DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities 

and Response Protocols 

OIG-08-19 December 2007
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

December 11, 2007 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General was established by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of 

a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office programs and initiatives to support 

the integration of domestic radiological and nuclear detection, notification, and response systems, 

including its coordination efforts with other federal and state governmental entities. The report also 

examines efforts undertaken by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to identify and address 

potential program overlap with other federal agencies involved in nuclear detection. It is based on 

interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions and a review of 

applicable documents. 

The analysis herein has been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and has been 

discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this report will 

result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of 

those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary...............................................................................................................................1 

Background............................................................................................................................................3 

Results of Review ..................................................................................................................................6 

DNDO Has Made Progress in Developing a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture ....................6 

DNDO Coordinates Preventative Radiological and Nuclear Detection Initiatives With Federal 

Partners ..........................................................................................................................................16 

DNDO is Coordinating the Effort to Improve the Detector Alarm Adjudication Process ............20 

DNDO Coordinates With State and Local Governments to Develop Preventative Radiological 

and Nuclear Programs....................................................................................................................24 

DNDO Works Closely With Other Federal Agencies to Prevent Overlap in Nuclear Detection 

Systems ..........................................................................................................................................32 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ........................................................................................35 

Figures 

Figure 1: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Organization ..........................................................4 

Figure 2: The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture....................................................................8

Figure 3: Layers of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture...................................................10 

Figure 4: Radiation Detection Equipment at a Foreign Port.........................................................11 

Figure 5: Example of DOE-Funded Radiation Detector Deployed Overseas ..............................13 

Figure 6: Examples of Personal Radiation Detectors ...................................................................21 

Figure 7: Examples of Radioactive Isotope Identification Devices..............................................21 

Figure 8: The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Reachback Support.......................................23 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .......................................................................37 

Appendix B: Management’s Comments to the Draft Report.....................................................38 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to this Report ........................................................................40 

Appendix D: Report Distribution...............................................................................................41 

Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

FY Fiscal Year 

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Federal agencies and state and local governments have developed numerous 

programs seeking to prevent the unauthorized possession and use of 

radiological or nuclear material to carry out an attack in the United States. In 

April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office, within the Department of Homeland Security, to enhance 

and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological and 

nuclear attacks. 

We reviewed the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s coordination with 

federal agencies and state governments to integrate detection capabilities and 

enhance response protocols. We also reviewed whether the office’s programs 

overlap with those of other federal agencies. 

Federal and state officials’ feedback on the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office’s engagement and outreach efforts have been positive. For example, 

some state officials said the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s assistance 

was beneficial in helping them determine the best the way to integrate their 

existing radiological and nuclear detection programs, and providing states 

with guidance and technical support for developing future programs. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is working to coordinate federal, 

state, and local government efforts to expand and improve detection 

capabilities. Also, the office has made progress in developing a Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture. The architecture is a multilayered system of 

detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to enhance the 

ability to detect the threat of a radiological or nuclear attack. 

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, in conjunction with the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s Office of Grant Programs, is collaborating 

with state and local officials in developing and delivering radiological and 

nuclear detection programs and training. Lastly, the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office is coordinating with federal partners to identify and prevent 

overlap of federal radiological and nuclear detection programs. We are 

making one recommendation to improve the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office’s coordination efforts with the Federal Emergency Management 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Agency’s Office of Grant Programs. DNDO is taking steps to implement this 

recommendation. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Background 

Preventing terrorists from using radiological or nuclear material to carry out 

an attack in the United States is a priority and major focus of the U. S. 

government. Experts contend that a radiological dispersal device, which 

combines a conventional explosive with radiological material, or an 

improvised nuclear device, which could cause a nuclear detonation, would 

potentially result in damage ranging from economic disruption to catastrophic 

loss of life. Federal agencies have developed programs to counter this threat. 

Additionally, state and local governments have deployed radiological and 

nuclear detection equipment for response to attacks or accidents. 

In April 2005, the President issued a joint directive, National Security 

Presidential Directive 43 (NSPD–43)/Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 14 (HSPD–14), establishing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance and 

coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear 

attacks. Congress made DNDO a statutory entity with the passage of Section 

501 of the SAFE Port Act of 2006.1 DNDO is working with federal agencies 

and state and local governments to enhance and coordinate radiological and 

nuclear detection programs. Also, DNDO in conjunction with the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Office of Grant Programs is 

offering state and local governments training and other technical support on 

detection equipment. 

DNDO Organization and Staff 

DNDO has offices and directorates that engage in research and development, 

purchasing detection equipment, and outreach to federal, state, and local 

entities involved in radiological or nuclear detection. Also, the Director of 

DNDO has a staff of advisors who provide strategic support and expertise. 

Figure 1 shows DNDO’s organizational structure as of May 2007. 

1 Public Law 109-347. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Figure 1: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Organization 

Director 

Deputy Director 

Advisory Councils Office of the 

Chief of Staff 

Chief State & 

Local Affairs 

Office 

Director’s Action 

Group

 Assessments 

Assistant Director

 Operations 

Support 

Assistant Director

 Transformational 

Research & 

Development 

Assistant Director 

Systems 

Architecture 

Lead Systems 

Architect 

y DNDO offices and programs discussed in the report. 

# Program not discussed in the report. 

y Test & Evaluation 

y Technology &

Operational Concepts y Red Teaming 

# Net Assessments of the deployed nuclear 

detection architecture 

y Development of the 

Global Nuclear 

Architecture 

y Operational & Intelligence Information 

y Joint Analysis Center y Training & Exercises 

y Technical support for alarm

resolution through regional reachback 

y Nuclear Assessment Program 

Systems 

Engineering 

Lead Systems 

Engineer 

 Systems

Development and

Acquisition

Assistant Director

National

Technical

Nuclear

Forensics Center

Assistant Director

DNDO is staffed with experts from the national laboratories under the 

authority of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act and detailees from other 

federal government entities.2 DNDO refers to these other federal agencies as 

partner agencies. Partner agencies include the Department of Defense (DoD), 

the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), the Department of State, and the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. In addition, DHS components such as U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the 

U.S. Coast Guard provide personnel to DNDO. DNDO also has its own 

complement of permanent employees. 

As of April 2007, DNDO had 150 employees of whom 48, or 32%, were 

either detailees or liaisons from partner agencies and 70, or 47%, were 

contractors. Detailees serve as subject matter experts and are assigned across 

DNDO offices and directorates. DNDO has executed memoranda of 

agreement with partner agencies that commit detailees to an assignment for a 

specified period. The length of commitment is negotiated on a case-by-case 

basis, with some supporting three to four year assignments, such as the U.S. 

Coast Guard, while others prefer one-year assignments. DNDO and 

interagency officials told us detailees are a beneficial asset in establishing and 

maintaining dialogue among partner agencies. 

2 The Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970, amended May 29, 1997; Title 5, United States Code §§ 3371-76. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 

NSPD-43/HSPD-14 requires DNDO to develop an “enhanced global nuclear 

detection architecture.” The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is a 

multilayered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines 

designed to enhance the nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or 

nuclear attack. DNDO is the primary office within the federal government 

responsible for furthering the development of the Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture. DNDO began the process of defining the architecture by 

conducting a net assessment of the nation’s radiological and nuclear detection 

capabilities. The assessment identified vulnerabilities and gaps in the nation’s 

nuclear detection capabilities. Identifying gaps in existing capabilities 

enabled DNDO to develop a list of detection priorities. 

The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is intended to integrate federal, 

state, and local governments’ nuclear detection and notification systems. 

DNDO is responsible for implementing the domestic portion of the Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture, and works with other federal agencies to 

integrate their detection programs into the architecture. For example, the 

architecture encompasses existing efforts of other federal agencies such as 

DOE’s Second Line of Defense Core program and the Megaports Initiative. It 

also includes DHS efforts such as the Container Security and Secure Freight 

Initiatives to prevent illicit radiological and nuclear materials from reaching 

the United States. 

Collaboration With Federal, State, and Local Partners 

DNDO works in coordination with its federal partners as well as with state 

and local governments. For example, DNDO coordinates with federal partner 

agencies to ensure radiological and nuclear detection activities are not 

duplicated. Additionally, DNDO, in collaboration with FEMA’s Office of 

Grant Programs, supports state and local governments by making detector 

training courses available to first responders or law enforcement officers. 

