United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

SPECIAL 

OPERATIONS 

FORCES 

Management Actions 

Are Needed to 

Effectively Integrate 

Marine Corps Forces 

into the U.S. Special 

Operations Command 

September 2007 

 

GAO-07-1030 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2007

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Management Actions Are Needed to 

Effectively Integrate Marine Corps Forces 

into the U.S. Special Operations 

Command 

Highlights of GAO-07-1030, a report to 

congressional committees 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

has relied on special operations 

forces to conduct military 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq 

and to perform other tasks such as 

training foreign military forces. To 

meet the demand for these forces, 

DOD established a Marine Corps 

service component under the U.S. 

Special Operations Command 

(USSOCOM) to integrate Marine

Corps forces. Under the authority 

of the Comptroller General, GAO 

assessed the extent to which 

(1) the Marine Corps special 

operations command has identified

its force structure requirements, 

(2) the Marine Corps has developed 

a strategic human capital approach 

to manage personnel in its special 

operations command, and 

(3) USSOCOM has determined 

whether Marine Corps training 

programs are preparing its forces 

for assigned missions. GAO 

performed its work with the Marine

Corps and USSOCOM and analyzed

DOD plans for this new command. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Marine

Corps conduct an analysis of the 

critical skills and competencies

required of personnel in its special 

operations command and that 

USSOCOM establish a basis to 

ensure they are trained to be fully

interoperable with DOD’s special 

operations forces. In commenting

on a draft of this report, DOD 

generally concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations and noted that 

actions consistent with the 

recommendations are underway. 

While the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special 

operations command (Command), the Command has not yet fully identified 

the force structure needed to perform its assigned missions. DOD developed 

initial force structure plans to establish the Command; however, it did not 

use critical practices of strategic planning, such as the alignment of 

activities and resources and the involvement of stakeholders in decisionmaking processes when developing these plans. As a result of limitations in 

the strategic planning process, the Command has identified several force 

structure challenges that will likely affect the Command’s ability to perform 

its full range of responsibilities, and is working to revise its force structure. 

Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not 

developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills 

and competencies required of personnel in its special operations command. 

While the Command has identified some skills needed to perform special 

operations missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive analysis to 

determine all of the critical skills and incremental training required of 

personnel in its special operations forces units. These analyses are critical to 

the Marine Corps’ efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for 

the management of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without 

the benefit of these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an interim 

policy to assign some personnel to special operations forces units for 

extended tour lengths to account for the additional training and skills; 

however, the policy is inconsistent with the Command’s goal for the 

permanent assignment of some personnel within the special operations 

community. Until the Command completes an analysis to identify and 

document the critical skills and competencies needed by its future 

workforce to perform its full range of special operations missions, the 

Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating 

alternative strategic human capital approaches for managing personnel 

assigned to its special operations forces units. 

USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the 

Command’s training programs are preparing units for their missions because

it has not established common training standards for many special 

operations skills and it has not formally evaluated whether these programs

prepare units to be fully interoperable with other special operations forces. 

The Command is providing training to its forces that is based on training 

programs for conventional units that were assigned some special operations 

missions prior to the Command’s activation and incorporates the training 

that USSOCOM’s other service components provide to their forces. 

However, USSOCOM has not validated that the training for Marine Corps 

forces prepares them to be fully interoperable with DOD’s other special 

operations forces. Without an evaluation, USSOCOM cannot demonstrate 

the needed assurances that Marine Corps forces are fully interoperable with 

its other forces, which may jeopardize the success of future joint missions. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1030.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup 

at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5

Background 8

Although Some Progress Made in Establishing Marine Corps 

Special Operations Command, Force Structure Needed to

Perform Its Missions Has Not Been Fully Identified 14 

Although Preliminary Steps Have Been Taken, the Marine Corps 

Has Not Developed a Strategic Human Capital Approach to 

Manage the Critical Skills And Competencies Required of 

Personnel in Its Special Operations Command 20 

USSOCOM Does Not Have a Sound Basis for Determining Whether 

Marine Corps Special Operations Forces Training Programs 

Prepare Units for Missions 26 

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 36 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 40 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43 

Tables 

Table 1: Description of Special Operations Forces’ Core Tasks 9 

Table 2: Description of Units within the Marine Corps Forces 

Special Operations Command 12 

Table 3: Actual and Projected Funding for the Marine Corps 

Special Operations Command, Fiscal Years 2006 through 

2013 14 

Figures 

Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events in the Integration of Marine Corps 

Forces into USSOCOM 11 

Page i GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2007 Military Positions Authorized for Special 

Operations Forces Personnel in the Active Component 

and Reserve Component 13 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

SEAL Sea, Air, Land 

USSOCOM U.S. Special Operations Command 

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Page ii GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 5, 2007 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

In 1987, the Department of Defense (DOD) established the U.S. Special 

Operations Command (USSOCOM) with a primary mission to provide 

trained and combat-ready special operations forces to the department’s 

geographic combatant commanders.1

 These forces differ from 

conventional forces in that they are specially organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct operations in hostile or politically sensitive 

environments and they employ military capabilities that are not present in 

conventional military forces. Subsequent to its activation, USSOCOM 

assumed operational control of existing units from the Army, Navy, and

Air Force.2 However, the Marine Corps did not assign any of its forces to 

USSOCOM, citing a need to retain the flexibility needed to perform its 

missions. Instead, the Marine Corps created a program to deploy forces to

the geographic combatant commands that were trained to perform some 

special operations missions. 

 1

The department’s five geographic commands—U.S. Central Command, U.S. European

Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern 

Command—are responsible for U.S. military operations within their areas. DOD plans to

establish a U.S. Africa Command with a full operational capability by the end of fiscal year 

2008. 

2

Examples of existing special operations forces that were placed under USSOCOM’s

control include Army Special Forces and Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) units.

Page 1 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
With the onset of the war on terrorism, DOD has greatly expanded the role 

of USSOCOM. As part of its strategy for this war, the department has 

relied on special operations forces to conduct military operations in the 

ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, special operations 

forces have performed other types of military tasks, such as training and 

advising foreign military forces in a number of countries around the world, 

in order to build the capabilities of partner nations to combat terrorists 

more effectively within their own borders. To meet these commitments, 

special operations forces have experienced a substantial increase in 

deployments. For example, we reported in July 2006 that from fiscal year

2000 through fiscal year 2005, the average weekly number of special 

operations forces personnel who deployed to the department’s geographic 

combatant commands increased by 64 percent.3

 DOD recognizes that it 

needs additional special operations forces to defeat terrorist networks and 

has sought to increase the number of these forces. One department 

initiative to increase the number of special operations forces has been to 

integrate Marine Corps forces into USSOCOM. In 2005, the Secretary of 

Defense requested that the Marine Corps and USSOCOM develop plans to

establish a Marine Corps service component to integrate Marine Corps 

forces within the special operations community. In October 2005, the 

Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a Marine Corps 

special operations command (Command) as a service component to 

USSOCOM. 

The Marine Corps activated its special operations command in February 

2006, and in August 2006 began deploying special operations forces units 

to conduct missions for the geographic combatant commanders. On the 

basis of initial department guidance, the Marine Corps special operations 

command will be comprised of approximately 2,600 Marines and Navy 

personnel to train foreign military forces and conduct other special 

operations missions. According to current plans, the Command will be 

fully operationally capable by the end of fiscal year 2008.4

 At DOD’s 

request, the Congress has provided the Marine Corps and USSOCOM with 

regular and supplemental appropriations in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 

totaling $509.5 million (excluding military personnel costs) to establish the 

 3

GAO, Special Operations Forces: Several Human Capital Challenges Must Be Addressed 

to Meet Expanded Role, GAO-06-812 (Washington D.C.: July 31, 2006). 

4

The Marine Corps special operations command defines fully operationally capable as the

organization, training, and equipping of 6 special operations companies and 16 foreign 

military training teams. 

Page 2 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Marine Corps special operations command.5

 In addition, the Marine Corps 

and USSOCOM have projected funding needs for the Command totaling

$907.8 million for fiscal years 2008 through 2013.

While USSOCOM is responsible for monitoring the status of its personnel, 

it does not have authority over personnel management issues such as 

recruiting, retention, or the assignment of servicemembers in special 

operations forces units. Instead, personnel management is the 

responsibility of each military service, and each service handles those 

responsibilities differently. For example, the Marine Corps is assigning 

personnel to its special operations command from a variety of career 

fields,6

 such as reconnaissance and intelligence, and plans to rotate these 

personnel between special operations forces units and conventional force 

units. This policy is in contrast to the management of some special 

operations forces personnel in the other military services. The Army, for 

example, has established separate career fields for Special Forces and 

Civil Affairs soldiers and in fiscal year 2007, the Navy established a 

separate career field for SEALs. Once assigned to the Command, 

personnel will be provided with additional training for the skills that are 

required to perform special operations missions. In general, the Marine 

Corps will retain the responsibility for providing training for basic Marine 

Corps skills to personnel who are assigned to its special operations forces 

units. USSOCOM, through its Marine Corps service component command, 

is responsible for providing training for special operations-unique skills to 

Marine Corps personnel in these units. 

We prepared this report under the Comptroller General’s authority to 

conduct evaluations on his own initiative. Our objective was to evaluate 

DOD’s efforts to establish a Marine Corps special operations command. 

Specifically, we assessed the extent to which (1) the Marine Corps special 

operations command has identified the force structure needed to perform 

its mission, (2) the Marine Corps has developed a strategic human capital 

approach to manage the critical skills and competencies required of 

personnel in its special operations command, and (3) USSOCOM has 

determined whether Marine Corps special operations forces training 

programs are preparing these forces for assigned missions. 

