OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Maj Thomas Deale)

Certified by: AFDC/CC (Maj Gen Lance L. Smith)

Pages: 116

Distribution: F

Approved by: MICHAEL E. RYAN, General, USAF

 Chief of Staff

BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2–1

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 22 JANUARY 2000
i

FOREWORD

Since the Wright Brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk, the airplane

has continually evolved as an instrument of military and national

power. Today, the proper employment of aerospace power is essential for

success on and over the modern battlefield. In many instances it will be the

military power of choice. Future advances in stealth, precision, and

lethality will make aerospace power increasingly more effective at all

levels of warfare across the range of military operations. Airmen must

not only understand the employment of aerospace power, but be able

to articulate the principles of air warfare.

Operation DESERT STORM (1991) validated the concept of a campaign

in which aerospace power, applied simultaneously against strategic and

operational centers of gravity (COGs), rendered opposing military forces

virtually ineffective. Aerospace power emerged as a dominant form of

military might. It was decisive primarily because it achieved paralysis of

the enemy at all levels of war with minimal casualties to friendly forces.

Recent events in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) continue to re-validate

that air warfare, using aerospace power and a joint air operations plan

(JAOP), will continue to be an essential and sometimes decisive tool in

future military operations. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1, Air

Warfare, provides a basis for understanding, planning, and executing air

warfare.

The US Air Force has adopted the term “aerospace” to describe the

medium within which its forces operate and has applied the term to those

broad and enduring concepts that apply across the entire medium. The

separate terms “air” and “space” continue to be used when describing those

specific tasks, missions, or platforms that apply strictly to the air or space

environment.

MICHAEL E. RYAN

General, USAF

Chief of Staff

22 January 2000
ii
iii

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... v

CHAPTER ONE—Air Warfare Fundamentals ................................... 1

Strategy ............................................................................................... 1

The Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) Campaign ................................ 1

Air Operations and Aerospace Strategy .............................................. 2

Asymmetric Strategy ...................................................................... 3

Functions, Effects, and Missions ........................................................ 5

Counterair ...................................................................................... 8

Counterspace................................................................................ 10

Counterland ................................................................................. 10

Countersea ................................................................................... 13

Counterinformation ..................................................................... 13

Strategic Attack............................................................................. 14

Command and Control ................................................................. 14

Airlift ............................................................................................ 17

Air Refueling ................................................................................ 18

Spacelift ........................................................................................ 18

Special Operations Employment.................................................. 19

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) ................. 20

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) .............................................. 22

Navigation and Positioning .......................................................... 23

Weather Services .......................................................................... 23

Unity of Command ........................................................................... 24

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)....................... 24

JFACC Designation ....................................................................... 25

JFACC Responsibilities and Authority .......................................... 25

Joint Force Air Assets ....................................................................... 26

Examples of Air Warfare ................................................................... 28

Guerilla Warfare ........................................................................... 28

Forced Entry ................................................................................. 30

Decisive Halt ................................................................................ 31

Global Conflict ............................................................................. 32

CHAPTER TWO—Air Warfare Planning ......................................... 35

Overall Joint Planning ...................................................................... 35

The Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP) ............................................. 38

Planning Joint Air Operations .......................................................... 39

JAOP Planning Process................................................................. 39

TABLE OF CONTENTS
iv

Phasing ......................................................................................... 41

Measures of Success ..................................................................... 43

JAOP Planning Factors ................................................................. 44

Tools for Joint Air Operations Planning ........................................... 46

Strategic Appreciation .................................................................. 46

Air Estimate of the Situation ........................................................ 46

JAOP Format ................................................................................ 47

CHAPTER THREE—Executing Air Warfare ................................... 49

Apportionment ................................................................................. 50

Target Development ......................................................................... 51

Allocation and Weaponeering........................................................... 51

Master Air Attack Plan ................................................................. 51

Weaponeering ............................................................................... 53

Air Tasking Order (ATO) Development ............................................ 54

Theater Air Control System.............................................................. 54

Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC) ............................................ 55

Other Centers and Liaison Elements ........................................... 56

Ground Elements ......................................................................... 57

Airborne Elements ....................................................................... 59

CHAPTER FOUR—Training and Education for Air Warfare ....... 63

Training Factors ................................................................................ 63

Battle Management Training ............................................................ 63

Aircrew Training ............................................................................... 64

Exercises and Wargaming ................................................................. 65

Education .......................................................................................... 67

Professional Continuing Education (PCE) ................................... 67

Professional Military Education (PME) ........................................ 68

Graduate Education ...................................................................... 68

Suggested Readings ............................................................................ 71

APPENDICES....................................................................................... 73

A. The Strategic Appreciation ......................................................... 73

B. The Air Estimate of the Situation ................................................ 77

C. Sample Joint Air Operations Plan Format .................................. 83

D. Sample Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL) ............. 87

E. Sample Master Air Attack Plan ................................................... 89

F. Sample Air Tasking Order ........................................................... 91

G. Additional Planning Tools ........................................................... 93

Glossary .............................................................................................. 101
v

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) implements Air Force Policy

Directive (AFPD) 10-13, Air and Space Doctrine. AFDD 2-1 Air Warfare

establishes operational doctrine for air warfare. It provides initial

guidance for conducting air operations as part of aerospace warfare.

Specifically, this document contains beliefs and principles that guide

the organization, command and control, employment, and support of air

forces conducting wartime operations. It examines relationships among

objectives, forces, environments, and actions that enhance the ability of

air operations to contribute to achieving assigned objectives. It focuses

on the sequencing of events and the application of forces and resources to

ensure aerospace power makes useful contributions to military and

national objectives. It examines the importance of command relationships, intelligence, space, logistics, and other factors to the planning and

conduct of air warfare.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all Air Force military and civilian personnel

(includes Air Force Reserve Command [AFRC] and Air National Guard

[ANG] units and members). The doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider not only

the contents of this AFDD, but also the particular situation when accomplishing the mission.

This document supports the fundamental concept of a single commander who is responsible for the planning and conduct of aerospace

warfare in a theater of operations. This single commander is codified in

joint doctrine as the joint force air component commander (JFACC).

Air power has become predominant, both as a deterrent to war,

and—in the eventuality of war—as the devastating force to destroy

an enemy’s potential and totally undermine his will to wage war.

General Omar Bradley
vi

SCOPE

This document focuses on the operational and strategic maneuver aspects of air warfare in theater and global operations. This

document does not specifically address military operations other than

war (MOOTW), but the doctrinal guidance in this document can be

applied to MOOTW where appropriate. Furthermore, this document also

does not specifically address airlift, but many portions apply to airlift as

part of an overall air operation. Other doctrine documents provide

specific guidance on MOOTW and airlift operations. Additional information on Air Warfare may be found in subordinate operational- and

tactical-level doctrine.
1

CHAPTER ONE

AIR WARFARE FUNDAMENTALS

STRATEGY

Strategy is a means to accomplish an end. Since overall theater

strategy for employment of US forces is normally developed jointly, it is

imperative that aerospace power be properly represented at the highest levels of strategy development. It is not prudent to wait for a theater strategy,

emphasizing surface maneuver to be developed, and then create a supporting air strategy. There are opportunities for a balanced, integrated strategy

to be developed, and in some cases, an effective air-centric approach at the

theater level would be an optimum use of available forces. But without

adequate air and space expertise at that level, planning has historically

devolved to an emphasis on surface warfare operations and objectives and

how they can be supported by aerospace power. This does not imply that

aerospace power is the answer in every case, but it does mandate that theater-level

planning include examining aerospace power options from the beginning.

THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER’S (JFC) CAMPAIGN

The JFC’s campaign is a series of major operations that arrange

tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic

and operational objectives. Wartime campaigns integrate air, land, sea,

space and special operations, interagency and multinational operations in

harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain

national and multinational objectives.

To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in

the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy

may be pleased to impose.

Giulio Douhet

Strategy is the employment of battle to gain the end in war; it

must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which must

be in accordance with the object of the war; in other words, strategy

forms the plan of the war.

Carl von Clausewitz
2

Air operations involve the employment of air assets by themselves or in concert with other assets or forces and are part of the

overall joint campaign. They can be used as the primary focus of the

JFC’s theater campaign plan, as in Operation ALLIED FORCE, or they can

complement and reinforce the employment of other forces. No matter

what type of air operation is used in the joint strategy, a joint air operations plan (JAOP) is the essential aerospace ingredient in the JFC’s overall campaign plan. The JAOP links specific air and space objectives and

tasks with overall military and political strategy. It also describes centers

of gravity, phasing of operations, and resources required. It describes

how aerospace power is used to achieve the overall theater and strategic

objectives. It explains how other forces will support air and space operations, taking advantage of the synergism between aerospace and other

forces. It also shows how air forces will complement and support other

forces to achieve joint objectives. Like the overall theater plan, the JAOP

carries through to the conclusion of the joint campaign and describes the

desired end state.

AIR OPERATIONS AND AEROSPACE STRATEGY

Every JAOP should include a desired outcome, target set, and a

mechanism for achieving the desired outcome. The task of the air

strategist is to translate a number of conflicting and competing targeting

requirements into a workable JFC air operations plan that supports the

overall joint campaign. This is done by first asking three fundamental

questions: What is the goal? How much is it worth to achieve that goal?

and What is it worth to the enemy to prevent friendly forces from

achieving it? These are vital questions, and Bismarck’s famous dictum,

“Woe to the statesman whose reasons for entering a war are not as clear at

the end as at the beginning,” is absolutely correct. Once these basic

 	 



	

  	

	  	

  

 	 

		
   


   



	






		
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questions are addressed, the strategist devises a joint campaign plan to

answer them, with a joint force air operation as part of it. This involves

transforming broad goals into specific military objectives, identifying the

target sets that need to be affected (not necessarily destroyed) to attain

those objectives, and then converting the whole into a coordinated operations order (OPORD) that can be implemented by the military forces involved. It cannot be overemphasized that there must be a clear linkage between the targets chosen and the objectives sought. If the overall objective is

to force the enemy to halt an invasion of a neighboring country, then

how, exactly, will striking the power grid—or munitions factory, or armored divisions, or intelligence headquarters—contribute towards achieving that objective? In other words, just because a target is destroyed or

neutralized does not mean objectives were achieved. The process of linking ends and means is a critical requirement for the air strategist. The

ultimate results are often psychological in nature; war is after all a human endeavor, and attempting to predict human reaction too precisely

can be difficult. Nevertheless, understanding the links between cause

and either physical or psychological effect is a key part of air warfare

planning. Failure to properly analyze the mechanism that ties tactical

results to strategic effects has historically been the shortcoming of both airpower

theorists and strategists.

Asymmetric Force Strategy

 A number of developments in recent years have contributed to

the emergence of a “new American way of war.” US military forces

now employ sophisticated military capabilities to achieve national objectives and avoid costly force-on-force engagements that characterized

the traditional strategies of attrition and annihilation that evolved from

nineteenth century warfare. Airpower is particularly relevant to this new

way of war or, as it is commonly referred to, “asymmetric force strategy.”

Asymmetric force strategy dictates applying US strengths against adversary vulnerabilities and enabling the US to directly attack an enemy’s

centers of gravity (COGs) without placing Americans or allies at risk

unnecessarily. Five key components of asymmetric force strategy are:

 The commander’s conceptualization of the battlespace uses

information to conceive a strategy for employment. It includes collecting and exploiting the information necessary to identify threats and

opportunities regarding national interests and preparing the area of

concern to initiate and conduct operations. This is a key step to
4

perform before committing resources to an operation. A key part of

maintaining consistency in this effort is intelligence preparation of the

battlespace (IPB).

 Controlling the battlespace means exercising the degree of control

necessary in all media (land, sea, and aerospace, in both their physical

and information domains) to employ, maneuver, and engage forces while

denying the same capability to the adversary. To position forces and

maximize the effectiveness of maneuver for decisive effect, commanders

should have freedom of operation. Forces and lines of communication

should be protected from a diverse set of threats to obtain that freedom of

action and to ensure the ability of friendly forces to deploy, maneuver,

and engage an opponent. Battlespace control includes a number of

active measures such as ensuring aerospace and maritime superiority.

Furthermore, information superiority and control of the use of the electromagnetic spectrum also plays a critical role in battlespace control.

The form of battlespace control most often practiced by aerospace forces is air

superiority, which enables friendly forces to use the air medium for military

purposes while denying the enemy effective use of the same.

 Decisive maneuver is positioning forces to gain favorable advantages

over an adversary or event in anticipation of engagement or strike.

Maneuver is inherent in aerospace power. Decisive maneuver requires

rapidly deployable, highly mobile joint forces that can outpace and outmaneuver opposing forces. These forces should be adept at sustained

and integrated operations from dispersed postures. During operations,

forces are positioned so they might rapidly transition to precision

employment, applying appropriate combinations of lethal and nonlethal

attacks against the enemy. The speed, range, and flexibility of air and

space assets make them uniquely qualified to employ rapid maneuver

against the enemy for maximum effect. Aerospace power alone possesses

the capability to bypass the bulk of enemy forces and maneuver directly to

their vital targets, whether the targets be critical-fielded forces or key strategic

centers.

Aerospace power’s inherent ability to maneuver also lends itself to

strategic mobility. As the US Air Force adopts a more expeditionary

posture, with air expeditionary forces (AEFs) on alert for contingency

deployments, the ability to quickly deploy decisive combat power to trouble

spots will become more important. Forward deployable aerospace combat

power, along with continental US (CONUS)-based global power, is vital to

the protection of US national interests.
5

 Precision employment is the direct application of force to degrade

an adversary’s capability or will, or the employment of forces to affect

an event. Airpower assets can effectively engage the adversary on

land, in the air, or at sea throughout the depth of the battlespace and

can deny the enemy the use of space by attacking vital ground nodes

such as launch and communications facilities. Precision employment

includes the application of force and supplies to achieve the desired

result, along with the required information to make that employment

truly precise.

 Integrated sustainment is the ability to effectively deploy and maintain forces. Integrated sustainment includes logistics, readiness, facilities, and modernization.

A key part of asymmetric force strategy as employed by aerospace

power is the concept of parallel attack. Parallel attack is defined as “simultaneous attack of varied target sets to shock, disrupt, or overwhelm an

enemy, resulting in decisive effects. Parallel attack is possible at one or

multiple levels of war and achieves rapid effects that leave the enemy

little time to respond.” Because of its speed, range, flexibility, and ability

to maneuver as required to locate and precisely attack targets while

neutralizing or avoiding threats, aerospace power is uniquely suited to

conducting rapid, parallel attacks against the enemy. The three-dimensional maneuver capability of aerospace forces allows them to avoid

noncritical enemy forces or defenses much more easily than surface forces.

As figure 1.1 depicts, air and space operations can support multiple simultaneous missions, and can easily flow from one phase, objective, or effect to the

next as simply as changing targets for the next mission.

FUNCTIONS, EFFECTS, AND MISSIONS

Any discussion of the various aspects of air warfare requires a careful

definition of the terms involved. In this regard, it is easy to become

confused when comparing and contrasting the concepts of function, effect,

and mission.

AFDD 1 defines functions as the broad, fundamental, and

continuing activities of aerospace power. Examples include counterair,

counterspace, countersea, counterland, strategic attack, counterinformation,

etc. Functions are the means by which Services or components accomplish the tasks assigned by the JFC.
6

Mount Decisive

Counteroffensive

Build Up

Combat Power;

Weaken the

Enemy

Halt the

Invading

Force

Traditional “Ground-Centric” View of Conflict

“Modern” View of Conflict

This is a “Modern” Culminating Point

Major

Regional

Conflict

Halt the Invading

Force

Deploy and Sustain Forces

Gain/expand

Strategic

Initiative

Mount Decisive

Counteroffensive

Disable enemy

regime

Punish/

impose sanctions

Build up ground

forces

These are

“Branches and

Sequels”

Aggressor’s initiative

and options

Time

Time

“Traditional” Culminating Point

Deploy and Sustain Forces


	  	
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7

Effects are the operational- or strategic-level outcomes that

functions are intended to produce. For example, a joint force air component commander (JFACC) employs the function of counterair to achieve

the effect of aerospace superiority, or employs the counterland function

to achieve the effect of battlefield isolation. The strategic attack function

is often aimed directly at producing the strategic effect of enemy defeat,

with no intermediate level effects on enemy forces involved.

Any discussion of effect must include the concepts of direct and indirect

effects. Direct effects are those that result immediately from attacking

the target set or sets involved. For example, bombing enemy surface-toair missile (SAM) sites and the associated command and control (C2)

facilities may directly result in SAM and radar sites destroyed, but the

cumulative indirect effect may be to achieve aerospace superiority across

the theater, which in turn allows other effects to be imposed on the

enemy. Detailed analysis of interconnected indirect effects can easily

become complex, and such effects are nearly impossible to predict

exactly. General predictions, however, can be made that have successfully guided aerospace strategy in conflicts from World War II to

Operation ALLIED FORCE (1999).

Another point requiring clarification is the difference between

strategic attack and strategic effect. A strategic effect is the disruption

of the enemy’s strategy, ability, or will to wage war or carry out aggressive activity through destruction or disruption of their COGs or other

vital target sets, including command elements, war production assets,

fielded forces, and key supporting infrastructure. If an operation aims

directly at those key targets whose destruction or disruption can cause

strategic effects, it is a strategic attack. Strategic effects can also indirectly result from the actions of aerospace or surface forces at the lower

levels of war. An example of the latter would be destruction of the enemy

army on the battlefield, which in turn impairs the enemy strategy to the

point where it is forced to cease fighting. In this latter case, the results

from the tactical level of war are eventually felt at the strategic level. A

key difference between aerospace power and surface warfare is that aerospace

forces can often strike directly at key target sets that have strategic results,

without having to go through the process of drawn-out attrition at the tactical

level of war. Analyzing the enemy for such critical targets is a fundamental

part of aerospace warfare.

The term mission, as applied to the tactical level of war, describes the

task assigned to small units, flights or individual aircraft, missiles, or space-
8

craft (This is different than the “mission” of the Air Force.). Therefore,

these missions describe the immediate, tactical results (e.g., an enemy

aircraft shot down or a bridge destroyed) and focus at the level of the

operator in the field and the specific tasks that must be performed. The

emphasis is more on affecting the enemy than on the platforms or weapons employed for the task. For example, destroying an enemy munitions

factory is a strategic attack mission, while employing the same asset to cut

an enemy supply route is an air interdiction mission. Unless there is a

thorough understanding of the aerospace functions, confusion can occur

based on the names of these functions since some of them also apply to

tactical missions, such as strategic attack and countersea. The following

section briefly addresses US Air Force functions as listed in AFDD 1, and

where applicable, further addresses the specific mission categories within

each.

Counterair

Counterair consists of

operations to attain and

maintain a desired degree of air superiority by

the destruction or neutralization of enemy

forces. Both offensive

and defensive actions are

involved. The former involves aggressively neutralizing enemy forces in-flight

or the supporting infrastructure on the ground,

while the latter describes

reactively engaging enemy aerospace forces

which have already

launched on an offensive

mission. The speed, range,

and three-dimensional vantage point of air and space

platforms give them unique

capabilities, as well as limitations, when compared to

ground or naval forces.



 
 		
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 Offensive counterair

(OCA) missions use

offensive aerospace forces

to destroy, disrupt, or limit

enemy air and missile

threats. OCA missions

proactively target enemy

airborne forces, or those

forces and supporting

infrastructure while on the

ground. Surface attack

missions represent the airto-ground portion of OCA

and disrupts or destroys selected targets including runways

complexes; hardened aircraft shelters; petroleum, oils, and lubricants

(POL) and munitions storage facilities, and C2 facilities used by the

enemy air force. The air-to-air portion of OCA is further broken down

into the missions of fighter sweep and escort. Fighter sweep employs

air superiority fighters sweeping through a designated portion of

enemy airspace to sanitize any enemy air-to-air threat, while escort

puts the air superiority fighters in a direct support role protecting less

air-to-air capable strike assets from enemy fighters. Modern multi-role

fighters often practice self-escort through the mixed carriage of longrange air-to-air missiles along with their standard air-to-ground

weapons loads. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) is a primary OCA mission designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily

degrade enemy surface based air defenses by destructive or disruptive means.

 Defensive counterair (DCA) includes both active and passive measures to protect friendly forces and vital interests from enemy air and

missile attacks. Active air defense missions use reactive air-to-air fighters or other assets placed on airborne or ground alert status to destroy

attacking air and missile threats or to reduce their effectiveness against

friendly forces and assets. Passive air defense includes all measures,

other than active air defense, to minimize enemy effectiveness and

includes dispersion, camouflage, concealment, and hardened shelters.

Although some DCA missions are normally scheduled when enemy air

attack is expected, air-to-ground OCA is typically the best way to employ

limited assets against an air threat because it employs concentration of

effects. DCA tends to disperse the counterair effort and many missions do

not actually engage the enemy since attacking aircraft have the initiative.

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Counterspace

Counterspace is the function that attains and maintains space

superiority. The main objectives of counterspace operations are to

allow friendly forces to exploit space capabilities, while negating the

enemy’s ability to do the same. Air, space, land, sea, or special operations

forces can conduct them. Counterspace operations include both offensive and defensive components.

 Offensive counterspace (OCS) missions destroy or neutralize an

adversary’s space capabilities through attacks on the various elements

of an adversary’s space systems. Specific effects of OCS include

disruption, denial, degradation, deception, and destruction of enemy

space systems. OCS missions may include surface-to-surface or air-tosurface attack on launch facilities or space C2 nodes, jamming satellite

uplink and downlink frequencies, and could expand in the future to

more active attacks on vehicles in space.

 Defensive counterspace (DCS) missions protect US space-related

systems and capabilities from enemy attack or interference. The

objective of active DCS missions is to detect, track, identify, intercept,

and neutralize or destroy enemy forces that threaten friendly space

capability. Passive defenses protect and increase the survivability of

friendly space forces and their products.

Counterland

Counterland involves those operations conducted to attain and

maintain a desired degree of superiority over surface operations

by the destruction or neutralization of enemy surface forces. The

main objectives of counterland are to dominate the surface environment

and prevent the opponent from doing the same. Counterland can either

be accomplished in direct or indirect support of large-scale ground operations, or can be carried out with minimal or no friendly ground forces in

the area. When friendly ground forces are present, counterland tends to

be more effective at greater distances from the ground battle where fratricide is not an issue and the enemy may be more vulnerable. In the latter

case, counterland operations may represent the bulk of overall theater

strategy. The ultimate expression of this doctrine is the “decisive halt” in which

the enemy is both stopped short of reaching their objective, which may be to
11

engage friendly ground forces and/or take territory, and destroyed or disrupted

to such a degree that continued fighting is no longer possible. Missions that

are used to perform counterland are air interdiction (AI) and close air

support (CAS).

 Air interdiction is a form of aerial maneuver that destroys, disrupts,

diverts, or delays the enemy’s surface military potential before it can

be used effectively against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its

objectives. Typical targets for AI are lines of communication, supply

centers, command and control nodes, or fielded forces. Air interdiction

planners typically look for targets that leverage the available air assets by

creating significant disruptions of the enemy through attacks on relatively

few targets. Direct attack of fielded forces, one vehicle or artillery

battery at a time, is possible but tends to be a less efficient use of aerospace power. Air interdiction is either performed as part of an overall

theater-wide interdiction effort, which typically aims to isolate all or

part of the battlefield from its source of support and reinforcement, or

as a more local effort in response to the needs of ground combat. Whenever AI is flown in the vicinity of ground operations, the two achieve

the greatest results when the efforts are integrated.

 Close air support is the use of aerospace assets to directly support

the ground force. CAS is flown against targets that are in close proximity

to friendly forces; that proximity requires detailed integration between

CAS missions and

the fire and movement of surface

forces. In this context, forces in “close

proximity” are

close enough to engage one another

with organic weapons such as artillery. Enemy forces

that are not within

this range are more

properly the targets of AI rather

than CAS. Long

range weapons that

do not bring a pre-

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ponderance of fire to the battlefield, such as tactical ballistic missiles, are

not used to set the maximum distance of “close proximity.” While CAS is

not considered the most efficient mission for aerospace power, in

critical ground combat situations it may be the most effective. Control

of close air support is performed by Air Force personnel attached to

the ground units being supported, working closely with their Army

counterparts. Tactical control of CAS always remains with the air component commander, not the ground commander.

In general terms, CAS should only be used when the surface force

cannot handle the enemy with organic firepower. This makes the

requirement for CAS greater with light forces, such as airborne or

amphibious units, and less for heavy units such as armored divisions.

Synergies at the Battle of Khafji

The Battle of Khafji was a critical event during the Gulf War and exemplified

the potential advantages of teaming information systems with interdiction assets. On January 29, 1991, two Iraqi heavy divisions began moving towards

allied forces near Al Khafji. Once detected by the joint surveillance, target

attack radar system’s (JSTARS) sensors and mission crew, coalition commanders quickly and decisively diverted airpower to counter the Iraqi offensive. In

the three days and over 1,000 sorties that followed, the two Iraqi divisions were

rendered ineffective. One Iraqi veteran described the coalition air attacks as

causing more damage in 30 minutes than in eight years of the Iran-Iraq War.

Coupled with the capabilities of its mission crew, the technology on board

JSTARS contributed in three critical ways. First, it located and tracked Iraqi

armor columns, immediately passing this information to airborne strike aircraft. Second, it gave commanders at the tactical air control center (TACC) a

significantly enhanced picture of the battlefield situation. Finally, it provided

critical insights about the Iraqi’s movements and intentions directly to coalition ground commanders throughout the Khafji operation.

Advanced information systems ensured that the coalition forces at the Battle

of Khafji maintained a heightened sense of awareness throughout the operation. Information technologies identified the enemy’s intent, combat units,

and scheme of maneuver, thus enabling coalition commanders to divert assets

and decisively employ their airpower.

Airpower and the Iraqi Offensive at Kahfji

AFSAA CD-ROM
13

Countersea

Countersea is a collateral

function that extends the

application of Air Force

power into the maritime

environment. Specific

countersea missions include

surface warfare (antiship),

undersea warfare (antisubmarine), sea surveillance, and

aerial minelaying. Other

aerospace power functions

and missions, such as

counterair and aerial refueling, can support maritime

operations in the joint environment. While these missions

will typically operate in support

of friendly naval forces, they

may be employed independently

when friendly naval forces are

not in the area.

Counterinformation

Counterinformation is the function that seeks to establish information superiority through control of the information realm. Like

counterair, counterinformation enables other functions and missions to

occur and can be broken down into offensive and defensive actions. Many

counterinformation actions directly achieve counterinformation objectives, while others are better seen as part of counterforce functions (as in

the case of employing anti-radiation missiles to achieve SEAD effects on

the enemy). Since the focus of air warfare planning is on achieving

effects on the enemy, the label placed on a given action is best determined by

the combination of function performed and effect achieved, rather than by the

type of weapon (information, electronic, or physical attack) used. A good

example of this is the broad area called electronic warfare, which

performs actions in many categories including air warfare and information operations.

One of the most successful sea-control

strikes occurred off the east coast of New

Guinea in March 1943. In that battle, known

as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, approximately one hundred Allied planes, including

modified B-25s carrying five-hundred-pound

bombs, attacked and successfully destroyed an

entire Japanese convoy. Flying at one hundred

feet above the ocean surface, American B-25s

skipped their bombs across the water and into

the hulls of these ships. At the battle’s conclusion, 12 cargo ships and 4 Japanese destroyers

were sunk or severely damaged.

Dr. Donald D. Chipman

AIRPOWER: A New Way of

Warfare (Sea Control)

Airpower Journal

 Fall 1997
14

A key part of counterinformation is “information attack.” Information attack refers to those activities taken to manipulate or destroy an

adversary’s information or information system without necessarily changing

visibly the physical entity within which it resides. Although different from

the conventional concepts of physical and electronic attack (EA), information attack can be an equally important part of air warfare.

In many cases, an attack on a specific target may have components of

two or even all three forms of attack. Figure 1.2 illustrates this in more

detail and shows the connection among physical, information, and electronic methods of attack and how they can interplay in the same action.

Other cases may involve only one method at work.

Strategic Attack

Strategic attack is

defined as military

action carried out

against an enemy’s

COGs or other vital

target sets, including

command elements,

war-production assets,

and key supporting infrastructure. It affects

a level of destruction and

disintegration of the

enemy’s military capacity to the point where the

enemy no longer retains

the ability or will to wage

war or carry out aggressive activity. The term “strategic attack” also

applies to the actual missions flown against strategic targets and is valid

when the primary value of those targets to the enemy exists at the strategic level of war. Whether a particular mission is labeled strategic should be

based primarily on the expected effects on the enemy and not on the type of

force used or the specific type of target attacked.

Command and Control

Command is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Control is inherent in

	
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command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the

commander’s intent. C2 includes both the process by which the

commander decides what action is to be taken and the system that


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A Use of electromagnetic jamming to deny key information to the enemy.

B Bombing an enemy C2 system represents both physical and information attack.

C Perhaps the oldest use of airpower, physical attack of enemy forces or industrial

production facilities represents pure physical attack.

D An example of all three would be the use of a high-speed anti-radiation missile

(HARM) to target the acquisition radar of an enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) site

for the purpose of obtaining local air superiority through SEAD. The HARM guides

on the electronic emissions of the enemy radar, a form of electronic attack since it

uses the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum. The actual detonation of the HARM warhead on the radar is a method of physical attack. Once the radar is destroyed, the

SAM launch crew is denied the information required to acquire and track the friendly

strike package, which thus makes it through to the target.









	







	






	




16

directs and monitors the implementation of the decision. Specifically, C2 includes the battlespace management process of planning,

directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations. C2 involves

the integration of systems, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and communications designed to

enable a commander to exercise command and control across the range

of military operations. Aerospace forces conduct command and control to

meet strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.

Air Force units are employed in a joint force context by a joint force

commander. C2 of those forces can be through a Service component

commander or a functional component commander if more than one

Service’s air assets are involved. This officer, the JFACC, should be the

Service commander with the preponderance of air and space assets and

the capability to plan, task, and control joint air and space operations. It

is a basic principle of aerospace doctrine that C2 of air and space forces be

centralized under one officer—an airman.

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Airlift

Airlift is the transportation of personnel and materiel through the

air and can be applied across the entire range of military operations

in support of national objectives. Airlift provides rapid and flexible forcemobility options that allow military forces to respond to and operate in a

wider variety of circumstances and time frames. A key function of the Air

Force, airlift provides global reach for US military forces and the capability

to quickly apply strategic global power to various crisis situations worldwide

by delivering necessary forces. The power-projection capabilities that airlift

supplies are vital since it provides the flexibility to get expeditionary forces

to the point of a crisis with minimum delay. Accordingly, airlift is viewed as

a foundation of US national security at the strategic level and as a crucial

capability for operational and tactical commanders within a theater. Therefore, airlift is not only a vital component of US defense policy but is critical to

support overall national policy and objectives.

Air Force airlift operations are typically classified as intertheater or

intratheater. Operational Support Airlift (OSA) comprises a third and

special classification of airlift operations. These operations are defined by

the nature of the mission rather than the airframe used. Most aircraft are

not exclusively assigned to one operational classification. In fact, the majority of the airlift force is capable of accomplishing any classification of airlift.

 Intertheater airlift provides the airbridge that links theaters to

the CONUS and to other theaters, as well as airlift within the

CONUS. Due to the global ranges usually involved, intertheater airlift

is normally comprised of the heavy, intercontinental airlift assets, but

may be augmented with shorter-range aircraft when required. Most of

the forces responsible for executing intertheater airlift missions are

under the operational control (OPCON) of the Commander, Air Mobility Command (AMC/CC).

 Intratheater airlift provides the air movement of personnel and

materiel within a geographic CINC’s AOR. Assets designated to

provide intratheater airlift are either assigned or attached to that

geographic CINC. This classification of airlift is generally fulfilled by

aircraft capable of operation under a wide range of tactical conditions,

including small, austere, unimproved airfield operations. Intratheater

operations provide time-sensitive airlift to the commander, which may

be critically needed to fulfill theater objectives.
18

 Operational support airlift is a special classification of operations

providing for the timely movement of limited numbers of priority

personnel and cargo during wartime as well as peacetime. OSA operations tend to be conducted by smaller-sized business type airframes.

In most cases, these airframes are permanently assigned to a theater

component or major air command (MAJCOM). While OSA operations

are normally conducted in support of the assigned organization’s

organic requirements, OSA assets may be used to reduce extraordinary

workload demands on the airlift system. United States Transportation

Command (USTRANSCOM) is responsible for the scheduling and

execution of OSA operations regarding CONUS based assets while the

Services validate OSA requests.

Air Refueling

Air refueling is an integral part of US airpower across the range

of military operations. Air refueling, along with airlift, fulfills the Air

Force contribution to the joint mobility role. It significantly expands the

employment options available to a commander by increasing the range,

endurance, payload, and flexibility of air forces. Therefore, aerial refueling is an essential capability in the conduct of air operations worldwide

and is especially important when overseas basing is limited or not available. Air Force air refueling assets perform six basic missions: (1) Single

Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) support, (2) global attack support,

(3) air bridge support, (4) deployment support, (5) theater support, and

(6) special operations support.

Air refueling provides additional options for the air strategist. If

forward locations are threatened, fighters and bombers may operate out

of bases further to the rear for airbase security. The same option may

work for cases where forward bases are unavailable for political or other

reasons. A drawback to this option is increased mission duration, which

reduces the total number of sorties possible in a given period.

Spacelift

Spacelift projects power by delivering satellites, payloads, and

materiel into or through space. During a period of increased tension

or conflict, the spacelift objective is to launch or deploy new and replenishment space assets to achieve national security objectives. To satisfy

this requirement, spacelift should be functional and flexible, capable of

meeting the nation’s full range of launch requirements from placing space
19

systems in orbit. Equally

important, spacelift should

be timely and responsive to

the user’s needs. Air Force

spacelift operations are

conducted to either deploy,

sustain, or augment satellite constellations supporting national security

objectives.

 Launch to deploy

describes launches

required to initially

achieve a satellite

system’s designed operational capability. In

this approach, space systems are launched on a

predetermined schedule.

 Launch to sustain

describes launches to replace satellites that are predicted to fail or abruptly fail. They may be

scheduled well in advance or may require unscheduled operations.

 Launch to augment describes launches to increase operational

capability in response to contingency requirements, crisis, or war.

Unscheduled launches or payload adjustment on scheduled activity

will likely be required.

Special Operations Employment

Special operations employment is the use of special operations airpower,

to conduct the following primary missions: unconventional warfare,

direct action, special reconnaissance, combating terrorism, foreign internal defense, psychological operations (PSYOP), civil affairs, information

operations, and counterproliferation. To execute special operations, Air

Force special operations forces (AFSOF) are normally employed in small

formations capable of both independent and supporting operations,

with the purpose of enabling timely and tailored responses across the

range of military operations.


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AFSOF may accomplish

tasks at the strategic,

operational, or tactical

levels of war or other contingency operations

through the conduct of

low-visibility, covert, or

clandestine military actions. US Air Force special

operations are usually conducted in enemy-controlled

or politically sensitive territories and may complement

or support conventional

operations. AFSOF may be part of a joint special operations forces (SOF)

team that provides combatant commanders with a synergistic capability

to accomplish specialized tasks.

Special operations differ from conventional operations in

operational techniques, mode of employment, degree of covertness, independence from friendly support, and dependence on

detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Those

circumstances are often dominated by high risk and political, environmental, and operational constraints. In addition, governments often view

the use of SOF as a means to control escalation in situations in which the

use of conventional forces is unwarranted or undesirable. Accordingly,

theater CINCs may choose to use special operations forces, working

either independently or in support of conventional forces, to operate in

rear areas to exploit enemy weaknesses or collect intelligence that would

not otherwise be available. However, it should be emphasized that

special operations forces can also operate as a strategic force independent of theater CINCs. Such employment should be carefully coordinated

to prevent conflict with other operations.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

Intelligence provides clear, brief, relevant, and timely analysis

on foreign capabilities and intentions for planning and conducting military operations. The overall objective of intelligence is to enable

commanders and combat forces to “know the enemy.” It helps commanders

across the range of military operations by collecting, analyzing, fusing,

	 	  	
 		


		 
	
  
 	 



		
21

tailoring, and disseminating intelligence to the right place at the right

time for key decision making. Intelligence provides indications of

enemy intentions and guides decisions on how, when, and where to

engage enemy forces to achieve the commander’s objectives. It assists in

combat assessment through munitions-effects assessment and bomb-damage assessment.

 Intelligence organizations integrate technical and quantitative assessments with analytical judgments based on detailed knowledge of the

way the enemy thinks and operates. Intelligence personnel should

maintain an independent perspective. Commanders anticipate that

even the best intelligence may not provide a complete picture, especially when the enemy is practicing deception or when the intelligence

is derived from a single source. Still, intelligence gives commanders

the best available estimate of enemy capabilities, COGs, and courses of

action.

 A useful tool for Air Force intelligence is “intelligence preparation of the

battlespace (IPB).” IPB is a four-step systematic process of analyzing the

threat and environment to help the commander better understand the

many variables that can influence his mission and operations. The

IPB methodology is an effective analytical process that can be used

during peacetime, crisis, or at the tactical, operational, and strategic

levels of war. While most of the individual actions that constitute IPB

are nothing new to Air Force intelligence, establishing a consistent

process will provide greater focus, thereby improving the overall effectiveness of aerospace power.

Specifically, IPB focuses on the relationship between the threat and

environment, along with the effect of that interaction on both friendly

and enemy courses of action. IPB results in the production of adversary

courses of action, named areas of interest, and high-value targets, which

are inputs to the JFACC/COMAFFOR campaign planning, intelligence

collection, and targeting processes. When done properly, IPB facilitates

getting “inside” the enemy’s decision-making cycle. IPB is viewed by the

US Air Force as a valuable methodology for focusing intelligence on the

commander and the commanders’ supporting C2 elements. Additional

advantages include integrating analysis, collection management, and

targeting processes, as well as providing a standardized analytic approach

for training purposes. Air Force intelligence entities at all levels of command should use IPB principles, focusing on environmental and threat
22

characteristics and activities that significantly influence air, space, and

information operations. However, specific IPB products and procedures

are left to the discretion of local commanders.

Surveillance is the function of systematically observing air, space,

surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual,

aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. Surveillance is a

continuing process, not oriented to a specific “target.” In response to the

requirements of military forces, surveillance must be designed to provide

warning of enemy initiatives and threats and to detect changes in enemy

activities. Airborne and space-based surveillance assets exploit elevation

to detect enemy initiatives at long range. For example, its extreme

elevation makes space-based missile-launch detection and tracking indispensable for defense against ballistic missile attack. Surveillance assets

are now essential to national and theater defense and to the security of all

military forces.

Reconnaissance complements surveillance in obtaining, by visual observation or other detection methods, specific information

about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy;

or in securing data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic,

or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance

generally has a time constraint associated with the tasking. Collection

capabilities including airborne and space-based systems, both manned

and unmanned, and their associated support systems are tailored to

provide the flexibility, responsiveness, versatility, and mobility required

by the strenuous demands of fluid, global taskings. Intelligence critical to

the prosecution of current combat operations is derived from reconnaissance operations and is evaluated and transmitted in near real time to

those elements needing that information. Intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance must operate together, enabling commanders to preserve forces,

achieve economies, and accomplish campaign objectives.

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

CSAR is an integral part of US combat operations and should be

considered across the range of military operations. CSAR consists of

those air operations conducted to recover distressed personnel

during wartime or contingency and is a key element in sustaining

the morale, cohesion, and fighting capability of friendly forces. It

preserves critical combat resources and denies the enemy potential sources

of intelligence. Although all US Air Force weapon systems have the
23

inherent capability to support CSAR operations, the US Air Force maintains certain forces specifically dedicated for search, rescue, and

recovery operations.

Navigation and Positioning

The function of navigation and positioning is to provide

accurate location and time of reference in support of strategic,

operational, and tactical operations. Navigation and positioning help

all military forces to precisely maneuver, synchronize actions, locate and

attack targets, locate and recover downed aircrew, and other tasks requiring navigation and positioning accuracy. Navigation and positioning are

key elements of information superiority and global awareness. Some key

portions of navigation and positioning, such as the global positioning

system (GPS) or ground-based navigation aides, may be exploited by the

enemy. This should be taken into consideration when weighing the

potential benefits versus potential threats of employing various systems.

Weather Services

 Weather services provided by the Air Force supply timely and accurate

environmental information, including both space environment and atmospheric

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weather, to commanders for their objectives and plans at the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels. They gather, analyze, and provide meteorological data for mission planning and execution. Environmental

information is integral to the timing of operations, employment

planning, and the conduct of air, ground, and space launch operations.

Weather services also influence the selection of targets, routes, weapon systems, and delivery tactics and are a key element of information superiority.

UNITY OF COMMAND

Aerospace power best serves the nation’s interests when tailored

to operate across the entire region or theater of battle. Doctrine

supports this concept by first adhering to the fundamental principle of

unity of command. One commander should have overall authority to

control all military operations within the theater. The JFC exploits the

capabilities of his various forces to accomplish theater and strategic

objectives. Similarly, aerospace power can be most effectively employed

when led by a single airman, the JFACC, who is responsible for the planning and conduct of air warfare in a given operation or conflict. In order

to benefit from unity of command, the JFACC follows principles that guide

the organization, command and control, employment, and support for

theater air forces.

Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

The JFACC is the professional airman with the requisite experience and expertise to integrate joint aerospace capabilities in meeting national and theater objectives. In that capacity, the JFACC shares

the JFC’s vision on how to meet those objectives and translates the JFC’s

concept of operations into terms relevant to air and space missions. The

The very flexibility of air forces makes true cooperation essential.

Air forces, at short notice, can be switched from one sort of target to

another and, within limits, from one type of operation to a quite

different type. There is, therefore, a constant temptation to use them

piecemeal to meet an immediate requirement, rather than to use

them on a long-term joint plan, and to utilize their flexibility in the

method of achieving a consistent aim which is an integral part of

our government’s policy and our strategy to implement that policy.

J.C. Slessor

Air Marshall, Royal Air Force
25

JFACC develops and executes an air operation to achieve the national and

theater objectives for the JFC, as part of the overall theater campaign.

Essentially, the JFACC is the single airman responsible for planning and

directing joint aerospace operations to maximize overall combat power for the

JFC.

JFACC Designation

Theater air commanders (JFACCs) devise ways to exploit the

different capabilities of the available air and space assets while

reducing their limitations; they also plan operations that help

maximize the combat power of both the aerospace and surface

efforts, and consequently conduct an effective theater air

campaign. Operation DESERT STORM provided a modern combat

validation of the JFACC concept, reinforced during operations in Bosnia

and Kosovo, that demonstrated the effectiveness of centralizing C2 of

aerospace power. Current joint doctrine acknowledges the lessons of

history by recommending that JFCs normally designate a JFACC to

ensure the proper application of the aerospace effort within a theater

of operations. Normally, the component commander with the preponderance of air and space assets and the capability to plan, task, and

control joint aerospace operations is designated as the JFACC. This

individual should have comprehensive knowledge and understanding of aerospace power doctrine and be trained in the application of

aerospace power to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Under most circumstances the commander of Air Force forces is

designated the JFACC, and as such will be the supported commander for

aerospace operations that are within or affect the theater of operations.

JFACC Responsibilities and Authority

The essence of the JFACC concept is the unified development of

a concept of air operations supporting the joint campaign plan to

meet the JFC’s objectives. JFCs define the JFACC’s responsibilities and

authority based on these objectives. The individual designated as the

JFACC uses established procedures with the joint force headquarters and

the other components to fulfill JFC-assigned tasks. These include planning, coordinating, tasking, and directing the overall aerospace effort, and

recommending apportionment of aerospace power to the JFC. The JFACC

is normally the area air defense commander (AADC) and the airspace

control authority (ACA). The JFC establishes the specific command

authority for the JFACC to accomplish those responsibilities. The JFACC
26

typically exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces and tactical

control (TACON) over other military capabilities and forces made available for tasking. Certain aerospace forces, such as intertheater airlift and

space assets, may not come under the operational control of the JFACC

but will still support operations. Some air assets, such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), Tomahawk land-attack missiles (TLAMs),

SOF aircraft, and Army/Marine attack helicopters, might remain under

the OPCON of the respective component commanders. Normally, the

JFACC needs only TACON or an established supported/supporting

relationship to conduct operations with augmenting forces that remain

assigned to other components. For example, the JFACC is normally designated the supported commander for counterair operations. When

aerospace operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to

directly attack strategic COGs, JFCs will normally task the JFACC, as a

supported commander, to conduct such operations. The JFACC will also

designate targets or objectives for other components in support of the

joint strategic attack effort. The JFACC is also the supported commander

for joint air interdiction and will use JFC priorities to plan and execute

the theaterwide interdiction effort. It is important to recognize that the

JFACC retains a theaterwide focus, and joint doctrine specifies the use of smaller

areas of operations (AOs) only for surface forces.

JOINT FORCE AIR ASSETS

The primary purpose for designating a JFACC is to provide unity

of the aerospace effort for the benefit of the joint force as a whole.

Component commanders make air and space capabilities/forces available to the JFC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole based on

the JFC’s mission. Normally, these capabilities/forces are provided by

the JFC to the JFACC for tasking.

 The US Navy retains organic control of those assets required for fleet

defense and related naval missions. TLAM and fixed-wing sorties in

excess of those needed to satisfy maritime air operations requirements

are normally made available to the JFACC.

 Army aviation assets are normally retained for employment as

organic forces. However, some Army helicopters can be employed for

AI or SEAD, in which case they come under the purview of the JFACC.

The same holds true for other systems (such as ATACMs) when

employed for AI or SEAD, depending on tasking and target location.
27

 For Marine aviation assets, the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF)

commander normally retains operational control of organic air assets.

Because the US Marine Corps’ surface forces do not bring a large amount

of heavy artillery to the battle, their need for CAS is greater than most

Army units. As a result, CAS is considered an essential component of

Marine battlefield firepower. During joint operations, the MAGTF makes

sorties available to the JFC, for tasking through the JFACC for air defense,

interdiction, and reconnaissance. In addition to those requirements, those

sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements are provided to

the JFC for tasking through the JFACC for support of other joint force

components or the joint force as a whole.

 The joint force special operations component commander

(JFSOCC), when established, exercises operational control over all

theater assigned joint special operations forces that have been made available for tasking by the Services. The Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander (JSOACC) would then control all theater assigned

special operations aviation assets. The JSOACC centralizes control of

special operations aviation much as the JFACC does for conventional

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airpower. Alternatively, Air Force special operations forces may be

placed under the OPCON or TACON of the COMAFFOR or JFACC.

EXAMPLES OF AIR WARFARE

Air power can be employed in as many different ways as there are

different kinds of warfare. Nevertheless, there are certain doctrinal

concepts, such as the tenets of airpower, that apply at least generally to

most cases. The following are examples of US Air Force doctrine on aerospace force employment in several different types of warfare. Not all

functions are illustrated in every example; some, like ISR and C2, are

assumed to be employed in all scenarios. The intent is to show how the

role of some functions change as a campaign develops.

Guerrilla Warfare

Guerrilla warfare is defined in joint doctrine as “military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular,

predominantly indigenous forces.” While sometimes limited enough to

qualify as a military operations other than war (MOOTW), guerrilla warfare can also be considered true warfare when the level of violence is high

enough. This was the case for operations in South Vietnam during the

Vietnam War, to cite one example. Aerospace power can be used

effectively in guerrilla warfare but will often be employed in either a

supporting role or some other form of operation that differs from the

conventional application of force against “traditional” targets. A guerrilla

enemy is typically equipped with light weapons, often of relatively low

technology. Air superiority will not normally be challenged; enemy air

defense weapons often consist solely of light antiaircraft guns and shoulder-launched SAMs. On the other hand, the enemy may enjoy support in

the local populace, and disrupting the enemy’s support base through

physical means may prove difficult. Although the level of information

sophistication of the enemy may vary greatly from one region to another,

it is becoming increasingly easy for small units in remote locations to

access data worldwide.

As with all military operations, aerospace power success in guerrilla

warfare requires a thorough understanding of the military and national

objectives and strategy. The character and scope of aerospace operations

will directly depend on the objectives they support. Under some circumstances,

airlift may represent the bulk of the air component’s contribution to the
29

war effort, providing mobility and resupply to ground forces operating in

remote areas. Special forces airpower may play a large role in guerrilla

warfare, especially for counterinsurgency operations. IO such as PSYOP

and ISR are uses of aerospace forces that may also play a critical role in

guerrilla warfare.

Figure 1.3 illustrates one possible scenario, in which only a small

portion of the available air and space assets are required for air superiority, and a large percentage of that is directed against surface-to-air targets.

ISR remains a vital part of the operation from beginning to end, as gaining

intelligence on enemy movements can be very difficult under guerrilla

warfare conditions. PSYOP is important and is used to win the local populace over through keeping them informed of actual events as they

transpire. This use of IO to overcome adversary propaganda is a vital part

of the campaign. Air mobility is also a key use of air assets, both in

support of actual combat operations and in resupply of remote ground

forces that enable monitoring of the entire country. Counterland attacks

are often made when enemy forces concentrate for conventional attacks,

since they become vulnerable when massing for attack or operating in

the open as conventional ground combat formations. Except for these

occasional counterland attacks, there is not a large need for conventional

force application since lucrative targets for air attack do not exist.


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Forced Entry

Forced entry operations are typically short in duration but may

involve high levels of conventional combat. Friendly ground forces are

inserted via various delivery methods to accomplish ground objectives,

while aerospace power operates in various supported and supporting roles.

The actual functions and missions performed vary with specific circumstances; for example, aerospace power might play a greater role during an

airborne force insertion than during an amphibious operation. Operation

JUST CAUSE in Panama was an example of forced entry warfare that

relied heavily on aerospace forces for both mobility and force

application. There may be a need to devote a large force to aerospace

superiority, since forced entry operations are usually planned for short

duration and there may not be time for a protracted aerospace superiority campaign. Surface forces may be employed in very vulnerable modes

of insertion, so enemy air and missile reaction must be reduced to

minimum levels. Forced entry operations may take place at long

distances from friendly bases, so the judicious use of both air refueling

and naval aviation assets is important.


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Figure 1.4 illustrates the use of aerospace forces in a sample airborne

forced entry operation. The key functions performed early on are

aerospace superiority and air mobility, since the enemy threat must be

eliminated and the friendly force must be delivered to the surface area of

operations. Once in place, and once the enemy aerospace threat is

neutralized, counterland operations ramp up to both destroy the enemy

ground force reserves and support the engaged friendly ground units. Some

strategic attack is also employed, mainly against enemy C2 centers that

will have immediate effects on the battlefield. Due to the short duration

of the operation, other strategic attacks that would have longer-delayed

effects are not employed.

Decisive Halt

A decisive halt operation is employed to stop an advancing enemy

ground force prior to reaching its objective, which typically is to seize and

occupy a certain amount of territory. Aerospace forces provide an

unmatched global response capability to perform decisive halt, and often

represent the only force application available on short notice to perform

expeditionary tasks. When a decisive halt is performed during conventional warfare, the enemy will often have a robust air defense system and

may possess a significant offensive aerospace capability of their own. This

requires a large application of counterair force early on, which can ramp

down to a maintenance level as the conflict progresses. As with forced

entry, the timespace of a decisive halt may be limited (the enemy must

be stopped before they have time to reach their objectives). This will

mandate the use of counterland in more of a direct attack mode than in

longer scenarios, and strategic attack should be restricted to those targets

whose payoff will be realized in the time allowed. There may not be any

need for traditional CAS, as the bulk of friendly ground forces may not

arrive in theater until after the halt has been accomplished.

Figure 1.5 shows one possible decisive halt scenario, which starts with

long-range strikes on counterair targets and some key strategic targets.

Depending on availability of nearby airbases, in-place forces and aircraft

carriers, the bulk of the first few days’ attacks may come from global-reach

missions launched from bases outside the theater. This places a heavy

demand on air refueling assets, which will also be heavily tasked to

support the deployment of shorter range air assets and ground forces into

the theater. Counterland attacks, primarily air interdiction of the invading enemy ground force, grow to become the bulk of missions flown until

the halt is achieved. This illustration is similar to that for the forced entry
32

example, with the exception that the air mobility effort to bring ground

forces into theater may be smaller (or possibly not required). This is

especially true if the allied nation involved can provide a capable,

on-scene ground combat force.

Global Conflict

The cold war era was an example of global conflict that was deterred

from ever reaching its full destructive potential, with only occasional

outbreaks of combat between the superpowers or their allies. Nuclear

weapons, along with other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have

such devastating potential that deterrence, not combat, has fortunately

remained their primary use. As the United States develops its strategy for

the post-cold war era, the global reach mission has become a province of

conventional forces. The US Air Force is becoming more expeditionary

in nature, with fewer forces permanently stationed at overseas locations

from which force may be directly applied against an enemy. The AEF

provides a task-oriented force that can be rapidly deployed to any part of

the globe, to perform any of the lethal or nonlethal missions assigned to

the Air Force. Naval airpower can supplement the AEF, depending on the

proximity of the theater to accessible sea approaches.


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Global power missions, such as B-52 and B-2 strikes from CONUS bases,

provide an important source of aerospace power that does not depend on

either forward bases or sea access, although long-range missions result in

far fewer sorties per day than in-theater forces can provide. This is somewhat offset by the large number of weapons that can be carried by longrange bombers and a growing family of independently targetable precision

weapons that enable strikes against multiple targets during a single bomber

sortie. Shorter-range forces can also be employed on very long-range

missions, provided proper air refueling support is available. An example

of this was the Libyan raid of 1986 using multiple refuelings to support

fighter attacks at intercontinental ranges. All of the examples listed in

this section employ some degree of the Air Force’s global reach capability; the amount they actually use depends on numerous factors that range

from geographic distance to political support from allied and neutral

nations.
34
35

CHAPTER TWO

AIR WARFARE PLANNING

Campaign plans provide practical guidance for the employment of

forces at the operational level of war. In a major conflict, a campaign

may be one of a series of campaigns needed to support a strategy that

accomplishes national objectives. Campaigns tie military strategy and

objectives to the battlespace. Just as a conductor directs the timing, tempo,

and phasing for an orchestra, so too the campaign plan directs the

conduct of tactical operations to achieve strategic goals.

OVERALL JOINT PLANNING

Joint planning is normally conducted via the deliberate planning

process, which produces operations plans (OPLANs) as the end product.

OPLANs provide detailed guidance, including deployment and logistical

support, for areas of the world where possible conflict may occur at some

future time. Crisis action planning, on the other hand, occurs in response

to an actual contingency and produces as its output an OPORD that is, if

needed, executed by the National Command Authorities (NCA) to put

military forces into motion. Figure 2.1 compares the two planning

procedures.

Simply stated, an OPLAN serves as the key employment concept

of the theater of war and theater of operations. It is the basis for all

other planning among the staff and various subordinate commands. It

provides the joint commander’s vision and intent through broad concepts

for operations and sustainment for the duration of the situation. For large

multiphase conflicts, a campaign plan with supporting OPLANs might be

developed. Regardless of which type of process is used, the resulting plan

provides strategic military objectives and operational direction. A

distinction is made for each phase of the conflict, and an end state for

each should be clearly defined. Reorganization of forces or resources

may be required at the end of a phase before another action is initiated.

The plan organizes and tasks subordinate forces. It furthermore designates command relationships, additional responsibilities, and objectives.

Air power can win battles, or it can win wars.

General William Momyer
36

	








	









 	
	  
    



	


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37

JAOP ensures synchronization and integration of aerospace, land, maritime, information, and special operations efforts into a synergistic whole.

Planning such operations revolves around precise communication

of commander’s intent and a shared, clear understanding of the

appropriate operational concepts at each level of command. Once

the overall strategy has been formulated for fighting the war, the theater

commander imparts it to his component commanders. They then devise a

game plan for supporting the national strategy by integrating the assets under

their command. It is from this point onward that strategic concepts are

translated into operational missions. The JFC’s strategic appreciation and

articulation of the strategic and operational objectives needed to accomplish the mission form the basis for determining the component objectives.

The capabilities of aerospace power, whether acting as the decisive force or

in support of other components, must be included in strategic planning at

the highest level. If the JFC focuses solely on the classic “post-buildup counterattack” as the decisive phase of combat, he may miss an opportunity to drive the

enemy out of the fight early on with aerospace power.

 Campaign plans set long-term goals such as control of a geographic

area or the defeat of an enemy in the theater of operations. Accordingly, campaign plans normally provide both a general plan for the

entire campaign and specific plans for the campaign’s various phases.

 The JFC should specify how to defeat the enemy. This plan also

aims for the fastest possible solution at the lowest possible cost in lives

and materiel. A protracted campaign rarely serves strategic purposes

well and usually increases friendly force exposure to losses.

 Above all, the method selected should be effective and militarily

achievable. An effective campaign plan focuses on the enemy’s

vulnerable COGs—those military, political, economic, or informational

points from which an adversary derives its freedom of action, physical

strength, or will to fight. If such a COG is attacked (or merely threatened), the enemy’s position may become untenable.

In order for aerospace options to be properly planned, presented, the

theater commander should have a representative number of airmen in the

key positions on the joint staff. This is particularly important if the JFC is

not an airman. Especially during crisis action planning, the JFACC and the

airmen on the CINC’s joint staff should ensure that all possible aerospace

options are examined in the formulation of overall joint courses of action.
38

THE JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN (JAOP)

Normally, the JFACC has the responsibility of developing the JAOP

in support of the JFC’s overall theater plan. The JFACC provides the

JFC the means to exploit joint aerospace capabilities, and the JAOP is the

vehicle through which the JFACC directs joint aerospace power. The JFACC

plans and conducts operations in coordination with the other component

commanders, creating a unified effort to accomplish theater military objectives.

While the JFACC provides the central guidance for conduct of the theater air

campaign, the JFC sequences and resolves component requirements and

priorities. The JAOP provides the blueprint for air and space tasking, which will

be implemented through the daily air tasking order (ATO) process. The ATO is

typically not developed until operations actually commence, but some

contingency plans include an “on-the-shelf” air tasking order for the first

few days of a possible conflict.

		


CONCEPT OF JOINT AIR OPERATIONS DEVELOPMENT

JFC STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

JFACC/JFC STAFF ESTIMATE OF THE

SITUATION

JOINT AIR AND SPACE

OPERATIONS PLAN

JFACC’s DAILY GUIDANCE

JOINT FORCE MISSION

OBJECTIVES & COMPREHENSIVE PERSPECTIVE

JFACC/JFC STAFF RECOMMENDS COA

FOR JFC / NCA APPROVAL

SUPPORTING PLANS

(Air Defense Plan, Airspace Control Plan, etc.)

REFINE PLANS AND SUPPORTING ORDERS

(JAOP, Joint ATO, Airspace Control Order, etc.)
39

The JFACC uses the JFC’s strategic and operational objectives to

develop an air estimate of the situation that results in the formulation of a course of action (COA). Once the air commander’s COA is

approved by the JFC, it becomes the basic concept for joint air

operations, stating what is to be accomplished. The JAOP and supporting

plans state how the air component commander will conduct aerospace

operations. This is the heart of what is colloquially called “the air campaign.”

PLANNING JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

In developing the JAOP, the JFACC leverages combinations of forces

and actions to achieve the assigned objective(s) in the shortest time and

with minimal casualties. The JFACC arranges symmetric and asymmetric actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy

vulnerabilities; this also preserves freedom of action for future operations.

Where possible, COGs are targeted to provide the greatest effect for the force

employed.

JAOP Planning Process

Normally, there are five stages in the joint air operations planning process, and each stage produces a desired product. While

presented in a sequential order, the steps are not all required to be completed in the given order. Work on the various phases may be concurrent

or sequential. At some point, however, the stages must be integrated and

the products of each phase must be checked and verified for consistency.

 Operational Environment Research. The product of this phase is

primarily the intelligence preparation of the battlespace that presents an

in-depth knowledge of the operational environment. This phase is

focused on gaining information about friendly and adversary capabilities and intentions, doctrine, and the environment in which the operations will take place. The goal of this phase is to gain an understanding

of the theater of operations, the adversary, and friendly forces available to accomplish the JFC’s objectives. Key factors such as threats

and airbase availability will affect the strategy development process.

A larger enemy air threat requires more time and assets dedicated to

the achievement of air superiority, to the initial detriment of other

missions. Airfields further from the AOR may be used by long-range

or tanker-assisted assets, but the increased mission duration will

reduce the number of targets that can be attacked in a given period.
40

Such airfields may be at lower risk to enemy air and missile attack,

however, providing a tradeoff between efficiency and survivability.

 Objective Determination. The products of this phase are clearly

defined and quantifiable objectives that will contribute to the accomplishment of the JFC’s overall objectives.

 The source of planning objectives is usually documented in the

JFC’s initial planning guidance and the operation or campaign

plan.

 Joint air objectives are derived from the JFC’s objectives.

 Aerospace power can impact all three levels of war and can perform independent, integrated, and supporting operations sequentially or simultaneously.

 Joint air objectives and supporting objectives should be identified

by listing those objectives at each level of war. The objectives of

each level should support the objectives of the next higher level

to ensure unity of effort.

 Centers of Gravity Identification. The product of this phase is the

identification of those strategic, operational, and tactical COGs whose

destruction or disruption will achieve JFACC and JFC objectives.

Clausewitz described a COG as “the hub of all power and movement,

on which everything depends.” Joint doctrine defines COGs as “those

characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force,

nation, or alliance derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or

will to fight.” A COG describes the central features of an enemy system’s

or force’s power that, if defeated, may have the most decisive result.

Aerospace power typically has the ability to attack COGs throughout

the AOR/joint operations area (JOA). It is important to remember that

the type of COG and method of attack may vary widely throughout the

range of military operations. Attacks may be restricted by political

considerations, military risk, laws of armed conflict (LOAC), and rules

of engagement (ROE). Examples of pertinent questions to consider

when selecting a potential COG include: Will disruption of activity at

this target satisfy a military objective? Is aerospace power the most

appropriate and efficient way to strike this target? Are the expected

results commensurate with the military risk? Proper analysis of what
41

constitutes a COG, and how best to attack it, form the heart of this

phase in JAOP planning.

 Strategy Identification. The product of this phase is a clearly defined

joint aerospace strategy statement. The operation or campaign plan

communicates the JFC’s strategy. The joint aerospace strategy states

how the JFACC plans to exploit joint air and space capabilities and

forces to support the JFC’s objectives. While designed to maximize the

efficient use of aerospace power, strategy should balance efficiency

against competing factors such as political restraints, ROE, and the time

available for effects to be felt by the enemy. Aerospace strategy is not

developed in a vacuum but is closely integrated with the other Services’

planning efforts to support the overall strategy.

 JAOP Development. The product of this phase is the final joint air

operations plan that details how joint aerospace employment will

support the JFC’s operation or campaign plan. Based on the JFC’s

guidance, the JFACC develops the JAOP. The joint air operations plan

developed during this process should:

 Integrate the efforts of joint air capabilities and forces in achieving JFC objectives.

 Identify objectives and targets by priority order, describing in

what order they should be attacked or dealt with, the desired results, and the weight of effort required to achieve the desired results in support of the JFC’s objectives.

 Account for current and potential adversary offensive and defensive threats.

 Indicate the phasing of joint air operations in relation to the JFC’s

operation or campaign plan.



Phasing provides an orderly schedule of military decisions and indicates preplanned shifts in priorities and intent. The joint air operation can

consist of several phases, with priority given to operations that can achieve

theater-level objectives. The JFACC uses varying combinations of the functions

and missions of aerospace power to accomplish the objectives in each phase.

The following factors influence the decisions on phasing the JAOP:
42

 Methods of Phasing. Phasing is accomplished in a variety of

ways. In cases when the JFC establishes phasing, this is the starting

point for determining JAOP phasing. A few of the more common methods for phasing are by region, objectives, or force limitations.

Commanders or planners should clearly identify start points, phase

objectives, and measures of merit which define when the phase is

complete. Note that the end point of one phase does not have to be the

start point on the next phase. Phases will usually overlap to some

extent and may occur simultaneously. Phasing guidance should identify phase objectives, tasks, and priorities.

 Prioritization of Attack. The JFC may prioritize theater military

objectives, which the JFACC uses to orient the JAOP to meet JFC

priorities. A conscious decision to prioritize objectives can drive the

phasing of the JAOP by dictating a specific mission flow. This is based

on strategic and operational considerations and translates into assignment of relative values for specific target sets and individual targets.

The JFACC directs attacks on the selected target sets in parallel, series,

or some combination of the two. Attack in series generally refers to

attacking targets in the highest priority target set sequentially, beginning with the highest priority target and continuing to the lowest priority,

before initiating attack on the next target set. Parallel attack refers to

multiple, simultaneous attacks against targets with different priority

levels. This is usually the preferred method, as it generates greater

disruption and shock effects on the enemy. Because of airpower’s

flexibility and the technologies of precision and stealth, air forces are

becoming more able to conduct parallel warfare. Parallel warfare uses

aerospace power to attack key enemy systems and forces in order to

paralyze its ability to function as it desires. Parallel warfare can use

simultaneous attacks in time, space, and at all levels of war to control

the enemy’s functions and activities. If the enemy’s key targets, target

sets, or COGs can be found and identified, they are usually within airpower’s

reach. This presents the enemy leadership (military and political) with

the dilemma of trying to cope with multiple threats against multiple

possible targets.

 Battlespace Control. JFCs normally seek aerospace and information

superiority early in the conduct of operations. Establishing control of

aerospace is normally the key objective in the first phase of the JAOP.

In general, aerospace control is a prerequisite to effective pursuit of

other objectives.
43

Not every operation requires phasing. Because of the unique nature and

capabilities of aerospace power, it may be artificially constraining for the JFACC

to describe the air campaign in terms of linear phases. Phasing is a tool used

by theater commanders to achieve synchronization in time. Air operations usually occur simultaneously and are considered complete when

the desired effect is achieved, not after a given time or when a specific

geographic point is reached. However, phasing can be a useful tool to

communicate the JFACC’s concept of operations.

Once friendly forces can operate without unacceptable risk from

enemy attack, aerospace operations often focus on neutralizing

the enemy COGs. The goal is to apply force against those points whose

disruption will achieve maximum effect in support of aerospace objectives and corresponding theater objectives. Air interdiction can also

significantly affect the course of a campaign. It contributes by interfering with the enemy’s ability to command, mass, maneuver, withdraw,

supply, and reinforce available combat power and by weakening the

enemy physically and psychologically. It also creates opportunities for

friendly commanders to exploit. The task of CAS is to provide selective

and discriminate firepower, when and where needed, in support of land

forces. It provides the land commander with highly mobile, responsive,

and concentrated firepower; enhances the element of surprise; can

employ munitions with great precision; and can attack targets that are

inaccessible or invulnerable to surface fire. Although CAS is the least

efficient application of air forces, at times it may be their most critical

mission, particularly when it is required to exploit the success or ensure

the survival of ground forces.

Measures of Success

Measures of success, or indicators, are required to determine

whether or not individual air and space missions, phases of an air

campaign, or an air campaign in general are meeting objectives.

Assessment of such indicators should take place at the operational and

even strategic levels of war and goes beyond counting craters or vehicles

destroyed. The key is to determine when the predetermined conditions

have been met that affect enemy operational employment or overall

strategy. Continuing intelligence analysis helps to ensure that proper

measurements take place.

Some attention should be paid to the specific process of how to determine measures of success. When possible, measures should not relate
44

directly to tactical actions but to higher level objectives. For example, the

first phase of an air campaign is often the achievement of some required

level of aerospace superiority. An obviously poor measure would simply

be to count friendly OCA sorties flown (although simple sortie counting

has been used in past conflicts). A better measure might be of enemy

sorties flown, since this relates more directly to the denial of aerospace

use by the enemy. An even better measure would take other factors into

account, such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and imagery intelligence

(IMINT) of enemy air and missile capability, readiness, morale, and other

factors. The downside of a more complete measure is that it becomes

difficult to quantify, and therefore more subjective to personal interpretation. As with many things, the best measures are probably those that are

a compromise between objective and subjective specifics, taken with a

proper understanding of the limitations involved. Measures that are used

to indicate the completion of one phase in a campaign are especially important, as are those that could require a possible need to change the applied

strategy.

JAOP Planning Factors

The following are some critical factors to consider in developing the

joint air operations plan:

 The Enemy’s Strategy. Sun Tzu’s advice to defeat the enemy’s strategy is as applicable today as it was over 2,500 years ago. This entails

not only understanding the nature of the enemy, but also the enemy’s

specific objectives and willingness to sacrifice to achieve those objectives. An enemy may be described as rational, irrational, fanatic, rigid,

flexible, independent, innovative, determined, doctrinaire, or countless other ways. Knowledge of the extent to which an enemy fits one

of these categories can assist in determining the enemy’s plans and

how they will react to a new situation. Therefore, the JFACC uses a broad

range of national, theater, and tactical intelligence capabilities to effectively

assess the enemy’s strategy in order to defeat it. In this effort, the JFACC

should guard against being too reactive when planning strategy.

 Logistics. Military power achieves its full potential when operations

and logistics harmonize to maximize mission effectiveness. Logistics

considerations are a key factor in sequencing and sustaining forces

and should be integral to the planning process. An air campaign’s reach

cannot exceed logistics’ ability to support it. The JAOP should allocate
45

sufficient forces of whatever type required to protect all aspects of the

logistics network: embarkation, transportation, debarkation, distribution, and logistics information systems.

 Air Mobility. Air mobility is a key part of any JAOP. Air refueling is

normally required for any large-scale deployment or employment of

air assets and may often be the determining factor of how much

aerospace power can be applied during a given period. Air mobility

plays a vital role in deploying both aerospace and surface forces to an

expeditionary location and can be considered part of force application

when delivering airborne assets directly into battle via airdrop. Air

mobility is also key to the sustainment of extended combat operations;

JAOP planners should anticipate the need for continued delivery of

fuel, ammunition, replacement parts, and all of the other items that

are required for modern warfare. Proper synchronization of both

intratheater and intertheater airlift with other aerospace operations is

therefore required. In the case of intertheater airlift, there may be

other taskings outside the combat theater that place some demand on

the available airlift.

 Space. Operations DESERT STORM, DELIBERATE FORCE, AND ALLIED FORCE highlighted the increasing role space systems and forces have in planning

and conducting theater air operations. Space assets (reconnaissance,

surveillance, navigation, weather, and communications systems) are a

primary means of collecting and transmitting information for intelligence preparation of the battlespace. These systems play an equally

important role supporting the JFACC, in concert with Commander in

Chief, US Space Command (USCINCSPACE), to assess the enemy’s space

capabilities and determine the impact they might have on the theater

air campaign. Space plays an especially vital role in providing secure,

survivable communications, both inter- and intratheater, to the

communications dependent JFACC staff. Additionally, US Air Force

space support teams augment the JFACC staff to provide in-depth

space expertise in support of the planning and execution of air and

space missions. For example, ballistic missile warning enhances the

JFACC’s counterair operations when conducting theater ballistic

missile defense. The increasing role of space in warfighting, and the

similarity of the effects it produces to those produced by air-breathing

assets, has led to the concept of a single aerospace medium when discussing

military applications.
46

TOOLS FOR JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING

Strategic Appreciation

Intelligence analysis supports the strategic appreciation, which forms a

key foundation for the joint air campaign plan. A process that guides

intelligence analysis is intelligence preparation of the battlespace. In developing the strategic appreciation, the JFC needs assessments of enemy

forces concerning strength, capabilities, availability, sustainability,

composition, disposition, movement of forces and weapon systems,

leadership, transportation, energy, and information infrastructure.

The strategic appreciation is an evaluation of the political, economic,

military, and social environments affecting the theater. It is one of the

most useful products of the initial planning stage and is developed using

a five-step process that can help clarify the nature of the conflict. The

five steps are:

 Assess the strategic context of the conflict.

 Analyze enemy and friendly objectives.

 Explicitly state campaign assumptions.

 Compare friendly and enemy capabilities and limitations.

 Assess costs to both sides.

 The goal is to understand the potential conflict and to conduct

military planning with a sound appreciation of social, political, and

economic considerations. This process is applicable across the range of

military operations. The strategic appreciation can help to identify

potential enemy and friendly COGs early in planning. Details of the

strategic appreciation are found in Appendix A.

Air Estimate of the Situation

The strategic appreciation is used by the JFACC to devise the air

estimate of the situation. This estimate helps identify enemy COGs to

attack and friendly COGs to defend. It follows a logical process to establish a sound course of action. The JFACC produces an estimate at the

request of the JFC, or the JFACC and joint air operations center (JAOC)
47

staff may develop one at an appropriate planning stage. The “estimate of

the situation” uses a systematic approach to propose courses of action for

solving a military problem. The air estimate may become part of the

overall CINC’s estimate, used to present possible courses of action to the

NCA. There are five key steps to writing the estimate, which are briefly

described in Appendix B.

 State the overall theater objectives.

 Develop friendly COAs.

 Analyze opposing COAs.

 Compare friendly and enemy COAs.

 Recommend friendly COA to JFC.

JAOP Format

The joint air operations plan uses the same format as the JFC

campaign plan but from an aerospace point of view. Each JAOP

differs with the AOR/JOA, situation, and capabilities of the joint force; a

sample JAOP format is included in Appendix C. Various other informal

tools and models for the aerospace planner are listed in Appendix G.
48
49

CHAPTER THREE

EXECUTING AIR WARFARE

Once the JAOP and its guidance have been developed, the

operational art of aerospace planning prior to execution of operations is essentially finished. When operations begin, an air tasking cycle

is normally established to develop daily tactical tasking (the ATO) based on the

operational guidance provided by the JAOP and other inputs. It provides for

the efficient and effective employment of the air and space assets of one

or more components. The air tasking cycle is an interrelated series of

actions that begins with the JFC’s guidance for the cycle period. The

JFACC’s joint air operations center staff then develops a plan to support

that guidance and develops an apportionment recommendation for the

JFC to execute the plan. Finally, the JFACC allocates resources based on

the JFC’s apportionment decision and publishes the ATO. The ATO, when

combined with the airspace control order (ACO) and special instructions

(SPINS), provides operational and tactical direction for air operations

throughout the range of military operations, as well as requesting the

appropriate support from space assets not under the OPCON of the JFACC.

The ATO is subsequently implemented by the theater air control system

(TACS).

	



	

















 

 

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50

The ATO cycle provides for the continuous collection, correlation, and

prioritization of a variety of relevant inputs, in accordance with the JFC’s

intentions. The cycle also provides a repetitive process for planning,

coordination, allocation, execution, and assessment of air missions. The

cycle accommodates changing tactical situations, the JFC’s revised

priorities and objectives, and requests for support from other Service and

functional commanders in an air tasking directive, which is the ATO. The

ATO incorporates specific targets compiled by the JAOC staff with the

availability and capability of forces provided to the JFACC for the given

ATO day. The cyclic ATO transmits mission tasking to individual units,

normally each day. The ATO is a detailed document specifying numbers

of sorties, refueling tracks and times, targets, times over target (TOT),

ordnance, coordinating and controlling agencies, as well as communications frequencies. In many situations, the JFACC issues mission type

orders (MTO) to assigned and attached air units. MTOs state the objectives to be accomplished but leave the detailed mission planning to the

tasked units. This enables subordinate echelons to exploit fleeting

opportunities better. Mission type orders can help the JFACC reduce

“micro-management” when developing and transmitting an ATO. JFACCs

pass along required planning information to units via SPINS and the ACO

and normally include their commander’s intent as part of the ATO. Tactical unit commanders and flight leaders determine the tactics employed

to accomplish the missions at the unit level, using decentralized orders.

This represents the “decentralized execution” vital to aerospace flexibility. A

less detailed ATO is required for units collocated with each other that

have established coordination procedures for mission planning. If units

are geographically separated or do not have reliable and secure communications, more detailed coordination may be required in the ATO.

APPORTIONMENT

Apportionment is the determination and assignment of the

total expected aerospace effort by percentage, priority, weight of

effort, or some other appropriate means, that should be devoted to

the various aerospace operations and geographic operations for a

given period of time. The JFACC normally makes an apportionment recommendation to the JFC, based on the overall needs of theater strategy and the

available aerospace forces. JFCs normally apportion by priority or percentage of effort into geographic areas, against mission type orders, or by

functional or mission categories significant for the campaign. JFC

approval of apportionment sets the degree of effort dedicated to accomplishing specific missions. For example, when opposed by an enemy with
51

a credible air force or missile threat, air superiority becomes a prerequisite

for successful military operations. In this case, the JFC normally apportions a larger percentage of air assets to counterair missions during the

initial stages of the conflict than in other circumstances. Apportionment

may remain relatively constant during an individual phase of a

campaign or require frequent adjustment when several phases of the

campaign are conducted simultaneously.

TARGET DEVELOPMENT

Once the available aerospace forces have been apportioned into

broad categories, a more detailed process develops the specific

targets that will be attacked to achieve aerospace objectives, thereby

supporting the overall strategy. Target development takes place in the

JAOC, normally as a part of the combat plans function. All potential

targets are prioritized and selected for inclusion on the joint integrated

prioritized target list (JIPTL) based on intelligence recommendations,

component requests, “no hit” lists, collection priorities, and other factors.

All components and agencies involved in or supported by aerospace

operations have an input in this process through both the target request

process and the component liaisons to the JAOC. If the JFC decides to

convene a joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) then that body will

provide additional broad targeting guidance to help ensure the consistency of aerospace targeting with overall theater strategy. The key for

including a target on the JIPTL is a demonstrated link between that target’s

destruction and the achievement of aerospace and overall military objectives.

A sample JIPTL is included in Appendix D.

ALLOCATION AND WEAPONEERING

Once the apportionment decision is made, the JFACC allocates

resources to accomplish specific missions. Mission packages are

normally constructed to get the most from the available resources. The

master air attack plan (MAAP) and the ATO provide more detailed guidance on how daily aerospace operations will be conducted.

Master Air Attack Plan

The MAAP provides theater level sequencing and resource inputs

necessary for producing an ATO and is the first time in the air tasking

process that detailed resource availability is matched against specific targets. The following factors, while not all inclusive, represent the primary
52

considerations for developing the MAAP. A brief sample of a generic

MAAP is in Appendix E.

 Time Relationships Inherent in Aerospace Objectives and Tasks.

The JAOP envisions a certain chain of events which seeks to increase the

vulnerability of enemy targets, increase the options available to friendly

forces, and minimize the attrition of friendly forces. The JAOP should

therefore consider probable enemy reactions and build flexibility into

any projected sequence of objectives and tasks. Some objectives and

tasks do not require a particular sequence; in such cases, operations

occur simultaneously with a weight of effort to reflect the JFACC’s and

JFC’s intent. At the air campaign level, phasing allows the JFACC to

prioritize and sequence events; the air campaign also guides prioritization

and sequencing of objectives and tasks within each phase.

 Target-based Timing Requirements. The relative values of targets

depend on their contributions to an enemy’s capacity to function governmentally, militarily, or economically. The characteristics of targets may

also dictate the assignment of timing requirements to their order of

attack in the MAAP. For instance, some targets are time-critical because

not striking them first might allow the enemy an opportunity to inflict

unacceptable losses on friendly forces. Other targets are of a fleeting

nature; while their destruction may not be critical to success on the first

day of the war, that may be the only time they can be targeted. As an

example, mobile targets are more readily targeted in garrison than after

they are dispersed. Several other factors concerning individual targets

may drive timing requirements, such as the need for immediate battle

damage assessment, the desire to limit collateral damage, or unique

intelligence which relates the value and vulnerability of a target to a

specific time.

 Synergies to Minimize Losses and Achieve Decisive Results. As a

general rule, stealth, standoff weapons (to include cruise missiles), and

specialized SEAD assets are used to degrade C2, EW/ground control

intercept (GCI), and lethal air defenses, providing less stealthy aircraft

greater freedom of maneuver. At the tactical level, surprise is important,

mass is useful, and unpredictability a healthy option when considering the principles of war to decrease the friendly loss rate to enemy air

defenses. While risk of losses drives the sequence of employing specialized assets to a great extent, events on the ground or near an area of

concentrated attack may also dictate the order of attack. Air campaign

plans may mass aircraft to maximize the protection afforded by limited
53

SEAD or OCA assets and exploit transitory weaknesses in enemy

defenses. Another example of massing is attacking targets that are

close together, even though they support different objectives.

 Effects of Other Joint Operations. Support to ground or naval forces

may dictate the order of attack for a portion of the MAAP. The MAAP

should have the flexibility to adapt to the changing battlefield situation

throughout the theater. The MAAP also adjusts to the changing availability of other joint assets to ensure each task or target is assigned the

best available capability. As a minimum, planners should track

availability of missile and airborne assets of the other components or

Services. However, aerospace planners should be careful not to

confine their planning to air and space assets alone, as the integration

of surface maneuver units or special forces units in support of certain

aerospace objectives can produce decisive results.

 Availability of Friendly Air Assets. While this factor is critical in

determining the desired sequence in the MAAP, it should not be the

only one. Indeed, the availability of aircraft, weapons, skilled personnel,

and support assets will limit the number of attacks in any one period

of time as well as the number of certain types of targets that can be

struck simultaneously. However, these considerations should fine tune

the MAAP sequence, and not be the foundation for it. Consideration of

friendly force availability provides a feasibility check for the MAAP so

that AOC planners may readily translate it into an ATO.

Weaponeering

All approved targets are weaponeered on target worksheets, which detail

recommended aimpoints (otherwise known as desired mean points of

impact [DMPIs]), recommended number and type of aircraft and weapons to

achieve the desired level of effect, weapons fusing, target identification and

description, target area terrain (desert, jungle, urban, etc.), target area threats

and weather, and restrictions on collateral damage. Weapons selection should

also take into account the availability of the various weapons being considered.

Certain high value weapons, such as those capable of deep penetration, are normally

limited in number and should only be used against those targets that both require the

weapon for successful attack and that have a definitive value to the enemy. In some

cases such as CAS or armed reconnaissance, the specific target will not be

known during the planning process. For these missions, weaponeering should

provide those munitions that have broad effectiveness against all the likely

targets that may be encountered.
54

AIR TASKING ORDER (ATO) DEVELOPMENT

After the MAAP is approved by the JFACC, detailed preparations

continue on the joint ATO, SPINS, and ACO. JFC and JFACC guidance,

target worksheets, the MAAP, and various component inputs are used to

finalize the ATO, SPINS, and ACO. Components may submit critical

changes to target requests and asset availability during this final phase of

joint ATO development; such changes will likely end up as amendments

and not as part of the original ATO. The ACA and AADC instructions

should be provided in sufficient detail to allow components to plan and

execute all missions tasked in the joint ATO. These directions should

enable combat operations without undue restrictions, balancing combat

effectiveness with the safe, orderly, and expeditious use of airspace. ACA

instructions should provide for quick coordination of task assignment or

reassignment. The AADC should direct aircraft identification and

engagement procedures and ROE that are appropriate to the nature of

the threat and existing constraints. ACA and AADC instructions should

also consider the volume of friendly air traffic, counterair requirements,

identification, friend or foe (IFF) technology, weather, and enemy capabilities. ACA and AADC instructions are contained in monthly, weekly,

and daily SPINS, and also in the ACO that is updated as frequently as

required. The joint ATO, ACO, and SPINS provide operational and tactical direction at appropriate levels of detail. These documents should be

very explicit when forces operate from different bases and multicomponent or composite missions are tasked. By contrast, less detail is required

when missions are tasked to a single component or base. A sample ATO

is shown in Appendix F.

THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

The JFACC normally employs the TACS to plan, direct, and

control theater air operations. The TACS consists of both ground and

airborne elements and is directly involved in the command and control

of most air missions. The TACS has the capability to plan, direct, coordinate, and control all air operations, including air defense and airspace

control, and to coordinate for required space mission support. The size

and structure of the TACS is tailored to meet theater-specific needs determined by the JFACC. The structure of the TACS should reflect sensor

coverage, component liaison elements, and the communications required to

provide adequate support. The TACS consists of the JAOC and subordinate

air and ground control elements. In multinational commands, the name
55

and function of certain TACS elements may differ, but multinational air

components have similar capabilities.

Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)

The JAOC is the JFACC’s planning and execution headquarters. The

JAOC is responsible for centralized planning, direction, control, and coordination of aerospace operations. The JFACC is normally designated as

the AADC and ACA, so these functions are typically performed at the

JAOC as well. The JAOC monitors execution of air operations and directs

changes as the situation dictates. As the focal point of the TACS, the

JAOC should have secure and redundant communications with

operations, logistics, weather, and intelligence centers, higher and lateral

headquarters, as well as subordinate units to preclude degradation in its

ability to control air forces. Primary functions of the JAOC include:

 Receiving, assembling, analyzing, filtering, and disseminating all-source

intelligence and weather information. Intelligence and weather

personnel work within Combat Plans and Combat Operations Divisions

to provide direct support for ATO development and execution.

 Developing an air campaign strategy for future operations to meet JFACC

objectives and guidance and building supporting planning documents

that implement the air strategy.

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 Acting for the ACA, issuing airspace control procedures, and coordinating airspace control activities. This includes transmitting airspace

control orders and activating joint special operations areas (JSOAs).

 Acting for the AADC, providing overall direction of defensive counterair,

including theater missile defense.

 Directing and controlling execution of day-to-day aerospace operations.

Providing rapid reaction, positive control, coordinated and deconflicted

weapons employment, as well as integration of the total air effort.

 Conducting combat assessment to determine mission results (battle

damage assessment), reattack requirements, munitions effectiveness,

and overall air campaign effectiveness as required by the JFC to

support the theater combat assessment effort. This effort supports

higher-level operational and strategic assessment, which in turn helps

guide campaign execution.

 Establishing procedures within the JAOC for modifying the current

ATO in light of emerging threats, battle damage assessment results, or

changes in guidance.

 Integrating the IO effort to achieve a synergistic plan for the JFACC.

The IO effort within the JAOC does this by interfacing with the intelligence and target planning functions.

Other Centers and Liaison Elements

Other centers and elements within the JAOC provide coordination with the other Service components, as well as interface for

other functional components such as special operations and

combat search and rescue. Liaison elements provide senior level

interface for supported land, maritime, and special operations forces.

Appropriate liaison elements are established within the JFACC’s staff to

coordinate efforts of theater air assets. These liaison elements should

have adequate communications with their respective Service component commands to support informed decisions regarding the use and

sustainability of their force’s assets.
57

Ground Elements

Ground-based elements of the TACS, subordinate to the JAOC,

provide similar capabilities as airborne elements but with reduced

range, flexibility, and mobility. However, ground-based elements do

not depend on high-value assets for continuous operations. Additionally,

they offer an important interface between the TACS and ground-based air

defense activities. Ground TACS responsibilities are often delegated to

the control and reporting center (CRC) and air support operations center

(ASOC).

 Control and Reporting Center. The CRC is the senior element

responsible for decentralized execution of air defense and airspace

control functions. The CRC:

 Performs identification and surveillance of assigned area of

operations.

 Monitors both offensive and defensive missions and provides

threat warning.

 Manages airspace and air defense.

 Coordinates control of missions with subordinate elements and

other agencies.

 Control and Reporting Element (CRE). The CRE is subordinate to

the CRC and augments the CRC’s mission by extending radar surveillance and airspace control capabilities within a CRC’s assigned area of

responsibility. In a system environment, one CRE will normally be

designated as the alternate CRC. The CRE:

 Provides aircraft control in the forward area.

 Provides early warning and surveillance.

 Provides gap-filler radar coverage.

 Provides forward-deployed data link interface with other agencies.
58

 Air Support Operations Center. The ASOC is the element

responsible for planning, coordination, control, and execution of air

operations that directly support ground combat forces. ASOCs are

normally located at corps level. In multicorps theaters, each corps fire

support element (FSE) will be collocated with an ASOC. Each ASOC

reports to the JAOC. On-scene OPCON of the ASOC is maintained by

the corps air liaison officer (ALO), who is normally the ASOC director

during operational contingencies or exercises. The ASOC:

 Provides Air Force expertise to senior Army tactical

echelons. Advises the ground commander on the capabilities

and limitations of aerospace power. ASOC personnel should

provide expertise on how and when air operations can enhance

the effectiveness of ground operations, allowing objectives to be

achieved at less cost. ASOCs should include ground force intelligence and operations representatives, as well as appropriate

liaison personnel of other components.

 Collocates with the senior tactical FSE and provides control of air

support allocated by the JAOC to the aligned ground combat unit.

Act as the corps ALO’s conduit for CAS requests by controlling

and maintaining the Air Force air request net (AFARN).

 Forwards ground forces’ requests for airborne electronic warfare

(EW) support and Air Force requests for ground or heliborne EW

support.

 Exercises OPCON of subordinate tactical air control parties

(TACPs) aligned with ground force combat units subordinate to

the corps.

 Coordinates joint air attack team (JAAT) missions that employ

helicopters together with fixed-wing assets.

 Tactical Air Control Parties. TACPs are subordinate to the ASOC

and are the single points of direct Air Force interaction with supported

ground combat units. Each combat maneuver battalion, brigade,

division, and corps headquarters will have an aligned TACP. Combat

aviation (attack only) brigades will also have an aligned TACP. TACPs

are staffed with ALOs and other terminal attack controllers. They

conduct liaison and control functions appropriate to the level of combat maneuver force supported. ALOs, Enlisted Tactical Air Controllers
59

(ETAC), tactical air command and control specialists/technicians

(TACCS), and forward air controller (airborne) [FAC(A)s] are the only

personnel authorized to perform terminal control of CAS aircraft

during operations (combat and peacetime) within close proximity of

their supported ground combat units.

 Wing Operations Centers (WOC). WOCs are the staff headquarters

for each flying wing. Wing commanders and their staffs receive orders,

directives, and guidance from the JAOC through the WOC. WOCs

manage resources, plan missions, and direct operations for their

respective wings. Composite wing WOCs may perform appropriate

JAOC duties for planning and execution of the air war when deployed

or operating independently. WOCs also monitor and control local

surface-to-air missile (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) operations

on and immediately around airbases.

Airborne Elements

Airborne elements of the TACS provide a highly responsive,

flexible, and survivable system to support the execution and coordination of theater aerospace operations. They may be employed autonomously during the early stages of theater contingencies and conflict or in

 

 

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concert with multinational and joint Service command and control

systems. As demonstrated during DESERT STORM, airborne elements of

the TACS can rapidly react to changing situations by adjusting sensor and

communications coverage to support ATO execution. As the technology

for direct sensor-to-shooter links provide more options for aerospace force

application, C2 and battle management techniques should grow to properly exploit those options. Airborne elements rely on onboard systems as

well as direct connectivity with off-board intelligence collectors (such as

RC-135 RIVET JOINT) to accurately assess the combat arena and adjust

force execution. The JFACC augments the airborne battlestaff with direct

representation having the authority to modify the ATO. Airborne

elements of the TACS include:

 Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC).

The ABCCC supports aerospace operations by coordinating air support

with land force elements. It serves as an airborne ASOC or as the

extension of the ground-based ASOC. The ABCCC has the capability of

supporting command and control of SOF missions or serving as an

extension of the Combat Operations Division of the JAOC.

 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). AWACS provides

the TACS a highly survivable airborne radar platform. AWACS is

normally one of the first assets to arrive in any new theater of operations.

It establishes an initial C2 capability and provides early warning, radar

surveillance, battle management, and weapons control functions. AWACS

provides detection and control of low-level aircraft beyond the coverage

of ground-based radars. AWACS will normally carry an airborne battlestaff

or airborne command element (ACE) authorized to redirect forces under

the authority of the JFACC. AWACS can assign weapons to engage threat

targets, scramble and divert aircraft conducting counterair missions,

detect and identify hostile airborne targets, and recommend changes in

air defense warning conditions.

 Joint Surveillance, Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). JSTARS

is a joint Air Force/Army system designed to provide surveillance,

target detection, and target-tracking capability to develop a picture of

the enemy surface situation. It is used to provide updates on enemy

force disposition, identify opportunities for rapid interdiction and

retargeting of enemy ground forces, and can also perform some battle

management functions.
61

 Forward Air Controller (Airborne) [FAC(A)]. The FAC(A)

provides terminal control for CAS aircraft operating in close proximity

to friendly ground forces. The FAC(A) is the only person cleared to

perform such control from the air, and can be especially useful in

controlling CAS against targets that are beyond the visual range of

friendly ground forces.

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Once mastery of the air was obtained, all sorts of enterprises would

become easy.

Sir Winston Churchill
62
63

CHAPTER FOUR

TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR AIR

WARFARE

If the above quotation is indeed true, then it would be just as valid to

state that DESERT STORM was won at the Nellis ranges and the US Army’s

National Training Center (NTC). Throughout history proper preparation

of warriors for battle has included the technical details of practicing

tactics—the planning experience to produce winning strategies and the

human element of exposure to realistic battlefield conditions. Actions

over Bosnia and Kosovo again reinforced the lessons of realistic training

at both the operational and tactical levels of war.

TRAINING FACTORS

Thorough training is vital for success in all aspects of aerospace

operations. The ability to plan and execute a theater air campaign

requires the same rigorous preparation required to achieve tactical

excellence. Training, therefore, involves mastering the necessary level of

knowledge and then developing the judgment to use that knowledge in

the fog of war. Training enables the timely and coordinated completion

of many difficult and diverse tasks required by a JFACC and the JFACC’s

staff during the conduct of theater air warfare. Realistic training prepares

air forces to transition from peace to war and back. Commanders at all

levels are responsible for training and preparing forces for their wartime

mission. Individuals should learn and practice their wartime tasks prior

to the outbreak of hostilities. The pace of modern warfare may not allow

time to polish skills, develop new procedures and techniques, or create

new organizational structures as the crisis develops or after hostilities

begin. Hence, training for aircrews, battle staff, and support personnel

should be as realistic as possible to reinforce the will as well as the skill of

the airman.

BATTLE MANAGEMENT TRAINING

At the heart of effective C2 for air forces is the battle management function. The goal for battle management training is to have

The Battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton.

Lord Wellington
64

component staffs train with the same realism and intensity that exercises

such as RED FLAG provide for aircrews. Just as aircrews face realistic

threats in getting to the target, commanders and air component planners

need to experience the stresses of selecting targets and devising concepts

of operations in plausible and realistic scenarios. Campaign planning,

combat staff expertise, and C2, are critical to warfighting—they make it

possible to strike the right target with the most appropriate system. Training for this crucial aspect of warfare is conducted through specialized

training programs and exercises. In addition to molding existing battle

staffs into smooth operating teams, these programs ensure that personnel

sent to augment battle staffs in theater commands have been trained to

perform effectively, immediately upon arrival. Proper training exposes

planners to the environment they will be thrust into, should the situation

arise, with very little warning.

AIRCREW TRAINING

Experience in war and peacetime tests shows effectiveness and

aircrew survivability increase dramatically with combat experience.

The peacetime training goal is to provide the equivalent of combat

experience in the maximum quantity and quality that resources can support. Operational ranges are central to this effort. The primary objective

of operational ranges is to provide realistic training and testing areas.

The combat environment, in terms of weather and its effects, surface and

airborne targets, enemy air defenses, and general fog and friction, should

be as realistic as training constraints allow. Computer simulations are

used to enhance realism since a realistic environment for training

contributes directly to increased combat effectiveness.

Operational academic training can be an important means of getting

knowledge gained from combat experience out to the field. While not a

substitute for hands-on experience, academics are valuable and should be

included in every unit’s training program.

I have flown in just about everything, with all kinds of pilots in all

parts of the world—British, French, Pakistani, Iranian, Japanese,

Chinese—and there wasn’t a dime’s worth of difference between any

of them except for one unchanging fact: the best, most skillful pilot

had the most experience.

Charles E. (“Chuck”) Yeager
65

EXERCISES AND WARGAMING

Exercises should be planned and conducted in a way that

reflects real war. For example, if large-scale force packages in a given

scenario would include threat suppression aircraft, then such aircraft need

to participate in exercises. Since some of the most effective operations

occur at night, night training should be as thorough and intensive as

daytime training. To improve readiness, air, space, and information forces,

including airlift, participate in numerous large-scale exercises at home

and overseas. JCS-directed exercises strive to improve joint interoperability

of procedures through field exercises for aircrews and command post

exercises for staffs. Exercises in overseas locations provide realistic training for in-theater air forces programmed for deployment to those

locations. These exercises allow forces to gain valuable experience in the

joint and multinational combat environments. Not only do aerospace

forces need to participate in exercises, they need to do it smartly and

jointly to ensure we train the way we fight.

Exercises at all levels of war need to maintain a proper focus.

Over experimentation with either operational or tactical doctrine does

not help the operators. Most experimentation is best left to battlelabs or

those exercises specifically designated “experimental;” doing otherwise

results in planners and operators who do not have a solid basis of knowledge and experience to build on during wartime. Likewise, honesty and

accuracy in after-action reports are critical in today’s environment of high

operations tempo and reduced time available for in-depth exercising.

Wargaming is used by both the Air Force and the military in general

for training, education, and testing new concepts for employment and

organization. It is critical that aerospace power be properly represented in

wargames, as it is fundamentally different from ground and sea power and

should be modeled accordingly. Where ground combat wargames often

focus on force-on-force attrition models with acceptable results, such an

approach for aerospace power ignores the primary methods of force

application historically used in combat. Aerospace planners normally

seek to attack key COGs or other critical targets that cause large-scale

disruption of the enemy force, thus avoiding the more costly and much

longer process of destroying the enemy one tank or truck at a time. If the

wargame does not adequately reflect this approach, then it will teach the

wargamers the wrong lessons about aerospace power’s strengths, limitations, and desired methods of employment.
66

A Primer on Major US Air Force and

Joint Exercises

This section briefly describes a few major USAF and joint exercises by providing the

objective, method, and participants of each exercise. It is not intended to be all encompassing, rather, the primer provides a brief overview to help form an airman’s knowledge base.

FLAG EXERCISES:

RED FLAG is a realistic combat training exercise employing the air forces of the US

and its allies on the vast bombing and gunnery ranges at Nellis AFB NV, Air Warfare

Center (AWFC) through the 414th Combat Training Squadron.

The “Blue” forces use various tactics to attack Nellis range targets: mock airfields,

vehicle convoys, tanks, parked aircraft, bunkered defensive positions, missile sites, etc.

These targets are defended by a variety of simulated ground and air threats to give

participating aircrews the most realistic combat training possible.

GREEN FLAG is similar to a RED FLAG but emphasizes intelligence gathering,

bomb damage assessment, and electronic warfare.

MAPLE FLAG is a combined US/Canadian Flag exercise held at Canadian Forces

Base (CFB) Cold Lake, Canada. Units fly as a combined air package through the Primrose Lake range. This exercise provides a chance for units to exercise with a full mix of

allied participants in a NATO atmosphere.

BLUE FLAG increases Air Combat Command’s (ACC) readiness by providing battle

staff experience to number air force (NAF) and other selected personnel in a realistic

environment. Training emphasizes the activities needed to plan and execute operations in accordance with current tasked theater war plans (when able). BLUE FLAG is

ACC’s foremost large scale, force-on-force, computer-assisted, airpower exercise.

ROVING SANDS:

The primary focus of ROVING SANDS is joint tactical air operations (JTAO). The

exercise location is western Texas and southern New Mexico, primarily in the White

Sands Missile Range (WSMR) and Fort Bliss, TX areas. Theater missile defense (TMD)

has become a very important facet of ROVING SANDS. Commander in Chief, US Joint

Forces Command (USCINCJFCOM) theater missile defense initiative (TMDI) operates

in conjunction with ROVING SANDS.

AIR WARRIOR I (AW):

Air Warrior provides realistic close air support (CAS), air interdiction (AI), and

airborne forward air control (FAC[A]) training in a simulated brigade-level conflict

conducted at the US Army’s National Training Center (NTC).

Air Warrior integrates elements of Air Land Battle training at NTC with combat air

and theater air control system elements. Theater air control system improvements

through CAS/AI training result from a realistic simulated combat environment. The

ground war is fought at Ft Irwin CA and the air battle is flown from Nellis AFB NV.

AIR WARRIOR II (AWII):

Air Warrior II is designed to provide realistic CAS, AI, and airborne forward air

control (FAC(A)) training, in a simulated low to mid intensity conflict at the US Army’s

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Air Warrior II provides light infantry battalion-sized unit commanders and their staff a data source for improving tactics and

procedures and theater air control system improvements through CAS/AI training in a

realistic simulated combat environment. The ground war is fought at Ft Polk LA, and

the air battle is flown from Barksdale AFB LA.
67

EDUCATION

The Air Force has a number of education programs that prepare

the airman to better employ aerospace power. They are designed to

increase professional knowledge and, more broadly, to improve critical

thinking skills and develop analytical ability. Different programs are

applicable at various points throughout an airman’s career and are most

effective if accomplished at the appropriate time.

Professional Continuing Education (PCE)

PCE is designed to increase an airman’s knowledge of important

concepts in a particular area of expertise. A number of commands

and schools offer courses specifically designed to improve the conduct of

air warfare. Some courses, such as the Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course,

are designed to help planners and commanders understand the planning

and command and control of aerospace operations. Others, such as some

courses offered by the US Air Force Special Operations School, focus on a

particular means of employing aerospace power. PCE programs are

A Primer on Major US Air Force and

Joint Exercises— continued

UNIFIED ENDEAVOR (UE):

 UE is a US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) exercise designed to train a joint

task force (JTF) commander/staff and JTF component commanders/staffs on joint

task force operations. In accordance with USJFCOM’s JTF training program, the focus

is on joint academic training; standing up a JTF; crisis action planning procedures;

joint doctrine; and tactics, techniques and procedures application. The JTF is comprised of Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine and special operations forces (SOF). The

commander, JTF develops an operations order (OPORD) and then conducts operations based on that order as directed by USCINCJFCOM.

INTERNAL LOOK:

 Internal Look is a US Central Command (USCENTCOM)-directed battle staff exercise designed to train a JTF commander/staff. The focus is on command and control

training; standing up a JTF; crisis action planning procedures; joint doctrine; and

tactics, techniques and procedures application. The JTF will be comprised of Army,

Air Force, Navy, Marine and SOF components of US CENTCOM. The CJTF develops an

OPORD and then conducts operations based on that order as directed by Commander

in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT).

JOINT TASK FORCE EXERCISE (JTFEX):

 JTFEX is a CJCS-approved, USJFCOM-scheduled, component-sponsored, field

training exercise employing Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and SOF elements

in a littoral environment off the east coast of the United States. The exercise is conducted to support requirements-based joint interoperability training for USJFCOM forces

and to certify the participating Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and Amphibious Ready

Group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) for forward deployment.
68

effective once an airman has developed the basic skills necessary to

perform the air warfare mission.

Professional Military Education (PME)

PME provides broad education appropriate for different points

in an officer’s, noncommissioned officer’s (NCO), or civilian’s

career. Within these programs, airmen learn about Air Force doctrine

and the role of aerospace power in joint doctrine. An understanding of

doctrine is critical if aerospace power is to be effectively employed in

operations and properly represented in the joint arena. Sequential levels

of PME provide the student a broader doctrinal foundation with which to

operate.

Graduate Education

Graduate education programs, both military and civilian,

provide the knowledge and the perspective that help airmen apply

tactical skills, plan operations, and prepare for the future. Liberal

arts programs such as military history or international relations help

airmen understand the context in which air warfare will be conducted.

Technical programs such as engineering or the physical sciences may

help airmen develop new tools that match the tenets of aerospace power

with emerging technologies.
69

At the Very Heart of Warfare lies Doctrine. . .

	

	





			



			
70
71

Suggested Readings

Armitage, M.J. and Mason, R.A., Air Power in the Nuclear Age (University

of Illinois Press). 1985.

Byman, D. L., Waxman, M. C., and Larsen, E., Air Power as a Coercive

Instrument (Rand). 19996.

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War (Princeton University Press). 1976.

Corbett, Julian S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Navy Institute

Press). 1988.

Creveld, Martin Van, Command in War (Harvard University Press). 1985.

Hosmer, Steven T., Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars,

1941-1991 (Rand). 1996.

Jomini, Antoine Henri de, The Art of War (Greenhill Books). 1996.

Lambert, Andrew P.N., Psychological Effects of Airpower (RUSI). 1994.

Liddell-Hart, B.H., Strategy (Meridian). 1991.

Mason, Tony, Airpower: A Centennial Appraisal (Brassey’s). 1994.

Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win (Cornell University Press). 1996.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Westview Press). 1994.

Warden, John, The Air Campaign (Presidio Press). 1989.

Warden, John, The Enemy as a System (Airpower Journal). Spring 1995.

Wylie, J. C., Military Strategy (Navy Institute Press). 1989.
72
73

APPENDIX A

THE STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

1. Context. The first step is to assess the strategic context of the conflict.

This requires an in-depth assessment of enemy and friendly sources of

national power. The examples and categories that follow are illustrative,

not exhaustive.

a. Enemy strategic analysis: This analysis promotes an understanding of enemy interests and objectives. Effective control of the

adversary leadership and associated power structure is the key to

achieving strategic goals.

(1) Political strengths, weaknesses, and trends such as:

 Commitment of enemy powers to their alliance.

 Additional potential allies and their vital interests.

 Strength of central government, method of rule (by mandate, terror, or both).

 General distribution of power: centralized or decentralized (legislative, military, security, financial, press, and

tribal organizations and elites).

 Political frailties.

(2) Social strengths, weaknesses, and trends such as:

 Assessment of national values.

 Dominant political or religious ideologies.

 Societal arrangements along religious, ethnic, tribal, or

political lines.

 Commitment or obedience to national or ethnic leadership.

(3) Information flow factors such as:

 Control of media.

 Reliance on verbal, written, radio, and television media.

 Public access to television and radio.

 Potential influence of international media on the enemy’s

internal public support.
74

(4) Economic dependencies, sources of national power a

and trends such as:

 Industry/agriculture/transportation systems.

 Energy and water sources.

 Reliance on international trade and imports of critical

 raw materials,

 Banking, credit and import routes.

(5) Military strengths, weaknesses, and trends such as:

 Force structure (conventional/unconventional).

 Proficiency and readiness.

 Sustainability and survivability.

 Doctrinal tendencies.

 Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and

 delivery capability.

 Terrorist capability within the theater of operations or

 US.

b. Assess the friendly strategic situation using the same variables

listed above. This should help the planner identify possible

friendly strategic weaknesses and COGs.

2. Enemy and Friendly Objectives. Enemy objectives may have to be

deduced—avoid accepting their stated objectives at face value. From a

friendly perspective, ideally the NCA and the JFC will set national- and

theater-level objectives. When this is the case, it is advantageous to

restate higher-level objectives verbatim. Realistically though, objectives

are often ambiguous, especially early in the campaign planning process.

Because of this, planners often have to infer national objectives. Even if

strategic guidance is not clear or specific, military objectives should be

written to clearly convey what the campaign is designed to achieve.

3. Assumptions. Explicitly state assumptions the campaign depends

on. The most important ones are often the hardest to state. These may

include expectations about public reaction, weather, training, willingness

of the enemy to use weapons of mass destruction, duration of the

campaign, and enemy reaction. It is important to remember that the US

and its enemies often do not share the same value system.
75

4. Capabilities. Compare absolute physical capabilities with limitations

in training, adaptability, friction, and confusion to get a feel for realistic

capabilities of both sides.

5. Costs. Assess what costs each national decision-making authority can

bear in money, casualties, equipment and force structure, and political

influence.

6. Conclusion. If the strategic appreciation is easy, straightforward, and

certain, it probably has been rushed. The greatest value of this effort is

that it clarifies the complex strategic environment of the theater. A solid

understanding of the strategic environment lays a firm foundation for the

whole air campaign planning process.
76
77

APPENDIX B

THE AIR ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. Objective(s). State the objective(s) assigned by higher authority or

deduced from instructions from that source. These are usually stated

from the point of view of the theater commander and should have a

defined, measurable purpose. In every case the first duty of a commander

receiving a mission is to be satisfied that he understands what is required

of his command as a part of the larger team.

a. National Objectives. Overarching goals of the United States as

articulated by the National Command Authorities.

b. Supported Theater Objectives. Objectives developed by the theater commander to achieve the national objective.

c. Assigned Aerospace Objectives. Objectives specifically assigned

to the JFACC by the JFC or those objectives which the JFACC can

assume that are required to conduct air operations. Each course

of action developed has its own specific objectives.

2. Situation and Courses of Action. This step develops several courses

of action that can be taken by air and space forces. Each course should be

substantially different in some respect. One course may use interdiction

as the primary means to destroy the enemy’s fielded forces, whereas in

another it may only serve as a supporting function. Any course of action

should not only support the JFC’s objectives but also consider the desired

end state as well (e.g., destructively or nondestructively disable an electrical power station). Either might support the JFC’s objectives, but might

have very different end state effects. All courses of action should include

logistics considerations. Another method to differentiate courses of

action is to change the phasing of air operations.

a. State commander’s intent:

(1) Identify desired end-state.

(2) Describe underlying logic for strategy (blueprint or pattern).

b. State military objectives. For each objective:

(1) State the objective clearly.

(2) State how the objective supports theater and NCA objectives.

(3) Specify tasks to be achieved and associated standards of performance.
78

c. Force assumptions (critical in a force projection scenario into an

immature theater):

(1) Total air forces potentially available to support course of action (Air Force, SOF, Navy, Marine, Army aviation and air

defense artillery).

(2) Reconnaissance assets required, both national and theater.

(3) Surface forces required to support the course of action.

d. Estimate requirements:

(1) Sorties and munitions required (by type aircraft where appropriate) to accomplish each task.

(2) Time required to accomplish each task given the priority and

phasing of the task.

(3) Time permitting, sketch out the MAAP. NOTE: Both d(1) and

d(2) have been traditionally underestimated.

(4) Essential supporting tasks from other components (air base

protection, logistical support, maneuver to support interdiction).

e. Logistics required to support:

(1) Deployment schedule and strategic lift requirements [timephased force and deployment data (TPFDD)]

(2) Daily logistics requirements (POL, weapons, water, spare

parts).

(3) Intratheater lift requirements, both surface and air.

f. Force capabilities and ratios. Consider the order of battle for both

sides.

(1) Friendly Forces. Factors to be considered are:

(a) Air/Space.

 Order of battle for air and space forces (include forces

from other services and coalition nations made available to the JFACC for tasking).

 Operating capacity of friendly airfields.

 State of supply (POL, weapons, water) and replace-

 ments.

 Effect of weather on flying and sortie generation ca-

 pability.
79

 Logistics support available from allies/ other Services

 (POL, water, surfacetransportation).

 Range of friendly aircraft and refueling capabilities.

(b) Ground/Naval.

 Order of battle. (Specify type—mechanized, light in

 fantry, etc.)

 Coalition, and those SOF forces not under the control

 of the JFACC.

 Flow of forces into theater.

 Organic air defense capability.

 Availability of air and sea ports of debarkation.

 Potential naval operating areas.

(2) Enemy Forces. Consider, from the enemy viewpoint, factors

similar to those given in (1) above.

(a) Command, control, and communications (C3).

(b) Air/Space.

 Air, air defense, and space order of battle.

 Operating and reconstitution capacity of enemy air

 fields.

 Effect of weather on flying and sortie generation ca-

 pability.

 Logistics support available and lines of communication.

 Range of enemy aircraft and refueling capabilities.

 Mobile and fixed missile forces.

(c) Ground/Naval.

 Order of battle (specify type).

 NBC weapons, delivery capability, and manufactur-

 ing capability.

 Organic air defense capability.

 Potential naval operating areas.

(3) Relative Combat Strength. Compare the opposing forces to

friendly forces from the point of view of the factors indicated

above, and also from the point of view of physical condition,
80

morale, amount of recent operations, doctrine, training, and

combat experience.

(a) Air Forces.

 Friendly forces’ ability to conduct offensive air oper-

 ations. Consider their ability to counter IADS from

 a technological and aircrew proficiency standpoint.

 Enemy ability to conduct offensive air operations

 Enemy and friendly ability to conduct air and space

 reconnaissance operations

(b) Land Forces.

 Based on the friendly current force structure and the

 planned force structure.

 Ability of enemy to conduct offensive operations.

 Vulnerability of friendly forces to air interdiction

(c) Maritime Forces.

 Friendly forces’ ability to gain and maintain sea control in theater and for strategic lines of communica

 tion.

 Friendly forces’ general vulnerability to air and sea

 threats.

g. Air component course of action. State all feasible and acceptable

courses of action open to the commander that can potentially

accomplish the mission.

3. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action. The air component

commander next assesses the intangible or abstract factor: the skill of the

enemy commander. It is rarely possible to obtain direct information on

the enemy’s objectives, at least in time to use this information. Since

they are a vital factor in the outcome, it is often necessary to deduce

them.

a. Enemy Air/Space Options. State concisely the reasonable alternatives that the enemy air forces may adopt to oppose the air

component commander’s mission. Given that it is impossible to

foresee or construct the actual plan that the enemy air commander

follows, therefore all reasonable and probable hostile alternatives

for his employment of airpower should be concisely stated and

considered.
81

b. Enemy Ground/Naval Situation. Identify all reasonable surface

force courses of action that would support their objectives. Include guerrilla force options.

c. Enemy NBC Options. Include likely delivery options (aircraft,

terrorist, artillery, cruise missile, ballistic missile).

d. Analyses of Enemy Alternatives. Analyze each alternative given

above and determine if it is workable and what its advantages

and disadvantages might be. State whether each alternative

has a reasonable chance of success and whether it would accomplish the enemy’s probable objective if successful. In analyzing

each potential enemy alternative, it is important to maintain the

enemy’s point of view.

e. Most Probable Courses of Enemy Action. Identify the alternatives

available to the enemy which appear most suited to the enemy’s

probable intention. Include justification. When no one hostile

plan appears to have a pronounced advantage over the others

from the enemy viewpoint, select the one that seems most disadvantageous to friendly forces.

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action. Compare each friendly

course of action with each enemy course of action given above and determine if it workable and what its advantages are over its disadvantages, to

include logistics considerations. Determine likely enemy responses to

each friendly course of action. For each friendly course of action assess

its chance of success, whether it would accomplish the strategic objectives if successful, and whether it would favor future action from the air

commander and supporting forces.

5. Decision. The last step of the estimate, the DECISION, states the

JFACC’s recommended course of action. Normally, the JFACC proposes

this course of action to the JFC. When it is approved, it becomes the

JFACC’s mission and the basis for the subsequent air campaign plan.
82
83

APPENDIX C

SAMPLE JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN

FORMAT

Copy No.

Issuing Headquarters

Place of Issue

Date/Time Group of Signature

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS PLAN: (Number or Code name)

REFERENCES: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: Briefly describe the command organization (composition and relationships) for the JFC’s campaign and the

aerospace operations envisaged. Detailed information may be included

in the command relationships annex. Cover component commanders,

Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) and Airspace Control Authority

(ACA) identities, and others as required.

1. Situation: Briefly describe the situation that the plan addresses (see

JFC’s estimate). The related CONPLAN or OPLAN should be identified as

appropriate.

a. Guidance: Provide a summary of directives, letters of instructions,

memoranda, treaties, and strategic plans, including any campaign/

operations plans received from higher authority, that apply to the

campaign.

(1) Relate the strategic direction of the JFC’s requirements.

(2) List strategic objectives and tasks assigned to the command.

(3) Constraints—list actions that are prohibited or required by

higher authority (ROE and others as appropriate).

b. Adversary Forces. Provide a summary of pertinent intelligence

data including information on the following:

(1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of

major adversary forces that can influence action in the AOR/JOA.

(2) Strategic concept (if known), should include adversary’s perception of friendly vulnerabilities and adversary’s intentions

regarding those vulnerabilities.

(3) Major objectives (strategic and operational).

(4) Adversary commander’s idiosyncrasies and doctrinal patterns.
84

(5) Operational and sustained capabilities.

(6) Vulnerabilities.

(7) Centers of gravity and decisive points.

c. Friendly Forces. State here information on friendly forces not

assigned that may directly affect the command.

(1) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting US commands (e.g.,

USTRANSCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, USSPACECOM).

(2) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting allied or other

coalition forces (e.g., NATO, Spain, Italy, Egypt, etc.).

d. Assumptions. State here assumptions applicable to the plan as a

whole. Include both specified and implied assumptions.

2. Mission. State the joint aerospace task(s) and the purpose(s) and

relationship(s) to achieving the JFC’s objective(s).

3. Aerospace Operations.

a. Strategic or Operational Concept. (Based on the relevant

elements of the JFC strategy.) State the broad concept for the

deployment, employment, and sustainment of major aerospace

capable joint forces including the concepts of deception and

psychological operations during the operation or campaign as a

whole. (This section is a summary of details found in the annexes.)

(1) Joint aerospace force organization.

(2) Joint force aerospace objectives.

(3) Beddown overview.

(4) Operational missions.

(5) Phases of joint aerospace operations in relation to JFC operation or campaign plan.

(6) Timing and duration of phases. (Aerospace operations

normally do not lend themselves to linear, sequential phasing. However, the concept of phases, even those conducted

simultaneously or unparallel, might provide a useful framework for thinking about the attainment of intermediate

objectives.)

b. Phase 1. Provide a phase directive for each phase.

(1) Operational concept. Include operational objectives, plan of

attack, and timing.

(2) General missions and guidance to subordinates and components’ supporting and supported requirements. Ensure that

missions are complementary.
85

(3) Capabilities/forces required by role or capability. Should

consider land, sea, air, space, special operations, and multinational.

(4) Tasks of subordinate commands and components.

(5) Reserve Forces. Location and composition. State “be prepared”

missions. Include guidance on surge sorties if used as reserve

capability.

(6) Mobility. Consider transportation, ports, lines of communication, transit and overflight rights, reinforcement, reception and

onward movement, and host-nation support arrangements.

(7) Deception.

(8) Psychological Operations. Ensure joint aerospace operations

will support established psychological operations.

c. Phases II to XX (last). Cite information as stated in subparagraph 3b above for each subsequent phase, to include whether or

not it will be conducted simultaneously with other phases.

Provide a separate phase for each step in the operation at the end

of which a major reorganization of forces may be required and

another significant operation initiated.

d. Coordinating Instructions. If desired, instructions applicable

to two or more phases or multiple events of the command may

be placed here.

4. Logistics. Brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept for the

joint aerospace operations with information and instructions applicable

to the joint aerospace operations by phase. Logistics phases must be

consistent with operational phases. This information may be listed

separately and referenced here. This paragraph should address:

a. Assumptions.

b. Supply aspects.

c. Maintenance and modifications.

d. Medical Service.

e. Transportation.

f. Base development.

g. Personnel.

h. Foreign military assistance.

i. Administrative management.

j. Line(s) of communication.
86

k. Reconstitution of forces.

l. Joint and multinational responsibilities.

m. Sustainment priorities and resources.

n. Inter-Service responsibilities.

o. Host-nation considerations.

5. Command, Control, and Communications.

a. Command.

(1) Command relationships. State generally the command relationships for the entire joint aerospace operations or portions

thereof. Indicate any transfer of forces contemplated during

the joint aerospace operations, indicating the time of the

expected transfer. These changes should be consistent with

the operational phasing in paragraph 3. Give location of

commander, JAOC, and command posts.

(2) Delegation of Authority.

b. Communications.

(1) Communications. Plans of communications. (May refer to a

standing plan or contained in an annex.) Include time zone

to be used; rendezvous, recognition, and identification instructions; code; liaison instructions; and axis of signal

communications as appropriate.

(2) Electronics. Plans of electronics systems. (May refer to standard plan or may be contained in an annex.) Include electronic

policy and other such information as may be appropriate.

(3) Combat Camera. Plans for combat camera. (May refer to standard plan or may be contained in an annex.) Include digital

still photo and motion video imagery transmission to the

Pentagon’s Joint Combat Camera Center.

(4) Armament Delivery Recording (ADR) (bomb and gun camera

imagery). Plan for ADR. (May refer to a standard plan or may

be contained in a combat camera annex.) Include imagery transmission to the Pentagon’s Joint Combat Camera Center.

(5) Communications and Information Requirements: Determine,

resource, and integrate supporting communications and information systems, personnel, and necessary bandwidth to meet

joint aerospace operational requirements.

(Signed) (Commander)

ANNEXES: As required.
87

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE JOINT INTEGRATED PRIORITIZED

TARGET LIST (JIPTL)

  	
 


		


	




	



	


	


		



	
		




	
	

		





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89

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE MASTER AIR ATTACK PLAN

Master Air Attack Plan

TOT MSN# TGT DESCRIPTION AIRCRAFT

H-15 63819 A011 COMMAND POST 1 F-117

H-10 6302C A09 ALERT FIELD 2 F-117

0000 6554D AS034 AIRCRAFT FUEL 4 F-15E

0000 43821 SAD32 EW/GCI PLATFORM 4 F-16

0000 43822 N/A AREA SEAD 4 EA-6B

0000 43823 N/A AREA/HVA CAP 4 F-14

0000 5103R AR71 AAR TRACK 3 KC-135R

0025 0255U CCC01 NATIONAL C2 2 F-117

0000 33717 INT37 RAILROAD BRIDGE 4 Tornado

0115 3212A INT16 POL STORAGE 2 F-15E

0125 2714G CP A4 CAS 4 A-10
90
91

APPENDIX F

SAMPLE AIR TASKING ORDER

ATOCONF MESSAGE SETS (BREAKOUT KEY)

MSNDAT / MSNNO / PKG / CALLSIGN / NUMACTYPE / AMSN /

ALRT / SCL1 / SCL2 / SIF1 / SIF2

MSNLOC / TIME ON STATION / TIME OFF STATION / LOCATION

NAME / ALTITUDE / REQUEST NUM / LOCATION

TGTLOC / TIME ON TGT / TIME OFF TGT / TGT ID / TGT TYPE /

DMPI / REQUEST / COMMENTS

CONTROL / TYPE / CALLSIGN / PRIMARY FREQ / SECONDARY

FREQ / REPORT POINT / COMMENTS

FACINFO / CALLSIGN / PRIMARY FREQ / SECONDARY FREQ /

REPORT POINT / SUPPORT UNIT ID / COMMENTS

ELECMBT / CALLSIGN / PRIORITY / LOCATION / ALTITUDE /

TOS / TFS / PRIMARY FREQ / SECONDARY FREQ

RECDATA / REQUEST NUM / PRIORITY / TIME ON TGT / LTIOV /

REC MSN TYPE / COVG TYPE / IMAGERY TYPE / IMG

QUALIFIER / COVG MODE / TGT CODE / PRINT SCALE /

DELIVER ADDRESS

TRCPLOT / INITIAL POINT / RADIUS, WIDTH OR ELLIPSE AND

QUALIFIERS

REFUEL / TANKER CALLSIGN / TANKER MSNNO OR TANKER

TACAN / ARCP / ALTITUDE / ARCT / OFFLOAD / TKR

FREQ 1 / TKR FREQ 2



ATO A: FAA000 UNCLAS EXER/ //

MSGID/ATOCONF//AOC//

PERID/OOOOOOZ/TO:OOOOOOZ//

AIRTASK/ATO A//

TASKUNIT/353TFS//

MSNDAT/AF003/-/GMAN11/4XA10A/GCAS/15M/A1/-/31511-//

TGTLOC/-/-/-/-//

AMPN/SEE UNIT REMARKS 1, 2, 3 ACEMAKER//

MSNDAT/AF004/-/GMAN15/4XA1OA/GCAS/15M/A1/-/31515/-//

TGTLOC/-/-/-/-//

AMPN/SEE UNIT REMARKS 1, 2, 3, ACEMAKER//

MSNDAT/AF005/-/GMAN21/4XA10A/GCAS/30M/A1/-/31521/-//

TGTLOC/-/-/-/-//

AMPN/SEE UNIT REMARKS 1, 2, 3, ACEMAKER//
92

MSNDAT/AF001/-/GMAN01/4XA1OA/CAS/-/A1/-/31501/-//

TGTLOC/121330Z/121350Z/B1234-12345/FTAFLD/

303645.7N1202739.1W/123B/BOMB DUMP//

AMPN/SEE UNIT REMARKS 1, 2, 3, ACEMAKER//

MSNDAT/AF002/-/GMAN05/4XA1OA/CAS/-/A1/-/31505/-//

TGTLOC/121530Z/121550Z/B123412345/FTAFLD/

303645.7N1202739.lW/124B/BOMB DUMP//

AMPN/SEE UNIT REMARKS 1, 2, 3, ACEMAKER//

TASKUNIT/59TFS//

MSNDAT/FT0011/-/GLIDER01/4XF15/DCA/-/D5/-/31401/-//

TGTLOC/-/-/-/-//

AMPN/SEE UNIT REMARKS 1, 2, 3 ACEMAKER//

MSNDAT/FT0015/-/GLIDER05/4XF15/DCA/-/D5/-/31405/-//

TGTLOC/-/-/-/-//

AMPN SEE UNIT REMARKS 1, 2, 3, ACEMAKER//

RMKS//
93

APPENDIX G

ADDITIONAL PLANNING TOOLS

This appendix presents a variety of various tools and models available

for the aerospace planner. Some are more official in nature than others,

but all have been used at various times in exercises, actual combat operations, or both.

Figure G.1. illustrates the interaction of external and internal elements

and their relationship to the planing process.




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TYING OBJECTIVE TO STRATEGY TO TASK

An important part of any military planning is ensuring that selected

strategies and tasks support higher-level objectives. The following two

models (figures G.2 and G.3) are often used to illustrate this concept for

aerospace warfare planning:

Z-Diagram: Objective Mechanism Strategy

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1. Receive overall policy and military guidance from above.

2. Analyze the adversary for possible COGs.

3. Determine if candidate COGs are truly critical to the enemy strategy.

This analysis must include a thorough examination of the mechanism by

which COG influence will affect enemy strategy.

4. Determine if identified COGs or their linkages are vulnerable to direct

attack. If not, examine for possible indirect attack.

5. Determine if the method of influencing the COG is feasible, considering such questions as number and quality of friendly forces, ROE, level of

conflict, projected losses, etc.

6. Develop overall military strategy to support the military objectives.

Among other factors, the strategy must consider objectives, threat, environment, mechanism, and law of armed conflict.

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Assessment

Execute Military Strategy

 Feasible?

 - Forces

 - Risk

Indirect

Attack?

Vulnerable?

Critical?

Political Policy Mil Obj

1 2

3

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7 6

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No

No (reassess)

No

No

(reassess) Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Center of Gravity Development

 Figure G.4. shows the COG process from start to finish. Note that it

must begin with national policy and military objectives and include

assessment of operations to determine if the COG(s) should be adjusted

as the operation progresses. The enemy may take actions that make the

original COG no longer critical or develop such defensive or dispersion

measures that new methods of attack are required.
97

7. Execute the strategy and attack/influence the COG as part of the

military operation.

8. Assess the success of the attack and study the overall impact on

adversary strategy (operational and strategic assessment). Assess adversary reaction to the attack, and determine if follow-up attacks are required

or if a new COG should be sought.
98

Five-Ring Targeting Model

The five-ring model was developed as part of the “enemy as a system”

concept, which analyzes the enemy from a systemic perspective. This

model can be used for analyzing the enemy as a whole or specific

portions of an enemy system may themselves be broken down into the

five categories using the “rings within rings” approach. The model places

leadership at the center based on the idea that leadership is normally the

ultimate target and attacks to directly affect leadership, when possible,

are often effective. How far the effects of disrupting leadership go

towards achieving military and national objectives depends on a host of

variables specific to each conflict.

	





		
	

	


	


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A further development of the five-ring concept (see figure G.6) has

been proposed which renames some of the categories and adds a “connectivity” outer ring to indicate the interaction between various nations,

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Figure G.7 below presents two samples of this process, in this case

using the six-ring method. The nation-state example provides a military

campaign application while the human body example represents the

concept’s application against a familiar “system.”

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Glossary

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA antiaircraft artillery

AADC area air defense commander

ABCCC airborne battlefield command and control center

ACA airspace control authority

ACC Air Combat Command

ACE airborne command element

ACO airspace control order

ACP airspace control plan

ADR armament delivery recording

AEF aerospace expeditionary force

AFAC airborne forward air control

AFARN Air Force air request net

AFB Air Force Base

AFDD Air Force doctrine document

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces

AI air interdiction

ALO air liaison officer

AMC Air Mobility Command

AO area of operations

AOC aerospace operations center

AOR area of responsibility

ARG Amphibious Ready Group

ASOC air support operations center

ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

ATO air tasking order

AW Air Warrior

AWII Air Warrior II

AWACS airborne warning and control system

AWFC Air Warfare Center

BCD battlefield coordination detachment

C2 command and control

C3 command, control, and communications

CAS close air support

CFB Canadian Forces Base

CINC commander in chief
102

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJTF commander, joint task force

COA course of action

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COG center of gravity

COMAFFOR Commander, Air Force Forces

CONPLAN operation plan in concept format

CONUS continental United States

CRC control and reporting center

CRE control and reporting element

CSAR combat search and rescue

CVBG carrier battle group

DCA defensive counterair

DCS defensive counterspace

DMPI designated mean point of impact

EA electronic attack

EP electronic protection

ES electronic warfare support

ETAC enlisted terminal attack controller

EW electronic warfare

FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)

FACP forward air control post

FSE fire support element

GCI ground control intercept

GLO ground liaison officer

GPS global positioning system

HARM high-speed antiradiation missile

HUMINT human intelligence

IADS Integrated Air Defense System

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

IFF identification, friend or foe

IMINT imagery intelligence

IO information operations

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
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JAAT joint air attack team

JFACC joint force air component commander

JAOC joint air operations center

JAOP joint air operations plan

JFC joint force commander

JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list

JOA joint operations area

JPEC Joint Planning and Execution Community

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center [US Army]

JSOA joint special operations area

JSOACC joint special operations air component commander

JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

JSTARS joint surveillance, target attack radar system

JTAO joint tactical air operations

JTCB joint targeting coordination board

JTF joint task force

JTFEX joint task force exercise

LOAC law of armed conflict

MAAP master air attack plan

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force

MAJCOM major air command

MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit

MOOTW military operations other than war

MTO mission type orders

NAF numbered air force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

NCA National Command Authorities

NCO noncomissioned officer

NTC National Training Center [US Army]

OCA offensive counterair

OCS offensive counterspace

OPCON operational control

OPORD operation order

OPLAN operations plans
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OPR office of primary responsibility

OSA Operational Support Airlift

PJ individual pararescue specialist

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants

POW prisoner of war

PSYOP psychological operations

ROE rules of engagement

SAM surface-to-air missile

SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses

SIOP Single Integrated Operation Plan

SOF special operations forces

SPINS special instructions

TACC tanker airlift control center; tactical air control center

TACCS tactical air command and control specialists/technicians

TACON tactical control

TACP tactical air control party

TACS theater air control system

TLAM TOMAHAWK land attack missiles

TMD theater missile defense

TMDI theater missile defense initiative

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

UE UNIFIED ENDEAVOR

USACOM United States Atlantic Command

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

USCINCACOM Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Command

USCINCCENT Commander in Chief, US Central Command

USCINCSPACE Commander in Chief, US Space Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

USSPACECOM United States Space Command

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command

USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WOC wing operations center

WSMR White Sands Missile Range
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Definitions

aerospace. Of, or pertaining to, Earth’s envelope of atmosphere and the

space above it; two separate entities considered as a single realm for

activity in launching, guidance, and control of vehicles that will travel in

both entities. ( JP 1-02)

air superiority. That degree of dominance of the air medium which

permits the conduct of operations by friendly land, sea, and air forces at a

given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy, while

denying that enemy the same freedom of action.

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the

airspace control area. Also called ACA. ( JP 1-02)

allocation. In a general sense, distribution of limited resources among

competing requirements for employment. Specific allocations (e.g., air

sorties, nuclear weapons, forces, and transportation) are described as

allocation of air sorties, nuclear weapons, etc. See also allocation (air);

allocation (nuclear); allocation (transportation); apportionment. ( JP 1-02)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of

limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as

apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. See also allocation; apportionment (air). ( JP 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate

unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall

responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be

the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and

execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other

components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air

defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed

at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time

and space. ( JP 1-02)
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centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from

which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or

will to fight. ( JP 1-02)

close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against

hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which

require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02)

component. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint

force. Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service

and functional components. (JP 1-02)

counterinformation. Those actions dedicated to controlling the information environment.

direct effect. Result of actions with no intervening effect or mechanism

between act and outcome. Direct effects are usually immediate and

easily recognizable.

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or

to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within

electronic warfare are: electronic attack— That division of electronic

warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack

personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA

includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use

of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic

deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers,

radio frequency weapons, particle beams). electronic protection.— That

division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy

employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy

friendly combat capability. Also called EP. and electronic warfare

support— That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked

by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for,

intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional

radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat

recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations
107

and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and

homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to

produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both communications intelligence

(COMINT) and electronics intelligence (ELINT). (JP 1-02)

indirect effect. Result created through an intermediate effect or mechanism to produce the final outcome, which may be physical or psychological

in nature. Indirect effects tend to be delayed and may be difficult to

recognize.

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information

and information systems while defending one’s own information and

information systems. Also called IO. (AFDD 1)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology

employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment,

and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the

battlespace builds an extensive data base for each potential area in which

a unit may be required to operate. The data base is then analyzed in

detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain

on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of

the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The joint force air component

commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the

authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to

ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The

joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component

commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsibilities

will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would

include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking

based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the

joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with

other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting

commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend

to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various

missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. ( JP 1-02)

operational assessment. The measurement of effects at the operational

level. Operational assessment determines whether or not force
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employment is properly supporting overall strategy by meeting operational objectives.

operational control. Transferable command authority that may be

exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant

command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) (COCOM). Operational control may be delegated and is

the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate

forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction

necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes

authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint

training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.

Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through

subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional

component commanders. Operational control normally provides full

authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as

the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish

assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include

authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline,

internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. ( JP 1-02)

operational effect. Link between tactical results and strategy; typically

the cumulative outcome of missions, engagements, and battles. Can also

result from the disruption of systems or areas of operational value.

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and

major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish

strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at

this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives

needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve

the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to

bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader

dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and

administrative support of combat forces, and provide the means by which

tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. ( JP 1-02)

parallel attack. Simultaneous attack of varied target sets to shock,

disrupt, or overwhelm an enemy, often resulting in decisive effects.

Parallel attack is possible at one or multiple levels of war and achieves

rapid effects that leave the enemy little time to respond.
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strategic assessment. The measurement of effects at the strategic level.

Strategic assessment determines whether overall strategy is working and

how well the strategic objectives of both sides are being achieved.

strategic attack. Military action carried out against an enemy’s center(s)

of gravity or other vital target sets, including command elements, warproduction assets, and key supporting infrastructure in order to effect a

level of destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s military capacity to

the point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or will to wage

war or carry out aggressive activity. (AFDD 1)

strategic effect. Disruption of the enemy’s overall strategy, ability, or

will to wage war or carry out aggressive activity.

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a

member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational

(alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and

uses national resources to accomplish those objectives. Activities at this

level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence

initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other

instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans

to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. ( JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces

or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking,

that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of

movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks

assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical

control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the

level of combatant command. Also called TACON. ( JP 1-02)

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements

are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to

tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered

arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other

and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. ( JP 1-02)

theater air control system (TACS). The organization and equipment

necessary to plan, direct, and control theater air operations and to coordinate air operations with other joint component command and control
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agencies. It is composed of control agencies and communicationselectronics facilities that provide the means for centralized control and

decentralized execution of missions.