* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-20873

(Summary Calendar)

GUARDIAN AD LITEM, also known as KIM BALLEW

Plaintiff–Appellee

v.

LOGISTICS PARTNERS INC; ET AL

Defendants

U LAWRENCE BOZE

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:97-CV-2894

Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant U. Lawrence Bozé appeals the district court’s denial of his

Motion to Sever Orders for Attorney’s Fees Disgorgement. Appellant argues

that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under the collateral order

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

December 12, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 06-20873

1 The Gary Law Firm is not a party to this appeal.

2 These orders that were the subject of the first appeal to this Court are referred to

collectively as the “2003 orders.”

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doctrine. Because we find that the collateral order doctrine does not apply, we

dismiss Appellant’s appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a series of chemical fires occurring at a chemical

warehouse located near Pleasantville, Texas. Thousands of plaintiffs emerged

and brought causes of action for various personal injuries and property damage.

The underlying case resulted from the consolidation of these claims. Appellant

Bozé and the firm of Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis, McManus,Watson

& Sperando (the “Gary Law Firm”)1 are the attorneys for the Pleasantville

Plaintiffs, including 565 minor Plaintiffs. The district court appointed Appellee

Kim A. Ballew to serve as Guardian Ad Litem for all minor Plaintiffs.

All Plaintiffs ultimately reached a settlement with the Defendants. The

district court, however, has yet to enter a final judgment approving all issues

relating to the settlements of the minor Plaintiffs. 

On January 28, 2003, the district court held a hearing regarding, in part,

the amounts of attorney’s fees and costs that were to be paid from the

Pleasantville minor Plaintiffs’ settlement proceeds. Despite seeking substantial

fees in excess of $1,000,000, the district court entered an order awarding

Appellant and the Gary Law Firm a nominal amount of attorney’s fees for their

representation of the minors. Appellant and the Gary Law Firm appealed this

order–along with the denial oftheir motion for reconsideration and several other

orders disbursing funds from the Pleasantville minor Plaintiffs’ settlement

proceeds–to this Court,2 which found want of appellate jurisdiction because the

orders appealed from were “interlocutory and unappealable rulings.”
No. 06-20873

3

Pleasantville Civic League of Houston, Tex. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 86 Fed. Appx.

743 (5th Cir. 2004). 

Thereafter, on February 13, 2006, Appellant filed its Motion to Sever

Orders for Attorney’s Fees Disgorgement with the district court, seeking to make

the orders concerning attorney’s fees disgorgementfinal, appealable judgments.

On February 24, 2006, the district court denied this motion. Appellant now

appeals the denial of its motion, two 2006 orders disbursing funds, and all the

2003 orders that Appellant previously appealed to this Court. 

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant concedes that the orders appealed from are not final, but

contends that appellate jurisdiction is proper pursuant to the collateral order

doctrine, which allows “appeals from orders other than final judgments when

they have a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties.” Cohen v.

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949). To come within the

collateral order exception, an order must satisfy three conditions: (1) it must

“conclusively determine the disputed question”; (2) it must “resolve an important

issue completely separate from the merits of the action”; and (3) it must “be

effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” In re Lieb, 915 F.2d

180, 184 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). Appealable collateral

orders are limited to a “small class which finally determine claims of right

separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to

be denied review and too independent ofthe cause itselfto require that appellate

consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen, 337 U.S.

at 546. Only serious and unsettled questions come within the collateral order

doctrine. Baldridge v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 404 F.3d 930, 931 (5th Cir. 2005).

With respect to the order denying Appellant’s motion for severance, this

Court has found that “the collateral order doctrine does not apply to an

interlocutory order denying severance of claims or separate trials.” Aime v. City
No. 06-20873

3

In its brief, Appellant summarily states that “[i]f the Appellant is not allowed to

presently appeal the order denying severance, there quite possibly will be no funds left in the

registry of the district court with which to pay the Appellant if and when a final judgment is

entered and if it is subsequently found that the Appellant is entitled to his attorney’s fees.”

Such a conclusory statement is insufficient, however, because Appellant must both “allege[]

and prove[]” that the fees would be “unrecoverable” if appeal must await a final judgment. See

Shipes v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 1989). It is undisputed that funds

are being held in a qualified settlement fund escrow account, and such funds cannot be

disbursed from that account without court order. Even if the district court does disburse all

such funds before a final judgment, Appellant offers no evidence that any funds, if paid, would

be unrecoverable from the payees. 

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of Jennings, 217 Fed. Appx. 338, 339 (5th Cir. 2007); see also In re Lieb, 915 F.2d

at 185 (finding that severance orders are analogous to orders under Federal Rule

of CivilProcedure 42(b), which are “interlocutory and non-appealable before final

judgment”). Appellant does not adequately explain how denial of a motion for

severance constitutes “an importantissue” or why itis “effectively unreviewable

on appeal from a final judgment.”3In re Lieb, 915 F.2d at 184 (internal

quotations omitted). 

With respect to the 2003 orders, this Court has already determined that

these orders are “interlocutory and unappealable rulings.” Pleasantville Civic

League of Houston, Tex. v. Guardian Ad Litem, 86 Fed. Appx. 743 (5th Cir.

2004). We will not re-examine this determination. See Fuhrman v. Dretke, 442

F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The law of the case doctrine provides that an

issue of law or fact decided on appeal may not be reexamined . . . by the

appellate court on a subsequent appeal.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

With respect to the two 2006 orders disbursing funds, Appellant has

wholly failed to explain how these orders come within the collateral order

doctrine. Furthermore, these 2006 orders authorize the same types of

disbursements as many of the 2003 orders that this Court previously found

unappealable prior to a final judgment.
No. 06-20873

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Thus, none ofthe interlocutory orders Appellant seeks to appeal fall within

the collateral order doctrine. Accordingly, these orders are unappealable at this

time. 

This is the second time Appellant has improperly attempted to appeal

interlocutory orders. Counsel for Appellant is cautioned against filing further

interlocutory appeals regarding the disgorgement of Appellant’s attorney’s fees

and warned that such further filing may result in sanctions. This Court will

consider Appellant’s contentions on appeal from a final judgment–but not before

then.

DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction; SANCTIONS WARNING ISSUED.