Support for Nuclear Detector Alarms 

DNDO supports federal, state, and local entities by connecting them to 

technical reachback services for radiological or nuclear alarm adjudication. 

Alarm adjudication is the process used to determine the cause of a detector 

alarm. Technical reachback services provide the expertise to make this 

determination. DNDO uses the term technical reachback to describe its 

system and access to on-call technical experts who are used to adjudicate 

alarms generated by radiological and nuclear detection equipment. DNDO 

established the Joint Analysis Center to make technical reachback services 

readily available to state and local entities. Through the Joint Analysis 

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Center, DNDO connects state and local entities to scientists at national 

laboratories. The scientists use data from radioisotope identification devices 

to determine the cause of a detector alarm. In general, other radiation 

detection devices can only detect the presence of radiation. A radioisotope 

identification device can detect and identify the type of radioactive material 

present. Joint Analysis Center staff advises state and local entities of the 

scientists’ findings, and the state and local entities take appropriate action. 

DNDO Fiscal Year Funding 

For Fiscal Years (FY) 2005 and 2006, DNDO’s operations were funded 

within DHS’ Science and Technology directorate’s budget. According to the 

DHS FY 2007 Budget-in-Brief, in FYs 2005 and 2006, DNDO was allocated 

$123 million and $318 million, respectively. In October 2006, DNDO 

separated from DHS’ Science and Technology directorate and became a direct 

reporting office to the Secretary of Homeland Security. DNDO’s FY 2007 

budget provided $481 million and included $30 million for salaries, expenses, 

and management and administration of programs and activities. The FY 2008 

budget request for DNDO is $561.9 million, and includes a $3.5 million 

increase for management and administration costs to create additional fulltime positions and reimburse other federal agencies for detailees assigned to 

DNDO. 

Results of Review 

DNDO Has Made Progress in Developing a Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture 

DNDO has made progress developing a nuclear detection and reporting 

architecture, referred to as the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. NSPD43/HSPD-14 and corresponding language in the SAFE Port Act requires 

DNDO to develop an “enhanced Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.” 

Further, DNDO’s strategic objectives indicate that it shall develop “the global 

nuclear detection and reporting architecture.” For the first phase of 

architecture development, DNDO identified programs within the U. S. 

government that make up the baseline of the architecture. The baseline 

represents the current state of nuclear detection and reporting systems. Also, 

DNDO identified gaps in the current state and is seeking—through technology 

deployments, research and development, other programs, and outreach with 

federal, state, and local agencies—to counter those vulnerabilities. 

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Progress in Developing the Architecture 

In developing the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, DNDO is working 

to integrate existing radiological and nuclear detection programs. Several 

related programs make up the various layers of the Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture, as a multilayered approach increases the probability that illicit 

nuclear material will be detected. 

DNDO is working with other federal agencies to deploy radiation detection 

equipment and related infrastructure overseas. Doing so provides the U. S. 

government with a greater ability to detect and interdict threats before such 

threats reach the United States. For example, the Megaports and the Secure 

Freight Initiatives are similarly focused on detecting and interdicting 

radiological or nuclear material in shipping containers at foreign seaports 

destined for the United States. These foreign ports of departure initiatives 

constitute one layer of the multilayer Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. 

Other programs are focused on securing nuclear material at its source. The 

DOE’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program is working to 

secure nuclear material at its origin in Russia and other countries, and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission is in charge of ensuring that nuclear material 

at sites within the United States are properly stored and protected. 

DNDO is using the baseline architecture to prioritize efforts to improve it. In 

a relatively short period—seven months—the office identified the baseline of 

the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. For example, using the baseline 

as a starting point, DNDO is working with CBP’s Office of Border Patrol and 

the U.S. Coast Guard to strengthen the architecture between land ports of 

entry and in the maritime domain. Additionally, DNDO continues to work to 

enhance the detection capabilities of other federal, state, and local agencies, 

thereby improving the effectiveness of the overall architecture. Figure 2 

depicts the layered global approach of the architecture. 

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Figure 2: The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture3 

Border 

Protection 

Coast Guard 

Inspection 

At-Sea 

Interdiction 

Potential Source of SNM 

Potential Target 

Port-of-Departure 

Screening 

Materials Protection, 

Control, and Accountability 

Second Line of Defense 

Source: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, April 20, 2006. 

The Architecture Baseline 

DNDO completed an analysis of the current worldwide nuclear detection 

programs in November 2006. In the current state, or baseline, the office 

identified 72 programs across the U. S. government focused on radiological 

and nuclear management. For the most part, DoD, DOE, and the Department 

of State manage these programs. As to DHS-managed programs, CBP seeks 

to prevent illicit transport of nuclear material through and between official 

ports of entry, and DNDO works to enhance the detection capabilities of 

federal, state, and local agencies. 

DNDO estimates that more than $2.2 billion has been spent on these programs 

in FY 2006. However, this estimate does not reflect all spending on the 72 

programs, as some programs had additional elements that did not involve 

nuclear management, and the amount for nuclear management could not be 

3 SNM is the abbreviation for Special Nuclear Material. According to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, special 

nuclear material is plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes uranium-233 or uranium-235. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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isolated. For example, costs associated with CBP’s enforcement activities are 

not included in the funding total because of the difficulty in separating 

radiological and nuclear detection costs from CBP’s other operational 

responsibilities. 

Gaps Identified in the Architecture 

DNDO officials presented the baseline to its partner agencies and the White 

House in October and November 2006. While DNDO will continue to expand 

its knowledge of the baseline architecture, the office is examining options for 

improving the architecture’s effectiveness both in the near- and long-term. 

The office is focusing its efforts on addressing vulnerabilities associated with 

the aviation and maritime domains, particularly the possibility that 

radiological or nuclear material could be smuggled via general aviation 

aircraft or small maritime craft, by expanding detection capabilities. DNDO 

is working with the U.S. Coast Guard, TSA, and CBP to improve their 

radiation detection programs. For example, DNDO is working to deploy 

“next generation” mobile and handheld radiation detection systems to the U.S. 

Coast Guard and CBP’s Office of Border Patrol to improve and expand 

detection capabilities between official ports of entry. 

Layers of the Architecture 

DNDO has adopted a multilayered approach to reducing radiological and 

nuclear threats. It considers the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture in 

terms of three layers—exterior, border, and interior. According to one senior 

DNDO official, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is layered in that it 

is a multifaceted approach to reduce radiological and nuclear threats. DNDO 

noted that a multilayered international system provides more than one 

opportunity for authorities to detect and interdict threatening materials. 

The interior layer of the architecture includes programs implemented within 

the United States. The border layer includes programs focused on detecting 

and interdicting radiological or nuclear material at our land, sea, and air ports 

of entry, as well as the borders between official land and sea ports of entry. 

The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture’s exterior layer includes programs 

implemented at sea and on foreign territory. Each of the architecture’s layers 

has sub-layers, and the layers sometimes overlap. For example, in order to 

interdict threats before they reach the United States, the border layer is 

expanded to overlap part of the architecture’s exterior layer, including the 

foreign departure and transit to the U.S. sub-layers. In the Global Nuclear 

Detection Architecture, efforts to screen cargo containers at foreign ports—the 

exterior layer—is also considered part of the border layer of the architecture. 

Figure 3 depicts the architecture’s layers and sub-layers. 

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Figure 3: Layers of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Exterior Border Int

erior 

Foreign Origin 

Foreign Departure 

U.S. Border 

U.S. Origin 

U.S. Regional 

Transit to U.S. 

Target Vicinity 

Foreign sites with nuclear 

material that could be misused 

Layers Sub-Layers Examples

Target Potential locations of nuclear 

attack within the U.S. 

Areas surrounding potential 

targets of nuclear attack 

Areas surrounding origins of 

nuclear material in the U.S. 

Hospital with nuclear medicine 

equipment, or industrial site 

Official U.S. ports of entry and 

between official land and sea 

ports of entry 

Ships transporting cargo from 

overseas to the U.S. 

Foreign seaport with cargo 

containers destined for the U.S. 

Foreign Transit Illicit trafficking of nuclear 

material within the exterior layer 

Source: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, May 17, 2007. 

