alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 120.16 Eligibility for approvals. ( a ) A U.S. person may receive a license or other approval pursuant to this subchapter. A foreign person may not receive such a license or other approval, except as follows: ( 1 ) A foreign governmental entity in the U.S. may receive a license or other approval;
( 2 ) A foreign person may receive a reexport or retransfer approval; or
( 3 ) A foreign person may receive an approval for brokering activities.
( b ) A request for a license or other approval by a U.S. person or by a person referred to in paragraphs (a)(1) and (3) of this section will be considered only if the applicant has registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls pursuant to part 122 or 129 of this subchapter, as appropriate.
( c ) Persons who have been convicted of violating the U.S. criminal statutes enumerated in § 120.6, who have been debarred pursuant to part 127 or 128 of this subchapter, who are subject to indictment or are otherwise charged (e.g., charged by criminal information in lieu of indictment) with violating the U.S. criminal statutes enumerated in § 120.6, who are ineligible to contract with or to receive a license or other form of authorization to import defense articles or defense services from any agency of the U.S. Government, who are ineligible to receive an export license or other approval from any other agency of the U.S. Government, or who are subject to a publicly announced Department of State policy of denial, suspension, or revocation under § 120.18(a), are generally ineligible to be involved in activities regulated under this subchapter.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Trujillo, Appellant.

[716 NYS2d 878]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), rendered March 13, 1998, convicting him of robbery in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction is unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant received meaningful representation of counsel at trial, viewing the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of the case in totality and as of the time of representation *(see, People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Santucci, J. P., Sullivan, Altman and Krausman, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Albert John Kousch, Jr., Appellant.

Order unanimously reversed and proceeding remitted to Jefferson County Court for a hearing. Memorandum: In May, 1951, defendant was indicted for assault, second degree, with intent to commit the crime of rape. The defendant waived the right to a jury trial and was convicted following a trial before the court. Thereafter the court in an apparent attempt to comply with section 2189-a of the Penal Law directed a psychiatric examination. Of course, pursuant to that section, the report to be submitted by the examiners should have been one including “all facts and findings *731necessary to assist the court in imposing sentence.” The examiners made a report that defendant was insane. Thereupon, an order was made committing defendant to Matteawan State Hospital with directions that he be returned if later he became sane. (Cf. Code Crim. Pro., § 662-b.) Some months later defendant was returned upon a certification that he had regained his sanity and then, instead of retrying the defendant, the court sentenced him to Elmira Reformatory for a term of not less than one day and not more than his natural life. Subsequently, for reasons unnecessary here to explore, that sentence was invalidated and defendant was again sentenced to an indeterminate term of 2% to 5 years in prison. Defendant is now serving a sentence imposed upon a subsequent conviction. He sought relief by way of *coram nobis*seeking to vacate the first judgment of conviction. His application was denied without a hearing. In our opinion, this was error and appellant should be given a hearing to determine his mental condition as of the time of the trial (cf. *People*v. *Nickerson,*283 App. Div. 854). The record before us does not conclusively demonstrate that defendant’s allegations are false *(People*v. *Guariglia,*303 N. Y. 338). To the contrary the record discloses that within eight days after the trial the court had before it a report finding that defendant was insane. Moreover, before the trial commenced the court apparently was alerted to defendant’s mental condition. Prom the prosecutor’s brief we learn that prior to trial defense counsel submitted proof from a psychiatrist that appellant was mentally ill. The trial proceeded because the District Attorney produced an affidavit stating that while the defendant was not mentally ill “he was a psychopath and could readily become mentally ill.” The remedy of *coram, nobis*is available to defendant. *(People*v. *Smyth,*3 N Y 2d 184, 187; *People*v. *Boehm,*309 N. Y. 362, 366, 367.) If he was tried and convicted while insane, then the judgment of conviction should be vacated. The order appealed from should be reversed and the proceeding remitted for a hearing at which counsel should be assigned, if requested. (Appeal from order of Jefferson County Court denying defendant’s application for writ of error *coram nobis.)*Present — Williams, P. J., Bastow, Halpem, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOAH BOOHER,

Plaintiff(s),

    v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

Defendant(s).                                                                      /

No. C 09-01045 MHP

ORDER(Ninety-Day Conditional Dismissal)

The parties hereto, by their counsel, having advised the Court that they have agreed to a

settlement of this action.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is dismissed with prejudice; provided,

however, that if any party hereto shall certify to this Court, with a proof of service of a copy on

opposing counsel, within 90 days from the date hereof, that the agreed consideration for the

settlement has not been delivered over, this Order shall stand vacated, and the action shall be

restored to the calendar to be set for trial.