 5

Military personnel costs for all servicemembers, including special operations forces

personnel, are included in the services’ budgets.

6

The military services delineate their force structure through career fields, or occupational

specialties, which represent the jobs that are necessary to meet their specific missions. 

Page 3 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps special operations 

command has identified the force structure needed to perform its mission, 

we identified and reviewed reports related to the department’s efforts to 

increase the size of special operations forces by integrating Marine Corps 

forces into USSOCOM. We analyzed available internal DOD 

documentation such as briefings, guidance, and memoranda that identified 

DOD’s plans and time frames for establishing the Marine Corps special 

operations command. We discussed DOD’s decision-making processes for 

developing force structure plans for the new Command with officials from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Staff; Headquarters, 

Marine Corps; USSOCOM; and the geographic combatant commands. We

also reviewed documents and interviewed officials with the Marine Corps 

special operations command to determine the force structure challenges

the Command has identified and the plans that are being developed to 

revise its force structure. To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps 

has developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical

skills and competencies required of personnel in its special operations 

forces units, we analyzed relevant Marine Corps policies for assigning 

personnel to conventional force units and to special operations forces 

units. We conducted interviews with officials from Headquarters, Marine 

Corps, who are responsible for managing personnel assigned to the Marine 

Corps special operations command. To better understand the unique 

personnel needs of the Marine Corps special operations command, we 

interviewed officials from the Command to discuss the specialized skills 

and training that are required by personnel who are assigned to special 

operations forces units to perform the Command’s assigned missions. To 

assess the extent to which USSOCOM has determined whether Marine 

Corps special operations forces training programs are preparing these 

forces for assigned missions, we examined relevant laws and DOD 

doctrine related to the responsibilities of the Marine Corps and USSOCOM 

for training special operations forces personnel. We reviewed available 

documents that detail training programs for Marine Corps special 

operations forces. We collected and analyzed documents related to 

USSOCOM’s evaluations of Marine Corps special operations forces 

training, and we discussed the efforts that have been taken by the Marine 

Corps special operations command and USSOCOM to assess the 

effectiveness of these training programs. Our assessment of data reliability 

concluded that the data used to support this review were sufficiently 

reliable to answer our objectives. We conducted our review from August 

2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. A more detailed discussion of our scope and 

methodology is contained in appendix I. 

Page 4 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Although the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special 

operations command, the Command has not yet fully identified the force 

structure needed to perform its assigned missions. The Marine Corps has 

taken several steps to establish its special operations command, such as 

activating the Command’s headquarters, establishing Marine Corps special 

operations forces units, and deploying these units to conduct special 

operations missions. DOD developed initial force structure requirements 

for the Command by basing the composition and number of special 

operations units on existing units within the Marine Corps that had 

performed similar missions in the past, but did not use critical practices of 

effective strategic planning when developing these requirements. We have

previously reported on several practices that are critical to effective 

strategic planning, including the alignment of activities and resources to 

support organizational missions and the involvement of stakeholders in

decision-making processes to help ensure efforts and resources are 

targeted to the highest priorities.7

 However, DOD did not fully incorporate 

these critical practices during its planning for the Marine Corps special 

operations command. For example, the Command’s activities and 

resources were not fully aligned with the organization’s mission. Neither 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Marine Corps conducted a 

comprehensive, data-driven analysis to determine the number of personnel 

needed to meet the Command’s mission requirements, and the number of 

personnel authorized for the Command was not directly tied to specific 

mission requirements. In addition, we found that some key stakeholders

were not involved in the establishment of the Marine Corps special 

operations command. For example, the special operations components 

within the department’s geographic combatant commands—which are 

responsible for commanding special operations forces around the world—

were not involved in the process to establish the Marine Corps special 

operations command or in the decisions to target the service’s resources 

to their highest priorities and mission requirements. As a result of 

limitations in the strategic planning process, the Command has identified

several challenges related to its planned force structure. For example, 

officials identified shortfalls in the number of personnel available to 

conduct support functions for Marine Corps special operations forces 

units. Additionally, the Command has determined that the number and 

composition of its special operations forces units are not aligned with the 

Command’s mission requirements and, at the time we issued our report, 

Results in Brief 

 7

GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and

Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). 

Page 5 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
the Marine Corps special operations command was developing several 

proposals to significantly revise its force structure to better meet its 

mission needs. These revisions would adjust the number and size of the 

Command’s warfighter units to better meet mission requirements. 

Although the Command had not completed several analyses of the 

personnel and funding requirements that are tied to these proposed force 

structure changes, it has set milestones for completing its work. Until the 

analyses are completed, however, the Command will be unable to 

determine whether the approved plans for its personnel and funding 

should be adjusted in order for the Command to perform all of its assigned 

missions. 

Although some preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has 

not developed a strategic human capital approach to manage personnel in

its special operations command because the Command has not yet 

conducted a comprehensive analysis to identify the critical skills and 

competencies required of personnel in its special operations forces units. 

Our prior work has shown that the analysis of critical skill and 

competency gaps between current and future workforce needs is an 

important step in strategic human capital planning.

8

 The Marine Corps 

special operations command has begun to identify some of the critical

skills that are needed to perform special operations missions. For 

example, as part of the effort to identify these critical skills, it is 

developing a training course that will provide baseline training to newly 

assigned personnel to prepare them for positions in warfighter units. The 

Command plans to provide these personnel with training on advanced 

survival skills and foreign languages. However, the Command has not 

conducted a comprehensive analysis to fully identify and document the 

advanced skills and additional training that are necessary to support its 

full range of assigned missions. Moreover, the Command has not yet fully 

determined which positions should be filled by specially trained personnel 

who are strategically managed to meet the Command’s missions. Such 

analyses are critical to the Marine Corps’ efforts to develop a strategic 

human capital approach for the management of personnel in its special 

operations forces units. Without the benefit of these analyses, the Marine 

Corps has developed an interim policy to assign some personnel to special 

operations forces units for extended tour lengths to account for the 

additional training and skills. According to officials with Headquarters, 

 8

GAO, DOD Civilian Personnel: Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plans Needed, 

GAO-04-753 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004).

Page 6 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Marine Corps, and the Marine Corps special operations command, the 

interim policy is designed, in part, to retain some personnel at the Marine 

Corps special operations command long enough to complete specialized 

training and conduct at least two deployments. However, the interim 

policy is inconsistent with the Marine Corps special operations command’s 

goal for the permanent assignment of some personnel within the special

operations community. According to officials from the Command, 

permanent assignments for personnel in special operations forces units 

are necessary to develop and sustain the critical skills required to support 

the Command’s full range of assigned missions. Officials with 

Headquarters, Marine Corps, told us the service plans to review the 

interim policy and work with the Marine Corps special operations 

command to develop a management strategy that better meets the 

Command’s personnel needs. However, until the Command completes a 

comprehensive analysis to identify and document the critical skills and 

training needed by its future workforce to perform the Command’s full 

range of assigned special operations missions, the Marine Corps will not 

have a sound basis for developing or evaluating alternative strategic

human capital approaches for the management of personnel assigned to its 

special operations forces units. 

USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether the 

Marine Corps special operations command’s training programs are 

preparing its forces for their missions because it has not established 

common training standards for many special operations skills and it has 

not formally evaluated whether these programs will prepare units to be 

fully interoperable with other special operations forces. The Marine Corps 

special operations command has taken several actions to implement 

training programs to fulfill its responsibility for training personnel to a 

unique set of special operations forces standards. For example, the 

Command has provided training to its forces that has been adapted from 

the training programs for conventional units that were assigned some 

special operations missions prior to the activation of the Command. In 

addition, Command officials told us that training programs for missions 

that conventional units are not assigned have been determined by 

consulting with, and selectively incorporating, the service-specific training

that USSOCOM’s other service components provide to their special 

operations forces. Although USSOCOM is responsible for evaluating the 

effectiveness of all training programs and for ensuring the interoperability 

of all of DOD’s special operations forces, it does not have a sound basis to 

determine whether Marine Corps training programs are preparing units for 

their missions for two reasons. First, common training standards have not 

yet been established for many special operations skills. USSOCOM has 

Page 7 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
established common training standards for some skills, and is working on 

an incremental basis to develop common standards for additional skills 

because of the recognition that current service-specific training may not 

optimize opportunities for commonality, jointness, or efficiency. Second, 

while USSOCOM has taken some limited steps to evaluate the training 

provided to Marine Corps special operations forces, it has not formally 

validated that the training programs developed by the Marine Corps 

special operations command meet special operations forces standards and 

prepare forces to be fully interoperable with the department’s other 

special operations forces. Without common training standards for special 

operations skills or a formal evaluation of the training and standards used 

to prepare Marine Corps forces for deployments, USSOCOM cannot 

demonstrate the needed assurances to the geographic combatant 

commanders that these forces are being trained to special operations 

forces standards and that these forces are fully interoperable with DOD’s 

other special operations forces, thereby potentially impacting the success 

of future joint operations. 

To facilitate the development of a strategic human capital approach for the 

management of personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special operations 

command and to validate that Marine Corps special operations forces are 

trained in a manner that is fully interoperable with DOD’s other special 

operations forces, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense to (1) direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to conduct an 

analysis of the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in 

Marine Corps special operations forces units, establish milestones for 

conducting this analysis, and use the results of this analysis to develop a 

strategic human capital approach for the management of these personnel; 

and (2) direct the Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a framework for 

evaluating Marine Corps special operations forces training programs to 

ensure the programs are sufficient to prepare Marine Corps special 

operations forces to be fully interoperable with the department’s other 

special operations forces. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD 

generally concurred with our recommendations and noted that actions 

consistent with the recommendations are underway. 

In 1986, the President signed a joint resolution of Congress that directed

the Secretary of Defense to establish a unified combatant command for 

special operations forces.9

 In April 1987, the Secretary of Defense 

Background 

 9

Pub. L. No. 99-500, § 9115 (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 167). 

Page 8 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
established USSOCOM with the mission to provide trained and combatready special operations forces to DOD’s geographic combatant 

commands. Since 2003, DOD has further expanded the role of USSOCOM 

to include greater responsibility for planning and leading the department’s 

efforts in the war on terrorism. In addition to training, organizing, 

equipping, and deploying combat-ready special operations forces to the 

geographic combatant commands, USSOCOM has the mission to lead,

plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute global operations against 

terrorist networks. 

Tasks and Missions of 

Special Operations Forces 

DOD doctrine describes the characteristics of special operations forces, 

and provides joint force commanders with the guidance and information 

necessary to identify, nominate, and select missions appropriate for 

special operations forces.10 According to doctrine, special operations 

forces perform two types of activities: special operations forces perform 

tasks that no other forces in DOD conduct, and they perform tasks that 

other DOD forces conduct but do so according to a unique set of 

conditions and standards. In particular, special operations forces are 

specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish nine core 

tasks, which represent the collective capabilities of all special operations 

forces rather than those of any one unit. Table 1 defines these core tasks.

Table 1: Description of Special Operations Forces’ Core Tasks 

Core task Description

Direct action Short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions 

conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments 

to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated 

targets. 

Special 

reconnaissance 

Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted in hostile, 

denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify 

information of strategic or operational significance, employing 

military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. 

Foreign internal

defense 

Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 

any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization, to free and protect its society from 

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 

 10Department of Defense, Joint Pub. 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (Dec. 17, 

2003). 

Page 9 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Core task Description

Unconventional 

warfare 

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally 

of long duration, predominately conducted through, with, or by 

indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, 

equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an

external source. 

Counterterrorism Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to

terrorism. 

Counterproliferation 

of weapons of mass 

destruction

Actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, render safe, capture, or 

recover weapons of mass destruction. 

Civil affairs 

operations 

Operations that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations 

among military forces, government and nongovernmental civilian 

organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in friendly, 

neutral, or hostile areas of operations in order to facilitate military 

operations and consolidate and achieve U.S. national objectives. 

Psychological 

operations 

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators 

to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, 

objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 

governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. 

Information 

operations 

Actions taken to affect adversary information and information

systems while defending one’s own information and information 

systems. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Prior Actions Taken to 

Integrate Marine Corps 

Forces into USSOCOM 

Since 1987, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have taken several steps to 

expand the relationship between the two organizations. For example, 

beginning in 1993, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM established a working 

group to discuss efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and 

interoperability. These efforts received a renewed emphasis with the onset

of the war on terrorism. In 2002, the Secretary of Defense requested the 

military services to increase their support to USSOCOM. In 2003, the 

Marine Corps established a specially trained and equipped unit as a 

concept to demonstrate the Marine Corps’ ability to conduct special 

operations missions under the operational control of USSOCOM. This unit 

deployed to Iraq in April 2004 to perform selected special operations 

missions. The Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of a 

Marine Corps service component to USSOCOM in October 2005. In

February 2006, the Marine Corps activated its special operations 

command. Since August 2006, the Marine Corps special operations 

command has deployed its forces to perform special operations missions 

to support the geographic combatant commanders’ requirements. Figure 1 

provides a timeline. 

Page 10 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Figure 1: Timeline of Key Events in the Integration of Marine Corps Forces into USSOCOM 

1987 1993 2002 2004 2006 2005 2007

USSOCOM 

established 

by DOD

Marine Corps

and USSOCOM

establish working

group to address

issues of mutual 

interest 

January: Secretary

of Defense designates

USSOCOM as the

DOD lead for planning 

the Global War on 

Terrorism

October: Secretary of 

Defense approves

creation of a Marine 

Corps special operations

component command 

under USSOCOM

August: Marine Corps

special operations

command units deploy to 

train and advise foreign 

military personnel

Marine Corps

establishes separate 

program to deploy 

units capable of 

performing special 

operations missions

Deputy Secretary 

of Defense requests

the Marine Corps

to identify special 

operations missions

that marines could 

perform

April: Marine Corps

deploys specially

trained unit with U.S. 

Navy special operations

forces to conduct 

special operations

missions in Iraq

February: Marine 

Corps Forces

Special Operations

Command activates

Marine Corps

special operations

forces deploy 

aboard Marine 

Expeditionary Units

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

2003

Organization of Marine 

Corps Forces Special 

Operations Command 

The Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command is the Marine 

Corps service component to USSOCOM. The Command is headquartered 

on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Marine Corps 

special operations command has five major subordinate units. These units 

include two Marine Special Operations Battalions, the Marine Special 

Operations Advisor Group,11 the Marine Special Operations Support 

Group, and the Marine Special Operations School. Table 2 provides a 

description of each unit.

 11Prior to May 2007, the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group was named the Foreign

Military Training Unit. 

Page 11 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Table 2: Description of Units within the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations

Command 

Unit Description

Marine Special Operations 

Battalion 

Provides special operations companies to perform direct 

action, special reconnaissance, and foreign internal

defense operations; companies can deploy aboard a 

Marine Expeditionary Unit or independently. 

Marine Special Operations 

Advisor Group 

Provides tailored, combat skills training and advisor 

support for identified foreign forces to enhance the 

capability of partner nation forces. 

Marine Special Operations 

Support Group

Provides tailorable and scalable support capabilities for 

worldwide special operations missions, including 

intelligence and communications support, combined arms,

military working dog support, and combat service support. 

Marine Special Operations 

School 

Conducts assessment and selection of Marines assigned 

to Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, 

develops and standardizes doctrine and tactics, and trains 

and certifies units for worldwide deployments. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

By fiscal year 2011, the Command will be authorized 2,516 personnel—

2,483 military personnel and 33 civilians. With the exception of one Marine 

Corps reserve position, all of the authorized military personnel will be 

drawn from the military services’ active components. The Marine Corps 

special operations component will be the smallest service component 

under USSOCOM. The other military services’ special operations 

components include the following. 

• The Army component is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. 

Army special operations forces include Special Forces, Rangers, Special 

Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. 

• The Navy component is the Naval Special Warfare Command. Naval 

Special Warfare forces include SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle 

Teams, and Special Boat Teams. 

• The Air Force component is the Air Force Special Operations Command. 

Air Force special operations forces include fixed and rotary wing aviation 

squadrons, a combat aviation advisory squadron, special tactics 

squadrons, and an unmanned aerial vehicle squadron. 

Figure 2 shows the number of military personnel positions in fiscal year 

2007 authorized for DOD’s special operations forces in the active 

component and reserve component. The authorizations include positions 

in special operations forces warfighter units, support units, and 

Page 12 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
headquarters units such as USSOCOM and its service component 

commands.

Figure 2: Fiscal Year 2007 Military Positions Authorized for Special Operations 

Forces Personnel in the Active Component and Reserve Component

Since fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have requested 

baseline and supplemental funding for the Marine Corps special 

operations command. In fiscal year 2006, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM 

received $109.3 million in supplemental funds to establish the Marine 

Corps special operations command. In fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps 

and USSOCOM received an additional $368.2 million in baseline funds for 

the Command, and $32 million in supplemental funding. As shown in table 

3, the Marine Corps and USSOCOM have projected military construction, 

operation and maintenance, and procurement funding for the Command 

for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. 

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

Marine 

Corps

Air

Force

Army Navy

Number of military personnel positions

Branch of military

National Guard

Reserve

Active

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Funding for the Marine 

Corps Special Operations 

Command 

Page 13 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Table 3: Actual and Projected Funding for the Marine Corps Special Operations Command, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2013 

Dollars in millions 

Appropriation

account 

Fiscal year 

2006 

Fiscal year 

2007 

Fiscal year 

2008

Fiscal year 

2009

Fiscal year 

2010

Fiscal year 

2011 

Fiscal year 

2012

Fiscal year 

2013

Military Construction $0 $228.6 $123.4 $10.1 $0 $0 $0 $0

Operation and 

Maintenance 

0 65.6 100.4 110.6 74.5 69.9 72.3 75.8

Procurement 0 74.0 56.1 57.6 70.6 77.4 2.2 6.9

Supplemental 109.3 32.0

Total $109.3 $400.2 $279.9 $178.3 $145.1 $147.3 $74.5 $82.7

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data as of February 13, 2007. 

Note: Amounts include Marine Corps and USSOCOM funding for the Marine Corps special 

operations command. 

Although the Marine Corps has made progress in establishing its special 

operations command, the Command has not fully identified the force 

structure needed to enable it to perform its assigned missions. The Marine 

Corps has taken several steps to establish its special operations command, 

such as activating the Command’s headquarters, establishing Marine Corps 

special operations forces units, and deploying these units to conduct 

special operations missions; however, DOD did not use critical practices 

of effective strategic planning when developing the initial force structure 

plans for the Command. As a result of limitations in the strategic planning 

process, the Marine Corps special operations command has identified 

several force structure challenges that will likely affect the Command’s 

ability to perform its full range of responsibilities, and is working to revise

its force structure to address these challenges. 

The Marine Corps has taken several steps to establish the Marine Corps 

special operations command. For example, the Marine Corps has activated 

the headquarters of its special operations command, established some of 

its special operations forces units—including 4 special operations 

companies and 12 foreign military training teams to date—and deployed 

these units to conduct special operations missions. However, the initial

force structure plans for the Command were not developed using critical 

practices of effective strategic planning. According to officials from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, and the Marine Corps, the 

Secretary of Defense directed that the Marine Corps establish a special 

Although Some 

Progress Made in 

Establishing Marine 

Corps Special 

Operations 

Command, Force 

Structure Needed to 

Perform Its Missions 

Has Not Been Fully 

Identified 

Steps Taken to Establish 

Marine Corps Special 

Operations Command, but 

Initial Force Structure 

Plans Were Not Developed 

Using Critical Practices of 

Effective Strategic 

Planning 

Page 14 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
operations command to meet the growing demand for special operations 

forces in the war on terrorism. The Secretary of Defense, with input from 

the Marine Corps, determined that 2,516 personnel was an appropriate size 

for the Command based on the assumptions that the Command was to be 

staffed within the existing Marine Corps end-strength, and the 

establishment of the Command could not significantly affect the Marine 

Corps budget. Marine Corps planners then based the composition and 

number of Marine Corps special operations forces units on existing units

within the service that had trained to perform similar missions in the past. 

For example, Marine Corps officials told us that the force structure plans 

for its special operations companies were modeled after a Maritime 

Special Purpose Force, which had previously trained to conduct some 

special operations missions for conventional Marine Corps units.12

Additionally, Marine Corps officials told us the initial force structure plan

to establish nine special operations companies was based on the need to 

accommodate the deployment schedule of its Marine Expeditionary Units. 

The initial force structure plan also included the transfer of the Foreign 

Military Training Unit from the conventional force to its special operations 

command. Using this existing force structure, the Marine Corps planned to

establish 24 foreign military training teams under its special operations 

command. 

DOD did not fully incorporate critical practices of effective strategic 

planning when it developed these initial force structure plans for the 

Marine Corps special operations command. We have previously reported 

that strategic planning is important to ensure that an organization’s 

activities support its strategic goals. Effective planning principles, such as 

those embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act of 199313

and used by leading organizations, require federal agencies to set strategic 

goals and develop strategic plans to accomplish those goals. Our prior 

work has identified several critical practices for effective strategic

planning, including the alignment of activities and resources to meet 

organizational missions and stakeholder involvement. Our prior work has 

shown that leading organizations recognize that an organization’s 

 12The Maritime Special Purpose Force was part of the Marine Corps’ Marine Expeditionary 

Unit—Special Operations Capable Program. This program provided a forward deployed,

sea-based Marine Air-Ground Task Force capable of executing designated maritime special 

operations, among other tasks. The Maritime Special Purpose Force was organized and

trained using Marine Expeditionary Unit assets to provide a special operations-capable 

force that could be tailored to execute maritime special operations missions. 

13Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

Page 15 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
activities, core processes, and resources must be aligned to support its 

mission and help it achieve its goals. Organizations should assess the 

extent to which their programs and activities contribute to meeting their 

mission and desired outcomes. In addition, successful organizations base 

their strategic planning, to a large extent, on the interests and expectations

of their stakeholders. Stakeholder involvement is important to help 

agencies ensure that their efforts and resources are targeted at the highest 

priorities. Just as important, involving stakeholders in strategic planning

efforts can help create a basic understanding among the stakeholders of 

the competing demands that confront most agencies, the limited resources 

available to them, and how those demands and resources require careful 

and continuous balancing.14

However, in our review of the planning process that preceded the 

establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command, we found 

the Command’s activities and resources were not fully aligned with the 

organization’s mission. For example, although the alignment of activities 

and resources to meet organizational missions, a critical practice of 

effective strategic planning, should include an analysis of the number of 

personnel required for an organization to accomplish its missions, Marine

Corps officials stated that the size of the Marine Corps special operations 

command (2,516 personnel) was not determined through an analysis of the 

Command’s assigned missions. Specifically, neither the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense nor the Marine Corps conducted a comprehensive, 

data-driven analysis to determine the number of personnel needed to meet 

the Marine Corps special operations command’s mission requirements that 

directly tied the number of personnel authorized for the Command with its 

assigned missions. USSOCOM did not provide official mission guidance to 

the Marine Corps until October 2006, almost 1 year after the Command’s 

personnel authorizations had been determined. In the absence of specific 

guidance, Marine Corps planners did not conduct a comprehensive, datadriven analysis to determine the number of personnel needed to meet the 

Marine Corps special operations command’s full range of mission 

requirements. Our prior work has shown that valid and reliable data on the 

number of employees required to meet an agency’s needs are critical 

 14GAO/GGD-96-118. 

Page 16 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
because human capital shortfalls can threaten an agency’s ability to 

perform its missions efficiently and effectively.15

The alignment of activities and resources should also include an analysis 

of the number and composition of Marine Corps special operations forces 

units. However, the Marine Corps did not determine the number and 

composition of its special operations forces units based on specific 

guidance from USSOCOM. Although the Marine Corps special operations 

command was established as the Marine Corps service component under 

USSOCOM, USSOCOM did not provide guidance to Marine Corps planners 

on the full range of missions assigned to the Command, or on the number 

of special operations forces that the Marine Corps needed to provide. Both

USSOCOM and Marine Corps officials reported that USSOCOM provided 

only informal guidance to Marine Corps planners on the core tasks that 

would be assigned to Marine Corps special operations forces units. 

According to Marine Corps officials involved in the planning for the 

Marine Corps special operations command, the informal guidance did not 

prioritize the core tasks to focus Marine Corps planning efforts, and the 

guidance did not identify the required capacity for specific capabilities 

within the Command. 

The official guidance that USSOCOM provided to the Marine Corps special 

operations command in October 2006 contained a complete list of 

missions the Command would be expected to perform. However, the 

guidance did not prioritize these missions to focus the Command’s 

planning efforts. Additionally, the guidance did not establish milestones 

and benchmarks that the Command could use to determine when, and to

what level of proficiency, Marine Corps special operations forces units 

should be able to perform all of their assigned missions. In the absence of

specific guidance, Marine Corps officials told us the initial force structure 

plan to establish nine special operations companies was not based on a 

USSOCOM requirement for the number of these companies. Moreover, 

while the decision to transfer the foreign military training teams to the 

Marine Corps special operations command met the Command’s mission to 

provide USSOCOM with a foreign internal defense capability, the decision 

on the number of teams needed by the Command to meet USSOCOM’s 

mission requirements was left to the Marine Corps. Marine Corps officials 

also told us that in the absence of clear guidance on the required capacity 

 15GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington,

D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). 

Page 17 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
for support personnel within the Command, Marine Corps planners 

prioritized the assignment of personnel in warfighter positions in special

operations forces units over positions in support units. Specifically, 

because planners were basing the Command’s force structure decisions on 

the personnel limit established by DOD, the Marine Corps exchanged 

positions related to support functions within the Command for positions 

in its warfighter units. Support functions such as vehicle maintenance, 

motor transportation, intelligence operations, communication support, 

and engineering support provide important and necessary support to 

Marine Corps special operations forces units, as well as other special 

operations forces units in USSOCOM’s other service components. 

Furthermore, we found a lack of involvement by some key stakeholders in

the establishment of the Marine Corps special operations command. For 

example, the special operations components with the department’s 

geographic combatant commands—which are responsible for 

commanding special operations forces around the world—were not 

involved in the process to establish the Marine Corps special operations 

command or in the decisions to target the service’s resources to their 

highest priorities and mission requirements. Officials with the U.S. Pacific 

Command’s special operations command who are responsible for 

functions such as operations and planning told us they provided little input 

into the planning process to help determine how Marine Corps special 

operations forces units should be organized and what capabilities were 

needed in these units to meet the mission requirements of the geographic 

combatant commands. Similarly, officials from the U.S. Central 

Command’s special operations command who were responsible for 

operations and planning in that command told us they were not included

in the planning process that preceded the establishment of the Marine 

Corps special operations command. In particular, officials told us they 

were not involved in the decisions regarding the types of missions that 

Marine Corps special operations forces units would need to perform, 

although as we noted in our July 2006 report on special operations forces 

deployment trends, 85 percent of all fiscal year 2005 special operations 

forces deployments were to the U.S. Central Command’s area of 

responsibility.16

 16GAO-06-812. 

Page 18 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
The Marine Corps special operations command has identified several force 

structure challenges that stem from limitations in DOD’s strategic planning 

process that will likely affect its ability to perform its full range of 

responsibilities, and the Command is revising its force structure plans to 

address these challenges. For example, the Command has determined that 

the number and composition of its special operations forces units are not

aligned with the Command’s mission requirements. In particular, the 

Command has identified shortages in positions such as authorized 

intelligence personnel, which will affect the Command’s ability to 

simultaneously provide intelligence support to Marine Corps special 

operations forces and USSOCOM. Moreover, according to Marine Corps 

special operations command officials, the limited number of personnel 

available to perform support functions will prevent the Command from 

effectively performing all of its mission requirements. To illustrate this 

point, Marine Corps special operations command officials told us that the 

initial force structure plans for the Command call for less than one 

support person available for every person assigned to a warfighter 

position. According to Command officials, this ratio is less than what 

would be expected for a command of similar size and assigned missions. 

Officials said an expected ratio for a command such as theirs would be at

least two support personnel to one warfighter, and therefore their goal is

to adjust the force structure to meet this ratio. 

Limitations in Strategic 

Planning Process Led to 

Force Structure 

Challenges, although Plans 

Are Being Revised to 

Address These Challenges 

In addition, Marine Corps special operations command officials reported 

that the number of positions authorized for support personnel will also 

affect the Command’s ability to meet its responsibilities to organize, train, 

and equip Marine Corps special operations forces. Officials stated the 

number of personnel assigned to its command elements, such as the 

headquarters and the staffs of the subordinate units, is insufficient to 

effectively accomplish these responsibilities. Current force structure plans 

authorize approximately 780 military personnel and 33 civilian personnel 

for the Command’s headquarters and the staffs of its major subordinate 

units. 

At the time of our work, the Marine Corps special operations command 

was developing several proposals to significantly revise its force structure 

to address the challenges stemming from the limitations in the planning

process and to better align the Command to meet USSOCOM’s mission 

guidance. These revisions would adjust the number and size of the 

Command’s warfighter units to better meet mission requirements. 

Additionally, if approved, some of the positions made available through 

the revisions could be used to remedy shortfalls in personnel who perform 

support functions such as personnel management, training, logistics, 

Page 19 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
intelligence, and budget-related activities. Command officials told us these 

proposals would likely mitigate many of the challenges that have resulted 

from the lack of a comprehensive strategic planning process, but they 

acknowledged that many of the decisions that are needed to implement 

the force structure changes will be made by Headquarters, Marine Corps. 

In order to move forward with its proposals, the Command is working to 

complete several analyses of the personnel and funding requirements that 

are tied to these proposed force structure changes. It has set milestones 

for when these analyses should be completed in order to determine 

whether any additional funding or personnel would be required. However, 

the Command expects to be able to implement these proposals within the 

funding levels already identified and planned for future fiscal years. Until 

the analyses are completed, the Command will be unable to determine 

whether the approved plans for its personnel and funding should be 

adjusted in order for the Command to perform all of its assigned missions. 

Although preliminary steps have been taken, the Marine Corps has not 

developed a strategic human capital approach to manage the critical skills 

and competencies required of personnel in its special operations 

command. While the Marine Corps special operations command has 

identified some skills that are needed to perform special operations 

missions, it has not conducted a comprehensive analysis of the critical

skills and incremental training required of personnel in its special 

operations forces units. Such analyses are critical to the Marine Corps’ 

efforts to develop a strategic human capital approach for the management 

of personnel in its special operations forces units. Without the benefit of 

these analyses, the Marine Corps has developed an interim policy to assign 

some personnel to special operations forces units for extended tour 

lengths to account for the additional training and skills needed by these 

personnel. However, this interim policy is inconsistent with the Marine 

Corps special operations command’s goal for the permanent assignment of 

some personnel within the special operations community. 

Although Preliminary 

Steps Have Been 

Taken, the Marine 

Corps Has Not 

Developed a Strategic 

Human Capital 

Approach to Manage 

the Critical Skills And 

Competencies 

Required of Personnel 

in Its Special 

Operations Command 

Page 20 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
While the Marine Corps special operations command has identified some 

critical skills and competencies that are needed to perform special 

operations missions, it has not fully identified these requirements because 

it has not yet conducted a comprehensive analysis to determine all the 

critical skills and additional training required of personnel in its units. We 

have previously reported that strategic human capital planning is essential 

to federal agencies’ efforts to transform their organizations to meet the 

challenges of the 21st century. Generally, strategic human capital planning

addresses two needs: (1) aligning an agency’s human capital program with 

its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals, and 

(2) developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, motivating, 

and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals. Our prior work has 

shown that the analysis of critical skill and competency gaps between 

current and future workforce needs is an important step in strategic

human capital planning.

17 We have also reported that it is essential that 

long-term strategies include implementation goals and timelines to 

demonstrate that progress is being made. 

While Some Personnel 

Requirements Have Been 

Identified, Marine Corps 

Special Operations 

Command Has Not Fully 

Identified the Critical 

Skills and Competencies 

Required of Its Personnel 

As part of the effort to identify these critical skills, the Marine Special 

Operations School is developing a training course that will provide 

baseline training to newly assigned personnel to prepare them for 

positions in warfighter units. For example, the Command plans to provide 

these personnel with training on advanced survival skills and foreign 

language in order to prepare them to perform special operations missions. 

However, the Marine Corps special operations command has not fully 

identified and documented the critical skills and training that are required 

for personnel to effectively perform special operations missions, and that 

build on the skills that are developed in conventional Marine Corps units. 

Officials told us the Command had not yet identified the full range of 

training that will be provided in this course in order to establish a 

minimum level of special operations skills for the Command’s warfighters. 

Additionally, the Marine Corps special operations command has not fully 

identified the advanced skills and training necessary to support some of 

the Command’s more complex special operations missions, such as 

counterterrorism, information operations, and unconventional warfare. 

While the Marine Corps special operations command has established a 

time frame for when it wants to conduct the training course under 

development, it has not set milestones for when it will complete its 

analysis of the critical skills and competencies required of its personnel. 

 17GAO-04-753. 

Page 21 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Moreover, the Marine Corps special operations command has not yet fully 

determined which positions should be filled by specially trained personnel 

who are strategically managed to meet the Command’s missions. Officials 

told us there is broad agreement within the Command that personnel 

assigned to operational positions in its warfighter units require specialized

training in critical skills needed to perform special operations missions, 

and should therefore be strategically managed to meet the Command’s 

mission requirements. These personnel include enlisted reconnaissance 

and communications Marines assigned to the Marine Special Operations 

Battalions and infantry Marines assigned to the Marine Special Operations 

Advisor Group, as well as some officers assigned to these units. At the 

time of our review, however, we found that the Command had not yet 

determined which additional positions should also be filled by personnel 

who are strategically managed. In particular, we were told by officials 

from the Command’s headquarters that a determination has not yet been

made as to whether personnel who deploy with warfighter units to provide 

critical combat support, such as intelligence personnel, require specialized 

skills and training that are incremental to the training provided in 

conventional force units. For example, officials have not yet decided 

whether intelligence personnel should attend the initial training course 

that is under development. However, the Marine Special Operations 

School plans to provide these personnel with specialized intelligence 

training to enable them to support certain sensitive special operations 

missions in support of deploying units. Officials acknowledge that until the 

Command determines the extent to which support personnel require 

specialized skills and training to perform their missions, the Command 

cannot fully identify which positions should be filled by personnel who are 

strategically managed. 

Marine Corps Has 

Developed an Interim 

Policy to Manage 

Personnel in Its Special 

Operations Command, but 

It Lacks Consensus on a 

Strategic Human Capital 

Approach 

To address the personnel needs of the Marine Corps special operations 

command, Headquarters, Marine Corps, has established an interim policy 

that provides for extended assignments of some personnel in special 

operations forces units; however, the absence of a comprehensive analysis 

of the critical skills and training required of personnel in special 

operations forces units has contributed to a lack of consensus within the 

Marine Corps on a strategic human capital approach to manage these 

personnel. The extended assignments apply to Marines who are beyond 

their first term of enlistment, which is typically 3 to 5 years, and who are 

assigned to one of the Marine Corps special operations command’s 

warfighter, training, or intelligence units. The policy directs that these 

personnel will be assigned to the Command for 48 months, in part, to 

account for the additional training provided to personnel in these units. 

Page 22 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
According to officials at Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine 

Corps special operations command, the 48-month assignment policy is 

designed to retain designated personnel within special operations forces 

units long enough to complete at least two deployments. All other Marines 

will be assigned to the Command for approximately 36 months, which is a 

typical tour length for Marines in conventional force units. 

The interim policy also addresses a concern that personnel assigned to 

special operations forces units will have opportunities for career 

progression. In general, Marines are managed according to established 

career progression models for their respective career fields. These career 

progression models identify the experiences, skills, and professional 

military education necessary for personnel to be competitive for 

promotion to the next grade. For example, as personnel are promoted to a 

higher grade, they are typically placed in positions with increased 

responsibilities that are consistent with their career progression models in 

order to remain competitive for further promotion. The Marine Corps has 

not established a separate career field for special operations forces 

personnel; instead, the Marine Corps is assigning personnel from a variety 

of career fields, such as reconnaissance, to its special operations forces 

units. However, the current structure of the Marine Corps special 

operations command cannot support long-term assignments of personnel 

within the Command, in some cases, due to limited opportunities for 

progression into positions with increased responsibilities. For example, 

our analysis of the Marine Corps special operations command’s force 

structure shows that the Command is authorized 76 percent fewer 

reconnaissance positions for personnel in the grade of E-7 as compared to 

the number of reconnaissance positions for personnel in the grade of E-6.

The Marine Corps has established targets for the promotion of 

reconnaissance personnel to the grade of E-7 after they have spent 

approximately 5 years in the grade of E-6. As a result, many 

reconnaissance personnel who are promoted to E-7 while assigned to a 

special operations forces unit will need to be reassigned to the 

conventional force in order to move into an E-7 position and remain 

competitive for further promotion. 

