FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT MAY 27, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1590 2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 9 6- 07 26 6- CV-DTKH TERRY M. J AMERSON,

Pet it io ne r-Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent -Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ ( May 27, 200 5) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , P RY O R and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PRY OR, Circuit Judge: T he sol e iss ue in thi s a

ppe al is w he the r T er

ry M. Jam er son is e nti tle d to2

federa l habeas relief

because a F lorida trial court allegedly instructed the jury

that it could find Jam erson guilt y as an ac com

plice to second-degree m urder if the j ury found Jam erson guilt y

of any lesser-included offense. Bec ause the j ury instructio ns, in the context of the entire charge, fairly and correc tly

stated the law of Flo rid a, we co nc lu de , un de r th e h ig hl y de fere nt ia l s ta nd ardof h ab eas rev ie w, that Jam erson was not denied due process. W e af firm the denial of habeas relief . I. BACKG ROUND Ja m er son’ s c onvi ct iona ri se s f ro m the 199 2 m

ur de r of L uy enN guy en , a19- y ear- old stu de nt o f V ie tnam es e de sc en t, w ho w as be at ento de ath by agr oup of drun ke n you ng m en . Accor di ng to tes ti m on y at J am ers on ’s tri al , Ngu y en an d t wo fr ie nds, Je ff

S int ay a nd R y anG ue rr a, a tte nde d aparty in Co ra l S pr ing s, F lor ida on August 15, 1992 . The thre e left the par ty after 45 m inutes. Sintay

testified that, a s they we re leaving the apartm ent wher e the party wa s held, Sintay

overheard several derogatory

rem arks directed at N guy en. Those re m arks included the racial sl ur s “ ch in k” an d “ Viet co ng .” Sintay told Nguy en about the epith ets. N guy en said that he wanted to return to the party

to “ talk” about the ins ults. Concerned about “ the ty pe of elem ent” at th e p art y , Sin ta y

co nv in cedNgu y en no t t o re tu rn to th e p art y . On the sidewa lk out side the apartm ent build ing, Sintay , Guerra, and Nguy en3

en co unt er ed

Br ad le y Mi lls , w ho h ad

a lso a tte nde d th e party . N guy ena ske d M ill s about th e com

m ents m ade at the party . Mills then called several party goers ga the re d onaba lc ony

ove rl ooki ng the sid ew al k and s ai d “ thi s ki d’ s go t a pr obl em . ” Mi lls a lso c al le d f or “ Ch ri s” a nd “ Ja m

m er ” to c om e dow n to the sid ew al k. Sintay testified that several persons, including Jam erson, surrounded N guy en . A n arg um en t e nsue d, a nd J am er son push ed N guy ena ft er

a nothe r pe rs on sla ppe d N guy enin the f

ac e. A ft er

Jam er son push ed

N guy en , m em

be rs of the group su rrounding Nguy en struck him num erous tim es. Sintay

testified that, a fter the a tta ck , Jam er son ran pa st S int ay a nd s ta te d, “ W e got

him goo d, but

som eo ne got m e good too . ” N guy endie d f

ro m ablo wto the he ad

that br oke his ne ck

a nd s e v e r e da n a rt e ry. O the r w itn es se s c or

ro bor at ed S int ay ’ s te sti m ony . D av id M ic ha el son te sti fi ed that he sawagr oup of

pe rs ons “ kic kin g and p unc hin g and j um pin g on ” N guy en , a nd J am er son w as part of that gr oup. Joh n R

uss te sti fi ed

that he he ar d a

“ lot of y elling,” including the phrase “ I hate V ietnam ese. ” Russ also testified that he sawJam er son an d anothe r pe rs on w al kin g aw ay f ro m w he re N guy enlay

on the gr ound a ft er the be at ing . Mathe wMe tz ge r, w ho kne wJam er son an d w as a re sid en t of

the apartm en t c om

ple x, te sti fi ed

that Jam er son cam e to h is a partm en t4

that ni ght , use d M et zg er ’ s te le phon e, a nd a ske d M et zg er about the be st w ay

to le av e th e ap art m en t co m

pl ex wit ho ut be in g s een . Jam erson and two others we re c harged with second-degree m urder and tried as principals in the first degree. A t the close of evidence, the state trial court instructed the jury

on the elem ents of second-degree m urder, along with the lesserincluded o ffenses of m anslaugh ter, aggravated battery , and battery . The tr ial court al so i nstru ct ed

the j ur y r eg ar din g th e Fl or ida

lawof pr inc ipa ls, w hic h ho lds ac co unt ab le , a s apr inc ipa l i n th e fi rs t de gr ee , a ny pe rs on who a ids in the co m m iss ionof

a ny c ri m ina l of

fe nse , r eg ar dle ss o f w he the r that pe rs on w as pr es en t atth e co m

m is si on of t he off

en se . Fla. St at . § 7 77 .01 1. The tr ial court gave the Florida Standard Jury Instruction then in effe ct re gard ing pr inc ipa l l ia

bil ity : If tw o or m or e pe rs on s help e ac h othe r co m m it a cr im e an d th e D ef en dant i s on e of t he m , th e D ef en dant i s apr inc ipa l and m ust be tr eate d a s if

he ha d do ne a ll of

the thi ngs the oth er pe rs on or pe rs ons did if the D ef en dant: N um be r one , kne ww ha t w as goi ng t o ha ppe n. A nd, num

be r tw o, int en de d to part ic ipate a ct ive ly or by sharing in an e xpe ct ed

be ne fi t. And, num ber three, actually

did som ething b y

which he intended to help comm it the crim e.5 H el p m eans t o a id, plan or a ssi st. To be a principal, the D efendant does not hav e to be present w hen the c ri m e is c om

m itt ed . D ur ing de lib er at ion s, the j ur y a ske d th e tr ia l c ourt the f oll ow ing que sti on:

“ Re gard ing the pr inc ipa ls c lause in num be r one , ‘ kne ww ha t w as goi ng t o happen,’ do we interpre t this to m ean death/serious bod ily injury or fight? ” A fter extensive argum ent, and ov er the obj ections of defense co-counsel, the tr ial court answer ed that the liabilityof a principal applied to each cr im inal charge:

Me m be rs o f the j ur

y , the lawof

pr inc ipa ls a

ppl ie s to the m ai n accusation, second degree m urder. It also applies to the lesser included o f f e n s e s o f man s l au g h t e r , a g g r a v a t e db a t t e ry an db a t t e ry. Ina nsw er to y our spe ci fi c que sti on, quot e, kne ww ha t w as goi ng to happe n, un qu ot e , t hat pe rt a i ns t o a c r i m i na l a c t . K ne w w ha t wa s go in g t o h ap pe n p ert ai ns to a cri m in al act . T he j ur y r et ur ne d to it s de lib er at ion s, but la te r as ke d ase co nd que sti on ab out pr inc ipa l l ia

bil ity , w hic h w as a cc om

panie d by adia gr am : [I] f w e have established that a s p ec ific cr im e w as com m itted betwee n C and D, and there is a chart here for [the c ourt] , under the law o f p r i n c i p a l s , c o u l d a n yo n e w h o c o mmi t t e dal e s s e r r e l a t e dc r i me betwee n A and C be charged as a principal with the crim e com m itted be t w e e n C a nd

D ? O ve r the obj ec tio ns o f de fe nse c o- co unse l, the tr ia l c ourt t old the j ur y to re ad the earl ie r ins tr

uc tio ns a ga in:6 W ithr es pe ct to thi s que sti on, I w oul d as k al l of y ou t o de lib er at e furthe r. Re re ad m

y ins tr uc tio ns o n th e law . A nd s inc e y ou h av e al re ady fo cu se d inon the lawof

pr inc ipa ls, I w oul d as k y ou t o r er ea d th e lawof pr inc ipa ls. Hop efu ll y , w ha te ve r fa ct s y ou h av e es ta bli she d w ill be able to an swe r th is qu es ti on un de r th e la w as I h av e al read y gi v e n i t t o y ou . .

. . Y ou are f

re e to r ev isi t thi s spe ci fi c que sti on o r a re la te d qu es tio n. If y ou c ana ns wer th is que sti on f ro m w ha t I have j ust

sa id, a nd i f it triggers som e o ther ty

pe of related questio n, in short, take anoth er har d lo okat t he in st ru ct io ns on th e la w. If y our que sti on i s af

ac tua l o ne , I c an ’ t answ er that. I have no ri ght to. I f y ou f

ee l tha t y our

que sti on i s pu rel y a le ga l qu es tio n in w hic h y ou are a ski ng m e to e xpand or am pl ify on e ith er

the lawof pr inc ipa ls o r som e oth er

le ga l c onc ep t, a sk the que sti on a ga in. T he j ur y a ske d no a ddi tio na l qu es tio ns and, a ft er f urthe r de lib er at ion s, found Jam erson guilt y

of second-degree m

urder. T he trial court sentenced Ja m er son to 2 2 y ears in pr iso n. Jam er son ap pe al ed . O n di re ct appe al , Jam er son ar gue d th at the tr ia l c ourt m iss ta te d th e lawin its an sw er s to the j ur

y ’ s qu es tio ns r eg ar din g th e phr as e “ kne ww ha t w as goi ng t o happen.” Jam erson contended th at the trial court instructed the j ury that so lon g as the j ury found Jam erson guilt y

of any crim e, it could conv ict him of second-degree m ur de r unde r the lawof

pr inc ipa ls. T he appe llate c ourt r ej ec te d th is arg um en t, with one j udge dis senting , and affirm ed Jam erson’ s convictio n without a written7

opin ion. Jam erson v. State, 677 So. 2d 129 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996 ) (per curi am). T he dis se nti ng j udge c ont en de d th at the a nsw er s gi ve n by

the tr ia l j udge

“ be g[ ge d] the que sti on a ske d by the j ur y ” an d “ co uld

have pot en tia lly

m isl ed the j ury to believe that if a defe ndant kn ewany crim inal act w as going to happen, then that de fe ndant c oul d be c onvi ct ed of se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r. ” I d. a t 13 00 (Par iente, J. , dissenting). In Oc tober 1996 , Jam erson filed in the Southern District of Florida a pe tit ionf or aw ri t of ha be as c or pus, und er

28 U . S. C. se ct ion225 4. Am ag istrate j udge iss ue d ar ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n th at

the pe tit ionbe de nie d, a nd the district court adopt ed that recom m endation in De cem

ber 1998. Jam erson appealed to this Court, where w e concluded that the dis trict court did not app ly the corre ct st an da rdto de te rm in e whe th er t he all eg ederro r de pr iv edJamerso n o f du e p ro ces s. Jam erson v. Se c’ y

for the D ep’ t of Corrs. , N o. 00-15605 , slip op. at 3 ( 11th Cir. June 26, 200 1) ( pe r curi am). W e state d th at the pr ope r standard

w as w he the r the erro r h ad “ s ub s t an t i al an di n ju ri o u s ef fe ct o r i n fl u en ce i n d et er m i n i n g th e ju ry’s ve rd ic t. ” I d. a t 2 (quot ing Ca lif or nia v. Ro y , 519 U . S. 2, 5, 117 S . Ct . 337 , 338 (1 996) ). W e re m an de d th e ca se f or r ev ie wund er

the c or re ct standard a nd p oss ibl e reviewfor har

m less error: [T ] he district c ourt is free to dete rm ine in the first i n s t an ce8

w he the r the j ur

y ins tr uc tio n and s uppl em en ta l e xpl an at ionin que sti on co nst itu te d fe de ra l co nst itu tio na l e rr or und er the pr ope r standard

a nd, if the c ourt de ci de s it

did , the n de ci de w he the r the error w as harm le ss unde r the pr ope r standard . O r the c ourt m ay ini tia lly de te rm ine if

the al le ge d e rro r was ha rm le ss . Id. at 4 (footnote om itted). T he m ag istrate j udge iss ue d ar ep ort and r ec om m en da tio n th at

the pe tit ion be denied. T he m agistrate j udge stated th at the j ury instruction s and later answ ers to th e jury’ s q ue st io ns , vi ewedas a who le , fai rly andaccu rat el y st at edth e la w. The m agistrate j udge further rec omm ended that, even if the instructions were erroneous, the er

ror w as harm less. T he m agistrate j udge no ted that “ the m ere poss ibilityof j ury

confusion does not establ ish the su bstantial and in j urious effect on the j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t” that i s r equir ed f or ha be as r el ie f, and “ co nsi de ratio n of the j ury instruction s as a w hole and the trial record” showe d that the jury determ ined Ja m ers on in te nd edto pa rti ci pa te in sec on d- de gr ee m ur de r. Af ter the m agistrate j udge iss ued the report and recom m endation, but before the dis tr ic t c ourt i ssu ed

it s r uli ng, Jam er son w as r el ea se d un co ndi tio na lly f ro m cu sto dy . T he dis tr ic t c ourt or de re d su ppl em en ta l br ie fi ng o n th e iss ue of m ootn ess. A fter hearing from the parties, the district court conclud ed that, under Mi nor v. D ugge r, 864 F . 2d 1 24, 127 ( 11th C ir . 198 9) , Jam er son’ s pe tit ionw as not m oot , be ca

use of the “poss ibi lity

of c oll at er al le ga l c onse que nc es ” fr om9

Ja m er son’ s c onvi ct ion . T he dis tr ic t c ourt the n a dopt ed the r ep ort and re co m m en da tio n of

the m ag istrate j udge a nd d en ie d Jam er son’ s pe tit ion . T his ap pe al fol lo wed . II. ST AN DA RD OF RE VIEW W e rev ie w de n ov o t he de ni al of a pe ti ti on forwrit of h ab eas co rp us . Wri ght v. H oppe r, 169 F . 3d 6 95, 701 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) , c er t. de nie d, 528 U . S. 934 , 120 S. Ct . 336 ( 1999 ). B ec au se Jam er son fi le d hi s pe tit iona ft er Apr il 24, 199 6, this case is governed bythe Antiterr orism and Ef fective D eath Penalty

Ac t (A E D PA ), w hic h e sta

bli she s a“ hig hly

de fe re nti al standard

f or r ev ie w ing state co urt j udgm en ts, ” Park er v. S ec ’ y f or the D ep ’ t of

Co rr s. , 331 F . 3d 7 64, 768 ( 11th Cir. 2003 ), and “ prevent[s] feder al habeas ‘ retrials’ . . . to ensure that state-court co nvi ct ion s are giv ene ff ec t t o th e ex te nt p oss ibl e unde r law . ” Be ll v. Co ne , 535 U. S. 685, 693, 122 S. Ct. 1843 , 1849 (2002). Afeder al court can grant habeas relief from

a state c onvi ction in two circum stances: (1) w here the state c ourt proceeding “ resulted in a decision th at w as contrary to, or involved an unr ea sona

ble appl ic at ionof

, c le ar ly e sta bli she d F ed er al law , a s de te rm ine d by the Su pr em e Co urt of

the U nit ed

S ta te s” ; or

( 2) w he re the state c ourt pr oc ee din g

“ re sul te d inade ci sio n th at w as ba se d ona n un re as ona ble de te rm inatio n of

the fact s i n l ig ht of t he ev id en ce p res en te d i n t he Sta te co ur t p ro ceed in g.” 28 U.S.C. §10

2254 (d ); se e al so D ia z v. S ec ’ y f or the D ep ’ t of

Co rr s. , 402 F . 3d 1 136, 114 1 ( 11th Cir. 2005 ). Fe de ra l ha

be as pr oc ee din gs “ ar e not f or um s inw hic h to r el iti ga te state tr ia ls. ” Bare fo ot v . E ste lle , 463 U . S. 880 , 887 , 103 S . Ct . 338 3, 339 2 ( 1983 ). T he w ri t of ha be as c or pus pr ote ct s pe rs ons ag ai nst “ ex tr em e m al func tio ns i n th e state cr im ina l j ust ic e sy ste m s, ” Ja ck son v. V ir gin ia , 443 U . S. 307 , 332 n. 5, 99 S . Ct . 2781 , 2796 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J. , c oncurring in th e j udgm ent), and habeas relief has histo rically

been lim ited “ to tho se whom society has grievousl y

wr onged.” Br ec ht v . Abr ah am son, 507 U . S. 619 , 637 , 113 S . Ct . 171 0, 172 1 ( 1993 ) (c itatio n an d qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed ). B ec au se “ [d ] ir ec t r ev ie wis the pr inc ipa l ave nue f or ch al le ng in g a co nv ic ti on ,” an d h ab eas pro ceed in gs are “ se co nd ary an d l im it ed ,” id. at 633, 113 S. Ct. at 1719, “ an err or that m ay j ustify rever sal on direct appeal w ill not ne ce ssari ly

sup port a c oll at er al a tta ck

on a f ina l j udgm en t. ” I d. a t 63 4, 113 S. Ct. at 1720 (citations and quot ation m arks om itted). Fe de ra l ha

be as r el ie f is una va ila

ble “ fo r er

ro rs of state law . ” E ste lle v. Mc G uir e, 502 U . S. 62, 67, 112 S . Ct . 475 , 480 ( 1991 ) (quot ing L ew is v . Je ff er s, 497 U.S . 764, 780, 110 S. Ct. 3092 , 3102 (1990)). Aj ury instruction that “ wa s al le ge dly inc or re ct und er state lawis not

aba sis f or ha be as r el ie f, ” id. a t 71 -7 2, 112 S. Ct. at 482, because f ederal habea s review“ is lim ited to decidin g whether a11

convictio n viol ated the Constitu tion, laws, or treaties of the United State s.” Id. at 68, 112 S. C t. at 480. Unlike state appellate c ourts, feder al courts on habeas re vie wa re c onstra ine d to de te rm ine onl y whe the r the c ha lle nge d in str uc tio n, viewed in the context of both th e entire c harge and the trial re cord, “ ‘ so infected the e nti re tr ia l tha t the r es ult ing c onvi ct ionvio la te [d ] due pr oc es s. ’ ” I d. a t 72 , 112 S. Ct . a t 48 2 ( quot ing Cu pp v . N au ght en , 414 U . S. 141 , 147 , 94 S . Ct . 396 , 400 -0 1 (1973)). III. D ISCU SSION T o r es olv e thi s a

ppe al , w e m

ust r ev ie wtw o is sue s. W e fi rs t a ddr es s our j ur isd ic tio n and c onsi de r w he the r the unc ondi tio na l di sc harg e of Jam er son’ s se nte nc e re nde rs thi s a

ppe al m oot . W e the n c onsi de r w he the r the j ur y ins tr uc tio ns giv enby the tr ia l c ourt vi olate d th e fe de ra l gu ar an te e of due pr oc es s. A . J am er son’ s A ppe al i s N ot M oot . Although Florida does not cont end that Jam erson’ s petition is m oot based on the unc ondi tio na l di sc harg e of his se nte nc e, w e m

ust e nsur e that w e ha ve j ur isd ic tio n to c onsi de r thi s a ppe al . C uban A m . Bar A ss’ n, I nc . v. Ch ri sto phe r, 43 F. 3d 1 412, 142 2- 23 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) . S ec tio n 22 54, by it s li te ra l t er

m s, appl ie s to pe rs ons “ in c ust ody , ” but the S upr em e Co urt ha s he ld tha t se ct ion225 4( a) is sa tis fi ed so l ong as the pe tit ion er

is in c ust ody

w he n th e pe tit ionis fi le d. Ma le ng12

v. Co ok , 49 0 U.S. 4 88 , 49 0- 91 , 10 9 S . Ct. 1 92 3, 1 92 5 (1 98 9) (pe r cu ria m ). Com pletion of a c rim inal sentence does not render a petition for habeas relief m oot, because the ongoin g collateral consequences of a wrongful conv iction, such as the possib le enhancem ent of a later crim inal sentence on the basis o f the earlier w ro ngf ul c onvi ct ion , sa tis fy

the c as e- or -c ontro ve rs y

j ur isd ic tio na l r equir em en t of A rt ic le I II of

the Co nst itu tio n. S pe nc er v. K em na , 523 U . S. 1, 7- 8, 118 S . Ct . 978 , 983 (199 8). The uncondition al discharge of Jam erson’ s sentence, ther efore, does not m oot thi s a ppe al . B . T he J uryI nstruc tio ns D id N

ot V iolate D ue Proc es s. Ja m er son co nte nds that the a nsw er s of the tr ia l c ourt t o th e j ur

y ’ s qu es tio ns erroneously

perm itted the jury , in violation o f In r e W inshi p, 397 U. S. 358, 90 S. Ct . 106 8 ( 1970 ), to co nvi ct Jam er son of

se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r w ith out

af ind ing of the r equir ed

state of m ind . Jam er son co nte nds that the ins tr uc tio ns i nc or

re ct ly state d th at , if

the j ur y f ound Jam er son gui lty

of a ny c ri m e, the j ur

y c oul d f ind Ja m er son gui lty

of se co nd- de gr ee m

ur de r. W e dis ag re e. T he ins tr uc tio ns o f the tr ia l c ourt c or

re ct ly state d th e lawa nd, the re fo re , did not de pr ive Jam er son of

due pr oc es s. S ee E ste lle v. Mc G uir e, 502 U . S. a t 72 , 112 S . Ct . a t 48 2. Ja m ers on was p ro se cu te d a s a p rin ci pa l i n t he fir st de gr ee. See Fla . Sta t. § 777. 011. T he S upr em e Co urt of F lor ida ha s he ld tha t t o be gui lty a s apr inc ipa l f

or13

a cr im e co m

m itt ed by a nothe r, the de fe ndant “ m ust int en d th at

the c ri m e be co m m itt ed a nd d o so m e ac t t o a ssi st the oth er pe rs on i n a ct

ua lly c om m itt ing the cr im e. ” S ta te n v. S ta te , 519 S o. 2d 6 22, 624 ( Fl a. 198 8) . I n othe r w or ds, to be l i ab l e a s ap r i n c i p a l f

o r ac r i mi n a l a c t , J a me r s o n mu s th a v e i n t e n d e dth a tth e c r i me ch ar ge d be c om

m itt ed . W e m ust c onsi de r tog ethe r the ins tr uc tio ns o n e ac h c ri m ina l c harg e an d pr inc ipa l l ia

bil ity in re vie w ing w he the r the la te r an sw er s of the tr ia l c ourt t o th e j ury ’ s questio ns vio lated due process. E stelle v. Mc Guire, 502 U.S . at 72, 112 S. Ct . a t 48 2. I t i s un dis put ed that the tr ia l c ourt c or

re ct ly ins tr uc te d th e j ur

y on the el em en ts o f se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r, inc lud ing the r equir ed m en ta l st at e, a nd the tr ia l c ourt c or

re ct ly ins tr uc te d th e j ur

y on the le sse r- inc lud ed

of fe nse s of m anslaugh ter, aggravated battery , and battery . It is also undi sputed th at the trial co urt gave the standard

j ur y ins tr uc tio n th enin ef

fe ct on the lawof

pr inc ipa ls. W iththo se ind isp uta

bly c or re ct ins tr uc tio ns i n m ind , w e ne xt c onsi de r the que sti ons of

the j ur y a nd the a nsw er s pr ovi de d by the tr ia l c ourt. R eg ar din g th e phrase “ knew w hat was going to happ en” in the instruction about princip al lia bil ity , the j ur

y a ske d “ do w e int er

pr et thi s to m ean de ath/s er iou s bo dil y inj ur y or fi ght ?” T he tr ia l c ourt answ er ed that “ the lawof

pr inc ipa ls a

ppl ie s to the m ai n accusation, second degree m urder. It also applies to the lesser included offenses14

of m an sla ught er , a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry a nd b atte ry . I n answ er

to y our spe ci fi c que sti on, quo te , kne ww ha t w as goi ng t o ha ppe n, unquot e, that pe rt ai ns t o a crim inal act. ” T his a nsw er

to the j ur y ’ s qu es tio n c or

re ct ly state d th e re le vant l aw . T he trial court explained that the law of pr incipals appli ed to all offenses the j ury wa s co nsi de ri ng— se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r, m an sla

ught er , a ggr av at ed

ba tte ry , a nd ba tte ry —and c or

re ct ly state d th at

“ kne ww ha t w as goi ng t o ha ppe n” pe rt ai ne d to ea chof tho se c ri m ina l a ct s. B y

ins tr uc tin g th e j ur

y that “ kne ww ha t w as goi ng t o h ap p en ” p er t ai n ed t o a c ri m i n al ac t , t h e t ri al co u rt co rr ec t l y an s we re dth e ju ry’s que sti on. T his appe al is not e ve n a s c los e as E ste lle v. Mc G uir e, w he re the S up r e me C o u rth e l d , o n h ab e a s r e v i e w , th a tad e v i a t i o n b y atr i a l c o u rtf r o m a standard Ca lif or nia j ur y ins tr uc tio n r eg ar din g e vid en ce of ac hara ct er ist ic plan or sc he m e did

not vio la te due pr oc es s. I d. a t 71 , 75, 112 S . Ct . a t 48 1, 484 . T he Co urt he ld tha t the re w as not a“ re as ona

ble li ke lih ood” that the j ur y m isu se d th e nons tandard

ins tr uc tio n, be ca

use the ins tr

uc tio n ha d to be r ea d inthe c ont ex t of the e nti re c harg e an d th e tr ia l c ourt gave ali m iti ng i nstru ct ion . I d. a t 74 -7 5, 112 S. Ct . 48 3- 84 . E ve n if the a nsw er

of the tr ia l c ourt t o th e j ur

y ’ s f ir st que sti on c oul d have be enc le ar er , w e m ay

not j udge it “ in art if ic ia l i sol at ion , ” but

m ust c onsi de r the15

j ury instruction s as a w hole. Id. at 72, 112 S. Ct. at 482 (quoti ng Cupp , 414 U. S. at 147, 94 S. Ct. at 400-01). V iewe d in that cont ext, the answ er of the tr ial court did not “ so i nf ec t[ ] the e nti re tr ia l tha t the r es ult ing c onvi ct ionvio la te [d ] due pr oc es s. ” I d. ( ci ta tio n and quot at ionm ar ks o m itt ed ). T he tr ia l c ourt c or re ct ly ins tr uc te d th e j ur

y about the e le m en ts o f ea chc harg e an d st at ed that the j ur

y ha d to find Jam erson poss essed a depraved m ind to convict him of second-degree m ur de r: “ Be fo re y ou c anf

ind a ny D ef en dant g uil ty

of se co nd d eg re e m

ur de r, the State m ust prov e . . . [ that] there w as an unlawful killing of Luy en Nguy en by an ac t i m m ine ntl y dange ro us t o anothe r an d e vin ci ng a de pr av ed m ind r eg ar dle ss o f hum anli fe . ” I n th e standard j ur y ins tr uc tio n onpr inc ipa ls, the j ur y w as a lso re qui re d to de te rm ine w he the r Ja m er son “ ac tua lly did som ethin g by

w hic h he int en de d to he lp c om

m it the c ri m e. ” T ha t i nstru ct iondid not say “ he lp c om

m it an y c ri m e, ” an d th e tr ia l c ourt di d no t say , in its a nsw er to the j ur y ’ s f ir st que sti on, that “ knew w hat was going to happ en” pertained to any crim e. Inr es pons e to a

f oll ow -u p qu es tio n, the tr ia l c ourt i nstru ct ed the j ur y to reviewand consid er a ll of the earlier instruction s. T he j ury

asked whether

“ an y one w ho c om

m itt ed ale sse r re la te d c ri m e be tw ee n Aa nd C [ co uld ] be charged as a principal with the crim e com m itted between C and D, ” and the trial co ur t i ns tru ct edth e jury to “ [r]ereadm y in st ru ct io ns on th e la w.” Beca us e we16

pr es um e that j ur ie s f

oll owins tr

uc tio ns, S te ve ns v . Z an t, 968 F . 2d 1 076, 108 6 (1 1thCi r. 199 2) , w e pr es um e that the j ur y in Ja m er son’ s tr ia l f

oll ow ed the ins tr uc tio ns o n se co nd- de gr ee m ur de r, le sse r- inc lud ed

of fe nse s, a nd the lawof pr inc ipa ls, w hic h, take n a s aw hol e, c or re ct ly state d th e law . T he a dm oni tio n of the tr ia l c ourt t o r ea d a ga in a ll of the e ar lie r ins tr

uc tio ns r ei nf

or ce s our co nc lus ion th atJamerso n was no t d en ie d d ue pro ces s. W e re co gni ze that the tr ia l c ourt c oul d have a nsw er ed the j ur y ’ s qu es tio ns i n gr eate r de ta il, but

the Co nst itu tio n “ en tit le s ac ri m ina l de fe ndant t o af ai r tr ia l, not a pe rf ec t on e. ” D el aw ar e v. V anA rs da ll, 475 U . S. 673 , 681 , 106 S . Ct . 143 1, 1436 (1986). O ur inquiry also is not whether

the challenged instructio ns were

“ undesirable, er

roneous, or even universally condem ned;” our inqu iry

is whether the instructio ns “ so infected the entire trial that the r esulting conviction violates due pr oc es s. ” E ste lle v. Mc G uir e, 502 U . S. a t 72 , 112 S . Ct . a t 48 2 ( ci ta tio n and quot at ionm ar

ks o m itt ed ). B ec au se the ins tr uc tio ns f ai rl y a nd c or re ct ly state d th e law , U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ru sse ll, 717 F . 2d 5 18, 521 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) , the y did not vio la te due pr oc es s. IV. C ONC LUS ION Be ca use the tr ia l c ourt c or

re ct ly state d th e lawin its a nsw er s to the que sti ons fr om

the j ur y , Jam er son’ s c onvi ct iondid not vio la te due pr oc es s. T he17

ru lin g of the dis tr ic t c ourt, the re fo re , is AFFIRMED.