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CURRENT SITUATION

AND FUTURE OF CHECHNYA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND

COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

Printed for the use of the

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

SEPTEMBER 16, 2003

[CSCE 108–1–6]
(ii)

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

HOUSE

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

Chairman

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama

ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

VACANT

SENATE

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

Co-Chairman

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

BOB GRAHAM, Florida

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

LORNE W. CRANER, Department of State

JACK DYER CROUCH II, Department of Defense

WILLIAM HENRY LASH III, Department of Commerce
(iii)

CURRENT SITUATION

AND FUTURE OF CHECHNYA

SEPTEMBER 16, 2003

COMMISSIONERS

PAGE

Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman .................................................................1

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member .......................................................9

WITNESSES

Hon. Steven Pifer, Assistant Secretary of State for European

and Eurasian Affairs ............................................................................................3

Anna Politkovskaya, Journalist and Author .....................................................12

Robert Bruce Ware, Associate Professor, Southern Illinois University.......14

The Lord Judd, Member, House of Lords and Former Rapporteur on

Chechnya, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe .................17

APPENDICES

Prepared Statement of Hon. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Co-Chairman,

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .................................29

Prepared Statement of Hon. Steven Pifer ..........................................................30

Questions Submitted for the Record to Hon. Steven Pifer

and His Responses .............................................................................................36

Prepared Statement of The Lord Judd ................................................................38

Letter from Members of the Commission on Security and

Cooperation in Europe to President George W. Bush,

dated September 12, 2003, and the Response of the Department

of State, dated October 20, 2003 .....................................................................43
CURRENT SITUATION AND

FUTURE OF CHECHNYA

SEPTEMBER 16, 2003

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC

The Commission met in 334 Cannon House Office Building, Washington, DC, at 1:30 p.m., Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.

Commissioners present: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman; and

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member.

Witnesses present: Amb. Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

State for European and Eurasian Affairs; Anna Politkovskaya, journalist and author; Robert Bruce Ware, Associate Professor, Southern Illinois University; The Lord Judd, Member, House of Lords, Former Rapporteur on Chechnya, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. SMITH. I am told that some of our fellow Commissioners are en

route. Ben Cardin, our ranking member, will be here momentarily. I

would like to begin because I know your time is very precious and scarce.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here.

Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to this hearing entitled Chechnya: Current Situation and Prospects for the Future. The situation in

Chechnya is the most egregious challenge to international humanitarian law in the OSCE region. In clear violation of the OSCE Code of

Conduct and articles of the Geneva Conventions, elements of the Russian military and security organs have employed brutal methods to

suppress Chechen separatism, methods virtually guaranteed to drive a

despairing civilian population into the arms of a radicalized resistance.

Even the Moscow-supported authorities in Chechnya have confirmed

that there are 49 known mass graves in Chechnya containing some

3,000 bodies. According to reliable sources, including those same authorities, hundreds of persons have disappeared after being detained by

Russian forces. Some were returned to their families after a ransom

was paid to their captors. However, most have not.

Let me emphasize that there should be no illusions about certain

elements of the Chechen resistance. They have murdered hostages, kidnapped civilians for ransom and used them as shields during combat

operations, and embarked on a campaign of inexcusable assassination

and suicide bombings against civilian targets. Three organizations in-
2

volved in the Chechen resistance have been formally linked by the U.S.

Government to international terrorism. One prominent Chechen rebel

leader, Shamil Basaev, has been designated by Secretary of State Colin

Powell as “a threat to U.S. security and citizens.”

But, to what extent is Russia reaping a harvest of terror that it has

sown through its own brutal policies? I would quote a very salient commentary written by the distinguished commentator Fareed Zakaria in

the August 28 edition of Newsweek. He wrote, “Over the past 10 years,

Russia’s military has had a scorched-earth policy toward Chechnya.

The targets are not simply Chechen rebels, but through indiscriminate

warfare, ordinary Chechens. And over time, the Chechen rebellion has

become desperate, more extreme and more Islamist.”

Meanwhile, the Russian Government declares that the situation in

Chechnya is normalizing, and that the counterterrorism operation is

over, but it appears to be a tenuous claim, if that. Besides the everpresent possibility of clashes between Chechen guerrillas and Russian

security forces, violence has broken out between rival Chechen groups,

and the Chechen militia of the pro-Moscow administration has shown a

capacity to abuse fellow Chechens, including in the lead-up to elections

scheduled for early October.

Despite this atmosphere of insecurity and violence, and clearly in

anticipation of the upcoming presidential vote in Chechnya, Moscow is

attempting to coercively repatriate thousands of internally displaced

persons who have fled from the war zone to neighboring Ingushetia. In

fact, reports indicate that the Bella Camp was closed last week, leaving

its roughly 1,000 inhabitants with few options other than to return to

war-torn Grozny.

Many of us on the Helsinki Commission and other concerned individuals and human rights organizations have protested, and will continue to protest, against these unconscionable moves. Co-Chairman

Campbell, Ranking Member Cardin, Commissioner Feingold and I have

written the President and asked him to raise these concerns with President Putin when they meet later this month.

While I understand and approve of our cooperation with Russia in the

war against international terrorism, the situation in Iraq, human trafficking, and other areas of vital interest to our citizens, I do believe that

the administration needs to be more active in persuading Moscow to

cease its counterproductive policies in Chechnya and consider seriously

how best to best secure a just and humane peace in Chechnya. One step

Moscow could take is to allow the OSCE Assistance Mission to resume

operations. At the same time, the administration should use every appropriate opportunity to impress on the Chechen resistance the necessity to disavow not only terrorist groups, but any tactics that violate

international humanitarian law.

Against this background, our witnesses are uniquely qualified to look

at the situation in Chechnya today and provide us with their insights

and their thoughts on the prospects for the future. I do want to express

my regret that Dr. Ruslan Khasbulatov, one of the leading Chechen

political figures in Russia, who had been invited to testify today, was

unfortunately unable to join us for this hearing.

I would like to begin with our first witness. We welcome him, Ambassador Steven Pifer, who is deputy assistant secretary of state in the

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. From January 1998 to October 2000, he was U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. His assignments to the
3

State Department include the Office of European Political and Security

Affairs and the Office of the Coordinator for the New Independent States.

He has also served at the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine and

Eurasia.

HON. STEVEN PIFER,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here and please proceed, as you

will, with your testimony.

Amb. PIFER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the welcome. I

appreciate the opportunity to appear here today to talk about the situation in Chechnya, and U.S. policy toward the Chechnya conflict. With

your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a written statement for the record and then just briefly summarize them in opening

comments.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your full statement will be made a

part of the record.

Amb. PIFER. Unfortunately, I am not able to present a very good

picture of the situation in Chechnya. It continues to be bleak. We see

continued fighting, casualties mounting on all sides, including among

the civilian population; a disturbing increase in resort to terror tactics,

and human rights violations by all participating in the fighting. This

includes Russian security forces, Chechen security forces under

Chechnyan administrative head Kadyrov and violations by the Chechen

separatists as well.

U.S. policy continues to rest on three pillars. First, while we support

Russia’s territorial integrity and we support Russia’s right to defend

itself against terrorism, we condemn the violations of human rights.

We call for an end to human rights violations and we call for the Russian authorities to bring those responsible to account. This is not just a

human rights issue. It is also a political issue. As you said, Mr. Chairman, it is counterproductive because these human rights violations have

the effect of increasing those who go over to the side of fighting in Chechnya.

The second element is our continued call for a cessation of all fighting

in Chechnya and a process that will produce a sustainable political settlement. That we see as the only real way to peace and stability in the

Chechnya region.

The third element is humanitarian assistance to mitigate the suffering of those in Chechnya and in surrounding regions affected by the

conflict. The United States remains the largest single provider of humanitarian assistance. We provided about $22.3 million in fiscal year

2003 and we expect to do a like amount this year. This assistance goes

to United Nations agencies, the Red Cross, and also to international

nongovernmental organizations for distribution in Chechnya and in areas

around Chechnya.

Looking over the last 9 months, one new factor that we have seen in

the Chechnya issue is an attempt by the Kremlin to try to find a political process. This was based on the March referendum that was held in

Chechnya and includes the elections scheduled for Chechen president

in October, and for the Chechen legislature in December. Senior Rus-
4

sian officials briefed us about this process in January. At the time, we

welcomed that because we had not previously seen a political effort by

the Russians to find a solution, and this seemed to be such an attempt.

We also told the Russians that we hoped to be supportive of the process, but we did, and we have over the last 8 months, raised particular

concerns about specific issues. For example, in the run-up to the March

23 referendum, we did raise concerns with the Russians about plans for

voting by Russian security forces in the referendum, people who had

come into Chechnya from outside. We also raised concerns about conditions for voting by internally displaced persons in refugee camps in

Ingushetia.

As the Russians later announced, ancillary steps were taken, such as

amnesty, compensation for damage committed in Grozny and Chechnya, and the negotiation of a treaty between Moscow and Grozny that

would delineate authorities between the central Government of Russia

and the Chechen administration. We pressed the Russians to follow

through in a serious way. Unfortunately, on several counts we have not

seen serious follow-through.

The next step in the process is the October 5 presidential election in

Chechnya. We have urged the Russians to do what they can to ensure a

free and fair process, but I must say that at this point we have concerns

about that process. Over the last 2 months, we have seen the number of

candidates shrink from 13 to 9. Four major candidates have removed

themselves. Three have withdrawn; one was excluded from the ballot

on a technicality by a Chechen court. It has had the result of removing

the primary challengers, the primary serious challengers, to Chechen

administration head Kadyrov, who by most polling is one of the most

unpopular figures in Chechnya.

We are also concerned in that Mr. Kadyrov controls most of the media outlets in Chechnya, so it is difficult at this point to see that the

electoral process that will conclude on October 5 will provide a process

or an outcome that will be seen by a large number of Chechens as credible and legitimate. Failing that, we are not sure that this election can

make a contribution to the process of finding a political settlement.

Turning to the human rights situation, it remains grim. Although

we do not have accurate numbers, we continue to receive multiple credible reports from a variety of organizations, including both Russian and

international NGOs, of disappearances, atrocities, torture, and extrajudicial killings. We understand that the number of zachistki, the security sweeps where whole towns were surrounded and then many military-age males were taken into custody, had been reduced over the last

year. However, they continue. This is not just a problem of Russian

security forces. Increasingly, we hear of abuses being committed by the

Chechen forces under Kadyrov, and also the Chechen separatists continue to commit abuses.

On one positive note, there was in July the decision by a court to

convict Colonel Budanov for the cold-blooded murder of a Chechen

woman, although the sentence was relatively lenient for this type of

crime. We hope this is indicative of a more serious and aggressive effort

by Russian military and civilian authorities to bring to account those

who commit human rights violations, but it is too early to tell.
5

On the question of internally displaced persons, we estimate that some

220,000 remain today; 80,000 of whom are still in Ingushetia. We continue to receive reports of pressure on those to return, and we continue

to stress that any return of refugees must be voluntary.

As I said at the opening, one of the disturbing increases that we have

seen in the last 10 months is that of increased resort by the Chechens to

terror. This was seen at the Dubrovka Theater incident in Moscow in

October of last year, the bombing of the main administration building

in Grozny in December, and other terrorist acts. We call and continue

to call on the Chechens to renounce terrorism and to distance themselves from those who support and advocate terrorism.

I would put down a note here that we do not share the Russian assessment that the Chechen conflict is simply and solely a counterterrorism

effort. We think it is a much more complex question. While there are

terrorist elements fighting in Chechnya, we do not agree that all separatists can be equated as terrorists.

Mr. Chairman, with that grim overview, I do want to reaffirm that

U.S. policy goals remain to press for a political settlement and observance of human rights norms. I believe that Chechnya will be one of the

difficult issues on the agenda when President Bush hosts President

Putin to Camp David in about 10 days. I wish I were able to report

better news about the situation in Chechnya, but I think it is difficult

at this point to be optimistic or to offer an optimistic forecast as to how

events there might develop.

With those opening comments, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to

answer questions.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. A couple of questions. As I indicated earlier, some of the Commissioners will be here

momentarily. It is unfortunate they did not get to hear your opening.

Hopefully, they will read your prepared text that lays out in very fine

detail what it is you think needs to be done and what is happening on

the ground.

I do have a question on the forced repatriation of people from the

camps. You just mentioned there are reports of pressure. We insist that

it be voluntary. At this point, it would seem not to be the case in the

extreme; that people are being coerced back into a war-torn area. You

also indicated in your statement that when the president is host to

Putin, he will be raising Chechnya. Can you tell us, will the IDPs be a

focus along with the atrocities? Is the President going to push this really? It seems to me that when he has that captive audience, the president of Russia, that is the time so say hey, we are not kidding; this is

really extremely important, and the international community is not

going to go away, and certainly the U.S. is not going to put this one

under the rug. It is just far too important.