The interim policy is also consistent with the approved plan to increase 

the authorized end-strength of the Marine Corps. In January 2007, the 

President approved plans to increase the active duty end-strength of the 

Marine Corps from 179,000 in fiscal year 2006 to 202,000 by fiscal year 

2011. This plan includes growth in the number and size of conventional 

force units and is intended to reduce the stress on frequently deployed

units, such as intelligence units, by achieving a 1 to 2 deployment to home 

Page 23 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
station ratio for these units. Marine Corps officials associated with units 

that will be affected by these increases, such as reconnaissance and 

intelligence units, told us that the rotation of personnel from Marine Corps 

special operations units back into the conventional force is important to 

help ensure that conventional force units are staffed with experienced and 

mature personnel. For example, our analysis of Marine Corps data shows 

that by fiscal year 2009, the Marine Corps will increase the servicewide 

requirement for enlisted counterintelligence/human intelligence personnel 

by 50 percent above fiscal year 2006 levels. Although the Marine Corps is 

adjusting its accession, training, and retention strategies to meet the 

increased requirement for enlisted counterintelligence/human intelligence 

personnel, officials stated the rotation of these experienced personnel 

from the Marine Corps special operations command back into the 

conventional force can help meet the increased personnel needs of 

conventional intelligence units, while also ensuring that conventional 

force units have an understanding of special operations tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. Additionally, officials told us the rotation of

personnel from special operations forces units to conventional force units

supports the Marine Corps’ process for prioritizing the assignment of 

personnel to units that are preparing for deployments to Iraq and other 

war on terrorism requirements. 

Notwithstanding the intended outcome of the interim policy, Marine Corps 

special operations command officials told us that the policy might impact 

the Command’s ability to prepare its forces to conduct the full range of its

assigned missions and that the policy is inconsistent with the Command’s 

stated goal for the permanent assignment of personnel in its special 

operations forces units. In congressional testimony, the Commander of the 

Marine Corps special operations command specified his goal to develop a 

personnel management strategy that would retain some personnel within 

the special operations community for the duration of their careers. 

Officials from the Command told us that a substantial investment of time 

and resources is required to train personnel in special operations forces 

units on the critical skills needed to perform special operations missions. 

For example, Marine Corps special operations forces personnel will 

receive in-depth training to develop foreign language proficiency and 

cultural awareness, which is consistent with DOD’s requirement to 

increase the capacity of special operations forces to perform more 

demanding and specialized tasks during long-duration, indirect, and

clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments.18 However, 

 18Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006). 

Page 24 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
these officials believe that the Command’s ability to develop and sustain 

these skills over time will be hampered if its special operations forces 

units experience high personnel turnover. In addition, according to 

USSOCOM doctrine, personnel must be assigned to a special operations 

forces unit for at least 4 years in order to be fully trained in some 

advanced special operations skills. Consequently, officials from the 

Command have determined that limited duration assignments would 

challenge the Command’s ability to develop the capability to conduct more 

complex special operations core tasks, and to retain fully trained 

personnel long enough to use their skills during deployments. The Marine 

Corps special operations command has determined that to achieve its goal 

of permanent personnel assignments within the special operations 

community, it requires a separate career field for its warfighter personnel. 

According to officials from the Command, a separate career field would 

allow the Marine Corps to manage these personnel based on a career 

progression model that reflects the experiences, skills, and professional 

military education that are relevant to special operations missions. 

Moreover, according to officials from the Command, the establishment of 

a special operations forces career field would allow the Marine Corps to 

develop and sustain a population of trained and qualified personnel, while 

providing the Command and USSOCOM with a more appropriate return on

the investment in training personnel to perform special operations 

missions. 

The Command’s goal for the permanent assignment of some special 

operations forces personnel is also consistent with USSOCOM’s current 

and projected needs for special operations forces personnel. USSOCOM 

has identified the retention of experienced personnel who possess 

specialized skills and training as a key component in its strategy to support 

the war on terrorism. In its vision of how special operations forces will 

meet long-term national strategic and military objectives,19 USSOCOM has 

identified the need for a comprehensive special operations forces career 

management system to facilitate the progression of these personnel 

through increasing levels of responsibility within the special operations 

community. In addition, senior USSOCOM officials have expressed 

support for an assignment policy that allows Marine Corps personnel to 

remain within the special operations community for the duration of their 

careers. 

 19U.S. Special Operations Command, Capstone Concept for Special Operations (2006). 

Page 25 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Headquarters, Marine Corps, plans to review its interim policy for 

assigning personnel to its special operations command annually to 

determine whether it meets the mission requirements of the Command. 

Additionally, the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently directed 

Headquarters, Marine Corps, to study the assignment policies for 

personnel in certain Army special operations forces units who rotate 

between conventional Army units and special operations forces units. 

According to a Headquarters, Marine Corps, official, one purpose of this 

study is to evaluate whether a similar management strategy may be 

applied to personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces units. 

Notwithstanding these efforts, officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps, 

and the Marine Corps special operations command acknowledge that the 

analysis of the critical skills and training required of personnel in the 

Command’s special operations forces units is a necessary step in the 

development of a strategic human capital approach to the management of

these personnel. Until the Marine Corps special operations command 

completes a comprehensive analysis to identify and document the critical

skills and additional training needed by its future workforce to perform 

the Command’s full range of assigned special operations missions, the 

Marine Corps will not have a sound basis for developing or evaluating 

alternative strategic human capital approaches for the management of 

personnel assigned to its special operations forces units. 

USSOCOM does not have a sound basis for determining whether Marine 

Corps special operations forces training programs are preparing units for 

their missions because it has not established common training standards 

for many special operations skills and it has not formally evaluated 

whether these programs will prepare units to be fully interoperable with 

DOD’s other special operations forces. The Marine Corps special 

operations command has provided training for its forces that is based on 

training that was provided to conventional units that were assigned some 

special operations missions prior to the activation of the Command, and 

by selectively incorporating the training that USSOCOM’s other service 

components provide to their forces. However, USSOCOM has not formally 

validated that the training used to prepare Marine Corps special 

operations forces meets special operations standards and is effective in

training Marine Corps special operations forces to be fully interoperable 

with the department’s other special operations forces. 

USSOCOM Does Not 

Have a Sound Basis 

for Determining 

Whether Marine 

Corps Special 

Operations Forces 

Training Programs 

Prepare Units for 

Missions 

Page 26 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
The Marine Corps special operations command has taken several actions 

to implement programs to fulfill its responsibility for training personnel to 

perform special operations missions. For example, the Command operates 

the Marine Special Operations School, which has recently finalized plans 

for a training pipeline to initially screen all of the Marines and Sailors 

identified for assignment to the Command to determine their suitability for 

such assignments. Once the initial screening is completed, personnel who 

volunteer for assignments in one of the Command’s warfighter units—

such as the Marine Special Operations Battalions and the Marine Special

Operations Advisor Group—will undergo an additional assessment that 

measures mental and physical qualifications. As indicated by the 

Command’s plans, personnel who successfully complete this assessment 

will be provided with additional baseline special operations training prior 

to being assigned to one of the Command’s warfighter units.20

Marine Corps Special 

Operations Command Has 

Implemented Programs to 

Train Personnel to Perform 

Special Operations 

Missions 

The Marine Special Operations School also provides training to personnel 

in special operations companies. This training consists of both classroom 

instruction and the practical application of specialized skills. For example, 

the school has provided training to personnel in skills such as precision 

shooting, close quarters battle, and special reconnaissance techniques. In 

addition, the school’s instructors conduct exercises to train the special 

operations companies on the unit’s tactics, techniques, and procedures, as 

well as predeployment training events, to certify the companies are 

capable of performing the primary special operations missions assigned to 

these units.21

The Command’s Marine Special Operations Advisor Group has also 

developed a comprehensive training program designed to build the 

individual and collective skills required to perform the unit’s mission to 

provide military training and advisor support to foreign forces. The 

program includes individual training for skills such as light infantry tactics 

and cultural and language training, as well as training for advanced skills 

in functional areas such as communications, intelligence, and medical 

training. The training program culminates with a capstone training event 

 20As discussed previously in this report, the Marine Corps special operations command has

not fully determined what baseline training will be provided to special operations forces 

personnel or which personnel will be required to receive this training.

21In addition to the training exercise to certify these units are capable of performing special 

operations missions, the special operations companies also conduct an extensive training 

program with a Marine Expeditionary Unit prior to deployment. 

Page 27 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
that evaluates the proficiency of personnel in mission-essential skills. The 

training event is used as a means of certifying that these units are trained

to perform their assigned missions. 

In addition, Marine Corps special operations companies and Marine 

Special Operations Advisor Group teams conduct unit training to prepare 

for the missions that will be performed during deployments. According to

officials with these units, this training is tailored to prepare personnel for 

the specific tasks that will likely be performed during the deployment. For 

example, officials stated that unit training may include enhanced language

and cultural awareness training for specific countries and training in 

environmental terrains where these units will be deployed. 

Marine Corps special operations forces have used conventional Marine 

Corps training standards to prepare personnel and units to conduct some 

special operations missions. Officials with the Marine Corps special 

operations command and its subordinate units told us that its special 

operations forces units have trained personnel in some skills based on the 

training programs for conventional units that were assigned some special 

operations missions prior to the activation of the Command. For example, 

according to Marine Corps policy, the service formerly deployed specially

organized, trained, and equipped forces as part of the Marine 

Expeditionary Units that were capable of conducting some special 

operations missions, such as direct action operations.22 Officials with the 

Marine Corps special operations command and the Marine Corps Special 

Operations Battalions told us that the special operations companies have

been provided with training for skills such as urban sniper, specialized 

demolitions, and dynamic assault that is based largely on the training and 

standards for these skills that were established for conventional Marine 

Corps forces. 

For other skills, Marine Corps special operations forces personnel have 

reviewed and incorporated the training plans that USSOCOM’s Army, 

Navy, and Air Force service components use to prepare their special 

operations forces. Marine Corps special operations command officials told 

us that conventional Marine Corps units are not typically trained in many 

of the advanced skills required to perform some special operations 

 22The Maritime Special Purpose Force was organized and trained using Marine

Expeditionary Unit assets to provide a special operations-capable force that could be

tailored to execute a maritime special operations mission. 

Page 28 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
missions, such as counterterrorism and unconventional warfare. To 

develop programs to train personnel on the skills required to perform 

these and other special operations missions, Marine Corps special 

operations forces have incorporated the training and standards from the 

training publications of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the 

Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Air Force Special Operations 

Command. However, according to a senior USSOCOM official, Marine 

Corps special operations forces have had the discretion to select the 

standards to use when training forces to perform special operations skills. 

During our review, we met with servicemembers who had recently 

completed deployments with Marine Corps special operations forces units 

as well as with servicemembers who were preparing for planned 

deployments. In general, these servicemembers told us that they believed

they were adequately trained and prepared to perform their assigned 

missions. Team leaders with the Marine Special Operations Advisor 

Group, for example, stated that they received sufficient guidance to 

properly plan and execute special operations missions during deployments 

to train and advise foreign military forces. However, at the time of our 

work, the Marine Corps special operations companies that participated in 

the first deployments of these units had not yet completed their 

deployments. As a result, we were unable to discuss whether the training 

that was provided was adequate to fully meet their mission requirements. 

USSOCOM Has Not 

Formally Validated That 

Marine Corps Training 

Meets Special Operations 

Forces Standards and 

Prepares Forces to Be 

Fully Interoperable with 

Other Forces 

USSOCOM has not formally validated that the training used to prepare 

Marine Corps forces meets special operations standards and prepares 

forces to be fully interoperable with the department’s other special 

operations forces. The Marine Corps special operations command has 

made progress in developing and implementing training programs for 

Marine Corps special operations forces. However, the Command has not 

used common training standards for special operations skills because 

USSOCOM has not developed common training standards for many skills, 

although work to establish common standards is ongoing. USSOCOM 

officials stated the headquarters and the service components are working 

to develop common training standards, where appropriate, because 

USSOCOM recognizes that the service-specific training conducted for 

advanced special operations skills may not optimize opportunities for 

commonality, jointness, or efficiency. In addition, USSOCOM officials told

us that common training standards would further promote 

departmentwide interoperability goals, address potential safety concerns, 

and provide greater assurances to future joint force commanders that 

special operations forces are trained to similar standards. 

Page 29 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Our prior work has shown that the lack of commonality in training 

standards for joint operations creates potentially hazardous conditions on 

the battlefield. For example, we reported in 2003 that the military services

and the special operations community did not use common standards to 

train personnel to control air support of ground forces. In particular, we 

found that the standards for these personnel in special operations units 

differed among the Army, Navy, and Air Force because personnel were 

required to meet their service-specific training requirements, which led to

hesitation by commanders in Afghanistan to employ some special 

operations forces personnel to direct air support of ground forces.23 In 

2005, USSOCOM established minimum standards for training, qualifying,

evaluating, and certifying special operations forces personnel who control 

air support of ground forces. 

USSOCOM formalized a process in 2006 to establish and validate common 

training standards for special operations skills. As part of this process, 

USSOCOM established a working group comprised of representatives from

USSOCOM and each service component to determine the baseline tasks 

that define the training standard and the service component training 

requirements for special operations skills. According to a USSOCOM 

official, the working group first identified the common training 

requirements and standards for the skills of military free fall and combat 

dive. In addition, USSOCOM and its service components are working 

incrementally to identify common training standards for other special 

operations skills, such as the training required for personnel assigned to 

combined joint special operations task forces.24 However, officials with 

USSOCOM and the Marine Corps special operations command told us the 

process to establish common training standards for applicable special 

operations skills will likely take a considerable amount of time to 

complete due to the number of advanced special operations skills and the 

challenge of building consensus among the service components on what 

constitutes a common training standard. 

 23GAO, Military Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper Air 

Support of Ground Forces, GAO-03-505 (May 2, 2003). 

24Combined joint special operations task forces are composed of special operations units

from one or more foreign countries and more than one U.S. military department. They are

formed to carry out a specific special operation or to prosecute special operations in 

support of a theater campaign or other operations. The combined joint special operations

task force may have conventional units assigned or attached to support the conduct of

specific missions. 

Page 30 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Furthermore, USSOCOM has not formally validated whether the training

used to prepare Marine Corps forces meets special operations standards 

and prepares forces to be fully interoperable with the department’s other 

special operations forces. USSOCOM has taken some limited steps to 

evaluate the training provided to Marine Corps special operations forces. 

In November 2006, for example, USSOCOM representatives attended a

training exercise on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton for a Marine 

special operations company that was preparing for an upcoming 

deployment. In addition, USSOCOM representatives observed training 

exercises in February 2007 for Marine Special Operations Advisor Group 

teams that were preparing to deploy. A USSOCOM official told us that the 

purpose of these evaluations was to observe some of the planned training 

tasks and focus on areas where USSOCOM could assist the Marine Corps 

special operations command in future training exercises. However, 

USSOCOM has not formally assessed the training programs used by the 

Marine Corps special operations command to prepare its forces for 

deployments, despite the fact that USSOCOM is responsible for evaluating

the effectiveness of all training programs and ensuring the interoperability 

of all of DOD’s special operations forces. Our review of the reports 

prepared for USSOCOM leadership and provided to Marine Corps 

personnel showed that they did not contain a formal evaluation of the 

training content and they did not provide an assessment of the standards 

used during the training to determine whether the training was in 

accordance with special operations forces standards. 

Officials with the Marine Corps special operations command and its 

subordinate units told us that USSOCOM has not been extensively 

involved in the development of Marine Corps special operations forces 

training programs and the performance standards used to train Marine 

Corps special operations forces. In addition, USSOCOM officials told us 

that a formal assessment of Marine Corps training programs has not 

occurred, and will likely not occur, because the management of the Marine 

Corps special operations command’s training programs is, like the other 

service components, a responsibility delegated to the Marine Corps 

component commander. These officials told us the service component 

commander has the primary responsibility for establishing training 

programs and certifying that special operations forces are capable of 

performing special operations missions prior to deployments. In addition, 

a USSOCOM official stated that any training-related issues affecting the 

readiness of special operations forces are identified in readiness reports 

and are discussed during monthly meetings between senior USSOCOM 

leadership and the service component commanders. However, without 

common training standards for special operations skills or a formal 

Page 31 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
validation of the training used to prepare Marine Corps special operations 

forces for planned deployments in the near term, USSOCOM cannot 

demonstrate the needed assurances to the geographic combatant 

commanders that Marine Corps special operations forces are trained to 

special operations forces standards and that these forces meet 

departmentwide interoperability goals for special operations forces, 

thereby potentially affecting the success of future joint operations. 

Since activating a Marine Corps component to USSOCOM, the Marine 

Corps has made considerable progress integrating into the special 

operations force structure, and several Marine Corps units have 

successfully completed deployments to train foreign military forces—a 

key focus area in DOD’s strategy for the war on terrorism. The Marine 

Corps has also taken an initial step to meet the unique personnel needs of 

its special operations command. However, it does not have complete 

information on all of the critical skills and additional training required of 

its personnel in special operations forces units. This information would 

enable the Marine Corps to assess the effectiveness of its human capital

planning to date and build consensus on the development of alternative 

approaches for the management of its personnel assigned to special 

operations forces units. Until the Marine Corps develops a strategic human 

capital approach that is based on an analysis of the critical skills and 

training required of personnel in Marine Corps special operations forces 

units, it may be unable to align its personnel with the Marine Corps special 

operations command’s actual workforce requirements, which could 

jeopardize the long-term success of this new Command. 

Conclusions 

The Marine Corps special operations command faces an additional 

challenge in training its forces to special operations forces standards and 

meeting DOD interoperability goals because USSOCOM has not yet 

established common training standards for many advanced skills. In the 

absence of common training standards, the Marine Corps special 

operations command is training its newly established special operations 

forces units in some skills that were not previously trained in conventional 

Marine Corps units. Unless USSOCOM validates that the training currently

being used to prepare Marine Corps special operations forces is effective

and meets DOD’s interoperability goals, it will be unable to ensure that 

Marine Corps special operations forces are interoperable with other 

special operations forces in the department, thereby potentially affecting 

the success of future joint operations. 

Page 32 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
To facilitate the development of a strategic human capital approach for the 

management of personnel assigned to the Marine Corps special operations 

command and to validate that Marine Corps special operations forces are 

trained to be fully interoperable with DOD’s other special operations 

forces, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 

two actions. 

• Direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct the Commander, 

Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, to conduct an 

analysis of the critical skills and competencies required of personnel in 

Marine Corps special operations forces units and establish milestones 

for conducting this analysis. This analysis should be used to assess the 

effectiveness of current assignment policies and to develop a strategic 

human capital approach for the management of these personnel. 

• Direct the Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a framework for 

evaluating Marine Corps special operations forces training programs, 

including their content and standards, to ensure the programs are 

sufficient to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully interoperable with 

DOD’s other special operations forces. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred 

with our recommendations and noted that actions consistent with the 

recommendations are underway. DOD’s comments are reprinted in 

appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps to direct the Commander, Marine Corps 

Forces Special Operations Command, to establish milestones for 

conducting an analysis of the critical skills and competencies required in 

Marine Corps special operations forces units and, once completed, use 

this analysis to assess the effectiveness of current assignment policies and 

develop a strategic human capital approach for the management of these 

personnel. DOD stated that the Marine Corps special operations command

is currently conducting a detailed analysis of the critical skills and 

competencies required to conduct the missions assigned to the Command. 

