alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FORM 10-Q AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          46,931
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 1,800
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                  3,150,300
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                      3,922,695
<ALLOWANCE>                                     39,779
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,416,947
<DEPOSITS>                                   4,014,668
<SHORT-TERM>                                   991,727
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            204,405
<LONG-TERM>                                  1,596,806
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           792
<OTHER-SE>                                     608,549
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>               7,416,947
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 73,176
<INTEREST-INVEST>                               62,065
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   233
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                               135,474
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              42,424
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              82,458
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           53,016
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             (7,784)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 18,641
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 31,170
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                      23,494
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    23,494
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.35
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.35
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.21
<LOANS-NON>                                     11,420
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
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<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                 10,504
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                40,155
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      460
<RECOVERIES>                                        84
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                               39,779
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</TABLE>
§ 221.280 Waived title objections. ( a ) *General provisions.* All of the provisions of § 203.389 of this chapter (relating to the waiver by the Commissioner of objections to title) shall apply to mortgages insured under this subpart, with the exception of mortgages involving condominium units.
( b ) *Provisions applicable to condominium units.* Where the mortgage involves a condominium unit, the Commissioner shall not object to title by reason of the following matters: ( 1 ) Violations of a restriction based on race, color, or creed, even where such restriction provides for a penalty of reversion or forfeiture of title or a lien for liquidated damage.
( 2 ) Easements for public utilities along one or more of the property lines, provided the exercise of the rights thereunder do not interfere with any of the buildings or improvements located on the subject property.
( 3 ) Encroachments on the subject property by improvements on adjoining property, provided such encroachments do not interfere with the use of any improvements on the subject property.
( 4 ) Variations between the length of the subject property lines as shown on the application for insurance and as shown by the record or possession lines, provided such variations do not interfere with the use of any of the improvements on the subject property.
( 5 ) Customary buildings or use restrictions for breach of which there is no reversion and which have not been violated to a material extent.
### §1473d. Insurance costs covering vehicles, aircraft, and boats operated by Department of the Interior in Canada and Mexico

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, in fiscal year 1992 and thereafter, appropriations in this title 1 shall be available to provide insurance on official motor vehicles, aircraft, and boats operated by the Department of the Interior in Canada and Mexico.

(Pub. L. 102–154, title I, §107, Nov. 13, 1991, 105 Stat. 1012.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This title, referred to in text, is title I of Pub. L. 102–154, Nov. 13, 1991, 105 Stat. 990, known as the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Prior Similar Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in the following prior appropriation acts:

Pub. L. 101–512, title I, §108, Nov. 5, 1990, 104 Stat. 1936.

Pub. L. 101–121, title I, §108, Oct. 23, 1989, 103 Stat. 720.

Pub. L. 100–446, title I, §108, Sept. 27, 1988, 102 Stat. 1801.

Pub. L. 100–202, §101(g) [title I, §109], Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1329–213, 1329–234.

Pub. L. 99–500, §101(h) [title I, §109], Oct. 18, 1986, 100 Stat. 1783–242, 1783–261, and Pub. L. 99–591, §101(h) [title I, §109], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341–242, 3341–261.

Pub. L. 99–190, §101(d) [title I, §109], Dec. 19, 1985, 99 Stat. 1224, 1243.

Pub. L. 98–473, title I, §101(c) [title I, §110], Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1837, 1855.

Pub. L. 98–146, title I, §111, Nov. 4, 1983, 97 Stat. 937.

1 See References in Text note below.
#### Brown *v.*The State.

November 13, 1912.

Indictment for rape. Before Judge Martin. Pulaski superior court. August 1, 1912.

*M. H. Boyer*and *W. L. & Warren Grice,*for plaintiff in error.

*T. 8. Felder, attorney-general,*and *E. D. Graham, solicitor-general,*contra.

Fish, C. J.

1. Upon the trial of one under an indictment for rape, the court did not err (the evidence authorizing it) in instructing the jury: “If you believe and find from the evidence submitted in this case that the defendant now on trial had carnal knowledge of Penny Jones [the prosecutrix, and the wife of another], and that at the time she was asleep and not consenting, or having given the defendant any reason to believe she consented, and the sexual connection was against her will, the jury would be authorized to find that the act was one of rape. Carnal knowledge of a woman while she is asleep and unconscious of the act, and her body being penetrated before she awakes, would be against her will and without her consent, and would constitute the offense of rape, unless she had given the party charged with the rape some reason to believe that she consented to the act.” Reg. *v.*Mayers, 12 Cox’s Crim. Cases, 311; Reg. *v.*Young, 14 Ib. 114; Harvey *v.*State, 53 Ark. 425 (14 S. W. 645, 22 Am. St. R. 229); Maupin *v.*State (Ark.), 14 S. W. 924; Malone *v.*Com., 91 Ky. 307 (15 S. W. 856); Payne *v.*State, 40 Tex. Cr. 202 (49 S. W. 604, 76 Am. St. R. 712); State *v.*Shroyer, 104 Mo. 441 (16 S. W. 286, 24 Am. St. R. 344); State *v.*Welch, 191 Mo. 179 (89 S. W. 945). In *Gore*v. *State,*119 *Ga.*418 (46 S. E. 671, 100 Am. St. R. 182), it was held that the words, “against her will,” in the definition of rape, are synonymous with “without her consent,” and that therefore: “A man who has sexual intercourse with an imbecile- female who is mentally incapable of expressing any intelligent assent or dissent, or of exercising any judgment in the matter, is guilty of rape, though no more force be used than is necessary to accomplish the carnal act, and though the woman offer no resistance.” This ruling in effect authorized the instruction complained of. See also *Carter*v. *State,*35 *Ga.*263; Com. *v.*Burke, 105 Mass. 376 (7 Am. R. 531).

2. Failure to charge upon the subject of impeachment of witnesses, and as to the rule in reference to reconciliation of conflicting testimony, is not cause for a' new trial, in the absence of appropriate and timely written requests to instruct in reference thereto. *Lewis*v. *State,*125 *Ga.*48 (53 S. E. 816), and cit.; *Lewis*v. *State,*129 *Ga.*731 (59 S. E. 782); *Alford*v. *State,*137 *Ga.*459 (73 S. E. 375); *McCrary*v. *State,*137 *Ga.*784 (74 S. E. 536).

3. There was evidence to support the verdict, and the court did not err in refusing a new trial. *Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Exhibit 99

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE


         ARC COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDES UPDATE TO LETTER OF INTENT TO MERGE
                       WITH WI-FI PROVIDER ROOMLINX, INC.


TINTON FALLS, NJ - September 19, 2003 - ARC COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (OTCBB: ACOC)
("ARC"), a full service media and technology communications firm, announced
today that it has amended its Letter of Intent to merge with privately held
RoomLinX, Inc., a leading provider of wireless fidelity ("Wi-Fi") high-speed
Internet network solutions to the hospitality industry. As contemplated under
the terms of the amended Letter of Intent, the transaction will involve a
corporate name change, and a change in the overall strategic direction of the
firm. Under the amended capitalization structure, following the merger, Arc
shares will be held 3/4 by RoomLinX shareholders and 1/4 by Arc shareholders.
The merger is subject to a number of conditions, including a capital raise of
$500,000, Mr. Robert Lunde entering into an Agreement to become CEO, and
execution of a definitive agreement. It is anticipated that the merger will
close in the fourth quarter of 2003.

RoomLinX's fully supported networks allow hotel, conference facility, and other
venue operators, to provide their guests with fast, reliable, and most
importantly, easy to use Wi-Fi broadband access. RoomLinX currently provides
services to hotels, convention centers, corporate apartments and special event
participants throughout the US, Canada and UK. RoomLinX operates some of the
largest Wi-Fi visitor based networks (VBN) in the Hospitality industry, serving
such clients as Westin, Sheraton, Ian Schrager, Dolce International and Hampton
Inn hotel chains. The firm has secured Wi-Fi service and support agreements for
over 10,000 hotel rooms. More information about RoomLinX can be found on their
web site http://www.roomlinx.com.

Arc Communications, Inc. offers a full-range of high-tech communications
products and services for clients. Information on Arc is available on its web
site http://www.arcomm.com.

The information contained in this press release, including any ``forward-looking
statements'' within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 and
Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contained herein, should be
reviewed in conjunction with the Company's Annual Report on Form 10-K and other
publicly available information regarding the Company, copies of which are
available from the Company upon request. Such publicly available information
sets forth many risks and uncertainties related to the Company's business and
such statements, including risks and uncertainties related to that are
unpredictable and outside of the influence and/or control of the Company.


Contact:

Arc Communications, Inc.
Michael Rubel, 732-224-7988
### §7384v. Assistance for claimants and potential claimants

#### (a) Assistance for claimants

The President shall, upon the receipt of a request for assistance from a claimant under the compensation program, provide assistance to the claimant in connection with the claim, including—

(1) assistance in securing medical testing and diagnostic services necessary to establish the existence of a covered beryllium illness, chronic silicosis, or cancer; and

(2) such other assistance as may be required to develop facts pertinent to the claim.

#### (b) Assistance for potential claimants

The President shall take appropriate actions to inform and assist covered employees who are potential claimants under the compensation program, and other potential claimants under the compensation program, of the availability of compensation under the compensation program, including actions to—

(1) ensure the ready availability, in paper and electronic format, of forms necessary for making claims;

(2) provide such covered employees and other potential claimants with information and other support necessary for making claims, including—

(A) medical protocols for medical testing and diagnosis to establish the existence of a covered beryllium illness, chronic silicosis, or cancer; and

(B) lists of vendors approved for providing laboratory services related to such medical testing and diagnosis; and

(3) provide such additional assistance to such covered employees and other potential claimants as may be required for the development of facts pertinent to a claim.

#### (c) Information from beryllium vendors and other contractors

As part of the assistance program provided under subsections (a) and (b), and as permitted by law, the Secretary of Energy shall, upon the request of the President, require a beryllium vendor or other Department of Energy contractor or subcontractor to provide information relevant to a claim or potential claim under the compensation program to the President.

(Pub. L. 106–398, §1 [div. C, title XXXVI, §3631], Oct. 30, 2000, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–508.)

#### **Executive Documents**

#### Delegation of Functions

For delegation of certain functions of the President under this section, see Ex. Ord. No. 13179, Dec. 7, 2000, 65 F.R. 77487, set out as a note under section 7384 of this title.
(January 26, 1961)

#### Victor Seroff v. Simon & Schuster, Inc.

Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied, with $10 costs. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Valente, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
#### Robert Di Resto et al., Respondents, v Long Island Lighting Company, Appellant. (And Third-Party Action.)

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated September 26, 1977, which granted plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order and denied defendant’s cross motion to compel compliance with its notice of discovery and inspection. Order reversed, with $50 costs and disbursements; motion denied and cross motion granted; and plaintiffs are directed to comply with item 2 of the notice of discovery and inspection; items 3, 4 and 5 of the notice were sought only as an alternative to discovery and inspection of item 2. The latter was not a privileged item and is within the proper realm of discoverable material. Damiani, J. P., Titone, Suozzi and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SAN

MATEO HOTEL EMPLOYEES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

LADY LUCK GOURMET LLC, d/b/a GO

BISTRO,

Defendant. /

No. C 09-01544 SI

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs filed this ERISA action on April 8, 2009, alleging that defendant violated the terms

of a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) and certain Trust Agreements by failing to make regular

contributions to the San Mateo Hotel and Restaurant Employees Welfare and Pension Funds (“Trust

Funds”), of which plaintiffs are trustees. Plaintiffs seek damages for unpaid contributions, liquidated

damages, interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and injunctive relief.

Defendant failed to answer the complaint or otherwise appear in this action, and default was

entered on September 1, 2009. On February 9, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment.

After holding a hearing on the motion, Magistrate Judge Zimmerman issued a Report and

Recommendation recommending that plaintiffs’ motion be granted, subject to certain modifications.

The matter was subsequently reassigned to this Court.

The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation. The Court hereby ADOPTS the

Report and Recommendation in full and GRANTS plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment. (Docket

Nos. 32, 25). The Court orders that default judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and against

defendant as follows:

Case 3:09-cv-01544-SI Document 35 Filed 04/08/10 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Damages for unpaid contributions: $94,784.29

Liquidated damages: $9,478.44

Interest: $1,517.71

Attorneys’ fees: $1,110.00

Costs: $740.00

TOTAL: $107,630.44

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 8, 2010 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01544-SI Document 35 Filed 04/08/10 Page 2 of 2
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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY BENDER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

NOKIA INC.,

Defendant. /

No. C-09-1247 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR RELIEF FROM NONDISPOSITIVE

PRETRIAL ORDER OF MAGISTRATE

JUDGE

Before the Court is plaintiff Gregory Bender’s (“Bender”) “Motion for Relief from

Nondispositive Pretrial Order of Magistrate Judge,” filed July 1, 2010. Having read and

considered the motion, the Court DENIES the motion: 

1. To the extent Bender argues that the magistrate judge’s finding that his

“infringement contentions and related claim charts lack the specificity necessary to comply

with the requirements of Patent L.R. 3-1" (Pl.’s Mot., 1), he has failed to demonstrate that

such finding “is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)

(providing that a district court judge must set aside any part of an order that is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law). Specifically, Bender has failed to demonstrate that the

magistrate judge erred by ordering him to amend his infringement contentions to comply

with Patent L.R. 3-1, or that his infringement contentions already meet the specificity

requirements thereof. 

