2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

9-17-2004 

# Kn api k v . Att y Ge n U S A

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ocke t N o . 03-2787

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du

. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" Kn ap i k v . Att y Ge n U SA" (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s
. P ape r 278. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/278PRECE DENTI AL

UNITED STA TES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 03-2787

JAN KNAP IK,

Petitioner

v.
*JOHN ASHC ROFT , Attorney General

of the Unit ed State s

Respondent

On Pe ti ti on f

orRev ie w of a Final Order of the Bo ard o f Imm igration Ap peals (No. A74-902-513)

Argued June 25, 2004

Before: AMBR O, BECK ER and GR EE NB ER G, Circuit

Judges
(Opinion fi led : September 17, 2004)
Steven Ly ons, Esqui re (Argued) Mart in C. Liu and Ass oci at es, PLLC 627 Greenwich St., 12th Floor New Y ork, NY 10014
Attorneyfor Peti tioner Peter D. Keis ler Assist ant Atto rney G enera l, Civil Divi sion Emily An ne Ra dford, E squire Assist ant Direc tor Dou glas E. G insburg, Esq uire John M . McA dams, Jr., Esqu ire Aviva L. Pocz ter, Esquire Nicole Nardone, Esquire ( Argued) Department of J usti ce CivilDivisi on Office of Immigrat

ion Litigati on P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin St ation Washington, DC 20044

At torneys for R espo nden t

OPINION OF THE COURT

AM BR O, Circuit

Judge

Jan Knapik chall enges the deci sion of the B oard of Im migra tion A ppea ls (BI A) that hi s convicti on for attempted reckless e ndan germ ent i s a crim e invo lv ing m oral t urpit ude unde r § 237 (a)(2)(A )(i) of th e Imm igrati on a nd Na tionality Act (“ INA”) , 8 U.S .C. § 1227(a)( 2)(A)(i ). Knapik argues tha t crimes with a men s rea no greate r than
rec klessness canno t involve m ora l turpi tude because suc h crimes requ ire intent. He also ar gues that , even ass uming reckless e ndan germ ent i s a crim e in vo lving moral tur

pitude, atte mpted reckless endangermen t is not. For the
reasons that f

ollow, we affi rm the BIA ’s determi nation that t he reckl es s endangermentstatute i n this case defines a2

cr ime involvi ng mor al tu rp it ude , b utwe a gree with Kn apik th at his co nvictio n fo r at tempted reckle ss endangerment is not
suc h a c rime

. I. Fac tual and Procedur al Backgr ound
Kn apik is a ci tize n of Slovakia

. He legally entere d the Uni ted States in June 1995. On September 16, 1996, he adj usted his status to that o f law ful permanent reside nt. He reside s in N ew Jersey w ith hi s fat her and si ster

who are both la wful permanentresidents. In Aug ust 2000, Kn apik pl ed guilt

y t o the cri me of atte mpted reckle ss endangerment in the firstdegree in v iolation of N ew Y ork Penal Law § 120.25. 1 The plea aros e from
an incide nt in which, while intoxica ted , Kn apik drove at an excessi ve rate of speed
a ga instthe fl ow of traffi c on the Staten Island Expressway . He pled gui lty , was sentence d to and serve d fo ur m onth s in jail.
In April 2000, the Immigration and National ization Servi ce (I NS) 2 served Kn api k with a noti ce to appear , chargi ng hi m with r emov abi li tyund er8 U. S. C. § 122 7( a) (2 )( A)( i) , w h ich allows t he AttorneyGen eral to order the removal of any alien w ho h as be en co nvic t ed of a
cr ime invo lving m oral turp itude w ithin five years of adm ission a nd f or w hic h a sentence of one year or more may be imposed. At the remova l hearing, the Immigration Judge (“I J”) hel d that Kn a pik’s con vi ct io n co nst it ut es a crime involvi ng moral tur

pitude and orde red h im removed from the Unit ed Stat es. K napik ti mel y ap pe al ed to th e BI A.
In May 2003, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s dec ision

. The BIA first observed that
a tt empt offenses are crimes i nvolving moral turpitude if t

he underlying offense inv olves moral tur

pitude. The BIA ne x t ad dresse d the is sue of cri mina l recklessness. R elyi ng on prior decisions, it concluded that moral tur pitude can lie in crimin ally r eck less behav ior. The B IA also exa mi n ed the aggr avatin g fac tors in New York ’s reckle ss end angerment stat ute, analogi zed to pri or BIA cases involvi ng manslaughte r and assault wit h a dead ly w eapon, and di sti nguished prior BIA cas es in vol vin g sim ple a ssau lt. Ta ken together, the BIA concluded that the elem ents of depravi ty , reckl essness and grave risk of death to another pe rson are suf ficie nt to esta blish mo ral tu rpitu de.
Kn a pik timel y fi led a petiti on for review of t

he BI A’s de cisi on. We have 1 Section 120 .25 provi des: “A per s on is gui lty

of reckl ess endangerment in the first degree when, und e r circumst ances ev incing adeprav e d indiff erence to hu m an life , he rec klessly engages in conduct

which creat es a grave risk o f de ath to ano ther per son .”

2 On M arch 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an indepe ndent agencywithi n th e United States Department of Justi ce and th e I NS’ s f

unc ti ons we re transf erred to the De pa rtm en t o f H om ela nd Se cu rity. See Ho mela nd S ecurity Act of 2002, Pub. L. No . 107 -29 6, §§ 441 , 45 1, 471, 116 Sta t

. 2135 (2002). The BIA remains within t he Department of J usti ce.3

juri sdiction to revi ew final or ders of
remov al pursuan t to 8 U.S.C . § 1252(a ). II. St andard of Review Under Chev ro n , U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re s. De f. Council , Inc. , 467 U. S. 837 (1984), w e review an agen cy’s constructionof a s tatute it ad minis ter s under a two-st ep in qu iry. If congres sional intent is clear from the stat

ute’s language,
we must giv e ef fec t to it a s w ritten

. Id. at 842-43. If Congress ’s intent is sil ent or ambiguous, we must decide if the agenc y’s acti on is bas ed o n “apermi ss ible construction of

the st atute .” Id. at 843.
We af for d de fere nce , how ever, onl y when an agen cy construes or inter prets a statute it adm inis ters. See id. at 843-44

. In Francis v. Reno , we refus ed to afford Chevron deferenc e to the BIA ’ s inter pretat ion of th e te rm “f elo ny” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 16 becaus e it i s a general criminal statute not implicating the BIA ’s experti se. 26 9 F.3d 16 2, 168 (3d Cir. 20 01). In Sandoval v. Reno , we decl ine d to give d efere nce to the BIA’s deci sion as to the ef fectiv e date of a s ta tu te because the “issue [of] a statute's ef fectiv e date is not one that

impli cates a gency expe rtise in
a meaningful way

. . . .” 166 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir . 199 9). Accordi n gly, we mu st decide which aspects of the BIA’s decisi o n are entitl ed to Chevron def eren ce. Kn apik argu es that Chevron deferenc e applie s onlyto what “moral turpi tude” means, 3 not to what crimes t hat term en com passes. Parti cularl y, he

contends th e BI A’s determi nation t hat recklessness cr ime s may constitute moral turpi tude is not

entitled to de ference. The First, Second, Fift

h and Eighth Circuits, how ever, have con clu ded th at cour ts shou ld de fe r n ot on ly to the BIA ’s defini tion of moral turpitude but also to its determi nationthat t

he elements of a crimina l statute satis fy tha t def initio n. See Cabral v
. INS , 15 F.3d 1 93, 195 (1 st Cir. 1994) (“We therefore inq uire whether the agency interpretation wa s arbitra ry, capricious, or clearlycontrary t o the statute.”); Mic he l v . I NS , 206 F.3 d 2 53, 263 (2d Cir. 2000) (st ating t hat “i n orderto affirm the BIA ’s determination [in regard to mor al tu rp it

ude ], we need only conclude that its inter pretat ion is reasonabl e and that it ‘consi dered the matter in a d etai led and reasonedfashion’” (c itation omitted)); Hamdan v. INS , 98 F .3d 18 3, 184 -85 (5 th Cir. 1996) (“We a cco rd deferenc e to the BIA ’s inter

pretat ion of question s such as t hose be fore us he r e ” — i.e

. , whethe r H amde n’s record of co nviction “support[s]
a finding of moral turpitude .”); Fran klin v.

3 We clearly a fford Chevron deference to the BIA’s de finit ion of “moral turp itud e.” The term is not defined in the INA, and “l egisl ative hist ory leaves
no doubt . . . t

hat Congress lef

t the term ‘c ri me involving m oral turpitude’ to futu re administ rati ve and judi ci al int erp retat ion .” Cabral v. INS , 15 F.3d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1994); see a lso Jordan v. De George , 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson , J ., dissent ing) (stating t

hat “Congress did not
see fit to state what meaning it attributes to the phrase ‘ crime i nv olving m oral turpitude’”).4

INS , 72 F.3 d 571, 572 (8t h Cir. 1995) (stating “we must decide w hether the B IA h as reaso nably inte rpreted its statuto r y man date to dep ort ali en s convicted of crimes involvi ng mor al turpitude”). In contra st, the Nin thCi rc ui t rev ie ws de novo whether a partic ular crim inal statu t e involves mo ral tu rpitu de. See, e. g. , Rod riguez-H errera v. INS , 52 F.3d 238, 240 n.4 (9 th Cir. 1 995 ); cf. Frankl in , 72 F.3d at 578 (Ben nett, J., dis s enting) (recogni zing “a sp lit of authori ty , or, at least, a fundam ental differe nce in appr oach to o r pe rcep tion of th e issu e”).
We adop t the m ajority position and conclude that

the BIA’s det ermination that reckless endan germent crimes may involve moral tu rp itude i s enti tled to Chevron deference. This issue g oes to the heart of the administ

rati ve schem e establ ished under the IN A. In this con text, the BIA ’s conclusi ons as to re ckl es s e nda nge rme n t impli cate BIA expertise.
B ut in dete rmining what t he elem ents are of a particu larcriminal statute de emed to impli ca te moral turpi tude, we do not defer to the BIA

. See Michel , 206 F.3d at 262 (stating t hat when “the BIA is interpreti ng state or federa l criminal laws, we must review it s decis ion de novo ” (citing Hamdan , 98 F.3d at 185)). As discusse d below, i t is unclear what the ele men ts of att empted reckl es s en dan germent(as opposed to reckless end ang er me nt) ev en are. This is not an issue th at

im pl ic at es th e BI A’ s experti se, and we decline to affo rd C hevron deference to the BIA’s decisi on relat ing to this matter . Our rev i ew of this issue is thus de novo

. III. A naly sis An alie n, even i f a lawful permanentresi dent, is subj ect to removal if he or s he has been convict ed of a crime “involvi ng moral tur

pitude” within fi ve years of the dat e of admissi on and the
conv ictio n is one for which a sentence of
one year or longer

may be i mpos ed. 8 U.S .C. § 12 27( a)(2 )(A )(i)(I) -(II). As f or the length of se ntenc e requ ireme nt, though Kn apik r ecei ved b ut a fo ur m onth
s ente nce, firs t degree reckle s s endangermentis a c la ss D fe lo ny , N .Y

. Penal Law § 120.25, pun ishab le by up to
seven year s impri son m ent, id. at § 70.00(2)(d). Thus the on ly is su e we must decide i s whether at tempted re ckles s endangermentin the first deg re e i s acr ime in volving moral turpitude . This inquiry entails a categorical approach, focusing on the un de rlyi ng cr iminalstat ute “rather t

han the alie n’ s speci fic act .” De LeonReynoso v. A sh croft , 293 F.3d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing All ey ne v. INS , 879 F.2d 117 7, 118 5 (3d Cir. 19 89)); see also Rodriguez-Herrer a , 52 F.3d at 239- 40 (stating that, in analyzing wh ether a cr ime involves mor al tu rp it

ude , “ we mu st focus
on the cri me categori call y as defined by the stat ute, and not on the specifi c conduct of Rodriguez-Her

rera”) . According ly, “w e look to the e lem ents o f the sta tutory state offense, not to th e spe cific fa cts. W e rely
on ‘what the c onvicti ng co ur t must
nece ssarily have found to support the conviction and n ot to oth er con duct in which the defendant

may have engage d in connecti on with the of

fense. ’” W ils on v. As hcroft , 350 F .3d 377, 38 1-82 (3d . Cir.5

2003) (quo t ing Steele v. Blackman , 236 F.3d 13 0, 135 (3d Cir.2001 )). 4
F ollowing th e categorical approach , and in li ght of our defe rent ial review on the issue, the BIA did n ot act u nreas onab ly in determ ining th a t New Y ork’s reckless end ang er me n t st atut e de fi nes a crime involvi ng moral tur

pitude. But revie wing de novo the B IA’s conc lusion s as to
a ttempt ed reck less e nda nge rme nt, w e conclude that

the cat egorica l nature of the moral turpit ude inquir y compel s the conclusi on th atth is cr ime does not invol ve moral tur pitude. A. Reckle ss Endange rment The BIA in this case defi ned moral turpi tude as conduct that is i nher ently base, vile, or depraved, contrary t o the acceptedrules o f mo rali ty and the duties owed other persons, either in dividu ally or to so ciety in gen eral. The BIA also noted tha t moral tur

pitude normallyinclude s onl y acts t

hat are malum in se ( i.e

. , an ac t that is i nherentl y i mmoral ) . These statem ents are in accor d with longestabl ished BIA pr i ncip les, see, e. g. , Ma tter o f Fra nklin , 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994); Matter of Danesh , 19 I . & N. Dec. 669, 670 ( BIA 1988), and decisi ons of our Co urt, see, e. g. , De LeonRey noso , 293 F.3d at 636 (quo ting w ith approval the following de finit ions of moral turpi tude: ( 1) “[c]onduct that is contrary to jus tice , honesty, or morali ty ”; and (2) “anything don e contrary to jus tice , hone st y, principle, or good morals” (citatio n s omitted)). As su ch, the BIA ’s defin iti on of moral turpi tu de wa s reasonabl e. Applyi ng the BIA’s defi niti on, th e New York statute under whic h Knapik was convict ed does not con tai n an inte nt requ ireme nt. T o repeat , N.Y. PenalLaw § 120 .25 pr ovid es that a “pers on is g uilty of reckle ss end ange rmen t in the f ir s t degree whe n, under circumst ance s evinci ng a depraved i ndiffere nce to human li fe, he reckl essly

engages in c ondu c t which create s a gr ave ris k of death to another pe rson. ”
Kn apik correctly notes that a strain of BIA dec i sions equates moralturpi tude with evil i nten t. Ma tter of Kh ourn , 21 I. & N. Dec. 10 41, 1046 (BIA 1997) (s tat ing the BIA “has held that ‘evi l intent’ is a requ isite elemen t for a cri me involvi ng moral turpi tude” (c iti ng Mattero f Serna , 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (BI A 1 992)). Matterof Flores , 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 227 (B IA 1980) (st ating “ evil or malici ous intent is said t o be the ess ence of moral turpitude”); Matterof Abreu-Semino , 12 I. & N. Dec. 775, 777 (B IA 1968) (concludi ng “crimes i n which evil intent is not an element, no matter how seri ous the actor ho w h armf ul t he consequences, do 4 Wilso n is not a moralturpi tude
case. T he langu age q uoted related to determi ning wh et her Wilson’ s state drug conviction consti tuted an “aggravat ed fe lo ny” und er 8 U.S .C. § 1101(a )(43). See Wilson , 350 F.3d at380- 82. W hile aggravat ed felonycases maybe irrelevant to t he mor al tu rp it

udein quiry , w e nonetheless have endorsed acategorical
a ppro ach for b oth types o f case s. In this conte xt, we b e lieve th e discu ssion in Wilson and simil ar cases is i nstruc tive.6

not inv olv e m ora l turp itud e”).
In this vein, prior

to 1 976 the BIA
was of the opin ion tha t crimin ally reckless conductwas not so debase d as to i nvolve moral turpi tude. S ee, e. g. , Matter of Ga ntus-B obad illa , 13 I. & N. Dec. 777 (BIA 1971). But i n Matter of Medina the BIA recons idered i ts posi tion an d concluded “t

hat moralturpi tude can lie in crimin ally reckle ss c ond uc t. ” 1 5 I . & N. Dec. 611 , 613 (BI A 1 976 ). Examining the Illinois defini tion of reckl essness , the BIA fou nd p ersua sive tha t a
person acting reckless l y must con sciousl

y disre gard a substant ial and unju stifi ab le risk, and suc h disregard must consti tute a g r oss deviation from the standard of ca re w hich a reaso nable person would exerci se in t he situation. This defini tion of recklessness requires an actualaware ness of the ri s k creat ed by the cri m inal violator’s ac tion. Id. at 61 3-1 4 (e mp has is in te xt).
In the twenty- eight y ears si nce Medina , the B IA c onsis tentl y ha s inter pretedmoral tur

pitud e to include
re cklessness crime s if certa in statuto r y aggravating f acto rs are present . For example, the B IA lim its mo ral turpitu de to crimes in whi ch a d efen dant c onsc iously disre gards a substantialrisk of seri ous harm or death to another . T hus reckle ssne ss crimes for assaul t with a dead ly we apo n, Matter of Medi n a , or ma nsla ugh ter, Matter of Fran klin , 20 I. & N. Dec. at 870- 71, and Matter of Wojtkow , 18 I. & N . Dec. 111 , 113 (BIA 1981), involve moral turp itud e. Sim ple ass ault does not

. M atter of Fua la au , 2 1 I . & N. Dec. 47 5, 478 (B IA 19 96).
We hold th at t he BIA did not act
unre ason ably in con cluding N ew Y ork’s first degr ee rec kless e ndan germ ent statu te is a crime involvi ng moral turpitude. Fi rst degree reckle ss enda nger ment is a much
more severe offe nse than dr u nk drivi ng, whi ch almo st certain ly does n ot invo lv e moral turp itud e. See Ma tte r of LopezMeza , 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188 ( BIA 1999) (expres sing opi ni on t

ha t “ a s im pl e DUI offense” will almost never ris e to the le vel of moral turpitude); cf. Dalton v. Ashcroft , 257 F.3d 200 , 205-06 ( 2d Cir. 2001) (concludi ng th at New York’s “dri ving wh ile intoxi cated” s ta tute doe s not
cons titute a “cri me of violence ” under the INA ). New Y ork Penal Law § 120.25 contai ns aggr avatin g fac tors, req uir ing tha t
a defe ndan t create a “grav e risk o f dea th to another person” “ under c i rcumstance s evinci ng a depraved i ndiffere nce to human life.” In this context, the B IA cou ld
reas on ably conclude that the elements of de pr av ity, reckle ssness and grave ri sk of death, wh en considered together, i mplica t e acceptedr ule s of morali ty and the duties
ow ed to so ciety. Cf. Fran klin , 72 F.3d at 573 (“In the framework of our deferent

ial
re vi ew, we cannot saythe BIA has gone beyondthe bounds of reasonabl ene ss in finding that an alie n who reckle ssly causes the death of he r child b y consc iously disre garding a subst antial and un justifiab le riskto li fe has committed a cri me that7

involves m oral turpitude.”). 5
B. Atte mpted Reckl ess Endang erment We do not dis agree w i th previ ous BIA deci sions concludi ng at tempt offens es can be crim es inv olv ing moral tur pitude. See, e.g. , M atter of Da vis , 20 I . & N. Dec. 536, 545 (BIA 1992) (st ating “[t]here is no distincti on for imm igra t ion p urpo ses in respect to moral t

urpit ude, between the commission of the subs tanti ve crime and the atte mpt to commit i t” (ci tati on omitted)). We also take no issue w ith previous BIA decisions that i t cannot go behind a vali d fi nal record of convi ction

— i.e

. , t ha t t he BIA c an not examine t he parti cular

facts of a

case. See, e. g. , Matter of C- , 2 0 I . & N. De c. 52 9, 532 (B IA 1992). In it s opini on in this case, how ever, the BIA glosses over

the pecul iarconfli ct between attempt crimes and recklessness. 6 Under New Yo rk la w, a “pers on is guilty of an atte mptto commi t acr ime when, with intent

to commit a c r i me, he [or she] engages in conduct wh ich ten ds to effectth e co mm i ssio n of suc h cr ime .” Peo ple v. Kassebaum , 744 N.E. 2d694 , 698 (N .Y. 2 001) (emphasi s added) (quoti ng N.Y

. Penal Law § 110.00). Yet by its very nature a cting re ckless ly is inconsi stent

with the mens rea required for attem pt. A p erson cann ot in tend to
com mit a crim inally reckle s s act. He or she either a cts reck lessly or do es no t. Addressing the stat

ute at issue i n our case, the Ne w Y ork A ppella te D ivis ion agree d with this senti men t, concludi ng that t he “cr ime of att empted r eckle s s endangermentis non existen t s ince it i s a nonintent

offense. ” People v. Trepanier , 84 A. D. 2d 3 74, 380 (N. Y. App . Div. 1982) (affir

ming the l ower cour t’s decisio n to dismiss the indictm ent as to this charge ). Further, New York courts have concluded in ot her conte xts that theconcept of an atte mpted reck lessne ss cri me i s non sensic al. See, e. g. , People v . Terry , 104 A.D . 2 d 572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 198 4) (st ati ng “o ne ca nn ot leg all y b e found guilt y o f att empted murder i n the second degree by r eckless conduct”)

. The only contrary authori ty in New York is People v. Foster , 19 N

. Y.2d 150 (1967). F ost er w as ch arged with
man slaughter in the f irst degree a n d ultima tely ple d guilt y t o atte mpted
mans laughte r in th e s ec ondde gr ee . O n appe al, Fo sterargued his conviction had
no basis i n law and viol ated due process. The New Y ork Court of Appeal s rej ected this arg um ent, concludi ng that Fos ter kno win gly accepted hi s plea “i n satisfac ti on of an indi ctment charging a
cr ime carry ing a heavi er penal ty . In s uch 5 We also re ject Kna pik’s content ion that hi s convict ion i s disting uisha ble from man sla u ghter or
assau lt wit h a deadlyweapon because the reckless en dan germent st atutedoes not require injury t o an indi v idual. W ith regard to reckless acts, mo ral turp i tude inheres in the conscious disre gard of a substant ial and unjustifiable ri sk of severe harm or death. Kna pi k’s go od f ortun e in not injuring or kil lin g anyone doe s not change the quality of his actions.

6 As noted previously, we exercise de novo review in resolvi ng this issue.8

c ase, there is no violation o f defen dant’s right to due proce ss.” Id. at 15 3. Our c ase , how eve r, i s disting uisha ble from Foster . The con cern drivi ng Foster

w as manipulation of the state criminal process — i.e

. , a de fendant may not inducea plea agr eement, receive
a redu ced s enten ce an d then challe nge h is
or her con victi on. See id. at 153-54 (“The defendantdeclin ed to ris k his chances with
a jury . He induced the proceedi ng of which he n ow com plain s.
. . . Wh ile there may be questi on whether a pl ea t o atte mpted man slaug hter is techn ically and logica lly consistent, such a plea should be sustai ned on the groundthat it was sought by [the] defendant and freelytaken as part of a bargai n which was stru ck fo r the defenda nt’s bene

fit .” (emphasi s added )). In contras t, Knapi k’s ple a did not decrease the level of the char ged offense orsubject him to a less seve re sen te nc e. He was charged with fir st degr ee reckless endangermentand he pled g ui lty to atte mpted firs t degree reckle s s end ang erme nt. Mo re importan tly, we are not reviewing a

due process chall enge to a state court convi ction; we are asses sing the immigrat ion implic atio ns of tha t
con victi on. As no ted pr ev io us ly, the moral turpi tude inq uiry is c ateg oric al. De LeonR eyn oso , 293 F.3d at 635 ; Rod riguez-H errera , 52 F .3d at 239 -40. Under the c ategori cal appr oach, we have cauti oned against

going “bey on d the offense as ch arged and scr utini z[ing] t

he underl yi ng facts” of a case t o determi ne whether a crime i nvolves moralturpi tude. Valansi v. Ashcroft , 278 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Drakes v. Zimski , 240 F.3d 246, 248 ( 3d C ir . 2001)). 7 This means, i n the context

of our case, that t

he elem ents of the underlyi ng offense mu st
necessarily establish that all convictions involve mo ral tu rpitu de. Wilson , 350 F.3d at 381-82. S ee also Michel , 206 F.3d at 263; O koroha

v. INS , 715 F.2d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1983 ). 8 Atte m pted reckless

7 Valansi , li ke Wil son (see not e 4 and accompanyi ng text) , is an aggravat ed felony , not mora l tur

pitude, case.

8 In an opini on issuedthe same day
as the opini on in thi s case, we engaged i n an exten sive an alysis of th e c ategori cal approach as appli ed in aggra vated f elon y cases. See Singh v. Ashcr oft , N o . 03- 1532, __ F.3d __ (3d Cir. Sept. __, 2004). Singh noted that while m ost prior Third Circu it cases had empl oyed t he “fo rmal categorical approac h” fr om Tayl or v. United States , 495 U .S. 575, 600 (1990) — which focuses exclusi velyon the statutory element s of the underly ing offense — others deemed it permissi bl e t o look beyondthe st atutor

y el ements of the und erlying off ens e.

In reconciling these ca ses, Singh deline ated two situations in which the formal categorical approach prop erly may be abandoned. The first is when th e t er ms of the st atute on which removal i s based invites inquiry i nto the f a c ts of t

he underlying co nvicti on. For exampl e, Nugent v. Ashcroft , 367 F .3d 162 (3 d Cir. 2004), and Munroe v. As hcroft , 353 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 200 3), co nce rn ed 8 U.S .C.9 e ndangermentis not a crime i nvolvi n g moral turpitud e bec ause , catego ric a lly speaking, the concept

makes no s en se. Attempt(nece ssarily requ iring inte nt to
com mit a crime) is inconsi ste nt w ith recklessness (which, by defini tion, impli es acti ng wit hou t inte nt). Terry , 104 A. D. 2d at 573 ; Trepanier , 84 A.D. 2d at 38 0. Put di ff er en tly, we cannot saythat a conviction for a ttempt ed reckl ess endangerment
ne c essarily involves moral tur pitude withoutalso ab andoning the categorical approach. 9 § 1101(a)( 43) (M )(i ), which def ines an agg rav ated felonyas an offense t hat “involve s fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victi m or victi ms exceeds $10 ,000 .” In both cases , however, the rel evant criminal statute di d not include a “loss greate r than $ 10,00 0” ele m ent. See Nugent , 36 7 F.3d at 168 n. 2 (quoti ng 18 Pa. Co ns. Sta t. § 392 2(a)); Munroe , 353 F.3d at 226 (citi ng N.J. Sta t. An n. § 2C:20- 4). Nonetheless , both Nugent and Munroe found it pr oper to examine the amount of loss esta blish ed. See Nugent , 367 F.3d at 175 (noti ng the part

ies had “s tipul ated that Nug ent’s state conviction was based on a bad check amount ing to only $4,831.26” ; Munroe , 252 F.3d at 226 ( looking to the ind ictm ent a nd r eco rd o f co nvi ction ).

The second exception to t he categor ical approach i s when the underly ing criminal statute is written in the disj unctive( i.e

. , the statu te crim inali ze s simil ar but lega l ly distinct c onduct) s uch that s o me, but not

all, convictions under the stat ute pla ce the al ien withi n the
r emoval categ ory for im migra tio n purposes. Valansi was such a case. 278 F.3 d at 214-17 ( in ente ring pl ea for embezzlementof monies from her employe r ba nk, pet iti oner av oide d admitting that she intende d to defra ud , thus not qualif

yi ng as an aggravated felony for removal pur pos es). See also Hamdan , 98 F.3d at187-89 (granting the petiti on for
rev iew and remanding forfurther examinati on o f

the rec ord of convic tion because (1) the Louisiana kidnappi ng statute und er which Hamda n wa s con victe d is di vided into di scret e subsection s, and (2) i t was unclear from the BIA’s decisi on which subs ecti on it belie ved H a mdan was convicted under and which subs ection s imp li cat ed mo ral turp itud e).

Examinationof

these ca ses furt

he r supp orts our posit

ion in t hi s case . Both Nugent and Munroe dealt with a provi sion of the IN A, 8 U.S.C . § 1101(a )(43)(M )(i), not relevant to t

he moral turpi tude in qu iry. And unlike t

he stat utes at issue i n Valansi and Hamdan , New Y ork’s reckless endangermentstatute is w ritten ne ither in the disj unctive nor in subs ecti ons
. Accordi ng ly, the G overnment has s upplied (and we can think

of) no pri nciple d reason
n otto app ly the form al categ oric a l approach.

9 While the Government does not ask us sp ec ifi ca lly t o abandon the categorical approac h in cases su ch as ou rs ( i.e

. , wh en it co unse ls again st d ep ortation), t hat wo uld b e the e ffec t. Und er th e10 * * * * *
In this context, we affirm the BIA ’s decisi on that New York Penal Law § 12 0.25, reckless endangerment i n the fir st degree, is a crime invol ving mor a l turpi tude, b ut we rev erse the BIA ’s conclusi on that Knapi k’s st ate convi ction forattem pted re ckless enda nger men t in th e first degre e is a crime invol ving moral turpi tude. Theref ore, we g rant Kn apik’s petit ion for revi ew an d rev erse the BIA ’s orde r of re mo val.

categorical approac h, courts and the BIA have long decli ned to con sider a rgum ents that, desp ite the elements of an offense, an alien’s ind ividua l cond uct did not fit withi n a p arti cular I NA-define d deportat ion cate gor y. See, e. g. , Alley ne , 879 F .2 d at 1185 (citations omitted); Okabe v. INS , 671 F .2d 86 3, 864 -65 (5 th Cir. 198 2); Matterof C- , 20 I. & N. Dec. at 532 (citation s om it ted) . Now that “the shoe is on th e othe r foo t,” it w ould be perverse ironyto all ow the Government to
u s e the cat egorica l approac h in peti tioner appe als but to abandon that approach when the Governme nt appeals.