The department further noted that the Command will also fully develop 

mission-essential task lists, and individual and collective training 

standards in order to clearly state the requirements for training and 

personnel. DOD also stated that USSOCOM is providing assistance so that 

these processes are integrated with USSOCOM’s development of the Joint 

Page 33 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Training System, which is mandated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. We believe these are important steps if fully implemented. We note,

however, DOD’s response does not address the issue of milestones and 

gives no indication when the ongoing analysis will be completed. We 

believe milestones are important because they serve as a means of holding 

people accountable. Furthermore, DOD did not address the need for the 

Marine Corps to use the analysis being conducted by the Command to 

assess the effectiveness of the current assignment policy. Without such an 

assessment, neither the Marine Corps nor DOD will have needed 

assurances that the current Marine Corps policy for assigning personnel to 

its special operations command is providing DOD with an appropriate 

return on the investment the department is making to train Marine Corps 

special operations forces personnel. Moreover, without a strategic human

capital approach that is based on the comprehensive analysis of the 

critical skills and training required of its special operations forces 

personnel, the Marine Corps may be unable to effectively align its 

personnel with the Marine Corps special operations command’s workforce 

requirements. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to require the 

Commander, USSOCOM, to establish a framework for evaluating Marine 

Corps special operations forces training programs to ensure the programs 

are sufficient to prepare Marine Corps forces to be fully interoperable with 

DOD’s other special operations forces. DOD stated that USSOCOM is

currently implementing the Joint Training System that is mandated by the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.01D. According to 

DOD, the Joint Training System will provide the framework for USSOCOM 

to evaluate component training programs to ensure special operations 

forces operational capabilities are achieved. DOD also stated that 

Headquarters, USSOCOM, established the Training Standards and 

Requirements Integrated Process Team to complement the Joint Training 

System, which is focusing on standardizing training for individual skills 

across USSOCOM, and ensuring increased efficiency and interoperability. 

DOD stated that USSOCOM delegates many authorities to its service 

component commanders, including training their service-provided forces. 

DOD further stated that the Marine Corps special operations command has 

established the Marine Corps Special Operations School, which is tasked 

with evaluating all unit training programs to assess their combat capability 

and interoperability with special operations forces. While we agree that 

implementing the Joint Training System and standardizing training 

through the integrated process team will help ensure the interoperability 

of Marine Corps special operations forces, according to USSOCOM 

officials, these efforts will likely take several years to complete. We 

Page 34 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
continue to believe that in the near term, USSOCOM needs to evaluate the

Marine Corps special operations forces training programs that are 

currently being conducted. While the Marine Corps has trained its 

conventional forces in skills related to the special operations forces’ core 

tasks of direct action and special reconnaissance, it has not traditionally 

trained its forces in other special operations forces core tasks, such as 

unconventional warfare. For this reason, it is incumbent on USSOCOM to 

validate the ongoing training to ensure these new Marine Corps special 

operations forces units are adequately prepared to perform all of their 

assigned missions and are interoperable with DOD’s other special 

operations forces. 

We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the 

Commander, United States Special Operations Command. We will also 

make copies available to other interested parties upon request. In addition, 

this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, 

please contact me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in

appendix III. 

Sharon L. Pickup, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 35 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps special operations 

command (Command) has identified the force structure needed to 

perform its mission, we identified and reviewed Department of Defense 

(DOD) reports related to the department’s efforts to increase the size of 

special operations forces by integrating Marine Corps forces into the U.S. 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). These documents included the 

2002 Special Operations Forces Realignment Study, the 2006 Operational 

Availability Study, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and the 

2006 Unified Command Plan. We analyzed available internal DOD 

documentation such as briefings, guidance, and memoranda that identified 

DOD’s plans and time frames for establishing the Marine Corps special 

operations command. We discussed with officials at DOD organizations 

the processes that DOD utilized to determine and implement the plans for 

the new Command. These organizations include, but are not limited to, the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; the Joint Staff, Force 

Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate; Marine Corps Plans, 

Policies, and Operations; Marine Corps Combat Development Command; 

and Marine Corps Manpower and Reserve Affairs. We also interviewed 

officials with USSOCOM and the special operations components of the 

U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command to determine the role of

these commands in the decision-making processes. We reviewed prior 

GAO reports and the Government Performance and Results Act of 19931

that discuss key elements of effective strategic planning. We interviewed 

officials from the Marine Corps special operations command to determine 

the status of the Command’s efforts to activate Marine Corps special 

operations forces units and discussed the challenges the Command has 

identified that may affect the Command’s ability to meet its full range of 

responsibilities. We analyzed documents that describe the Marine Corps 

special operations command’s proposals to readjust its force structure to 

overcome its identified challenges. We discussed the status of these 

proposals with officials from the Marine Corps special operations 

command and Headquarters, Marine Corps. However, at the time of our 

review, the Marine Corps special operations command had not finalized

decisions on proposed changes to its force structure and concepts of 

employment for its special operations forces units. As a result, we were 

unable to assess the extent to which any proposed changes to the 

Command’s force structure would mitigate identified challenges and 

specified personnel shortfalls. 

 1

Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993). 

Page 36 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which the Marine Corps has determined a strategic 

human capital approach to manage the critical skills and competencies 

required of personnel in its special operations command, we examined 

relevant Marine Corps policies for assigning personnel to conventional 

force units and the service’s interim policy for assigning personnel to 

special operations forces units. We interviewed officials from the Marine

Corps special operations command and Headquarters, Marine Corps, to 

discuss the service’s career progression models for personnel assigned to 

Marine Corps special operations forces units. We also reviewed DOD plans 

to increase the active duty end-strength of the Marine Corps, and 

interviewed officials from Headquarters, Marine Corps, to discuss the 

service’s strategy to meet the personnel needs of its special operations 

forces units and its conventional force units. We analyzed the Marine 

Corps special operations command’s planned force structure and 

interviewed officials with Headquarters, Marine Corps, and the Marine 

Corps special operations command to determine the challenges the Marine 

Corps may face in developing a long-term plan to assign personnel to its 

special operations forces units. To better understand the unique personnel 

needs of the Marine Corps special operations command, we interviewed 

officials from the Command to discuss the specialized skills and training

that are required by personnel who are assigned to special operations 

forces units to perform the Command’s assigned missions. We reviewed 

available documentation on the current and proposed training plans that 

identify the critical skills and training that will be provided to Marine 

Corps special operations forces personnel, and we interviewed officials 

with the Command to discuss the status of their efforts to fully identify all

special operations critical skills and training requirements. We reviewed 

congressional testimony by the Commander of the Marine Corps special 

operations command2

 and relevant Command planning documents to 

identify the Marine Corps special operations command’s goal for a human 

capital plan that supports its assigned missions. We examined USSOCOM 

annual reports and strategic planning documents relevant to the Marine 

Corps special operations command, and interviewed USSOCOM officials 

to discuss the management of special operations forces personnel. We also 

reviewed our past reports that discuss effective strategies for workforce 

planning. 

 2

Statement of Major General Dennis Hejlik, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special 

Operations Command, before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats 

and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, January 31, 

2007. 

Page 37 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the extent to which USSOCOM has determined whether Marine 

Corps special operations training programs are preparing these forces for 

assigned missions, we examined relevant laws and DOD doctrine related 

to the responsibilities of the Marine Corps and USSOCOM for training 

special operations forces personnel. We analyzed Marine Corps special 

operations command and USSOCOM training guidance for special 

operations forces. We examined USSOCOM documents related to the 

processes in place to establish common training standards for advanced

special operations skills, and interviewed officials to discuss the status of 

USSOCOM’s efforts to establish common training standards for special 

operations skills. We examined available documents that detail training 

programs for Marine Corps special operations forces. We interviewed 

officials from the Marine Corps special operations command and 

USSOCOM to discuss the processes used to identify and select training 

standards for special operations skills. We collected and analyzed 

documents related to USSOCOM’s evaluations of Marine Corps special 

operations forces training, and we discussed the efforts that have been 

taken by the Marine Corps special operations command and USSOCOM to 

assess the effectiveness of these training programs. We conducted our 

work from August 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. Using our assessment of data

reliability, we concluded that the data used to support this review were 

sufficiently reliable to answer our objectives. We interviewed the source of

these data to determine how data accuracy was ensured, and we discussed 

their data collection methods, standard operating procedures, and other 

internal control measures. 

We interviewed officials and obtained documentation at the following 

locations: 

• Office of the Secretary of Defense 

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and 

Low Intensity Conflict 

• Joint Staff 

• Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J8 

• U.S. Marine Corps 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Combat Development Command) 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Installations and Logistics 

Department) 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Intelligence Department) 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) 

Page 38 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Plans, Policies, and Operations) 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Programs and Resources) 

• U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters (Training and Education Command) 

• Marine Corps Forces Command, Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia

• Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii 

• I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California 

• II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 

• III Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Japan 

• Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command 

• Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command Headquarters 

• 1st Marine Special Operations Battalion 

• 2nd Marine Special Operations Battalion 

• Marine Special Operations Advisor Group 

• Marine Special Operations Support Group 

• Marine Special Operations School 

• U.S. Special Operations Command 

• U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Command Support 

• U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Special Operations 

• U.S. Special Operations Command, Center for Special Operations 

Knowledge and Futures 

• Theater Special Operations Commands 

• Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command 

• Special Operations Command, U.S. Pacific Command 

Page 39 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 40 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 41 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 42 GAO-07-1030 Special Operations Forces
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 43 GAO-07-1030 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Carole Coffey, Assistant Director; 

Renee Brown; Jason Jackson; David Malkin; Karen Thornton; and Matthew 

Ullengren also made key contributions to this report. 

 Special Operations Forces

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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