Some Examples of Programs Identified in the Architecture Baseline 

DNDO identified programs that make up the baseline of the Global Nuclear 

Detection Architecture. Some of the programs are focused exclusively on 

securing nuclear material at overseas locations, such as the Materials 

Protection, Control, and Accounting program, which is managed by DOE’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration. While other programs, such as 

CBP’s Container Security Initiative have a nuclear detection component, the 

program also addresses other threats. There is also DOE’s Second Line of 

Defense Program that seeks to prevent smuggling of nuclear warheads 

overseas. In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard’s maritime radiation detection 

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program uses its boarding and inspections authority to detect and interdict 

illicit radiological or nuclear smuggling. 

Container Security Initiative 

A focus of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is securing the supply 

chain, particularly cargo-shipping containers. One program designed to 

secure the supply chain is CBP’s Container Security Initiative, which began in 

January 2002. DNDO identified this initiative in the exterior layer of the 

architecture. Through the Container Security Initiative, CBP deploys multidisciplined teams including criminal investigators, intelligence analysts, and 

CBP officers to selected foreign seaports. 

The CBP teams seek to identify and screen high-risk containers destined for 

the United States before the container departs the foreign port. To screen 

containers, CBP and host governments, upon CBP’s request, use large-scale 

X-ray and gamma ray machines as well as radiation detection equipment. As 

of August 2006, the Container Security Initiative was operational in 44 

seaports throughout the world. Figure 4 shows an example of radiation 

detection equipment deployed at a foreign port. 

Figure 4: Radiation Detection Equipment at a Foreign Port 

Source: CBP, Container Security Initiative, 2006-2011 Strategic Plan, page 17. 

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Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting 

Another program DNDO identified in the exterior layer of the architecture is 

DOE’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program. Sometimes 

referred to as the “first line of defense,” the program focuses on radiological 

source security. Under this program, DOE’s National Nuclear Security 

Administration works with foreign governments to secure nuclear weapons 

and weapons material at its current location, as the material could be prone to 

theft or misuse. To prevent the illicit use or trafficking of the material, the 

National Nuclear Security Administration improves physical security 

protections and upgrades material accounting and control systems at buildings 

and other sites housing nuclear warheads and weapons material. 

The Second Line of Defense 

DOE has another major program, called the Second Line of Defense, which 

complements the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program. 

The Second Line of Defense provides an additional layer of protection against 

illicit trafficking of nuclear weapons and weapons material. The Second Line 

of Defense program works to secure international land borders, seaports, and 

airports that might be used as points for illicit trafficking of radiological or 

nuclear materials. 

The program has two components, the Second Line of Defense Core program 

and the Megaports Initiative. The Core program provides fixed and handheld 

radiation detection equipment and related training and communications 

technology to border security authorities in foreign countries. The purpose for 

providing the equipment and training to foreign government authorities is to 

improve their ability to detect and interdict potential radiological or nuclear 

threats before they reach the United States. According to the National 

Nuclear Security Administration, the program has installed equipment along 

the borders of Russia and Greece, and is working with other countries in 

Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus, Baltic, and Mediterranean regions. 

The goal of the Megaports Initiative, which began in 2003, is to improve the 

ability of foreign governments to detect radiation in cargo containers at 

seaports using radiation portal monitors. Figure 5 shows an example of a 

radiation detector deployed overseas. Through the program, the National 

Nuclear Security Administration supports the installation of radiation 

detection monitors and provides training and maintenance to support the 

continued use of the equipment. 

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Figure 5: Example of DOE-Funded Radiation Detector Deployed Overseas 

Source: DOE National Nuclear Security Administration, April 2006. 

The United States Coast Guard’s Radiation Detection Program 

The goal of the U.S. Coast Guard maritime radiation detection program is to 

use its boarding and inspections authority to detect and prevent illicit nuclear 

or radioactive materials from entering the United States. In its baseline 

architecture, DNDO identified the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard to detect 

and interdict radiological or nuclear threats at sea as pieces of the border and 

exterior layers of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. 

U.S. Coast Guard detailees are working with DNDO to improve the Coast 

Guard’s ability to detect and interdict radiological or nuclear threats near 

United States coastal borders. For example, one U.S. Coast Guard detailee 

said that prior to establishing DNDO, creating a preventive radiological and 

nuclear program for the maritime environment was not a focus for the U.S. 

Coast Guard. Rather, the U.S. Coast Guard focused most of its maritime 

policy and efforts on port and container security. To complement deploying 

detectors at sea ports of entry, DNDO and the U.S. Coast Guard are working 

to improve the Coast Guard’s maritime radiation detection program, which 

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will increase the overall likelihood of preventing the illicit traffic of nuclear or 

radiological material before it reaches the United States. 

Radiation Detection at United States Borders 

While the U.S Coast Guard protects the nation’s coastline, CBP is responsible 

for protecting U.S. coastal borders as well as U.S. land borders. Programs in 

the architecture, such as the Megaports Initiative, seek to detect radiological 

or nuclear materials before they reach the United States. Programs in the 

architecture also attempt to detect radiological or nuclear materials at U.S. 

borders. At official ports of entry, CBP uses radiation detection equipment 

and other technology to keep radiological materials out of the United States. 

Also, DNDO has been working with CBP to improve the radiation detection 

capabilities of the Border Patrol to detect nuclear or radiological material 

between land ports of entry. 

Other Notable Nuclear Detection Initiatives 

There are additional nuclear and radiological programs not mentioned in 

DNDO’s baseline architecture that merit discussion. For example, DHS and 

DOE recently announced a joint program, the Secure Freight Initiative. The 

aim of the initiative is to detect radiological or nuclear material in shipping 

containers before the containers reach the United States. Additionally, there 

are other programs involved in detecting illicit trafficking of radiological or 

nuclear material and preventing unconventional nuclear attack, which DoD 

agencies lead, particularly the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 

Secure Freight Initiative 

After DNDO identified the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture baseline, 

DHS and DOE announced the Secure Freight Initiative. This initiative 

involves cooperation with foreign governments and the maritime industry. 

The SAFE Port Act of 2006 requires DHS, DOE, and the Department of State 

to designate three foreign ports to test the practicality of scanning all 

containers for radiation and using imaging technology to see the various 

densities of objects inside the container.4 

According to DHS, phase one of the initiative will involve scanning all 

containers for radiation and using non-intrusive imaging technology at ports in 

Pakistan, Honduras, and the United Kingdom. Also, limited detection 

technology will be deployed at ports in Oman, Singapore, and South Korea to 

test integrating new radiation detection technology with existing port 

operations. 

4

 Public Law 109-347, section 231. 

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DHS is contributing $30 million to the effort to pay for the installation of the 

imaging equipment, and DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration is 

contributing $30 million to fund the installation of the radiation detection 

equipment. Data from radiation detection alarms and the non-intrusive 

imaging equipment is sent to CBP’s National Targeting Center for analysis. 

Department of Defense Programs 

The DoD has the overall mission to provide for the common defense of the 

United States. Because of sensitivity issues, DoD programs that DNDO 

identified as part of the architecture are not included in our report. 

Nonetheless, under NSPD-43/HSPD-14 and the SAFE Port Act, the Secretary 

of Defense retains the “responsibility for implementation of DoD 

requirements within and outside the United States,” and maintains 

responsibility “for policy guidance and implementation of the portion of the 

global architecture outside the United States.”5 The Office of the Secretary of 

Defense is determining DoD’s roles under NSPD-43/HSPD-14 and the SAFE 

Port Act and how DoD programs fit into the Global Nuclear Detection 

Architecture. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is working to counter the threat of 

weapons of mass destruction. The agency’s primary customers are the armed 

services and their units that carryout combat operations. Programs that 

support combat operations are not discussed in this report. 

Implementing the Domestic Portion of the Architecture 

Under NSPD-43/HSPD-14 and the SAFE Port Act, DNDO has the 

responsibility to implement the domestic portion of the global architecture. 

The interior layer of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture includes 

programs to detect illicit trafficking of radiological or nuclear materials and 

efforts to detect radiological or nuclear materials at or near potential terrorist 

target locations. 

DNDO is implementing the domestic portion of the architecture in partnership 

with other federal, state, and local governmental entities. For example, 

DNDO is working with state and local agencies to improve their preventive 

radiological and nuclear detection capabilities through pilot programs, such as 

the Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot and the Securing the Cities 

initiative. Also, DNDO pointed to the equipment it has purchased for CBP’s 

use at official ports of entry as part of DNDO’s effort in implementing the 

domestic portion of the architecture. 