Dated: July 13, 2010MARILYN HALL PATELUnited States District Court Judge

Case 3:09-cv-01045-MHP   Document 55   Filed 07/14/10   Page 1 of 1

    -       - Superintendent of Documents
      - 2018-03-13T03:37:58-0400
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# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed December 20, 2018.

________________ No. 18-2532 Lower Tribunal No. 18-1804

________________ 

### Alvaro Elias, Appellant,

vs. 

### The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Diane V. Ward, Judge. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Natasha Baker-Bradley , Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Gabrielle Raemy Charest -Turken, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before LOGUE, SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ.
ON MOTION TO REVIEW ORDER DENYING POST-TRIAL RELEASE
PER CURIAM.2 Alvaro Elias seeks review of the trial court’s denial of Elias ’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.691(b) motion for post-trial release pendi ng review of his conviction and sentence. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R. Ap p. P. 9.140(h)(4). In denying Elias’s motion for post-trial release, the trial court was required to enter a written order setting forth the factual basis on which the cour t reached its decision and the reasons for its denial. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.691(b); Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(h)(3). The lower court committed reversible error in fai ling to enter such a written order. See Metayer v. State, 52 So. 3d 691, 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Montgomery v. State, 788 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); B uckhalter v. State, 416 So. 2d 862, 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Accordingly, we grant Elias’s motion for review, reverse the denial of Elias’s motion for post-trial rel ease, and remand for the lower court to reconsider Elias’s motion in accordance with the applicable criminal and appellate rules within three days of the date of this opini on. If the lower court again denies post-trial release, it must make the necessary wri tten findings to support the denial. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with t his opinion.
### §7384w–1. Completion of site profiles

#### (a) In general

To the extent that the Secretary of Labor determines it useful and practicable, the Secretary of Labor shall direct the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health to prepare site profiles for a Department of Energy facility based on the records, files, and other data provided by the Secretary of Energy and such other information as is available, including information available from the former worker medical screening programs of the Department of Energy.

#### (b) Information

The Secretary of Energy shall furnish to the Secretary of Labor any information that the Secretary of Labor finds necessary or useful for the production of such site profiles, including records from the Department of Energy former worker medical screening program.

#### (c) Definition

In this section, the term "site profile" means an exposure assessment of a facility that identifies the toxic substances or processes that were commonly used in each building or process of the facility, and the time frame during which the potential for exposure to toxic substances existed.

#### (d) Time frames

The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall establish time frames for completing site profiles for those Department of Energy facilities for which a site profile has not been completed. Not later than March 1, 2005, the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall submit to Congress a report setting forth those time frames.

(Pub. L. 106–398, §1 [div. C, title XXXVI, §3633], as added Pub. L. 108–375, div. C, title XXXI, §3166(c), Oct. 28, 2004, 118 Stat. 2189.)
### §9204. Research, development, and demonstration

#### (a) Areas of knowledge limiting system utilization

The Secretary shall initiate research and development or accelerate existing research and development in areas in which the lack of knowledge limits the widespread utilization of wind energy systems in order to achieve the purposes of this chapter.

#### (b) Development of system prototypes and improvements

(1) The Secretary shall continue an aggressive program for the development of prototypes of advanced wind energy systems.

(2) As often as he deems appropriate, the Secretary shall solicit and evaluate proposals for the research and development of any new or improved technologies, which, in the Secretary's opinion, will contribute to the development of improvements in current wind energy systems.

#### (c) Acquisition of economic, scientific, and technological information of system operations under various circumstances and conditions

The Secretary is authorized to enter into contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements with public and private entities for the purchase, fabrication, installation, and testing to obtain scientific, technological, and economic information from the demonstration of a variety of prototypes of advanced wind energy systems under a variety of circumstances and conditions.

#### (d) Other provisions inapplicable

In carrying out the responsibilities under this section, the Secretary is not subject to the requirements of section 553 of title 5 or section 7191 of this title.

(Pub. L. 96–345, §5, Sept. 8, 1980, 94 Stat. 1141.)
### §9127. Periodic review and revision of regulations

The Administrator and the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating shall periodically, at intervals of not more than every 3 years, and in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, review any regulations promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter to determine the status and impact of such regulations on the continued development, evolution, and commercialization of ocean thermal energy conversion technology. The results of each such review shall be included in the next annual report required by section 9165 1 of this title. The Administrator and such Secretary are authorized and directed to promulgate any revisions to the then effective regulations as are deemed necessary and appropriate based on such review, to ensure that any regulations promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter do not impede such development, evolution, and commercialization of such technology. Additionally, the Secretary of Energy is authorized to propose, based on such review, such revisions for the same purpose. The Administrator or such Secretary, as appropriate, shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any such proposal by the Secretary of Energy and, pursuant to applicable procedures, shall consider and take final action on any such proposal in an expeditious manner. Such consideration shall include at least one informal hearing pursuant to the procedures in section 553 of title 5.

(Pub. L. 96–320, title I, §117, Aug. 3, 1980, 94 Stat. 991.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 9165 of this title, referred to in text, was omitted from the Code.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Transfer of Functions

For transfer of authorities, functions, personnel, and assets of the Coast Guard, including the authorities and functions of the Secretary of Transportation relating thereto, to the Department of Homeland Security, and for treatment of related references, see sections 468(b), 551(d), 552(d), and 557 of Title 6, Domestic Security, and the Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan of November 25, 2002, as modified, set out as a note under section 542 of Title 6.

1 See References in Text note below.
#### § 92.54 “Letters rogatory” defined.

In its broader sense in international practice, the term *letters rogatory* denotes a formal request from a court in which an action is pending, to a foreign court to perform some judicial act. Examples are requests for the taking of evidence, the serving of a summons, subpoena, or other legal notice, or the execution of a civil judgment. In United States usage, letters rogatory have been commonly utilized only for the purpose of obtaining evidence. Requests rest entirely upon the comity of courts toward each other, and customarily embody a promise of reciprocity. The legal sufficiency of documents executed in foreign countries for use in judicial proceedings in the United States, and the validity of the execution, are matters for determination by the competent judicial authorities of the American jurisdiction where the proceedings are held, subject to the applicable laws of that jurisdiction. See § 92.66 for procedures in the use of letters rogatory requesting the taking of depositions in foreign jurisdictions.
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JOSEPH P. RUSSONIELLO (CABN 44332)

United States Attorney

BRIAN J. STRETCH (CABN 168973)

Chief, Criminal Division

AARON D. WEGNER (ORBN 035354)

Assistant United States Attorney

450 Golden Gate Ave., Box 36055

San Francisco, California 94102

Telephone: (415) 436-6831

Facsimile: (415) 436-6982

E-mail: aaron.wegner@usdoj.gov

Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JIA YUE,

Defendant.

 

)

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No. CR-09-00917-VRW

[PROPOSED] ORDER AND

STIPULATION EXCLUDING TIME

FROM JANUARY 7, 2010, TO JANUARY

26, 2010, FROM THE SPEEDY TRIAL

ACT CALCULATION (18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(8)(A))

On January 7, 2010, a status conference was held before the Court and the parties stated

that several discovery disputes existed. The Court ordered the defendant to file an appropriate

discovery motion by January 12, 2010, and set a hearing on January 26, 2010.

With the agreement of the parties, and with the consent of the defendant, the Court enters

this order documenting the exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b),

from January 7, 2010, through January 26, 2010.

The parties agree, and the Court finds and holds, as follows:

1. The defendant agrees to an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act from

Case 3:09-cr-00917-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/15/10 Page 1 of 2
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January 7, 2010, through January 26, 2010, based upon the need for effective preparation of

counsel. The defendant agrees to this exclusion on the condition that his right to bring motions

claiming Speedy Trial Act violations prior to January 7, 2010, shall remain preserved. 

2. Counsel for the defendant believes that the exclusion of time is in her client’s best 

interest. 

3. Given these circumstances, the Court finds that the ends of justice served by excluding

the period from January 7, 2010, through January 26, 2010, outweigh the best interest of the

public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). 

4. Accordingly, and with the consent of the defendant, the Court orders the period from

January 7, 2010, through January 26, 2010, shall be excluded from Speedy Trial Act calculations

under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) & (B)(iv). 

STIPULATED:

DATED:__01/11/2010______ _________/s/______________________

GALIA PHILLIPS

Attorney for Defendant

DATED:__01/11/2010______ _________/s/______________________

AARON D. WEGNER

Assistant United States Attorney

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:________________ _______________________________

HON. VAUGHN R. WALKER

United States District Judge

January 15, 2010 

U

NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Vaughn R Walker

Case 3:09-cr-00917-VRW Document 34 Filed 01/15/10 Page 2 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES STEVENS,

Petitioner,

 v.

RON DAVIS, Warden, San Quentin

State Prison

Respondent.

/

No. C 09-137 WHA

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER SETTING BRIEFING

SCHEDULE FOR RECORD-BASED

MERITS CLAIMS

The Court is in receipt of the parties joint statement regarding record-based claims that

can proceed to briefing on the merits without a request for an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner

identified fourteen such claims. The parties are directed to brief the merits of the claims.

In the interest of efficiency, and in order to avoid oversize briefs, the parties shall divide

the claims into two groups (by grouping together, for example, claims that have the same

factual predicates), and shall file two rounds of briefing, with each brief addressing no more

than eight claims.

Accordingly, by May 12, 2015, petitioner shall file his opening brief. The response is

due on or before June 11, 2015. The optional reply is due within fifteen days of the date of

service of the response.

//

//

Case 3:09-cv-00137-WHA Document 110 Filed 03/13/15 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The parties are directed to observe a 25-page limit for their briefs; please, no

attachments. Due dates for subsequent briefs shall be set in a subsequent order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12 , 2015. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:09-cv-00137-WHA Document 110 Filed 03/13/15 Page 2 of 2
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 247 (Monday, December 27, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Pages 77315-77316]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-28176]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Surface Transportation Board

[STB Finance Docket No. 34564]


Portland & Western Railroad, Inc.--Lease and Operation 
Exemption--Union Pacific Railroad Company

    Portland & Western Railroad, Inc. (PNWR), a Class III rail carrier, 
has filed a verified notice of exemption under 49 CFR 1150.41 to lease 
and operate approximately 0.87 miles of rail line currently owned by 
Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) between milepost 741.59 near 
Willsburg Jct. and milepost 740.72 at the connection with UP's main 
line at Willsburg Jct., in Clackamas County, OR.
    PNWR certifies that its projected revenues as a result of this 
transaction will not result in the creation of a Class II or Class I 
rail carrier. Because PNWR's projected annual revenues will exceed $5 
million, PNWR has certified to the Board on October 6, 2004, that the 
required notice of the transaction was posted at the workplace of the 
employees on the affected line on October 1, 2004, and was sent to the 
national offices of the labor unions representing employees on the 
line. See 49 CFR 1150.42(e).
    The transaction was scheduled to be consummated on or after 
December 10, 2004 (which is more than 60 days after PNWR's 
certification to the Board that it had complied with the Board's rule 
at 49 CFR 1150.42(e)).
    If the verified notice contains false or misleading information, 
the exemption is void ab initio. Petitions to revoke the exemption 
under 49 U.S.C. 10502(d) may be filed at any time. The filing of a 
petition to revoke will not automatically stay the transaction.
    An original and 10 copies of all pleadings, referring to STB 
Finance Docket No. 34564, must be filed with the Surface Transportation 
Board, 1925 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20423-0001. In addition, a 
copy of each pleading must be served on Eric M. Hockey, Gollatz, 
Griffin & Ewing, P.C., Four Penn Center, Suite 200, 1600 John F. 
Kennedy Blvd., Philadelphia, PA 19103-2808.

[[Page 77316]]

    Board decisions and notices are available on our Web site at http://www.stb.dot.gov.

    Decided: December 20, 2004.

    By the Board, David M. Konschnik, Director, Office of 
Proceedings.
Vernon A. Williams,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 04-28176 Filed 12-23-04; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915-01-P