______________________________________ 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 State of California
 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
 Attorney General
 

OPINION	 : 

: No. 92-306 

of :
 

:
 DANIEL E. LUNGREN :
 Attorney General	 : OCTOBER 21, 1992 

:
 GREGORY L. GONOT :
 Deputy Attorney General :
 

:
 

THE HONORABLE QUENTIN L. KOPP, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA 

SENATE, has requested an opinion on the following questions: 

1. May a city or county prohibit by ordinance the parking of particular categories of

vehicles on private property, such as private driveways, private residential streets, and private

commercial parking lots? 

2. If so, may a city or county enforce the ordinance by removing parked vehicles

from private property even if the vehicles are duly licensed and operational and on the private

property of their owners? 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. A city or county may generally prohibit by ordinance the parking of particular

categories of vehicles on private property, such as private driveways, private residential streets, and

private commercial parking lots. 

2. A city or county may enforce an ordinance prohibiting the parking of particular

categories of vehicles on private property by removing such vehicles even if they are duly licensed

and operational and on the private property of their owners, provided that due process requirements

have been met and the vehicles so parked have been declares by the ordinance to be public

nuisances. 

ANALYSIS 

We are informed that a city council is contemplating the enactment of an ordinance

prohibiting the parking of motor homes and other large recreational vehicles, including those with

boat trailers attached, in certain residential and business areas of the city. The primary purpose of 

the ordinance would be to enhance the city's appearance. The questions to be resolved are whether 
such an ordinance would be valid, and if so, may the ordinance be enforced by the removal of any

vehicle in violation thereof. 

1. Validity of the Ordinance 

The general authority of cities and counties to adopt regulations and ordinances is

set forth in Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution: 

"A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police,

sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." 

This authority, often referred to as the "police power," is thus a plenary power subject only to the

limitations that it be exercised by cities and counties within their territorial limits and be subordinate

to state law. Apart from these limitations, a city's or county's police power is as broad as the police

power exercisable by the Legislature itself. (Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High

School Dist. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 885; Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 140;

73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 28, 29-30 (1990); 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13, 13-14 (1990).) Of course, the 

exercise of the police power by the Legislature or by cities and counties is subject to the limitations

imposed by the state and federal Constitutions. Among these limitations are the requirements that

the ordinance be rationally related to a legitimate governmental concern (Metromedia, Inc. v. City

of San Diego (1981) 453 U.S. 490, 512; Schad v. Mt. Ephraim (1981) 452 U.S. 61, 68), that it does

not result in the taking of property without just compensation (Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24

Cal.3d 266, 272-273, 277; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. _____ [120

L.Ed. 2d 798]), and that it does not result in the deprivation of property without notice and the

opportunity to be heard (Conner v. City of Santa Ana (9th Cir. 1970) 897 F.2d 1487, 1492). 

Generally speaking, ordinances which restrict parking on private property are enacted

for purposes of promoting traffic safety or enhancing the appearance of a city or county, both of

which have been found by the United States Supreme Court to be substantial governmental interests.

(Metromedia, Inc.v. City of San Diego, supra, 453 U.S 490, 507-508.) Regulations to further these

two goals fall within the permissible bounds of the police power of a city or county. (Duffy v. City

of Arcadia (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 308, 311.) In People v. Tolman (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d. Supp.

6, 10, an ordinance prohibiting the parking on private property of registered commercial vehicles

weighing more than three tons was upheld by the court because it bore "an adequate relation to the

general welfare by being considered as a regulation of the aesthetic appearance of residential

neighborhoods." 

Recently in Crown Motors v. City of Redding (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 173, the court

dealt with a challenge to an ordinance which banned electronic reader-board signs based upon a city

finding that "such signs are aesthetically displeasing and out of harmony with the character of this

community so as to constitute visual blight which reduces the quality of life within the community

to the extent that the overall public health is detrimentally affected." (Id., at pp. 176-177.) The court 

upheld the ordinance, stating: 

"Crown Motors contends 'public health' cannot be equated with 'aesthetics.'

Since the city council referred to aesthetics as the justification for adopting the

urgency ordinance, Crown Motors maintains the city council could not base the

immediate effectiveness of the ordinance on public health. We disagree. 

"The United States Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of basing

restrictive local legislation on aesthetic concerns. ' It is well settled that the state 

may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance aesthetic values.' (City 

2 92-306
 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent (1984) 466 U.S. 789, 805 [80 L.Ed.2d 772, 787, 

104 S.Ct. 2118].) Further, '[t]he Constitution itself confers upon all cities and

counties the power to 'make and enforce within [their] limits all local, police,

sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with the general laws.'

(Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) A city's police power under this provision can be applied

only within its own territory and is subject to displacement by general state law but

otherwise is as broad as the police power exercisable by the Legislature itself.' 

(Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 140, italics added.) 

" ' Public health' must be interpreted according to the circumstances in which

it is used. It is 'not susceptible to accurate definition since it takes on new definitions

when new conditions arise, but generally speaking, it means the wholesome

condition of the community at large.' (Chisholm v. California Jockey Club (1958)

164 Cal.App.2d 367, 369, quoting 39 C.J.S., Health, § 1, p. 811.) The city council

has broad powers in enacting ordinances to maintain the public health within its

jurisdiction. (Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners (1972) 7

Cal.3d 64, 72; Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) 

"We see no reason to restrict from these broad powers, within the spectrum

of public health, the power of the city council to advance the quality of life in the

community by eliminating visual blight. Mental health is certainly included in the 

public health. `[T]he city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life

is one that must be accorded high respect.' (Young v. American Mini Theatres (1976)

427 U.S. 50, 71 [49 L.Ed.2d 310, 327, 96 S.Ct. 2440], quoted in City Council v. 

Taxpayers for Vincent, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 807 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 789].) The broad 

definition of public health and the city council's broad powers to implement general

policy lead us to conclude aesthetics may be properly considered a public health

matter under the circumstances of this case." 

For purposes of this analysis, we will assume that the ordinance to which the question

refers would in fact bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. The focus of 

our inquiry then becomes whether the ordinance would conflict with California's general laws and

thereby violate Article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution. In the context of the question

before us, the Vehicle Code represents the area of general law with which the ordinance would be

most apt to be in conflict. To the extent that it occupies certain fields of law, such as traffic

regulation and control, the Vehicle Code preempts local legislative action. (See Rumford v. City of

Berkeley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 545, 551; City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa (1979) 91

Cal.App.3d 749, 755-756; 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13, 14 (1990).) 

The Vehicle Code contains its own preemption rule in section 21,1/ which provides

as follows: 

"Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this code are

applicable and uniform throughout the state and in all counties and municipalities

therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters

covered by this code unless expressly authorized therein." 

1. All section references hereafter to the Vehicle Code are by section number only. 

3 92-306 
In answering the first question presented, we are thus concerned with whether the Vehicle Code

covers the parking of particular categories of vehicles on private property and, if so, whether it

contains any provisions which expressly authorize cities and counties to enact their own regulations

in that area. As there are different considerations implicit in each of the three types of parking

ordinances outlined in the question, we will address each in turn. 

A. Parking of Vehicles on Private Driveways 

The need for regulating vehicles parked in driveways2/ would most likely arise from

the "visual blight" which may be engendered when the presence of a certain type of parked vehicle

is inconsistent with the use of the property permitted under city or county land use regulations.

Blight control or nuisance ordinances typically prohibit such things as the parking of construction

and commercial vehicles in areas zoned for residential uses, the parking of inoperable vehicles for

more than a certain length of time in residential areas, and the parking of trailers, motor homes, and

recreational vehicles in front yard setback areas (which may or may not include driveways) for more

than a certain length of time. (See People v. Tolman, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6; Sechrist v. 

Municipal Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 737; In re Scarpitti (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 431.) Such 

ordinances are concerned with the local use of property and are generally grounded in zoning laws. 

The Vehicle Code, on the other hand, primarily seeks to achieve uniform regulation

in the enforcement of matters relating to traffic control, traffic safety, and vehicle equipment.

(Rumford v. City of Berkeley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 545, 550; City of Lafayette v. County of Contra

Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d 749, 755.) Parking on private driveways, as distinguished from parking

on private roads used for vehicular traffic, would have at most only an indirect effect upon traffic

control or safety. The Vehicle Code does not preclude regulations enacted for non-traffic purposes

which only incidentally affect the preempted field. (People v. Mueller (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 849,

954.) 

At most, then, we believe that the regulation of parking on private driveways would

be an exercise of local authority which would only affect incidentally the fields of traffic control and

traffic safety. Therefore, a local entity may, consistent with constitutional requirements, enact an

ordinance prohibiting the parking of certain categories of vehicles on private driveways. 

B. Parking of Vehicles on Private Residential Streets 

2. "Parking" is defined in section 463 as follows: 

" ' Park or parking' shall mean the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or

not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while actually engaged in

loading or unloading merchandise or passengers." 

The term "private road or driveway" is defined in section 490 as: 

". . . a way or place in private ownership and used for vehicular travel by the

owner and those having express or implied permission from the owner but not by

other members of the public." 

The terms "parking" and "driveway" are used in the Vehicle Code with reference to vehicular

activity on roads and in parking lots. (See §§ 21107, 22108, 21111, 21360, 21804.) 

4 92-306 
 

It has long been recognized that the right to exclusive control of vehicular traffic on 

public streets and highways resides with the state. (Pipoly v. Benson (1942) 20 Cal.2d 366, 372- 373; City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d 749, 753-756; 64 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 710 (1981).) And it is well-established that the regulation of parking on

public streets and highways is a legitimate aid to such traffic control and regulation. (County of Los

Angeles v. City of Alhambra (1980) 27 Cal.3d 184, 192-193.) We have previously concluded that 

the state has preempted local legislation dealing with parking on public streets and highways. (64

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 710 (1981).) 

In order to determine whether a city or county is preempted from enacting an

ordinance which would prohibit the parking of vehicles on private roadways, we must properly

apply the prohibition of section 21 that "no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on

the matters covered by the code unless expressly authorized herein." (Emphasis added.) As we 

stated in 30 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 69, 71 (1957): 

". . . the Vehicle Code is composed of several fields of law, and the problem becomes

to determine with respect to each field whether the Legislature intended to fully

occupy that field. . . ." 

We have previously determined that, within the field of vehicular noise limits, control

over noise with respect to off-highway use directed at vehicle operators was not covered by the

Vehicle Code (55 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 178, (1972)); that within the field of drivers' and operators'

licenses, the matter of licensing the operators of self-propelled wheelchairs was not covered by the

traffic laws division of the Vehicle Code (30 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 69 (1957));3/

 that within the field 

of fire or public safety, the matter of parking a vehicle on that portion of a private way which had 

been designated a fire lane was either a matter not covered by the Vehicle Code or one that only

incidentally affected the field (traffic control and regulation) preempted by the code (64

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707 (1981)); and that within the fields of traffic control and public safety, at least 

as to public streets and highways, the matter of parking of vehicles was covered by the Vehicle Code

and was subject to a limited exception permitting local authorities to prohibit the parking of vehicles

on certain streets or highways (73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13 (1990)).4/ 

3. At the time the cited opinion was issued, Vehicle Code preemption extended only to

the division of the code dealing with traffic laws.

 4. The exception at issue in 73 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13 (1990) is contained in section

22507. It permits local authorities to prohibit or restrict the stopping, parking, or standing of

vehicles, including, but not limited to, vehicles which are six feet or more in height (including any

load thereon) within 100 feet of any intersection, on certain streets or highways, or portions thereof

during all or certain hours of the day. This provision does not restrict parking on private roads

because, by its own terms, it applies to streets and highways, which under section 360 are defined

as "way[s] or place[s] of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for 

vehicular travel. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the provision is not relevant to the issue of

preemption of local legislation in matters of parking on private roads or driveways. Where, 

however, a city or county has elected to apply the Vehicle Code to private roads pursuant to section

231107.5 (see infra), an ordinance which makes private roads subject to the restrictions authorized

by section 22507 would not be in conflict with state law. Our 1990 opinion included an

interpretation of section 22507, unrelated to the present inquiry, that was rejected by the Court of

Appeal in People v. Garth (1991) 224 Cal.App.3d 1797, 1800-1801. 

5 92-306
 
Here, the field in question may be considered to be traffic control, public safety, or 

blight control. The first of these fields is, as we have seen, preempted as to the parking of vehicles 

on public ways. However, with respect to the parking of vehicles on private roads, it appears that

such matter is only partially covered by the code. We made the following observation in 64 

Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 711 (1981): 

"At the time Vehicle Code section 21 was enacted in 1959, only five

provisions concerning traffic control and regulation on private property were in

effect. (§§ 21107 (based on former § 458.5); 21108 (based on former § 459.3);

21111 (based on former § 459.7); 22500 (based on former §§ 586(a), 586.1); and

22503 (based on former § 588(b), (c)).) The former sections authorized local 

authorities to enact traffic regulations with respect to certain private roads, but it

cannot be said that the code coverage was comprehensive. In fact, there are currently

no provisions which specifically regulate the parking of vehicles on private

roadways." 

As in our 1981 opinion, there are still no current provisions of the Vehicle Code

which specifically and directly regulate the parking of vehicles on private roadways. Instead, there 

are three provisions which allow local authorities to make the Vehicle Code applicable to certain

privately owned and maintained roads. Section 21107.5 governs roads that are generally held open

for use by the public for vehicular travel and which so connect with highways that the public cannot

determine that the roads are not highways, provided the owner has not already posted the road as

being privately owned and maintained and not subject to public traffic regulations or control.

Section 21107.6 concerns roads which are generally held open to the public for purposes of

vehicular travel to serve commercial establishments, provided the owner has not already posted the

road. The third is section 21107.7 which relates to roads not generally held open for use of the

public for purposes of vehicular travel but which, by reason of their proximity to or connection with

highways, would better serve the interests of the residents residing along the roads and the motoring

public by being made subject to the code, provided that a majority of the road owners request such

action. 

In addition, sections 21108 and 21111 permit local authorities to adopt rules and

regulations for the purpose of regulating vehicles on privately owned and maintained roads in

private airports and publicly operated housing projects, provided that the rules or regulations are

implemented by the posting of appropriate signs along such roads. Finally, section 21107 permits

cities having no publicly maintained city streets to adopt rules and regulations to regulate vehicular

traffic on privately owned and maintained roads, provided again that the rules or regulations are

implemented by the posting of signs. 

This pattern of legislative activity regarding regulation of private roads shows an

intent by the Legislature that, except in narrow circumstances, the Vehicle Code is to apply

wherever there is a need for traffic control and regulation. Uniformity of regulation in the

enforcement of matters relating to traffic control is a primary goal of the Vehicle Code (§ 21), and

where traffic on private roads is such that it requires regulation, the rules as between public and

private roads should be uniform to the extent possible. Thus, under our view of Vehicle Code 

preemption principles, if the local authority seeks to prohibit the parking of particular categories of

vehicles on private residential streets for reasons of traffic regulation and control, it would be 

limited to the adoption of whatever restrictions the Vehicle Code itself affords. 

With respect to the field of public safety, greater latitude exists for local authorities

to enact ordinances regulating parking on private residential streets. In 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707,

711 (1981), we determined that the Vehicle Code did not preempt local legislation in the field of 

6 92-306
 
public safety with respect to the parking of vehicles on private ways, although such matter was

partially covered by the code. We there observed that: 

". . . while the Legislature has exhibited concern with respect to the field of

fire or public safety as to public streets and highways (e.g., §§ 22104 (prohibiting Uturn in front of a fire station), 22500(d) (prohibiting parking within 15 feet of the

entrance of any fire station), 22514 (prohibiting parking within 15 feet of a fire

hydrant) and 22651(e) (permitting the removal of an illegally parked vehicle so as

to allow access by fire fighting equipment to a fire hydrant when it is impractical to

move the vehicle to another point on the highway)), it has not done so with respect

to private ways. We would note that section 35701 of the Streets and Highways 

Code states: 

" ' Any agreement to maintain parking meters on a public way shall not affect 

the right of a city, acting by virtue of its police power, to control, regulate, or 

prohibit the parking of vehicles on any public way, or portion thereof, to the extent 

necessary to protect the public safety.' (Emphases added.)" (Ibid.) 

If the purpose of an ordinance prohibiting the parking of particular categories of

vehicles on private residential streets is that of blight control, we have a situation similar to that

discussed above in connection with private driveways. Here again, the Vehicle Code does not cover

what is essentially a land use regulation. Unlike the driveway situation, traffic regulation and

control is implicated to the extent that the ordinance deals with roadways, but that state interest

would appear to be only incidentally affected. As a blight control ordinance and not a traffic

ordinance, the prohibition against parking on private residential streets may be viewed in the same

light as the ordinance at issue in People v. Deacon (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d Supp. 29. The holding of

that case was made clear in 64 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 707, 712 (1981), footnote 3: 

"In People v. Deacon (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d Supp. 29, the appellate

department of the Los Angeles County Superior Court declared that there was no

validity to the argument that regulation of private roads had been preempted by the 

state. (Id., at Supp. 32-33.) The court was concerned with an ordinance which 

forbade motorcycle riding on an easement within Catalina Island. (Id., at Supp. 31.)

It was determined that the ordinance was not a traffic ordinance but one regulating

the use of a particular and unique land area available for recreational purposes. (Id., 

at Supp. 32.) In other words, the Deacon court concluded that any state regulation

of private roads had not preempted the field as to environmental matters." 

Similarly, it may be said here that the state's preemption of the field of traffic control and regulation

does not extend to matters of blight control on private roads. 

C. Parking of Vehicles in Private Commercial Parking Lots 

The principal Vehicle Code provision affecting private commercial parking lots is

section 21107.8. It permits cities and counties to determine that there are privately owned and

maintained off-street parking facilities within their boundaries that are generally held open for use

by the public and thereby cause those facilities to become subject to specified provisions of the

Vehicle Code. The code provisions applicable to private off-street parking facilities by means of

section 21107.8 are sections 22350 (basic speed law), 23103 (reckless driving), 23109 (speed

contests and exhibitions of speed), and Division 16.5 (off-highway vehicles). In addition, there are 

two code provisions dealing with parking which are independently applicable to off-street parking 

7 92-306
 
facilities: section 22507.8 (parking on privately maintained off-street parking facilities with respect

to disabled persons) and section 22500.1 (parking in a fire lane in off-street parking facilities). 

Unlike the situation with respect to vehicular activity on private streets, only selected

portions of the code may be made applicable to vehicular activity in private commercial parking lots.

Other than Division 16.5, which pertains to off-highway vehicles, the provisions made applicable

through section 21107.8 deal exclusively with hazardous vehicular movement. The act of parking

a vehicle in an off-street parking facility is thus governed by only two specialized code provisions,

sections 22507.8 and 22500.1. This minimal application of state law to privately owned and

maintained off-street parking facilities indicates a legislative intent not to preempt local legislation

in the field of traffic regulation and control, or any other field, as to matters of parking in such

facilities. We thus conclude that local authorities may regulate off-street parking facilities with

respect to the parking of certain categories of vehicles. 

2. Enforcement of the Ordinance 

We are next asked to determine whether an ordinance which prohibits the parking

of particular categories of vehicles on private property may be enforced by removal of the offending

vehicles even if the vehicles are duly licensed and operational and on the private property of their 

owners. As previously discussed, such ordinances will generally not conflict with or be preempted

by state law when enacted for reasons of public safety or aesthetics. However, preemption remains

an issue in connection with the removal of the vehicles in violation of those enactments. 

With the Legislature's enactment of Chapter 10 of the Vehicle Code, the state has

entered the field of vehicle removal (see § 22650, et seq.). Under the provisions of section 22651,

subdivision (n), local authorities may remove vehicles from posted areas where, by resolution or

ordinance, parking has been prohibited and removal authorized. With regard to vehicles parked on

private property, the property owner may seek removal pursuant to sections 22658 and 22658.2.

Vehicle removals from private property are also authorized under the following circumstances: an 

alarm device has been activated within a vehicle parked in a residential area and the owner of the

vehicle cannot be located within 45 minutes (§ 22651.5); a report has previously been made that the

vehicle has been stolen or a complaint has been filed and a warrant issued charging that the vehicle

has been embezzled (§ 22653, subd. (a)); the vehicle has been involved in, and left at the scene of,

a traffic accident and no owner is available to grant permission to remove the vehicle (§ 22653,

subd. (b)); and the vehicle has been used in the commission of a public offense or the vehicle

contains evidence, not readily removable, which tends to show that a crime has been committed (§

22655.5). In addition, cities and counties may, pursuant to sections 22660 and 22661, remove

abandoned, wrecked, dismantled, or inoperative vehicles from private or public property when such

vehicles constitute public nuisances. 

It is evident that the vehicle removal statutes go beyond matters of traffic regulation 

and control. Two of the statutes, sections 22651.5 and 22660, deal substantively with the abatement

of nuisances, an area which encompasses the principal means of physically enforcing blight control

ordinances.5/ When the parking of certain vehicles on private property is found by local authorities

to constitute a form of blight, such parking may be said to fall within the definition of "nuisance" 

5. The remainder of this analysis concerns removal of vehicles for reasons of blight 

control. The preemption and constitutional considerations therein would also apply to removals

under a valid ordinance which finds the parking of certain categories of vehicles on private property

to be a threat to public safety. 

8 92-306
 
contained in Civil Code section 3479. That definition includes anything "offensive to the senses."

A public nuisance is one that affects an entire community or neighborhood or any considerable

number of persons. (Civ. Code, § 3480.) Local governments have broad discretion in designating 

public nuisances. (See People v. Johnson (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 1, 6-7.) A public nuisance may 

be abated by any public body or authorized officer. (Civ. Code, § 3494.) Authority for the

abatement of nuisances by municipalities is specifically provided in Government Code section

38771, et seq. 

Although the Vehicle Code covers removal of vehicles from public streets, (e.g., §§

22651, 22651.2) and addresses itself to the removal of certain vehicular nuisances on private

property, the authority of local governments to abate a public nuisance is too well established for

us to conclude that the Vehicle Code leaves cities and counties no additional room to use that 

authority when the offensive condition is caused by an operable vehicle parked on a private street

or driveway. The limited circumstances under which the Vehicle Code provides for abatement of

vehicular nuisances does not demonstrate a comprehensive treatment of local needs at the state level

(see Galvan v. Superior Court (1969) 70 Cal.2d 851) and therefore is not indicative of a paramount 

state concern. In the absence of a paramount state concern, additional local regulation is permitted

in an area partially covered by state law. (See In re Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, 128.) 

Finally, it should be noted that, as with the act of prohibiting the parking of certain

types of vehicles on private property, the act of removing such vehicles is subject to constitutional

limitations, particularly the search warrant and procedural due process (notice and hearing)

requirements. Constitutional issues regarding vehicle removal under a nuisance ordinance were

recently considered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Conner v. City of Santa Ana, supra,

897 F.2d 1487. There, the court held that the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment

applies to entries onto private land to abate known nuisances. (Id., at pp. 1490-1492.)6/

 With regard

to the procedural due process requirements of notice and hearing, the court stated that these rights

must be granted before the government may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property

interest. (Id., at pp. 1492-1493.) No violation of procedural due process was found by the court

under the circumstances presented because the owners had been afforded notice and several

opportunities to be heard before their automobiles were seized by the city. (Id., at p. 1493.) 

We thus conclude that if applicable constitutional requirements are observed, a city

or county may remove a duly licensed and operational vehicle from the private property of its owner

when the presence of the vehicle is in violation of a valid ordinance which declares the parking of

particular categories of vehicles on private property to be a public nuisance. 

* * * * * 

6. In fact, as noted by the court, the State of California has set out the procedures for

obtaining a warrant for inspecting nuisances. (Code Civ. Pro., § 1822.50, et seq.) 

9 92-306