Case 3:09-cv-01247-MMC Document 59 Filed 07/15/10 Page 1 of 2
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2. To the extent Bender challenges the magistrate judge’s decision to “limit[]” his

amendment “to the single product specifically charted in his infringement contentions,” to

wit, a “Nokia 6205 cell phone” (Pl.’s Mot., 2), Bender fails to show that such decision is

clearly erroneous or is contrary to law for the reason that he failed to identify that good

cause exists for amendment. See Patent L.R. 3-6 (“Amendment of the Infringement

Contentions or the Invalidity Contentions may be made only by order of the Court upon a

timely showing of good cause.”) 

3. To the extent Bender asserts that the magistrate judge should not have enforced

a standing order on discovery that “does not permit the submission of additional materials[,]

like declarations[,] in support of one’s position” (Pl.’s Mot., 5), there is no indication in the

record before the Court that Bender sought leave from the magistrate judge to present

such materials. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2010 /s/ Charles R. Breyer 

CHARLES R. BREYER for

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01247-MMC Document 59 Filed 07/15/10 Page 2 of 2
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T R OZ A S T E P AN YA N, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 10- 71627 A ge nc yN o. A 095- 582- 751 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

a n O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d O c t obe r9, 2012 ** B efo re: R A W L IN S O N , M U R G U IA , an dW A T F O R D , C i rcu i tJu d g es. R oza S t epanyan, a nat i ve of Ir an and ci t i ze n o f A rm eni a, pet i t i on s f or re vi ew of the B oard of Im m i grat i on A pp ea l s’ (“ B IA ”) order di sm i ss i ng her app ea l fr om an i m m i gr a t i on j udge ’ s de c i s i on de ny i ng he rc l a i m f ora s y l um , w i thhol di ng of r e m ova l , and pr ot e c t i on unde rthe C onve nt i on A ga i ns tT ortur e ( “ C A T ” ) . W e ha ve 

# FI LED OC T 15 2012 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS10- 71627 2 j ur i s di c t i on unde r8 U . S . C . § 1252. W e r e vi e w f ors ubs t ant i a l e vi de nc e the a g e n c y ’s f

a c tu a l f in d in g s a n dr e v ie w d e n o v o th e a g e n c y ’s le g a l d e te rm in a tio n s . W akkaryv. H

older , 558 F . 3d 1049, 1056 ( 9th C i r . 2009) . W e de nythe pe t i t i on f or r e v i e w. S ub st ant i alevi dence s up po rt s the B IA ’ s f i nd i ng thatthe harm s S t epanyan a nd he rf a m i l ys uf

f e r e d i n A rm e ni adi d notr i s e t o the l e ve l of pe r s e c ut i on on a c c o u n t o f

ap r o te c te dg r o u n d . Se e I N S v . E l i as - Zac ar i as , 502 U . S . 478, 482- 84 ( 1 9 9 2 ) ; s e e Na g o u lko v . I NS , 3 3 3 F .3 d1 0 1 2 , 1 0 1 6 - 1 8 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 3 ) ( h ar a s s m e n t, d is c r im in a tio n , an de c o n o m ic d e p r iv a tio n d o n o t n e c e s s ar ilyc o n s titu te p e r s e c u tio n ) . F u rth e r , th e B I A ’s d e c is io n b e lie s S te p an y an ’s c o n te n tio n th a t it o n ly c o n s id e r e dth e 2 0 0 4 in c id e n t in f in d in g s h e d idn o t s u f

f e rp a s t p e r s e c u tio n . S ubs t a nt i a l e vi de nc e a l s o s upport s the a ge nc y ’ s de c i s i on tha tS t e pany an doe s not h a v e an o b

je c tiv e lyr e a s o n ab le w e ll- f o u n d e df e aro f f u tu r e p e r s e c u tio n . See N ag ou lko , 33 3 F . 3d at10 18 (possibi l i ty of f uture pers ec ut i on i s t oo spec ul at i ve). F i na l l y , s ubs t ant i a l e vi de nc e s upport s the a ge nc y ’ s de ni a l of C A T pr ot e c t i on b e c au s e S te p an y an d idn o t e s tab lis h it is m o r e lik e lyth an n o t s h e w ill b e to rtu r e dif r e tu rn e dto A rm e n ia . See G o v. H older , 64 0 F . 3d 10 47 , 10 53 -54 (9th C i r. 20 11 ). P E T I T I ON F OR RE V I E W DE NI E D.