IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs May 22, 2007

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. WILLIAM THOMAS HECKART

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

Nos. S50,356; S50,357; S50,856; S50,866 Phyllis H. Miller, Judge

No. E2006-01961-CCA-R3-CD - Filed June 20, 2007 

The defendant, William Thomas Heckart, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to

reckless endangerment, a Class E felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony;

misdemeanor violation of the sex offender registry, a Class A misdemeanor; and felony violation of

the sex offender registry, a Class E felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to an effective

six-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in

denying his request for probation or other alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm

the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form in count two of

case number S50,856 to reflect that the conviction offense was a Class C felony. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed and

Remanded for Entry of Corrected Judgment

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR. and

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JJ., joined.

Leslie S. Hale, Assistant Public Defender, for the appellant, William Thomas Heckart.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Cameron L. Hyder, Assistant Attorney

General; H. Greeley Wells, Jr., District Attorney General; and William B. Harper, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

In separate cases, the defendant was indicted bythe Sullivan County Grand Jury on one count

of reckless endangerment, one count of misdemeanor violation of the sex offender registry law, one

count of felony violation of the sex offender registry law, and two counts of aggravated assault. On
-2-

July 11, 2006, he entered no contest guilty pleas to all counts and was sentenced as a Range I

offender to an effective sentence of six years in the Department of Correction.

At the guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor informed the trial court of the proof the State would

have presented at trial:

Judge, in talking with [defense counsel] I understand that the defendant would

dispute any [sic] of these facts but had these cases gone to trial the evidence that the

State would present, starting with Case No. S50,357, on February the 19 , 2005 th

Officer Dennis Hickman with the Kingsport Police Department was called to the

M&M Market located on North Eastman Road in Kingsport and Sullivan County.

When he arrived he spoke with Sherrita (phonetic) Sexton who stated that the

defendant, William Heckart, had repeatedly struck her and grabbed the steering wheel

while she was attempting to drive on East Center Street. Eventually she was able to

swerve into the parking lot of the market and get away from him. The State would

also present the testimony of two witnesses who said that they observed [the

defendant] striking Ms. Sexton and pulling her hair while she was driving down the

road. They would also testify that the car was weaving and swerving all over East

Center Street. Officer Hickman was able to observe red marks and an abrasion on

Ms. Sexton’s face and head. 

The prosecutor informed the court that the State’s proof in case number S50, 856, involving

the two counts of aggravated assault, would have been as follows:

In that case on April the 18 of 2005 Officer Tracy Mowdy with the th

Kingsport Police Department was called to the emergency room at Indian Path

Hospital located on Brookside Drive in Kingsport and Sullivan County. When he

arrived he spoke to Terry Laughlin who was a nurse there at the emergency room.

He stated that the defendant, William Heckart, who was a patient there at the hospital

had walked out of his room and began to chase Mr. Laughlin in the hall with a knife,

made several attempts and swung at him. Eventually [the defendant] stopped and

said he was going to leave and at that point [the defendant] began to walk out of the

building. At that point Mr. Laughlin, along with another individual, Anthony

Stiltner, began to follow him. There were several visitors in the area and they

advised just to kind of stay away because of the fact that [the defendant] had a knife.

At that point [the defendant] then began to chase again Mr. Laughlin and Mr. Stiltner

with a knife and their testimony would be that they were put in fear by [the

defendant’s] actions. 

Finally, the prosecutor informed the trial court of the State’s proof in the misdemeanor and

felony violation of the sex offender registry cases: 
-3-

The State’s proof in S50, 356 would be that the defendant, William Heckart,

was convicted on February the 3 , 1998 here in Sullivan County of the offense of rd

sexual battery. As a result of that he was required to register with the TBI as a sex

offender. He did so. It was shortly thereafter he was placed on probation, went over

the sex offender registryforms with his probation officer, Wendy Minton, signed that

he understood what the requirements were under the registration program and the

State would present evidence that in 2001 the sex offender monitoring forms were

mailed to [the defendant] at the address that he had provided to the TBI and that

those forms were returned unclaimed to them, that he failed to return monitoring

forms several times in October and in December of 2001, that he was required to do

so as a result of being a convicted sex offender. And that would be the State’s proof

in S50,356.

The proof in S50,866 would be that as a result of a change in the law that was

passed in July of 2004 [the defendant] again as a result of his conviction of sexual

battery and being classified as a sex offender was required to register in person with

a registering agency here in Sullivan County during the month of August 2004 and

that between the dates of August 1 , 2004 and August 31 , 2004 he failed to register st st

with the registering agency. The State would present proof that at that time [the

defendant] was living in Kingsport and should have registered with the Kingsport

Police Department in person as a sex offender. 