5 NSPD-43/HSPD-14, paragraph 2(d), and the SAFE Port Act (Public Law 109-347) § 501. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Additionally, DNDO is working to enhance the detection capabilities of the 

U.S. Coast Guard and CBP’s Office of Border Patrol in the maritime and land 

border domains. Complementing the domestic efforts of DNDO, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission works on source security of domestic commercial 

nuclear material. 

DNDO Coordinates Preventative Radiological and Nuclear Detection 

Initiatives With Federal Partners 

DNDO is coordinating radiological and nuclear detection initiatives with 

federal partners through committees, councils, and integrated product teams. 

DNDO also collaborates with federal partners on developing protocols to 

address radiological and nuclear detector alarms and provides grants and 

detector training opportunities to state and local officials. 

A goal of NSPD-43/HSPD-14 is to enhance the coordination and cooperation 

among the various federal agencies with radiological and nuclear management 

responsibilities. The presidential directive also requires DNDO to work with 

federal departments and agencies to coordinate the integration of radiological 

and nuclear detection programs. DNDO uses a number of methods to engage 

DHS components and works closely with its interagency partners on nuclear 

detection program issues. DNDO has also taken action to establish or 

implement initiatives that facilitate the flow and management of information 

between federal, state, and local partners. Its actions include: 

• Chartering interagency working groups; 

• Developing detection alarm adjudication protocols; 

• Conducting joint agency assessments on the operational capabilities 

of radiation detection equipment; and 

• Collaborating with FEMA’s Office of Grant Programs on delivery of 

training courses for state and local officials. 

The Domestic Nuclear Defense Policy Coordinating Committee 

The DNDO Director is the DHS representative to the Domestic Nuclear 

Defense Policy Coordinating Committee. Created in 2004 by the Homeland 

Security Council and the National Security Council, the committee is a joint 

policy coordination body that is made up of representatives of all federal 

agencies with management responsibilities for nuclear defense, detection, and 

interdiction. This committee has been instrumental in providing guidance on 

developing DNDO’s nuclear detection response protocols. Policy 

Coordinating Committee meetings are attended by an under or assistant 

secretary of each cabinet department. Meetings are also attended by staff 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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from other Executive Office of the President offices with an interest in nuclear 

defense matters. 

Interagency Coordination Council and DHS Advisory Council 

The Interagency Coordination Council is the forum established by DNDO to 

coordinate its activities with other federal agencies. Members of the council 

include senior officials from DoD, DOE, the Department of State, the FBI, 

and other appropriate agencies. The Interagency Coordination Council meets 

to discuss strategy planning, policy, and other activities across the federal 

government that require coordination to support national nuclear 

counterterrorism and counter-proliferation programs and initiatives. For 

example, the council developed the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture 

deployment strategy, and the maritime and aviation pathway studies to 

address gaps in the architecture. 

The internal DHS counterpart to the Interagency Coordination Council is the 

Advisory Council. Members of the Advisory Council include intra-agency 

senior officials from CBP, TSA, the U.S. Coast Guard, and other DHS 

components as appropriate. The Advisory Council provides guidance to 

DNDO, and is the forum used to address intra-agency issues and activities 

related to DNDO strategies and initiatives. It also plays a role in coordinating 

and communicating across DHS components on nuclear detection 

requirements and related security programs. For example, DNDO officials 

said the concept of operations for the Joint Analysis Center was discussed 

thoroughly and endorsed by the Advisory Council before the Secretary of 

Homeland Security approved its implementation. 

Use of Integrated Product Teams 

DNDO uses a cross-functional team approach, referred to as Integrated 

Product Teams, to provide project and program management for some major 

initiatives, such as detection equipment deployment to state and local 

governments. Integrated Product Teams consist of members from the 

different mission elements within DNDO, such as Systems Architecture, 

Assessments, and Operations Support, as well as representatives from the 

Department of State, DoD, and other DHS components such as TSA and CBP. 

Integrated Product Team meetings provide members an opportunity to discuss 

and take action on issues and to facilitate planning and implementation efforts. 

The DNDO Integrated Product Teams that are relevant to our review include: 

• The Domestic, State, and Local Integrated Product Team is 

responsible for implementing efforts to reduce the risk to densely 

populated urban areas by developing, demonstrating, procuring, and 

supporting the deployment of radiological and nuclear detection 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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equipment, and reporting systems for the interior layer of the Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture. 

• The Joint Analysis Center Integrated Product Team is the DNDO 

entity that addresses requirements and programs that support the 

Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and Joint Analysis Center 

operations. 

DNDO Red Team Activities 

DNDO is working toward implementing a red team program to assess the 

effectiveness of deployed detection systems. The term red team is used to 

describe adversarial role-playing to test a system’s security vulnerabilities or 

readiness. Red teams provide DNDO the ability to identify vulnerabilities or 

gaps within radiological and nuclear detection and reporting systems before 

adversaries can exploit them. In a FY 2007 House Appropriations Committee 

Report,6 concerns were expressed that the Government Accountability Office 

had succeeded in smuggling nuclear material into the country during a red 

team exercise.

7 The committee report acknowledged DNDO’s proposed plan 

to begin red team activities to test the portions of the architecture in the 

coming years, and it cautioned that DNDO should not only test the 

technological component of the architecture, but also explore administrative 

and bureaucratic weaknesses of the system. The Committee directed DNDO 

to submit a report on red team exercises and make any recommendations by 

January 16, 2007. 

During our review, DNDO was in the process of conducting an extensive 

open source information review on adversarial capabilities. DNDO officials 

reported it had not conducted any field red team operations, but it is working 

with partner agencies to develop objectives for red team activities in the near 

future. In the interim, DNDO program managers, in partnership with CBP, 

have participated as observers in two border penetration operations. DNDO 

has also participated in a TSA sponsored two-week operational test of a 

quickly deployable mobile radiation detection system. 

Collaboration With FEMA’s Office of Grant Programs 

DNDO has collaborated with FEMA’s Office of Grant Programs to provide 

funding for radiological and nuclear detection programs through DHS’ 

Homeland Security Grant Program. DNDO, in partnership with the Office of 

Grant Programs, crafted language promoting the development of preventative 

radiological and nuclear detection programs in the Homeland Security Grant 

6

 House Report 109-476. 7

 GAO-06-389, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at

U.S. Ports-of Entry, but Concerns Remain. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Program FY 2007 solicitation kit. DNDO also wrote an appendix that 

explained its support for preventative radiological and nuclear detection 

program development. In addition, DNDO provided subject matter expertise 

during the state grant application review process. The Office of Grant 

Programs also supported DNDO initiatives through its participation in DNDO 

state and local web-based outreach initiatives. 

DNDO and the Office of Grant Programs have also developed and piloted 

radiological and nuclear detector training courses that are designed for first 

responders and public safety officials. The training provides educational 

instruction on the use of detectors in daily operational environments. DNDO 

and FEMA’s Office of Grant Programs have an informal agreement on the 

funding and delivery of jointly developed courses. A senior grant programs 

official expressed concern about DNDO’s reliance on Grant Program funding 

for the development and delivery of training courses. The official said DNDO 

should provide more funding for course delivery, exercises, and detection 

equipment for state and local operators. For future initiatives, the official 

expressed a desire for a formal memorandum of agreement with DNDO 

outlining the respective roles of both offices and funding obligations. DNDO 

officials responded that detection program funding should be provided 

through DHS’ Homeland Security Grant Program, because the Office of Grant 

Programs, which manages the program, is the DHS office that provides 

funding for training, equipment procurement, exercise support, and technical 

assistance to state and local entities. 

Both DNDO and FEMA’s Office of Grant Programs recognize the need for a 

formal agreement on the funding responsibilities of each office. Officials 

from both offices were negotiating the terms of a memorandum of agreement 

in April 2007, when the Office of Grant Programs was re-aligned from DHS’ 

Preparedness directorate to FEMA. DNDO officials said they are prepared to 

undertake the issue again, once the interagency transition is complete. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, in 

coordination with the Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency: 

Recommendation #1: Negotiate and execute a memorandum of agreement 

between the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency’s Office of Grant Programs that defines funding 

responsibilities of each office for preventative radiological and nuclear 

training courses. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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DNDO is Coordinating the Effort to Improve the Detector Alarm 

Adjudication Process 

Many state and local officials, such as police officers and transportation 

personnel, have radiological and nuclear detection equipment for use during 

routine operations and patrols. This equipment alerts the user to the presence 

of radiological or nuclear material. Alarm adjudication is the process to 

determine whether a detector alarm represents a threatening situation or not. 