These people go back to a very unsafe environment, and obviously the

accountability that needs to be there for crimes against humanity or

war crimes. It seems to me that, although there are misgivings about

how it might operate, the international criminal court certainly would

be a venue, notwithstanding the U.S. position on it, to look at and to

investigate exactly what has gone on in Chechnya. If not that, this is

still another question, should we be looking at, again notwithstanding

our emerging friendship with Russia, that there is a need for a regional

criminal court type of investigation to hold both sides accountable. Obviously, atrocities have been committed on both sides.
6

Amb. PIFER. Thank you. Let me try to take those in three parts.

First on the question of forced returns of refugees. We were very disturbed at the end of 2002 when there were outright closures of three

refugee camps. At that time, we weighed in directly with the Russian

Government. We also went in jointly with the European Union and

other international organizations to reiterate the point that any return

of refugees had to be voluntary.

We took some encouragement when shortly thereafter President Putin publicly declared that there should be no forced returns, that returns should be voluntary. Although I have not seen the one report that

you referenced about the closure of a camp last week, my information is

that we have not seen any overt closures of camps this year. However,

we do continue to receive multiple reports of pressure on people to return, although it probably is not as blatant as it was at the end of 2002.

This does remain an issue with us, and we continue to make the point

to the Russians that returns must be voluntary.

How President Bush will address this issue at Camp David—we will

ensure that he will have a very good briefing on the full range of issues,

including the question of internally displaced persons. My colleagues on

the NSC staff who work Russia have all been very closely involved in

Chechen policy. In fact, a number of the communications that have

been conducted have been staff members of the National Security Council talking to their counterparts in the Russian presidential administration. So I believe the NSC staff has a full understanding of the problems there, and I think we will be able to prepare the President. I always

find it risky to predict exactly how a conversation will develop, and I

could not really say how the President will raise this issue with President Putin, but I do believe that it will come up at Camp David.

On the question of how we handle the crimes being committed there,

one alternative, yes, might be some sort of a regional court, although I

think probably the better route, the more direct route is to continue to

press the Russians to do the right thing on this, and that is both Russian military legal authorities and Russian civilian prosecutors need to

pay serious attention to human rights violations. They need to go after

the perpetrators. Unfortunately, the record in this case is not all that

good. Again, we do not have full statistics, but all too often we hear of

investigations opened, but then not pursued in a serious way. Part of

our concern here is not just the human rights issue, but the message

that is being sent to the Chechen population is one that we feel is counterproductive in terms of how they view Russia, and in terms of pushing them and encouraging them to go and join those who are fighting

against the Russians.

Mr. SMITH. Was the will to prosecute and convict Budanov, was that

basically because of international pressure? Is that an isolated incident

or is it likely that others who have committed atrocities will be held to

account?

Amb. PIFER. Certainly, the Budanov case was the one that garnered

the most public attention in the last couple of years. It was certainly a

case that was clear on its merits, where you had an outright confession

by Colonel Budanov that he had committed the murder. It is hard for us

to estimate how much impact international pressure had on this. We

are encouraged that what we believe the right decision was taken by

the court. At this point, though, it is too early for us to tell whether this
7

is just a single example or whether this portends a more aggressive

pursuit of other people in the security forces or in the military who may

have committed human rights violations.

Mr. SMITH. In your statement, you report that, in connection with

the October 5 elections in Chechnya, the “most serious challengers have

either withdrawn from the race or been disqualified, and that the U.S.

Government is concerned that the political process the Russians began

with the referendum last March is being slowly undermined.” Can you

give us any insight as to why Russia would go through what seems to

be a charade now of setting up an election only to sabotage it themselves?

Amb. PIFER. This is one question that we ourselves do not understand. But as you mentioned, 2 months ago the field of candidates was

13, including 5 who were seen as serious candidates that included Mr.

Kadyrov, who is now the only one of the 5 still in the race. Three withdrew, although one alleged that he would have faced pressure to withdraw had he not voluntarily withdrawn. Then the fourth candidate, a

businessman by the name of Mr. Saidullaev, was found invalid and was

removed from the ballot on a technicality by a Chechen court. Now, he

plans to appeal.

The concern that we have is if you look at some of the polling, and

admittedly polling is more an art than a science in this region, somebody like Mr. Saidullaev consistently outpolled Mr. Kadyrov. So it does

raise questions about the field being managed in a way to a specific

outcome. Again, our concern here is 1) about the process, but 2), and

perhaps what is more important, is if the result and the process are not

seen by the Chechen people as credible and legitimate. We feel that

undercuts the ability of this election to contribute ultimately to a political settlement.

Mr. SMITH. Can I just ask you about Arjan Erkel and his disappearance obviously a year ago in August? What are we doing to secure his

release? How close are we? Do you have expectations that this is something that President Bush is likely to bring up when he meets with

Putin?

Amb. PIFER. The case of Mr. Erkel is one that we follow very closely.

He is a Dutch national, so our embassy in Moscow actually coordinates

very closely with their Dutch counterparts on this. In coordination with

the Dutch over the summer, our embassy did make an approach to the

Russians asking for a reinvigorated effort to locate Mr. Erkel and secure his release. I have met here in Washington with representatives of

Doctors Without Borders and actually will meet again later this week,

so we will have a clear understanding as we approach Camp David of

the situation.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. I hope that will be raised. I think one of

the hallmarks of conversations with governments that have less than

desirable human rights is always the backup, the generic concern with

individuals. It certainly has worked. This Commission for years, we

always had a list of people that we were concerned about when we talked

to the Russians or the East Germans or the Romanians or whoever. So

I do hope that would make a list.

We have had one hearing and we are planning on having another

hearing on Thursday dealing with missing persons in the Balkans. The

International Commission for Missing Persons is doing all that it can

do, whether it is for Kosovar Albanians or for ethnic Serbians who are
8

missing in that part of the world. What is being done regarding missing persons in that Commission or anything else that you know about

regarding Chechnya?

Amb. PIFER. At this point, we do not see much serious effort by the

authorities to move forward on the question of disappearances. It remains one area of human rights violations that is very much of concern. We know that some nongovernmental organizations are trying to

do things in this area, but their ability to operate in Chechnya, given

the very difficult security situation there, is somewhat limited.

So this is one where I do not think we have seen much progress. It is

an issue that we think needs to be addressed.

Mr. SMITH. Is the intended consequence of arresting or incarcerating

or mistreating people like from Doctors Without Borders, is that what

they intend to do, so that others will not be willing to come in and do

their human rights and humanitarian work? You wonder why a person

like Mr. Erkel suddenly is swept away. It sends a message, because

obviously that organization and other organizations are going to be loathe

to put their people at risk, and it has a chilling effect.

Amb. PIFER. Mr. Chairman, I think that is exactly right. One thing

we have already seen, because of the security situation in Chechnya

with the approach of the elections on October 5, with the bombing yesterday in Magas. We are already seeing some of the NGOs that operate

in Ingushetia reassessing their security posture. So certainly the inability of NGOs and people like Dr. Erkel to operate and perform humanitarian tasks in an open manner, the inability to do that is one that

is very discouraging to other NGOs who might be making very valuable contributions on the humanitarian front.

Mr. SMITH. Do you have any insights as to whether or not any of the

IDPs have been coerced into prostitution and trafficked, as maybe an

effort by the Russian mob, to exploit those people? We know that in

other camps that has been a regular, regrettably sad feature, that certain women, especially young women, are literally abducted out of the

camps and sold into human slavery. Is there any evidence of that in

Ingushetia or anywhere else?

Amb. PIFER. Certainly, trafficking is a problem more broadly for

Russia. I have not seen specific information suggesting that specific

problem of moving people out of the refugee camps and trafficking them

for purposes of sexual slavery, although I do not exclude it. That may be

just an issue of imperfect knowledge on our part.

Mr. SMITH. Could I ask you to look into that on behalf of the Commission?

Amb. PIFER. I would be happy to.

Mr. SMITH. Many of us are very well aware that Russia, although it

is a tier two country in its rating on the tier one, tier two, tier three

under the trafficking list, and is only tier two because of expectations

that they may soon pass a new law on trafficking. It would be very

helpful to know if this kind of trafficking is happening, and especially if

there is complicity by the Russian military. That would be very useful

to know that so that we can start to fight it, if indeed it is happening.

This is hypothetical on my part. I do not know, and if you could get

back to us with that information it would be most helpful.

I have one final question before asking my ranking member for any

comments he might, Mr. Cardin. We were very disappointed to hear

that the OSCE, should it return to Chechnya, has been told by Moscow
9

that monitoring of human rights will not be part of its portfolio. Is that

what you have heard, and how can that get turned around? Otherwise,

it seems to me it is a mission without a mission.

Amb. PIFER. This is an issue that goes back really to the end of last

year, when there was a very hard and unfortunately losing fight to

maintain the OSCE assistance group in Chechnya. The Russians took

a fairly strong position against continuing that mandate. At the end of

the year, we were unable to reach agreement, and the assistance group

ceased operation in March.

The Dutch, who are currently the OSCE Chairman-in-office, have

been conducting discussions with the Russians on reestablishing some

OSCE presence in or near Chechnya. But so far, those negotiations

have not proven successful. The Dutch intend to continue that effort.

For our part, we would very much like to see part of that mandate

resume operations, the ability to watch and monitor human rights issues. Though at this point, I cannot make a confident prediction that

there will be an arrangement with the Russians to that effect.

Mr. SMITH. Just finally, what are the current estimates as to the

enormity of the loss of life? How many people have lost their lives in

Chechnya through war and/or displaced?

Amb. PIFER. Right. It is very hard to come by specific numbers. I will

give you a range, for example, for Russian military personnel in the

current conflict, as opposed to the conflict in 1993 to 1996. The official

estimate is about 6,000 Russian soldiers killed. We have seen Russian

NGO estimates of the numbers closer to 12,000. Somewhere in that

range is indicative of the losses that the Russian security forces have

taken. In terms of the number of Chechens, both Chechen fighters and

Chechen civilians, we do not have an accurate number, but I would say

it is probably in the tens of thousands.

Mr. SMITH. And how does that compare to the war in the mid-1990s?

Amb. PIFER. Can I check that? I am not quite sure how the numbers

balance out. I would have to go back and check.

Mr. SMITH. If you could provide that for the record, that would be

very helpful.

Amb. PIFER. We will do that.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Cardin?

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, it is a pleasure to have you here. I apologize I was not here for your

testimony, although I did have a chance to read your statement. We

share your concern in regard to the circumstances in Chechnya. Our

delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has authored resolutions in this regard. We have had bilateral meetings with our Russian

counterparts to urge them to take a responsible position for the human

rights issues in Chechnya. We share your concern in this regard and

want to work with you to raise the awareness of what is happening in

Chechnya.

My question to you is, can you give us an assessment as to how much

impact we are having with the Russian Federation on this issue? How

much they are concerned about the opinions of the United States or how

high of a priority this is placed in their bilateral relations with us?
10

Also, it seems to me that we get support from some of our European

friends when we raise the issue, but have we seen our European colleagues independently raise the issues of what is happening in Chechnya in order to try to reverse the deteriorating impact that is occurring

in that region?

Amb. PIFER. Thank you for that question. We do raise the issue of

Chechnya with the Russians at a variety of levels, from the President

down to our embassy in Moscow, which pushes the issue regularly. We

have also raised it in the contacts that our NSC colleagues have with

their counterparts in the Russian presidential administration.

It is hard to estimate how much impact it has. I think we do have

some influence, and I believe that the Russians are not blind to the fact

that this remains a difficult issue on the bilateral U.S.-Russia agenda,

but exactly quantifying that influence is difficult to do. I would note

that it was interesting to us that in January of this year, before the

Russians proceeded very far with this new effort that was based on the

referendum in March in Chechnya, and the elections to be held this

fall, they did have a senior official come to Washington specifically to

discuss their concept of how to move forward on Chechnya. I use that in

part as a sense that they are sensitive to our concerns and our views on

the issue, but exactly how much influence we have is difficult to say. I

suspect our influence is more at the margins than at the center.

On the question of European support, we have seen some cases where

European countries have been fairly organized in raising the Chechnya

question. We have had good cooperation traditionally with the European Union at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. We also in

some specific cases, and I had mentioned earlier, that in the case of

December of last year when following the closure of three refugee camps,

we were able to organize through our embassy a joint U.S.-E.U.

démarche that also included representatives from other international

organizations. So we were able to have a multiplier effect by going in to

give a message that was not just the American message, but really a

Western message.

So we do look for opportunities working with our European colleagues

to try to strengthen the message that we are conveying to the Russians

about the need to find a political settlement and to end human rights

violations.

Mr. CARDIN. I appreciate that. I think we need to look for opportunities here that we can elevate the importance of resolving these issues.

This has been going on for too long, way too long, and there has been

deterioration of late. We need to get an accounting of what is happening

in that region. I agree with Chairman Smith that one of our priorities

is to get an OSCE mission there. It is not going to do any good unless it

has the mandate to look at human rights, to be evenhanded, but to look

at the human rights issues so that we can get some objective eyes on

the ground that can report to the international organizations about what

is happening there.

I think that should be one of our top priorities. I would hope that in

the bilateral discussions that we reinforce the efforts of the Dutch to get

that mission started again. We talked about that in our Rotterdam

meetings, and there was clearly a lot of support for the mission to be

reinstated in Chechnya. But it is also important that it have the authority to carry out its mission. There is no sense in having people

there unless they can do what is necessary to be done.
11

We do look forward to looking for new opportunities to try to advance

the issue in the Chechnya region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Cardin.

Let me just finally ask, Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the meeting

that is going to be held in Warsaw. Will Chechnya be an issue that is

raised robustly there? Will it be raised at all with regard to both the

refugees, the IDPs and the ongoing issue of human rights abuse?

Amb. PIFER. I have not seen the specific agenda for that meeting, but

let me take that issue back. I know Ambassador Pamela Smith who

will be heading our delegation is a very strong spokesman on human

rights issues, and this may be an opportunity for us to have a discussion.

Mr. SMITH. I would hope so, and I would certainly urge you, obviously. That is why we are having this hearing, because we think there

is not enough by us or by the administration, frankly, being done on

this issue. Part of the concern is that, since September 11, in seeking

partners against terrorism, with the more identifiable foes being al

Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas and the like, that somehow since the

Chechens have committed some atrocities themselves, some horrible,

horrific atrocities, that we then gloss over what the Russian military is

doing, has done and will continue to do unless they are reined in.

It seems to me that we need to speak with absolute clarity, and again

with the upcoming meeting with President Bush and Putin, my concern would be that in further forging that partnership somehow this

whole issue of Chechnya has the possibility, I would not say probability,

of becoming an asterisk or an irritant that needs to be raised almost in

an obligatory way, rather than in a way that says we are serious about

this.

I would just ask you to take that.

Amb. PIFER. Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate and share your

concern on that. Although we want to work with Russia as a partner in

the struggle against global terrorism, that does not relieve the Russians from the requirement to observe human rights norms in their

conduct of military security operations in Chechnya. While we do see a

Chechen terrorist element operating, we have continued to tell the Russians that in dealing with that, they need to curb human rights abuses

and bring those responsible to account.

On the question of how this will come up at Camp David, I cannot tell

you exactly how it will be raised, but I am very confident that it will

come up. One thing about the relationship between President Bush and

President Putin is that while both do want to form a stronger partnership between the two countries, the relationship does allow for the discussion of difficult issues such as Chechnya, and it has come up in

virtually every session that they have had over the last two years.

Mr. SMITH. That is very encouraging. Friends do not let friends commit human rights abuses. It seems to me that one hallmark of a true

friendship is that kind of transparency and the ability to say, “Cease

this; it is in your own interest, not just the interest of innocent people

who lose their lives or limbs. It is in your own interest, short-, intermediate- and long-term, to stop it.”

I do thank you for that. We will have some written questions, if you

do not mind, that we will submit to you, and if you could get back to us

in a timely fashion we would appreciate it.
12

Thank you.

Amb. PIFER. Thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, we appreciate it.

I would like to ask our second panel of witnesses if they would make

their way to the witness table. Before doing that, I just want to note the

presence of Larry Uzzell who is the editor of the Chechnya Weekly. He

is with the Jamestown Foundation. I have known Larry since 1978. He

has been an indefatigable warrior on behalf of human rights, and particularly in the area of religious freedom. Larry, thank you for being

here and thank you for your good work.

I would like to welcome the Right Honorable Lord Judd of Portsea,

who is a member of the British House of Lords and previously represented Portsmouth in the House of Commons. He is also a former director of OXFAM. Lord Judd has served as the rapporteur for Chechnya to

the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the

Council of Europe, or PACE, and also Co-Chaired the Joint PACE-Duma

Working Group on Chechnya. He resigned as rapporteur in January of

2003 in an attempt to encourage the Russian Federation to postpone the

March, 2003 Chechen constitutional referendum.

We will next hear from Ms. Anna Politkovskaya, who is a journalist

and author from Moscow. As a special correspondent for the bi-weekly

Novaya Gazeta, her dispatches are ready by more than 7,000 readers.

She received the 2000 Golden Pen Award from the Russian Union of

Journalists, as well as awards from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Amnesty International for her coverage of the Russo-Chechen

War. A compilation of her dispatches from Chechnya, dating from 1999

and 2000, has appeared in English under the title A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya, published by Harvill Press.

Finally, we will hear from Dr. Robert Ware who is currently an associate professor of philosophical sciences at Southern Illinois University,

Edwardsville. Since 1996, he has conducted field research in the North

Caucasus, and has published numerous articles on the politics and religion of the Caucasus in both scholarly journals, as well as major U.S.

and overseas media outlets. He has been an invited speaker at many

lectures and seminars worldwide.

Right Honorable Lord Judd, if you could begin? I am sorry. I have

been advised that you would rather close.

Anna, if you could begin?

ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA,

JOURNALIST AND AUTHOR

MS. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you.

I will not repeat what was said by the previous speaker about the

current situation in Chechnya. I would like to address the issue of the

October 5 elections that are about to happen.

On the one hand, it was the tragic event of the capture of a whole

theater in Moscow that occurred in October of last year, and the authorities once again were faced with a decision that had to be made

about what to do about Chechnya. On the other hand, President Putin

got tired of having to answer questions from his international colleagues

about the legitimacy of Maskhadov as the President of Chechnya.
13

Instead of using the tragic events at the Dubrovka to start a meaningful and fruitful process of ending the war, the president elected to

launch something that is called a political process that led to the announcement of the elections in October. It is the past practice of political manipulation. Why? Because while there still existed a constitution

in Chechnya, the decision was made to have a referendum on creating

another constitution without abrogating the previous one. In other words,

it was a mechanical replacement of one constitution by another without

really finding out the will of the people. So according to this constitution, the new constitution that is called the constitution of March 23,

again mechanically, a new president would replace the previous one.

In other words, the powers that be created a situation of existence of

double powers in Chechnya in the double constitution. It basically gave

the people of Chechnya a choice of being “good Chechens” and therefore

have the right to live, or being “bad Chechens” and therefore opening

themselves to the possibility of being exterminated.

From my point of view, this is a totally unacceptable position for

serious politicians if they care for the fate of their country and their

state.

The next step in this process was a public open declaration by President Putin that we, Russia, are in favor of and support free and democratic election in Chechnya and will accept any choice, any person that

the people of Chechnya would elect. This, as is clear now, did not happen because all viable candidates that could have participated in the

presidential election now have been removed.

In preparation for this election, the only remaining candidate, Kadyrov,

has been given pro-opportunity to create huge armed units. What this

amounts to is that coming from the top in Moscow, from the Kremlin, a

sponsorship of an all-out “Chechen against Chechen” war has been given.

By the end of this summer, it became clear that Chechnya is filled up to

the brim with arms and armed forces, much more so than it was in

1999 and the year 2000. Even considering that there is a state of war

there, the number of armed bands or units or formations exceeds any

reasonable amount, even in a situation like that.

Under these circumstances, the only reasonable goal and question

that is to be raised is the demilitarization of Chechnya, but what is

actually happening, what is on the planning board is a further militarization of Chechnya. Kadyrov, who has now control over a whole army

financed by federal means, terrorizes the population of Chechnya to an

even greater extent than was done by the federal troops who have been

doing this up to now.

Kadyrov has no authority in the eyes of the Chechen people. He does

not have the respect that would allow him to win in regular elections.

In the meantime, the federal government has increased the number of

federal troops in Chechnya to 86,000. According to Russian law, these

86,000 federal troops can vote in the Chechen elections, and that is onethird of the votes that can be cast in the elections there for the president.

My opinion is that the opportunity or resources given to President

Putin after the tragic event in Dubrovka have been used by him in the

worst possible way. The constitution of March 23 does not safeguard a

single human being, a single person in Chechnya. Our people cannot
14

consider it as a defense for them. All those people in Chechnya who

either supported or worked for the other candidates now face the necessity to become refugees and to leave the country.

So how can one under such circumstances say that we, the Russians,

are winning the Chechen war? What does victory mean under those

circumstances? I consider it a disaster.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ware, if you could proceed?

ROBERT BRUCE WARE,

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

Dr. WARE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have prepared a written

statement that I would like to submit.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Ware, without objection, your statement and that of

any of our other witnesses, if they have a longer version, we clearly

would make a part of the record.

Dr. WARE. I have made that available and it is out on the table outside the door for anyone who is interested. What I want to do today is

just present some brief supplementary remarks.

The people of Chechnya have suffered a great deal. Some of them

have excellent reasons for cherishing separatist sentiments. But we

should make no mistake, the current war in Chechnya is not a separatist conflict. Chechnya had achieved de facto independence in 1999 when

the neighboring republic of Dagestan was invaded from Chechen bases

by Islamist militants bent on the forcible conquest of Dagestan. The

fighting resulted in numerous deaths among Dagestani civilians and

displaced 32,000 people from their homes and villages.

These Dagestani IDPs endured under conditions of severe deprivation for 8 months prior to the arrival of even the most rudimentary

international relief. That was because all major relief and rights organizations had fled the region by the end of 1997 due to the relentless toll

of the hostage industry that was based in Chechnya. Western human

rights organizations never documented or took any serious interest in

the Dagestani IDPs that resulted from those incursions.

Following those incursions, Russia had a moral obligation to protect

its citizens in the region. Indeed, by 1999 federal protection was long

overdue since thousands of Russian citizens in the region, especially

those in the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus, were suffering

under the predations of the hostage industry and almost daily crossborder raids from Chechnya.

Basically, what that involved was more than 1,000 people kidnapped

from territories surrounding Chechnya, held hostage in Chechnya, brutalized, tortured, mutilated on videotapes that were sent to their impoverished families for purposes of the extortion of exorbitant ransoms.

By 1998, there was a palpable sense of terror in the region as a result

of those circumstances. Human rights and relief organizations did not

come to the region to help with these problems. Instead, all major organizations fled the region and abandoned the people of the region to face

these massive and sustained human rights abuses without any support

whatsoever. No human rights groups held hearings about these abuses.

From the time that Russian troops left the region in 1996 until the time

that they returned in 1999, few journalists ventured into the region, so

the world knows little about what happened during those years. After

Dagestan was invaded, Russia finally began to protect its citizens and
15

do something about these problems. After Russian troops returned to

the region, the region became somewhat safer. That was when the journalists returned to the region. That was when the relief groups returned

to the region. That is when the rights groups returned to the region.

It seemed that no one was interested in the massive human rights

abuses that were perpetrated in the region from 1996 to 1999, but after

Russian troops returned to the region the world was suddenly interested in human rights abuses in the region again. So the world has

heard little about the massive human rights abuses that occurred in

the Northeast Caucasus from the end of 1996 to the end of 1999, but the

world has heard much about human rights abuses that occurred in the

Northeast Caucasus from the end of 1999 to the present.

Now, this hearing takes up the important task of investigating and

airing the human rights abuses that are taking place in the region

today. This is vital work that should be prosecuted with vigor and with

greater effectiveness than achieved to this date. But our work today

will have little effect if we attempt to abstract the human rights abuses

that are occurring in the present from the human rights abuses that

occurred in the past. We will achieve the end that we all desire only if

we balance our understanding of the present with our understanding of

the past.

As the people of South Africa have reminded us, there is no end to

human rights abuse, there is no peace, and there is no reconciliation

without truth. There is no truth when you look at only one side of the

problem. Here are four truths that emerge when we begin to take a

balanced look at human rights abuses in the Northeast Caucasus. First,

my survey research in Dagestan has found that most Dagestanis view

Chechnya as a threat and that most Dagestanis look to the Russian

Federation for assistance.

Second, while the return of Russian troops to the region has resulted

in many horrible human rights abuses, it has also reduced some kinds

of human rights abuse and opened channels for the relief of others. For

example, the Dagestani Bureau of Statistics has reported significant

reduction in crime and dramatic reductions in kidnappings since Russian troops returned to Chechnya. Many people who were being held as

hostages or slaves in Chechnya have been freed. The return of Russian

troops to the region was followed by the return of human rights and

relief organizations that had fled the region at the height of the hostage

industry. One of those organizations was the OSCE.

So while the abuse and suffering have occurred continuously in the

region on a massive scale, it was only with the return of Russian troops

that people in the region began to receive international relief and international attention to their rights, such as that which we have here

today.

The third truth is that human rights abuses that are being committed in Chechnya today are not being committed by one side, but by all

sides. There are many mass graves in Chechnya and there can be little

doubt that Russian federal forces are responsible for many of them, but

there is also little reason to suppose that Russian federal forces are

responsible for all of them. All sides have resorted to the horrible practice of kidnapping their adversaries. Before the Russian military returned, thousands of Chechens were kidnapped by other Chechens.
16

The fourth truth is that people who invaded Dagestan were Islamist

terrorists who sought to forcibly conquer the people of Dagestan and

impose a medieval Islamist regime that would have resulted in the

massive deprivation of human rights. In 1999, Chechnya was rapidly

converting itself into a militant Islamist state. That has been stopped.

When we get to a more complete and balanced view of the situation in

Chechnya, we see that there are no simple truths and no easy answers.