At the August 14, 2006, sentencing hearing, the sixty-three-year-old defendant testified that

he had saved enough money to rent a room at a motel and that he would “like to go on probation to

see if [he could] handle it.” He said that his sister, who lived in “Carolina,” had sent him the money

to pay for the motel lodging and that he might later seek to have his probation transferred to

“Carolina.” He acknowledged he had previously been in the “Hay House program” but had been

asked to leave due to his failure to ask “permission to go up town.” He believed, however, that he

had been given “a raw deal” by the Hay House staff. The defendant testified that he was currently

“taking blood pressure pills, baby aspirin for [his] heart, a fluid pill, a gout pill and some mental

health medicine,” all of which was administered by the jail nurses. He said he planned to continue

taking his medication on his own if released on probation. He stated that, as an older inmate, he was

“threatened a lot” in jail, which made life difficult for him. In addition, the holding cell in which the

jail staff had placed him for his protection did not have a television. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for probation

or alternative sentencing, finding that measures less restrictive than confinement had frequently been

applied unsuccessfully to the defendant. The trial court agreed, however, to recommend that the

defendant be incarcerated at a special needs facility. Thereafter, the defendant filed a timely notice

of appeal to this court. 
 On June 7, 2005, the General Assembly amended Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-102(6), -210, 1

and -401. See 2005 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 353, §§ 1, 6, 8. The amended code sections, however, do not apply in this case

because the defendant’s offenses were committed prior to the enactment of the statute and he did not elect to be sentenced

under the 2005 amendment. 

Under the amended code section, a defendant who receives a sentence of ten years or less is eligible for

2

probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a) (2006). 

-4-

ANALYSIS

The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying his

request for probation or alternative sentencing. He argues, among other things, that the time he had

already served in jail prior to sentencing should serve as an adequate deterrence for the crimes and

that the facts surrounding the offenses were not sufficiently serious to warrant a sentence of further

confinement. The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying probation

or alternative sentencing based on the defendant’s numerous past failures to comply with the

conditions of probation or alternative sentencing. We agree with the State. 

 When a defendant appeals the manner of service of a sentence imposed by the trial court,

this court conducts a de novo review of the record with a presumption that the trial court’s

determinations are correct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (2003). This presumption of 1

correctness, however, is “conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court

considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances.” State v. Ashby, 823

S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991). The burden is on the appealing party to show that the sentence is

improper. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d) (2003), Sentencing Commission Comments.

 As a standard offender convicted of Class C and E felonies, the defendant was presumed

to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-102(6) (2003). Moreover, because he received a sentence of eight years

or less, he was eligible for probation and the trial court was required to consider probation as a

sentencing option. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(a), (b) (2003). However, although the defendant 2

was entitled to the presumption of alternative sentencing, he was not automatically entitled to

probation as a matter of law. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b) (2003). The burden was upon the

defendant to show he was a suitable candidate for probation. Id.; State v. Goode, 956 S.W.2d 521,

527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Boggs, 932 S.W.2d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In

order to meet this burden, the defendant “must demonstrate that probation will ‘subserve the ends

of justice and the best interest of both the public and the defendant.’” State v. Bingham, 910 S.W.2d

448, 456 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1990)).

There is no bright line rule for determining when a defendant should be granted probation.

Bingham, 910 S.W.2d at 456. Every sentencing decision necessarily requires a case-by-case

analysis. Id. Factors to be considered include the circumstances surrounding the offense, the
-5-

defendant’s criminal record, the defendant’s social history and present condition, the need for

deterrence, and the best interest of the defendant and the public. Goode, 956 S.W.2d at 527.

The presumption in favor of alternative sentencing may be overcome by facts contained in

the presentence report, evidence presented by the State, the testimony of the accused or a defense

witness, or any other source, provided it is made part of the record. State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945,

958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). A trial court may deny alternative sentencing and sentence a

defendant to confinement based on any one of the following considerations:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant who has

a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense or

confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely

to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently been

applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1).

In this case, the trial court imposed a sentence of confinement based on the defendant’s

extensive history of failure to complywith the conditions of probation. The trial court noted, among

other things, that the defendant’s presentence report contained “page after page of violation of

alternative sentencing,” which included the defendant’s recent failure to complywith the rules of the

Hay House. We can find no error in the trial court’s sentencing determinations. As the trial court

noted, the defendant has an extensive criminal history as well as an extensive history of failure to

comply with the conditions of probation. By our count, the defendant has been found guilty of

violating his probation on at least seven separate occasions in the past. Based on this record, we

conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant probation or other alternative

sentencing.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgement of the trial court

but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form in case number S50,856 to reflect that the

defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault is a Class C, rather than Class D, felony.

___________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE