IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Friends of Lackawanna, Joseph James : and Mari May, Edward and Beverly : Mizanty, and Katherine and Todd : Spanish, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1586 C.D. 2018 : Argued: September 17, 2019 Dunmore Borough Zoning Hearing : Board :

:

v. :

: Dunmore Borough, Keystone Sanitary : Landfill, Inc., F&L Realty Corporation, : F&L Realty, Inc., Keystone Company : and Keystone Landfill, Inc. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Presid ent Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON , Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH , Judge

OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: February 18, 2020

The Friends of Lackawanna and individual objectors, Joseph James and
Mari May, Edward and Beverly Mizanty, and Katherine and Todd Spanish
(collectively, Objectors)

, 1 appeal an order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Lackawanna County (trial court) that affirmed a decision of the Dunmore Borough
Zoning Hearin g Board (Zoning Board). Objectors contend that the height

restrictions for building s set forth in the Borough of Dunmore Zoning Ordinance

1 Friends of Lackawanna is a registered, non

- profit organization committed to protecting the community’s property values, image, and the environment. Reproduced Record at 67a (R.R. __). The individual citizens own property abutting or in the immediate vic inity of Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc

.2

(Zoning Ordinance) 2 apply to sanitary landfill s and that the Zoning Board erred in
otherwise holding

. Concluding tha t the Zoning Board improvidently granted
Objectors a hearing

, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter to the
trial court to vacate the Zoning Board’s decision

. Background
Since 1972, Keystone Sanitary Landfill, Inc. (Keystone) has owned and
operated a 714

- acre sanitary landfill

, which is divided between Dunmore Borough
and neighboring Throop Boroug h. Keystone’s landfill in Dunmore Borough

consists of 398 acres in the M

- 1 (Light Manufacturing) District . The landfill is
regulated by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
pursuant to the Municipal Waste Planning, Recycling and Waste Reduction Act 3 and
the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA)

. 4 It currently operates under a Phase II
Major Permit Modification, with an ex isting elevation of 1573 feet.

In 2014, Keystone submitted an application to DEP to use 216 acres
within the pr eexisting 714

- acre permit area as a Phase III Major Permit Modification
(Phase III). The se 216 acres are in that part of the landfill located in the M

- 1 District
in Dunmore Borough

. Under Keystone’s requested permit modification

, its landfill

would accept new waste and excavat ed waste from an unlined site. Under the Phase

III permit, Keystone intended to expand the landfill vertically, to a height of 1722

feet.
In November 2014, Keystone requested a preliminary opinion from the
Borough’s Zoning Officer on whether Phase III comp lied with the Zoning

2 B OROUGH OF D UNMORE Z ONING O RDINANCE (2000) ( Z ONING O RDINANCE )

. 3 Act of July 28, 1988, P.L. 556, as amended , 53 P.S. §§4000.101

- 4000.1904.

4 Act of July 7, 1980, P.L. 380, as amended , 35 P.S. §§6018.101

- 6018.1003.3

Ordinance. 5 Keystone made this request pursuant to its “Host Municipality F ee Agreement” with Dunmore Borough, which required Keystone to “make immediate
application for an opinion to the Dunmore Borough Zoning Officer under, [ inter

alia ] 53 P.S. [ § ] 10916.2, [ 6 ] to confirm the landfill is a pre

- existing use as a landfill,

as that term is defined in [ the SWMA]; and is not a building under the current zoning
ordinance pertaining to maximum building height.” R.R. 112a

- 13a. The Zoning

Officer responded that the terms “building” and “building height” pertain to
structures with a roof supported by columns or walls. Noting that Keystone’s landfill
“lacks walls and columns, and of p articular note there is no roof,” t he Zoning Officer

concluded that the height requirement for buildings in the M

- 1 District was inapplicable to Keystone’s landfill

. Preliminary Opinion at 11; R.R. 1166a.

Objectors appealed the Zoning Officer’s prelimin ary opinion to the
Zoning Board, asserting that the landfill constituted a structure that w as subject to

the 50

- foot height limitation on buildings in the M

- 1 District

.

The Zoning Board conducted six days of hearings. Initially, Keystone
moved to dismiss Objectors’ appeal

, asserting that they lacked standing . The Zoning

Board deferred rulin g on its motion , and Objectors presented evidence.

Objectors’ only witness was Jeffrey Spaide

, an environmental engineer

who works for DEP and is a ss igned to the Northeast Region of the Commonwealth

. I n that capacity, Spaide reviews permit applications f or landfills, transfer stations,

incinerators and waste processing facilities. In the course of his work, Spaide visited
Keyston e’s landfill on several occasions.

5 Dunmore Borough first enacted a zoning regulation in 1942 to address “dumps.” R.R. 1093a. A 1979 amendment authorized sanitary landfills as a permitted conditional use in the M

- 1 District. Id.

6 Sec tion 916.2 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended , added by Section 99 of the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.4 Spaide testified that Keystone’s sanitary landfill was constructed using

liners, anchor trenches, waste placement, gas collection syste ms, leachate collection

systems and stormwater collection systems. There are manholes to access the
landfill’s leachate collection system pipes

. Notes of Testimony ( N.T. ) , 4/30/2015,

at 33; R.R. 383a. These systems would be involved in the Phase III expansion

. Additionally, Keystone’s sanitary landfill has well s that extract gas from the landfill

and pipe it to a point onsite where the gas is flared

. Spaide testified that as part of

each cell construction, there is a capping layer once the landfill “reaches final

elevations.” Id

. at 28; R.R. 378a. The capping layer is similar to the liner at the

bottom of the landfill.

Keystone presented tes timony and documentary evidence , including
expert testimony about the distances of homes from the Phase III expansion area and

the extent to which residents within a thre e

- mile radius of the landfill would be able

to see the expansion

. Keystone also presented testimony about landfill height and

the building height restrictions in the Zoning Ordinance.

T he Zoning Board determined that Objectors lacked standing to file the
appeal. Nevertheless, the Zoning Board addressed the merits of Objectors’ appeal

.

T he Zoning Board began with the definitions in the Z oning Ordinance.
The term “building” is defined as “[a]ny structure having a roof supported by
columns or walls, used or intended to be used for the shelter or enclosure of persons,
animals, or property....” Z ONING O RDINANCE §11.115; R.R. 862a. The term

“ structure” means, “[a]nything constructed or erected, the use of which requires
location on the ground or attachment to something having a fixed location on the5

ground.” Z ONING O RDINANCE §11.201; R.R. 879a. 7 The Zoning Ordinance define s “Sanitary Land Fi ll” a s

any facility devoted to the storage and/or disposal of solid
wastes [ 8 ] pursuant to the regulations of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection go verning sanitary land fills.... Sanitary landfills shall be subject to all regulations contained herein governing earth

- moving activities.

Z ONING O RDINANCE §11.185; R.R. 875a. The Zoning Ordinance defines “ building
height” as follows :

The vertical distance measured from the mean level of the ground surrounding the building to a point midway between the highest and lowest point of the roof, but not including chimneys, spires, towers, elevator penthouses, tanks, and similar projections.

Z ONING O RDINANCE §11.117; R.R. 862a.

The Zoning Board held that a landfill is not a “ structure ” because it

lacks an “ attachment ” or “ fixed location on the ground. ” Z ONING O RDINANCE
§11. 201

. In support, the Zoning Board noted the testimony of Keystone’s expert,
Joseph Zadlo, who described the landfill as “trash ... being dumped and earth
moving equipment compressing and distributing the pile of trash after it came out of

the truck. ” Zoning Board Decision at 7; R.R. 73a. The Zoning Board reasoned that

the landfill consisted of moveable materials that could not be attached to the ground

or have a fixed loc ation on the ground

.

7 Section 11.201 contains a non

- exhaustive list of examples of structures, which does not specifically include landfills.

8 The term “solid waste” is defined as “[a]ny garbage, refuse, industrial, lunchroom or office waste or other material including solid, liquid, semi

- solid or contained gaseous materials, resulting from the operation of residential, municipal, commercial or institutional establishments and from community activities.” Z ONING O RDINANCE §11.194; R.R. 876a.6 Assuming, arguendo

, the landfill w as a structure, the Zoning Board

concluded that the height restriction in the Zoning Ordinance did not apply to a

landfill

. Section 4.210 of the Zoning Ordinance states that:

No building or structu re shall have a greater number of stories than are permitted in Article 3 hereof, provided further that the aggregate height of such buildings or structures shall not exceed the number of feet permitted in Article 3, except as otherwise provided herein in Section 4.220.

Z ONING O RDINANCE §4.210; R.R. 754a. 9 Article 3

, entitled “District Regulations

, ”
sets forth height restrictions by zoning district. Z ONING O RDINANCE , a rt. 3, Table

No. 4; R.R. 742a, 751a. Table No. 4 governs building size restrictions for
“nonresidential zones,” includi ng the M

- 1 D istrict where Keystone’s landfill is

located. Table 4 states :

Maximum Building Height

– Feet 50

Maximum Building Height

– Stories 2

Id ., R.R. 751a. T he Zoning Ordinance sets the precise methodology for me asuring
building height as follows :

The vertical distance measured from the mean level of the ground surrounding the building to a point midway between the highest and lowest point of the roof, but not including chimneys, spires, towers, elevator penthouse s, tanks, and similar projections.

9 The Zoning Ordinance establishes exceptions to the height limitations: Height limitations stipulated elsewhere in this Ordinance shall not apply to open amusement areas, barns, silos, schools, church spires, belfries, cupolas and domes, monuments, water towers, utility poles, chimneys, sm okestacks, flagpoles, residential telecommunications facilities; or to parapet walls extending not more than four (4) feet above the limiting height of the building.

Z ONING O RDINANCE §4.220; R.R. 754a. Landfills are not included in this list

.7

Z ONING O RDINANCE §11.117; R.R. 862a. (emphasis added).

Keystone’s landfill does not have a roof , let alone a spire or an elevator
penthouse

. Accordingly, the Zoning Board held that it was impossible to apply the

presc ribed method for measuring a building ’s height to Phase III of Keystone’s

landfill.
The Zoning Board concluded that a sanitary landfill was not a
“structure” or a “building” and that its “height” w as impossible of measurement
under the prescribed methodol ogy. Thus, Keystone’s landfill was not limited to a
height of 50 feet or 2 stories. The Zoning Board affirmed the Zoning Officer’s
preliminary opinion, and Objectors appealed to the trial court.

Trial Court’s Decision
Without taking any additional evidence, the trial court affirmed the
Zoning Board

. 10 The trial court agreed that the height restriction s in the Zoning

Ordinance did not apply to a landfill

. Additionally, the trial court observed that the
Zoning Ordinance contained provision s specific to sanitary landfills

, subjecting

them “ to all regulations contained herein governing earth

- movi ng activities

. ”

Z ONING O RDINANCE §11.185. The Zoning Ordinance set s height restrictions for

fences surrounding landfills, but it does not impose a height restriction on the landfill

itself.

T he trial court agreed that Keystone’s landfill was not a “structure

, ”

i.e.

, “ [ a ] nything constructed or erected, the use of which requires location on the
ground or attachment to something having a fixed location on the ground.” Z ONING

10 Initially, the trial court dismissed Objectors’ appeal on the basis that Objectors lacked standing. Our Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case to the trial court to decide the merits of Objectors’ appeal. See Friends of Lackawanna v. Dunmo re Borough Zoning Hearing Board and Dunmore Borough (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 656 C.D. 2017, filed May 7, 2018).8

O RDINANCE §11.201

. It also agreed that e ven if the landfill w as considered a “structure,” the formu la for measuring the height of a building was written in such a
way that it was impossible to apply to a landfill. Further, the Zoning Ordinance did
not provide an alternative method to measure the height of a landfill

.

O bjectors appealed to this Court

.

Appeal
On appeal, 11 Objectors raise one issue. They contend that the Zoning

Board abused its discretion and erred in holding that Keystone ’s landfill wa s not a

structure and that the landfill wa s not subject to the height restrictions in the Zoning

Ordinance

. In response, K eystone raises a procedural challenge to Objectors’
appeal. I t argues that the Zoning Board lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of
the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion . It contends that the Zoning Board ’s
jurisdiction was limited to a substantive v alidity challenge to the Zoning Ordinance,

and Objectors presented no such challenge. Keystone also contends that Objectors’
appeal is moot because it has eliminated the height increase from the Phase III

expa nsion

. On the merits , Keystone contends that the Zoning Board and trial court
correctly construed the Zoning Ordinance.
Zoning Board Jurisdiction
We begin with Keystone’s c hallenge to the Zoning Board ’s jurisdiction

to rule on Objectors’ appeal of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion . Keystone

11 Where the trial court does not take any additional evidence, this Court’s scope of review determines whether the zoning board committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Dore v. Zoning Hearing Board of West Norriton Township , 587 A.2d 367, 368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). This Court may only conclude that the zoning board abused its discretion “if its findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Valley View Civic Association v. Zoning Board of Adjustment , 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983)).9

argues that under the MPC, the only issue properly before the Zoning Board in
Objectors’ appeal of the Zoning Officer ’s preliminary opinion was the substantive

validi ty of the Zoning Ordinance. Keystone con tends that we must dismiss
Objectors’ appeal because the Zoning Board lacked jurisdiction to consider the
merits of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion

.

Objectors respond that their appeal was authorized by Section 909.1(a)
of the MPC, which provides for a review of any dete rmination of a zoning officer.

See Section 909.1(a) of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10909.1(a). 12 Objectors contend that this
Court specifically remanded this matter to the trial court for a decision on the merits

of the ir appeal. O bjectors’ Reply Brief at 3.

As this Court has explained, Section 916.2 of the MPC “provides a
mechanism whereby a landowner wishing to take advantage of an ordinance or map
may foreclose challenge to such ordinance or map by requesting a preliminary
opinio n” from the zoning officer. MCM Ventures, Ltd. v. Zoning Hearing Board of

the Borough of Sewickl e y (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 759 C.D. 2011, filed August 10, 2012),
slip op. at 3

- 4 (unreported)

. 13 Section 916.2 states, in relevant part, as follows :

In order not to unreasonably delay the time when a landowner
may secure assurance that the ordinance or map under which he proposed to build is free from challenge , and recognizing that the procedure for preliminary approval of his development may be
too c umbersome or may be unavailable, the landowner may advance the date from which time for any challenge to the ordinance or map will run under section 914.1 [ 14 ] by the following procedure:

12 Added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.

13 An unreported panel decision of this Cour t, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited “for its persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).

14 Section 914.1 provides, in relevant part, as follows:10 (1) The landowner may submit plans and other materials describing his proposed use or development to the zoning officer for a preliminary opinion as to their compliance with the applicable ordinances and maps. Such plans and other materials shall not be required to meet the standards prescribed for preliminary, tentative or final approval or for the issuance of a building permit so long as they provide reasonable notice of the proposed use or development and a sufficient basis for a preliminary opinion as to its compliance.

(2) If the zoning officer’s preliminary opinion is that the use or development complies with the ordinance or map, notice thereof shall be published once each week for two successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality.... The favorable preliminary approval under section 914.1 an d the time therein specified for commencing a proceeding with the board shall run from the time when the second notice thereof has been published.

(a) No person shall b e allowed to file any proceeding with the board later than 30 days after an application for development, preliminary or final, has been approved by an appropriate municipal officer, agency or body if such proceeding is designed to secure reversal or to lim it the approval in any manner unless such person alleges and proves that he had no notice, knowledge, or reason to believe that such approval had been given. If such person has succeeded to his interest after such approval, he shall be bound by the knowle dge of his predecessor in interest. The failure of anyone other than the landowner to appeal from an adverse decision on a tentative plan pursuant to section 709 or from an adverse decision by a zoning officer on a challenge to the validity of an ordinanc e or map pursuant to section 916.2 shall preclude an appeal from a final approval except in the case where the final submission substantially deviates from the approved tentative approval.
Section 914.1 (a) , added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. §10914.1 (a) (emphasis added)

.11

53 P.S. §10916.2 (emphasis added)

. In short, Section 916.2 sets up a procedure “to

advance the date from whi ch time for any challenge to the ordinance or map will

run under [ S ] ection 914.1 [ of the MPC ] .” Id.

Section 909. 1 of the MPC sets forth the categories of appeals over
which a zoning board has jurisdiction. Section 909.1(a) states , in pertinent part, as

follows:

(a) The zoning hearing board shall have exclusive jurisdiction

to hear and render final adjudications in the following matters:

* * *

(3) Appeals from the determination of the zoning officer, including, but not limited to, the granting or denial of any permit, or failure to act on the application therefor, the issuance of any cease and desist order or the registration or refusal to register any nonconforming use, structure or lot.

* * *

(8) Appeals from the zoning officer’s determination un der section 916.2.

53 P.S. §10909.1(a) (3), (8) (emphasis added).

In an appeal of “ a zoning officer’s determination under Section 916.2, ”
the issue before the zoning board is the substantive validity of the zoning ordinance.

This Court so held in Susqu ehanna Rheems Holdings, LLC v. West Donegal
Township Zoning Hearing Board (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1394 C.D. 2017, filed July 23,
2018) (unreported), petition for allowance of appeal denied , 207 A.3d 906 (Pa.
2019).

In Susquehanna Rheems Holdings, LLC, the landowner sought a
preliminary opinion under Section 916.2 that its proposed land development plan12

complied with the township’s zoning ordinance, which had recently rezoned the
land in question from commercial to agricultural. The zoning officer issue d a
favorable preliminary op inion. The objectors filed a substantive validity challenge
and appealed the merits of the zoning officer’s preliminary opinion. The zoning
board concluded that the only issue before it was the validity of the ordinance, not

t he merits of the preliminary opinion. The zoning board explained that the sole
purpose of a preliminary opinion is to advance the date by which a challenge to the
underlying ordinance or map begins to run; it is not a binding determination on

whether the propo sed land use complies with the zoning o rdinance

. Susquehanna
Rheems Holdings, LLC , slip op. at 13. The trial court affirmed, as did this Court.
We held the only issue before the Court was the substantive validity of the zoning

ordinance. 15

Keystone argues that the Zoning Board lacked jurisdiction over the
merits of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion

. Objectors respond that Section
909.1(a) authorizes an appeal of the merits of any determination of a zoning officer,
including a preliminary opi nion issued pursuant to Section 916.2 of the MPC. We
agree with Keystone.

On December 22, 2014, the Zoning Officer issued a preliminary
opinion that Keystone’s proposed landfill expansion complied with the Zoning

O rdinance. O n January 20, 2015, Objector s appealed th is preliminary opinion to the
Zoning Board raising 14 issues , including a challeng e to the substantive validity of

15 On appeal to the trial court, the objectors also raised the issue that the zoning officer’s preliminary opinion was in valid ; however, they did not brief this issue or raise it at oral argument. Therefore, the trial cour t determined that the objectors waived this issue. Susquehanna Rheems Holdings, LLC , slip op. at 49, n.15.13

the O rdi n ance. 16 However, by the time of the hearing before the Zoning Board,
Objectors limited their challenge to “whether the height limitation under the ...
Zoning Ordinance applies to [Keystone].” Zoning Board Decision at 3, F inding of

F act No. 25; R.R. 69a. Thereby

, Objectors abandoned their substantive challenge to
the Zoning Ordinance.

Section 916.2 of MPC allows a land developer to “advance the date

from which time for any challenge to the ordinance or map will run under Section

914.1 .” 53 P.S. §10916.2 (emphasis added)

. Section 916.2 does not confer broad
authority upon a zoning officer to issue an advisory determination on the validity
of a land use proposal. A favorable preliminary opinion does not give the

landowner a substantive land use approval

. See Keystone’s Brief at 14
( acknowledging that a preliminary opinion “ creates no vested rights in the

landowner ”).

T he Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion reduced the period of time
Objectors had to challenge the substantive validity of the Zoning Ordinance

. Once
Objectors abandoned their substantive validity challenge to the Zoning Ordinance,
the Zoning Board was deprived of jurisdiction to consider the other 13 issues raised
by Objectors in their appeal

.

Objectors maintain that a zoning hearing b oard can always consider

the merits of a preliminary opinion of a zoning officer . It relies on Section
909.1(a)(3) of the MPC , which permits “ [ a ] ppeals from the determination of the

16 Specifically, Objectors argued that the Zoning Ordinance is substantive ly invalid if it fails “ to state a height limit or other zoning restr ictions applicable to landfills and the proposed [Keyston e landfill] expansion.” R.R. 103 a.14

zoning officer

. ” 53 P .S. § 10909.1(a)(3) (emphasis added ). 17 Notably, Objectors

did not appeal the Zoning O fficer’s preliminary opinion under Section 909.1(a)(3 )
but, rather, under Sec tion 909.1(a)(8), which relates only to appeal s arising from

Section 916.2. W e reject Objectors ’ argument.

Section 909.1(a)(3) does not confer jurisdiction on a zoning hearing

board to consider the merits of a preliminary opinion issued under Section 916.2 of

the MPC

. Simply, a preliminary opinion is not a “ determination ” fo r purposes of
Section 909.1(a)(3 ). W hen interpreting a statute, courts must give full effect to each
provision of the statute if at all possible. East Lampeter Township v. Pennsylvania
State Horse Racing Commission , 704 A.2d 703, 708 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). Section
909.1(a)(3) and Section 909.1 (a)(8) provide for different categories of appeals. To
hold that Section 909.1(a)(3) pro vides for an appeal from the zoning officer’s
preliminary opinion issue d pursuant to Section 916.2 would render the language of
Section 909.1(a)(8) as surplusage. 1 Pa. C.S. §1921 (a) (“Every statute shall be
construed, if possible, to give effect to all [ of ] its provisions .” ).
We also reject Objector s ’ contention that this Court’s decision in North
Codorus Township v. North Codorus Township Zoning Hearing Board , 873 A.2d
845 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), supports their interpretation of Section 909.1(a)(3)

. Ther e, a land development plan was filed after the enactment of a zoning ordinance

amendment but before its effective date. The land developer requested a

determination as to which version of the ordinance applied , and t he zoning officer

informed the develope r that the amended zoning ordinance applied

. The developer
appealed, and the zoning hearing board revised the decision of the zoning officer.

17 The term “determination” is defined as a “final action by an officer, body or agency charged with the administration of any land use ordinance or applications th ereunder[.]” Section 107 of the MPC, 53 P.S. §10107.15

The township appealed, arguing that the zoning hearing board lacked jurisdiction
because the zoning officer’s oral statement was not a “ determination. ” The trial

court held that the zoning officer’s non

- written opinion constituted a

“determination ” for purposes of Section 909.1(a)(3). This Court agreed and held that
the zoning officer’s oral “determination” was reviewable by the zoning hearing

board.

In contrast to North Codorus

, K eystone had not submitted a development plan or zoning permit application to Dunmore Borough. T he zoning
officer’s preliminary opinion is, by definition, limited in scope to the pro cedure

described in Section 916.2 of the MPC

. That preliminary opinion has no bearing on

any zoning permit application yet to be made by Keystone, if any is ne eded

. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above

, we conclude that the Zoning Board
lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the Zoning Officer’s preliminary opinion

. Accordingly

, the trial court should have vacated the decision of the Zoning Board

. Therefore, we will vacate the order of the trial court and remand the matter to the

t rial court to vacate the decision of the Zoning Board

.

_____________________________________ MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President JudgeIN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Friends of Lackawanna, Joseph James : and Mari May, Edward and Beverly : Mizanty, and Katherine and Todd : Spanish, :

Appellants :

:

v. : No. 1586 C.D. 2018

: Dunmore Borough Zoning Hearing : Board :

:

v. :

: Dunmore Borough, Keystone Sanitary : Landfill, Inc., F&L Realty Corporation, : F&L Realty, Inc., Keystone Company : and Keystone Landfill, Inc. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 18 th day of Februa ry, 20 20 , the order of the Common
Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court) dated October 26, 2018, in the above

captioned matter is hereby VACATED

, and this matter is REMANDED to the trial

court with instructions to vacate the September 28, 2015, decision of the Dunmore
Borough Zoning Hearing Board

.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

_____________________________________ MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge