alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                            9

<CIK>0001021061
<NAME>Metris Companies Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000
<CURRENCY>                                     0

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Dec-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   Sep-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         32,055
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                         0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                               34,800
<TRADING-ASSETS>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                    0
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                         0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                           0
<LOANS>                                        1,545,772
<ALLOWANCE>                                    553,400
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,812,472
<DEPOSITS>                                     588,297
<SHORT-TERM>                                   893
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            290,069
<LONG-TERM>                                    343,894
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    322,473
<COMMON>                                       386
<OTHER-SE>                                     266,460
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 1,812,472
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                148,449
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              3,390
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               1,495
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               153,334
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             9,013
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             35,161
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          118,173
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  122,215
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                308,415
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                134,867
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     81,325
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                50,808
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   30,517
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (2.29)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (2.29)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                 18.00
<LOANS-NON>                                    0
<LOANS-PAST>                                   218,034
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                               0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               393,283
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  422,059
<RECOVERIES>                                   24,387
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                              553,400
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                           553,400
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                            0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                        0




</TABLE>
# United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 18-1386 UNITED STATES, Appellee,

v. TRAVIS J. STINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

**_____________________**

**ERRATA SHEET**
The opinion of this Court, issued on October 23, 2020, is amended as follows: On page 4, line 24, replace "months" with "months'"
#### The People of the State of New York v. Henry Fleischmann.

Motion for leave to dispense with printing granted insofar as to permit the appeal to be heard on the original record, without printing the same, except that a certified copy of the indictment shall be substituted in place of the original indictment, and upon typewritten or mimeographed appellant’s points, on condition that the appellant serves one copy of the typewritten or mimeographed appellant’s points upon the District Attorney of Bronx County and files 6 typewritten or 19 mimeographed copies of appellant’s points, together with the original record, with this court on or before January 3, 1961, with notice of argument for the February 1961 Term of this court, said appeal to *617be argued or submitted when reached. Concur — Botein, P. J., Breitel, Stevens, Eager and Noonan, JJ.
#### SHAMROCK GOLF COMPANY, Appellant, v. RICHCRAFT, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 81-5939.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 6, 1982.

Decided June 30, 1982.

*646Richard M. Moneymaker, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.

Stuart L. Brody, Valensi & Rose, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.

Before CHAMBERS, ANDERSON and SKOPIL, Circuit Judges.

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge:

Shamrock Golf Company appeals from the district court’s dismissal of its appeal from the bankruptcy judge’s order adjudicating Shamrock to be bankrupt. The parties agee that the case is subject to the law in effect prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. The order of involuntary bankruptcy was based on the assumption that the original petition was timely, i.e. that it was filed within four months of the date of the alleged preferential transfers, in compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(2), prior to its repeal.

The issue is a narrow one and it is not necessary to dwell on the factual details. The original petition was filed on October 20,1977. The transfers that form the basis of the allegations of preference were by checks that were delivered on June 17,1977, but not presented to the drawee bank for payment until June 20 and 21, 1977. The checks were paid and not dishonored on that date or thereafter.

Shamrock’s position is that the payment was complete on June 17 and the transfers were not made within the statutory four-month period, thus the original petition was not timely filed. We agee. In *Engstrom v. Wiley,*191 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1951), we held that payment by check constituted a “cash” sale, and was therefore a “contemporaneous transfer,” so long as the cheek was presented within a reasonable time and not dishonored. The same position is taken as to contemporaneous transfers in Section 547(c) of the 1978 Code. Indeed, the Notes of the Senate Judiciary Committee state:

> “Contrary to the language contained in the House Report, payment of a debt by means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless the check is dishonored. Payment is considered to be made when the cheek is delivered for purposes of Section 547(c)(1) and (2).”

We rely on rationale that applies to situations dealing with contemporaneous transfers as an exception to the preference provisions of the bankruptcy statutes. But the same rationale applies in cases arising under the four-month provision of Section 21(a)(2). We believe *Engstrom v. Wiley*is analogous to the present situation and we are not persuaded that general escrow law, cited by the creditors, should apply, e.g. *Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Corp.,*491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974).

Given this disposition of the case, we need not address the other issues raised by appellant. Reversed.
###### Editorial Note on Part 200

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 200 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

#### § 200.640 Effect on other requirements.

The requirement for compliance with this part is in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other requirements imposed by or under Executive Order 11063 or the Fair Housing Act.

[58 FR 41337, Aug. 3, 1993]
### §5060. Repealed. Pub. L. 103–82, title III, §368, Sept. 21, 1993, 107 Stat. 909

Section, Pub. L. 93–113, title IV, §420, Oct. 1, 1973, 87 Stat. 414; Pub. L. 96–143, §13(a), Dec. 13, 1979, 93 Stat. 1080; Pub. L. 98–288, §26, May 21, 1984, 98 Stat. 196, set out requirements for prescribing regulations.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date of Repeal

Repeal effective Oct. 1, 1993, see section 392 of Pub. L. 103–82, set out as an Effective Date of 1993 Amendment note under section 4951 of this title.
JUN O 2022 EyzAR

. 

## ;F. .A
. ..BROwN 9 CLERK

J.

Cadish Pickering Silver • , J. 

# Pick. , J IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA ALEX PENLY, Appellant, VS. MILTON J. WOODS; AND CIRRUS AVIATION SERVICES INC., A WASHINGTON CORPORATION, Res • ondents. ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL No. 84710



# - FILED

This is a pro se appeal from an order denying motion to strike affidavits of renewal of judgment and untimely reply in support of affidavit. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Nancy L. Allf, Judge.

Initial review of the notice of appeal and the documents before this court reveals a jurisdictional defect. This court "may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule." Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013). No statute or court rule allows for an appeal from the district court's order identified in appellant's notice of appeal. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction and

ORDERS this appeal DISMISSED.



## --I SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA (0) I947Acc: Hon. Nancy L. Allf, District Judge Alex Penly Fox Rothschild, LLP/Las Vegas Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA ( o ) I 947A 2
§ 96.83 Suspension or cancellation of accreditation or approval by the Secretary. ( a ) The Secretary must suspend or cancel the accreditation or approval granted by an accrediting entity when the Secretary finds, in the Secretary's discretion, that the agency or person is substantially out of compliance with the standards in subpart F of this part and that the accrediting entity has failed or refused, after consultation with the Secretary, to take action.
( b ) The Secretary may suspend or cancel the accreditation or approval granted by an accrediting entity if the Secretary finds that such action: ( 1 ) Will protect the interests of children;
( 2 ) Will further U.S. foreign policy or national security interests; or
( 3 ) Will protect the ability of U.S. citizens to adopt children.
( c ) If the Secretary suspends or cancels the accreditation or approval of an agency or person, the Secretary will take appropriate steps to notify both the accrediting entity and the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
[71 FR 8131, Feb. 15, 2006, as amended at 79 FR 40636, July 14, 2014]
**EXHIBIT32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

 

 

In connection with the accompanying QuarterlyReport of Bionova Holding Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ended September 30, 2003 (the “Report”), I, Arthur H. Finnel, ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, hereby certify that to my knowledge:

 

(1)           The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Dated:   December 2, 2003 |                     |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
|                                |                     |
|                                |                     | /S/ ARTHUR H. FINNEL |   |
|                                | Arthur H.  Finnel        |   |
|                                | Chief  Financial Officer |   |

 

----
Editorial Note on Part 61
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 61 appear at 64 FR 54539, Oct. 7, 1999.

§ 61.7 Review and appeal procedures. ( a ) An applicant may request a formal review of any adverse ruling rendered by the Attestation Officer. Such request for review must be made in writing and received no more than 30 days from the date of the Attestation Officer's decision.
( b ) The request for review must set forth all arguments which the applicant wishes to advance in support of his or her position and any data upon which such argument is based. A copy of the material for which certification or authentication has been denied must accompany the request for review. The request for review should be addressed as follows: Attestation Program Review Board ECA/GCV—Attestation Officer, Department of State, 301 4th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20547.
( c ) The Review Board shall render the applicant a written decision, reversing or affirming the ruling of the Attestation Officer, within 30 days from receipt of the request for review. Such decision shall constitute final administrative action.
#### A. S. Wikstrom, Inc., Appellant, v. State of New York, Respondent.

(Claim Nos. 33300, 34584.)

Judgment unanimously affirmed, without costs of this appeal to either party. (Appeal from judgment of Court of Claims dismissing two claims against the State.) Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ. [16 Misc 2d 587.]
#### Leathers *et al. v.*Leathers *et al.*

September 27, 1912.

Fish, C. J.

1. Where in a former suit between the same parties, and relating to the same subject-matter, a verdict and judgment were rendered against the defendant, whose motion for a new trial was overruled, and such judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court, a petition subsequently brought by the defendant, to review and set aside the verdict and judgment, was properly dismissed on general demurrer, where it appeared that the grounds for review were such as were known, or could by reasonable diligence have been discovered in time to incorporate them in the motion for new trial made in the former case.

2. Such petition for review was subject to dismissal, at any time before verdict, for failure to set out a cause of action.

*Judgment a'ffirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*

*741Equitable petition. Before Judge Edwards. Douglas superior court. March 23, 1911.

*J. 8.*James, for plaintiffs.

*H. W. Nalley*and *J. H. McLarty,*for defendants.
### §5716. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 5716 was editorially reclassified as section 11274 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
#### Bertram M. Ostrau et al., Appellants, v Harry M. Bobley et al., Respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on September 14, 1977, unanimously affirmed on the opinion of Riccobono, J. (See, *900also, *Levine v Silverman,*NYLJ, June 16, 1972, p 2, col 3.) Respondents shall recover of appellants $60 costs and disbursements of this appeal. Concur—Lupiano, J. P., Fein, Lane, Markewich and Sullivan, JJ.
§ 213.253 Premiums upon initial endorsement. ( a ) *Management and Sales Types and Investor Sponsored Projects.* The mortgagee, upon the initial endorsement of the mortgage for insurance, shall pay to the Commissioner a first mortgage insurance premium equal to one-half of one percent of the original face amount of the mortgage.
( b ) *Purchasing cooperatives.* The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section do not apply to the mortgage or a purchasing nonprofit cooperative housing corporation or trust where such mortgage is endorsed for insurance pursuant to the sale of an Investor Sponsored Project to such purchasing nonprofit cooperative housing corporation or trust.
( c ) *Existing Construction.* The provisions of paragraph (a) of the section shall apply to a mortgage covering Existing Construction which involves insurance of advances for Commissioner approved or required repairs, improvements, alterations and additions.
( d ) *Operating loss loans and supplementary loans.* The provisions of paragraph (a) of this section shall apply to any operating loss loan and to any supplementary loan, except a supplementary loan to finance the acquisition of an existing community facility.
EXHIBIT 99.7





VERMILION ENERGY INC.


CERTIFICATE OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER





Pursuant to Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code





In connection with the annual report of Vermilion Energy Inc. (the “Corporation”) on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Curtis Hicks, Chief Financial Officer of the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.





Dated at Calgary, Alberta, Canada this 11th day of March 2011.





(“Curtis W. Hicks”)____________________________________________CURTIS W. HICKS, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER











EXHIBIT 99.7
 
 VERMILION ENERGY INC.
 CERTIFICATE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 
 Pursuant to Section 906(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code
 
 In connection with the annual report of Vermilion Energy Inc. (the “Corporation”) on Form 40-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Lorenzo Donadeo, Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation.
 
 Dated at Calgary, Alberta, Canada this 11th day of March 2011.
  (“Lorenzo Donadeo”)____________________________________________LORENZO DONADEO, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
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 ORDER GRANTING ADMIN MOTION

TO REQUIRE COMPLETE SERVICE OF TAC

C-08-02658-RMW (HRL)

I. NEEL CHATTERJEE (STATE BAR NO. 173985)

nchatterjee@orrick.com

G. HOPKINS GUY, III (STATE BAR NO. 124811)

hopguy@orrick.com

THERESA A. SUTTON (STATE BAR NO. 211857)

tsutton@orrick.com

NITIN GAMBHIR (STATE BAR NO. 259906)

ngambhir@orrick.com

ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP

1000 Marsh Road

Menlo Park, CA 94025

Telephone: 650-614-7400

Facsimile: 650-614-7401

Attorneys for Defendant

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY KHARAGPUR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

M.A. MOBILE LTD., a limited liability

company chartered in Dominica; and 

MANDANA D. FARHANG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 

KHARAGPUR, an Indian Institute of 

Technology incorporated under the “Institutes 

of Technology Act, 1961”; TECHNOLOGY 

ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TRAINING 

SOCIETY, an Indian society; PARTHA P. 

CHAKRABARTI; PALLAB DASGUPTA; 

RAKESH GUPTA; PRAVANJAN 

CHOUDHRY; SUBRAT PANDA; 

ANIMESH NASKAR; and DOES 1 through 

100, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. C-08-02658-RMW (HRL)

ORDER GRANTING 

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF 

TECHNOLOGY, KHARAGPUR’S 

ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO 

REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO 

COMPLY WITH FED.R.CIV.P. 4 

AND GENERAL ORDER NO. 62, 

AND SETTING TIME TO RESPOND 

TO THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Dept: Courtroom 6, 4th Floor

Judge: Honorable Ronald M. Whyte

Case 3:08-cv-02658-WHO Document 160 Filed 07/06/10 Page 1 of 2
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- 1 - 

 ORDER GRANTING ADMIN MOTION

TO REQUIRE COMPLETE SERVICE OF TAC

C-08-02658-RMW (HRL)

Having considered Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur’s Administrative Motion to 

Require Plaintiffs to Comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 and General Order No. 62, and Setting Time to 

Respond to Complaint, and all papers in opposition thereto,

Good Cause appearing therefore, IIT’s Motion is GRANTED. After entry of a Stipulated

Protective Order, Plaintiffs must serve IIT with all exhibits attached to and incorporated in the 

Third Amended Complaint, after which IIT shall respond to the Third Amended Complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(3). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 6, 2010

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

. 

Case 3:08-cv-02658-WHO Document 160 Filed 07/06/10 Page 2 of 2
§ 180.660 Closing of record. ( a ) *Oral hearings.* Where there is an oral hearing, the hearing ends on the day of the adjournment of the oral hearing or, where written briefs are permitted, on the date that the written briefs are due.
( b ) *Hearing on written record.* Where the parties have waived an oral hearing, the hearing ends on the date set by the ALJ as the final date for the receipt of submissions by the parties.
( c ) *Receipt of evidence following hearing.* Following the end of the hearing, no additional evidence may be accepted into the record, except with the permission of the ALJ. The ALJ may receive additional evidence upon a determination that new and material evidence was not readily available before the end of the hearing, the evidence has been timely submitted, and its acceptance will not unduly prejudice the rights of the parties.
###### Editorial Note on Part 200

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 200 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

#### § 200.70 Location and fee interest.

The property must be held by an eligible mortgagor, and must conform with requirements pertaining to property location and fee or lease interests of the section of the Act under which the mortgage is insured.
### §7383j. Definition of Restricted Data

In this subchapter, the term "Restricted Data" has the meaning given that term in section 2014(y) of this title.

(Pub. L. 106–65, div. C, title XXXI, §3156, Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 942.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This subchapter, referred to in text, was in the original "this subtitle", meaning subtitle D of title XXXI of div. C of Pub. L. 106–65, Oct. 5, 1999, 113 Stat. 931, which is classified principally to this subchapter. For complete classification of subtitle D to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 7383 of this title and Tables.
### §3797o. Transferred

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section 3797o was editorially reclassified as section 10566 of Title 34, Crime Control and Law Enforcement.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Marcel Grant, Appellant.

[832 NYS2d 441]—

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (McKay, J.), rendered July 28, 2003, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the defense counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the indictment on the ground that there was an unreasonable delay in sentencing *(see*CPL 380.30 [1]; *People v Drake,*61 NY2d 359 [1984]) did not deprive him of meaningful representation *(see*US Const Sixth Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6; *Strickland v Washington,*466 US 668 [1984]; *People v Caban,*5 NY3d 143 [2005]; *People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708 [1998]). Skelos, J.P., Angiolillo, Carni and Balkin, JJ., concur.