It is true that Russia has committed horrendous abuses in Chechnya

and made horrible mistakes for which Russian leaders must be held

responsible. It is also true that whatever happened in Chechnya in the

last 4 years would have been horrible, and that the people of Chechnya

should be held to their fair share of responsibility for this.

The horrible truth about Chechnya is that it has not been a question

of having massive human rights abuses on the one hand, and on the

other hand having no human rights abuses. In Chechnya, one set of

massive human rights abuses have been followed by another. If we are

to reduce or eliminate human rights abuses in Chechnya, then we must

consider both sets of human rights abuses together. One-sided criticism of Russia does not help the people of the region. It undermines

Russian moderates, encourages Russian hardliners, and provides an

opportunity to ignore legitimate criticism from the outside.

A balanced understanding of the last decade in Chechnya indicates

that it is no more possible or desirable to return to the conditions of

Chechnya’s de facto independence in the late 1990s than it is to return

to the conditions of centralized subordination in the late 1980s. In the

last decade of Chechnya’s history, there has been a cavalcade of extremism that has brought nothing but death, destruction and instability.

Extremists must be excluded from Chechnya’s future. Chechnya’s future lies with a new generation of moderates that has been coming to

the fore. Partly as a consequence of widespread exhaustion and desperation, many Chechens share a spirit of moderation and are prepared to

work within the framework of the Russian Federation. In the long run,

a new spirit of moderation will save Chechnya. This moderating trend

is currently being supported by a decrease in cleansing operations by

federal forces in Chechnya that has been on the decline throughout the

current calendar year. It is being encouraged by the transfer of authority from Russian authorities to Chechen officials who are now largely in

control of their own administration in Chechnya. That is to say, the

Chechen nationals are.

The process of moderation in Chechnya is also in principle being encouraged by the political process that is under way involving the selection of a Chechen administration. However, in practice I would agree

with the previous speaker’s remarks that the details of the Chechen

constitution which have been put into play are likely to give rise to

intra-Chechen conflict; that is, to move the conflict from conflict between Russians and Chechens to intra-Chechen conflict, and I do see

that as a very bad thing. I think this is the wrong constitution for

Chechnya. I also completely agree that this is not a democratic election

that is about to take place in Chechnya, and that its consequences are

also likely to be destabilizing.

Finally, I agree with previous speakers who have emphasized that it

is not only a severe human rights problem to close the refugee camps or

even to pressure refugees to leave those camps. I would also like to add

that even from a Russian perspective it does not make sense because
17

there is likely to be an increase of terrorist activity in Chechnya in the

next year. The more people that there are in Chechnya, the easier it

will be to commit such acts, the more devastating those acts will be. So

it seems that even from a Russian perspective this would be a mistake.

That concludes the remarks that I intended to make. Could I comment just briefly on a couple of the questions that you asked to the

other speakers, for example, Arjan Erkel? Since Arjan Erkel was kidnapped in Mahachkala in August 2002, I have followed the incident

very closely and made inquiries of my own. I must say that the situation, when one examines it closely, is much more complicated than has

come up thus far in this hearing.

When one looks carefully and when one talks to people in Mahachkala

about the situation, one finds that in fact there are speculations about

personal motives and professional motives, as well as political motives.

My own inclination would be to eliminate at this stage in the game,

since it has gone on so long, some personal and professional motives

that have been suggested for his disappearance. I certainly do agree

with the implication earlier that Russian security forces might have

been involved in this. There is some evidence suggesting that they were,

and that is indeed very distressing.

However, some considerations make it very hard to believe that Russian security services are currently holding Arjan Erkel. The evidence

suggests equally that the people who are holding him may be interested

in manipulating Russian authorities.

So it is not easy to see what is happening there. This case is full of

anomalies. I think that while it is very important, and while I certainly

would very strongly emphasize that the case should be raised in conversations with Russian officials and should be brought forward with the

strongest possible emphasis by meetings such as this, I am going to

suggest that there is really a great deal of uncertainty about what is

happening here. While concern should be expressed, care should be taken.

Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony and for your

commentary on Dr. Erkel.

Lord Judd, if you could proceed?

THE LORD JUDD, MEMBER,

HOUSE OF LORDS,

FORMER RAPPORTEUR ON CHECHNYA,

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

Lord JUDD. Mr. Chairman, my last visit to the Chechen Republic

was in January. It was in the aftermath of the terrorist attack action at

the Moscow theater in October 2002, and against the civilian administrative headquarters in Grozny in December. Like subsequent atrocities, including the attack at Znamenskoe, violence of that kind has no

place in meeting the needs and aspirations of the Chechen people. Obviously it should be condemned without qualification, whoever is ultimately found responsible.

However, that applies to all violence. State violence, abductions, disappearances, unlawful killings, beatings, torture, and harassment

by members of the Russian security forces, whether officially condoned

or not, are every bit as unacceptable as other forms of violence. They

strike at the moral credibility of government.
18

Hence the frustration in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council

of Europe with the continuing absence of convincing evidence that allegations of crimes by the security forces are being rigorously pursued.

This frustration, it should be said, is not simply with the Russian Government. It is also with other member governments of the Council of

Europe for their failure to bring adequate pressure to bear. Hence also

the frustration that the Russians have failed to make public the reports

by the Council’s own Committee on Torture.

The human situation in the Chechen Republic remains grim. While

schools are open, parts of severely war-damaged hospitals are in operation and some agricultural activity can be seen, the economy remains

shattered. Displaced people who have returned to Grozny are desperately worried about their personal security and about help with reconstructing their devastated homes. The atmosphere is tense and security personnel are everywhere. I traveled in and out of the republic on

my last visit surrounded by troops in a small armored convoy.

There is obviously no military solution to all this. The political process is indispensable. It is only with a political solution that human

rights can be guaranteed and the humanitarian well-being of the people

can be assured. Otherwise, we may all be involved in sticking fingers in

the holes in the crumbling dike.

However, there are no shortcuts to this. There has been a prolonged,

devastating, cruel and bloody civil war. Before any new constitution

has any hope of being effective, there will have to be a great deal of

dialogue and attempted reconciliation. This cannot be limited to the

more acceptable power brokers and co-opted intellectuals. It has to involve the widest possible cross-section of the Chechen community. The

Russian authorities, however, were determined to drive ahead with their

referendum on a new draft constitution on March 23. This was, in my

view, so premature, so ill-conceived, and in effect so cynical and potentially counterproductive that I felt compelled to make claim that I was

unable to continue in my role as rapporteur.

Some argue that the constitution can be amended, but by whom? It

seems that the right to do this is limited to those elected under its

provisions. It is also worth noting that the draft speaks of, quote, “affirming our historical unity with Russia and its multinational people.”

That wording begs many key questions at the heart of the bitter conflict. Well, the referendum took place. Ninety percent of those who were

registered to vote voted; 96 percent voted in favor. I ask myself, whatever happened to the other 4 percent?

Why is the constitution for me so deeply disturbing? First, the constitution has to be the outcome of the process. It has to be forged. There

has to be a sufficient consensus. While there are without doubt fighters

in the republic who are close to al Qaeda and who have no interest in

what any reasonable person would regard as a political settlement, there

are others who, whether rightly or wrongly, are fighting for what they

perceive is the honor and identity of their people faced with insensitive

oppression. If a settlement is to be viable, there must be a genuine

attempt to win at least some of these people back into a political process.

No serious attempt has been made to do this. The acute danger is that

they will therefore be further alienated and driven into the arms of the

extremists.
19

Quite apart from the fighters, little attempt, so far as I can see, has

been made to draw into the process any significant players at all who

are not already at least marginally part of the Russian Government’s

game.

Second, there must be a credible franchise. Was the census on which

the referendum was based genuinely comprehensive? Who precisely was

able to vote? What was the position of Chechens living outside the republic? Which service personnel were able to vote and why? There is

little indication that these questions and others have been transparently addressed. I was told of areas where those undertaking a census

had not visited. It was explained to me by the authority that only those

soldiers permanently stationed in the republic would be allowed to vote.

However, it proved impossible to elicit a clear definition of what “permanently stationed” meant.

As late as the end of January, some officials said that displaced people

would be able to vote in their camps, with what integrity of ballot still

to be seen. But others said they would be taken back to the republic in

buses to vote. As for the Chechens in Moscow or beyond, the answers

were conspicuous by their absence. All the cards were in the hands of

the Russian administration.

Third, the context in which the referendum was held was all important. There should have been debate and evaluation, pluralist and independent media, freedom of association, and freedom for political parties

were needed. There should have been adequate public information. Yet

this context was just not there. In January, in camps for displaced

people in Ingushetia, it was impossible to find anybody who had seen a

copy of the proposed draft constitution, let alone who had been invited to

a meeting to discuss it.

Fourth, there should have been sufficient non-menacing security for

people to feel freely able to participate. My last visit was limited to

Grozny. God knows what life is now like further afield, but even in

Grozny the right conditions did not exist. Indeed, I was asked whether

I would feel able on security grounds alone to recommend sending observers to the referendum. My reply was that it was far too dangerous.

Where observers were most needed, it would have been most dangerous. If it were too dangerous for observers, how realistic or safe was it

for the people themselves to participate in the referendum? It is tragic,

in my view, that the authorities have resorted to the referendum techniques employed by too many dictators in the 20th century.

By their rushed, ill-prepared referendum, without the necessary political and security environment, the authorities have made, I fear, a

terrible mistake. Far from promoting the peace they say they seek,

they may have made it impossible to achieve. The challenge of the

Chechen Republic is central to the stand against global terrorism. President Putin is 100 percent right when he claims that in the republic,

Russia is at the world’s front line. Even in the midst of the gruesome

realities of that conflict, a meaningful political process can be generated

which leads to a lasting and viable solution. It will send a powerful

message to the wider world about how whatever the bitterness, reasonable politics can produce the basis on which to build for the future.

By contrast, if there is a failure to promote a meaningful political

process, the message to too many in the wider world will play right into

the hands of the extremists. It will strengthen their claim to be the only

true friends of the excluded and deprived. It will undermine still further
20

the hundreds of thousands of moderate and wise Islamic people who

seek to build bridges, rather than to hurdle into a new dark age of

irreconcilable confrontation.

Of course, we want to see Russia as a major responsible partner in

the global community. But if partnership with Russia is to work, it has

to be based on candor. The partnership will have precarious foundations if in a desire not to jeopardize other policy objectives, be they Iraq

or the global coalition against terrorism, we play down concern about

aspects of Russian policy that are quite simply wrong. In the case of the

Chechen Republic—and I am sorry that I use strong wording, but I

would abuse your hospitality at this hearing if I did not say exactly

what I felt—in the case of the Chechen Republic, it is inexplicable folly

to hold back on criticism when by their policies and methods of implementing them, the Russians are perversely recruiting for the global

terrorists.

Mr. Chairman, I feel I must just say a word on the current situation,

if I may with your leave. Over the 10 weeks to the beginning of August,

Russian officials confirmed no less than 17 separate Chechen ambushes

and 9 attacks, resulting in the downing of two military helicopters and

the deaths of at least 113 Russian soldiers and interior ministry troops.

On 10 June, Radio Liberty reported the deployment to Chechnya of 1,000

elite Russian paratroopers. Later that month, Associated Press reported

that the Ministry of Defense in Russia had canceled scheduled withdrawal of a heavy artillery battalion. Last month, The New York Times

reported that in the previous 4 months there had been an acceleration

in suicide bombings, particularly in Moscow and North Ossetia, with

seven separate attacks, six allegedly by Chechen women, together resulting in 165 people killed.

There have also been attacks apparently specifically targeted at military personnel directly involved in the aerial bombardment of Chechnya, for example at the military hospital at the important Prokhladny

military base, well within Russian territory. These bombings could well

be part of the offensive strategy announced by Basayev in June. He

claimed to have recruited for special action women who had been raped

or who had lost close relatives. It should be noted that Aslan Maskhadov

has totally dissociated himself from the Basayev action and issued a

decree in May ordering Chechen units not to attack civilian targets and

to abide by articles three and four of the Geneva Convention.

On 11 August, according to Agence France Presse, the NGO Mothers

of Russian Soldiers Committee in Russia estimated, contrary to what

we have heard this afternoon, that more than 12,000 Russian troops

have died in Chechnya since 1999. If this is right, and I suggest the

mothers are likely to be calculating rather closely, it is possible that

Russia will have lost more troops in Chechnya since 1999 than the

Soviet Union lost in a decade in Afghanistan.

Disturbingly, the conflict seems to be spilling over more seriously

into Ingushetia with attacks by fighters on Russian personnel and convoys and raids like those in Chechnya by the Russian forces on villages.

The Russians are reported to be determined to close all internally displaced people camps in Ingushetia by October. The pressure is alleged

by some close to the situation to be assisting the recruitment of young

people by the fighters. Dr. Salambek Maigov, until recently Maskhadov’s
21

representative in the Russian Federation, has claimed that such young

recruits have more than doubled the ranks of one rebel leader, Gelayev,

in the western sector near the border with Galashki.

The human rights and security situation can be judged by the Russian nongovernmental organization Memorial’s estimate that the per

capita murder rate in Chechnya now exceeds that of the entire Soviet

Union during the height of Stalin’s purges. According to Le Monde,

documents leaked to the press by the Kadyrov administration in Chechnya last April indicate an average of 109 extrajudicial executions by

federal authorities in Chechnya every month.

Public opinion in the Russian Federation is reflecting great unease.

Last month, a leading polling agency calculated that only 28 percent of

1,585 respondents in 40 administrative regions supported continued

military action, while significantly 57 percent favored direct political

negotiations with the Chechen resistance. Last September, the same

polling organization found a year ago in a poll that only 37 percent

favored the political approach, while 39 percent favored increased military action to annihilate the Chechen fighters.

This must, in my view, be a dilemma for President Putin as the date

for the Russian Federation’s presidential elections approaches, in view

of the great play he made of his military muscle in Chechnya in his last

election campaign. Meanwhile, next month there is to be the presidential election in Chechnya, about which we have heard. Putin clearly

wants to control this. Despite assurances that the multi-candidate election was the name of the game, in the cause of demonstrating democracy, all serious opposition to the Putin candidate, Mr. Kadyrov, currently the head of administration in Chechnya, is being manipulated,

promoted, even intimidated out of the campaign.

Aslambek Aslakhanov, the representative of Chechnya in the Duma,

and the most popular rival candidate to Kadyrov, is the latest to be

offered and to accept a high-ranking alternative job by Putin. Many

believe he would have secured twice as many votes as Kadyrov, perhaps

as much as 25 percent of the total poll. As far as I could make out last

week, and I do not know whether he is still in the running this week,

the only significant remaining contender is Malik Saidullaev, a rich

Chechen resident in Moscow. All, Mr. Chairman, all my anxieties about

the referendum and the context in which it was held inevitably apply to

this election as well.

If the security situation remains bad, the human rights and humanitarian situation remains grim. Since April 2000, the European Court

on Human Rights, Europe’s supreme court on human rights, has received directly some 200 individual complaints. This resulted in 100

files being recorded, as some complaints concerned the same events. Of

these, some 55 have been officially opened. The information in others is

as yet insufficient for registration. Six complaints have already been

found admissible by the court, and some others have been officially referred to the Russian Government.

Alarmingly, and I find this very disturbing, there are well-authenticated reports of intimidation and worse, disappearance and killings, of

applicants to the European court and their families. It seems the court

stands ready to pursue these as soon as it has adequate information.

Also of considerable relevance, Mr. Sulumbek Maigov, until recently

Mr. Maskhadov’s representative in Moscow, has ceased to operate. The

circumstances are unclear, but may be related to Russian, including
22

FSB, pressure and action following his last visit to Washington. Indeed, I understand that he was specifically pressured not to come to the

American committee’s conference that was held today, and he may not

be alone in having had such pressure. This week in London the extradition court case concerning Akhmed Zakayev is likely to be concluded. I

know and have met and talked with this man. I will be glad to answer

questions about him, together with questions on any of the other matters about which I have spoken.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

Mr. SMITH. Lord Judd, thank you very much for your very comprehensive testimony. For all of your testimonies, they are very helpful,

enlightening, provocative at times, but very important contributions to

this issue that really does not go away, but does not get the kind of

scrutiny for a variety of reasons that it ought to be getting, not the least

of which is our focus on terrorism, to the exclusion of other types of

terrorism and activity and human rights abuse that just goes underfocused upon.

It is not without precedent. Even before we had 9-11, we convened a

series of hearings in the first Chechen war. We had Yelena Bonner

testify and many other distinguished people, including people from the

Russian Government who were involved with human rights. I will never

forget how scathing their criticism was, not just of what was going on

in Russia, but of the U.S. response to it, referring to the war as analogous to the United States Civil War where two disagreeing people were

just fighting it out, rather than what we know to be a scorched-earth,

almost take-no-prisoners type of operation.

Dr. Ware, I think your point is well taken about stressing the atrocities that have been committed by both sides. It is not just the Russians.

We say that over and over again, but I do not think we can say it

enough. I noted the comment that was made earlier about the 86,000

federal troops that are there. I am wondering, if you could, Ms.

Politkovskaya, if you could tell us, are those 86,000 going to vote? Do

they have the requisite criteria for residency, even though they probably are augmented in and out at the will of the military?

Secondly, and all of you might want to touch on this, Mr. Kadyrov,

we all expect him to win. What will Chechnya look like if he does win?

What does it look like if he does not? If you could perhaps spend a little

time talking about this, because I think that is the most likely. We see

fewer Russian operations and more of the operations by this army that

you spoke about earlier, that is emerging, so perhaps you might want

to touch on that.

Dr. Ware?

Dr. WARE. With regard to the Kadyrov administration, first of all it

looks to me as if perhaps Moscow has vacillated in their support of

Kadyrov in recent months. For example, his name was put on the list of

representatives to the United Nations, which looked for a while like it

might mean an honorary exile. So it has not been clear. And also the

United Russia party declined to support Kadyrov. That is essentially

Putin’s political party, and it declined to support Kadyrov. So it was not

always clear that Moscow was backing Kadyrov.

But clearly, what has happened has not been consistent with a democratic outcome in the election. It looks as if the long-term plan is to use

the referendum and the elections to get an administration set up in

Chechnya, and then to continue transferring authority and to start

transferring funds through that administration in order to give rise to
23

a new group of more moderate Chechen elites who will crystallize around

that financial flow and provide a new basis for political organization in

Chechnya. My opinion would be that in the long term, looking beyond 5

years, that strategy is likely to work in terms of providing some kind of

stabilization to the situation in Chechnya. But this particular constitution and this particular election are not going to be legitimizing and I

am afraid are not going to be stabilizing.

Lord JUDD. Could I just add a word? I think this is a very central

issue. First of all, if my analysis is accepted about the invalidity of the

referendum, by definition the election cannot be acceptable because it is

a consequence that follows on from the referendum. It would be very

unfortunate if we started by the back door to authenticate the referendum by recognizing an election not having recognized the referendum’s

validity.

But my feelings are deeper than that. I have visited Chechnya eight

times in the past 3 years or so. Having seen the anguish, the consequences, the suffering, the grieving mothers. Where are their children?

They have been taken, disappeared. Fathers disappeared. Brothers disappeared. It is awful in a member state of the Council of Europe at the

beginning of the 21 century. Unbelievable.

Now, in that kind of atmosphere, to think that you can sort of administratively clear it up by getting some people, and I do not doubt that very

sincere hard work was done by some of these academics and people who

were brought in on the constitution. To produce a constitution, rush it

through, get it approved, get the implications of the constitution operating as if it is going to solve the problem, is just dumbness. It would not.

And of course, the situation may, I desperately hope I am wrong, but of

course the situation may get worse as disillusion and disenchantment

sets in. And certainly all this will play into the hands of the extremists.

It seems to me that if you are going to get a political process going, of

course it does not only apply in Chechnya, but if you are going to get a

political process going, the art of the business is to get as many people as

possible, as wide a cross-section of people as possible, feeling a stake in

the process, feeling a sense of ownership for the process. Yes, of course,

there will still be the unreconciled, but they will be marginalized. They

will not become the champions because the others are not playing a part

and not being listened to, and apparently have no influence whatsoever.

I speak with some feeling on this because although I know my Russian friends get very annoyed, and I have many friends in Russia, get

very annoyed and say, “But Frank, please do not oversimplify. Northern Ireland and Chechnya are not the same.” Of course, they are not

the same, but there are lessons that you can draw from different experiences for each other. We only began to make serious progress toward

a solution, and we have a long way to go yet, but we only began to make

serious progress toward a solution in Northern Ireland when government accepted that it was necessary to talk to the political representatives of the IRA. If you just picked the people who it is convenient to talk

to, who are your friends, after a conflict, and Northern Ireland was a

disturbing conflict, but it was nothing on the scale of Chechnya. I am

afraid it is destined for disaster.
24

Ms. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. As to the question as to

why and how, what basis the 86,000 military will be voting, it is enshrined in Russian law that the military personnel which are on the

territory of Chechnya, which is part of the Russian Federation, have

the right to vote.

This is a great problem for the Chechen population, and this has been

stated to me a number of times. What will happen, and this is what

worries the Chechen population, is that Kadyrov will be elected by an

electorate that consists at least one-third of Russian military personnel. This will not create a good basis for the creation of a new Chechen

elite as mentioned by Dr. Ware. And anything that will be built on the

clay feet created by this illegitimate and really indecent referendum

has no chance for survival or creating something positive.

Really, the only question that matters now is, how many victims will

be eventually found under this new edifice that is being created and

that is doomed to crash. How to make this new assault against the

Chechen people less bloody, that is what is important. Unfortunately,

the elections of October 5 can no longer be avoided. So now, it is the

process that happens after the 5 of October that is placed into the hands

of the Western community of nations. Will the Western community of

nations force the Russian leadership to begin actual contacts that can

lead to a peaceful solution? And will the Russian leadership be forced by

the Western public opinion and nongovernmental organizations to make

Kadyrov disband or disarm his units that have already been created?

Or will this conflict be allowed to be Talibanized?

Mr. SMITH. You may have mentioned it earlier, but how many troops

does Kadyrov have?

Ms. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. The process of creating

these armed forces is continuing. The mechanism that was used for it

was the so-called amnesty. So it continues to grow, but at this point

according to some of their own sources, Kadyrov sources, it is from

3,000 to 4,000. So I think it is somewhere in between 3,000 and 4,000.

It is a very considerable force.

Mr. SMITH. Lord Judd, you had indicated, and I could not agree with

you more, the inexplicable folly earlier on, and you probably heard the

exchange with our Ambassador Pifer that I had about that we have got

to be candid, and that was your word, we have got to be more transparent and open and not reduce this or put this on page four of a list of

talking points for the summit, the meeting at Camp David. I fully agree

that this needs to be front and center. That is the proximity of this

hearing right before the meeting, frankly, to try to bring some additional focus. We have written, many of us have contacted the White

House to try to ensure that this issue of the IDPs, the ongoing human

rights abuses, get center stage in the discussion. So I thank you for

your comments on that.

Lord JUDD. Could I just say on that, having been a foreign office

minister, what I often remark upon is that, yes, people can come back

and say, of course we raised this matter with the Russians. But there is

a world of difference between raising the matter with the Russians and

over coffee, as it were, at the end of a visit, sort of rattling the teaspoons. I am speaking metaphorically and saying, oh, and by the way

before I go back, there is just this issue, because there are a lot of human rights freaks around, and so on, who do not see the importance of

our battle against terrorism, and it would be helpful.
25

You know what I am saying. I think one really has to set out to make

this a major issue. I hope you will forgive me, just because I am repeating myself, which is unforgivable in political circles, but I just feel so,

the expression I used several times in Washington in the last few days

is that I have never in my political experience felt so stumped. This is

an English expression taken from cricket. It means so perplexed. I just

cannot see the logic of a total preoccupation with a fight on global terrorism, and then as it were almost indirectly aiding and abetting a

process which is recruiting for extremist terrorists. To me, I just cannot understand where this is coming from, because to me I can see no

logic for this position whatsoever.

Mr. SMITH. I agree, and I think your point is very well taken. I have

been in Congress for 23 years and it has been my experience working on

human rights, religious freedom for years, that is why I sought out the

Helsinki Commission 22 years ago, in my second term, I got onto this

Commission. It was that very often human rights, unless it was politically expedient, were reduced to the back burner. It was always a matter of being able to say I raised it. Well, that does not cut it. It has got to

be a serious engagement of the issue and it has got to be done with

repetition over and over again in a way that can produce results. So I

think your point is very well taken.

I would agree with you as well, because I have worked on the Northern Ireland issue, particularly as it relates to policing there. We have

had seven hearings on Northern Ireland. It was not until there was an

outreach to all of the communities that were using violence, both the

Protestant and the Catholic, but certainly talking to Sinn Fein made it

possible for the Good Friday agreement to become a reality. So I would

agree as well with your comments on that.

Let me just ask you, if I could, all of you, whoever would want to

comment, obviously there is a December 7 election, Duma election that

is fast approaching. Will Chechnya be an issue? Are there political parties in Russia that are talking about a new course, or is it just pretty

much a subterranean issue that is not being brought to the fore?

If I heard it right, 57 percent of the people favor negotiations. That is

a pretty high number. Would any of you want to touch on that? Yes?

Ms. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. The problem is that not

a single one of the Russian parties proposes any plan of ending the

Chechen conflict. None of the parties, aside from Putin’s own party,

Russian Unity, participate in the elections. None of the Russian parties

participate in the Chechen elections.

Mr. SMITH. But again, I am talking about now the Duma elections in

Russia.

Ms. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. The reason why none of

the parties are saying anything about the Chechen elections of October

is because of the upcoming Duma elections. So none of the parties want

to spoil their relationship with the president and to create difficulties

for themselves for the upcoming election of the Duma in Russia.

A number of events happened this summer which have diminished

the low desire on the part of opposition parties to bring up and fight

about the Chechen issue. The reason is one of these events was that

most of them were deprived of a great deal of financial support because

of what happened to the Yukos Company and its president. I do not

think that the Chechen issue will play a major role in the Duma elections.
26

Dr. WARE. May I comment briefly on that? I am not an expert on

Russian federal politics, but I do look at the North Caucasus. What I

can tell you is that on the whole, people that live in the North Caucasus

view the problem in Chechnya as the responsibility for the most part of

the Chechens. They sympathize with what is happening there, and they

certainly do not like to have that kind of suffering on their border, but

they think that the people in Chechnya are largely responsible for what

has happened, and it is very unlikely to be an electoral issue in that

area.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask one final question. There is a widespread

opinion that one of the reasons the Chechen conflict continues is that

high-ranking Russian military people are profiting from it. Can any of

you shed any light on that? Do you agree or disagree with that assertion?

Lord JUDD. I do not think this is a phenomenon limited to the Chechen

conflict. Again, in Northern Ireland one of the complicating factors has

been what has happened in terms of criminality of those involved. I am

sure there is criminality on all sides. On the other hand, there are

people on both sides who are not criminals, but I am sure that there is

big business at work, big profiteering by some, out of the war. I obviously have not been able to pursue any sort of deep-down inquiry on

this, but I shudder to think at what levels and where some of those

involved might be found.

Dr. WARE. I do not think there is any question that Russian military

officials are profiteering on the war. I also think that there is profiteering all around on all sides. In fact, I think that there has been a good

deal of political profiteering associated with the war on all sides.

Ms. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. It is not only the highranking military that profits, and that is part of the problem. The war

has created a certain structure and hierarchy in the military, and each

one of the levels has its own way of profiteering. The higher officers are

involved in the trade of oil and nonferrous materials. The middle ranks

are involved in the same business, only on a lower level, taking charge

of the transport and warehousing of the materials involved. And the

lowest ranks profit simply by bribes. In other words, any time anybody

wants to pass through a checkpoint, that involves a bribe.

So this whole idea has become so entrenched that Chechnya is a business area. So actually, there is a line, the military are lining up to get

into Chechnya. An additional source of income for the soldiers manning

the check-posts was that they were selling registration forms, in other

words, signatures for candidates, which were sold at the same time at

these check-posts.

Mr. SMITH. In all candor, given the impoverishment of Chechnya,

how lucrative are these bribes and other payments, particularly at the

lower level officers?

Ms. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. Whatever they get is a

substantial addition to their family income, because the lower ranks

and the lower-middle ranks live on a pittance as far as their military

pay is concerned. There is also another additional profitable aspect of

the war for the lower ranks. Service in the war counts more toward the

years that they spend in the military. It makes it possible for them to

retire earlier. That is another additional benefit.
27

Mr. SMITH. Do you know of any instances or reports of trafficking in

human persons, especially women? Is there any evidence of that? Trafficking in human beings, women for forced prostitution?

Ms. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. There was human trafficking, but it took the following form. At the beginning of the war

whenever there was a cleansing operation, everybody who was taken in

was then offered to their relatives for a ransom payment. And the disappearance without trace would occur after a 48-hour period during which

the family had the chance to buy back their relative. That system continues to this day. Others are called it the hostage business.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. If any of you would like to add anything further, perhaps hypothetically if Bush were sitting right here, what would

you say to him with this upcoming summit just days away?

Ms. POLITKOVSKAYA [through interpreter]. If Bush were sitting in

your place, I would tell him the following. Over the last 4 years, that

which is called in Russia in Chechnya, as an antiterrorist operation

has had two results. One is the emergence of thousands of new terrorists among the federal military and among the Chechen people. The

second result of this operation is the creation of conditions for the third

Chechen war. That is, of course, irresponsible policies.

Lord JUDD. As I gather it, you asked if there is any last thought, as it

were.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, and especially with a hypothetical that we are sitting here with President Bush.

Lord JUDD. Well, that is a dangerous question, because I never have

a last thought on Chechnya. I am thinking about it all the time. But if

I could just say a couple of things. I will not go over the arguments

which we have tried to deploy this afternoon, but there are a couple of

things I would like to say. The first thing I would say is that there is

not a monopoly or good or evil on either side in this history. It would be

very naive to suppose there is. It is also important to remember that for

ordinary young Russian soldiers who may not be terribly well educated

or well prepared, they can find themselves faced in very emotional circumstances with very provocative action.

But this is always a challenge to all of us in what we call the democratic world based on human rights, because it is when the pressure is

most acute that it is most important to transparently demonstrate in

all we are doing that we are about something different. Every time that

we are provoked into taking shortcuts or oversimplified, disproportionate, unjustifiable action, we play straight into the hands of the extremists who are sitting there saying, look, all this commitment is paper

thin; it collapses; they are no better than us; they are no different from

us.

That is the message that I think we must try and get to our Russian

friends. It is not easy, but it is one I think it is terribly important to try

and support them in understanding. As members, and I want to see

them, because I cannot say how strongly I want to see Russia as a full

partner in global affairs. I really have that as a top priority in my political life. As a nation now participating in the global community in this

way, it is incumbent to demonstrate that the discipline is there, the

commitment is there at all levels, which illustrates to everybody that

this is a course worth having taken.
28

Dr. WARE. I would say first to President Bush that it is really pointless to talk about negotiating an end to the conflict. I certainly think

that it would be good if it were possible to do that, and perhaps there is

nothing wrong with the attempt. But it is rather facile to focus on that

because there simply is no one with whom to negotiate. If anybody were

able to control Chechen militants, it is unlikely that there would be the

present war. Certainly, President Aslan Maskhadov of Chechnya was

unable to control the militants that went into Dagestan. There has

been no evidence since that he is capable of controlling them. Militant

forces are fragmented, and nobody controls all of them. So there is nobody to guarantee any agreements that Moscow might conceivably reach

with any of the militants. So to talk about a negotiated settlement of

the conflict is in some respects a nonstarter. It would be great if it could

happen, but there seems to be little prospect that it will.

I would encourage him, first of all, to thank President Putin for finally coming to the rescue of so many Muslim people in the North Caucasus that suffered tremendously between 1996 and 1999. Then I would

encourage him to further encourage President Putin and to put all possible pressure on President Putin to try to stop the human rights abuses

that are occurring in Chechnya at the moment.

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank both of you, and Anna who had to leave,

for your excellent testimony. It gives us the basis to continue our work

as a Commission. As you know, the Commission is made up of nine

senators, nine House members and three executive branch members.

We do work the issue very hard. The hearings are a way of getting

additional input, highlighting an issue, if you will, but also getting input. The proof is always in the follow-up, and we play on following-up

very aggressively.

So I want to thank you so much. Without further ado, the hearing is

adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
29

APPENDICES

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

HON. BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, CO-CHAIRMAN,

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman thank you for convening this hearing as part of the

ongoing efforts of the Helsinki Commission to draw attention to the

human dimension of the conflict in Chechnya. Today’s hearing is especially timely given the upcoming meeting between President Bush and

President Putin of Russia. The scope of the human rights violations

occurring in that region of the Russian Federation warrant that level of

discussion, not delicate diplomatic doublespeak.

As I have noted in the past, the continuing war in has resulted in the

most egregious violations of international humanitarian law in the OSCE

region. Recent film footage shown during a Commission briefing late

last week documented the physical, psychological, and personal destruction resulting from four years of conflict in this round of the war. With

most journalists prevented from reporting on developments in Chechnya,

one gets a limited glimpse into the war, typically surrounding the latest

act of terrorism launched by fringe radical elements.

The picture the Kremlin does not want us to see is a wasteland dotted

with mass graves, villages depopulated of men—young and old, and

unspeakable crimes committed against civilians. Each side should and

must be held accountable for its acts of lawlessness and brutality. Extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and abuse of the noncombatants by elements of the Russian military continue. A representative

of the respected human rights group “Memorial” reported at a Commission briefing earlier this year that of 119 persons abducted by Russian

forces in Chechnya in the first three months of this year, 9 were killed,

19 were released after severe beatings, and the rest have “disappeared,”

their whereabouts unknown. A lack a accountability leaves family members with little hope for justice as they search for some clue about the

fate a missing son, husband, or father.

The discovery of mass graves—with bodies mutilated to thwart identification—is not uncommon. Russian authorities claim that the bodies

are victims of Chechen guerrillas, but on at least one occasion the mass

grave was located in close proximity to the major Russian military base

outside the capital, Grozny. Even the pro-Moscow Chechen administration in Grozny has criticized the brutality of the Russian military against

the Chechen people.

The war in Chechnya has also created tens of thousands of refugees

and internally displaced persons (IDPs), about 100,000 of whom of have

been living in IDP camps in neighboring regions. There are disturbing

and credible reports that the Russian Government is using coercive

methods to repatriate these IDPs back into a Chechnya that is not only

dangerous, but insufficiently prepared to house them. Repatriation efforts have only intensified, despite pledges by President Putin and other

officials that IDPs would not be made to return against their will.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome Ambassador Pifer’s unvarnished and candid assessment of developments in Chechnya since he last appeared

before the Commission in May 2002. I echo his call upon the Chechen

leadership to clearly reject terrorist methods and those who resort to

them. At the same time, it is essential to avoid branding all Chechens

as terrorists. To do so will only prolong the conflict, adding to the already terrible toll for Chechens and Russians alike.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
30

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

AMB. STEVEN PIFER,

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS

OVERVIEW

Chairman Smith, Co-Chairman Campbell, CSCE Commissioners,

thank you for this opportunity to update the Commission on the situation in Chechnya and Administration actions related to the Chechen

crisis. There have been a number of important developments since I

last had the opportunity to meet with the Commission in May 2002.

Regrettably, since I spoke with you last, the daily reality for the people

of Chechnya has been bleak and deteriorating. The present phase of the

armed conflict there entered its fourth year this summer. The toll of

casualties, both Chechen and Russian, combatant and civilian, continues to mount. The living conditions for the great majority of Chechens,

whether living inside Chechnya itself or displaced to other regions of

the Russian Federation, remain dire. Deplorable violations of human

rights persist; terrorist attacks by Chechen extremists have increased.

Although the Russian Government has launched a new effort to find a

political solution, based on the election of a new Chechen President and

legislative body, it is not clear that this effort will lead to a peaceful

settlement.

Continuing instability in Chechnya complicates both the war on global terrorism and our attempts to improve relations with the Russian

Federation. After the 1994-96 Chechen war, the resulting chaos and

lack of rule of law drew international terrorists to Chechnya. Treatment by Russian security forces of the civilian population during the

current war has contributed to growing extremism and further sharpened the conflict. Moscow’s black and white treatment of the conflict

makes cooperation in the war on terrorism more difficult as its conduct

of counterterrorist operations in Chechnya fuels sympathy for the extremists’ cause and undermines Russia’s international credibility. This

in turn has a deleterious effect on the overall U.S.-Russia relationship.

The United States Government remains firmly engaged on Chechnya.

While we support Russia’s territorial integrity and right to defend itself

against terrorism, we consistently press the Russian Government in

various channels to end human rights abuses committed by Russian

security forces, and to prosecute those found responsible when violations do occur. We remain committed to a cessation of violence by all

parties and to finding a sustainable political solution to the conflict.

Simultaneously, through our humanitarian assistance programs, we

seek to alleviate to the greatest extent possible the tragic suffering of

the civilian population.

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

In this crucible of military stalemate and humanitarian disaster, there

have been important political developments since May 2002.

The Russian Government initiated early this year a process that it

stated was aimed at restoring civilian authority and reintegrating the

Chechen Republic into the political life of the Russian Federation. Senior Russian Government officials briefed us on this initiative and their

planned way forward in late January. We welcomed the fact of the Rus-
31

sian effort to find a political solution, something that was not apparent

one year ago. We indicated that we hoped to be able to support that

effort. But we also voiced a number of concerns about the particulars,

which raised questions in our mind about the prospects for success. To

be credible, the process would need to reflect the will of the Chechen

population and not be biased by allowing security forces from outside

Chechnya to vote. We also have stressed that the Russian Government

needs to provide internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Chechnya the

possibility to vote without having to return to Chechnya.

The first step was holding a referendum on March 23 for a new Chechen

constitution and on laws governing presidential and legislative elections. According to the official count, the turnout was over 80 percent of

the eligible voters, and the constitution and electoral laws were approved

by an overwhelming 96 percent majority of those voting. Security concerns prevented an effective assessment by outside observers. While we

have seen some polling which suggested that a majority of those who

turned out to vote on March 23 indeed supported the constitution and

proposed laws, the percentages cited by the official count have struck

many outside observers as high and have been treated with skepticism.

Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to see the outcome of the vote as an

expression of the Chechen people’s desire for a normal existence, free

from the depredations of nearly a decade of war and lawlessness. We

received no confirmed reports of violence on election day.

The Russian Government made a number of additional commitments

to make this political process more acceptable to the Chechen people.

These included an amnesty for rebels (as well as Russian soldiers) who

committed certain types of offenses, compensation for destroyed property, and negotiation of a treaty on a formal division of authority between Moscow and Groznyy. We have consistently urged the Russian

Government to fulfill the commitments it has made as part of this process.

