U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

69–118 

" ! SENATE 110TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

TREATY DOC. 

2007

110–8 

PROTOCOLS OF 2005 TO THE CONVENTION CONCERNING SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION AND 

TO THE PROTOCOL CONCERNING SAFETY OF 

FIXED PLATFORMS ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 

MESSAGE 

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

TRANSMITTING

PROTOCOL OF 2005 TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION 

OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION (THE ‘‘2005 SUA PROTOCOL’’) AND THE PROTOCOL OF 

2005 TO THE PROTOCOL FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL 

ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF FIXED PLATFORMS LOCATED ON 

THE CONTINENTAL SHELF (THE ‘‘2005 FIXED PLATFORMS PROTOCOL’’) (TOGETHER, ‘‘THE PROTOCOLS’’), ADOPTED BY THE 

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE IN LONDON ON OCTOBER 14, 2005, AND SIGNED BY 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON FEBRUARY 17, 2006 

OCTOBER 1, 2007.—Treaty was read the first time, and together with 

the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate. 


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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

THE WHITE HOUSE, October 1, 2007. 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to 

ratification, I transmit herewith the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 

Maritime Navigation (the ‘‘2005 SUA Protocol’’) and the Protocol of 

2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 

the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (the 

‘‘2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol’’) (together, ‘‘the Protocols’’), adopted by the International Maritime Organization Diplomatic Conference in London on October 14, 2005, and signed by the United 

States of America on February 17, 2006. I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with 

respect to the Protocols. 

The Protocols are an important component in the international 

campaign to prevent and punish maritime terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and promote the aims of 

the Proliferation Security Initiative. They establish a legal basis for 

international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of those who commit or aid terrorist acts or trafficking in 

weapons of mass destruction aboard ships at sea or on fixed platforms. 

The Protocols establish the first international treaty framework 

for criminalizing certain terrorist acts, including using a ship or 

fixed platform in a terrorist activity, transporting weapons of mass 

destruction or their delivery systems and related materials, and 

transporting terrorist fugitives. The Protocols require Parties to 

criminalize these acts under their domestic laws, to cooperate to 

prevent and investigate suspected crimes under the Protocols, and 

to extradite or submit for prosecution persons accused of committing, attempting to commit, or aiding in the commission of such offenses. The 2005 SUA Protocol also provides for a shipboarding regime based on flag state consent that will provide an international 

legal basis for interdiction at sea of weapons of mass destruction, 

their delivery systems and related materials, and terrorist fugitives. 

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Protocols, subject to certain understandings that are 

described in the accompanying report of the Department of State. 

GEORGE W. BUSH. 


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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

Washington, May 29, 2007. 

THE PRESIDENT, 

The White House. 

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view 

to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, subject to understandings set forth in the enclosed overview, 

the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the 2005 

SUA Protocol) and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol) 

(together, ‘‘the Protocols’’) adopted by the International Maritime 

Organization (IMO) on October 14, 2005, and signed on behalf of 

the United States on February 17, 2006. The Protocols are an important component in the international campaign to prevent and 

punish maritime terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction. They provide a legal basis for international cooperation in the investigation, prosecution, and extradition of those 

who commit or aid terrorist acts or trafficking in weapons of mass 

destruction aboard ships at sea or on fixed platforms. 

As of March 29, 2007, 18 States have signed both the 2005 SUA 

Protocol and the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol, subject to ratification. In addition, two States have acceded to the 2005 SUA Protocol. A detailed overview analysis of the provisions is enclosed 

with this Report. Recommended legislation necessary to implement 

the Protocols is being prepared for separate submission to the Congress. The Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense join in recommending that these Protocols be transmitted to 

the Senate at an early date for its advice and consent to ratification, subject to the understandings to Articles 3 and 4(5) of the 

2005 SUA Protocol and to Article 2 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms 

Protocol. I recommend that these Protocols be transmitted to the 

Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. 

Respectfully submitted, 

CONDOLEEZZA RICE. 

Enclosures: As stated. 


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PROTOCOL OF 2005 TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF

UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF MARITIME NAVIGATION

AND PROTOCOL OF 2005 TO THE PROTOCOL FOR THE SUPPRESSION

OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY OF FIXED PLATFORMS

LOCATED ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF

OVERVIEW

The Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of 

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (‘‘2005 

SUA Protocol’’) and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (‘‘2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol’’) 

(together, ‘‘the Protocols’’) are an important component in the international campaign to prevent and punish maritime terrorism and 

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Protocols 

amend two International Maritime Organization (IMO) 

counterterrorism agreements to which the United States is party: 

the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 

Safety of Maritime Navigation (‘‘the Convention’’), and its accompanying protocol, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental 

Shelf (‘‘the 1988 Protocol’’), both done at Rome, March 10, 1988, S. 

Treaty Doc. 101–1. The Convention and 1988 Protocol seek to ensure that all individuals who commit acts of terrorism that endanger the safe navigation of a ship or the safety of a fixed platform 

will be prosecuted in the State in which they are found, or extradited to another State for prosecution. The Convention and 1988 

Protocol require States Parties to criminalize certain terrorist acts 

involving the safety of maritime navigation and fixed platforms, 

and they create a series of obligations relating to those offenses 

with the object of bringing the perpetrators to justice. 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the international community recognized the urgent need for a more effective 

international regime to combat maritime terrorism and to conduct 

maritime interdictions of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, 

the United States led the effort to negotiate the Protocols for over 

three years in the IMO. The resulting Protocols fill several gaps in 

the existing treaty framework for combating global terrorism. The 

Protocols require States Parties to criminalize under their domestic 

laws certain acts, including using a ship or a fixed platform in terrorist activity, transporting weapons of mass destruction (‘‘WMD’’), 

their means of delivery or related materials, and transporting terrorist fugitives. The Protocols also incorporate many of the provisions in recent counterterrorism conventions to which the United 

States is already a party, such as the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (‘‘Terrorism 

Financing Convention’’), S. Treaty Doc. 106–49, and the 1997 InterVerDate Aug 31 2005 06:22 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 069118 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 7633 E:\HR\OC\TD008.XXX TD008

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national Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 

(‘‘Terrorist Bombings Convention’’), S. Treaty Doc. 106–6. Like 

prior conventions, the Protocols require Parties to extradite or submit for prosecution persons accused of committing, attempting to 

commit, or aiding in the commission of such offenses. The 2005 

SUA Protocol also creates a shipboarding regime based on flag 

state consent similar to agreements that the United States has concluded bilaterally as part of the Proliferation Security Initiative 

(‘‘PSI’’) (see www.state.gov/t/isn/cl0390.htm). This shipboarding regime will provide an international legal framework to facilitate 

interdiction on waters seaward of the territorial sea of any State 

of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials, and terrorist fugitives. 

As of March 29, 2007, 18 States have signed both the 2005 SUA 

Protocol and the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol, subject to ratification. In addition, two States have acceded to the 2005 SUA Protocol. The 2005 SUA Protocol will enter into force 90 days after the 

date on which 12 States have expressed their consent to be bound. 

The 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol will enter into force 90 days following the date on which three States have expressed their consent 

to be bound. However, the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol may not 

enter into force before the 2005 SUA Protocol enters into force. 

Because the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol incorporates all of the 

provisions of the 2005 SUA Protocol, except those relating to transport offenses and the shipboarding regime, which are not relevant 

in the context of fixed platforms, this report first addresses the provisions of the 2005 SUA Protocol. It then details which of the 2005 

SUA Protocol provisions are incorporated into the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol, with the intention that the same description of the 

underlying provisions also applies to their operation in the 2005 

Fixed Platform Protocol. Finally, this analysis will also summarize 

the few additional provisions of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol. 

THE 2005 SUA PROTOCOL

Definitions 

Article 1 of the 2005 SUA Protocol defines, for the purposes of 

the Protocol, the terms ‘‘Convention,’’ ‘‘Organization,’’ and ‘‘Secretary-General’’ as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 

Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, the IMO, and the 

IMO Secretary-General, respectively. 

Article 2 of the 2005 SUA Protocol amends Article 1 of the Convention to include and define additional terms used in the Convention. ‘‘Transport’’ means to initiate, arrange, or exercise effective 

control, including decision-making authority, over the movement of 

a person or item. ‘‘Serious injury or damage’’ means serious bodily 

injury; extensive destruction of a place of public use, State or government facility, infrastructure facility, or public transportation 

system, resulting in major economic loss; or substantial damage to 

the environment, including air, soil, water, fauna, or flora. Article 

2 defines ‘‘BCN weapons’’ as biological weapons, chemical weapons, 

and nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The definitions of biological and chemical weapons are drawn from the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and 


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Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 

on Their Destruction (‘‘BWC’’), S. Treaty Doc. 92–29, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction 

(‘‘CWC’’) S. Treaty Doc. 103–21. Article 1 also defines ‘‘toxic chemical’’ and ‘‘precursor’’ in the same manner as the CWC. The United 

States is a party to the BWC and the CWC. 

Article 1 also provides that the terms ‘‘place of public use,’’ ‘‘State 

or government facility,’’ ‘‘infrastructure facility,’’ and ‘‘public transportation system’’ have the same meaning as is given to those 

terms in the Terrorist Bombings Convention, and that the terms 

‘‘source material’’ and ‘‘special fissionable material’’ have the same 

meaning as is given to those terms in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (‘‘IAEA’’), TIAS 3873. Those definitions are as follows: 

• ‘‘place of public use’’ means those parts of any building, land, 

street, waterway or other location that are accessible or open to 

members of the public, whether continuously, periodically or occasionally, and encompasses any commercial, business, cultural, historical, educational, religious, governmental, entertainment, recreational or similar place that is so accessible or open to the public. 

(Terrorist Bombings Convention, Article 1(5)). 

• ‘‘State or government facility’’ includes any permanent or temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied by representatives of a State, members of Government, the legislature or the 

judiciary or by officials or employees of a State or any other public 

authority or entity or by employees or officials of an intergovernmental organization in connection with their official duties. (Terrorist Bombings Convention, Article 1(1)). 

• ‘‘infrastructure facility’’ means any publicly or privately owned 

facility providing or distributing services for the benefit of the public, such as water, sewage, energy, fuel, or communications. (Terrorist Bombings Convention, Article 1(2)). 

• ‘‘public transportation system’’ means all facilities, conveyances 

and instrumentalities, whether publicly or privately owned, that 

are used in or for publicly available services for the transportation 

of persons or cargo. (Terrorist Bombings Convention, Article 1(6)). 

• ‘‘source material’’ means uranium containing the mixture of 

isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; 

thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical 

compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or 

more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material 

as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine. 

(IAEA Statute, Article XX(3)). 

• ‘‘special fissionable material’’ means plutonium-239; uranium233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material 

containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable 

material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term ‘‘special fissionable material’’ does not include 

source material. (IAEA Statute, Article XX (1)). 


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Exclusions and exceptions 

Article 3 of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 2bis to the Convention to address the interaction of the Convention with other 

rights, obligations, and responsibilities of States and individuals. 

Paragraph 1 provides that nothing in the Convention shall affect 

other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international 

human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law. Paragraph 1 is 

based on the similar provisions contained in Article 19(1) of the 

Terrorist Bombings Convention and Article 21 of the Terrorism Financing Convention, but adds specific reference to international 

human rights and refugee law to take into account the interests of 

seafarers. 

Paragraph 2 of Article 2bis contains two important exceptions to 

the applicability of the Convention with respect to activities of 

armed forces and other military forces of a State. It states that the 

Convention does not apply to: (i) ‘‘the activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law’’; and 

(ii) ‘‘the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the 

exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by 

other rules of international law.’’ This exception restates similar 

language in Article 19(2) of the Terrorist Bombings Convention. 

The first exception is meant to exclude from the Convention’s 

scope the activities of national and sub-national armed forces, so 

long as those activities are in the course of an ‘‘armed conflict.’’ To 

ensure that suspected offenders cannot claim the benefit of the 

‘‘armed conflict’’ exception in Article 2bis(2) to avoid extradition or 

prosecution under the Convention, it would be useful for the 

United States to articulate an understanding clarifying the scope 

of this exception, consistent with the understandings it included in 

its instrument of ratification for the Terrorist Bombings Convention with respect to the similar provision in Article 19(2) of that 

Convention and in its instrument of ratification for the Terrorism 

Financing Convention with respect to the reference to the undefined term ‘‘armed conflict’’ in Article 2(1)(b) of that Convention. 

Both of those understandings were based upon the widely accepted 

provision in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Protocol II Additional to the 

Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (‘‘Additional Protocol II’’), S. Treaty Doc. 100–2, which states that ‘‘armed 

conflict’’ does not include ‘‘internal disturbances and tensions, such 

as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 

similar nature.’’ Including an understanding that specifies the 

scope of ‘‘armed conflict’’ in a manner consistent with Additional 

Protocol II would help to counter attempts by terrorists to claim 

protection from this exception in circumstances for which it is not 

intended. As in Article 19 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention, 

Article 2bis(1) and (2) use the term ‘‘international humanitarian 

law,’’ which is not used by the United States and could be subject 

to varied interpretations. Accordingly, it would be appropriate for 

the United States to include an understanding that, for the purposes of this Convention, this phrase has the same substantive 


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meaning as the phrase ‘‘law of war.’’ I therefore recommend that 

the following understandings to Article 3 of the 2005 SUA Protocol 

be included in the United States instrument of ratification: 

The United States of America understands that the term ‘‘armed conflict’’ in Article 3 of the Protocol of 2005 to the 

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 

the Safety of Maritime Navigation (which adds, inter alia, paragraph 2 of Article 2bis to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 

Navigation) does not include internal disturbances and 

tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature. 

The United States further understands that the term ‘‘international humanitarian law’’ in Article 3 of the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 

(which adds, inter alia, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2bis 

to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

against the Safety of Maritime Navigation) has the same 

substantive meaning as the ‘‘law of war.’’

The United States included substantially identical understandings in its instrument of ratification for the Terrorist Bombings Convention and, with respect to the meaning of ‘‘armed conflict,’’ in its instrument of ratification for 

the Terrorism Financing Convention. 

Given the importance of protecting the flexibility of the 

United States to conduct legitimate activities against all 

lawful targets, the second exception in paragraph 2 of Article 2bis was also an important objective of the United 

States when negotiating the Protocols. This provision exempts from the Convention’s application ‘‘the activities undertaken by military forces of a State in the exercise of 

their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by 

other rules of international law.’’ This language is consistent with Article 19(2) of the Terrorist Bombings Convention. Although this exclusion might be thought to be 

implicit in the context of the Protocols, the negotiators 

thought it best to articulate the exclusion explicitly. It is 

intended to exclude all official acts undertaken by U.S. and 

other State military forces from the scope of criminal offenses. Because the Convention does not impose criminal 

liability for the official activities of State military forces, it 

similarly does not impose criminal liability for persons, including non-military, policy-making officials of States, who 

direct, organize, or otherwise act in support of the activities of State military forces. Recognizing the importance of 

this provision, I recommend that the following understanding to Article 3 of the 2005 SUA Protocol be included 

in the United States instrument of ratification: 

The United States of America understands that, pursuant to Article 3 of the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention 

for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 

Maritime Navigation (which adds, inter alia, paragraph 2 


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of Article 2bis to the Convention for the Suppression of 

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation), 

the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005, does not 

apply to: 

(a) the military forces of a State, which are the 

armed forces of a State organized, trained, and 

equipped under its internal law for the primary purpose of national defense or security, in the exercise of 

their official duties; 

(b) civilians who direct or organize the official activities of military forces of a State; or 

(c) civilians acting in support of the official activities 

of the military forces of a State, if the civilians are 

under the formal command, control, and responsibility 

of those forces. 

Paragraph 3 of Article 2bis states that nothing in the 

Convention shall affect the rights, obligations, and responsibilities of States Parties under the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (‘‘NPT’’), TIAS 6839, the 

CWC, or the BWC. Article 2bis(3) is discussed below in the ‘‘New Offenses’’ section under the heading ‘‘Non-proliferation provisions.’’ Paragraphs 1–4 of Article 4 of the 2005 SUA Protocol 

make several minor technical amendments to Article 3 of 

the Convention. Paragraph 1 amends the chapeau of paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Convention to insert the clarifying words ‘‘within the meaning of this Convention.’’ Paragraph 2 corrects the grammatical construction of subparagraph 1(f) of Article 3 of the Convention. Paragraphs 

3 and 4 together delete the accomplice liability provisions 

from Article 3(1)(g) and 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Convention, 

because Article 3quater, a new provision added by the 

2005 SUA Protocol, includes attempt and accomplice liability within a more comprehensive framework for accessory 

offense liability. Paragraph 4 retains subparagraph 2(c) of 

Article 3 of the Convention as paragraph 2 of that article. 

New offenses 

Paragraphs 5–7 of Article 4 of the 2005 SUA Protocol 

also create four new categories of offenses under the Convention: using a ship in a terrorist offense; transportation 

of WMD, delivery systems, and related items; transportation of a terrorist fugitive; and accessory offenses. It does 

so principally by adding three new articles to the Convention: Article 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater. 

Article 4(5) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 3bis 

to the Convention. 

Counterterrorism offenses 

Article 3bis(1)(a) makes it an offense for a person to unlawfully and intentionally, with the purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an 

international organization to do or abstain from doing any 


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act: (i) use against or on a ship or discharge from a ship 

any explosive, radioactive material or BCN weapon in a 

manner that causes or is likely to cause death or serious 

injury or damage; (ii) discharge, from a ship, oil, liquefied 

natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious substance in 

such quantity or concentration that causes or is likely to 

cause death or serious injury or damage; (iii) use a ship in 

a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage; 

or (iv) threaten to commit any offense set forth in (i)–(iii). 

Non-proliferation provisions 

Article 3bis(1)(b) makes it an offense to transport on 

board a ship: 

(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing 

that it is intended to be used to cause, or in a threat 

to cause, death or serious injury or damage for the 

purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a 

government or an international organization to do or 

abstain from doing any act; or 

(ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as defined in Article 1; or 

(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or 

prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to 

be used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other 

nuclear activity not under safeguards pursuant to an 

IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement; or 

(iv) any equipment, materials or software or related 

technology that significantly contributes to the design, 

manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the 

intention that it be used for such purpose. 

These nonproliferation offenses make significant advances to counterterrorism efforts by filling a gap in the 

existing international treaty framework. The Convention 

requires criminalization of certain transports of nuclear-related items associated with nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and thus provides a complementary law enforcement element to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv) of the Convention goes beyond the 

NPT in requiring criminalization of the transport of equipment, materials or software or related technology that significantly contributes to the design or manufacture of delivery systems for nuclear weapons (other than those of 

NPT nuclear-weapon States Parties). The nonproliferation 

offenses further the objectives of, and are complementary 

with, the nonproliferation obligations set forth in United 

Nations Security Council Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 

1673 (2006). 

Article 3bis(2) constitutes an important nonproliferation 

‘‘savings clause’’ by specifying that nuclear transport activities remain permissible under the Convention in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the wording of the offenses in Article 3bis(1)(b). Article 3bis(2) states that it 


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shall not be an offense within the meaning of the Convention to transport an item or material covered by Article 

3bis(1)(b)(iii) or, insofar as it relates to a nuclear weapon 

or other nuclear explosive device, Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv), if 

such item or material is transported to or from the territory of, or is otherwise transported under the control of a 

State Party to the NPT where: ‘‘(a) the resulting transfer 

or receipt, including internal to a State, of the item or material is not contrary to such State Party’s obligations’’

under the NPT, and ‘‘(b) if the item or material is intended 

for the delivery system of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device of a State Party’’ to the NPT, ‘‘the 

holding of such weapon or device is not contrary to that 

State Party’s obligations under that Treaty.’’

This nonproliferation savings clause in Article 3bis(2), 

coupled with the general provision in Article 2bis(3) declaring that the Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of States Parties under the NPT, ensures that the 

Convention is consistent with the rights and obligations of 

the States Parties to the NPT (except to the extent that 

the Convention goes beyond the NPT with respect to nuclear weapon delivery systems). As provided in Article 

3bis(2), the Convention would not require criminalization 

of the transport to or from the territory of, or under the 

control of, an NPT State Party of source or special fissionable material, or of equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of 

special fissionable material, as long as the resulting transfer or receipt of such items or materials is not contrary to 

the NPT obligations of the NPT State Party. This is the 

case even when a non-NPT party is on the ‘‘other end’’ of 

the transport to or from (or under the control of) the NPT 

State Party. 

I recommend that the following understanding to Article 

3 and Article 4(5) of the 2005 SUA Protocol be included in 

the United States instrument of ratification to clarify the 

applicability of new Article 2bis(3) and Article 3bis(2) of 

the Convention to the offense in new Article 3bis(1)(b)(iii) 

of the Convention: 

The United States of America understands that: 

(a) Article 3 and Article 4(5) of the Protocol of 2005 to 

the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (‘‘the 2005 SUA 

Protocol’’) (which add, inter alia, Article 2bis(3) and Article 

3bis(2), respectively, to the Convention for the Suppression 

of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (together referred to as ‘‘the NPT savings clauses’’)) 

protect from criminality under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 

Navigation, 2005, the transport of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of 

special fissionable material 


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(i) from the territory of, or otherwise under the control of, a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (‘‘NPT’’) to the territory 

of, or otherwise under the control of, another NPT 

State Party or a state that is not an NPT party, and 

(ii) from the territory of, or otherwise under the control of, a state that is not an NPT party to the territory of, or otherwise under the control of, an NPT 

State Party, 

where the resulting transfer or receipt of such items or 

materials is not contrary to the NPT obligations of the 

NPT State Party. 

(b) The following are illustrative examples of transport 

of source or special fissionable materials (hereinafter referred to collectively as ‘‘nuclear material’’) and especially 

designed or prepared equipment or material that would 

not constitute offenses under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 

Navigation, 2005, by virtue of the savings clauses: • Transport of nuclear material (from either an 

NPT State Party or a non-NPT party) to an NPT nuclear-weapon State Party, regardless of whether the 

nuclear material will be under safeguards in the NPT 

nuclear-weapon State Party, because the resulting receipt of the item or material is not contrary to the 

NPT obligations of the nuclear-weapon State Party; • Transport of nuclear material to a non-nuclear 

weapon State Party to the NPT for non-nuclear use 

without safeguards, in accordance with the provisions 

of the recipient country’s IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC 153) allowing for exemption of the nuclear material from safeguards or the 

non-application or termination of safeguards (e.g., for 

specified de minimis amounts, or use in a non-proscribed military activity which does not require the 

application of IAEA safeguards or in a non-nuclear use 

such as the production of alloys or ceramics); 

• Transport of nuclear material or especially designed or prepared equipment, as described in Article 

4(5) of the 2005 SUA Protocol (which adds Article 

3bis(1)(b)(iii) to the Convention for the Suppression of 

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation), from an NPT State Party to a non-NPT party, 

so long as the relevant material is for peaceful purposes and placed under IAEA safeguards, consistent 

with the NPT State Party’s obligations under Article 

III.2 of the NPT. If the nuclear material transferred 

for peaceful purposes is subject to an INFCIRC/66 

safeguards agreement or other IAEA safeguards arrangement but is not required by that agreement actually to be under safeguards (e.g., under an exemption 

for de minimis amounts or provision permitting safeguards termination for non-nuclear use), the transport 

would not constitute an offense under Article 


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3bis(1)(b)(iii) of the Convention for the Suppression of 

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005. 

Transport of terrorist fugitives 

Article 4(6) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 3ter 

to the Convention. Article 3ter makes it an offense for a 

person to unlawfully and intentionally transport another 

person on board a ship knowing that the person has committed an act that constitutes an offense under Article 3, 

3bis or 3quater or an offense set forth in one of the treaties 

listed in the Annex to the Convention, and intending to assist that person to evade criminal prosecution. The Annex 

is added to the Convention by Article 7 of the 2005 SUA 

Protocol. The inclusion of such an Annex mirrors the approach to the Terrorist Financing Convention. The United 

States is party to all nine of the instruments currently listed in the Annex, and the provisions for amending the instruments listed in the Annex are provided by Article 22 

of the 2005 SUA Protocol, outlined more fully below. Although accessory provisions in the existing 

counterterrorism conventions and protocols may criminalize aiding and abetting a fugitive to flee during the 

course of a crime, this provision would criminalize assisting a fugitive to avoid apprehension after the crime has 

been completed. 

