1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELIZABETH KARNAZES,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et al,

Defendants. /

No. C 09-767 MMC

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; VACATING HEARING

Before the Court is defendants County of San Mateo (“County”) and Debra Titone’s

(“Titone”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Alternatively Summary Adjudication of

Issues, filed July 9, 2010, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Plaintiff has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having read and

considered the papers and admissible evidence filed in support of and in opposition to the

motion, the Court finds the matter appropriate for decision on the parties’ respective

submissions, VACATES the hearing noticed for August 13, 2010, and rules as follows.

 Under Rule 56, summary judgment shall be granted “against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). “[A] moving party without the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial . . . may carry its initial burden of production [on summary judgment] by

either of two methods. The moving party may produce evidence negating an essential

Case 3:09-cv-00767-MMC Document 107 Filed 08/11/10 Page 1 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Plaintiff’s hearsay objection to Exhibit D to the Silberman Declaration is GRANTED. 

In all other respects, plaintiff’s Objection to Defendants’ Evidence is DENIED.

2

element of the nonmoving party's case, or, after suitable discovery, the moving party may

show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element of

its claim . . . to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” See Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting nonmoving party may

meet its initial burden “by showing–that is, pointing out to the district court–that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case”). 

For the reasons set forth by defendants, the Court finds defendants have shown by

undisputed evidence that no triable issue of fact exists with respect to whether a County

policy or custom or failure by the County to provide adequate training was “the moving

force behind” any constitutional or statutory violation alleged herein. See Plumeau v.

School Dist. # 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). (See Declaration of

David Silberman in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Silberman Decl.”) Ex. A

(excerpts from plaintiff’s deposition testimony); see also id. Exs. B (Sheriff’s Office use of

force policy), C (excerpts from Titone’s training records).)1 Consequently, the County is

entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (holding, for purposes of §

1983, local governmental bodies not liable under “theory of respondeat superior”;

“requir[ing] a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a

municipal policy or custom that caused the plaintiff’s injury”) (internal quotations and

citations omitted); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (holding

“[o]nly where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a

‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly

thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983").

For the reasons set forth by defendants, the Court finds defendants have shown by

undisputed evidence that no triable issue of fact exists with respect to whether Titone’s

conduct was, either in whole or in part, “motivated,” see Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F.

Case 3:09-cv-00767-MMC Document 107 Filed 08/11/10 Page 2 of 3
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Supp. 2d 1129, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2009), by plaintiff’s gender. (See Silberman Decl. Ex. A;

see also id. Exs. B, C.) Consequently, the County and Titone are entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiff’s claim brought under California Civil Code § 51.7. See Winarto v.

Toshiba America Electronics Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1290 (9th Cir. 2001)

(finding, for purposes of § 51.7, employer can be held liable for acts of its agent only to

extent agent is liable).

Accordingly, defendants’ motion is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2010 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-00767-MMC Document 107 Filed 08/11/10 Page 3 of 3