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TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST

CENTURY: DO NEW THREATS REQUIRE

NEW APPROACHES?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 17, 2010

Serial No. 111–86

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

VACANT 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

AMANDA SLOAT, Professional Staff Member 

GENELL BROWN, Senior Staff Associate/Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Thomas Graham, Senior Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc. (Former 

Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council) ......................... 8

The Honorable Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference (Former German Ambassador to the United States) ........................... 21

Ms. Sally McNamara, Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs, Margaret 

Thatcher Center for Freedom, The Heritage Foundation ................................. 31

Mr. Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Center ........................................ 40

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Thomas Graham: Prepared statement ............................................................ 11

The Honorable Wolfgang Ischinger: Prepared statement .................................... 23

Ms. Sally McNamara: Prepared statement ........................................................... 33

Mr. Dmitri Trenin: Prepared statement ................................................................ 43

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida: Letter dated December 11, 2009, to the Honorable Barack 

H. Obama, President of the United States, from Members of Congress ......... 61

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 75

Questions for the record submitted by the Honorable Barbara Lee, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and responses from: 

Mr. Thomas Graham ........................................................................................... 77

Ms. Sally McNamara ........................................................................................... 79

Mr. Dmitri Trenin ................................................................................................ 83

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TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DO NEW THREATS REQUIRE NEW APPROACHES? 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman, 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman BERMAN. The committee will come to order. After the 

ranking member and I make our opening remarks, I will recognize 

the chairman and ranking member of the Europe Subcommittee for 

3 minutes to make opening statements and other members of the 

committee for 1 minute should they wish to make opening remarks. 

Members are welcome to place written statements in the record, 

and we welcome our panelists and everyone who is with us for a 

hearing on a subject that is actually much more interesting than 

it sounds. 

For over four decades after the Second World War, the United 

States and Europe were focused on confronting the threat posed by 

the Soviet Union. That threat disappeared with the end of the Cold 

War, but it was replaced with a much wider, more complex array 

of security challenges, many of which emanate from outside the 

Euro-Atlantic region. Do we have the right tools, institutions and 

approaches to deal with these new threats? That is the subject of 

our hearing today. 

In addition to the potential instability in Southeastern Europe, 

we are confronting the ever-growing likelihood of a nuclear-armed 

Iran, the menace of al-Qaeda that continues to spread around the 

world, a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

We also need to determine how to deal collectively with concerns 

such as energy security, sea piracy and climate change. 

The existing transatlantic and European institutions—such as 

NATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 

or OSCE, and the European Union—have done a remarkable job 

building peace and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic zone for many 

decades. But they are now re-evaluating their roles and capabilities 

to ensure that they can confront the challenges of the 21st century 

as effectively as possible. 

NATO has been an extraordinarily successful military alliance 

for the past 60 years, but the purpose for which it was created no 

2

longer exists. Since the Cold war has ended, it has transformed to 

address new threats—but as demonstrated by the current difficulty 

in obtaining sufficient troop levels in Afghanistan, many alliance 

members question the desirability of engaging in out-of-area missions. Other allies question whether NATO should—and indeed is 

structured to—take on issues such as energy security. 

As NATO reviews its Strategic Concept, what should be its mission for the foreseeable future, and what changes, if any, need to 

be made to the structure of the alliance? 

The OSCE is the Euro-Atlantic organization with the most comprehensive membership, comprising 56 countries, all with equal 

standing. But Russia has argued that rather than fulfilling its goal 

of a continent-wide security organization, the OSCE has focused 

mostly on human rights and so-called ‘‘soft’’ security concerns. 

Thus, Russia’s leadership has reiterated its call to strengthen and 

expand the OSCE’s responsibilities. 

Following its meeting in Corfu last June, the OSCE set up a 

process to consider ways to increase security from Vancouver to 

Vladivostok. Can and should the OSCE become the preeminent security organization in the transatlantic region and do more to 

strengthen its political-military and economic and environmental 

dimensions in addition to its human dimension? 

Finally, the European Union has evolved from its initial function 

of preserving peace between France and Germany to developing a 

single economic union and seeking a more unified approach to foreign policy among its 27 members. The U.S. has often been critical 

of the EU for a lack of coherence in its foreign policy decision-making and its comparatively low defense spending. The recent ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is expected to herald a more united common security and defense policy—maybe. 

The EU is effectively handling humanitarian and training responsibilities in Afghanistan, and it has conducted peacekeeping 

missions in Chad, the Congo and the Balkans. But is the EU adequately structured and resourced to address the new threats, and 

do we want it to do more? 

While these three institutions are studying these issues internally, and academic commentators—including our witnesses—have 

begun to identify the questions, there have been few answers about 

the next steps. Some people talk about strengthening the existing 

institutions to address the new threats, but they do not say how 

or whether that is all that is necessary. Others contend that we 

need to fundamentally rethink and restructure how the transatlantic community addresses these new threats. 

This debate has also been fueled by the re-emergence of Russia 

as a major power. The Euro-Atlantic community learned the hard 

way in August 2008 that none of its institutions was sufficient to 

prevent the conflict between Russia and Georgia. 

Russian President Medvedev has proposed a new treaty to rectify 

what he perceives as the failure of existing structures to create a 

unified security sphere in Europe. His treaty is centered on the 

concept of indivisible security: That is, that one country cannot 

guarantee its security at the expense of another’s. Some in the 

West reject this proposal, arguing that it is designed to undermine 

and weaken NATO. Others believe it has generated an important 

3

dialogue about the existing institutional framework. How should 

the transatlantic community respond to Russia’s proposal? 

Russia is a vital actor on issues such as Iran and Afghanistan, 

nonproliferation and counterterrorism. While a new treaty may not 

be necessary, do we now have an historic opportunity to put the 

Cold War behind us once and for all and forge a strong partnership 

to face the new threats together? Is it time to reconsider the prospect of Russia joining NATO? 

The issues that will be discussed during this hearing are vital to 

the security of all of our countries. I am delighted we have such 

an extraordinary and distinguished panel of experts with us today 

to help us consider these issues from the American, European and 

Russian perspectives, and we look forward to their testimony. But 

before we go to their testimony, I want to turn to the ranking member for any comments that she may wish to make. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

happy St. Patty’s Day to you. I am not one of those who think it 

fashionable to believe that this is now the Pacific Century and that 

the transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe is largely unremarkable. On the contrary, what happens in 

Europe remains very important to us today, just as it was important to earlier generations of Americans. 

There are two major issues that I hope will be discussed in depth 

this morning: The European relationship with Russia, as the chairman pointed out; and the role that Europe needs to play in the 

world. 

We all continue to want what was sought when the Cold War 

ended 20 years ago: ‘‘A Europe whole and free.’’ However, it is 

naive to think that can be accomplished with the kind of regime 

that rules Russia today. We should not welcome into our ranks a 

regime that: Sponsors widespread corruption; represses its political 

opponents; and mounts open aggression and intimidation against 

neighboring countries. We should also recall the lessons of history 

and how appeasement in Europe has been a certain path to a bitter, devastating outcome. 

The leaders in Moscow today, despite their occasional soothing 

statements, quite simply recognize that they need to create the 

image of an ‘‘enemy’’ for their people in order to justify their continued rule. Our efforts to appease them will only lead them to raise 

the ante. Why? They have done little to nothing to set a strong 

foundation for Russia’s future economic progress. They have also 

done little to set forth a realistic foreign policy that will provide 

true security for Russia in the future. 

Instead, they have enriched themselves while sponsoring the 

most shameful methods to eliminate their internal critics, all the 

while keeping the Russian people distracted by creating a fac ̧ade 

that their country faces a threat from the West, particularly from 

the United States. 

It is easy to see what is wrong with the policies of those who lead 

Russia today, but we need to see what is wrong with our own policies toward Russia. 

We cannot expect to have any real credibility if we condemn Russia’s invasion of Georgia, but then make excuses for that invasion, 

ignore Russia’s continue occupation of Georgian territory, re-admit 

4

Russia into NATO’s councils and then offer to sell it our advanced 

weapons. 

We cannot make major reductions in our strategic nuclear forces 

and play with negotiating away our right to deploy strategic missile defenses simply to cater to the Russian leadership. 

We cannot talk of human rights with sincerity if we ignore the 

all-too-obvious campaign of beatings and murders of independent 

reporters, lawyers and activists in Russia in recent years. No. This 

is not the time for appeasement, arms sales and abandonment of 

those struggling for democracy in Russia and the countries that 

once formed the Soviet Union. 

It is important that the leading states of Europe set for themselves a role that reflects the reality of the world as it is and of 

the events and policies in Russia as they are rather than continuing to take the paths of least resistance and wishful thinking. 

For decades during the Cold War, the democracies of Europe 

were basically asked to focus only on their own defense from attacks by the Soviet block while the United States provided leadership around the world and invested in the preparedness of its 

troops, in global force projection capabilities, in the introduction of 

precision-guided munitions and advanced technologies; the states of 

Europe grew comfortable with deploying forces that focused mostly 

on their own defense. 

Now the United States seeks real, comprehensive support from 

the leading states of Europe in the fighting in Afghanistan. I am 

hopeful that the attempts by leading countries within the European Union to: Develop strategic airlift capability; to procure advanced military technologies; and to prepare at least some troops 

for rapid deployment are a sign that they recognize that Europe 

cannot continue to leave the United States to assume all the responsibility for global security and stability. 

I am hopeful that the EU’s mission to combat piracy off the coast 

of East Africa is indeed a sign of new activism, but I am not overly 

optimistic. The leading European states continue to allocate insufficient funding to defense, and, when they do deploy troops to truly 

important military operations, such as in Afghanistan, many of 

them limit their troops’ exposure to combat by means of ‘‘caveats.’’

The leading European governments cannot expect the United 

States to continue to offer our guarantee for their European security if those governments continue to carry on as usual by: Flirting 

with sales of arms to China and Russia; trading with countries like 

Iran; and looking away when dictators repress opposition whether 

in Cuba, Russia, Sudan or Iran. Europe remains important to the 

United States, obviously, but our calls for support must not go 

unheeded. 

Moreover, the future of small states, like Georgia, cannot be sacrificed for the sake of European commerce and unwillingness to 

stand up in defense of a ‘‘Europe whole and free.’’ Finally, we all 

welcome the European Union’s efforts to improve European defense 

capabilities, but we hope that those efforts will not come at the expense of the NATO alliance and its ability to ensure the security 

of Europe and to address new threats. 

Thank you, as always, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to 

speak. Thank you. 

5

Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, and now I am 

pleased to yield 3 minutes to the chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, Mr. Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, thank you, and I want to extend a welcome 

to all of our panelists, but particularly to Ambassador Ischinger, 

who served his country so well here and was a resource for members of this committee as well as Dmitri Trenin, whom I have had 

the opportunity to meet in Moscow and I must say is well respected 

and well regarded both here and in Russia and has done much to 

advocate for democracy in Russia. Mr. Chairman, the evolution of 

European security and the concept of an integrated Europe in the 

destructive aftermath of World War II has really been dramatic 

and swift in an historical context. 

Through a shared commitment with the United States, the modern transatlantic security structure was developed to deter the Soviet Union as you have said and to promote cooperation and prosperity for Europe. When one views the historical context from 

Churchill’s 1947 speech in Zurich calling for closer European integration and cooperation, the formation of NATO in 1949 and 

Schumann’s 1951 speech that led to the European Coal and Steel 

Community, the end result is that the 27-member European Union 

enjoys an unprecedented level of peace on their continent, which is 

welcome by all. 

But with peace comes a recognition that today’s threats are different. The Cold War is over, and the development of a new security strategy taking into account the United States, Europe and 

Russia must take a new turn. In fact, I believe the shared common 

interest of the United States and Europe must view Russia as a potential partner for continued peace and security. In today’s 

globalized world, the relationship is simply too important to ignore. 

It is not going to go away. Russia is an essential partner for security and progress in Europe and its relationship with NATO, and 

OSCE is an important foundation to overcome East-West security 

concerns. 

While NATO should remain the cornerstone to Europe’s security, 

their ongoing strategic review should ensure pragmatic dialogue 

and policies toward Russia. While there is diversity in the opinions 

and beliefs as to the blueprint and infrastructure, it is imperative 

that future transatlantic security continues to embrace the concept 

of Europe whole, free and united, and with that, I yield back. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and 

on behalf of the ranking member of the Europe Subcommittee, but 

in his absence, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California, 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

and I welcome the panelists. I am going to have to run in and out 

of this hearing because I have another hearing right down the hall 

in another major committee which I am a member. Just a few 

points, and I will be coming back. If I can’t hear all your testimony, 

I will read it. Let me just note people understand that I worked 

for Ronald Reagan, and I was one of his primary speech writers, 

and even before that, I was the ultimate cold warrior. 

I was in Czechoslovakia with the students there in 1968. I went 

to Vietnam to work with anti-Communist elements there in 1967, 

6

and I have been engaged in a lot of anti-Communist activity in my 

life, but the Cold War is over, and Russia is no longer dominated 

by the Communist Party. It is time for us to understand the Cold 

War is over, and people can’t get over that, and people keep vilifying Russia at our expense. The fact is the challenge we face today 

is far different than the one that I faced when I was younger and 

that our country faced years ago. 

The fact is radical Islam is on us. Radical Islam wants to slaughter our people. We need Russia on our side. We do not need to 

vilify Russia. We recognize their shortcomings, work with them on 

it and try to establish a positive relationship. China is the next 

major challenge we face. It is emerging, and there have been enormous changes in Russia, anyone who has visited Russia knows 

that. I went to Russia in 1985 as part of a delegation from the 

White House, and I have been back a number of times. It is a different country in a better way. 

Well, the fact is, China hasn’t had one iota of reform. They still 

slaughter people for their religious beliefs in China, the Falun 

Gong and others. They are rebuilding their military and aimed it 

at us. Yet, we end up vilifying Russia and not permitting Russia 

to have any of the trade benefits that we have heaped upon China. 

We need to have a new alliance system that will deal with the 

challenges of the future, and that new alliance system has to include Russia, or the United States will be vulnerable. 

It is time to get out of the Cold War mentality and figure out 

what is going to work to create a more peaceful world in the future 

to meet these serious challenges. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you 

holding this hearing because we need to encourage a national discussion on how we are going to shape the future and what alliances 

we have to have if we are going to have a peaceful future. Thank 

you very much. 

Chairman BERMAN. I thank the gentleman, and I am going to 

yield 3 minutes. Our committee is very privileged to have on it the 

current president of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary Assembly in a statement that not everyone thinks we 

have gone to a Pacific orientation. The gentleman from Tennessee, 

Mr. Tanner. 

Mr. TANNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for having this hearing, which is quite timely. Welcome to the 

panel. I may have to go. We have got a markup going in another 

committee, but I too will read the testimony if I am not here partially to listen to it. I will be very brief. As all of you know, NATO 

is currently undergoing its own self-analysis and a new strategic 

concept. The panel of experts chaired by Former Secretary of State 

Madeleine Albright was just down at NDU for a session, which I 

attended as the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. 

We are eager and will participate, and next weekend, the NATO 

PA standing committee will finalize our contribution to and our 

intervention to the Secretary General, who was here, and who we 

had a meeting with 2 weeks ago. Having said all that, this new 

strategic concept I would ask that you give your opinion as to what 

should or should not be included because it is critically important. 

I may have to re-assess some of my positions because I find myself 

agreeing with Mr. Rohrabacher on several points that he made, so 

7

either he or I may wish to reconsider our position, but seriously, 

this idea of NATO is in many respects sort of like the U.N. 

I get so disgusted with the U.N., but if we didn’t have a place 

for people to go and talk, we would have to create one, and NATO, 

for all of its shortcomings, if it were not to exist, we would be welladvised to create something similar, and so this strategic exercise 

is very, very timely, and I too agree what has been one of my frustrations is sometimes the inability of the Russian members of the 

DUMA who attend our NATO meetings to set aside those issues 

that we disagree on and dive wholeheartedly into those that we do 

and help us, nuclear proliferation, radical fundamentalism. 

All of those things are in our mutual interest to work together 

on, and yet we get clouded by our inability to set those aside or 

work on those because of the other areas which made us great. 

Having said all that, I will look forward very much to your contributions. Thank you for being here. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has 

expired. Does anyone else seek recognition for opening statement? 

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 1 minute. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just agree with 

several of the comments that have gone before. It is really time for 

leadership to take center stage on this whole issue of how to deal 

with Russia in a modern concept. As it has been stated, we are no 

longer in the Cold War, but leadership requires boldness. It requires looking at situations with the intelligence and common 

sense that presents the immediacy of now and the future, and 

there is no question about it. 

When it comes to every major issue facing Europe and the north 

Atlantic, Russia is dead center. I am a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and have an opportunity to have visited Russia, and I have engaged with them. It is not a perfect country, but 

let me just say if we are going to have global peace, if we are going 

to learn how to work with our resources in a way that provides for 

energy security, for a way to deal with nuclear non-proliferation. 

There is no question that we have to re-set our relationships 

with Russia and be bold enough to entertain the possibility of looking at Russia as a partner with NATO. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired, and 

now I am very pleased to introduce really an excellent panel. Several of them I know. I actually, on one of those rare occasions, did 

my homework and spent until very late last night reading all their 

testimony, and I do commend it very much to the members of the 

committee. There are really some fascinating and interesting statements there. 

Our first witness is Thomas Graham. He is senior director at 

Kissinger Associates. He was special assistant to the president and 

senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff 

from 2004 to 2007, and director for Russian Affairs at the NSE 

from 2002 to 2004. From 2001 to 2002, Mr. Graham served as the 

associate director of the policy planning staff at the Department of 

State. 

Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger is the chairman of the Munich 

Security Conference. He previously served as Germany’s Deputy 

Foreign Minister from 1998 to 2001, Ambassador to the United 

8

States from 2001 to 2006 and as Ambassador to the U.K. from 2006 

to 2008. In December, Ambassador Ischinger became the co-chair 

of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, which will examine the security challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic region and prepare recommendations for reforming the existing architecture. 

Ms. Sally McNamara is senior policy analyst in European Affairs 

at the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom of the Heritage 

Foundation. Before joining Heritage, she worked at the American 

Legislative Exchange Council as director of International Relations. 

Previously, she worked as an aide in the European Parliament and 

as a press officer for the UK Conservative Party. 

Mr. Dmitri Trenin is director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. I 

have known him a long time, but not that long. From 1972 to 1993, 

he served in the Soviet and Russian Armed Forces during which 

he spent 6 years from 1985 to 1991 as a staff member of the delegation to the United States-Soviet nuclear arms talks in Geneva. 

After retiring from the Russian Army, Mr. Trenin held posts as a 

senior research fellow at the NATO defense college in Rome and a 

senior research fellow at the Institute of Europe and Moscow. 

Thank you all very much for being here. Mr. Graham, why don’t 

you start? All the testimony in their entirety will be put into the 

record. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS GRAHAM, SENIOR DIRECTOR, 

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC. (FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR 

FOR RUSSIA ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) 

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank 

you for this opportunity to testify on a very timely issue of transatlantic security. As you said, Mr. Chairman, the Cold War is over, 

but I would like to stress that the post-Cold War world is also over. 

The hopes that we had a generation ago that we would be witnesses the march of democracy and free markets around the globe 

under American leadership is not the case today. 

Rather, we have entered a period of tremendous global flux and 

uncertainty that will endure until a new global equilibrium is established. This has consequences for Europe and European security. First, and of greatest importance, I think it is clear that global 

dynamism is shifting away from Europe and the Atlantic region to 

Asia and the Pacific region. Now, Europe remains important. It remains important for the United States for a variety of reasons. Our 

closest traditional allies lie in that area. 

But Europe and the struggle for domination in Europe is no 

longer the central drama of the current period, and that means 

that the United States no longer has to worry about the domination of Europe by a single power. Remember, we fought two hot 

wars and one cold war in the 20th century specifically to prevent 

the domination of Europe by a single power. Today, in the current 

environment, we need a unified Europe. A unified Europe that can 

work with the United States in dealing with global challenges in 

Europe and beyond. 

This means that the United States should be encouraging a 

much greater role for a unified Europe both within NATO and the 

EU as a security organization that is capable of dealing with the 

problems in Europe and beyond, so the goal of the United States 

9

should be through its policies and actions to encourage the further 

unification of Europe, specifically, the further unification of Europe 

in defense and security policy. Now, Mr. Chairman, you have described in great detail the global challenges that we face, and I 

think you are absolutely right that the challenges now emanate 

from beyond Europe and not so much from inside Europe. 

That is a consequence very much of the success of the policies 

that the United States and our European allies have pursued for 

the past 65 years. In fact, the concerns about instability in Europe 

and security threats emanating for Europe is probably at its lowest 

in history, so we need to work on the global challenges, and here 

Russia becomes a much more important player. Now, Russia is of 

course a major challenge to all of us in the United States and Europe. 

It is a new Russia, but it is also a Russia that has made clear 

over the past several years that it intends to pursue an independent foreign policy as Russia has historically, but this is a Russia that contrary to where it was in the immediate post-Cold War 

environment no longer seeks integration with the West and specifically with Europe. Now, this presents two challenges for us. The 

first is, how do we deal with the states of the former Soviet Union? 

This is an area that is critical to Russia’s great power aspirations 

and the way they think of themselves as a great power. 

Historically, this is the region that has given Russia its geopolitical heft in the world. For various reasons, the Russian elites 

believe that primacy in this region is important for Russia’s security and prosperity today. The Russians believe that they ought to 

have a zone of privilege in the former Soviet space to use President 

Medvedev’s formulation. Now, clearly neither Europe nor the 

United States is prepared to recognize a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, but we do need to find a way that 

we can work with the Russians to minimize the risk that challenges there will undermine our ability to work elsewhere. 

The second challenge we face is how Russia defines its own interest in Europe and how we should define those interests. As a process of European integration proceeds, much of what happens on the 

continent become in a sense European domestic affairs in which 

Russian involvement should be minimal. Yet, Russia believes that 

it should play a central role in Europe. I believe that it can compete as an equal with the major powers of Europe such as the U.K., 

France and Germany, but it realizes that it cannot compete effectively against a unified Europe which would have the potential 

power capability that far outweighs Russia much the way the 

United States power outweighs Russia today. 

We will have to figure out a way in which we can in a sense 

bring Russia’s sense of its own interest in Europe in conformity to 

the way the world is developing. Now, do we need new mechanisms, new architecture to deal with these new challenges? I would 

argue no, but clearly the architecture needs to evolve to take into 

account the new situation. A few preliminary thoughts on how we 

ought to do this. First, we need to move to a situation in which 

more of the discussion really has three pillars: The United States, 

a unified Europe in the guise of the European Union and Russia, 

and we should be setting up a triangular discussion, U.S.-EU, EUVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 May 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031710\55514 HFA PsN: SHIRL
10

Russian, United States-Russian discussions on a whole range of security issues. 