Accessory offenses 

A comprehensive framework creating criminal liability 

for accessory offenses is provided in Article 3quater, which 

is added to the Convention by Article 4(7) of the 2005 SUA 

Protocol. Subparagraph (a) of Article 3quater makes it an 

offense to kill or injure any person in connection with any 

offense under Articles 3(1), 3bis, or 3ter of the Convention. 

Subparagraph (b) of Article 3quater makes it an offense to 

attempt to commit an offense under Articles 3(1), 

3bis(1)(a)(i)–(iii), or 3quater(a) of the Convention. Subparagraphs (c) and (d) of Article 3quater make it an offense to 

participate as an accomplice or organize or direct others in 

connection with any offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 

3quater(a) or (b). Finally, subparagraph (e) of Article 

3quater makes it an offense to contribute to the commission of one or more offenses under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 

3quater(a) or (b) by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. These accessory offenses are substantially 

the same as those provided for by the Terrorist Bombings 

Convention and the Terrorist Financing Convention. They 

will strengthen the ability of the international community 

to investigate, prosecute, and extradite those who conspire 

or otherwise contribute to the commission of offenses 

under the Convention. 


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XVI

Criminalization and jurisdiction under domestic law 

Article 5(1) of the 2005 SUA Protocol modifies Article 5 

of the Convention to add the offenses enumerated in Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater to the list of criminal offenses that States Parties must make punishable by appropriate penalties that take into account their grave nature. 

Article 5(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds to the Convention a new provision, Article 5bis, to ensure liability for 

legal entities as well as persons. Article 5bis requires 

States Parties, in accordance with their domestic legal 

principles, to take the necessary measures to enable a 

legal entity located in their territory or organized under 

their laws to be held liable when a person responsible for 

the management or control of that legal entity has, in that 

capacity, committed an offense under the Convention. 

Such liability may be criminal, civil, or administrative and 

is without prejudice to the criminal liability of individuals 

having committed the offenses. Further, States Parties 

must ensure that legal entities held liable for offenses 

under Article 5bis are subject to effective, proportionate 

and dissuasive criminal, civil, or administrative sanctions, 

which may include monetary sanctions. This provision is 

identical to Article 5 of the Terrorism Financing Convention. 

Article 6 of the 2005 SUA Protocol makes conforming 

amendments to Article 6 of the Convention, which requires 

States Parties to establish jurisdiction over the offenses set 

forth under the Convention. Each State Party is now required to establish jurisdiction over offenses under Articles 

3, 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater. Article 8(1) of the 2005 SUA 

Protocol makes a similar conforming amendment to Article 

8, paragraph 1, of the Convention to permit the master of 

a ship to deliver to the authorities of any other State Party 

any person who the master has reasonable grounds to believe has committed an offense under Article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater. Both provisions simply update the Convention 

provisions to include the full range of offenses under the 

Convention as revised by the 2005 SUA Protocol. 

Innocent parties 

The 2005 SUA Protocol was drafted to ensure that innocent seafarers will not be subject to criminal prosecution 

under the Convention simply for being on board a vessel 

that was engaged in or used for illegal purposes. This is 

the case even where the seafarer had mere knowledge of 

the criminal activity. 

The offenses enumerated in Article 3bis(1)(b) (the transport provisions described above) apply by virtue of the definition of ‘‘transport’’ in Article 2 of the 2005 SUA Protocol 

(amending Article 1 of the Convention) to those persons 

who initiate, arrange, or exercise effective control, including decision-making authority, over the movement of a 

person or item. This definition would exclude from criminal liability seafarers and employees on shore, except in 


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XVII

those rare cases where they are actively engaged in the 

criminal activity. 

The individual offenses added by the 2005 SUA Protocol 

contain subjective elements that would exclude innocent 

carriers and seafarers from their reach. For example, 

under the provision that covers certain dual use items (Article 3bis(1)(b)(iv)), the transporter must have the intention that the dual use item will be used in the design, 

manufacture, or delivery of a BCN weapon. In most situations, a seafarer, for example, would not have the requisite 

general knowledge and intent, let alone the additional specific intent required under this provision. When containers 

are ordinarily sealed and loaded at port, a seafarer would 

not know what is in the containers. In order for a seafarer 

to be held criminally liable, a prosecuting State must 

prove, for example, that the seafarer (1) knew what the 

item was, (2) intentionally initiated, arranged, or exercised 

effective control, including decision-making authority, over 

the movement of the item by, for example, smuggling the 

item on board or placing the item in a container to be loaded on the ship, and (3) intended that the item would be 

used in the design, manufacture, or delivery of a BCN 

weapon. 

Shipboarding 

Article 8(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 8bis 

to the Convention. Article 8bis creates a shipboarding regime by establishing a comprehensive set of procedures 

and protections designed to facilitate the boarding of a vessel suspected of being involved in an offense under the 

Convention. The boarding procedures do not change existing international maritime law or infringe upon the traditional principle of freedom of navigation. Instead, the procedures eliminate the need to negotiate time-consuming ad 

hoc boarding arrangements when facing the immediacy of 

ongoing criminal activity. Additionally, the boarding regime builds upon existing regimes under bilateral and 

multilateral agreements to which the United States is a 

party, including agreements with respect to fisheries, narcotics, illegal migrants, and WMD interdiction. 

The first three paragraphs of Article 8bis set forth general parameters for the shipboarding regime. States Parties must cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent 

and suppress offenses under the Convention, in conformity 

with international law, and to respond to requests under 

the boarding regime as expeditiously as possible (paragraph 1). This provision is derived from Article 17(1) of the 

1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 Vienna Narcotic 

Drug Convention), S. Treaty Doc. 101–4, and Article 7 of 

the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, 

Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Migrant 


bajohnson on PROD1PC71 with REPORTS
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Smuggling Protocol), S. Treaty Doc. 108–16. The United 

States is a party to both Conventions. 

Each request should, if possible, contain the name of the 

suspect ship, the IMO identification number, the port of 

registry, the ports of origin and destination, and any other 

relevant information (paragraph 2). In addition, each State 

Party must take into account the dangers and difficulties 

involved in boarding a ship at sea and searching its cargo, 

and give consideration to whether other appropriate measures agreed between the States concerned could be more 

safely taken in the next port of call or elsewhere (paragraph 3). 

The United States will implement its obligations to ‘‘cooperate to the fullest extent possible’’ under Article 8bis(1) 

by designating a competent authority at the national level 

for making, receiving, processing, and responding to boarding. requests under the Convention, as we have done for 

counternarcotics, migrant, fisheries, WMD interdictions, 

and other similar law enforcement agreements. The competent authority, who will most likely be the Commandant 

of the U.S. Coast Guard, will execute its obligations 

through a national level command or operations center, 

which will have immediate access to all national vessel 

registry data, as well as procedures established for realtime U.S. Government coordination, including the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan. See further the 

discussion of Article 8bis(15) below. 

Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 8bis, if a State Party 

has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offense under 

Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of the Convention has 

been, is being, or is about to be committed involving a ship 

flying its flag, it may request the assistance of other States 

Parties in preventing or suppressing that offense. The 

States Parties so requested shall use their best endeavors 

to render such assistance within the means available to 

them. This provision is derived from Article 17(2) of the 

1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 8(1) of 

the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. This provision does not 

obligate the United States to board or take law enforcement actions on foreign flagged ships, except to the extent 

it is required to use best endeavors to render assistance 

within the means available to it upon request of a flag 

State to assist in prevention or suppression of an offense 

specified under the Convention. The absence of a reference 

in paragraph 4 to ‘‘marks of registry’’ (both ‘‘flying its flag’’

and ‘‘displaying marks of registry’’ are used in paragraph 

5) is of no consequence because each refers to indicia of the 

nationality of the vessel permissible, as reflected in Articles 5 and 6 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 

(‘‘High Seas Convention’’), TIAS 5200, and Articles 91 and 

92 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 

Sea, (‘‘Law of the Sea Convention’’), S. Treaty Doc. 103–39. 

See Article 8bis(5)(a), (b) and (d). 


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XIX

Paragraph 5 of Article 8bis sets forth the procedures for 

shipboarding. Whenever law enforcement or other authorized officials of a State Party (‘‘the requesting Party’’) encounter a ship flying the flag or displaying the marks of 

registry of another State Party (‘‘the first Party’’), located 

seaward of any State’s territorial sea, and the requesting 

Party has reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or 

a person on board the ship has been, is or is about to be 

involved in the commission of an offense under Articles 3, 

3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of the Convention, and the requesting 

Party desires to board, it shall take the following steps. It 

shall request, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2, that 

the first Party confirm the claim of nationality (subparagraph (a)). If nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party 

shall ask the first Party (hereinafter ‘‘the flag State’’) for 

authorization to take appropriate measures, which may include stopping, boarding, and searching the ship, its cargo 

and persons on board, and questioning the persons on 

board (subparagraph (b)). 

The flag State may, pursuant to subparagraph (c) of Article 8bis(5), authorize the requesting Party to board and 

to take appropriate measures described in subparagraph 

(b), conduct the boarding and search with its own law enforcement or other officials, conduct the boarding and 

search together with the requesting Party, or decline to 

authorize a boarding and search. Paragraph 8bis(5)(c) expands on the provisions of Article 17(4) of the 1988 Vienna 

Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 8(2) of the Migrant 

Smuggling Protocol. Nothing in Article 8bis(5) requires the 

flag State to provide any such authorization. Moreover, 

subparagraph (c) makes clear that the requesting Party 

may not take any measures set forth above without the express authorization of the flag State. A flag State may also 

impose certain restrictions on the requesting Party’s board 

and search measures, in accordance with Article 8bis(7), 

discussed more fully below. 

A State Party may provide advance consent to board 

ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry pursuant to subparagraphs (d) or (e) of Article 8bis(5) by notification to the IMO Secretary-General. A notification pursuant to Article 8bis(5)(d) would grant the requesting 

Party authorization to board and search a ship, its cargo 

and persons on board, and to question the persons on 

board in order to locate and examine documentation of its 

nationality and determine if an offense under Articles 3, 

3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of the Convention has been, is being, 

or is about to be committed, if there is no response from 

that State Party, within four hours of acknowledgement of 

its receipt of a request to confirm nationality. Notification 

pursuant to Article 8bis(5)(e) would provide general advance consent for other States Parties to board and search 

such ships, their cargo and persons on board, and to question the persons on board in order to determine if an offense under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater of the ConvenVerDate Aug 31 2005 06:22 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 069118 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 6969 E:\HR\OC\TD008.XXX TD008

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tion has been, is being, or is about to be committed. These 

optional notifications may be withdrawn at any time. Advance consent pursuant to either subparagraph (d) or (e) 

is not authorization for detention of the vessel, cargo, or 

persons on board or any other enforcement action. The 

United States will not file a notification with the IMO Secretary-General granting either such form of advance consent. 

Under paragraph 6 of Article 8bis, when the requesting 

Party boards and finds evidence of the conduct described 

in Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater, the flag State may authorize the requesting Party to detain the ship, cargo, and 

persons on board pending receipt of disposition instructions from the flag State. The requesting Party must in all 

cases promptly inform the flag State of the results of a 

boarding, search, and detention conducted pursuant to Article 8bis, including discovery of evidence of illegal conduct 

that is not subject to the Convention. 

Paragraph 7 of Article 8bis permits a flag State to subject its authorization under paragraphs 5 or 6 to conditions, including obtaining additional information from the 

requesting Party and relating to responsibility for and the 

extent of measures to be taken. This provision builds on 

the text of Article 17(6) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug 

Convention and Article 8(5) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. Paragraph 7 also prohibits the requesting State from 

taking any measures without the express authorization of 

the flag State, except when necessary to relieve imminent 

danger to the lives of persons or when otherwise derived 

from bilateral or multilateral agreements. 

Paragraph 8 of Article 8bis reaffirms explicitly that, for 

all boardings under Article 8bis, the flag State retains the 

right to exercise jurisdiction over a detained ship, cargo, or 

other items and persons on board, including seizure, forfeiture, arrest, and prosecution. However, the flag State 

may, subject to its constitution and laws, consent to the 

exercise of jurisdiction by another State Party that has jurisdiction under Article 6 of the Convention. 

Paragraph 9 of Article 8bis sets forth overarching principles for the use of force by officials acting under the 

shipboarding regime. It directs States Parties to avoid the 

use of force ‘‘except when necessary to ensure the safety of 

its officials and persons on board, or where the officials are 

obstructed in the execution of the authorized actions.’’ It 

also specifies that any such use of force ‘‘shall not exceed 

the minimum degree of force which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.’’ The language of Article 

8bis(9) is drawn from Article 22(1)(f) of the Agreement for 

the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 

1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 

Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 

S. Treaty Doc. 104–24, to which the United States is a 

party. Article 8bis(9) is also similar to use of force proviVerDate Aug 31 2005 06:22 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 069118 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 6969 E:\HR\OC\TD008.XXX TD008

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sions in other maritime law enforcement agreements to 

which the United States is a party. As such, this use of 

force provision reflects and is consistent with current practice on the use of force in international law and U.S. maritime law enforcement. 

Paragraph 10 of Article 8bis establishes a number of 

safeguard provisions to protect seafarers and carriers during the conduct of shipboardings. First, subparagraph (a) 

sets forth a series of safeguards that a State Party taking 

measures against a ship must respect. These include taking due account of the need not to endanger the safety of 

life at sea; treating all persons in a manner that preserves 

their human dignity and complies with applicable provisions of international law; ensuring that a boarding and 

search is conducted in accordance with applicable international law; taking due account of the safety and security 

of the ship and cargo; taking due account of the need not 

to prejudice the commercial or legal interests of the flag 

State; ensuring, within available means, that any measure 

taken with regard to the ship or its cargo is environmentally sound; ensuring that any person on board against 

whom proceedings may be commenced in connection with 

offenses under the Convention is guaranteed fair treatment, regardless of location; ensuring that the master of a 

ship is advised of its intention to board, and is, or has 

been, afforded the opportunity to contact the ship’s owner 

and the flag State at the earliest opportunity; and taking 

reasonable efforts to avoid undue detention or delay of the 

ship. These safeguards build on those contained in Article 

17(5) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and 

Article 9 of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. 

Subparagraph (b) of Article 8bis(10) establishes a framework for liability and recourse arising from any damage, 

harm, or loss attributable to States Parties taking measures under Article 8bis. It clarifies that authorization to 

board by a flag State shall not per se give rise to its liability. Liability for damage, harm, or loss as a result of 

shipboarding activities arises under two circumstances: 

first, when the grounds for shipboarding measures prove 

to be unfounded, provided that the ship has not committed 

any act justifying the measures taken; and second, when 

such measures are unlawful or unreasonable in light of the 

available information to implement the provisions of Article 8bis. States Parties are obligated to ‘‘provide effective 

recourse in respect of any such damage, harm or loss.’’

This provision does not require a State Party to provide a 

specific remedy, forum, or venue, and it does not require 

any form of binding dispute resolution. Accordingly, the 

manner of ‘‘effective recourse’’ remains at the discretion of 

each State Party. Article 8bis(10)(b) of the Convention is 

consistent with the claims provisions of existing relevant 

international treaties, including Article 22(3) of the High 

Seas Convention, and Article 9(2) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. As a matter of policy the United States 


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compensates innocent people whose property is damaged 

by Federal officers during maritime law enforcement operations. Congress has established mechanisms that permit 

the United States Navy (10 U.S. Code 2734, 7622; 32 CFR 

Part 752) and the United States Coast Guard (10 U.S. 

Code §§ 2733, 2734; 14 U.S. Code 646; 33 CFR Part 25) to 

consider and pay meritorious claims for damaged property 

arising from maritime law enforcement operations. These 

mechanisms are administrative procedures, rather than judicial remedies, which permit the consideration and payment of meritorious claims by Executive Branch agencies. 

Accordingly, no new legislation is needed to comply with 

Article 8bis(10)(b). 

Subparagraph (c) of Article 8bis(10) requires any State 

Party that takes measures against a ship in accordance 

with the Convention to take due account of the need not 

to interfere with the rights and obligations and exercise of 

jurisdiction of coastal States in accordance with the international law of the sea, and the authority of flag States to 

exercise jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters involving the ship. This provision 

builds upon Article 17(11) of the 1988 Vienna Drug Convention, Article 94(1) of the Law of the Sea Convention, 

and Article 9(3) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. 

Subparagraphs (d) and (e) of Article 8bis(10) designate 

who may conduct shipboardings consistent with the Convention. Article 8bis(10)(d) requires that any shipboarding 

measure must be carried out by law enforcement or other 

authorized officials from warships or military aircraft, or 

from other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable 

as being on government service and authorized to that effect and, notwithstanding Articles 2 and 2bis of the Convention, the provisions of Article 8bis will apply. This provision reflects the accepted international law rule as set 

out in Article 17(10) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug 

Convention, Article 9(4) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, Articles 21 and 23(4) of the High Seas Convention, 

and Articles 107 and 111(5) of the Law of the Sea Convention and is consistent with U.S. practice. Article 8bis(10)(e) 

defines ‘‘law enforcement or other authorized officials’’ as 

‘‘uniformed or otherwise clearly identifiable members of 

law enforcement or other government authorities duly authorized by their government.’’ For the purposes of 

shipboarding under the Convention, these officials must 

provide appropriate government-issued identification documents for examination by the master of the ship upon 

boarding. 

The shipboarding provisions under the Convention do 

not apply to or limit boarding of ships conducted by any 

State Party in accordance with international law, seaward 

of any State’s territorial sea. Paragraph 11 of Article 8bis 

confirms this understanding of the Convention’s applicability. Other lawful shipboarding measures include, but 

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erent rights under the law of war, self-defense, the enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 

actions taken pursuant to specific bilateral or multilateral 

instruments such as counter-narcotics agreements, the 

rendering of assistance to persons, ships, and property in 

peril, authorization from the flag State to take action, or 

the historic role of the armed forces in law enforcement activities on the high seas. In addition, the United States 

has often employed its military forces abroad to protect 

U.S. citizens and to enforce provisions of U.S. law. Article 

8bis would not affect these rights. 

Paragraph 12 of Article 8bis encourages States Parties 

to develop standard operating procedures for joint operations and consult, as appropriate, with other States Parties with a view to harmonizing such standard operating 

procedures. Paragraph 13 allows States Parties to conclude 

agreements or arrangements between themselves to facilitate law enforcement operations carried out pursuant to 

Article 8bis. This provision is adapted from Article 17(9) of 

the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention and Article 17 

of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. Paragraph 14 requires 

each State Party to take appropriate measures to ensure 

that law enforcement or other authorized officials acting 

on its behalf are empowered to conduct shipboarding activities and take other appropriate measures pursuant to 

Article 8bis. Finally, paragraph 15 of Article 8bis directs each State 

Party to designate the appropriate authority or authorities 

to receive and respond to requests for assistance, confirmation of nationality and authorization to take appropriate 

measures. This designation, including contact information 

of the authority or authorities, must be notified to the IMO 

Secretary-General within one month of becoming a Party. 

The IMO Secretary-General will inform all other States 

Parties within one month of such designation. Each State 

Party is responsible for providing prompt notice through 

the IMO Secretary-General of any changes in the designation or contact information. This provision is adapted from 

Article 17(7) of the 1988 Vienna Narcotic Drug Convention 

and Article 8(6) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. As previously mentioned during the discussion of Article 8bis(1), 

the United States will implement its obligations by designating a competent authority at the national level, most 

likely the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, which 

will execute our obligations through a national level command or operations center in accordance with established 

procedures, including the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, as we have done for other similar law enforcement agreements. 

Article 9 of the 2005 SUA Protocol amends Article 10, 

paragraph 2, of the Convention by adding specific reference to international law including international human 

rights law. This amendment is intended to enhance further the safeguards for seafarers. As revised, Article 10(2) 


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of the Convention would provide that any person who is 

taken into custody or otherwise subject to proceedings 

under the Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, 

including all rights and guarantees under the law of the 

State in which that person is present, ‘‘as well as applicable provisions of international law, including international 

human rights law.’’ This additional text already appears in 

Article 17 of the Terrorism Financing Convention and in 

Article 14 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention. 

Extradition 

Article 10 of the 2005 SUA Protocol makes several revisions to the extradition scheme established under the Convention. 

Article 10(1) of the 2005 SUA Protocol revises the first 

four paragraphs of Article 11 of the Convention to incorporate the offenses set forth in Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 

3quater of the Convention into the extradition regime. 

These provisions, designating the offenses under the Convention as extraditable offenses between States Parties, 

simply update the extradition obligations to include the 

new offense articles. 

Article (10)(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds a new provision to the Convention, Article 11bis, which states that 

none of the offenses under the Convention shall be regarded, for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as a political offense. Accordingly, a request for 

extradition or mutual legal assistance may not be refused 

on the sole ground that it is a political offense or an offense connected with a political offense or an offense inspired by political motives. Article 11bis thus provides a 

useful narrowing of the ability to invoke the political offense exception in response to requests for extradition for 

offenses under the Convention. Many modem U.S. bilateral 

extradition treaties already contain provisions that bar application of the political offense exception to extradition 

under multilateral conventions to which similar ‘‘prosecute 

or extradite’’ obligations apply. Like similar provisions in 

Article 14 of the Terrorism Financing Convention and Article 11 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention, Article 11bis 

builds on this trend by making the restriction on the invocation of the political offense exception for requests based 

on offenses under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater a matter of general application, rather than dependent on the 

terms of individual bilateral law enforcement treaties between the States Parties. 

Article 10(3) of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds Article 11ter 

to the Convention, which provides that the Convention 

does not impose an obligation to extradite or afford mutual 

legal assistance if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing that such request for extradition 

or mutual legal assistance has been made for the purpose 

of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that 

person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political 


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opinion, or gender, or that compliance with the request 

would cause prejudice to that person’s position for any of 

these reasons. This article is similar to provisions already 

included in a number of existing UN counterterrorism 

treaties, including Article 12 of the Terrorist Bombings 

Convention and Article 15 of the Terrorism Financing Convention. 

Mutual legal assistance 

Article 11(1) of the 2005 SUA Protocol makes conforming 

changes to Article 12(1) of the Convention, which maintains States Parties’ obligations to afford one another assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought 

for offenses under the Convention. The amended provision 

updates the terms of assistance to encompass the new categories of offenses under the Convention as amended by 

the 2005 SUA Protocol, but it does not change the substantive language describing the degree of assistance required. 

Article 11(2) of the 2005 SUA Protocol does, however, establish a system to enhance the assistance that States 

Parties may provide to each other in connection with offenses under the Convention. It provides for a new article, 

Article 12bis, to govern the transfer of individuals in the 

custody of one State Party to provide assistance to another 

State Party in connection with an investigation or prosecution for offenses under the Convention. 

Paragraph 1 of Article 12bis provides that a person who 

is being detained or is serving a sentence in the territory 

of one State Party whose presence in another State Party 

is requested for identification, testimony or otherwise providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the investigation or prosecution of offenses set forth in Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 3quater may be transferred, if two conditions are 

met. First, the person in custody must freely give informed 

consent to be transferred (subparagraph (a)). Second, the 

competent authorities of both States must agree upon the 

transfer, subject to such conditions as those States may 

deem appropriate (subparagraph (b)). Similar provisions 

for the temporary transfer of persons in custody of one 

State Party to another State Party are included in Article 

16 of the Terrorism Financing Convention, Article 13 of 

the Terrorist Bombings Convention, and numerous bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties to which the United 

States is a party. 

Paragraph 2 of Article 12bis details certain rights and 

obligations of a State to which a person is transferred pursuant to Article 12bis. Under subparagraph (a), the State 

to which the person is transferred shall have the authority 

and obligation to keep the transferred person in custody, 

unless otherwise requested or authorized by the State from 

which the person was transferred. Subparagraph (b) requires the State to which the person is transferred to implement without delay its obligation to return the person 


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to the custody of the State from which the person was 

transferred as agreed in advance, or as otherwise agreed, 

by the competent authorities of both States. Subparagraph 

(c) states that return of a person transferred under Article 

12bis shall not require initiation of extradition proceedings. Finally, subparagraph (d) requires that the person transferred receive credit for service of the sentence 

being served in the State from which the person was 

transferred for time spent in the custody of the State to 

which the person was transferred. 

Paragraph 3 of Article 12bis establishes a default rule 

that a person transferred pursuant to Article 12bis, whatever that person’s nationality, shall not be prosecuted, detained, or subjected to any other restriction of personal liberty in the territory of the State to which that person is 

transferred for acts or convictions prior to that person’s departure from the territory of the transferring State. However, the State Party from which the person was transferred pursuant to Article 12bis may agree otherwise, in 

which case this default rule will not impair the agreement 

between the State from which the person is transferred 

and the State to which the person is transferred. 

Article 12 of the 2005 SUA Protocol makes conforming 

changes to Article 13 of the Convention to incorporate references to the new offenses. As amended, Article 13 would 

provide that States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of offenses set forth in Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter, and 

3quater by taking all practicable measures to prevent 

preparation in their respective territories for the commission of such offenses and by exchanging information and 

coordinating measures to prevent the commission of such 

offenses. Article 13 also would provide that any State 

Party shall be bound to exercise all possible efforts to 

avoid undue delay or detention of a ship, its passengers, 

crew or cargo when the passage of that ship has been delayed or interrupted due to the commission of an offense 

under Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater. 

Articles 13 and 14 of the 2005 SUA Protocol make conforming amendments to Article 14 and Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Convention to make those provisions consistent with the new articles and terminology added to the 

Convention by the 2005 SUA Protocol. These provisions 

govern information sharing under the Convention with respect to any offense or suspected offenses under the Convention. 

Interpretation and application 

Article 15 of the 2005 SUA Protocol provides that the 

Convention and the 2005 SUA Protocol shall be read and 

interpreted together as one single instrument. It further 

provides that Articles 1 to 16 of the Convention, as amended by the 2005 SUA Protocol, together with Articles 17 to 

24 of the 2005 SUA Protocol and the Annex, ‘‘shall constitute and be called together the Convention for the SupVerDate Aug 31 2005 06:22 Oct 02, 2007 Jkt 069118 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 6969 E:\HR\OC\TD008.XXX TD008

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pression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 

Navigation, 2005, (2005 SUA Convention).’’

Final clauses 

Article 16 of the 2005 SUA Protocol adds a new provision to the Convention, Article 16bis, which states that the 

final clauses of the 2005 SUA Convention shall be Articles 

17–24 of the 2005 SUA Protocol, and that references in the 

2005 SUA Convention to States Parties shall mean States 

Parties to the 2005 SUA Protocol. Articles 17 and 18 of the 

2005 SUA Protocol detail the requirements for signature, 

ratification, acceptance, approval, accession, and entry into 

force. Article 17 provides that the 2005 SUA Protocol shall 

be open for signature from February 14, 2006 to February 

13, 2007 and shall thereafter remain open for accession. 

(The United States signed the Protocol on February 17, 

2006.) Paragraph 2 of this article provides that States may 

express their consent to be bound by: signature without 

reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; signature subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval followed by ratification, acceptance or approval; or accession. 

Under paragraph 3, ratification, acceptance, approval or 

accession are to be effected by the deposit of an instrument 

to that effect with the IMO Secretary-General. Paragraph 

4 provides that only States that are parties to the Convention may become parties to the Protocol. Article 18 provides that the 2005 SUA Protocol will enter into force 90 

days after the date on which 12 States have expressed 

their consent to be bound. For each State that ratifies, accepts, approves, or accedes to the treaty after the deposit 

of the twelfth instrument, the 2005 SUA Protocol will 

enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit of that State’s instrument. 

Article 19 of the 2005 SUA Protocol allows any State 

Party to denounce the 2005 SUA Protocol at any time after 

the date on which it enters into force for that State. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of denunciation with the IMO Secretary-General and 

shall take effect one year, or such longer period as the 

State Party may specify in the instrument of denunciation, 

after the deposit of the instrument with the IMO Secretary-General. 

Amendments 

Article 20 of the 2005 SUA Protocol establishes the procedures for revising and amending the Protocol. The IMO 

Secretary-General will convene a conference to revise or 

amend the Protocol at the request of one third of the 

States Parties or 10 States Parties, whichever figure is 

higher. Any instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession deposited after entry into force of an 

amendment to the 2005 SUA Protocol is to be deemed to 

apply to the Protocol as amended. Pursuant to Article 16, 

these procedures would also apply to amendments to the 


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2005 SUA Convention. (Amendments to the Annex are 

dealt with in Article 22, discussed below.) 

Declarations 

Article 21 of the 2005 SUA Protocol outlines several permissible declarations with respect to the Annex incorporating other counterterrorism treaties into the Convention under Article 3ter. Article 21 allows any State Party 

that is not a party to a treaty listed in the Annex to declare that, in the application of the 2005 SUA Protocol to 

the State Party, that treaty shall be deemed not to be included in Article 3ter. As discussed above, Article 3ter of 

the Convention criminalizes the transport of a terrorist fugitive suspected of committing an offense under the Convention or any of the treaties listed in the Annex. However, this declaration shall cease to have effect as soon as 

such treaty enters into force for that State Party, which 

shall notify the IMO Secretary-General of such entry into 

force. In addition, if a State Party ceases to be a party to 

any of the treaties listed in the Annex, it may make a declaration as provided for in Article 21 with respect to that 

treaty. Finally, Article 21(3) allows a State Party to declare that it will apply the provisions of Article 3ter ‘‘in accordance with the principles of its criminal law concerning 

family exemptions of liability.’’ This provision makes allowance for some Sates that provide defenses under domestic 

law from prosecution for family members who otherwise 

could be charged with harboring fugitives. The Administration does not propose any declarations under Article 21 

to accompany its instrument of ratification. 

Annexed List of Treaties 

Article 22 of the 2005 SUA Protocol relates to the category of offenses covered under Article 3ter to the Convention, criminalizing the transport of terrorist fugitives. It 

establishes a mechanism for expanding the scope of the 

Convention by adding new treaties to the Annex. Paragraph 1 of Article 22 states that the Annex may be amended by the addition of relevant treaties that: are open to the 

participation of all States; have entered into force; and 

have been ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to by at 

least 12 States Parties to the 2005 SUA Protocol. After the 

2005 SUA Protocol enters into force, any State Party may 

propose such an amendment to the Annex by communicating it to the IMO Secretary-General in written form. 

The IMO Secretary-General will circulate any proposed 

amendment that meets the requirements of Article 22(1) to 

all members of the IMO and seek from States Parties to 

the 2005 SUA Protocol their consent to adoption of the 

proposed amendment. Article 22(3) declares that the proposed amendment shall be deemed adopted after more 

than 12 of the States Parties to the 2005 SUA Protocol 

consent to it by written notification to the IMO SecretaryGeneral. However, under Article 22(4), a State Party will 


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not be bound with respect to such additional treaty unless 

it deposits an instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval for that amendment with the IMO Secretary-General. An adopted amendment shall enter into force, for 

those States Parties that have consented to be bound, 30 

days after the deposit with the IMO Secretary-General of 

the twelfth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of the amendment. Thereafter, the amendment 

shall enter into force for any other State Party on the thirtieth day after the deposit of its own instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval. The amendment mechanism under Article 22 of the 2005 SUA Protocol ensures 

both that the scope of the Convention can evolve to encompass additional terrorist activity, as may be agreed by the 

international community, and that the scope of the Convention is not expanded with respect to a particular State 

Party without that State Party’s explicit agreement. 

Under this provision, the United States expects to deposit an instrument of acceptance of such an amendment 

if the treaty that is the subject of the amendment has entered into force for the United States with the advice and 

consent of the Senate. Otherwise, any amendment to the 

Annex that the United States proposes to accept would be 

submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. 

Depositary 

Article 23 of the 2005 SUA Protocol designates the IMO 

Secretary-General as the Depositary of the 2005 SUA Protocol and any amendments adopted under Articles 20 and 

22 of the 2005 SUA Protocol, and sets forth the duties of 

the Depositary. 

Official languages 

Article 24 of the 2005 SUA Protocol provides the six languages for the official texts of the 2005 SUA Protocol. 

THE 2005 FIXED PLATFORMS PROTOCOL

Article 1 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol defines 

the terms ‘‘1988 Protocol,’’ ‘‘Organization,’’ and ‘‘SecretaryGeneral’’ as the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located 

on the Continental Shelf, the IMO, and the IMO Secretary-General, respectively. 

Article 2 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol amends 

Article 1, paragraph 1 of the 1988 Protocol, to incorporate 

all of the substantive provisions of the 2005 SUA Convention, except those that address transport offenses and the 

shipboarding regime, which are not relevant in the context 

of fixed platforms. Specifically, Article 1, paragraphs 1(c), 

(d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and 2(a), Articles 2bis, 5, 5bis, and 7, 

and Articles 10 to 16, including Articles 11bis, 11ter, and 

12bis, of the 2005 SUA Convention shall apply mutatis 

mutandis to the offenses set forth in Articles 2, 2bis, and 

2ter of the 1988 Protocol, as amended by the 2005 Fixed 


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Platforms Protocol (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘2005 

SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol’’) where such offenses are 

committed on board or against fixed platforms located on 

the continental shelf. These provisions include, inter alia: 

the definition of new terms; the savings clauses regarding 

the effect of the Protocols on other rights, obligations and 

responsibilities of States Parties; the obligation to make offenses punishable under domestic law; the establishment 

of liability for legal entities; the guarantee of fair treatment; revisions to the extradition regime, including the 

provision circumscribing use of the political offense exception for offenses under the Convention; the framework for 

transfer of persons in custody; and the obligations to assist 

with criminal investigations, share information, and prevent preparation for the commission of offenses under the 

Convention. 

Because Article 2 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol 

incorporates provisions of the 2005 SUA Convention that 

were amended and added by the 2005 SUA Protocol, I propose that similar understandings be included in the U.S. 

instrument of ratification for the 2005 Fixed Platforms 

Protocol as are recommended above for the corresponding 

provisions of the 2005 SUA Protocol. These understandings 

read as follows: 

The United States of America understands that the term 

‘‘armed conflict,’’ as used in paragraph 2 of Article 2bis of 

the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005, and incorporated by Article 2 of the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 

Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental 

Shelf, does not include internal disturbances and tensions, 

such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 

other acts of a similar nature. 

The United States further understands that the term 

‘‘international humanitarian law,’’ as used in paragraphs 1 

and 2 of Article 2bis of the Convention for the Suppression 

of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 2005, and incorporated by Article 2 of the Protocol of 

2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, has the same substantive meaning as the 

‘‘law of war.’’

The United States of America further understands that, 

pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 2bis of the Convention 

for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 

Maritime Navigation, 2005, as incorporated by Article 2 of 

the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of 

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 2005, does not 

apply to: 


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(a) the military forces of a State, which are the 

armed forces of a State organized, trained and 

equipped under its internal law for the primary purpose of national defense or security, in the exercise of 

their official duties; 

(b) civilians who direct or organize the official activities of military forces of a State; or 

(c) civilians acting in support of the official activities 

of the military forces of a State, if the civilians are 

under the formal command, control, and responsibility 

of those forces. 

For a more detailed discussion of these proposed understandings, please refer to the corresponding discussion in 

the 2005 SUA Protocol section of this Overview. 

Article 3 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol makes 

several conforming amendments to Article 2 of the 1988 

Protocol. Article 3(1) restates subparagraph 1(d) of Article 

2 of the 1988 Protocol as the final subparagraph of that article, while Article 3(2) deletes subparagraph 1(e) of the 

1988 Protocol. Together with Article 3(2) of the 2005 Fixed 

Platforms Protocol, Article 3(3) removes the attempt and 

accomplice liability provisions from Article 2 (subparagraph 1(e) and subparagraphs 2(a) and (b)) of the 1988 

Protocol, because Article 2ter, a new provision added by 

the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol (discussed below), includes attempt and accomplice liability within a more comprehensive framework for accessory offense liability. Article 3(3) of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol retains subparagraph 2(c) of Article 2 of the 1988 Protocol as paragraph 2 of that article. 

Article 4 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol adds two 

new provisions, Articles 2bis and 2ter, to the 1988 Protocol 

to provide the same regime of liability for offenses under 

the 1988 Protocol, including accessory offenses, as those 

contained in Article 3bis and 3quater of the 2005 SUA 

Convention. These provisions provide that it shall be an offense to conduct such acts against or on a fixed platform, 

rather than on or against a ship as in the 2005 SUA Convention. 

Article 5 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol makes 

conforming amendments to Article 3 of the 1988 Protocol 

to incorporate the new offenses. Article 5(1) of the 2005 

Fixed Platforms Protocol amends Article 3(1) of the 1988 

Protocol to require each State Party to take such measures 

as necessary to establish jurisdiction over the offenses set 

forth in Articles 2, 2bis, and 2ter when the offense is committed either against or on board a fixed platform while it 

is located on the continental shelf of that State or by a national of that State. Article 5(2) of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol makes conforming amendments to Article 3, 

paragraph 3 of the 1988 Protocol in accordance with new 

terminology under the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol. Finally, Article 5(3) of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol 

makes conforming amendments to Article 3, paragraph 4 


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of the 1988 Protocol to require each State Party to take 

such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Articles 2, 2bis, and 

2ter, when the alleged offender is in its territory and it 

does not extradite the alleged offender to any of the States 

Parties that have established jurisdiction in accordance 

with the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol. Each of these 

amendments to Article 3 simply updates the provisions to 

incorporate the new articles provided by the 2005 Fixed 

Platforms Protocol. 

Interpretation and application 

Article 6 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol states 

that the 1988 Protocol and the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol shall ‘‘be read and interpreted together as one single 

instrument.’’ It further states that Articles 1 to 4 of the 

1988 Protocol, as revised by the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol, together with Articles 8 to 13 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol, ‘‘shall constitute and be called together the 

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 

Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental 

Shelf, 2005, (2005 SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol).’’

Final clauses 

Article 7 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol adds a 

new provision, Article 4bis, which makes Articles 8 to 13 

of the 2005 Fixed Platform Protocol the final clauses of the 

2005 SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol. It further states that 

references in the 2005 SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol to 

States Parties shall mean States Parties to the 2005 Fixed 

Platforms Protocol. Articles 8 and 9 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol describe the requirements for signature, 

ratification, acceptance, approval, accession and entry into 

force. Article 8 provides that the 2005 Fixed Platforms 

Protocol is open for signature from February 14, 2006 to 

February 13, 2007 and will thereafter remain open for accession. Paragraph 2 of this article provides that States 

may express their consent to be bound by: signature without reservation as to ratification, acceptance or approval; 

signature subject to ratification, acceptance or approval 

followed by ratification, acceptance or approval; or accession. Under paragraph 3, ratification, acceptance, approval 

or accession is to be effected by the deposit of an instrument to that effect with the IMO Secretary-General. Paragraph 4 provides that only States that are parties to the 

1988 Protocol may become parties to the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol. Article 9 provides that the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol will enter into force 90 days following the 

date on which three States have expressed their consent to 

be bound. However, the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol 

may not enter into force before the 2005 SUA Protocol enters into force. For each State that ratifies, accepts, approves, or accedes after the deposit of the third instrument 

and after the 2005 SUA Protocol enters into force, the 


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2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol will enter into force on the 

ninetieth day after the date of deposit of that State’s instrument. Article 10 allows any State Party to denounce 

the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol at any time after the 

date on which it enters into force for that State. Denunciation shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of denunciation with the IMO Secretary-General and shall take 

effect one year, or such longer period as the State Party 

may specify in the instrument of denunciation, after the 

deposit of the instrument with the IMO Secretary-General. 

Article 11 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol establishes the procedures for revising and amending the 2005 

Fixed Platforms Protocol. The IMO Secretary General will 

convene a conference of States Parties to revise or amend 

the Protocol at the request of one third of the States Parties or five States Parties, whichever figure is higher. Any 

instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession deposited after entry into force of an amendment to 

the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol is to be deemed to apply 

to the Protocol as amended. Pursuant to Article 7, these 

procedures would also apply to amendments to the 2005 

SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol. 

Article 12 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol designates the IMO Secretary-General as the Depositary of 

the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol and any amendments 

adopted under Article 11 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol, and sets forth the duties of the Depositary. Article 

13 of the 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol provides the six 

languages for the official texts of the 2005 Fixed Platforms 

Protocol. 

Implementing legislation 

Title 18, U.S. Code sections 2280 and 2281 implement 

the Convention and the 1988 Protocol. Legislation necessary to implement the 2005 Protocols is being prepared 

for separate submission to the Congress. 

The Departments of Justice, Homeland Security and Defense join in recommending that the 2005 Protocols be 

transmitted to the Senate at an early date for its advice 

and consent to their ratification, subject to the understandings previously described. 


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