NO. 87-499 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

DONALD AND LOIS STOUT, husband 

and wife, and MAX AND MARIE 

McGRANN, husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs and Respondents, 

-vsTHE MONTANA POWER COMPANY, 

a Montana corporation, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Fergus, 

The Honorable Byron Robb, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Patrick T. Fleming, Butte, Montana 

For Respondent : 

R. Keith Strong; Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams, 

Great Falls, Montana 

John R. Christensen, Stanford, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: July 21, 1988 

Decided: October 17, 1988 

. Clerk 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

The Montana Power Company, defendant, appeals the jury 

verdict and decision of the District Court of the Tenth 

Judicial District, Fergus County, denying defendant's motions 

for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the 

jury verdict. We affirm. 

Montana Power Company raises the following three issues 

on appeal: 

1. Whether the District Court erred by denying 

defendant's motion for a directed verdict after the close of 

plaintiffs' cases. 

2. Whether substantial evidence exists to support the 

jury verdict, finding defendant negligent in constructing, 

maintaining and inspecting the power equipment and service 

lines connected to Stouts' building. 

3. Whether the District Court erred by denying 

defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury 

verdict. 

Donald and Lois Stout owned a building in Coffee Creek, 

Montana. They leased part of the building to Max and Marie 

McGrann, who used a portion of the building as a residence 

and another portion to operate their meat cutting business. 

Stouts reserved a portion of the building to use as a storage 

facility and post office. Montana Power Company owned the 

power equipment and service lines that delivered electricity 

to Stouts' building. 

On April 2, 1985, a fire completely destroyed Stouts' 

building and its contents. Stouts filed a lawsuit on June 4, 

1985 in the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, 

Fergus County, alleging that defendant. failed to perform 
properly its duty of inspecting and maintaining its power 

equipment and service lines connected to their building in 

Coffee Creek and that the failure proximately caused the fire 

that destroyed their building, causing them financial loss. 

Shortly thereafter, McGranns filed a similar lawsuit in the 

same action. The District Court consolidated Stouts' and 

McGranns' lawsuits for trial. 

The parties tried the lawsuits before a jury beginning 

September 28, 1987 and continuing through October 1, 1987, at 

which time Stouts and McGranns rested. Defendant moved for a 

motion for a directed verdict as to its alleged negligence. 

The District Court found that sufficient facts existed to 

permit the cases to go to the jury and denied the motion. 

Defendant rested without presenting any additional evidence. 

The jury returned a verdict on October 1, 1987 finding 

defendant negligent in constructing, maintaining and 

inspecting the power equipment and service lines connected to 

Stouts' building. On October 8, 1987, defendant moved for a 

judgment in its favor notwithstanding the verdict. The 

District Court denied the motion and defendant then appealed 

to this Court. 

The first issue presented to this Court is whether the 

District Court erred by denying defendant's motion for a 

directed verdict after the close of plaintiffs' cases. 

The District Court, as well as this Court, must view a 

motion for a directed verdict in a light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Britton v. Farmers Insurance Group 

(Mont. 1986), 721 P.2d 303, 317, 43 St.Rep. 641, 656; Jacques 

v. Montana Nat'l Guard (1982), 199 Mont. 493, 504, 649 P.2d 

1319, 1325; Weber v. Blue Cross of Montana (19821, 196 Mont. 

454, 462, 643 P.2d 198, 202. The motion is properly granted 

only if no evidence exists that would warrant submission to 

the jury. A directed verdict is not proper, therefore, when 
the inferences and conclusions drawn from the evidence 

presented could differ among reasonable people. Britton, 721 

P.2d at 317, 43 St.Rep. at 656; Jacques, 199 Mont. at 504-05, 

649 P.2d at 1325; Weber, 196 Mont. at 462-63, 643 P.2d at 

202. The District Court found that sufficient evidence 

existed that was within the province of the jury. We agree. 

At the trial level, the primary issue presented was 

whether defendant was negligent in maintaining and inspecting 

the power equipment and service lines connected to Stouts' 

building. In denying the motion for a directed verdict, the 

District Court relied on Professor Bernstein's expert opinion 

as to the cause of the fire; Marie McGrann's testimony that 

on the day of the fire she saw a loose wire; and photographs 

of other service lines in the Coffee Creek area that are 

maintained by defendant. As the District Court properly 

noted, a jury was impaneled and when geniune questions of 

facts exist it is the jury's function to determine the facts. 

In this case, the jury was the proper body to determine the 

weight of Professor Bernstein's expert opinion; Marie 

McGrann's testimony; and the photographs of other service 

lines in the Coffee Creek area that appeared poorly 

maintained. The inferences and conclusions drawn from this 

evidence could differ among reasonable people, as evident by 

the jury's inferences and conclusions, which resulted in a 

verdict for Stouts and McGranns, versus defendant's assertion 

that no evidence whatsoever exists that would establish 

negligence on their part. 

When requested to direct a verdict, a court must 

exercise the "greatest self-restraint in interfering with the 

constitutionally mandated processes of jury decision. The 

message is to do so only in the clearest of cases. . . ." 

Jacques, 199 Mont. at 504, 649 P.2d at 1325 (quoting 

Karczewski v. Ford Motor Co. (N.D. Ind. 19741, 382 F.Supp. 
1346, 1348, aff'd, 515 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1975)). After 

viewing the motion in a light most favorable to Stouts and 

McGranns, we affirm the District Court's finding that 

sufficient evidence existed to deny defendant's motion for a 

directed verdict after the close of plaintiffs' cases. 

The second issue raised on appeal is whether substantial 

evidence exists to support the jury verdict finding defendant 

negligent in constructing, maintaining and inspecting the 

power equipment and service lines connected to Stouts' 

building. 

When presented with this issue, the law requires this 

Court to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prevailing party. Wheeler v. City of Bozeman (Mont. 1988) , 

757 P.2d 345, 347, 45 St.Rep. 1173, 1176; Kukuchka v. Ziemet 

(Mont. 1985), 710 P.2d 1361, 1363, 42 St.Rep. 1916, 1917; 

Gunnels v. Hoyt (Mont. 1981), 633 P.2d 1187, 1191, 38 St.Rep. 

1492, 1495. The evidence may be inherently weak and still he 

considered substantial. Wheeler, 757 P.2d at 347, 45 St.Rep. 

at 1176; Gunnels, 633 P.2d at 1191, 38 St.Rep. at 1495. 

The record shows that Max and Marie McGrann testified 

that just prior to the fire their lights were flickering and 

their radio was making static. Lois Stout also testified 

that the lights were flickering just before the fire started. 

Marlin Jegtvig, who hauls away meat by-products from 

McGranns' business once a week testified that on the day of 

the fire he made his routine stop at McGranns' and witnessed 

arcing, a sustained luminous discharge of electricity across 

a gap, within the joints of the tin siding of the building. 

He informed Max and Marie McGrann, who both testified that 

they also observed the arcing. Marie McGrann then testified 

that she promptly called Montana Power Company so as to have 

the power turned off and that she had also noticed a loose 

swinging wire when she observed the arcing. Ron Brinkman, a 
member of the Coffee Creek Volunteer Fire Department, 

testified that he also observed a loose wire on the top roof 

knob, after Dick Ronish, another person at the scene of the 

fire, pointed it out to him. 

The record also shows that Theodore Bernstein, a 

professor of electrical and computer engineering and who is 

frequently called to assess the cause of a fire, testified 

that after reading statements and depositions from people at 

the fire, studying photographs of Montana Power Company's 

service lines in the Coffee Creek area shortly after the 

fire, photographs of the equipment that was removed from the 

fire, and photographs of the fire scene, that in his expert 

opinion the fire began when the upper roof knob pulled loose 

from the building and swung into the tin siding. He further 

testified that every time the roof knob would hit the tin 

siding the electricity would go from the pole to the siding 

via the wire and roof knob, and then to the ground. He 

testified that the temperature of the arcs range from two to 

four thousand degrees, or even higher. The fire ignited, in 

his opinion, when the electricity would cross over flammable 

materials in the building, such as wooden slats or beams. 

Defendant argues that Professor Bernstein's opinion 

regarding the cause of the fire was wrong because his opinion 

was based on a roof knob coming loose, and Ronald Brinkman, a 

volunteer fireman at the scene of the fire, testified that he 

did not see any loose roof knobs. Professor Bernstein also 

testified, however, that a roof knob from Stouts' building 

had signs of arcing, which would only occur if the knob had 

swung loose and hit the tin siding. When conflicting 

evidence exist, the credibility and weight given to the 

conflicting evidence is within the jury's province. Wheeler, 

757 P.2d at 347, 45 St.Rep. at 1176; Mountain West Farm 

Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Girton (Mont. 1985) , 697 P. 2d 
1362, 1363, 42 St.Rep. 500, 501. This Court will not reweigh 

conflicting evidence on appeal. We therefore hold that 

substantial evidence existed to support the jury verdict. 

The last issue raised on appeal is whether the District 

Court erred by denying defendant's motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the jury verdict. 

This motion, like a motion for a directed verdict, is 

properly granted only when no evidence exists to support a 

jury verdict. Wilkerson v. School Dist. No. 15, Glacier Cty. 

(Mont. 1985), 700 P.2d 617, 622, 42 St.Rep. 745, 750-51. 

Gunlock v. Western Equipment Co. (Mont. 1985), 710 P.2d 714, 

716, 42 St.Rep. 1882, 1884-85. In light of our previous 

discussion, we hold that the District Court properly denied 

defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict. 

Affirmed. n 

We Concur: