ALD-017 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-2490

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FAWAD SHAH SYED,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN LORETTO FCI

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-00122)

District Judge: Honorable Stephanie L. Haines

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 26, 2023

Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed November 21, 2023)

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OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Appellant Fawad Syed, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 

dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the 

following reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.

In 2013, following a jury trial, Syed was convicted, in the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Georgia, of attempted online enticement of a minor, 

destruction of records, and attempted destruction of records. He was sentenced to 294 

months’ imprisonment. Syed appealed and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed his conviction. United States v. Syed, 616 F. App’x 973 (11th Cir. 2015) (per 

curiam), cert denied, 577 U.S. 1240 (2016). Syed thereafter filed a motion to vacate 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied by the District Court. Syed v. United 

States, No. 117-036, 2018 WL 4494202 (S.D. Ga. July 6, 2018), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3738222 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 7, 2018).

On June 13, 2023, Syed filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Syed presented the 

following claims: (1) insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, (2) entrapment 

which resulted in a due process violation, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. The 

Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation recommending that the petition be 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Syed objected. On August 9, 2023, the District Court 

entered an order overruling Syed’s objections and dismissing the petition. Syed appeals.
3

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing the 

District Court’s dismissal of the § 2241 petition, we exercise plenary review over its legal 

conclusions and review its factual findings for clear error. See Cradle v. United States ex 

rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We may summarily affirm a 

District Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record if the appeal does not 

raise a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. 

Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

The District Court correctly determined that Syed could not pursue his claims in a 

§ 2241 petition. As recognized by the District Court, “[m]otions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255 are the presumptive means by which federal prisoners can challenge their 

convictions or sentences” on constitutional grounds. Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 

117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002). Such claims may not be raised in a § 2241 petition, except 

where the remedy under § 2255 would be “inadequate or ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2255(e); Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 475 (2023) (discussing the saving clause).

Syed has not argued, much less demonstrated, that this exception applies.

Notably, he has not cited any “unusual circumstances mak[ing] it impossible or 

impracticable to seek relief in the sentencing court.” Jones, 599 U.S. at 478.1 Rather, he 

1 To the extent the District Court relied on the interpretation of the savings clause 

in In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251–52 (3d Cir. 1997), that decision has been 

abrogated by Jones, 599 U.S. at 477.
4

presents claims that he either could have raised or did raise in his initial § 2255 motion or 

on direct appeal. Although the limitations on second or successive § 2255 motions might 

prevent him from raising the claims in a new § 2255 motion, that does not make § 2255

inadequate or ineffective. See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120.

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.