The next critical step in this process will be the Chechen presidential

election on October 5. Among the nine candidates registered in the race

is Akhmad Kadyrov, appointed by President Putin in June 2000 to head

Chechnya’s interim administration. He has little opposition. The most

serious challengers have either withdrawn from the race or been disqualified. For example, Ruslan Khasbulatov, formerly a nationally prominent politician, dropped out early, throwing his support behind the wellknown businessman Khuseyn Dzhabrailov. Dzhabrailov first registered

as a candidate, then withdrew. Last week Aslanbek Aslakhanov, the

sole Chechen representative in the State Duma, took himself out of the

race to accept a position as an advisor to President Putin on southern

Russia issues. The following day, Malik Saydullayev, a Moscow-based

businessman who heads the Moscow-backed Chechen State Council,

was disqualified by the Chechen Supreme Court on a technicality.

Critics further charge that the conduct of the election will not be fair

and that Kadyrov is using his control over security forces and local

sources of information to his advantage. For example, the appointment

of Kadyrov’s campaign manager to head the Chechen Press and Nationalities Ministry leaves no independent media in Chechnya. As was

the case with the referendum, the security situation is likely to preclude effective participation of international observers. We are concerned

that the elections will lack sufficient credibility with the Chechens to

advance the process toward a political settlement and could even set
32

that process back. To date, fulfillment of the Russian Government’s

commitments meant to accompany the voting has been incomplete at

best. Fewer than 200 Chechen fighters had taken advantage of the

amnesty by the September 1 deadline, while approximately 225 Russian soldiers and police had applied for amnesty. The Russian Government budgeted 14 billion rubles (approximately $450 million at current

exchange rates) for some 39,000 families eligible for compensation for

destroyed property, but many criticize this amount as insufficient given

the degree of devastation in Chechnya. Payment is not scheduled to

begin until September 25, and Russian officials have admitted that corruption has led to theft of funds allocated for Chechnya. Work on the

treaty between Moscow and Groznyy has, by all appearances, not advanced beyond the most tentative discussion.

Given these developments, the United States Government is concerned

that the political process the Russians began with the referendum last

March is being slowly undermined.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The violation of human rights in Chechnya continues to be an issue

of the gravest concern for the United States Government. Because Russian Government restrictions as well as security considerations limit

access for international human rights monitors and journalists, it is

impossible to verify exact numbers of victims. Nevertheless credible

human rights organizations—Chechen, Russian, and international—

continue to report atrocities, disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial

killings committed by Russian federal forces, by forces of the Kadyrov

administration, by Chechen separatist forces, as well as by terrorist

elements.

The extent of notorious “zachistki,” large-scale sweeps of entire villages by Russian military rounding up Chechen males, is reported to

have declined. This change is in line with the orders issued by the Russian military in 2002 intended to enforce discipline and curb abuses.

Unfortunately, many reports indicate that the implementation of those

orders by Russian military forces has been spotty. Night raids by what

are alleged to be Russian forces, using military vehicles, persist. Human rights groups also report that similar raids are conducted by

Kadyrov’s forces. Chechens picked up in these raids disappear, most

often permanently; in some cases corpses are later found. Detainees

who return to their families commonly report the use of torture in interrogations and other mistreatment. While reliable numbers are impossible to obtain, credible reports estimate that disappearances continue on virtually a daily basis. We are also extremely concerned by

reports that individuals seeking accountability for abuses have themselves become targets for reprisals by government forces.

We continue to raise our concerns with the Russian Government about

the conduct of Russian forces and urge that Russia curb abuses and

prosecute those who have committed them. The July court ruling that

Colonel Yuri Budanov was guilty of murdering a Chechen woman was

hailed as progress by human rights groups, though his 10-year sentence is lenient by Russian standards. We hope this ruling is indicative

of a new effort to bring to account those who commit human rights

abuses, but this remains to be seen.
33

We have repeatedly underscored to Moscow that return of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Ingushetiya or elsewhere must be

strictly voluntary. There has been a slow but steady flow of IDPs returning to Chechnya. This is most likely due to both the promise of

compensation for some families whose homes were destroyed, and to

fears that, after the elections, the conditions for IDPs might only worsen,

or that the camps will be completely closed.

The United States and OSCE partners worked very hard to renew

the mandate of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya at the end of

2002. We were disappointed that the Russian Government chose to block

renewal of that mandate, despite our efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution. Although the Russian Government indicated its willingness to work with the OSCE in the future, it has indicated that the

OSCE’s role would not extend to direct involvement in—and/or monitoring of—the human rights situation in Chechnya.

Working with the Dutch Government and Médecins sans Frontières

(MSF), we are pressing the Russian Government to do more to seek the

release of MSF Caucasus director Arjan Erkel, who was abducted in

Dagestan in August 2002.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Some 220,000 Chechens remain displaced because of the conflict in

and outside Chechnya. Almost 80,000 of them remain in the neighboring Republic of Ingushetiya, living in tent camps, spontaneous settlements or with host families. Humanitarian organizations estimate that

140,000 people are displaced inside Chechnya.

The humanitarian needs arising from this long and painful conflict,

which has left economic devastation in its wake, continue unabated.

The United States Government contributes significant sums to various

international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) dispensing

assistance to vulnerable portions of the population in Chechnya, as well

as to Chechen IDPs in Chechnya, Ingushetiya, and other regions of

Russia.

The United States is the largest single provider of aid to the North

Caucasus. Overall, we have contributed $97.7 million since fiscal year

2000 to meet the humanitarian needs of the Chechen people in Chechnya

and the surrounding areas of the North Caucasus. This includes $22.3

million in fiscal year 2003, an increase of over $5 million from the previous year. We expect the program funding to continue at comparable

levels in the next fiscal year.

These USG assistance funds go to UN organizations, such as the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as the ICRC,

and international NGOs such as International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee, CARE and World Vision. Programs we

finance help the needy in Chechnya and Chechen IDPs with food, shelter, water and sanitation, health care, children’s education, legal protection and detention issues, mine awareness training, and local capacity building.

We maintain a Refugee Coordinator at our Embassy in Moscow to

work with the international community and the Russian Government

in order to deliver humanitarian assistance and report on further needs.

The Coordinator is the U.S. Government’s point of contact for international and non-governmental organizations in the field. Monitoring the
34

situation on the ground, the Coordinator identifies where U.S. assistance should be targeted to maximize its effectiveness in helping the

displaced who need it most.

TERRORISM

Terrorism, unfortunately, over the last sixteen months has increased

significantly. In October last year, Chechen extremists took some 800

hostages at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, which led to the death of

129 hostages. In December, a suicide truck bombing destroyed the main

government building in Groznyy, killing 72 and wounding over 200. In

May, a car bombing in Znamenskoye, ordered by the Chechen terrorist

commander Shamil Basayev, killed 60 people. This July two Chechen

women with explosives strapped to them killed 18 at a rock concert

outside Moscow. These terrorist acts are only among the most deadly of

many that have occurred inside Chechnya and elsewhere in Russia,

perpetrated by Chechen extremists.

No cause, no circumstances can justify these reprehensible actions.

The increasing resort to terrorism by Chechen extremists has prompted

condemnation and coordinated action by the Administration. On February 28, Secretary Powell designated three Chechen fighter organizations—all of which were connected with the October theater seizure—

as terrorist organizations under Executive Order 13224, thereby blocking

assets of these groups that are in the United States or held by U.S.

persons, wherever located. Those organizations are the Riyadus-Salikhin

Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion, the Special Purpose Islamic

Regiment, and the Islamic International Brigade.

In June, the United Nations’ 1267 Sanctions Committee included on

its consolidated list of international terrorists Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev,

former president of separatist Chechnya. The Committee included

Basayev on August 13.

We have repeatedly since the fall of 2001 called on the Chechen separatist leadership under Aslan Maskhadov to repudiate terrorism and

distance itself from those who support terrorism. While they have distanced themselves from some of these recent attacks, on other occasions they have been silent or ambiguous. They need to condemn terrorism completely and unequivocally.

One positive development is that there has been a decrease of guerrilla activity based in the Pankisi Gorge beyond Chechnya’s southern

border in Georgia. This improvement in the security situation, and the

defusing of the tensions between Russia and Georgia, came about in

part thanks to our work with President Shevardnadze and assistance

to the Government of Georgia in training and equipping the Georgian

military so that it could better police its hinterland. The increasing

resort to terrorism by Chechen extremists is of great concern and will

set back the prospects for a peaceful settlement. We do not, however,

share the Russian Government assessment that equates the separatist

movement with terrorism. While we condemn all terrorist acts and the

linkages of some separatists to international terrorist groups, we do not

believe that Russia can address the conflict in Chechnya simply as a

counterterrorist operation. If any political settlement is to achieve a

lasting peace, the Russian Government will need to include the Chechen

people as broadly as possible in reaching that settlement, including those

opposition elements willing to eschew violence.
35

CHECHNYA AND U.S.-RUSSIA RELATIONS

The conflict in Chechnya and the human rights abuses associated

with it pose one of the greatest challenges to our partnership with Russia. This Administration regularly reminds the Russian Government

that we need to deal with that challenge in a forthright and practical

manner. We seek an immediate end to human rights violations as the

only possible avenue to ending the vicious cycle of violence in the Caucasus. Furthermore, we stress to our Russian partners that, while we

respect Russian territorial integrity, a political solution to the conflict

that will be credible to the Chechen people must be found. Only then

will the fighting end, the displaced persons feel safe to return home,

and hope for a sustainable peace be possible.

Without such a political solution, we are not optimistic that any of

the actors in Chechnya can effectively impose a cessation of all abuses

by its forces. We are also concerned that the present political process in

which Moscow has been engaged is not sufficiently legitimate in the

eyes of the Chechen people to bring about an end to the violence or to

resolve the Chechen crisis anytime in the foreseeable future.

When President Bush hosts President Putin at Camp David next

week, I expect that these concerns will be among the most troubling

that the two leaders will find on the U.S.-Russian agenda.
36

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

TO HON. STEVEN K. PIFER AND HIS RESPONSES

Question: Your testimony implicates at least a segment of Russia’s

military for some unconscionable acts in Chechnya. Understanding that

this question might also be directed toward the Department of Defense,

and keeping in mind the necessity of cooperation in the war against

terrorism, could you tell us briefly what kind of military-to-military

contacts we have with the Russian Government?

Answer: The Department of Defense conducts information exchanges

through the sponsorship of conferences, seminars and workshops; staff

visits and port calls; high-level talks, planning groups, and high-level

counterpart visits; and combined exercises focused on peacekeeping,

humanitarian assistance and search & rescue operations. The U.S.

Defense and Military Contact (DMC) program with the Russian armed

forces has among its objectives increased cooperation in the global war

on terrorism, counterproliferation, and promotion of defense reform. We

would defer to the Department of Defense for greater detail on the scope

and nature of these activities.

Question: The Administration has properly condemned human rights

abuses committed by the Chechen resistance. However, the State Department appears reluctant to meet with representatives of the

Maskhadov administration when they visit the United States. Keeping

in mind legitimate diplomatic considerations, wouldn’t it be reasonable

to have substantive meetings with these representatives in order to

press our valid human rights concerns, among other things?

Answer: We have had very infrequent and informal contact with representatives of Aslan Maskhadov over the past two years, and used

those contacts to convey our position on Chechnya.

We have during this same period repeatedly called on Mr. Maskhadov

to renounce terrorist acts firmly and unequivocally, and clearly cut any

ties to terrorist groups and all who are affiliated with them. We are

concerned that he has not done so. This has a major effect on our readiness to have contact with those who represent him.

Question: Since the Chechen war broke out, there have been serious

instances of prejudice and acts of violence against so-called “dark-people”

from the Caucasus in Moscow and other Russian cities. Has President

Putin publicly condemned or commented on these acts, in the way he

has condemned anti-Semitism?

Answer: President Putin has stated that Chechens are entitled to all

protections of Russian law as citizens of the Russian Federation, in

reference to allegations of human rights violations by Russian forces.

During the Dubrovka theater hostage-taking last year, President Putin announced that unjust actions against Chechens in public places

are unacceptable.

Question: Another ethnic group that has been victimized by ethnic

intolerance in the former Soviet Union is the Meskhetian Turks. One of

the advocates for this minority is Mr. Vadim Karastelev of Krasnodar

Krai, Executive Director of the School for Peace. We understand that

the regional government is now trying to shut down his organization.

Has the State Department made any inquiries on his behalf? What is

the current status of his case?
37

Answer: An Embassy official raised this case with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs this summer. We understand that Russian authorities initiated a court proceeding, which began in August. An Embassy official will travel to Krasnodar the week of October 13 to assess

the situation of the Meskhetian Turks, and to again raise this case

with Russian officials.
38

PREPARED STATEMENT OF

THE LORD JUDD, MEMBER, HOUSE OF LORDS

AND FORMER RAPPORTEUR ON CHECHNYA,

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

My last visit to the Chechen Republic was in January. It was in the

aftermath of the terrorist action at the Moscow theater in October 2002

and against the civilian administrative headquarters in Grozny in December.

