99–006 

112TH CONGRESS REPT. 112–224 " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session Part 1 

CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY 

AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2011 

SEPTEMBER 26, 2011.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. KING of New York, from the Committee on Homeland Security, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 901] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Homeland Security, to whom was referred the 

bill (H.R. 901) to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to codify the requirement that the Secretary of Homeland Security maintain chemical facility anti-terrorism security regulations, having 

considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment 

and recommend that the bill as amended do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

Amendment .............................................................................................................. 2 

Purpose and Summary ............................................................................................ 4 

Background and Need for Legislation .................................................................... 5 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 6 

Committee Consideration ........................................................................................ 7 

Committee Votes ...................................................................................................... 10 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 16 

New Budget Authority, Entitlement Authority, and Tax Expenditures ............. 16 

Congressional Budget Office Estimate ................................................................... 16 

Statement of General Performance Goals and Objectives .................................... 17 

Congressional Earmarks, Limited Tax Benefits, and Limited Tariff Benefits ... 17 

Federal Mandates Statement ................................................................................. 18 

Preemption Clarification ......................................................................................... 18 

Advisory Committee Statement .............................................................................. 18 

Applicability to Legislative Branch ........................................................................ 18 

Section-by-Section Analysis of the Legislation ...................................................... 18 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 24 

Additional Views ...................................................................................................... 31 


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AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Authorization Act of 2011’’. 

SEC. 2. CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is 

amended by adding at the end the following new title: 

‘‘TITLE XXI—CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTITERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS 

‘‘SEC. 2101. CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall maintain, and revise as necessary, regulations to protect chemical facilities against terrorism and potential terrorist attacks. 

Such regulations shall include— 

‘‘(1) risk-based performance standards for chemical facility security; 

‘‘(2) requirements for chemical facility security vulnerability assessments; and 

‘‘(3) requirements for the development and implementation of chemical facility 

site security plans. 

‘‘(b) FACILITIES REGULATED.—The regulations required by subsection (a) shall 

apply to any chemical facility that the Secretary determines presents a high level 

of security risk with respect to acts of terrorism, except that the Secretary may not 

apply such regulations to any of the following: 

‘‘(1) Any facility owned or operated by the Department of Defense. 

‘‘(2) Any facility owned or operated by the Department of Energy. 

‘‘(3) Any facility subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

‘‘(4) Any facility regulated under chapter 701 of title 46, United States Code. 

‘‘(5) A public water system, as such term is defined by section 1401(4) of the 

Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f(4)). 

‘‘(6) A treatment works, as such term is defined by section 212(2) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1292(2)). 

‘‘(c) SECURITY MEASURES.—The regulations required by subsection (a) shall provide that each such facility, in developing and implementing site security plans, be 

permitted to select layered security measures that, in combination, appropriately 

address the vulnerability assessment and the risk-based performance standards for 

security for the facility. 

‘‘(d) REVIEW.— ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall review and approve or disapprove each 

vulnerability assessment and site security plan required under this title or by 

the regulations required by subsection (a). 

‘‘(2) STANDARDS FOR DISAPPROVAL.—The Secretary may not disapprove such a 

site security plan based on the presence or absence of a particular security 

measure, but the Secretary may disapprove such a site security plan if the plan 

fails to satisfy the risk-based performance standards established by the Secretary. 

‘‘(3) DEADLINE FOR NOTIFICATION.—Beginning after the Secretary publishes 

final regulations to implement this section, not later than 180 days, to the 

greatest extent practicable, after the date on which the Secretary receives a security vulnerability assessment or site security plan under this title, the Secretary shall review and approve or disapprove such assessment or plan and notify the covered chemical facility of such approval or disapproval. 

‘‘(4) NOTIFICATION OF DISAPPROVAL.—If the Secretary disapproves the security 

vulnerability assessment or site security plan submitted by a covered chemical 

facility under this title or the implementation of a site security plan by such 

a chemical facility, the Secretary shall provide the owner or operator of the covered chemical facility a written notification of the disapproval not later than 14 

days after the date on which the Secretary disapproves such assessment or 

plan, that— 

‘‘(A) includes a clear explanation of deficiencies in the assessment, plan, 

or implementation of the plan; and 

‘‘(B) requires the owner or operator of the covered chemical facility to revise the assessment or plan to address any deficiencies and, by such date 


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as the Secretary determines is appropriate, to submit to the Secretary the 

revised assessment or plan. 

‘‘(5) REPORTING.—The Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland 

Security of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of the Senate, on an annual basis, information 

on the number of instances during the year covered by the report where the 

Secretary determined that the 180 day notification requirement under paragraph (3) was impracticable. 

‘‘(e) ALTERNATIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS.—The Secretary may approve any alternative security program established by a private sector entity or Federal, State, or 

local authority, or under another applicable law, if the Secretary determines that 

the requirements of such program meets the requirements of this title and any regulations issued or maintained pursuant to this title. 

‘‘(f) SECURITY BACKGROUND CHECKS.—In any personnel surety regulation issued 

by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary shall include provisions 

on how an owner or operator of a covered chemical facility can meet, in whole or 

in part, the requirements set forth in such regulations by submitting— 

‘‘(1) information on an employee or individual holding a valid transportation 

security card issued under section 70105 of title 46, United States Code; 

‘‘(2) an alternate security background check conducted by a private sector entity, including the owner and operator of a covered chemical facility and a nonprofit personnel surety accrediting organization; and 

‘‘(3) an alternate security background check conducted under another applicable law. 

‘‘(g) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SMALL BUSINESSES.—The Secretary shall provide 

technical assistance to any owner or operator of a covered chemical facility who requests such assistance to prepare a security vulnerability assessment or site security plan required under this title or by the regulations required by subsection (a), 

if the covered chemical facility is a small business concern, under the meaning given 

that term in section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632). 

‘‘SEC. 2102. INFORMATION PROTECTION. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, information developed pursuant to this title, or pursuant to the regulations required by section 

2101(a), including vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other security 

related information, records, and documents shall be given protections from public 

disclosure consistent with similar information developed by chemical facilities subject to regulation under section 70103 of title 46, United States Code. 

‘‘(b) SHARING OF INFORMATION.— 

‘‘(1) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.—This section does not prohibit the 

sharing of such information, as the Secretary determines appropriate, with 

State and local government officials possessing the appropriate security clearances, including emergency response providers, for the purpose of carrying out 

this title, as long as such information may not be disclosed pursuant to any 

State or local law. 

‘‘(2) CONGRESS.—Nothing in this title shall permit or authorize the withholding of information from Congress or any committee or subcommittee thereof. 

‘‘(c) ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.—In any proceeding to enforce 

this title, vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other information submitted to or obtained by the Secretary under this title, and related vulnerability or 

security information, shall be treated as if the information were classified material. 

‘‘SEC. 2103. ENFORCEMENT. 

‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall audit and inspect chemical facilities subject to regulation under this title for the purposes of determining compliance with 

this title and the regulations required by section 2101(a). 

‘‘(b) ORDERS FOR COMPLIANCE.—If the Secretary determines that a chemical facility is not in compliance with this title or the regulations required by section 2101(a), 

the Secretary shall provide the owner or operator of the facility with written notification (including a clear explanation of deficiencies in the vulnerability assessment 

and site security plan) and an opportunity for consultation, and issue an order to 

comply by such date as the Secretary determines to be appropriate under the circumstances. 

‘‘(c) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Any person who violates an order issued under this title 

shall be liable for a civil penalty under section 70119(a) of title 46, United States 

Code. 

‘‘(d) ORDER TO CEASE OPERATION.—If the owner or operator of a chemical facility 

subject to regulation under this title continues to be in noncompliance, the Secretary 


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may issue an order for the facility to cease operation until the owner or operator 

complies with the order. 

‘‘(e) EXCEPTION.—Nothing in this title confers upon any person except the Secretary a right of action against an owner or operator of a chemical facility to enforce 

any provision of this title. 

‘‘SEC. 2104. JOBS IMPACT. 

‘‘Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this title, and annually 

thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of 

the House of Representatives and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that, at a minimum, includes— 

‘‘(1) an estimate of the potential jobs created or lost within the private sector 

as a result of the regulations required under section 2101 of this title; and 

‘‘(2) information on feedback received from owners and operators of covered 

chemical facilities about how the regulations required under section 2101 of this 

title could be revised to spur potential job creation or stem job losses. 

‘‘SEC. 2105. SCOPE. 

‘‘Nothing in this title shall be construed to supersede, amend, alter, or affect any 

Federal law that regulates the manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, sale, 

other treatment, or disposal of chemical substances or mixtures. 

‘‘SEC. 2106. PREEMPTION. 

‘‘This title shall not preclude or deny any right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce any regulation, requirement, or standard of performance with respect to chemical facility security that is more stringent than a regulation, requirement, or standard of performance required under this title, or otherwise 

impair any right or jurisdiction of any State with respect to chemical facilities within that State, unless there is an actual conflict between this title and the law of 

that State. 

‘‘SEC. 2107. TERMINATION. 

‘‘The authority provided by this title shall terminate on September 30, 2018. 

‘‘SEC. 2108. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

‘‘There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this title 

$89,928,000 for each of fiscal years 2012 through 2018.’’. 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents in section 1(b) of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the 

following new items: 

‘‘TITLE XXI—CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS 

‘‘Sec. 2101. Chemical facility anti-terrorism security regulations. 

‘‘Sec. 2102. Information protection. 

‘‘Sec. 2103. Enforcement. 

‘‘Sec. 2104. Jobs impact. 

‘‘Sec. 2105. Scope. 

‘‘Sec. 2106. Preemption. 

‘‘Sec. 2107. Termination. 

‘‘Sec. 2108. Authorization of appropriations.’’. 

SEC. 3. CONFORMING REPEAL. 

(a) REPEAL.—The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 

(Public Law 109–295) is amended by striking section 550. 

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on 

the date of the enactment of this Act. 

SEC. 4. HARMONIZATION. 

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

of Homeland Security shall submit to Committee on Homeland Security of the 

House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report on the extent to which the security requirements under 

title XXI of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by this Act, have been 

harmonized with the security requirements for facilities regulated under chapter 

701 of title 46, United States Code. 

PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

In 2006, Congress recognized the vulnerability of our Nation’s 

chemical infrastructure to terrorist attacks and authorized the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to regulate security at our 

Nation’s high-risk chemical facilities. The Department issued inVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:43 Sep 28, 2011 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR224P1.XXX HR224P1

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terim final regulations that became effective on June 8, 2007, and 

resulted in the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards 

(CFATS). The legislative authority for CFATS was scheduled to 

sunset originally on October 4, 2009, but has been extended by a 

series of short-term extensions through October 4, 2011. The 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Authorization Act of 

2011, H.R. 901, provides the Secretary of Homeland Security with 

long-term authority to continue providing for performance-based 

regulation to protect chemical facilities against terrorist attacks 

and maintain the progress being made by both the Department and 

the chemical facilities. 

H.R. 901 preserves the essential provisions of the original statute 

(section 550 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub.L. 109–295) and maintains the existing 

framework of the CFATS program, requiring chemical facilities to 

conduct Security Vulnerability Assessments, develop Site Security 

Plans, and implement layered protective measures necessary to 

meet risk-based performance standards established by the Department. H.R. 901 codifies the Secretary’s authority to regulate chemical facility security within the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and 

extends this authority for seven years—through September 30, 

2018. H.R. 901 is intended to provide long-term certainty to the Department and chemical facilities regarding the requirement to improve security at our Nation’s chemical facilities while preserving 

the ability of American companies to compete, remain innovative, 

and create jobs. 

BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION

Some chemicals can be very toxic, flammable, or explosive— 

which is why terrorists may seek to use them in attacks that may 

cause mass casualties, weaken the U.S. economy, and damage public confidence. The vulnerability of our Nation’s chemical infrastructure is particularly worrisome considering that many chemical 

facility sites are located near dense population centers. 

Congress recognized this vulnerability and, in 2006, through the 

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 

(Pub.L. 109-295), authorized the Department to regulate the security of high-risk chemical facilities. Given the diverse and wideranging categories of facilities subject to the regulations, Congress 

required that DHS establish ‘‘risk-based performance standards,’’ 

providing flexibility for the facility to identify security measures 

tailored to each site’s unique security challenges in order to meet 

the performance standards. 

In response, DHS issued the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS) which became effective on June 8, 2007. Under 

these regulations, high-risk chemical facilities are required to conduct Security Vulnerability Assessments (SVAs), develop Site Security Plans (SSPs), and implement layered protective measures necessary to meet the risk-based performance standards established 

by the Department. The Department places facilities into four highrisk tiers, with those in the highest tier subject to the most stringent security requirements. As a result, DHS must review and approve the SSPs and monitor compliance of tiered facilities. 

To date, DHS has reviewed information submitted by more than 

39,000 chemical facilities and determined that 4,755 facilities are 


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high-risk and covered under CFATS. Some facilities have demonstrated they are taking steps to reduce their risk profile sufficiently so that they move to a lower tier or are no longer subject 

to regulation under this program. However, there is still much 

work to be done to secure the chemical sector. DHS is currently in 

the process of reviewing SSPs and performing inspections. No SSPs 

have been approved to-date. 

Enactment of H.R. 901 is necessary to continue uninterrupted 

implementation of CFATS and protect U.S. citizens against potential terrorist attacks. The legislative authority for CFATS has been 

extended multiple times through a series of short-term extensions, 

but this piecemeal approach has created uncertainty for DHS and 

the chemical facilities when planning investment and security 

strategies to meet CFATS standards. Current statutory authority 

for CFATS is set to expire on October 4, 2011; language was passed 

by the House of Representatives in the FY 2012 Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act (H.R. 2017, 112th Congress) that would extend 

the program by one year. H.R. 901 provides DHS and chemical facilities with needed certainty, consistency, and continuity by maintaining the existing CFATS framework; codifying the Secretary’s 

authority to regulate chemical facility security in the Homeland Security Act of 2002; and extending this authority for seven years— 

allowing the program to be fully implemented. H.R. 901 preserves 

all of the essential elements contained in the original statute. The 

Committee intends for this legislation to provide for performancebased regulation to protect facilities against attack, without increasing current spending or imposing additional, burdensome and 

costly requirements that could slow or hinder progress. 

By maintaining the existing risk-based, CFATS framework, H.R. 

901 will enable the partnership between DHS and the facilities to 

strike the right balance between strengthening security against 

terrorism while preserving this vital sector of our economy. 

HEARINGS

No hearings were held on H.R. 901 in the 112th Congress; however, the Committee has held hearings on chemical facility regulations. 

112th Congress 

On February 11, 2011, the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies held a hearing 

entitled ‘‘Preventing Chemical Terrorism: Building a Foundation of 

Security At Our Nation’s Chemical Facilities.’’ The Subcommittee 

received testimony from Hon. Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Timothy J. Scott, Chief Security Officer, The 

Dow Chemical Company, testifying on behalf of the American 

Chemistry Council; Dr. M. Sam Mannan, PhD, PE, CSP, Regents 

Professor and Director, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, 

Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M 

University System; and Mr. George S. Hawkins, General Manager, 

District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority. 


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111th Congress 

On June 16, 2009, the Committee on Homeland Security held a 

hearing on H.R. 2868, the ‘‘Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Act 

of 2009.’’ The Committee received testimony from Mr. Philip 

Reitinger, Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security; Ms. Sue 

Armstrong, Director, Infrastructure Security Compliance Division, 

Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Paul Baldauf, Assistant Director, Radiation Protection 

and Release Prevention, New Jersey Department of Environmental 

Protection; Mr. Marty Durbin, Vice President, Federal Affairs, 

American Chemistry Council; Dr. Neal Langerman, Principle Scientist and CEO, Advanced Chemical Safety, Inc.; and Mr. Martin 

Jeppeson, Director of Regulatory Affairs, California Ammonia Company. 

110th Congress 

On December 12, 2007, prior to introduction of H.R. 5577 in the 

110th Congress, the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and 

Infrastructure Protection held a hearing on H.R. l, the ‘‘Chemical 

Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2008.’’ The Subcommittee received 

testimony from Col. Bob Stephan, Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Clyde Miller, Director, Corporate Security, BASF Corporation; Mr. Gerald C. 

Setley, Vice President, Region 3 Director, International Chemical 

Workers Union Council, United Food and Commercial Workers 

Union; Mr. Gary Sondermeyer, Director of Operations, New Jersey 

Department of Environmental Protection; and Dr. M. Sam 

Mannan, PhD, PE, CSP, Professor and Director, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Artie McFerrin Department of Chemical 

Engineering, Texas A&M University System. 

109th Congress 

On June 15, 2005, prior to introduction of H.R. 5695 in the 109th 

Congress, the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure 

Protection, and Cybersecurity held a hearing entitled ‘‘Preventing 

Terrorist Attacks on America’s Chemical Plants.’’ The Subcommittee received testimony from Mr. Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University; Mr. Stephen Bandy, 

Manager, Corporate Safety and Security, Marathon Ashland Petroleum, LLC, testifying on behalf of the National Petrochemical and 

Refiners Association and the American Petroleum Institute; Mr. 

Marty Durbin, Managing Director of Security and Operations, 

American Chemistry Council; Mr. Allen Summers, President and 

Chief Executive Office, Asmark, Inc., testifying on behalf of The 

Fertilizer Institute; and Mr. Sal DePasquale, Independent Consultant. 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION

The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, 

and Security Technologies met on April 14, 2011, to consider H.R. 

901, and ordered the measure to be reported to the Full Committee 

with a favorable recommendation, without amendment, by a roll 

call vote of 6 yeas and 4 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 4). The Subcommittee took the following actions: 


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The following amendments were offered: 

An Amendment offered by MS. CLARKE (#1); to insert a new subsection (b) in the proposed section 2010 of the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002 entitled ‘‘Facilities Regulated.’’ and insert a new paragraph (3) in subsection 2102(b) entitled ‘‘Other Federal Agencies’’; 

was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll 

Call Vote No. 1). 

An Amendment offered by MS. RICHARDSON (#1); Page 2, line 18 

strike ‘‘and’’. Page 2, after line 18, insert the following: ‘‘(3) requirements for chemical facility process safety reviews; and’’. Page 2, 

line 19, strike ‘‘(3)’’ and insert ‘‘(4)’’.; was NOT AGREED TO by a 

roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 2). 

An amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#3); Page 4, after line 

16, insert a new subsection ‘‘(f) Employee Participation.’’; was NOT 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote 

No. 3). 

The Committee on Homeland Security met on June 22, 2011, to 

consider H.R. 901, and ordered the measure to be reported to the 

Full House with a favorable recommendation, amended, by voice 

vote. The Committee took the following actions: 

The Committee adopted H.R. 901, as amended by a roll call vote 

of 26 yeas and 5 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 12). 

The following amendments were offered: 

An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. 

LUNGREN, was AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 22 yeas and 9 

nays (Roll Call Vote No. 11). 

An Amendment offered by MR. THOMPSON (#1A) to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 

2, line 76, strike subsection (b) and insert a new subsection (b) entitled ‘‘Facilities Regulated.’’ Page 5, after line 2, insert a new paragraph (3) entitled ‘‘Other Federal Agencies’’; was NOT AGREED 

TO by a roll call vote of 9 yeas and 15 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 

1). 

An Amendment offered by MS. SANCHEZ (#1B) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 3, 

after line 22, insert three new paragraphs: ‘‘(3) Deadline for Notification.’’; ‘‘(4) Notification of Disapproval.’’; and ‘‘(5) reporting.’’; was 

AGREED TO by voice vote. 

An Amendment offered by MS. RICHARDSON (#1C) to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; In the 

matter proposed to be inserted as title XXI of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by section 2 of the bill, redesignate sections 2104 

through 2017 as sections 2105 through 2108, respectively, insert a 

new section 2104, and amend the proposed amendment to the table 

of contents of such Act accordingly: ‘‘Sec. 2104. Protections for 

Whistleblowers at Chemical Facilities Associated with the Risk of 

Chemical Facility Terrorist Incidents.’’; was NOT AGREED TO by 

a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 16 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 2). 

An en bloc Amendment offered by MS. JACKSON LEE (#1D) to the 

Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; 


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Page 5, after line 9, insert a new subsection entitled ‘‘(d) Security 

Background Checks.’’ 

Page 8, after line 3, insert a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 4. Harmonization.’’ was AGREED TO by voice vote. 

An Amendment offered by MS. CLARKE (#1E) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 7, line 

6, strike ‘‘2018’’ and insert ‘‘2013’’. Page 7, line 10, strike ‘‘2018’’ 

and insert ‘‘2013’’.; was NOT AGREED TO by voice vote. 

An Amendment offered by MS. CLARKE (#1F) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 7, line 

6, strike ‘‘2018’’ and insert ‘‘2016’’. Page 7, line 10, strike ‘‘2018’’ 

and insert ‘‘2016’’.; was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 

yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 3). 

An Amendment offered by MS. CLARKE (#1G) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 4, 

after line 4, insert a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 2101A. Office of 

Chemical Facility Inspections.’’; was NOT AGREED TO by a roll 

call vote of 11 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 4). 

An Amendment offered by MR. DAVIS (#1H) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 7, 

after line 10, insert a new section entitled ‘‘Sec. 2108. Jobs Impact.’’; was AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 28 yeas and 2 nays 

(Roll Call Vote No. 5). 

An Amendment offered by MS. HOCHUL (#1I) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 4, 

after line 4, insert a new subsection entitled ‘‘(f) Technical Assistance to Small Businesses.’’; was AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 

29 yeas and 1 nay (Roll Call Vote No. 6). 

An Amendment offered by MR. CLARKE (#1J) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 5, 

after line 9, insert a new section, and redesignate accordingly, entitled ‘‘Sec. 2103. Security Background Checks of Covered Individuals at Certain Chemical Facilities.’’; was NOT AGREED TO by a 

roll call vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 7). 

An Amendment offered by MR. CLARKE (#1K) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 2, 

strike line 21 and all that follows through page 3, line 3. Page 4 

after line 4, insert a new subsection entitled ‘‘(f) Water Treatment 

Works and Public Water Systems.’’; was NOT AGREED TO by a 

roll call vote of 11 yeas and 19 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 8). 

An Amendment offered by MR. CLARKE (#1L) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; Page 4, 

after line 4, insert a new subsection entitled ‘‘(f) Consultation.’’; 

was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays 

(Roll Call Vote No. 9). 

An en bloc Amendment offered by MS. SPEIER (#1M) to the 

Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; 

Page 4, beginning on line 6, strike subsection (a) and insert a new 

subsection entitled ‘‘(a) In General.’’ 

Page 6, after line 13, insert a new subsection entitled ‘‘(f) Delegation of Authority.’’; was WITHDRAWN by unanimous consent. 


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A unanimous consent request by MS. SPEIER to withdraw her 

amendment, was not objected to. 

A Substitute Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered 

by MR. THOMPSON (#2) was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote 

of 13 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 10). 

COMMITTEE VOTES

Clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives requires the Committee to list the roll call votes on the motion to report legislation and amendments thereto. 

The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, 

and Security Technologies considered H.R. 901 on April 14, 2011, 

and ordered the measure reported to the House with a favorable 

recommendation, without amendment, by a roll call vote of 6 yeas 

and 4 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 4). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Daniel E. Lungren Ms. Yvette D. Clarke 

Mr. Tim Walberg Ms. Laura Richardson 

Mr. Michael T. McCaul Mr. Cedric L. Richmond 

Mr. Patrick Meehan Mr. William R. Keating 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Tom Marino 

An Amendment offered by MS. CLARKE (#1); was NOT AGREED 

TO by a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 1). 

The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Mr. William R. Keating Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Tom Marino 

An Amendment offered by MS. RICHARDSON (#2); was NOT 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote 

No. 2). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Mr. William R. Keating Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Tom Marino 

An Amendment offered by MR. RICHMOND (#3); was NOT 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 4 yeas and 6 nays (Roll Call Vote 

No. 3). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Mr. William R. Keating Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Tom Marino 


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The Committee on Homeland Security met on June 22, 2011, to 

consider H.R. 901, and ordered the measure to be reported to the 

Full House with a favorable recommendation, as amended, by voice 

vote. The Committee took the following votes: 

An Amendment offered by MR. THOMPSON (#1A) to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; was 

NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 9 yeas and 15 nays (Roll 

Call Vote No. 1). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson Mr. Peter T. King 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee Mr. Mike Rogers 

Mr. Henry Cuellar Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Mr. Brian Higgins Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Hansen Clarke Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

An Amendment offered by MRS. RICHARDSON (#1C) to the 

Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; 

was NOT AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 16 nays 

(Roll Call Vote No. 2). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson Mr. Peter T. King 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee Mr. Mike Rogers 

Mr. Henry Cuellar Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Mr. Brian Higgins Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Ms. Jackie Speier Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Mr. Hansen Clarke Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

An Amendment offered by MS. CLARKE (#1F) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; was NOT 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 3). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson Mr. Peter T. King 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez Mr. Lamar Smith 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Mr. Henry Cuellar Mr. Mike Rogers 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Brian Higgins Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Ms. Jackie Speier Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Hansen Clarke Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul Mr. Patrick Meehan 


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Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

An Amendment offered by MS. CLARKE (#1G) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; was NOT 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 4). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson Mr. Peter T. King 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez Mr. Lamar Smith 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Mr. Henry Cuellar Mr. Mike Rogers 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Brian Higgins Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Ms. Jackie Speier Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Hansen Clarke Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

An Amendment offered by MR. DAVIS (#1H) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; was 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 28 yeas and 2 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 5). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Peter T. King Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Lamar Smith Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Mr. Mike Rogers 

Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee 

Mr. Henry Cuellar 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke 

Ms. Laura Richardson 

Mr. Danny K. Davis 

Mr. Brian Higgins 

Ms. Jackie Speier 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond 

Mr. Hansen Clarke 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul 


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An Amendment offered by MS. HOCHUL (#1I) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; was 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 29 yeas and 1 nay (Roll Call 

Vote No. 6). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Peter T. King Mr. Mike Rogers 

Mr. Lamar Smith 

Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee 

Mr. Henry Cuellar 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke 

Ms. Laura Richardson 

Mr. Danny K. Davis 

Mr. Brian Higgins 

Ms. Jackie Speier 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond 

Mr. Hansen Clarke 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul 

An Amendment offered by MR. CLARKE (#1J) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; was NOT 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 7). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson Mr. Peter T. King 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez Mr. Lamar Smith 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Mr. Henry Cuellar Mr. Mike Rogers 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Danny K. Davis Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Mr. Brian Higgins Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Ms. Jackie Speier Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Mr. Hansen Clarke Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

An Amendment offered by MR. CLARKE (#1K) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; was NOT 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 11 yeas and 19 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 8). The vote was as follows: 


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YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson Mr. Peter T. King 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez Mr. Lamar Smith 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Mike Rogers 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Mr. Danny K. Davis Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Brian Higgins Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Ms. Jackie Speier Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Hansen Clarke Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

Mr. Henry Cuellar 

An Amendment offered by MR. CLARKE (#1L) to the Amendment 

in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN; was NOT 

AGREED TO by a roll call vote of 12 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call 

Vote No. 9). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson Mr. Peter T. King 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez Mr. Lamar Smith 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Mr. Henry Cuellar Mr. Mike Rogers 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Danny K. Davis Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Mr. Brian Higgins Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Ms. Jackie Speier Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Mr. Hansen Clarke Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

On agreeing to the Substitute to the Amendment in the Nature 

of a Substitute offered by MR. THOMPSON (#2); was NOT AGREED 

TO by a roll call vote of 13 yeas and 18 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 

10). The vote was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Bennie G. Thompson Mr. Peter T. King 

Ms. Loretta Sanchez Mr. Lamar Smith 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee Mr. Daniel E. Lungren 

Mr. Henry Cuellar Mr. Mike Rogers 

Ms. Yvette D. Clarke Mr. Michael T. McCaul 

Ms. Laura Richardson Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Danny K. Davis Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Mr. Brian Higgins Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Ms. Jackie Speier Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Mr. Hansen Clarke Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. William R. Keating Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 


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Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

On agreeing to the Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute offered by MR. LUNGREN, as amended(#1); was AGREED TO by a roll 

call vote of 22 yeas and 9 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 11). The vote 

was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Peter T. King Mr. Bennie G. Thompson 

Mr. Lamar Smith Ms. Loretta Sanchez 

Mr. Daniel E. Lungren Ms. Yvette D. Clarke 

Mr. Mike Rogers Ms. Laura Richardson 

Mr. Michael T. McCaul Mr. Danny K. Davis 

Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis Mr. Brian Higgins 

Mr. Paul C. Broun Ms. Jackie Speier 

Mrs. Candice S. Miller Mr. William R. Keating 

Mr. Tim Walberg Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul 

Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee 

Mr. Henry Cuellar 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond 

Mr. Hansen Clarke 

On agreeing to H.R. 901, as amended; was AGREED TO by a roll 

call vote of 26 yeas and 5 nays (Roll Call Vote No. 12). The vote 

was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mr. Peter T. King Mr. Bennie G. Thompson 

Mr. Lamar Smith Ms. Loretta Sanchez 

Mr. Daniel E. Lungren Ms. Yvette D. Clarke 

Mr. Mike Rogers Mr. Danny K. Davis 

Mr. Michael T. McCaul Mr. Brian Higgins 

Mr. Gus M. Bilirakis 

Mr. Paul C. Broun 

Mrs. Candice S. Miller 

Mr. Tim Walberg 

Mr. Chip Cravaack 

Mr. Patrick Meehan 

Mr. Benjamin Quayle 

Mr. E. Scott Rigell 

Mr. Billy Long 

Mr. Jeff Duncan 

Mr. Tom Marino 

Mr. Blake Farenthold 

Mr. Mo Brooks 

Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee 

Mr. Henry Cuellar 

Ms. Laura Richardson 

Ms. Jackie Speier 

Mr. Cedric L. Richmond 

Mr. Hansen Clarke 

Mr. William R. Keating 

Ms. Kathleen C. Hochul 


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COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the Committee has held oversight hearings and 

made findings that are reflected in this report. 

NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY, ENTITLEMENT AUTHORITY, AND

TAX EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee finds that H.R. 901, the 

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Authorization Act of 2011, would 

result in no new or increased budget authority, entitlement authority, or tax expenditures or revenues. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

The Committee adopts as its own the cost estimate prepared by 

the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 

402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, July 6, 2011. 

Hon. PETER T. KING, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 901, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act of 2011. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason Wheelock. 

Sincerely, 

ROBERT A. SUNSHINE, 

(For Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director). 

Enclosure. 

H.R. 901—Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act of 2011 

H.R. 901 would extend through fiscal year 2018 the Department 

of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) authority to regulate security at 

certain chemical facilities in the United States. Under this authority, which under current law is set to expire in October, DHS runs 

the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. 

Under CFATS, DHS collects and reviews information from chemical facilities in the United States to determine which facilities 

present a security risk. Facilities determined to present a high 

level of security risk are then required to develop a Site Security 

Plan (SSP). DHS in turn conducts inspections to validate the adequacy of a facility’s SSP and their compliance with it. 

H.R. 901 would authorize $90 million annually for CFATS over 

the 2012–2018 period. That amount is equal to the $90 million provided in 2011 for the program. CBO estimates that implementing 

this legislation would cost $361 million over the 2012–2016 period 

and about $260 million in subsequent years, assuming the appropriation of the specified amounts. 


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By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2012– 

2016 

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 

Authorization Level ....................................................................... 90 90 90 90 90 450 

Estimated Outlays ........................................................................ 32 64 87 89 89 361 

H.R. 901 could result in the collection of additional civil penalties, which are recorded as revenues and deposited in the Treasury; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures apply. However, CBO estimates that such collections would be minimal and the effect on revenues would be insignificant. Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending. 

H.R. 901 would extend intergovernmental and private-sector 

mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

(UMRA), on owners and operators of public and private facilities 

where certain chemicals are present. Requirements on those owners and operators to assess the vulnerability of their facilities to a 

terrorist incident and to prepare and implement facility security 

plans would be mandates. Based on information from DHS and industry sources, CBO estimates that the aggregate costs of complying with the mandates would be small and would fall below the 

annual thresholds established in UMRA for intergovernmental and 

private-sector mandates ($71 million and $142 million, respectively, 

in 2011, adjusted annually for inflation). 

On June 15, 2011, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 908, 

the Full Implementation of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards Act, as ordered reported by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on May 26, 2011. Both H.R. 901 and H.R. 908 

would authorize nearly $90 million for CFATS, and CBO estimates 

that spending under the two bills would be the same. In addition, 

CBO determined that the bill would extend the same mandates as 

H.R. 901. 

The CBO staff contacts for this estimate are Jason Wheelock (for 

the federal costs), Melissa Merrell (for the intergovernmental impact), and Paige Piper/Bach (for the private-sector impact). The estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director 

for Budget Analysis. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, H.R. 901 contains the following general performance goals and objectives, including outcome related goals and 

objectives authorized. 

The performance goals and objectives of H.R. 901 are to extend 

the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism standards authority enacted 

under the FY 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act. 

CONGRESSIONAL EARMARKS, LIMITED TAX BENEFITS, AND LIMITED

TARIFF BENEFITS

In compliance with rule XXI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, this bill, as reported, contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in 

clause 9(e), 9(f), or 9(g) of the rule XXI. 


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FEDERAL MANDATES STATEMENT

The Committee adopts as its own the estimate of Federal mandates prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 

pursuant to section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. 

PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION

In compliance with section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act 

of 1974, requiring the report of any Committee on a bill or joint 

resolution to include a statement on the extent to which the bill or 

joint resolution is intended to preempt State, local, or Tribal law, 

the Committee finds the following. While the Committee believes 

H.R. 901, as reported, does not preempt any State, local, or Tribal 

law—Section 2106 does allow for preemption should such actual 

conflict exist. 

ADVISORY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

No advisory committees within the meaning of section 5(b) of the 

Federal Advisory Committee Act were created by this legislation. 

APPLICABILITY TO LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

The Committee finds that the legislation does not relate to the 

terms and conditions of employment or access to public services or 

accommodations within the meaning of section 102(b)(3) of the Congressional Accountability Act. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATION

Section 1. Short Title. 

This section provides that the bill may be cited as the ‘‘Chemical 

Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Authorization Act of 2011.’’ 

Sec. 2. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Regulations. 

This section adds a new title, the ‘‘Title XXI—Chemical Facility 

Anti-Terrorism Security Regulations’’ to the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 and includes the following provisions: 

TITLE XXI—CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM 

SECURITY REGULATIONS 

Sec. 2101. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Security Regulations. 

This section requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to 

maintain security regulations for high-risk chemical facilities. 

These regulations must establish ‘‘risk-based performance standards’’ and require facilities to prepare Security Vulnerability Assessments (SVAs) that identify facility security vulnerabilities, and 

develop and implement Site Security Plans (SSPs). This section 

codifies the key elements of the existing Chemical Facility AntiTerrorism Standards (CFATS) framework that should be maintained. The Committee does not intend for the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) to reissue existing regulations; but provides the Department the flexibility to revise them within the existing framework if changes are necessary. 


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Importantly, H.R. 901 requires risk-based performance standards 

instead of a prescriptive approach, providing diverse facilities with 

the appropriate discretion and flexibility to design site-specific security measures. The Committee believes that the security measures taken to comply with the risk-based performance standards 

may differ from facility to facility. Under this section, facilities may 

select a combination of security measures tailored to their unique 

circumstances that together meet the security performance requirements. While the Department cannot dictate that a particular security measure be used, it sets the performance standards. Upon request, the Secretary is required to provide technical assistance to 

small businesses developing SVAs and SSPs. 

The Committee is aware that the Department recently revised 

the tiering assignments for approximately ten percent of the facilities covered under CFATS due to an error in the risk assessment 

modeling. Recognizing modeling processes can often be complicated 

and fall victim to a variety of errors, especially in the context of 

terrorism where there is very little historical data, as compared to 

natural catastrophes, the Committee believes it is imperative for 

the CFATS risk assessment model to be validated—including inputs, processes, and outputs—in order to increase its credibility 

and minimize future errors. The Committee directs the Department 

to report on how it has validated, or plans to validate, the model 

and prevent future errors of a similar nature. Additionally, the 

Committee believes that there should be internal controls to detect 

anomalies based on human or other error in a timely manner. 

After final regulations are published, the Secretary must approve 

or disapprove SVAs and SSPs within 180 days of receipt, to the extent practicable, and notify the facility of the outcome. If an SVA 

or SSP is disapproved, the Secretary has 14 days to provide the facility a written explanation for the disapproval and a date by which 

the facility is required to revise the SVA or SSP. The Committee 

expects DHS to make a good faith effort to provide a timely review 

of the assessments and plans, and notify facilities within the designated timeframe. However, the Committee recognizes that chemical facilities regulated under this Title are very diverse and the 

content and quality of the SVAs and SSPs may vary greatly. Additional time may be warranted for certain facilities in order to reach 

a successful outcome. The Committee expects DHS to continue 

working collaboratively with the facilities to provide appropriate 

guidance and ensure their SVAs and SSPs meet DHS security requirements. This section also requires the Secretary to submit an 

annual report to Congress indicating the number of instances the 

180 day notification requirement was not met. 

This section allows the Secretary to accept, in whole or in part, 

an alternate security program, prepared by the facility for another 

reason, such as complying with another law or an industry-wide security program, as long as it provides an equivalent level of security by meeting the regulatory requirements issued or maintained 

by this title. 

Under this section, the Secretary is also required to describe, in 

any personnel surety regulations, the information that will be required from a facility for acceptance of alternate security background checks. The Committee intends to promote comparability 

and reciprocity across credentialing and screening programs and 


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believes DHS should enable chemical facilities to leverage other existing background check programs, such as the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) or private sector programs, as part of the identity, legal authorization to work, and 

criminal history background checks they perform to meet personnel 

surety requirements of this title. The Committee does not intend 

for DHS to require TWICs for persons accessing chemical facilities 

not regulated under the Marine Transportation Security Act 

(MTSA), nor that such facilities be equipped with TWIC readers. 

Instead, facilities should have the option to recognize TWIC or 

other background check programs—so long as these programs are 

verified as described below. 

The Committee recognizes that background checks to identify individuals with terrorist ties is an inherently governmental function 

and several existing Federal government programs achieve this by 

vetting individuals against the Terrorist Screening Database 

(TSDB). To limit duplicative efforts, the Committee intends for 

DHS to share and reuse results from other governmental programs 

that conduct equivalent vetting against the TSDB, such as the 

TWIC program. The Committee believes that, for security purposes, 

in order for DHS to reuse such vetting results to meet any personnel surety requirements issued pursuant to this title, DHS may 

need to verify the active enrollment in the accepted alternate security background check. The Committee intends to provide DHS the 

flexibility needed to leverage alternate security background checks, 

such as the TWIC program, as they fully mature. The Committee 

expects DHS to ensure the process is minimally burdensome on facilities and individuals while also identifying security gaps. The 

Committee supports the activities of the working group composed 

of representatives from the Transportation Security Administration, the DHS Screening Coordination Office, the National Protection and Programs Directorate, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the DHS 

Office of General Counsel with the aim of aligning relevant personnel surety programs and urges the working group to receive 

feedback from the regulated communities and report back to the 

Committee on its recommendations. 

This section specifies that the regulations maintained by this 

title do not apply to any facility owned or operated by the Departments of Defense or Energy; any facility regulated by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC); any facility regulated under the 

MTSA; and facilities defined as a water system or wastewater 

treatment works. 

While this section upholds the exemption from CFATS for facilities subject to regulation by the NRC, the Committee intends for 

this exemption to apply only to facilities where the NRC already 

imposes significant security requirements and regulates the safety 

and security of most of the facility. The Committee does not intend 

for the NRC exemption to apply to facilities that house just a few 

small radioactive sources or to portions of facilities not subject to 

NRC security requirements. The Committee supports the formal 

establishment of the memorandum of understanding between DHS 

and the NRC to help define the types of facilities that are wholly 

or partially exempt from CFATS because of NRC regulatory authority, and to establish processes for identifying those facilities. 

The Committee also urges completion of the NRC study comparing 


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CFATS security standards to security measures at NRC-regulated 

facilities and encourages the NRC to address any gaps in NRC requirements, if any are found. 

This section also preserves the exemption from CFATS for 

MTSA-regulated facilities. The Committee is aware that some port 

facilities have chemicals of interest onsite above threshold quantities. The Committee intends to ensure that high-risk chemical facilities that are potentially subject to both CFATS and MTSA are 

not saddled with duplicative or conflicting requirements and that 

high-risk chemical facilities with commensurate risk are subject to 

equivalent and appropriate security requirements, regardless of the 

regulatory regime under which they are captured. While there are 

similarities between the programs, there are significant differences 

between the requirements of each regime. The Committee encourages the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Protection and Programs Directorate to maintain an active and thorough effort to examine both regulatory regimes, identify opportunities for harmonization, and take appropriate action to close any security gaps. The 

Committee recognizes the formal establishment of the DHS 

CFATS-MTSA Working Group that is conducting an ongoing, full 

regulatory review of the two security regimes and has taken initial 

positive steps to coordinate activities. The Committee urges this 

work to continue in order to inform recommendations for any statutory changes that might be needed to MTSA or CFATS legislative 

authorities. 

This section maintains the exemption from CFATS for drinking 

water and wastewater treatment facilities. The Committee recognizes that the water sector is prioritized among the nation’s critical 

infrastructures—so vital that damage to, or destruction of, drinking 

water or wastewater treatment utilities by terrorist attack could 

have a debilitating effect on homeland security and public health. 

The Committee notes that terrorist attacks on these facilities could 

come in many forms, including: physical attacks (such as the release of toxic gaseous chemicals); biological or chemical contamination; and cyber attacks. Assessing and addressing the 

vulnerabilities of these facilities to terrorist attack should form the 

basis of any strategy to secure this critical infrastructure and reduce the risks to these facilities, with chemical security as an essential element. 

Many facilities have made security improvements since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but the Committee recognizes 

there are still no mandatory Federal standards that govern the security of water infrastructure. While DHS’ engagement with the 

water sector has grown given its responsibilities to secure the Nation’s critical infrastructure, the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) remains the lead Federal agency for protecting drinking 

water and wastewater utility systems. However, EPA has not been 

given authority by Congress to establish a risk-informed, performance based security program like CFATS for the protection of the 

water sector and, with respect to wastewater treatment facilities, 

no federal agency has been conferred the authority to review security plans, set security standards, or require implementation of security measures. 

While the Committee did not include language to govern chemical security at drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities 


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in H.R. 901 due to the imminent expiration of the CFATS authority 

and the foremost need to ensure the CFATS regulations remain in 

place to allow the program to mature and continue uninterrupted, 

the Committee acknowledges a Federal role in promoting security 

at drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities. Therefore, 

the Committee is committed to working with the Administration, 

appropriate authorizing committees, and other stakeholders to address this significant security concern. The Committee intends to 

continue its examination of chemical security gaps with a view to 

identifying solutions that improve security and minimize the risks 

to homeland security, public health, and the economy, while reducing duplication and regulatory burdens. Specifically, the Committee 

intends to investigate: how chemical security will fit into the broader context of legislative efforts to comprehensively improve security 

at drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities without creating the potential for duplication; the distributed and diverse nature of ownership (Federal, non-Federal government, and private) 

of these facilities; and the need for greater clarity with regard to 

the roles and responsibilities of DHS and EPA. 

The Committee encourages the Department to work with EPA in 

addressing ongoing security gaps at drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities. Furthermore, the Committee encourages 

the Department to report back to the Committee on the scope and 

nature of these security gaps, including potential approaches to enhance chemical security, and any recommended changes in legislative authorities that are needed. 

Sec. 2102. Information Protection. 

This section requires information developed under CFATS to be 

protected, from unauthorized public disclosure, consistent with protections under the MTSA. In administrative and judicial proceedings, CFATS-related information will be treated as if classified. 

In addition, this section allows for information sharing with appropriate State and local government officials, but only as long as the 

protected information cannot be disclosed under any State or local 

law, and also specifies that DHS cannot withhold such information 

from Congress. The Committee believes that the Department may 

continue to use the existing ‘‘Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information’’ regime for safeguarding protected information as it was 

designed to have minimal burden on regulated facilities while 

achieving real protection of information that might be useful to terrorists. The Committee does not intend to preclude efforts by the 

Department to align this information protection regime with others, as long as the requirements of this title are still met and the 

security of protected information is not compromised in doing so. 

Sec. 2103. Enforcement. 

This section requires the Secretary to audit and inspect facilities 

to determine compliance. If a facility is found not to be in compliance with this Title, the Secretary must communicate in writing 

the deficiencies in the vulnerability assessment and site security 

plan, provide an opportunity for consultation, and issue an order 

requiring compliance by an appropriate date (See notification requirements in section 2101). If a facility violates a written order, it 

will be liable for a civil penalty. If a facility continues to be in nonVerDate Mar 15 2010 06:43 Sep 28, 2011 Jkt 099006 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR224P1.XXX HR224P1

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compliance, the Secretary may issue an order to cease operations 

until the owner or operator of the facility complies. This section 

also prohibits third-party rights of action against a facility to enforce this Title. 

Sec. 2104. Jobs Impact. 

This section requires the Secretary to submit an annual report 

to Congress that provides an estimate of the potential private sector jobs created or lost as a result of the chemical security regulations maintained by this Title and any feedback received from 

chemical facilities on changes to the regulations they believe might 

spur job creation or stem job loss. The Committee intends this report to provide additional context to inform discussions on chemical 

security regulations going forward. The Committee believes the 

CFATS regulations need to be viewed not only in the context of 

their role in ensuring the security of the Homeland against terrorist attacks, but also in the context of the economy in general 

and job creation specifically. The Committee intends for the Department to strike the appropriate balance between securing the 

Nation while preserving this vital sector of the economy, and ensure the overall benefits of the chemical security regulations outweigh their costs. 

Sec. 2105. Scope. 

This section specifies that this Title is not intended to affect or 

modify other Federal laws that govern chemical manufacturing, 

transportation, use, sale, disposal, etc. 

Sec. 2106. Preemption. 

This section allows for regulations, requirements, or standards 

maintained under this Title to preempt State or local government 

regulations, requirements or standards only when there is an ‘‘actual conflict’’ between them. 

Sec. 2107. Termination. 

This section establishes a seven-year sunset of the Department’s 

authority to maintain security regulations for high-risk chemical 

facilities. The Committee intends to provide DHS and chemical facilities with the long-term certainty and stability needed to complete a full cycle of compliance, assess the program’s effectiveness 

at reducing terrorism risks, and make informed improvements. The 

Committee believes the current piecemeal approach of short-term 

extensions of the CFATS authority creates regulatory uncertainty 

for DHS and chemical facilities that runs counter to the Committee’s intent—to ensure that investments made today are optimized 

to improve our Nation’s security for tomorrow and the long-term. 

The seven-year sunset does not preclude the Committee from conducting on-going CFATS oversight or developing additional legislation as necessary. 

Sec. 2108. Authorization of Appropriations. 

This section authorizes $89.9 million for each fiscal year 2012 

through 2018 to carry out the requirements of this Act. 


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Sec. 3. Conforming Repeal. 

This section strikes Section 550 of the Department of Homeland 

Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Pub. L. 109–295) on the date of 

enactment of this Act. 

Sec. 4. Harmonization. 

This section requires the Secretary to submit to Congress a report within six months after enactment on the extent to which 

CFATS security requirements have been harmonized with the security requirements imposed on ports pursuant to the MTSA. The Department shall include any future plans for harmonization and a 

timeline for implementation of these plans. The Committee supports the Department’s efforts to harmonize the two security regimes in order to limit duplicative requirements and address any 

security gaps. The Committee intends for the report to aid in identifying whether legislative changes to the MTSA or CFATS authorities are needed to achieve appropriate harmonization or whether 

sufficient changes can be made within the existing regulatory 

frameworks. 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 

* * * * * * * 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) * * * 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as 

follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE XXI—CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY 

REGULATIONS 

Sec. 2101. Chemical facility anti-terrorism security regulations. 

Sec. 2102. Information protection. 

Sec. 2103. Enforcement. 

Sec. 2104. Jobs Impact. 

Sec. 2105. Scope. 

Sec. 2106. Preemption. 

Sec. 2107. Termination. 

Sec. 2108. Authorization of appropriations. 

* * * * * * * 


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TITLE XXI—CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTITERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS 

SEC. 2101. CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTI-TERRORISM SECURITY REGULATIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall maintain, and revise as 

necessary, regulations to protect chemical facilities against terrorism 

and potential terrorist attacks. Such regulations shall include— 

(1) risk-based performance standards for chemical facility security; 

(2) requirements for chemical facility security vulnerability 

assessments; and 

(3) requirements for the development and implementation of 

chemical facility site security plans. 

(b) FACILITIES REGULATED.—The regulations required by subsection (a) shall apply to any chemical facility that the Secretary determines presents a high level of security risk with respect to acts 

of terrorism, except that the Secretary may not apply such regulations to any of the following: 

(1) Any facility owned or operated by the Department of Defense. 

(2) Any facility owned or operated by the Department of Energy. 

(3) Any facility subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

(4) Any facility regulated under chapter 701 of title 46, 

United States Code. 

(5) A public water system, as such term is defined by section 

1401(4) of the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. 300f(4)). 

(6) A treatment works, as such term is defined by section 

212(2) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 

1292(2)). 

(c) SECURITY MEASURES.—The regulations required by subsection 

(a) shall provide that each such facility, in developing and implementing site security plans, be permitted to select layered security 

measures that, in combination, appropriately address the vulnerability assessment and the risk-based performance standards for security for the facility. 

(d) REVIEW.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall review and approve or 

disapprove each vulnerability assessment and site security plan 

required under this title or by the regulations required by subsection (a). 

(2) STANDARDS FOR DISAPPROVAL.—The Secretary may not 

disapprove such a site security plan based on the presence or 

absence of a particular security measure, but the Secretary may 

disapprove such a site security plan if the plan fails to satisfy 

the risk-based performance standards established by the Secretary. 

(3) DEADLINE FOR NOTIFICATION.—Beginning after the Secretary publishes final regulations to implement this section, not 

later than 180 days, to the greatest extent practicable, after the 

date on which the Secretary receives a security vulnerability assessment or site security plan under this title, the Secretary 


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shall review and approve or disapprove such assessment or 

plan and notify the covered chemical facility of such approval 

or disapproval. 

(4) NOTIFICATION OF DISAPPROVAL.—If the Secretary disapproves the security vulnerability assessment or site security 

plan submitted by a covered chemical facility under this title or 

the implementation of a site security plan by such a chemical 

facility, the Secretary shall provide the owner or operator of the 

covered chemical facility a written notification of the disapproval not later than 14 days after the date on which the Secretary disapproves such assessment or plan, that— 

(A) includes a clear explanation of deficiencies in the assessment, plan, or implementation of the plan; and 

(B) requires the owner or operator of the covered chemical 

facility to revise the assessment or plan to address any deficiencies and, by such date as the Secretary determines is 

appropriate, to submit to the Secretary the revised assessment or plan. 

(5) REPORTING.—The Secretary shall submit to the Committee 

on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs of 

the Senate, on an annual basis, information on the number of 

instances during the year covered by the report where the Secretary determined that the 180 day notification requirement 

under paragraph (3) was impracticable. 

(e) ALTERNATIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS.—The Secretary may approve any alternative security program established by a private sector entity or Federal, State, or local authority, or under another applicable law, if the Secretary determines that the requirements of 

such program meets the requirements of this title and any regulations issued or maintained pursuant to this title. 

(f) SECURITY BACKGROUND CHECKS.—In any personnel surety regulation issued by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary shall include provisions on how an owner or operator of a 

covered chemical facility can meet, in whole or in part, the requirements set forth in such regulations by submitting— 

(1) information on an employee or individual holding a valid 

transportation security card issued under section 70105 of title 

46, United States Code; 

(2) an alternate security background check conducted by a 

private sector entity, including the owner and operator of a covered chemical facility and a non-profit personnel surety accrediting organization; and 

(3) an alternate security background check conducted under 

another applicable law. 

(g) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SMALL BUSINESSES.—The Secretary shall provide technical assistance to any owner or operator 

of a covered chemical facility who requests such assistance to prepare a security vulnerability assessment or site security plan required under this title or by the regulations required by subsection 

(a), if the covered chemical facility is a small business concern, 

under the meaning given that term in section 3 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632). 


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SEC. 2102. INFORMATION PROTECTION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, information developed pursuant to this title, or pursuant to the regulations required by section 2101(a), including vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other security related information, 

records, and documents shall be given protections from public disclosure consistent with similar information developed by chemical 

facilities subject to regulation under section 70103 of title 46, 

United States Code. 

(b) SHARING OF INFORMATION.— 

(1) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.—This section does not 

prohibit the sharing of such information, as the Secretary determines appropriate, with State and local government officials 

possessing the appropriate security clearances, including emergency response providers, for the purpose of carrying out this 

title, as long as such information may not be disclosed pursuant to any State or local law. 

(2) CONGRESS.—Nothing in this title shall permit or authorize the withholding of information from Congress or any committee or subcommittee thereof. 

(c) ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.—In any proceeding to enforce this title, vulnerability assessments, site security 

plans, and other information submitted to or obtained by the Secretary under this title, and related vulnerability or security information, shall be treated as if the information were classified material. 

SEC. 2103. ENFORCEMENT. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall audit and inspect chemical 

facilities subject to regulation under this title for the purposes of determining compliance with this title and the regulations required by 

section 2101(a). 

(b) ORDERS FOR COMPLIANCE.—If the Secretary determines that a 

chemical facility is not in compliance with this title or the regulations required by section 2101(a), the Secretary shall provide the 

owner or operator of the facility with written notification (including 

a clear explanation of deficiencies in the vulnerability assessment 

and site security plan) and an opportunity for consultation, and 

issue an order to comply by such date as the Secretary determines 

to be appropriate under the circumstances. 

(c) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Any person who violates an order issued 

under this title shall be liable for a civil penalty under section 

70119(a) of title 46, United States Code. 

(d) ORDER TO CEASE OPERATION.—If the owner or operator of a 

chemical facility subject to regulation under this title continues to 

be in noncompliance, the Secretary may issue an order for the facility to cease operation until the owner or operator complies with the 

order. 

(e) EXCEPTION.—Nothing in this title confers upon any person except the Secretary a right of action against an owner or operator of 

a chemical facility to enforce any provision of this title. 

SEC. 2104. JOBS IMPACT. 

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this 

title, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the 

Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives 


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and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report that, at a minimum, includes— 

(1) an estimate of the potential jobs created or lost within the 

private sector as a result of the regulations required under section 2101 of this title; and 

(2) information on feedback received from owners and operators of covered chemical facilities about how the regulations required under section 2101 of this title could be revised to spur 

potential job creation or stem job losses. 

SEC. 2105. SCOPE. 

Nothing in this title shall be construed to supersede, amend, alter, 

or affect any Federal law that regulates the manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, sale, other treatment, or disposal of chemical 

substances or mixtures. 

SEC. 2106. PREEMPTION. 

This title shall not preclude or deny any right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce any regulation, requirement, or standard of performance with respect to chemical facility security that is more stringent than a regulation, requirement, 

or standard of performance required under this title, or otherwise 

impair any right or jurisdiction of any State with respect to chemical facilities within that State, unless there is an actual conflict between this title and the law of that State. 

SEC. 2107. TERMINATION. 

The authority provided by this title shall terminate on September 

30, 2018. 