DNDO is coordinating the effort with federal, state, and local governments to 

develop an improved alarm adjudication process. Additionally, state officials 

told us they plan to acquire more equipment in the future. 

The Joint Analysis Center 

DNDO established the Joint Analysis Center to facilitate alarm adjudication at 

a single location. DNDO’s Operations Support directorate manages the 

center, and DNDO personnel and detailees from partner agencies staff the 

center. 

A state or local official with a detector alarm can call the Joint Analysis 

Center’s toll-free number and be connected to federal alarm adjudication 

assistance. Scientists at national laboratories conduct analysis of detector data 

to make the determination of the cause of an alarm. Joint Analysis Center 

personnel then communicate the results to the state or local official. If at any 

time terrorism is suspected, the FBI, which is the lead federal agency for 

investigating terrorism, is contacted. 

Common Nuclear Detection Equipment 

Most detection equipment being used by state and local officials includes 

personal radiation detectors, radiation portal monitors, and radioisotope 

identification devices. Personal radiation detectors, commonly called 

“pagers,” can also detect the potential presence of radiological or nuclear 

material. Figure 6 shows examples of the types of personal radiation 

detectors. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Figure 6: Examples of Personal Radiation Detectors 

Source: www.radiationpager.com 

When a personal radiation detector worn by a law enforcement officer or first 

responder alerts to radiation, the source of the alarm is isolated and a 

secondary inspection is conducted with a handheld radioisotope identification 

device. A radioisotope identification device is more sensitive to radiation and 

enables the operator to identify and locate the exact source of the material or 

materials that triggered the detection alarm. Examples of handheld 

radioisotope identification devices are shown in Figure 7. 

Figure 7: Examples of Radioactive Isotope Identification Devices 

Sources: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and U.S. State Department. 

Radiation portal monitors, which are used to screen vehicles or cargo 

containers, can also detect the potential presence of radiological or nuclear 

material. Like radioisotope identification devices, most radiation portal 

monitors can give the operator an indication of the isotope causing a detector 

alarm. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Reachback Programs 

If the state or local official cannot determine the cause of an alarm in the field 

by using state assets, such as a state’s radiation protection office, the officer 

can call the Joint Analysis Center. If required, Joint Analysis Center staff will 

contact scientists at the national laboratories through the Regional Reachback 

program. Should those scientists be unable to identify the cause of an alarm, 

Joint Analysis Center staff would then contact the National Reachback 

program. 

Regional Reachback 

Currently, the Regional Reachback program is active in two regions. The 

Southeast region uses the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee and 

the Savannah River Site in South Carolina, and the Northeast region uses the 

Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York, and the DHS Environmental 

Measurements Laboratory in New York City. DNDO officials told us, as 

more states acquire radiological or nuclear detection equipment, Regional 

Reachback will expand to include the Midwest, Southwest, and Northwest 

regions using six additional national laboratories to support the expected 

demand for technical reachback. Regional Reachback is the first DNDO 

program used to adjudicate a detector alarm. 

To improve the capability of the Regional Reachback program, DNDO funded 

training for 20 spectroscopists. The spectroscopists were selected from 

personnel already employed at the laboratories as health physicists, general 

scientists, or radiation measurement technicians. Spectroscopists receive 

training in several areas such as understanding radiological and nuclear 

terrorist threats, sources of naturally occurring radioactive material, and 

radiation material commonly used for medical or industrial purposes. They 

also receive training on radiation detection equipment including the proper use 

of equipment, and common equipment failure and error codes. 

Spectroscopists perform alarm adjudication functions in addition to their 

primary duties. 

Regional Reachback is activated through the Joint Analysis Center after it 

receives a request, usually by a phone call, from a state or local official for 

technical assistance to adjudicate a detection alarm. The caller sends the 

radiation spectral data and event information by fax or email to the Joint 

Analysis Center. The Joint Analysis Center forwards the spectral data to the 

appropriate Regional Reachback spectroscopists for technical analysis while 

the Joint Analysis Center performs its own analysis on the event information. 

The spectroscopists will attempt to determine isotope or isotopes present and 

determine threat potential. The Joint Analysis Center will verify licensing 

data and tie relevant intelligence to the event. The Joint Analysis Center and 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 22 
Regional Reachback analyses will be brought together at the Joint Analysis 

Center and a threat determination will be made. If the alarm is adjudicated to 

be a threat or there is still not enough information to make a determination, 

the event will be elevated up to National Reachback for further analysis, and 

the Joint Analysis Center will contact the state or local official to update them 

on the request. If the event is adjudicated to be a non-threat, the Joint 

Analysis Center will contact the state or local official and report that 

information. 

National Reachback 

National Reachback experts are highly trained in such technical areas as 

special nuclear material, the design of nuclear weapons, and nuclear 

smuggling and terrorism. Three national laboratories support National 

Reachback: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, Sandia 

National Laboratory in New Mexico and California, and Los Alamos National 

Laboratory in New Mexico. The results of technical reachback analysis from 

Regional and National Reachback are provided by DNDO to state or local 

officials to assist these officials in determining an appropriate response to the 

event, which may include involving other federal agencies such as the FBI. 

The national laboratories do not decide or recommend what action officials 

should take. Figure 8 depicts DNDO’s reachback support system. 

Figure 8: The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Reachback Support 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Joint

Analysis Center Reachback Services

Department of 

Homeland 

Security National 

Reachback 

(nuclear weapons 

laboratory 

scientists) 

Joint Analysis

Center links 

operators to 

reachback 

services as 

required, and 

maintains 

situational 

awareness of 

detector alarm 

events. 

Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office General State and Local Government Detection Regional

Procedures Reachback 

(National Lab 

nuclear scientists) 

Weigh Station

Secondary Weigh Station Inspection with Radiation Portal Radioisotope Monitor or 

State Alarm 

Adjudication

Procedures 

Identification Personal Device Radiation

Detector

Should national laboratory scientists determine that the cause of an alarm is 

radiological or nuclear material that could be used in a terrorist attack, the FBI 

is contacted to coordinate the response. Should the cause of an alarm involve 

the illegal transport of nuclear material without the proper license, local or 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 23 
state law enforcement would handle the situation as a law enforcement and 

regulatory violation. 

After an event concludes, the responding laboratory issues an initial report to 

the Joint Analysis Center, which details information such as the date and time 

of the event, name of the spectroscopists or scientist conducting the analysis, 

location of the event, reachback activation method, event summary, and 

analysis results. Within 36 hours of an event’s conclusion, the responding 

laboratory provides the Joint Analysis Center’s Information and Analysis 

team with a detailed after action report for trend analysis and archiving. 

Management of DHS’ Nuclear Assessment Program 

Depending upon the circumstances of a detector alarm, DHS’ Nuclear 

Assessment Program assets may also be activated to conduct a credibility 

assessment of a radiological or nuclear threat. For example, the Nuclear 

Assessment Program would conduct an assessment of a detector alarm if it 

involved the transport of illicit nuclear material. The Nuclear Assessment 

Program is coordinated through the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

and provides a national capability to assess the credibility of communicated 

radiological and nuclear threats. It also monitors illicit nuclear material 

trafficking incidents worldwide. The Nuclear Assessment Program uses 

nuclear specialists and behavioral analysts to determine the credibility of a 

particular threat. The program is accessible to any federal or state agency and 

can be activated independently of a nuclear detector alarm. In FY 2006, the 

Nuclear Assessment Program performed 120 formal assessments. 

DNDO Coordinates With State and Local Governments to Develop 

Preventative Radiological and Nuclear Programs 

DNDO has worked closely with state and local officials to develop and 

improve their preventative radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. 

DNDO’s outreach efforts include inviting states to participate in nuclear 

detection working groups, assisting states in developing detection programs, 

hosting detector equipment and technology demonstrations, and developing 

detector training courses. DNDO also provides technical reachback support 

through the Joint Analysis Center. These efforts focus on providing 

awareness, building on existing state radiological and nuclear detection 

capabilities, detection equipment training, and support for reporting and 

adjudicating detector alarms. 

Additionally, DNDO is working with nine states and the District of Columbia, 

through the Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot, to develop radiological 

and nuclear detection programs for interstate weigh stations. DNDO has also 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 24 
developed plans to assist other states with deploying mobile and fixed 

radiological and nuclear detectors to commercial vehicle inspection units in all 

50 states. Further, DNDO has also assisted New York City with integrating 

methods of preventing the transportation and use of illicit radiological and 

nuclear materials into current and future detection programs through the 

Securing the Cities initiative. 

In working toward deploying domestic detection systems, DNDO reached out 

to state Homeland Security Advisors and Urban Area Security Initiative leads. 

While not all states have been responsive to its outreach efforts, DNDO 

officials reported they recognize some states have higher priorities and 

competing interests, such as preparation for hurricanes or other natural 

disasters. For states with competing priorities, DNDO maintains contact with 

state officials through presentations and working groups designed to update 

those officials on developing detection programs and initiatives. 

Mainly through two of its components, the State and Local Affairs Office and 

the Operations Support directorate, DNDO reaches out and supports state 

government officials in developing and integrating preventative radiological 

and nuclear detection into current and planned detection programs. Both 

organizations play a role in enhancing states’ preventative radiological and 

nuclear detection efforts through the development and implementation of 

outreach initiatives such as working groups, pilot projects, demonstrations, 

and training. 

The State and Local Affairs Office 

The State and Local Affairs Office is DNDO’s primary component for 

collaboration with state officials. It develops office-wide policies for 

interaction and engagement with states, and it coordinates and integrates staterelated DNDO efforts in order to assist states with deploying radiological and 

nuclear detection systems. 

DNDO’s State and Local Affairs Office has engaged state Homeland Security 

Advisors and other state officials and has informed those officials of DNDO’s 

mission and programs. DNDO uses its State and Local Working Group as a 

forum to provide information to states, and for states to exchange information 

on best practices. DNDO also uses the working group as means to obtain 

information on states’ detection capabilities, requirements, and future plans. 

The State and Local Affairs Office assists states with developing grant 

applications for preventative radiological and nuclear equipment and projects. 

Also, DNDO holds working group meetings to discuss ongoing or upcoming 

preventative detection initiatives. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 25 
The Operations Support Directorate 

The Operations Support directorate engages states through presentations and 

conference calls and collaborates with the State and Local Affairs Office in 

working with states to develop grant applications for preventative radiological 

and nuclear detection programs. Operations Support staff also assist states by 

designing and providing exercises, identifying training requirements for 

detection equipment, and establishing protocols for adjudicating and reporting 

detector alarms. 

The Domestic State and Local Integrated Product Team 

DNDO’s Domestic State and Local Integrated Product Team manages all 

DNDO activities with states to ensure outreach efforts are coordinated. The 

team is made up of DNDO staff from each directorate. The team identifies 

state requirements for preventative radiological and nuclear detection and 

ensures DNDO working groups, exercises, training, and technical assistance 

for detector deployment programs are coordinated to benefit state and local 

entities. The team reviews fixed and portable detectors to identify personnel, 

equipment, and network requirements, as well as training, exercise, and 

operational procedure needs. 

State and Local Stakeholder Working Group 

The DNDO State and Local Stakeholder Working Group works to improve 

concepts of operations development and to identify environments where 

detection equipment may be used. The group is made up of DNDO staff, and 

state and local officials. The group considers various factors affecting the 

deployment and function of detectors such as operational environments, 

detector capabilities, and the potential for connecting newly acquired 

detection equipment with existing radiological and nuclear detection systems. 

Through the State and Local Stakeholder Working Group, DNDO 

incorporates stakeholder concerns and feedback into exercise development 

and training opportunities to assist detector users better. 

State working group participants have contributed to developing DNDO’s 

preventative radiological and nuclear detection training and educational 

materials. Two major products resulting from this effort are the Preventative 

Radiological and Nuclear Detection Program Management Handbook and the 

Commercial Vehicle Inspection Radiological and Nuclear Detection Program 

Management Module. The handbook provides guidance to help jurisdictions 

build radiological and nuclear preventative detection capabilities and presents 

a flexible framework for jurisdictions with varying capabilities. The 

handbook also serves as a guide for developing and integrating preventative 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 26 
detection capabilities in state and local enforcement and response operations. 

It covers preventative radiological and nuclear detection planning, 

organization, equipment, training, exercises, and operational support. State 

officials told us that working with DNDO on the development of the 

handbook was informative and that states will use the handbook as the guide 

for their preventative detection programs. 

In addition to the program management handbook, DNDO worked with state 

officials and other subject matter experts to develop and deliver a guide for 

integrating radiological and nuclear detection into commercial vehicle 

inspection operations. The Commercial Vehicle Inspection Radiological and 

Nuclear Detection Program Management Module provides guidance on 

integrating a radiological and nuclear detection capability into commercial 

vehicle inspection operations. Similar to the program management handbook, 

the module provides instruction and guidance on planning, organization, 

equipment, training, exercises, and operational support for commercial vehicle 

inspection programs. This module was distributed to more than 200 

emergency responders, public safety, and transportation operators. 

While many states reported they already employed commercial vehicle 

inspection operations, states were thankful for the opportunity to work with 

DNDO in integrating radiological and nuclear components into their 

enforcement operations. State officials told us that having effective 

collaboration with DNDO enhanced their understanding of preventative 

radiological and nuclear detection. Also, state officials praised DNDO for 

soliciting descriptions of current operations and working with states in 

developing future detection programs requirements. Further, state officials 

reported the working group is beneficial because it provides a method for 

states to explore other states’ radiological and nuclear detection activities. 

State officials said knowing what other states are doing is helpful, and allows 

for incorporating ideas and best practices into their own commercial vehicle 

inspection programs. Finally, state officials told us that DNDO provided 

guidance on which state agencies should be involved in planning preventative 

radiological and nuclear detection programs, such as state health and 

environmental agencies. 

Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot 

In an effort to build upon existing state collaboration on transportation 

initiatives, DNDO has engaged states in the Southeast region through the 

Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot. With this pilot, DNDO has 

supported Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, 

South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of Columbia in 

deploying radiological and nuclear detectors that target commercial traffic on 

highways and at interstate weigh stations. Through the Southeast 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 27 
Transportation Corridor Pilot, DNDO assists states with developing 

radiological and nuclear threat detection capabilities. 

Congress, in the FY 2006 DHS Appropriations Conference Report, 

recommended DNDO use $4 million to deploy detection systems at interstate 

weigh stations. DNDO allocated the $4 million for preventative radiological 

and nuclear detection training, exercises, equipment procurement, and 

equipment deployment to states. Also, DNDO has worked with states to 

develop and implement operational detection capabilities and has encouraged 

states to develop regional concepts of operations to include alarm reporting 

and adjudication protocols. In FY 2006, DNDO provided funding for 

radiological and nuclear detectors to Georgia, Kentucky, South Carolina, 

Tennessee, and Virginia, and anticipates providing similar equipment funding 

to Alabama, the District of Columbia, Florida, Mississippi, and North 

Carolina during FY 2007. 

State officials participating in the Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot 

have been generally satisfied with their interaction with DNDO. Some 

officials indicate they would not have developed preventative radiological and 

nuclear detection programs if DNDO had not approached them. State officials 

said DNDO has been responsive to their requests for assistance in 

understanding potential threats from radioactive and nuclear material, and 

developing detector deployment strategies. Some state officials told us that 

dealing with DNDO was the best experience they have had with a federal 

agency. 

DNDO not only supports states with existing radiological and nuclear 

detection programs, it has been key in introducing and supporting preventative 

radiological and nuclear detection capabilities with other states in the 

Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot. For example, DNDO has been 

instrumental in developing a preventative radiological and nuclear detection 

capability for Tennessee. Tennessee officials told us that prior to its work 

with DNDO, state efforts had focused on developing and deploying an 

experimental radiation detection program and equipment for responding to 

radiation and nuclear incidents. With DNDO’s support, Tennessee is now 

integrating detectors into preventative missions. For example, DNDO assisted 

Tennessee officials with incorporating more than 700 radiological and nuclear 

detectors into an integrated system targeting commercial hazardous materials, 

rental trucks, and weigh stations. Also, DNDO assisted Tennessee with 

recognizing gaps in its detection protocols and procedures, helped it become 

aware of additional preventative detection resources, and provided a 

framework for Tennessee to develop a more comprehensive detection 

program and better alarm adjudication protocols. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 28 
Tennessee plans to use Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot funding to 

purchase a radioisotope identifier, which provides users information on the 

type of radiological or nuclear material detected; and a mobile radiation portal 

monitor, which allows users to direct traffic through a detector that can be 

moved to different vehicle inspection locations. 

In another example of DNDO’s support to states with existing radiological 

and nuclear detection programs, Kentucky officials told us DNDO had 

approached them during the development of Kentucky’s “Weigh Station of 

the 21st Century.” The Kentucky weigh station has an integrated system that 

includes a radiation detection system, a license plate reader, an infrared brake 

monitoring system, an integrated user interface, and a chemical detection unit. 

The system allows vehicle enforcement inspectors to spot potential violations 

more quickly and efficiently. Kentucky transportation officials also told us 

that DNDO assisted them in identifying and engaging other Kentucky 

agencies that should be involved in their preventive detection efforts, such as 

the radiation division of the state’s Department of Public Health. 

Kentucky was awarded Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot funds to 

procure radiological and nuclear detectors that indicate the type of material 

present during an alarm and a mobile radiation portal monitor. State officials 

plan to use this equipment to complement existing detectors. 

A Florida Department of Transportation official told us that Florida has not 

deployed radiological and nuclear detectors at weigh stations. DNDO worked 

with Florida to determine appropriate equipment for detecting nuclear and 

radiological materials at weigh stations. As a result, Florida officials have 

requested funding for a mobile detector, for use at weigh stations throughout 

the state. 

In another example of DNDO’s support to states, a North Carolina official 

told us one of its state agencies possesses and uses radiation detectors, but the 

state’s highway patrol was unable to determine how to integrate the patrol’s 

operational requirements with existing detection capabilities of the other state 

agency. DNDO is currently working with North Carolina to develop an 

acquisition and deployment strategy for new radiological and nuclear 

detectors. 

Finally, an Alabama official reported that without DNDO’s assistance, the 

state would not be developing a radiological and nuclear detection program. 

Currently, Alabama has one weigh station and with DNDO assistance the state 

has applied for a grant to purchase a mobile radiation portal monitor. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 29 
Other State Activities 

DNDO has not limited its engagement with states to the southeast. It has 

reached out to all states and has promoted the office’s preventative 

radiological and nuclear detection mission through conferences, workshops, 

and individual meetings with state officials. As with states in the southeast, 

DNDO officials have supported the integration and deployment of 

radiological and nuclear detectors in other states. 

For example, California Homeland Security officials told us that DNDO has 

greatly assisted its efforts in furthering preventative radiological and nuclear 

detection programs and capabilities. Officials said DNDO has helped 

California determine the best the way to integrate its existing radiological and 

nuclear detection programs, and provided guidance and technical support for 

developing future programs. 

Also, California officials reported DNDO has been helpful in enhancing state 

inspection operations and with the state’s understanding of various detector 

capabilities. For example, state officials reported that DNDO provided 

information on the capabilities of detectors and is working with the state to 

deploy an integrated statewide radiological and nuclear detection system. 

Furthermore, DNDO has supported California’s plans to expand detection 

capabilities in the maritime environment by providing assistance with 

developing alarm adjudication procedures. 

A New Mexico official praised DNDO efforts in assisting the state with 

integrating prevention into existing radiological response operations. State 

officials plan to purchase a mobile radiation portal monitor to support vehicle 

inspection operations. An official also told us they look forward to receiving 

further guidance from DNDO on the technical aspects of radiological and 

nuclear detectors and integrating planned systems with current radiological 

and nuclear detection systems. Also, the official reported New Mexico’s 

radiological and nuclear detection capabilities would not be as advanced 

without DNDO’s assistance. 

Prior to the creation of DNDO, New Jersey received funding through DHS’ 

Homeland Security Grant Program. New Jersey used those grant awards to 

purchase radiological and nuclear detectors and to develop a concept of 

operations plan. Since the initial acquisition of radiological and nuclear 

detectors, DNDO has assisted the state with understanding its detector 

capabilities, and DNDO has been helpful in assisting New Jersey with future 

detector deployment planning. 

DNDO launched the Securing the Cities initiative in March 2006 to enhance 

radiological and nuclear protection and response capabilities in urban areas. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

Page 30 
DNDO officials reported that it is working with New York City to identify 

appropriate detection equipment, develop a deployment strategy, and establish 

a support structure for equipment. Further, DNDO is engaged in evaluating 

the effectiveness of initial detector deployments. Overall, DNDO engagement 

with New York City is designed to leverage current detection capabilities and 

procedures, and provide assistance with detector alarm adjudication. DNDO 

plans to use lessons learned from New York City to further engage cities and 

states in the Northeast region. 

Demonstrations, Exercises, and Guidance 

DNDO assists state governments in developing and deploying preventative 

radiological and nuclear detection capabilities through equipment and 

technology demonstrations, exercises, and guidance it provides in After 

Action Reports and handbooks. For example, DNDO held an equipment 

demonstration for state and local officials from January through February 

2006, to educate these officials on commercially available detector 

capabilities. DNDO brought together subject matter experts from the DHS, 

DOE, DoD, and the Department of Commerce, and demonstrated the use of 

handheld and mobile radiation portal monitors. After the equipment 

demonstration, DNDO provided the detector performance testing results to 

state and local officials to assist them with procurement decisions. 

In addition to the equipment demonstration, DNDO conducted the New Jersey 

Operation Intercept Functional Exercise in September 2006 and the Southeast 

Transportation Corridor Pilot Technology Demonstration in November 2006. 

The exercise and the technology demonstration sought to identify baselines of 

state radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. DNDO brought together 

subject matter experts from national laboratories to assist states by providing 

an assessment of detection equipment and protocol use in operational 

environments. 

Participants in the technology demonstration and functional exercise tested 

existing radiological and nuclear detection abilities to detect radiological and 

nuclear materials during routine operations at commercial vehicle inspection 

sites. The technology demonstration and exercise presented an opportunity 

for states to improve existing detection procedures. DNDO will build upon its 

initial efforts with states and is planning future exercises, demonstrations, and 

workshops. 

State officials told us that the equipment demonstration, Southeast 

Transportation Corridor Pilot Technology Demonstration, New Jersey 

Operation Intercept Functional Exercise, and program guidance increased 

their understanding of detector capabilities, guided procurement decisions, 

and enhanced existing procedures for inspection and alarm adjudication. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Some state officials told us that if DNDO had not conducted these activities, 

states might have purchased equipment and use protocols that did not meet 

their needs. 

Education and Training Opportunities 

DNDO and FEMA’s Office of Grant Programs have collaborated in the 

development and delivery of two radiological and nuclear detection courses 

that focus on preventing radiological and nuclear incidents. These courses 

target first responders and public safety officials and provide education on the 

use of detectors in daily operational environments. In FY 2006, more than 

400 officials participated in these courses. 

The Personal Radiation Detector course is designed for law enforcement, 

emergency medical service, fire, hazardous materials, and public works 

personnel. It provides fundamental information on radiological and nuclear 

materials relating to detection and interdiction. The course also provides 

training on detector operation and on-scene alarm assessment. 

The Detection Equipment for Law Enforcement course specifically targets the 

law enforcement community. In addition to covering the fundamentals of 

radiological and nuclear materials and operation of detectors, it also provides 

further instruction on the detection, verification, assessment, and reporting of 

illicit attempts to possess, transport, or store radiological and nuclear 

materials. 

DNDO is developing and funding the delivery of the Advanced Radiation 

Detection course. This course is planned to build on knowledge gained in the 

Personal Radiation Detector and Detection Equipment for Law Enforcement 

courses and present information on detection mission planning. DNDO 

reported that the course would cover detector deployment and planning for 

targeted detection operations. 

DNDO Works Closely With Other Federal Agencies to Prevent Overlap in 

Nuclear Detection Systems 

We analyzed the missions of federal, non-DoD nuclear and radiological 

detection programs that appeared to have similar or related goals. We used 

DNDO documentation, publicly available information, and interviews with 

DNDO, CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, DoD, DOE, and Department of State 

personnel to compare DNDO’s radiological or nuclear detection program 

activities with these federal agencies. Unlike these federal agencies, DNDO 

does not operate detection equipment. Rather, it seeks to improve the 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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detection capabilities of other federal, state, and local agencies, through 

research and development, procurement, and training. 

Agencies that operate detection equipment such as CBP, DOE, and state and 

local officials each have distinct detection programs. As DNDO does not 

operate this equipment, there is no overlap between the nuclear or radiological 

detection programs of DNDO and these agencies. However, there are 

programs managed by DHS and DOE, specifically the Secure Freight, 

Megaports, and Container Security Initiatives, which appear to have similar, 

potentially overlapping goals, but our analysis did not identify any overlap 

among those programs either. Furthermore, DNDO works closely with 

federal agencies to prevent overlapping research and development programs. 

According to DNDO officials, it works closely with other federal agencies to 

identify and prevent program overlap in detection systems and acquisitions. 

DNDO’s coordination takes place through its participation in interagency 

working groups. These interagency groups have a common goal to identify 

crosscutting program activities and to prevent overlap among the various 

radiological and nuclear detection programs across the federal government. 

DoD and DOE officials told us that these interagency meetings have been 

beneficial in reinforcing agencies’ roles and responsibilities; providing a 

forum for sharing information on planned research and development activities, 

and are necessary to identify and prevent program overlap among federal 

agencies. 

Congress directed DNDO “to provide a report to the Committees on 

Appropriations, no later November 1, 2006, on the budget crosscut of federal 

agencies involved in domestic nuclear detection.”8 In April 2006, DHS 

components, DoD, DOE, and the Departments of Justice and State provided 

DNDO with agency-specific plans for implementing their respective parts of 

the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The program budget crosscut 

report provided a baseline assessment of the federal government investments 

in nuclear detection strategies, programs, and initiatives within each layer of 

the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. 

Three operational DHS components, CBP, TSA, and the U.S. Coast Guard, 

have programs or activities within the architecture. When we compared the 

radiation detection missions and program activities of CBP, TSA, and the U.S. 

Coast Guard with DNDO, we determined no overlap exists. DNDO does not 

operate detection equipment to scan people, vehicles, or cargo containers. For 

example, CBP radiation detection activities involve the use and operation of a 

variety of radiation detection equipment, such as personal radiation detectors, 

radiation portal monitors, and handheld radioisotope identification devices. In 

8

 Conference Report to accompany Public Law 109-295 (House Report 109-699). 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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contrast, DNDO’s responsibility is the development and acquisition of 

detection equipment for CBP’s use. 

Some federal programs appear to have similar purposes, but are designed to 

support different functions. For example, there are three federal technical 

programs that can be used in detector alarm adjudication, the Regional 

Reachback program, the National Reachback program, and CBP’s Laboratory 

and Scientific Services. DNDO’s Regional Reachback program primarily 

assists state and local authorities with adjudicating detector alarms. CBP’s 

Laboratory and Scientific Services provides technical and scientific support 

solely for CBP operations and activities at and between official ports of entry. 

The National Reachback program, which connects radiological and nuclear 

detector operators with scientists who specialize in nuclear weapons, 

adjudicates alarms that cannot be adjudicated by Regional Reachback, or 

CBP’s Laboratory and Scientific Services. 

Other programs appear to have similar goals, but are actually distinct. For 

example, the Secure Freight Initiative, managed jointly by DHS and DOE, and 

the Megaports Initiative, which is managed by DOE’s National Nuclear 

Security Administration, both have the goal of detecting illicit radiological or 

nuclear material at foreign ports of departure. Also, the Container Security 

Initiative, which is managed by CBP, has the goal of identifying cargoshipping containers destined for the United States that are suspected of being 

used by terrorists. CBP screens the cargo-shipping containers, including 

screening for radiation, before the containers depart the foreign port. These 

programs might appear to overlap one another. However, our analysis 

determined each is implemented differently. 

Specifically, the Container Security Initiative involves sending teams of DHS 

employees to work at foreign ports of departure to ensure that high-risk 

containers are screened before they reach the United States. As of August 

2007, the Container Security Initiative was operational in more than 50 ports 

throughout the Americas, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe, and the Middle East. 

The Megaports Initiative, on the other hand, seeks to improve the detection 

capabilities of foreign government entities that operate ports by providing 

equipment, training, and maintenance. Megaports is only operational at ports 

in the Bahamas, Greece, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, and Sri Lanka, 

however DOE is working to expand the initiative to additional ports. 

Moreover, the SAFE Port Act of 2006 mandated that DHS and DOE test 

screening cargo containers in three foreign ports. In response, the 

departments established the Secure Freight Initiative, which builds on existing 

port security measures to improve the federal government’s ability to screen 

containers. The Secure Freight Initiative is operational at six specific ports. 

DHS and DOE coordinate the application of the Secure Freight, Megaports, 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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and Container Security Initiatives closely, and we have no evidence that these 

programs overlap. 

DNDO also supports the interagency Domestic Nuclear Defense Research and 

Development Working Group, and co-chairs the working group on 

interdiction research and development. DNDO is drafting, in partnership with 

other federal departments and agencies, a national research and development 

roadmap for domestic nuclear defense and is expected to deliver this report to 

Congress in October 2007. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We obtained technical and written comments on a draft of this report from 

DNDO. DNDO management agreed with the report’s findings and our 

recommendation. Where appropriate, we made changes to the report to 

address the DNDO management’s comments. A copy of DNDO’s written 

comments in its entirety is included as Appendix B. 

In its written response, DNDO described the self-initiated internal realignment 

of activities to reflect DNDO’s full range of missions and customers better. 

DNDO said that this realignment, highlighting unique maritime, aviation, and 

state and local requirements, programs and activities reflects the maturing of 

DNDO and the changing nature of the threat. Specifically, with the 

realignment DNDO can give more attention to other pathways or gaps in the 

Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. However, this realignment took place 

in August 2007, after we concluded our fieldwork, and we did not discuss the 

realignment in our report. 

In addition, DNDO suggested that we provide greater clarity for the activities 

of the Operations Support directorate by adding an additional paragraph to the 

report. We did not add this paragraph to the text of the report. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, in 

coordination with the Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, negotiate and execute a memorandum of agreement between the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Office of Grant Programs that defines funding responsibilities of 

each office for preventative radiological and nuclear training courses. 

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DNDO Response 

DNDO concurred with our recommendation. DNDO has met with 

representatives from FEMA to discuss scope, funding, roles, and 

responsibilities to be included in the memorandum of agreement. 

Additionally, DNDO has created a working draft memorandum and is 

coordinating it with FEMA. 

OIG Analysis 

We agree that the actions DNDO is taking, and plans to take, begin to satisfy 

the intent of this recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but 

remains open pending our receipt of the finalized memorandum of agreement 

between DNDO and FEMA. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We evaluated whether DNDO programs and initiatives support the integration 

of domestic radiological and nuclear detection, notification, and response 

systems. Our objectives were to determine whether DNDO is meeting its 

obligations to develop and implement an integrated nuclear detection 

capability and response protocol system as directed by the National Security 

Presidential Directive–43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive–14, and 

whether the DNDO’s mission or programs overlap with those of other federal 

agencies. 

Our fieldwork was conducted from December 2006 to April 2007. We 

interviewed DNDO staff, DHS officials from CBP, FEMA’s Office of Grant 

Programs, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and other federal agency 

officials from the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, and the National Counterterrorism Center. We 

conducted telephone interviews with homeland security, emergency 

management, transportation, and public safety officials, including police and 

highway officials from Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 

Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, New Jersey, New Mexico, 

Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. We also reviewed 

component records and documents such as reports to Congress on DNDO’s 

progress, working group and policy coordination meeting minutes, 

memoranda of agreement with other federal agencies, and preventative 

radiological and nuclear training course curricula. 

This review was scheduled as part of our annual work plan. Our work was 

conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the 

President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Appendix C 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections 

Carolyn Aya Johnson, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Levar Cole, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Michael Zeitler, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs 

Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

 Director, Federal Emergency Management Policy Office 

Audit Liaison, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

Audit Liaison, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to use at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: 

Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528, 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.