Like subsequent atrocities including the attack at Znamenskoye, violence of that kind has no place in meeting the aspirations of the Chechen

people. It should obviously be condemned without qualification, whoever is ultimately responsible: but that applies to all terrorism. State

terrorism: abductions, disappearances, unlawful killings, beatings, torture and harassment by members of the Russian security forces, whether

officially condoned or not, are every bit as unacceptable as other forms

of terrorism. They strike at the very moral credibility of government.

Hence the frustration in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council

of Europe with the continuing absence of convincing evidence that allegations of crimes by the security forces are being rigorously pursued.

This frustration is both with the Russian authorities and the governments of other member states of the Council of Europe. Hence also the

frustration that the Russians have failed to make public the reports by

the Council’s own Committee on Torture.

The human situation in the Chechen Republic is still grim. While

schools are open—albeit in deplorable conditions and with lack of even

basic supplies—while parts of severely war-damaged hospitals are in

operation and some agricultural activity can be seen, the economy remains shattered. Displaced people who have returned to Grozny—often

coerced to do so—are desperately worried about their personal security

and about help with reconstructing their homes. Mega corruption is

rampant. The atmosphere is tense and security personnel are everywhere. This last time I traveled in and out of the Republic surrounded

by troops in a small armored convoy.

There is no military solution. A political process is indispensable. It

is only with a political solution that human rights can be guaranteed

and the humanitarian well-being of the people can be assured. Otherwise we are only sticking fingers in the disintegrating dike. However,

there are no short cuts. There has been a prolonged, devastating, cruel,

and bloody civil war. Before any new constitution has any prospect of

being effective there will have to be a good deal of dialogue and attempted

reconciliation. This cannot be limited to the more “acceptable” power

brokers and co-opted intellectuals. It has to involve the widest crosssection of the Chechen community.

The Russian authorities, however, were determined to drive ahead

with their referendum on a draft constitution on March 23. This was in

my view so premature, ill conceived (or in effect cynical) and potentially

counterproductive that I felt I was unable to continue in my role as

Rapporteur—a role which required close cooperation with the Russians.

Some argue that the constitution can be amended. But by whom? It

seems to me that the right to do this is limited to those elected under its

previsions. It is also worth noting that the text speaks of “affirming our

historical unity with Russia and its multinational people.” That wording begs many key questions at the heart of the bitter conflict. Why is

the constitution process so disturbing? We are told that 90 percent of
39

those who had registered voted. And of that of that 90 percent, 96 percent approved the constitution. Forgive my skepticism! Whatever happened to the other 4 percent? My thesis is that first a constitution has

to be the outcome of a genuine process. It has to be forged. There has to

be a broad consensus and sense of ownership. While there are, without

doubt, fighters in the Republic who are close to al-Qaeda and who have

no interest in what any reasonable person would regard as a political

settlement, there are others—whether right or wrong to have resorted

to arms—who are fighting for what they perceive as the honor and

identity of their people faced with intolerable oppression. If a settlement

is to be viable, there must be a genuine attempt to win at least some of

these people back into a political process. No serious attempt has been

made to do this. The acute danger is one of still more alienation and

still more fighters driven into the arms of extremists. Quite apart from

the fighters, little attempt has been made to draw into the process any

significant players at all who are not already at least marginally part of

the government manipulated game. In the United Kingdom we were

only able to start working seriously towards peace in Northern Ireland

when we recognized that it was essential to talk to the political wing of

the IRA.

Second, there must be a credible franchise. Was the census on which

the referendum was based convincingly comprehensive? Who precisely

was able to vote? What was the eligibility of Chechens living outside the

Republic? Exactly which service personnel were able to vote and what

qualified them to do so? There is scarce indication that these questions

and others have been credibly answered. I was told of areas where those

compiling the register had failed to visit. It was explained to me that

only those soldiers “permanently stationed” in the Republic would be

allowed to vote, but it proved impossible to elicit a clear definition of

“permanently stationed.”

As late as the end of January some officials said that displaced people

would be able to vote in their camps—with what integrity of ballot unclear—but other officials said they would be taken back to the Republic

in buses to vote. As for Chechens in Moscow or beyond, the answers

were conspicuous by their absence. All the cards were in the hands of

the Russian Government.

Third, the context in which the referendum was held is all-important. There should have been debate and evaluation. Pluralist and independent media, freedom of association and political parties were needed.

There should have been adequate public information. Yet this context

was just not there. In January in camps in Ingushetia it was impossible to find anybody who had seen a copy of the proposed draft constitution let alone who had been invited to a meeting to discuss it.

Fourth, there should have been sufficient non-menacing security for

people to feel freely able to participate. My last visit was limited to

Grozny. God knows what life is like now further afield. But even in

Grozny the right conditions did not exist. Indeed, I was asked whether

on security grounds alone I would feel able to recommend sending observers to the referendum. My reply was that it was far too dangerous.

If it was too dangerous for observers, how realistic or safe was it for the

people themselves to participate in the vote?

Russia seeks to become a full democracy. It is tragic that the authorities have resorted to the referendum techniques too often employed by

dictators in the 20th Century. By their rushed, ill-prepared referen-
40

dum, without the necessary political and security environment, the authorities have made, I fear, a terrible mistake. Far from promoting the

peace they say they seek they may well have made it impossible to

achieve.

The challenging issues of the Chechen conflict are central to the stand

against global terrorism. President Putin is right when he claims that,

in the Republic, Russia is at the world’s front line. If, in the midst of the

gruesome realities of that conflict, a meaningful political process can be

generated which leads to a lasting and viable solution, it will send a

powerful message to the wider world about how, whatever the bitterness, reasonable politics can produce the basis on which to build for the

future.

By contrast, if there is a failure to promote a meaningful political

process, the message to too many in the wider world will play right into

the hands of extremists. It will strengthen their claim to be the only

true fiends of the excluded and deprived. It will undermine still further

the hundreds of thousands, the millions, of moderate, wise Islamic people

who seek to build bridges rather than hurtle into a mew dark age of

irreconcilable confrontation.

Of course we want to see Russia as a major, responsible and full

partner in the global community. But if partnership with Russia is to

work it has to be based on candor. The partnership will have precarious

foundations if, in a desire not to jeopardize other policy objectives—be

they Iraq or the global coalition against terrorism—we play down concerns about aspects of Russian policy which are wrong. In the case of

the Chechen Republic—I myself must be candid—it is inexplicable folly

to hold back on criticism when by their policies and methods of implementing them, the Russians are perversely recruiting for the global

terrorists.

And what of the situation now? Here I must express my high regard

and appreciation for the diligent monitoring and briefing by courageous

Russian and Chechen non-governmental organizations and the for the

work of NGO’s outside Russia as well, not least the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya. Over the ten weeks to the beginning of August, Russian officials, I understand, have confirmed no less than seventeen separate Chechen ambushes and mine attacks, resulting in the

downing of two military helicopters and the deaths of at least 113 Russian soldiers and interior ministry troops. On 10 June Radio Liberty

evidently reported the deployment to the Chechen Republic of 1,000 elite

Russian paratroops. Later the same month Associated Press reported

that the federal defense ministry has cancelled the scheduled withdrawal

of a heavy artillery battalion.

Last month, August, the New York Times reported, I gather, that in

the previous few months there had been an acceleration in suicide bombing, particularly in Moscow and North Ossetia, with seven separate

attacks, six allegedly by Chechen women, resulting in 165 people killed.

There have also been attacks apparently specifically targeted at military personnel identifiable as directly involved in the aerial bombardments of the Chechen Republic. One, for example, was at the military

hospital at Prokhladny, an important military base well within Russian territory. These bombings could well be part of the offensive strategy which, it is reported, Basayev announced in June. He reportedly

claimed to have recruited for special action women who had been raped

or who had lost close relatives. It seems that Aslan Maskhadov has
41

totally dissociated himself from this Basayev campaign and that he

issued a decree in May ordering Chechen units not to attack civilian

targets and to abide by Articles III and IV of the Geneva Convention.

On August 11, according to Agence France Presse, the non-governmental organization, Mothers of Russian Soldiers Committee, estimated

that more than 12,000 Russian troops (three times greater than official

Russian figures) have died in the Chechen Republic since 1999. The

estimates of mothers, of all people, cannot be lightly dismissed. If this is

right it is possible that Russia will have lost more troops in Chechnya

since 1999 than the Soviet Union lost in a decade in Afghanistan.

There are disturbing indications that the conflict with all its sinister

ugliness is spilling over into Ingushetia with attacks by fighters on

Russian federal personnel and convoys and heavy-handed raids by the

Russian forces on villages. Humanitarian workers report that the Russians are determined to close all camps for internally displaced people

in Ingushetia by October. The closures on coerced returns to the Chechen

Republic are alleged by some close to the situation to be provoking and

assisting the recruitment of young people by the extremists. Dr. Salambek

Maigov, until recently Maskhadov’s representative in the Russian Federation, has, I gather, claimed that such young recruits have more

than doubled the ranks of just one of the rebel leaders, Gilayev, alone in

the western sector near the boarder with Galashki.

The human rights and security situation can be judged by the muchrespected Russian NGO Memorial’s estimate that the per capita murder rate in the Chechen Republic now exceeds that for the Soviet Union

during the height of Stalin’s purges. According to Le Monde documents

leaked to the press by the Kadyrov administration in the Chechen Republic last April indicate an average of 109 extrajudicial executions by

federal authorities in the Republic every month.

Meanwhile public opinion polls in the Russian Federation are reflecting growing unease. Last month (August) VTsIOM, the leading independent polling agency, calculated that only 28 percent of 1,585 respondents in 40 administrative regions supported continued military action

while significantly 51 percent favored direct political negotiations with

the Chechen resistance. In September 2002 the same agency had found

only 37 percent favored a political approach while 39 percent favored

increased military action to annihilate the Chechen fighters.

This trend must be a dilemma for President Putin as the date of the

Russian Federation’s presidential elections approaches in view of the

great play he made of his military muscle in the Chechen Republic

during his last election campaign.

Meanwhile, next month there is to be the presidential election in the

Republic. President Putin clearly wants to control this. Despite assurances that a multi-candidate election was the name of the game in the

cause of democracy, all serious opposition to Mr. Kadyrov, the Putin

candidate, and currently head of administration in the Republic, is being manipulated, promoted, or intimidated out of the campaign. For

example, Aslambek Aslakhanov, the representative for the Republic in

the Duma and believed by many to be the most popular rival to Kadyrov,

was offered, and accepted, a high ranking alternative job by President

Putin. Some observers held that he would have scored twice as many

votes as Kadyrov.
42

All my anxieties about the referendum and the context in which it

was held inevitably apply to the presidential election as well. Furthermore, if the referendum was invalid, this election which flows from it

must by definition be invalid as well.

If the security situation remains bad, the human rights and humanitarian situations remain grim. Since April 2000 the European Court of

Human Rights, which can be described as in effect “Europe’s Supreme

Court” on human rights, has received directly some 200 individual complaints. This resulted in 100 files as some complaints concerned the

same events. Of these 50 files have so far been opened. The information

in the others is as yet insufficient for registration. Six complaints have

already been found admissible by the Court and others have been officially referred to the Russian Government.

Alarmingly there are well-authenticated reports of intimidation and

worse—even disappearances and killings—of applicants to the court and

their families. It seems that the Court stands ready to pursue these.

Mr. Salambek Maigov, until quite recently the recognized representative of the Maskhadov government in Moscow, has apparently ceased

to function in this role. The circumstances are unclear but may well be

related to Russian, including FSB, pressure and action following his

last visit to Washington. There are however also reports that he may be

considering standing for election to the Duma in December.

In London the extradition court case concerning Akhmed Zakayev is

moving towards its conclusion. I have met Mr. Zakayev on a number of

occasions. While obviously I don’t know about his past activities I have

found him to be one of the most articulate and open Chechen spokesmen

when it comes to talking rationally about the need for a political process

which is viable and about the demands this will make on all sides. It is

impossible not to wonder why he was in effect isolated by the Russian

extradition request at this juncture.

There is no monopoly of right or wrong, good or evil, in the terrible

Chechen saga. What, I submit, is crystal clear is that if the battle for

peace and security is to be won it will be won in hearts and minds. This

will require patience, imagination, and commitment to a transparently

honest political process. It will mean that whatever the provocations by

extremists the Russians, encouraged and supported by us all, will have

to demonstrate unwaveringly that they are about something altogether

different and qualitatively better. It won’t be easy. Nobody should underestimate the courage it will require. But it is precisely when the

provocation is most acute that consistent commitment to the rule of

law, human rights, humanitarian concern and accountable democratic

government becomes most essential. To forego or waver in that commitment plays directly into the hands of the extremists. It is to do exactly what they want. It is inevitably exploited by them as justification

for their ruthlessness.
43

LETTER FROM MEMBERS OF

THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH,

DATED SEPTEMBER 12, 2003
44
45

RESPONSE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO THE

SEPTEMBER 12, 2003 LETTER TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH,

DATED OCTOBER 20, 2003
 	








  	

 

	
 	 



  

  




   

 


    


	



	
  
  


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