SEC. 2108. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry 

out this title $89,928,000 for each of fiscal years 2012 through 2018. 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2007 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE V—GENERAL PROVISIONS 

øSEC. 550. (a) No later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue 

interim final regulations establishing risk-based performance 

standards for security of chemical facilities and requiring vulnerability assessments and the development and implementation of 

site security plans for chemical facilities: Provided, That such regulations shall apply to chemical facilities that, in the discretion of 

the Secretary, present high levels of security risk: Provided further, 

That such regulations shall permit each such facility, in developing 

and implementing site security plans, to select layered security 

measures that, in combination, appropriately address the vulnerability assessment and the risk-based performance standards for 

security for the facility: Provided further, That the Secretary may 

not disapprove a site security plan submitted under this section 

based on the presence or absence of a particular security measure, 

but the Secretary may disapprove a site security plan if the plan 

fails to satisfy the risk-based performance standards established by 


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this section: Provided further, That the Secretary may approve alternative security programs established by private sector entities, 

Federal, State, or local authorities, or other applicable laws if the 

Secretary determines that the requirements of such programs meet 

the requirements of this section and the interim regulations: Provided further, That the Secretary shall review and approve each 

vulnerability assessment and site security plan required under this 

section: Provided further, That the Secretary shall not apply regulations issued pursuant to this section to facilities regulated pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Public 

Law 107–295, as amended; Public Water Systems, as defined by 

section 1401 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, Public Law 93–523, 

as amended; Treatment Works as defined in section 212 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Public Law 92–500, as amended; 

any facility owned or operated by the Department of Defense or the 

Department of Energy, or any facility subject to regulation by the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

ø(b) Interim regulations issued under this section shall apply 

until the effective date of interim or final regulations promulgated 

under other laws that establish requirements and standards referred to in subsection (a) and expressly supersede this section: 

Provided, That the authority provided by this section shall terminate on October 4, 2011. 

ø(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subsection 

(b), information developed under this section, including vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other security related 

information, records, and documents shall be given protections 

from public disclosure consistent with similar information developed by chemical facilities subject to regulation under section 

70103 of title 46, United States Code: Provided, That this subsection does not prohibit the sharing of such information, as the 

Secretary deems appropriate, with State and local government officials possessing the necessary security clearances, including law 

enforcement officials and first responders, for the purpose of carrying out this section, provided that such information may not be 

disclosed pursuant to any State or local law: Provided further, That 

in any proceeding to enforce this section, vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other information submitted to or 

obtained by the Secretary under this section, and related vulnerability or security information, shall be treated as if the information were classified material. 

ø(d) Any person who violates an order issued under this section 

shall be liable for a civil penalty under section 70119(a) of title 46, 

United States Code: Provided, That nothing in this section confers 

upon any person except the Secretary a right of action against an 

owner or operator of a chemical facility to enforce any provision of 

this section. 

ø(e) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall audit and inspect 

chemical facilities for the purposes of determining compliance with 

the regulations issued pursuant to this section. 

ø(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede, 

amend, alter, or affect any Federal law that regulates the manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, sale, other treatment, or disposal of chemical substances or mixtures. 


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ø(g) If the Secretary determines that a chemical facility is not in 

compliance with this section, the Secretary shall provide the owner 

or operator with written notification (including a clear explanation 

of deficiencies in the vulnerability assessment and site security 

plan) and opportunity for consultation, and issue an order to comply by such date as the Secretary determines to be appropriate 

under the circumstances: Provided, That if the owner or operator 

continues to be in noncompliance, the Secretary may issue an order 

for the facility to cease operation, until the owner or operator complies with the order. 

ø(h) This section shall not preclude or deny any right of any 

State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce any regulation, requirement, or standard of performance with respect to 

chemical facility security that is more stringent than a regulation, 

requirement, or standard of performance issued under this section, 

or otherwise impair any right or jurisdiction of any State with respect to chemical facilities within that State, unless there is an actual conflict between this section and the law of that State.¿ 

* * * * * * * 


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ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

We, the undersigned Democratic Members of the Committee on 

Homeland Security, support the reauthorization of the Chemical 

Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards Act program, as administered by 

the Department of Homeland Security, and submit the following 

additional views. 

BACKGROUND

As discussed in the report, with the enactment of section 550 of 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 

2007 (P.L. 109–295), Congress granted DHS, for the first time, authority to issue regulations relating to the security of the Nation’s 

chemical sector. Section 550, however, expressly exempted certain 

facilities from the authorized Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 

Standards (CFATS) regulations, which were issued as interim final 

regulations on April 4, 2007. We would note that since enactment 

of the 2007 DHS Appropriations Act, the following categories of facilities have been explicitly exempted from the CFATS regulation: 

facilities that are regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard pursuant to 

the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA); drinking water 

and wastewater treatment facilities (as defined by section 1401 of 

the Safe Drinking Water Act and section 212 of the Federal Water 

Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Clean Water 

Act’’, respectively)); facilities owned or operated by the Departments of Defense and Energy; and certain facilities subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 

Section 550 of the 2007 DHS Appropriations Act was enacted as 

a short-term grant of authority to allow DHS to begin moving forward with the design and publication of regulations for the chemical sector while congressional authorizers worked out policy and 

jurisdictional differences to pass comprehensive CFATS authorization legislation. For five years, enactment of comprehensive CFATS 

authorization legislation has been elusive. In the absence of a comprehensive CFATS bill, Congress has repeatedly extended the section 550 authority in appropriations bills. DHS’ authority to regulate security in the chemical sector is scheduled to expire at the 

end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 unless legislation to extend authority 

is enacted. 

Committee Democrats have a longstanding record of supporting 

this novel regulation which, in recognition of the diversity of the 

chemical sector, sets forth a series of risk-based, performance-based 

standards that are to be met by facilities that hold threshold quantities of chemicals that would be of interest to terrorists. We would 

note that in the 110th Congress, then-Chairman Thompson was 

able to work effectively with the Committees on Energy and Commerce (then-Chairman Henry Waxman (D–CA)) and Transportation and Infrastructure (then-Chairman James Oberstar (D–MN)) 


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to introduce comprehensive chemical security legislation. H.R. 

2868, the ‘‘Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009,’’ was approved by the House on November 6, 2009 by a vote of 230 to 193. 

One of the key areas of distinctions between H.R. 2868 and prior 

attempts at enacting comprehensive CFATS legislation was with 

regards to the regulation of drinking water and wastewater facilities for security. Whereas the 109th and 110th Congress bills (H.R. 

5695 and H.R. 5577 respectively) granted DHS regulatory authority over these facilities, H.R. 2868 granted regulatory authority for 

security to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the existing regulator for the safety of drinking water and wastewater facilities. Subsequently, witnesses representing DHS and EPA testified in support of the regulatory approach in H.R. 2868. 

This Congress, Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies (CIPST) Subcommittee Chairman Rep. Dan 

Lungren (R–CA) introduced H.R. 901, a bill largely modeled after 

the language carried in the 2007 DHS Appropriations Act. We 

would note that with the exception of H.R. 901, each comprehensive CFATS bill advanced by the Committee since 2006 has included provisions to close the water and wastewater security gap. 

FULL COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 901

On Wednesday, June 22, 2011, at the Full Committee mark up 

of H.R. 901, Democratic Members of the Committee on Homeland 

Security submitted twelve amendments to improve the underlying 

bill. 

Committee Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson (D–MS) offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute (Thompson substitute) that would have replaced the measure under consideration 

with a comprehensive authorization of the CFATS program. The 

Thompson Substitute was based on H.R. 2868, the only freestanding CFATS authorization bill to have been approved by the 

House. H.R. 2868, approved by the 111th Congress by a vote of 230 

to 193, was the result of Committee oversight, years of bipartisan 

discussions, and extensive engagement of facility operators and 

other effected stakeholders. Like H.R. 2868, the Thompson Substitute sought to codify and enhance large sections of CFATS riskbased, performance-based regulation that has gained acceptance in 

Congress and the regulated community since 2007. Further, the 

Thompson Substitute also sought to leverage a recognized ‘‘best 

practice’’ in the chemical sector to ‘‘reduce the consequences of a 

terrorist attack’’ for facilities and their surrounding communities 

by conducting assessments as part of their Security Vulnerability 

Assessments. The Committee has received testimony that facilities 

which voluntarily perform these assessments, sometimes called ‘‘inherently safer technology’’ or ‘‘IST’’ assessments, often discover that 

reducing risk is not only good for homeland security but the business’ operations. Additionally, the amendment included provisions 

to protect whistleblowers, enhance worker security training, and 

allow citizens to bring actions against DHS in the event that DHS 

fails to enforce this security law. During consideration of this 

amendment, Committee Ranking Member Thompson argued that 

this substitute offered more predictability and protections to the 

regulated community than the underlying measure insofar as it 


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sets forth, with specificity, timelines, notification, and redress for 

the facilities. This amendment was defeated by a vote of 12 to 18. 

We are pleased that, for the first time in the 112th Congress, 

amendments offered by Committee Democrats were accepted. Specifically, the following five amendments were accepted: 

• An amendment, authored by Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D–CA), 

sought to provide greater transparency and predictability to owners 

and operators of regulated chemical facilities. Specifically, it required DHS, to the greatest extent practicable, to review and issue 

an approval or disapproval for any Security Vulnerability Assessment or Site Security Plan submitted by a facility operator within 

180 days of receiving it. In the event that DHS disapproves a Security Vulnerability Assessment or Site Security Plan, the Department would be required to provide a written notification that, 

among other things, sets forth the deficiencies in the submission, 

not later than 14 days after the decision is made. To foster close 

adherence to these requirements, the amendment required the Department to report to Congress, on an annual basis, on the specific 

circumstances where it found that to meet the 180-day requirement 

would be impracticable. We would note that, at the time of the 

mark up, the Department had not approved a single Site Security 

Plan submitted by a regulated facility. This amendment was approved by voice vote. 

• Two amendments, offered en bloc by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee 

(D–TX), sought to foster a streamlining of chemical security regulatory activity at DHS and the leveraging of security enhancements 

by regulated facilities. The first amendment required the Secretary 

of Homeland Security to report on the progress of efforts to harmonize the CFATS program with the Maritime Security Transportation Act (MTSA) program, as administered by Coast Guard. The 

second amendment directed DHS, in any CFATS rule governing 

personnel surety, to set forth how a facility can meet the requirements, in whole or in part, by submitting: (1) information on employees with valid Transportation Worker Identification Credentials; (2) information on compliance with an alternate security 

background check, including those undertaken by a non-profit personnel surety accrediting organization; and (3) information on compliance with a personnel surety requirement under another law. 

Both amendments are predicated on the view that, wherever possible, facilities should not be subjected to redundant or even conflicting requirements. We believe that the second amendment, in 

particular, has the potential of resulting in a savings of time and 

money for facility operators and their workers. These amendments 

were approved by voice vote. 

• By a recorded vote of 28 to 2, the Committee approved an 

amendment, authored by Rep. Danny K. Davis (D–IL), that required DHS to report to Congress within one year of enactment of 

this measure and annually thereafter on: (1) the estimated impact 

on employment of the CFATS regulations; and (2) any information 

from regulated facilities on how the CFATS regulation could be revised to foster job growth or prevent job losses. As the national unemployment rate remains stubbornly high, we believe that it is important that DHS be aware of what impact the implementation of 


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1For instance, just prior to the June 22nd mark up, the Committee was informed by DHS 

that anomalies surrounding the assessment tool used for designating facilities on risk-based 

tiers had been detected. Subsequently, DHS reevaluated about 10% of the regulated population 

and determined, ultimately, that all the effected facilities were in proper tiers, would be placed 

in a lower tier, or, in the case of roughly 100 facilities, were found to have insufficient risk to 

be regulated under the program. Previously, DHS determined that it had provided wages to a 

number of CFATS inspectors, deployed around the Nation, at an incorrect rate. 

this regulation could have on the workers and the operations of the 

regulated facilities. 

• An amendment, offered by Rep. Kathleen Hochul (D–NY), required DHS to provide technical assistance to any facility that 

qualifies as a small business concern under the Small Business Act 

and requests such assistance to meet the requirements of this 

novel regulatory program. This amendment acknowledges the fact 

that not all chemical facilities have the in-house resources or expertise to complete a Security Vulnerability Assessment or Site Security Plan. It also recognizes that producing a Security Vulnerability 

Assessment and Site Security Plan is often a complex and costly 

endeavor. We believe that small businesses, as the engine of our 

national economy, should not be forced to choose between hiring expensive consultants or adding to their workforce. This amendment 

was approved by a vote of 29 to 1. 

Committee Democrats offered six other amendments at the Full 

Committee mark up. We are disappointed that none of those 

amendments, as discussed herein, were accepted: 

• CIPST Subcommittee Ranking Member Clarke (D–NY) offered 

two amendments to shorten the length of authorization for the 

CFATS program from seven years. The first amendment would 

have shortened the authorization period from 2018 to 2013; it was 

defeated by voice vote. The second amendment would have shortened the authorization period from 2018 to 2016; it was rejected by 

a vote of 11 to 18. At the mark up, we expressed the view that it 

would be imprudent to authorize the CFATS program for seven 

years when the program has not been fully implemented, the inspector workforce is not fully in place, and not even one facility has 

received final approval from DHS on its Site Security Plan. While 

we commend the Department for taking swift action to establish 

the program, we recognize that the CFATS program is not yet mature and, as such, DHS has experienced some missteps.1 We believe that the establishment of a regular rhythm of reauthorization 

is critical to the program’s success. Through such a process, Congress can effectuate its oversight findings and adjust programmatic 

resources, as needed. We would also note that both amendments 

would have significantly lowered the total cost of the legislation. 

• Committee Ranking Member Thompson offered an amendment 

that would have eliminated most of the exemptions established 

under section 550 of the 2007 DHS Appropriations Act. In the case 

of drinking water and wastewater facilities, the EPA would be responsible for establishing a parallel security program to DHS’s 

CFATS program, and, in the case of facilities regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Coast Guard, the responsibility 

for issuing parallel security regulations would be delegated to the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Coast Guard, respectively. 

This amendment, which would have addressed the water and 


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wastewater security gap and brought other at-risk facilities under 

parallel security systems, was rejected by a vote of 9 to 15. • Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications 

(EPRC) Subcommittee Ranking Member Laura Richardson (D–CA) 

offered an amendment that would have directed DHS to establish 

a process for whisteblowers at chemical facilities to keep their identities confidential. It would have prohibited chemical facility owners and operators from retaliating against an employee who discloses violations of the CFATS regulations, testifies before the government, or refuses to participate in activities they reasonably believe violate the law, after notifying their employer. It also outlined 

a procedure for whisteblowers to file a complaint if they allege they 

have experienced discrimination based upon their whistleblower activities. We believe that the men and women who work in the 

chemical sector have special knowledge which is critical to the 

identification of security vulnerabilities within their facilities. We 

believe that it is imperative employees are protected, should they 

report violations or vulnerabilities through appropriate channels. 

This amendment was rejected by a vote of 11 to 16. • CIPST Subcommittee Ranking Member Clarke (D–NY) offered 

an amendment that would have authorized the Office of Chemical 

Facility Inspections. It also included specifications on the qualifications and the selection process for this program office’s director. 

Every CFATS authorization bill advanced by the Committee since 

2006 has specifically authorized this office to ensure that the program could be managed effectively and efficiently. We believe this 

amendment would have enhanced this Committee’s oversight capabilities and accountability for this program office; we would note 

that this program office has been in operation since the 2007 DHS 

Appropriation Act and is referred to as ‘‘Infrastructure Security 

Compliance Division.’’ We recognize that the CFATS program cannot run itself and is in need of a standing program office to provide 

day-to-day administrative leadership and resources to implement 

this novel program. This amendment was rejected by a vote of 11 

to 18. 

• Rep. Hansen Clarke (D–MI) authored three amendments to 

improve the underlying bill. The first amendment directed DHS to 

establish personnel surety regulations for facilities that provide 

worker protections. Specifically, the amendment set forth the scope 

of the background check and directed DHS to require facilities to 

establish redress and reconsideration processes for employees who 

are subject to adverse employment actions, as a result of a CFATSrequired background check. The amendment also sought to restrict 

the use and maintenance of information gathered in these background investigations. This amendment was rejected by a vote of 

12 to 18. 

• The second amendment offered by Rep. Clarke (D–MI) would 

have directed the President to delegate to the EPA the authority 

to issue CFATS regulations for drinking water and wastewater facilities and directed the EPA to provide technical assistance to any 

affected facilities. We recognize that many water and wastewater 

facilities are owned and operated by public authorities and, therefore, they may have limited resources to comply with the CFATS 

regulation. The water and wastewater security gap has been of 


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2Michael Chertoff, DHS Secretary, speaking before the 2007 Chemical Sector Security Summit, June 12, 2007 @ http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/spl1181830119723.shtm. 

major concern to DHS under both the Bush and Obama Administrations. In fact, after enactment of section 550, then-DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff was among the first to acknowledge the 

water and wastewater security gap when, speaking at the 2007 

Chemical Sector Security Summit, he stated ‘‘[A]s comprehensive 

as we’re trying to be, there remains one gap in our system of regulation, and that has to do with certain kinds of chemicals that are 

held at water treatment plants and wastewater plants.’’ 2 This 

amendment was rejected by a vote of 11 to 19. • The third amendment offered by Rep. Clarke (D–MI) would 

have directed DHS to consult with the EPA in establishing chemical facilities anti-terrorism standards regulations on various subjects, including which substances should be designated as substances of concern, methods to reduce the consequences of terrorist 

attacks and how to minimize paperwork for overlapping issues. We 

believe that this amendment would have helped foster greater collaboration between DHS and EPA, in furtherance of a more secure 

Nation. This amendment was rejected by a vote of 12 to 18. 

SUBCOMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 901

On April 14, 2011, during consideration of H.R. 901 by the 

CIPST Subcommittee, Committee Democrats offered three targeted 

amendments to improve the underlying measure. All three were rejected. They are as follows: 

• An amendment, offered by CIPST Subcommittee Ranking 

Member Clarke (D–NY), to close the drinking water and wastewater security gap created by the 2007 DHS Appropriations Act 

and require that the regulatory authority over these facilities be 

delegated to the EPA. We would note that at that mark up, CIPST 

Subcommittee Chairman Lungren, after stating his opposition to 

this amendment, explained that he remains concerned that there 

may be security gaps with respect to the water and wastewater sectors and pledged to hold specific hearings on this security risk and, 

if necessary, work with CIPST Subcommittee Ranking Member 

Clarke on future legislation to address this matter. 

• An amendment, offered by EPRC Subcommittee Ranking Member Richardson (D–CA), to require facilities deemed to be highest 

risk to undertake product safety reviews, an industry best practice 

according to testimony received by the Committee. 


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• An amendment, offered by Rep. Cedric Richmond (D–LA), to 

ensure that each facility that is required to undertake a Security 

Vulnerability Assessment and Site Security Plan includes employees in the development of these critical documents. We believe that 

the participation of on-the-ground employees will help make facility 

submissions more comprehensive and responsive to the security 

risks at that facility. 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON. LORETTA SANCHEZ. SHEILA JACKSON LEE. HENRY CUELLAR. YVETTE D. CLARKE. LAURA RICHARDSON. DANNY K. DAVIS. BRIAN HIGGINS. JACKIE SPEIER. CEDRIC L. RICHMOND. HANSEN CLARKE. WILLIAM R. KEATING. KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL. 

Æ 


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