United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 20-3561

___________________________ 

United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Devin L. Ashford

 Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska 

____________ 

Submitted: October 18, 2021

Filed: February 25, 2022 

[Unpublished]

____________ 

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM. 

A jury convicted Devin Ashford of sex trafficking of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c); production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); sex 

trafficking by means of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, 18 U.S.C 

§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2); and interstate travel for prostitution, 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a). 
-2- 

The district court1 sentenced Ashford to three consecutive terms (and one concurrent 

term) of imprisonment totaling 47 years. Ashford appeals, arguing there was 

insufficient evidence for his conviction on each count and that the district court’s 

sentence was unreasonable. We affirm.

We review sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction de novo, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. 

Paul, 885 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 2018). We will overturn a conviction “only 

where no reasonable jury could find all the [crime’s] elements beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. at 1102 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cole, 721 F.3d 

1016, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013)). We address sufficiency of the evidence for each count 

in turn.

First, Ashford argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction 

for sex trafficking of a minor because there was no evidence E.F., the minor victim,

ever actually engaged in commercial sex acts or was enticed by Ashford to engage 

in such acts. The sex trafficking of a minor statute, however, does not require a 

commercial sex act—Ashford is guilty if he knowingly enticed a person knowing,

or recklessly disregarding, the fact “that the person has not attained the age of 18 

years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)

(emphasis added); see also United States v. Collier, 932 F.3d 1067, 1079 (8th Cir. 

2019) (“[T]he fact the victim never actually engaged in commercial sex is irrelevant” 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).). 

Ashford does not dispute he knew E.F. was not yet 18 years old. And E.F.’s 

phone revealed social media communications with Ashford indicating E.F. was 

“trapping,” a term often associated with illicit activity according to witness 

testimony, and going on “dates” to make money for Ashford. While Ashford argues 

there is no direct evidence he sent these messages, the jury reasonably inferred he 

1

The Honorable John M. Gerrard, then Chief Judge, now United States 

District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
-3- 

did because the messages came from his phone and Ashford presented no evidence 

indicating someone else sent them. Moreover, a witness who lived with E.F. 

testified Ashford instructed her to find “dates” for E.F. This evidence was sufficient 

for a reasonable jury to conclude Ashford knowingly enticed E.F. to meet with men

knowing she would be caused to engage in commercial sex acts. 

Next, Ashford arguesthere was insufficient evidence to support his conviction 

for production of child pornography. Ashford argues that while the minor victim

testified Ashford requested and she sent sexually explicit pictures of herself to his 

Facebook Messenger account, no direct evidence showed he actually sent and 

received those communications. Again, there was sufficient circumstantial 

evidence, including the lack of evidence as to any alternative, for a reasonable jury 

to conclude it was Ashford who requested and received the child pornography

through his account. 

Third, Ashford argues there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for sex trafficking by fraud, force, or coercion. He contends there was

no direct evidence that the victim engaged in a commercial sex act. But again, direct 

evidence of a commercial sex act is not required under § 1591(a). See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1591(a); Collier, 932 F.3d at 1079. Ashford is guilty of sex trafficking by fraud, 

force, or coercion if he knowingly enticed or advertised a person knowing or 

recklessly disregarding that fraud, force, threats of force, or coercion “will be used 

to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). The 

victim’s testimony that Ashford advertised her to men, expected her to have sex with 

men for money, and would beat her if she refused to go on “dates” was sufficient for 

a reasonable jury to conclude Ashford knowingly advertised and enticed the victim 

to meet with men knowing the threat of force would cause her to engage in 

commercial sex acts. See United States v. Reed, 972 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2020)

(“The jury is the final arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility, and we will not disturb 

that assessment.”) (quoting United States v. Listman, 636 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 

2011)); United States v. DeCoteau, 630 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting “a 

victim’s testimony alone can be sufficient to prove aggravated sexual abuse”). 
-4- 

Ashford offers the same no-evidence-of-a-commercial-sex-act argument for 

the final count, interstate travel for prostitution. However, victims testified Ashford 

traveled with them and intimidated them into having sex for money in several

differentstates. Thisis sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude Ashford 

knowingly transported victims across state lines intending they engage in 

prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a).

Finally, Ashford claims the district court imposed unreasonable consecutive 

sentences of imprisonment totaling 47 years when, according to Ashford, a 30-year 

concurrent sentence, the minimum sentence advised by the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual, would have satisfied the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553. 

We review whether the district court’s sentence was substantively reasonable “under 

a ‘deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. Stephen, 984 F.3d 

625, 632 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Cole, 657 F.3d 685, 688 (8th Cir.

2011)). Here, the district court thoroughly considered the sentencing factors under 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court emphasized the nature of the offenses and 

the need for the sentence imposed, noting Ashford’s disregard and cruelty towards

his victims and that he had no other career outside of his crimes. The district court 

was well within its broad discretion in determining the § 3553(a) factors required a 

sentence more severe than Ashford wanted. See United States v. Donahue, 959 F.3d 

864, 867 (8th Cir. 2020) (“[S]entencing courts . . . have wide discretion to weigh the 

§ 3553(a) factors.”) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Wilder, 597 

F.3d 936, 946 (8th Cir. 2010)).

For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm. 

______________________________