alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between HRH Construction Corporation, Respondent-Appellant, and Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Appellant-Respondent.

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County, entered June 28,1977, granting in part a motion for a stay of arbitration and granting in part the cross motion to compel arbitration, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of denying the motion to stay arbitration and granting, in all respects, the motion to compel arbitration and otherwise affirmed, without costs or disbursements. HRH Construction Corporation (HRH), the general contractor, and Bethlehem Steel Corporation (Bethlehem), the steel subcontractor, were engaged in a construction project for the erection of a building for Citibank (the owner). Bethlehem claimed a contract balance due to it, as well as additional charges for extra work and materials and damages for delay. It requested arbitration of its claim pursuant to the terms of its contract with HRH. The subcontract between HRH and Bethlehem consisted of a printed form with additional typed inserts and a 10-page rider. The rider described certain documents incorporated into the subcontract, including the "General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, ALA Document A-201, 12th Edition, April, 1970. Supplementary General Conditions consisting of 5 pages, dated March 19, 1974.” These conditions contained a broad-form arbitration provision recommended by the American Arbitration Association, with certain deletions not relevant on this appeal. The printed form of the subcontract contained an *902arbitration provision which noted that if a lawsuit were initiated by the owner against the contractor (HRH) for deficiency in a subcontractor’s work, then the contractor and subcontractor would be bound by a decision rendered in that lawsuit. A lawsuit was instituted by Citibank against HRH for damages *after*the demand for arbitration had been served upon HRH by Bethlehem. HRH sought a stay of arbitration and permission for the litigation to proceed, claiming that it would otherwise be subject to possible inconsistent results. Bethlehem, in turn, sought to compel arbitration. Special Term allowed both the plenary suit and the arbitration to continue without defining the scope of the disputes to be decided in either forum. We would modify the determination of Special Term. In view of the fact that the broad arbitration clause in the prime contract was incorporated by reference in the subcontract, the question of which arbitration clause , should be applied is a matter for the arbitrators to determine *(Pearl St. Dev. Corp. v Conduit & Foundation Corp.,*41 NY2d 167). In this case, therefore, the propriety of continuing the lawsuit of the owner and of the underlying disputes themselves is a matter of contract interpretation which should properly be left for the arbitrators to determine. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Silverman, Evans, Lane and Sandler, JJ.
CHIEF JUSTICE

ROGELIO VALDEZ

JUSTICES

NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ

DORI CONTRERAS GARZA

GINA M. BENAVIDES

GREGORY T. PERKES

NORA L. LONGORIA

CLERK

DORIAN E. RAMIREZ NUECES COUNTY COURTH OUSE

901 LEOPARD, 10TH FL OOR

CORPUS C HRISTI, TEXAS 78401

361

- 888

- 0416 (TEL)

361

- 888

- 0794 (FAX)

HIDALGO COUNTY

ADMINISTRATION BLDG.

100 E. CANO, 5TH FLO OR

EDINBURG, TEXAS 7853 9

956

- 318

- 2405 (TEL)

956

- 318

- 2403 (FAX)

www.txcourts.gov/13thcoa 

# Court of Appeals

Thirteenth District of Texas

February 26, 2015

Hon. D. Allan Erwin, Jr.

Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher

Attorneys at Law

855 West Price Road, Suite 9

Brownsville, TX 78520

* DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL *

Hon. Roger W. Hughes

Adams & Graham

P. O. Drawer 1429

Harlingen, TX 78551

- 1429

* DELIVER ED VIA E

- MAIL * Hon. Moises R. Hernandez

Hernandez Law Firm

P. O. Box 2999

Harlingen, TX 78551

Re: Cause No. 13

- 12

- 00199

- CV

Tr.Ct.No. 2006

- CPC

- 92

- B

Style: GRADY DOWELL v. GRACIE QUIROZ, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE

ESTATE OF MARIO GONZALEZ LIRA, NOE LIRA; M ARIA ANGELES LIRA;

MARLINY GUTIERREZ, ANNETTE GUTIERREZ, NANCY GUTIERREZ,

AND DAVID GUTIERREZ

Enclosed please find the opinion and judgment issued by the Court on this date.

Very truly yours,

Dorian E. Ramirez, Clerk

DER: ch

Enc.

cc: County Court at La w No. 2

Hon. Sylvia G. Perez , Cameron County Clerk (DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL)

Hon. J. Rolando Olvera Jr. , Presiding Judge, Fifth Administrative Judicial Region

(DELIVERED VIA E

- MAIL)
Editorial Note on Part 200
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 200 appear at 69 FR 18803, Apr. 9, 2004.

§ 200.82 Maturity. The mortgage shall have a maturity satisfactory to the Commissioner, and shall contain complete amortization or sinking-fund provisions satisfactory to the Commissioner. ( a ) The maximum mortgage term may not exceed the lesser of: ( 1 ) Any limits included under the applicable section of the Act.
( 2 ) Thirty-five years for existing projects, except that the mortgage term may be up to 40 years under terms and conditions established by the Commissioner, and 40 years for proposed construction and substantial rehabilitation projects.
( 3 ) Seventy-five percent of the estimated remaining economic life of the physical improvements.
( b ) The minimum mortgage term shall not be less than 10 years.
#### In the Matter of Shirley C. Soman, Individually and as Coexecutrix of Robert Soman, Deceased, Appellant, v Dominick J. DiMaio, as Chief Medical Examiner of the City of New York, Respondent.

— Judgment of the *522Supreme Court, New York County, entered March 7, 1977, dismissing petition, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs and without disbursements, and respondent directed to serve an answer, precedent to such further proceedings as may be appropriate. Appeals from the orders of the Supreme Court, New York County, entered October 5, 1976 and November 24, 1976, unanimously dismissed as academic, without costs and without disbursements. There is no claim herein that the petition is insufficient as a matter of law. Although no answer to the petition was filed by respondent and in his cross motion to dismiss the petition he did not controvert petitioner’s allegation that his action was arbitrary and capricious, nevertheless, Special Term in its order of October 5, 1976, dismissing the petition herein, held that respondent’s conclusion that deceased’s death was suicidal was not arbitrary or capricious. The person supplying the sole information upon which respondent presumably relied in arriving at his conclusion, disavowed by affidavit many of the statements attributed to her, claiming that if the statements were made, they were the product of confusion and suggestion and were inaccurate. Respondent, however, refused to change his conclusion of suicide, prompting the petition herein. We believe the action of the Special Term, even if correct (and we do not pass on it at this time), was premature. Although respondent relies upon *Matter of Mitchell v Halpern*(17 AD2d 922, affd 14 NY2d 817) in which the refusal of the medical examinaer to expunge a statement of suicide from his records was upheld, the record on appeal discloses the judgment therein followed the submission of an answer by respondent. Accordingly, in the circumstances of this case, we reverse the judgment below and direct respondent to serve an answer, precedent to such further proceedings as may be appropriate. In the framework of the pleadings there, Special Term shall determine whether or not the determination of suicide by respondent was arbitrary or capricious. Concur—Kupferman, J. P., Birns, Silverman and Lane, JJ.
Case 3:08-cv-04118-BZ Document 90 Filed 06/11/10 Page 1 of 2Case 3:08-cv-04118-BZ Document 90 Filed 06/11/10 Page 2 of 2
#### § 203.469 Reinstatement of defaulted loan.

If after default and prior to assignment by the lender of the loan to the Commissioner, the borrower shall pay to the lender all monthly payments in default, written notice shall be given to the Commissioner within 30 days and the insurance shall continue as if such default had not occurred.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Metris Companies Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David
D. Wesselink, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1.       The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.       The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and results of
                  operations of the Company.

                                        /s/ David D. Wesselink
                                        ----------------------
                                        David D. Wesselink
                                        Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
                                        April 9, 2004
<PAGE>

                                  EXHIBIT 32.2

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, R. Greg Smith, certify to the best of my knowledge based upon a review of the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of ERF Wireless, Inc. for the quarter ended
September 30, 2006 (the "Form 10-QSB"), that the Form 10-QSB fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended, and that information contained in the Form 10-QSB fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of ERF
Wireless, Inc. for the periods covered by the Form 10-QSB.

     DATED: NOVEMBER 20, 2006               BY: /s/ R. Greg Smith
                                                --------------------------------
                                                R. GREG SMITH,
                                                CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
### §7626. Authorization of appropriations

#### (a) In general

There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this chapter such sums as may be necessary for the 7 fiscal years commencing after November 15, 1990.

#### (b) Grants for planning

There are authorized to be appropriated (1) not more than $50,000,000 to carry out section 7505 of this title beginning in fiscal year 1991, to be available until expended, to develop plan revisions required by subpart 2, 3, or 4 of part D of subchapter I, and (2) not more than $15,000,000 for each of the 7 fiscal years commencing after November 15, 1990, to make grants to the States to prepare implementation plans as required by subpart 2, 3, or 4 of part D of subchapter I.

(July 14, 1955, ch. 360, title III, §327, formerly §325, as added Pub. L. 95–95, title III, §315, Aug. 7, 1977, 91 Stat. 790; renumbered §327 and amended Pub. L. 95–190, §14(a)(83), Nov. 16, 1977, 91 Stat. 1404; renumbered §326, Pub. L. 96–300, §1(c), July 2, 1980, 94 Stat. 831; renumbered §327, Pub. L. 98–213, §11, Dec. 8, 1983, 97 Stat. 1461; Pub. L. 101–549, title VIII, §822, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat. 2699.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Prior Provisions

Provisions similar to those in this section were contained in section 1857l of this title, act July 14, 1955, ch. 360, title III, §316, formerly §13, as added Dec. 17, 1963, Pub. L. 88–206, §1, 77 Stat. 401; renumbered §306 and amended Oct. 20, 1965, Pub. L. 89–272, title I, §101(4), (6), (7), 79 Stat. 992; Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. 89–675, §2(a), 80 Stat. 954; renumbered §309 and amended Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L. 90–148, §2, 81 Stat. 506; renumbered §316 and amended Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. 91–604, §§12(a), 13(b), 84 Stat. 1705, 1709; Apr. 9, 1973, Pub. L. 93–15, §1(c), 87 Stat. 11; June 22, 1974, Pub. L. 93–319, §13(c), 88 Stat. 265, prior to repeal by section 306 of Pub. L. 95–95.

#### Amendments

1990—Pub. L. 101–549 amended section generally, substituting present provisions for provisions authorizing specific appropriations for certain programs and periods and appropriations of $200,000,000 for fiscal years 1978 through 1981 to carry out the other programs under this chapter.

1977—Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 95–190 substituted "section 7403(a)(5)" for "section 7403(b)(5)".

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Effective Date

Section effective Aug. 7, 1977, except as otherwise expressly provided, see section 406(d) of Pub. L. 95–95, set out as an Effective Date of 1977 Amendment note under section 7401 of this title.
#### (A) The People of the State of New York v. Walter Jones. (B) The People of the State of New York v. Augustine Rodriquez. (C) The People of the State of New York v. Alfonso Cepeda and Francisco Rondon. (D) The People of the State of New York v. Oliver Smith. (E) The People of the State of New York v. William Coleman.

[In each action] Enlargement of time granted. Concur—Botein, P. J., Breitel, Rabin, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
#### Caesar Nobiletti, Appellant, v Zingarella Realty Corp. et al., Respondents.

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on March 28, 1977, unanimously affirmed for the reasons stated by Fein, J., without costs and without disbursements. Concur — Kupferman, J. P., Lupiano, Evans and Markewich, JJ.
#### Wayne A. SOUSER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sergeant J. ROBINSON, Building 9; Lieutenant G. Jacobs, Building 9; L. Johnson, Nurse, Defendants-Appel-lees.

No. 05-7979.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 30, 2007.

Decided: April 27, 2007.

Wayne A. Souser, Appellant Pro Se.

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Wayne A. Souser appeals the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed the record, considered the Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Jones v. Bock,*— U.S.—, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007), and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Souser v. Robinson,*No. CA-05-481-2 (E.D.Va. Dec. 7, 2005). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM VITECH
AMERICA, INC.'S CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED
MARCH 31, 1999 AND THE CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                           4,797,353
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   39,747,775
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,028,750
<INVENTORY>                                     32,688,694
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                82,362,660
<PP&E>                                          19,474,114
<DEPRECIATION>                                     814,258
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 126,675,999
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           69,012,171
<BONDS>                                         13,673,637
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                        60,844,866
<OTHER-SE>                                    (16,854,675)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   126,675,999
<SALES>                                         15,302,714
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                15,302,714
<CGS>                                            8,359,136
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   15,102,396
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,265,696
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (22,722,258)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (22,722,258)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (22,722,258)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (1.55)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (1.55)


</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**Certificationof Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuantto Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

Pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, the undersigned officer of Guitar Center, Inc. (the “Company”)hereby certifies, to such officer’s knowledge, that:

 

(i)                                     theaccompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for thequarterly period ended March 31, 2005 (the “Report”) fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), asapplicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(ii)                                  theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date: May 6, 2005 |   | /s/ Bruce Ross          |   |
|------------------------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|                   |   | Bruce Ross              |
|                   |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2954 Introduced in House (IH)]

109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2954

To suspend temporarily the duty on manganese metal flake containing at 
               least 99.5 percent by weight of manganese.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 16, 2005

 Mr. Sessions introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To suspend temporarily the duty on manganese metal flake containing at 
               least 99.5 percent by weight of manganese.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. MANGANESE METAL FLAKE CONTAINING AT LEAST 99.5 PERCENT BY 
              WEIGHT OF MANGANESE.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``      9902.81.01      Manganese metal     Free         No change        No change        On or before 12/  ''.
                         flake containing                                                   31/2008
                         at least 99.5
                         percent by weight
                         of manganese
                         (provided for in
                         subheading
                         8111.00.47)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
with respect to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption, on or after the 15th day after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
#### In re: Carol A. DIXON, Petitioner.

No. 07-1348.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Rule 21, Fed. R.App. P. Feb. 8, 2007.

Filed: Feb. 13, 2007.

Carol A. Dixon, Newark, NJ, pro se.

Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.

*53OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Carol Dixon has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Dixon makes several allegations regarding her fear of the “mob” and her belief that she and her family need to be protected. She has attached various documents referencing, *inter alia,*social security and public assistance benefits, travel accommodations for her daughter and communications with the United States Marshals Service. She appears to request that the court enforce certain “default judgments” and award her $300 billion. We must note that her petition is barely comprehensible and at times illegible.

A writ of mandamus will issue only in extraordinary circumstances. *See Sporck v. Peil, 759*F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir.1985). As a precondition to the issuance of the writ, the petitioner must establish that there is no alternative remedy or other adequate means to obtain the desired relief, and further must demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought. *Kerr v. United States District Court,*426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976). A writ is not a substitute for an appeal; only if a direct appeal is unavailable will the court determine whether a writ of mandamus will issue. *See In Re Ford Motor Co.,*110 F.3d 954, 957 (1997).

Dixon’s petition is woefully deficient. To the extent that her allegations are somehow related to pending or closed lawsuits, Dixon has failed to show that alternate remedies do not exist. Dixon had the opportunity to request relief during the pendency of these lawsuits and to appeal any adverse orders that were issued. Moreover, insofar as any of the allegations set forth in her petition have not been raised previously, Dixon may do so by initiating an action in the appropriate court. She has thus failed to demonstrate that she is entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Accordingly, we will deny the petition.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

11

17

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20

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13

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PEDRO GOMEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

DOCTOR MERLE SOGGE, et al.,

Defendants.

C 08-2969 MMC (PR)

[Proposed] ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR AN

EXTENSION OF TIME TO REPLY TO

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION

For good cause appearing, the request by Defendants Bree, Can, Cox, Mills, Quam, Rowe,

Strain, Timme, Waddell, and Williams for a two-week extension of time to file a reply to Plaintiff

Pedro Gomez's opposition to their motion for summary judgment motion is granted. Defendants

Bree, Can, Cox, Mills, Quam, Rowe, Strain, Timme, Waddell, and Williams shall file their reply

on or before August 20, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

THE HONORABLE MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Order Granting Defs.' Mot. Extension Time Reply Pl.'s Opposition (C 08-2969 MMC (PR))

Case 3:08-cv-02969-MMC Document 149 Filed 08/05/10 Page 1 of 1
### §7269a. Repealed. Pub. L. 109–289, div. B, title II, §20319, as added Pub. L. 110–5, §2, Feb. 15, 2007, 121 Stat. 21.

Section, Pub. L. 102–377, title III, §302, Oct. 2, 1992, 106 Stat. 1339, authorized transfer of funds between appropriations for Department of Energy activities.