The Honorable Lyle E. Strom, United States District Judge for

the District of Nebraska, adopting the Report and Recommendation of

the Honorable Kathleen A. Jaudzemis, United States Magistrate Judge

for the District of Nebraska.

___________

No. 96-2909

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Steven C. Taylor, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: January 15, 1997

 Filed: February 18, 1997

___________

Before BEAM, ROSS, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Steven C. Taylor appeals the district court's denial of his

1

motion to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to Taylor's

warrantless arrest. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND

Omaha police arrested a drug dealer in April 1995, who agreed

to cooperate with authorities. The newly acquired informant knew

his source of methamphetamine only as "Steve," but provided police

with "Steve's" telephone number, address, and a description of his

vehicle. Officers checked out this information and identified

Steven Taylor as the supplier. Under the officers' supervision,

the informant then called Steve and arranged for delivery of

methamphetamine to room 103 of the Savannah Suites Motel. The

informant warned that "Steve" was "famous for being late" but that

he always arrived with drugs as promised. The final phone call was

placed at 6:00 in the evening, and a tape recording of the

conversation reveals "Steve" promising that he was on his way. At

7:00 p.m. Taylor arrived at room 103 of the Savannah Suites and

found police waiting. Taylor was arrested and searched. He was

carrying an ounce and a half of methamphetamine, a scale, a loaded

.38-caliber revolver, and a set of nunchakus. Taylor was informed

of his rights, agreed to be interviewed and quickly confessed.

After he was indicted, Taylor moved to suppress all evidence

obtained as a result of his arrest, including the items recovered

from his person and his incriminating statements. He argued that

the arrest was unsupported by probable cause, in violation of the

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The magistrate

judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and made a recommendation

that the motion be denied, which recommendation the district court

adopted. Taylor then entered a conditional plea of guilty to

charges that he possessed methamphetamine with the intent to

distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1) and that, as
-3-

a felon, he violated 18 U.S.C. SS 922(g)(1) by possessing a

firearm. He appeals the suppression ruling.

II. DISCUSSION

We will only overturn a district court's finding of probable

cause to make a warrantless arrest if it is clearly erroneous.

United States v. Morgan, 997 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1993).

Determining probable cause to arrest requires the court to focus on

the moment the arrest was made and to ask whether "the facts and

circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they

had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant

a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was

committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).

This calculation "does not depend upon individual facts; rather it

depends on the cumulative effect of the facts in the totality of

the circumstances." United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1349

(8th Cir. 1995). 

Taylor relies on United States v. Everroad, 704 F.2d 403 (8th

Cir. 1983) to argue that his mere presence in a location known to

be the site of criminal activity was insufficient to establish

probable cause for his arrest. This is a correct statement of the

law, but it has very little relevance to these facts. Taylor was

not arrested merely because of his physical location. The Omaha

police believed Taylor was committing a crime because of

intelligence provided by a previously unknown informant. The

pertinent inquiry, then, is whether the informant was sufficiently

trustworthy to support the officers' belief that Taylor was engaged

in criminal activity.
 Taylor reports that the objections were sustained based on

Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Our review of the transcript

indicates that the objections were not based on undue prejudice but

on relevance, which is guided by Rule 401. We review rulings based

on either provision for abuse of discretion. United States v.

Johnson, 934 F.2d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1991) (Rule 403) and United

States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1124 (8th Cir. 1977) (Rule 401).

-4-

"Where a previously unknown informant provides information,

the informant's lack of a track record requires <some independent

verification' to establish the reliability of the information."

United States v. Amaya, 52 F.3d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Brown, 49 F.3d at 1349). This confirmation can consist of

verifying details that would not, standing alone, lead police to

suspect a crime. United States v. Wilson, 964 F.2d 807, 809-10

(8th Cir. 1992).

Here, the informant correctly identified Taylor's address,

phone number, vehicle and first name. He also correctly predicted

that Taylor would arrive at room 103 of the Omaha Savannah Suites

on a certain date, even including a warning that Taylor would be

late. Taken together, these facts established sufficient grounds

to support a belief that Taylor was committing or had committed an

offense involving drug trafficking. 

At the suppression hearing, defense counsel sought to explore

the informant's criminal history, arguing that the informant's

prior convictions undermined his credibility. The magistrate judge

sustained objections to this line of inquiry, which Taylor asserts

was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. 2
-5-

When an informant's data is at least partially corroborated,

attacks upon credibility and reliability are not crucial to the

finding of probable cause. United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309,

313 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 259

(8th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the police were not required to

investigate the informant's criminal background before lending

credence to a story which they had already confirmed in many

respects. The magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in

excluding evidence of the informant's criminal record or police

knowledge thereof.

III. CONCLUSION

We have carefully considered each of Taylor's arguments and

find them to be without merit. The decision of the district court

is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.