We already have annual U.S.-EU summits, semi-annual EU-Russian summits. We need to regularize and institutionalize United 

States-Russian summits, which now tend to be ad hoc, and make 

them a regular part of the architecture. We also ought to consider 

putting in place at least an annual event that brings the United 

State, the EU and Russia together specifically to discuss security 

challenges both in Europe and beyond. Finally, with regard to 

NATO itself some suggestions: First, we need to encourage the development of a European pole inside NATO. 

This is already taking place, but the United States needs to be 

more forward-leaning in encouraging this. Obviously, this will 

change the way NATO operates, but I think that will be to our advantage, and it will encourage the Europeans to take more responsibility for what happens inside Europe as well as to develop the 

capabilities to deal with the global challenges. We ought to take 

the NATO Russia Council and focus that on the challenges that 

emanate beyond Europe. 

Working with the Russians in developing missile defense capabilities, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, piracy and other such 

issues, and eventually the NATO-Russia Council over the longer 

term should become in effect a United States-EU-Russia forum for 

discussing these challenges. In addition, we need to reassure many 

of our allies, particularly in Eastern Europe, that Article V means 

something within NATO, and that means that we need to continue 

to develop contingency planning for the defense of those areas and 

begin to practice and conduct exercises to demonstrate that we 

have the capability to do that. 

Finally, we also need to provide assurances for the countries that 

lie between Russia and NATO, specifically Ukraine and Georgia, 

and one thing that we ought to consider is a way of reiterating 

multi-lateral security guarantees for these countries so that they 

can feel more comfortable that they are not going to be a zone of 

geopolitical competition between Russia, the United States and Europe. Finally, I think that the long-term goal and ambition for the 

United States ought to be to turn NATO into a Pan-European security organization based on the pillars of the United States, the European Union and Russia. 

Clearly, this is a long-term ambition. The goal is distant, but I 

think it provides a way of organizing our thinking at the moment. 

One final point on process; the days are long since past when the 

United States and Europe can agree on a policy or a set of programs and then present them to the Russians and hope that the 

Russians will acquiesce in fete accompli. We need to have Russia 

at the outset of our discussions if we want them to be with us at 

the end. 

I think it is very important that as we discuss the NATO concept, for example, that we do reach out as we have already to the 

Russians to get their views, to take them into account, and to see 

the extent to which we can meet their interest or accommodate 

them without of course jeopardizing the long-term interest of the 

United States or Europe. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Graham follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. Ambassador Ischinger? 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WOLFGANG ISCHINGER, 

CHAIRMAN OF THE MUNICH SECURITY CONFERENCE 

(FORMER GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES) 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege and a personal pleasure for me to be back here in my personal 

capacity. You have my written testimony. Please allow me to summarize what I believe are my key views and salient points. I will 

be very brief. First, I think it is important to note that even if our 

main challenges of today and tomorrow present themselves in 

areas far away from Europe, far away from the transatlantic region, Europe and the United States are and will continue to be, 

will remain each other’s principal and best allies. That is how we 

Europeans look at it, and it is our hope that it is a view that is 

shared by the United States. 

By the way, if you look at transatlantic trade and investment 

statistics, the economic data support this political desire very 

strongly. Let me add also that I think it is important that from the 

United States you show a bit of patience with post-Lisbon EU. We 

Europeans have learned to understand that an incoming U.S. administration sometimes needs a bit of time to get into gear. A lot 

of things in Europe are new, so I would invite you to allow the EU 

to come to grips with the new system. I think we will be able to 

do better. We will be more effective in the future, but we take time. 

Second, I share the view of those who believe that the key issue 

for the transatlantic community as we look at current and future 

challenges is Russia. My view is if we get Russia right, most of the 

other things, cyber security, terrorism and many other challenges, 

can be addressed more easily than if we do not get Russia right. 

This therefore is the key issue. During the debate on NATO enlargement, which began 15, 16 years ago, agreement was reached 

with NATO that NATO enlargement should be accompanied by initiatives which would address Russia’s concerns. 

At the time, in 1997, the NATO Russia Council was established, 

and while I believe this was the correct decision at the time, this 

council and its later incarnations never really lived up to expectations. In retrospect, this forum was never really used for discussing 

common challenges and searching for common strategies. As a result, the relationship between Russia and NATO, between Russia 

and the West, between Russia and Europe became increasingly 

burdened. 

Third, Mr. Chairman, Russia for its part has repeatedly expressed the view that they feel, rightly or wrongly, marginalized in 

Europe. The proposal for a new security treaty as presented by 

President Medvedev is a demonstration of this frustration, but 

more importantly this security treaty with all its flaws and the 

many question marks that one can attach to this proposal, it does 

show that Russia considers itself as an element of Europe, as belonging to Europe, as wishing to be part of the European security 

architecture. I believe that is very important. 

Fourth, our key problem today between the West and Russia is 

a fundamental lack of mutual trust. I have no time here to go into 

why there is such a lack of trust, but I believe that rebuilding and 

22

building trust has to be at the core of our work as we move forward. The work which is currently being undertaken to develop the 

future strategic concept for NATO offers, in my view, a historic opportunity to deal with these issues. 

It is a window of opportunity to develop something which I would 

like to call an offer for a new grand bargain, strategic bargain with 

Russia. The new NATO strategic concept should reaffirm, as it has 

just been said, the guarantee of Article V binding all members of 

the alliance together, but this concept, in my view, should also encourage sustained efforts to link Russia to the West or at a minimum to make sure that Russia understands that from our side of 

the bargain, of the possible bargain, the door is open, and it is for 

Russia to accept it or to decline the offer. 

Sixth, regarding the institutional relationship between Russia 

and NATO, in a way we were further advanced 15 years ago than 

we are today. In the mid-’90s, as I recall, the Clinton administration occasionally raised the question should or should we not consider Russia a potential future member of the alliance? 

I would like to inform you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of 

the committee that recently a colleague of mine, the former Secretary of Defense of Germany, Vocko Ruhe, suggested that we 

should go back to those ideas and reiterate an offer in principal 

even if we are all agreed that there are many areas in which Russia lacks the conditions to be a member of the alliance, but we 

should make clear that if Russia wishes to comply with the requirements, there is no obstacle in principal to consider Russia a potential member of the Euro-Atlantic Security institutions, including 

NATO, in the future. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, allow me to say that one of the areas 

where I believe that trust building can be done in an effective and 

in a useful way is the area of nuclear weapons. From a European 

point of view, I speak as a West European, the ongoing United 

States-Russian arms control discussions are an important element 

in rebuilding trust, and that is why some of us in Western Europe 

have raised the question of whether we should not also raise the 

issue of negotiations about the remaining tactical nuclear weapons 

on both sides, in Western Europe, American weapons and of course 

if I can say it in this way the unaccounted for weapons on the Russian side, which have been a source of great concern for us over 

decades and many years. 

In this sense, Mr. Chairman, trust building and keeping the door 

open and thinking out of the box on how we can organize our work 

with Russia in the future in my view is the key challenge, the key 

strategic challenge for us in 2010. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ischinger follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, Ambassador. Ms. McNamara? 

STATEMENT OF MS. SALLY MCNAMARA, SENIOR POLICY ANALYST IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, MARGARET THATCHER CENTER FOR FREEDOM, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, 

and distinguished members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Since the end of the Second World War, the Transatlantic Alliance has been the backbone of American foreign policy. The postwar political, economic, security successes enjoyed by Western Europe and America and by the Euro-Atlantic community more broadly after 1990 are well known. How we got there is equally clear due 

in no small part to the resoluteness of NATO. 

Therefore, it is hard to believe that we are now talking about demolishing the very architecture which underpinned this extraordinary success story. Whether it is the European Union’s hamfisted attempts to duplicate NATO’s roles and structures or Russian proposals for entirely new European security architecture, 

supplanting NATO with either will kill the goose that laid the golden egg of transatlantic security. The question of whether new 

threats require new approaches is a rehash of a 20-year-old debate: 

Is NATO relevant anymore? The answer is unequivocally yes. 

I was pleased to hear that the Cold War is over. I agree. NATO 

has focused on new threats and challenges, and we need only to 

look at Afghanistan for evidence of that. The alliance is currently 

active on three continents in missions ranging from counterinsurgency to counter piracy, and the reason NATO has seamlessly 

adapted to these new missions is because it was always an alliance 

of two things: A defense alliance and an alliance of values. Unless 

the transatlantic community has decided that neither security nor 

values matter any more, there can be no rationale for downgrading 

NATO. 

NATO is not a perfect alliance. It has its failings epitomized not 

least of all by the inequitable burden sharing among the allies in 

Afghanistan, but the perfect cannot be the enemy of the good. Reforming and revitalizing NATO is the answer to these new threats, 

not abolishing or undermining it. At the NATO summit in Lisbon 

at the end of this year, NATO will unveil its new strategic concept. 

As a truly strategic alliance, NATO must outline the threats it 

faces not only today, but tomorrow. 

Most importantly, it must put resources and political will behind 

addressing those threats, but above all, the United States must reinforce the primacy of NATO in Europe security architecture. Simply put, neither the European Union nor Russia is capable of supplanting America’s leadership role on the continent in a stable, productive or healthy way. In terms of economic development, the European Union does have a role to play, especially in this area 

abroad, but in security terms, its efforts have been dreadful. 

Since the creation of a separate European defense identify in 

1998, overall European defense spending, military capabilities and 

deplorable manpower have decreased. Since the introduction of the 

Lisbon Treaty designed to answer the infamous question who do I 

call when I want to speak to Europe, little has been realized in 

terms of the EU’s capability to act as we saw so devastatingly in 

32

Haiti, and it is under the EU’s leadership that Tehran now stands 

far closer to getting its hand on a nuclear weapon than it did when 

the EU began its carrots and flowers approach. 

In this respect, NATO must remain the cornerstone of Europe’s 

security. In terms of redefining the NATO–EU relationship, the 

United States should adopt a few simple principles. NATO’s primacy in Europe’s security architecture is supreme. The EU should 

be a civilian compliment to NATO rather than a separate military 

identify, and NATO must reserve its resources exclusively for 

NATO missions. Another important element of revitalizing NATO 

is ensuring that the alliance’s Article V guarantee is credible. 

However, Russia sees calls to strengthen Article V as a zero-sum 

game assuming anything that makes Article V stronger will make 

Russia weaker. In November, Moscow unveiled the text of its proposed legally binding European Security Treaty to organize European security arrangements. It is with some irony that this treaty 

was unveiled in the wake of Russia’s simulation of a nuclear attack 

on a NATO member, Poland. Although the text of the treaty seems 

almost benign respecting members’ territorial integrity establishing 

new processes for conflict prevention, we must sincerely doubt Russia’s willingness to take them seriously. 

Moscow unilaterally withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe. It has not ratified the Energy Security 

Treaty. It redrew Europe’s borders by force when it invaded Georgia in 2008, and it remains in permanent violation of the EU-brokered cease fire which it signed by unilaterally recognizing the 

break away regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As long as 

Russia’s foreign policy affirms a zone of privilege interest and identifies NATO and the United States as major threats to global security and Russian military interests, there is no reason to believe 

that a new treaty will make Russia a better partner than the existing architecture allows for. 

President Obama has shown a greater willingness than almost 

any other U.S. President to accommodate Russia under the rubric 

of resetting United States-Russian relations, but abolishing or undermining NATO as suggested by Russia will ultimately harm 

American security interests. I would like to conclude with a quote 

from President Obama:

‘‘NATO stands as an example of how the United States can advance American national security and the security of the world 

through a strong alliance rooted in shared responsibility and 

shared values. NATO remains a vital asset in America’s efforts 

to anchor democracy and stability in Europe and defend our interests as well as values all over the world.’’

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. McNamara follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Thank you, and finally, Mr. Trenin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DMITRI TRENIN, DIRECTOR, CARNEGIE 

MOSCOW CENTER 

Mr. TRENIN. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen, 

esteemed Members of Congress, it is a great privilege and a great 

honor for me to speak in this audience. The problem with European 

security as I see it, to put it in a nutshell, is that two decades after 

the end of the Cold War Russia and the new states that emerged 

from the former Soviet Union, including Ukraine and Georgia and 

others, find themselves outside of a meaningful security framework 

for that part of the world. 

The existing framework formed by the Atlantic Alliance and the 

European Union, the twin pillars of peace and security, has greatly 

expanded in the last decade. Yet, it has fallen critically short of the 

promise of a Europe whole and free. Mr. Chairman, you referred 

to the failure to prevent a war between Russia and Georgia. This 

illustrates the risks that exist in that part of the world. 

Even before the Georgian war, it should have been clear that 

safe limits for NATO’s enlargement to the East had been achieved. 

After Georgia, it became obvious to all. Right now, the mood is certainly less somber than it was 18 or 20 months ago. Yet, the fundamental problem remains, and it is just beneath the surface. The 

roots of this problem, as I see them, are largely psychological. 

There is no longer an ideological divide across Europe, nor is 

there a military standoff, trade and travel thrive across borders, 

and yet there is a palpable obsession in Russia with America’s intentions toward it and an equally strong obsession in many of the 

countries of central and Eastern Europe with Moscow’s motives. To 

call this problem essentially psychological is not to dismiss it. Rather, it is to point to the depth and strength of the prevalent sentiments. 

The respective fears are, in my view, baseless, but they are not 

harmless. They misinform and misguide and allow for wide manipulation. The time to act is now as the United States-Russia relationship is on the mend. As we know from experience, windows of 

opportunity do not stay open forever. The issue is how to go about 

squaring the circle of European security. In my view, no silver bullet can do it. The draft treaty proposed President Medvedev and referred to several times during this session, in my view, is too conservative to be realistic. Even though his proposed remedy is probably ineffective, his broad initiative can be constructive. 

Regarding Russia’s fears, in my view, it is the United States that 

needs to take the lead. The Obama administration has exercised 

care, tact and patience, and it has taken a number of Russian concerns aboard. This however is just clearing the ground, not yet 

building upon it. Start is good, but alone it is not good enough. No 

amount of strategic arms reductions is capable of altering the nature of the United States-Russian strategic relationship, which is 

basically unchanged from the years of the Cold War. 

The confrontations’ afterglow, ladies and gentlemen, shines on. If 

one looks for a game changer, which can replace that pattern, it is 

cooperation on missile defenses, in my view. The United States has 

already offered this to Russia, but the Russians are not jumping at 

41

the offer. They evidently don’t want to be a mere add-on to the U.S. 

program. They aspire to a parity-based deal. They claim an equal 

right with the United States to discuss and define threats. This is 

a long list. No question that working on that issue is going to be 

difficult, and the positive outcome, a joint United States-EuropeanRussian missile defense system is not assured. 

If however such a system were to become a reality at some point, 

this would constitute a dramatic improvement, I would say a revolution for the better in European security. As the further enlargement of NATO to the east, its prospects really depend on the countries’ concern. Should an overwhelming majority in Ukraine, including a solid majority in Crimea, support accession, no force in 

the world would be able to veto or exploit it. The current circumstances are different as reflected in the recent election. 

Georgia’s situation is conditioned by the post-conflict realities on 

the ground. Admitting any country to the alliance should not lead 

to importing a real risk of military conflict with third parties. 

Above all, Americans, Europeans and Russians need to look to the 

future even as they draw lines unto the past. The security interests 

of the 21st century call for a common cause among them. This is 

evident, and this has also been evident in this discussion so far. 

Even now, on nuclear proliferation and climate change, energy, security, counterterrorism, cyberspace and the arctic. There is a lot 

that binds the three would-be partners together. 

Russia of course will not be able to deliver Iran, but it is a key 

partner in any effort to bring the Iranian nuclear program to a 

peaceful resolution. Moscow will not determine the outcome in Afghanistan, but it helps with U.S.-NATO transit there and is able 

to contribute to an eventual settlement in Afghanistan. Russia will 

not solve the world’s energy needs, but it can be helpful from Europe to East Asia to the Arctic. In the end, one needs to ask oneself 

a question: What is the future that we want? 

If one wants a whole and peaceful Europe, one needs to build an 

inclusive security community, a community of countries that share 

security among themselves. Europe’s general prosperity can be 

helped by common economic space. A freer Europe means the rule 

of law firmly established in all its countries including Russia, democracy through participation and adherence to international 

norms and commitments. It can be helped by visa-free travel and 

open exchanges. The future it shaped by the decisions taken today. 

As far as the obsession with Russia is concerned, I think that it 

is Russia’s turn to lead just as it is the United States’ turn to take 

on Russia’s obsession. Moscow needs to treat its neighbors’ concerns seriously. Russia has already recognized Poland as a key 

country in the region and a key to better relations with the European Union. This needs to be expanded and deepened. The Russians need to develop a habit of regular consultations with the 

Poles like they have already developed with the Germans, the 

French and some of the others. 

They need to open the archives much wider. They need to reach 

out to the Baltic States without provoking them unnecessarily with 

military exercises. To conclude, let me say that to motivate movement toward the desired future, we need a new narrative, not the 

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times, and not the rosy one of the immediate post-Cold War that 

hoped to do away with differences. 

The Americans in view of their global role need to think about 

broadening the community of responsible stakeholders, specifically 

to include Russia, the Europeans about finally reuniting their family, which remains incomplete and thus insecure. As for the Russians, they need to find after all their place and role in the world. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trenin follows:]

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Chairman BERMAN. Well, thank you, and thank all of you. Very 

interesting. I am going to yield myself 5 minutes. There are many 

issues to go off on, but I want to clarify two points that I am not 

sure I understand. Mr. Graham, you talk about creating a European pole within NATO. Could you just describe that a little more, 

and how does that relate to an EU security activity? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Certainly. I think we are seeing a process where 

Europe is moving toward a unified security and defense policy. Obviously, with fits and starts, and it is not going to be linear, but 

that means that increasingly we are going to find that inside 

NATO we are not going to have a discussion between or among the 

United States and dozens of other European allies. We are increasingly going to have a discussion that is between the United States 

and EU positions as EU articulates a more common policy. 

That means that the way we have gone about managing our relationship with NATO is going to change. It will become much more 

an institution that is built around two pillars: The United States 

probably with Canada and a unified European Union. That will 

lead to certain changes in, as I said, how we manage the dialogue 

inside NATO, how we divide up the various security roles, the various positions within our military and security structures, and so 

on. 

What I am talking about basically is the recognition that as the 

process of European Union integration moves forward, we are going 

to find ourselves facing increasingly a unified Europe inside NATO. 

That is something that we should recognize. It is something that 

I think we should foster because I believe in the long run it is good 

for the United States, and it is good for the security of Europe and 

our ability to operate with Europe in challenges beyond the European continent. 

Chairman BERMAN. There are a lot of questions that come off of 

that, issues like EU countries that aren’t in NATO, to what the 

British and French think in the context of their entire security arrangements about subordinating some of their security forces to a 

larger European pole. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Absolutely, but here I think the process of both 

NATO enlargement and European Union enlargement will overlap. 

There is already a tremendous overlap in membership. 

Chairman BERMAN. Right. 

Mr. GRAHAM. And I can foresee a time as Europe moves toward 

a more unified position on foreign and security policy that it becomes thinkable that countries like Sweden, Finland and Austria 

will themselves become members of the NATO alliance, so again, 

this is not something that describes the situation now. It is a direction in which we are moving. I think it is a direction that the 

United States for our own interest ought to encourage. It shouldn’t 

be something that we should resist. 

Chairman BERMAN. All right. Ms. McNamara, you talked about 

strengthening Article V commitments. Now, I thought I heard a 

very fascinating concept in terms of the ranking member’s opening 

comments regarding Article V obligations and the participation of 

individual members of NATO and to what extent we are going to 

review Article V obligations differently based on how individual 

NATO members are meeting common threats and participating in 

48

that, but, Ms. McNamara, what do you mean by strengthening Article V? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Article V is the heart and soul of NATO. 

Chairman BERMAN. Yes. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. If you don’t have Article V, then you don’t have 

NATO in my opinion. 

Chairman BERMAN. We do have Article V. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Yes. In terms of making it credible, it is no secret that Central and Eastern Europe have some nervousness at 

the moment about whether their security concerns are taken as seriously as Western Europe. In terms of what Article V means, and 

I think it will evolve in this strategic concept, but at the moment 

it means more military exercises, it means more investment, more 

officer exchanges. Those sorts of things are all valuable, they are 

all credible, but it is also a political thing, and I think politics really does play a part within NATO, and I think unless Central and 

Eastern Europe feels part of the conversation on an equal level. 

As long as they don’t feel an equal partner in this conversation, 

then I think Article V cannot be credible. In terms of one of the 

worst things we can do for Article V, it is try and make NATO look 

like the European Union. I think that would be a disaster, and 

having an EU Corps within NATO I think goes to what Henry Kissinger said. He said if we have a European Corps, then America 

loses out in the conversations that matter the most because the 

conversation is brought to America that has already been concluded by the Europeans. 

Chairman BERMAN. Unfortunately, my own time has expired before I ever got to the questions I really wanted to ask, but thank 

you. The ranking member I yield 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I wish 

to comment on assertions that Russia has been helpful with Iran. 

Russian entities for years have facilitated the advancement of 

Iran’s missile and conventional weapons capability. Russia is 

poised to sell advanced missile defense systems to Iran. During the 

last Congress, we had to make changes to the Iran-North KoreaSyria Nonproliferation Act because a certification could not be met, 

that is that the President could not certify that Russian entities 

were not in fact continuing to provide equipment, materials, technology and other assistance to Iran’s nuclear, chemical, biological 

and advanced-weapons programs. 

Russia, with China, has been one of the biggest obstacles to securing comprehensive crippling sanctions at the U.N. Security 

Council against the Iranian regime. Are these the actions that we 

deem to be helpful? Rhetorical assurances from the Russian leadership on Iran do not negate all of the other Russian policies that undermine European and global security and stability and in turn 

threaten U.S. security interests. 

Today, as I look at Russia’s actions, I am reminded of what Winston Churchill called in the 1920s and 1930s as ‘‘The Gathering 

Storm.’’ We all know what happened when such warnings were ignored, and hopefully we will not repeat those mistakes today with 

Russia. 

Ms. McNamara, I wanted to ask you this question: Last September, President Obama decided, as we know, to abandon the esVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 May 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031710\55514 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tablished plans to deploy missile defense components in Poland and 

the Czech Republic which were aimed at countering potential longrange missile threats emanating from Iran. 

The previous plan had been unanimously endorsed by the NATO 

alliance at its summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Despite this decision, which was viewed by many as a step to appease Moscow, 

Russia is now complaining that Romania and Bulgaria have expressed a willingness to host missile defense components on their 

territory. Russia is also linking the issue of missile defense to the 

signing of the next START treaty. Could you please comment on 

Russia’s strategy in regard to the issue of missile defense and its 

possible implications for the national security interests of the 

United States and our allies in Europe? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Thank you very much. The abandonment of the 

third site missile defense agreement came at a very, very unfortunate time. It came on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet’s invasion 

of Poland. I think it was a little tone-deaf to come out on this day. 

There is no doubt that the Czech Republic felt as if a dirty deal 

had been done, as if they had been traded away for the prospect 

of a future START agreement with Russia, and we still haven’t actually got that agreement. 

For Russia, there is no doubt their objections to a third site were 

not because it was worried about its strategic security interests. 

They knew very well that the third site couldn’t harm them in any 

way. What it was about was what their stated policy is; the zone 

of privileged interest. They view they have a sphere of influence. 

I mean, you would have to be in a coma to think that it is surprising now that they are objecting to Romania or Bulgaria or any 

other Central or Eastern European or former satellite republic 

being involved in the phase adaptive approach. 

I think when I talk about things on a political level, this is entirely political. I don’t think Russia’s objections were at all securitybased. I think they were political. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and I just have a little time. I 

wanted to ask the panelists if France and Russia are currently negotiating a sale of one or more of France’s Mistral amphibious assault warships to Russia as well as a license for Russia to produce 

additional such vessels in its own shipbuilding facilities. If this contract is finalized, it would be the first time that a member of NATO 

has sold to Russia such a major weapons system. What message 

would this sale send to our allies, namely in the Baltic States? To 

anyone. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I think it would be an absolute disaster. I think 

in the words of a Russian general it will take us 40 minutes to do 

in Georgia what previously took us 22 hours to do, and those 22 

hours were very, very valuable because that is what got the conflict 

on the front page of the international media and finally got Russia 

to back off, so I think the sale of this goes against everything that 

NATO is about, and it also goes against what the EU about. The 

EU has a code of conduct for arms sales, and one of the features 

of that is that you are not meant to jeopardize regional stability, 

and this would increase instability. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

50

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the ranking member has expired. The gentleman from Massachusetts. It is the intention of the 

chair depending on the time we finish the first round to have a second round and get reactions to many of these issues. Mr. Delahunt? 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. I would just like to note my disagreement 

with the conclusion that has been articulated about Russia invading Georgia when the EU itself, its envoy, concluded otherwise. I 

think it is important to state that for the record because it keeps 

getting repeated, and it takes on a certain validity and legitimacy 

that it doesn’t deserve, but I don’t want to focus anymore on that. 

I want to go to Mr. Trenin’s concept of obsession and a certain psychology here. 

You, Mr. Trenin, talk about missile defense as being an opportunity to be a game changer in terms of the psychology that you 

refer to and presumably the obsession. What were, and I will ask 

the Ambassador to comment on this, the obsession that Russia has 

in terms of its national security, and I think we have to empathetic 

here. Whether it is real or not, it does create a fear that there is 

an encroachment that could threaten the national security interests of Russia. 

How did this obsession evolve, and why is missile defense a potential game changer in terms of the psychology that currently exists, Mr. Trenin and Ambassador Ischinger? You don’t have to pay 

any attention to him. That is you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TRENIN. Mr. Delahunt, thank you for your question. I think 

if you are certainly in Moscow, a lot of people at least would feel 

you are being surrounded by the United States, that you have very 

little power and the alliances to which you do not belong and which 

harken back to the days of the Cold War keep expanding. I do not 

share that view, but I understand the sentiments of those who are 

responsible for Russia’s strategic assessment and Russia’s foreign 

and security policy. 

The one important paragraph in the Russian national security 

strategy says that the biggest military threat potentially to the 

Russian Federation is the United States acquiring through building 

missile defenses a first-strike capability against Russia. To me this 

is a fantasy that has little relevance to today’s world. Now, this is 

an official statement, and this statement underlies Russian strategic thinking and Russia’s defense policy. 

Now, if you build a missile defense system which is operated 

jointly by the United States, Russia and Europe, then this can no 

longer be advanced, this can no longer be supported, this should be 

out of the Russian military doctrine and out of the Russian national security strategy. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, I only have 1 minute left, and I 

want to ask the Ambassador to comment. 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you very much. First of all, I do 

not disagree in any way with what was just said by Mr. Trenin. 

I would just like to point out that in the original concept more than 

a decade ago when we created the NATO-Russia Council as a counterweight to the idea of NATO enlargement, a balancing act, the 

idea was that this would be underpinned or supplemented by 

shared projects in many different areas which were listed at the 

time. 

51

Not much has been achieved in terms of doing things together, 

certainly not in any sphere that is relevant to military concerns 

and worries, which is why I believe that Mr. Trenin is correct in 

pointing out that a shared effort in the ballistic missile defense 

area could be a game changer. It would actually force people to 

abandon the classic zero-sum thinking and move into win-win 

types of thinking, which is where we should be moving. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

join Mr. Delahunt in setting the record straight. A Russian military 

retaliation against a Georgian breaking of a long-term truce by 

sending their military into Ossetia and Abkhazia would be no different in my mind than a United States military action against 

Serbia if it launched its troops into Kosovo. We shouldn’t have a 

double standard here. The double standard is very clear. 

We demand Russia accept that Kosovo is independent, but no, 

when it comes to people who don’t want to be part of Georgia, now 

we insist that they be forced to remain part of Georgia and that 

Georgia has a right to use military force. It is ridiculous. If we are 

going to have to be friends with Russia, they have to know that we 

have a single standard for them and for us. That standard should 

be truth, truth, and we haven’t heard that when it comes to Georgia as my friend says, a repeated distortion of what happened 

there. 

Let me note I went to the Reagan Library this weekend with my 

children. Excuse me, not the library, the ranch, up there at Ronald 

Reagan’s ranch, and I was ushered up there because of course I 

was a former speech writer for the President, and I have been up 

to the ranch during the days when Reagan was there, and there 

was a picture that I saw prominently displayed at the ranch, and 

it was a picture of President Reagan and Gorbachev and their families who were there. Reagan brought the Gorbachevs up, and let 

me note that is after a lifetime of being anti-Soviet on Ronald Reagan’s part. 

He invited Gorbachev up, and there was Gorbachev and Reagan, 

and Reagan had given Gorbachev a cowboy hat, and if you look 

real close at the picture, Gorbachev had the cowboy hat on backwards. Let us note that it was an obsession about the Cold War 

that seems to still be preventing us from moving forward with the 

type of relations that we need to have with Russia on our part and 

on the Russian’s part as we have heard today. Missile defense, 

what Ronald Reagan championed and which I wrote numerous 

speeches with him on and worked with him on those speeches was 

very clear. 

Ronald Reagan thought of missile defense as a way to end the 

Cold War and as potentially a method of cooperating with our 

former enemies. He made that very clear, and the fact that we put 

a missile defense system in place that was clearly aimed at Russia 

was a total rejection of what Reagan’s vision missile defense was, 

and I would agree with the witnesses, Mr. Chairman, when they 

say that missile defense——

Chairman BERMAN. Some of the witnesses. 

52

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Some of the witnesses when they say that 

missile defense is something that could be used as a vehicle to 

overcome this obsession on both sides, in Moscow and in Washington, and also let me add Ronald Reagan did not want to have 

huge mountains of nuclear weapons, and if we have a missile defense system coupled with a logical and rational reduction of nuclear weapons so that we don’t have to waste money, limited defense dollars on weapons that will never be used, I think that 

would go a long way toward making this a more peaceful world, 

and I would hope that our administration follows that course. I 

have 1 minute for anyone who disagreed on the panel or disagreed 

with what I had to say. 

Chairman BERMAN. Go right ahead. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I don’t want to disagree. I just want to say missile defense, one of the original architects of the concept of missile 

defense was actually Winston Churchill when the V–2 rockets were 

raining down on London, and for him then I think missile defense 

is very much what the motivating factor should be today. It should 

be a protect and defend strategy, and if Russia wants to be part 

of that, then okay, but we look at the third site, there is this I 

think unfair bias that the third site was directed against Russia. 

It was absolutely nothing of the sort, and Russia knew that, and 

there was also deep verification measures within the third site so 

that Russia could absolutely be 110 percent sure that third site 

wasn’t a threat against them. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, we did not plan that missile defense 

system with cooperation with Russia, and if they ended up with 

some sort of missile defense system on our border, we would probably feel a little bit upset about it as well, as well as of course creating a military alliance that went right up to our border. If we 

have a chance for future peace, we have to be a partner with Russia against China and radical Islam, or we lose. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I assume there was no picture at the ranch of President Reagan and 

Prime Minister Thatcher, but——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, there was. In fact, there was a picture 

of the Prime Minister. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you for clarifying that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. She wasn’t wearing a cowboy hat, however. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to get your 

reaction to something. As I mentioned earlier, I am a member of 

the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and I am one of the General 

Rapporteurs there, and as such, I have been asked to do a paper 

and lead a discussion on Russia, the NATO, this new strategic alliance, and in that discussion, in that paper, which we will do this 

coming May in I think either Belarus or Latvia, I will make that 

recommendation that we offer membership to Russia in NATO for 

some of the very pressing reasons that we mention on this committee. 

It seems very illogical for us to move with a new strategic concept for NATO given this new opportunity, this new window when 

every basic issue, energy security, cyberspace, the high north, the 

53

climate change, missile defense, all of these. Russia, the largest 

country in the north Atlantic should be at that table. In that regard, I would like to take benefit of your joint expertise to share 

with us what the response you feel will be, what some of the challenges and problems might be and the reaction from the membership from your perspective if you could. Maybe I will start with 

you, Ambassador, and certainly Ms. McNamara on extending membership to Russia in NATO. 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you. Thank you very much. First, 

let me say, as I said in my opening statement, I believe this is an 

important point whose time has come, but we need to make it clear 

that all we can do is explain that there is a door that is open. Russia will have to walk through that door and would need to accept 

the conditionalities and the principles that govern our Transatlantic Alliance. In other words, this is not an invitation without 

a certain number of clearly established conditions. 

In principle, I certainly share the view that this is a point that 

should be made in the context of the future strategic concept because there is in my view no better way than to express our continued commitment to this fundamental idea of Europe whole, free 

and united provided that Russia can meet the conditions. Thank 

you. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Russia does not want to and will never want to 

join NATO. They have stated on several occasions that they 

thought NATO should be abolished when the Warsaw Pact was 

abolished, so I like the idea that we have this hand of friendship 

out to them, but I think Mr. Ambassador is right. The North Atlantic Treaty itself says any European country or North American 

country that abides by the rules of NATO, the door is open to them. 

We have a permanent open-door policy, so I don’t think the problem is opening the door. The problem is Russia doesn’t want to 

walk through it, and if you look at the things that we hold dear, 

not using energy as a weapon, not resolving your conflicts by military means, territorial integrity, not using cyber attacks, respecting 

human rights, on all of these things Russia is failing at the moment, and so they don’t qualify to get in, so I think we don’t need 

to say Russia needs to get into NATO. All we need to do is reaffirm 

the North Atlantic Treaty, which I think is one of the best written 

treaties in the world. 

We stand behind the fact that NATO has an open-door policy, 

but it is my expert testimony that Russia has no intentions of 

walking through the door. 

