[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 21-10976

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BARRINGTON M. HAMILTON, 

a.k.a. Jaame Amun Re El, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-00072-AT-JKL-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10976

Before WILSON, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Barrington Hamilton, a.k.a. Jaame Amun Re El, was 

convicted for offenses relating to bank fraud and for structuring 

transactions to evade reporting requirements. See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1344, 1349; 31 U.S.C. § 5324. He was sentenced to 70 months’ 

imprisonment followed by 36 months’ supervised release. Less 

than three years later, Hamilton filed a pro se motion labeled

“Termination Notice: Requested Claim to Close Stated Account 

and Terminate Supervised Release.” The district court construed 

the filing as a motion to terminate supervised release and denied 

the motion, finding that Hamilton was ineligible for termination

because his supervised release term had not yet begun. Hamilton, 

still proceeding pro se, now appeals.

We review the denial of a motion for early termination of 

supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017). An abuse of discretion 

occurs if the district court “applies an incorrect legal standard, 

follows improper procedures in making the determination, or 

makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. 

Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). We 

review issues raised for the first time on appeal for plain error. 

United States v. Gresham, 325 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003).

As an initial matter, we note that Hamilton does not contest 

the district court’s finding that he was not yet eligible for early 

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21-10976 Opinion of the Court 3

termination of supervised release when he filed his motion. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) (allowing termination of supervised release “at 

any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release”). 

Instead, he raises a constitutional challenge to the validity of the 

district court’s order. He claims that the district court judge, Judge 

Amy Totenberg, engaged in the practice of law in violation of 28 

U.S.C. § 454 and was biased against him as a result, abridging his 

Fifth Amendment due process right to an impartial judge. See 

Wellons v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison,

695 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2012).

Hamilton’s argument does not persuade us.1 Section 454 

states: “Any justice or judge appointed under the authority of the 

United States who engages in the practice of law is guilty of a high

misdemeanor.” 28 U.S.C. § 454. Even assuming the unlawful 

practice of law under that provision amounts to a due process 

violation, Hamilton has not shown that Judge Totenberg engaged 

in the practice of law. Congress did not explicitly define the term 

“practice of law” as used in § 454, but the plain meaning of that 

term encompasses the “professional work of a lawyer,” such as 

advising clients on legal issues, representing clients in litigation, 

and drafting legal documents. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1362 

(10th ed. 2014); 28 U.S.C. § 451. Hamilton contends that Judge 

Totenberg practiced law by virtue of her status as a member of the 

1 Because we conclude that Hamilton has failed to show that an error 

occurred, we need not decide whether he adequately raised this issue before 

the district court.

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10976

State Bar of Georgia. He also claims that Judge Totenberg 

practiced law when she presided over his criminal trial. But neither 

her membership in the state bar nor her role as trial judge 

constitutes the “practice of law.” Because Hamilton has pointed to 

no other ground to support his claim that Judge Totenberg was 

biased against him, his due process argument fails.

We decline to consider other arguments that Hamilton 

raises. To the extent that he challenges his original convictions and 

sentences, those arguments are properly raised in a request for 

collateral relief, not in a motion for termination of supervised 

release. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Hamilton 

does not argue on appeal that the district court should have 

construed his “Termination Notice” as a collateral challenge rather 

than a request for early termination, so we do not review that 

determination. In addition, we do not address arguments that 

Hamilton raises in his reply brief but not in his initial brief. See 

Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 682–83 (11th 

Cir. 2014).

We AFFIRM the district court’s order denying Hamilton’s 

motion for termination of supervised release.

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