

Hours

Minutes

Threat Target Type

Mobile

Fixed

Complexity of

Target Locations

Urban

and/or

Buried

Isolated

and/or

Surface

Number of Targets

> 1000

> 100

Figure 1. Targeting Trends

8
D irec tor/C hief Sc ien tist’s C orn er

Dr. Kitchens (cont from page 8)

Targeting trends are illustrated in Figure 1, adopted from a presentation at the Precision Strike Technology Symposium by Lt 

Col John Boylan (USAF) of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The time required to address targets is now 

being measured in minutes, targets are being buried and/or located in urban terrain, and the number of potential targets 

that must be dealt with is in the thousands. Clearly, the targeting problem has become more difficult. CDR Spencer Miller, 

U.S. Navy, PMA 258, NAVAIR, offered his thoughts at this Symposium about what will be required to engage and destroy 

moving targets. He outlined a need to develop radars that can provide target quality output from long standoff ranges,

create high speed target imaging and mission planning tools, and develop a standoff weapon that can receive in-flight 

updates in real time. Such standoff weapons will need to be able to link with either the shooter, another off-board sensor 

tracking the target, or both. In effect, the weapon system itself will need to become an integrated part of the attack

network. COL Kenneth Dobeck, Director, Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Project Office described four joint Service

efforts that are helping to improve and demonstrate an adverse weather, all day/night, end-to-end, sensor-to-shooter 

precision strike capability to locate, identify and eliminate high-value, short dwell targets and assess damage within

tactically meaningful timelines. These efforts include the Theater Precision Strike Operations Advanced Concept

Technology Demonstrator (ACTD), the Rapid Terrain Visualization ACTD, the Joint Continuous Strike Environment ACTD

and the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance ACTD. These and related programs aimed at defeating time 

critical and mobile targets will all help make Joint Vision 2020 a reality. 

This issue of the WSTIAC Newsletter features two articles on non-lethal weapons. We are grateful to Mrs. Susan 

Levine, Deputy Director for Technology, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, for contributing an overview of the Joint

Non-Lethal Weapons Program written by Major John Manley and to Dr. Warren Switzer of the IIT Research Institute for

contributing an essay discussing the use of non-lethal weapons. We welcome your feedback about the WSTIAC Newsletter 

and solicit your suggestions for future topics you would like to see included. You can reach me by Email at

wkitchens@iitri.org or by phone at (703) 933-3317. ♦ 

WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 4th Quarter 2000

WSTIAC Wants Your Contributions

u We hope you find this issue of the WSTIAC Newsletter useful and interesting. You can help us to better serve you by 

your contributions, such as:

u Your comments on what you liked and disliked about the Newsletter

u Your suggestions for WSTIAC data products and services

u Technical articles, opinion pieces, tutorials, news releases or letters to the Editor for publication in the 

Newsletter

u To contact WSTIAC, use any of the ways listed on the back cover, or use the feedback form on the WSTIAC 

webpage

u We welcome your contributions.

WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 1st Quarter 2001

9
Sm art W eapon s Train in g Sem in ar

Huntsville, Alabama

13-15 March 2001 and 21-23 August 2001

(Seminar starts at 8:00 AM Tuesday and ends at 12:00 PM Thursday.)

Seminar Scope: The Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WSTIAC) developed this 2-1⁄2 day Smart

Weapons Training Seminar to provide a comprehensive understanding of smart weapons and related technologies. This seminar

is aimed at providing general knowledge about smart weapons technology and a source of current information on selected U.S.

and foreign smart weapons, to include system description, concept of employment, performance characteristics, effectiveness and 

program status. 

Seminar Objectives: The seminar’s objective is to inform materiel and combat developers, systems analysts, scientists, engineers, 

managers and business developers about smart weapons to include: State of the art of representative U.S. and foreign smart

weapon systems; Employment concepts; Smart weapons related systems, subsystems, and technologies; and Technology trends.

Seminar Sponsors: 

• AMC Smart Weapons Management Office (AMC-SWMO) 

• Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) 

• Joint Technical Coordinating Group Munitions Effectiveness (Smart Munitions Working Group) 

About the Seminar: This seminar was originally developed for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas. It has proven to be enormously popular with attendees from both government and industry. The seminar is 

updated annually to include current information about the latest technology and capability upgrades being made to

representative US and foreign smart weapon systems. Instructors include: Dr. Wes Kitchens, WSTIAC Director and former DDR&E 

Director for Weapons Technologies; Mr. Mark Scott and Mr. Hunter Chockley, IITRI Science Advisors; Mr. Ron Funderburk IITRI

Research Engineer and retired US Army Colonel; and Mr. Mike Holthus, foreign weapons expert at the National Ground

Intelligence Center. 

Security Classification: The security classification of this seminar is SECRET (U.S. Citizens Only).

Fee: The registration fee for this 2-1⁄2 seminar is $950 for US government personnel and $1150 for government contractors.

Contractor teams of 3 or more, registered at the same time, are charged $950 per person.

Registration: Attendance is limited to 35 people and the seminars generally fill up fast. Please complete and return the attached 

registration form and forward your security clearance information as soon as possible to guarantee a seat. All registrations will be 

acknowledged, and each attendee will be sent an agenda, maps, and directions to the seminar site.

Sm art W eapon s Train in g Sem in ar Offered at You r Loc ation

WSTIAC can conduct its 2-1/2 day Smart Weapons Training Seminar at your location during 2001 to reduce your travel time and 

cost. This seminar has been presented to hundreds of students over the past decade. This is a very cost effective way to provide 

smart weapons training to up to 35 people at your site. ♦

FYI... (cont from page 7)

The selected projects will explore physics and technology in

a wide range of areas relevant to high-energy-laser 

weapons, including chemical lasers, solid-state lasers, freeelectron lasers, adaptive optics, and the interaction of laser

beams with target materials. ♦

More information on the High Energy Laser program 

can be found at 

http://www.dtic.mil/dusdst/JTO_newsletter.html.

10

Please call Mrs. Shirley Hardy at (256) 382-4756 or email shardy@iitri.org for more information 

and a brochure with seminar details.
13-14 February 2001

UAV/UCAV Payloads Conference

U.S. Army Research Lab

Adelphi, MD

For additional information 

Tel: 1-888 OLD-CROW Email: info@crows.org 

14-15 February 2001

Defense Reform 2001 Conference & Exhibit

Washington, DC.

For additional information call

703/264-7500 or 800/639-2422

Email: custserv@aiaa.org

http://www.aiaa.org/calendar/DR01prog.html

28 February-2 March 2001

2001 AUSA Winter Symposium and Exhibition

“Partnering for the Future”

Fort Lauderdale, FL

For additional information contact Leigh McMillan

Tel: 703-907-2661

E-mail: lmcmillan@ausa.org 

http://www.ausa.org/

13-15 March 2001

The Tactical Situational Awareness (SA) Symposium

San Diego, CA

For additional information call 301.342.9268

Email: HeffnerPL@navair.navy.mil

http://pma202.navair.navy.mil/sas/

20-22 March 2001

Undersea Warfare Division Spring Conference

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center

San Diego, CA

For additional information Email: kwilliams@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~

126 

25 - 26 March 2001

Vulnerability of Ballistic Missiles to Direct Hit Warhead 

Technology

Short Course $775

Laurel, MD

Phone: 800/639-AIAA (U.S. only), 703/264-7500 

Fax: 703/264-7551 

E-mail: custserv@aiaa.org

http://www.aiaa.org/calendar/index.html

26-29 March 2001

National Summit on US Defense Policy:

Acquisition, Research, Test and Evaluation

Hyatt Regency Hotel

Long Beach, CA

For additional information Email: pedmonson@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~

1910

9-12 April 2001

36th Gun & Ammunition Symposium

San Diego, CA

For additional information

Email: djenks@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~

159 

14-16 May 2001

Missiles & Rockets 

Weapon System Effectiveness

San Antonio, TX

For additional information: Email pedmonson@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~

1630

28-30-May-2001

8th St. Petersburg International Conference on Integrated 

Navigation Systems

Call for Papers

St. Petersburg, Russia

Contact: Dr. George Schmidt 617/258-3841

12-14 June 2001

69th MORSS

Sailing Into a New Millennium

US Naval Academy Annapolis, MD

http://www.mors.org/

18-10 June 2001

Future Combat Systems Conference

Parsippany, NJ

For additional informationdjenks@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?~Brochure~

1600

WSTIAC NEWSLETTER, 1st Quarter 2001

11
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