Mr. GRAHAM. While I agree sort of long term that what we want 

to see is Russia part of NATO, I think the offer at this point actually will focus the discussion more on what the conditions are for 

getting in becomes an ideological debate of some sort that actually 

detracts attention away from what we ought to be doing at this 

point, and that is looking at areas of concrete cooperation between 

NATO and Russia. We have talked about some already, but I think 

the concrete cooperation is the key. 

That is what builds the trust. That creates the habits of cooperation that makes thinkable over the longer term NATO transforming itself into a Pan-European security organization, but I do 

think if you make the offer to Russia now, you will find yourself 

54

side-tracked in a discussion of what that really means, which I 

think is a waste of valuable time. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I am 

going to recognize the gentleman from New Jersey. I yield 5 minutes. We have a vote going on. We will have to take a short recess 

to make those votes. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and let me 

thank our panel for their great and incisive insights today. Mr. 

Graham, you spoke of the unified defense policy for the EU, and 

I am wondering if you might speak to the issue of lessons learned 

from the Balkan War. I, like many colleagues, made trip after trip. 

I was actually in Vukovar immediately prior to its fall, and I remember during the Bush administration, and it carried right into 

the Clinton administration, there was always talk about let Europe 

handle it. 

Right where you sit, and I chaired the hearing, and we had the 

translator when Mladic and the Dutch peacekeepers sold out 

Srebrenica, killing over 8,000 people in a matter of just a few days, 

and I am hoping that lessons learned from that are being very judiciously applied. I would ask you to speak to that. In follow up to 

the question about whether or not Russia should be invited into 

NATO, what do you consider the risks to be with regards to China? 

The border between China and Russia obviously is thousands of 

miles long. 

The population density on the Chinese side vis-a`-vis the Russian 

side is something in the order of 250:1 in many places. There is occasionally a fire fight of incursion that occurs, and even though 

they may have mutual agreements right now, there are potential 

cinder blocks or sparks that could ignite into a war. That would 

then bring NATO and by extension obviously the United States 

into a war with China. Is that a concern? If you could speak to that 

very quickly. 

Finally, I have co-chaired or chaired the OSCE Helsinki Commission here. I have been on the commission since 1983 and strongly 

oppose the Kazakhs getting the chair and office at the OSCE because of their human rights beliefs, which are not good. The 

Kazakh government has sought to de-emphasize human rights because of security and their closeness to Russia. Is that a concern 

that you might share—as to whether or not they change by taking 

the Russian view of the OSCE and its many principles in trying to 

change it? We have had a major fight with Russia trying to undermine what was the consensus for years. Mr. Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, very briefly on Balkans. Obviously, in the 

1990s the Europeans didn’t cover themselves with glory in those 

series of events, and the United States did play an important role 

in putting together the final settlements. The point is that we need 

this to change over time, so we need to engage in a serious discussion with our European partners on the roles and responsibilities 

that Europe will assume inside Europe for European security and 

stability. I think they have learned the lessons as well, so that is 

a discussion we need to have. 

On Russian and NATO with regard to China, that is another reason why I don’t believe that we should make the offer explicit at 

this point because it does raise that issue, but through, as I said, 

55

a process of concrete cooperation with the Russians, I think you put 

that issue to the side. We will also need to obviously engage with 

conversations with the Chinese going forward as to what greater 

cooperation between Russia and NATO might mean for China’s relationship both with Russia and NATO and the United States. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Trenin? 

Mr. TRENIN. In my view, it is a great idea whose time is passed. 

It could have been had in the early 1990s. It could have been had 

in the early 2000s. Right now and for the foreseeable future, Russia will not give up its strategic independence. NATO can only live 

with so much divergence and so much diversity in its ranks, and 

clearly no one wants China as it would be adversary. As to RussiaChina relations, it is the best relationship that Russia has had 

with China in many, many years, but it is a very different relationship. 

For the first time since the two countries have known each other, 

Russia sees China as a stronger party, and Putin sees his best, 

most important achievement as President fixing every inch of the 

China-Russian border, and that speaks volumes about their friendly relationship. It is friendly, but it is very, very important that it 

is very serious. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Talking about the Balkans War, the EU has 

learned absolutely nothing. If you remember, when we started the 

unfortunate conflict, I am sure you remember this line: This is the 

hour of Europe. The follow up line to that was: This is not the hour 

of the Americans. For the EU, this was about their aggrandizement, not about the safety and security of the people of the Balkans. In terms of what they have learned, they said we need the 

Maastricht Treaty and then we will be able to do more. We need 

Amsterdam. Then, we need Lisbon. None of these things have done 

anything. 

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador Ischinger, I am going to just 

give you an additional 30 seconds here to get your reactions. 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you. Well, just two very brief 

points. First of all, I think that the EU has been on an important 

learning curve because of the events in the 1990s. I believe that 

mainstream Europe continues to believe that America should continue to consider itself and to be a European power. Even as we 

grow, we don’t want the United States to consider its own role in 

Europe to be terminated, not so. 

On the Kazakhstan issue, on the Kazakhs question because that 

has not been referred to, let me just say that I don’t think too 

many people were happy with this development for the very reasons that you outlined yourself. However, my own personal impression has been that surprisingly or maybe not so surprisingly the 

leadership in Kazakhstan has gone out of their way to play a useful and relevant chairmanship role in the OSCE. In other words, 

I think the actual conduct has not justified the concerns that we 

had as we went into this. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 

committee will recess for about 15 minutes as we take our votes, 

and then we will be back to at least give me a chance to ask the 

question I wanted to ask. 

56

[Recess.] 

Chairman BERMAN. This is my ideal time because I am the only 

one here I have to recognize. I recognize myself for another round 

while we wait for some of my colleagues to get back from the votes. 

We have a process here sometimes where the staff suggests questions, and one of the questions they suggested to me was one that 

says that a lot of us in the West believe—we see it in the context 

of Iran, we see it in the context of our mission in Afghanistan, 

counterterrorism—that Russia is an important actor on these kinds 

of threats that we have all alluded to in this hearing on proliferation issues. 

We also see it as a difficult partner, and is that view of Russia 

as a ‘‘difficult partner,’’ is that a difference caused by the issue of 

core values? Is it caused by a different perception of the threats 

facing us? I guess I would add to the question—or is it what Mr. 

Trenin talked about—to the extent that there is a Russian obsession that—I forget his terms—it was not well placed, but it was not 

a harmless obsession with U.S. intention that therefore clouds perceptions and maybe comes across as separate from core values. 

What is the cause of the difficulties of the incredible amount of 

work that seems to have to be done to sometimes get a true partnership on these major threats. Any of you? Ambassador, did you 

want to start? 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be 

happy to start. I just offer one or two observations. I believe it is 

correct to find in many areas Russian behavior as that of a difficult 

partner, certainly not an easy partner. Russia has not been known 

to say yes and amen to each and every proposal that we have 

made. I do not share the view that the reasons for this lie primarily in different perceptions on values. I believe that the fundamental reason why Russia has been a difficult partner is that Russia tends to define its interests in a very straightforward manner. 

Russian interests are Russian interests, and the additional problem has been, and I believe I alluded to this earlier, is that there 

has been a tendency to believe that whatever is good for NATO or 

for that matter the United States, cannot possibly be good for Russia, this is thinking in zero-sum terms. I believe we would see Russia to be a less difficult partner if we managed to create more mutual trust, and if we manage to create in the way that Russia deals 

with us and we deal with Russia more of a thinking in win-win 

terms. 

Russia knows that it is not in Russia’s interest for Iran to be a 

military nuclear power, but I am certain that there are a number 

of strategists in Moscow who are not interested in giving on the silver platter so to speak a dramatic international political victory to 

the United States so long as more fundamental issues between the 

United States and Russia have not been resolved, so I believe this 

zero-sum thinking is one of the reasons, which has made it more 

difficult than it should be to reach common positions. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Well, unfortunately, my time has expired. I 

may be able to get back to this. Although, I just want to point out 

the ranking member raised this specific issue of Iran and Russia, 

and in a sense you are giving your thoughts about why that is so. 

The only person here who has not yet had a chance to question is 

57

the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Tanner, so he is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. TANNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your patience. Voting is a necessary inconvenience around here unfortunately, but thank you for your patience. I just have I guess one 

question, two parts. The stumbling block to many with respect to 

moving ahead with a United States-NATO-Russia relationship is 

the situation in Georgia. I have a slightly different version of 

events than have been expressed here. Well, not slightly, but a different version. 

Regardless of that, it appears to many that the situation in 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia or the Russian behavior there is in 

violation of the Sarkozy agreement, and until we get that resolved, 

it is sort of difficult to move in the direction I think we all want 

to see us go. If that is the stumbling block that many that share 

my opinion believe it to be, how and what is the best form in your 

opinion to address this, NATO, U.N., OSCE, EU, a combination of 

all of the above? I guess to all of you or to those who wish to respond, how do we move this ball down the field? Yes, sir. 

Mr. TRENIN. Mr. Tanner, I think that before we finally resolve 

the issue, which I think will take a long time, and it is not clear 

to me how the issue will be resolved. What is clear to me as I look 

into the future is that Georgia will probably not be restored in the 

border in which the international community recognizes it, but that 

is for the future. I think we need to make sure that there is no war 

again. I think we need to make sure there is no fighting, there are 

no shootings on the border, and I think that it is no accident as 

people say that in the past 15 months the situation in Georgia and 

around Georgia has been relatively calm. 

There hasn’t been a single major incident, and this is not an accident. People worked on that, and I think the Russians recognize 

the commitment of this administration in Washington to transparency in their relations with Georgia and the fact of that relationship on Russia. I think there are fewer Russian fears than 

there used to be, and I think this is all for the good, and let me 

say just one thing. The very idea of Russia recognizing Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia was predicated on the fear of a war of revenge 

wages by Georgia and fully supported by the United States of 

America. 

They only recognize that in order to deter what they thought was 

another, but more serious, attack on them supported by the United 

States. Otherwise, it was foolish for the Russians to recognize 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, just tied their hands, but that is a 

product of fears and misjudgment but based on a high-degree of 

mistrust between Moscow and Washington in the times of the previous administration. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Really, the only thing I think I agree with Mr. 

Trenin on is that I think we are going to go through a very, very 

long time before this dispute gets solved. Where I depart from him, 

whether you think Georgia was to blame or not, and I have serious 

reservations about the EU’s report, I think the EU report should 

be renamed blame the victim. That is the only credibility that report had. The disproportionate use of force by Russia and their unilateral recognition thereafter was hugely provocative, and they 

58

have also militarized the region heavily, 10,000 Russian troops, five 

bases. This is not really the actions of someone who wants to resolve this peacefully going forward. 

However, I think we are sending mixed messages. On the one 

hand, we are saying Georgia is an ally, they are going to get into 

NATO someday, but on the other hand, the Americans won’t even 

entertain upgrading Georgia military equipment to help them in 

Afghanistan, and of course Georgia was one of the first countries 

to respond when President Obama outlined his new counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan. I think the Americans need to 

make it very clear that Georgia is an ally of the United States, and 

I think there needs to be a little bit more energy on the part of the 

United States. In terms——

Chairman BERMAN. I am sorry. The time of the gentleman has 

expired. That is the problem with 5 minutes. It goes by fast. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A couple of different questions that are related to one another with regards to 

this discussion we have been having this morning with Russia. The 

Kremlin has been described both during the Soviet era and now 

today as a bit of a puzzle palace to say the least, and I am still 

trying to get a better understanding as to the decision-making 

process as they transition with a new President. Clearly, it seems 

to be that the Prime Minister is still involved to a high degree in 

the different factions that are taking place. 

How would the four of you describe the decision-making process 

taking place today within the Kremlin as it relates to these very 

foreign affairs issues that we are talking about? Multiple factions? 

Different camps? Different schools of thoughts? Who wants to 

start? Yes, Mr. Trenin. 

Mr. TRENIN. Well, thank you, sir. I believe on the important 

issues dealing with foreign and security policy there is a shared responsibility by the President and the Prime Minister, but clearly 

the Prime Minister is the leading actor in this duo, and on all important foreign policy issues, he weighs in very heavily, so it is Mr. 

Putin, but as far as the execution of foreign policy is concerned, 

Medvedev is the man who fully assumes the presidential duties, so 

you have an interesting and strange, almost unheard of situation 

in Russia in which you have dual leadership, but there is leadership within that dual leadership, and it clearly belongs to the 

Prime Minister. 

Mr. COSTA. Do you see it continuing to change? 

Mr. TRENIN. Well, I see Mr. Putin being almost as influential 

today as when he was president of the Russian Federation. 

Mr. COSTA. Ms. McNamara, do you agree? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I absolutely agree. I think the decision making 

is opaque, but it is transparent from the point of view that we all 

know that Putin is in charge, and I don’t think he is going anywhere. This is deeply undemocratic. I think going to this broader 

question of decision making and where they are going, Russia is 

not the enemy, that they are a strategic competitor, and I think 

going to the heart of the relationship is the fact that United States 

and Russian interest core values and threat perception fundamenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 May 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031710\55514 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tally differ, and I think until we realize that, we are not going to 

get a partnership going forward that we want. 

Mr. COSTA. Ambassador? 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. I have nothing to add. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay. 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Except to the very last point if I may? 

I believe that strategically there is a convergence of interest between the West and Russia. There are very few central challenges 

that I can think of that we can solve and address without Russia 

in a meaningful way, and there are very few issues that Russia can 

resolve without cooperation with the West. That is the challenge 

that we should focus on and explore as best we can. 

Mr. COSTA. Mr. Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, I agree with what is said about Mr. Medvedev 

and Mr. Putin, but I would add a further point that we tend not 

to focus on. Much depends on what type of information the top decision makers are getting, both Medvedev and Putin, and obviously 

there are a number of different sources, a number of different factions, if you will, within the Russian Government, within their 

military, security services, foreign policy organizations that pass information forward that provide the basis for decision making, 

whether it be Putin or Medvedev. 

What we have found is that much of the information that is 

passed forward from our perspective actually distorts what our 

policies are, what our intentions are and what we are actually 

doing in the world, and this is another argument for much more 

intense engagement with the Russians using the channels that we 

have, creating channels that provide us as much direct access to 

the senior leaders and also those that pass up the information. 

Mr. COSTA. Don’t you think that is internally within Russia deliberately done by many? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Well, look, I mean, there are numbers of opponents 

to better relations between Russian and the West within the Russian bureaucracy. 

Mr. COSTA. Okay. 

Mr. GRAHAM. But there are also a number of people that would 

be prefer to have better relations, and we need to understand that 

is a reality, we need to deal with it, but I think it is incumbent 

upon us to pass as much information forward on our positions as 

possible. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Chairman BERMAN. Time of the gentleman has expired. I yield 

to the ranking member 5 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much for the time, Mr. Chairman. As you know, I have a resolution, House Resolution 982, calling on France not to proceed with such ship sales to Russia, which 

I have referred to in my previous questions. This issue is of tremendous importance to our allies in the Baltic States, and our 

friends in Georgia, and I would ask that you give your full consideration, Mr. Chairman, to consider House Resolution 982 at the 

next committee markup. It is no commitment your considering it. 

Chairman BERMAN. I got distracted. Remind me of what H. Res. 

982 is? I am bad with numbers. 

60

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is the measure dealing with the French 

sale of ships to Russia that I had referred to in my previous set 

of questions. 

Chairman BERMAN. Yes, you did. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I also would like to ask 

unanimous consent if I could to insert into the record at this point 

the text of a bipartisan letter that I and 70 other Members of Congress sent to President Obama last December, asking that he focus 

on the important issue of the murders of Russian reporters, activists and lawyers in his discussion with the Russian leadership. 

Chairman BERMAN. Without objection, it will be included in the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:]

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55514g-1.eps
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55514g-2.eps
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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And to the panelists: Regarding 

the arms sales to Georgia—do you think that the United States or 

other NATO allies should sell strictly defensive weapons to Georgia 

to help that country deter another potential attack on its territory 

by Russia? I know that we have differing views on the earlier attack. Do you think that the United States and other NATO allies 

should sell strictly defensive weapons to Georgia to help that country deter another potential attack? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Well, I think arms sales should be based on 

general principles. America decides to sell arms to certain countries 

and have different trade treaties with different countries depending 

on how trustworthy they are, how much technology they want to 

transfer, et cetera, et cetera. If we have decided that Georgia is an 

ally, then I don’t see why not. However, one of the things you do 

have to consider in any arms sale is regional stability. 

If we think Georgia is an ally and can contribute to regional stability, then okay, but I think you have to look at it on a case-bycase basis, but I see absolutely no objection to selling them defensive weapons, and we mustn’t forget as well that NATO has stated 

on the record that they do view Georgia as a future member of the 

alliance. We have the NATO-Georgia Commission. They are a special ally if you want to put it that way. 

They don’t have the membership action plan, but they are a special ally, and we have designated them 1 day to be a full member, 

so I find it pretty objectionable that we are thinking about selling 

an assault ship to Russia, but we won’t give defense weapons to 

Georgia. I find it quite unconscionable on some level. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would 

yield to you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Any other panelists want to answer? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TRENIN. Thank you. I think one needs to consider that from 

the standpoint of Georgia, Russia occupies the territories in 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and from the standpoint of Georgia, 

the most important duty of the Georgian Government is to restore 

the territorial integrity of the Georgian state. As people sell arms 

to Georgia, they need to consider that those arms may be used in 

the ways that a sovereign government in Georgia would decide to 

use them, and that I think is a major concern that should be 

weighing on people’s minds. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I think if Georgia uses defensive weapons to defend itself, then that is a good thing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Yes, sir? Mr. Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. Yes, just briefly on this. I mean, you always have 

to be concerned about the consequences. I would pick up on what 

Dmitri Trenin says. If you are going to make the sale, you have to 

have to have some sort of sense of what the Georgian Government 

is going to do with them, and no matter what we may think about 

what the Russians have done or may do, the fact of the matter is 

that as in August 2008, the United States is not prepared to do 

anything militarily, and if you get involved in another shooting 

conflict, it will redound to our disadvantage. 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Just one sentence. Thank you. If, as I 

believe, our key job is to try to build trust and the working relaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 May 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031710\55514 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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tionship with Russia, I would advise restraint, and I would support 

the considerations offered by Dmitri and by Tom. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much, to all of you. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. If you will excuse me, I have to attend another 

event. 

Chairman BERMAN. I understand. Thank you very much. All 

right. Yes. We are now on second rounds. Okay. Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Ambassador, in your remarks, you mentioned that we need to rethink what security means in terms of our 

dealings with Russia, and I think you used the words it needs to 

be rethought from a standpoint of from each other to with each 

other, and you see, that is sort of where I think we have got to be 

useful going forward, find those areas that we can work together 

on, Russia, the United States and NATO. I think that has to be the 

arrangement. 

I don’t think it should be Russia and the United States without 

incorporating the role of NATO. I think that NATO to do anything 

other than that rushes itself off the cliff of irrelevancy. How can 

you rethink a new strategic concept for NATO, and you are leaving 

Russia on the sidelines when it is Russia plays such a critical role 

in every major feature and concern? The whole issue of energy, 

their use of energy as a political weapon, how can that be dealt 

with with Russia in isolation? 

The fear within the European countries themselves are divided 

of that. It just seems to me that common sense says we have got 

to find a way to rethink and reinvent this. I am reminded of the 

advice that Frank Sinatra gave the answer to the question that 

asked Frank Sinatra why have you been on top, the ’30s, the ’40s, 

the ’50s, the ’60s, even into the ’80s up to the time near his death 

he was packing them in in Madison Square Garden, and when the 

question was put to Frank Sinatra why have you lasted, Frank Sinatra simply said because I have constantly reinvented myself, and 

so how do we move forward with this in getting a way to do this. 

Pointedly, I want to ask you a question about that, but really 

where are the problem areas within Russia? What is the thinking 

on one side or the other and what is that reasoning? Where is the 

resistance within the European block at we need to work with? 

Why not identify these problem areas to a greater cooperation and 

try to defeat these, and most of them from my experience in dealing with this issue is simply fear, and leadership requires that you 

have the boldness to lead, and that succumbs the fear. Where do 

we start with this, and where are the problem areas that are preventing us from this corporation? 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. You raise a key issue, and I am sure the 

other panelists have their own views. My view would be that one 

of the areas that we should focus on are those areas where mistrust is greatest, and for a number of reasons, mistrust appears to 

be significantly greater on the military side than in some other 

areas. This is why I believe that measures which would create an 

atmosphere and a culture of cooperation of shared objectives would 

be helpful. That can be done, for example, in the very large area 

of arms control where I am pleased to see that the United States 

65

has taken initiatives and is working hard to move forward, but 

that is an area that is larger than just the START follow-on treaty. 

I happen to believe that one of the biggest challenges for the 

West, one of the biggest global challenges is the prevention of further nuclear proliferation. If we wish to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, we need, if we can, to have Russia on our side 

as a partner in an effort to strengthen the treaty, to make the up 

coming review conference a success and not a dismal failure like 

the one that we had 5 years ago, et cetera, et cetera, so military 

and arms control and proliferation would be my issue number one. 

Others are not unimportant, but would have to be in the back seat. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman is expired. The 

gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again, 

I would suggest that the misrepresentation of Russia’s military retaliation against Georgia’s invasion of Ossetia and Abkhazia has 

not done the cause of world peace or the cause of more cooperation 

between our countries’ service. Let us note that the Russian military action was preceded by the Georgian military attack, which 

violated a long-term truce, and while I certainly would agree that 

it was a disproportionate response, let us note such a disproportionate response could be predicted if Serbia sends their military 

into Kosovo. 

Chairman BERMAN. Would the gentleman yield just for 1 second? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. As long as it is not off my time. 

Chairman BERMAN. It is only 10 seconds of your time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Go ahead. 

Chairman BERMAN. The Georgian move was in South Ossetia, I 

am unaware of a move in Abkhazia by the Georgians. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. All right. Well, I will take a look and 

see exactly how that proceeded, but one thing we do know is it 

wasn’t dissimilar to what our position is in Kosovo and perhaps it 

wasn’t all that different from what happened when Great Britain 

was in a dispute over the Falkland Islands and used a disproportionate response when the Argentineans attacked, and it would be 

wrong to say that Great Britain attacked the poor Argentineans 

and used force, and thus we should be suspect of Great Britain. 

It doesn’t go. It is not consistent. We are either going to be consistent in our dealings with our dealing with the Russians, or they 

are not going to trust us. Let me ask a yes or no or a one-answer 

question from all the panelists. Which country represents the most 

dangerous long-term threat to American security and world peace? 

China or Russia? One answer. Write it down. 

Mr. GRAHAM. Neither. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Same answer. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. No comment. 

Mr. TRENIN. Neither country, and certainly not Russia. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Certainly not Russia? 

Mr. TRENIN. Certainly not Russia. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much. Let me note 

the courage of the last man to speak the truth when we are here 

to have an honest discussion. Let me tell you something. It is very 

66

clear that China is an emerging threat and a greater threat every 

day. We have headlines in the paper where we find out, and we 

talk about Russia’s relationship with Iran, which we have pushed 

them into Iran’s arms by excluding them from the EU market and 

the United States’ market when they needed it the most. 

Let us note the Chinese, who we have totally open markets with, 

are now arming Iran, arming Iran and selling all kinds of weapons 

systems to Iran, and that is consistent with a pattern throughout 

the world. Yet, do we try to magnify any flaw of China? No. In fact, 

we are magnifying the flaws of Russia while accepting all of these 

things of China while sending over our technology and massive investment by our private sector. 

In fact, I would suspect that some of the technology that they are 

selling to Iran originated in the United States? Mr. Chairman, we 

have a totally inconsistent approach to China and Russia, and unless we understand that it is Russia who offers us some hope of a 

cooperative relationship because they have had the reform, and 

China has had no democratic reform and is in fact worse off now 

in terms of civil liberties than it was 25 years ago that it is going 

to hurt our cause. It is going to hurt the cause of world peace. It 

is going to leave us in jeopardy. 

There are areas we can work with Russia on, the arctic is an example. Instead of trying to make that an international solution to 

what we are going to do in the Arctic, we should be working with 

Russia and have them work with us to find a formula that is good 

for Russia and good for us rather than just trying to establish a 

global solution, missile defense it has been said here quite often 

and let us note the threat that we face right now, not just China 

in the future, radical Islam is at our throats. 

They slaughter people in Russia, too. Our President didn’t even 

bother to go and stand next to Putin when they murdered hundreds of its children a few years ago. When our people were lost, 

Russians have built a magnificent monument to the people that 

were lost in 9/11, to the victims of terrorism and didn’t get so much 

as a thank you. Listen, we need to reach out to the Russians so 

they will be our friends, or we will pay a dear price because China 

is going to be our enemy. 

Chairman BERMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, 

for a second round. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On that cheerful note, we have talked a lot about what is right and what is 

wrong with our current policy with regards to Russia, and the inconsistencies I think clearly are there not only today but in the 

previous administration. Mr. Trenin, what would you suggest because I am always very focused in terms of setting the expectation 

bar at a level that is achievable, what do you think with this administration if you were to be advising is achievable here in the 

next couple of years? 

Mr. TRENIN. Well, Mr. Costa, I think that it is clear that after 

the START follow-on treaty is signed, which I expect to happen 

very soon, the big thing of course will be its ratification, but on the 

diplomatic front, the big thing will be moving onto the next issues, 

and the next issues will be related to missile defense, and I think 

67

that turning a problem into an opportunity would be something 

that is both important, timely and achievable. 

Mr. COSTA. What about Iran? 

Mr. TRENIN. With regard to Iran, I think that the Russians have 

been moving toward a position that is closer to the position of the 

United States. 

Mr. COSTA. What is achievable? 

Mr. TRENIN. Well, I think the achievable thing, it does not depend on Russia. The problem is that as I sit here today, I see the 

Iranian leadership so split that they are essentially unable to reach 

out to the international community, and I am very, very worried 

about what will happen over Iran. 

Mr. COSTA. Ms. McNamara, what do you think is achievable? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Over Iran, I don’t think Russia is going to be 

any meaningful help to you whatsoever. I don’t think it is in their 

interests to do so. They may eventually support sanctions, but the 

only sanctions they will support are going to be so watered down 

as to be meaningless. We have already had three rounds of sanctions against Iran. 

Mr. COSTA. Are the sanctions won’t affect them? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I mean, of course. They have——

Mr. COSTA. I mean, in things that they view critical in terms 

of——

Ms. MCNAMARA. They have a huge economic interest. 

Mr. COSTA. Right. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. But apart from that, they have geopolitical interest. 

Mr. COSTA. Sure. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. And I think the rise of Iran they see as a 

counter-balance to the United States’ power in that region. I think 

in terms of sanctioning Iran, we have to go down a coalitions-ofthe-willing approach, and I hope Germany will be part of that because they have 5,000 companies currently doing business in Iran. 

Mr. COSTA. All right. So you think trade is achievable in the next 

couple of years? 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Certainly, Russia wants to be a member of the 

World Trade Organization, and they want to get rid of the JacksonVanik Amendment. However, being a member of the international 

community means you have to be in good standing. I don’t think 

the United States should give away things for free. I think in terms 

of taking a relationship forward, these should be on the table, but 

you have got to earn it. 

Mr. COSTA. Yes. Do either of the two of you care to opine on what 

is achievable here in the next 2 years? Mr. Graham? Mr. Ischinger? 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. On Iran, I belong to the school of 

thought that does not think that sanctions will change a lot for a 

number of reasons, including the inability of the Iranian leadership 

to react to whatever we are doing, so I don’t think that the sanctions issue will take us closer to a solution. I believe that there are 

a lot of things that are achievable, but they are in the area of bilateral United States-Russian relations, including missile defense, including arms control and a number of issues related——

Mr. COSTA. Incremental progress, yes. Mr. Graham? 

68

Mr. GRAHAM. Building on that, I think there are a number of 

areas, nonproliferation. We are already working very closely with 

Russia on a lot of nonproliferation issues, securing fissile material 

inside Russia, the former Soviet space. That has been expanded. 

That is something that we can build on with the Russians, and 

both of us exercise global leadership. Civil nuclear, if the 123 

Agreement is eventually resubmitted to the Congress, is ratified or 

allowed to go through, that would open up the possibility for cooperation on civil nuclear energy, very positive, an area where Russia has certain unique technologies we don’t. It would be valuable 

doing a joint venture somewhere in a third country. All of this I 

think also creates an environment in which is easier——

Mr. COSTA. What you can build on. 

Mr. GRAHAM. That we should build on but also helps us with 

Iran in that area as well. 

Mr. COSTA. Right. Quickly before my time expires, I am concerned about the gaps in NATO defense and assets and forces and 

with their flat or declining defense how do expect NATO to continue to perform? Who wants to take a whack at it? One person. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. I think you are absolutely right. There are only 

five countries in the whole NATO alliance who spend the benchmark of 2 percent of GDP on defense, and I think that has got to 

change. Will it change? I don’t think so in the immediate future, 

so NATO has got to do better with what it has got. What we can’t 

do is say we are going to have a second defense identity within the 

European Union to draw on those resources because most of the resources come from the member states, and so the worst thing that 

we could do is have a separate defense identify within the European Union because it is not additionality. It is taking away from 

NATO. 

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. I 

know you guys are probably wanting to go somewhere else, but I 

want to just, if you don’t mind, yield myself another 5 minutes to 

just pursue a couple of issues that were left dangling. Unfortunately, Ambassador Ischinger’s most recent comment requires me 

as the sponsor of a piece of sanctions legislation vis-a`-vis Iran to 

say you may be right, but I don’t know that you are right. 

Absent an effort to get a meaningful international sanctions regime at the same time keeping the avenue for engagement open so 

that there is a diplomatic alternative to deal with this issue if the 

regime chooses to exercise it, without that kind of regime, you are 

left with only two consequences. One is living with a nuclear Iran 

and figuring out how to live with a nuclear Iran and all that 

means, and the other one is a military confrontation, and so it is 

not quite on the subject of our hearing, but the issue was raised 

about the French sale to Russia. 

In fact, I was asked to move a resolution on that subject through 

the committee. Ms. McNamara had a chance to respond, but no one 

else did. Do any of you have thoughts on either that sale or what 

our response or the NATO response should be to that sale? Mr. 

Trenin? 

Mr. TRENIN. The sale is actually pretty controversial within Russia, and people say that this is a blow to the Russian domestic deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 May 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031710\55514 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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fense industry, not unheard of, but I think that most sensible Russians see it as a symbol of trust between Russia, and they underlined that, a major NATO power. To them, to those who are for the 

deal, the thing is that this will create a bond, a security relationship, not just between Russia and France, but between Russia and 

NATO, and I just wanted to highlight that. 

Chairman BERMAN. Mr. Graham? 

Mr. GRAHAM. I will just second what Dmitri has just said. I agree 

that is important. It is important. It is important for building trust, 

but I also think it underscores as Dmitri said the problems that 

exist in the Russian defense industry, which is another reason why 

I think Russia doesn’t pose the threat that many people here think 

it does. 

Chairman BERMAN. Ambassador? 

Ambassador ISCHINGER. Arms exports are almost always problematic. That is true in this case also, but when one weighs the 

pros and cons, I would definitely come down on the side of Dmitri 

and Tom. I think trust building is at this moment the most important point. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one sentence to your 

question on the sanctions. I did not mean to indicate that I would 

be opposed to sanctions. I just have a great deal of hesitation that 

they will bring about a rapid solution of our problem in regard to 

Iran. Thank you. 

Chairman BERMAN. Ms. McNamara wants to respond to the responses. 

Ms. MCNAMARA. Just very quickly. In terms of building trust 

with Russia, well your NATO partner should also be able to trust 

you, and there is absolutely massive push-back on this sale from 

many NATO allies, not least of all in Central and Eastern Europe. 

I think it would behoove France to take into account the trust it 

has built with its own NATO partners who it has an alliance guarantee with rather than those outside the alliance. 

Chairman BERMAN. Thank you. In the prepared testimony, we 

didn’t spend much time or any time talking about it that I remember, there was sort of a reference to the Russian decision on the 

conventional forces agreement, and then I think it was Mr. Graham’s testimony that suggested a way to deal with it is to restructure it not so much to focus on where Russian forces are stationed, 

but on a level of transparency on where they are stationed and notifications as a way of both getting that agreement sort of back into 

operation and an area to build trust in. 

I guess, Mr. Trenin, would the Russians be open to that kind of 

a suggestion and particularly important, I guess, for some of the 

Eastern European countries? 

Mr. TRENIN. Well, I think we missed an opportunity earlier this 

decade when the CFE Treaty, the adapted CFE Treaty was not 

ratified, and I think that it needs to be made clear that the Russian——

Chairman BERMAN. Refresh my memory. 

Mr. TRENIN. There was a treaty signed in 1990 between the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries on the one hand and 

NATO on the other hand, so that is the treaty from which Russia 

pulled out. Russia pulled out of the treaty that operated on the assumption of the Warsaw Pact and NATO facing each other in EuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 May 25, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\031710\55514 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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rope. Now, there was another treaty, the adopted treaty, concluded 

in 1999, which took account of the changes, geopolitical, 

geostrategic changes in Europe in the decade of the 1990s. 

The Russians as well as the Ukrainians, the Belarusians and the 

Kazakhs ratified that treaty, but no NATO country did because 

Russia had not withdrawn from Georgia and Moldova, and that I 

think——

Chairman BERMAN. No NATO country ratified it. 

Mr. TRENIN. No NATO country ratified that. 

Chairman BERMAN. It wasn’t just our fault? 

Mr. TRENIN. No, no. 

Chairman BERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. TRENIN. I think that it is very important that the CFE Treaty is brought back or at least a system that guaranteed military 

security in Europe is brought back, and I think it is important to 

start negotiations, discussions on the new parameters of the treaty 

or the treaty that exists, the 1999 treaty that was signed by NATO 

counties, but not ratified by those countries. Absent that treaty, we 

have a certain amount of insecurity in Europe, and it is in everyone’s interest to minimize that amount. 

Chairman BERMAN. Anybody disagree with that? Okay. On that 

note of unanimity, I think we will thank you all very much for 

being here, very interesting, a lot more issues we could cover, but 

not enough time. So with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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